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Explaining intra- and between country variations in attitudes to differences in pay in Scandinavia

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First draft...

Abstract

Introduction

The Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden are in existing literature *in general* often seen as being quite exceptional countries. The exceptionality argument can be based on a uniqueness in the institutional settings e.g. the universal/social democratic welfare regime and the industrial relations system (Addison, 2003; Christiansen, Petersen, Edling, & Haave, 2005; Ervasti, 2008; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990a; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990a; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990b; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990b; G. Esping-Andersen, 1999; C. A. Larsen, 2006; S. Svallfors, 2004; S. Svallfors, 1997). The exceptionality is also found on key quantitative measures of society success e.g. social- and institutional trust, level of happiness, Gini-coefficient and measures of social mobility (Ervasti, 2008; Larsen, 2013). On the attitudinal side; existing research has documented a high level of support for redistributive policies and thus an egalitarian distribution of *net incomes* as well as uniquely egalitarian attitudes towards the distribution of *gross pay* in the Scandinavian countries (Ervasti, 2008; Kjærsgård, 2012b; C. A. Larsen, 2006).

The aggregated picture revealed so far fits well with a description of the Scandinavians as a uniform mass of *homo socialdemocraticus* (G. Esping-Andersen, 1999; C. A. Larsen, 2006), with in time consistent attitudes legitimising their rather peculiar institutional and societal

arrangements known as the Nordic model¹. By *disaggregating* the measure of attitudes towards the distribution of gross pay; Kjærsgård (2012a) have shown that this *aggregated* picture of similarity hides significant differences between the Nordic countries. His results reveal that in the period 1992-2009, the Swedish responses follow a distinctly different pattern, than the Danish and Norwegian responses that are more alike. Kjærsgård's (2012a) conclusion is thus that in Sweden big *between* group differences exist and remain, but at the same time the *intra-group* differences are small, also in 2009. In Denmark and Norway the differences *between* groups are small (with notable exceptions), whereas the *intra-group* differences skyrockets in 2009 for a majority of the groups investigated (more so in Denmark, than in Norway)².

The point of departure of this article is the empirical results described above. More specifically we will try to explain, why the intra- and between country variations in attitudes to differences in pay in Scandinavia revealed by Kjærsgård (2012a) exist – and thus that Swedish attitudes seems to follow a distinctively different path than the corresponding Danish and Norwegian. Building on this premise the article will investigate which effect the perception of the actual level of income differences has on the norms of the Scandinavians to the just level of the same. This actually means focussing on three distinct dimensions: *firstly* the norms of, what actually is the just level of income differences in the country, *secondly* the perception of how big the actual differences are in society and *thirdly* what is the correlation between the two. Furthermore, following Kjærsgård (2012a) we will *firstly* disaggregate the analyses of on generations, social classes and political orientations. *Secondly* a time perspective will be maintained in all analyses. Result of 1992, 1999 and 2009 will thus be present in all analyses below. All in all this adds up to a very complex design, in spite really only investigating the relationship between two central variables. Before we continue, two important issues will be dealt with – the operationalization of the two central measures of the article and the definition of central concept continuously referred to throughout the article.

The two central measures – the *norms* about the just level of income differences in society and the *perception* of, how big these actually are – are both variables created by combining others

¹ And a range of other acronyms: “social democratic welfare regime”, “the Nordic welfare regime”, “the Nordic welfare state”, “the universal welfare state”, “the institutional welfare state” and in the Nordic settings simply “the welfare state” (Larsen 2013).

² The between group differences are in all cases measured by comparing the median values of the various social groups. The intra-groups differences are likewise measured by comparing the standard deviations of the various groups.

present in the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) Social Inequality modules II-IV, which are the datasets used here. The *first* norm-measure stems from the survey question: '*What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get...?*'. Using this a ratio is created for, how many times more a respondent thinks a chairman of a large national corporation ought to earn than either an unskilled factory worker, or a shop assistant. The *second* perception-measure is created in exactly the same manner, only *ought* is switched to *actually earn usually*.

A central concept throughout the article is what we denote as the *classic social-democratic polity*. It can be defined as an orientation by the majority in the political sphere towards trying to break down societal structures, prohibiting some groups in society from enjoying the same opportunities as others in society. This of course rests on an ontological foundation among a majority of the political actors and organised populace: they must actually envision these prohibiting societal structures to exist and be crucial for societal outcomes³. On the other hand, it must also be emphasised that a classic social-democratic polity is not to be understood as a consensus-culture. The structural ontological view also prompts the better-off groups in society to be equally group-conscious. The political cleavages in society are thus expected to separate social groups or classes having different material interests than other social groups in society. The antithesis to this ontology is obviously an individualistic approach, where societal outcomes are seen as a result of differences in individual effort, ability or luck. If such ontology is shared by a majority of the political actors and organised populace, cleavages do not follow materialistic group-interests and a classic social-democratic polity does not exist (Rothstein, 1998).

In the article it will be argued and shown, that the differences between Sweden and Denmark/Norway revealed by Kjærsgård (2012a) are not that surprising after all. Even if compared to other western countries the three Scandinavian countries seem quite alike, their political history of the last century and especially within the last two decades has been quite diverse. The overall argument of the article is that in *Sweden* the polity maintains and reproduces

³ The underlying assumption behind the notion is thus also a *positive* freedom concept – the state must help people, so they have freedom *to* something, they are not otherwise capable of. This is in opposition to a *negative* freedom concept, where freedom is understood as freedom *from* oppression.

Definition of positive and negative freedom: "*negative*" freedom hold that only the presence of something can render a person unfree; writers adhering to the concept of "*positive*" freedom hold that the absence of something may also render a person unfree (MacCallum, 1967).

perceptions and identities linked to a society dominated by social groups with different material interests and societal structures prohibiting equal opportunity. In many respects the Sweden has retained a classic social-democratic polity from “the golden age of welfare capitalism⁴” till today.

In Norway and even more so in Denmark on the contrary, the modern political identity of their populaces have not been dominated by this group-struggle at all. The national Danish and Norwegian narrative are ones of successful consensual welfare-societies, where the different social groups and interests in society in the past got together: alleviating the societies’ social problems, eliminating any real class differences and thus also the prohibiting societal structures perceived to exist in the past. The political struggle and cleavages in these two countries of the last decade has clearly been value-oriented and not traditional materialistically class-oriented. In opposition to Sweden the article thus finds clues that the Danish and Norwegian polities especially in the last decade have departed quite a lot from their classic social-democratic foundations.

