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**PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT:  
LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT TRACK**

by  
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PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT TRACK

Abstract

There is a structural correspondence between the military and the civilian part of society. The purpose here is to identify models of development that breed peace as well as development. Discussing the virtues and drawbacks of "Mainstream" - and "Another Development"-models the article suggests an incompatibility between the peace/security and the welfare dimension of development. While a vision of positive peace is supported, the assertion is that this goal must be partially sacrificed for the achievement of other goals of development.



Georg Sørensen

PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT TRACK

Introduction

In 1967 - close to the peak of the roaring sixties in an economic sense, and on the threshold of a phase of detente between the USA and USSR on the military front - a report was published in the US, pointing to the extreme dangers to Western society posed by the prospects of a lasting world peace. 'The 'Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace' saw peace and disarmament as threat to development.<sup>1</sup> Fourteen years later - with the economic crisis of the West entering its second decade and amidst a new Cold War between East and West - the problematique has been reversed: disarmament is seen as a precondition for development, and it is suggested that the world is in for a choice; it can "either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigor, or move consciously and with deliberate speed toward a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both."<sup>2</sup>

This latter message is clear enough: spend more on development and less on arms in order to achieve development. A sympathetic viewpoint, although there are large technical problems involved in realizing it and more importantly, there is no straightforward relationship between increased resources to development and a more peaceful world.<sup>3</sup>

While the authors of the Iron Mountain Report and the Thorsson Report disagree fundamentally on the relationship between peace/disarmament and development they do, however, have something in common also: both tend to take the issue of what kind of 'development' that is desirable for granted, leaving it to conventional wisdom: development as modernization, industrialization, and economic growth. In other words, from the viewpoint of alternative development thinking and research, both the Iron

Mountain and the Thorsson reportwriters represent the same, conventional point of view. The danger is, of course, that the whole knitty gritty thing of the peace and development problem threatens to escape this kind of thinking, if it can be demonstrated that the possibility for peace is closely related to the kind of development pursued by groups of people, on local, national and global levels.

This is exactly the starting point adopted by some recent contributions which draw on peace as well as development research.<sup>4</sup> The aim is that of identifying 'peace intensive' models of development. Thus, a certain kind of development is seen as a condition for peace, both in its narrow sense as absence of hot war and in its broad sense, as positive peace.<sup>5</sup>

The basic argument of these contributions is that conflict and armament is fed by conventional, mainstream models of development aiming at modernization and growth, while peace and disarmament may be promoted by the development path conceptualized in counterpoint development thinking, aiming at "Another Development".<sup>6</sup>

The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the identification of development models that breed peace as well as development. In doing so I shall question the notion that "Another Development" may be the solution to our search for the "best" model of development. This requires a few initial notes on what the "best" model of development is all about.

### **The Right Track?**

There can be no uniform development path applicable to all countries, and there can be no "final" definition of what development is; only indications of what development should imply.<sup>7</sup> Following Galtung<sup>8</sup>, we may contend that the notion of development contains a universal dimension having to do with the material and non-material needs of man. Development may then be

said to imply the satisfaction of these needs for individuals and groups in a way that is unharmed to other people and to nature. Four groups of needs have been identified: survival (as opposed to destruction); welfare (material needs); freedom/rights (as opposed to repression); and identity (as opposed to alienation).

From this starting point, the notion of security may be said to involve the defense of survival, welfare, freedom and identity, in other words, the precondition for the satisfaction of material and non-material needs. In this way peace, like development, becomes a permanent social process, aiming at developing security and securing development for the single and for all human beings.<sup>9</sup>

Approaching the notions of peace and development in this manner means that both concepts become structurally interlocked: development (in a broad sense) becomes a condition for peace (in broad sense) and vice versa.

If we can agree on this description of "the goal", then the next question is this: looking at the real world, what kind of development path is closest to "the goal"? In other words, where are we able to identify - if at all - 'peace intensive' paths of development?

