Country Report
Denmark

Jan. 31, 2007

By Dr. Rikke Andreassen with Prof. Birte Siim.

Part of the VEIL - Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies
Danish session Rikke Andreassen & Birte Siim.

All rights reserved. Copyright © 2007 by Rikke Andreassen.
# Table of content

A) The State of the Art.........................................................................................................................4
Veiling in relation to identity formations.........................................................................................4
B) Institutional context........................................................................................................................6
B 1. Government structure ..............................................................................................................6
B 2. Migration regimes ......................................................................................................................7
B 2.1. Status of immigrants..............................................................................................................7
B 2.3 Acculturation – Assimilation..................................................................................................8
B 2.4. Multiculturalism recognition..................................................................................................8
B 2.5. Marginalization ......................................................................................................................8
B 2.6. Laws regulating migration.....................................................................................................9
B 2.7. Definition of country.............................................................................................................12
B 3. Citizenship regimes ................................................................................................................12
B 3.1. Political citizenship .............................................................................................................12
B 3.2. Naturalization laws .............................................................................................................13
B 4: Church (religious communities-state relation(s))......................................................................14
B 4.1 and B 4.2 ................................................................................................................................14
B 4.3 (See C 4)................................................................................................................................14
B 4.4..................................................................................................................................................14
B 4.5. (See C 5)................................................................................................................................15
B 4.6..................................................................................................................................................15
B 4.7..................................................................................................................................................15
B 4.8..................................................................................................................................................15
B 4.9..................................................................................................................................................16
B 5: Gender regimes ........................................................................................................................16
5.1. Political representation.............................................................................................................16
5.2. Work force participation..........................................................................................................17
5.3. Welfare system........................................................................................................................18
5.4. Education ................................................................................................................................19
5.5. Equal opportunity measures/laws............................................................................................19
5.6. Gender mainstreaming ..........................................................................................................19
B 6. The Women’s Movement(s):....................................................................................................20
B 7. Individual rights (women’s rights) and vs. cultural group rights..............................................23
B 7.1..................................................................................................................................................23
B 7.2..................................................................................................................................................24
B 8. Antidiscrimination law .............................................................................................................24
B 8.1.1. EU-Directives ...................................................................................................................26
B 9. Nationhood, national identity ................................................................................................26
C. Religion, society and population (context)..................................................................................27
C 1. Religious demography.............................................................................................................27
C 2. Religious Geography................................................................................................................28
C 3. Religious Observance................................................................................................................29
C 4. Religious Change ....................................................................................................................29
C 5. Religion and Power ................................................................................................................30
C 6. Religion and Gender................................................................................................................30
C 7. Muslim Population....................................................................................................................31
A) The State of the Art

It is characteristic for the Danish academic research into the field of veils that it is very limited. Despite the fact that veils have been heavily debated in Denmark, there is very little research done in the field, therefore there is also little documentation providing us with knowledge of veil practices and debates about veiling in Denmark. Muslim veiling is related to issues about culture and religion, and it is remarkable that there is very limited research on the implications of the fact that Denmark has an Evangelical Lutheran state religion (the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church, i.e. Folkekirken) and of the meaning of religion for migrants in general and migrant women in particular. It is also characteristic for the current research that most of it has not included Muslim women’s voices. The research done can roughly be divided into two categories: Veiling in relation to identity formation and veiling related to the labor market and citizenship.

Veiling in relation to identity formations

An important representative for the first category is Ph.D. and psychologist Dorthe Staunæs. She has published the book *Køn, etnicitet og skoleliv* (2004). Staunæs works from a social constructivist perspective (gender and ethnicity as performances) and uses interviews and observations to get narratives which challenge classical and dominant tales of gender and ethnicity. She is drawing upon intersectionality in her understandings of identity formations and has analyzed narratives about veiling in that perspective. She looks at clothing, the display or hiding of bodies, as practices which constitute subjectivity. The veil is, like other clothing, a garment which offers certain spaces or options for identity formations. In her book, she describes and interviews a 13-year old student, Selma, who wears a veil. Because of her veil, Selma is understood in a certain way by the official Denmark, where the veil is interpreted as female oppressive and as non-Danish practice. Contrary to that understanding, Staunæs shows how Selma’s usage of veiling does not simply fit into the official reading of veiling. As a child, Selma’s veil allowed her to form a certain subjectivity which gave access to the child communities. Now in grade seven, in a public Danish school, Selma’s veil functions as a protection. Via her veil she signals that she is not sexually accessible. That has several benefits in a Danish public school where the male students’ pawing on female students is an integrated part of everyday school life. In Selma’s situation, the veil is a tool to freedom, namely freedom from male hands on her body. Furthermore, Selma is able to engage in friendships and activities she might not other wise have been engaged in. Her veil is therefore her tool into the
Danish community. Staunæs shows how veils must be interpreted multifaceted, and not simply as symbols of female oppression and distances from the Danish community.

Scholar Camilla Elg recently completed her Ph.D. degree from the University of Aalborg with a dissertation titled *Unge kvindelige indvandrere og stil* (2006). She is looking the clothing, body and space. Her idea is that clothing does not only have symbolic meaning it also plays into bodily experiences and experiences of bodily differences. She is aiming at describing various immigrant women’s use of veils as part of their bodily experiences and as markers of bodily difference. She has interviewed a number of immigrant women and theoretically her project is placed within the field of post-structuralism and social constructivism.

Ph.D. and historian Rikke Andreassen’s research on veiling places itself within the field of social construction, intersectionality, and post-colonialism. Andreassen analyzes how narratives of veiling play into construction of whiteness and Danish nationality. Her take on veiling is not the identity formation of the veiled women but the identity formation of white, Christian, Danish women who construct themselves and their nation in opposition to the veil. See for instance her article “Det islamistiske kvindesyn står i skærende kontrast til vores kvindesyn’. Nyhedsmediernes konstruktioner og intersektioner af køn, race, integration og ligestilling fra 1970’erne til 2000’erne”, *NordNytt*, Dec. 2005). Her Ph.D. dissertation *The Mass Media's Construction of Gender, Race, Sexuality and Nationality* (University of Toronto, 2005) also has a chapter on veiling, i.e. on media debates about veiling in Denmark.

**Veiling related to the labor market and citizenship**

In this category, scholars have looked at how veiling has functions in relation to the labor market. Anthropologist Christina Bækkelund Jagd is currently writing her dissertation at the University of Copenhagen on institutional discrimination. She is looking at Danish-Somali women on the labor market. She finds that much of the discrimination that Danish-Somali women experiences in the public social service system is caused because of their veils. Her dissertation should be finished January 2007, and might be titled *Nødvendigheden af et inkluderende medborgerskab*.

Ph.D. and anthropologist Yvonne Mørk at Roskilde University has touched upon veiling in her work on gender, ethnicity and multiculturalism. She has looked at veiling as a means of controlling women’s sexuality. Her work is within the field of gender studies, and she has focused on the tension between gender equality and multiculturalism. She has published *Bindestregsdanskere. Fortællinger om køn, generationer og etnicitet* (1998),

Professor and political scientist Birte Siim has done research for the Danish Commission of Power and Democracy on the Political Mobilization of Migrant women. Her work focuses on the tensions between citizenship, gender equality and multiculturalism and on the relation between multiculturalism and feminism. She has looked at migrant women’s organizations in a case-study of women as leaders of voluntary associations in civil society. The study includes interviews with reformed Muslims refugee groups, organized in the Danish umbrella organization, Kvinderådet (the Women’s Council), with practicing Muslim women leaders of ethno-and trans-national associations, e.g. Dialog 2 and VISION, some of whom wore a veil. The publication was titled: Medborgerskabets udfordringer – etniske minoritetskvinders politiske myndiggørelse. Magtudredningen (2003). She has published “Den multikulturelle udfordring til velfærdsstaten” in Nordic Institute for Women’s and Gender Research, NIKK, no. 2-2006, “The challenge of recognizing Diversity from a perspective of Gender Equality” in CRISPP, Critical Revue on International Social and Political Philosophy (forthc. 2007) and “Dilemmas of Citizenship: Multiculturalism and Gender Equality” (forthc. 2007).

B) Institutional context

B 1. Government structure

Denmark has a parliamentary democracy with only one chamber called Folketinget, with 179 seats – two seats are reserved for members from Greenland and two for members from the Faeroe Islands. Formally the main power is in Parliament and the Government must step down if it does not have the support of the majority. The current government coalition, which has since the last election of November 2001, is a Centre-Right coalition government of the Liberal Party [Det Liberale Venstre] and the Conservative People’s Party [Det Konservative Folkeparti]. It is a minority government depending on the parliamentarian support of the nationalist populist anti-migration Party, the Danish People’s Party [Dansk Folkeparti].
1.2. Denmark has a tradition for a high degree of local democracy based upon decentralisation of power to elected municipalities and regional counties. Till January 1, 2007 there were 270 municipalities and 14 regional counties. A structural reform has reduced the number of municipalities from 270 to 98 and created 5 regional councils; the latter is without the power to tax.

1.3. Denmark has a representative election system. There are presently seven parties in Parliament and the Social Democratic Party has traditionally been the biggest party but it now competes with the Liberal Party about being the biggest party. The Social Democratic Party, The Socialist People’s Party [Socialistisk Folkeparti], the Social Liberal Party [Det Radikale Venstre] and the small Red Green Alliance [Enhedslisten] presently forms the opposition.

1.4. No single party has been able to gain a majority in Parliament and Denmark has had either minority or coalition governments. This is the basis for a consensus model of governance between the political parties, which often includes representation of all involved parties (popular corporatism).

1.5. Denmark has a civic citizenship model based upon a high degree of participation of the population in voluntary associations. The country is relatively homogeneous in relation to religion, language and ethnicity, and the political culture is characterised by a cultural monism.

**B 2. Migration regimes**

**B 2.1. Status of immigrants**
The status of immigrants has been constantly debated during the previous decade. Several people (e.g. the oppositional parties in Parliament, i.e. left wing parties) argue that immigrants are treated as second class citizens; others (e.g. the current rightwing government and their support party) are arguing that they are treated fairly, i.e. not being discriminated against. So it is hard to factually determine the status of immigrants. The answer will depend too much on whether the person answering is in favor of tight immigration rules or less tight immigration rules. The Institute of Human Rights have argued that immigrants do not have the same status of living, same rights, or receive same treatment as white, ethnically Danish citizens.

An illustration of the status is that there is a difference between ‘being Danish’ and holding Danish citizenship. Immigrants and their descendants who have gained Danish citizenship
have therefore not necessarily become ‘Danish’. They are referred to as ‘immigrant’, ‘foreigners’, ‘ethnic minorities’, etc. Hence, legal citizenship does not equate inclusion in the national community.

B 2.3 Acculturation – Assimilation
Integration initiatives, and ways of speaking about immigrants and their descendants, have been closely interlinked with ideas of assimilation. However, the word assimilation has not been used much in the Danish discourse. Instead the term ‘integration’ is used. Assimilation tends to have a negative connotation, whereas ‘integration’ is more positively connotated. In March 2006, the Danish government changed the immigration laws. Immigrants therefore now have to sign a declaration in which they oblige themselves to respect "Danish values”. They must sign a declaration where they sign that they acknowledge a numbers of specified ‘Danish’ values and rules for the Danish society. ["Lov om ændring af integrationsloven og udlændingeloven (Integrationskontrakter, erklæring om integration og aktivt medborgerskab, skærpede betingelser for tidsubegrænset opholdstilladelse, uddannelsespligt for unge nyankomne udlændinge, sygeopfølgning over for sygemeldte introduktionsydelsesmodtagere m.v.].

B 2.4. Multiculturalism recognition
See B 2.3. and B 2.7.

B 2.5. Marginalization
Overall, immigrants and descendants are marginalized compared to ethnically Danish citizens in Denmark. Danes have high activity rates and Danish women have the highest employment rates in the EU. The country presently has the lowest unemployment rate in 30 years. This contrast with the relatively higher unemployment rate of migrants from non-European countries, especially women. A recent report from the Danish Welfare Commission confirms that unemployment of migrants is one of the biggest welfare problems and that the biggest gap is between the high labor market participation of Danish majority women and the low labor market participation of migrant women from non-European countries. This is both due to a lack of education of unskilled migrant groups and to discrimination of well-educated migrants. However, the level of marginalization differs
depending on which national group of immigrants one looks at. Generally, immigrants and
descendants have a higher unemployment rate, higher crime rate, lower educational rate, lower
political participation rate, and worse financial situation than ethnically Danish citizens. But reality
is more complex than these figures. Two illustrative examples of this complexity are: Pilipino
women have a higher employment rate than ethnically Danish men and women, they are educated
and make money, yet they are marginalized and cannot be characterized as ‘integrated’. The high
crime rate for immigrants’ descendants is not higher than for ethnically Danish citizens when the
crime rate is corrected for difference in demography (the descendent population is much younger
than the ethnically Danish population), employment rate and educational rate.

B 2.6. Laws regulating migration

The following paragraphs provide a brief historical description of the legal and political context
framing immigration to Denmark during the previous decades. During the 1970s, Denmark began
receiving refugees from outside Europe through the UN refugee quota system. The arrival of these
refugees was well-organized and controlled. The arrival of refugees from outside Europe marked a
shift in the racial and ethnic composition of the refugee pool; previously, the refugees had mainly
been from Eastern Europe. With these new groups of refugees, immigrants became visually
distinguishable; immigrants became visible minorities. In the beginning of the 1980s, a large
number of so-called spontaneous refugees began arriving at the Danish borders. These were people
outside the UN quota system who had found their way to Denmark on their own in order to apply
for asylum. The majority of these were refugees from the war between Iraq and Iran, but Lebanese,
Palestinian, and Tamil refugees also arrived.

During the late 1960s and 1970s, foreign workers arrived in Denmark, due to the
demand of labor caused by the economic boom. These were primarily from Turkey and former
Yugoslavia but also from Pakistan. From 1965-1967, the numbers of Turkish and Yugoslavian
foreign workers were less than 500 a year, but this increased to 5000-7000 per year by the end of
the decade. The number of Pakistanis who obtained residence permits was about 2000 in 1971 but
had increased to about 3000 in 1975.³

Foreign workers’ immigration to Denmark was regulated by the 1952 Alien Act,
which allowed non-Danish citizens to arrive in Denmark and find a job before applying for a
working permit. This changed from mid-1960s, when non-Danish citizens were only allowed to
enter the country if they had money enough to provide for themselves and for a potential return
In 1970, the legislation was changed, and the Danish Parliament passed the first law aimed at regulating foreign workers. Working permits had been previously issued in Denmark, now the permits had to be obtained before arrival. In November 1970, a freeze on all first-time working permit applications was introduced that lasted throughout the winter of 1970/71. In 1973, because of the oil crisis, the Parliament passed a formal freeze on further foreign workers and immigration to Denmark, except for citizens from the Nordic countries or members of the European Economic Community (EEC, later EU). At the time of the immigration freeze, there were ca. 15,000 guest workers in the country, the majority from Turkey and Yugoslavia.

Immigration laws regulating arrivals in Denmark changed several times during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. One of the most important changes was the passing of a new Alien Act in 1983. This new act went granted residence permits to Convention and de facto refugees, making family reunification a legal right, and granting free access to asylum procedure. The Danish Refugee Appeals Board [Flygtningenævnet] was established as part of the new act to handle complaints regarding asylum decisions made by the Danish Immigrant Service [Direktoratet for Udlændinge]. The Alien Act was passed under the center-right government [Venstre, Konservative, Centrum Demokraterne and Kristeligt Folkeparti] that held power from 1982 to 1988. All members of the Parliament, including the opposition, voted in favor of the Act except the 12 members representing the extreme right-wing Progressive Party [Fremskridtspartiet]. The Alien Act of 1983 received international attention for its liberal stance, which gave Denmark a reputation for providing a very humanitarian approach to refugees.

The liberal approach of the 1983-Alien Act was modified in 1985 with the introduction of the so-called ‘manifestly unfounded procedure’. This amendment allowed the Danish Immigrant Service [Udlændingestyrelsen, now Udlændingeservice] to speedily view applications and to deny asylum, as well as close off the option for appealing a refusal of asylum, if the grounds for applying for asylum were ‘manifestly unfounded’. Another amendment was introduced in 1985 that enabled Danish authorities to deny entry to people without a valid passport and valid visa if the person was arriving from a country considered safe. It also became possible to issue fines to airlines transporting passengers without proper documents. From 1992 it was possible to fingerprint asylum seekers who had been denied asylum. In 1994, an amendment made it easier to expel asylum seekers from Denmark once their asylum had been denied.

