Reframing nationalism, citizenship and gender
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Abstract: The growth of nationalism and nativist parties and movements has raised political and scholarly debates about the future viability of European welfare states and democracies. These projects are sparked by reactions to the global war on terror and the economic and financial crises followed by austerity politics, growing securization, unemployment and poverty across the continent. The nationalist trend has been visible in national elections and culminated in the European Parliamentary elections in 2014, where Rightwing Populist parties increased their presence. European scholars have pointed towards the growth of exclusive welfare nationalism fueled by global mobility and increased migration. Feminist scholars have started to analyse the articulation of welfare and citizenship in nationalist projects. The theoretical section revisits approaches to gender nationalism arguing that in order to understand contemporary nationalist policies gendered approaches need to evolve beyond notions premised on family values and motherhood. The empirical section addresses the challenges from contemporary nationalisms in Europe focusing on the politics and rhetoric of Rightwing nationalist parties in Scandinavia. It proposes that in order to overcome exclusive notions of nationalism and formulate more inclusive notions of justice one strategy could be to rethink citizenship beyond the nation state.
Introduction

The paper aims to explore issues of nationalism from the perspective of welfare and citizenship. It proposes to reframe gendered approaches to nationalism by employing an intersectional approach to citizenship, focusing on differences between native born citizens and immigrant groups. The main argument is that the theoretical approaches to gender, nations and nationalisms premised mainly on family values and on women’s roles as ‘mothers of the nation’ need to evolve in order to understand the articulation of gender in contemporary versions of nationalisms. From a gender perspective it discusses the tensions 1) between welfare and exclusive forms of solidarity limited to native born citizens, as expressed by the nationalist parties: and 2) between national and transnational versions of gender equality, citizenship and justice.

On the theoretical level the paper proposes that the reconstruction of citizenship must be both intersectional and transnational to be able to address inclusionary and exclusionary notions of welfare and bounded and unbounded framings of citizenship within and beyond the nation state (cf. Siim 2013). It is inspired by researchers concerned with notions of welfare, citizenship and (gender) equality beyond the national borders and have started to reframe citizenship and social justice from intersectional (Yuval-Davis 2011) and transnational/global perspectives (see e.g. Fraser 1990; 2007).

Empirical studies have started to address the changes in the way gender equality is articulated as part of national narratives and nationalist claims in contemporary Europe, indicating that gender equality has come to play an important role in the constructions of both national and European identities. Increased migration to and internal mobility within Europe has contributed to new nationalist projects which challenge approaches to nationalism and the primary focus on women’s roles as mothers. It is a theoretical and political challenge for feminist approaches to understand new forms of welfare nationalism overcoming exclusive notions of social justice tied to the nation state. Recent feminist research suggests that an intersectional perspective is fruitful to understand the challenges contemporary nationalisms pose for gender equality (Siim & Mokre 2013). We propose that increasing nationalism may also present an opportunity to reflect upon (gender) equality and social justice from transnational, European and global perspectives.

The first section briefly revisits some of the main points in scholarship on gendered approaches to nationalism (cf. Thapar-Björkert 2013) focusing on two approaches that contribute to a (re)thinking of gender and nationalism from intersectional and transnational perspectives (Yuval-Davis 1997, 2011; ÖzKirimly 2005; 2010). Articulations of nationalisms and gender equality are both historical and contextual and research has started to explore diverse framings of gender equality, welfare and citizenship in contemporary European nationalisms (Rosenberger and Sauer 2012). The paper proposes that in order to understand the articulation of gender in neo-nationalist European projects the role of the family and motherhood needs to be critically scrutinized.

