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Jacobsen, Rikke Becker

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The becoming of problems, selves and others in the everyday politics of meaning

Rikke Becker Jacobsen ∙ PhD thesis ∙ 2013
Aalborg University ∙ the Doctoral School of Engineering and Science
Department for Development and Planning ∙ Innovative Fisheries Management
Partner: Greenland Climate Research Centre
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- The Becoming of Problems, Selves and Others in the Everyday Politics of Meaning

Rikke Becker Jacobsen

Thesis supervisor:
Jesper Raakjær, PhD, DSc
Innovative Fisheries Management, Aalborg University

Thesis co-supervisor:
Alyne Delaney, PhD
Innovative Fisheries Management, Aalborg University

List of published papers:

A Case of Greenlandic Fisheries Co-politics: Power and Participation in Total Allowable Catch policy-Making

Small-scale Fisheries in Greenlandic Planning – the Becoming of a Governance Problem

Who Defines the Need for Fishery Reform? Actors, Discourses and Networks in the Reform of the Greenlandic Fishery
Journal article by R.B. Jacobsen and J. Raakjær (Forthcoming 2013) Polar Record special edition on Northern Fisheries. Accepted for publication.

When Social Sustainability Becomes Politics – Perspectives from Greenlandic Fisheries Governance

This thesis has been submitted for assessment in partial fulfilment of the PhD degree. The thesis is based on the submitted or published scientific papers which are listed above. Parts of the papers are used directly or indirectly in the extended summary of the thesis. As part of the assessment, co-author statements have been made available to the assessment committee and are also available at the Faculty. The thesis is not in its present form acceptable for open publication but only in limited and closed circulation as copyright may not be ensured.
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Summary

This PhD dissertation offers an analysis of power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance by means of analysing the everyday politics of representing problems, selves and others. In a context in which the fishery matters to different groups in different ways, this thesis takes a point of departure in the premise that no governance problem is self-evident. On the contrary, exclusion and inclusion are approached as equal parts of a problem-making process. Yet every emerging policy or reform seems to gain its strength from the gradual formulation of an uncontested problem to which it offers a solution and in the aftermath, consensus is emphasised and participatory procedure often claimed by those who succeeded in de-facto creating the final problem. Taking the 2011 reform of the Greenlandic fishery bill, the 2011 Greenland halibut management plan and the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) policy-making process as a combined case of problem-making and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance, this thesis analyses the way different actors create subject positions for themselves and others as a way to control fishery policy and reform. As significant identities and problems are analytically re-constructed, patterns of power and participation start to emerge. The thesis consists of four articles of which three have been either published or accepted for publishing at time of PhD submission and a synthesis. The three articles analyse the TAC policy-making process, the formulation of the new regulation for the coastal Greenland halibut fishery plan as well as the process leading to the reform of the Fishery Bill in 2011. The fourth article is submitted to peer-review at the time of PhD submission and analyses the impact of social science research and social sustainability discourse on fishery policy-making.

The first article (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012) dissects the centralised fishery governance institutions in terms of a differentiated cast of actors and their interaction in relation to TAC policy-making. It argues that participation and power come in many institutional guises as the complex casts of actors within the centralised system represent themselves and others. The article identifies two representations that had significant influence on the constantly changing TAC policy of the 2009-2012 period: A ‘new paradigm’ in Greenlandic fisheries governance and an alliance between the political Siumut party and coastal fishers. The article exemplifies that if we are to understand power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance, it may be fruitful to pay attention to the way actors create subject-positions in alliance as a way to control Self-rule fisheries governance decision-making.

The second article (Jacobsen 2013) analyses the planning process in Greenlandic fisheries governance that was introduced in 2012 aimed at reforming the coastal Greenland halibut fishery. It examines the way certain truths about this fishery and the need for reform are produced up to and in the final policy document ‘regulation concerning the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut’. Findings highlight the way the small-scale Greenland halibut fishery system becomes a particular governance problem with respect to particular contextual meanings of sustainability and long-term planning. The article then examines whether this governance problem could also be understood as primarily a problem to a certain ‘governementality’ mode of governance and lands at a confirmatory stance: The governance problem may reflect a governance system’s need for indirect control and not the inherent truth about the coastal fishery as such. Whereas some fishery studies document how governementality modes of governance in fisheries succeeds
in transforming subjectivities, this article offers a view into the process that might go before successful
governmentality: The process whereby a selected fishery becomes subjected to planned out-phasing
through a combined construction of fleet and human identity.

The third article (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013) investigates the reform process of the Greenlandic fishery bill
and derives some general lessons on reform and power in the context of a changing Arctic stakeholdership.
It analyses participation in fisheries governance decision-making by tracing the emergence of discourses
and policy networks that came to define the very need for reform. A policy network is identified across
state ministries, powerful officials, banks and large scale industry that managed to define the need of
reform presented in a ‘grand reform discourse’. But inertia characterized the actual decision-making
process as reform according to this grand reform discourse was repeatedly blocked by a combination of
small-scale fishers’ informal network processes and the power of parliamentary majority. After a
parliamentary shift in power the grand reform is being implemented gradually by the government while
new patterns of participation and exclusion are emerging. In this process, identities of the participating
actors are reinterpreted to fit the new patterns of influence and participation. The article offers the
perspective that fishery reform does not necessarily start from collective recognition of a problem in the
marine resource use and a power-neutral process of institutional learning. Instead, it argues that fishery
reform is the ‘reform of somebody’ and that this ‘somebody’ is itself a changing and manipulative identity.

The fourth article (Jacobsen and Delaney forthcoming) contextualizes our own experience of conducting
and communicating research to inform the reform underway. Based on a literature review it finds that
social science researchers have put considerable effort into identifying social sustainability in ways that
reflect local experiences and relevant processes of change and which may serve to inform policy-making.
We ask then, what are the dominant ways of thinking about social sustainability in the social sciences when
it comes to Greenland and the Arctic and what are the potentials of actual impacts of social sustainability
talk on policy-making and development in this context? The conclusion is realist-political. Ever since the
beginning of its independence process, Greenland has found itself in the midst of a push for profits from
old and new industries to finance its welfare state. Meanwhile, the social sciences have increasingly
focused on local livelihoods and the mixed economy as important for human well-being in the Arctic. This
schism is driving the social sustainability discourse onto a political battlefield where the term acts as social
resistance to the dominant Greenlandic governance regime. This runs counter to the idea that social
scientists provide straightforward, neutral scientific advice to decision-makers with studies and
recommendations. Yet, in the Greenlandic context, the battleground of discourses can have no ‘neutral’
knowledge; the activation of competing discourses or knowledge is itself inherently politicized.

The synthesis presents the methodological process and joins the articles through an elaboration of their
theoretical themes of power. By adding a power dimension to the phenomenological question of how the
world appear to us, it presents the overall argument that actors, problems and participation all appear
simultaneously in the everyday politics of meaning-making. It is in the very constitution of this threesome
that power and participation reside. The synthesis argues that this ensemble varies and that Greenlandic
fisheries governance exhibits inconsistent patterns of power, participation and exclusion. It also observes
that in the findings of the articles, Greenlandic fishery governance and fisher participation appear more vivid than normally described. When fisheries policies and regulations that distribute the goods and evils connected to the use of living resources (rights of access, processing rights, employment, profit, state tax, cultural meaning etc.) are formulated, conflicts arising from contested meanings are rife. There is little agreement as to what defines and constitutes sustainability, participation, necessary change or the best way of structuring the fishery. Consensus, participation and cooperation are uncontested ideals, but the synthesis argue that defining problems and offering the right solutions is just as much a matter of exclusion as it is a matter of inclusion. The synthesis recapitulates conflicting representations and conflicting spheres of participation across the different cases. With inspiration from Laclau and Mouffe (1985) the synthesis eventually argues that Greenlandic fisheries governance takes place as a process of radical politics where identities and problems are repeatedly constructed and contested and where consensus is repeatedly dissolved. But all radical political processes need not reflect a radical democratic politics, leaving room for a radical plurality of identities. Exclusion and extinction is a returning theme in Greenlandic fisheries governance. But so are issues of inclusion and survival.

The dissertation rests upon qualitative research methodologies and a theoretical tradition that is sensitive to the ways meaning and identity is formed in the interactions of everyday life. Findings on the interaction of actors in Greenlandic fisheries governance are based on a variety of sources, the most important of which is fieldwork (2010-2013) in Nuuk with an emphasis on participant observation of everyday working life at the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources and the Greenlandic Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, Parliamentary as well as observation of public debate in Greenland Self-rule Parliament and the media.
**Resumé (Danish Summary)**


‘governmentality’ problem og dermed et problem, der i langt højere grad afspejler forvaltningssystemets behov for indirekte kontrol end en i det kystnære fiskeri iboende sandhed. Analysens svar er bekræftende og på den måde biddrager artiklen til en forståelse af de ekskluderende processer, som går forud for succesful ‘governmentality’ forvaltning. Det vil sige, de processer hvorved mennesker og fiskersegment flyder sammen til én problemidentitet og hvorved et givent fiskeri med dets nuværende aktører bliver udskilt til udfasning.


Den fjerde artikel (Jacobsen og Delaney Indsendt til publicering) er en kontekstualisering af egen erfaring af, som forsker, at gå i dialog med planlæggere af igangværende reformer. Et litteratur studie konkluderer at socialvidenskerne i Arktis har haft en tendens til at identificere social bæredygtighed på en måde, der vurderer forandringer og politiske beslutninger ud fra et hensyn til lokale livssyn. Artiklen spørger, hvilken potential effekt begrebet om social bæredygtighed har på beslutningsprocesser i en sådan kontekst. Vores egen erfaring gøres til et casestudie af, hvorledes den socialvidenskabelige diskurs om social bæredygtighed modtages af andre aktører i Grønlands fiskeriforvaltning. Lige så længe man har stræbt efter en selvbærende grønlandsk økonomi, lige så længe har der været et stigende fokus på at skabe en profitabel fiskerindustri, der kan finansiere den grønlandske velfærdstat. I mellemtiden har socialvidenskaben i tiltagende grad fokuseret på velfærd som opretholdelsen af lokale subsistens- og blandingsøkonomien samt de måder på at leve på, som knytter sig til den lokale brug af naturressourcer og det decentraliserede bosætningsmønster. Dette, hævder artiklen, driver begrebet om social bæredygtighed ind på en politisk slagmark, hvor begrebet agerer som social modstand i forhold til dette andet dominerende udviklingsregime i Grønlands politik. Denne omstændighed kolliderer med en eventuel (selv)opfattelse af socialvidenskaben som værende i stand til at udføre og kommunikere en uinteresseret videnskab om social bæredygtighed til politiske beslutningstagere. For den konkurrerende diskurs om social bæredygtighed er nemlig allerede dybt politiseret i kraft af det faktum, at den finder sted indenfor en af de mest højtspændte politiske diskussioner i Grønlands nyere politiske historie.

Abbreviations and organisations

APNN: The Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture. Greenland Self-rule
FD: the fishery department of APNN
GA: the Employers’ Association of Greenland
GFLK: the Greenlandic Fisheries License Control
GINR: Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources
GCRC: Greenland Climate Research Centre
ITQ: Individual Transferable Quota
KNAPK: the Association of Fishers and Hunters in Greenland
KNR: Greenlandic Broadcasting Cooperation
NAPP: The Nuuk local branch of KNAPK
SIK: the Greenlandic Workers Union
TAC: Total Allowable Catch
Introduction
Introduction to a problem

This PhD is essentially about the becoming of problems. It examines the way problems come into being in Greenlandic fisheries governance by means of human interpretation and representation. The synthesis at hand will gradually unfold the theoretical and methodological premises for this study as well as the perspectives it offers for interpreting a selected range of policy-making events. To stay true to its methodological and theoretical perspective, which is yet to be presented, the synthesis will open with a description of the context that led this study to its own problem. Adhering to the perspective to be presented later, this description is in itself an interpretation. It has evolved throughout the numerous situations in which I have had to describe my PhD project so far. I present my problem through a narrative starting from the beginning, describing significant leaps of recognition and ending with a final problem. The narrative style offers the advantage of a retrospective direction and a degree of closure to an otherwise open-ended qualitative research process that is sometimes difficult to convey. The research process leading to the final thesis has been characterized by a handful of more or less decisive turns and shifts in focus and I have no illusions that this research has been as systematically structured as research is sometimes normatively described (e.g. Friedman 2003). This was expected and it is not something I regret. I come from a hermeneutic anthropologic discipline and from the beginning I perceived of my own method in line with Gadamer’s (1960) argument about the historical situatedness of understanding. Gadamer argues that the theme and object of humanistic research is motivated by the present and its interests; it is constituted by the motivation of the problem (Gadamer 1960 p. 147). A research process that change is, in my hermeneutically inspired view, not a weakness but a characteristic of the way we come to understand. A perspective that finds support in Wadel’s (1991) understanding of ethnographic method as a continuous round dance between theory, method and perceptions of what constitutes data. Despite the Mertonian ideal (as summarized and discussed by Degnbol 2012), science is perhaps best understood as not independent of politics and policy. Rather than engaging myself in boundary work that should serve to establish the objective and independent character of my research, I will inspired by Degnbol (2012) account for the ways my research has been facilitated, influenced and written into political priorities, interests and struggles. The first chapter in this synthesis aims to present the history of the problem of the thesis. It will account for the preconditions brought into the research process by the researcher and from the institutional setting and it will account for the most significant turns and twist in the course of recognition that formed the eventual problem. This chapter thus becomes the first of many chapters engaged with the becoming of problems.

The financial and institutional framework for this PhD. was given by a politically defined need to act scientifically upon Climate Change. In this way, the project is symptomatic of recent development in Danish and international funding opportunities in research where a climate-angle is, if not mandatory, then at least a means to improve funding chances. From 2009 to 2014 the Danish state and Greenland Self-rule provided significant funding for research on climate change under the umbrella of the Greenland Climate Research Centre (GCRC) in Nuuk. Next to an existing monitoring programme at The Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources, seven external projects from Danish research institutions received funding under GCRC within a five year period. This PhD is part of such an external project conducted by Innovative Fisheries Management – an Aalborg University Research Centre (IFM) under the Faculty of Science and Engineering at Aalborg University. IFM conducts social scientific research on fisheries governance issues and fishery community development. The research often has an aim of applicability to real life fisheries governance.
situations and is often conducted within a broad research consortium that is primarily natural scientific. It is often funded externally by for example the EU framework programmes. In relation to GCRC, the division of labour was similar: Our project would provide a socio-economic perspective on climate change as the only social scientific project among seven research projects. In line with our interest in fisheries issues and the assumed importance of the use of marine resources to the Greenlandic economy (Greenland statistics 2012) and to Inuit communities in Greenland and elsewhere (Dybbroe and Møller 1978, Rasing 2000, Dahl 2000, Nuttall 2000, Fienup-Riordan 2000, Poppel 2010), we designed a project to investigate how climate change impacts Greenlandic communities through Greenlandic fisheries. Many studies had argued that hunting was important for building a sense of identity and belonging – and perhaps even more so in an struggle for independence formulated around articulations of ethnic identities (Dybbroe and Møller 1978, Rasing 2000) and a time of rapid change (Fienup-Riordan 2000). At the same time, it was argued in the Greenlandic case that hunting activities and the functioning of the subsistence economy is dependent on incomes generated from within the informal or formal monetary economy (Poppel 2010) which points back to participation in the commercial fishery as well as other economic sectors. The problem was more or less straight forwardly defined from a climate change angle: Climate change is already visible in Greenland and it is expected to keep on changing the marine environment upon which Greenlandic communities and Greenlandic society depend for the functioning of various economies, the building of identity, the coping with change and more. The question was one of climate change impact on a fishery-dependent human society: How will fishery dependent Greenlandic communities be affected by a changing environment? We planned for an initial baseline study of the fisheries governance institutions’ and the ‘socio-economic system’ (Charles 2001) followed by a comparative study of how three fishery-dependent towns were affected by climate change impacts on the marine environment. The first decisive turn in the becoming of the eventual problem presented in this PhD. was a turn away from the comparative study and a sharp turn into the fisheries governance institutions from which this PhD. project never returned.

I had not come far in the initial literature review before I came across a document that would come to play a critical role in the change of the future research design: the Fishery Commission report from 2009 (Government of Greenland 2009). This report presented a picture of the Greenlandic fishery and the Greenlandic society which was new to me and which, arguably, challenged the starting point I held based on various ethnographic studies of the role of fishing and hunting in Greenlandic, Canadian and Alaska Inuit communities. The studies I had read so far displayed a consensus that fishing and hunting activities were economically, culturally and socially important to these communities. The Fishery Commission on the other hand, identified a need for Greenland to restructure Greenlandic fisheries and coastal fishery-dependent communities. It estimated that the Greenland halibut dingy fishery with many participants and high deliverances to the land based processing industry was a hindrance to sound economic development. To increase profitability in the fishery, it argued for a restructuring of the fishery into larger and more efficient fishing vessels and for abandoning land-based processing. It envisioned a less labour intensive fishing and processing industry and released labour from the fisheries was considered a means to meet the demands in the new extractive industries to come. Shortly before I read the fishery commission report, I had had the opportunity to meet with an experienced expert in Greenlandic fisheries and consultant in the Association of Greenlandic Employers (GA) at the time. He had as many other actors within the decision-making and stakeholder bodies in Greenlandic fisheries experience from an impressively broad range of different private and public offices relating to the fishing industry. He explained some main themes of the fishery and
the governance system and he introduced the overall line of an extensive reform of the fishery underway in Greenland. Many interesting themes were introduced which could have been relevant for research, but at the time I took particular notice of a perspective from the on-going debate in Greenland then offered to me for the first time then; that the fishery was no longer perceived to be as important to the Greenlandic people as it used to be. What was important was the access to the sea, or the special connection to the sea, and thus implicitly, it was not access to any of the commercial fisheries as such. The dinghy fishery, small in scale and spread out along the coast, was therefore to be out-phased. An existing picture of local communities depending on fishery and hunting activities for economic, social and cultural reasons was thus confronted with an alternative picture of a reform-needy fishery and from this confrontation a PhD. problem started to emerge.

Just as much as the problem emerged from a reform process within the ‘case’, so it equally emerged out of a particular informed starting point from which it was at all possible to wonder about this reform. This starting point can be perceived as a ‘prejudice’ in the process of understanding in a Gadamer sense (1960). According to Gadamer, prejudices and authorities condition our understandings of the world and should not be avoided even if we could, but should instead be valued for their productive capacity in starting processes of understanding. The problem is not how to get rid of prejudices, but to reduce the arbitrariness of prejudices through the perfection of our understanding by inclusion of the history of the object. Every question and every problem has its own history that includes accumulated knowledge from which we can depart and during the history of the object, some productive prejudices have been emphasised while others have been abandoned. It became obvious to me, that there was another history to the ‘Greenlandic fisheries’ than the one I had up till now encountered in the available academic literature. This history is to be found in everyday speech and debate in Greenlandic and in the grey literature relating to Greenlandic planning and policy work. To Gadamer, the question of prejudice is linked to the recognition of authority (Gadamer 1960, p. 142). And the question which I would come to ask again and again throughout my analysis is if not the choice between productive prejudices, integral to recognition of the object, is not really an articulation of power? But for now, at this point in the research process, this fuller history challenged the authorities and prejudices I had relied on so far. And quite importantly, it also challenged the climate change dominated agenda for the research: If most fishers are to stop being fishers and if fishing communities are to cease being communities relying on fishing, would there then be any fishery-dependent communities left to be affected by climate change at all?

The emerging hypothesis that on-going fishery policy-making might change Greenlandic fisheries as we know it and fishing-dependent communities as we know them before climate change would even get the chance, had me recall passages in a book I had recently read entitled ‘Climate change and anthropology’ (Crate and Nuttall 2009). Published recently the book presented state of the art perspectives from emergent anthropological climate change research. Passages authored by Nuttall presented the theoretical perspective that climate change may act as a magnifier of existing problems faced by indigenous peoples.

“Massive changes in ecosystems are occurring and have in many cases been accompanied by opportunistic and often environmentally devastating resource exploitation. To indigenous peoples, this means that climate change is not something that comes in isolation; it magnifies already existing problems of poverty, deterritoriality, marginalization, and non-inclusion in national and international policy-making processes and discourses” (Nuttall 2009, p. 12)
In regard to Greenland specifically, Nuttall points to the possibility that climate change may not offer the primary constraint to Greenlandic hunting and fishing practices:

“Long-term policies of shifting demographics, investment in a few major centers, a reluctance to introduce development policies for small villages and settlements, a redefinition of resources and rights of access to them, and a political desire to encourage the depopulation of some communities all perhaps have greater significance for changing hunting and fishing practices than climate change does” (Nuttall 2009, p 307)

“In Greenland, climate change is present in the unavoidable evidence of melting ice and receding glaciers. However, rather than having immediate social and economic concerns, it magnifies the threats to the cultural and economic viability of hunting livelihoods in small Greenlandic communities that come more immediately from transformations in resource-use rights and Home Rule government policy to the villages. These subvert local customary practices and knowledge systems” (Nuttall 2009, p. 308)

A second decisive turn in the research process was the decision to embrace this theoretical hypothesis in such a way that climate change was bracketed for a while to focus primarily on the on-going policy-making within Greenlandic fisheries. Climate change remained on the long term research agenda of the IFM research project under the Greenland Climate Research Centre, but it was decided that this PhD. should focus on the fishery policy reform process and climate change would be included as context. Early on in the research process I found that the very planning for climate change was already being integrated into the discourses on community vulnerability as well as the discourses supporting a restructuring of the labour force from fishing to mining. A small anecdote will serve to illuminate this: As a part of my methodology I participated in a working group under Greenland Self-rule charged with the task of investigating possible effects of climate change and possible adaptation strategies in the fishing and hunting professions. I attended and observed all the meetings of our working group in this project throughout its entire duration of two years and contributed with summaries of primarily anthropologic and fisheries governance related background literature to the final report (Government of Greenland 2012). In my view, the discussions between the diverse set of participants and the final report is an inclusive ensemble of suggestions of many popular, but also conflicting, solutions to adaptation known to different actors. Suggestions range from marine protected areas, management plans, co-management, a strengthening of local fishing communities as well as a restructuring of the fishery in line with the recommendations of the fishery commission referred to above. Paradoxically, the climate change working group that should map climate change and adaptation in the fishery only nourished the hypothesis of climate change as a magnifier. The strategic report about future climate change offers only very modest perspectives in regard to the future but reveals a rich depiction of contemporary perceptions of relevant problems and solutions in today’s fishery. The idea that climate change acts as a magnifier was in my opinion confirmed in the sense that existing problems were reproduced by the occasion of strategic planning for climate change.

I started to look for the way competing perceptions about ‘problems of the present’ within these processes of fishery policy-making were represented and how this would or would not lead to changes in ownership and access rights. Centrally induced programs in the fishery held a high potential impacts for persons and communities in Greenland under the fishery-based industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s (see for example From et al. 1975, Gullestrup 1976). But recent studies had also drawn attention to the significance of the design of access regimes for Greenlandic actors and communities making a living from fishery and hunting today (Sejersen 2007, Nuttall 2013). On an international level and recently in Iceland in particular,
different studies had pointed to critical issues of equity and cases of negative community impacts stemming from the privatization and concentration of fishing rights (Pálsson and Helgason 2000, Macinko and Bromley 2004, Pauly 2008). The questions of power in the form of the possible impacts served to attract my attention to the case because it seemed relevant to a broader debate on equity and social justice in natural resource use. From a theoretical perspective, however, I thought it could be interesting to add to this debate through an analysis of the power of the problem. I was interested in understanding in detail the coming into being of the problems and the truths in governance situations that have showed this strong potential for conflict elsewhere.

In the process of narrowing the focus to the reform of access and use rights, other problems were excluded. Other ‘problems’ are articulated within Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions than the ones investigated in this thesis. Especially the ones that concern the very solutions to some already established problem as they are perceived by different actors. The integration of fisher and biologist knowledge, the challenges in obtaining MSC certification for the industry and the local marketing conditions for small-scale fishers are only some of the major articulated problems that keep returning to the debates in Greenland, but which do not in themselves receive in-depth analysis as a case in itself by this PhD. By focusing on how actors, problems and participation comes into being in the first place through policy-making, this PhD does not offer much in terms of solutions to the once established problems of different actors. Still, a power perspective like this illuminates a social condition that is perhaps more basic to Greenlandic lives than any specific solution.

Research questions

My final PhD. theme is thus about power and participation in the shape of problem-making in Greenlandic fisheries governance. The PhD consists of four case studies that illuminate this same problem from different angles with each of their research question. Each case study is presented in an article guided by a specific research question:

Case 1: TAC policy-making. Research question: Who precisely gets to have a say in the Total Allowable Catch policy within the, assumed, centralized fisheries governance institutions? What are the roads to influence for the different stakeholders? And what unofficial paths to influence exist in conjunction with formal participation on the Fishery Council?

Case 2. The new regulation of the Greenland Halibut Fishery. Research question: How are the truths about human and fleet identities and economies in the current fisheries constructed in the new regulation of the Greenland Halibut fishery and can these constructions be understood as arising out of governmentality challenges posed by the fishery to the centralized governance regime?

Case 3. The reform of the Greenlandic fishery bill. Research question: How have different actors been able to insert their representations of fisheries and relevant reforms into the fishery bill reform process and with what outcome?

Case 4. The impact of the social scientific discourse on social sustainability in Greenlandic fisheries governance. Research question: What do the emergent concepts of social sustainability in Greenland and the Arctic do to policy-making?
The four articles are presented in Appendix C. The PhD. synthesis combines the findings of these four articles into a coherent analysis of the overall theme. As a red thread running through the four articles, I have been concerned with the type of power that manifests itself in the different types of representations that managed to affect fishery policy and planning. For the synthesis, I have constructed a synthesizing research question:

*How do actors represent problems, selves and others and how do these representations shape participation in policy-making and planning?*

To answer this question, the synthesis repeatedly asks three descriptive but fundamental sub-questions:

*How do actors become actors?*

*How do problems become problems?*

*How does participation become participation?*
Methodology: Long-term fieldwork and participant observation

I collected data on meaning in the making by means of a qualitative methodology. The family and I packed our belongings and moved to Nuuk in the summer 2010 where I for three years have turned everyday life into field work with shifting emphasis on participation and observation combined with informal conversations. I observed the every-day work of the Ministry of hunting, Fishing and Agriculture and the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources and I participated in Greenlandic society as a citizen, colleague, parent and neighbour. I observed meetings and working groups relating to fisheries governance and engaged in informal conversations in the settings that I later came to define as the Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions: The every-day interactions primarily within and around GINR, APNN, Parliament, and media, where meaning of fisheries governance issues were exchanged.

Grey literature in the shape of laws and regulations, background papers, commission reports, public communications, consultation answers were broadly included in my dataset throughout the entire research process. During the research process I identified and focused specifically on three on-going policy processes relating directly to the articulations of the necessity of fishery reform: The TAC policy, an upcoming new regulation for Greenland halibut and the on-going process of fishery law reform.

Scoping fieldwork and interviews

As described in the introduction, a meeting with a GA representative at IFM in 2010 played a significant role as a first scoping interview and meeting with a Greenlandic fisheries governance expert. In April 2010 supervisor and project leader Jesper Raakjær and I arranged, with the invaluable assistance of Helle Siegstad at GINR, a range of formal meetings to introduce ourselves and to discuss the research project with central organisations in Greenlandic fishery governance. The meetings were also thought of as a scoping exercise to identify issues relevant to stakeholders in the fishery. We met with representatives from the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture (APNN); the Ministry Housing, Nature and Environment, Greenlandic institute of Natural Resources (GINR); The Association of Fishers and Hunters in Greenland (KNAKP), the Employers’ Association of Greenland (GA), Polar Seafood and Royal Greenland. In July 2010, before arriving in Ilulissat, I went to Ilulissat, Ilulmanaq and Qeqertassuaq in the Disko bay to talk to fishers and local managers about the local fisheries, local participation in fisheries management decision-making and their view on the suggested fishery law reform as envisioned by the Fishery Commission report of 2009. I interviewed the municipal hunting and fishing committees in Ilulissat and Qeqertassuaq about the existence and practices of local decision-making. I spoke to fishers on the port of Ilulissat about the fishery there and with the assistance of KNAPK in Nuuk I managed to arrange one in-depth interview with fisher Henrik Sandgreen (elected chairman in 2013) about the fishery, the management system and the local organisation of Disko bay fishers around marketing options. I visited and spoke to a family (Arne and Martha with their five children) in Ililmanaq about their village life as part of a guided boat tour to the village – together with a French film team and a French essayist doing research as well, indicating just how much research attention Greenlandic people must sometimes bear. With the help from Outi Tervo from the Arctic Station of Copenhagen University in Qeqertassuaq I came into contact with three fishers/hunters (Abel, Ado and Johannes) in Qeqertassuaq who assisted biologists from Copenhagen and Nuuk in the targeting of whales for research. They were kind enough to invite me along on one of their day-excursions and answer my first questions about Greenlandic fishing, hunting and management of which many must
arguably have seemed rather weird. It was a short but valuable fieldwork because it allowed me for the first time to touch base with the experiences and viewpoint of some of the persons living their everyday life in Greenlandic communities outside Nuuk. Feeling however uneasy about the massive research attention paid to a rather small population in the North, this fieldwork also confirmed to me the relevance of the Nuuk-based fieldwork among fisheries managers that was to come.

Long-term fieldwork in Nuuk

Qualitative methodology and long-term participant observation in particular is dependent on the social relations between researchers and informants in the field. Seventy years ago, and from within a naturalistic method paradigm, Whyte reflected on the methodology of long-term fieldwork behind his study of ‘Street Corner Society’. He then argued what is still considered generally valid, namely that the personal life of the researcher is increasingly mixed with his research:

“There are many good published studies of communities or organizations, but generally the published report gives little attention to the actual process whereby the research was carried out. There have also been some useful statements on methods of research, but, with few exceptions, they place the discussion entirely on a logical-intellectual basis. They fail to note that the researcher, like his informants, is a social animal. He has a role to play, and he has his own personality needs that must be met in some degree if he is to function successfully. Where the researcher operates out of a university, just going into the field for a few hours at a time, he can keep his personal social life quite separate from field activity. His problem of role is not quite so complicated. If, on the other hand, the researcher is living for an extended period in the community he is studying, his personal life is inextricably mixed with his research. A real explanation, then, of how the research was done necessarily involves a rather personal account of how the researcher lived during the period of study” (Whyte 1943, p. 279)

Whyte and his informant Doug is a classic example from the ethnographic literature of a researcher’s access to social situations is often highly dependent on gate keepers and key informants that are willing to engage with you, explain to you and reflect upon the social practices within the field together with you. It has since been argued that role of a researcher is commonly nested in other social roles proper to the social context (Wadel 1991). Yet, as Gubrium and Holstein (1997) has pointed out, field work is not only a question of access through roles to a ‘field’ objectively located somewhere. From a naturalistic view it is possible to speak about ‘being there’, ‘becoming part of their worlds’ or ‘becoming an insider’. From this view one will speak of places and communities concretely placed in time and space as if we were speaking of a natural habitat from a natural scientific perspective (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, p. 24.) The interpretive tradition within ethnographic method, however, introduces a new metaphor of the field as ‘the lived border of reality and representation’. This metaphor is based on the observation that sociology occupies an analytical space between positivist scientific description and literary representation, striving for explanation and control as well as meaning and empathy. The qualitative enquiry that stems from this paradoxical interest is thereby particular attuned to representational matters:

“Qualitative inquiry is especially sensitive to representational matters because of its unique position at the lived border of reality and representation. By “lived”, we mean the actual locations within the life world where those things, events, and circumstances that people experience are meaningfully described and conveyed, to one’s self as well as to others. Being at this lived border, qualitative inquiry assumes a
distinctive vantage point from which to observe how actors “in the world” both participate in and re-present experience” (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, p. 101)

The ‘field’ in this PhD can be perceived as such a border between reality and representation that is not bound to a geographical place but reaches far beyond for its constitution. Yet I will argue that this border becomes visible by means of the researcher being present in some specific situations located in time and space. While ‘being there’ is an expression that bears some imprecise connotations as to the type of field, being ‘somewhere’ – in this case the geographical location of Nuuk - was still necessary in order to observe and construct as a researcher a meaningful ‘there’ at the border of representation and reality. This chapter will provide a critical account of how I as a researcher in Nuuk was allowed access to observe certain interactions where interpretations occurred. It will present my main groups of informants. And it will also present an evaluation of how my interpretations of what constitutes data changed throughout the research process as a result of the possibilities and limitations constituted by my changing roles during a long-term fieldwork. While not paying full homage to Whyte's (1993) call for detailed description of the social life of the researcher, the chapter will include a few citations from the field-dairy to illustrate some of the most important field long-term work dilemmas as they were experienced at the time and the way they were finally addressed.

Participant observation among managers and biologists

The fieldwork can be divided into two stages with differing emphasis on observation and participation. The first consists of three months of intense fieldwork when I observed the workdays at the Fishery Department (FD) of the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture and at the Department for Fish and Shellfish at the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources. This period stretched from September to December in 2010 when I was new in the field and I relied mostly on my role as a researcher from which I observed, asked questions and tried to understand the basics. I had gained access to observe the working days in Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture through the permanent secretary of the Ministry. I wrote him an e-mail requesting opportunity to follow the everyday work in the Ministry and offered to take on some tasks in return. This was also a decision inspired by Wadel's (1991) insight that nesting the researcher-role within the role of an apprentice (here a new employee) offers a unique chance of learning in the new social environment. The offer was accepted and I was allowed into the department of fishery with access to observe all meetings with the exception of weekly meeting between the permanent secretaries of the Self-rule ministries about whom I was told that they needed a free room for themselves. Around that time the Fishery Department had been asked to send staff to a working group under the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Energy to investigate climate change impact on the fishing and hunting profession. We agreed that I would represent a resource person from the fishery department. The strategy of establishing a learning-role as such did not succeed. The task we decided for me – in cooperation – was given to me in the role of an affiliated researcher. But in my own self-understanding at least, it did give me that ‘extra’ level of attachment to the department of fishery and I was in many ways treated as a kind of new colleague equipped with the almost ritual ornaments of a modern office employee: a network pass-word and a door-key.

Due to a lack of space in the fishery department and because I already had a fully equipped office in town at GCRC, we decided I did not need a desk of my own. Instead, I was offered a seat at the large meeting table in the four-person office functioning as the permanent secretary’ right hand. I deemed that this was
not a bad spot at all. The permanent secretary and the three managers in the office were kind to receive me, to answer my questions, to grant me access to observe their internal meetings and to offer to take me along to meetings in the Fishery Council. Every morning there was a post meeting at the department where these four employees and the leadership went through the inbox together and were the leadership briefed about on-going activities. These meetings often touched upon the political aspects and the challenges posed to the minister. But through the inbox-go through they also offered an insight into the many different actors engaging with the Ministry including fishers and international NGOs. These meetings thus provided a very good insight into a broad range of themes and have provided much data for the final analysis. Being at the Fishery department I also had the privileged opportunity to speak with most of the managers about any governance related issue: My first interest was to know what they were working with and how. Later on I would ask more specific questions about the themes that emerged in the data, especially the TAC policy, the fishery law and the management plans for cod and Greenland halibut. I observed meetings and working groups, but just as importantly the APNN staff was very helpful explaining to me and answering my questions on the way back and forth to these meetings. And they were helpful in forwarding me relevant contextual material such as meeting minutes from previous meetings, background reports and de-facto non-public consultation answers.

After three months, however, the role of the visiting researcher started to exhaust itself and I felt increasingly self-conscious in the guest spot as I was no longer new to the situation and now that the situation were decreasingly new to me. I continued my work in the climate change working group, I stayed in contact with the Greenland Halibut working group and later on, I and colleagues planned a social impact assessment (SIA) in cooperation with the Fishery Department which my colleague, Delaney, conducted. I think that my primary role in relation to most informants of the Fishery Department has been that of a visible researcher or a kind of researcher-colleague hybrid. I do not know for sure and as I will return to below, I was sometimes confused myself. Nevertheless, the fieldwork in the Fishery Department was of enormous value because it kick-started most of the more specific questioning pursued in this PhD.

A key site for participant observation. The Fishery Department of the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture then located on the first floor of this administration building of Greenland Self-rule.
I had not foreseen that GINR would come to play that key role in terms of access and information that it did. I came to the house as a PhD student under the GCRC which is a department under GINR. I was part of GCRC and was given an office space as an associated researcher. But staff from the department of fish and shellfish was very helpful from the beginning and I was soon connected to this department in my role as a fisheries governance researcher. I was allowed to observe the weekly department meetings in the department and as an associate researcher at GCRC I participated in the weekly house meetings at GINR.

And just as importantly, I had lunch. The lunch has always been a great opportunity for informal conversations about fisheries governance issues and just being around the house offered extensive insight into themes I readily recognized as central to a fisheries governance context: Research projects, political context, cooperation with policy-makers, administration and fishers and I was privileged as a fieldworker in this environment. Leadership as well as staff would often inform me of upcoming meetings; they would advise me to turn on the radio on days with Parliament debates on fishery related issues; they would invite me to come along when they went to meet with stakeholders and managers. This participatory experience of the continuous and often informal interaction between biologists, managers, fishers and fisher representatives had me conceptualize Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions as closely-knit, fluent and continuous interaction across the different organizations of the Self-rule administration, stakeholders and biologists. The accounts of managers and biologists of regular e-mail exchanges with fishers and fishing companies only confirmed this. A quick glance at the CV of the administrative leadership within the Self-rule administration and interest organizations also had me realize at a very early stage that it is very common for the most central actors to have worked on more than one side of the table: APNN, GA and KNAPK, Royal Greenland, Polar Seafood, ICC, fish factories and other Self-rule administrations. Such dynamic labour market behaviour is found to be a characteristic of the Greenlandic elite (Christiansen and Togeby 2003), but may indeed also be a characteristic of the Nuuk labour market in general (fieldwork observations of the Greenlandic careers of own colleagues, friends and neighbours in Nuuk).

It is beyond doubt that both managers and biologists have found that the subject of fisheries governance is interesting and important and that I have benefitted enormously from this in the form of open doors and interested discussion partners. Many of my informants have decades of experience observing and acting within the governance system. Had I relied on interviews alone, I would have had to schedule a time with them (which was also done in the beginning of the project). But I have had the additional privilege of observing them in interaction and of having them within reach whenever new questions emerged. In this respect my key informants have been fishery biologists from GINR and managers from the Fishery department – from high ranking managers and department leaders to hands-on managers and research assistants. While all employees at GINR and APNN have been important to this research, I would say that I spent most time talking to around 10 persons in APNN and 20 persons at GINR; the imbalance being a reflection of the greater amount of time finally spent at GINR.

With the exception of first meetings, formal interviews have been almost non-existent and most of the information gathered was given to me for my own orientation without any clear agreement about quotation. This lack of formal interview situations and the fluency of every-day working interactions make it difficult to provide an exact account in terms of numbers as is otherwise considered good practice when describing research methodology. Submerged in every-day life, improvising as chances offered themselves and pursuing themes rather than persons, I did not keep a calendar on when I was where, who I talked or what I observed. But during the first four months of the more intensive fieldwork I took field notes on
subjects that I deemed to be relevant and I ordered them with the help of the Nvivo coding programme (later on, I tended to integrate new data directly into the articles I was writing at the time). Based on memory, e-mails and the notes available, it is possible to re-construct a numerical overview which offers some minimum numbers of attendances, meetings and key events. In my own view, this numerical overview is not always that telling of the actual qualitative outcome. Some days at APNN I found no need to make notes. Other days were full of good opportunities for discussions. In the same vein, informal discussions on the way back and forth to meetings with GINR or APNN staff were sometimes just as valuable as the meeting observations in themselves. I also got to attend entire meeting sessions about themes that were in the end only superficially dealt with in this Ph.D. such as those of the Climate change working group and the cod management plan working groups. Nevertheless, these meetings offered data and direction for my other analyses, they established and maintained informal relationships and they provided contextual information to the final analyses. With appendix A, I intend to provide the reader with a quantitative tool for evaluating the scope and quality of the fieldwork with the note that it should only be approached the condensation points of a fieldwork within and around which the actual data-producing situations emerged. As condensation points for meanings they often proved to expand beyond the immediate time of event.

It can come as no surprise that the access gained and the roles performed in this first period sets the stage for my analysis in many ways. It has meant that the FD and GINR has almost always been the starting point for my observations. Even when I observed public demonstrations or stakeholder meetings, I entered these situations together with the biologists and fishery managers who took me along. Had I connected myself closer to a group of fishers or politicians, I might have been able to observe other types of situations and had other conversations afterwards and my analysis would probably have taken a very different form. It is an important delimitation to be aware of: Representations of GINR and FD staff have been observed at more close hand and have sometimes been presented to me as ‘audience’. Representations of fishermen and politician, on the other hand, have been observed only to the extent that I have observed them in direct interaction with managers and biologists at for example public demonstrations and meetings or when they raised opinion in public through the media or Parliament debates. This inevitably means, and this is my own impression too, that I have a fuller and more multi-layered understanding of the representations of GINR and FD staff. A type of understanding that is probably best aligned with the hermeneutic ethnographic method as described by Geertz who advocated for the need of ‘thick’ descriptions that were capable of giving accounts of the meaning that people themselves attach to their actions (Geertz 1975). Still, this type of bias towards a thicker understanding of administrators and biologists is also a deliberative effect of an observation of gaps and saturations in the existing literature. While the rationality of Self-rule administration is often observed to be influential it has to my knowledge not been as systematically investigated as the ‘rationalities’ of fishers and hunters (e.g. practices of hunting, fishing, selling and sharing as well as meanings of home, community, land, resources etc.) For an understanding of Greenlandic fishers, hunters and their communities I chose to rely on the literature already available on Inuit social organization which is mostly, but not exclusively, based on field work within Northern Greenlandic communities in particular (e.g. Dahl 2000, Nuttall 1992, 2000, Dybbroe and Møller 1978, Rasing 2000, Fienup-Riordan 2000, Poppel 2010, Sejersen 1997). The understanding derived from these studies has, as the introduction describes, played a fundamental role in shaping the overall problem of the thesis.
The observation of the interaction of others constitutes an important part of the data and was collected throughout the entire fieldwork period. Appendix B offers an overview of the field and categories of actors that I have observed in interaction with others from 2010 to 2013. In line with my theoretical approach, which will be presented later, actors are not approached as pre-defined actors representing for example an interest organisation or GINR. The analysis is mostly interested in how ‘actors come into being in interaction with each other. In an analysis like this, an informant is not always an informant in the traditional sense for an informant can also be someone who I have just observed in interaction with others. Inspired by Goffman’s theory of impression-management (1959) I therefore prefer to conceptualize these persons as performants in the appendix, highlighting their character as actors in interaction with others. When presenting Appendix B, it is only to provide the reader with an initial map of the situations observed and the formal professional position of the performants I was able to observe or speak to in these situations.

GINR offered privileged access to observe interaction between the actors shaping Greenlandic fishery policy. Nuuk cod fishers and biologists in dialogue at GINR after the fishers’ demonstration. 6. October 2011 (photo: Kitte Winther)

Ethical considerations of reciprocity and anonymity

In discussion of methods in qualitative fieldwork the social relations developed by the researcher in the field are often relevant to understand the construction of data. I do not wish to make this a personal
account, however. Suffice to say that I have tried to stay true to my own temper when it comes to social relations. My data may be constrained by the times I chose not to interrupt, confront or disturb. On the other hand, the participant observation method is not as constrained by time as an interview situation and I felt that the best data came to me by staying alert and being around. And the conversations I had were not concentrated interview situations. Mostly I would find a good moment during the workday to ask some of the questions that had been growing on me. It is my firm impression that I have always received honest and often critical and self-reflexive answers. I took field notes after conversations and observations. When presenting data from non-public meetings I do not quote anyone by name. In January 2011 I withdrew to my office at GCRC to start writing based on the data I had collected so far. This was a choice made under institutional constraint: If I was to complete my PhD in time I needed to start producing articles for publication already at this stage.