Denmark experienced a general growth in the numbers of asylum seekers from the mid-1980s. In number of asylum seekers culminated in 1984 and 1985 with 8698 and 9299
spontaneous refugees respectively. After this, the number declined and remained stable around 3000-4000 refugees annually until the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{11} The war(s) in the former Yugoslavia caused arrivals of new refugee groups in the early 1990s: Ca. 9000 asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia arrived annually in Denmark during 1992 and 1993. First they were granted temporary residence permits. In 1994, when several thousand temporary permits ran out, the majority of refugees were accepted as \textit{de facto} refugees and gained permanent residence permits. This led to a peak in the number of granted asylum seekers in 1995, when altogether 20,402 asylums were granted. Of these, 16,185 were granted to people from Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{12}

Immigration became a heavily debated topic from 1997, when the then-Social Democrat-led government appointed the former mayor of Aarhus, Social Democrat Thorkild Simonsen as Minister of the Interior. In 1998, Simonsen introduced a new immigration and integration law. The law demanded that a person in Denmark who wished to unite with a spouse should have lived in Denmark for at least six years, and a spouse residing in Denmark needed be able to financially support his/her incoming spouse as well as to provide adequate housing for the two of them. Asylum seekers were to receive a so-called introduction payment, which was lower than the basic social welfare payment \textit{kontanthjælp}. This introduction payment was later declared against international law and therefore suspended.\textsuperscript{13}

In 2001, the Conservative [\textit{Konservative}] and Liberal [\textit{Venstre}] government, with the support from the Danish People’s Party [\textit{Dansk Folkeparti}] came to power. A central part of their election campaign had been arguing in favor of tightened immigration laws. In 2002, they passed a law stating that family unification was only possible for people over 24 years of age. The law also established that in order for a couple to be united in Denmark, they had to prove that their connection to Denmark was stronger than their connection to any other country \textit{tilknytningskrav}. They also declared that one had to have stayed in Denmark for seven years in order to obtain permanent residence; previously, it was five years. In 2003, the regulation governing a couple’s connection to Denmark was changed, mainly because a large number of ethnic Danes with foreign partners were caught in the rule. From 2003 a person who had lived in Denmark for more than 28 years could unify with a spouse in Denmark regardless of if their connection \textit{tilknytningskrav} to Denmark.\textsuperscript{14} Denmark currently has one of the tightest immigration laws in Europe.
B 2.7. Definition of country
There is an on-going struggle for defining Denmark as either a multicultural country or monocultural country. This debate is twofold: It is debated whether Denmark currently is or is not a multicultural country; and it is debated whether Denmark in the future should be or should not be a multicultural country. The term multicultural is in these debates understood as a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious, and the term ‘not multicultural’ is understood as ‘Danish’, i.e. white, ethnically Danish, and Christian. The terms assimilation or mono-cultural are not used in the debates.

B 3. Citizenship regimes

B 3.1. Political citizenship
This distinction between being Danish and holding Danish citizenship is connected to the history of the Danish *Indfødsretten*, which was introduced in 1776. *Indfødsretten* literally translates as ‘the native’s right’ or ‘the right of the internally born’. Even though it has often been used as a synonym for Danish citizenship [*statsborgerskab*], the two concepts are not identical.

The reason behind the establishment of *Indfødsretten* was the growing sentiment of Danish nationalism, partly directed against the high number of German immigrants who occupied positions in the Danish royal administration and in Danish educational institutions in the eighteenth-century. The fall of the German Johann Friedrich Struenseee was central to the passing of *Indfødsretten*. Struenseee came to the Kingdom of Denmark in 1769 as King Christian VII’s (1766-1808) personal doctor. Christian VII, generally agreed to be schizophrenic, was unable to rule, and Struenseee quickly became his closest associate and trusted friend. Struenseee managed to change the legislative processes which enabled him to ruled the Kingdom from 1770-1772. In this period, he passed Enlightenment-inspired reforms as freedom of the press, freedom of expression, prohibition of torture, etc. Struenseee and Christian VII’s wife, Queen Caroline Mathilde, quite openly had an affair and a child together, which most of the Danish population viewed negatively. On January 17, 1772, Struenseee was arrested and he was publicly executed in April 1772. The group that came to power after Struenseee, the so-called Høegh-Guldberg government, designed and passed *Indfødsretten*, which stated “that all positions in our [the King’s] states, court, church, military, and civil services, of great or of little responsibility, cannot and must not be given to other
people than to the country’s natively born children.”\textsuperscript{18} *Indfødtretten* served to limit the number of Germans in the administration and to secure Danish control of the state apparatus. *Indfødsretten* defined native Danes as people possessing the “quality…of being born in our [the King’s] states.”\textsuperscript{19}

This definition of belonging was based on the principle of *jus soli*, also called citizenship of the soil, which meant that only people born in the territory of the Danish Kingdom could receive *Indfødsretten*. Internationally, *Indfødsretten* was exceptional. There were examples of other European laws granting limited groups of people the rights to certain positions, but *Indfødsretten* was the first to grant all official positions to a group of people solely based on where they were born.\textsuperscript{20} The growing Danish sense of nationality, which culminated in *Indfødsretten* in 1776, illustrated a break from a traditional, historical understanding of nationality being born with the French revolution of 1789.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1849, Denmark received its constitution [*Grundloven*], and *Indfødsretten* was written into it. In the process, *indfødsretten* was revised to incorporate aspects of *jus sanguinis*. *Jus sanguinis*, citizenship of blood, refers to citizenship and status obtained based on parental status. In 1849, *Indfødsretten* was no longer mainly concerned with the question of who gained access to state positions but rather with who were desired as Danish citizens. *Indfødselsretten* in the Constitution emphasized that it was only people with Danish parents who could obtain *Indfødsretten*. A reform in 1898 made the status of *Indfødsretten* dependent on the male head of household. Children automatically received their fathers’ citizenship, and wives automatically obtained that of their husbands.

**B 3.2. Naturalization laws**
The linguistic phrasing of *Indfødsretten* was important. It stated that *Indfødsretten* was “a quality [egenskab]” received by being born within the Kingdom. People who obtained naturalization did not obtain that quality, i.e. they obtained the same rights as the Danish internally born citizens but they did not become Danish. This might explain the distinction between being Danish – implying possessing the “quality” to be born in Denmark by Danish parents – and holding Danish citizenship.

Non-Danish citizens can apply for Danish citizenship if they have lived in Denmark for at least seven years or, for refugees who have been granted asylum, for seven years after having received their residence permits (2007). Citizens from other Nordic countries need only to have lived in Denmark for two years before applying, and people who have been married to a Danish citizen for at least three years only need to have lived in Denmark for four years. The number of
naturalizations was about 3,000–4,000 annually during the 1980s. In the early 1990s the number increased to about 5000 annually, and has remained at that level throughout the decade. The number of people actually applying for Danish citizenship was much lower than it potentially could have been. Only about six percent of people who were entitled to apply for citizenship chose to do so. On average 42 out of 1000 non-Danes gained citizenship during the last few years (2003); these numbers illustrate that only a small percentage of potential applicants have actually applied for citizenship. The low number of applicants might be explained by the Danish prohibition of dual citizenship, which has forced people to give up their old citizenship in order to receive Danish citizenship.

B 4: Church (religious communities-state relation(s))
(See also session C. Religion, society and population for themes related to B 4).

B 4.1 and B 4.2 (See also C 5)
Denmark is defined as a Protestant Lutheran country according to its Constitution. The Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is a state church and has special privileges according to the Constitution. The Constitution also grants freedom of religion but the hierarchy of religions is not questionable. The Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is therefore quite powerful. It is integrated into several institutions in Denmark. In the Danish public schools, Christian studies are integrated into the teaching at the elementary level, and preparation for Christian confirmation is integrated into the teaching at the junior level. Students can be excused from Christian studies if their parents do not want them to attend such studies. In Denmark, everybody is registered with name, address and personal number, and the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is in charge of this registration. This means that all parents, regardless of religious observation or lack of, must register their children at the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church.

B 4.3 (See C 4)

B 4.4
The status of religious communities has not really influenced legal conflicts about veiling. The legal conflicts about veiling have been centered around employment in areas of retail and media, and these conflicts have not been directly linked to the status of religious communities. (See also C 5)
B 4.5. (See C 5)

B 4.6
There are Christian private schools as well as Muslim private schools in Denmark. All private schools in Denmark receive state funding. The schools are partly funded by public subventions – a private school receives 75 percent of the expenses of an average public school – and partly by tuition. Since the amount of tuition often accounts for more than 25 percent of an average public school’s budget, most private schools have been financially stronger than public schools. The division of students at these schools is not always religious. In Copenhagen, ca. 25 percent of all children attend private schools. Here many middle- and upper class ethnically Danish students, who are not very Christian, attend Christian private schools, as these are known for having a high level of education. Many Muslim children with resourceful parents attend Christian private schools because they are known for their high level of education, high percentage of ethnically Danish students, and strict discipline. All private schools must fulfill certain educational requirements, i.e. make their students learn the minimum standards of knowledge defined in the law of education [Folkeskoleloven].

B 4.7
The Danish Constitution grants freedom of religion. It also states that Denmark is an Evangelical Lutheran country, and that the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church has special privileges (see section C). The Constitution does not say anything specific about minority rights, but several international laws that Denmark has signed guarantee these rights (see section B8). There has not been a post-colonial critique or revision of the Danish Constitution of 1848. Neither has there been a revision in relation to gender, sexuality, or religion.

B 4.8
The theological education for Christian Lutheran pastors and theologians takes place at the Danish universities, and is – as all higher university education – free. There is not a similar official and state funded education of Islamic theologians. Muslim activists, e.g. the organization Critical Muslims, have argued in favor for getting an Islamic theologian education at the Danish universities.
Denmark participated in the 30-years war (1618-1648), i.e. the war between Protestants and Catholics. The conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism has been the most serious conflict in relation to religion in Denmark. Since the reformation (1532 in Denmark), the dominating status of Protestantism has not been seriously challenged. Some nationalist politicians have argued, and continue to argue, that Christianity is threatened by Islam. The newspaper *Jyllands-Posten’s* publishing of drawing of the Prophet Muhammad has been seen as a conflict between Christianity and Islam by some; others have viewed the conflict differently, e.g. as an illustration of minority discrimination (see D 5).

**B5: Gender regimes**

The Nordic countries are perceived to belong to the same model of welfare, citizenship and gender. During the last 30 years, women have increasingly been included on the labor market and in the political elite. Gender equality has become part of the Danish citizenship model, and the present government defines gender equality as a key aspect of Danish ness and Danish values. Gender equality and women’s rights have become politicized in the struggle for control over migration, and the discourse of gender equality has increasingly become a means to legitimize discrimination and stigmatization of ethnic/racial and religious minorities.

**5.1. Political representation**

In the Nordic countries, there has been a general development from a small to a large minority of women in the political elite during the last 30 years, and the political representation of women has generally been higher at the national than the local level. After the last Danish elections in 2001, women made up 38 percent of all political representatives at the national level; 27 percent at the regional level, and 27 percent of representatives in the municipalities. Only Sweden has a higher representation of women in Parliament, with 45.3 percent. In Denmark, the number of women Ministers peaked (so far) during the Centre-Left government in 1998 with 35 percent; whereas the current Centre-Right government has ca. 30 female ministers. Women’s representation in the European Parliament is 35.5 percent.

The political opportunity structure has been open to women, and in contrast to Norway and Sweden, there are today no Danish political parties that have retained affirmative
actions. The Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People’s Party both adopted affirmative actions (for women) in the 1980s but abandoned them again during the 1990s.

5.2. Work force participation

Denmark has high employment rates – above the Lisbon target – and the latest figures show an employment rate of 75.1 percent in total for the age group 15-64 years, with 79.1 percent for men and 70.5 percent for women. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the Danish gender regime has been based upon a dual breadwinner model and women’s labor market participation is the highest in the EU. Women’s employment rates have been growing rapidly since 1960, while men’s employment rates have fallen during the same period, due to higher educational rates. There are important differences between the employment and unemployment rates of ethnic Danes and ethnic/racial minorities. It is a goal for the Danish government to include more ethnic/racial minorities on the labor markets, and employment is seen as the key to integration. In 2004, male immigrants from non-western countries in total an employment rate lower than 55 percent, and female immigrants from non-western countries had an employment rate lower than 40 percent. In sum, an increase in female participation at the labor market would mainly require an increase in female labor market participation from non-western countries.

Unemployment rates have fluctuated since 1993 with a declining tendency and they are today lower than the EU average – it covers however large variations. Women’s unemployment rates have been slightly higher than men’s. In 2004, women’s unemployment rates were 7 percent whereas men’s were 6 percent. Immigrants from non-western countries have the highest unemployment rates with in total almost 14.7 percent for men and 16.5 percent for women.

There is a high degree of gender division on the Danish labor market with women working predominantly in the public sphere and men in the private sphere. Women have also a higher propensity to work part time than men.

In Denmark, women and men do not have equal pay for equal work. The wage gap depends on the sector of work. Women have lower hourly wages than men and there is an almost permanent gender wage gap between 12-19 percent in the period 1997-2002. Most of the wage gap in the public sector is explained by differences in human capital but in the private sector 12.6 percent of the wage gap was unexplained in 2000. Unskilled women’s workers’ wage is 89 percent

---

1 The numbers in this section is based upon Emerek, 2005 and the appendix of Borchorst & Dahlerup, 2003; 221-250
of men’s and white collar women workers wage is 73 percent of men’s wage. In the private sector men and women’s wages differs as much as 20-25 percent.

5.3. Welfare system
Since the beginning of the 1960s, there has been a gradual development of universal and gender neutral welfare policies in relation to health care and elderly care, including universal childcare provisions. Childcare represents one of the few areas where Denmark is at the forefront compared to other Nordic countries. Childcare is considered a public responsibility and the major part of the costs is officially subsidized. Municipalities have a childcare guarantee and parents pay maximum 33 percent of the costs. In 1964, there was a radical shift in the public policies towards childcare with the introduction of the universal principle in childcare legislation. The number of childcare facilities has continued to grow and the coverage ratio increased and has remained among the highest in Western Europe, especially for the 0-3 year olds.

Since 2002, parents in the labor force are entitled to maternity/paternity/parental leave with unemployment benefit in 52 weeks. A mother is entitled to four weeks leave before the birth. Following this period, she is entitled to 12 weeks leave – a total of 18 weeks. The father is entitled to two weeks parental leave during the first 14 weeks after the birth of the child. Subsequently the parents are entitled to 64 weeks leave. Mothers take ten times as much parental leave than fathers, despite the law allowing them to split the leave.2 The parent in a same sex couple is not entitled any parental leave.

In terms of daddy-quotas earmarked for fathers Denmark is the Nordic laggard. In 1984, the statuary right to paid maternity leave for women in the labor market was extended from 14 weeks (since 1966) to 24 weeks and fathers for the first time became entitled to two weeks after the birth together with the mother. Furthermore, father and mother could share the last 10 weeks. In 1997 the leave was prolonged from 24 to 26 weeks, and for the first time two weeks was earmarked for the father inspired by the Norwegian and Swedish adoption of daddy-quotas. The current Centre-Right government decided to prolong the parental leave to one year in 2002. At the same time it abolished the first two weeks earmarked for fathers. Presently, two weeks after the birth is earmarked for the mother, and after this 12 weeks are reserved for the mother. This makes the Danish leave the most gendered in Scandinavia.23

---

5.4. Education
In the early 21st century, Danish women’s educational level has surpassed that of men’s for the first time in history. Immigrants and their descendants have significantly lower educational levels than ethnic Danes.

5.5. Equal opportunity measures/laws
Today, gender equality has become institutionalized in public politics and as an official political discourse. Gender equality started as a policy area in the middle of the 1970s, and in 1975, a Council of Equal Status was established. Equality politics is low politics, and Denmark has been much more reluctant to establish gender equality policy machinery than Norway and Sweden. In 2000, there was a shift in Danish equality politics as the mainstreaming principle of integrating equality in all public planning and administration became institutionalized as part of new EU equality law; this law also obliged public institutions to draft equality reports every other year. The objective of the law was “to strengthen equality between women and men, including equal integration, equal influence and equal possibilities in all functions of society based on women and men’s equal worth”. The new active policy did not last long. The Council of Equal Status was dissolved, an administrative unit was established instead attached to the Ministry of Equality and an independent Knowledge Centre for Equality was set up. However, the new equality skeptical Centre-Right government dissolved the Knowledge Centre again with a change in the Equality Law in 2002.