The second section addresses the challenges from contemporary European nationalisms focusing on the recent changes in the politics and rhetoric of Scandinavian nationalism by Rightwing populism parties. Scholars have
shown that the association between the particular Scandinavian nationalism and the welfare state (Brochman & Hagelund 2010) is premised on specific meanings of welfare and democracy. Feminist scholarship has argued that Scandinavian welfare nationalism is also premised on particular understandings of gender equality, social rights and the family (Borchorst and Siim 2002; Melby et. al. 2008). The paper argues that the exclusive perceptions of citizenship articulated by the three Scandinavian Rightwing parties, The Danish Peoples’ Party, The Norwegian Progress Party and the Swedish Democrats, is premised on a defense of mainstream understandings of welfare including gender equality. One question is whether these claims for welfare and gender equality express the particular Scandinavian nationalism, or to what extent similar articulations of welfare and gender equality can be found in other versions of European nationalism?

The last section reflects on contested issues of relations between nationalism and gender equality from the contemporary European context. It discusses in what way the analyses based on the Scandinavian cases can contribute to evolve the methodological and theoretical approaches to contemporary nationalisms. It proposes that growing nationalisms following the economic and financial crisis represent not only a challenge but also a chance for reframing (gender) equality, citizenship and social justice from intersectional and transnational, EUropean perspectives.

Reframing gender, nation and nationalism – theoretical reflections

This section revisits existing theoretical approaches to gender, nation and nationalism which have all in different ways emphasized women’s traditional family roles. Feminist scholarship on nationalism convincingly documents that relations between gender and nationalism are dynamic and contextual (Thapar-Björkert 2013). The studies show that the gendered approaches to nationalism have evolved through a growing body of scholarship globally, nationally and regionally (cf. Thapar-Björkert 2013; Conversi 2013; Millard 2013). Cross-national approaches sensitive to spaces and places have contributed to re-formulate the links between gender and contemporary nationalisms, for example the intersections of gender with welfare and citizenship.

Thapar-Björkert’s recent review of this global body of literature (2013) presents a useful overview of feminist contributions to engender nationalism starting with Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias’ seminal book ‘Women-State-Nation’ (1989). This influential approach emphasizes five ways through which women participate in ethnic and national processes; 1) as biological reproducers; 2) as reproducers of symbolic boundaries of ethnic and national identities; 3) as ideological reproducers of the collectivities; 4) as the symbolic signifiers of ethnic-national differences; 5) as participants in nation-building, and economic, political and military struggles (2013; 808). The review emphasizes that a number of feminist contributions have moved beyond the focus on culture towards a ‘politicization’ of women’s public and private lives (815-18). In spite of this the study of national symbolism and of women’s roles as ‘mothers of the nation’ is still a major trend, which is visible in recent studies of nationalism, religion and violence. The review highlights Sylvia Walby ‘s criticism of the focus on women’s cultural and ideological roles for neglecting the gendered division of labour, class and the economic content of gender relations. It follows that women’s contribution to nation building have not only been affected by their differences from men but also by differences between women (Thapar-Björkert 2013; 809).
The review does not present the body of literature which has highlighted the meanings of gender in transnational migration processes (Yuval-Davis 2011). For example studies that have explored the transnational experience which can both sustain gender divisions, hierarchies and inequalities and contribute to more equitable relations between men and women (Fouron & Glick Schiller 2010). Nor does it include studies which explore the framing of women and gender equality in the discourse and policies of Rightwing nationalist and populist parties in Europe (Rosenberg & Sauer 2012; Foerster 2014; Mulinari & Neergaard 2014). This article builds on a number of European research projects (cf. Siim & Mokre 2013) and aims to explore the theoretical implications for intersections of nationalism, citizenship and gender from the particular European perspective.

**Intersectional approaches nationalism, citizenship and gender**

The following presents two of the recent approaches to nationalism that has inspired the rethinking of gender and welfare nationalism from historical and intersectional perspectives (Yuval-Davis 2011; Özkirimli 2005; 2010). One is Yuval-Davis who understands nationalism as a ‘politics of belonging’ concerned with the construction of boundaries of belonging, of a delineated collectivity that includes some people and excludes others (Yuval-Davis 2011; 86-94). The other is Özkirimly, who defines nationalism as a metanarrative or discourse, a particular way of seeing and integrating the world, a frame of reference which helps to make sense of and structure the reality surrounding us (Özkirimly 2005; 163).