### **Mainstream Models of Development: All That Bad?**

The basic argument of the contributions mentioned in the introduction, searching for 'peace intensive' models of development, is that of a structural correspondence between the military and the civilian part of society. The structure of civilian society breeds certain forms of force and coercion. The hypothesis is that development in the "standard" meaning of the word (growth and modernization) "...serves the interest of the ruling elites rather than the people, and therefore the process of development has to be maintained by force or at best moderate forms of coer-

cion, depending on how much of the surplus can be spent on welfare. To maintain a coercive structure, more development of the same kind is needed, which necessitates even more coercion. Sustained growth consumes resources that usually must be found outside the borders of a particular nation-state - we may call this 'the world market' or 'the international division of labour' - and this struggle for resources implies violence, or the threat of violence, between states. Development thus means power and power means more development." "Mainstream development thinking can be analysed along a continuum running between two ideological antipoles 'socialism' versus 'capitalism', defined as state-orientation and market-orientation. ... This debate is largely about means, but as far as the ends are concerned, there is little difference between the various mainstream strategies (ranging from the Soviet model to neo-liberal monetarism). They all lead to Western-type 'modernity', institutionalized in structures such as the bureaucratic state, the industrial system, the professional elite, the techno-scientific system, the military-industrial complex etc."<sup>10</sup>

There is little doubt that this line of thinking contains an important element of truth: the organization of means of destruction tend to run parallel to the organization of the means of production, the catchwords being in this case: technology/capital intensive, professional, centralized, hierarchial, growth-oriented, etc.

How to change this state of affairs? That obviously depends on a more precise diagnosis of what is wrong; is it for example the way we produce (industrialization), our hierarchial and exploitative social structure (class society) or is it our basic ideas about life (the cosmology of Western Civilization)<sup>11</sup> that are primarily responsible for the breeding of arms race, internal and external conflict? The contributions referred to above hesitate to point to any specific element as sole or even prime responsible in this regard. Rather, the whole Western way



of development - mainstream development - is seen as one unified structure and it is this whole structure which is to blame. That is why a basic remoulding of the system in terms of "Another Development" (to be dealt with in detail below) is deemed necessary.

However, we know that not all mainstream models of development are equally militaristic and that not all of them make substantial contributions to the arms race, or generate very high levels of internal and external conflict. Even if military spending is significant in most "mainstream" countries, only very few of them come close to the levels of the superpowers, relatively speaking of course.<sup>12</sup> There are a number of countries, the Scandinavian ones, for example, where the link between a coercive apparatus and the internal suppression of the people is not too obvious. There are countries in which defense is organized in ways substantially different from the standard picture of technology-capitalintensive, professional, centralized, etc., cf. the example of Switzerland.<sup>13</sup>

All this should be taken to mean that even though a link between the role of coercion and conflict on the one hand and mainstream models of development on the other may be recognized, it is not a one-to-one connection: mainstream development breeds militaristic, conflict-ridden societies armed to the teeth, but also relatively peaceful societies in which militarism, arms and violence do not play a very important role.

It might be argued that this line of reasoning is erroneous because it focuses too narrowly on the single nation-state. In other words, the link between coercion/conflict and mainstream development should be made at the global level, with mainstream development models creating "internal" conflict (for example between East and West) and "external" conflict (for example between the First and the Third World, following the struggle for resources and markets). Conflict and coercion is then fed by the whole mainstream "system" of development, which

means that the link is on this level, leaving the situation of the single mainstream nation-state to be explained by other factors.

There may be some truth in this, but even in that case the automatic link between mainstream development of a single nation-state and the precise role of coercion and conflict would be broken, leaving us with something to be accounted for by something else than the simple diagnosis: this is a mainstream society, ergo it is ridden by militarism, coercion and conflict.

But the issue of mainstream development models should be approached from another angle also. What is actually the attraction of mainstream development models compared with the four dimensions of development mentioned in the previous section? There can be no doubt about it: the advantage of mainstream models is their huge capacity for producing goods, material satisfiers of all sorts. This is of course due to industrialization which is one of the basic pillars of the mainstream model. The capacity to produce goods seems to be highest in the market-oriented versions of the mainstream model; on the other hand, the planning-oriented versions seem to place a higher priority on an equal distribution of what is actually produced. The important point in the present context is that due to industrialization, mainstream development models have proven highly capable of producing goods and although some of these models do not score too high on the distributional side and some of them are so clever in churning out goods that the covering of material needs tends to turn into the threat of suffocation from too much materialism, the question must be asked: is industrialization necessary in order to take care of the welfare dimension (material needs) of the concept of development presented in the previous section? If the answer is yes, and if industrialization is recognized as something producing - or at least tending to producing - coercion and conflict, we are in for an incompatibility between the peace/security and the welfare dimension of development.