5.6. Gender mainstreaming
In 1996-99, the Nordic Council supported a larger mainstreaming project with a number of cases, which were methodological inspirations to start new projects. With the adoption of the Equality Law of 2000 mainstreaming became the official strategy in Danish equality policy. The objective of the law was precise but there was no description of methods and means to achieve gender equality. In reality and in practiced politics, Danish equality politics have not become main-streamed, and the efforts to mainstream gender have been modest. The current government has declared that Danish women have already achieved gender-equality and has directed the resources towards ethnic/racial/religious minority women.
B 6. The Women's Movement(s):

The traditional division of first, second and third wave feminism does not really correspond to the history of the Danish women’s movement(s). The women’s organization Danish Women’s Society [Dansk Kvindesamfund] was established in 1871 as the first organization focusing on improving women’s rights. They were not focused on getting women the right to vote, as generally believed (and as first wave feminism was). In the beginning the struggle for women’s right concerned women’s lack of legal authority. The married woman had legal rights like a child; the husband and father possessed all legal family rights. This meant that he owned the family’s property, gained custody over the children in a case of divorce, etc. Women were also prohibited from getting most higher educations. The early struggles were about getting women rights, authority, and respect as an adult person.

During the 1880s, questions of women’s right were debated publicly, and many women began to organize around women’s rights. It was mainly women from the middle- and upper classes who were engaged in these struggles. However, some organization of working class women took place. In 1885, the first female labor organization was founded (The Organization for Laundry and Cleaning Women, i.e. Foreningen for Vadske- og Rengøringskoner). This union developed into Women’s Workers’ Union [Kvindeligt Arbejderforbund] in 1901. In 1899, the umbrella organization Danish Women’s Council [Dansk Kvinderåd] was established.

In the beginning of the 20th century, women gained a series of rights. The parliamentary democracy was carried through with a reform in 1901, and after this reform the struggle for female suffrage took off. The demand for suffrage had been raised in the Parliament during the 1880s but at that time it was not taken seriously and was made fun of. In 1907, the National Union of Women’s Suffrage [Landsforbundet for Kvinders Valgret] was established. Compared to other European countries, there was a very large number of women (and some men) behind the demand for suffrage. In 1908, women and servants gained the right to vote at municipality elections, and in 1915, they gained the right to vote in national elections. On Constitution Day [Grundlovsdag] June 5, 1915, 10-12,000 women, representing various women’s organizations, marched to the Royal Palace [Amalienborg Slotsplads] to celebrate, and thank the king for, the new Constitution which gave them suffrage. In 1919, a law establishing equal pay for equal work in public jobs was passed. However, the breadwinner in of a family received a bonus pay, which in reality made many men (the father of a family) make more money than women. In 1921, women received the access to public jobs previously enjoyed only by men, with the exception
of positions as pastors and military servants. In 1922, a marriage law was passed which gave women a better legal status in the marriage and gave her shared custody of the children.

In 1918, the first women were elected into Parliament. Their representation has (so far) never equated their population number. In the interwar period, women constituted 2-3 percent of the Parliament [Folketinget], 7-11 percent of the Landsting [Landstinget], and 1-2 percent of the municipalities [Kommunalbestyrelserne]. In 1924, the first female minister was appointed. This was social democrat Nina Bang who became Minister of Education. At the last Parliament election in 2005, 66 women were elected out of 179 seats, i.e. 36.9 percent. In 1984, there were 26.3 percent. The highest percent of women in Parliament (so far) was in 2001 where 38 percent of the elected were women.24

In the interwar period, contraception and abortion were debated, even though they were both controversial topics. The Second World War strengthened traditional gender roles in Denmark. Unlike the European countries which were actively engaged in the war and therefore developed a home front, where women occupied men’s traditional jobs and positions, Denmark did not experience this change in gender roles. At the Danish national election to Parliament in 1943, the lowest number of women, since the gain of female suffrage, was elected; only two women were chosen to Parliament.

During the 1960s, there was an ongoing debate about whether women should be employed outside their homes. Often when talking or writing about this debate retrospectively, it sounds as if all women were working as housewives before the 1960s. This was not the case; most working class women had been working outside the homes for generations. The debate in the 1960s was really about whether middle and upper class women should begin working outside their home. Danish women’s employment rate increased dramatically from the mid-1960s to the 1990s. In 1965, their employment rate was 34 percent, in 1975 their number had risen to 55 percent; in 1985 it was 65 percent, and in 1995 it was 72 percent, where it has remained since.25 Women’s educational level also increased during this period. During the 1960s, organizations like the Danish Women’s Society’s Youth Group [Dansk Kvindesamfunds Ungdomsgruppe] and Sex & Society [Sex og samfund] were established. These organizations worked towards abortion rights. Abortion became legal in 1973.

In 1970, the Redstocking [Rødstrømperne] movement took off. The Redstockings questioned gender roles and societal gender structures. Often in Denmark when talking about gender, gender equality, women’s movement(s), etc. most people tend to associate these issues with
the Redstockings. In 1974, The Lesbian Movement [Lesbisk Bevægelse] was established, as a reaction to the Redstockings which were considered heteronormative (even though that term was not invented then). The Redstockings often connected class struggles with women’s liberations, hence their famous slogan: ‘Women’s struggle is class struggle. Class struggle is women’s struggle’. Most participants in the Redstocking movement were well-educated middle class women, who had a leftwing political approach towards gender equality. Another famous slogan from the Redstocking was ‘The personal is political’. This slogan was accompanied with new modes of activism, e.g. the establishing of consciousness raising groups [basisgrupper], where women debated their personal problems and discovered that these issues were common signs of structural oppressions. The Redstockings and the debate about gender roles, gender structures, gendered socializing of children, influenced large segments of society. Most labor unions, educational institutions, and many families debated gender roles during the 1970s and first half of 1980s.

In the second half of the 1980s, the Redstocking Movement dissolved itself. Feminist activism, and leftwing activism in general, decreased during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.

In the end of the 1990s and first half of 2000s, there have been some feminist voices in Denmark. In the early 2000s, a few publications marked new social constructivist feminist voices.26 However, it is not possible to speak about a general feminist movement(s) today, i.e. Denmark is not experiencing its third wave feminism. Today very few people label themselves feminists. Paradoxically, the term feminist is generally negatively viewed and associated with lesbianism, non-sexually attractiveness, backwardness (1970-ish, hippies) while there, at the same time, is a general consensus that gender equality is positive and that there exists gender equality in Denmark; i.e. that with the Redstocking Movement in the 1970s, Denmark received gender equality. There has not been a serious post-colonial critique of the (white, ethnically Danish, heteronormative) Danish women’s movement(s).

Professor in gender studies and political science, Drude Dahlerup, points out that feminism in Denmark and the other Nordic countries is exceptional because the women’s movement(s) has been visible and vocal since the 1870s. The Danish Women’s Society’s journal Kvinde og Samfundet has existed since 1885. (It is the world’s oldest women’s movement’s journal). Dahlerup argues that this continuity can explain why feminism has been quite strong in the Nordic countries.27 However, it cannot explain why feminism has been rather weak during the previous decade.
B 7. Individual rights (women’s rights) and vs. cultural group rights

B.7.1.
Some rights are given to the individual other rights are given to the married, heterosexual couple and the (heterosexual) nuclear family. Married couples form a unit which gives them economic tax benefits, legal rights (inherit each other), access to each others names, etc. These rights cannot be received unless a couple marries; i.e. Denmark does not operate with ‘common law spouse agreements’ (i.e. if a couple live together they receive the same rights as a married couple). No one but a sexuality engaged couple of two people can form this unit. Same sex partner can register as a couple, which will give them the same rights as married couples; they cannot marry. This means that several economic tax benefits can only be received as a married (or same sex registered) person, not as an individual or as engaged in other family formations.

Only heterosexual couples and heterosexual single women are allowed to adopt in Denmark. From Jan. 1, 2007, lesbian couples and single mother have been allowed to be inseminated. Prior only heterosexual couples were allowed medical public assistance in their reproduction. Due to the late time of birth, the average primiparous woman is 29, and the increasing obesity, a very large proportion of Danish women get need medical assistance in order to reproduce. The quality of men’s semen is declining, due to environmental reasons and because men are old when they reproduce. Most reproduction clinics have only racially white semen in Denmark.

As a point of departure, most rights are individual rights in Denmark. However, some new laws challenge this. In 2005, the so-called 300 hours rule was passed. This rule effects couples who are both on welfare or couples where one is working and the other is on welfare. If a (married) person has had less than 300 hours work during two years, then person will loose her/his welfare benefits if her partner is either working or on welfare. In reality, this means that the person in a couple who has worked the least will loose her/his benefits and depend on her/his partner’s benefit. In many immigrant couples, the man will have had a few small jobs and thereby having worked a little more than his wife, who will loose her benefit and become economically dependent on her husband.
There are no ‘minority rights’ in Denmark, i.e. no special considerations of ethnic/racial minorities, sexual minorities, religious minorities, etc. However, there are some ‘majority rights’. In marriages, one cannot bring a spouse to Denmark if the couple has a stronger connection to another country than Denmark. This means that a Dane of Pakistani origin cannot bring a Pakistani bride/groom to Denmark because the couples’ connection to Pakistan will be greater than their connection to Denmark. An exception from this rule is ethnic Danes who are more than 28 years old (and people with permanent residence permits having lived more than 28 years in Denmark); they are allowed to bring their spouses to Denmark.

B 7.2
There are no regulations that can be perceived as “cultural group rights” (unless one considers heterosexual nuclear families a cultural group, see B 7.1.).

B 8. Antidiscrimination law
The Danish Constitution guaranties freedom of religion (§ 67). Besides this constitutional right, hate speech is illegal according to the Danish penal code’s paragraph § 266 b. This paragraph is commonly known as the racism paragraph [racismeparagraffen]. It prohibits “threatening, insulting or disgracing statements or propaganda against a group of people because of their race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation.” The statements have to be publicly uttered or printed with the intention of circulation to a wider group of people. Very few people have been found guilty of this paragraph. Often consideration for the constitutional right of freedom of expression has carried greater weight than § 266 b. This law was passed in 1939 and revisited in the mid-1960s and in 1987.

Denmark also has the Law Prohibiting Discrimination because of Race etc. [Lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på grund af race m.v.] This law states that ”Nobody must be discriminated by differentiating in service or admission to all public places and premises, like transportation, hotels, restaurants, cafés, theatres and parks, due to their race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation.” The law was passed in 1971 and revised in 2000.

In 1996 the Law against Discriminatory Behavior on the Labor Market [Lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet m.v.] was passed. This made it illegal to
discriminate in employment, including discrimination in hirings and firings, against people because of their race, skin color, ethnic origin, religion or faith, sexual orientation, age and disability. In 2004 a board of appeal \([\text{Klagenævn}]\) was established for complaints regarding discrimination in employment.\(^{30}\)

In 2003 the Law about Ethnic Equal Treatment \([\text{Loven om etnisk ligestilling}]\) was passed. This law aims at preventing discrimination and promoting equal treatment for all regardless of race and ethnic origin. It prohibits discrimination in all private and public sectors including health services, social services, education, access to housing, etc. The law also established a Complain Committee for Ethnic Equal Treatment \([\text{Klagekomitéen for Etnisk Ligebehandling}]\).\(^{31}\) This law does not include discrimination because of religion, and in situations where discrimination against veiling is interpreted as a religious discrimination it is not prohibited here.\(^{32}\)

Furthermore Denmark has ratified several international laws preventing discrimination. The UN declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states: “All humans are born free in equal dignity and with rights”, and all people are entitled to these rights “without any kind of discrimination because of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, place of births of other kind of societal belonging.”\(^{33}\) These anti-discrimination rights are further elaborated in different UN conventions including the UN convention about civil and political rights (1966), the UN convention about financial, social and cultural rights (1966), UNESCO’s convention about eliminating discrimination in relation to education (1960), UN convention to end racial discrimination (1965), UN convention about discrimination against women (1979), UN’s child convention (1989), and UN’s convention about migrant workers and their families (1992). Denmark has ratified all of these conventions except the latter.\(^{34}\) The European Human Rights’ Convention (from 1953) also underscores anti-discrimination and equal treatment, and imposes on the European member states to promote human rights, including anti-discrimination. The Council of Europe passed an additional protocol to the European Human Rights Convention in 2000; this prohibits all kinds of discrimination in relation to gender, race, color, language, religions, political or other opinions, national or social origin, affiliation with national minorities, property, birth, etc. The protocol also demands that the member states initiate actions aiming at preventing discrimination. The European Union has also passed directives aiming at eliminating discrimination. In 2000, the Employment Directive regarding equal treatment in relation to occupation and employment as well as the Equal Treatment directive about equal treatment to all regardless of race or ethnic origin were
passed. These two directives demand the member states to implement laws which will prevent discrimination and ensure equal treatment in the private as well as the public sectors.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{B 8.1.1. EU-Directives}

All EU-Directives (2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC) are implemented in the Danish legislation.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{B 9. Nationhood, national identity}

The Danish national identity(ies) is hard to determine, especially because it is currently object for several struggles of definition. The concepts Danishness, Danish values, and national Danish identity are often verbalized but the content of the concepts are seldom made explicit. The national identity is a floating signifier where the content is constantly challenged, changed, and re-interpreted. I would argue that Danish nationality is closely connected to whiteness. The terms ‘Dane’ and ‘Danish’ are linguistically synonymous with being white and ethnically Danish. Denmark has a long tradition of voting against EU-treaties, and the nationality can therefore be defined as being closer linked to itself as a nation than to the continent.

During the 1970s, 1980 and first half of the 1990s, the Danish nationality was not associated with religion. Currently, Christianity seems to (increasingly) be an integrated part of the Danish nationhood. The Christianity connected with Denmark is not a fundamentalist version, but a version that allows abortion, divorce, and Darwinism. However, it is a version that is not tolerant towards Islam or homosexuality. Christian spokespeople are not agreeing on the interpretation of Danish Christianity. There are evangelical sessions [\textit{Indre Mission}], represented by the politicians and pastors Jesper Langballe and Søren Karup, representing the nationalist, populist party The Danish People’s Party at Parliament, who agitate against human rights and in favor of a white, straight, Christian, exclusive Denmark, and there are pastors, like the 10 pastors in the town of Hillerød led by pastor Thyge Enevoldsen, who demonstrated against an inhuman asylum politic this Jan. 2007. They represent a more tolerant Christianity, and connect Christianity with human rights. Both wings argue that their version of Christianity is the embodiment of Danishness.
C. Religion, society and population (context)

C 1. Religious demography

It is not possible to get precise data for the religious demography in Denmark because it is illegal to register citizens according to religious affiliations. Only members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church are registered. There were 4,506,422 members of Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church, i.e. 83 percent of the population (Jan. 01, 2006). The national statistics [Danmarks statistik] has for a number of years tried to measure the population in relation to religion. Unfortunately, they stopped this measurement in 2002. The Ministry of the Church [Kirkeministeriet] has some statistic but their statistics are not updated. The data presented here is therefore not up to date despite it being the newest data available.

Population divided according to religion. Jan. 01, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>4,612,887</td>
<td>85,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>3,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>4,572</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahá'í</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (without religious affiliation)</td>
<td>576,452</td>
<td>10,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,368,354</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews seem rather low in this statistics. Tim Jensen, Danish religious historian, argues that there is 8-10,000 Hindus (mainly represented by people with relations to India, Sri Lanka, and Hare Kristnas); 8-10,000 Buddhists (represented by people with relations to Thailand, Vietnam, and Tibet, for the latter these are mainly ethnically Danish converts); 7,500 Jews; max. 1000 Sihks, and max. 500 Bahai.
The Roman-Catholic Church, the Reformed Church, and the Jewish community [Mosaisk trossamfund] had religious privileges and were recognized as religious societies before the Danish Constitution granted religious freedom in 1849. Later the Methodist Church, the Swedish Gustaf’s Church, the Baptists, King Håkon’s Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church were also recognized. Today the Ministry of Church has registered altogether 89 religious societies. This number is rather high because the Ministry tends to register several departments from the same religious affiliation. For instance they have registered 11 Muslims religious associations. Tim Jensen concludes that there most likely ca. 4.5 percent of the population belong to a non-Christian religion.39

C 2. Religious Geography

There are no data on general religious geography in Denmark. It is likely that many non-Christian religions are based in the larger cities. There is data on demography for members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church. Members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church tend to be from the country side as shown below.