The two approaches can supplement each other, since they are both concerned with borders and boundaries and is concerned with women’s roles as mother at the symbolic level (often embodying the homeland, i.e. Mother India or in a Swedish context Mother Svea). From this perspective nationalism is defined as claims of community cohesion centered on ‘the nation’ as a common frame of reference. It is a form of discourse that structures the reality around us. In this vein, it is nationalism that defines the nations and not the other way round. We add to this that an intersectional analysis of contemporary nationalist politics of belonging in Europe should be concerned with intersections of welfare nationalism, citizenship and gender equality (which in/exclude specific groups).

Nira Yuval-Davis’ influential work (1997; 2011) has documented the multiple ways that constructions of gender and gender equality are embedded in national histories, institutions and politics of belonging. In the seminal book ‘Gender and Nation’ (1997) Yuval-Davis addressed key aspects of nationalism and gender, and her recent book ‘The Politics of Belonging - Intersectional contestations’ (2011) elaborates further on this approach. It proposes that an *intersectional analytical perspective* is crucial for any concrete analysis of belonging/s and political projects of belonging, since ‘different political projects of belonging have different effects of different members of collectivities who are differently located and/or have different identifications and normative value systems (Yuval-Davis 2011; 25). This approach is fruitful from a citizenship perspective since it distinguishes between belonging, which refers to emotional attachment about ‘feeling at home’, and the politics of belonging which concerns both the construction of boundaries and the politics of in/exclusion of particular people, social categories and groupings within these boundaries. It is also concerned with the symbols and imaginary of a population emphasizing that it is not the figures of women/mother alone that symbolize homelands, but rather the imaginary social relations and networks of belonging in which they are embedded.
Yuval-Davis’ approach is also concerned with the rise of ‘autochthonic’ or nativist politics of belonging, which is important for understanding nationalist and extreme right politics in Europe and elsewhere. Claims to territories and states are here made according to logic of ‘we were here first’.

Umut Özkirimli’s (2005, 2010) recent approach to nationalism divides the nationalist discourse in different dimensions as well as in public and private institutions. The discourse of nationalism operates in ways that divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, produces hierarchies among actors, naturalizes itself and reproduces itself through private and public institutions, especially family, school, workplace, media, church and the police (2005; 32-33). This approach is promising for empirical analysis, since it encompasses both the spatial dimension associated with the territory – an actual or imagined homeland; the temporal dimension – the construction of national history; and the symbolic dimension – aiming to provide a grammar for the collective consciousness through its metaphors, its heroes, its rituals and its narratives. In addition it is also concerned with the everyday dimension, whereby national identity is produced, reproduced and contested in the details of social actions and routines of everyday life that are taken for granted (179-194).

Özkirimli further proposes that nationalist claims provide a communication strategy that: (1) divides the world into homogeneous and fixed identity positions; (2) creates a temporal lineage from the past, through the present and by way of extrapolation into the future to demonstrate the diachronic presence of the nation; and finally (3) is based on a preoccupation with the national territory, imagined or real. This emphasis on political communication is especially fruitful for the empirical analysis of contemporary nationalisms. In addition to this, we follow Michael Freeden (1998), who argues that nationalist claims rest on a positive valorization assigned to one’s own nation, granting it specific claims for social cohesion. We thus interpret nationalist claims as a particular communication strategy that seeks to reify and naturalize the nation as something natural and commonsensical (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz 2012; Özkirimli 2010).