But when I withdrew to the writing process at my office at GINR relations here also changed. GINR slowly became a normal working place where I could turn off my fieldworker role and feel less a guest and more at home. And the informants there slowly became colleagues and friends. Since then I have not been able to retrieve the initial curiosity that comes with the distance. Still it is a very rewarding middle ground for observing and staying up to date with Greenlandic fisheries governance events. But the leap came with some methodological and ethical concerns at the time:

Fieldwork reflections. March 14. 2010:

“All in all I think that I have been away a little too long from reflection. For two months (three very soon!) I have been sitting at GINR to write the first article. I have put the data collection on standby – except from collection of news from TV and newspapers, department meetings and meetings with (manager) about status of the Greenland halibut management plan. And some information on the salmon conservation project in Kapisillit. OK – maybe not completely on standby, yet I feel as if I have been a little far away. I have almost just felt relieved that the news has not been full of fishery issues that I ought to have pursued. Then I don’t feel as if the data is ‘getting away’. But for example two suggestions are now ready for the amendment of the fishery law and I have not been back stage to follow that process. But I was also relieved to see that there were only two minor suggestions. But I have to go down in Parliament when they are to be presented. But to return to subject: I have now been submerged in the ‘normal workplace’ that GINR is without any great reflection on their everyday practices. But then we had a meeting in the climate working group where they discussed the role of GINR in this context. And through that I got more data relating to GINR.

I might be in above my head. My double role as an employee at the GINR and one who studies the fishery management makes the boundaries rather fluent. At private get-togethers I can suddenly get insight into something that is relevant to my area of study. On the one hand this is only characteristic of fieldwork that you don’t distinguish between formal and informal situations. Still I think that I might be catching some people off guard in relation to their own interests and wishes of public self-representation. The same is probably true for data gathered among managers in the Fishery Department. But at GINR I have now started to mingle with people privately. In December I discussed with an old study friend how similar many of my informants are to me in age, background and interest and whether it was best to keep the distance. But that also just seemed cynical. I have also developed a saying that ‘after trust comes only either loyalty or treason’. I was also invited to a farewell party at the house of the manager leading the cod management
plan work. There wasn’t any data in this. The dilemma is that you socialise. But does it have to be a dilemma? I think I just need to be clear on not using the data I get in these situations? But what if it is good and illuminating? Much can probably also be used to secure that I have understood things the right way. I have actually reached this conclusion before: The direct quotations must be taken from another context, but I can then use the information I get by more informal means a way to construct a more secure analysis”.

‘After trust comes only either treason or loyalty’. I certainly knew how to put it at the edge at the time. Other researchers have landed on more of a middle stand seeing themselves as the ‘critical friend’ (personal conversation with colleagues at Aalborg University). I have sympathy for this interpretation and I think it can help the researcher come to term with her own role. But the methodology also presents ethical dilemmas to the ‘critical friend’ that must be weighed and confronted: What to do with the ‘back-stage’ data (Goffman 1959) you get from people off-guard in private settings? What to do with the fact that you gain the trust and friendship of people and go back to write an analysis that is inherently critical and deconstructionist? And what is worse, you probably know it at the time you ask for access. One of the ways I chose to ease these dilemmas has been not to refer to the ‘back-stage data directly, but to let it inform my analysis still. It has made focus on some representations over others, but citations are mostly taken from public statements. But here is a lack of methodological transparency in this process as the reader cannot trace the full collective source. Even in more formal settings of the fishery department I have chosen to protect the performants and informants somewhat. Though I was allowed access to the situations in which they interacted I have not quoted anyone directly for anything they have said outside the few formal interview situations that was also conducted. When I needed direct quotes I looked to public interaction or opinions raised in the media or in documents. Ethnographic method has traditionally been superior at providing ‘the native point of view’ (e.g. Malinowski 1922) and there has been much experimentation with letting people have their say in the form of quotes (e.g. Keesing 1992). The transferring of ethnographic method to critical policy studies based on long-term fieldwork has in my case come with a cost. In order to be critical without exposing individuals in the process of ‘demystifying power’ (Bourdieu 1980) I have sometimes had to speak in general terms or provide quotes through formalized sources such as written or public presentations.

Another way of easing the dilemma has been to present my final drafts for critical comments to my informants before submission. I thereby offered them a chance to become my critical friends in return and this restored the balance of reciprocity in my own consciousness at least. I widely distributed the first manuscript that later turned into the two separate articles about the TAC policy and the new regulation for Greenland Halibut respectively. This manuscript was based on data from the first stage of fieldwork and here, the most fundamental analyses of the actors’ ways of representing were presented. I explicitly acknowledged my informants’ expertise and asked them for their critical comments and any identification of misunderstandings. Three managers and four biologists provided comments and I know that at least one more manager has read it. The comments I received were all constructive and no bad feelings were ever raised – at least not to my face. There was a joke from one of the biologists that from then on I would hear a ‘the anthropologist is coming!’ when I walked down the hall at GINR. The greatest advantage of this strategy was that it led staff at the department for fish and shellfish at GINR to discuss in more detail with me and send me new examples of informal interaction between fishers, biologists and managers. I was happy to experience that some of the most experienced staff here and another at GFLK recognized my finding of an informal TAC decision-making process and helped me refine it in more detail. But I also
received a general comment from a just as experienced manager at FD that the entire analysis was ‘a very different way of seeing things’. Another manager at FD said it was a very honest analysis.

**Repetitions and contradictions**

As the field-reflections above convey, I gradually lost the sensitivity of a stranger to the field and in the meantime, an angle for analysis had started to take form in the article-writing period at GINR. The research method that evolved during this long-term, but less intensive fieldwork, can perhaps be termed a strategy of increasingly focused data collection aimed at nuancing emergent understandings from the first period of fieldwork. I gradually sharpened the focus and engaged in a less broad and scoping type of data collection. For the every-day life lived in Nuuk and the writing hours spent within a research institution that is, after all, essential to the natural resource governance system has exposed me to a continuous stream of events and situations relating to fisheries governance. But it was a field-work identity that could be switched on and off, but which was generally on full-time stand-by and I would pick up on situations as data when I registered that they offered perspectives on some of my on-going analysis. This could be anything from the establishment of a new fishery organization in Ilulissat, a national election or the observation of even more interactions in regards to fishery reforms in the years that followed after the submission of my first article. And then I have had a continuous need to retrieve new fishery and governance related facts from friends and colleagues working at APNN and GINR.

In a three year long fieldwork like this, time has had the uncomfortable advantage that new events and new situations have come along to induce me with uncertainty and make me revise my first conclusions. But it is also a fact that I have repeatedly been exposed to almost identical statements throughout a three year period. And it is also a fact that literature studies has made me aware that many representations of the ‘urgent’ problem of today are really not that new but decades old such as the case of the here-and-now need to develop an extractive industry of oil and mining. The repetition of issues and modes of representation over time and across different spheres has eventually made me a little more confident about the conclusions finally made. Paradoxically a little quantitative methodological security has thus introduced itself in the form of continuous repetition. In my analytical framework I have translated such repetition into discourses as well as examples of social reproduction of problems, selves and others.

Just as I have observed repetition, so I have also observed contradictions. Inspired by Sjørslev (1992), I have strived towards not describing the representations as more coherent and ordered than they actually are. The representations of everyday life are puzzling and they can be difficult to order in an analytical way. The final analysis reflects a double goal to make the text empirical enough to be trustworthy and analytical enough to be interesting. Contradictions within otherwise connected discourses on problems have been identified and I have made an effort to convey these in the final analysis of for example the governance rationality of the Greenland halibut management plan and party political self-representation. In the same vein data has been constructed around registrations of repetition across space. Unavoidably, I have been drawn to other important societal debates at the time of fieldwork where representations of problems, selves and others were often complimentary to those in the fishery field. And I realized at a very early stage of my research that representations of the fishery cannot be separated from the greater question of Greenlandic development as such and as a result there will be analytical excursions into the larger context of Greenlandic planning in general.
Making a case of participation

The increasingly participatory aspect of the second face of fieldwork formed the ground of the fourth case presented in article four on the politics of social sustainability talk. Throughout the summer and autumn of 2011 IFM colleague and co-supervisor Delaney and I prepared a preliminary social impact assessment of the Greenland halibut management plan for the Fishery Department. Forerunning this assessment was my study of power relations in the case, a certain concern about the social impacts of the management plan and our own estimation that it would be a relevant way of contributing directly to the work in the Fishery Department. We asked FD if they were interested and upon a positive reply we planned the fieldwork in consultation with the working group. The three of us authored the report “Greenland Halibut in Upernavik: A preliminary study of the importance of the stock for the fishing populace” (Delaney, Jacobsen and Hendriksen 2012) and a letter summarizing the main themes in Danish and Greenlandic was published in the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq with the title: “The management of the Greenland halibut fisheries and the critical dilemmas” (Hendriksen, Delaney and Jacobsen 2011). Both were distributed to FD; Qaasuitsup municipality that hosts the northern communities depending most directly on the Greenland halibut fishery; the Fishery Committee of Greenlandic Self-rule; to fisheries organisations and companies involved in the fishery; and the media.

The report (Delaney, Hendriksen and Jacobsen 2012) summarizes the main issues as follows:

“7. Conclusions

Upernavik district’s economy is one of contradictions. Outside of the public employees of Upernavik town, Upernavik society remains very much one of a subsistence economy and way of life, supplemented with the selling of halibut for cash. Yet Greenland’s central administration is interested in promoting and enforcing a ‘modern society’ with an economy-oriented frame of reference. Joining the two realities is challenging (Hendriksen and Jørgensen n.d.). Such societies as this Greenlandic one often have traditional networks used for bartering and trade, often for social and cultural reasons, not simply for simple economic expedience and to deliberately cheat on a contemporary government with a formal tax system. In Upernavik, the meat and parts of marine mammals such as seals and whales, and rarely a polar bear skin, may be sold “outside the system” for societal and cultural reasons. Hunters and fishers in Greenland are self-employed. This means that they may deduct documented business expenses such as gasoline, ammunition, and fishing gear for tax purposes. Consequently, most hunters with a taxable income end up having a tax liability very close to zero, even though they have had a reasonably good halibut catch. Thus, on paper, it appears they do not contribute to ‘community’ (tax) or gross domestic product (GDP) and are perceived as unproductive and unprofitable for greater Greenland society (Hendriksen and Jørgensen n.d.). Yet seen from the perspective of the local community, these individuals are good citizens who contribute to the family and the village with their catch. Historically, the rulers (first Denmark, and later the central Greenland) have looked down upon such peripheral districts, and have tried various incentives to encourage locals to leave these areas, such as through the centralization policies. Their insistence that these individuals contribute tax for the development and servicing of Greenland’s major cities is a limited economic perspective and one which follows an old-fashioned, and often failing, model of development (Hendriksen and Jørgensen n.d.). There is an unspoken tension between the central government and the district’s inhabitants, who are rooted in different ways of seeing the world and lack of understanding and insight into the other’s perspective. This is a classic center-periphery contradiction, and it is replayed in a
number of third world countries and countries with indigenous populations around the world (Hendriksen and Jørgensen n.d.).

On visits to Upernavik district in March-April and July-August of 2011, none of the fishermen and hunters interviewed was aware of the details of the new management plan for Greenland halibut. This is despite the fact at the time was one of the 'hot topics' in the central administration and the press. When such plans are made available, they are always, as one interviewee reported, prepared by Danes, who are not familiar with their Greenlandic lives, and always in Danish. It is unusual for such reports to be translated, and if they are, they will be translated into a Greenlandic which local fishermen do not understand. Also, they commented that politicians and officials rarely, if ever, visit the district. If they do visit, it will only be for a short time and without the possibility for locals to ask questions or talk about their lives (Hendriksen and Jørgensen n.d.). When people do not know that great change is coming their way, they can neither relate to these changes nor develop a strategy to mitigate the negative impacts. Most locals see the plan as simply another in a long series of key measures over the years and cannot see how this may actually be drastically different from measures of the past. The fishers are assuming that in practice it does not get the great importance and that life can continue as before. Such assumptions by the locals may inadvertently increase the negative effects of the management plan since fishers are unprepared and un-comprehending. Yet, it is management which must ensure stakeholders are informed and given the opportunity to comment on management plans; management needs to be transparent in their actions.

Management plans need to fully encompass needs of all the various subgroups and ensure equity. Management also needs to conduct thorough social and economic analyses to make sound decisions based upon scientific advice. In order for management to be successful, it needs to follow the practices of good governance. Good governance is participatory and is based upon, among other points, social equity, responsiveness, and transparency (UNEP n.d.). It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society (UNEP n.d.). With the Greenland halibut plan, APNN has the opportunity to work for the betterment of all of its citizens, including those most vulnerable. Up until this point in time, the process has not been particularly transparent nor has it included stakeholder participation with all groups. Since the plan has not yet been implemented, however, there is still time to follow good governance practices for the sustainability of not only the Greenland halibut stock, but also for Greenlandic society” (Delaney, Hendriksen and Jacobsen 2012, p. 35-36).

The report was based on two weeks of fieldwork in Upernavik district in the summer 2011 and interview data collected in the same district by PhD student Hendriksen in 2009 and 2011. But what else was the report based upon? What representations of reality were we supporting and which were we contesting? I had myself played a central role in initially having identified and analysed the management plan in terms of power, in discussing the themes of the final conclusion and in formulating a public letter summarizing key issues together with Hendriksen.

As my fourth case I turned our experience of offering, conducting and delivering this social impact assessment into a case of participation and power. With this case our own activities as researchers nested within certain academic discourses on social sustainability as well as the impact of this discourse on policymaking are included in my final analysis as an attempt to come full circle and include my original problem perceptions, as described in the introduction, into the game of power and everyday politics in Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions.
Theoretical framework: Understanding fisheries governance as politics of everyday meaning-making

I have turned problem-making within Greenlandic fishery policy into my case and thus, my research problem has been directed towards the meaning-making processes as such. This chapter will gradually introduce the theoretical framework for analysing these meaning-making processes in terms of power and participation, starting with the overall premise of a phenomenological argument.

A phenomenological point of departure

The theoretical framework of the analysis of power and participation of Greenlandic fisheries governance is nested in premises from phenomenological epistemology. Let me be clear from the beginning: This analysis recognizes the deep complexity of the thousand year old epistemological debate of how we can know anything with certainty. But as a starting point for analysis, this PhD departs from phenomenological argument (e.g. Husserl 1931) concerning the limitation of scientific method. The argument implies that we cannot know with certainty about the world outside of our perceptions. What we can hope to get to know is, at best, how we perceive it. This limitation of scientific method combined with the existentialistic significance of perception for our way of acting in and upon the world around us is the premise that makes the theoretical framework of this analysis relevant. Perceptions are simply assumed to matter in a fundamental way to how we relate to ourselves, to each other and to what has in fisheries governance terms often been categorized as the ‘natural system’ or the ecosystems of which we are part. Yet, however relevant it may be, this analysis does not offer a systematic analysis of how and what the different actors in Greenlandic fisheries governance perceive as such. It is, instead, asking how the actors interact to shape each other’s perceptions and thus it seeks to integrate a power perspective into the phenomenological problem through the problem of representation. A theoretical perspective on power and phenomenon that owes much of it conceptualization to the work of Bourdieu, who argues that people engage in symbolic manipulation which aim at determining the mental representation that other people may form (e.g. Bourdieu 1980b). In Bourdieu’s word, ‘reality’ is defined ‘the site of permanent struggle to define reality’ and in order to be able to explain reality more completely, one must “grasp at one and the same time what is instituted (without forgetting that it is only a question of the outcome, at a given point in time, of the struggle to bring something into existence or to force out of existence something that already exists) and representations, performative statements which seek to bring about what they state. To restore at one and the same time the objective structures and the subjective relation to these structures, starting with the claim to transform them” (Bourdieu 1980b, p. 224-225).

The analysis of representation continues a power-sensitive tradition across the social sciences. The theoretical framework rests upon a mixture of theories and conceptualizations that have emerged from within anthropological, sociological and philosophical disciplines. It is inspired by theories of meaning from cultural anthropology; it is inspired by a theory of performance and representation from institutional sociology; it is inspired by a theory of governance and power from the philosophy of Foucault and it is inspired by a theory of radical democratic politics by Laclau and Mouffe.
Meaning – between shared and contested

The first theoretical set of premises of the analysis concerns the character of meaning. It states that humans are meaning-making creatures; that meaning-making activity shapes reality as it appears to us; that meaning is often created in interaction; that meaning is sometimes shared and other times contested. The hermeneutic discipline within philosophy has been promoted as the most significant theory of science within the humanistic sciences (Gulddal and Møller 1999). To account for its history, its primary thinkers and its influence on the sciences is an enormous task which lies beyond this PhD. And any short summary will lack the depth necessary for understanding the nuances of this tradition. Suffice here to recapitulate the, for this PhD, relevant legacies as they have been so comprehensively presented elsewhere (Gulddal and Møller 1999). The evolution of the hermeneutic discipline within philosophy played an important role in articulating human beings as meaning-making creatures. The early hermeneutics of the 19th century investigated the process and principles whereby we understand historical, legal or religious text. Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s phenomenological conceptualization of understanding was important for positioning the problem of understanding as a phenomenological condition that affects everyday ways of orienting ourselves. Heidegger argued that understanding is an integrated part of ‘being’ (Heidegger 1927). What we are always in the process of understanding is our own existence as well as the world around us. Thrownness into the world is a central concept for describing the possibilities and limitations of our actions in a world that was never a ‘clean sledge’. Through our thrownness we understand our own being and our possibilities in the world in which we live. This existential understanding, this way of orienting ourselves, is according to Heidegger a primary and unarticulated understanding. Upon it rests every secondary articulated understanding such as for example a text (Gulddal and Møller 1999, p. 30).

The hermeneutic turn in the social sciences put meaning on the agenda in the study of human interaction. It investigates what it means to understand and interpret not only texts but also cultures and human interaction. Within anthropology Geertz has played a prominent role in the hermeneutic turn as he argued that culture could be approached as text. He defined culture as a web of signification man himself has spun and directed analysis towards the search for meaning (Geertz 1975). Through the example of a wink with the eye, he argued for the need of what he called ‘thick description’ in the analysis of culture. At thin description would only describe the physical twinkle. A thick description would also describe what this wink means within the context in which it is performed (Geertz 1975). Through this concept of culture and his analytical focus on performance Geertz was able to describe human interaction in terms of shared meaning-making. Later studies have opened up for the possibility that perhaps, meaning is not always that shared, not even in the Balinese culture that served as empirical grounding for Geertz’ theories. Barth composed a monograph termed ‘Balinese worlds’ emphasising themes of variation, plurality and unboundness as opposed to the theme of sharedness introduced by Geertz. Barth criticised Geertz (and others) for assuming congruence between the formal rules, observed patterns of behaviour and the purposes and priorities of the participants of Balinese society Barth objected that Geertz’ systematics of cultural material had led to a disregard for whole persons and life situations and to misplaced assumptions of homogeneity and congruence. Barth argued that actors are always and essentially positioned, and the interpretations they make will reflect this positioning and the knowledge they command. Context is, likewise, not to be assumed by the researcher in the form of for example a local culture. People themselves embed their acts in particular contexts through their interpretations of these. A major task of the researcher is therefore to discover and give account of how acts are placed in particular contexts (Barth
Meaning has thus gained a central place within culture studies, but there are unsettled issues as to how we come to understand properly the meaning people attach to their actions and how we are to understand the concept of culture and whether meaning-making activities are perhaps better illuminated by means of other concepts such as practice or discourse (e.g. Ortner 1997, Abu-Lughod 1993). The analysis build on the insights provided by central debates around culture within anthropology that have opened up for the possibility of analysing meaning-making – often in the form of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ - as involving dimensions of sharedness as well as contestation (see also Baumann 1996). The concept of culture will not receive particular attention in this analysis, but the tension between sharedness and contestation is pursued further because my research problem emerged from empirical observations of conflict and contestation in the existing interpretations of problems in the Greenlandic fisheries, while at the same time, I am interested in the coming into being of final representations of coherent and seemingly shared problems in policies and representations of consensus in decision-making processes. As a matter of fact, the power perspective does exactly develop around mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion related to the processes whereby contested issues take on a form of shared meaning. That is, how wicket issues manage to take on, if only for a short while but long enough to affect policy, a non-contested and consensual appearance.

The analysis is very sensitive to the meanings actors explicitly appear to convey to each other. It is sensitive to the way people represent themselves, others and the relevant problems as they articulate statements relating to the fisheries and fisheries governance issues. It is an advantage that my case is a conflict prone one: The competing representations are very visible. This also means that to a wide extent it is my data that has shaped my conceptual framework to embrace acts of representations and power. As I said in the introduction, my problem arose from recognition of competing perceptions of the fishery and related problems. What I am able to interpret as fisheries governance is the everyday interactions where the meaning of fisheries and their relevant context is at stake. This also means that the question of what constitutes situations of fisheries governance has become an empirical question: It is something that was identified during the research process. This perspective finds support in recent theoretical development within interpretive studies of ‘governance’.

Definitions of fisheries governance situations

The term ‘governance’ has enjoyed much attention and revival within the last decade of studies into natural resource management and other problems of collective action and the concept is said to embrace a new type of political reality (e.g. Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, Koimann 2005, Hoppe 2011).

As summarised by Hoppe (2011) this reality is commonly asserted to be one of a more self-regulating society where governance as a result of economic-liberal ideology is increasingly put in the invisible hand of the market; it is said to be one of increased state-penetration into life-worlds of individuals which makes distinctions between private and public increasingly obsolete; and it is said to be one of an increasingly complex practice of decision-making. This new reality is also said to stem from the welfare state experiment in the western world (Hoppe 2011). Writing before the concept of governance achieved it new popularity, Foucault did not use the concept of governance, but his studies of the governmentality mode of governance as a historical up-coming is based on similar conclusions of the of the private/state divide and the importance of disciplinary techniques working on the micro-level of identity (Foucault 1978, 1979). Identity formation in the context of welfare policies and governmentality represent an anthropological
study field of its own today (e.g. Mik-Meyer and Järvinen 2004, Shore and Wright 1997) and will be returned to in more detail below.

The concept of governance is also being understood and deliberately developed to confront the characteristics of the problems that is said to characterise reality today, namely crisis ‘wickedness’. The concept of governance is evoked to embrace the circumstance that when a ‘hypercomplex’ society faces economic and ecological crises, “(t)he institutional orders of households, corporations, markets, civil society and the state appears to criss-cross each other in chaotic, hardly understandable but troublesome ways” (Hoppe 2011, p. 13). The experience of crisis and the wickedness of problems accommodate well present day descriptions of capture fisheries as being in states of crisis (e.g. Kooiman 2005, Montaigne 2007), fishery governance systems as being in a state of crisis (e.g. Raakjær 2009) and of fishery governance issues as being of an inherently wicket character as argued by Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2008): “Problems are wicket (as opposed to “tame”) when they are difficult to define and delineate from other and bigger problems and when they are not solved once and for all but tend to reappear. Wicked problems have no technical solution that can be determined scientifically. Instead, for wicket problems governance must rely on the collective judgment of stakeholders involved in a process that is experiential, interactive and deliberative” (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2008, p. 553)

Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) caution that macro-explanations for this new reality are more often asserted than argued. Still, when analysing environmental governance specifically, they use the metaphor of a network society. They emphasise shifting patterns of participation along the lines of expansive democracy and they analyse the new complexity as shifts and new instability in networks. Furthermore, they argue that in this network society, established institutionalised routines and representations are losing their value as interest representation. And therefore, policy-making is increasingly becoming a stage for political will formation. Hajer and Wagenaar argue for a need for an interpretive account of governance, because a post-positivist policy analysis that is “interpretive, pragmatic, and deliberative is both practically and philosophically attuned to the continuous give and take in networks of actors that, as a result of the changing political topography, have sprung up around concrete social and political issues” (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, p. xiv). An interpretive approach to governance has thus developed around the experience and analysis of a new reality and the governance concept of this thesis builds upon the insights of this emerging tradition.

As a methodological and analytical consequence of the interpretive theoretical approach, social spheres of ‘fishery governance’ practice are not defined a priori but constitute an essential area of inquiry. This means that the analytical framework allows it to occur in some of the conventionally more likely places and institutions such as within the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture or the Parliament, in consultations of official interest organisations or in the drafting of background papers and commission reports. But it is also allowed to occur over lunch at the Greenlandic institute of natural resources, at dinner tables in private homes as well as within academic circles discussing Greenlandic development and social sustainability. This definition can be seen as taking the interpretive approach to its full consequence, embracing all meaning-making activities related to fishery governance, even those that are seemingly private. But as far as I recall myself, the decision to broaden the range of possible situations of fisheries governance as meaning-making to this extent, was first made upon observations of the acts of representations observed in the ‘field’. I wanted to be able to embrace the observation that the
representations that seemed to matter to policy discourse were in fact articulated across both formal and private spheres.

Still, I am not able to document any direct connection between what is said by a friend at a dinner table in Nuuk working for the Self-rule administration and the way a policy is actually formed. I am only able to recognize a representation I have heard so many times before in the formal policy work and to assert that a meaning has thus become shared. The observation can be illuminated by the theory of the diminishment of the state/private divide and the way policy-meaning diffuse into private life. But what about the other way around? Can this private/public diminish be used to understand policy-formulation as well? If we are to dive into questions of causality from this opposite direction, the case of Greenlandic Self-rule might be a very fruitful case. There is such a conspicuous turn-over in the Self-rule administration as well as within the interest organizations of the fishery that it is really not unlikely that the person working in one ministry one year will work in another next. The interaction between the various actors I have identified as participants in Nuuk consistently ignores any organizational or institutional border. They meet across work, family, friendship, free-time, children’s institution and neighbourhood. My experience is backed by the findings of others that claim that the elite in Nuuk is more closely knit than elites in other democracies (Christiansen and Togeby 2003). My definition of situations of fishery governance as pertaining even to private get-togethers is therefore based on a qualified leap of faith that while meanings are constructed in situations, the negotiated perceptions of problems and solutions in regard to Greenlandic issues will not leave the actors once they leave the dinner tables, the lunch or the ‘kaffemik’. On the contrary, I allow myself to assume that these can in principle be important situations in which actors together construct, test and reconstruct ‘take-away’ images of relevant problems and solutions with regard to the fishery and Greenlandic development. It can be a place of continuous reproduction and consolidation of the particular representations that shape policy and regulation. And it can be a place for contestation. I only find it implausible that water-proof walls should exist between the formal and informal productions of meaning that affect policy-making in this setting.

While the definition of fisheries governance as everyday meaning-making is very broad when it comes to which meaning-making occasions it is willing to define as fisheries governance, it is also blind to other significant occasions that is not defined as meaning-making. There is most probably other less public or less conflict prone actions relating to Greenlandic fisheries governance which I do not have access to through my data and my conceptual framework and which would be better illuminated by a different definition. For example, fisheries governance has often been approached as institutional frameworks to solve problems of collective action and this type of approach produces some very different accounts that are less focused on conflict and contestation. This analysis also focuses exclusively on that sequence of fishery governance that relate to decision-making processes that lead to policies and regulations. But these are, in my view, only temporary condensations points of meaning that may change with implementation. The related question of how regulations and policies are in turn interpreted and implemented or how they translate into new meanings and new practices is another set of very relevant questions that this PhD has had to bracket.

Performing actors

As the analysis focus on meaning in the making, it is inspired by Goffman’s theories about the performative character of meaning-making (Goffman 1959, 1961, 1963, 1967). Goffman offers a view on human interaction as performance that creates meaning. The room between people is a scene upon which selves
are played out in the form of role plays with others as spectators. With the concept of roles, role expectation, role embrace and role distance Goffman analyses both the structural constraints and actors’ possibilities in shaping their selves. So for example, people and institutions can create a limited set of possible roles for a person entering a specific situation of interaction (Goffman 1961). On the other hand, the entering person may apply different strategies as for example a role embrace or playing the role with a distance. Goffman shows that the situation offers constraints and defines possibilities in the public meaning-making process that shapes identities, but cooperation and contestation are indeed equal possibilities for the actors involved. The inspiration of this theoretical framework is particularly visible in the analysis of how decision-making actors construct themselves and others in alliance in the context of the TAC decision-making process and the new regulation on Greenland halibut. For these are cases constructed around my own direct observation of human interaction in public spaces, meetings and working groups.

The case of TAC decision-making offers data on dynamic real-time interaction between decision-making actors in the context of direct conflict. The case of the new regulation offers real-time data on how administrators represent themselves to each other as they cooperate to formulate a new regulation and plays a significant role in the analysis. In this optic, the decision-making actor is also in a state of becoming and an open empirical question. And to understand the decisions made one needs also understand how a decision-making actor becomes an actor in the first place.

There is one concept, however, which has repeatedly imposed itself upon my analysis and that is the concept of the ‘problem’. It is characteristic for the analysis that the construction of selves and others is intimately and unbreakably bound to the simultaneous constructions of ‘problems’. The reason is to my best judgement that my case is one of governance which Goffman’s cases were not necessarily. It has been argued that governance is essentially about the governance of problems and not, as also argued, about finding sophisticated solutions (Hoppe 2011). Nevertheless, “...questioning or problem finding, posing the right questions, does not nearly get the attention devoted to providing the right answers, or problem solving” (Hoppe 2011 p. 4). In the case of this PhD, practices of problem finding – or more precisely problem making - has continuously stolen the attention.

The connection between identities and problems in governance has been investigated in institutional sociology from which important insights are to be gained in regard to the connection between problems and identity. Continuing Goffman’s tradition, a group of Scandinavian researcher has analysed welfare service institutions as ‘people-processing institutions’ that create roles for the clients it serves (Mik-Meyer and Järvinen 2004.). These roles centre on problems and they become ‘problem identities’ in the sense that the institutions create clients with problems that the institution is able to solve. In this perspective, it is the available solutions offered by the institution that creates the problems of the clients and thus also the identity offered to the clients as they enter into interactions with the institutions. This way of thinking, that turns the relationship between problem and solution on the head, is also available from organizational theory in the form of the garbage can model (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). This model argues that decision-making in organization is often anarchistic, where solutions are looking for problems and decision-making occasions and not the other way around. This way of thinking exerts significant influence on my analysis of both decision-making and representational identity work in the cases. It means that the analysis is inherently concerned with the way problems and identities come into being as a result of the very institutional setting within which the problems and identities are articulated. In the analysis such institutional settings are for example the way managers represent themselves and the goal of their actions
and the fact that certain discourses of sustainable or profitable fisheries are more dominant than others. My case offers problems which are not directly coupled to any identity on the surface such as biological sustainability or profitability. Yet it has been argued that all fisheries governance is essentially about the governance of humans just as many have argued that it is a problem of collective (human) action. And my analysis seeks to argue that most of the problems do in fact have to do with perceptions of problematic or unproblematic human behaviour and thus with representations of selves and others according to different degrees of problematism. That is why we see, in my analysis, that for example some actors in the fishery represent the future while others represent the past. On this account, the resulting policies will eventually favour some types of identities over others.

The case of the new regulation for Greenland halibut is also a case of a situation in which problem identities are created in a regulation for others who were not themselves present in these situations. I have had access to the formulation of policy, but not its implementation or reception by those for whom the ‘roles’ have been formulated. In this empirical context, the concept of role has not been pursued further as there simply was no ‘role performance’ to observe. The question of the identities constructed on paper is instead formulated as a case of how governable subjects are created in policy. In this case, the actors of the fishery are similar to the objectified actors of governance described by governmentality studies. They are seen but do not see, they are the object of information but never a subject in communication (Shore and Wright 1997). To analyse this cases, which one may argue structure the very institutions within which actors have to act (e.g. the regulatory framework within which families have to make a living), I have complemented my theoretical framework with less actor oriented theories about governmentality and the rationality of governance itself. The argument by Mik-Meyer and Järvinen (2004) presented above and the central, but to the governance institution secondary character of the problem, is part of this theorization. But a short presentation of the original Foucaultian legacy on governance and power is needed to appreciate the theoretical implications of this sort of perspective.

**Identity and power in governance**

The second theoretical set of premises for the analysis builds on the first which stated that meaning-making can be a contested political activity. The second premise concerns the character of power in governance and states that governance can be analysed as a process of constructing ‘truths’ beyond contestation; that governance takes place through problem construction and identity work: that governance is something that is exercised by and upon changing identities.

The governance concept of this PhD. is concerned with the governance of reality in Bourdieu’s sense. “Science can take as its object the very game whose stake is the power of governing the sacred frontiers, that is, the quasi-divine power over the vision of the world, and in which one has no choice, if one seeks to exercise it (rather than submit to it), other than to mystify of demystify” (Bourdieu 2003a, p. 228). The analysis of governance thereby also becomes a process of explicitly describing and thereby unmasking the power that functions through the construction of realities and truths.

Governmentality studies of the way actors and discourses manage to make ‘something you can govern by the help of identity formation’ have provided a fruitful frame for analysing the way people govern themselves and others. As a mode of governance, governmentality has been historically connected to the nation-state, the democracy and the imagery of populations that made the well-being of this population
the primary goal of governance endeavours (Foucault 1994a, 217). Governmentality refers to a type of governance that takes place through the general management of ‘men and their relations’ to a multiplicity of actors and phenomena. It is a governance mode that acts in conjunction with the ‘free’ action of self-governing subjects and multiple tactics are central to its working (Foucault 1994a, 209). Governmentality is about how you make actors govern themselves by shaping and structuring their selves and actions according to specific ideas or ideals, and hereby, the construction of truths and identities by a government regime provides a framework for analysing techniques of governance. A literature on anthropology of policy (e.g. Shore and Wright 1997) has emerged around this type of thinking. In line with Foucault’s analysis it has defined policy as a type of power which works both on and through the agency and subjectivity of individuals as ethically free and rational subjects. It argues that policy has become a major institution of Western and international governance and therefore, the study of policies provide unique avenues to analysing wider issues of governance. These issues are portrayed as being of a political character that works under the guise of neutrality: “Policies are most obviously political phenomena, yet it is a feature of policies that their political nature is disguised by the objective, neutral, legal-rational idioms in which they are portrayed. In this guise, policies appear to be mere instruments for promoting efficiency and effectiveness. This masking of the political under the cloak of neutrality is a key feature of modern power” (Shore and Wright 1997, p. 8). The anthropological type of questioning that starts from a sensitivity to actors’ point of view and the ways these contradict or clash, combined with the capacity for problematizing the taken for granted, is said to be particularly suited to analyse policies (Shore and Wright 1997 p.24).

Within fisheries studies, anthropologist have been particularly strong at illuminating community aspects of fisheries and the community impact of policies and this seems to be the case for most anthropological studies in Greenland (e.g. Dahl 2000, Nuttall 2000). Alongside, studies of fisheries governance as identity-making have started to emerge with an obvious legacy of Foucaultian governmentality-thinking. There are similarities between Foucault’s observation that with modernity humans became envisaged as population to be governed and Roepstorff’s (1998) observation that modern states attempts to govern fisheries are equally connected to the perception of fish as abstract populations that have such an inherent quality as a maximum sustainable yield. Yet, the fish resource can only be controlled indirectly and so, historically, the disciplinary problem was soon transferred to the human agents in control of its harvest mortality. Thus it is widely recognized today that what you do in reality govern in fisheries governance is human behaviour. Bavington has argued that particularly the 1990’s realization of the complexities within the natural system had governors redirect their gaze towards human actors, believing they are ‘less complex and more determined by causal or statistical laws’ (Bavington 2010, p. 107). It is observed that fisheries management in the western world has turned industrial fisheries into management-fisher hybrids – or ‘Cyborgs’ as Johnsen et al. (2009) coin it. They argue that the relations that make up fisheries have become increasingly formalized and mechanized as the ‘unmanageable’ were made manageable. Still, according to fishermen themselves and other analytical observers, fishermen still tend to form very diverse groups in terms of their values and actions (Christensen and Raakjaer 2006). A study of fishermen’s perception of fleet categories throughout Europe showed that management categories tend to form and reorganize fisheries and fishing activities as fishers respond to the rules-in-place when they physically (re)build and (re)equip their boats (Wilson and Jacobsen 2009). Thus, fisheries governance as a type of governance activity has for some time been moulding its object of governance (also recognized by Jentoft 2007) and in the process, one may
argue, self-identification and management classification have become intertwined. In the context of New Zealand fisheries management, Massey (2004) has analysed discourses of ‘sustainable management’ as an expression of governmentality in the sense that they have transformed stakeholders into subjects bound to a commercial discourse. Bavington (2010) and Carothers (2010) have observed that neoliberal fisheries governance discourses envisage a new type of fisher: That of the self-managing, profit-seeking, detached and fully professionalised business entrepreneur. In line with much governmentality thinking, Bavington observed that the internalization of control through identity work was a means to increase the effectiveness of the Newfoundland fisheries governance system after the cod collapse. So he for example observes: “Managerial interventions in the cod fishery now work by involving rather than excluding fishermen, once they have been licensed … Management now operates on the identity of fishing people – attempting to turn them into technicians for fisheries science and (self-) managing entrepreneurs” (Bavington 2010, p. 113). By implication, a range of studies now assert, from different but compatible perspectives, that modern fisheries governance have become possible through the discursive and material construction constructing and de-facto promotion of certain types of (self)governable subjects. The meaning-making analysed in this literature pertains to the way the governance regime construct subject positions for fishers and the extent to which fishers have changed behaviour as a result.

I see this thesis as a continuation of a trend to ask anthropological questions of power, identity and meaning to fisheries governance. But contrary to the most other studies, this thesis focus exclusively on ‘policy in the making’ as a result of every-day interactions between an identifiable group of actors within the fisheries governance system. In comparison with other literature, this thesis takes a step back in time and analyses the coming into being of the policies which effects are often described but which rationality are often only superficially analysed or assumed. It has been stated that the governance system work on another rationality than that of the small-scale fishers (Rasmussen 2003) and that it seeks its legitimacy in the international community (Sejersen 2007). But to my knowledge, there are no in-depth analysis available of how exactly subject positions of governors and governed are first created in the interactions leading to the so often criticized fishery policies. The thesis aims to offer a more nuanced but not necessarily less critical perspective on Greenlandic fisheries governance.

The thesis investigates the extent to which governmentality is a relevant framework for understanding Greenlandic fisheries governance. It uses the concept of ‘subject positions’ to ask two related questions. One is related to the becoming of subjects-to-be-governed in the conventional sense of the theory and related literature. Another question asks about the subject positions made available to the governors themselves. Through the different cases, my analysis asks how human identities are constructed in and for a planning process. In line with the theory of problem identities, a particular emphasis is put on how these identities are constructed around governance problems articulated in the planning process itself. In regard to the Greenland halibut management plan work the analysis unfolds around a central aspect of governmentality observed by Foucault: That governance in its most economic form takes place as a ‘conduct of conduct’ whereby subjects-to-be-governed are cultivated that will, in all freedom and voluntariness, act in accordance with the way the governors, if their rationalities ever had a face, would like them to act. A relationship of power is an ‘action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future’ and ‘the exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’ (Foucault 1982, p. 214). The ‘subject’ is not an essentialist category in this view where the very way people see themselves and choose to act become a central space
of interference for a governance regime. The case of the Greenland halibut management plan investigates how the subjectivities in the coastal fishery for Greenland Halibut in Greenland are first interpreted, and thus constructed, by the centralized governance regime and asks if the fishery can be said to pose a challenge to the ‘soft’ governmentality type of governance, whereby subjectivities that act in accordance with the new government regime are successfully created. The conclusion is affirmative and the analysis thus primarily offers the perspective of describing a process of out-phasing aimed at that which ‘governmentality realizes it cannot govern’; that which subjectivity is not to be changed successfully and which conduct is not to be conducted.

The concept of subject positions also informs my analysis of the ‘governors’ and not just the governed. Governmentality analysis can be said to credit the governance system with most agency and to provide the subjected subjects with little independent agency. Indeed, this is what makes the power perspective so persistent in my view. Yet, the governing agent is analysed as a rationality and not as a collection of living agents which is of course due to Foucault’s take on the subject: It does not start from historical individuals but probes the discursive constitution of these in the first place. The agency of governors and governed therefor appears somewhat anonymous and collective. Nevertheless, the concept has something to offer the actor-oriented parts of my analysis because it opens another set of questions relevant to power. This is a questioning that does not start from any essentialist assumption about the governing actors and their interests. The governing actors are conceptualized as always being in a state of becoming as they engage in policy-making. They too are subordinated to processes of subjectivisation. This perspective is compatible with the perspective offered by Goffman: Actors take on roles that are created for them in the situation of interaction. But the theoretical connotations of the concept of subject-positions draw attention to the possibility that the constellation of a governor identity is an equally important technique of governance. Governors too have their identities processed in a governance situation where the creation of a subject position for oneself as a governing subject is just as important for the policy outcome as creating one for others. It also means that we cannot know beforehand who succeed to become governors in the sense that there was some level of cooperation around their role as for example responsible governors. The Greenlandic case has, in my view, blurred the governor/governed divide – or the governance system/social system divide (Charles) - because, as the analysis shows, the problem of governance is fundamentally a problem of governing co-governors. In many ways this takes us back to the original problem of natural resource governance as commons dilemmas and collective action: the problem is how to govern ‘us’. My analysis then analyses the problem of governing ‘us’ as something that may be pursued through identity formation: It may simply be a question of constructing the ‘us’ that matches the problem. As an example, the analysis argues that a perceived common dilemmas can also be solved by excluding the tricky elements from the ‘us’ in an attempt to build consensus. A practice that compromises broad de-facto participation.

With the construction of subjectivities and the building of consensus we are approaching the third and last theoretical premise of my analysis. It concerns my working concepts of politics and democracy that are inspired by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and how they relate to state of the art analyses of the state of Greenlandic democracy.

**Politics and democracy**

Existing studies of power and participation in Greenland has not been hesitant to point to weaknesses of Greenlandic democracy. Greenland was colonized by Denmark and significant dependency still prevails
despite the establishment of Home-rule in 1979. Greenlandic politicians have continuously been striving towards full independence and with the transition to Self-rule in 2009, Greenland is prepared for full formal independence when economically capable and otherwise ready to take on all administrative responsibilities. But the Home-rule governance institutions evolving since 1970 have reflected the power structures inherited by Denmark. The colonial legacy of centralisation and its negative impacts on the local communities is well described in a comprehensive study of local Greenlandic communities conducted in the 1970-ies by Gullestrup (1976), Schwerdtfeger (1976) and Sørensen (1976). A critical theme found in the most recent studies of local communities and natural resource governance as well (Dahl 2000, Sejersen 2007). Since Home-rule, most analysis of Greenlandic democracy and self-governance has focused on issues of Danish colonialism, ethnicity, gender and centre-periphery relations. In 2003 a collection of power studies was published (Winther et al 2003) that offered a range of new perspectives on power and participation in the Greenlandic democracy after Home-rule. Winther (2003) present the historical argument that a new post-colonial social class took control over this Home-rule governance set-up and that no democratisation, decentralisation or self-managing institutions ever evolved internally. Janussen (2003) argued that due to large gaps between decision-makers and large parts of the population, Greenland has experienced general problems in its democracy and an emerging crisis of legitimacy. Andersen and Tonsgaard (2003) have characterized Greenlandic voting behaviour in terms of ‘political poverty’ arguing that they lack in resources and participation opportunities. Studies of the elite within the Home-rule institutions found that Danes are overly dominant in administration and business whereas Greenlanders and men from Nuuk in particular take on the political positions. Furthermore a Greenlandic line of identity is said to be subordinate to a Danish one that sets the rule-of-game when political decisions are made (Adolphsen 2003). The Greenlandic elite is also found to be woven tighter together than elites in other democracies and the tripartition of power into three separate domains of an executive, a legislative and a judicial institution is considered problematic in a Greenlandic society that is characterised by close relations between the persons holding an office in these respective institutions (Christiansen and Togeby 2003). Winther (2003b) argues that on the board level of public and semi-public companies, Home-rule governance interests melt together with political interests and the interests of the large economic enterprises. So all in all, a picture emerges of a Greenlandic governance system with a condensed and intransparent power centre, a tightly woven elite that is furthermore particularly attuned towards the interest of large companies. And a corresponding picture emerges of a relatively disempowered localness.

Ten years after these conclusions, and just recently, Olsvig and Hansen (2011) argued that Greenlandic citizens have shown an increased interest in decision-making processes in connection with the Alcoa aluminium smelter planning process. Yet, a challenge to civil society participation is observed in the fact that the Greenlandic citizens have little chance to see through the intransparent decision-making procedures, which makes them doubt the effect of their participation. As Hansen showed in a study of decision-making relating to the Alcoa project, de-facto decisions made do not follow the formal procedure set out. Instead, actors manage to change the very procedure as the process moves along (Hansen 2010). Other significant debate and critique of participatory procedures have lately emerged in the slip-line of renewed activity by the Self-Rule government to attract and facilitate large-scale projects within oil and mining (e.g. Aaen 2012, Nuttall 2012). A law regulating large scale industrial activity was adopted by Greenlandic Self-Rule in 2012 under considerable promotion, discussion and debate in Greenlandic media and in my own circles of interaction in Nuuk at least (personal observation). Based on his fieldwork in Nuuk,
Nuttall (2012) recently argued that people perceive of the Self-rule decision-making procedures in relation to large-scale projects as being intransparent. A study initiated by GA (Aaen 2012) concluded that the consultation process in connection with large scale projects were not illegitimate. Positive elements were identified such as the political will to include the population and the short distance between citizens and politicians. But the report also concluded that a lack of transparency by the authorities and the often pro-forma character of the consultation process constituted significant problems for the democratic legitimacy (Aaen 2012).