The article starts out in the *following section* by giving a presentation of the modern political history of the Scandinavian countries, with a focus on the framing of group-differences and a structural perspective on society. One can look at political history through many different lenses; in the *third* section we will therefore present a theoretical model designed to be able to actually test the particular version of the political history presented here, and the implications on the development in attitudes of the Scandinavian to the norms of just income differences in society. To track the diversified development through time between Sweden and Denmark/Norway, a rather complex design will be needed. The design is to allow both within- and between country variations and changes over time on each of the three above mentioned dimensions. Then a *fourth* section presenting the results follows. *Lastly* a conclusion will come up and elaborate the results.

⁴ The period of general welfare state expansion in the western world lasting from, when the western economies recovered after WWII till the oil crises of the seventies – approximately 1950-1973(Flora, 1986).

A modern Scandinavian political history in relations to framing group-differences and a structural perspective on society

The rather common political history of the Scandinavian countries of, what is often known as the “golden age of welfare capitalism” is well-described (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990 29-33; Esping-Andersen 1999, 1-94). In all three countries the welfare state went through a period of rapid expansion in the period. One of the main normative goals behind this expansion was to insure the same possibilities - or positive freedom - for the working class as the well-off in society, by expanding social rights to all citizens⁵. The working class were obviously frontrunners in this endeavour, but a great deal of literature has by now revealed that the “social-democratic welfare regime” to a large extent is a result of compromises made between the workers and the peasants (G. Esping-Andersen, 1990b; Korpi, 1983b). In Sweden the workers movement was markedly stronger, than in Denmark and Norway though. In several periods the Swedish social democratic party managed to maintain around 50 percent of the votes, something which was not accomplished in either Denmark or Norway (see figure 2 below).

Our data does not cover so far back – we have datasets from 1992, 1999 and 2009; therefore we can only guess what imprint this context had on the Scandinavian identities, perceptions and attitudes several decades ago. It seems quite clear though, that in all three countries – and in other western countries for that matter – the class differences and structures prohibiting some groups more than others have been very salient and central in the political reality people in the societies faced. As the social rights gradually expanded, the welfare state in all three countries became part of the countries’ national narratives and thus the form of nationalism and national-identity dominating each country (Anderson, 1983; C. A. Larsen, 2008; Smith, 2003). In general the contextual imprint on the identities, perceptions and therefore attitudes of the Scandinavians in the three countries must therefore have been rather similar in this period in relations to attitudes to differences in levels of pay. Furthermore, being almost a tautological argumentation, it is clear that this imprint should have resembled, what is above defined as entailed in a classic social-democratic polity.

Because of the unique strength of the social-democratic party in Sweden, the Swedish working class have maybe, to a higher extent than in Norway and Denmark, been able to define and form

⁵ For a classic demarcation between civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1963).

the welfare state as they wanted, without having to compromise with the farmers. This could possibly have led the Swedes to understand their successful welfare state more as a result of the struggles of the working class, winning the class struggle and imposing progressive reforms against the will of the other classes in society. In Denmark and Norway the formation of the likewise successful welfare state is a result of “the cooperating democracy”, where the classes got together and created reforms benefitting everybody.


As we leap forward in time approaching the period covered by our data – 1992 and 1999 – one could argue that Denmark and Norway more and more depart from the classical social-democratic polity, while Sweden to a much larger extent retains it. Several clues indicating this can be found in existing research on differences between the Scandinavian countries in regards to how to handle issues of *gender*, *ethnicity* and *health policy*. Although these areas are distinctively different from each other and even more so from what we are investigating here – norms about just income differences – a similarity in conclusions between them are striking, and we propose here that the same pattern might be traced to our area.

In historical comparisons of all three areas, an overall conclusion is that while Norway and even more Denmark have departed from the path of Sweden as time has progressed. In Sweden a *structural focus* has been maintained in the policy formation and especially in the discourse concerning the nature of the problems related to these areas till today. In Norway and especially Denmark, the explanation for undesirable outcomes has more and more been framed in an *individualistic* manner (Borchorst & Teigen, 2010; Breidahl, 2012; Vallgarda, 2003). While the lower employment rates of ethnic groups in Sweden for example has been framed mainly as a result of discrimination among the employers, a skill-deficit etc., in Denmark on the other hand the outcome has been framed more as a result of lack of effort, a dependency culture among ethnic groups etc. A tendency can thus be identified, when investigating several areas with problems that could or could not be framed in a structural manner. It would not be surprising if an analogy of the same discursinal logic could be transferred to the view on legitimate differences in income levels, which, given the long history of the class struggle, clearly also is an area, that if framed by its very nature easily implies a structural view of society’s problems.

One thing is the *framing and discourse*, another clue supporting the idea, that Norway and Denmark gradually depart their original path shared with Sweden, can be found when looking at

the development among the relationship and strength of various *political actors*, who are prone to problematize the distribution of incomes in society and more importantly promote structural discourses (Korpi, 1983a). The strength and discursinal impact of a political actor is notoriously hard to quantify, and in interpreting any such measure one has to be cautious. Nevertheless, we will try and do so anyway. A first actor to look at could be the trade unions. Figure 1 below portrays the development in trade union density rates in the Scandinavian countries since 1960:

FIGURE 1. *Trade union density rates in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1960 – 2011.*




Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics).
Source: www.stats.oecd.org.

Figure 1 show that while the Danish trade union density rates peaked in 1983 and goes into a rapid decline after 1996, the Swedish rates peaks ten years later in 1993. The Norwegian rates on the other hand are quite stable, but never reach the Danish and Swedish levels. Trade union density rates are not a perfect measure of the discursinal power of the trade unions combined, nor do they say, which discourse the trade unions actually try to promote. But, if we see powerful trade unions and the trend in trade union density as an institution likely to correlate with the traditional social-democratic polity in at least Denmark and Sweden, the Danish decline after the 1983 fit the expectations of an evaporating structural perspective from early on. The figure does not reveal much about the power of a possible Norwegian classic social-democratic polity though. Figure 2 below therefore plots the voter share of the traditional political organ of the

workers-movement on the various general elections in the three countries – the social-democratic parties:

FIGURE 2. *Share of votes for the social-democratic party on general elections in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1890-2011.*




Results combined with data from from Statistics Denmark (DST), Statistics Norway (SSB) and Statistics Sweden (SCB).