Members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church divided according to sex, age, and geography.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Members of Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church</th>
<th>Members of Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,368,354</td>
<td>4,526,693</td>
<td>84,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2,654,146</td>
<td>2,197,322</td>
<td>82,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2,714,208</td>
<td>2,329,371</td>
<td>85,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14 years</td>
<td>1,005,203</td>
<td>783,242</td>
<td>77,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 years or older</td>
<td>4,363,151</td>
<td>3,743,451</td>
<td>85,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>500,531</td>
<td>336,026</td>
<td>67,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C 3. Religious Observance

The majority of members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church are what can be labeled ‘cultural Christians’. They attend church at special occasions. Christmas Eve is the busiest day for the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church. Here there are extra services because so many people want to attend; unlike the regular services which are rather empty. 15,637 couples are married in the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church annually (2005), and 1,741 get the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church’s blessing for their marriage. The latter are couples who have previously been married before the registrar but who want the Church’s blessing; e.g. same sex couples who are not allowed to be married in the Church. 75 percent of Danish children are baptized in the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church (2004). Traditionally, all Danish citizens have been buried at the graveyards of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church, as it is not legal to be buried, or have one’s ash thrown, anywhere else. In 2006, the first Muslim burial place was established after years of struggle for get a burial place. Most members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church have a limited context with the Church except from at the great occasions mentioned above. Many of them might not even define themselves as religious. Only two percent of the population attend the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church on a weekly basis. Of out these 57 percent are women. 57 percent are above 50 years, and 35 percent have a higher education. 60 percent of those who never attend church are men.

C 4. Religious Change

There has been a continuous decline in members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church. In 1990, 89.3 percent of the population were members, today it is 83 percent. In 1995, 79 percent of the youth had their confirmation in the Church, today it is 72 percent (2005). In 1990, 80.6 percent of the children were baptized in the Church, today it is 75 percent (2005).

With the increasing number of immigrants from non-Christian countries, the number of religious worshippers of Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism has proportionally increased (see section C7). 5000-6000 ethnic Danes have converted to Islam. 10-20 years ago most people
converted because they married a Muslim. Today many people convert because of personal, religious, and political reasons. Many converts are quite young, i.e. teenagers or in their early twenties. The fundamentalist Muslim organization Hizb ut-Tahrir has ca. 350 members in Denmark (where the organization is legal); ca. 50 of these are ethnically Danish converts.

C 5. Religion and Power

Denmark is defined as a Protestant Lutheran country according to its Constitution. The Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is a state church and has special privileges according to the Constitution. The Constitution also grants freedom of religion but the hierarchy of religions is not questionable. The Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is therefore quite powerful. It is integrated into several institutions in Denmark. In the Danish public schools, Christian studies are integrated into the teaching at the elementary level, and preparation for Christian confirmation is integrated into the teaching at the junior level. Students can be excused from Christian studies if their parents do not want them to attend such studies. In Denmark, everybody is registered with name, address and personal number. It is the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church who is in charge of this registration. This means that all parents, regardless of religious observation or lack of, must register their children at the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church.

C 6. Religion and Gender

According to surveys, the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is influenced by stereotypical gender roles. The management and leaders are predominately men while the churchgoers are women.43

In 1875 women were allowed to study at the Danish university, incl. studying theology but they were not allowed to become pastors. In 1921, a reform gave women access to most jobs in the public sector, but the theological and military positions remained reserved to men. Not before 1947, were women allowed to occupy positions as pastors. In 1995, Lise-Lotte Rebel became the first female bishop in Denmark. Today there are two female bishops. Today ca. one third of the pastors are women, while women constitute more than half the theology students at universities.44

Muslim women activists are arguing in favor of female khatibas. Sherin Khankan, who is the leader of the Danish organization Critical Muslims, argued in an interview Dec. 2006: “Critical Muslims have always focused on making women more visible. We want to break the men’s monopoly on interpreting the Koran and on communicating about the Koran. The right to
interpret the Koran should not be determined by gender. The person who has knowledge should do the interpretation, regardless of gender. We in Critical Muslims want to draw attention to women’s importance in Islam. We are in favor of that those who have knowledge should speak. We have a vision about getting female khatibas in the mosques, i.e. a woman to do the Friday prayer, the khutba, in the mosque. The woman can also lead the prayer for the women after the khutba, and a man can lead the men. The Koran preaches gender equality. To me the most important woman’s question in relation to Islam is a re-interpretation of the Koran.”

C 7. Muslim Population

No one knows how many Muslims there are in Denmark. In Denmark there is not any statistical registration of religious affiliations, others than for members of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church. The estimates regarding the number of Muslims vary from 100,000 to 300,000. Recently, Brian Jacobsen, a sociologist of religion, has tried to nuance the numbers by combining the numbers of immigrants and descendents from Islamic countries with surveys about the number of followers of various religions in these countries. He has found that the number of immigrants and descendents from ‘Islamic countries’ is 265,814 (2005), i.e. 4.9 percent of the total population; of those 189,832 are believed to be Muslims, i.e. 3.5 percent of the Danish population.

Often the number of Muslims is equated with the number of immigrants. Below is a description of immigration demography in Denmark. The number of immigrants has more than doubled during the previous two decades in Denmark. Furthermore, there has been a shift in the immigrants’ countries of origin. Until the mid-1990s, the majority of immigrants were from so-called more developed countries. During the 1990s, the number of immigrants from so-called less developed countries increased, and from mid-1990s it surpassed the number of immigrants from so-called more developed countries. It is interesting that the number of immigrants from so-called more developed countries has been so high because public debates about immigration has primarily focused on immigrants from the so-called less developed countries, giving the impression that they have made up the absolute majority of immigrants in Denmark.

Today (2005) there are 343,367 immigrants in Denmark; of these 116,071 are from Europe, Australia, USA and Canada and 227,296 from Asia, Africa, South American and the Middle East. There are 108,728 descendents of immigrants in Denmark: 15,461 with parents from Europe, Australia, USA and Canada and 93,267 with parents from Asia, Africa, South America, and the Middle East. In total there are 452,095 immigrants and descendents in Denmark, of which
320,563 are from Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East, i.e. visible minorities. The total population of Denmark is 5,411,405, making immigrants and descendants constitute ca. 8.4 percent of the population, while visible minorities constitute ca. 5.9 percent of the population.

The central point here is that the number of actual Muslims in Denmark seems to have been (and continues to be) much lower than the number of immigrants and descendants. Thus equating “Muslims” with “immigrants”, as the Danish media as well as politicians constantly do, is an unjustified generalization.

**Population in Denmark (2005)**


**Immigrants and their children in Denmark (2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Descendents</th>
<th>In total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Europe, Australia, USA and Canada</td>
<td>116,071</td>
<td>15,461</td>
<td>131,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Asia, Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>227,296</td>
<td>93,267</td>
<td>320,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total</td>
<td>343,367</td>
<td>108,728</td>
<td>452,095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no data informing about the subdivisions of Muslims in Denmark. If one looks at the country of origin of the immigrants from so-called Muslim countries, it is most likely that there are most Sunni Muslims (from Arabic countries, Turkey, Somalia, and Pakistan,); followed by Shia Muslims (from Libanon, Iran, and Irak); and then Ahmadiyya Muslims (from Pakistan). Similarly, there is no data about the number of Islamic converts. A survey from 2000 suggests that the
majority of Muslims, i.e. 54 percent, are Sunni, followed by Shia, i.e. 11 percent. 65 percent of immigrants and descendants answer that they feel moderate or very little religious when asked, whereas 18 percent feel ‘very religious’. Very generally speaking and generalizing, divided by national origin, Iranians and Ex-Yugoslavians feel very little religious, whereas Somalis, Palestinians and Iraqis feel very religious. Pakistanis and Turks hold a position in between. Divided by gender and religion, women and Sunni Muslims find that religion is more important in their daily lives than men and Shia Muslims do. Fatima Zahra, an ethnically Danish convert, believes that there are 5000-6000 ethnically Danish Muslims. Many Muslims in Denmark do not define themselves as Sunni or Shia but rather as Muslims or Danish Muslims. In the public debate there is not distinction between different kinds of Muslims; the ethnic/racial minority population is simply referred to as ‘Muslim’.

C 8. Spokespersons, representation

Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church is strongly represented via the Minister of Church, the bishops, and the pastors. There is no unifying Muslim organization. There are several organizations, imams, and individuals who have tried to speak on behalf of the so-called Muslim community. The organization Islamic Faith Society [Islamisk trossamfund] is one of the organizations which have aimed at speaking on behalf of other, and which the Danish media has treated as if it was an umbrella organization or represented a wide community. The organization is organized around the Tauba mosque in Copenhagen. The leader of the organization is Iman Abu Laban, a Dane of Palestinian origin, who also leads the Friday player at the Tauba mosque. Islamic Faith Society was very vocal about the cartoon crisis, and Abu Laban among the imams who traveled to the Middle East and presented his version of the case to various Middle Eastern authorities (see session D6). Two other imams have been heard a lot in debates and in the media. One is Ahmed Akkari, who is iman in Aarhus, and the other is Abdul Wahid Pedersen, who is iman in Copenhagen. Wahid Pedersen is an ethnically Danish convert who is often interviewed by the media. Several interviewed Muslim women, who are active in religious and/or anti-discrimination organizations, argue that there is not a united Muslim community. Instead there are several communities, often organized on relation to national origin. Therefore no one can speak on behalf of ‘the Muslim community’. The Social-Liberal [radikale venstre] politician Naser Khader tried to speak on behalf of all ‘democratic Muslims’, when he founded the organization Democratic
Muslims in 2006. However, this was not been possible, as several Muslims, who had been working on favor of democracy for many years prior to Democratic Muslims, did not wanted to be associated with Khader.

C 9. Surveys of orientation of population

Women’s emancipation has been understood as closely connected with freedom of dressing and women’s employment outside the home since the 1970s in Denmark. It is generally believed in Denmark that a large number of Muslim women are veiled because they are forced to by their fathers, brothers or communities. A quantitative survey on ethnic Danes’ attitudes towards visible minorities showed that ethnic Danes saw gender liberation as manifested in women’s free choice of clothing, and viewed clothing itself as an indication of the state of emancipation.54

The ethnically Danish population has very limited contact with the Danish Muslim population. A recent survey has shown that only 2.9 percent of ethnic Danes interact privately with Muslims on a daily basis.

How often do you interact privately with Muslims?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>2.9 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6 times a week</td>
<td>6.2 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>6.7 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>24.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>59.7 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rambøll Management for Jyllands-Posten.55

D) Prevalence and context of veiling

D 1. Types of veiling

There is no data on veiling in Denmark. My experiences from work and living my daily life in two of the most racially/ethnically diverse areas of Denmark (Nørrebro and Vesterbro) is that the hijab is by far the most used type of veil. The hijab is used many, many times more often than other kinds of veils. There are a few chadors and nicabs in the cityscape. Traditionally, ethnically Danish women have been wearing a headscarf around their hair when going out, and many older ethnically Danish women still do that today. During the 1970s, many feminists working as pedagogues or educationists wear a purple cotton cloth (the same as used for re-usable diapers) around their hair.
D 2. Empirical data about veiling

No one knows how many Muslim women veil and contrary to Norway and Sweden there has not been a Danish debate about the difference between hijab and nijab and the problems of wearing the nijab. A recent survey showed that two thirds of Danish Muslims did not find it necessary for Muslim women to veil. According to ethnically Danish convert Fatima Zahra, almost all converts are veiled.

D3 Veiling increasing/decreasing

Since there is no data available, it is hard to determine whether the practice of veiling is increasing or decreasing. Visually, when looking at a Danish metropolitan street, it seems like there are more veils today than five years ago, where there were more veils than 10 years ago, etc. But this visual increase might explained by the increasing number of ethnic/racial minorities in Denmark. I.e. the percentage of Muslims who are veiled might not have increased but the number of Muslims has increased. However, there might also be an increase in younger women beginning to veil during the 2000s; also among women whose mothers are not veiled.

D4 Visibility of veils/headscarves

Veils and headscarves are visible in cities with Muslim populations. In the larger cities headscarves are seen on a daily basis, in smaller towns and villages, with a very white ethnically Danish population, there are few, if any, headscarves.

D5 Important issue

Veiling is a very important issue in the Danish debate. It is one of the most debated topics in relation to ethnic/racial minorities and integration in the country. Almost everybody has an opinion about veiling. It has been debated so much in the media and among politicians, that even people who have no personal or professional relation to Muslims or veils have an opinion about veiling.
D6 Other issues / clothing related to the veil debates

There have not been other issues related directly to the debates about veiling. There are too few Sikhs to create an issue of turbans. There is very little criticism of Jews who wear skullcaps, and they are also few in numbers. There has been a little critique of a famous TV hostess who wore a large crucifix at one TV program, but crosses and crucifixes have not been debated seriously. The lack of debate might be because there are few visible crosses in the public sphere. It might also be because the Danish nation is a Christian nation, and crosses are therefore an integrated part of the nationhood. I am including a description of the cartoon crisis, that Denmark experienced in 2006, here because it is relevant for the debates about Islam, immigrants, integration, discrimination, etc.

The cartoon crisis

On Sep. 30, 2005 the national Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published 12, now infamous, drawing of the Prophet Muhammad. This let to a serious diplomatic crisis for Denmark, as well as questioned the country’s tolerance – or lack of – for its Muslim minority population, and sparked a debate about the freedom of expression.

The drawings were part of an article titled “The face of Muhammad” [*Muhammeds ansigt*] written by the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten’s* editor of culture, Flemming Rose. He wrote: “The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand special treatment when they insist on special consideration of their religious feelings. It is incompatible with secular democracy and freedom of expression, where one must be ready to accept scorn, mockery and being made ridiculous.” Rose argued that self-censorship was on the rise in Denmark, and in order to fight it *Jyllands-Posten* had asked several cartoonists to draw the Prophet Muhammad. Among the published drawing were images of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban as well as an image of Muhammad with two (oppressed) veiled women.

The article and the drawings were critiqued nationally and internationally. On Oct. 19, 2005, eleven ambassadors, representing Muslims countries, sent a letter to the Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, asking him for a meeting in which to discuss *Jyllands-Posten’s* drawings; they also wanted to discuss member of Parliament, Louise Frevent, who, on her website, had compared Muslims to cancer, as well as the local radio station *Radio Holger*, which had agitated for expelling, and if necessary killing, Muslims. The Prime Minister, Fogh Rasmussen, who is also the Minister of the Press, refused meeting with the ambassadors and argued that he could not dictate what a newspaper should or should not print.
This led to an escalate of the crisis which culminated in January 2006 with demonstrators burning Danish flags, the burning of the Danish embassy in Syria, boycott of Danish goods by several Arabic countries, and the withdrawal of Syria’s and Saudi Arabia’s ambassadors from Denmark. Prior to that, i.e. in the beginning of Oct. 2005, the Islamic Faith Society [Islamisk Trossamfund] had encouraged Jyllands-Posten to withdraw the drawings and apologize to the Muslim community(ies). Mid-Oct. 2005, ca. 3500 Danish Muslims had carried out a peaceful demonstration against the Jyllands-Posten. Mid-Oct., the Danish police’s intelligence service (PET) also asked the 12 cartoonists to go under ground because of security reasons. During October various international media covered the case. On Oct. 29, 2005 a group of 11 Danish Muslim organizations file a complaint against Jyllands-Posten for violating the laws against blasphemy and racial discrimination. The Crown Prosecutor later decided (January 2007) that the publication of the drawings did not form the basis for a court case.

During December 2005, the drawings were on the agenda for a meeting between the 57 Muslim countries in OIC. OIC complained to the UN, whose commissioner for human rights, Louise Arbour, became involved in the case and critiqued Jyllands-Posten and Fogh Rasmussen. The European Union’s legal commissioner, France Frattini, called the publication of the drawings “thoughtless and unwise” (Dec. 2005). The Arabic league’s ministers of foreign affairs critiqued the Danish government for their handling of the crisis (Dec. 2005). In Denmark, 22 ex-diplomats critiqued that Danish government for their handling of the crisis, especially Fogh Rasmussen’s refusal to meet the 11 ambassadors (Dec. 2005).