Industrialization is organized mass-production of goods. If we submit that the welfare dimension of development cover material needs that are also of a non-agricultural kind, then there are basic arguments in favour of industrialization in general, and of large-scale, concentrated industrial production in particular.<sup>14</sup>

- 1) The level of prosperity obtainable from agricultural production alone has a definite limit. This is due to the fact that the need of human beings for food is finite, i.e. the income elasticity of demand for food is limited. The argument does not call for establishment of industry everywhere, however, but for industrial economies to exist somewhere and for agricultural economies to be trading with them.
- 2) Mass production involves economies of scale. The latter are, however, only operative in certain industrial sectors.
- 3) External economies arising from the spatial concentration of industry. These do, however, depend on political conditions, and political actions can (at least to some extent) undermine them or offset them.

There are qualifications added to the arguments in favour of industrialization. It may thus be debated whether large scale industry is really necessary,<sup>15</sup> but I submit that some kind of industrialization is necessary in order to take care of the welfare dimension (material needs) involved in the conceptualization of development.<sup>16</sup> This involves both a measure of division of labour (but not necessarily one involving unequal exchange and exploitation) and of so-called modern, advanced technologies. Computers/microelectronics may, for example push development on the welfare dimension. It has even been argued that these technologies make decentralized, democratic structures a real possibility for the first time.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, there is little doubt that the employment of such technologies also makes the society that uses them more vulnerable than before.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, although the limits are rather wide as argued above, I submit that a certain incompatibility between the welfare and the peace/security dimension of development must be recognized.

This incompatibility or contradiction will be more or less serious depending on the kind of industrialization that is feasible and desirable in the single case. Desirability has to do with uncovered material needs. There is little doubt that many Third World countries want industrialization so badly that they are willing to accept almost any price in terms of vulnerability, pollution, exploitation, etc. in order to get it. The point in the present context is that it is not from the Third World countries we should expect a careful balancing of the welfare dimension of development against the other dimensions. Such initiatives should be expected to come from states where material needs is no longer a significant problem. (This is, incidentally, in accordance with the analysis by Marx, who "clearly believed that in some way human societies could, and must, pass through a phase of industrialization and urbanization, of the large-scale concentration of people, forces of production (technology) and capital, in order to use the knowledge and productive power acquired in that process to create afterwards a smaller-scale, more democratic and less alienated world under communism".<sup>19</sup>) This is, however, not at all the vision contained in "Another Development" to which we must now turn.

### **"Another Development": All That Good?**

The argument by proponents of "Another Development" is similar to the one presented above: there is an structural corespondence between the military and the civilian part of society. But this time, "Another Development" spells the building of a society that is structurally peaceful - in other words, a "peace intensive" model of development.<sup>20</sup>

The definition of "Another Development" proposed by the contribution that coined the concept<sup>21</sup> runs as follows:

Need-oriented (being geared to meeting human needs, both material and non-material).

Endogenous (stemming from the heart of each society, which defines in sovereignty its values and the vision of its future)

Self-reliant (implying that each society relies primarily on its own strength and resources in terms of its members' energies and its natural and cultural environment)

Ecologically sound (utilizing rationally the resources of the biosphere in full awareness of the potential of local ecosystems as well as the global and local outer limits imposed on present and future generations)

Based on structural transformation (so as to realize the conditions of self-management and participation in decision-making by all those affected by it, from the rural or urban community to the world as a whole, without which the above goals could not be achieved).

Following Björn Hettne, the vision of "Another Development" roughly corresponds to what is termed Counterpoint development thinking, the essence of which is "a negation of the modern complex. A society organized in accordance with counterpoint ideals would be physiocratic (the earth, the natural resources and the ecological balance constitute the ultimate preconditions for human existence), ultrademocratic (people must exercise control over their own situation), and structurally undifferentiated (the division of labour within and between societies should be limited to what may be considered as necessary exchange). If mainstream development thinking stresses either the state or the market, the counterpoint would rather emphasize the role of the local community."<sup>22</sup>

This is in many ways an attractive vision of development, but it also raises a number of problems when compared with the dimensions of development involved in "the right track", as discussed above. The first is of course the issue already raised in the previous section: Another Development is opting for a non-industrial society (at least when referring to "industrialization" in the conventional, mainstream meaning of the term). Will such a model be able to cover the welfare dimension of development? It was argued above that it was not; some measure of industrialization was necessary.