Although not as easy to read as figure 1, figure 2 reveals that while the Danish and Norwegian labour parties started a gradual decline in their voting share already in the 1950's, the Swedish social democratic party have managed to keep an average voting share of above 40 % until the mid-nineties. While the Norwegian social-democratic voters' share from around 1970 till today seems to have stabilised around 35 %, the Danish social democrats seems to follow an almost linear declining trend, with no clear bottom value in sight. Again although one has to be cautious over-interpreting these results. The Swedish social democrats have maintained a much broader electoral appeal than their Norwegian and especially Danish counterparts. The swedes have until the mid-nineties and thus in their transition to a post-industrial society stuck both with their trade-unions and their social-democratic party. This is not the case in either Denmark or Norway. The Norwegians in the nineties still had a quite popular social-democratic party, while the Danish trade unions still had a quite strong grip on the workforce.

If these quantitative comparisons can be trusted as measures of discursinal power and impact of the trade unions and social democratic parties, the joker is still, whether the trade unions and social-democratic parties actually have promoted a structural based view of society and have helped maintain the classic social-democratic polity?

This leads us towards describing the events after the turn of the century. Around this time, extreme right-wing parties in Denmark and Norway – respectively the Danish peoples party and the Norwegian Party of Progress – both gained success. This success was furthermore both electoral-wise but also in setting a strict immigration-critical agenda for the political debate. Perhaps even more importantly, both parties’ electoral base was mainly the old social-democratic working-class. In the Danish election studies have on this background concluded the 2000’s was a decade dominated by value- and especially immigrant-oriented politics, not old class-politics. In the same decade an economic boom was experienced, with a corresponding plummeting unemployment rates reaching levels as low as the 1960’s, before especially in Denmark and Sweden coming to an abrupt stop with the financial crisis in 2008:

FIGURE 3. Annual harmonised unemployment rates in percentage of working age population 15-64 for Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1983-2011.



Source: www.stats.oecd.org.

The social democrats in Denmark slowly and reluctantly followed suit accepting tougher immigration policies, but also a version of the ruling right-wing government (in)famous “tax-stop”. The only labour market related “structural” problem, which was really continuously on the agenda in the period, was the lower employment rates of the “non-ethnic” Danes. This problem framed as described above as a result of a lack of effort and motivation among the immigrants,

which ultimately was seen as a problem with their culture. On the political front in Denmark it seems safe to say, that the classic social-democratic polity more or less disappeared in the haze of the immigrant question and economic boom of the 2000's. The social-democrats did not help the situation, but played along exactly the same discourses.


The Danish traditional trade unions in the same way also quickly lost power in this period. When the leaders of the social-democrats and the liberal party one night in 1998 agreed on a significant reform of the early-retirement scheme, this marked the beginning of the end of the old corporative tradition in Denmark. Up to this point all major labour market related reforms had seen the major actors on the labour market included in both the decision-making process, but also often the implementation of reforms. Other tragedies also hit the traditional unions though. In 2002 across-trade unemployment insurance funds (tværfaglige a-kasser) was legalised, thereby a traditional main channel of recruitment of new members were weakened for the trade unions. In 2006 closed shop agreements were forbidden, diminishing the monopolistic power of the trade unions versus various employers. On the workplaces the employees were encouraged to use yearly appraisal conversations (MUS-samtaler), with the boss, to settle matters of pay or working environment instead of turning to the union representative. All this coincided with a rise in memberships of the alternative "yellow" unions, explicitly a-political, and the decline of membership of almost all traditional unions (see figure 1). No matter what, this substantial weakening of the power of the traditional trade unions have not helped maintain a structural focus in relations to attitudes to income differences in Denmark.

The situation in Sweden on the other hand has if not opposite from Denmark, then a much less severe turn from the classic social-democratic political culture. *Firstly* of all the social-democrats managed to stay in power uninterruptedly from 1994-2006 (see also figure 2). *Secondly* and more importantly a main theme of the Swedish general elections has remained of economical character. The agendas of the social-democrats and the main right-wing party - the liberal conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet) - on these issues have remained clearly distinguishable on each election. *Thirdly* the major parties in Sweden and the media in general have refused to buy into the same kind of immigrant critical rhetoric seen in Denmark and Norway. The immigrant critical party in Sweden – the Swedish democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) – only barely managed to gain parliamentary representation for the first

time in the election of 2010. This is quite different from the Norwegian and Danish experience. The Norwegian progress party have since the election in 2005 been the second largest Norwegian party, while the Danish peoples party have since the election in 2001 been the third largest Danish party. There is thus good reason to believe that the political identity and consciousness of the swedes to a high extent also in the 2000's have been defined in terms of traditional economic cleavages, rather than value- and especially immigration-oriented cleavages as in Denmark and Norway.

In 2008 the financial crisis struck the western world. The Danish boom ended abruptly and the Norwegian oil fund lost 1/3 of its value on the global stock- and bond markets. Sweden on the other hand came through the crisis with fewer bruises, and quickly regained a by western standards very impressive growth rate (see also figure 3 above):

FIGURE 4. Annual real-GDP growth rates for Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1950-2011.



Source: www.stats.oecd.org.


The general economic trends are less interesting for our purpose, than the sudden media-attention to *firstly* the salaries, bonuses and profits in the top of the hierarchy in the financial sector, and *secondly* the immense political power and importance the big financial institutions had gained on the whole economy, and the economic situation of everyday people. In other words the question about the distribution of resources and economic power in society clearly came on the main

media agenda in all western- and also Scandinavian countries. We must therefore expect to see some kind of financial crisis shock on *perceptions and attitudes* in all Scandinavian countries. But, our guess is the Swedish respondents were better prepared, already having a clear conceptual framework and a political identity linked to the exactly the type of political questions brought about by the financial crisis – a conceptual framework and political identity long gone in Norway and Denmark. In the following section, we will elaborate this hypothesis in a theoretical model, which will then be operationalized and tested.