With its excursion into questions of power and politics, this PhD is positioning itself within an emerging field assessing the state of Greenlandic democracy. And a relevant question is whether the decision-making procedures in Greenlandic fisheries governance are as centralised, elitist and intransparent as Greenland Self-rule administration in general tends to be portrayed. The conclusion will of course depend on the criteria used. But with the concept of radical democratic politics (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Mouffe 2005) I will look for participation where it actually occurs, that is, I will look for actors engaging in the creation of political subject-positions for themselves and others. And I will seek to identify antagonisms and contestation in whatever sphere they may occur. The approach is similar to that of Dybbroe (1988) when she was to study the political participation of Greenlandic women. She presented the on the one hand simple, on the other hand often forgotten perspective, that to understand women’s participation you need to look to the spheres where they actually participate. With the concept of democracy as radical debates over ‘who we are’ this theory should be able to cast a wide net looking for participation. But with its sensitivity to the power of representations it should also be able to identify processes of exclusion that limits participation.

The third basic premise of the analysis is then that a theory of participation and democracy must give privilege to the political moment in the construction of identities and problems. The theoretical framework above implicitly treats political actors as being in a state of becoming and Laclau and Mouffe offer a historical perspective for this theorization. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985) modernity is characterized by the demolition of old authorities and stable political positions defined according to class. There was a time when social struggles “always took place in the context of the denial of given and relatively stable identities; as a result, the frontiers of antagonisms were plainly visible and did not require to be constructed – the hegemonic dimensions of politics was consequently absent”. But in the present industrial societies, they claim, “the very proliferation of widely differing points of rupture, the precarious character of all social identity, lead also to a blurring of the frontiers. In consequence, the constructed character of the demarcating lines is made more evident by the greater instability of the latter, and this displacement of the social become more radical” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 171).

This type of analysis of modernity is so common that it sets a shared premise for many of the most popular theories of the modern condition. According to Marx and Engels the new bourgeois epoch, their epoch, distinguished itself from all earlier ones by means of ‘uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions’ whereby ‘all that is solid melts into air’: “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (Marx and Engels 1848). Weber (1920) analysed of the historical circumstances for the rise of ‘modern rationality’ and argued that modern
rationality was not quite as disenchanted as Marx and Engels had indicated. Nevertheless, the rationality was just as ‘modern’. The observation that social relations of present day as distinctly plastic and fluid echoes in post-modernist works of Baumann (2001), Giddens (1994) and Beck (2002), in prevalent theories on new governance and network governance in natural resource government (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) and in the arguments of Laclau and Mouffe.

Yet there is reason to be sceptic about the many introducing statements in today’s governance literature that matter-of-factly claims that we are today as we have never been before as when for it is for example asserted that ‘modern societies have become culturally more complex’ due to greater heterogeneity in for example language and interpretation (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, p. 10). The problem is that there is no considerable body of in-depth studies that manages to present the argument as convincingly in terms of the supposed positive features of ‘traditionalism’ and ‘stability’ of other societies. Quite to the contrary, before diving head first into premises of today’s particularly unstable and plastic reality, it may be sobering to recall the conflicting conclusions as to the homogeneity of Balinese culture (Barth 1993) and the possibility that if anything, modern man is characterized by the belief that he lives in a time that is unique in history. The demarcation of modern man has all too often come with the cost of simplifying the others (Said 1978) or even denying them a history (Wolf 1982). In a similar vein it has been argued (Argyrou 2003) that ‘reflexive modernization’ theories have re-defined and refashioned the modernity that strive to maintain western identity over and above its other, the traditional. This PhD builds on the emerging interpretive tradition in governance studies and its heritage of analysing the becoming of subjectivities as a starting point for an analysis of politics and participation. But it has no assumptions about a pre-modern past – or ‘traditional societies’ for that matter – as necessarily being less reflexive and less changing. In relation to debates on ecological crises and natural resource governance I think it would be more interesting to take the theory of governance and deliberation and raise the possibility if not people of other times, so as for example the Inuit, have also reflected upon themselves as permanently exposed to potential crisis in their relation to nature and if not they too, through their own actions of careful and preventive conduct, engaged in deliberation with other actors – human and non-human - influencing their living conditions. This PhD will not pursue this historical questioning further but only use it to establish the possibility that the theoretical questioning in this thesis is not necessarily confined to illuminate the social processes of a delimited time and a delimited type of society. It might gain its relevance from a more human-universal phenomenological level.

Mouffe and Laclau were, as Foucault was too, dissatisfied with the explanatory potential of Marxist theories that tended to rely on stable categories of the subjects and class interests and so they were to a large extent formulating their theory against a dominant intellectual trend at the time. The theoretical legacy that this type of thinking represents for this PhD is well-known by now: Identities are for making. The theory of radical politics of Laclau and Mouffe argues that political identities are not pre-given and that politics “does not consist of simply registering already existing interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping political subjects” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. xvii). In the meantime Laclau and Mouffe hold a particular perspective on democracy, conflict and consensus in that they argue that conflict and division is what makes a pluralist democratic politics possible. In this view, ‘any form of consensus is the result of a hegemonic articulation’ that ‘always has an outside that impedes its full realization’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. xviii). Thus the political struggle is a struggle to create functioning hegemonies. And in their work, Laclau and Mouffe is on an explicit mission to create a new hegemony that allows for radical democratic
politics understood as radical conflicts including conflicts over what should constitute democracy. The constitution of the very identities which will have to confront one another antagonistically is the first of political problems (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 135, p. 153). Antagonisms are created when subject positions are constellated so that they share a feature together (a relation of equivalence) which is defined as the negation of a feature shared by other subject positions (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.125).

Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of radical democratic politics implies that identity is under negotiation in the political situation and that antagonism and conflict are therefore the most vital and abiding feature of a radical democracy. It is a perspective that is celebratory of conflict and division and which is therefore also inherently sceptic towards the truly democratic potential of consensus and the forms of liberal pluralism, which “generally start by stressing what they call ‘the fact of pluralism’, and then go on to find procedures to deal with differences whose objective is actually to make those differences irrelevant and to relegate pluralism to the sphere of the private” (Mouffe 2005, p. 19). Unanimity and homogeneity are always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion and so it is only by allowing conflict that we can really make room for the contemporary proliferation of political spaces and the multiplicity of democratic demands. The concept of radical democratic politics is developed with a democratic vision: To allow for a truly liberal democracy which allows for pluralism understood as “the end of a substantive idea of the good life, what Claude Lefort calls ‘the dissolution of the markers of certainty” (Mouffe 2005, p. 18). This democratic vision, however, offers an important limitation to total pluralism, because it aims first and foremost at challenging relations of subordination. While celebratory of differences, it therefore also recognizes that some differences are constructed as relations of subordination “and therefore should be challenged by radical democratic politics” (Mouffe 2005, p. 20). To conceive of democratic politics “exclusively in terms of a struggle of a multiplicity of interest groups or minorities for the assertion of their rights, is to remain blind to the relations of power. It is to ignore the limits imposed on the extension of the sphere of rights by the fact that some existing rights have been constructed by the very exclusion or subordination of others” (Mouffe 2005, p.20). This is a central schism of legitimate conflict and problematic exclusion, which will be pursues in the analysis.

What I term radical politics in the analysis is a process in which battles over meaning are rife and where subject-positions are being openly contested. On the contrary, non-radical politics can be compared to what has been termed technocratic procedures elsewhere, except I would not say they are free of politics because meaning is still created and subjects are constructed. But they are constructed so within a hegemony of meaning. The defining difference is that it is not being contested in the situation. It is free of conflict over ‘who we are’ and ‘where we should be going’ – questions that have been identified as absolutely essential to deliberations over planning elsewhere (Flyvbjerg 1998). It is a state of consensus that has been achieved by means of exclusion of representations incompatible to the state of consensus. In Bourdieu’s terms, we would speak of the reproduction of doxa (1977) and with Laclau and Mouffe we would speak of the continuation of a certain hegemonic order. This analysis too is inherently celebratory of conflict and division when it seeks to unravel the functioning of Greenlandic politics and democracy. But it is furthermore sensitive to the power outcome of power; that is, to the radical democratic outcome of the constituted identities. In the end, it poses the question: Do the antagonistic politics identified allow for radical democratic pluralism or not? For as we shall see, exclusion is a prevalent theme which makes Greenlandic fishery politics balance on the edge of the promotion and distinction of identities.
**Operationalization**

The theoretical framework is put into operationalization with different emphasis throughout the thesis. Article one (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012) takes a close look at how subject-positions of governors are created in the TAC policy-making process. Article two (Jacobsen 2013) takes a close look at how a subject-position is created for the small-scale fishery by a governmentality rationality in the Greenland halibut management plan. Article three (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013) examines how the need for fishery reform was first constructed as a ‘truth’ and how participation in the reform was constructed and contested around representations of the decision-making actors. Article four (Jacobsen and Delaney forthcoming) examines how the prevalent debates over Greenlandic development and fisheries governance is nested in antagonistic conflicts over meaning. All articles are to be found in appendix C.

The analysis that follows now is a synthesis of the articles and other literature based on three research questions: How do actors become actors? How do problems become problems? How does participation become participation? It investigates the different ways actors, problems and participation emerge together through acts of representations. The conclusion closes with a summary of the theoretical relationship between problems, actors and participation. The final discussion lingers on the theoretical implications for conceptualising and analysing power as they have been brought to fore by the analysis of representations of problems, selves and others in Greenlandic fisheries governance.
Synthesising the becoming of actors, problems and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance
Greenlandic natural resource governance is most commonly described as a centralized institution evolving around the Home-rule (1979-2009) or Self-rule (2009-) government and the actors of the Fishery Council (APNN 2013, Sloan 2004, Rasmussen 1998, Sejersen 2007, Danielsen et al. 1998). Fieldwork studies relating to fisheries governance have often had their base within local communities in Northern Greenland and the redefinition of marine resources from local to national resources as a result of the formation of a state-like structure has been one of their key themes (Dahl 2000, Nuttall 1992, Sejersen 2007). Most studies of the Greenlandic natural resource governance system have centred on the governance of the use of marine mammals. The fishery as an economic sector of importance to socio-economic development in Greenland and the Atlantic region has been researched from a geographical and socio-economic perspective (e.g. Winther 1988a, Friis and Rasmussen 1989, Otto, Mølgaard and Christensen 1987, Danielsen et al. 1998). Last but not least, the fishery has played an integral role in the studies of Greenlandic nation building and independence (Nuttall 1992, Dahl 1986). But direct analyses of recent practices of policy-making in Greenlandic fisheries governance are few and short (Sloan 2004, Rasmussen 1998). Still, the historical perspectives offered by these studies in sum introduce a range of central themes of Greenlandic fishery governance. They touch upon policy-making in terms of choices of investments, initiation and structuring of production that resulted from the regional development strategies and in terms of fisheries management tools. These types of findings are here distilled and summarized as a historical introduction to the subject of Greenlandic fisheries governance and an analytical starting point for the synthesis.

Fish are expected to have played an economic role to Greenlandic Inuit as a subsistence activity and a local market activity before and during colonial times (Sørensen 1996, Marquardt 1999). As a commodity on the world market, however, fish did not gain footing until the late nineteenth century as a result of divergent factors. The systematic cultivation of fishing along the coast of West Greenland had been advocated in the eighteenth century, but the colonial administration decided to promote hunting more or less exclusively from the 1850s (Marquardt 1999). This interest was accompanied by colonial representations of fisheries as being the profession of ‘weaklings’, culturally inferior to the Greenlandic hunting culture, and only pursued by elders, women, children and men unable to hunt (Marquardt 1999, Langgaard 1999). It was not before the late nineteenth century that fish as world market commodity started to gain a stronghold and seal and whale blubber slowly ceased to be the primary world market activity in the then Danish colony of Greenland (Friis and Rasmussen 1989). Until the 1920s the commercial fisheries were based on flounders, redfish, Greenland halibut, arctic char and capelin (Rasmussen 1998). In 1920 cod spread from the south to Upernavik in north (Friis and Rasmussen 1989), a change in the ecosystem commonly connected with an observed rise in sea temperature in the period (Sørensen 1996). With the cod, the fishing industry turned into the most important activity of the colonial trade, represented by the ‘Royal Greenland Trade Company’. The fishery also became the primary economic colonial and state activity around which Greenlandic modernization and welfare policies would come to evolve throughout the 20th century – and well into the 21st as will become obvious in this thesis.

After the Second World War, the Danish colonisation of Greenland was problematized internationally. The restructuring of the colonial relationship and the improvement of the poor living conditions of Greenlanders entered the Danish political agenda and a Greenland commission was established to examine these issues. These events are commonly analysed as resulting in the ‘G-50 plan’. The G-50 plan proposed
investments that should bring educational and health conditions up to an acceptable level, seen from a European viewpoint. In that connection, the need for a self-sufficient Greenlandic economy based on a rationally-run cod-fishing and processing industry was articulated. Private investments in the fishery and private entrepreneurship were encouraged in a context of the hitherto colonial monopoly on trade. But the private capital stayed out of the fishery and went to retailing and construction instead, where risks were less and duties to provide services to outer settlements non-existent (Dahl 1986, Friis and Rasmussen 1989). The Royal Greenland Trade Company therefore prepared a range of reports of its own in which it envisioned a different kind of development based on three premises: 1) an income basis should be established as fast as possible to establish a self-sufficient Greenlandic economy 2) productivity was best raised by organising the production of large scale factory work 3) The factories were to be built in larger ‘open-water’ settlements on Greenland’s west coast, from Paamiut in South to Sisimiut, where access would never be hindered by sea-ice formation. In 1964 the recommendations of a second Greenland commission, the G-60 plan, supported the conclusions envisioned by the reports of the Royal Greenland Trade Company. Unable to rely on private capital, the state, or the public sector through the state, was to play a key role in the building up of the Greenlandic fishing industry based on cod (Friis and Rasmussen 1989). The Danish wishes for a capitalist development in Greenland thus resulted in a comprehensive state sector engaging directly in the fishery (Dahl 1986).

Investments were distributed unevenly throughout the Greenlandic west coast according to the development strategy of the 1960s (Friis and Rasmussen 1989). The modernization of Greenland was based on the centralisation of production and administratively forced re-settlement from settlements to towns started to occur. These were the strategies of Danish policy aimed to kick-start a staggering colonial-economic development and eradicate proletarianization (Dahl 1986). The administrative force expressed itself in policies on schooling, building of houses, loans to fishing vessels; people living in settlements would not receive any support of this kind (Dahl 1986). People living in settlement targeted for closure experienced that they were unable to attract investments to uphold a reasonable living standard in their communities. Their settlements had explicitly been classified as a settlement to be depopulated according to established categories which reflected a development strategy articulating cod as the only profitable resource and thus directing production exclusively to the selected open-water towns. Living with access to a variety of other natural resources than just cod – such as salmon, lumpsucker roe, cod, catfish - the population of negatively classified settlements (e.g. Atangamik, see Schwerdtfeger 1976) did not agree with the evaluation granted. A Danish study in four volumes entitled ‘the local community investigation in Greenland’ from 1976 (Schwerdtfeger 1976, Gullestrup 1976, Sørensen 1976, Gullestrup, Sørensen and Schwerdtfeger 1976,) presented a conclusion which raises a significant schism of power and participation between central authorities and local populations in regard to the post-colonial development policy based on fisheries:

“The main conclusion of the analyses of the local community investigation is that the population in settlements because of a range of societal factors are fare worse off in regard to commercial activities than they need to be their natural factors considered, and, the population of the settlements is in a very weak position in regard to their opportunities of influencing the societal factors” (Gullestrup 1976 p. 9)

The policies of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s aimed at building a commercial fishing and processing industry through modernization and industrialisation, writing the well-known history of Greenlandic centralisation
and investments in only few geographical places. The experience of forced re-settlement, and of a Danish rationality overruling Greenlandic perspectives, played an important role in the elitist formation of Greenlandic political parties that paved the road for increased Greenlandic independence in the shape of the Home-rule institution (Dahl 1986, Nuttall 1992). Home-rule was achieved in 1979, but it seems as if the tension between a rationalized production and a de-centred settlement structure and the tension between locally available resources and centrally defined plans for buying and marketing have haunted Greenlandic fishery and development policy ever since. When Siumut came into power in 1979 they had a dual goal of decentralisation and a state controlled centralised planning (Dahl 1986, p. 20). The official strategy of building a Greenlandic self-sustaining economy through a strong state engagement in the 1980’s development was evaluated by Winther (1988a). He argued that state investments could strengthen the establishment of a fishing-industry complex, but he identified a range of challenges of which he in particular emphasised a too centralized governance paradigm. As a follow-up to the identified shortcomings of the Home-rule policy of centralised planning, Winther (1988b) researched the possibilities and challenges of establishing some sort of Greenlandic cooperative management model in the Greenlandic fisheries. According to Rasmussen (1998) the development policies of the 1980’s were characterised by a dual strategy of de-centralised investments as well as the building of an avant-garde off-shore shrimp industry. The small settlements were considered important to Greenland and there was a confidence about the availability of local resources and processing activities were therefore maintained in the larger fisheries dependent settlements. According to Rasmussen’s conclusion in 1998, the management initiatives had succeeded in terms of economic efficiency, but not in terms of overall development policy that focus on the small settlements and the small-scale fisheries and hunting as essential to Greenlandic development.

In terms of fishery management tools, the home-rule has controlled the trade through state owned de-facto trade monopolies and control of where and when landings were allowed. TACs and technical limitations were introduced during the 1970’s as a result of investments in the fleet and increased pressure on dwindling resources. But the capacity of onshore processing facilities was often the de-facto limitation causing the most severe limitations for fishermen in practice. As a result of further fishing pressure during the 1980s, additional management schemes were introduced: The management system divided the fisheries into a coastal and an off-shore sector with each their part of the overall TAC. The off-shore and coastal shrimp fishery has been managed by an Individual transferrable quota (ITQ) system since 1990. Otherwise, the coastal fisheries are generally regulated according to an Olympic system and license regulation. In 1998 Rasmussen described how the fisheries, as a result of development policy and regulations developed into three diverse segments. An off-shore sector dominated by the general tendencies of capitalism with centralisation and concentration through large scale projects and economy of scale as the fundamental mechanisms. For even though Greenland Home-rule did not have capitalism as a directly formulated goal, the efficiency measures initiated by the Home-rule owned monopoly of Royal Greenland express a capitalistic concern; Secondly, an intermediate sector with in-shore fisheries partly based on a capital rationality, partly based on a life form which has become a backbone of many of the larger settlements; And thirdly, there is the small boat sector which is vital for small settlements and thereby acting as a backbone of the cultural heritage and which is therefore also central to political attempts at maintaining reasonable living conditions for the smaller places (Rasmussen 1998).

In terms of the recent state of relative participation-opportunities for different stakeholders in Home-Rule decision-making, Danielsen et al. (1998) identified a significant conflict of interest between the coastal
fishers and the avant-garde off-shore fishing industry. The avant-garde industry had an interest in further rationalisation of the production and continued concentration of fishing rights whereas the coastal fishers had an interest in their continued access to fishing and thus, a local employment. That same schism was confirmed by Rasmussen eleven years later (2009). Whereas Danielsen et al. had observed a conflict of interest that could potentially affect the policy in the direction of either increased rationalisation or continued local employment, Rasmussen presented an argument about the relative power of the two sectors in actually influencing policy as it had emerged. According to Rasmussen, the coastal and the off-shore fleet segments had not been equally strong in influencing policy. A dominant, but in Rasmussen’s view incorrect, perception prevailed that the coastal segment and the local communities did not contribute financially to the Greenlandic society. At the same time, a neo-liberal discourse ruled discussions about the development of Greenlandic fisheries. Rasmussen argued that within fisheries, power therefore resided in the choice of rationalities within fishery policy where the Home-rule owned companies dominated this choice whereas local communities had little say. Conclusions by Winther (2003) equally argued that a market- and privatization discourse was generally found to be of considerable importance in Greenlandic planning in the 1990s. And the primary reason, he suggested, was close connections between high-level political and administrative actors and other actors within the elite who had an interest in the outcomes of privatization (Winther 2003b, p. 120). His argument was premised by the view that economic theory acts to legitimise power of a capitalist elite in general as well as in the Greenland in particular:

“*The neo-classical economic theory about complete competition and private enterprise are perceived by the businessman – in Greenland those who are sympathetic towards privatisation and market economy – as the establishment of private business empires. The circles that have a real interest in the myth about an economic system where the ‘consumer is king’ are private capitalist members of an elite in the top of large economic enterprises. In practice this type of images served to cement the power position of the large enterprise on the market and the possibility of the enterprise to influence the other decision-makers in the society*” (Winther 2003, p. 117)

Sejersen (2007) and Dahl (2000) present arguments that resonate with Rasmussen’s and Winther’s conclusions as they identify loss of local control and disempowerment from a local perspective. From a feminist perspective, Sloan has furthermore pointed to the significance of women’s role in the dinghy fishery and observed that women’s access to the decision-making institutions did not match their high exposure of policy impacts (2004).

With these great lines of fishery-as-development, the schism between centralisation and de-centralisation and the power of competing rationalities already established, this thesis takes a dive into the assumingly significant practices of meaning-making, participation and power on the micro-level of everyday interaction within the centralized fisheries governance institution. It is in the analysis of these small practices based on a new setting for fieldwork that this thesis offers its most original contribution. Wondering anew about these governance institutions from within, it goes back and asks the basic questions all over again in the context of a range of new reforms: How do actors become actors? How do problems become problems? And how does participation become participation? To the extent that this type of interrogation is capable of formulating a coherent account of power as becoming, the thesis also helps beat a path to a way of analysing fisheries governance that focus on power and identities in the making (Massey 2004, Johnsen et al. 2009, Bavington 2010, Carothers 2010, Johnsen 2013). The four articles in appendix C offer in-depth
analysis of meaning-making in three policy processes and this part of the thesis will synthesize and discuss the main findings of the four articles in regard to the becoming of actors, problems and de-facto participation. A short conclusion is followed by discussion of theoretical implications for the study and conception of power and participation in fisheries governance in Greenland and the extent to which it holds some perspectives for fisheries governance in general as well.

The formal institutions of Greenlandic fisheries governance

Up to a certain level, Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) confirm the conclusions of present analyses (APNN 2013, Sloan 2004, Rasmussen 1998, Sejersen 2007): The centralisation of Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions is a formal fact. They portray Greenland as a sovereign fishing state managing its fisheries within its territorial waters. Greenland is not part of the common European fishery policy and did in fact withdraw from EU in 1985 because of fisheries governance issues: It wanted control over its own fishery resources that had up until then been intensively exploited by international fleets. Greenland decides on the TAC of the fish stocks within Greenlandic territory and is responsible for all the decisions pertaining to national fisheries management. When Greenland fish on shared and straddling stocks, some of the TACs are subjected to bilateral cooperation and international institutions such as NEAFC\(^1\) (for pelagic and deep water stocks in the North Atlantic), NAFO\(^2\) (for shrimp at Flemish cap and Grand Bank) and NASCO\(^3\) (for salmon). Furthermore, Greenland and EU negotiates an agreement on EU access to Greenlandic fisheries for regional development support. The fishing act of 1996 mandates Greenlandic Self-rule the exclusive right to make all the relevant decisions pertaining to the Greenlandic fisheries. The only exception is related to the implementation of additional conservation measures, which can be formulated by the municipalities with the approval of the Self-rule (the fisheries act § 23). Within the municipalities local fishing and hunting committees implement regulations and offer consultation. In cooperation with local fishing and hunting organisations they make decisions on quota allocation for hunting (personal communication with representative of the fishery committee in Ilulissat and Qeqertassuaq, July 2010). In relation to the fishery, however, all decisions on quota allocation are taken on a national basis.

The monopoly on decision-making is somewhat levelled by the institution of the Fishery Council. The Self-rule is obliged to consult the Fishery Council on matters at the heart of Greenlandic fisheries policy: TAC, fishing rights, fishing capacity, conservation measures, landing obligations and rules for Greenlandic affiliation of crew (the fisheries act § 32.). The Fishery Council consists of all the interest organisations representing the commercial fishers and hunters as well as the fishing companies: KNAPK, GA and the Organisation of Greenlandic Employers (NUSUKA). Originally, KNAPK represented most fishers, but today KNAPK increasingly represents the small-scale fishers and hunters (commonly referred to as ‘the fishers’ and ‘the hunters’) whereas GA represents companies of the off-shore fleet (commonly referred to as ‘the industry’). In order to secure a balanced decision-making process, the Fishery Council includes a wide range of other stakeholders as appointed members with observer-status. These are the Ministry of Fishery, Hunting and Agriculture (APNN), the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources (GINR), the Greenlandic Fisheries License Control (GFLK), the Association of Greenlandic Municipalities (KANUKOKA), the Greenlandic Workers Union (SIK), the Ministry of Finance and Domestic Affairs (as needed), the Ministry of

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1 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
2 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission
3 North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization
Industry and Minerals (as needed), the Ministry of Housing, Nature and Environment and the environmental NGO Avataq. The two largest fishing companies, the self-rule owned company Royal Greenland A/S and the private Polar Seafood A/S form part of the Fishery Council as appointed members though they are represented by GA on some occasions. Jacobsen and Raakjær (2102) found than in practice, the Fishery Council members are most commonly consulted individually in written consultations. Depending on the extent of cooperation FD managers and the Minister are aiming at, all or only some of the members are consulted. In the same manner, selected members may be consulted by FD managers prior to written consultation.

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The formal organization for agency in Greenlandic fisheries governance is designed as if the formal institutions are the actual spheres of decision-making and as if the actors are fixed and organized into objective social categories such as fishers and hunters, industry and state administrations. There is a Self-rule government with a Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture. There is a Fishery Council consisting of organisations representing other ministries and the fishers and the hunters, the industry and the fish factory workers: All organised into separate professional interest organisations. And there is scientific advice. However, this PhD aims to make explicit what every observer of Greenlandic fisheries governance probably already knows: That these formal categories of representation do not convey the full story. A look into Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions in the period from 2009 to 2013 shows that the fisheries governance institutions were also populated by some very different actors: ‘Political fishers’ and a ‘resisting minister’; ‘poor fishers’ and ‘tough decision-makers’; ‘capitalists’ and ‘non-cooperatives’; ‘technocrats’ and ‘populists’. These empirically identified categories are probably just as square as the formal ones and should of course not be taken too literally. I find it most likely that even the actors of Greenlandic governance hold more nuanced pictures of each other when not having to put meaning on the edge in a politized context. Yet, these sort of categories were condensation points for ‘meaningful’ representations of actors that proved highly relevant for decision-making outcomes. At least, that is what this thesis argues. The formal actors became ‘de-facto actors’ through other representations such as these. And some informal situations turned into de-facto governance institutions as a result of the social effort it took to establish them.

**Representations of a new paradigm**

In 2009 something happened in Greenlandic politics that had never happened before in the thirty year history of Greenlandic Home-rule. A government was formed without Siumut. And Siumut is not just any political party. It is a party that played an immense role in the independence movement leading to the establishment of Greenlandic Home-rule in 1979 and a party that has continuously occupied a lead position in Home-rule politics. It was established around the movement for Greenlandic independence by the grand old men of Greenlandic Home-rule: Jonathan Motzfelt, Lars Emil Johansen and Moses Olsen. The premier of Greenlandic Home-Rule has always been Siumut, but the party-political dominance of Siumut has not been absolute and Siumut has governed in coalition with the left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) since 1985 and from 1995-1999 Siumut also formed coalition with liberal Atassut.

2007 is a year worth noticing from a fisheries governance perspective for in May that year, an already fragile cooperation between IA and Siumut broke down irrevocably over fisheries governance issues and IA was excluded from the government by Siumut Premier Hans Enoksen. The point of contestation was
whether or not to include discarded cold water prawns in registrations of the total catch and the conflict was represented as the economic interests of trawler owners versus biological sustainability with Siumut and IA on each their side (Sermitsiaq 03.05.2007, Sermitsiaq 22.05.2007). The election of 2009 was called a snow-slide election because a new coalition formed for the first time through an alliance of Demokraatit and IA and, not least, through the deliberate bypassing of Siumut.

This shift of government in 2009 would not have been an important starting point for the analysis of this thesis had various actors in Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions not defined it as such. But they did. There was a consistent representation within IA and the Demokraatit party, the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources, Danish experts and the media that that the election announced a new paradigm in Greenlandic fisheries governance and Greenlandic politics in general (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). A representation that was so robust that it survived an election period and was reproduced in the Danish media up to the following election in 2013 (Information 16.01.2012). The exclusion of Siumut was important because it was represented as the coming of a new era which Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012), inspired by these dominant representations, has labelled ‘the new paradigm’ in Greenlandic fishery governance. The thesis shows that this representation was not without actual connection to de-fact policy-making practice for under the ‘new paradigm’ that lasted from 2009 to 2013 the fishery laws and regulations were reformed quite significantly: 1) A new access right system was introduced into the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut which divided the coastal fishery into two segments. It granted ITQs quotas to all fishing entities over 6 meters and installed a closure to new access in the Olympic fishery that was to continue for entities under 6 meters, which is in essence the dinghy and dog-sledge fishery. 2) The first management plans for the fishery were also completed in this period, namely the ones for cold water prawn, offshore cod and coastal Greenland halibut (which in reality covers the regulation above). 3) Then two fishery law amendments were passed which allowed for non-fisher ownership and raised the limit for maximum ITQ ownership from 10 to 15 per cent. 4) And, as a perhaps minor but to local fishers a quite decisive new regulation, a license fee of 1.500 DKR was introduced on every commercially marketed species.

On March 12 2013 the new paradigm lost its majority vote in the national election. The majority of Nuuk voters still supported IA, but the coastal towns and settlements that had in 2009 provided IA with its majority vote was back voting for Siumut. Furthermore a newly established party, Partii Inuit, won four mandates and attracted a great deal of attention for articulating ethnic inequality and for promoting a Greenlandic identity based on Greenlandic language. The new paradigm and media claimed that IA and the Demokraatit had lost to two populist parties speaking to the heart of people. Coastal Siumut voters interviewed on national TV on election night said that the new paradigm had led a mistaken fishery policy. Some accused it for being technocratic and for running ahead too far without the support of the people. And IA premier Kupik Kleist expressed the view that the government was being punished for introducing strict but necessary policies (See also Politiken 13.03.2013). As so many times before during the 2009-2013 period, discourses left us with an antagonistic analysis: All hearts; all brains and feet (Personal observation. See also: KNR 27.02.2013)

The period from 2009 to 2013 was a time of reform in the fisheries. That was the intention at least and while reforms were perhaps not as comprehensive as the new paradigm had aspired, it is a fact that considerable changes in access right structure were introduced. On the other hand, important fishery
reforms are the very history of Greenlandic development (Friis and Rasmussen 1989, Dahl 1986, Rasmussen 1998, Nuttall 1992). And within the most recent history of Siumut-led government, fishery reforms have been introduced of which the most significant is the perhaps the introduction of ITQ into the cold water prawn fishery and the subsequent concentration and consolidation of the offshore prawn fishing fleet. So this thesis approach the period of 2009 to 2013 presents a case of reform in Greenlandic fisheries while cautioning, that this is perhaps not as historically unique as dominant representations in this same period might convey. Yet, any such case of actual fishery reform is an interesting case for fisheries governance theories. For fishery reforms are often just as difficult to agree upon and implement as they are in demand. The reform of the Common Fishery Policy in Europe is for example object of considerable debate in academia that is hardly matched by actual practice (e.g. Raakjær 2009, Hegland 2012, Symes, Raakjær and Hegland 2012). Step by step this thesis has examined the coming into being of three important policies in the fishery in the 2009-2012 period and this analysis can also be read as a case of how these policies introduced reform as a result of the becoming of actors, problems and de-facto participation. But just as importantly, due to the historical importance of the fishery to Greenlandic society, the case of reform is interesting for understanding continuity and change in the political processes that shape Greenlandic history. The following section synthesises the articles’ conclusions relating to these political reform processes, starting with the TAC policy.

Timed alliances and a shifting TAC policy

TAC policy is a conservation policy in essence that determines the total fishing effort to be allowed. It emerged as a dominant management tool from the 1960s to the 1980s (Gezelius 2008) in response to increased fishing pressure and the recognition that the sea did not offer inexhaustible resources. Meanwhile, TAC policy has also become a governance instrument for distributing access rights and this fact influences TAC policy-making considerably. TAC as a management tool is subject to much discussion and some have characterised it as a ‘TAC machinery’ working on yearly cycle making fisheries management possible through a governance rationality of its own (Holm and Nielsen 2004, Johnsen et al. 2009). The knowledge base for TAC advice is an equal object for debate, internationally as well as in Greenland where TAC advice is developed by scientists at the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources (GINR) in consultation with the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). In this thesis the decision on an overall TAC and distribution of access rights to fishing relating to TAC policy is seen as a locus for negotiations of problems and identities. TAC policy-making offers a unique window into how different actors and problems emerge on the scene of Greenlandic fisheries governance. These identities are quite important, for as Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) and Jacobsen (2013) also shows, actors and problems constructed in this yearly policy process are in fact diffused across more than this one policy-making situation and influence the outcome of long-term planning.

Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) argue that the TAC policy processes creates its own problems and identities. In the international negotiations over establishments and shares of internationally shared TACs, FD managers represented themselves as caretakers of biological sustainability to the extent that other countries agreed to cooperate around this goal. When the cooperation collapses in seemingly perfect prisoner dilemma style they represented themselves as caretakers of national industry interests opting for as high a TAC as possible. The situations of international negotiations thus offered two very different subject-positions for the managers and in that way, some very different ‘de-facto’ actors came into being
and made some very different decisions as a result. One subject-position was not allowed to define the problem alone because of the fact of social interactions. When managers from other countries did not cooperate around the problem of primarily securing social sustainability as defined by scientific advice, the Greenlandic managers were not able to control representations of the game or themselves. A second subject-position was then activated from which a new game was defined and new interests articulated. As actors change, the model of the prisoner dilemma is challenged. It is not only the outcome that is changed when cooperation fails: it is the very identity of the ‘prisoners’ as well as their interests that change. Ostrom (1990) argued that most actors sharing common resources are indeed able to change the game and thus they are rarely faced with real ‘prisoner dilemmas’ in which involved actors feel forced to engage in competitive and non-cooperative behaviour in favour of the common good. This finding confirms that managers and industry can simply chose to change the subject positions of selves and others as an integral part of their yearly negotiation strategies; and they can equally chose to act as protectors of the ‘common good’ defined as scientifically determined biological sustainability and as ‘prisoners’ of competing national industry interest. Such problems of controlling representations were identified on the level of national TAC decision-making as well.

In the national negotiations over coastal TACs for cod and Greenland halibut a new paradigm in Greenlandic fisheries governance was busy creating itself. The new IA Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, Ane Hansen, became a symbol of change in everyday speech at GINR, FD and the Greenlandic media. There she was spoken of in terms of steadfast defence of biological sustainability in the form of scientifically advised TAC; a characteristic defined in opposition to the former Siumut premier Hans Enoksen. Faced with pressure, she was said to ‘resist’ and to ‘wear the trousers’ which is a Danish expression for inserting ones authority. But the minister and the government had a hard time upholding a new line of national TAC policy. It seemed that the main reason was the incapability to control representations. Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) identified a first round of TAC policy-making in which TACs was decided upon according to scientific advice in cooperation with members of the fishery council. This first round took place in the beginning of the year without much disagreement over representations. The agreed upon problem was how to secure a biologically sustainable fishery for years to come defined according to scientific advice. In a newly articulated context of increased consumer demands for Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certified seafood-products, the need to secure market shares through biological sustainability was another agreed upon problem. But then something happened in early autumn. TACs were exhausted and the trade-ins closed and suddenly a battle of representation was being fought out in the Parliament, in demonstrations, in media, in phone-calls and in e-mails. Suddenly, the minister and the government were not just caretakers of biological sustainability. They were also insensitive to fisher knowledge, local hardship and they were punishing Greenland’s own fishers in order to meet international consumer demands. An alliance of subject positions emerged between fishers in desperate social and economic conditions and a Siumut party fighting shoulder to shoulder with fishers and their families against a too restrictive TAC policy. The government eventually granted a number of conditioned raises that compromised the demands of the two competing subject-positions (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012).

These competing representations emerged every year from 2009 to 2013 and as far as I was able to find information on the subject, otherwise accepted TACs had repeatedly been raised in previous years as well. I would therefore characterize the complementary subject positions for fishers and the Siumut party as a latent alliance emerging only on ‘real-time’ and which is not timed with the TAC-machine as such. That is,
when the consequences of the first TACs become obvious. It is stated elsewhere that the Greenlandic public and publics in general tends to react only when the policy actions become physically manifest (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013) and the finding of Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) seemingly supports Gammeltoft’s observation. In the TAC policy process, which can be described as a machine working on a yearly basis, it would be very remarkable, however, if the ‘fishing public’ should be surprised by the exhaustion of the TAC year after year. At the same time, the emergence of the Siumut-coastal fishers alliance is so consistent in form and timing that I think it is fair to characterise the battle over representation that follow in the autumn as a de-facto decision-making institution. It does indeed appear as more advantageous and reliable institution for the coastal fishers than the initial Fishery Council consultation itself.

Familiar faces in Greenlandic fisheries governance. Dissatisfied with the TAC policy on inshore cod and the scientific basis for it, NAPP leadership and cod fishers in Nuuk demonstrate in front of GINR for a higher TAC on coastal cod (6. October 2011). The fishers claimed that coastal cod was abundant while GINR and ICES formed its advice based on an integrated assessment of coastal and off-shore cod with the aim of rebuilding the off-shore stock. At the time of writing, GINR, is working to establish a separate scientific advice on coastal cod as a result of study of cod genetics which recognizes the existence of inshore stocks. (Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources 24.04.2012) (Photo: Kitte Winther).
Selves of biological sustainability and long-term solutions

The long term management plans can be analysed as means of the ‘new paradigm’ to create itself according to its own preferred image. This is where the government attempted to fulfil its promises of long-term solutions and a halt to ad-hoc decision-making by means of ‘long-term solutions’ as seen in for example the Greenland halibut management plan process (Jacobsen 2013). This type of practice would expose a remarkable similarity to representations found in Danish politics. A recent study of reforms in Danish politics (Greve 2012) argued that reforms have become a common political practice and a method for politicians to attract attention to its policy and set a political agenda. During the rule of the ‘new paradigm’, long-term management plans were introduced for the first time. One for the cold water prawn fishery; one for the off-shore cod fishery; and one for the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut. The Minister and the government often emphasised the on-going work with the management plans as documentation for political action. It is my impression that the content of the three management plans was never communicated as actively to the public as the statement that a management plan was underway. It was as if the fact of management plan underway was a full message in itself. This point to the probability that the management plans served as representations of political long-term agency in line with Greve’s description of the symbolic value of reforms. Long-term management plans have become good practice in international fisheries governance and as an act of self-representation, the Greenland halibut management plan had the clear advantage of providing a statement of biological sustainability in a universal fisheries governance language to those concerned with biological sustainability and previous practices of ad-hoc decision-making.

But the long-term management plans were also more than political signals and public self-representation. They also had a character of necessity that cannot be described in terms of the self-representations of the new regime alone. There were other actors involved who had activated a whole different context for their actions. The cold water prawn industry wanted a MSC certification for its products on the international market and to obtain this, a management plan was mandatory. Thus, the management plan for cold water prawn was first a solution to MSC certification problem. In fact, the activation of a MSC context brought many changes along and came to define many problems for the off-shore fleet. They organised a new organisation called ‘sustainability Greenland’ and they partly funded a PhD scholarship to investigate the impacts of trawling on benthos, which was a sensitive subject in the MSC certification project. It was also industry representatives that first proposed to accept the request for observer status in the Fishery Council by a Greenlandic environmental NGO, Avataq. The argument presented to the Fishery Council was that this would look good in relation to the MSC process (personal observation). Whatever the degree of instrumentalism, it can hardly be denied that the self-representation of the ‘industry’ challenged the representation of the industry that led to the 2007 conflict between IA and Siumut over how to register prawn catches. This representation had then positioned the industry in opposition to biological sustainability. The new representations of necessity to a greater extent aligned the interests of the cold water prawn industry with biologically defined problems of sustainability.

EU receives cod quota in exchange for monetary development support and EU demanded that Greenland made a long-term management plan for cod. A high-ranking manager proposed the analysis that EU had learned from the African experience that fishing on unsustainable quotas creates a bad reputation. And so, the Fishery Department administration initiated the work for a cod management plan because the
managers had promised the EU to do so (personal observation). Thus, the cod management plan was first a solution to a problem of EU fishery policy and Greenlandic/EU fishery agreements. This point to the analysis that the two plans for prawn and cod were initiated by the industry and the FD administration respectively out of a perception of some externally derived necessity. But the new government was quick to activate another context and turn the management plans into symbols of political action on the national political scene. And biological sustainability was integrated into the self-representation of the industry, at least whenever the MSC context was activated. As described above, the industry may choose to act from another subject-position in the international TAC negotiations. But during the rule of the ‘new paradigm’, the problem of a biological unsustainable industry was not articulated nearly as intensively in relation to the off-shore industry, if articulated at all, on the national policy scene (personal observation). The coastal fishery was in turn heavily problematized in terms of sustainability - biological as well as social and economic.

**Constructing a problem identity for an ITQ solution**

Contrary to the management plan for cod and cold-water prawn, the management plan for Greenland halibut was actually initiated by the Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture and it was a clear-cut symbol of political reform. It was all the more interesting then, that it was eventually re-defined as a ‘new regulation’ only. What exactly was this thing called a Greenland halibut plan and later, a new regulation? And what was it a solution to? In line with theories of the institutional anchoring of problem-identities (Mik-Meyer and Järvinen 2004), the article by Jacobsen (2013) tries to understand the character of this problem by paying attention to the type of rationality and the available solutions offered by the institution creating it. It dissects the becoming of problems in the Greenland halibut management plan and argues that it was a solution to a problem of governmentality internal to the rationality of the governance institution. It was a solution to the problem of not being able to govern co-governors – that is, of the new paradigm not being able to control competing representations of and by itself and the many fishers influencing TAC politics. Had the Minister and the new government been able to control representations they would not, so Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) and Jacobsen (2013) indirectly argue, have had to raise the TACs. It was also a solution to the problem of small-scale fishers simply being small-scale fishers, that is, a problem defined according to a ‘grand reform discourse’ of best solutions in Greenlandic fisheries governance defined by the ‘grand reform network’ identified by Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013). And thirdly, and perhaps only marginally, it was a solution to a perceived poverty problem among the small-scale fishers. The Greenland halibut management plan had constructed a subject position for the existing fishers as poor and problematically political and it aimed at creating a new subject position for the fishers as ‘profitable’ and acting in a biologically sustainable way by not having to mobilize a political pressure in the TAC policy-making process. One can then also say that the Greenland halibut management plan was a solution of a very final sort to a problem-identity that is the coastal small-scale fishery in its present form. The plan was an ITQ reform from the beginning. And some of its rationality is probably best understood in terms of a ‘grand discourse’ of fishery reform that will be returned to below. But under the new paradigm, an additional context was activated, namely that of governance and a lack of political control – here understood as the inability to control representations and implement long-term solutions. Indirectly, the ITQ system was expected to offer a long-term solution to problems pertaining to the political characteristics of the coastal segment and its human actors and thus the thesis argues, that the plan became a long-term solution to a governmentality problem confronting the ‘new paradigm’.
As a case of ITQ reform, the Greenland halibut management plan is an interesting case speaking to a general experience across the western world: That of increased privatization of fishing rights (Del Valle, Hoefnagel and Astorkiza 2006). Some studies have shown how new subjectivities have been created through the ITQ system (Bavington 2010, Carothers 2010,) and some have observed how previous social fishery systems and local communities have been put under pressure as a result (Eythórsson 1996, Carothers 2010, Pálsson and Helgason 2000). The thesis has analysed the long-term management plan while it took form and points to the possibility that the construction of an ITQ system relies strongly on a process of exclusion in the design-phase. It analyses the becoming of a governance problem and argues that pre-ITQ identities become subjected to planned out-phasing through a combined construction of a problematic fleet-human identity. The analysis opens up the possibility that the exclusion of certain actors and the destruction of certain social traits within the fishing community that have been observed in so many places, are perhaps not just unforeseen effects. The de-construction of fleets and social groups is initiated early on in the planning phase at the meaning-making level: The management plan will not impact any socially, economically or biologically sustainable fishery ‘out there’ for in the management plan, there is no such thing. Any ‘local’ well-functioning fishery was de-constructed as the management plan constructed its problem identity: the fishers were poor, the fishery was non-profitable and the many actors were biologically unsustainable. There was a need to get rid of this system in order to save the humans that were involuntarily caught therein, Jacobsen (2013) asserts. This echoes many previous analyses of common pool resource situations: the problem is the game. Not the players as such. But the problem of the game is the existence of too many players and thus, it is actually the existence of players that become the problem and their exclusion the solution. This is where the tough/necessary relationship evolves: exclusion is recognised as a tough and necessary decision. Necessity refers to the game while toughness refers to the subjects involved.