In the beginning of January 2006, it was exposed that a group of Danish imams had traveled to the Middle East in order to get support from politicians and religious leaders in their protest against Denmark. In Denmark there was serious critique of these imams, who were accused of treasonable action and for stirring up the crisis. During January 2006, several Arabic countries initiated boycotts of Danish goods. Violent demonstrations against the drawings were held in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Syria and several people were killed during these demonstrations. At the same time, European ministers of foreign affairs supported Denmark and their right to defend freedom of expression. As a reaction to the boycott, the demonstrations, and the diplomatic crisis, Jyllands-Posten’s chef editor Juste regretted that his newspaper unintentionally had upset Muslims but he refused to apologize for the drawings. The Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen explained that he personally repudiated the drawing but that he would not apologize for them because, as he argued, “freedom of expression is inviolable.” During February
2006, the UN general secretary, Kofi Annan, argued that Denmark had not been able to adapt to its Muslim immigration.  

During February 2006, the Danish organization Democratic Muslims [Demokratiske muslimer] was formed. The goal of the organization was to expose the diversity in the Muslim community(ies) in Denmark, and especially to show that many Muslims were not fundamental Islamists; instead many were democratic and defended freedom of expression. One can argue that a consequence of the cartoon crisis has been that the Danish public has gained a broader understanding of its Muslim population. A positive outcome of the crisis might be that a number of ethnic Danes no longer view the Muslim communities as one homogenous group.

It is interesting to notice the linguistic terms used in the descriptions and debates about Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons. In Denmark, the crisis has continuously been called “the Muhammad crisis”, unlike the international English speaking media which have called the crisis “the cartoon crisis”. This linguistic difference can be seen as an illustration of the interpretation of the crisis in Denmark. By using the term “the Muhammad crisis” it is implied that it is Muhammad, i.e. Muslims, who are the responsible for the crisis. The term “the Muhammad crisis” therefore plays into the interpretation of the conflict that blames the group of Imams, who traveled to the Middle East, as well as demonstrating and boycotting Muslims in the Middle East, for the crisis. It also plays into the interpretation of viewing this crisis as a ‘clash between civilizations’, i.e. a clash between a fundamentalist Islam and a democratic West. The term “the Muhammad crisis” neglects that the Danish Government’s handling of the crisis also might have played into the escalation of the crisis.

**D7 Veiling and participation opportunities**

Wearing a headscarf limits the employment opportunities (see session E3 and E6). It does not limit access to universities or educational institutions. There are very few ethnic/racial minorities in politics, and even fewer ethnic/racial minority women, so it is not possible to determine whether veiling stands in the way of political participation.
E) Regulations, debates, conflicts and solutions of veiling

E1. Historical context and developments
The most important historical context is the development in demography described in C7. Another important context is Denmark status as a Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church, described in e.g. C5.

E2. Current regulation
There are no rules or regulations regarding the wearing of veils or any other religious symbols in Denmark. Neither are there clear rules preventing discrimination against women wearing veils. Veil discrimination therefore relies on the existing legal framework against various forms of discrimination.

Parliament debates
Legal prohibition of veiling was debated in the Danish Parliament in May 2004. The (populist, nationalist) Danish People’s Party [Dansk Folkeparti] had made a proposal for prohibiting veiling in public institutions. The proposal was put forward on April 29, 2004 and the debate took place in Parliament on May 28, 2004. Before the debate the proposal had been submitted to the Danish Institute for Human Rights in order for them to consider the proposal from a human rights’ perspective. In Parliament, the proposal was discussed for a few hours after which it was referred to the Education Committee where it was shelved; this is a common procedure for proposals evaluated never to pass in Parliament.

According to the Danish People’s Party, the reason behind the proposal was that “head coverings, especially veils, have increasingly become a problem and veiling seems offensive to many ordinary people.” Besides this veiling was said to “keep young Muslim girls within a cultural pattern which many would rather be without. A prohibition of veiling would therefore be a help and a lending hand to the many Muslim girls who wish to become well-integrated into the Danish society.” According to the proposal, veiling was to be prohibited in all public institutions, i.e. in schools, in hospitals, in public offices, etc.

Unlike the French prohibition of religious symbols in public institutions, which was passed earlier the same year, i.e. Feb. 10, 2004, this Danish proposal was aimed solely at Muslim
veils. The Danish proposal was named “Proposal to Parliament decision to prohibit culturally
determined head coverage” [Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod at bære kulturbestemt
hovedbeklædning]. It was specified that the term “culturally determined head coverage” referred to
“any kind of veil or head coverage which is not included in the Christian-Judean culture.”61 This
meant that Jewish skullcaps (kippas) or Christian crosses were not to be prohibited.

During the debate in Parliament it became obvious that no other party would second
the proposal. The then Minister of Employment, conservative Henriette Kjær, was the first to
comment the proposal. She said: “The Government cannot support this proposal, and the reasons for
that is first and foremost that the proposal differentiates between different religions.…Secondly, the
Danish People’s Party’s proposal will go against the Law against Discriminatory Behavior on the
Labor Market [Lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet m.v.] and the Law about
Ethnic Equal Treatment [Lov om etnisk ligebehandling]…The proposal is unlawful because it
differentiates between citizens.”62 The Minister further explained that a realization of the proposal
would go against the Constitution’s [Grundloven] § 67 and § 70 (i.e. freedom of religion and
prohibition of religious discrimination) and the Convention of Human Rights’ article 9 (i.e. freedom
of religion) and article 14 (i.e. prohibition against discrimination). Spokesperson of the other
governing party, the Liberal Party [Venstre], Gitte Lillelund Bech, also underscored these legal
aspects and referred to the Human Rights’ Constitution when she explained why “We from the
Liberal Party will most strongly reject this proposal.”63

The veil debate in Parliament can be interpreted as a struggle over the definitions of
Danishness, Danish norms and Danish values. The Danish People’s Party argued in their proposal
that “it is only natural what this law demands, [namely] that people employed in the public services,
who represent the public sector, in their relation to the citizens not simultaneously with their work
can practice religions which strongly diverge from the traditions in our part of the world.”64 During
the debate in Parliament, the Danish People’s Party’s spokesperson, Louise Frevert, repeatedly
argued that wearing a veil is not compatible with Danish values and Danish democracy. She said for
instance: “Muslim women’s veils are expressions of a gender compulsion which does not at all
belong in a modern society like the Danish society….A veil [represents] precisely a person who is
against the Danish norms and against the values in Denmark and in our culture.”65 During the
debate in Parliament it was only the spokesperson of the Conservative Party [Det konservative
folkeparti], Else Theill Sørensen, who agreed with the Danish People’s Party’s argument that
veiling is not compatible with Danish identity. Else Theill Sørensen argued that wearing a veil
“signals dissociation from the Danish society.”66 A contesting view of Danish identity was argued by the spokesperson of The Red-Green Alliance [Enhedslisten], Line Barfoed, who said: “I live in Nørrebro [a racially diverse area] so I see lots of veils every day, also in the stores when I go shopping, but I do not experience that the young women I meet are dissociating themselves from the Danish society. They are participating in it on equal terms with everybody else.”67

In the debate, veiling and its potential prohibition was used as a means to discuss what kind of society the different parties wanted. The Social Democrats, the Social Liberals [Radikale Venstre] and the Christian Democrats argued in favor of multiculturalism; e.g. “In the party of Christian Democrats we work towards an inclusive society. We are not interested in excluding anyone because of their ethnicity, religion or anything else. We therefore also accept diversity….Cultural diversity is not to be viewed as a problem…Cultural diversity contributes to development.”68 Contrary, the Danish People’s Party’s intentions with the proposal was to prohibit, or limit, the options of an inclusive multicultural society. They argued: “We will accommodate differences and flexibility but it must be done on Danish terms.”69 “On Danish terms” equaled for the Danish People’s Party that public institutions and their employees appear “neutral”; this neutrality was not an inclusive religiously diverse neutrality, but rather a ‘neutrality’ which signaled white, Christian Danishness. To the Danish People’s Party, veiling became a measurement to distinguish who to in- or exclude in the Danish society. In the parliament debate, veiling became a tool for arguing for or against the multicultural society.

Interlinked with the debate about veiling was the presumption that veiling is a symbol of female oppression. The fight against female oppression was used as a central part of the Danish People’s party’s arguments against veiling during the debate in Parliament. The reason why the Conservatives found veiling incompatible with democracy was because they viewed veiling solely as an expression of female oppression. The conservative spokesperson, Else Theill Sørensen, argued: “We do not reject that it is a problem that so many girls and women in Denmark are wearing a Muslim headscarf, burkas etc. because I actually find it a problem. What might appear as a banal case, as people’s right to decide how they dress, is really a much deeper issue. It is about young women’s personal freedom and their rights to organize their lives…When a young woman, who has been wearing western clothes, from one day to another tells her employer that she from now on wants to wear a veil because her God demands it, and because she is afraid that she will not go to Heaven if she does not wear it, then I am seriously concerned that this is a sign that there are forces in the immigration communities which will not accept that the girls become too integrated
into the Danish society. Expressed more specifically, I think that the God who has demanded the
girls something is their families, most likely the male family members...Therefore we cannot let
things slide. For the sake of the young women and for the sake of the Danish society we must send
a clear signal stating that we do not accept to see women’s personal freedom violated.”

Most parties interpreted veiling as a symbol of female oppression. The Liberals and
the Social Democrats both pointed out how prohibiting the veil was not the best way to end the
female oppression of veiling. They feared that a prohibition would increase the number of Muslim
girls attending private schools, where veiling could be allowed. Prohibition might therefore be more
damaging than liberating for these girls’ personal freedom and integration into Danish society.
Other parties argued that they would be happy to discuss female oppression within immigrant
communities but that this proposal was neither a good way to debate female oppression nor to end it. Margrete Vestager, spokesperson of the Social Liberals, argued: “It [the prohibition] is a wrong
tool because what is happening is that we place ourselves in the patriarchal father’s position and
instead [of him] let the state acts like the patriarchal father who, on behalf of the individual, can say
what one is allowed to do and what one is not allowed to do...Instead we must intervene when there
is pressure [i.e. when females are oppressed]. Both in relation to veiling and in relation to forced
marriages...when we experience that young women are subjected to force...What is worth debating
is whether some are forced to wear the veil...and how we can assist preventing that from
happening.”

Some parties moved a step further. The Christian Democrats argued for instance: “If
this proposal really was an expression of that they [the Danish People’s Party] really wanted to
debate the oppression of women, well, then lets take that discussion. All oppression is completely
unacceptable...We would like to discuss, and fight against, and thereby not accept, any kind of
oppression. But really, this is not the intention with this proposal.”

The Red-Green Alliance similarly argued: “We should take a debate another time where we debate how we help these
children, young girls, who have problems, and also young men for that matter, who are caught up in
some of the attitudes that some of these environments produce.” The Red-Green Alliance argued
that not only children in Muslim families but also for instance children from Jehovah’s Witness
families were facing religious pressure. The Red-Green Alliance was the only party which included
other religions in the debate.
E3 Public debates and conflicts
The debates about veiling can be divided into different themes. These are: employment debates, feminist debates, debate about Asmaa Abdol-Hamid and DR, and parliament debate; the latter is described above (E2). The other three debates will be described below:

Employment debate
The national public service station DR broadcasted a series of news clips that discussed veiling in relation to employment during August 1999. In these clips, several chain grocery stores announced that their practice was not to hire veiled women, and they had no intentions of changing these practices. The chains were FDB (now COOP), which owned Super Brugsen, Kvickly, Irma, and Fakta, and Dansk Supermarked, which owned Netto, Fotex, and Bilka. A representative new clip, which can illustrate the media’s coverage of these veil debates, was a DR news clip which broadcasted an interview with the director of distribution [forhandlingsdirektør] for FDB, Hans Havsager. Havsager argued that FDB had prohibited veils because “it [the veil] repels our customers.” He explained: “We know that some of our customers react negatively if employees signal that they belong to certain groups. This is why we emphasize that our employees wear uniforms that strictly signal FDB and not anything else.”

During the news media’s coverage of veiling and employment, the news media presented veiling as a hindrance for employment. According to a voice-over, introducing a DR news clip about veiling and employment, “the veil stands in the way of getting a job.” The journalist presented this as a problem because “the group of Muslim women, who, up till now, have been home on welfare now have to begin working, according to a new law. But employment does not grow on every bush...because workplaces reject veils.” The news clip did not question the workplaces’ refusal of hiring veiled women instead it indirectly criticized the Muslim women for not taking off their veils. The blame of the Muslim women’s lack of participation in the labor force was therefore put on the women and not on the potentially prejudiced employers. The news clip can therefore been seen a classical example of ‘blame the victim’.

Feminist debates regarding veiling
Feminists have debated veiling for a number of years in Denmark. There have been disagreements within this debate but it seems like the Danish media mainly have given voice to people arguing that the veil is a symbol of female oppression. One debate that calls for special attention can be
called the 2001-feminist immigration debate.\textsuperscript{80} This debate was introduced by writer and journalist Helle Merete Brix who, in an article published in the national social liberal newspaper \textit{Politiken}, representing social liberal political values, accused the Danish women’s movement of letting Muslim women down. She wrote: “It is embarrassing that the Danish women’s movement remains completely silent about the fact that several female citizens in the country are living under oppressing patriarchal norms from seventh-century Arabia.”\textsuperscript{81}

Brix’ article was followed by two articles where two well-known feminists were interviewed by a \textit{Politiken} journalist. The first interview was with the leader of KVINFO (Danish Centre for Information on Women and Gender), Elisabeth Møller Jensen, who pointed out how she, as a white ethnically Danish feminist would not speak on behalf of visible minority women. She argued: “One can easily end in a situation of cultural imperialism where the privileged Danish women condemn these ‘backward individuals who live in the dark the Middle Ages’. What right do we have to execute such judgment over other people’s lives?”\textsuperscript{82} She further added: “It is hypocritical to experience how reactionary rightwing forces, who previously have never fought for gender equality, suddenly appear to be ‘oh so progressive’ when it come to gender equality among immigrants. Why are they doing that? Because their aim is to make a whole group of people disliked…I do not want to participate in that game.”\textsuperscript{83}

Following the interview with Møller Jensens was an interview with Nahid Riazi who is the chairperson for the Iranian Women’s Organization IKIR. Riazi argued that the Danish women’s movement had failed because of their refusal to engage in the debate about women’s rights within immigrant communities. She argued: “Human rights and women’s rights are universal and if women are oppressed then fighters for women’s rights must be against it. The women’s movement’s argument about ‘it is their culture and if they want to practice female oppression then it is their choice’ is some of the most hypocritical arguments I have heard.”\textsuperscript{84} She therefore demanded, and pleaded, that the women’s movement began speaking out against the oppression of women in immigrant communities.

The three articles in \textit{Politiken} were followed by a series of letters to the editors. These letters talked to a large extent about veils and reduced the debate about immigrant women’s right to a question of veiling. Maybe this was simply due to the fact that the veil functioned as a symbol of both the women in question and their (alleged) oppression. Writer Hanne Vibeke Holst argued for instance: “To me the veil is a profoundly revolting way of limiting girls’ and women’s free actions, bodily as well as mentally…If we are to deal with some of the serious integration problems, that we
currently are in the middle of, then it is necessary that we, as a society, take the painful confrontation with the fundamentalist patriarchal [Muslim] culture.”

Politician Mai-Britt Iversen, representing the Social Democrats in Aalborg city council, agreed with Holst’s negative view of veiling, when she explained her experiences at a local playground: “I met two totally veiled girls who had problems playing. It was a frightening sight not only because of the clothing but because of the oppression behind [the veil].” She therefore concluded: “We must speak out against veiling, and speak in favor of that boys are raised to respect women.”

The debate in Politiken was followed by a long article in the national right-wing liberal newspaper *Jyllandsposten*. This article consisted of various interviews with ethnically Danish feminists who were asked about why they did not support visible minority women. The article was introduced by a rhetorical question which was representative for the main message in the article: “Who fights for the veiled woman passing by on the street with her eyes on the ground and the prospect of forced marriage, and for whom the debate about career options seems utopian?”

According to the article’s author, journalist Pernille Ammitzbøll, veiling, forced marriage, and the lack of a career were all caused by Islam’s “different view of women.”

One of Ammitzbøll’s interviewees was Ulla Dahlerup whom Ammitzbøll introduced with the following words: “Ulla Dahlerup, nation-wide known redstocking [*rødstrømpe*] activist all the way back to the 1970s, has almost given up trying to help immigrant women in contemporary Denmark.” Dahlerup explained: “Back in 1992, I contacted a Pakistani women’s group in Nørrebro and it had a dreadful come-down. Later I tried to make connections in other situations but the women do not want help. They view redstockings with horror and see us as satanic women. The cultural gap is simply too wide.”