A theoretical model - The impact of a traditional social-democratic polity on group-consciousness (salience and a structural perspective)

The main theoretical thesis of the article is; that the reason Kjærsgård (2012a) finds the Swedes portraying a remarkably different pattern from the Danes and Norwegians on attitudes to difference in levels of pay, has to do with Denmark and Norway gradually and especially the past decade departs from the social-democratic polity of “the golden age of welfare capitalism”, while Sweden more or less retains the path. Furthermore the assumption is that the polity, which is a *macro* level phenomenon, in feedback effects translates into the political identity and thus the perceptions and attitudes of people in society at the *micro* level. Therefore the thesis of this article is furthermore, that we can measure the change in the orientation of the polity by relating the development in *norms* about just income differences, with the development in the *perceptions* of the actual income differences. And, investigate the development in the relation between the two variables over time, disaggregated on three central potential cleavages in society. *Figure 5* below outlines the causal reasoning behind this, which will then be elaborated below. *Figure 6* then deduces hypothesis regarding, which attitudes and perception to expect from different groups of Scandinavians at various points in time, by combining the contextual description above with the theoretical model of figure 5:

FIGURE 5. *Proposed model for the connection between the organisation and functioning of the polity, group-consciousness and the political identity-, perceptions- and attitudes of people in society.*



In the *first box* from the top in figure 5, we have the macro level concept of polity, which as defined in the introduction is a kind of ideological and ontological superstructure of society. This superstructure is assumed through feedback-mechanisms to influence the political identity of people in society (meaning both perceptions and attitudes). Surely this superstructure is also dependent on, and changes by receiving inputs and legitimacy from the people of society (Easton, 1979) – the assumption is thus not that the causal-arrow goes only from the macro to the micro level imposing a kind of false consciousness on the population-sheep. Instead the assumption is some kind of symbiosis or interdependence between the two levels. For our purpose here the analytically interesting arrow is the macro→micro level feedback arrow. What is assumed important about the polity for our purpose is that two crucial dimensions are defined here. *Firstly*, which political cleavages define the polity at a given point in time, and *secondly* whether the polity promotes an individualistic or structural view on these cleavages and society in general. These two dimensions seems likely to be highly correlated and in the polity-version defined in the introduction – the classic social-democratic polity – the cleavages follow materialistically defined group-interest and a structural view on society or ontology is promoted.

The *second box* shows the assumed “effects” at certain point in time on the structure of political identities regarding just income differences of the populace, by being exposed to different types of polities (again effects is not the most precise word to use, since we rather assume correlation). The idea is that these “effects” are traceable on three dimensions:

- 1) On how the *norms* regarding the just income differences themselves are structured on social groups in society.
- 2) The pattern on how the big the actual income differences are *perceived* to be, structured on the same social groups.
- 3) The relationship or correlation between 1 and 2.

In a country having a strong social-democratic polity at a given point in time (the lower left box), we therefor assume the following:

- 1) *Norms*: high degree of group internal consistency, big differences between groups. This was the result of Kjærsgård (2012b) regarding Sweden, being the empirical inspiration for the article.

- 2) *Perception*: high degree of salience and knowledge in various social groups general
 - a. The financial crisis is only a shock to selected weaker groups.
- 3) *Relationship between perception and norms*: weak correlation, especially for highly mobilized groups.

The short version of, my ideas of, why we expect these results in a country with a classic social-democratic polity at a given point in time, is as based on the high degree salience and strong political identity and affiliation with a given social group. The salience is a result of the political cleavages focusing exactly this dimension, while the corresponding structural ontology encourages people to see themselves as a group with different interests, than other groups in society.

Because of this strong group affiliation, people internally in a social group will receive, trust and share certain information sources. In a different social group, other information sources will be received, trusted and shared. This leads to a high degree of group-internal similarities in *perception* of the actual degree of income differences in society, but not necessarily a big degree of similarity between-groups. Furthermore, because of the salience of the subject – we will not expect a big degree of deviation from the group median. People will not answer, on what is “on top of the head”, but know exactly what to answer such a question (Zaller, 1992).

It is easy to make an analogy of this argumentation, to the *norms* about just income differences. Svallfors (2004) finds and argues that the intra-class attitudinal differences in Sweden are much larger, than in other countries, where the actual class differences are much bigger. Svallfors (2004) explains this paradox by arguing that the class differences are both more institutionalised and politicised in Sweden, than in the other countries.

If we turn to the relationship between *perception* and *norms*; the argumentation is a direct methodological consequence of Zaller’s (1992) description of the meaning of salience. In all three surveys, we are using as data in our empirical investigation here (ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009), the respondents where *firstly* asked about their perception of the average pay of various occupations, and *afterwards* their view on the just level of the same i.e. norms. What is “on top of the head”, when answering what the just income differences are, is thus clearly the perception of actual differences. If the subject is already salient in the mind of the respondent’s political

identity before answering the questionnaire, he/she will have a conceptual framework, with which to separate the two. We thus expect to see a much weaker correlation between the two in a country with a classic social-democratic polity at a given point in time. Furthermore this correlation should be even weaker for highly mobilised groups within such a country.

In figure 6 below these theses are combined with the contextual development in the Scandinavian countries described above.

Results

We now turn to test our model; we start out by the aggregated differences between the countries in the three surveys:

TABLE 1. *Aggregated attitudes to the perception of the level of differences in levels of pay, attitudes to the just level of the same and correlation between the two in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.*

	1992	N:	1999	N:	2009	N:
Denmark						
- Perception of the level of differences in levels of pay (a)			2.53 (0.134)	1440	3.81 (0.522)	1348
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)			2.00 (0.083)	1418	2.00 (0.326)	1302
- Correlation between a and b (c)			.380 (0.013)	1398	.273 (0.015)	1298
Norway						
- Perception of the level of differences in levels of pay (a)	3.33 (0.051)	1394	2.98 (0.055)	597	4.55 (0.544)	1395
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	2.00 (0.035)	1329	2.13 (0.032)	936	2.33 (0.195)	1381
- Correlation between a and b (c)	.410 (0.015)	1326	.427 (0.023)	563	.137 (0.009)	1373
Sweden						
- Perception of the level of differences in levels of pay (a)	3.00 (0.090)	668	3.87 (0.200)	1010	4.57 (1.36)	1038
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	1.92 (0.063)	622	2.08 (0.103)	967	2.22 (0.180)	1003
- Correlation between a and b (c)	.419 (0.021)	618	.228 (0.013)	946	0.042 (0.004)	998

^a The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. Shown are medians and standard deviations in brackets.