To sum up: Feminist approaches have demonstrated that nationalist discourses have a gender bias which constructs men and women differently in their public and private lives and research has shown that relations between gender and nationalism are dynamic and contextual. In spite of this there has been a major focus on women’s reproductive and symbolic role ‘as mothers’ of the nation and the idealization of motherhood and ‘the home’. This is an important element of global nationalisms, but one critical question is to what extent the role of motherhood is still dominant part of contemporary nationalisms? In order to discuss this, the next section explores the articulation of gender in contemporary nationalisms in Europe where gender equality is part of the dominant discourse and politics. The empirical focus is on the Scandinavian cases which represent a ‘best case’ for exploring gender equality and welfare in nationalist projects. The paper suggests that there are tensions in contemporary nationalist projects between support for women’s traditional family roles, gender equality and women’s rights. The claim is that approaches to gender and nationalisms should be reframed to include gender equality and welfare. Recent feminist research suggests that an intersectional approach to citizenship is fruitful to understand the challenges contemporary nationalisms present for gender equality. From this perspective one promising research agenda would be to explore similarities and differences in nationalist claims to gender equality, welfare and migration from a European perspective.
A case study of Scandinavian nationalism

The following section applies Özkirimli’s and Yuval-Davis’ concepts on analysis of contemporary Scandinavian nationalism. The claim is that the Scandinavian case can contribute to the understanding of contemporary nationalisms in Europe. Scholars have recently started to explore the specific version of nationalism tied to the Scandinavian (often labeled “social democratic”) welfare state and its politics of gender equality (Melby, Ravn & Carlsson Wetterberg 2008; Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz 2012; Meret & Siim 2013b). Scholars have recently claimed that immigration represents a blind-spot in Scandinavian welfare theory and research (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010). Studies show that Scandinavian welfare nationalism is increasingly premised on differentiated citizenship which distributes unequal rights to native citizens and immigrants from countries outside Europe and the West (Bengtsson, Strømblad and Bay 2010). This has implications for understanding relations between welfare, gender equality and citizenship status in contemporary Scandinavia (Siim & Stoltz, 2015).

First following Özkirimli the *temporal* dimension of nationalism concerns the construction of national history and the *symbolic* dimension aims at providing a grammar for the collective consciousness through its narratives. This image of the universal welfare state and gender regime based upon equality and ‘women-friendly’ social policies can be interpreted as part of the national narratives of the Scandinavian countries formulated by politicians and ordinary citizens, praised by scholars from both inside and outside Scandinavia (e.g. Hernes 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990; Walby 2009).

In comparative and historical research the Scandinavian countries are often considered to belong to the same welfare and gender model characterized by a large and generous public sector, a high level of universalism and tax financed social benefits (Melby et. al 2008). The three Scandinavian countries are highly individualized and have developed flexible labour market models, which share a number of characteristics: a) well-organized labour markets; b) relatively strong and independent trade union movements; c) a close cooperation between employers union, trade unions and the state.

Comparative gender research have emphasized that the Scandinavian welfare states combine a large public sector with a dual breadwinner model. The common elements include; 1) a family and welfare model where both partners are expected to participate on the labour market; 2) public welfare with extensive childcare services and generous maternity- and parental leave schemes, 3) a relative high number of women in the political elites, 4) gender equality as a strong norm in public discourse and politics as well as a value embedded in the practice of citizens (see Bergqvist et al., 1999). On this basis feminist scholars have generally agreed that the countries in spite of their differences in gender profiles share basic characteristics that make it meaningful to include them as part of one common gender equality model (Melby et al. 2008).

Secondly looking at the spatial dimensions of nationalism and the politics of belonging in Scandinavia, it is worth noticing that immigration from countries outside Europe and the West is a relatively recent phenomenon. Migration regulations and policies were not a focus of attention in welfare politics; research and
public debates till the 1990s (cf. Brochmann & Hagelund 2011). Since then increased immigration has raised concerns about the limits to welfare disclosed by failed integration policies, which have created new forms of inequalities between the native born and third country nationals. This development has also inspired debates about the Scandinavian gender model’s ability to accommodate increasing diversities among women (Siim & Skjeie 2008).