Even if this should turn out to be a wrong assertion there are several problems for Counterpoint development models left to deal with.

One such problem is about the possible carriers of Another Development, i.e. the social forces favouring this path of development. While the question is often left unanswered by proponents of this model, it is the merit of Hettne's discussion to bring it out in the open. In the context of the Third World two groups are pointed out. Firstly, the "traditionalist" movements "that resist penetration of modern structures (commercialization, industrialization, statebuilding and professionalization) and articulate on non-modern way of life. Their mobilization derives its strength from counterpoint values: non-Western civilizations and religions, local communities, subsistence economies etc."<sup>23</sup> Secondly, the marginalized - people "pushed out from the modern sector and finding rescue in the subsistence economies".<sup>24</sup>

The lining up of such forces behind Another Development contains one fundamental problem: the simple fact that social groups can be indentified as non- or even anti-modern, anti-mainstream development, does in no way secure that these same groups are in favour of the sympathetic goals included in a Counterpoint development path, or, in turn, the four dimensions of development outlined above. Thus, the Islamic revitalization movement is certainly anti-modern; but it is hard to find the notions of ultra-democracy and positive peace in the development path pursued by e.g. the Iranian Mullahs.

A similar argument is perhaps even more forceful in the case of the marginalized masses of the Third World. The "undetermined" structural position in society of the marginalized is paralleled by an "underdetermined" political stance. Thus, the marginalized may support extremely right-wing caudillos, they may support middle-of-the-road Christian Democrats, or they

may support the revolutionary left, all depending on the concrete circumstances.<sup>25</sup> The point in the present context is of course that significant growth in the masses of marginalized in the Third World in no way equals a strengthening of the Counterpoint movement pressing for Another Development.<sup>26</sup>

In broader historical terms, counterpoint development thinking has often been expressed by spokesmen of premodern social forces, whose petty mode of agrarian production or manufacture was threatened by extinction through the expansion of industrialism and modernization.

What unifies this populist tradition is its criticism of industrialization together with a tendency for idealization of the petty structures threatened by it<sup>27</sup> and a lack of alternative development strategies really going beyond this defense.

The social forces in the industrialized countries opting for Another Development share two of these elements: a criticism of industrialization and a lack of elaborated alternatives. The "post-materialist" movements, articulating 'counterpoint' values are "the peace movement, the environmental movement, the woman's liberation movement, ethnic and linguistic movements etc."<sup>28</sup>

The "post-materialists" know what they do not want; they have a harder time agreeing upon what they actually do want. One example of this is the Green Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose parliamentary representatives have already been plagued by many instances of disagreement.

This is in no way an attempt to ridicule these movements; on the contrary: I find it a rather healthy sign that the "post-materialists" have obvious problems in the role as "commissars" or avantgarde, leading, guiding and directing the people. It illustrates to me the fundamental paradox involved in turning

spokesmen of counterpoint development thinking into taking responsibility for the entire path to be followed. Such a process threatens to spell the metamorphosis of proponents of Another Development from pensive critics pointing to necessary corrections to be made to the mainstream path into a dominant elite acting as avantgarde in charge of the development path to be chosen.

The result is potentially dangerous because the process may "petrify" what was basically a democratic movement into a strict hierarchy and the lack of clear-cut strategy may lead the development path far astray. While we have no examples of this from the industrialized countries, I believe such elements to have played a role in the Ujamaa-period of Nyerere's Tanzania and the villagization-period of Pol Pot's Campuchea, although one should not hesitate to stress that a host of other factors had an important role to play in these two experiments of non-mainstream development.

All this should be taken to mean that Another Development is not feasible in its own right when the aim is achieving our four dimensions of development, but solely in a dialectical interplay with the mainstream model of industrialization. The following section has a little more to say on this issue.

#### **The Favourite Mix: Mainstream and Counterpoint in the Boiling Pot.**

While it may be true that proponents of mainstream and counterpoint development thinking have difficulties in communicating and understanding each other because their differences of opinion are of paradigmatic nature,<sup>29</sup> this does in no way mean that counterpoint viewpoints cannot influence mainstream models of development. One of the important reasons for the differences between various mainstream models of development is exactly the extents to which they have been influenced by counterpoint values. Thus, while the "typical" mainstream answer to the prob-



lem of energy supply is something big, capital intensive, centralized, ecologically dangerous - spell nuclear power - in a number of industrialized countries, the environmental and other counterpoint movements have succeeded in stopping the advance of nuclear power or keeping it out of the country altogether. While the "typical" mainstream attitude to relations between the sexes and between various ethnic groups is that of sexism and racism, in a number of countries woman's liberation movements and ethnic and linguistic movements have succeeded in setting new trends for equal rights between men and women and between ethnic groups. While the "typical" mainstream weapon is the nuclear warhead, the peace movement in some countries has at least had some measure of success in - if not turning then slowing the forward pace - of nuclear arms build-up.