^b Created the same way as index a, but on the basis of the items measuring, what the different occupations ought to earn, instead of what the respondents think they actually earn. Shown are medians and standard deviations in brackets.

^c Shown are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets.

Although table 1 can be regarded as portraying quite preliminary results, quite interesting things are revealed. If we start out describing the development in the median levels of *perception* of the difference in levels of pay (a), a financial crisis shock clearly seems to be present in the 2009 results. Especially in Denmark and Norway both the medians and the corresponding standard deviations explode in 2009. In Sweden the median level is also markedly bigger in 2009, than in 1999 – the change is not bigger than the one from 1992 to 1999 though. The Swedish results of 2009 could instead of a shock suggest just a steadily rising tendency. On the other hand, the Swedish standard deviations in 2009 are very large (see also the appendix for disaggregated versions of this measure on generations, class and political vote on last election).

As it was revealed in Kjærsgård (2012,), the aggregated *norm* medians (b) hides significant results. As also Kjærsgård (2012b) revealed, there are almost no change in either of the countries in their aggregated medians over time. The Swedish standard deviations rise steadily over the period, while the corresponding Danish and Norwegian explode in 2009 – again this seems a sign of a financial crisis effect in these two countries in 2009. Recalling the results of Kjærsgård (2012a) also presented in the introduction, this rise in Danish and Norwegian aggregated standard deviations is a result of a sharp rise for all social groups investigated, while the corresponding Swedish aggregated rise is a result of a sharp rise for only a few selected groups⁶.

Lastly table 1 also portrays the correlation between the two in each country in each survey. What we see is that in all countries the correlation is much weaker in 2009, than in the previous surveys. This is maybe not that surprising. *Firstly* the financial crisis may have sparked revelations of the actual level of difference in pay in society, but norms are probably and hopefully more sluggish. *Secondly* it corresponds with the Zaller (1992) argument described above: when a subject is salient, you are more prone to tap opinions in a survey, than just what's "on top of the head", that you would otherwise tap. It should be noticed, that the Swedish correlation in 2009 is much weaker, than the corresponding Norwegian and especially Danish.

The aggregated results, although preliminary, fit the expectations quite well. We see a financial crisis shock on the *perception* of the level of income differences in all countries, but the shock is less severe in Sweden. In the appendix we even see, that some social groups' standard deviations do almost not rise at all from 1999 to 2009, which is not the case for any Danish or Norwegian social group. We know from Kjærsgård (2012b) that in aggregated median terms the *norms* of the same are much more stable, also in the face of the financial crisis. But recalling Kjærsgård (2012a) the Swedish pattern disaggregated is quite different from the corresponding Danish and Norwegian. We also see weaker *correlations* in all countries, when the salience of the subject rises with the financial crises. The correlation is also here markedly weaker in Sweden in 2009, than in the two other countries – the level of salience seems even higher. On the other hand, the

⁶ Elder/retired, the above higher secondary educational group, former and non-members of trade unions, the voters of the liberal conservatives and lower- and upper middle class (Kjærsgård 2012b).

rather strong correlation in all countries in 1999 and especially 1992 suggest, that the level of salience of the subject was rather low in all countries – also Sweden prior to the 2000’s.

As before the aggregated results of table 1 can potentially hide important results on the meso-level (Kjærsgård 2012a). We will therefore now present three tables – one for each country – disaggregating and further investigating, what the correlations above actually signify. We start out with the results of Denmark in table 2 below. In each survey we estimate three hierarchical regression systems. One where we disaggregate the bivariate correlation on generations, one on social class and one on political vote on last election. In each of the hierarchical systems we estimate three models:

TABLE 2. *Estimating group variations in attitudes to the just level of differences in pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009 in Denmark.*

	1999			2009		
	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.380****	0.381****	0.926****	0.273****	0.272****	0.184****
- Born 1980 and thereafter		-0.483	2.349****		-0.049	-1.729
- Born 1970-1979		-0.056	2.326****		-0.745	-2.144**
- Born 1960-1969		-0.269	1.786****		-0.330	-3.840****
- The baby boom generation		-0.262	1.399****		-1.410	-2.010**
- War and pre-war generations (ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- Born 1980 and thereafter*b			-0.835****			0.169****
- Born 1970-1979*b			-0.744****			0.147****
- Born 1960-1969*b			-0.620****			0.429****
- The baby boom generation*b			-0.520****			0.035
- War and pre-war generations*b (ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.385****	0.383****	0.262****	0.281****	0.280****	0.390****
- Salaried		0.504*	-1.318****		0.705	2.149**
- Intermediate employee'		-0.072	-0.277		0.339	-0.986
- Small employers and self-employed		0.229	-0.606		0.434	0.396
- Lower sales and service		-0.114	0.259		0.218	1.141
- Lower technical		-0.290	0.518		0.360	-0.351
- Routine (ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- Salaried*b			0.467****			-0.173****
- Intermediate employee'*b			0.040			0.170***
- Small employers and self-employed*b			0.209**			0.023
- Lower sales and service*b			-0.129***			-0.118
- Lower technical*b			-0.218****			0.179
- Routine*b (ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.358****	0.357****	0.180****	0.241****	0.239****	0.341****
- The Social Democrats		-0.130	-1.074****		-0.961*	-0.352
- The Social Liberal Party		0.117	-1.268**		0.540	0.304
- The Conservative Party		0.504*	-0.761**		-0.750	-0.574
- The Socialist Peoples Party		-0.561**	-0.020		-2.197****	0.497
- The Danish Peoples Party		0.016	-1.449****		-1.556**	-0.255
- The Liberal Party (ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- The Social Democrats*b			0.281****			-0.078**
- The Social Liberal Party*b			0.390****			-0.044*
- The Conservative Party*b			0.332****			0.008
- The Socialist Peoples Party*b			-0.112**			-0.328****
- The Danish Peoples Party*b			0.449****			-0.187***
- The Liberal Party*b (ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)

Dependent variable: Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001.

N (1999): generation-models=1398, class-models=1010, political party-models=1063. N (2009): generation-models=1298, class-models=1209, political party-models=1048.