That the policy of exclusion is tough in terms of its immediate impact on the policy objects is only one way of understanding the role of ‘toughness’ in giving meaning to policy. Another is to note that toughness also refers to the subject position of managers. Managers and politicians create themselves as actors who have to take on these responsibilities of taking necessary and tough decisions. This is expressed in the representation of a ‘resisting minister’ (Jacobsen and Raakjaer 2012, Jacobsen 2013) and in the way managers of the working group behind the Greenland halibut management plan collectively created a subject-position for themselves from which they performed the task given to them (Jacobsen 2013). Toughness is the inevitable burden of the ‘acting ones’ of the new paradigm and it defined the type of actors that fishery managers and politicians became. In the articulated necessity of toughness we thus see the coming into being of the subjectivity of the ‘governing actor’ that shapes the eventual decisions taken. Had it not been as legitimate to make ‘hard decisions’ the management plans would probably have looked differently today. Successful governmentality can be described as a somewhat unnoticeable, voluntary and therefore seemingly ‘soft’ type of governance. But the Greenland halibut management plan shows that for successful governmentality policies to be formulated, it is necessary with tough actions that first have to exclude in order to work through inclusion, as Bavington (2010) Johnsen (2013) and Johnsen et al. (2009) have so meticulously described.

Comparing the three different cases it becomes obvious that representations of human identities are at stake in fishery policy-making and it is equally obvious that it is not only human actors that are often constructed as problem identities in fisheries governance. Fisheries governance is said to be about
governing human behaviour. Yet, it is often abstracted to a level where human actors are not spoken of and where the central problems are formulated in terms of fisheries and fleets. Rasmussen (1998) has categorized the Greenlandic fleet into three segments: the small boats, the inshore fleet and the offshore fisheries. During fieldwork I noticed that it was common to use the two categories of the ‘industry’, referring to off-shore segment and the ‘fishers’ referring to the coastal segment. In the Greenland halibut management plan one of the most central techno-political efforts of the managers was to decide on how to split the coastal Greenland halibut fishery into two new separate categories: A category where the individual fishing entities would be granted an ITQ and a category where the entities would continue to fish on a common Olympic quota. The problematic thing was that the minister wanted to introduce ITQ into the fishery. But on the other hand, everyday managers in the ministerial agency GFLK, that would eventually be charged with the monitoring and enforcing the ITQ regulation objected that it would be almost impossible to keep track of the then more than thousand small ITQ owners. The ITQ system simply did not fit the entire fleet. So the fleet was made to fit the ITQ system: a portion of the fleet was selected based on size to receive ITQ. They were called large entities. Interestingly enough, ‘large’ only referred to the length of the boat. A survey made by the Greenland halibut management plan working group showed that some of the most efficient entities in terms of landings were in fact, dinghies. That categorization of fishing entities according to size is a central endeavour in fisheries governance is only confirmed by a glance around the European fisheries governance landscape where fisheries are also managed according to size categories. In the UK ‘ten meter’ is today a significant line of demarcation between common quota fishing and ITQ fishing and it has become the basis for fishermen’s organisation. And throughout Europe, fisheries are classified by management on a fleet basis that is most often defined by size and gear (Wilson and Jacobsen 2009). The rationality of fleet categorizations thus appears as a rationality pertaining to fisheries governance in general and thus, as an example of how Greenlandic fisheries governance rationality reaches far beyond the Greenlandic borders for its logical establishment. In this context of fishery categorisation the case study shows that fleet segments can indeed be perceived of as ‘problem identities’ in the sense that they are results of available solutions of a management system.

**Competing constructions of reform necessity**

The case of the fishery bill reform was articulated explicitly as ‘a reform’ by the actors involved. The articulation of the fishery reform predates the coming into power of the ‘new paradigm’ in 2009. Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013) have been able to track the reform discussion back to a parliament discussion in 2003. The theoretical attractiveness of the case of the fishery bill reform is similar to that of the TAC process: It is a window into the contentedness and temporality of policy meaning constructs. Actors, problems and democracy were all changed underway.

The fishery bill reform process was characterised by a range of specific problem perceptions and articulations of necessity. According to the analysis of Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013), the necessity of changing the fishery law was first articulated in the wave of the ITQ reform of the cold-water prawn fishery (in 1990 and 1996 for off-shore and coastal segment respectively). Now managed by an ITQ system, fishing rights had started to concentrate dramatically and questions were raised in Parliament as to the desirability of this development. But the fishery reform process exhibited a significant twist of problems when a range of commissions were established to evaluate the desirability of the ITQ system. A first evaluation report concluded that the ITQ system, first casted into doubt, functioned according to the goal (Government of
Greenland 2005). A fishery commission was then formed to investigate the possibility of promoting consolidation in the coastal fishery as well. Releasing its conclusions in 2009 (Government of Greenland 2009), the problem was turned 180 degrees: From problematizing the consolidation of the off-shore fleet to problematizing the coastal fishery not yet consolidated. One problem-identity was substituted for another. In Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013) conclusions of the Fishery commission from 2009 were compared with consultation answers responding to the suggested amendments of the fishery law in 2010 and revealed a strikingly consistent pattern of actors emerging to formulate the new problems and necessities of the fishery law reform. And this finding led to the conclusion that fishery reforms are most accurately described, not in terms of agreed-upon perceptions of crisis and necessity, but in terms of power. Reforms belong to political someones who have been able to translate their perceptions of problems into a necessity of fishery reform. The someones behind formulations of necessity implicit in the 2011 law amendment were very concretely identified as the off-shore industry, Greenlandic banks and auditing companies, influential Self-rule administrators from the ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture and as newcomers in 2009: the new IA led government. They all played a key role if not in formulating for the first time then at least in reproducing problems and necessities in what Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013) term ‘the grand reform’ discourse.

Rasmussen (2003) has argued that there is a tension between the off-shore prawn industry and the coastal segments of other fisheries because they work according to different principles whereas it is the rationality of the off-shore prawn fishery that most often inform management decision-making. Winther (2003b) identified a close connection between high-level political and administrative actors and other actors within the elite who had an interest in the outcomes of privatization. The fishery reform appears as a replay of this tension. The identified policy network behind ‘the grand reform’ discourse was made up by powerful officials, the most powerful Self-rule agency (Finance), banks, GA and the off-shore industry including the Self-rule owned Royal Greenland. In terms of the dominance of the avant-garde off-shore industry’s rationality, I think it is perfectly fair to say that the grand reform discourse sought to create production conditions for new areas in the coastal fishery that were similar to those of the prawn fishery: Numbers of entities should be reduced, processing should be allowed on board, labour should be released, productivity should be increased and profits should be maximised and taxed accordingly through a resource rent: the solution deemed best for society at large. Historically the development of the Greenlandic fishery has always had a double aim in relation to the development of a modern welfare state: To create a modern profitable fishery to fund welfare state expenditure and to secure local development and available jobs along the coast (Rasmussen 1998). The off-shore fleet was allowed to develop into a modern capital-intensive fishery with fewer obligations to the communities on land (currently they are in general obliged to land only 25 per cent). The coastal fishery on the other hand has, and this is the case still, is generally obliged to land 100 per cent of its catch to land-based processing. With the ‘grand reform’ the latter part of the historically dual strategy is continuously moving into the background and the processes of power identified by Rasmussen and Winther in 2003 continues. At least in the fora of commission reports. But the policy-process does not end with commission reports and the dominance of the ‘grand reform’ is far from uncontested in other fora. Another policy-network was defined in the analysis of the fishery bill reform process by Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013). This network is not as coherent as the grand reform network, but municipalities, KNAPK, NUSUKA and the ministries of social affairs and parts of Royal Greenland coastal businesses have been defined as having a shared and articulated interest in upholding coastal activities.
And the grand reform has so far been incapable at introducing ‘the full package’ of fishery reform. And thus the policy-making power of the grand reform network is not as dominant as one could otherwise deduce from an analysis of the formally formulated and written reports, notes and recommendation that also accompany the policy-making processes.

The grand reform network proposed a number of changes to the fishery law. But in the time of the new paradigm, it was not fully implemented. In 2010 the government prepared a comprehensive amendment of the bill along many of the lines laid out by the grand reform discourse, but did not follow it through: Too much protest had seemingly been raised by all of the members of the Fishery Council. In 2011 only two amendments were prepared and followed through with the support of Royal Greenland and GA. The amendments allowed for non-fisher investments and greater ownership concentration. Meanwhile, Jacobsen and Raakjaer (2012) and Jacobsen (2013) argue that the grand reform discourse had paved the ground for the problem perception of the Greenland halibut management plan and Jacobsen and Raakjaer (2013) argue that the Greenland halibut management plan is perhaps most accurately perceived as an alternative less politicised forum to implement the fishery reform deemed necessary by the grand reform discourse.

Democratic representation defined and contested

Parliament politics become interesting when, as Laclau and Mouffe assert, alliances are not approached as pre-determined because the field of politics is not considered a straight forward representation of objective interest (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 58). From this perspective, representation is always only a ‘so-called representation’. Yet, representation is of great significance because it modifies the nature of what is represented. The fishery bill reform had to be processed in Parliament by means of formal party-political representation and this representation is analysed by Jacobsen and Raakjaer (2013) as modifying party-political actors and stakeholders in Greenlandic fisheries considerably. Within the context of the parliamentary institution, representations of the grand reform network were contested in KNAPK fisher demonstrations and by the Siumut opposition in Parliament that did not support the amendments. The battle over meaning was phrased in terms of democracy and participation as actors created and dismantled subject-positions for themselves and others. In the case of the fishery bill reform two central subject-positions emerged as party-political actors in Parliament tried to de-construct the self-representations of each other: ‘capitalist supporters’ and ‘un-cooperatives’. The Siumut opposition accused the government of including only capitalist interests and of excluding concerns of Greenlandic coastal fishers in the design of reform. The positively defined representation of the new paradigm as a responsible government working for long-term solutions to an established problem was now confronted as a government in alliance with capitalist interests at the expense of coastal fishers and Siumut voters. From the other side of parliament hall, the government accused the opposition of excluding itself from the decision-making process: Refusing to support the amendment, the opposition was represented as non-cooperative just as it had managed to define itself positively as being more democratic because it was inclusive of fisher concerns. An IA member of the Parliament Fishery Committee represented participatory democracy along the line of Parliament decision-making; a majority vote was also democratic. The minister redefined the category of majority coastal fishers: Majority could also be defined in terms of ITQ ownership in the cold water prawn fishery and in terms of employees and shareholders in the large sea-food companies and in that way, RG and GA members represented an included majority. And after all, Greenland was a share-holder in Royal
Greenland. In the end, the opposition proposed a motion of no confidence. It was rejected and the two amendments were adopted (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013).

Thus, at the public scene of parliament, the party-political actors engaged in some very explicit discussion about democracy and participation. Along the way, there was intense battle over meaning; not so much on how to define each other positively or negatively according to agreed-upon categories of ‘undemocratic’ behaviour, but on how to define democratic behaviour and relevant stakeholder categories as such (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013). To a certain extent IA representations echoed a classical standpoint, commonly connected to Schumpeter, that in elitist representative democracy where legitimate participation goes through the election of formal representatives and where writing letters and the sort is perceived as untimely interference (Pateman 1970). On the other hand, expansive democracy was also claimed. In the struggle to define oneself as democratic, different contexts can thus be simultaneously evoked. The case of the fishery bill amendment can be analysed as a third example of how in Greenlandic fisheries governance actors, problems and participation are always on the move.

The decision-making process of the fishery law reform shows an important similarity with the TAC decision-making process. Different actors emerged at different times to represent themselves and others together with particular representations of problems and necessities relating to the fishery. In both cases, problem perceptions are antagonistic in the sense that they are defined in opposition to each other trying to dismantle the positions of the other. In both cases, policies were eventually redefined and turned 180 degrees: From a strict TAC policy to granting extra quota; from problematizing a consolidated fishery to problematizing the non-consolidated fishery. The decision-making process behind the Greenland halibut management plan, on the other hand, was unique in this respect. It pursued the problem first defined to the very end.

The contested role of fisheries in Greenlandic development

By now it should have become evident that it is not ‘unproblematic’ to make a problem statement about the Greenlandic fisheries. Yet, problem statements based on the Greenlandic fishery are presented all the time to contextualize and legitimize both reforms and scientific research in Greenland. A standard opening of research presentations often involves the fantastic Greenlandic export figure, seen from a natural resource perspective: That some 80-90 per cent of Greenland’s export stems from the fishery (88 per cent in 2012. Greenland statistics 2012). This ‘fantastic figure’ seemingly suffices to provide enough external legitimation to the significant amount of money spent on monitoring and researching various aspects of the Greenlandic ecosystem in the context of climate change (personal observation of presentation of monitoring programmes at GCRC and GINR). Even when most researcher know for a fact that they will not in any near future be able to link any conclusions on sea-ice melt or the dynamics of lower trophic organisms to the actual dynamics of the natural resources that are targeted directly by the fishery (personal conversation with colleagues at GCRC), the fishery takes on a privileged role as the problem that makes a broad range of natural and social scientific research in Greenland relevant. Personally I have used this figure in some way or another in almost all of my project applications and articles serving as an introductory statement of the relevance of the study to be presented. Furthermore, I usually supply a list of references to the various anthropological studies and reports that document how culturally, socially and economically important the fishery and the hunting activities are to local Greenlandic communities. It is not
a question of pure cynicism. While I have some research interests, as for example power, that can in principle be detached from the here and now relevance of the empirical case, the choice to study fisheries governance in Greenland in the first place was based on a belief that this provided an opportunity to ask the more universal research questions in a context in which it actually still mattered directly to most people. Only few countries are portrayed as dependent on the living marine resources as Greenland is in literature.

The narratives of the relevance of the fishery as economic sector has actually been challenged for a long time in the form the emerging new industries: The large-scale, extractive industries within oil and mining. Discussions on how to diversify the Greenlandic economy has been on-going for decades. Since the 1970’s Danish and Greenlandic leaders have envisioned a Greenlandic future that was bound to extractive industries next to so many other important economic, social and cultural activities. In spite of the fantastic figure of 83 per cent, Greenland has long had four official pillars for economic development: fishery, tourism, extractive industries and other land based professions (Danielsen et al. 1998). Just like discourses of previous decades, discourses today tend to present Greenland as standing on the threshold of introducing large scale projects within mining and oil extraction. Both the fishery and the emerging extractive industries are generally represented as the two most important economic sectors in the future development of Greenlandic society. But in situations in which different actors compete to establish truths about necessity in development, there is a tendency for these actors to emphasize or de-emphasise the importance of the segments of the fishery or the overall category of fisheries accordingly. Jacobsen (2012) and Jacobsen and Raakjær (2013) shows how a grand reform discourse in the fishery bill reform process tend to de-emphasise the importance of the coastal segment with reference partly to the economic characteristics of the coastal fleet, partly to the need of labour in the emerging extractive industries. Indeed, it is not be the first time in Greenlandic history that the creation of subjectivities are at stake in facilitating a transition in the economic production and Greenlandic ‘development’: The history of the development of Greenlandic fisheries is riddled with such shifting symbolic constructions of possibilities, problems and subjectivities (Marquardt 1999, Langgard 1999).

On the level of Parliament politics the role of the fishery is deeply integrated in the party political battle over constituencies within Greenlandic Self-rule. The 2013 Parliament election is a good example of this. Siumut’s portraits of necessity and development tended to emphasise the present fact that the fishery remains the most important profession in Greenland. Portraits by the ‘new paradigm’ tended to challenge the political omnipotence of the fishery by means of two alternative facts. For one, they emphasised the fact that most Greenlanders are employed in professions outside the fisheries. Secondly, while the most significant economic sector in terms of export, it is also a fact that the fishery alone has proved incapable of financing the Greenlandic welfare state and of paying this ‘real’ price of economic independence from Denmark. Up to the 2013 election the singular economic role of the fishery was further challenged by recent development in the scientific estimation of the state of the cold water prawn. Cold water prawns constitutes over half of the fantastic fisheries export figure (Greenland statistics 2012), but in 2012 biological surveys revealed a dramatic reduction in the cold water prawn bio masse and the Total Allowable Catch quota was significantly reduced by a whole 25 per cent (that this reduction was at all accepted has been attributed to the management plan for cold water prawn and the MSC interest of the industry). Up to the 2013 parliament elections it was common for the seated government to activate this fact as a new urgent context that would make Greenlandic fisheries increasingly incapable of financing Greenlandic
society in the future. This de-emphasis of the fishery fed into another prime political discussion during the election: That of haste and democratic procedures of the ‘new paradigm’ in relation to large-scale projects. The new government had just succeeded in passing a law regulating large-scale projects before the election. But it was a contested law passed under considerable debate and critique. The facts deemphasising the fishery were used to defend and promote the haste and to argue that Greenland had no choice but to facilitate the establishment of extractive mine and oil industries in cooperation with international partners. On the level of party-politics and long-term planning; the fishery thus appear as an ever-changeable object, continuously reshaped by competing politics of every-day meaning making activities.

**Arctic social sustainability: Meaning in opposition**

Jacobsen and Delaney (forthcoming) present a slightly different case of how problems are constructed and contested in relation to Greenlandic fisheries governance. The study by Jacobsen and Delaney (ibid) has played an important role in the conceptualization of Greenlandic fisheries governance as a battle over meaning and fishery policies as instances of temporary fall-outs of these battles. Taking the first-hand experience of participating more or less directly in discussion over how to (re)define the relevant problems of fishery policy and reform, and turning it into a case of fisheries governance as meaning-making, we argue that the social sciences of the Arctic have long been part of the Greenlandic fisheries governance landscape perceived as meaning-making. The subject-position of the arctic social sciences ought to be recognized for being placed within a meaning-political landscape. This will provide a deeper understanding of the landscape and of the arctic social sciences as well.

Across international experience, social scientists have been engaged in developing the concept of social sustainability and finding ways for its operationalization. It is a characteristic concept in terms of politics because it is often developed with an eye to its application in real-life politics. The concept often respond to a range of ‘concerns’ emerging as a response to current developments be it a specific policy or general ‘unprecedented change’ (Jacobsen and Delaney forthcoming) There are often ambitions to let it function as a tool to monitor policies and inform decision-makers. Drawing on Zizeck and Mouffe, Davidson (2009) even argues that in a time of post-politics where consensus prevail over neo-liberal regimes and most issues are perceived and treated technocratic, social sustainability can open up basic discussion of ‘where do we want to go with society’. When debates today are not taken due to lack of imagination of place based politics as to their external effects or due to cynicism in social consciousness, social sustainability may help social issues enter the field and politics to be activated. Based on a literature review, Jacobsen and Delaney (forthcoming) argue that in the Arctic and in Greenland, discussions of social sustainability have been quite encompassing and effort has been put into developing definitions and indicators that reflect prevalent concerns in the Arctic such as self-control, connection to land and the continuation of livelihood and culture. It can hardly be denied that these issues stand in relation to the region’s recent history of external impacts and policy responses: Centralization of settlements; shifts in dominant modes of production; and loss of local control. The point made that social sustainability is about sustaining something (McKenzie2004) seems as relevant as ever in the Arctic and Greenlandic case and local livelihoods have received particular attention in this regard.
In 2012 a report on likely social impacts of the Greenland halibut management plan was presented to the Ministry and stakeholders from the subject-position of three social scientists, author included (Delaney, Hendriksen and Jacobsen 2012). It reflects the same type of concern as found in the social sustainability approaches of the science literature in the Arctic. Based on literature studies and field work in the northernmost of the three Greenland halibut fishing districts, Upernavik, the report identified ways in which the Greenland halibut fishery was important to different groups of the fishing populace in Upernavik district and pointed to some critical consequences that were to be expected next to the more positive ones assessed by the government and the ministerial working group behind the plan. The report was handed over to the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture and separately to all involved managers. It was furthermore sent all organisations of the Fishery Council involved in the fishery (Royal Greenland, Polar Seafood, KNAPK, SIK and GFLK) and to the secretariat of the Self-rule fishery committee and to Qaasuitsup municipality that hosts the three main Greenland halibut fishing districts (Upernavik, Ummannaq and Ilulissat). A public letter (Hendriksen, Delaney and Jacobsen 2011) was formulated in Danish and Greenlandic and published in the national but Nuuk-oriented newspaper, Sermitisíaq, that is a commonly used by government and interest organisations as a forum for communicating opinion on fishery policy issues. It was also sent directly to the group of actors mentioned above. The public letter preceded the finalization of the report and drew attention to the fact that a new regulation was about to be introduced and pointed to the probability that it would have diverse impacts on different groups in the fishery. It argued that the new regulation would lead to increased closure of access and argued that the expected profitability of those to be granted ITQs may come with an unforeseen cost of increased unemployment and therefore, also increased social expenditures (Hendriksen, Delaney and Jacobsen 2011).

The fishery committee in Qaasuitsup expressed an interest in the public letter and suggested to publish it in the local newspaper in Ilulissat as well. The report also led to new dialogue with new members of the working group and with the secretary of the Self-rule committee. But it did not impact the formulation of the final policy. At one stage a paragraph was included in the Greenland halibut management plan working document which stated that it was important to follow up on the impacts of the management plans. But that paragraph was omitted in the final plan. Jacobsen and Delaney (Forthcoming) therefore concludes that the social impact assessment is a case of social sustainability discussions ‘not affecting fisheries policy-making’.

There may be many plausible reasons why the report failed to influence policy-making. It could be anything from inefficient communication to simply not being in the loop. Hansen’s recent study of decision-making within Greenland self-rule (Hansen 2010) holds some interesting perspectives for a discussion as to why the report did not have much of effect. The study posed a similar question asking about the inclusion of ‘environmental knowledge’ in the form a strategic environmental impact assessment (SEA) in Greenlandic Self-rule planning of a the Alcoa mega-project. This can be somewhat compared to our question about the inclusion of ‘social sustainability knowledge’ into the form of a ‘social impact assessment’ in Greenland Self-rule planning of the Greenland halibut management plan. Yet there are some significant changes in the two cases of which the most apparent is perhaps the fact that the SIA was much less comprehensive and initiated from outside of Greenland Self-rule planning, namely by an external research group.

Hansen (2010) can point to situations in the planning process where the SEA was influential and identified reasons for this. For one, the assessment process was coordinated so there was interdependence between
the time schedules of the two processes. But at the same time, Hansen argued that actors were continuously changing the formal structures for communication and decision-making and thus, one cannot rely exclusively on formal structures to influence on the final decision: Sometimes the formal opportunity given simply comes too late. Hansen’s analysis implies a need for a certain flair for when to communicate with other working groups and to keep an up-to-date knowledge about the development of the process.

In contrast to the official coordination in the case of the SEA, ‘our’ social impact assessment somewhat forced itself into a planning process that was already long underway. The formal decision was not made, but the final decision was there from the very start: ITQ’s were to be introduced. So our case of non-influence might simply just be a sign of the difficulty of affecting a decision already made in practice. Nevertheless, Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012, 2013) shows that it is not uncommon at all for fishery policies to make 180 degree turns.

Meanwhile, Hansen identifies a last, but in my view very interesting, factor for inclusion of environmental knowledge: The final importance of the willingness of other actors to embrace and forward the environmental knowledge produced by the SEA onto the very final steps of the decision-making process: “Looking at the full decision-making process, it shows that the formal structures did not secure influence for the SEA working group. Environmental knowledge was included in the process, but it was not due to the structures, as the SEA working group was not included in the first of last part of the process. Rather it was due to other actors’ interest in promoting the environmental arguments, which were in support of the site recommended. If the environmental knowledge had been in opposition to the economic recommendations, then the actors representing the environmental considerations in the process would maybe not have had the access to influence the decision-making arenas they enjoyed in practice” (Hansen 2010, p. 80). Hansen therefore also poses the question as to whether the SEA would have been as effective had it been a ‘showstopper’ that would in effect halt the final implementation of the project.

That social sciences position themselves within a political landscape is perhaps a controversial statement to some. Others, such as Bourdieu, have argued that this is not controversial at all. Bourdieu (1980a) describes sociology as demystifying and as unmasking that which is hidden or repressed. This puts sociology in a direct relationship with existing interests: “When the sociology succeeds in creating a little bit of truth, it is not in spite of his interest in creating this truth, but because there is an interest, which is exactly the opposite of the slightly stupefying discourse about ‘neutrality’” (1980, p.28). The scientific position of sociology vis-à-vis existing interests also puts sociology in a special position where it tends to cause ‘troubles’: “Within sociology, any argument that contradicts the preconceived perceptions are to the contrary (of arguments of physics) suspected of ideological preconception, for political judgment. Such an argument clashes with some social interests. It goes for the dominant interests that work through the silence and the common sense (that says that what is there should be there or that it could not be any different way). And it goes for the interests of the spokes-persons, the ‘loud-speakers’, that depend on simplified ideas, on slogans” (Bourdieu 1980a, p. 29)

The discussion of Jacobsen and Delaney (forthcoming) beg the question if the social scientific community has itself established a functioning hegemony from where it constructs truths that are antagonistic to the truths of the type of development that have been promoted before in Greenlandic policy and which were now, again, promoted by the Greenland halibut management plan. That is perhaps, a ‘show-stopper’ on the meaning-making level? There are some very deep differences in the way truths about the coastal villages
are defined and Hendriksen (2012) has made a critical assessment of the ‘sustainability’ of Greenlandic settlements in the context of those conflicting truths. But not all aspects of newer Greenlandic fishery policy have had a decentralizing aim. At the insertion of Home-Rule, the strategy was a dual one of centralised planning and a de-centralised settlement structure (Rasmussen 1998, Dahl 1986). The coastal fishery for Greenland halibut in Upernavik district is in its first place also a result of a very deliberative interference by Greenland Home-rule in the 1980’s to create income opportunities and development in this district (personal communication with GINR biologists). Thus, the fishery reform and the Greenland halibut management plan is perhaps best perceived as a more or less direct confrontation with what was left of this sort of ‘fishery-dependent’ hegemony in Greenlandic fishery policy. If this is the case, it is important for the social sciences to know that they are not perceived of as bringing new information to a rational and deliberative decision-making table: They are not speaking truth to power. Social sciences may be perceived, as nothing but yet another well-known subject-position in the battle over meaning in relation to the question of where Greenlandic society and Greenlandic fisheries should be going. They are perceived as such because development policy is shaped by interest.

Alyne and Jacobsen (forthcoming) also ask why a report like the one above did not manage to open up politics as Davidson (2009) has otherwise suggested that it could, referring to the theories of Mouffe and Laclau as well. The argument of Jacobsen and Delaney goes that it may be precisely because politics are already on-going in the Greenlandic case. From this perspective, nothing new was provided by the social impact assessment report; only a well-known antagonistic view-point taking a point of departure in ‘well-functioning’ local economies in contrast to assumptions of poverty. The struggle to create functioning hegemonies is politics in its essence according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and one may say that, if nothing else, then the social sciences have managed to create a hegemony for itself. But the extension of this hegemony into policy-making is confronting and confronted by adverse hegemonies and the discourse on Arctic social sustainability is not that powerful in influencing policies when writing from a social scientist position subject position. But other actors articulating similar concerns, extracted from a similar discourse, actually are; namely the actors acting from the subject-positions emerging around the Siumut-coastal fishers alliance identified in Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012, 2013). In fact, the power of these subject positions becomes even more visible when compared to that of that of the Arctic social sciences.
Conclusion and implications for power, politics and participation in fisheries governance
The relationship between actors, problems and participation

At the end of my study one of my conclusions is that any ‘problem’ related to Greenlandic fisheries cannot be formulated unambiguously and any way it is formulated, it tends to interact with existing national development discourses. For the exact same reason, I have been hesitant to formulate my problem in terms of the relevance of fisheries to Greenlandic society or the significant changes facing Greenland today. I have turned problem-making within Greenlandic fishery policy into my case and thus, my problem has become the very meaning-making processes whereby problems in the fishery and problematic fisheries are being articulated, disarticulated and rearticulated.

The synthesis of the findings of the study of three policy-making processes within Greenlandic fisheries governance offers a description on how actors, problems and de-facto participation emerged. The theoretical framework focused on meaning-making and by adding a power dimension to the phenomenological question on how the world appears to us the synthesis explored how actors in Greenlandic fisheries governance interacted to shape the perceptions of selves, others and relevant problems in Greenlandic fisheries governance. The synthesis was interested in questions of participation, power and identity. And it posed the question of how actors become actors, how problems become problems and how participation becomes participation. At the end of the analysis it becomes clear that these three questions are inseparable. To answer one of them, it is necessary to simultaneously answer the other two. To understand who the de-facto actors are, it is necessary to understand that actors act out of temporary and timed subject-positions through which they articulate problems or are being articulated as problems. To understand how problems become problems it is necessary to understand that problems perceptions are inscribed into the very subjectivity of the acting or acted-upon subjects. To understand how de-facto participation takes place, it is necessary to understand that participation of the different subject-positions is directly reflected in the very way problems and actors have become. Problems and actors are, in short, constructed simultaneously in the everyday politics of meaning-making and de-facto participation emerges and changes with the actors and the problems.

This process can be described by the wheel-model presented below in figure 1. Here, participation is a wheel that is put into movement by the dynamics of the becoming of problems and actors. The model may even be used to describe how patterns of participation may roll back and forth between two points in analytical space: that is, between the two major alliances and networks described. Still, the wheel metaphor should not be expanded to imply a normative progression or regression towards ‘more’ or ‘less’ participation, for at this level of the analysis, the points of orientation reflect divergent and contested logics of the wheel itself. The most important thing to understand about the working of the model is that it depends on becomings arising from never-ceasing conflicts and not on progression.
What then does this model has to offer discussions on power, politics and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance? The most significant outcome of the analysis is, in my view, that the sensitivity to ‘becoming’ of the actors and of the problems has made it possible to see that fisheries governance in Greenland is essentially a simultaneous struggle over the truth about oneself and others, of fisheries and of where Greenland should be going as society. Herein lays a power perspective that sees power as becoming. In situations in which conflict and contestation is prevalent, the capability of constructing and controlling confined representations of selves, others and problems is really a great symbolic achievement of power. For as a rule, in this environment, the actors and the problems are always on the move and as a result, so is participation.

This perspective on power and participation recognizes both formal and informal institutions of meaning-making and major as well as minor acts of de-facto participation. As a result, it also describes Greenlandic democracy as more vivid than normally described in literature. In a way, this conclusion is closer in line with the observation of my informants that fisheries governance in Greenland is very political. But the analysis is also at pains to establish that it is not only political when the fisher-Siumut alliance activates itself – as sometimes represented. What is commonly analysed as heads and hearts, bureaucracy and fishers, technical solutions and politics – that is all treated here as belonging to the same category of the politics of everyday meaning-making and the struggle to create functioning hegemonies in the form of Greenlandic fishery policies. This holds a theoretical implication for the way we may perceive of politics and democracy in fishery governance.
Theoretical implication: Fisheries governance as radical politics

According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985) a fragmentation of positions exists within social agents themselves and no subject positions should be privileged over others in the analysis. Hence they abandon the idea of objective interests and advance the political significance of the successful construction of antagonisms (1985 p. 84). To paraphrase it, the political endeavour is playing with the open-endedness of ways of joining these positions exactly. In the struggles over identity one cannot equal the representations to persons as such. That has been the very point of many theories of subjectivisation aimed at nuances theories of objective interests. To Foucault, the becoming of the subject was a critical question in itself (Foucault 1982). This plasticity of the subject is accompanied by apparent contradictions in the representations identified in Greenlandic fisheries governance. Take for example the coastal fisher-Siumut alliance: It was a Siumut-led government that first introduced ITQs into Greenlandic fisheries. According to other observers in Greenland, Siumut is a party with internal disagreement as to the question of increased privatization and liberalization. It has been observed that then Premier from Siumut, Hans Enoksen, represented a more liberal branch of Siumut and while he managed to promote himself as ‘man of the small villages’ he was responsible for the abolishment of the one-price system whereby public services and goods were sold at the same price in villages and towns, keeping village prices lower than more free market processes would otherwise allow (Egede in Information 21.01.2008). It was also observed that Enoksen was responsible for massive privatization in the fishery while making use of a nationalistic discourse to ‘make the bitter medicine go down’ (Kjærsgaard in Information 21.01.2008). This analysis clashes with the self-representation of a defender of the small professional fisherman and local communities seen in Parliament debate during the time of the new regime (see Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012, 2013).

The seemingly alliance between ‘the new paradigm’ of the IA led government and the rationality of the grand reform discourse, that is to all my best of judgement informed by a capitalist rationality, is an equal paradox when IA officially represents itself as a socialistic party with a primary aim of promoting an equal society. In 2003 Andersen and Tonsgaard observed that Greenlandic parties are particular difficult to place on a left-right stratum because they tend to change their positions on most subjects relevant to the voters except from the question of the relationship to Greenland: “Thus it is not possible today to speak of a traditional left-right scale in Greenlandic politics. Where IA was seen before as the leftist party, Siumut as the social-democratic party and Atassut as the liberal party, the picture of today is ambiguous. As an example IA has lately advocated and implemented a more contractive economic policy without significant re-distribution aspects as a means to achieve increased economic independence from Denmark” (Andersen and Tonsgaard 2003 p. 60). But the paradox of left wing capitalism need not be a Greenlandic one exclusively, reflecting the special party-political set-up which resists standard left-right categorization (Andersen and Tonsgaard 2003). Throughout Europe today, a capitalistic economy and growth is seen by most political parties as the best means to achieve a functioning welfare state providing services to all.

The contradictory character of Greenlandic party political representations also derives much of their raw material from the sometimes somewhat contradictory colonial experience. In parliament debates in 2010 the opposition accused the new government of acting like the colonisers when promoting centralisation. The government returned the accusation claiming that the opposition were the ones acting like colonisers when promoting de-centralisation (personal observation). Both observations of the colonizing practice is to the best of my knowledge recognized Greenlandic history. The Danish trade first promoted a de-centralised
settlement structure when colonial world trade was based on seal-hunting. When trade was to be based on fisheries, concentration was promoted in the 1960’s (Dahl 1986). This complexity of history offers some categories along the lines of colonialism, capitalism and domination while leaving room, at the same time, for different interpretations as to what a given type of policy action really expresses.

The open-endedness of identity – and history for that matter - means that the dominant representations identified during the time of the new paradigm were not without overlaps and contradictions at all. In the policy-cases of this PhD, representations managed to move from the contested to the apparently consensual if only for a while: There was indeed an IA new paradigm that managed to implement significant reforms in line with the grand reform discourse (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012, 2013, Jacobsen 2013). And there was a coastal fisher-Siumut alliance that managed to stall such reform in regard to the TAC policy (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). I suggest that these representations that shaped policy are indeed best perceived of as hegemonies build from creating and joining some of many possible subject-positions. They were hegemonies of meaning that were allowed to function for a while from 2009 to 2013 and long enough to shape policy.

**Fishery co-politics, antagonism and radicalization**

Lending from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony to create a theory of the governance problem, we can then say that if a problem and a subjectivity is never given, but always on the move, power resides in any formulation of a final, though often still only temporary, problem and identity. Power and participation can then be approached as a question of how, in a context of conflict and contestation, necessity and consensus is finally established in the form of policy problem by emerging actors. That is, looking at how functioning hegemonies are temporarily established. Looking at the three cases it is possible to see that the construction of subject-positions and problems were subjected to very different conditions of articulation. I will argue that it is possible to distinguish between two types of conditions that have played a determinant role in the establishment of Greenlandic fishery policies understood as functioning hegemonies: that of privileged consensus and that of radical antagonistic politics. As examples of the first we had the first round of TAC policy-making, the formulation of the Greenland halibut management plan, the Fishery commission report and the two fishery bill amendments of 2011. Here, the new paradigm was able to unfold itself and its policy in line with its own representations. As examples of the second we had the second round of TAC policy-making and the Parliament debate surrounding the 2011 fishery bill amendments. Here the selves of the new paradigm could not unfold themselves in a forum characterised by a privileged state of consensus. From new subject positions, there was little cooperation around the self-representations of the new paradigm and no support of its representations of reform necessity. A range of alternative representations forced themselves onto the policy-decision making scene. In the case of TAC policy-making, a de-facto institution of co-politics emerged because it was able to change the direction of policy. This was not the case with the fishery bill amendments of 2011.

Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) termed the second round of TAC policy making a case of fisheries co-politics in search of a concept that would embrace broad stakeholder participation. It was characteristic of this second of TAC policy-making that decisions were taken outside of formal spheres by fishery stakeholders. Yet, it was not a formal decision-making institution and therefore it hardly merits the concept of co-management if we thereby mean a formal and voluntary sharing of power by the government as indicated by for example Jentoft (2003) and Sen and Nielsen (1996) where categories of co-management reflect
degrees of government devolvement of power. In this case, I would say that it is more as if it is a type of ‘stolen’ power; a de-facto but not formally recognised, nor by the government desired, devolution of power. The performants of the ‘new paradigm’ characterised it as ‘politics’ and reveal that they perceive the process as more political than others. This thesis conceptualises politics as meaning-making and within this perspective such an evaluation makes little sense: the first round of TAC policy-making is just as political as the other. Nevertheless, the second round of TAC policy-making may be seen as a case of radical politics in the sense that identities were cast into an antagonistic relationship in order to challenge previously established consensus.

There may be different explanations as to why a situation of radical politics evolved into an institution of co-politics or not; that is, why it got to influence policy. One explanation may be that the power of the grand reform discourse provided the new paradigm with the necessary strength to resist radical politics. In the case of the fishery bill amendments, the new paradigm managed to represent themselves as caretakers of fishers’ interest as they reinterpreted the category of fishers according to larger-scale fishers and fishing companies. The ‘standard’ criticism of the Siumut-coastal fishers alliance was thereby resisted and the government was able to introduce the fishery bill reform with a degree of claimed fisher’s representation. Though the new paradigm attempted to convince the Siumut-coastal fishers alliance of a MSC interest in observing scientific TAC advice, they were eventually unsuccessful in re-claiming representation. And they could not fall back on constructing an alternative fisher representation as in the case of the reform of the fishery bill as the TAC policy reform had little if anything to do with the grand reforms backed by Royal Greenland.

What emerges is then, that the political problem in a situation of radical politics is that representations are difficult to control. If we see the problem from the point of view of the new paradigm, this tension between privileged consensus and activated politics explains why the Greenland halibut regulation was implemented as a more or less full-blown full reform whereas the TAC policy was not reformed completely and why the fishery bill is only being changed incrementally. These divergent outcomes may be perceived as a trade-off between reform efficiency and extended participation in the decision-making process. But the radical politics perspective throws into doubt the view that this is really a trade-off between an organisational characteristic and a democratic process. It would be more accurate to describe the uneven success to introduce reform as nothing but divergent outcomes of privileged consensus and radical politics. In the tension between consensus and radical politics, patterns of inclusion and exclusions were not consistent. It was more as if exclusion took turns as a ‘new paradigm’ and an alliance of ‘coastal fishers-Siumut politicians’ took turns to exist.

We may also conclude that participation of the smaller-scale coastal segment of the fishery primarily takes place through the radicalization of representations: Only when actors are able to radically contest and change existing problem and identities does their de-facto participation take place. The subject-positions identified in the comparative analysis offers similarities to antagonism as defined by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). An antagonistic relation “arises not from full identities but from the impossibility of their constitution” and so “It is because a peasant cannot be a peasant, that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land”, Laclau and Mouffe argues referring to the case of the Italian peasant revolution (1985, p. 125). “Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence of myself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of my non-being and, in
this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meaning which prevent its being fixed as full positivity”. Antagonisms thus somehow seem to spring from experiences that have to do with limitations of becoming and the impossibility of final suture of identities. It seems a perfect concept to the case of Greenlandic fisheries governance where governors and governed are always on the move and where issues of exclusion are a constant theme. And perhaps, it has something to offer for fisheries governance in general.

That fisheries governance would tend to take form of antagonistic identity politics actually makes a lot of sense when we talk about fishers and access rights insofar that a fisher’s identity depends on that fisher’s right to fish. It is directly comparable to the case of the Italian peasant who cannot be a peasant if he is denied access to farming land. Fisheries governance that is so hung up on access right systems is easily articulated as a matter of existence versus extinction. Jacobsen (2012) articulated this relationship and fishers in Greenland and elsewhere articulate it as such as well. Thus it is probably no co-incidence that KNAPK and coastal fishers accused the Self-rule of breaching basic human rights when they were denied the right to fish (see Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). In the same vein fishers elsewhere protest against the 2008 increase in oil prices with the words ‘we want to live’ (Personal observation at the port of Guilvinec, France, summer 2008). In this perspective, fisheries governance becomes identity politics of a very fundamental kind.

But if this is the case, then it is equally justified to say that the grand reform discourse is also a case of radical politics that works on an antagonistic basis and which manage to challenge consensus. And it even goes for the Greenland halibut management plan if you put it into the larger context of the fishery reform. For the grand reform discourse is in itself challenge to another state of consensus, namely the consensus of dual development where coastal fisheries are to sustain an existing pattern of fishery dependent local development whereas the off-shore fishery alone should be able to pursue a profit-maximising strategy (Friis and Rasmussen 1989, Rasmussen 1998, Dahl 1986). In essence, however, the problem is again ‘the impossibility of constitution’ of full identities caused by the adversary party: The existence of the small-scale coastal segment is in reality the existence of a limitation. The designation of fishing rights to the coastal segment exclusively is a hindrance to the full unfolding of the larger-scale segment which needs to be able to continually increase its profitability through increased rationalisation and production. Just as the peasant cannot be a peasant when expelled from the land, so the profitable fishery cannot be a profitable fishery if denied access to new accumulation of fishing quota and external investors. At least, those are the logics of the identities themselves.

In the TAC policy process it is easy to observe the antagonistic shifts and turns because they are played out on an annual basis; a simple reflection of the fact that TAC policy is a yearly policy reflecting the working of the ‘TAC-machine’. To observe the radically political aspect of the fishery law reform, however, we need to look at the development of the fishery policy since it was first designated a central place in the development of the Greenlandic welfare state. That is, back to the 1950s. And Rasmussen’s analysis has shown that at least since the achievement of Home-rule in 1979 there has in Greenlandic fishery policy been a certain division of welfare-state labour between the coastal and off-shore fleet (1998). To re-define the coastal fishery as ‘no longer that important to community survival or the Greenlandic people’ is probably the most fundamental example of radical Greenlandic fishery politics since 1979: It is that challenge of that prevailing common sense that Greenlandic communities are somehow still fishery dependent which was described in the introduction.
The decision-making processes that promote this new perspective are in fact just as radical as that in the TAC policy-making. The meaning-making just take place in commission working groups and administration hallways. Yet they challenge a political status quo. It is just another set of networks at play and another set of subject-positions emerging. A far less visible set in fact, because it does not depend on public displays of stakeholder discontent for its working. Within these networks consensus is established and thus, by scaling in, the decision-making process takes form of a hegemonic non-political process as in the case of the Greenland halibut management plan in Jacobsen 2013. Scaling out, however, they are part of a greater battle of meaning. A conclusion will have to be, however, that the problems of the new paradigm and the grand reform is most efficiently implemented surpassing Parliament debate and relying on majority power of the new paradigm in Greenlandic fisheries governance and working groups within the Greenland Self-rule administration. Parliament, on the other hand, is a central venue for the articulation of the problems of the coastal fishers as a result of the way the Siumut-costal fisher alliance functions. But all constructions of fishery-political subjects work through the logic of antagonisms.