Brochmann and Hagelund (2010) coordinated a large study of the welfare-political consequences of immigration to the Scandinavian welfare states’ titled ‘limits to welfare’. According to this study the founding and evolution of the Nordic welfare states’ can be interpreted as a particular ‘welfare nationalism’ based upon integration with three central elements: democracy, citizenship and modernization. It interprets the three Scandinavian countries as one welfare model with three exceptions. The ‘multicultural’ Swedish model is presented as the ‘good’ model with the most inclusive immigration legislation and a relative accommodating response towards diversity focusing on the rights rather than on obligations of immigrant minorities. The Danish model is presented as the ‘bad’ model with the most restrictive citizenship legislation with an emphasis of the obligations of ethnic minorities. Finally, the Norwegian response to immigration and integration is positioned ‘in between’ the two balancing the rights and obligations of ethnic minorities (356-357). On the basis of the historical and comparative case studies they conclude that the three countries in spite of the differences in governments’ policies and in public discourses towards immigration face similar problems with discrimination and failed integration of immigrant minorities on the labour market and in society.

In spite of the similarities in relation to welfare and gender equality, the Scandinavian countries have different experiences with multiculturalism and have adopted diverse discourses and policies towards migration and integration. Sweden has the longest history of work-related immigration since the early 1960s. Denmark’s guest-worker model also dates back to the 1960s, and Norway experienced immigration from Third-country nationals from the end of the 1960s.

During the last fifteen years Scandinavian research has started to discuss the implications of the universal Scandinavian welfare model for the in/exclusion of immigrant minorities on the labour market, in politics and society (cf. Bengtson, Strömblad & Bay 2010). The studies all emphasize that traditional welfare state policies have failed to integrate immigrants groups on the labour market and in developing equality based policies towards new immigrant groups (Brochmann & Hagelund 2010; 367). One of the main conclusions is that the three countries have become de facto multi-ethnic countries that are presently forced to re-define the national welfare projects faced with global mobility and growing demands for labour power. The most controversial conclusion of Borchman and Hagelund’s study is probably that even the more accommodative Swedish policies face similar problems with failed integration of immigrants on the labour market and in society.

**Intersections of citizenship and gender**

The universal Scandinavian welfare states are premised on citizens’ rights and obligations to wage-work and extensive welfare rights financed by direct taxes. The high employment rates of the native populations are above the Lisbon target for both men and women – about 80 per cent for men and 70 per cent for women, a
number that contrasts with the low employment rates for immigrants. Women from non-western countries are perceived to present special challenges for Scandinavian welfare states, since the gap in employment rates between the native populations and these immigrants groups are among the highest in Europe (Siim & Borchorst 2010).

The marginalization of non-western immigrant groups on the labour market and in society represents real problems of ‘integration’, which have been addressed by both Rightwing nationalist and main-stream parties. In Denmark and Norway gender equality has come to play a key role in the discourse about integration, where the perceived gender equality in ‘ethnic majority families’ is contrasted with the supposed patriarchal oppression of women in ‘immigrant families’ (Siim & Skjeie 2008). The Danish and Norwegian cases illustrate how Governments and nationalist anti-immigration forces have used/misused gender equality against ethnic minority women, who are perceived to be oppressed by their ‘patriarchal’ culture (Meret & Siim 2013a).

The political developments have in turn inspired feminist scholars to start to scrutinize Scandinavian welfare and ‘women-friendly’ social policies ‘from within’ focusing on diversities of interests among women (Mulinari et. al. 2009). Research has compared the effects of various Scandinavian migration/integration and gender equality policies from the perspective of immigrant and refugee women (Langvasbråten, 2008; Borchorst & Teigen 2010). One central concern is the perceived conflicts between the official gender equality norms and the cultural norms and practices in immigrant families, which have been politicized by Right wing anti-immigration forces (Meret & Siim 2013b). Another concern is the absence of ethnic minority women from decision-making (Siim & Skjeie 2008), which influences the power to define gender equality and feminism (Pristed & Thun 2010), and has made alternative perspectives on gender and family relations invisible and illegitimate (Langvasbråten, 2008).