A few months prior to the article, Dahlerup had written a book for the nationalist, right-wing party Danish People’s Party. This book can be characterized as one long attack on Islam and multiculturalism. Ammitzbøll forgot to mention Dahlerup’s engagement with the Danish People’s Party in her article. She therefore also forgot to reflect upon how Dahlerup’s hostility against visible minorities, in particular Muslims, might not have made her the most nuanced person to interview about these issues.

Most Danish feminists as well as the Danish media have, directly and indirectly, presented Muslim women’s situation as oppositional to ethnically Danish women’s situation. The negative descriptions of Muslim women’s lack of gender equality have therefore been supplied with descriptions of how liberated white Danish women are. When various feminists and/or the news media have described Muslim women as oppressed victims of patriarchy and the veil as a symbol of
female oppression, they have simultaneously participated in construction ethnically Danish women as liberated and the Danish society as a liberating place with structures of gender equality. The discourse of Danish gender equality has become almost hegemonic, and the one-sided focus on Muslim veils as oppressive has played, and continues to play, a role in maintaining this hegemony.93

Several politicians have been using the claimed gender equality among white Christian Danes to argue against Muslims and veiling. The examples are many: The spokesperson on equality issues from the current governing Liberal Party [Venstre], Troels Lund Poulsen, has argued that since ethnically Danish women are liberated debates about gender equality should focus on Muslims.94 Member of Parliament for the Danish People’s Party, Peter Skaarup, has argued: “It is negative that…[some Muslims] wear a veil because the veil makes integration complicated. If the family demands that a girl must be veiled in the school and at the work place when there will be Danish employers and customers in the store, where the girl is employed, who feel that veiling is a problem because veiling is making a distinction between Muslims and Danes, and that distinction creates another integration problem…In Denmark we have experienced a change in our society during the previous 20, 30, 40 years, where women and men have become equal, and traditionally, according to Danish culture and Danish history, it is discriminatory to wear a veil. The fact that women must hide their sexuality, cover their hair, it is, in a Danish context, an expression of devaluing the woman when compared to the man, and that is what we have fought against with our struggle for gender equality, and therefore the veil is a problem for our society…We have been fighting for this women’s emancipation and gender equality…The right thing is therefore to avoid the veil and live accordingly to our customs here in Denmark.”95 It is fascinating how Peter Skaarup, who has previously not been known for having participated in any feminist struggles or expressed feminist views – just like the Danish People’s Party neither has initiated any political actions aimed at increasing gender equality nor has feminism as part of their program – was speaking in favor of feminism when feminism could be used as an anti-Muslim tool. In Denmark, feminism has often become hostage in arguments against veils and/or Islam.

**Asmaa Abdol-Hamid and DR**

In March 2006, the Danish public service institution DR’s hiring of a veiled Muslim woman as a TV-hostess gave rise to a new veil debate in Denmark. The hostess, Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, was hired together with a male host Adam Holm, who is a declared atheist, to host a debate program
sparked by the recent cartoon controversy. Their program was titled *Adam & Asmaa*. According to DR2, the reason behind the program was: "The Muhammad case [i.e. the cartoon controversy] has revealed a gap in the understandings between the Western and the Islamic world. *Adam and Asmaa* is a debate series…which spans both sides of the gap in this conflict of understanding." The hiring of Asmaa was met with an outcry by IKIR (Organization for immigrant women) and the newly (March 8, 2006) established organization Women for Freedom [*Kvinder for frihed*], who demanded DR to fire Abdol-Hamid. On April 2, 2006 Women for Freedom published a press release which harshly criticized DR for the hiring of Abdol-Hamid. They wrote: “Abdol-Hamid is known as an Islamic fanatic and a supporter of sharia…DR is a public service channel and it is important that TV-hosts are objective, and not a space where fanatic views are expressed and rewarded. Views which in this case constitute a grim threat against for instance women’s rights.” This press release was quoted in the absolute majority of the Danish news media, and Women for Freedom received a lot of media attention which they used to express their dislike for Islam and veiling, which they interpreted solely as female oppressive. April 3, 2006 the organization Feminist Forum sent out a press release supporting the hiring of Abdol-Hamid: “The Feminist Forum want to congratulate DR with the hiring of Asmaa Abdol-Hamid…By doing this DR has contributed to improving both gender and ethnic equality in Denmark.” The following week several media debates between the Feminist Forum and Women for Freedom took place. The debates often emerged from a disagreement regarding veiling. Women for Freedom argued that veiling fundamentally and solely was an expression of female expression whereas the Feminist Forum argued that veiling was a multifaceted practice which could not simply be interpreted as oppressive. Furthermore Women of Freedom argued that DR’s hosts and hostess could signal neutrality and not agitate in favor of patriarchy or religion (as they interpreted a veiled hostess to do), whereas the Feminist Forum argued that Women of Freedom did not have the right to dictate how to be a ‘correctly’ liberated woman. On April 10, 2006, Women for Freedom presented the editor of DR news, Lisbeth Knudsen, with almost 500 signatures protesting against Asmaa Abdol-Hamid and demanding that she was removed from the program. Lisbeth Knudsen declared that her hiring of Abdol-Hamid was not to be reversed.

One of the interesting aspects of this debate was why the hiring of a veiled hostess could cause such a debate. What was the rationale behind the newspapers, radio and TV stations to cover this debate so fiercely? How come a veil could spark such debates within the Danish population? The feminist debate over the hiring of Abdol-Hamid can be interpreted as a struggle
over the right to define feminism as well as the right to define Danishness. Questions about whether feminism should be expressed as a post-colonial version of feminism or as a universal version and questions about whether Danishness and Danish nationality should be defined as multicultural or monocultural underlined the debate.

E4 How did the public debate start
The public debates about veiling began prior to 9/11, French regulation, and other external factors. According to some Muslim women, they have met more resistance towards their veil after 9/11 but the debates about veiling began much earlier. The debate about veiling began in the late 1990s, and it is hard to determine what sparked the debate(s). The employment debate seems to have been sparked by DR sending a series of news clips about how employers would not hire veiled women. The feminist debate seems to have been sparked by two newspapers who wanted to debate feminism and multiculturalism. The debate about Asmaa Abdol-Hamid began when she was hired and IKIR and Women for Freedom sent our press releases complaining about her hiring. Conclusively, it seems like internal factors sparked the debates, not external.

E5 Lines in the debate
See E3.

E6. Court cases
Danish employers’ refusal to hire veiled women has let to a few court cases where employers have been sued of discrimination. Below are descriptions of four legal cases where veiled employees have taken their (often former) employers to court. These four cases are the only legal cases I have been able to locate. However, there might have been other cases which have ended with reconciliation; often an integrated part of a legal reconciliation is that the involved are not allowed speaking publicly about the case, hence there are no public records of the case.

The Magasin veil case
A quite famous legal veil case is the so-called Magasin case. In this case, the department store Magasin was convicted of discrimination because they had refused to give an internship to a
woman who wished to wear a veil. The intern’s story has been written by Fakhra Mohammad, chairperson of the board at the Centre for Documentation and Counseling Related to Racial Discrimination (DRC), in the collection Når du strammer garnet (2004). The following description is based on Mohammad’s article and on archival material accessed at DRC. In November 1998, the 14-year-old Islam Amin Baktyar from grade 9 was to be an intern for a week at the department store Magasin in Odense, the third largest city in Denmark. Islam Amin was from a middle-class family, both her parents were doctors, and she was doing very well academically, so well in fact that her school had made her skip a year, hence her young age for a student in grade 9. Prior to her internship, she discussed with her mother whether her hijab might cause a problem. Her mother, herself veiled when working at Odense University hospital as a doctor, had argued “This is Denmark. It is a free country. You will not experience problems”. Upon her arrival at Magasin, Islam Amin was introduced to the store together with two other (unveiled) interns. The problem occurred when Islam Amin met the (female) head of the lingerie department. The head of department took her aside and said: “I really don’t want to deal with girls with veils.” Islam Amin was chocked by the woman’s tone of voice and her harshness. The woman did not explain why Islam could not wear a veil but simply said: “I have the decision making power and I do not want girls with veils.” Islam Amin refused to take off her veil, and the head therefore decided: “Well, then we cannot have you as an intern here in Magasin”. The same evening Islam Amin was watching a TV-show at the Danish public service TV-station TV2. The theme for the evening’s show was Muslim women’s relations to Denmark and viewers were invited to call in. Islam Amin called the show – and made her case public. The Magasin veil case, as the Islam Amin vs. Magasin case has become known as, was taken to court by DRC. Magasin was convicted of indirect discrimination and sentenced to pay Islam Amin 10,000 Dkr. on August 10, 2000. This case was the first court case in Danish legal history to decide upon interpretations regarding veiling in relation to the Law against Discriminatory Behavior on the Labor Market [Lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet m.v.]. The Magasin sentence let several chain stores and companies to change their previous practice of not hiring veiled women. FBD, DSB (The national railroads), IKEA, MacDonalds, Unibank (now Nordea) and Magasin for instance gave up previous requirements prohibiting head veils. The sentence did not change all stores’ attitudes, Dansk Supermarked’s head of information, Poul Guldborg, said immediately after Magasin was found guilty of discrimination:
“The sentence does not really mean anything to us, and we do not see any reason to change our procedures”.

The large cleaning service chain, ISS, has since the late 1990s supplied employees with ISS-veils if they wish to be veiled while working. It was not because of campaigns or court cases that ISS introduced a veiled version of their uniform, it was simply because an increasing number of their employees were Muslim women and they therefore saw a need for including a veiled uniform.

The Tom Chocolate Factory Case

Another case initiated by DRC was the, less famous, legal case called Tom’s case or Tom’s Chocolate Factory vs. DRC. Based on DRC’s archival material, the case was as follows: Famita Andersen, a Danish Muslim woman, had been unemployed for a while. In June 1998 she signed up for a so-called AMU course. (AMU courses are training courses with the intention of preparing people for entering the labor market). She was to attend a seven weeks course including a two weeks internship at Tom’s Chocolate Factory (Tom’s). She was told that Tom’s guaranteed employment for participants who completed the course. She did inquire a Tom’s representative about whether she as a (hijab) veiled woman also could be sure of getting employment. The representative responded negatively. Despite this, Famati remained at the course. Two weeks later, she re-inquired and received again a negative response. Hereafter she provided Tom’s with several suggestions to how it could be possible to be veiled at their factory, e.g. she could wear a net on top of her veil. On Aug. 03, 1998 she received a letter from Tom’s stating: “Regarding head covering: We hereby inform you that it is not allowed to wear other head coverings that the supplied hairnet in the production, not even if one was to wear another head covering under the hairnet. If you are not able to accept this, you cannot work at Tom’s Chocolate Factory.”

The General Workers’ Union [Fabrik- og Specialarbejdernes forbund] became involved in the case and Tom’s elaborated that it was two large supermarket chains, Tesco i England and ICA i Sverige, i.e. the purchasers of Tom’s chocolate, who demanded the strict employee uniform requirements. The Union therefore concluded that Tom’s practice of not hiring veiled women was fair because departing from purchasers’ demands would be financially fatal; hence the Union closed the case. Famati Andersen contacted DRC who decided to take her case to court. Famita Andersen’s case was taken to the High Court, which on April 5, 2001 sentenced that Tom’s practice regarding head coverage as hygienically moved; hence Tom’s was found not guilty of discrimination. DRC appealed the case and it was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court never sentenced because the case ended
with reconciliation in January 2002. In January 2002, Tom’s launched their new uniform veil: A Muslim veil which lived up to Tom’s high security and hygienic standards and carried the firms’ logo. Famita Andersen had help develop the veil and was paid Dkr. 30,000 for her veil consultant work. Following the reconciliation, Famati Andersen said in a press release: “Successful business management demands co-operativeness and open-mindedness, and I encourage businesses in Denmark to support the fine results we have gained for religiously veiled women. We, Muslim women, want to join the labor force, and I don’t find that a headscarf should be any hindrance. We would like to contribute to a positive relationship between us and the employers. We are open-minded and we hope that the business concerns also will be open-minded because oppression of our religious identity only leads to narrow-mindedness and intolerance.”

**HK vs. Aldi case**
The Union HK (an abbreviation for ‘trading and office’, in Danish *Handel & Kontor*) has taken two cases of veil discrimination to court. The union HK represents employees within the areas of retail and administration. The first case is called the HK vs. *Aldi* case. *Aldi* is a German-owned grocery store chain. According to the Muslim woman, AC, and various legal documents as well as internal documents accessed at HK’s legal department, the story behind the case was as described below.

In July 2001, AC responded to a job advertisement from *Aldi*. A few days later, *Aldi*’s regional manager, CC, called her and asked her for interview. Meanwhile she had been granted six months parental leave, and was therefore no longer interested in employment. CC asked her to contact him when her leave was over. In January 2002 she got back to CC to inquire about job opportunities. He sent her for an interview with the Head of Branch [*filialleder*], TL, in Rødovre on May 14, 2002. The interview went well and TL was very enthusiastic about AC’s competences and told her not to get employment elsewhere as TL wanted to employ her. However, TL did not have the authority to hire her and therefore needed to speak to the regional manager CC. Friday the 18th of May, 2002, AC was then called for an interview with TL and CC who both were excited about AC and the prospect of hiring her. During the interview, CC asked AC about her religion and asked whether she would be wearing her veil (hijab) while working. He said that he personally did not mind her veil but if she was to wear it during work, he had to speak to his superior regarding rules of veiling. CC promised to call AC back on Monday (May 21, 2002). CC did not call on Monday and AC therefore called him Tuesday afternoon. According to AC, CC did not know what to say to her during the phone conversation, but he did say that he suddenly had come across other applicants...
whom he also needed to interview. He also said that AC’s veil had not been a problem with his superior. On Wednesday AC called CC again and was told that he had decided to hire two other employees on halftime contracts instead of hiring her fulltime. AC then asked if CC needed her for some of the other Aldi stores which CC said he did not. However, AC had seen job advertisements from Aldi in a newspaper as well as at the public job centre [Arbejdsformidlingen]. AC also knew, from previous working experiences at Aldi, that the chain always lacked employees. AC had – before her conversion to Islam – been educated as a sales assistant and had been working as sub-local manager [I. stedfortræder] in a Aldi store for two years. Furthermore, she had held the position as Department Responsible [Områdeansvarlig] in Dagrofa (Denmark’s largest grocery supplier company) for 18 months and a position as First Assistant in a Netto store (chain of grocery stores) for one year. She said: “There is no doubt that I possess the required qualifications to get a job in Aldi, and I know that I would have been hired on the spot had it not been for my veil.”

AC’s union HK took her case to court. According to Aldi’s lawyer, Aldi did not agree with AC’s version of what had happened during her job interviews and after the interviews. Aldi argued that CC informed AC that there were other applicants for the job during the interview. Aldi also argued that they asked AC if she was interested in working halftime which she refused. Aldi further argued that CC had not asked AC about her religion or veiling during the interview, and finally, Aldi argued that there were no other job availabilities in the district. The first two issues AC continuously denied and they ended as conflict of evidence during the case. Regarding the final issue, HK proved that there had been other job availabilities in Aldi in the Copenhagen area but not in CC’s specific district.

Aldi’s lawyer further emphasized that veiling could not clearly be interpreted as a religious act. The lawyer for instance included documents from Muslims arguing that veiling is caused by culture and not religion. There has been much dispute about whether veiling is a religious or cultural practice in Denmark and elsewhere. The reason behind Aldi’s lawyer’s emphasis of veiling as a cultural practice is that the Danish laws prohibit religious discrimination. This means that if the defense could prove that veiling is a not a religious practice then Aldi could not be convicted of religious discrimination.

The case Aldi vs. HK ended with a reconsolidation in June 2003. AC was awarded 30,000 DKr. from Aldi according to the Danish discrimination law. Because of this reconsolidation this case is not well-known in Denmark. It never received much media attention because there never was any public or press access to court documents or a final reconsolidation.
The Føtex case
A much more widely known case is the so-called Føtex case. This case was conducted by HK on behalf of Najla Ainouz against the department store chain Føtex. According to Najla Ainouz, Føtex discriminated against her when they fired her on May 28, 2000. Najla Ainouz has hired as a Føtex cashier in September 1996. From 1996-1999 she worked halftime as a cashier while also attending commercial upper-secondary school [Handelsgymnasium]. From August 1999 to March 2000 she was employed as a fulltime cashier while also helping out in the store’s bakery department. The bakery’s manager [slagsleder] offered her a fulltime position in the bakery, which she accepted March 2000. She was well-liked in the store. The Føtex’s staff club asked her to join and she participated in arranging parties and social gathering for the staff at her store; she was also chosen as vice-chairperson for the staff club. The bakery’s manager resigned and Najla Ainouz applied for her job but her application was turned down. Instead a man, who had not previously worked at Føtex, got the job. Najla Ainouz spent the next few months introducing her new boss to his job. She found those months hard because the bakery became chaotic due to the manager’s limited knowledge of bakeries or Føtex stores. Furthermore there were several replacements of staff in the bakery. From March 2000 to April 2001 she worked a lot, including taking shifts for other employees who were sick. She found that her workload was larger than what could be expected of a sales assistant. At the end of April 2001, she was offered the position as bakery manager, because her new male boss had been promoted. She accepted the position.