An emerging literature on natural resource governance argues that we are moving towards new modes of governance that are increasingly moving down and moving out, including stakeholders and based on temporary networks (e.g. Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). But others studies show that the picture is not without contradictions and there is hesitancy to submit to any conclusions that current government regimes are moving unequivocally in that direction (Hegland 2012). I find that the Greenlandic case resists any such clear conclusion as well. We have seen informal networks being activated way outside the formal spheres to influence TAC fishery policy (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). And we have seen a fishery minister and managers work in undisturbed peace from their office as they introduced a reform that would change access rights dramatically for good (Jacobsen 2013). And what is even more concerning for theories of network governance, is the empirical fact that what could otherwise be termed ‘expansive democracy (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, p. 3 with reference to Warren 1992), that has in Greenland repeatedly been represented as the ‘bad old days’ or the ‘medieval’ practices of a former paradigm (personal observation) whereas increased government control has been represented as new responsible ways. This complicates some aspects of the admittedly much nuanced discussion on ‘new modes of governance’ (e.g. Hegland 2012, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). As Hegland (2012) argues, new modes of governance should not be reduced to define ‘any change from whatever government arrangement was before’ (2012, p. 17), but requires a certain level of ‘novelty’ or ‘innovation’. Referring to Diedrichs (2008) analysis of EU governance, Hegland summarises that this novelty or innovation may pertain to certain shifts: From hard law to soft law resting on voluntary agreements and peer-pressure; up or down grading existing modes of decision-making into hierarchical patterns; the mixture between old and innovative ways of decision-making is changed by enhancing certain modes over others; the involvement of public and private actors and institutions is extended and strengthened (Hegland 2012, p. 18). With the concept of network governance, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) equally seek to describe a ‘new’ phenomenon in governance. They observe a shift in the analytical vocabulary away from such concepts as ‘the state’, ‘government’, ‘power’ and authority’ towards others such as ‘governance’, ‘networks’ and ‘deliberation’.

In regard to any sub-question on whether we are moving towards new modes of governance or we are falling back to old ones, complications arise from the Greenlandic case in relation to any clear trends towards either government control or expanded network governance. The interesting thing about Laclau and Mouffe is to me, that they embrace this institutional heterogeneity in a less trend-dependent fashion.
With inspiration from Laclau and Mouffe it is possible to primarily understand the emergence of policy networks in Greenlandic according to the concepts of radical politics and hegemony. The concepts of networks remain very relevant to the Greenlandic case, but the question of their ‘new’ or ‘old’ character is riddled with the politics of everyday meaning-making. Different types of networks also do not seem to replace each other for good, but seem to co-exist in competition or conjunction with each other. They seem to offer different opportunities for different subject positions and thus, they are promoted or condemned respectively. If a mode of participation is prevalent for a time – and it thus seemingly becomes a trend or represents the enhancing of certain modes of governance - it is only as a temporary result of a never-ceasing social power struggle. The hierarchy of modes of decision-making is continuously re-arranged. Based on the Greenlandic case, one may therefore argue that old and new vocabularies are needed for a full explanation: power and government have for example proven just as relevant as network and deliberation.

Is there a radical democratic aspect to radical fisheries politics?

The ‘dark side’ of antagonistic politics is of course the more or less deliberate deconstruction of competing identities. The theme of exclusion and out-phasing was central to the analysis of the fishery reforms that among other things, involved the out-phasing of a particular type of fishery just as it to many persons can be an end to them being fishers. The Greenland halibut management plan was the most clear-cut example. Governors had free room to construct such an uncontested thing as ‘the necessity of tough decisions’. The toughness of tough decisions has implication for the narrowing or broadening of participation and deserves further scrutiny in this discussion as well. In the Greenland halibut management plan we saw that the ‘acting ones’ were constructing a subject position for themselves in terms of necessity and toughness. But I would like to postulate a different fact, namely that the toughness of tough decisions did not reflect that it was tough to reach a decision. Quite to the contrary. Making the tough decision actually went quite easily for it was decided from the beginning that this was a plan that should introduce ITQ. If we look closely we see that ‘tough’ only means that you are willing to make decisions to which other people disagree and for which subjects of that policy may even have to bear a cost. Tough decisions thereby have a lot do to with participation in decision-making. Or more precisely, it refers to the willingness of excluding other from participating in the formulation of solutions. It is in such cases that creating successful accounts of participation appears a finer art than ensuring de-facto broad participation. Based on the analysis of the Greenlandic fishery reform processes I would say that the tough way tends to represent the easy way when it comes to the difficult challenge of participation. The easy way to reform in the case of the Greenlandic fishery bill and the Greenland halibut management plan was to take advantage of the head start of already being in control of the formal decision-making institutions and of the consultation process. It is the choice to go ahead without re-defining your problems. In the second round of the TAC policy process, we saw how that choice was suddenly no longer available. Inspired by a short but interesting analysis by Center for Vild Analyse (02.10.2010), one may wonder if not the alternative ‘soft’ decision is in reality the truly hard one when it comes to participation.

Because of this ‘dark side’ of excluding to extinguish, fishery politics may very well be radical and antagonistic without being radical democratic. Radical democratic politics is about making room for a pluralism of identities and not the opposite (Mouffe 1993, Mouffe 2005, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 167). At the end of the day, the concept of radical democratic politics should therefore be reserved for those
political acts which establish political subject positions which do not depend upon the full extinction of others and the rights of which are established by the very exclusion or subordination of the rights of others (Mouffe 2005, p. 20). As such, the grand reform discourse may challenge consensus, it may work on an antagonistic logic, but it does not offer a radical democratic politics. The Siumut-coastal fishers alliance may compromise the subjectivity of the new paradigm and the hegemony of the grand reform discourse. And they may be negatively evaluated in terms of legitimacy by competing actors. But I would like to add, that at least, they do not depend upon the full extinction of others for their own existence. And that gives them a head start in terms of democratic legitimacy if the democratic ideal is defined along the lines of radical democracy and not according to whether or not actors confine themselves to the formal channels for consultation or not: That is, if we dare to judge Greenlandic democracy on the degree of de-facto inclusion of the otherwise excluded instead of seeing it as a problem. In this respect, the former policy of Greenland Home-Rule of a dual development (Friis and Rasmussen 1989, Rasmussen 1998, Dahl 1986) does in fact appear as a more radical democratic alternative. And since it is historically available, I will therefore allow myself to propose a representation that goes against the common wisdom of Greenlandic politics today: Status quo is an option. And even a radical democratic one, because this dual policy to a greater extent allows for a plurality of identities. It allows for coastal as well as avant-garde fisheries. But it does not allow for endless accumulation of access rights in the name of development and it does not depend more or less directly on the deliberate exclusion of the identity of some for the expansion of others.

If Greenlandic fisheries governance is really an example of radical politics understood as a battle over creating new hegemonies in formal policy, this also leads us right back to the beginning of this thesis: Its own problem perception. It then becomes possible to see that the initial confrontation between the discourse of the need for reform and the discourse of the fishery-dependent local communities were indeed a clash of hegemonies. Based on the analysis of Jacobsen and Delaney (forthcoming) one may even say that this is a 60 year old on-going clash. Jacobsen and Delaney therefore also conclude that the attempts of social science to bring all the ‘relevant facts’ on the fisheries governance decision-making table may all too easily be interpreted as promoting familiar positions from the political battlefield. There is little way around it.

From a radical democratic point of view, the interesting thing about the meaning produced by the Arctic social sciences and social sustainability studies concerned with sustaining local livelihoods is perhaps not only what it is, but also what it is not. For in contrast to so many of the other subject positions in radical fishery politics, it is not at stake with the radical democratic ideal: Its concern about sustaining something may be in opposition to dominant policy paradigms of its time. But that is perhaps only because it is in opposition to any policy-induced extinction of identities as such. This is arguably a slightly conservative understanding of the Arctic social sciences (status quo is an option) and maybe this perspective is of the same family as those analyses that accuse small-scale oriented studies of romanticism. But such accusations fail to understand the context of the conservative concern, which is the existence of a non-conservative interest as such; an interest which is today couched in talk of necessity and toughness. By explicitly not relying on discourses of tough decisions and unequivocal necessity, the social sciences can insist on making the easy ways of non-inclusion difficult again. But this is, of course, not always a welcome exercise of complicating the accomplishment of uncomplicated matters.
Post script

The PhD is based on four articles and a synthesis of these. It presented a study of the way actors and problems came into being based on decision-making processes unfolding during the time of the 2009-2013 rule of the IA/Demokraatiit coalition. As I retreated to write the final synthesis from January 2013 to July 2013, the ‘case’ outside my window slowly turned upside down and the empirical configurations of power and participation changed, once again. The events that followed constitute a twist of things that speak so well to the themes of this PhD that it would be a shame not to include them as a post script together with a preliminary discussion of how they relate to the analyses offered in the PhD.

After the finalization of the first three articles the Greenland halibut management plan was implemented and fishers started to react. Indeed, it was through fishers reaction that the existence of the management plan, and the policy, first became visible to the public through the media. Three fishers, who had been denied a license in 2013 as a result of the Greenland halibut management plan, raised complaints and the ombudsman is currently investigating the procedures of the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture to see if the refusal of licenses were legal. In Jacobsen (2013) a fisher in Ilulissat named Anthon Lindenhann appears as an example of a counter-discourse as he engaged in the public debate and raised concerns about the current reforms. From the summer of 2012 he made several new appearances on KNR: Being dissatisfied with the inability of KNAPK to defend the fishers in relation to the new regulation for Greenland halibut he and the local KNAPK branches in the Disko bay (Ilulissat, Saqqaq, Qeqertaq and Ilimanaq) had now initiated an outburst from KNAPK and worked to establish their own organisation, ‘Qaleralinniat Kattuffiat’ (see also KNR 18.08.2012, 21.08.2013 and 28.01.2013). As a side note it should be mentioned that the local branches did eventually not break out from KNAPK due to restrictions in regulations. But KNAPK was reformed and a new chairman, Henrik Sandgreen from Ilulissat, was elected and announced that he would work towards integrating the main organisation (KNR 12.06.2013). In March 2013 KNR made a report from the northern districts in which KNAPK and Siumut representatives (Petrus Biilman and Tom Ostermann) together problematized the impacts of the new management plan for Greenland halibut and questioned whether the ITQ privatization system was the right system for Greenland. The report told of a reduction in fishers by 20 per cent and of crew members that had not been able to renew their licenses. 90 dinghy fishers had not received their licenses (see also Sermitsiaq 11.03.2013).

On March 12 2013 Greenlanders were again to choose their government. The coalition government whose reform work I had spent three years describing suffered a major set-back. It lost its power to Siumut. On the election night it showed that throughout the coast IA lost votes and Siumut together with the new party, Partii Inuit, gained votes. Live transmissions from Ilulissat a fisher explained that the fishery policy of the government had been pivotal for this reaction among voters. KNR reports showed a similar picture: Even though public political debate had concentrated on large scale projects, language and fishery policy had been decisive for Siumut and Partii Inuit voters in Ilulissat (KNR 12.03.2013). Up to the election new metaphors had started to emerge: It had suddenly become popular in the media (KNR and Sermitsiaq) and in Nuuk (personal observation) to state that Siumut ‘spoke to the heart’ and IA represented a more rational reasoning. As far as I could observe, it started with a Sermitsiaq article quoting a university student. Soon, however, the observation was repeated in discussions of how to analyse the election (KNR on election night as well as personal discussions which I observed. See also: KNR 27.02.2013). Siumut and the new Partii Inuit was repeatedly analysed as populist by supporters of the now former coalition. Some even compared it to...
the Danish right wing Danish People’s Party indicating similarity with its nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric. In turn, supporters of the now new coalition argued that IA had acted technocratically and did not consider the voters. Media and others argued that the election was a wake-up call to the parties of the previous government.

On June 18 2013 the new Siumut Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, Karl Lyberth, announced that the new government planned to re-establish the ‘rubber-boot’ paragraph that grants exclusive access rights to the fishery to professional fishers and which was cancelled as an effect of one of the two amendments passed under the former government (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013). The licence fee for each commercially marketed species was also reduced to two licences: one for Greenland halibut and one for the remaining species. Furthermore, the Greenland halibut TAC was raised with 1,000 tonnes for each of the three management districts. At the time of writing, it thereby seems that the election of a new government has resulted in the rolling back of many of the most central reforms of ‘the new paradigm’ in line with the interests of the coastal fishers as they were represented by KNAPK and Siumut in previous political battles over meaning (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012, Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013). The national media covered the announcement with the title: ‘Karl Lyberth i sit es’. The expression of being ‘i sit es’ indicates a feeling of ease with oneself. The Danish-English dictionary translates it into ‘being in one’s element’ and not being ‘i sit es’ is translated into not feeling quite oneself (Gyldendal 1984). This expression can be seen as telling of how Karl Lyberth thus acted in line with former self-representations performed by himself and other Siumut colleagues (see Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012) and it can be seen as telling of an undisturbed state of meaning as to the identity of a political actor and his ability to act on the basis of this identity.

Another shift of hegemony in Greenlandic fisheries governance may very well be occurring. The fishery bill and the Greenland halibut management plan that could be characterised as hegemonic in the period of 2009 to 2012 is allowed to turn into radical antagonistic politics if only we extend the case in time. When analysing power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance – and fisheries governance in general perhaps - one therefore also needs to prepare oneself for significant delays in the interaction. The timing of the fishers’ reaction supports the argument presented above that radical politics first begin when fishers experience a limitation to the full constituency of their fishing identity. The twist of things following the new election also speaks to the theme of how difficult it really is to reform fisheries policy in Greenland and thereby change the governance system. For at the end of the day, the very economic, cultural and social importance of fisheries is boiled down to politics related to how Greenland should or should not be. The ‘new paradigm’ was an interesting case in Jacobsen and Raakjær 2013 because it showed what it took for reforms to be actually implemented, namely a certain tunnelvision based on the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others. But the turn of events after the election in 2013 only supports the argument of Jacobsen and Raakjær (2012) that any established consensus is only a temporary one and that reform is in fact very reversible. The ‘wheel model’ presented above seems as relevant as ever.

But compared to the Ph.D. analysis, the twist of things underlines to an even greater extent that in the long-term perspective, the every-day politics of meaning are highly oriented towards the formal organisations. Looking back, the last observation of this study ends with the first. Before arriving in Nuuk in 2010 I went to the Disco bay to talk to fishers about how they perceived the management system. I asked a fisher to explain to me how he as a fisher was able to affect the management decisions. He told me, that
they as fishers left it to KNAPK to promote their interests and he trusted they would do that. He didn’t say much else on that matter. I took notice of this as a reliance upon and trust in KNAPK as an institution. I also interviewed employees at the municipal fisher committees in Ilulissat and Qeqertassuaq to identify instances of local decision-making. I was told that quota allocation was decided on locally when it comes to hunting. But I was not told of any local decision-making when it comes to the fishery. At the office in Ilulissat I told them that I was interested in understanding what influence they as fishers have on the formulation of management rules and their reply was: up here we are all fishers. And I think I had a nagging feeling that there had to be more to the story than that – there surely was too, for the way of influencing is a more detailed story of inclusion and non-exclusion at certain moments. But when it comes to the smaller-scale fishers, my first interviews now start to make sense. The inclusion and participation really does take place with an orientation towards the formal institutions such as political parties, fisher organizations and Parliament elections. And maybe at the same time, it is still true, that on some political level, in the Northern districts ‘they are all fishers’ in the sense that participation through election takes place among so many people that it makes little sense to confine participation to a few representative institutions: Parliament itself can at times function as a very real representative fisher organisation. Therefore, understanding localised and informal governance, as Hajer and Wagenaar has also indicated in relation to the state (2003, p.5), one should not analytically assume a rolling back of the formal institutions; it is the interplay that is key to understanding outcomes. I did not appreciate this information it to its fullest when it was first indicated to me by the fishers I spoke to when I had first arrived in Greenland. Now I think I do. One may not see formal co-management arrangements or much formal civil society activity and this may be one of the reasons why there has been talk about a democratic deficit in the literature. But I would argue that one should not underestimate the ability of fishers and actors of fishing communities to react and influence the centralized system at the level of the formal institutions such as the national election and the reform of their fishery organisations. We may prevent such underestimations if we allow for considerable delays and strategic timing. Then we see how there are still discourses that construct a subject-position for a considerable part of the Greenlandic people as dependent on access to not only the sea, but also to fishing and coastal fishery activities. It is no surprise then if this is where the battle over meaning stands today.
References


Symes, D., Raakjær, J. and Hegland T.J. 2012. EU fisheries reform losing momentum. EU observer.


### Appendix A. Condensation points for participant observation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant observation of working days at APNN 2010</td>
<td>Approximately 2-3 days a week in September, October and December 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant observations of working days at GIINR 2010</td>
<td>Approximately 2-3 days a week in September, October and December 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in working days at GIINR 2010-2013 with ad hoc observation and informal conversations.</td>
<td>All days a week from: January 2010 - March 2012 November 2012 – July 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations of Fishermens’ demonstration 12 October 2010 and 6 October 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations of meetings in the Ministerial Greenland Halibut Management Plan Working Group in 2010</td>
<td>6 (of 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations of working group meetings and stakeholder meetings in relation to the Cod management plan in 2010</td>
<td>6 (of 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in working group on Climate Change in Fishery and Hunting (together with representatives from APNN, KNAPK and the Ministry of Housing, Nature and Environment) from 2010-2012.</td>
<td>11 (approximately)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of Fishery Council Meeting in relation to an urgent raise of TACs, 30 September 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of Fishery Council Meeting in relation to the reform of the fishery bill, 22 October 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly staff meeting at department of Fish and Shellfish at GIINR from September 2010 to around April 2011</td>
<td>20-24 (incomplete recording)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily morning meetings at APNN</td>
<td>17 as a minimum (incomplete 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous meetings between GINR staff fishers, managers and/or</td>
<td>10 as a minimum (incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politicians 2010-2013</td>
<td>recording)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation and/or listen in of Parliament debate on fishery</td>
<td>6 (approximately)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance related issues 2010-2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of public communications by politicians, fishers and</td>
<td>Daily. 2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stakeholder representatives in the media (Sermitsiaq, AG, KNR and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUUKTV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Map of the field

Situations, performants and access:

- **Fishery Council meetings**
  Performants: KNAPK, GA, Polar Seafood, Royal Greenland, APNN, SIK, GFLK, GINR.

- **Every day work in department of Fishery**
  Performants: FD managers

- **Working group: Greenland halibut management plan**
  Performants: FD managers, GFLK managers

- **Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources. Every-day work.**
  Performants: GINR staff

- **Department for Fish and Shellfish. Everyday work.**
  Performants: Staff

- **Private get-togethers**
  Performants: Friends, colleagues and others as occasional performers of fishery governance and Greenlandic development discourses

- **Social Impact Assessment in interaction with policy**
  Performants: Social scientist and policy-makers

- **Morning meetings in Department of Fishery**
  Performants: FD leadership, managers

- **From the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, Department of Fishery**

- **Climate change working group.**
  Performants: APNN, KNAPK, Ministry of Environment, Housing and Infrastructure, Knap, Housing.

- **Working group: Cod management plan**
  Performants: FD managers, GINR staff, FD staff, GA, Polar Seafood, RG, KNAPK, GFLK

- **From the Greenland Climate Research Centre, located at Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources**

- **From the media scene**

- **From the private sphere as a member of Nuuk-based communities**

- **Parliament debate and national election**
  Performants: Party politicians

- **Public demonstrations**
  Performants: Politicians, NAPP fishers, FD managers, GINR staff

- **Miscellaneous meetings fishers and biologists**
  Performants: GINR staff and fishers and/or fisher and industry representatives

- **Climate change working group.**
  Performants: APNN, KNAPK, Ministry of Environment, Housing and Infrastructure, Knap, Housing.

- **Every day work in department of Fishery**
  Performants: FD managers

- **From the Greenland Climate Research Centre, located at Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources**

- **From the media scene**

- **From the private sphere as a member of Nuuk-based communities**

- **Research experience and social scientific discourse**

- **Fishery related debates.**
  Performants: Fishers, fisher and industry representatives, media, opinions, other academic observers
Appendix C. Papers

Published and submitted papers.

A Case of Greenlandic Fisheries Co-politics: Power and Participation in Total Allowable Catch policy-Making

Small-scale Fisheries in Greenlandic Planning – the Becoming of a Governance Problem

Who Defines the Need for Fishery Reform? Actors, Discourses and Networks in the Reform of the Greenlandic Fishery

When Social Sustainability Becomes Politics – Perspectives from Greenlandic Fisheries Governance.
A Case of Greenlandic Fisheries Co-Politics: Power and Participation in Total Allowable Catch Policy-Making

Rikke Becker Jacobsen & Jesper Raakjær
A Case of Greenlandic Fisheries Co-Politics: Power and Participation in Total Allowable Catch Policy-Making

Rikke Becker Jacobsen · Jesper Raakjær

Abstract Greenlandic governance institutions have been criticised for their colonial heritage of centralisation and lack of democratic participation. In the same manner, Greenlandic fisheries management is notorious in the academic literature for its centralised and locally illegitimate character. While recognising the lack of localised co-management fisheries governance institutions in Greenland, we argue that something has yet to be said about power and user participation in the centralised institutions that have developed. From a symbolic interactionist perspective we dissect the centralised institutions in terms of a differentiated cast of actors and their interaction and argue that participation and power come in many institutional guises as the complex cast of actors within the centralised system represent themselves and others. If we are to understand power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance, we need to understand the creation of alliances of the subject-positions that seek control of the self-rule fisheries governance decision-making.

Keywords Fisheries governance · Greenland · Power · Participation · Total allowable catch policy

Introduction

Hunting and fishing are exceptionally important to Greenlanders in terms of both their livelihoods and their social organization (Dahl 2000; Golhar et al. 2010; Nuttall 2000; Olsen 2010; Rasing 2000). Human use of the Greenlandic marine ecosystem presents a complex mosaic of small- and large-scale subsistence and commercial fishing and hunting activities. Today, the Greenlandic marine ecosystem sustains fisheries (primarily shrimp, Greenland halibut, cod and crab) that contribute 83% of Greenland's total export value (Greenland Statistics 2010a) as well as supplying households with a wide range of fish, birds and sea-mammals through subsistence activities, sharing institutions and—in larger towns—purchase from supermarkets, the local markets (Kalaaliaraq) or directly from fishers, hunters and crew-members in the street.

According to Charles (2001) a fisheries system can be understood as three interacting subsystems: a natural system comprised of the ecosystem and the fish stocks; a socioeconomic system comprised of fishing, processing, marketing and processing industries in the fishing sector as well as the fishing communities; and a governance system comprised of the fishery policies, management decision-making and the knowledge that is applied to govern the fisheries sector (Fig. 1).

In an ongoing research project¹ we are concerned with the practices of power and participation in the Greenlandic fisheries governance system. This article focuses on two decision-making institutions that play a central role in Greenlandic fisheries governance today in determining the annual sizes of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC).

It has for quite some time been acknowledged that participation in decision making does not automatically fulfil its dual promise of bottom-up democracy and equity, nor

¹ 'The West Greenland marine ecosystem and climate change—The socio-economic adaptation and governance challenges for fisheries management'. Innovative Fisheries Management—an Aalborg University Research Centre and Greenland Climate Research Centre.
increased effectiveness. Cooke and Kothari (2001). In the context of fisheries governance a number of researchers have critically discussed the experiences, challenges and potentials of fisheries co-management in (e.g., Jentoft 2005; Jentoft et al. 1998; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Raakjær 2009; Wilson et al. 2003). In this article, we address the question of how power relations facilitate certain types of participation and non-participation for certain actors. The fisheries system in question is nested in a national governance system and we therefore present an initial review of power and participation in this larger system before turning to our empirical analysis of fisheries governance.

Power and Participation in Greenlandic Governance

Greenlandic governance institutions are subject to the power structures taken over from Denmark at the inception of Home Rule on May 1st 1979. The colonial legacy of centralisation and its negative impacts on local communities is well described by Gullestrup (1976), Schwerdtfeger (1976) and Sørensen (1976). A new post-colonial social class took control over these pre-existing institutions and no democratisation, decentralisation or self-managing institutions evolved internally (Winther 2003). Because of the significant level of alienation of large parts of the population from the decision-makers, Greenland’s government has experienced problems in implementing policy and maintaining legitimacy (Janussen 2003). The voters are characterised by ‘political poverty’ in that they lack both resources and participation opportunities (Andersen and Tønsgaard 2003). Although Olsvig and Hansen (2011) note that citizens have shown an increased interest in decision-making related to the Alcoa aluminium smelter planning process, it remains the case that they doubt the effectiveness of their participation.

In the context of fisheries governance, Rasmussen (2003) argues that an unequal power relation exists between the coastal and the sea-going fleet segments. A widespread but incorrect perception prevails that the coastal segment and the local coastal communities do not contribute financially to Greenlandic society. Thus, power resides with Self-rule government owned companies, which dominate fishery policy and local communities have little input. Sejersen (2003) and Dahl (2000) describe loss of local control and disempowerment from a local perspective. Studies of the elite within the centralised system found that Danes are dominant in administration and business whereas Greenlanders and men from Nuuk in particular occupy most of the political positions. Adolphsen (2003) has identified a ‘Greenlandic’ and a Danish’ line of identity and argues that the Danish line of identity often manage to define the rules of the game. Further, the Greenlandic elite is said to be more tightly knit and exclusive than elites in other democracies, (Christiansen and Togeby 2003). Thus, a picture emerges of the Greenlandic governance system with concentrated power and opaque decision-making processes, a tightly knit elite monopolizing political positions, administration, and business, and a disempowered local population. This study provides further analysis of what is actually going on in the ‘centre’ in terms of power and participation within the decision-making practices by examining the micro-processes of everyday human interaction.

Method and Perspectives

Our analytical framework (Fig. 2) is based on Raakjær (2009) and shares the assumption that insights into the governance process can be obtained by paying attention to the way actors form alliances around similar or compatible interests. We, however, speak of subject-positions rather than interests in order to emphasise the way actors and their interests are created in interactions. Similarly, we use the
term acts of representation rather than discourse as a way of approaching a process wherein dominant lines of reasoning are activated and manifested. Alliances remain central to this model as we argue that by constructing and taking on certain subject-positions, actors promote certain alliances. Thus from a methodological point of view we start from observations of interactions and not from identification of any essential stakeholder interest. Our conceptual framework for analysing the interactions is concerned with the way actors represent themselves and others and how the resulting subject-positions form alliances that enable them to influence the final decisions taken in regard to how to govern the Greenlandic fisheries.

The empirical examples presented or referred to in this article are based on 4 months of fieldwork within the fisheries management institutions. Daily interactions were observed at the Fisheries Department (FD) of the Greenlandic Ministry of Hunting, Fishing and Agriculture (APNN) and the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources (GINR) and the 2010 autumn assembly of the Parliament of Greenland Self-rule. The Greenlandic media coverage of events related to fisheries governance and the subsequent public debates were collected systematically. Depending on the situation, informal conversations and observations were either noted simultaneously or summarized within a few hours. The type of data for this analysis is thus 1) data on social interaction between actors collected by the researcher as an interpreting observer and 2) the actors’ own reflections on the professional roles of themselves and others expressed in informal conversations with the researcher. The article in draft manuscript form was distributed to all members at the FD and GINR for comment and eight people thereby contributed valuable feedback.

The Formal Participatory Institutions in Greenlandic Fisheries Governance

The Greenland Home Rule government withdrew from the European Union in 1985 with the explicit aim of being the master of its own fishery management. As a sovereign fishing state today it negotiates and sets its own limits for the total allowable catch (TAC) of the fish stocks within Greenlandic territory and is responsible for all the decisions pertaining to fisheries management. When Greenlanders fish on shared and straddling stocks, some of its TACs are subjected to bilateral cooperation and international institutions such as NEAFC (for pelagic and deep water stocks in the North Atlantic), NAFO (for shrimp at Flemish cap and Grand Bank) and NASCO (for salmon) (Greenland Statistics 2010b).

The fishing act of 1996 mandates for the Home Rule government the exclusive right to make all decisions pertaining to the Greenlandic fisheries. The only exception is related to the implementation of additional conservation measures, which can be made by the municipalities with the approval of the central government (the fisheries act § 23). This monopoly on decision-making is somewhat mitigated by the Fishery Council. The Self-rule government is obliged to consult the Fishery Council on all matters that are absolutely central to the Greenlandic fisheries policy: TAC, fishing rights, fishing capacity, conservation measures, trade-in obligations and rules for Greenlandic affiliation of crew (the fisheries act § 32).

The Fishery Council consists of all organisations representing the commercial fishers and hunters as well as the fishing companies. Currently the following organisations (who sometimes merge and split) are on the Fishery Council: The Association of Fishers and Hunters in Greenland (KNAPK), the Employers’ Association of Greenland (GA), and the Organisation of Greenlandic Employers (NUSUKA). Originally, KNAPK represented most fishers, but today it increasingly represents small-scale fishers and hunters (commonly referred to as ‘the fishers’ and ‘the hunters’) whereas GA represents companies of the sea-going fleet (commonly referred to as ‘the industry’). ‘In order to secure a balanced decision-making process’ the Fishery Council includes a wide range of other stakeholders as appointed members granting them observer status. These are the Ministry of Fishery, Hunting and Agriculture (APNN), the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources (GINR), the Greenlandic Fisheries License Control (GFLK), the Association of Greenlandic Municipalities (KANUKOKA), the Greenlandic Workers Union (SIK), the Ministry of Finance (as needed), the Ministry of Industry and Labour (as needed), the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, Nature and Environment and the environmental NGO Avataq. The two largest fishing companies, the Self-rule owned company Royal Greenland A/S and the private Polar Seafood A/S form part of the Fishery Council as appointed members though they are represented by GA on some occasions. Based on our own observations of the Fishery Council meetings, we get the impression that the Fishery Council is not physically assembled very often by APNN and that it does not assemble on the initiative of any other member. Instead, the Fishery Council members are consulted individually in writing. Depending on the extent of cooperation FD managers and the Minister seek,

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5 We received and took into account many helpful comments on factual matters, fisher- and industry-influence and our ways of representing the actors involved. The interpretations and arguments expressed in this article however remain the authors’ alone.

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3 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
4 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission
5 North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization
all or only some of the members are consulted. In the same manner, selected members may be consulted by FD managers prior to written consultation.

The long list of appointed members to the Fishery Council reflects recognition of the central role of the fishing and processing industry for the many groups in Greenlandic society that depend on the marine resources. Nevertheless there are groups who have an obvious stake in the fishery but not represented in the Fishery Council, for example women in small-scale hunting and fishing households (for women’s participation in Greenland see Sloan et al. 2004 and Dybbroe 1988).

Decision-making power is legally concentrated in centralised institutions. In practice this ‘centralised’ governance system consists of a wide cast of actors with a legal right to consultation. Our analysis therefore is based on the fact that the Government, the Parliament and the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture have the formal right to make and implement decisions in consultation with Fishery Council members. But due to the wide range of actors and the widespread institutions of consultation the central questions remain: Who precisely gets to have a say within this arrangement? What are the roads to influence for the different stakeholders? And what unofficial paths to influence exist in conjunction with formal participation on the Fishery Council?

TAC Decision-Making: Formal and Informal Participation

The official descriptions of the annual TAC decision-making process in Greenland (Greenland Statistics 2010b; APNN 2011b; Sloan et al. 2004) leave a good deal unsaid about its actual complexity. The TAC decision-making process is split into two rounds. The first round takes place at the beginning of the year and sets both the sea-going and the coastal TAC. The second round, not in the official description of Greenlandic fisheries management, pertains to the coastal TACs and follows late in the year. Whereas the first round takes place as actors perform their roles in the venues of management, the second takes place as actors perform their roles on multiple stages throughout the country including the parliament.

Round One: Formal TAC Setting with Formal Participation

In the first round of TAC decision-making the GINR presents to parliament its scientific advice for the exploitation of fish stocks in Greenlandic waters in cooperation with ICES and NAFO, after which the Fisheries Department (FD) of the Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture drafts their TAC recommendation based on the scientific advice and the fishery of the previous year. FD managers seek to avoid drastic changes and they consider their job is to strike a balance between scientific advice and considerations of the fisheries. Their proposal is then distributed to the members of the Fishery Council. Upon receipt of the responses FD drafts a final TAC proposal. Recently, the most significant changes made in the FD proposals have stemmed from changes in the scientific advice on cod. Furthermore, since the Greenlandic TAC forms part of a larger international mosaic of fishery agreements the FD seeks not to change the annual TAC too much in order not to disrupt the arrangement. The final TAC recommendation is presented to the government, which usually adopts it without alterations (managers at FD, personal communications). In this process FD managers are thus powerful participants and the way they handle their own roles impacts the outcomes.

In this first round of setting the TAC, different fleet segments participate in different ways prior to the consultations of the Fishery Council. The sea-going companies accompany FD managers to international TAC negotiations where they consistently urge as large a TAC as possible (FD manager, personal communication). Scientific uncertainty and lack of consensus prevail in discussions of the biologically sustainable management of pelagic redfish (NEAFC 2006; Sen 1997). For Greenlandic managers this means that they see themselves as unable to impose a biologically sustainable fishery on these stocks. Added together the autonomous TACs set by each member state continually exceed the recommended total pelagic redfish quota. As long as other states do not lower their TAC, the FD managers feel there is little they can do: They have to consider that their industry’ interest lies in ‘as high a TAC as possible’. Adding to the dynamics of industry pressure, the managers see themselves in a negotiation situation where any self-imposed reduction of TAC can be considered a sign of weakness. Any perceived weakness will rebound on them in the TAC negotiations the following year (FD manager, personal communication). The managers thus find themselves in a typical game of “race for more fish” even though they know it may deplete the common resource. A similar process of adding together autonomous national TACs is evident in the case of the Greenland halibut in the sea-going management district off East Greenland. Here, Greenland granted itself a quota equal to the size of that set by Iceland and the Faroe Islands in order to ‘mark’ the Greenlandic historical rights to the management area (APNN 2011a). In 2011 Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland together raised the TAC to seven times the size of the biologically recommended 5,000 tonnes. In contrast, the Greenland halibut stock shared with Canada is governed in strict accordance with biological advice as the two countries have a ‘tradition’ of sharing the biological TAC equally.
The yearly TAC-decision sets the scene for actors to insert problems and solutions based on what had transpired earlier (Enderud 2003). The outcome of the Greenlandic TAC-setting can thus be considered a result of the FD managers working as mediators who have to find a balance between biological advice and industry interests. Even if managers prefer to comply with scientific advice, they often feel forced to defer to the social dynamics within the multilateral institutions. The FD managers’ perception of the sea-going industry’s interest in ‘as much TAC as possible’ is seemingly not enough for managers to compromise scientific advice. But as soon as biological sustainability is compromised, managers engage in a non-cooperative “race for fish” which they may not approve of, but in which they feel the need to participate in order to meet industry interests once the goal of biological sustainability is not feasible.

Coastal Greenland halibut, cod and crab are not shared with other states and are thus not negotiated internationally. The FD only has to balance biological advice and domestic interests. At the beginning of the year TAC is set according to biological advice in consultation with members of the Fishery Council. Thus, the balance is preferably reached within the limits of biological advice. The FD managers and the Minister are however put under pressure to reconsider this balance by the end of the year. We argue that this happens as new subject-positions take form that influence decision-making that has otherwise been controlled by the priorities of the FD managers and the Minister.

Round Two: Raised TACs and Multiple Paths of Informal Participation

With the exception of the Individual Transferable Quota regulated shrimp fishery, the coastal TAC is a common quota for the entire coastal fleet that engages Olympic fisheries. For the last 10 years towards the later months of the year the coastal quota for crabs, shrimps, Greenland halibut and cod has been exhausted. At this point, a second round of the TAC decision-making takes place.

In autumn 2010 the opposition party in Parliament, Siumut, was quick to turn the situation of exhausted coastal quota into an opportunity to represent a large part of the Greenland democratic constituency: the coastal fishers and the salaried workers in the inshore processing industry. Siumut demanded that the Minister of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture raise the quota for the sake of the fishers and processing workers. Confronted with new closures of the cod and Greenland halibut fishery following 2 months of repeated closures and reopenings, the Minister, Ane Hansen, responded in Parliament. After an initial supporting question from her party colleague that allowed her to unfold her standpoint, she was confronted by the former Premier Hans Enoksen—a member of the historically influential Siumut party that was only recently (in 2009) accorded a place in the opposition after 30 years in government. An exchange unfolded that clearly condensed the acts of representation as performed by the minister and the opposition in various situations:

Hans Aronsen (IA) to the Minister of Hunting, Fishing and Agriculture, Ane Hansen (IA): What influence will MSC\(^6\) have for the users, say in terms of trade-in on the Greenland halibut?
Ane Hansen (IA): It is important to document sustainability: That you do not cause harm to the nature. MSC products are expensive to buy and this will have a positive effect on the price that the fishers receive for their products.
Hans Enoksen (Siumut): In these days we have big problems—perhaps the biggest problems we have seen in a long time. The cod fishery is closed and the trade-in closes tonight. The Greenland halibut fishery in Upernavik has been closed. The Uummanqaq quota will be fished up soon. In the south a halt has been put on the trade-in of crabs. The trade-in on sealskin has been stopped too. The government punishes the fishers in order to meet the international community.
Ane Hansen (IA): You can also turn it around: How have we gotten to where we are now? We have not focused on sustainability and now we have reached a point where we have to be strict in our quota allocations. New thoughts are necessary and we cannot continue to give high quotas. The former government was aware of the problem and wished for initiatives that can move people away from the fishery. The new government has started to look at how this important industry can develop where there is also an opportunity to develop other professions for the fishers. We are working on a long-term management plan in close cooperation with the users.
Hans Enoksen (Siumut): What’s done is done. We have a problem today and the government is turning its blind eye to it. The hunters and the fishers live from day to day. They have house rents and boats to pay off. The result of the current situation may be that they are kicked out of their apartments.
Ane Hansen (IA): You yourself must carry the burden of proof with regard to your comments. We do not find the situation that hopeless. Concerning the crabs there is furthermore a misunderstanding (…).

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\(^6\) MSC refers to Marine Stewardship Council certification. It is a certification of fish products that claims to guarantee the consumer that the fishery behind the product is conducted in a biologically sustainable way.
Hans Enoksen (Siumut): You say the future is bright. But I’d rather say that today it is dark. (The above points are then repeated by both parties for a while) (Extract of debate in Parliament: Questions to the Minister of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture. 29/10 2010. Author’s translation of official Greenlandic-Danish simultaneous interpretation in Parliament.)

Within these representations at least three subject-positions emerge: The fishers as being let down by the government, the opposition as the one fighting the fishers’ case, and the government as driven by a desire to please the international community. Sejersen (2003) argued that local villagers perceived the (at that time) Self-rule government and GINR as importing non-Greenlandic standards. He therefore found reason to expect that these institutions obtained their legitimacy from the ‘outside’ rather than from ‘within.’ The statements made by Enoksen above shows that this discourse of critique is no longer articulated only locally, but is in fact strongly connected to party-politics within the centralised institutions of the government. An alliance between the coastal fishers and Siumut thus emerged across the centre and periphery. The question remains whether Siumut’s ‘representing’ resonates with an actual constituency of fishers and processing workers and to what extent they agree with Siumut that they were ‘fishers in need of political action.’ The actions of the fishers that showed up for the NAPP (Nuuk branch of KNAPK) demonstration in front of the Parliament leads one to suspect that they did indeed agree and at least some fishers embraced the role of being represented by Siumut: spokespersons in the crowd demanded the minister’s resignation, and members of the crowd jeered at the minister’s speech and cheered as the opposition spoke.

Other actors created a subject-position for themselves from which they sought to influence this second phase of the TAC decision-making outside the sphere of the Fishery Council. Local KNAPK branches arranged demonstrations in Nuuk and the fishing town of Ilulissat and at this stage, chairmen of the local KNAPK branches presented similar arguments in letters to the national newspaper. They emphasized the social catastrophe awaiting the fishing households and they argued that by cancelling the fishers’ jobs without informing them first, the government breached human rights conventions.

In addition, individual fishers engaged in their own acts of self-representation. They acted separately yet their actions had a concerted appearance that led the FD and GINR to perceive them as forming one group. One action was participation in the public demonstration in front of the Parliament, which, according to FD managers, is a yearly event. Another was to make direct contact with the minister, the head of the GINR department for shrimp and fish and the FD. A fair amount of e-mails were sent to the FD and the Minister from the coastal fishers detailing at length the hardship imposed on them and their families by the trade-in closure and urging that it be re-opened. The head of the fisheries department at GINR received phone calls from fishers from the town where she once lived who tried to convince that there were more fish in their local area than estimated by GINR. This type of ‘direct correspondence’ is not confined to the coastal small-scale fishers. Staff at GINR regularly receive e-mails from sea-going companies and individual skippers–either directly or forwarded by FD–wherein they request, in a polite cooperative style, that the GINR and FD consider releasing more quota to their company. They will for example apply for additional quota for ‘exploratory fishing’ to test user-hypotheses while noting that they will necessarily need a certain tonnes of bycatch of a species that is otherwise highly restricted.

When Participation is a Problem

In order to understand the long-term effects of these informal modes of fisher participation outside the sphere of the Fishery Council it is important to be aware that the Minister, FD and GINR perceive these forms of fishers’ participation as a problem hindering their effectiveness. This is especially the case for the small-scale fishers. Their e-mails to FD and the Minister are particularly challenging to the Minister and her attempt to ensure biological sustainability.

“At the post meeting in FD today I learned that FD indeed did receive many letters and requests from fishers that needed to be answered. I asked about this and can summarize as follows: FD must reply all incoming e-mails. It does not suffice simply to say thank you for your correspondence. And the e-mails tend to accumulate–also because they have to be translated. But the Minister had taken a long time in deciding on the issue of the Olympic quota, so the administration was unable to answer all the while. Now that the quota was exhausted they could expect yet another round of letters–but the old ones still need to be replied. At FD they are weary of the tone in the letters from KNAPK because they write ‘we demand that...’ which is simply not considered ‘good style’. And they receive many letters from local branches of KNAPK ‘even though they have a national organization’. I asked if the minister sensed the pressure or if it was mostly the FD staff: The minister also sensed the pressure because the e-mails were forwarded to her and because the fishers wrote her directly–also with non-official requests, just e-mails saying ‘come on, Ane’”. (Summary of informal conversation with a FD manager, September 29th 2010)
In the FD the subject-positions from which the fishers participate tend to be associated with party politics insofar as the demand for higher quota is so strongly represented by one party, the Siumut, and insofar as local KNAPK branches are said to be Siumut-supporters:

“(A FD manager) states that the local KNAPK branches are running all the show in the day to day business. They have put themselves over the national organization. And the chairman does not do anything about it. And these branches are performing party politics. There are some down here, he says referring to the party headquarters on the floor below, that call out to all over West Greenland to those who they know are Siumut-supporters–asking them to add fuel to the fire.” (Summary of informal conversation and observation at the morning post meeting in the FD, October 22nd 2010)

From a slightly different perspective, the long and personal descriptions of hardship are in themselves also construed as ‘political statements’ that the FD administrators feel they should not be asked to answer. The fishers’ means of participation thus challenges the way FD managers understand themselves as well as their ability to do ‘their real job’:

“(A FD manager) explained to me that they received whole A4 sheets of paper from the fishers filled with ‘political stuff’—how would they now be able to pay their house rent? Feed their children? The manager jokingly suggests having four Greenlandic political ‘spin doctors’ write a reply. It is not included in the task of the administration to reply to political statements from citizens—as bureaucrats they are not obliged to process pure political statements. Citizens have a right to receive for example advice on loan applications. But the guy who applies for 2000 tonnes of fish has no business with us. It is a purely political decision.” (Summary of informal conversation and observation at the morning post meeting in FD, September 27th, 2010)

Another manager regretted that traditionally, considerations of social consequences resulting from the FD’s administration were not part of the FD’s mandate. Thus the dominant logic seems to be that the FD should not be burdened with considerations of the social impacts of political decisions. The wider context of Greenlandic politics may be key to understanding some of the unease occasioned by personal requests and networks of informal influence. The Siumut party had been in power for 30 years until the 2009 landslide election that shifted power to the IA party led by Kupik Kleist, who, the day before the election, had promised to form a coalition government bypassing Siumut. Corruption, nepotism and private abuse of public assets were attributed to the outgoing party (eg. Cortzen 2010).

In this time of transition the new Premier Kupik Kleist became a symbol of change and a break with former bad governance practices. Time and again in the course of research we were told that we had arrived in the midst of a ‘transition period.’ With the shift in power to IA, a new Fisheries Minister was appointed who vowed to comply with the scientific advice. In contrast a much quoted quip has it that: ‘before you could just call the Premier on the phone if you needed more quotas.’ As an example the national newspaper Sermitsiaq also quoted the former Premier Hans Enoksen as saying, in the context of the new Minister not being willing to raise the TAC that he ‘had never denied the fishers anything.’ A long-term GINR observer of Greenlandic fisheries governance (personal communication) presents the perspective that the former government managed the fishery resources according to a paradigm that provided fishers and industry with the power to assert high TACs through the consultative Fisheries Council, while the FD was kept to a weak and politically controlled function.