Table 2 portrays an array of results. For our purpose we will only comment on a selection – especially the interactions. In accordance with Kjærsgård’s (2012b) results albeit with different methods, we see very few instances, where there are actually significant differences in group-means on the dependent variable⁷. Only the voters of the socialist peoples party consistently score much lower, than the voters of the liberal party, which is the reference group. In 2009 a voter of the socialist peoples party is estimated on the average to score more than 2 lower on the scale of the dependent variable, than a voter of the liberal party, controlled for the effect of the perception of the actual level of difference in pay. This is a huge effect and suggests that if there are cleavages to be found on the matter of just income differences in Denmark, then they clearly follow political orientations.

It is much more interesting to follow the interactions though, since they describe the level of salience of the question of just income differences within various social groups. In general the group differences in the correlations are much larger in 1999 than 2009. This is exactly as expected, by an evaporated group-consciousness and classic social-democratic polity. Voters of the socialist peoples party, the salariat class and maybe the two eldest generations seem to be the only groups left with a much weaker correlation than the other respondents in 2009. This means they have more salient views on the matter, and possibly a political identity suited for the developments revealed by the financial crisis. In 1999 on the other hand, we see much clearer pattern: The correlation gets stronger with increasing age, and the lower classes have a weaker correlation than the higher ones – suggesting a kind of economic class-consciousness not gone in 1999.

The result is thus again in good accordance with the expected. Denmark maintains a quite strong aggregated correlation also in 2009. Only very few selected groups - the socialist peoples party, the salariat class and maybe the two eldest generations - are able to have as weak correlations as the Swedish aggregated bivariate correlation. This is a clear sign that the Danes, although shocked by the revelations of the financial crisis - as seen in the *perception* measures – do not have a classic social-democratic polity and corresponding political identities, with which to interpret and grasp these revelations. We now turn our attention to Norway. Because Norway,

⁷ In contrast to Kjærsgård (2012b), the group-differences are here ”controlled” for the perception of the actual level of differences in pay. This probably makes it even more difficult to achieve significant differences from the reference group.

but not Denmark participated in ISSP 1992, we are able to include a longer time span in the analysis. If our assumptions are correct, we should see results quite similar to the Danish ones:

TABLE 3. *Estimating group variations in attitudes to the just level of differences in pay in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009 in Norway.*

	1992			1999			2009		
	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.410****	0.409****	0.389****	0.427****	0.407****	0.354****	0.137****	0.138****	0.255****
- Born 1980 and thereafter		-	-		0.196	0.050		0.615	-0.527
- Born 1970-1979		0.411****	0.019		0.312***	-0.026		0.045	1.266*
- Born 1960-1969		0.210***	0.106		0.337****	-0.001		-0.145	1.547**
- The baby boom generation		0.078	0.098		-0.016	-0.065		-0.489	1.334**
- War and pre-war generations (ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- Born 1980 and thereafter*b			-			0.054			-0.130****
- Born 1970-1979*b			0.104**			0.115			-0.137***
- Born 1960-1969*b			0.028			0.114*			-0.191****
- The baby boom generation*b			-0.106			0.018			-0.190****
- War and pre-war generations*b (ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)				0.430****	0.434****	0.233***	0.146****	0.146****	0.016
- Salaried					0.127	-0.648**		1.009	-1.274*
- Intermediate employee'					0.100	-0.564**		0.804	-1.212
- Small employers and self-employed					-0.127	-0.779**		0.081	-0.803
- Lower sales and service					-0.029	-0.548*		1.386	-2.746***
- Lower technical					-0.135	-0.298		3.201***	2.591**
- Routine (ref.)					(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- Salaried*b						0.267***			0.201****
- Intermediate employee'*b						0.228**			0.157****
- Small employers and self-employed*b						0.223**			0.010
- Lower sales and service*b						0.180*			0.338****
- Lower technical*b						0.062			0.000
- Routine*b (ref.)						(ref.)			(ref.)
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.446****	0.442****	0.365****	0.444****	0.462****	0.417****	0.107****	0.107****	0.009
- The Labour Party		0.065	0.200		0.253**	0.105		1.583	-0.621
- The Party of Progress		0.483***	0.244		0.306**	0.194		1.263	1.561
- The Conservative Party		0.757****	-0.148		0.484****	-0.005		1.100	0.694
- The Christian Democratic Party		0.415***	-0.027		0.290**	0.447		0.404	0.415
- The Centre Party		0.193	-0.137		0.293*	0.764*		1.266	-0.882
- The Socialist Left Party (ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- The Labour Party*b			-0.042			0.045			0.283**
- The Party of Progress*b			0.064			0.034			0.022
- The Conservative Party*b			0.241****			0.178*			0.069
- The Christian Democratic Party*b			0.123			-0.064			-0.007
- The Centre Party*b			0.088			-0.169			0.233*
- The Socialist Left Party*b (ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)

Dependent variable: Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001.

N (1992): generation-models=1326, political party-models=893. N (1999): generation-models=563, class-models=505, political party-models=447. N (2009): generation-models=1373, class-models=1261, political party-models=1061.

Table 3 reveals that in 1992-1999 there actually seems to be significant differences between generations and voters of various political parties on attitudes to the just level of income differences, controlled for perceptions of the same. Especially three right-wing parties thus show a significantly higher mean value than the other parties. This could indicate that the Norwegian political spectrum to a greater extent than in Denmark was defined by the matter in the nineties. In 2009 this has all broken down though, and all group-differences are insignificant (except the lower technical class). A dramatic shift thus occurs between 1999 and 2009 in Norway.