On this basis we suggest that one of the main challenges for the Scandinavian countries today is how to reformulate welfare, citizenship and gender equality in the face of increasing ethno-cultural and ethno-religious diversity (cf. Siim & Stoltz 2015). Up until the 1960s immigrants came primarily from other Nordic or European countries. As the countries became increasingly diverse, inequalities are also opening up between more “culturally distant” migrants from the Middle East, Africa and Asia and the rest of the population. Culturalist explanations to inequalities feature in the public discourses about work, family, sexuality and personal life. Gender equality has become a key marker in these contexts, delineating the boundary between Nordic and “other” cultures by means of the portrayal of immigrant men as more patriarchal than Nordic men and immigrant women portrayed as being more oppressed than Nordic women. From this perspective the strong “equality norm” seems to be premised on an underlying “antipathy to difference” (Kabeer 2008). Such representations serve to ignore the observation that cultures are negotiated and transformed through interactions with others and shift attention away from wider issues of racism that are likely to permeate these interactions (Kabeer 2008; 266-268).

Arguably this focus on gender inequalities in terms of categorical differences between men and women, as these cut across the class-based categories of capital and labour has led to “epistemological blind spots”. This
has made it difficult to incorporate inequalities of race/ethnicity and more particularly the intersections between gender, class, and race/ethnicity. Scandinavian gender research has also for many years tended to take the perspective of ‘autochthonic’ Nordic women and has ignored differences between women or between men from different social categories. While migration research has mainly focused on immigrant men, immigrant women are often represented as passive, victimized and trapped in their cultures. This situation has gradually changed, and there is a growing literature where feminist scholars are questioning basic assumptions of Nordic gender equality politics (Siim & Skjeie 2008; Långvasbåten 2008; Multinari et. al. 2009)).

To sum up: Feminist scholarship generally agree that the political developments of gender equality, welfare and citizenship have challenged the grand vision of a ‘women-friendly’ society ‘where injustice on the basis of gender would be largely eliminated without an increase in other forms of inequality, such as among groups of women’ (Hernes 1987: 15). The growth of inequalities among women can be interpreted as a Scandinavian gender equality paradox contrasting the relative inclusion of native majority women with the relative marginalization of women of diverse ethnic minorities in society (Siim and Skjeie 2008). The Scandinavian welfare model has until recently been relatively uncontested. The evolution towards de facto multi-ethnic countries has changed both the research agenda and the political landscape in Scandinavia. This contributes to explain political challenges from main-stream parties to reformulate welfare policies, but also the interest in gender equality issues on the part of Rightwing populist and nationalist parties. The next section analyses the claims made by nationalist parties about gender equality as part of exclusive forms of welfare and citizenship that have raised concerns by mainstream politicians and feminist researchers alike.

Claims about welfare and immigration by nationalist parties in Scandinavia
This section addresses claims about gender equality and women’s rights by nationalist parties in Scandinavia exploring tensions between immigration and welfare; women’s family roles and gender equality; between women’s roles as mothers and workers. European gender research has noticed that Rightwing parties across Europe have found new and creative ways to use/misuse gender equality as a key value which separates the modern majority from the oppressive, patriarchal immigrant Muslim minorities (Rosenberger & Sauer eds. 2012). Scholars have also noticed that in the Scandinavian context right wing political parties have combined anti-immigration with support for the welfare state and defense of liberal values, including gender equality and women’s rights (Meret & Siim 2013a, b).

Welfare nationalism can be more or less in/exclusive in relation to national and immigrant groups. In the last decades, the Scandinavian countries have witnessed profound changes in the political landscapes. The ‘Social Democratic’ understanding of equality policies that dominated larger parts of the last century, focusing mainly on class and gender, have come under pressure from increased globalization and immigration processes, and the countries have witnessed a growth of neo-liberalism and new forms of social conservatism. The last twenty years or so each country has for longer or shorter periods of time had Conservative, Liberal or Center as well as coalition governments.
Important historical differences exist between the political landscapes in the three countries. One contested issue is the special links between Right wing populism, welfare politics and the parties’ close relations to Social Democracy. The Scandinavian populist right-wing parties have a strong working class profile, which has affected their position on welfare issues.