We argue that in the same manner as Kupik Kleist, the new Minister Ane Hansen had a subject-position created for her as representing a new paradigm in Greenlandic fisheries governance. In Parliament, as can be seen in the extract above, Ane Hansen argues in favour of observing scientific advice. Her argument centres on explaining that the fishers have not seen a decline in the total annual income but only earned it quicker. A key strategy has been to argue that insofar the fishers wish to sell their products on the international market they need to comply with consumers and the Marine Stewardship Council demands for biologically sustainable fisheries. Ane Hansen also refers to the ongoing work in the FD to find long-term solutions to the underlying problems.

Ane Hansen’s ‘struggle’ to adhere to the biological advice finds moral support and admiration among many supporters of biological sustainability within the GINR, GFLK and FD. Public debates reveal a similar support; for example, this comment on an article on the national newspaper’s website: “Ane Hansen has secured the fishery for the future. With her courage and iron will she has made sure that the sea will not run dry of fish—at least for now” (Sermitsiaq.gl 09/02-11). The collective representation of ‘Ane Hansen’ as a symbol of a new paradigm seems resilient. In fact, the Minister had to compromise on the issue of extra quota in the autumn 2010, when she granted several conditional raises. Nevertheless her ‘face’ as promoter of biological sustainability was maintained. In the GINR and FD Ane Hansen is in everyday speech described in terms of ‘meeting resistance’ and ‘having to resist.’ The fishers, on the other hand, are described as the ones who exert pressure by telephoning and e-mailing, practices that in themselves are positively appreciated and recognised in both the GINR and
FD, and the informal and frequent interaction between the FD, GINR and the fishers may indeed be a highly valued feature of the Greenlandic fisheries governance system in most contexts. However, in the specific TAC context telephoning is interpreted as political antagonism. It then relates to ‘untimely politics’ and to Siumut politicians, about whom it is said that they used to respond to such practices and who are themselves ‘making phone calls’ to the Siumut-supporting coastal fishers in the villages in order to mobilise them against the government. Parliament party politics, the construction of fishers’ concerns as ‘political’ and the wider change in the political scenery are thus central to understanding the governance challenges as they are experienced by the supporters of the new paradigm represented by Ane Hansen. In this picture, the fishers’ participation is perceived most of all as a serious challenge to implementing a biologically sustainable TAC policy.

The second round of the TAC decision-making is another occasion (Enderud 2003) where acts of representations create certain subject-positions that in turn form certain alliances that seek to direct the TAC allocations. We argue in the public arena of the media and Self-rule government and in the daily interactions at the FD and GINR, two alliances-by-representation have emerged: The coastal-fisher/Siumut alliance and the Ane Hansen/New Paradigm Alliance. The first consists of Siumut as the opposition and coastal fishers as represented by Siumut and as autonomous agents performing informal acts of influence in unison. The latter consists of Ane Hansen as both a symbol of change and as a Minister, the new government, and the dominant lines of reasoning within the FD, GINR staff, Greenlandic media and at least some segments of the public. These subject-positions are arbitrary symbolic constructions that nevertheless define the lines along which real persons perceive their own roles and interests.

Coastal TAC Decisions as a Result of a Battle of Informal Alliances

As pressure from Siumut and the coastal fishers could no longer be ignored, there were rumours in Nuuk that there had been threats to overthrow the Minister. At the same time various meetings of stakeholders were held within the centralised governance system in Nuuk. At GINR scientists presented, once again, the scientific advice to Parliament represented by the Fisheries Committee. In Parliament, the role of ‘science’ had risen high on the political agenda and there seemed to be a general belief among the promoters of more user inclusion that if only more studies were made, the GINR would realise the real state of the stocks. The interaction at the meeting was characterised by a debate as to how many fish there really were and if the GINR had actually considered the facts as presented by the fishers. The GINR’s response was to state that they had considered this information but were only able to use it to confirm their own estimation of the overall state of the stocks. During the 2010 discussion, however, the GINR department of fish and shrimp had experienced unanticipated pressure from both KNAPK and members of Parliament to include more user knowledge. New projects that would pursue user hypotheses were suggested. But it had also made the GINR engage in its own ‘politics’ of visibility wherein it tried to make its existing cooperation with users more visible. By representing the fishers’ points of view, KNAPK and politicians in the government as well as the opposition paved the road for further inclusion of user knowledge in the science that forms the basis for the TAC advice. Quite apart from future studies, there were some immediate problems to be solved. As the situation became increasingly critical to both fishers and to the minister, the Fishery Council was assembled by the FD to advise the government on whether or not to raise the coastal TAC. At first the KNAPK director stated that the most important thing was to secure biological sustainability. But the KNAPK chairman and the chairman of the workers union SIK representing the processing workers protested and had their protests considered. The FD formulated a final draft that was validated by the members and forwarded to Parliament. It recommended a raise on the condition that further monitoring of the catches would be conducted. The coastal TAC was repeatedly raised that year too.

If we consider the TAC decision-making a game between alliances of subject-positions, we can argue that the Ane Hansen/New Paradigm Alliance had its interests met at the first round of the TAC allocations, where biological advice set the agenda. At that time the fishers were represented solely through the formal institution of the Fisheries Council and the KNAPK national headquarter’s representation. At that time, decisions to observe biological advice could also be made ‘free of charge’ as the severity of any restrictions had not yet been manifested. In what we call the second round, however, the effect of restrictions became obvious. The coastal fishers and Siumut entered into their powerful alliance: Siumut chose to represent the fishers as a group in urgent need of a raise in the TAC while at the same time the coastal fishers cooperated around this representation and added multiple strategies of informal participation in attempts to influence those persons at the GINR and FD who they considered responsible for the strict guarding of the TAC. The Ane Hansen/New paradigm was unable to control the representation of selves and others. It had to react to the political pressure of an alternative representation of the fishers as a group in need and a group that knew about the state of stocks. And it had to react to a representation of the new government as unconcerned with the social impacts of their TAC policy. The latter alliance won some ground in a twofold way: The TAC was raised and once again, the
GINR was put under pressure to find additional ways to integrate user knowledge into the stock assessments.

**Discussion: Greenlandic Fisheries Co-Politics and the Limits of Formal Avenues of Participation**

In Greenlandic fisheries no localised co-management regime evolved, but what we have instead might be a case of *national fisheries co-politics* at the level of Greenland Self-rule. Within this set-up, as has also been argued with respect to co-management institutions (Raakjær 2009), the power games are not stabilised and no formal institutions adjudicate the issues. The symbolic power battles are ongoing.

We argue that stakeholders participation evolves as actors represent one another and that local judgments arise as to whether these forms of participation promote something good. The participation of the coastal fishers is active in the TAC decision-making. This may indeed be to the fishers’ advantage and, as is quite rare in Europe, the power of fishers is actually located in the national power of fisheries.

The socio-economic importance of the fisheries puts it high on the political agenda and the sheer number of coastal fishers and fishing families make them a relevant political constituency within the Greenlandic democracy. Our second argument is that this power has turned out to be a problem for those decision makers who wish to rely on scientific biological advice in setting TAC quotas, here identified as the Ane Hansen/New Paradigm alliance.

Thirdly, we find that any conclusion concerning the effect of this national TAC co-politics on the fish stocks will have to begin with the recognition that disintegrated and competing knowledge bases coexist within the Greenlandic fisheries system. Since 2005 the GINR has observed decreasing sizes in landed Greenland halibut in the Disko Bay district. In Ummanaq the stocks are considered stable while data for Upernavik is inadequate to allow for any advice at all. Signs of improvements in the cod stock have been observed since 2003 and the hitherto restrictive zero-advice on coastal cod is part of a strategy to rebuild the off-shore stock further. The fishers are many and we are not aware of everyone’s view. But when confrontations occur, the message put forward is that coastal cod are very abundant and that the Greenland halibut too can sustain a higher TAC.

It is tempting to argue that parallel systems of stakeholder participation exist in Greenland fisheries governance. A formal consultation set-up of the Fisheries Council is carried out while a dynamic informal set-up of multiple alternative ways of inserting influence through public displays and practices of telephoning and e-mailing is observed outside this forum. Indeed, the two routines may be considered complementary. The reason why coastal fishers have to insert their influence in public and along other informal means may very well be that they have little opportunity to have their opinions represented solely through KNAPK headquarter representation and via the standard Fishery Council hearings. In accordance with the experiences of the FD managers (personal communication), Rasmussen (2003) argues that vis-à-vis the interest organisations of the few sea-going companies, KNAPK has less opportunity to represent their constituency of a large and heterogeneous group. This argument seems plausible in the light of the fact that the fishers’ organisations have faced the exact same problem elsewhere, for example in Denmark (Nielsen 1994).

Greenlandic fisheries governance decision-making might teach us something about the limits of formal avenues of participation. Formal participatory institutions are perhaps best described not as inclusive but as inherently exclusive. Therefore, when the participatory consultation institution is seized by certain powerful representations but the battle is staged at a level where fisheries matter to everyone—as seems to be the case at the level of the imagined community of ‘Greenland’—we may have a de-facto case of national fisheries co-politics. And these politics must be understood in their widest sense as something that pertains not only to parliament and party politics, but just as importantly to everyday battles over the meaning and truth of fish, managers and fishers as they take place in public demonstrations, telephone calls and e-mail correspondences.

We doubt that this is unique to the Greenlandic case. Perhaps Greenland simply exemplifies the fact that formal consultative institutions can be seized by competing parties. Participatory governance studies have long focused on the correct establishment of formal institutions. Greenland reminds us of the need of a ‘return of the political’ in our analytical approach. Greenland’s national fisheries co-politics is a splendid example of how consensus is a strong ideal in a given social context and how it is then achieved through a consultative institution. But the consensus is nevertheless overturned by actual conflicting viewpoints that have to find their way around the very formal consultative forum that created that consensus in the first place. But the good news is that Greenlandic democracy is not moribund. .

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**References**


Small-scale fisheries in Greenlandic planning – the becoming of a governance problem

Rikke Becker Jacobsen

Abstract
This article analyses an ongoing planning process in Greenlandic fisheries governance aiming to reform the coastal Greenland halibut fishery. It examines the way certain truths about this fishery and the need for reform are produced up to and in the final policy document ‘regulation concerning the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut’. Findings highlight the way the small-scale Greenland halibut fishery system becomes a particular governance problem with respect to particular contextual meanings of sustainability and long-term planning. The article then examines whether this governance problem could also be understood as primarily a problem to a certain ‘governmentality’ mode of governance. Whereas some fishery studies document how governmentality modes of governance in fisheries succeeds in transforming subjectivities, this study offers a view into the process that might go before successful governmentality: The process whereby a selected fishery becomes subjected to planned out-phasing through a combined construction of fleet and human identity.

Keywords: Fisheries governance - Governmentality, Long term management plans, Small-scale fisheries - Greenland

Introduction
Governmentality analyses of the way actors and discourses manage to make ‘something you can govern by the help of identity formation’ have provided a fruitful frame for analyzing the way people govern themselves and others. As a mode of governance, governmentality has been historically connected to the nation-state, the democracy and the imagery of populations that made the well-being of this population the primary goal of governance endeavours (Foucault 1994a, 217). Governmentality refers to a type of governance that takes place through the general management of ‘men and their relations’ to a multiplicity of actors and phenomena. It is a governance mode that acts in conjunction with the ‘free’ action of self-governing subjects and multiple tactics are central to its working (Foucault 1994a, 209). Governmentality is about how you make actors govern themselves by shaping and structuring their selves and actions according to specific ideas or ideals, and hereby, the construction of truths and identities by a government regime provides a framework for analyzing techniques of governance.

This article takes the theory of governmentality as a point of departure for analyzing the 2012 reform of the coastal commercial fishery for Greenland Halibut in Greenland.
This reform grants individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to a relatively small group of vessels in the fishery and introduces a closure of new access to fishery on a shared quota performed by a relatively large group of small dinghies, dog-sledges and snowmobiles. The article applies the theory of governmentality to examine the articulated goals and rationalities of the reform and it examines how and why the future exclusion of the relatively more small-scale modes of production becomes part of a long-term planning solution in a reform that aims to improve a perceived situation of low profitability and problems of biological sustainability in the fishery. The questions the article seeks to answer are: ‘how are the truths about human and fleet identities and economies in the current fisheries constructed in the reform?’ and ‘can these constructions be understood as arising out of governmentality challenges posed by the fishery to the centralized governance regime?’ Secondly, the article builds on observations pertaining to the problem of ‘governability’ (Jentoft 2007; and Chuenpagdee 2009a, 2009b; Song and Chuenpagdee 2010) and seeks to draw a connection between the workings of governmentality, the limits of governability and the future exclusion of certain fisheries.

The article identifies three problems of governmentality that the centralized management regime seeks to address: One relates to the perceived economic behaviour of the participants in the fishery and the other to their de-facto influence on total allowable catch (TAC) policy. Thirdly, the article argues that issues of future exclusion and social justice in relation to ITQ implementation have had little influence on the decision-making as low monetary incomes and an assumed poverty problem of most participants came to define the key moral problem as a problem of necessary change.

Theory and conceptual framework: governmentality and exclusion in the context of neoliberal fisheries governance

The legacy of Foucaultian governmentality-thinking is implicit in some fisheries governance studies. There are similarities between Foucault’s observation that with modernity humans became envisaged as population to be governed and Roepstorff’s (1998) observation that modern states attempts to govern fisheries are equally connected to the perception of fish as abstract populations that have such an inherent quality as a maximum sustainable yield. Yet, the fish resource can only be controlled indirectly and so, historically, the disciplinary problem was soon transferred to the human agents in control of its harvest mortality. Thus it is widely recognized today that what you do in reality govern in fisheries governance is human behaviour. Bavington has argued that particularly the 1990’s realization of the complexities within the natural system had governors redirect their gaze towards human actors, believing they are ‘less complex and more determined by causal or statistical laws’ (Bavington 2010, 107).

It is observed that fisheries management in the western world has turned industrial fisheries into management-fisher hybrids – or ‘Cyborgs’ as Johnsen et al. (2009) coin it. They argue that the relations that make up fisheries have become increasingly formalized and mechanized as the ‘unmanageable’ were made manageable. Still, according to fishermen themselves and other analytical observers, fishermen still tend to form very diverse groups in terms of their values and actions (Christensen and Raakjær 2006). A study of fishermen’s perception of fleet categories throughout Europe showed that management categories tend to form and reorganize fisheries and fishing activities as
fishers respond to the rules-in-place when they physically (re)build and (re)equip their boats (Wilson and Jacobsen 2009). Thus, fisheries governance as a type of governance activity has for some time been moulding its object of governance (also recognized by Jentoft 2007) and in the process, one may argue, self-identification and management classification have become intertwined.

In the context of New Zealand fisheries management, Massey (2004) has analyzed discourses of ‘sustainable management’ as an expression of governmentality in the sense that they have transformed stakeholders into subjects bound to a commercial discourse. Bavington (2010) and Carothers (2010) have observed that neoliberal fisheries governance discourses envisage a new type of fisher: That of the self-managing, profit-seeking, detached and fully professionalized business entrepreneur. In line with much governmentality thinking, Bavington observed that the internalization of control through identity work was a means to increase the effectiveness of the Newfoundland fisheries governance system after the cod collapse. So he for example observes:

Managerial interventions in the cod fishery now work by involving rather than excluding fishermen, once they have been licensed . . . Management now operates on the identity of fishing people – attempting to turn them into technicians for fisheries science and (self-) managing entrepreneurs’. (Bavington 2010, 113).

By implication, a range of studies now assert, from different but compatible perspectives, that modern fisheries governance have become possible through the discursive and material construction and de-facto promotion of certain types of (self)governable subjects. The concern for profitability and the introduction of ITQs can probably be viewed as a persistent trend in many fisheries governance discourses. Since the 1980’ies market-based fisheries management systems based on ITQs have gradually replaced traditional state-based command and control regimes in developed-nations fisheries across Oceania, North America and Europe (Valle et al. 2006). The described experiences and estimated effects of ITQs have varied and so for example has the Dutch system, that combines ITQ with a co-management system, been positively evaluated by participating fishers (Symes et al. 2010), whereas evaluations are highly diverse in the Icelandic case (e.g. Pálsson and Helgason 2000). On a universal level, advocates have argued for the advantages of ITQ in terms of efficiency and conservation while critics have questioned these advantages and raised general issues of social fairness and effectiveness. (Bromley 2008; Pauly 2008; Macinko and Bromley 2004). ITQs tend to present tradeoffs between economic efficiency and other socio-economic concerns such as for example community survival; tradeoffs that have been addressed differently by different nations (de Valde et al. ibid).

While governmentality-inspired fishery governance studies point to examples where neoliberal governance regimes have been successful in moulding the subjects to be governed, other fisheries governance studies have been concerned with the problem of ‘governability’ and over-ambitious governance ambitions (Jentoft 2007; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009a, 2009b; Song and Chuenpagdee 2010). These touch upon the problem of actual limits of governability and have invested considerable effort into understanding and asserting different degrees of governability pertaining to a given fisheries system. Essentially they promote recognition of the fact that fisheries management cannot, and therefore should not, aim to
control every feature of inherently uncontrollable systems. Drawing on ‘interactive governance theory’ (Koimann 2005), these works exhibit a certain plea for a more gentle approach that accepts the limits of governability (see for example Jentoft 2007, 361) and a normative literature has thus emerged that argues that not only can we not manage to perfection – our attempts at doing so may even be harmful.

Based on the Greenlandic case, this article is theoretically concerned with the way human and fleet identities are constructed in and for a planning process with a particular emphasis on how these identities are constructed around governance problems articulated in the planning process itself. Theoretically, the analysis unfolds around a central aspect of governmentality observed by Foucault: That governance in its most economic form takes place as a ‘conduct of conduct’ whereby subjects-to-be-governed are cultivated that will, in all freedom and voluntariness, act in accordance with the way the governors, if their rationalities ever had a face, would like them to act. A relationship of power is an ‘action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future’ (Foucault 1982, 214) and ‘the exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’ (Foucault 1982, 214). The ‘subject’ is not an essentialist category in this view where the very way people see themselves and choose to act become a central space of interference for a governance regime. This article investigates how the subjectivities in the coastal fishery for Greenland Halibut in Greenland are first interpreted, and thus constructed, by the centralized governance regime and asks if the fishery can be said to pose a challenge to the ‘soft’ type of governmentality governance, whereby subjectivities that act in accordance with the new government regime are successfully created. The conclusion is affirmative and the article thus primarily offers the perspective of describing a process of out-phasing aimed at that which ‘governmentality realizes it cannot govern’; the subjectivity of which is not to be changed and the conduct of which is not to be conducted.

Method
This article is part of a Ph.D. study of Greenlandic fishery governance institutions based on fieldwork and qualitative methods. A total of sixteen months of fieldwork was conducted in Nuuk from 2010 to 2012. Three months with half a week of participatory observation of the everyday work of the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture under Greenland Self-rule was arranged and informal contact was since sustained and data collected through informal conversations. For the remaining time the author has worked every day from the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources (GINR) which has provided rich access into observing formal and informal interactions between the managers, scientist, fishers and fisher representatives that make up the centralized part of the everyday fisheries governance system of Greenland. This system can be characterized as a closely knit field with regular and often informal contact between scientists, minister, fishery ministry and stakeholder organisations. Field notes with observations of meetings, summaries of informal conversations as well as public letters and speeches are used as data. The ‘new regulation’ and its drafts and background papers together with observations of the working group that formulated these, are particular central to this article. From this data ‘identity construction’ is identified by systematically comparing passages where the fishery is debated and described, noticing regularities as well as...
inconsistencies. The ‘problem’ of this coastal Greenland halibut fishery was very prevalent in the governance field and came to my interest as a result of an open approach as to what could eventually constitute data, method and theory (Wadel 1991) where this particular research problem started as an investigation of a problem ‘taken for granted’ in the Ministry.

The coastal commercial fishery for Greenland Halibut and current management

The commercialization and modernization of fisheries constitute the history of Greenland’s industrialization and today, Greenland halibut is the second most important sea-food export article in Greenland. The coastal part of this commercial fishery takes place at the deep fiords of the west coast of Greenland in the three management districts of Upernavik, Ummannaq and Illulissat where long lines are set from cutters and dinghies in the open water seasons and from dog sledges and snow mobiles on the ice in the wintertime. A general intensification of the fishery occurred since the 1980s and today the fishery is seemingly characterized by a relatively large number of participants with heterogeneous types of socio-economic behaviour. The coastal fishery for Greenland halibut is generally poorly understood besides what can be deduced from catch, trade and income statistics, but one indication of the diversity is visible from the 2009 sale statistics showing that a small percentage of the fishery’s participants catch and sell most of the total catch while a very large group catch and sell very little (see also Table 1 in section seven). A study conducted in 2011 of the social impacts of the new regulation indicates that within the Upernavik district alone, several different types of ‘socio-economic’ systems are at play (Delaney et al. 2012). These range from systems where Greenland halibut is the sole production activity of companies or individuals to where Greenland halibut is only caught and sold when the fisher/hunter is in need of cash to buy consumption goods or to finance hunting activities. The small size of sales of Greenland halibut in some villages may thus be counterweighed by their importance in underpinning a mixed economy based on hunting and self-sufficiency in regions with few alternative employment possibilities.

The commercial coastal fisheries were first restricted by TACs in 2007. Three separate TACs are now provided for the three different management districts based on biological advice that presupposes that Greenland halibut seldom return to the off-shore banks to reproduce once they have entered the deep fiords (Roepstorff 1998). When presenting its scientific advice, GINR therefore often represent the inshore fiords as ‘banks’ in which fish left in the fiords are fish left to grow, but never to spawn (personal observation). The TACs are, up to the new regulation, fished on a common quota and access to the fishery is obtained by means of license to this Olympic fishery. In 2009 the licensed fleet consisted of 151 vessels above eight meters and about 1100 small entities, which is a term that covers boats under eight meters/dinghies, snow mobiles and dog sledges. Licenses are granted to companies or individuals, but the actual number of participants is expected to be somewhat higher than the number of licenses granted as the Ministry and the Greenlandic Fisheries Licence Control (GLFK) are aware of instances where several persons or family members fish on the same license, probably a result of an introduced license fee (202 Euros) per fished specie in 2010. The small-scale fishery conducted by numerous actors from settlements scattered across great distances in the vast management districts is notoriously difficult to monitor and control.
for the management system (personal observation of meetings with GFLK managers). Thirteen control officers together cover the inshore fishery of Greenland of which four are responsible for the areas coinciding with the Greenland halibut management districts. Dinghies are not registered, making physical monitoring difficult, and it can be difficult to get a precise picture of the fishery system from the centralized ‘gaze’ of the administration.

The new regulation

‘Isn’t the most general of political problems the problem of truth?’ Foucault once asked from the position of an observer of governance (1994b, 233). I would argue that to those responsible of managing the coastal Greenland halibut fishery, the truth was indeed a problem. Not as in a question as to ‘what is the truth?’ about a complex socio-economic system, but as a real, severe and true problem with the Greenland halibut fishery and what to do about it. When I started observing and participating in the everyday work of the Fisheries Department (FD) at the Ministry, the truth was already there as a premise for the need to act as the FD had been given the task by the Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture to investigate how best to implement an ITQ system into the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut. During its investigations FD followed the common practice of consulting the fishers’ organisations (KNAPK, GA), the larger fishing companies (Polar Seafood and Royal Greenland A/S) and the municipalities’ organisation (Kalaallit Nunaanni Kommunit Kattuffiannit (KANUKOKA)). Yet the very decision on introducing ITQs was in practice irrevocable as it formed the very mandate for the work to be done. The vision of the new regulation was to address, in the words of FD, the dual goal of simultaneously securing biological sustainability and a sound economic development in the fishery by reducing the numbers of fishers to a number where the participating fishers ‘could make a living of it’. These goals are visible in two of the three official goals of the final proposal for the new regulation:

The objectives of the final new regulation for the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut are:

- A structural adaptation of the fishery that will in the long term guarantee the participants an economically viable fishery.
- To show consideration of small and large vessels in the fishery so that these do not compete directly with each other.
- That the number of entities is reduced and that the stress on the biological advice is reduced.

(Medlem af Naalakkersuisut for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug 2011).

A Greenland halibut management plan working group (WG) within the Ministry was established with the mandate to explore the possibilities in terms of transferability and principles for distributing the ITQ’s. Soon however, it was realized by the leadership in FD that if every participating vessel was to have an individual share of the TAC in the form of a vessel quota, that share would be so small that it would not ‘make any sense’. GFLK also observed that it would be an administrative nightmare to keep track of individual quotas for those participants who fish only a few tonnes a year. The leader group within FD therefore soon convinced
the Minister not to distribute individual vessel quota to the very smallest entities – the dinghies and dog sledges. These should instead continue to fish on a common Olympic quota. The TACs of the three management districts would therefore in the future be divided between ITQ holders and those with a license to fish on a common quota – each group receiving a fixed percentage of the TAC. Where exactly to draw the line between large and small entities was difficult to decide upon for the managers. They knew this was a fundamental political decision, but charged with the mandate of making the necessary recommendations they sought solution on technical grounds looking at what was administratively possible (personal communication with WG members and observations of WG meetings). The limit was eventually drawn at six meters.

In practice, the new regulation which emerged implies that the relatively 'larger entities' in the coastal fisheries are invited into a game of consolidation where they are to compete and buy each other up within a set limit of maximum ownership of 5% of the entire TAC. The dinghies, sledges and snow mobiles will continue to fish on an Olympic quota. Meanwhile, the problem of how to reduce the small scale fishers was not really solved by this solution since the reduction of the majority was no longer to happen automatically through an ITQ consolidation process. This became a main concern for the working group behind the new regulation which, having to respond to the political wish for general reduction, eventually suggested that the very small entities were to be gradually reduced by not allowing for new access to the fishery. In the final regulation a general closure of access to this type of fishery was therefore introduced for an unknown time period until the number of participants is reduced (Medlem af Naalakkersuisut for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug 2011).

The new regulation will start a structural reform that can in the long run – if implementation allows - lead to, on the one hand, a consolidation within the group of boats over six meters and a gradual reduction of the type of fishery that relies on small catches caught from dinghies, dog-sledge and snow-mobiles. It is a new regulation that prioritizes a future fishery of a few larger and more efficient boats with access to a large amount of quota and presumably high profitability over a large group of smaller boats, dinghies, dog-sledges and snowmobiles producing on a relatively smaller scale. With regard to the ITQ segment the Minister also states elsewhere that 'no new company is to be granted a quota unless the quota is large enough to guarantee a whole year of sustainable fishing' (Sermitsiaq 10.06.2011).

Somewhere along the way, a situation therefore must have emerged where the larger-scale mode of production achieved something close to a monopoly on the biological and economic sustainability leaving the smaller-scale fishery as the antithesis. How did this situation emerge? It is paradoxical that this majority of low-producing fishers come to represent a problem in terms of economic and biological sustainability if they are capable of supporting themselves based on a mixed economy and if their catches, put together, are not even close to exhausting the overall TAC. Nevertheless there are reasons for this problem to emerge in the way it did and the following sections analyses the process whereby this fishery became a governance problem as one that emerged out of three types of governmentality challenges which, from each of their direction, made it possible to think the small-scale fishery as problematic: an economic, a political and a moral one.
The political ungovernability of the coastal halibut fishers

The coastal fishery presents a governance challenge to the current Minister of Hunting, Fishing and Agriculture, Ms Ane Hansen, in a number of ways. The above mentioned control challenges are good examples of the limits of a fishery systems’ governability, but these were actually not the ones articulated during the decision-making process. A certain conflict in the TAC policy making, on the other hand, appeared as an underlying concern as implicitly reflected in the proposal referred to above. In line with what I have argued elsewhere the Fisheries Minister has since her appointment to the post become a symbol of a new fisheries governance paradigm that emphasizes biological sustainability higher than the former Siumut regime (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). But together with the workers in the processing industry and the Siumut party in opposition today, coastal fishers repeatedly manage to pressure the Minister to raise the coastal TACs beyond biological advice. Through formal as well as informal channels, they are able to exert a pressure that is hard to resist due to the very real social and economic consequences presented by closing down the only income opportunity for many people in the northern villages and towns. Elsewhere, I have characterized this decision-making process as ‘fisheries co-politics’ (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012).

It has been argued that governance systems often face ‘limits of governability’ of the natural and social systems (Jentoft 2007). In the Greenland halibut case, however, it is not just that the social and natural system is ‘ungovernable’ in itself. It is also the political actions of the fishers within the governing system that is ungovernable. In a fisheries co-political system, the coastal fishers simply have too much ‘unwanted’ influence on the TAC decision-making vis-a-vis the current government aiming to govern according to a new governance paradigm, in a fisheries co-political system (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). In this analysis, the governmentality problem for the new paradigm in Greenlandic fisheries governance can also be analyzed as a problem of how to govern de facto co-governors. What we may really see in the new regulation is a process whereby one group – the government and its sustainability concerned constituency – is replacing one group of co-governors for another: a few economically and biologically sustainable fishing companies for many politically powerful fishers. The governmentality concept of ‘a conduct of conduct’ may thus prove relevant in a Greenlandic fisheries governance context in the sense that subjects, at once powerful co-governors and objects of governance, that do not voluntarily exhibit the desired conduct are to have their political power reduced by actual exclusion from the fisheries. Just as much as governmentality manifests itself in acts of inclusion and cultivation, as has before been documented by other studies, so there also seems to be a ‘limit to governmentality’ that manifests itself in act of exclusion and eradication. And it seems to be because the TAC policy-making is characterized by confrontation between two adversary parties: a situation that does exactly not characterize the more consensual type of governance that goes by unnoticed and which can perhaps be said to characterize truly successful ‘governmentality’. It is in this context, future exclusion becomes part of a long term planning solution. Thus, in response to fishermen’s protest in October 2010 the Minister wrote a public letter to the newspaper Sermitsiaq in which she argued that the new regulation was part of an overall promise and need to find long term solutions:
The government promised changes when we took over from the last elections. Notably changes that were based on careful evaluations and thorough analyses. Political zig-zag course and ad-hoc solutions that have not been thought through have throughout the years prevented long-term solutions in a range of areas with high costs for the Greenlandic society. It will stop now, we promised the voters and we stand by this. This naturally implies that all necessary changes must enter into an overall plan that does not only consider the wishes of some groups but the development of the entire society... many initiatives have been taken following the necessary investigations. Actions that points forward. We can take the work we have put into long-term management plans as example. The important work was only started when we arrived. Now we are ready with a management plan for shrimp and management plans for Greenland halibut and cod are underway (Sermitsiaq 15.10.2010b).

The new governance paradigm in Greenland seems to understand itself in opposition to past paradigms. Long term management plans – as the 'new regulation' was originally perceived - are new in the Greenlandic context and may be perceived as a confrontation with the perceived ad-hoc solutions of earlier times. This attitude towards necessary and long-term solutions in fisheries are in line with the general discourse in Greenland planning and governance circles, where you repeatedly hear such sentences as ‘status quo is not an option’ and that ‘ad hoc solutions will no more suffice’. These statements are put forward in relation to many of the debates on top of Greenlandic political agendas such as welfare (Skatte – og Velfærdskommissionen 2011, 17; Nathanielsen et al. 2010), regional development (the Regional Development Strategy) and fisheries (Premier’s opening speech, 2010, 9). Judging from the assumed appeal of this rhetoric, the greatest crime, it seems, will be not to do something.

The main newspaper in Nuuk, Sermitsiaq, covered the development of the new regulation with interest (Sermitsiaq 10.06.2011) and provided discursive backing for the Minister’s attempts at reforming the fisheries in line with the recommendations of the Fishery Commission, which I will return to below. In a critical editorial that deems the new government to have delivered little of the changes it promised, Ane Hansen is put forward the only one who has actually delivered by steering a hard-liner course towards reform and necessary change:

Ane Hansen has finally started to wear the trousers, shows who is in charge and she is about to get the fishery in order. But that she should have done two years ago when she had a fresh commission report and could have gone through with something which today could have been felt in Greenland’s most important industry and which could have provided the promised feeling of change (Sermitsiaq 17.06.2011).

Fisheries managers tend to see the decision to reduce the small-scale fishery as an unpopular, problematic but indeed necessary next move. Not only is it necessary from a biological sustainability perspective, from a social perspective it also becomes a moral problem not to do something. The fishers were seen as caught in an inefficient fishery with a poor livelihood on public subsidies as a logical consequence. The working group managers understand their own and the Minister’s role as that of being the unpopular guys that break down taboos as they push for an unpopular but necessary development
while ‘nobody dares to do anything’ (personal observation of working group meeting). The WG managers were not alone charged with the key political decisions and so their perspective cannot explain entirely why the new regulation materialized as it did. But their understanding of the implementing mandate is telling of a dominant discourse in the context of the management of the fishery.

While the coastal fishery represents a challenge in terms of power and governance that becomes a problem of how to overcome general ‘overcapacity’ and the persistence of ‘taboos,’ it’s problematism is also couched in economic terms. The small-scale fishery is said to be unprofitable and increased profitability is the second goal of the new regulation. But how has this truth come to be?

**Economic governability – a standard set by the large scale fisheries**

The problem of profitability is central to many fishery discourses as described above. In the Greenlandic coastal fisheries this problem was also a dominant truth long before the new regulation perceived of it as the cause of a conservation problem. The problem of profitability and economic sustainability in the inshore fishery had been discussed in connection with an ongoing revision of the Greenlandic fisheries law (Fiskerikommissionen 2009; Regional Udviklingsstrategi 2011). ‘Big is better’ could be a slogan that covers the conclusions of the Fishery Commission which claims that resource rents paid by a very efficient fishing entity is the best way for a fishery to contribute to the national economy and hence, Greenlandic society. It is a discourse that weaves taxable income, Greenlandic future, international competition, efficiency and large scale modes of production together. Where the underlying numbers and calculations come from is difficult to assess, but as a closed argument the document stands strong and consistent as it at once performs and refers back to a coherent discourse.

Irrespective of its very foundation, the Fishery Commission’s report of 2009 stands as a recent example of how the self-rule has chosen to look for answers in the big-scale production and capitalisation in its quest to develop Greenlandic fisheries. It is the most cited document in the work leading to the new regulation and in the work with the fisheries law reform that takes place in parallel to it. One of the central mandates of the commission was exactly to investigate the potential of the advantages of large-scale operations and the commission was able to conclude that there would be considerable advantages of large scale operations. In the Greenland halibut fisheries the advantages would befall to line-vessels with catch capacities between 800 to 5,000 tonnes per year on the condition that the current obligation to sell the fish to processors on land must be abolished (Fiskerikommissionen 2009). The commission also concluded that ‘at least in the shrimp fishery as well as the Greenland halibut fishery, it is necessary with large vessel quota if the profitability shall be as good as possible’ (Fiskerikommissionen 2009, 108-109).

The background paper for the new regulation shows that only one percent (equal to eighteen persons) of the participants in the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut sells more than hundred tonnes while forty-five percent of the fishers sell between five and thirty tonnes. Thus, serious concentration has to happen before the aforementioned considerable advantages of large scale production is reached according to the big-is-better discourse itself that estimated 800 tonnes to be the lower limit. Nevertheless, large scale production and consolidation is exactly what the new regulation for Greenland halibut is
aiming at as it seeks to implement a reform through a process of concentration and increased profitability ensured by an ITQ regime. The Greenlandic sea-going shrimp fishery often serves as the implicit model for the necessary development in Greenlandic fisheries. In this sea-going shrimp fishery an ITQ system has been implemented with great consolidation effects reducing some fifty actors to only five today (FD manager, personal communication). Studies made back in 2003 (Rasmussen 2003) stated that the dominant discussions of the Greenlandic fisheries rests on the assumption that the sea-going shrimp fishery is the most important factor in the development of Greenlandic society. Export statistics confirm this assumption, but the assumption is, according to Rasmussen, flawed in the sense that it conflicts with the material and economic reality that local fleets, other fisheries and the subsistence economy are of great importance locally as well as nationally.

I have found, however, that the discourse on the relative contribution of different fisheries is riddled with contradictions. So for example, FD managers will acknowledge the importance of coastal fisheries while they in practice advocate their restructuring into something else. They will also claim that the Minister does not wish to out-phase the small-scale fisheries (FD managers, personal communication) and the Minister publicly states that she wish to emphasise that the reform ‘is not an end to the fishery for Greenland halibut as we know it today. There will in the future be room for some of the existing actors’ (Sermitsiaq 10.06.2011). On the other hand, I have on several occasions heard the leadership in FD say that ‘one wishes to put an end to the small scale commercial fishery’ – though it has never been completely clear to me who this ‘one’ is or are. In one and the same Parliament opening speech the Greenlandic Premier Mr. Kupik Kleist will also, on the one hand, recognize the importance of the present coastal fishery while shortly after, he will advocate its modernization by which it will, arguably, be turned into something else:

The population in villages and the outer districts are the ones that benefits most from the living resources based on fishing and hunting. They are to a considerable degree also contributing to the economic development of the country and we have great hopes for them. We from IA (political party) are content with the fact that the government is working diligently towards the realization of the new fisheries law (...). We in IA will work towards an economically sustainable fishing and hunting profession. The present structures within the fishing and hunting professions are unsustainable and therefore the need for reforms have been discussed for a long time (...). We need to adapt the profession and make it more competitive. We should be prepared to make certain tightenings and this should not be done through temporary ad hoc solutions. The fishing and hunting professions must be arranged to that they will also in the future secure a better outcome for the actors – through a sustainable solution (Kleist 2010, 8–9).

The decision-makers preference for ITQ should probably also be understood in the context of the general popularity of ITQs in fisheries governance discourse. Iceland is together with Norway the country Greenlandic politicians and managers look to for inspiration due to similarities in ecosystem and infrastructure challenges (personal observation). Indeed, a broad range of actors in Greenland seems to share a general belief in the promises of ITQ. The consultation answers of the companies that represent the
sea-going and large-scale actors (Polar Seafood Ltd., Royal Greenland Ltd. and the Organization of Greenlandic Employers, GA) fully support the insertion of ITQ into the coastal halibut fishery. In their consultation answer to the new regulation they supported the new regulation with a steadfast belief in the universal superiority of the ITQ system that they based on what they perceived as an unambiguous historical truism. So GA claimed: ‘History has shown that the (ITQ) model is best suited for creating the dynamic that leads to a structural reform that guaranties an economically sustainable fishery at fewest public expenses’ (GA consultation answer 2011). Indeed, GA announced in an interview that it is only one step in the right direction and that its members would have preferred even further liberalization (Sermitsiaq 10.07.2011). KNAPK, the organization representing most coastal fishers supported the reform and the ITQ model at the beginning. The chairman did however emphasize that KNAPK wanted the quotas to remain on as many Greenlandic hands as possible in contrast to the large concentration seen in the Greenlandic shrimp industry (Sermitsiaq 24.06.2011). KNAPK’s only concern and the reason why it did not support ITQ eventually was that they did not think that the Ministry’s administration would be able to administer it effectively (KNAPK, personal communication) and the KNAPK chairman publicly supports the modernization of the coastal fishery that implies both more efficient and fewer vessels (Sermitsiaq 15.10.2010). As a manager in the FD observes, the Minister is neither the first nor the only one to promote the professionalization of the coastal fisheries, but she is at pains stating this view in public – something that may also explain the contradiction in the big-is-better discourses described above:

(A manager) explained to me that the Minister has announced that twenty percent of the fishers shall exit the fishery. Recently she has then added that this is to happen over a period of five to six years. It is however a little silly to blame her for this idea. The chairman of KNAPK has announced the same himself: We need a professionalization with less and better educated people. This is the official policy by KNAPK. A considerable amount of their members also agree – and (the manager) said he assumes nobody is in favour of that low an income. The problem is if the Ministry cannot announce that there is a need for education and a food foundation for those who continue in the fishery. The politicians in Northern Greenland feel uncomfortable with the restrictions the Ministry introduce to the fisheries – otherwise they will be unpopular with their constituency (personal communication with FD manager).

In the Danish ITQ case Hegland and Raakjær (2008) argued that the ITQ model had been waiting for some time before the timing was right and a window of opportunity showed itself as two strong politician-actors promoted it. In the Greenlandic case one may argue in a similar vein that the new regulation as a decision-making occasion has provided nothing but yet another window of opportunity for the ITQ model to smoothly insert itself into yet another fishery. In Greenland, the ITQ model does not meet much resistance. Rather, there seems to be a dominant perception among government, fishery managers and formal stakeholder representatives that the ITQ-governed fishery provides Greenland with a historical national example of successful governance.

But there are counter discourses present that directly questions the ‘big is better rationality’ (Sermitsiaq 30–03.2011) and the advantages of a reduction of the number
of fishers. After the Minister’s announcement that twenty percent of the fishers were to leave the fishery, the fishers demonstrated in front of Parliament where they demanded the Ministers exit and stated “Ane, we are not numbers” (personal observation; Sermitsiaq 12.10.2010). Ten days later, a local fishers’ representative from Ilulissat, Anthon Lindenhann, gave an interview to the national newspaper where he called for a port blockade in protest to the fact that the demonstration of the fishers had had no effect. He articulated a point of view that stands in opposition to the dominant discourse:

We are one of several fishing families in Ilulissat, who have handed over the family fishing business from the older to the younger generation and the new generation of fishers are ready. But there is great frustration as we feel that the fishery profession is to be out-phased. Everybody talks a lot about the oil and the job opportunities it will provide. But we are fishers and we would rather see our profession developed than out-phased. We have so many living resources that our politicians are unable to govern these riches. It is not only Greenland halibut we are thinking of. There are many different species which we do not use sufficiently. For example, we throw out the liver instead of producing it like other items. (Sermitsiaq 22.10.2010a).

I will argue that a certain trust in the claimed advantages of ITQ and large-scale production functions as a frame through which it becomes possible to view the small-scale fishery as inherently economically imperfect in the first place. As the new regulation explicitly states, the (first) goal of the new regulation is a structural reform of the fishery that will in the long run guarantee a number of participants in the fishery, which is economically profitable. By implication, the current fishers are not conducting the desired economic behaviour. Whereas the political governmentality problem evolved around the new governance paradigm being unable to control its co-governors in TAC policy making, the economic governmentality problem is a problem of how to out-phase that which stands in the way for the necessary development and those who represent it. It is however, as if the dominant ideas of ‘appropriate economic conduct’ were beforehand shaped by the big-is-better rationality while competing perspectives, though marginally raised, have not entered the core documents of current fishery policy making of today such as the fishery commission report or the new regulation of the Greenland halibut fisheries.

The planning governability of the poor

From the perspective of power, a central question when it comes to the advantages of increased profitability and ITQ may be the question of advantage to whom? It is difficult to see how those to be excluded from the fishery will reap equal benefits from the new regulation. ITQ’s have often been critiqued for the impacts it leaves on abandoned fishing communities and excluded fishers. In the context of the new regulation however, the truth of the small-scale fishery is constructed in a way so it poses the question of social fairness somewhat differently. It is important to understand this dimension of the new regulation though it is not stated explicitly anywhere, because it smoothens the very reform process through the dual construction of poverty and necessary moral action. It starts with a very dominant assumption about the small-scale fishery that is
often articulated in informal conversations and public debates. It is, however, rarely supported by actual systematic documentation. The assumption is that the small-scale coastal fisheries in their current state do not make economic sense: They are politically powerful, and culturally and socially important, but they are not profitable and people ‘cannot make a living out of it’. They are heavily subsidised and many of the coastal fishers get by only by help of welfare or they have a hard time getting by at all. It’s a discourse that you find among managers in FD, at dinner tables in Nuuk, in political statements and public debates (Sermitsiaq 15.10.2010b). In the new regulation the income of the Fishers in the Greenland halibut fishery is one of the main arguments for the need for reform. Table 1 below presents one of the two tables that played a central role in supporting the implicit assumption that the fishery is not profitable enough as it is.

Whereas the background paper for the new regulation left the table to speak for itself, the Minister made the implicit explicit in a public letter:

Let me mention the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut as an example of the need for change: In this profession 150 vessels above eight meters and 1100 small entities in the form of dinghies, dog sledges and snow mobiles are dependent on the fishery. Sum-ups from 2009 concerning 1,268 fishers and hunters show that only 12% of these sold for over [26,851 Euros] and that a whole 63% sold for less than [10,069 Euros]. Anyone can see that these are conditions that make it impossible to sustain an economically sensible livelihood without public subsidies – not to mention being able to afford material renewals and purchases within this fishery (Sermitsiaq 15.10.2010b).