The degree of influence achieved by counterpoint viewpoints is of course due to the activity by the "post materialists", but it is also due to the fact that the "post materialists" have succeeded in imbuing "mainstream" social forces with some of their arguments. In a number of countries both the peace issue and the issue of equal rights has been taken up by one of the "old" social movements - the labour movement - which has traditionally accepted the mainstream model of development.

One pleasant aspect about the growth of the "post-materialist" movements is that they help creating a more decentralized power structure in society, by adding new forces to be reckoned with in the power structure, without at the same time creating new 'commissars' to lead and direct the people. In this way the movements help realize elements of the non-material dimensions involved in our conceptualization of development: freedom and identity.

This is not to imply that some countries where counterpoint movements are strong have reached an "optimal" mix of mainstream/counterpoint development, although I would submit that some of

those countries - like for example the Scandinavian ones - are among the least bad, when judging the degree of realization of the four dimensions of development. To the pessimist, this perhaps indicates how much the situation has deteriorated, and now urgent is the need for reform and new directions; whereas the optimist would perhaps find proof in this that to some modest extent the four dimensions are realizable.

In any case, concerning the industrialized countries the call of the day would be to support the vision of Another Development - as a vision. Less alienation and more human control. Smaller and more self-reliant units. Non-polluting ways of producing in an ecological balance. More equality between human beings.

But there will still be a measure of industrialization involved, of so-called modern and sophisticated technologies. The goal is not a backward-looking recreation of agrarian, non-industrial society. It is the conquest of the excessive materialism involved in mainstream development,<sup>30</sup> through promotion of the non-material elements involved in development. Not scrapping the industrial system outright has two advantages: material needs may still be taken care of and the new social forces carrying Another Development will not turn into 'commissars' in their own right, but act in dialectical interplay with the forces of mainstream development.

The principal goal for the Third World would be the same as for the industrialized countries: an optimal realization of the four elements of development. But following the discussion above, more attention will have to be devoted to the issue of material needs - of welfare - and accordingly to industrialization. This does not mean industrialization in the vein of the West. It does not mean the disregarding of rural development. The suggestion is that even rural development has to be backed by industry to be effective.<sup>31</sup>

There is strong evidence that such a process of industrialization in the Third World has to take place in a socialized, planned economy in order to avoid unacceptable social and human cost.<sup>32</sup> This issue cannot be treated in depth here. What may be stressed is that the strategy for Third World countries suggested here would most often not be one that is proposed by the forces that were suggested to be the main carriers of Another Development: the "traditionalists" and the marginalized. Industrial and rural working class are the central social forces in this regard, perhaps supported by the marginalized, parts of the middle strata and even by parts of the local bourgeoisie.

#### **Development and Peace Reconsidered**

The starting point was the suggestion that there is structural correspondence between the military and the civilian part of society. Consequently, the search was for peace intensive models of development, while also involving additional desirable elements of development. The path of Another Development has been proposed as a model for peace intensive development, but the above discussion claimed the presence of a number of problems in this model. Most importantly perhaps was the existence of an incompatibility between the welfare dimension of development (calling for industrialization) and the peace intensive model of development (endangered by industrialization).

The positive peace envisioned by Another Development, structurally linked to a non-industrial, highly self reliant, and structurally undifferentiated society is not likely to be attainable in the development path suggested here. However, the promotion of counterpoint values may take us a substantial part of the way, particularly in the industrialized societies where the soil is most fertile for post-materialist, non-industrial values. And judged from the distribution of world military expenditure with seventy per cent accounted for by

the alliances of the industrialized (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and with a similar disparity in the global distribution of means of destruction, it is exactly these - the most militarized societies - that most urgently need the development of more peaceful structures.

