Model-Free Detection of Cyberattacks on Voltage Control in Distribution Grids

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceedingArticle in proceedingResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Incorporating information and communication technology in the operation of the electricity grid is undoubtedly contributing to more cost-efficiency, controllability, and improved interfacing for the energy industry. However, inasmuch as this technology is promoting flexibility and convenience, its integration with the electricity grid is rendering this critical infrastructure inherently vulnerable to cyberattacks that have potential to cause large-scale and far-reaching damage. In light of the growing need for a resilient modernized smart grid, developing attack-detection mechanisms has become a pressing matter. In this work, we investigate the effectiveness of PASAD, a model-free method recently proposed by the cybersecurity community, in detecting various common types of cyberattacks on voltage control in distribution grids. The proposed approach is validated through a series of experiments using a low-voltage grid model based on a real distribution grid in Denmark. Experimental results show that, by monitoring raw controller and smart-meter data in real time, PASAD is capable of successfully detecting common cyberattacks such as denial-of-service, replay, and integrity attacks, thus contributing to a more resilient grid.
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Incorporating information and communication technology in the operation of the electricity grid is undoubtedly contributing to more cost-efficiency, controllability, and improved interfacing for the energy industry. However, inasmuch as this technology is promoting flexibility and convenience, its integration with the electricity grid is rendering this critical infrastructure inherently vulnerable to cyberattacks that have potential to cause large-scale and far-reaching damage. In light of the growing need for a resilient modernized smart grid, developing attack-detection mechanisms has become a pressing matter. In this work, we investigate the effectiveness of PASAD, a model-free method recently proposed by the cybersecurity community, in detecting various common types of cyberattacks on voltage control in distribution grids. The proposed approach is validated through a series of experiments using a low-voltage grid model based on a real distribution grid in Denmark. Experimental results show that, by monitoring raw controller and smart-meter data in real time, PASAD is capable of successfully detecting common cyberattacks such as denial-of-service, replay, and integrity attacks, thus contributing to a more resilient grid.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE ICC 2019
PublisherIEEE Communications Society
Publication date2019
Publication statusSubmitted - 2019
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes
ID: 291335893