The role of Social Democracy and the working class has historically been weaker in Denmark than in Norway and Sweden. Liberalism has been strongest in Denmark and the country has had long periods with liberal conservative-center governments since 1980. The first was headed by the Conservative Poul Schlüter (1982-1993); the latest by the liberal leaders Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001-2009) and Lars Løkke Rasmussen (2009-2011) with the right-wing populist Danish People’s Party [Dansk Folkeparti, DF] as the parliamentary support.

When it comes to the Danish party political landscape, research highlights that DF has succeeded in moving from a maverick party to become a legitimate support party for the previous Government (Meret 2010). The Party’s popularity rests on two major issues; the opposition to immigration and EURO-skepticism, and it has influenced the main-stream discourses on these issues as the support party for the Liberal-Conservative Government (2001-2011). The pro-welfare orientation has gradually become part of the DF program. Today the party leadership promotes the DF as the only genuine carrier of the classic Social Democratic welfare tradition and has softened its Euro-skepticism (Meret & Siim 2013b).

The Danish People’s Party has been remarkably successful in the role of ‘welfare guarantor’ within the Liberal and Conservative project (Meret and Siim 2013b). More than half of the DF votes come from skilled and unskilled manual workers, principally men and people with low levels of education (Meret 2010). Working class support has mainly been achieved at the expense of the traditional left-wing, especially Social Democrats, which in the past decade have lost a considerable share of working class support. In the election in 2007 the party gained 25 out of 179 seats in Parliament and it won a land-slide victory at the EP elections in May 2014 with three representatives it became the biggest Danish party represented in the EP. In the recent election in June 2015 DF increased their mandate from 12 to more than 20 percent of the voters and became the second largest party after the Social Democratic Party winning 37 seats (+15). It is presently the support party for the liberal minority government headed by Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

Social Democracy has been stronger in Norway, but since 1990 the country has had two Conservative-centre governments (1997-2000 and 2001-2005). The Norwegian Progress Party [Fremskridtspartiet, FrP] has also been highly successful in electoral politics. In the local election in 1987 Progress Party gained around 12 percent of the votes nationally and the success was largely due to the party’s focus on restrictive immigration policies. In 2009 the FrP became the second strongest party in Norway with 22.9 per cent of votes, a significant share coming from less-educated, less-skilled workers (cf. Bjørklund 2011: 285). The FrP became the second strongest political organization in Norway after the Labour Party, but until the last election it did not have direct influence on politics. The election in 2013 changed the political landscape, when the Social Democrats lost power and was replaced by a coalition Government headed by the Conservative Erna Solberg and with Siv Jensen, the leader of the Progress Party as Minister of Finance.
The Norwegian Progress Party has roots in the neo-liberal and tax protest wave of the 1970s (Goul Andersen & Bjørklund 2000) but the FrP survived the new times, re-thinking its positions on economic issues, emphasizing anti-immigration and cultural protectionist standpoints, strongly critical of the multiculturalist politics pursued by the Norwegian governments. From the 1990s the party leadership acknowledged its role as ‘new working class party’, introducing ad hoc pro-welfare measures that appealed to this electorate. For instance, the party asked to ‘use oil reserves to benefit the common people’ and to employ the revenues to finance public infrastructures and improve social, health and schooling systems.