The notion of development supported here involves the partial sacrifice of the goal of positive peace for the achievement of other goals of development. A vision of positive peace is supported, however. There is no paradox in this. A similar vision of positive peace may well be entertained by revolutionaries forced to strike back when threatened by counter-revolutionaries. There is repressive, but there is also emancipatory and liberating violence, though the distinction of one from the other is not always a simple task.<sup>33</sup>

There are difficulties, pitfalls and incompatibilities involved in the support of both peace and development when the goal is that of a structurally peaceful society which also covers other dimensions of what we would include in the notion of development.

In advances the cause of neither peace nor development if this problem is avoided or run away from, in theory or in practice.

## Notes

- 1) Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace, 1967, Danish edition: Om Muligheden for og Ønskeligheden af Fred, København 1968.
- 2) Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, UN General Assembly A/36/356/Oct. 1981 (Thorsson Report).
- 3) Hans-Henrik Holm: Udviklingsbistand og konflikter (Development Aid and Conflict), in Internasjonal Pólitik nr. 4, 1982, pp. 821-35.
- 4) Björn Hettne: Peace and Development. Contradictions and Compatibilities, in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1983, pp. 329-43; Jan Øberg: At udvikle sikkerhed og sikre udvikling. Et essay om militarisme og fred. (Developing Security and Securing Development. An Essay on Militarism and Peace), Gylling 1983. Johan Galtung, Mary Kaldor and other peace researchers have expressed similar ideas. The discussion in the present paper draws primarily on Hettne's contribution.
- 5) Hettne in Journal of Peace Research 1983 (Hettne-JPR), p. 335n. The concept of positive peace, developed by Galtung, implies the absence, not only of war and direct, personal violence, but also of indirect, structural violence.
- 6) Hettne-JPR, p. 338.
- 7) cf. Björn Hettne: Current Issues in Development Theory, SAREC Report R5, 1978.
- 8) Johan Galtung et.al.: Why the Concern with Ways of Life? GPID Project, United Nations University, printed in The Western Development Model and Life Style, Council for International Development Studies, University of Oslo, 1980.
- 9) Øberg 1983, p. 173.
- 10) Hettne-JPR p. 333, p. 338, emphasis in original.
- 11) Galtung 1980, p. 65.
- 12) Cf. the figures in Jan Øberg: Myter om vor sikkerhed (Myths about Security), Skive 1981, ch.7.
- 13) Cf. Roy Preiswerk et.al.: Formen Schweizerischer Friedenspolitik, Freiburg 1982.
- 14) The following is based on Gavin Kitching: Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective. Populism, Nationalism and Industrialization, London & New York 1982, ch. 1.

- 15) Cf. for example the objections by Otto Ullrich and Andre Gorz, quoted in Strömfåra och Kontrapunkt i Västerlandsk Utvecklingsbatt, Stockholm 1982, p. 67n. (Mainstream and Counterpoint in Western Development Thinking).
- 16) This will have to stand largely as a postulate here; cf. the analyses by Gavin Kitching 1982, and Tom Kemp: Industrialization in the Non-Western World, London & New York 1983.
- 17) Cf. the view from the Left, presented by Tor Nørretranders in Information, October 18, 1982.
- 18) Øberg 1983, p. 137f.
- 19) Kitching 1982, p. 180, emphasis in original.
- 20) Hettne-JPR, p. 336n.
- 21) Marc Nerfin (Ed.): Another Development: Approaches and Strategies, Uppsala 1977, quoted her from Hettne-JPR, p. 336.
- 22) Hettne-JPR, p. 338.
- 23) Hettne-JPR, p. 341.
- 24) Hettne-JPR, p. 341.
- 25) My example is from Chile, and the situation there is by no means unique.
- 26) Hettne recognizes this, but he also concludes that the process of marginalization "will add strenght to the new social movements" (Hettne-JPR, p. 340).
- 27) This is excellently recorded by Kitching 1982, and by Hettne 1982.
- 28) Hettne-JPR, p. 340.
- 29) Hettne-JPR, p. 338n.
- 30) Cf. Georg Sørensen: Notes on Materialism and Boredom - Western Development Ideals, Development Research Group, Working Papers No. 5, Aalborg University 1984.
- 31) Cf. Kitching 1982, p. 178.
- 32) Cf. Kitching 1982, p. 178.
- 33) Cf. The Role of Force in Development: A Research Programme, University of Gothenburg (Björn Hettne et.al.) 1983, p. 30.

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