What are really interesting are the interactions though. Here the general result is that we in 2009 see no groups having a markedly weaker correlation than the others. The small employers and self-employed have a somewhat stronger correlation, but only marginal differences exist between the rest – and none comes close to the level of the low aggregated Swedish correlation in 2009. In 1999 there was a weak tendency of a stronger correlation, with rising class. These results even more clearly than in Denmark suggests that the Norwegians although shocked by the financial crisis, did not anymore have a classic social-democratic polity. In 1999 there are only very weak signs and in 2009 there are no social groups with group consciousness and a structural perspective mobilised in their political identities. The ultimate test for on our model is Sweden, who is supposed to show a very different pattern than Denmark and Norway, because they are assumed to a large extent to have maintained their classic social-democratic polity:

TABLE 4. *Estimating group variations in attitudes to the just level of differences in pay in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009 in Sweden.*

	1992			1999			2009		
	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions	Bivariate	Trivariate	With interactions
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.419****	0.420****	0.494****	0.228****	0.221****	0.292****	0.042****	0.041****	0.287****
- Born 1980 and thereafter		-	-		-1.250***	-0.550		-2.822****	1.270**
- Born 1970-1979		0.246	-0.021		-0.884****	-0.457		-2.044****	1.299**
- Born 1960-1969		-0.049	0.805****		-0.692***	-0.860**		-1.922***	0.585
- The baby boom generation		0.111	0.000		-0.892****	0.001		-1.529***	1.369****
- War and pre-war generations (ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- Born 1980 and thereafter*b		-	-		-	-0.136		-	-0.268****
- Born 1970-1979*b			0.123			-0.053			-0.161***
- Born 1960-1969*b			-0.248****			0.070			-0.062
- The baby boom generation*b			0.039			-0.129****			-0.165****
- War and pre-war generations*b (ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)			(ref.)
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)				0.226****	0.222****	0.126****	0.041****	0.041****	0.019****
- Salarial					0.624**	0.251		1.550***	-0.209
- Intermediate employee'					0.391	-0.347		1.065	-2.305****
- Small employers and self-employed					1.678****	-1.442***		2.802***	-2.531***
- Lower sales and service					0.074	-0.977**		0.581	-0.756
- Lower technical					-0.331	-0.299		0.142	-1.081
- Routine (ref.)					(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)
- Salarial*b						0.063*			0.142****
- Intermediate employee'*b						0.122***			0.362****
- Small employers and self-employed*b						0.474****			0.545****
- Lower sales and service*b						0.207***			0.134****
- Lower technical*b						0.010			0.134**
- Routine*b (ref.)						(ref.)			(ref.)
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)	0.338****	0.325****	0.717****	0.192****	0.192****	0.280****	0.231****	0.228****	0.040
- The Centre Party		-0.605	0.917		0.539	-1.691**		0.061	-0.305
- The Liberal Party		-0.397	1.010		0.447	0.663		1.567*	-0.998
- The Liberal Conservatives		0.092	2.147****		0.470	0.924**		1.480**	-0.633
- The Social Democrats		-0.528	0.613		-0.212	0.494		-0.097	-0.630
- The Left Party		-	-		-1.213***	0.383		-1.159	-0.740
- The Christian Democrats (ref. 1992-1999)		(ref.)	(ref.)		(ref.)	(ref.)		-	-
- The Green Party (ref. 2009)		-	-		-	-		(ref.)	(ref.)
- The Centre Party*b			-0.375**			0.338****			0.029
- The Liberal Party*b			-0.340**			-0.039			0.312****
- The Liberal Conservatives*b			-0.507****			-0.083			0.259****
- The Social Democrats*b			-0.261**			-0.124**			0.091
- The Left Party*b			-			-0.266****			0.032
- The Christian Democrats*b (ref. 1999)			(ref.)			(ref.)			-
- The Green Party*b (ref. 2009)			-			-			(ref.)

Dependent variable: Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. N (1992): generation-models=618, political party-models=349. N (1999): generation-models=946, class-models=869, political party-models=626. N (2009): generation-models=998, class-models=937, political party-models=825.

Table 4 reveals quite large intergenerational differences in mean values on the dependent variable. The differences for between classes and political parties are smaller, than what could be expected: Kjærsgård (2012a) actually found quite large differences here. This must mean that the differences in the groups mean values to the just level of differences in pay in Sweden to a large extent is caused by different perceptions of how big these differences actually are – at least in 1992-1999. As Kjærsgård (2012a) showed, the younger generations are the most egalitarian, and the small employers and self-employed are clearly much less egalitarian, than the rest. The comparison of Swedish voters is “hampered” by the fact that most swedes vote for either the social democrats or the liberal conservatives. There are in each case very few respondents voting for other parties, and it is hard getting significant effects. The results do indicate that the voters of the liberal conservatives are less egalitarian, than most other voters in 2009, while the left party (Vänsterpartiet) was more egalitarian than others in 1999. These are of course expected differences.

The big question is, whether the interaction effects are different in Sweden, than in Denmark and Norway. The general result is yes, but the tendency is not overwhelmingly different from the Danish results. In all interaction-models of table 4 some groups have a much weaker correlations than others. In 1992 it is especially the 1960-69 generation and to some extent the liberal conservatives; in 1999 it is the two lowest classes and the salariat and the left party; in 2009 it is the youngest generation and the routine workers and to some extent the non-right-wing parties. In 1999 and 2009 the groups, who portray the weakest correlations, are more or less the ones you would expect to the matter of income distribution as a most salient part of their political identity in a classic social-democratic polity – the left-wing voters and the lower classes. The fact that this group also includes the youngest generation suggests that the classic social-democratic polity has a grip on the new generations and therefore also the future in Sweden.

The results of 1992 at first glance seem peculiar tough, while it is totally different groups – the liberal conservative voters and the 1960-69 generation – that portray the highest degree of salience in their political awareness to the matter. By further consideration the results are not that peculiar at all. In the early nineties, Sweden was hit by a severe economic crisis with exploding unemployment rates, a negative GDP-growth, enormous interest rates and finally a drastically devaluated currency (figure 3 & 4). In figure 1 & 2 we also see that both the trade union density

rates in Sweden and the voters share of the social democrats started a steady decline in exactly this period. The 1992 result can thus be seen as a consequence of a right-wing awareness and revolt against the failed policies of the social democratic led governments of the eighties.

Conclusion

This article has developed, presented and tested a theoretical model linking the development of a *macro level* phenomenon – the characteristics of the polity – with the political identities (attitudes and perceptions) of the Scandinavians. Starting with the macro-level phenomenon of the characteristics of the *polity*; this article has argued that the Scandinavian countries, in spite rather origins in their political history, in recent two decades have followed a quite distinct path. It was argued that it looks like Sweden more or less has maintained the original path and the classic social-democratic polity. Denmark and Norway on the other hand in the last two decades departed more and more from this original path and the classic social-democratic polity.

In the empirical analyses we tested the claim that this diversified development in the characteristics of the polity, could be traced at the *micro level* on the development in the *political identities* of the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes. We expected to track these changes in the political identities on three dimensions, disaggregated on three potential main-cleavages in society – generations, social class and political party affiliation: the *norms* regarding the level of just income differences in society, the *perception* of the actual level of the same and the *correlation* between the two.