The table reappeared in another major planning project, the Regional Development Strategy, where it was used to conclude that ‘barely 2/3 of those who sold Greenland halibut in 2009 sold for less than [10,069 Euros]. From this amount expenses to vessels, fuel, equipment et cetera must be deducted. On the other hand only 12 per cent had an income above [26,851 Euros] from the sale of Greenland Halibut’ (Regional development Strategy, p 44). Another figure in the background paper served to show that the gross income of fishers in the northern municipality Qaasuitsup Kommunia – where most Greenland halibut fishers live - were 2,014 Euros lower than the average income of other citizens the Municipality and 7,250 Euro lower than the average male citizen in Greenland. The background paper notes that the value of country food for private

Table 1 Value from sale of Greenland halibut in 2009 (Source: ministry of fisheries, hunting and agriculture)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value of sale (EUR)</th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
<th>Percentage of license-owners</th>
<th>Average value of sale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1,343</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,343 – 4,028</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,028 – 10,069</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,069 – 26,851</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26,851 – 40,276</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32,424</td>
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<td>40,276 – 67,127</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52,440</td>
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<tr>
<td>67,127-134,253</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>95,383</td>
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<tr>
<td>More than 134,253</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>174,992</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>1,268</td>
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consumption, to which the fishers have more ready access, may in practice minimize the actual income gap. Still, the paper eventually concluded that ‘generally, it can be concluded that the income if fishers in the coastal fishery for Greenland halibut is relatively low compared to the remaining part of the population’ (Medlem af Naalakkersuisut 2011). With the implicit assumption of poverty in the Greenland halibut fisheries as a backdrop, the new regulation seems to consider the negative social and economic impacts of ITQ as the lesser of two evils. The background paper for the new regulation states as one of the negative consequences of an ITQ system that ‘those fishers who sell their quota will no longer be certain that they can have a job as fishers. This can potentially lead to greater unemployment among the fishers which can have considerable social and financial costs for the families of the fishers’. How can the new regulation, being aware of the high probability of these consequences in regions with few other employment opportunities than fisheries, eventually defend this? Whenever the discussion lands here, ‘new growth-industries’ are put forward as absorbers of the released fisheries labour. It is stated in the Fishery Commission’s report and it was stated by the Minister when she for the first time publicly announced that twenty percent of the fishers were to leave the fishery (Sermitsiaq 07.10.2010).

Off-shore courses are in fact offered today and jobs are available at the explorations stage of what many hope will be continue into a regular Greenlandic oil industry. From a governmentality perspective one may argue that the out-phasing of small-scale fishers has as much to do with a strategy of creating new subjectivities of oil industry workers. As an example, the newspaper Sermitsiaq has taken on the responsibility of promoting this new opportunity for Greenlandic and Greenlandic workers (Sermitsiaq 29.04.2011). Still, the problem of the chicken and the egg seems stumblingly close in the context of fishery reform discussions: Are fishers to be offered a subjectivity as off-shore and mining workers because there will be a need for labour or is the expected growth-industries a convenient opportunity to legitimize the reduction that follows from concentration? A win-win situation certainly emerges within the discourse on a rhetorical level as the problem of necessary development meets the discursive reality of the poor. A question that is yet to be answered is whether the new regulation as a fisheries governance technique will succeed in its implementation. Implementation of conservation goals can be a very critical issue in fisheries governance in general (Gezelius and Raakjær 2008) and the new closure as well as the introduction of ITQ fishery may hypothetically create new subjectivities which the management did not foresee and whose behaviour may present new problems of control.

Discussion
Is the truth about the impossible economic situation of the small-scale fishery then the only truth? Within the fisheries department and the official discourse of high-level politicians in the Greenlandic government the answer appears confirmative. Other truths have not been allowed to function as truths and a very strong state of uncontested commonsense prevails. But in for example the descriptions of ‘the hunting mode of production’ provided by Dahl (2000), the livelihood approach in small-scale fisheries by Johnson et al. (2005), the economic strategies of hunters and fishers provided by Sejersen (2003) and the pan-arctic Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) (Poppel 2006), that aims
to understand why people choose village life in spite of some statistically observable drawbacks, a competing discourse emerges that the small-scale fishery as a mode of organisation may actually make economic sense if approached from its own rationalities. A study of the social impact of the new regulation conducted in 2011 (Delaney et al.) arrives at similar conclusions. On the other hand I have spoken to quite a few public debate observers in Nuuk, who seem to know by heart the rhetoric of fishers and their representatives in Parliament when they assert pressure on the TAC by lamenting the fact that fishers will not be able to buy Christmas presents for their children. So the truth of the 'poverty-stricken' coastal fishers is also an effect of the strategy applied by fishers themselves in the TAC decision-making process. Thus it may be fair to say, that the representation of the coastal fishery as economically challenged is in reality constructed in perfect cooperation with (some) fishers and fisher representatives themselves in their political TAC strategies.

But no matter what the actual condition of the small-scale fishing economy, at the end of the day, the new governance paradigm is left with a limit-to-governmentality problem as it has to deal with what is at least perceived as a large group of coastal Greenland halibut fishers and their allies that are able to undermine a restrictive TAC policy. And not doing anything will not satisfy the perceived need for long-term planning to change what currently appears as the great ‘other’ in Greenlandic planning: ad hoc solutions and the status quo. And as long as poverty is the necessary antithesis to profitability measured in terms of monetary taxable income from the Greenland halibut fishery alone, the Minister and the administration have to pursue a governmentality technique that replaces small-scale subjectivities with large-scale ones as the very ‘field of possible action’ as a fisher is altered. This technique is the new regulation. The truth that underpins the need for action is, in the words of the dominant discourse, that this must be done for the sake of the small-scale fishers bound to poverty, for the sake of biological sustainability, for the sake of the national economy and for the sake of Greenlandic society at large.

Some observers of fisheries governance systems have noted that fishery governance systems have increasingly come to rely on the successful moulding of governable objects. And as other observers of the governability problem argue there are some highly ungovernable characteristics to the systems-to-be-governed – albeit more to some than others (Jentoft 2007; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009a, 2009b; Song and Chuenpagdee 2010). In the Greenlandic case the ungovernable feature that may turn out to matter the most for the destiny of the small-scale Greenland halibut fisheries system might be their political ungovernability in a fisheries co-political system and the fact that they are the implicit antitheses to the dominant development discourse in Greenlandic fisheries governance that asserts that big is simply better. The conclusions of this case may foster a continuist’s statement that history seems to be repeating. In spite of all the case-specific actors and actions, a structuralist observation creeps in that fisheries management almost takes place in mythic time and space and there is something archetypical to the characters of the ‘ungovernable small-scale fishery’ and to ‘the control-seeking system’ that governs it. And, as pertains to myths, the content of the narratives varies, but their underlying structure is one as for example the global ITQ victory march. But this Greenlandic case also illuminated the circumstance that the ‘ungovernables’ are not only ungovernable in their capacity of passive systems-to-be-governed. They are in fact political co-governors who themselves actively participate in
and form part of the governance system. Thus the binary opposition between a govern-
ing system and a governed system is partly challenged in this fisheries co-political sys-

and I would argue that this is recognized as the new regulation becomes a technique for the new governance paradigm to make room for the cultivation of a new type of co-governors and extinguish the old type. Furthermore this article argues that the micro-tactics within the fishery policy arena over definitions of sustainability and the current compulsion to act, plan and reform – that do in fact characterize many fisheries governance systems - have been important drivers in this process.

In Foucault’s original studies of the governance of ‘bodies’ and ‘populations’ the gov-

ernors were never described as seeking to extinguish their subjects or giving up on gov-

erning them. One may present the counter-argument that that the new regulation is actually trying to govern the small-scale fisheries from a distance by bringing them into a more profitable larger-scale fishery. This is arguably likely to be the case for those who receive ITQ shares and who will be able to expand their production. On the other hand, a considerable number of persons are expected to leave or never to enter the fishery to make room for the profitability of the relatively few and profitable in the long term. In a fisheries governance context this ‘limit to governmentality’ appears as a peculiar mix of the brutality of technification and the humane. One speaks of technical fleet entities as ‘small entities under six meters’ while one acknowledges that what you govern – and what you save – is in reality humans. Paradoxically, politicians and man-
g

agers can therefore work to out-phase fleets in order to save the humans that are not only socially and economically bound to the social and managerial reality of these categories, but who are also perceived of as being involuntarily caught therein.

Endnote

aAt the time of publication the maximum ownership and its technical formulation is still being debated in Parliament.

Competing interests
The author declares that she has no competing interests.

Authors’ contributions
RBJ concieved of the study, carried out the research and drafted the manuscript. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

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References
Who defines the need for fishery reform? Actors, discourses and networks in the reform of the Greenlandic fishery

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Rikke Becker Jacobsen

Innovative Fisheries Management – an Aalborg University Research Centre

c/o Greenland Climate Research Centre

Kivioq 2

3900 Nuuk

rbj@ifm.aau.dk

+299 5890222

Jesper Raakjær

Innovative Fisheries Management – an Aalborg University Research Centre & Greenland Climate Research Centre

Department of Development and Planning

Skibbrogade 5

9000 Aalborg

Denmark
Abstract

This article investigates recent reform of the Greenlandic coastal fisheries in order to contribute to the general lessons on reform and policy networks in the context of a changing Arctic stakeholdership. It analyses participation in fisheries governance decision-making by analysing the emergence of discourses and policy networks that come to define the very need for reform. A policy network is identified across state ministries, powerful officials, banks and large scale industry that managed to define the need of reform presented in a ‘grand reform’ discourse. But inertia characterized the actual decision-making process as reform according to this grand reform discourse was blocked by a combination of small-scale fishers’ informal network processes and the power of parliamentary majority. After a parliamentary shift in power the ‘grand reform’ was implemented gradually by the new government while new patterns of participation and exclusion emerged. In this process, identities of the participating actors were reinterpreted to fit the new patterns of influence and participation. The article offers the perspective that fishery reform does not necessarily start from collective recognition of a problem in the marine resource use and a power-neutral process of institutional learning. Instead, it argues that fishery reform is the ‘reform of somebody’ and that this ‘somebody’ is itself a changing identity.
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Introduction: Fishery reforms and the problem of overcoming inertia

It has been stated repeatedly that fisheries around the world are in crisis; that the fishing industry is plagued with overcapacity resulting in low profitability and declining fish stocks. This again has led to a declining number of fishers and processing plants, with severe negative impacts on employment and livelihood in fishery-dependent communities. Most countries have been unable to carry through major reforms of their fisheries governance system, with few exceptions such as New Zealand and Iceland. The EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is a very good example of a fisheries governance system that has been impossible to reform (Raakjær 2009). The CFP is subject to decennial review, and previous reforms (1992, 2002) have been characterised by a lack of radical change, as only incremental, path-dependent change has been the result of the reform attempts, which has compounded its problems rather than cured them (Symes and others 2012, Raakjær and others 2012); and the prospects for the 2012 reform are not more promising.

This is not a new phenomenon. In the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries from 1945 onwards, crises and discontent with the implementation of conservation measures have been identified as key drivers behind demands for reform. However, key obstacles such as the costs of agreement among a diverse set of actors over decisions regarding distribution generally tend to create a default situation of institutional inertia (Gezelius and others 2010). Fishery reforms have been theoretically approached with the analytical question of how institutions are able to transform historical learning into necessary reform; institutional arrangements need often be changed after their establishments to make them function according to their original purposes (Gezelius and others 2010). But such reform is sometimes difficult to achieve. The necessity of some kind of reform is often recognized by the actors involved, and key drivers and obstacles to reforms in the complex fishery governance systems have been identified and theorized in light of some sort of recognition of a need for change. Some governance systems have had more success than others in overcoming situations of inertia. Raakjær (2009) provides detailed analyses of why it has been so difficult to reform the European common fishery policy (CFP). Raakjær (2009:147-48) outlines that there has been a
persistent lack of political will in the Council and the member states to reform the CFP and subsequently a lack of commitment within the Council to ensure sustainable fishing. Attempts to introduce elements of ‘New modes of governance’ have not been successful in the fisheries domain. Member states have generally emphasised domestic interests reflecting the fact that the EU fishing industry is fragmented and often has little in common, leading to a fragmented interest structure in the EU fishing industry. Furthermore, a clash between the ways administrators and fishermen view the goals and means of the management regime has been observed adding to the resistance towards policy reforms.

On the surface, the situation in Greenland is no different in terms of a need for reform and difficulties in actually implementing it. For the last decade various attempts have been made to reform the Greenlandic fishery bill according to some clearly defined goals, but reform has been halted and postponed. Nonetheless, the fishery reform process took a leap forward in 2011 as two amendments to the Greenlandic fishery bill and a new regulation on Greenland halibut were adopted in congruence with the envisioned reform. Greenland thereby offers an example of a fisheries governance system overcoming reform inertia and so this article aims to distil the lessons to be learned from Greenland in relation to existing theory of policy networks, reform drivers and reform obstacles in fisheries and marine governance.

Our point of departure is, on the one hand, that the very analytical question of drivers and obstacles tends to gain much of its relevance from the particular perspectives of those who see a need for a reform. On the other hand, the analysis of fishery reform processes and the way they are able to move forward or not can also, as an end in itself, provide a study of ‘who manages’ and the power relations between old and new stakeholders in fisheries. This aspect speaks to a general theme in the Arctic. Most Greenlanders today are not fishers. As is the case with much of the Arctic, the majority of Greenland’s workforce has entered a post-industrial stage as defined by the Arctic Human Development Report: “Typical for this period has been the growth of the information and service sectors, including telecommunications, education and tourism. State welfare institutions have played a major role in many Arctic communities. For some regions, this has
also been marked with de-industrialization, when old manufacturing industries closed down or departed” (2004 p. 123). While fisheries is the most important industry in Greenland in terms of export (83 per cent in 2010), and thus have the nation depending on it to finance its public welfare institutions (together with an annual grant from Denmark), it employs a decreasing share of the population. The total population of Greenland is around 56,000 of which about 48,000 live in towns (byer) and 8,000 in smaller coastal settlements (bygder), which are known to be particularly dependent on fishing and hunting. And only 4.8 and 3 per cent of the population is directly employed in ‘fishery’ and ‘industry’ respectively. The actual numbers may be higher as the fishery may create a significant, but not readily assessable, level of indirect employment (Landsstyreområdet for Fiskeri og Fangst. 2004). The fact that the national economy depends so heavily on the fishery, while only a relatively small part of it engages directly in it, may lead to a continuous change in the representations of the relevant reform problems as well as the relevant stakeholders that ought to participate in the design of fishery reform.

The analytical perspective: The power of discourses and policy networks

This paper is based on the perception that the Greenlandic fishery reform can be understood as a decision-making process and our empirical research question is: How have different actors been able to shape the fishery reform process according to their interpretations of relevant problems and right solutions and how have the decision-making actors been re-defined in the process? In answering our research question we apply the analytical framework (inspired by Raakjær 2009) illustrated in figure 1 below.
The framework shares Raakjær’s argument that insights into the governance process can be obtained by paying attention to the way actors form policy networks around similar or compatible interests and by paying attention to the way actors apply dominant lines of reasoning in the form of discourses to promote their interest. In this case, the concept of discourse is primarily used to denote a largely closed and self-referring mode of rationalising which has the effect of strengthening that very mode of rationalising in itself. This definition is inspired by Foucault’s analysis on power and knowledge (Foucault 1976) by which power is defined in terms of the discursive production of truths. Here, discourse becomes an analytical tool to denote a type of power that is intentional, yet not subjective. In our analysis subjects of intentions are however re-introduced into the analysis in the sense that we try to empirically identify the actors who promote and reproduce certain discourses to the extent that they come to have a truth-producing and material effect on Greenlandic law and fishery governance. Because Greenlandic fisheries governance is characterised by open conflict between different groups and goals in the fishery, we find it relevant to ask the question: Exactly which of the discursively constituted subjects managed to shape the truths about problems, solutions and each other that came to matter?
Similar to the ‘garbage-can model’ in organisational theory (Cohen, M. and others 1972) we do not look for the way rational agents first define the problem in order to look for a solution later. Instead, we are interested in the way actors tend to subscribe to existing solutions that emanates from certain discourses and how actors are on the lookout for new occasions of decision-making that may open a ‘window of opportunity’ for the actors to insert their preferred solutions. The power exerted by policy networks is approached as deriving from the power of the discourses that form ‘existing solutions’ and from the actors’ abilities to apply discourses strategically in new situations. But, as different actors subscribe to different discourses and solutions in the fishery, competing definitions of relevant stakeholder groups also arise. In this model, therefore, ‘actors’ is also a changeable category that too can be affected by the discursive articulation of new identities.

The analytical value of this model is that it connects fishery reforms with power. It is an alternative to the way actors in the field represent problems and solutions as simply being about promoting the, objectively defined, best solution for all. It is also an alternative to an academic study of neutral processes of historical learning. In this perspective, reform is never just necessary. Necessity has to be interpreted. And it is with interpretation that power comes into the equation. Power is here understood as the power to interpret something as problematic, other things as necessary and to represent oneself and others in such a way that new patterns of exclusion and participation become ‘democratic’. Successful participation in fisheries governance is exerted as any actor’s preferred interpretations, often grounded in a shared discourse, materialize into actual reform.

The empirical data in this article are summaries of parliament debates, fishery bill reform drafts, background reports, stakeholder consultation answers, parliamentary fishery committee summaries and recommendations, coverage of the reform process in the media, observations of public discussions in the media, personal observation of Fishery Council meetings relating to the fishery reform, personal observations of the Greenlandic fishery department’s work with the reform and informal conversations.
with stakeholder representatives and fishery managers. The data has been collected as part of one and a half year of fieldwork (July 2010 - January 2012) in Nuuk focusing on the Greenlandic fishery governance institutions. We construct a summary of the process from 2000 to 2009 based on document studies and from 2010 and onwards the summary is supplemented by data obtained through participant observation and personal communication within the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture and personal communication.

The case of the Greenlandic fishery bill reform

A history of a fishing society

Fish are expected to have played an economic role to Greenlandic Inuit as a subsistence activity and a local market activity before and during colonial times (Sørensen 1996, Marquardt 1999). As a commodity on the world market, however, fish only started to play a role in the late nineteenth century. The systematic cultivation of a fishing along the coast of West Greenland had been advocated in the eighteenth century, but the colonial administration prioritised hunting more or less exclusively from the 1850s (Marquardt 1999). It was not before the late nineteenth century when the demand seal and whale products declined, that fish became the most important economic activity of the then Danish colony of Greenland (Friis and Rasmussen 1989). With the coming of the cod in the 1920s, the fishing industry turned into the most important activity of the colonial trade, represented by the ‘Royal Greenland Trade Company’ and it remained the primary economic colonial and state activity around which Greenlandic modernization and welfare policies would come to evolve throughout the 20th century and well into the 21st.

Greenland achieved the formal institutions of ‘Home-Rule’ in 1979 and ‘Self-Rule’ in 2009. At the take-over of fishery governance responsibilities in 1979, Greenlandic politicians submitted the fisheries to the dual goal of promoting a self-sustaining national economy while also supporting a Greenlandic way of life closely bound to the use of natural resources and the life of small villages spread out along the coast (Rasmussen 1998). The access rights to the Greenlandic fisheries have been on Greenlandic hands since Greenland
chose to leave the European Community in 1985. The largest sea-food company in Greenland, Royal Greenland ltd. is the descendant of the colonial ‘Royal Greenland Trade Company’ and has been owned by Greenland Self-Rule since 1990. Greenlandic fisheries governance decision-making formally rests with the Greenlandic Self-Rule in consultation with the Fishery Council where fishers and industry are represented through their professional interest organisations. A range of Self-Rule ministries, the Greenlandic municipalities and the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources have observer status and they are commonly included in the consultation processes as well. Still, it has been argued that actual decision-making is best described by means of paying attention to the informal networks of subject-positions that do in fact transcend these formal categories and channels of participation (Jacobsen and Raakjaer 2012). This article proposes a similar approach as it aims to understand the coming into being of the 2011 reform of the Greenlandic fishery bill.

A history of gradual reforms
The development of Greenlandic fisheries and fishery regulation can to a large extend be read as the history of Greenlandic national development policy and nation building. Since the early 20th century, the way of administering access to, processing of and sales of particularly cod (gadus mahua), Greenland halibut (reinhardtius hippoglossoides), cold water prawn (pandalus borealis) and crab (Chionocetes opilio) have had impacts on the development of Greenlandic society which can hardly be overestimated. During the 1950s and 1960s, central planning sought to transform Greenland into an industrial fishing society, which spurred the industrialisation of Greenland and the following modernisation defined as increased urbanisation, centralisation of settlements, the development of fish-factory labour, increased level of welfare services and nation state building. Fish and shell fish have since been the primary export commodity and the primary source of income for the Greenlandic state next to the annual grants received from the Kingdom of Denmark, of which Greenland is part.
The Greenlandic fisheries have undergone considerable technological development throughout the 20th century and fishery policy reforms have been implemented gradually (for historical overviews see Skydsbjerg 1999, Hamilton & Rasmussen 2001, Marquardt, Holm and Starkey 1999). Greenland has the mandate to independently elaborate its own fishery bill, the first version of which stems from 1967. Amendments have been gradually included into the bill, some of which have been explicit conservation measures such as the introduction of TAC (total allowable catch) and licenses, while others concerned restructuring the fishing fleet. One of the more significant examples of the latter relates to the off-shore cold water prawn fishing fleet which was reduced from 42 trawlers to 5 high-efficient, capital-intensive factory trawlers from 1991 to 2011. This restructuring was facilitated by the introduction of Individual transferrable quotas (ITQs) in 1990.

Our case study focuses on a structural reform of the coastal fisheries primarily for prawns and Greenland halibut. Coastal fisheries tend to target different species depending on the season. In Greenland, coastal fisheries can also be undertaken in combination with hunting for sea mammals and birds primarily for the domestic market and/or for subsistence. Therefore, the socio-economic and cultural value of coastal fisheries may in many cases also be most accurately assessed by considering the role it plays in relation to both the formal market economy and informal local economies (one example is the case of Greenland halibut fisheries in Upernavik district, see Delaney and others 2012).

**Greenland fisheries reform: the emergence of a ‘grand reform’ discourse**

The reform of the coastal fisheries in Greenland has been envisioned, debated, incrementally implemented and – just as importantly – resisted and stalled for a decade by now. The reform changes that have materialized so far, and we will elaborate on this below, are probably best perceived in their essence as a continuation of a strategy to develop the Greenlandic fisheries in the direction of greater profitability through increased ownership consolidation and liberalization of fisheries that have historically been
formed by two conflicting interests in Greenland’s structural fisheries policy and therefore also in Greenland’s modern development: 1) the development of a modern rationalised industry and 2) the consideration of the need to uphold livelihood opportunities in coastal communities through local fishing and processing activities (Hamilton and Rasmussen 2011, Gullestrup 1976).

The very idea of reforming the fishery bill of 1996 emerged from a whole variety of concerns, and the way actual reform decision-making evolved followed its own history. The official story line dates the beginning of the reform process back to 2003 with a Home-rule parliament discussion on some critical effects of the recently introduced ITQ system in the prawn fishery. This system had been introduced in 1990 and 1996 for the off-shore and coastal segment respectively with time-unlimited licenses and a concern was raised in 2003 that the new system granted de facto permanent quotas to the actors involved. The quotas, which hold considerable value as the exclusive right to fish and sell a part of the formerly shared national resource, was granted to existing Greenlandic fishing companies and fishers. An expert committee was established to investigate alternative license systems, but it eventually concluded that the current system of permanent ITQs generally worked as intended and ought to be preserved (Det uvildige udvalg 2005). In 2004 the government presented a vision of a structural policy in the fishery to the Parliament. It identified a context of global markets and increased competition and foresaw a need for the coastal fishery to develop into a more profitable industry characterized by growth, fewer and larger vessels equipped with newer technology and a better educated workforce. Subsidies and short sighted concerns for local politics and employment were identified as challenges to these visions (Landsstyremrådet for Fiskeri og Fangst. 2004). The report claims to be largely based on the Government’s structural-political action plan “A vision for the future” from 2000 (Landsstyret 2000) and the foci of the vision for the report strongly reflects those of the plan. Fishery stakeholders had been consulted at a conference held June 12-13 2004, but the influence of this consultation is not clear from our available historical sources.
In 2007 the government was ready with a proposal for a fishery bill reform which it presented for consultation with fishery stakeholders. A foreword to the proposal states that the proposal attempts to incorporate the concerns expressed in Parliament in 2003 and to consider the above mentioned structural-political action plan, the structural policy in the fishery as well as the conclusions of the expert committee concerning the ITQ system. Thus, one may observe that this amendment tried to reconcile a critical concern about the de-facto ownership constellations emerging from the ITQ system with a continued vision of increased privatization, profitability, concentration and growth in the fishing industry. The proposal included eleven amendments of which six offered a more precise formulation of the ITQ system including a specification of the state’s right to withdraw ITQs. Other amendments included a demand for fisher ownership of fishing vessels, user fees, data collection from users, less emphasis on local employment at the expense of biological sustainability and the merging of the prawn TAC that had previously been divided with 43 per cent reserved for the coastal segment and 57 per cent for the off-shore segment. The proposal was met with great resistance from the fisheries’ organizations. The Association of Hunters and Fishers in Greenland (KNAPK) that represents the larger number of coastal fishers, mostly Greenlandic speaking, critiqued the proposal for not being available in Greenlandic. Both KNAPK and the Employers’ Association of Greenland (GA) found that the recommendations were rushed through and the Parliament urged the government to postpone the decision and establish a fishery commission. In 2007 a comprehensive grand reform was thus postponed and a Fishery Commission was established.

The Fishery Commission had its analysis and recommendations ready by 2009 (Fiskerikommissionen 2009). The foreword of the Fishery Commission report formulates the problem in a new context, namely the need to reconsider the very 2003 political discussions as such. The reason was that parts of the fishing industry estimated that the abolishment of the ITQ system would have a long-term negative effect on the development in the Greenlandic fisheries (2009, p.6). The Fishery Commission was made up of fourteen members: An appointed chairman (an economist from Odense University, Denmark) and one person from: each of the organizations represented in the Fishery Council; each of the fishery related organization not
included in the Fishery Council; each of the (two) Greenlandic banks; the Economy and Personnel Agency under the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Finance and one person from the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture. One can analyse the list of members in many ways. But we suggest paying attention to the fact that out of fourteen participants, the small-scale coastal fishers and the workers at the processing factories were only represented by one member each, though possibly also by the municipalities’ organizations (KANUKOKA) as the municipalities are known to express concerns for local employment. This is interesting in light of the fact that the core ‘solutions’ of the fishery commission was to abolish the obligation to land, thus affecting factory workers negatively, and allowing for larger concentration of ownership which will probably also mean the exclusion of the many smaller-scale fishers in the long term.

One may also notice, that the Ministry of Finance and the Personnel Agency (under the Ministry of Finance) was represented by two names which are commonly known among administrators in Nuuk to be among the most influential officials in the Greenlandic administration; any project of ‘theirs’ tend to be carried through in spite of resistance or hesitation from other actors (personal conversation with Nuuk officials). The relationship of the commission members will be analysed later in connection with the 2010 consultation where it becomes clear that a network consisting of about half of the fishery commission members – the Ministry of Finance, the large-scale industry and the banks - support the changes suggested by fishery commission, whereas the remaining actors disagree with one or more of the key problem-solution constructions.

Further attempts at reform awaited the conclusions of the commission that handed over its report in January 2009. In accordance with a discourse on the relatively larger national-economic contribution of large scale fishing operations, the commission concluded that in order to make the Greenlandic fishery more profitable and create higher revenue for society, it is necessary to a) facilitate a take-over of the capital-intensive offshore fleet from the existing owners and thus; b) allow foreign ownership and investment in Greenlandic fisheries; c) allow for processing on board or landings abroad (abolishing at least partly the requirement to supply land-based factories); d) impose a resource rent to increase state revenue
from the fisheries and e) abolish the fixed allocation of the prawn TAC between the coastal and offshore segment. Overall the commission and its mandate played an important role in formulating a need for a reform of the fishery bill that could support the development of the industry with the help of increased capitalization, consolidation and ownership concentration (Fiskerikommissionen 2009). In spite of the fact that these issues are of a latent controversial character in Greenland, considering the effect it could have on the coastal segment of the fishery, the fish factory workers and local fishing-dependent communities and municipalities, the report did not prompt any public debate at the time.

The commission’s recommendations were taken up and pursued by the new government that came into office in 2009. In 2010 this new government proposed a reform of the fishery bill that was in congruence with the fishery commission’s recommendations to maintain the ITQ system and abolish the obligation to land the catches to land-based (or community based) processing in Greenland. This new government represented a considerable shift in the party political make-up, including the parties Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA), Demokraatit and Kattusseqatigiit Partiiaat and leaving the Siumut party to the opposition for the first time in the history of Greenland Home- and Self-rule. The Greenlandic party-political landscape was originally structured around standpoints vis-à-vis Danish rule and independence and it has been argued that this has remained the only stable point of orientation for Greenlandic political parties today (Andersen and Tonsgaard 2003). In that respect, Siumut and IA were both important vehicles for the independence movement leading to Home-rule in 1979 while Atassut represented a more conservative stance. Still, most Greenlandic parties also have a Danish sister party, which are organised along a left-right continuum. The Demokraatit party (Established in 2002) and the Atassut party consider themselves liberal whereas both IA and Siumut are respectively leftist and centre-leftist (compared to Danish standards). The most common analysis of the electoral shift leading to a new government in 2009 is however not so much related to aspirations to a new balance of left-right politics as to a fatigue with the Siumut regime. IA stated the day before the election that it would bypass Siumut if it won. Thus, the most leftist party joined forces with the most liberal party in Greenland – bypassing the centre-leftist party in the middle. In Jacobsen and Raakjær
2012 this new coalition is described as a ‘new paradigm’ in Greenlandic fisheries governance. It represents itself as a break with former decision-making practice in conservation (TAC) policy connected with the former Siumut-led government. The Siumut party represents itself and is represented by others as being very responsive to fisher demands and willing to grant, on demand, TAC’s that are higher than biologically advised. We observe that this new government also participates in the discourse of the ‘grand reform’ when it presented the 2010 proposal for a new fishery bill.

Policy networks and the grand reform

In understanding the policy-making process we have been inspired by Nedergaard (2007) and Raakjær (2009) and believe we can strengthen the analysis by supplementing our argumentative discourse analysis with a policy network analysis in order to explore and capture the political and economic interests of the actors and further understand their policy positions.

The 2010 proposal for a new fishery bill, heavily influenced by the recommendations of the Fishery Commission but also by the 2003 debate, went into consultation with the stakeholders organisations of the Fishery Council. These consulted parties comprise various ministries, the Association of Hunters and Fishers in Greenland (KNAPK), the Association of Employers in Greenland (GA), the organisation of Greenlandic employers (NUSUKA), the Greenlandic workers union (SIK), the Greenlandic municipalities (KANUKOKA), the Greenlandic Fisheries License Control (GFLK), the Greenlandic Institute of Natural Resources (GINR), the private sea-food company Polar Seafood as well as the Self-rule owned sea-food company Royal Greenland Ltd.. Additional parties outside the Fishery Council were also consulted: the European Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG-MARE), two Greenlandic banks (Grønlandsbanken and Sparbank Vest) and two Greenlandic auditing companies (Deloitte and Grønlands Revisionskontor).

Figure 2 below presents our policy network analysis in 2010 in relation to the proposed changes in the new fisheries bill. The large-scale industry, the Ministry of Finance and the banks – corresponding to about half of the original members of the fishery commission - together with the two auditing companies and now
also the Premiers office jointly supports the major changes: to facilitate sale of the existing capital-intensive fishing companies by allowing for non-Greenlandic ownership; increase profitability of the fishers/fishing companies by allowing for the coastal and offshore segments to buy up quota from each other; increase profitability of the fishing companies by removing the obligation to land the catches to processing facilities located in Greenland.

Support the Fishery Commission’s recommendations to: Abolish coastal/sea-going divide, allow for greater ownership concentration, abolish the obligation to land and to allow for non-Greenlandic ownership.

GA (representing large-scale industry), the Banks, the Ministry of Finance, the Premier’s Office, Deloitte, RG (partly)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared concern: To preserve the coastal/off-shore divide</th>
<th>Shared concern: To preserve the obligation to sell to land-based facilities in Greenland</th>
<th>Shared concern: To preserve Greenlandic ownership in the fisheries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNAPK, KANUKOKA, RG, Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
<td>KANUKOKA, RG, Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
<td>KNAPK, NUSUKA, Ministry of Industry and Labour</td>
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</tbody>
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Figure 2. Grouping of actors into policy networks based on key points of contestation over the 2010 proposal for reform of the Greenlandic fishery bill.

As shown in figure 2 two different political positions were expressed by two different networks: the ‘Grand reform’ and the ‘protectors of coastal fisheries’ although the latter was not as united as the former.

The ‘grand reform’ network is composed of the Premier’s Department, the Ministry of Finances and GA on behalf of its members in the fishing industry, the Greenlandic banks and auditing company Deloitte. This network was actively advocating for a comprehensive reform of the coastal fishery that would lead to
greater concentration and liberalization in support to the prevailing scientific opinion that fishing effort needs to be reduced to avoid over-exploitation. Thus, they had a strong interest in adopting radical reforms to accommodate conservation concerns and firmly believed in ITQs as the most appropriate tool rooted in what Degnbol and others (2005) have described as a technical fix often emerging into a tunnel vision and diverting attention from other potential solutions by focussing entirely on ITQ’s. This way of thinking has according to Jacobsen (2013a) turned the relationship between problem and solution up-side down and characterised the promotion of ITQs as what in organizational theory is mentioned as the garbage can model (Cohen and others 1972), where the solution is known and decision-makers are just waiting for a chance to apply the ‘solution’.

Fisheries reforms will always produce winners and losers (Jentoft 2006). It is rather obvious that a reform largely based on introducing ITQs in all Greenlandic fisheries will provide the grand reform network a great victory, because the reform of the fishery bill would be highly economic beneficial for the larger fishing companies, improve the value of the collateral for the banks and supporting the wish of the Government in leading Greenland from an almost purely fishery-dependent country into the a new era of exploitation of its non-renewable natural resources (mining and oil extraction).

Although we portrait ‘protectors of coastal activities’ network as one grouping in direct disagreement with one or more of the suggested amendments, the reality was the network faced internal disagreement over the most central amendments. Thus, this network was in practise not forming a policy network as unambiguous and coherent and as the grand reform network. The different actors in the ‘protectors of coastal activities’ network presented a range of individual suggestions and not all are included in the figure and a full understanding of the interests of each groups of actors really demands a more detailed presentation that is not offered here. So for example, KNAPK had no less than 19 suggestions ranging from new financing options including public investments; better administration; further restriction on ownership concentration and a new allocation key between off-shore and coastal TAC that raises the coastal quota
from 43 to 50 per cent. None of the protector of the coastal activities argued in favour of allowing for non-Greenlandic ownership but to some it was left uncommented. The obligation to land, however, was an internal point of contestation. KNAPK supported the abolishment of the obligation to land. The fishers have an interest in receiving as good a price as possible for their fish and the monopoly of land-based processing plants (mostly owned by Royal Greenland) is a problem to the fishers who have often sought to establish private and fisher-owned alternatives – most recently in Ilulissat and Nuuk. In its consultation answer KNAPK explained that since most of the landed catch is frozen and sold for export without greater local refinement, the price received for landed fish are so low that it hardly makes sense for fishers to sell the fish. The municipalities on the other hand, have a strong interest in the employment that local fishing activities and land-based processing industries after all create and to which there is little alternative at present time. In their consultation answer they state a strong wish to preserve the obligation to land until a secure and real development of the non-renewable natural resource area has evolved. This position is a direct contestation of the judgements of the situation that informs the ‘grand reform’ discourse and the 2010 proposal: That employment concerns should no longer dominate fishery policy and that labour should be released for the this industry.

Royal Greenland was against both the abolishment of the coastal/off-shore TAC division as well as the abolishment of the obligation to land. But as an actor already engaged in ITQ fisheries, Royal Greenland also supported the grand reform’s resistance towards an introduction of a 8 year ‘draw-back’ period on the ITQ licenses for the sake of financing opportunities. Royal Greenland was also against further reduction of concentration as this would imply a hand-off of its companies. Royal Greenland supported a raise of off-shore quota from 10 to 15 per cent and an allowance of up to 25 per cent foreign ownership in the fishery.

In that way, Royal Greenland had a foot in each policy network depending on the issue; a circumstance that reflect the historical role of Royal Greenland in Greenland’s industrial history very well as a State owned company simultaneously engaged in avant-garde off-shore industry and the coastal fishing and processing activities.
None of the networks backed the 2010 proposal in its entirety and after the 2010 consultation process and the first reading, the new fishery bill was postponed to the next Parliament session in spring 2011. In the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture there was still a will to facilitate the grand reform: The new permanent secretary of the Ministry took up his position in 2010 and had as one of his primary ambitions to facilitate the reform of the fishery bill. In this process, the Ministry was reorganized bringing all fishery related administration under one hat and located in the same physical building (Permanent Secretary, Personal communication). The Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture worked at creating a broad political support for the next proposal within and across political parties. Building support within IA presented a challenge as well (fisheries managers, personal communication autumn 2010). The fishery department under the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture worked to engage the relevant fishing organizations in dialogue (RG, KNAPK, Polar Seafood and GA) and invited them to meetings. But these stakeholder meetings, arranged by the Ministry, did not manage to build consensus among the diverse stakeholder groups presenting very conflicting interests or, as the managers had hoped for, make them come up with concrete suggestions to new amendments in the next proposal (personal observation of a Fishery Council meeting 22.10.2010). Little progress to reach broad consensus in support of the new fishery bill was made by the Fishery Department in consulting stakeholders. Still, the government was pushing for the Fishery Department to continue the reform process (personal observation of meetings and personal communication with fishery managers autumn 2010).

The Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture was able to present a revised fishery bill to parliament in spring 2011. This bill was much less radical and comprehensive, presenting only two amendments to the current bill. The paragraph known as the ‘rubber boot paragraph’ was removed, whereby the fishery bill came to allow for investment in the fishing fleet by non-fishers. Another paragraph was changed whereby maximum allowable quota ownership was increased from 10% to 15% in the coastal fishery. We observe that these two amendments met some, but far from all of the interests of the grand reform network. Only two of the interests of the grand reform network were met by this ‘amputated’ grand reform and
meanwhile, the obligation to land was not abolished, the TAC remained divided and foreign ownership was not allowed. Still, it was the concerns of the ‘grand reform’ and not the concerns of the ‘protection of coastal activities’ network that set the agenda and which was to be further promoted or resisted. With the 2011 amendments it is actually Royal Greenland, positioned across the two policy networks, which appears as the actor who had most of its interests met. However, the Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture emphasised that this was only to be the first round of amendments to the fishery bill, and that she would follow up with amendments relating to aforementioned issues in spring 2012. However, no new amendments were presented for Parliament (January 2013).

This summary of the decision-making process leads to several conclusions in regard to the actors, discourse and networks influencing the fishery reform process. The process started in 2003 with a critical reaction to the ownership effects of a previous ITQ reform introduced in 1990 and 1996. There were discussion of introducing a 8 year draw-back period for the otherwise time-unlimited ITQ licences. But a grand reform discourse had emerged and manifested itself from early structural policy reports in 2000 and 2004 to a positive evaluation of the ITQ system in 2005 to the fishery commission report in 2009. The establishment of the fishery commission in 2009 was prompted by a reaction by ‘parts of the industry’ to a political unease about the existing quota system expressed in 2003. With the establishment of the ITQ expert committee (Det uvildige udvalg) and the fishery commission, the original agenda for fishery bill reform was turned 180 degrees, promoting continued concentration and liberalization. The problem and solutions identified by the fishery commission laid out a grand reform discourse that managed to set the agenda for the fishery reform work in 2011. The commission included a wide range of stakeholders, yet there was an overweight of state departments, large scale companies and auditing firms: the exact same group of actors that supported the ‘full proposal’ in the 2011 consultation.

While the discourse of the grand reform was fixed in terms of problems and solutions, our observations of the process after 2010 also reveals that the actors interested in this reform worked for an even broader
political backing of the reform among the political parties as well as among the coastal fishers’ organisations. But such consensus would not materialize. During our time of fieldwork, however, some but not all central aspects of the grand reform was pushed through anyway. The grand reform was not introduced at once. Instead, only few amendments to the actual fishery bill were made to allow for larger concentration in ownership and greater investment in the fishery as well as for the sale existing quota shares and fishing companies. Meanwhile, the discourse on the necessity of change and the prospects of larger-scale operations also informed a new regulation on Greenland halibut that was crafted by the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture. This new regulation introduced ITQ into the coastal fishery for Greenland Halibut (See Jacobsen 2013a for an analysis of this process), thus expanding the ITQ system considerably. Furthermore, the discourse of the fishery commission continues to make itself relevant to new decision-making occasions: From 2010 to 2012 one of the authors participated in a working group under Greenland’s self-rule that should provide an analysis of possible adaptation strategies in the fishing and hunting profession. In this group none of the members of the aforementioned grand reform network were present. The final report shortly discussed pros and cons of the structural reform promoted by the Fishery commission without providing any final conclusion as to what was the ‘best’ development, recognizing the political and distributional dimension of this problem. When the report was sent out to consultation, the Ministry of Finance asked the working group to explicitly formulate its suggestions for adaptation in line with the government’s political strategy for fishery reform. The group chose not do this as it considered this to be a political decision (personal observation and participation). The Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Transport (under the auspices of which the report was written) and the Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture eventually wrote a foreword for the report through which the grand reform discourse is re-activated. It states that the report ‘reflected the composition of the working group’ and that in the political follow-up, ‘the government wishes to include the industry and parties of the labour market’. Furthermore, the last paragraphs writes that further strategic recommendations based on the report ‘shall be closely linked to existing plans for making the fishery and hunting more efficient and to
strategies for development in the regions; The tax and welfare commission, the Fishery Commission and that they should be integrated into the broader sustainability work’ (Departement for Boliger, Infrastruktur og Trafik og Department for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug. 2012 p.2. Authors’ emphasis). A picture thus emerges of a grand reform being implemented by gradual reform as windows of opportunity opens up in the form of new decision-making occasions within but also outside the forum of a fishery bill reform.

While the stakeholders in this analysis are approached on the level of interest organisations and thus as somewhat stable categories, they can also be analysed as subjects-in-the-making during the reform process. The implications of the reform and the relative power of different groups to influence the reform process was in fact vividly debated in Parliament in connection with the two amendments to the Fishery bill in 2011. The next section analyses the way actors represent each other as participation and democracy became objects of contestation.

The end to inertia and the redefinition of actors and democracy

In spite the reduced number of amendments, the grand reform did materialize for the first time with this 2011 proposal. This represents an end to years of reform inertia, at which point the 2011 parliamentary decision-making event becomes theoretically interesting: What brought an end to the inertia after 8 years of proposed and rejected proposals?

The political party composition in Parliament played a key role as the amendments were eventually decided upon by a majority vote where all parties in the coalition government voted in favour of the proposal, but the opposition parties, Atassut and Siumut, voted against. When the coalition government presented the 2011 proposal, it was met with great resistance from the opposition. KNAPK had expressed its non-support and arranged demonstrations in front of Parliament; a mode of participation that has proved efficient on previous occasions (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). The main concern of Siumut and KNAPK was the risk of
fishers being squeezed out of the fishery and of an independent profession being submitted to dependence on financially strong others; they were concerned that independent fishers would be reduced to deck men. They also presented a range of what they in turn perceived as the deeper structural problems within the fishery; problems which the current reform would not address.

Still Parliament majority was secured without the support of Siumut, and arguably also without the support of small-scale fishers and the government eventually pushed the reform through by a majority vote. The party-political schism can be analysed as a conflict between two discursive positions expressing two different tendencies in Greenlandic development discourses. One represents the pre-2009 election system where the coastal fishers were given more or less direct access to political decision-makers (see also Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012) and where continuous postponing of the grand reform was accepted. The other represents a new paradigm where biological sustainability is prioritized over immediate (or what is represented as immediate) socio-economic concerns and where ‘hard decisions’ are believed to be necessary in order to secure economic and biological sustainability of the fishery. But as the new government so openly pushed for this structural reform, this paradigm also echoed the discourse underpinning the conclusions of the Fishery Commission and it has thus positioned itself within the grand reform network, though not completely. It unwilling to move forward without the full support of Royal Greenland and Royal Greenland came to play an important part in the final battle over meaning fought in Parliament.

The decision of the government to reform the fishery bill was followed by intense debate in the Parliament. The debate was soon hardened as the opposition attacked the democratic legitimacy of the government’s decision-making on two grounds: 1) It failed to take into account the perspective of those most directly impacted, who they defined to be the coastal fishers and 2) it represented only the interests of ‘the large capital’.
Aleqa Hammond, chairman of the Siumut party: I shall cite the cooperation agreement of the government coalition at the time of its establishment: ‘On behalf of the democracy of Greenlandic Self-rule, dialogue shall be conducted and the consequence shall be the co-responsibility of the population based on equality (...).’ The fishers have not been heard and I would like to know why the coalition did not follow this agreement. And the fishers do not know that they have had an opportunity to cooperate. What does IA think in this regard?