On May 24, 2001 she called the Assistant Service Person [assisterende serviceperson] to inform that she had decided to begin wearing a headscarf. During the previous five months, Najla Ainouz had participated in a so-called cultivating group. This was a kind of study group where a female friend taught Najla Ainouz and other females about Islam. During this cultivation she had become more conscious of her religion and had decided to wear a veil (hijab). The following day the Head of Service [serviceleder] called Najla Ainouz and told her that she was shocked about her decision to veil. She asked her to participate in a meeting with her and the Head of the store [Varehuschef]. Najla Ainouz was asked to arrive at the meeting, which took place in the Føtex store, in civil clothing. During the meeting, Najla Ainouz was asked if her parents have forced her to be veiled. Despite her decline of force, the Head of Service asked Najla Ainouz’s friend, behind Najla Ainouz’s back, if she had been forced to wear the veil. This upset Najla Ainouz who was also upset that the Head of Service had gossiped about her and her veil to other staff members. During the meeting, Najla Ainouz was asked if she was a member of a union. She responds positively but
added that she would not fire complains against *Føtex* because she liked her job. The meeting took place on Friday the 25th of May, and at the end of it they all agreed that they will find a solution. They arrange to meet again on Monday for a new meeting.

During the meeting, Najla Ainouz had a suspicion that they might fire her because the Head of the *Føtex* store expressed that he feared that HK might sue them, even though Najla Ainouz would not. Najla Ainouz therefore called HK who advised her to participate in Monday’s meeting and actively offer solutions which could combine her religious needs and *Føtex*’s needs. On Monday she offered to wear veils with *Føtex*’s logo that would match the uniform. *Føtex* was not interested in this offer, and asked her to resign, which she refused. The Head of the store told her that the only job available for a veiled woman was at the gate (for delivery of goods) but that position was currently occupied.\(^{119}\) The Head of the store fired Najla Ainouz. Her firing included an immediate dismissal, contrary to the traditional three months notice.

HK took the case to court twice. The first case was held at the High Court which acquitted *Føtex* of charges on December 18, 2003. This sentence was appealed and the case was taken to the Supreme Court which also acquitted *Føtex* on January 21, 2005.

Sparked by the *Magasin* case (described above), *Dansk Supermarked*, who owns the chains *Føtex*, *Netto* and *Bilka*, introduced clothing regulations in August 2000. These regulations prohibited veiling for employees who are in contact with costumers, i.e. employees working in the store room can be veiled. The clothing regulations also prohibit caps, Jewish skullcap (kippas), large Christian crosses as well as visible piercings or unnatural hair colors. These clothing regulations had been written down and distributed among all *Dansk Supermarked*’s staff during the fall of 2000, and from August 2000 onwards all new employees had been equipped with a pamphlet describing the clothing regulations. The judges therefore ruled that *Føtex*’s veil prohibition was not a question of discrimination but rather a question of clothing uniform. According to Najla Ainouz’s contract from March 1, 2001 (where she was hired fulltime in the bakery) she had signed that her employment included “the rules and duties described in the staff regulations”. This meant that Najla Ainouz, when signing her contract, also had accepted that she would oblige to the regulations in the staff regulations. In the clothing regulations from August 2000 it says: “In all areas where there is not a demand for a certain head covering it is a part of our uniform demands that employees do not wear headgear.”\(^{120}\)

According to Frans Harboe, Head of Staff [*Koncernpersonalechef*] for *Dansk Supermarked*, veiling has always been prohibited for employees at *Dansk Supermarked*. Because of
the *Magasin* case, *Dansk Supermarked* saw a need for specifying this prohibition, hence the introduction of their clothing regulations. The reason behind the clothing regulations was, according to Frans Harboe, that employees must signal that they are affiliated with the store in question and that the employees appear as neutral as possible.\(^{121}\)

There have been other complaints regarding veil-based discrimination in the field of employment that have not been taken to court. Most often because the complainers have chosen not to take legal means against the employers who have discriminated against them.

The Danish legal practice contrasts with the Norwegian case where veil bans in the workplace has been ruled to be a violation of the Gender Equality Act. Here it is the discriminatory effects of veil bans on women employees, which have been in the forefront, and the individual women’s right to non-discrimination in the labor market has decided the matter. The general evaluation by the appeals boards as well as the Ombud is that prohibition mainly would have negative consequences for women employees using veils.\(^{122}\)

### E7 Actors in the debates

Actors are mentioned in more detail the description of the debates (E3). Actors are mainly politicians, women’s/feminist organizations, and interviewed employers. Very few ‘ordinary’ people, who have not been organized, have been actors.

During Dec. 2006 and Jan. 2007, I interviewed six Muslim women, who are all prominent actors in the Danish debates about veiling and women's rights.\(^{123}\) Theses women were:

**Nahid Riazi (NR):** 40-years old woman of Iranian origin who has lived in Denmark since 1989. NR is the founder and leader of the organization IKIR (Organization for Immigrant Women’s Rights). NR has been advocating actively against veiling for a number of years. She argues that religion (Islam as well as Christianity) is patriarchal and does not benefit the freedom of women. She is in favor of a total separation of religion and politics. She is one of the most media quoted women of color in Danish debates about gender equality and Islam.

**Sherin Khankan (SK):** 32 years old Danish Muslim feminist with a Syrian father and Finnish mother. SK is the founder and head of the organization Critical Muslims [*Kritiske Muslimer*]. SK
advocates for a feminist re-interpretation of the Koran and practices of Islam. She works as a
teacher at the Arabic independent school [Den arabiske friskole], has a consultant firm, is a
columnist and public speaker, and has published the book Islam & Forsoning – en offentlig sag
(2006). She has been involved in the public debate in Denmark for a number of years. She argues in
favor of Euro Islam. She is not veiled herself but argues in favor of veiling and against the French
regulation. She argues in favor of integrating religious arguments at the same level of other
arguments in political debates.

Fatima Zahra (FZ): 48-year old ethnically Danish convert. FZ converted in 1999. She is an active
member of Critical Muslims and a co-founder of Critical Muslims’ women’s counseling. She is also
an active member of the organization Democratic Muslims. FZ is veiled because of political
reasons. She finds her veil expands her options in her multicultural neighborhood in Copenhagen.
FZ is determined to give ethnic Danes a different image of Muslim women. She is a feminist and
argues that Islam gives women freedom.

Asmaa Abdol-Hamid (AAH): 25-year old Danish Muslim of Palestinian origin. Trained as a social
worker, has worked as a TV-hostess, whose veil sparked much debate (see session E3). She
advocates for Islam as a feminist project, and has started the Muslim feminist group The Green
Veils. AAH is actively involved in politics, and ran for office, for the Red-Green Alliance, at the
last municipality election (2005). AAH reported, and ran the case against, the newspaper Jylands-
Posten for discrimination when the paper published their drawings of the Prophet Muhammad. She
lives in Vollsmose, an infamous ‘immigrant ghetto’. She argues in favor of veils in all public
places.

Uzma Ahmed Andresen (UAA): 31-year old Danish Muslim of Pakistani origin. UAA is the head
of the Organization for Ethnic Equality [Foreningen for etnis ligestilling]. She is also the head of the
women’s organization Hennah; a women’s organization for ethnic/racial minority women with
various backgrounds. Hennah aims at creating space for themselves as minority women and
undermining the stereotypical image of minority women in Denmark. The Organization for Ethnic
Equality is not a religious organization, and UAA argues against organizing according to religion.
UAA has been active in the Danish debate about integration, discrimination and minority women
for a number of years. UAA is working as an integration consultant for the Danish Red Cross. UAA is not veiled; she argues against prohibiting veiling as well as forced veiling.

Halima El Abassi (HEA): 28-years-old Danish Muslim of Moroccan origin. HEA is the sub head of the Organization for Ethnic Equality and an active member of the women’s organization Hennah. She works as a social worker, specialized in intercultural social work. She has been active in debates about ethnic/racial minorities and discrimination for a number of years. HEA finds that ethnic Danes expect her to be an oppressed, uneducated, and unemployed woman, and meet her as such. She fights against that image. HEA will (together with UAA, AAH and three other women) participate in a public service national (DR) TV series about ‘Muslim women’ (six women will be portrayed) in the spring 2007. HEA has been veiled but is no longer veiled; she argues against prohibiting veiling as well as against forced veiling.

**E8 Sites**

The public labor sector is affected by the lack of will / regulations against hiring veiled women. Mainly the veiled women are affected. Muslim women point to that they face a double or triple barrier: Firstly, by having a non-ethnically Danish name, which prevents employment; secondly by wearing a veil which prevents employment; and thirdly, by being a woman which prevents them from reaching top positions in the Danish patriarchal society.  

**E9 Religious pressure groups**

The Muslim religious pressure groups do not have much pressure power. This might be because there is not one united pressure group (see C8). No Islamic schools are arguing that the court should take them into consideration. The imam Abu Laban argued in relation to a homicide on a racial/ethnic minority committed by a group of ethnic/racial minority men in 2005, that the violator’s family should pay 200,000 Dkr. as blood money to the violated person’s family, as a means of ending the conflict. The suggestion was negatively received by various politicians in Denmark. No courts are taking schools into consideration when judging. Only marginalized groups, like Hizb ut Tahrir, are publicly advocating the implementation of sharia into the Danish court system.
The voice of the ordinary Muslim is silenced. Ethnic/racial minorities are seldom heard in the debates. Surveys show that ethnic/racial minorities are only cited as sources or experts in 20 percent of the news stories about ethnic/racial minorities. I.e. ethnic/racial minorities’ voices are not heard in stories about ethnic/racial minorities. If one look broadly at news stories, then surveys show that ethnic/racial minorities only very seldom are used as sources; only 0.5 percent of the news stories have ethnic/racial minorities as sources. If one looks at which ethnic/racial minorities are being cited in the media, there is a heavy domination of male ethnic/racial minorities. Most of these men are politicians, imams, or academics specialized in ethnic/racial minority issues.

Several Muslim women, that I interviewed in Dec. 2006, argue that they have a hard time being heard in the debate. They complain that only the extremist voices are heard. Halima El Abassi, sub leader of the Society for Ethnical Equality, argues for instance: “We only hear the extreme stories in the media, and these stories are presented as general stories. Individual women, who have terrible stories, get voice in the media, and they are used in the integration councils [integrationsråd], so these women get a lot of space, and their stories influence the Danish understanding of Muslim women and veiling”. One of the few female Muslim voices who have been heard is Sherin Khankan, the leader of Critical Muslims. She argues: “Critical Muslims have always focused on making women more visible. We have been quite successful in making women visible. Prior to the foundation of Critical Muslims there were very few Muslim female voices in the Danish debate. Now female voices from Critical Muslims are heard often in the debate.”

Nahid Riazi, leader of the IKIR (Organization for Immigrant Women) argues: “There is a struggle going on between different groups of immigrants who want to represent ‘all’ immigrants. Many of the religious immigrants claim to talk on behalf of all of us. But there are many immigrants who are not religious. Many immigrants have fled from a religious regime and they don’t want to be represented by the Imams in Denmark. We, myself and IKIR, are struggling to be heard. We are fighting against the religious groups because we want to show the official Denmark that there are many different kinds of immigrants. The main image of immigrants is that they are religious Muslims, we need to show that there are other immigrants also. There are many ordinary immigrants, who are not so religious, but we do not get voice. The fundamentalist Muslims are very vocal, they get much more attention than their numbers justify. They are better organized than we are, and they have much more money, because they get support from the Muslim countries, so it is hard for us to compete against them.”
E11 Loci of debates
The main site for debate has been the media, especially the news media.

E12 Public opinion on veiling
There are no surveys on ethnic Danes’ attitudes towards or opinions about veiling. See also C9.

E13 Proposed solutions
Some people argue in favor of prohibiting veiling from the public sphere. Others argue in favor of including headscarves completely, i.e. stop discriminating against veiling in relation to e.g. employment. Neither of these two standpoints can be characterized as solutions.

E14 Identify documents
- The debate in Parliament about prohibiting veiling (called B 201 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod at bære kulturbestemt hovedbeklædning). The debate is transcribed and available via: http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm. This debate can be analyzed in relation to notions of nationality and neutrality.
- Media debates: I have copied all newspapers articles from the first court case (Magasin case) that can be analyzed.
- Grounds of the judgment (from the court cases); these are legal documents.
- Feminist debates re. veiling (newspaper articles and news clips, press releases, Women for Freedom’s website and writings).
- Interviews with actors in the debate.

Appendix
The various Muslim headscarves and veils have generally been labeled “the veil” [tørklædet] by politicians, debaters and media producers. Despite that fact, that media debates have been
accompanied by visual images illustrating different kind of veils, i.e. burkas, nikabs, hijabs, chadors, and dupattas, people debating veiling have verbally been talking as if there was only one kind of veil, namely “the veil” or “the Muslim veil”.

1 A new comparative research project Gender, Islam and liberal citizenship: the mobilisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom focuses on the role of religion for the majority and minorities from a cross-national perspective. The Danish country study by Birte Siim is titled “Between secularism and Islamism: The mobilisation of Muslim Women in Denmark “.
2 This session is based on Andreassen, The Mass Media’s Communication about Visible Minorities from 1971 to 2004, 29 ff.
3 1965 is the first year when statistics about Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrants are available, and 1971 is the first year with available statistic for Pakistani immigrants. See David Coleman & Eskil Wadensjö, Immigration to Denmark: International and national perspectives, (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, 1999), 151.
4 One exception to this was Nordic citizens who from 1954 were allowed to settle and work freely within the three countries.
5 The term EU substituted the term EEC when the European Economic Community officially transferred to the European Union with the implementation of the Maastricht treaty, signed in 1992 and implemented in 1993. I use the terms EEC when talking about earlier stages of the European community and the term EU when talking about the European Community from 1993 onwards.
6 Hans Kornø Rasmussen, No Entry: immigration policy in Europe, (Copenhagen: Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1997), 30. There is uncertainty about the number, David Coleman et al. argues that there were 18,650 immigrants at the time the immigration stop was passed in 1973. See David Coleman & Eskil Wadensjö, Immigration to Denmark: International and national perspectives, (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, 1999), 154.
7 For more on the Alien Act of 1983 see Lone Christensen et al., Udvænder, (Jurist og økonomiforbundet, 1995).
8 Birgitte Gormsen, Flygtninge/indvandrer-debatten i 30 år. En diskursanalytisk tilgang til de politiske orienteringer, (Unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Department for Political Science, University of Aarhus, 1999), 68.
9 Lone Christensen et al., Udvænder, (Jurist- og økonomiforbundet, 1995), 237.
10 This section is based on Søren Pedersen, “Migration to and from Denmark during the period 1960-97”, in Immigration to Denmark. International and National Perspectives (David Coleman & Eskil Wadensjö, Aarhus: The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, Aarhus University Press, 1999, pp. 148-191) and Hans Korno Rasmussen, No Entry: Immigration Policy in Europe, (Copenhagen: Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1997), 154 ff.
11 There is discrepancy between numbers of asylum seekers from source to source; these numbers are based on information from Danish Refugee Council [Dansk Flygtningehjælp], “Anerkendte flygtninge 1956-1995”, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, provided by Ole Hjulmand, Dansk Flygtningehjælp and “Numbers of Asylum Seekers in Denmark 1980-1990”, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, provided by Ole Hjulmand, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, and “Spontane asylansøgere, alle nationaliteter 1986-1995”, Dansk Flygtningehjælp, provided by Ole Hjulmand, Dansk Flygtningehjælp. These numbers do not always correspond with Danmarks Statistik.
15 This chapter is based on (it is a copy of) Rikke Andreassen, The Mass Media’s Constructions of Gender, Sexuality, Race and Nationality, 69-73.
16 Despite this, the only way to translate the Danish ‘erhvervelse af indfødsret’ seems to be by using the term ‘naturalization’, just as it seems like the best way to translate the Danish ‘at få dansk indfødsret’ is by the terms ‘becoming naturalized in Denmark’ or ‘obtain Danish citizenship’.

Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 29, original text: "ingen på grund af sin race, hudfarve, nationale eller etniske oprindelse, tro eller seksuelle orientering.

Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 34, original text: "Alle mennesker er født frie og lige i værdighed og rettigheder" and "uden forskelsbehandling af nogen grund af race, hudfarve, national eller etniske oprindelse, tro eller seksuelle orientering.


Indfødsretten 1776, original text: “at alle Embeder I Vore Stater, Hof, Geistlige, Militære og Civile, af stor eller lille Betroenhed, ej kunne eller skulle gives til andre end indfødte Landets Børn.” A scanned copy of the original Indfødsrets law can be seen at: http://www.dr.dk/undervisning/indvandring/docs/1776.htm

Original text: “…Égenskab…at Personen er født i Vore Stater.” A scanned copy of the original Indfødsrets law can be seen at: http://www.dr.dk/undervisning/indvandring/docs/1776.htm.


Scandinavia” in Christina Carlsson-Wetterberg, Kari Melby, and Anna-Birte Ravn (eds): Gender Equality as a Perspective of Welfare. The Limits of Political Reform, the Nordic Council of Ministers (forthcoming).


Mandana Zarrehparvar, Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 33, original text: "forbyder truende, forhånende og nedværdigende udtalelser og propaganda mod en gruppe personer på grund af race, hudfarve, national eller etnisk oprindelse, tro eller seksuel orientering".

Mandana Zarrehparvar, Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 34, original text: "ingen på grund af sin race, hudfarve, nationale eller etniske oprindelse, tro eller seksuelle orientering må diskrimineres ved blandt andet betjening og adgang til alle for offentligheden bestemte steder og indretninger, såsom transportmidler, hoteller, restauranter, cafeer, teatre og parker".

Mandana Zarrehparvar, Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 34.

Mandana Zarrehparvar, Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 36.

This contrast with Norway where hijab bans in the work place has been ruled to be a violation of the Gender Equality Act, because it is against individual women’s right to non-discrimination in the labour market (Skeje, 2006).

Mandana Zarrehparvar, Ligebehandling, status og fremtidsperspektiver, (Institut for menneskerettigheder, 2005), 29, original text: "Alle mennesker er født frie og lige i værdighed og rettigheder” and “uden forskelsbehandling af nogen art, fx på grund af race, farve, køn, sprog, religion, politisk eller anden anskuelse, national eller social oprindelse, formueforhold, fødsel eller anden samfundsmaessig stilling.

The Women’s Convention is not included into Danish law and this has raised a debate about advantages and disadvantages about included the Convention into Danish legislation. The Women’s Convention has been called the “invisible convention” and the Institute for Human Rights finds that the general knowledge of the Convention is limited due to the lack of incorporation in Danish legislation and feminist lawyers like Kirsten Ketcher have complained of its lack of binding effect (Siim, 2005).


The directive 2000/43/EF is implemented in Danish law via law no. 411 of 06/06/2002, (i.e Lov om etablering af Dansk Center for Internationale Studier og Menneskerettigheder) and via LBK no. 31 of 12/01/2005, (i.e. Lov om etnisk ligebehandling) and via Bekendtgørelse af lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet m.v. (for latter two see prior B 8). The directive 2000/78/EF is implemented in Danish law via law no. 1462 of 22/12/2002 (i.e. Lov om ændring af sømandsloven og lov om skibes besætning (Justering af reglerne om tidsbegrænset ansættelse for søfarende samt tilpasning af nationalitetskrav til førere af handelsskibe og fiskeskibe), and LBK no. 31 of 12/01/2005 (i.e. Bekendtgørelse af lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet m.v.); via LBK no. 68 of 21/01/2005 (i.e. Bekendtgørelse af lov om retsforholdet mellem arbejdsgivere og funktionærer); via LBK no. 742 of 18/07/2005 (i.e. Bekendtgørelse om Statens
Descendants from less developed countries with visible minorities is, of course, a generalisation. People of colour, among the immigrants from more developed countries, and the equalisation of immigrants and descendants from more developed countries has surpassed the number of immigrants from less developed countries. From the second half of the 1990s, the number of immigrants from less developed countries and 79,594 immigrants from less developed countries. Five years later, in 1995, the number of immigrants from less developed countries has surpassed the number of immigrants from more developed countries.


According to the UN’s 1994-definition the term “more developed countries” includes USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all European countries except Turkey, Cyprus, and parts of the former Soviet Union.

In 1980, the number of immigrants from more developed countries was 99,795 compared to the number of immigrants from less developed countries which were 34,910; in 1990 the number had risen to 101,515 immigrants from more developed countries and 79,594 immigrants from less developed countries. Five years later, in 1995, the numbers of immigrants from the two groups are almost equal with 112,763 immigrants from more developed countries and 112,272 immigrants from less developed countries, and from the second half of the 1990s, the number of immigrants from less developed countries has surpassed the number of immigrants from more developed countries.


Interview with Fatima Zahra by Rikke Andreassen & Birte Siim, Dec. 21, 2006.

Interview with Uzma Ahmed Andresen & Bente Clausen, ”Flest til højmesse hos de mandlige præster”, Kristeligt-Dagblad, Nov. 17, 2006.

Interview with Fatima Zahra by Rikke Andreassen & Birte Siim, Dec. 21, 2006.


According to the UN’s 1994-definition the term “more developed countries” includes USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all European countries except Turkey, Cyprus, and parts of the former Soviet Union.

In 1980, the number of immigrants from more developed countries was 99,795 compared to the number of immigrants from less developed countries which were 34,910; in 1990 the number had risen to 101,515 immigrants from more developed countries and 79,594 immigrants from less developed countries. Five years later, in 1995, the numbers of immigrants from the two groups are almost equal with 112,763 immigrants from more developed countries and 112,272 immigrants from less developed countries, and from the second half of the 1990s, the number of immigrants from less developed countries has surpassed the number of immigrants from more developed countries.

Parlament debate re. B210, available via http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm, original text: “Regeringen kan ikke støtte forslaget, og det skyldes for det første, at forslaget gør forskel på religioner…For det andet vil Dansk Folkepartis forslag være i strid med bl.a. lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet og lov om etnisk ligebehandling…Forslaget er retsstridigt, fordi der gøres forskel på landets borgere”.


B 201 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod at bære kulturbestemt hovedbeklædning, available via http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm, original text: “det er helt naturligt, at loven forlanger, at mennesker, der er ansat af det offentlige, og som repræsenterer det offentlige i forholdet til borgerne, ikke samtidig med udøvelsen af deres arbejde kan praktisere religioner, der er stærkt afvigende fra de traditioner, der gælder i vores del af verden”.

Parlament debate re. B210, available via http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm, original text: “tørklæder er et udtryk for kønslig tvang, som overhovedet ikke hører hjemme i et moderne samfund som det danske…et tørklæde, det er lige præcis en person, som er imod de danske normbegreber, værdibegreberne I Denmark of I vores kultur”.


Parlament debate re. B210, available via http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm, original text: “Vi skal nok have plads til forskellighed og fleksibilitet, men det skal være på danske værdipræmisser”.

Parlament debate re. B210, available via http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm, original text: “når en ung kvinde i Denmark, efter at have gået vestligt klædt, fra den ene gad til den anden meddeler sin arbejdsgiver, at hun nu vil gå med tørklæde, fordi hendes gud forbyder hende det, og fordi hun er bange for ellers ikke at komme i himlen, så er jeg alvorlig bange for, at det er tegn på, at der er kræfter i indvandrermiljøerne, der ikke vil acceptere, at pigerne bliver for integrerede i det danske samfund. Og for at sige det mere og helt direkte, jeg tror, at den gud, der har påbudt pigerne noget, er deres familier, måske mest de mandlige familiemedlemmer…Derfor skal vi ikke bare lade stå til. For de unge kvinders skyld og for det danske samfunds skyld må vi sende det tydelige signal, at vi i Danmark ikke vil acceptere, at vi ser kvinders personlige frihed knægtet”.

Parlament debate re. B210, available via http://www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm, original text: “når det er et forkert redskab, så er det jo, fordi man her stiller sig i den patriarkalske fars sted og i stedet for lader staten optræde som den patriarkalske far, der på vegne af individet kan sige, hvad man må, og hvad man ikke må…Derfor må man skrde ind der, hvor presset påstår. Det gælder i forhold til tørklæder, og det gælder i forhold til tvangsægteskaber…når man oplever…at unge kvinder bliver udsatt for tvang…det der er værd på at debattere, nemlig om nogle bliver påduttet et tørklæde, som de ikke har nogen interesse i, og hvordan vi understøtter, at det ikke sker.”


debatter på et andet tidspunkt om, hvordan vi hjælper de børn, unge piger, som har problemer, og også unge mænd for den sagen skylde, der jo også bliver fanget af nogle af de holdninger, der kan være i nogle miljøer.”

34 This section is based on Rikke Andreassen, The Mass Media’s Construction of Gender, Race, Sexuality and Nationality: An Analysis of the Danish News Media’s Communication about Visible Minorities from 1971 to 2004, Ph.D. dissertation from Dept. of History, University of Toronto, 2005, 124-191.

35 DR (Station), primetime news program TV-Avisen, date: 19990806, original text: “det [hovedtørklæde] frastøder vores kunder.”

36 DR (Station), primetime news program TV-Avisen, date: 19990806, original text: "vi ved, at nogle af vores kunder de reagerer negativt, hvis medarbejdere signalerer tilhørsforhold til bestemte grupper. Og derfor er det, at vi lægger vægt på, det er den uniformering vi har, den signalerer rent FDB og ikke andet.”

37 DR (Station), primetime news program TV-Avisen, date: 19990806, original text: “tørklædet lægger hinderinger i vejen for jobs.”


41 Per Michael Jespersen, “Ikke vores ansvær”, Politiken, (Copenhagen, May 26, 2001): section 3, 6, original text: “Man ender let i en kulturimperialisme, hvor fulde danske kvinder går ind af fordommmer disse ‘tilbagestående individer, som lever i den mørke middelalder’. Hvilken ret har vi til at foretage sådanne dommer over andres liv?”


43 Per Michael Jespersen, “Kvindesværgens fatale svigt”, Politiken, (Copenhagen, May 26, 2001): section 3, 6, original text: “Menneskerettigheder og kvindereettigheder er universelle, og hvis kvinder bliver undertrykt skal kvindesværgensforkæmpere da være imod det. Kvindesværgens argument om at ‘det er deres kultur, og hvis de vil tillade kvinduendertrykning, så må de selv om det’ er noget af det mest hykleriske, jeg længe har hørt”.

44 Hanne Vibke Holst, “Det nødvendige oprør”, Politiken, (Copenhagen, June 02, 2001): section 3, 6, original text: “sløret for mig at se er en dybt oprørende måde at hæmme pigebarnets og kvindens frie udfoldelse på, såvel kropsligt som mentalt…hvis vi skal løse nogle af de voldsomme integrationsproblemer, vi så afmægtigt trampet rundt i, så er det nødvendigt, at vi som samfund tager det pinefulde opgør med den fundamentalistiske kultur”.


46 Mai-Britt Iversen, “Gu’ er det vores ansvær”, Politiken, (Copenhagen, June 02, 2001): section 3, 6, original text: “Vi skal tale imod slør, men for at drænge opdragtes til at respektere kvinder.”


The debate included a few letters to the editors from ethnically Danish feminists who argued that they had helped or collaborated with visible minority women. But these counter-voices were not given much room in the newspapers. Letters to the editor that tried to add nuance to the debate and critiqued Ammitzbøll’s article, for instance, were not published; instead the newspapers provided space for presenting the veil as a symbol of female oppression. See for instance the Feminist Forum [Feministisk Forum] website where a letter to the editor, regarding the debate, which was sent to Jyllandsposten but not published, is available: http://www.feministiskforum.dk/tekster/Modbilleder.html.


DR’s website: http://www.dr.dk/dr2/Adam+og+Asmaa, original text: "Muhammed-sagen har afsløret en afgrundsdyb forståelseskløft mellem den vestlige og islamiske verden. 'Adam og Asmaa' er en debatserie, der spænder over begge sider af forståelseskløften.

Women for Freedom’s website:
http://www.kvinderforfrihed.dk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=2, original text: "Asma Abdul Hamid er kendt som islamisk fanatiker og tilhænger af sharia...DR er en public service kanal - og det er afgørende, at studieværter er objektive og ikke som et holdested, hvor fanatiske holdninger udtrykkes og belønnes. Holdninger som i dette tilfælde udgør en ganske grum trussel mod bl.a. kvinders rettigheder".


I, the author Rikke Andreassen, must add that I personally took part in this debate, representing the Feminist Forum, and I am therefore not neutral in this debate. However, I do believe that I, as an academic scholar, am able to describe my positions on the political issues involved.

However, several of these signatures were not valid. In order for a petition signature to be valued it must include a person’s full name and address; a large amount of Women for Freedom’s signatures consisted only of initials and/or were lacking addresses.

Lisbeth Knudsen’s written response to the petition can be seen via DR’s website:
http://www.kvinderforfrihed.dk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=2


http://www.kvinderforfrihed.dk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=2

Letters to the editor that tried to add nuance to the debate and critiqued Ammitzbøll’s article, for instance, were not published; instead the newspapers provided space for presenting the veil as a symbol of female oppression. See for instance the Feminist Forum [Feministisk Forum] website where a letter to the editor, regarding the debate, which was sent to Jyllandsposten but not published, is available: http://www.feministiskforum.dk/tekster/Modbilleder.html.


Fakhra Mohammad, “Oplevet discrimination”, *Når du strammer garnet*, (Carsten Fenger-Grøn, Kamal Qureshi & Tøger Seidenfaden eds., Gylding: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2004), 281-301, 288, original text: “Ja, så kan vi ikke have dig som praktikant her i Magasin”.


Foreningen Nydanskers newsletter, Sep. 2000, see http://www.foreningen-nydansker.dk/brevet/2000/sep/septema.html, original text: ”Dommen har ikke rigtig nogen betydning for os, og vi ser ingen grund til at ændre på vores procedurer”.

Conversations with Lise-Lotte Eriksen, HR consultant, ISS and Tove Sørensen, Clothing Associate, ISS, May 11 and May 15, 2006.

Eric Tinor-Centi, *DRC newsletter*, No. 6, Oct. 1998, original text: ”Vedr: hovedbeklædning. Vi skal hermed meddele dig, at det i produktionen ikke er tilladt at bære anden hovedbeklædning end den udleverede nethue, heller ikke selv om anden hovedbeklædning bores under nethuen. Såfremt du ikke er i stand til at acceptere dette, kan du ikke arbejde i produktionen på Toms Chokoladefabrik”.

In their legal proceedings, DRC had demanded that Tom’s compensated Famita Andersen with Dkr. 50,000.


The woman is named AC because I have promised KH to make her anonymous. I do know her name. AC has written an account of what happened to HK and their lawyers.

Like AC all actors in this description are made anonymous. I do know their names.

Cited from the correspondence between AC and HK, HK Archives, Copenhagen.

Lawyer for Aldi Anders Vass’ correspondence to HK’s lawyers, HK Archive, Copenhagen.

Najla Ainouz has given a written account of the sequence of events that let to her firing. The account is available at HK’s Archives. I base this description upon her account as well as other internal documents from HK, their lawyers, Føtex’s lawyers, and the courts’ pronouncements of sentences in the case.

Later Føtex offered Najla Ainouz a position in the store room which she turned down.

Udskrift af Østre Landsrets Dombog, B2498007, IDJ, Dec. 18, 2003, p. 16. For a discussion on the idea of neutral appearance see the section on Parliament debates.


Birte Siim participated in the interviews of Sherin Khankan and Fatima Zahra, both carried out on Dec. 21, 2006.


Poul Anders Pedersen, ”Indvandrere taber terræn i udlændingedebatten”, *MandagMorgen*, nr. 16, 2. maj 2005., 5-8.

Tanja Nyrup Madsen, ”Medier taler ikke med indvandrere”, *Ugebrevet A4*, nr. 32, 03/10-05.

Poul Anders Pedersen, ”Indvandrere taber terræn i udlændingedebatten”, *MandagMorgen*, nr. 16, 2. maj 2005., 5-8.


Interview with Nahid Riazi by Rikke Andreassen, Jan. 07, 2007.