The empirical results in general fitted the expectations quite well, although surprising results appeared as well. The *aggregated* analysis of table 1 revealed that the Swedes departed somewhat from the Danes and Norwegians. The financial crisis shock on *perceptions* of the level of income differences appeared more severe in Denmark/Norway than Sweden. In the former countries both the medians and standard deviations of all groups exploded comparing the 2009 results with the 1999-results. In Sweden this was only the case for some of the groups investigated. We also know from Kjærsgård (2012a & b) that *norms* of the Swedes developed differently than in Denmark/Norway. In Sweden we consistently see big differences in medians between groups, but internal consistency within groups. The opposite is the case in Denmark/Norway in 2009. The *correlation* in all countries is clearly weakened in 2009, being very low in Sweden in this year. Because this correlation is argued to be the best measure of a

normative salience of the matter of just income differences in the political identities of the respondents, the analyses proceeded disaggregating these on social groups in the three countries over time.

The results showed that in *Denmark* a few groups actually seem having maintained a high/Swedish degree of salience of the matter throughout the period. This is especially the voters of the socialist peoples party, the salariat class and to some extent the eldest generation. In 1999 the tendency was even stronger incorporating other lower classes. This result actually hints the remnants of the existence of a classic social-democratic polity in Denmark even in 2009, where a socialist party is still able to mobilize political identity and consciousness to question of income differences in society.


In *Norway* on the contrary only in 1999, it is possible to identify weak signs of a tendency for the matter to be a little more salient in the lower classes, than in the higher. There are no other clear cleavages in correlations in either 1999 or 2009, where even the weak differences between the classes have evaporated. Norway, not Denmark thus seems to be the prime example of an evaporated classic social-democratic polity.

Sweden fulfills the expectations and present quite clear class differences in salience in 1999 and 2009. Here the traditional working class, in the form of the lower social classes and the non-right-wing political parties, clearly have stronger independent norms regarding the just income differences, than other groups. Interestingly the youngest generation of 2009 both score a lower median, than other generations and have weaker correlation, than the other generations. The youngest generation thus does not seem to follow the Norwegian lead, but instead are politically socialized towards the same political-economic cleavages and the classic social-democratic polity, as the older generations.

Appendix

Denmark

FIGURE 7-8. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for different generations in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): War and pre-war generations=297, the baby boom generation=462, Born 1960-1969=351, Born 1970-1979=271 and Born 1980 and thereafter=59.

N (2009): War and pre-war generations=246, the baby boom generation=398, Born 1960-1969=297, Born 1970-1979=209 and Born 1980 and thereafter=198.

FIGURE 9-10. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for 6 different social classes in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1999): Salariat=413, Intermediate employee=232, Small employers and self-employed=57, Lower sales and service=115, lower technical=97, Routine=128.

N (2009): Salariat=530, Intermediate employee=275, Small employers and self-employed=62, Lower sales and service=151, lower technical=70, Routine=165.

FIGURE 11-12. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for people voting for various political parties on the last general election in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): The Social Democrats=367, The Social Liberal Party=68, The Conservative Party=117, The Socialist Peoples Party=141, The Danish Peoples Party=75, The Liberal Party=324.

N (2009): The Social Democrats=283, The Social Liberal Party=70, The Conservative Party=103, The Socialist Peoples Party=211, The Danish Peoples Party=114, The Liberal Party=306.

Norway

FIGURE 13-14. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for different generations in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1992): War and pre-war generations=426, The baby boom generation=429, Born 1960-1969=321, Born 1970-1979=218.

N (1999): War and pre-war generations=143, The baby boom generation=158, Born 1960-1969=144, Born 1970-1979=127.

N (2009): War and pre-war generations=183, The baby boom generation=416, Born 1960-1969=302, Born 1970-1979=276, Born 1980 and thereafter=218.

FIGURE 15-16. Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for 6 different social classes in Norway in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1999): Salariat=202, Intermediate employee=103, Small employers and self-employed=54, Lower sales and service=79, lower technical=30, Routine=67.

N (2009): Salariat=575, Intermediate employee=306, Small employers and self-employed=56, Lower sales and service=164, lower technical=78, Routine=102.

FIGURE 17-18. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for people voting for various political parties on the last general election in Norway in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.


N (1992): The Labour Party=281, The Party of Progress=79, The Conservative Party=224, The Christian Democratic Party=63, The Centre Party=132, The Socialist Left Party=160.

N (1999): The Labour Party=130, The Party of Progress=66, The Conservative Party=123, The Christian Democratic Party=58, The Centre Party=32, The Socialist Left Party=64.

N (2009): The Labour Party=367, The Party of Progress=225, The Conservative Party=292, The Christian Democratic Party=37, The Centre Party=81, The Socialist Left Party=72.

Sweden

FIGURE 19-20. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for different generations in Sweden in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1992): War and pre-war generations=286, The baby boom generation=214, Born 1960-1969=140, Born 1970-1979=28.

N (1999): War and pre-war generations=282, The baby boom generation=301, Born 1960-1969=199, Born 1970-1979=185, Born 1980 and thereafter=43.

N (2009): War and pre-war generations=182, The baby boom generation=308, Born 1960-1969=204, Born 1970-1979=181, Born 1980 and thereafter=163.

FIGURE 21-22. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for 6 different social classes in Sweden in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1999): Salariat=317, Intermediate employee=188, Small employers and self-employed=52, Lower sales and service=183, lower technical=67, Routine=118.

N (2009): Salariat=399, Intermediate employee=184, Small employers and self-employed=37, Lower sales and service=173, lower technical=68, Routine=115.

FIGURE 23-24. *Perceived difference in levels of pay^A for people voting for various political parties on the last general election in Sweden in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.*



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1992): The Centre Party=40, The Liberal Party= 53, The Liberal Conservatives= 118, The Social Democrats= 134.

N (1999): The Centre Party=32, The Liberal Party= 49, The Liberal Conservatives= 165, The Social Democrats= 256, The Christian Democrats= 80, The Left Party= 89.

N (2009): The Centre Party=60, The Liberal Party= 74, The Liberal Conservatives= 265, The Social Democrats= 329, The Left Party= 63, The Green Party= 64.

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