(Extract from the first reading of the 2011 amendment, 13 April 2011. Simultaneously translated from Greenlandic to Danish. Translated from Danish to English by the authors)

Karl Lyberth, Siumut: IA’s spokesperson said that the majority supports the amendment. And this is true and it is a shame in other words. Among the political parties in the Self-rule, Siumut is the only party that protects the fishers, and the consequence of the amendment will be the wiping out in our country of fishers who own their own vessels. The amendment provides the large capital with an opportunity to enter the coastal fishery and the self-respecting fishers in this country will be deprived of that same possibility. I hope that all members of the Self-rule will understand this. It should be very easy to understand (...)

(ibid)

Members of the government who promoted the reform in turn presented various counter-arguments whereby they re-interpreted democratic legitimacy as synonymous with parliamentary representation. Moreover, they emphasized the need to move ahead, as opposed to the opposition’s alleged lack of will to do so.

Aqqaluq Egede, IA spokesperson: I have to emphasize that we in IA also appreciate the fishers and the hunters and that we support them. But it does not suffice only to support and work for
the fishers when it is the society one shall work for. We shall find whole solutions for the society with the fishery bill, because soon we cannot afford the social expenditures and we cannot afford children and youth because we will soon no longer afford health care and education because we have to reduce our expenses. Insofar we cannot change anything, we need to compromise with each other and the parties must also demand something from each other. It does not suffice all the time to work towards something and then refrain from taking the next step, being fully aware that the country needs the next step to prevent complete collapse. Dialogue therefore has to occur in such a way that it creates greatest progress and finds areas in which to cooperate in order to lay the best foundation for a self-supporting Greenland. That ought to be the point of departure.

(ibid)

Later in the debate, the coalition government was again confronted with Siumut’s accusations of undemocratic behaviour which made the IA spokesperson emphasize the legitimacy of a voted-in government and the concerns of the general public:

Aqqaluk Egede, IA spokesperson: The government is elected by the Greenlandic people and we are together here regardless of language. Siumut being in minority does not mean that Greenland has lost. It does not mean that the fishers have lost. That Siumut does not agree does not mean the democracy has lost. I think we ought to conduct ourselves in a more respectful manner, and when you understand democracy and when you respect the statements of others, then one does not need to present such statements. When one disagrees with everything there is no respect. But IA, we believe that in order to protect the whole of society, the fisher is obliged to help lift his country. The carpenter, the joiner, everyone. We are not losing. It is a downward going direction we are trying to correct. The people have the will to change it and they have voted us in and changed power by their votes because nothing has
happened for many years. And if things do not go according to the will of the people, then others will be elected. That is where democracy is anchored.

(ibid)

The Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture presented a different representation of democratic behaviour by re-interpreting the actors in the large-scale industry. She reinterpreted ‘the impacted coastal fishers’ as a category as she argued that while GA members may not outnumber non-GA members among the country’s fishermen, GA members do however have a majority of ownership of the quota. In this way, majority is no longer based on number of humans but on relative quota possession, which, arguably, changes the field in favour actors with strong economic interests:

_Ane Hansen, Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, IA: I would just like to correct what has been said about all the stakeholders in the fishery being against the amendment. One also has to remember that there are two fishery organizations in the coastal fishery. Besides from KNAPK there are coastal fishers among GA’s members and I can say that most of the prawn fishers are GA members. Ten coastal prawn fishers are members of KNAPK and they have nineteen to twenty per cent of the entire prawn quota. And GA’s members consist of 12 companies, and they have more than eighty per cent of the coastal prawn quota. Therefore it cannot be said that all coastal prawn fishers are against the amendment. Because they, i.e. GA, have already expressed their support in the press._

(ibid)

For the second reading, the minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture had composed a new argument in response to the accusation of not listening to the fishers. In her opening presentation she contested the very definition of fishers as she redefined the category of fishers to include large-
scale companies and their employees as well. In the same vein, she redefined what ownership de-
concentration meant.

*Ane Hansen*: *The definition of a fisher is wide today. The government keeps itself up to
date with the shares of individual companies in the fishery. If the fishery is defined by
turn-over or quota shares, a very large part of the fishery is conducted by companies
where each company is composed of competent fishers, book-keepers, buyers, sales-
persons etcetera. The wish for ownership de-concentration can be viewed in many ways.
For example, the company Ice Trawl owns a relatively large share of the quota, but the
company is actually owned by a large group of people. 50 per cent of the company is
owned by the Greenlandic state owned Royal Greenland ltd, while the rest is owned by
persons and companies that have merged after being involved in many different fishing
companies (...)*

(Extract from the second reading of the 2011 amendment, 7 November 2011.
Simultaneously translated from Greenlandic to Danish. Translated from Danish to
English by the authors).

The decision of the grand reform network to go through with the prepared reform was debated publicly in
connection with Parliament decision-making. Here the two amendments were succeeded by a process
whereby the participating and non-participating actors were re-interpreted and where the democratic
legitimacy of the new patterns of participation was contested. Siumut in opposition represented the
government as undemocratic because it did not listen to the fishers and because it only served the interests
of ‘large capital’. The members of government (primarily IA) responded to this representation with various
counter-interpretations. Firstly, they stated that the proposal was to the fishers’ advantage as it would
facilitate a better economy in the fisheries. Secondly, they represented the resistance of opponents as non-
cooperativeness. Thirdly, they redefined the coastal fishers and what ‘majority’ meant. The two discourses
almost re-enacted a century old discussion of democracy – that of the legitimacy of the representative government versus more direct modes of participation.

**Conclusion**

The reform of the Greenlandic coastal fisheries had been long underway and is still on-going. The need for reform in the coastal fishery slowly came to be defined mainly by large-scale fishery actors, the two Greenlandic banks, Self-rule ministries and auditing companies. This need for reform, identified as ‘the grand reform’ relies on a certain economic rationality promoting private ownership, market mechanisms, effectiveness but also ownership concentration. This discourse has broadened into an alliance with the new government and the new permanent secretary of the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture. Paradoxically, political debates in the Greenlandic Parliament started with a critical examination of the existing ITQ system, but with the expert committee on ITQ and the Fishery Commission report, the agenda changed into a cementation of the development discourse that promotes further concentration and capitalization in the fishery. A grand reform discourse emerged. Yet it was repeatedly blocked by deliberative politics until a change in Greenlandic voting behaviour brought a new government to power in 2009. This new government represented itself as a break with former practice in Greenlandic fisheries governance when it comes to caring for biological sustainability. But the government also appeared to represent a break when it comes to fishery reform inertia: In 2011 the grand reform took a significant leap forward through the amendment of two paragraphs in the fishery bill and the new regulation on Greenland halibut.

The grand reform could not be implemented in its entirety through Parliament decision-making on a new fishery bill, however. But the grand reform has been gradually introduced at other decision-making occasions within the more administrative sphere of the Ministry of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture. The new regulation of the Greenland halibut fishery adheres to the grand reform discourse and was introduced without any political or public attention being drawn to it at the time (Jacobsen 2013a). Furthermore, the
The grand reform network continues to insert the recommendations of the fishery commission, and thus the grand reform discourse, into new decision-making occasions such as climate change adaptation strategies. The grand reform discourse only partly won the fishery bill reform process, but it won the implementation process and the effect is almost just the same: Greenland’s two most important fisheries – those for prawn and Greenland halibut – are now being managed through ITQs according to the logic of the grand reform discourse.

We thus conclude that this fishery reform did not start from a collective recognition of a problem in the marine resource use and a power-neutral process of institutional learning. Instead, the fishery reform is analysed as ‘belonging’ to an identified policy network within the broad ensemble of actors in the Greenlandic fisheries governance institutions. Secondly we conclude that, when confronted with a lack of broad support, it took the will to make use of majority parliamentary power and a redefinition of stakeholder-ship and democratic participation to overcome fishery reform inertia. But reform was also pushed through as the grand reform discourse influenced new regulations and continues to direct the formulation of other structural strategies such as climate change strategies. Thirdly, this end to inertia involved the exclusive inclusion of some stakeholders, voter’s majority and the larger-scale industry as well as the bypassing of actors that have traditionally had more influence: the many coastal fishers represented by Siumut and KNAPK. Not surprisingly, such new relationship of power was followed by contestations over participation and democratic legitimacy in which actors were re-defined.

**Perspectives: The role of new fisheries stakeholdership in fisheries reform**

Greenland can, together with other Arctic regions be characterized as post-industrial in the sense that a very small percentage of the population is employed in fishery and industry. Internationally, talks of new fishery constituencies have risen, inviting various non-fisher stakeholders onto the scene of legitimate fisheries governance decision-making. Such new stakeholdership particularly tends to include as new actors
those with environmentalist interests and public concerns for biological sustainability. In addition, the concern of how best to develop Greenland’s general welfare services is intimately bound to fishery governance due to its economic importance, whereby the profitability of each entity in the fishery, as the case shows, becomes interpreted as the concern of all citizens.

The tendency to expand the legitimate stakeholders in fishery matters has been described as a ‘paradox of participation’ marginalizing some of the traditional stakeholders (Suárez de Vivero and others 2007). This is evident in our case with regard to smaller scale coastal fishers. Meanwhile, the expanded stakeholdership in Greenland has seemingly strengthened the say of other traditional stakeholders such as large-scale fishing companies. So one may add that in the Greenlandic case, the paradox of participation does not impact equally on traditional fishery stakeholders where larger scale stakeholders, represented by GA, have successfully engaged in alliances with the new stakeholders and achieved outcomes that were blocked before. Others (Mikaelsen and Jentoft, 2003) have argued that there is a moral need to invite a broader range of interests into fisheries governance decision-making otherwise monopolised by industry and fishers’ interests. One may argue that Greenland is already in the process of out-living this vision; the constituency of the new government was represented as the the democratic fishery stakeholdership par excellence during the debates cited above. The lack of efficiency has been suggested (ibid) as one of the main drawbacks of an expanded stakeholdership. However the case of Greenlandic fisheries reform shows that it was the coming into being of a powerful new stakeholder construct which facilitated a reform flow after a long period of inertia. But as the efficiency of this new stakeholder construct in implementing the reform also relied on the exclusion of alternative discussions and of the influence of other stakeholders, it becomes difficult to assess whether what emerged was an expanded or just a replaced stakeholdership. What is more clear is that if we perceive fishery reform as always being someone’s reform, the question of how to overcome inertia in fishery governance today may be approached by paying attention to policy networks and the ability of actors to defend new exclusions through symbolic re-constructions of actors, participation and democratic decision-making.
The challenges of a small society, which has a major stake in fishing, is a unique contribution that the example of Greenland makes to the literature on fishery policy making. In contrast to larger polities such as the EU, fishery reforms in Greenland are immediately recognised by local actors as representing a democratic challenge that transcends fishery policy. The policy networks defined as the ‘Grand reform’ and the ‘Protectors of coastal activities’ are not retained to issues of fisheries, but expands into the heart of Greenlandic democracy and national development. The ‘Grand reform’ network is generally supporting economic reforms focussing on the market and globalisation using economic forces to foster development, whereas the ‘Protectors of coastal activities’ in general is concerned with upholding coastal communities and maintaining status quo. This became clearly evident on March 12 2013 when a new government was voted in and Siumut returned to power. The change of power echoed the words of IA politician Aqqaluk Egede, quoted above: “if things do not go according to the will of the people, then others will be elected. That is where democracy is anchored”. Policy networks such as the ‘Grand reform’ network is generally influential, but it is still at the mercy of the very institution of national Parliament elections. Space does not allow for a detailed discussion of democracy and fishery policy in Greenland here, but the subject is pursued in (Jacobsen 2013b) in which it is argued, that through the formation of fishery policy networks, Greenland is deeply engaged in a process of radical democratic politics (as defined by Laclau and Mouffe 1985) where the very constitution, promotion and out-phasing of identities are at stake.

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1 On March 12 2013 Siumut was voted back in power with Aleqa Hammond in front. IA and the Democrat party lost the coastal voters that had tipped the balance in 2009. The new winners of Parliamentary power as well as the media and voters interviewed in the coastal town of Ilulissat all pointed to the fishery reforms as one of the key reasons for the change in voting behaviour. The new Minister of Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, Carl Lyberth from Siumut, has announced that he will work towards re-installing the ‘rubber boot’ paragraph. This turn of events indicates that the last word on the ‘real’ fishery stakeholder constituency in Greenland has not yet been said.
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When social sustainability becomes politics – perspectives from Greenlandic fisheries governance

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Alyne E. Delaney, ad@ifm.aau.dk
Innovative Fisheries Management (IFM), Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, Nybrogade 14, 9000 Aalborg, DENMARK

Rikke Becker Jacobsen*, rbj@ifm.aau.dk
IFM and Greenland Climate Research Centre, c/o Greenland Institute of Natural Resources
Kivioq 2, P.O. Box 570, 3900 Nuuk, Greenland

*Corresponding Author
ABSTRACT

Social science researchers have put considerable effort into identifying social sustainability in ways that reflect local experiences and relevant processes of change and which may serve to inform policy-making. Yet, the process of defining the concept of social sustainability can impact the form development takes. We ask then, what are the dominant ways of thinking about social sustainability in the social sciences when it comes to Greenland and the Arctic and what are the actual impacts of social sustainability talk on policy-making and development in this context? Ever since the beginning of its independence process, Greenland has found itself in the midst of a push for profits from old and new industries to finance its welfare state. Meanwhile, the social sciences have increasingly focused on local livelihoods and the mixed economy as important for human well-being in the Arctic. This schism is driving the “social sustainability” discourse onto a political battlefield where the term acts as social resistance to the dominant Greenlandic governance regime. This runs counter to the idea that social scientists provide straightforward, neutral scientific advice to decision-makers with studies and recommendations. Yet, in the Greenlandic context, the battleground of discourses can have no ‘neutral’ knowledge; the activation of competing discourses or knowledge is itself inherently politicized.

Keywords: Greenland; social sustainability; fisheries; policy-making; social science; Arctic communities; Social Impact Assessment
List of abbreviations

SLICA. Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic
UNESCO. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
GNP. Gross National Product
MOST. Management Of Social Transformation
AHDR. Arctic Human Development Report
ASI. Arctic Social Indicators
ITQ. Individual Transferrable Quota
TAC. Total allowable catch
SIA. Social Impact Assessment
KNAPK. Association of Fishers and Hunters in Greenland
GA. Employers’ Association of Greenland

Introduction

The concept of social sustainability has played an important role in identifying social science research questions for over a decade. No clear definition exists and many scholars do indeed agree that local context-specific definitions need to be worked out from community to community. The analytical content of local social sustainabilities are therefore often shaped by a particular time and space. Furthermore, social sustainability studies often play a role in identifying important nexuses for human development. As a concept in concerned dialogue with human development it engages, perhaps in a more direct way than other concepts, with ‘the way development is going’ and one may expect it to enter into a dialogue with the planning regimes of the particular times and spaces. So next to the question of how to define the analytical content of the concept in a way that is sensitive to issues of current developments, it is also relevant to ask: “But what do the emergent concepts of social sustainability then do to policy-making?
Insofar social sustainability studies wish to affect the planning regimes of their time, are they then able to? One may expect the answer to vary with the specific planning regimes just as the analytical content of ‘social sustainability’ varies with the specific communities under study. On the other hand, the concept of social sustainability may in itself also carry the historical legacy of a general tendency to position itself in opposition to ‘the way things are going’, acting like resistance and thus, often meeting resistance? This article would like to make this inquiry based on a review of the concept of social sustainability in a global, Arctic and Greenlandic context. In the final analysis of the impact of social sustainability studies on planning, we include a case in which we as social science researchers identified and delivered to the Greenlandic self-rule planners, dilemmas of social development connected with a structural reform of the coastal Greenland halibut fisheries. These dilemmas, we argue, included prevalent discussions of social sustainability in the Arctic and as we re-visit our own experience to construct our ‘case’, we analyze our ability to influence ‘the way things were going’ in the light of the possibilities and limitations inherent in prevalent definitions of social sustainability to influence the developments to which they speak

**Defining social sustainability – defining the context**

Up through the 2000s, reviews of definitions and ways of measuring social sustainability have emerged (e.g., Pepperdine and Ewing 2001; McKenzie 2004; Koning 2002; Scott et al. 2000, Davidson 2009). The history of the concept links to that of the sustainability concept in general, which came out of the 1960s in response to concerns about environmental degradation. The Bundtland report (WCED 1987) introduced the theme of ‘rural community sustainability’ that encompassed social, environmental/ecological and economic sustainability. An early way of approaching the social dimension was through the development and monitoring of the Gross National Product (GNP) while later discussions put
focus on measurements that made more sense locally (Pepperdine and Ewing 2001). While social sustainability was the least explored of the three sustainability dimensions to start with, it has been argued that it is now seen as a topic that is social at its core addressing for example ‘how societies can shape their modes of change’ where social sustainability is defined as ‘the viability of socially shaped relationships between society and nature over longer periods of time’ (Koning 2002). With reference to Philip Sutton, Mckenzie (2004) alerts to the fact that ‘sustainability is always about maintaining something and to understand the concept you need first identify the focus of concern’. The literature reveals that even within its relatively short life-span, the concept of social sustainability has been re-modelled to accommodate new foci of concerns. Writing from the platform of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Koning (2002) argues that not only does the concept gain its relevance from former end-of-the-world scenarios and concern for the carrying-capacity of the world that inspired the definition of the Bundtland Commission, it also speaks to larger social transformations today related to globalisation and urbanisation. Globalization is accompanied by new patterns of risk, inequality and polarization and urbanization has led to concerns about work and employment, security, quality of life and governability: all themes relating to new concerns for social sustainability. Koning has looked into the concept of ‘social capital’ to understand social sustainability and based on various studies of social capital Koning observes: “In general terms social sustainability (both in rural and urban context) refers to a society that is socially just, equal, without social exclusion and with a decent quality of life, or livelihood, for all. It cannot be denied that there is hardly disagreement on this. As such, social sustainability is both a means and an end…” (Koning 2002: 70). From a different angle, Scott et al. (2000) argued that social sustainability should replace the concept of ‘sustainable rural communities’ as both the concept of ‘rural’ and ‘community’ are subject to colonization by dominant groups who make them serve their
interests and perspectives. Social sustainability, on the other hand, should focus on principles such as livelihood, social participation, justice and equity, they argue.

In addition to identifying the concept and its potential within social sciences as well as within politics, there is considerable literature on social sustainability which focuses on finding methods to measure social sustainability. Pepperdine and Ewing (2001) observed that common practice, at the time of writing, had been to identify social sustainability as a condition and then to define indicators to measure that condition with. As examples mentioned is United Nations UNESCO’s Management of Social Transformation (MOST) programme concerned with the social sustainability of various social policies, Australia’s bureau of statistics and the model developed by the Western Australian Council of Social Services (the WACOSS model) in connection with housing issues. Koning (2002) has looked to ‘social capital’ as a way to measure and monitor social sustainability taking a point of departure in the Dutch Brabant Centre for Sustainable Development (the TELOS project) that tried to monitor sustainable development in the Dutch province of Brabant. It defined social sustainability as the achievement of certain capitals identified through literature review and local consultation. Koning concluded that social capital, with its focus on community possession of resources through networks, was a fruitful concept but too narrow. Other important concepts included social cohesion, inequality, stratification and multiculturalism.

Major methodological challenges to the condition/indicator model has been identified by Pepperdine and Ewing (2001). Conditions and indicators are difficult to distinguish from each other and no evidence of causality between the two exists. Furthermore, the conditions and indicators are either too broad to fit local contexts or, developed directly on a local context, they are too specific to be transferred to other cases. Koning (2002) has argued that the social
sustainability definitions can be generalized, but that indicators must be (re)developed in specific contexts.

In the Arctic and in Greenland, social science researchers have engaged in discussions of social sustainability and affiliated concepts. At the level of conceptual developments, one of the most encompassing endeavors has probably been the pan-arctic Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) of 2004 and the subsequent development of Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) in 2010. The mission of the AHDR was to explore livelihood and welfare in the Arctic and identify issues relevant to the Arctic next to those identified by the Human Development Index of the United Nations. The method was a literature review of existing social scientific knowledge about the Arctic communities and as such, the results can also be said to reflect the prevalent research foci of the social scientific community. A range of Arctic issues was identified and these evolved around control of destiny, cultural continuity and a close relationship to nature and land. The report provides a synthesis of existing knowledge to assess the current state within a wide range of spheres including demography, culture, economy, political systems, legal systems, resource governance, community viability, human health and well-being, education, gender issues and circumpolar international relations and geopolitics. As a follow-up on the AHDR the Arctic Social Indicators project (2010) discussed a range of arctic social indicators and their potential for developing to measuring Arctic well-being over time for policy purposes. Another encompassing conceptual project, which was also implemented, was the ‘Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic’ (SLICA): Inuit, Saami and the Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka’. This project set out to develop a new research design to measure living conditions and individual well-being relevant to inuit, saami and other indigenous peoples. The initiative came from Statistics Greenland under Greenland Selfrule, deeming that new measurements of living conditions
designed specifically to the Arctic region was needed. A 1997 survey of living conditions based on the Scandinavian model had presented dilemmas that were difficult to explain in conventional well-being terms: why do many people choose to remain in their communities despite poor housing conditions and low material standard of living? Conventional economic indices provided insufficient explanation. Based on consultation with indigenous groups and researchers from various disciplines and under an indigenous steering group, alternative indicators were developed around the role of household production, mixed cash-local harvest economy, family relationships, spirituality, social adjustment and support and ethnic identity.

The survey was conducted in Canada (2001), Alaska (2002-2003), Greenland (2004-2006) and Chukotka (2004-2006). It was able to conclude that productive activities, the presence of production opportunities (i.e. fish and game, jobs) and a sense of local control are associated with satisfaction with life as a whole (Poppel et al.). Whereas SLICA does not operate directly with the concept of social sustainability, the concepts it developed dovetails with other discussions of social sustainability in the Arctic under the aforementioned Arctic Council program on the social aspects of sustainable developments – such as the importance of faith control and connection to land.

The continuation in itself of local livelihoods has received particular attention in discussions of social sustainability in the Arctic and in Greenland in particular. As such, Arctic community studies are similar to the fishing community research that discusses social policy impacts in terms of impacts on fishery dependent communities (e.g. Symes 2000, Jacob, Jepson and Farmer 2005). Nuttall (2002) has for example been concerned with the continuation of local livelihoods and cultures claiming that “the viability of arctic coastal communities depends on the long-term sustainability of local livelihoods and economies based on the resources of the sea.” Threats to the continuation of these livelihoods and
economies are identified as 1) the restructuring of fisheries including a shift from local to international enterprises and the redistribution of wealth from traditional actors to more powerful global players; overfishing, national subsidies to the fishing industry; restrictions on market sale of sea mammals internationally; changing community dynamics as a fishery to a lesser extent than hunting depends upon and reproduces relations based on kinship; inserting Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) due to concentration of power and wealth, enclosure of commons and exclusion of women; negative climate change effect on fish stocks; persistent organic pollutants in the Arctic sea. Local livelihoods has also received attention by Rasmussen (1999) who takes a point of departure in the Arctic Settlement pattern and its development characterized by a shift from self-sufficiency to increased dependence on other regions and where a seemingly paradox exists in the fact that a decentralized settlement structure persist in spite of centralization policies. Rasmussen has argued for a practical approach to the concept of social sustainability that is not for deep academic scrutinizing but for structuring discussions and securing that important dimensions in the development process is taken into consideration. Rasmussen identifies issues of social sustainability as being defined in the context of five conflicts in Greenlandic planning: 1) Centralization versus decentralization – the most prominent conflict 2) small versus large scale production 3) whether to look towards renewable or non-renewable resources for development 4) monopoly versus market economy 5) self-reliance versus dependency. Rasmussen argues that defining the concept of social sustainability is a continuous process and the key is to develop ways of measuring it: But in Greenland there is no need to start from scratch as there is a development process to build on: “there is an income structure and therefore also a formal economy which is very dependent either on transfers or single sources which makes it vulnerable. But there is also a strong informal sector which is stabilizing the development process i.e. reducing vulnerability and there is a strong subsistence sector which reduces vulnerability further”
(Rasmussen 1999: 227). Thus, Rasmussen is particularly concerned with how to enhance stability. As positive factors he identifies the subsistence economy, a robust settlement structure and a continuation of local communities. As threats he identifies campaigns against traditional survival methods of sealing and whale hunting together with dependency on transfers. In relation Greenlandic marine resource management, Sejersen (2003) has linked social sustainability to the inclusion of local perspectives and local knowledge and to fairness in distribution of access rights.

Based on the literature review, we observe that social sustainability as a concept may have come to a place in its history where, first emerging from a reaction to the negative consequences of western civilization, it has now linked to some broadly (though not universally) recognized principles as those identified above (justice, equity, security, participation, multiculturalism etc.). Context specific definitions and indicators are developed on very different cases, yet they often seem to shape the concept in the language of these principles. In the Arctic context discussions of social sustainability have been quite encompassing and effort has been put into developing definitions and indicators that reflect prevalent concerns in the Arctic such as self-control, connection to land and the continuation of livelihood and culture. It can hardly be denied that these issues stand in relation to the region’s recent history of external impacts and policy responses: centralization of settlements, shifts in dominant modes of production, loss of local control, etc.).

The point made that social sustainability is about sustaining something seems as relevant as ever in the Arctic and Greenlandic case. And local livelihoods have received particular attention in this regard. In a general fisheries management context, it has been argued (Johnsons 2006) that small-scale fisheries often have been attributed with the characteristics of social sustainability. They have come to represent counter-narratives to the three dominant
narratives informing social and economic development: modernization, state socialism and globalism. He argues that “small-scale fisheries have a particularly iconic role in these narratives of change because they stand for a traditional sector to be modernized or, as has been the case in more recent years, they stand for counter narratives of social justice and ecological sustainability”. But, Johnsons argues, the categorization is problematic and the target should be to pursue the values that the category is said to represent rather than the category in itself. In the Arctic context, however, there seems to be a shared focus on local livelihoods and the smaller-scale modes of production that are often connected with them – particularly the hunting and subsistence activities. To conclude that they represent counter-narratives to modernization, state socialism and globalism will, however, be imprecise: authoritative works in the Arctic have explicitly argued that these local ways of lives have incorporated modernity (Dahl 2000, AHDR 2011). Nevertheless, the local communities still stand out as something not mainstream after this ‘incorporation’ and it cannot be denied either, as shown in the literature review above, that a certain unease prevails that ‘local livelihoods can only take so much’ (AHDR 2011:211-212).

The content of social sustainability and its operationalisation is often developed with an eye to its application. They often respond to a range of ‘concerns’ emerging as a response to current developments be it a specific policy or general ‘unprecedented change.’ There are often ambitions to let it function as a tool to monitor policies and inform decision-makers. Drawing on Zizeck and Mouffe, Davidson (2009) even argues that in a time of post-politics where consensus prevail over neo-liberal regimes and most issues are perceived and treated technocratic, social sustainability can open up basic discussion of ‘where do we want to go with society?’ When debates today are not taken due to lack of imagination of place based politics as to their external effects or due to cynicism in social consciousness, social
sustainability may help social issues enter the field and politics being activated. It is difficult to say what effects the projects on social sustainability have actually had on national politics in the Arctic. Have they informed policy and have they even managed to open up basic discussions of ‘where do we want to go’ that challenge the way we are already going? The question is large and complex and to answer it in full is beyond this article. One may expect the answer to vary with the specific planning regimes. On the other hand, the concept of social sustainability may in itself also carry the historical legacy of a general tendency to position itself in opposition to on-going policy-making, acting like resistance and thus, often meeting resistance? The next section illuminates this question based on a case-study of how we as science researchers investigated some common social sustainability problems in relation to a new policy being formulated and the way our results were or were not integrated into the on-going policy-making process when delivered.

**Dilemmas of social sustainability in Greenlandic fisheries governance**

The case-study presented here forms part of a three year research project on power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance. As social scientists we studied the working process behind a management plan for the coastal Greenland Halibut fisheries by means of participant observation in the ministerial working group in charge of formulating the plan, informal conversations with its members and studies of the evolving documents. The management plan was to introduce an ITQ system into the fishery that has hitherto been conducted on an Olympic basis (free fishing by all until the total allowable catch (TAC) was exhausted). Over a thousand licenses had at the time been granted to ‘small entities’ such as dog sledges, dinghies, snow mobiles together with boats of cutter size, thus reflecting a fishery with a large number of participants and interests. One of the main goals of the management plan was to secure the biological sustainability and increase the profitability of
the fishing fleet by reducing the number of participants (Medlem af Naalakkersuisut for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug 2011). As social scientists we first observed this work from the side in order to understand the rationalities at play. At the same time we were, due to previous research experiences and studies, aware of other cases around the world where ITQs had been introduced and the dilemmas that ITQ may present (Bromley 2008; Pauly 2008; Macinko and Bromley 2004; Pálsson and Helgason 2000). We were in particular alert to the possible impacts such a structural change would entail for the communities. The communities in Northern Greenland that engage in the fishery have few alternatives for monetary income and furthermore, recent prominent social science studies (as reflected in the work on social sustainability in the Arctic above) have documented the importance of the mixed cash/hunting economy and the cultural meaning of fishing and harvesting activities. We therefore asked the working group if it was interested in our research team conducting a preliminary social impact assessment (SIA) of the management plan and the offer was accepted. The working group itself was all but blind to the possibility that the management plan could have a range of possible negative impacts next to the expected positive ones. Together we decided upon the Upernavik community which was visited in the summer 2011.

The preliminary SIA (Delaney, Hendriksen and Jacobsen 2012) was based on interviews from the 2011 fieldwork together with interviews conducted by another member of our research team on earlier visits in the village of Upernavik and surrounding settlements. Statistics collected and analyzed in connection with another three year research project on the sustainability of Greenlandic settlements also played a major part of the analysis together with a general literature review. The analysis articulated many of the perspectives that had shaped the discussions of ‘social sustainability’ in the Arctic context: As an underlying premise it was concerned with the continuance of local livelihoods and communities and it included a
specific emphasis on the importance of the fishery for the working of the mixed cash/subsistence/informal economy. It was also concerned with principles of equity and local participation in decision-making. The study presented a number of likely positive and negative impacts on the individual and the community level.

With a separate quota for larger and smaller boats, the SIA study observes that some small-scale fishers will have their quota protected. Meanwhile, other small-scale fishers will lose a supplementary, yet vital, source of cash income needed for their mixed economy. Such cash is needed, for example, to purchase hunting equipment (bullets, gasoline, etc.), pay for housing, etc. This income otherwise enables fishers to pay the municipality back for their social transfer payments. Those who have fished under a shared license will not be able to fish from 2012. The lack of area restrictions, (potentially) places Upernavik dinghy fishers at a disadvantage; southern fishers may come north in the summer and help deplete Upernavik’s quota, and then continue to fish in the south where they will have more quota remaining. This can be seen with dinghy fishers and not only the larger boats. The closure of the fishery for new entrants will mean younger men coming in to the fishery will have to wait to be able to fish independently, or not fish at all, with no foreseeable means of employment. The plan potentially sets up inequity between the two groups: the government states explicitly in their management proposal that large boats will be “guaranteed a minimum quota and do not risk that the quota will be fished by other fishers in case of illness, technical problems or the like” (2012). Small-scale fishers are not given the same guarantees.

The study also concludes that the plan may also have far-reaching impacts at the community level. Upernavik is a northern district with a limited amount of alternative livelihood opportunities: if the young men can not fish, what will they do to earn a livelihood? The only
suggestion proposed is the possibility of working in the new industries such as mines, but these options are neither available now, nor are they necessarily desired or healthy. They also do not fit with local culture, as the experiences of Nalunaaq have shown. Nalunaaq is the site of a small gold mine in south Greenland. The mine has been in operation for at least ten years, but it has not succeeded in filling more than half of the 100 jobs with Greenlandic workers. Some of the reasons for the difficulty in keeping Greenlandic workers are cultural; most people do not wish to live long-term in barracks with only short visits home with their families; they also refuse to accept the working conditions found in the mine. If the Nalunaaq mine has failed to attract and keep Greenlandic workers, the question of what success future mines will have should be asked. Still, if the young people or men do decide to leave the settlements for work, the next question is where will they live? Waiting lists for public housing are very long and public housing is also very expensive. In Nuuk, the housing list is reputed to be decades-long. In Upernavik, one informant spoke of her mother waiting a very long time for a house from the public housing list, and once one (in very poor condition) was available, the rent was 8000 DKK per month; an expense well beyond her means.

Communities will also be impacted through a further reduction in the traditional practice of sharing meat and food among community members. This practice of meat gift-giving is still important in the North, especially in the settlements. The supplementary income earned through fishing income helps hunters meet these social obligations and customs of generalized reciprocity (From et. al 1975). The rise of anomie from lack of opportunities combined with stress from changing social conditions such as through not being able to meet obligations of reciprocity, or being forced to migrate for employment should not be underestimated. Anomie is “defined as a state or condition of individuals or society characterised by a breakdown of social priorities and values” (Waldman 2010:1). Migration and movement, combined with “poor social ties and large, unpredictable events” can evoke
anomie (Kelly 2003: 468). As Kelly describes (2003), Durkheim used the term in his work to “describe a state in which norms are confused, unclear or absent, and where there are large-scale social changes that the individual cannot understand, let alone control” (Kelly 2003: 468). Though Kelly is writing about mental illness and Durkheim spoke of suicides, the concept is an important one for resource-dependent communities, especially in this era of globalisation. In a world in which the life of the individual is shaped by global events which seem to lie beyond the individual’s control, feelings of anomie increase (Kelly 2003). Symptoms of anomie can be seen socially through rising crime rates and increased substance (alcohol and drug) abuse. This has been documented in declining resource dependent communities such as in fisheries, forestry, and mining (Wilson 1998). Thus, it would appear Upernavik residents could be faced with feelings of anomie in the future, just as Greenlandic society could probably be said to have faced it in the past with its history of colonization and forced migration (From, et. al. 1975).

In considering the community, the issue of social grants should also be considered. In Upernavik there is a tradition whereby when a fisher receives a social grant from the municipality, Upernavik Seafood helps ensure this money is paid back in installments each time the fisher sells fish. This means that social grants are used as a sort ‘thrift institution’. As a result of this system, Upernavik appears to have one the lowest social grants per capita in all Greenland. Yet if the hunters and fishers loose their opportunity to sell fish, the social grant averages in the district will increase to at least the national levels, straining municipal resources. Also, the value of the subsistence economy should not be underestimated. A number of vital goods and foods are obtained through hunting and bartering in their informal economy which wages can not make up for. Finally, the vulnerability seen in the form of climate change cannot be overlooked. Often, it is the cumulative impacts which thrust communities over the edge from healthy to struggling communities (Delaney 2007). For
example, when fisheries management introduced the cod recovery plan for North Sea cod, it was not only the new regulations which impacted fishers, but the measures on top of other management plans (e.g. plaice and sole long term management plan) and increasing fuel costs. Often one challenge can be met, but cumulative impacts may prove too much. In Upernavik, and indeed all of Greenland, climate change is a serious issue. Changes in wildlife migratory patterns and sea ice coverage, for example, should also be considered when investigating livelihoods and community sustainability.

These possible impacts were presented in the concluding chapter of a report handed over to the management plan working group in February 2012 and distributed to the interest organizations representing the Greenlandic fishers and hunters (the Association of Greenlandic Fishers and Hunters, KNAPK) and the fishing companies (Employers’ Association of Greenland, GA), the fishing and processing industry (Polar Seafood, Royal Greenland ltd.), the committee of fishing and hunting within the Greenland self-rule parliament and the municipality of Qaasuitsup that encompasses the most important coastal fisheries for Greenland halibut. On October 5th 2011 we published a public letter in the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq – a popular medium for politicians and others for presenting opinions - wherein we pointed to the difficult political dilemmas of distribution of rights and wealth entailed by the management plan and the risk that the expected increase in profits in the formal economy of a few boats may be compromised by the general deterioration of the mixed economy in the hunting and fishing districts if access rights to the fishery is to decrease dramatically.
Social sustainability – a concept in opposition?

In 2009 Symes and Phillipson wrote an article headlined ‘whatever became of social objectives in fisheries policy?’ Here they argue that social concerns have disappeared from view in western world with neo-liberal discourse emphasizing national growth which is simply expected to automatically trickle down. The article expressed a concern with the viability of coastal communities and presented, in our opinion, a normative message that social issues ought to inform fisheries policies. In the Greenland management plan, Greenland self-rule puts its trust in ITQ as the best means to restructure the fishery in a way that would benefit society at large the most. In economic terms, it focused on the formal taxable economy as a goal and market mechanisms as the means. The context of the Greenlandic economy is important to understand this choice: Since 1979 Greenland has gradually been taking over the political decision-making and administration from Denmark. Greenland took over a state infrastructure that was far too costly for its home production relying on the use of its renewable marine resources (Dahl 1986). The running of its modern welfare state has up until today had Greenland depend on transfers from the Danish state. Since the establishment of Home-rule up to the Self-rule of today, Greenland has been and is still struggling not only to pay the expenses of a modern welfare state but also to gain economic and hence ‘real’ independence for Denmark. So while fisheries management regimes across the world may have a tendency to aim for general national growth, the incentives for doing so by Greenlandic politicians and public administrators may actually be particularly strong. This observation is not new. Furthermore, Greenlandic nation-building and the development rationalities of an anonymous category of ‘politicians’ and ‘administrators’ has before been identified as one of the main reasons for the deterioration of local livelihoods in Greenland (Nuttall 1992). As Rasmussen also observed, centralization and decentralization is probably the most prevalent conflict in Greenlandic planning (Rasmussen 1999).
Analysis like the one we presented in the preliminary SIA to the working group is not new in a Greenlandic context either. One may even argue that it was just yet another analysis along well-know lines in the arctic social scientific tradition. But the perspective it represented had not been included in the management plan. Nor was it included after our study: The structural reform is being implemented without further measures being developed to ease what we estimated to be likely negative impacts of the plan. The case-study presented here is thereby a case of social sustainability not having an impact on ‘where things are going’. To analyze why something was not included is methodologically difficult and it certainly presupposes a certain perspective of interest; the loud silence that followed the handing over of the preliminary SIA and the public letter may only have been loud to those who actually perceive of this silence as a ‘problem’. But asking the managers within the working group what reactions had been, we were told that the head of the Ministry’s administration was surprised our public letter had not prompted any reactions within Parliament, thus perhaps indicating that the administration does not see itself as a player in the decision-making but places political agency with the politicians. This is in line with other findings of the way the Ministry’s administrators see themselves and their role (Jacobsen and Raakjær 2012). This self-image is interesting considering the power the administrators actually possess in designing – though not finally approving - the detailed content of the new regulation.

Another reaction, we were told, was that other administrators might have perceived the study as belonging to a certain type of studies that is somewhat idealizing village life. There may be additional explanations for the ‘silence’ that we are not aware of: the report or letter wasn’t read, the issues were too complex to include within the tight timeframe, the study could have been perceived as being of a poor quality and so on. In this article however, we would like to pursue one type of explanation (while not dismissing other likely explanations), which is
connected to the perception of such a thing as a category of village-idealizing studies and the possible tendency of such studies to be dismissed by some politicians and administrators.

In Greenland it is possible to observe a certain dichotomy between the continuation and interest of the dispersed coastal settlements and small-scale fishers on the one hand and neoliberalism and the interest of the nation state and the larger scale fishing industries on the other. It is possible to date this conflict back to the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s that brought industrialization and centralization to the country, but which also prompted an elitist political movement towards self-government as a reaction to village closures and the dire social consequences that followed (Dahl 1986). As pointed out above, the challenges faced by local communities have since been identified regularly by the social sciences – perhaps to such an extent that the social sciences have even played a role upholding the dichotomy. Still, the dichotomy is even harder defined in the ‘live’ political discussions in Self-rule parliament. Accusations of ‘capitalist’ interests overruling the small Greenlandic fisher were put strongly forward by the Siumut party in recent discussions of a reform of the fishery bill. From another perspective the former chairman Hans Enoksen from the Siumut party has gained the nickname of ‘the village partisan’ because he is said to actively promote the interest of the villages. The administration in the fishery department is aware of the dichotomy which is witnessed by their ability to joke with it: One day during fieldwork in the Ministry, one administrator noticed his colleague’s background picture on the PC. It showed colorful Greenlandic wooden houses at a fiord – an archetypical picture of a Greenlandic settlement - and he jokingly asked his colleague if he was a ‘village partisan’. In the context of fisheries, to preserve small-scale fisheries is also perceived as the stagnation of development as expressed in an informal conversation during fieldwork with a democrat politician and members of government and the Parliament’s fishing committee. One of the authors told that
she was surprised to hear about the general plans to out-fase the small-scale fisheries in Greenland considering the fact that much of the anthropological literature describes how important it is for Inuit to engage with their marine environment. To answer the question, the politician explained that as he envisioned the fishery, it was important not to keep it in the state of an ‘open air museum’. All these examples serve not so much to place this or that actor with this or that perspective and to define the political camps because any such pattern is not unambiguous. We simply wish to state the fact that discussions on ‘the maintenance of local livelihoods’ in the form of ‘villages’ or ‘local small fisheries’ is far from unknown to administrators and politicians. These discussions are, in fact, already politicized and ready-to-wear positions in the policy-making scenery.

In a political environment such as the Greenlandic one, social sustainability understood as ‘the maintenance of local livelihoods’ can hardly be value neutral. If anything, it speaks directly to one of the most stubborn dilemmas in Greenlandic planning and politics. This brings challenges to the perception of social scientists offering value neutral advice on ‘social sustainability’ to fisheries management. The discourse we applied in making our analysis is already inherently politicized. It has been said that ‘social sustainability’ should be a pragmatic concept, that it should speak to policy, inform policy and monitor policy impacts. But being the ‘concerned’ concept that it is, it may be more accurate to describe it as a watchdog keeping an eye on the specific development it has already identified as ‘problematic’? In the Greenlandic and Arctic case, the ‘problematic’ development is the one that undermines local livelihoods.

When applied in practice to open up a dialogue with policy makers, the problem of having an impact may be illuminated by looking to Bourdieu (1997) and approaching the social
scientific practice as being stretched out between two types of practices: that of the social engineer and that of the critical scientist. Bourdieu has said that “To ask the sociology to serve something is always a way of asking it to serve the power. Its scientific function in contrast consists in understanding the social world including, first and foremost, power” (1997: 32. Translated from Danish). The social engineer serves the policy makers with studies and perspectives, but from the perspective of the dominant class:

“A considerable part of those who define themselves as sociologists or national economists, are social engineers who have as their purpose to supply leaders in private corporations or public administrations with guiding for action. They offer a rationalization of the practical or semi-intellectual recognition that members of the dominating class has of the social world ” (1997: 32. Translation from Danish).

But in the context of social sustainability studies, it seems that a critical approach is quite prevalent; at the sight of it, these studies do not wish to serve power on the premises of the powerful understood as those who currently define ‘the way development is going.’ In social sustainability studies the social scientist is, it seems, particularly alert to the negative impacts of the policy-making power. Social sustainability – or let us be precise, those social actors who apply the concept: social scientists - may very well not wish to advocate any specific policy, but it would like to ‘draw attention to policy relevant findings’ as for example the Arctic Human Development Report phrases it (2004: 9). But the dilemma when it comes to the impact of social sustainability talk may very well be that it is not at all easy for the social sciences to have its cake and eat it too. The twin purpose of serving power and distancing oneself from power may be at odds with itself. If policy relevant findings on ‘social sustainability’ are perceived as being not entirely neutral by the targeted governance regime, it may be because they are not. ‘Drawing attention to’ is not a particularly politically neutral
action and the findings are immediately driven into a political battlefield where they act like resistance to the development they wish to ‘draw attention to.’

This need not present an insurmountable existential problem to the social sciences – postmodernism has already commented on this problem at length. But thus having thought about studies of ‘social sustainability’ it in the context of Greenlandic fisheries management, we are a little less surprised if arguments of social sustainability are sometimes not that straight forwardly delivered and received. And we would like to support Davidson’s finding (2009) that social sustainability holds a potential for politics. From our case we would in fact like to add that the concept is prone to be born from politics. The opening – or continued re-opening - of politics is indeed a possibility. But what if the problem is not one of pure hegemony but of existing politics? If the concept is defined within some of society’s most stubborn conflicts, the politics it wishes to open may be very well known already and held positions may be very hard to loosen up. This is one of the challenges the concept and associated social scientific practices may face when it seeks to have a ‘relevant’ impact on real world issues.

References