Sweden has had Social Democratic governments from the 1930s until 1976, from 1982 until 1991 and from 1994 until 2006, when the Centre-right coalition of Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt took over the government. This coalition lost power in the election of 2014 when the coalition of Social-Democrats and the Green Party formed a minority Government. The extremist origins of the Sweden Democrats and its past associations with national-socialism constitute one of the major differences with the other two cases (Hellstrom, Nilsson & Stoltz 2012). It was not till the general elections of 2010 that the nationalist political party, Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats, SD), had its electoral breakthrough. With 5.7 per cent of the total votes the party crossed the 4 per cent threshold of representation in the national parliament. Before the 2006 elections the SD was hardly noticed in the media; afterwards, it became a high-profile party in the public debate (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz 2012). The party emerged from the shadows of the far right at the 2006 elections receiving 2.93 per cent of the votes – not enough to secure a position in parliament, but enough to gain representation in almost half the country’s municipalities. During the 2006 general election campaign SD blamed the Social Democrats for refusing to see the connection between the open immigration policies and the implosion of the universal welfare system. They called for a return to a more homogeneous Sweden with less immigration referring to the metaphor of the so called ‘People’s Home’. Popular use of the phrase ‘people’s home’ by leading Social Democrats since the late 1920s alluded to a trinity of democracy, the people and the nation that contributed to establish the founding myth of the modern Swedish national community (Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz 2012).

In 2011 the party changed its designation from ‘nationalist’ to ‘social conservative with a nationalist foundation’ (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram 2011). Discussions about ideological deviations and party discipline have since then led to the exclusion of members with amongst others Nazi and extreme right wing sentiments. This is still internally controversial (see e.g. Dagens Nyheter, 18 March 2013, ’Hotande uteslutning splittrar SD’). Interestingly, an exit poll by Swedish Television SVT in 2014 showed that the party losing most voters to SD in the 2014 elections was not the Social Democratic Party, but the liberal-conservative Moderate Party (16 vs 29 percent of the new SD voters; SVT, 15 Sept 2014). At the election in 2014 SD gained 13 percent of the votes, which gave them the balance of power in parliament. The minority government and the Centre Right Alliance bloc subsequently made a deal to sideline SD until 2022 (Reuters Dec 27, 2014, online access Jan 4, 2015). Today struggles exist between so called ‘nationalist’ and ‘social conservative’ wings amongst its members.

To sum up: The profound differences in right-wing populism’s history, politics have influenced the political agenda in the three countries. Since the 1990s the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party
have both succeeded in attracting a large part of the population and both parties have been able to influence main-stream welfare and immigration policies and discourses. The growth and influence of the Sweden Democrats is a later phenomenon, and recent events in Sweden illustrate that the main strategy of both political blocks is still to prevent the party from influencing the relative open Swedish immigration policies. Hellström, Nilsson and Stoltz (2012) point out that Sweden has ceased to be an exception within the Nordic and European context and has started to develop similar patterns in relation to the role and challenges of the populist right.

Nationalist parties’ framing of gender equality and women’s rights
One of the contested issues is the nationalist parties support for liberal values like freedom of expression and gender equality, homosexual rights. Meret & Siim (2013a) have compared the framings of gender equality, women’s rights and family values in the party programs and manifestos of the Danish Peoples’ Party and the Norwegian Progress Party with the Austrian Freedom Party (FFÖ). The study illustrates that all three parties’ express exclusionary nationalist positions and nativist discourses combined with a growing emphasis on the importance of liberal democratic values, including gender equality and women’s rights. That emphasis is particularly important in Denmark and Norway and one explanation could be that gender equality discourses and policies have become important parts of the national narratives and contemporary political of belongings and thus resonate with the particular Scandinavian welfare and gender regimes (93).

The studies illustrate that there are the tensions in the two parties’ positions to gender equality. According to both the DF and the FrP, there is no need to adopt new gender equality policies and they oppose gender equality policies, like ‘gender mainstreaming’ policies, gender based quotas, or positive action (Meret & Siim 2013: 85-90). Modernization of gender roles and the achievements in gender equality on the labour market and in the family reached so far in both Denmark and Norway is sufficient, and thus further advances can only be reached by the labor market’s self-regulatory mechanisms. DF and FrP have supported gender equality issues mainly such as genital mutilation, enforced marriages, honor killings or veiling in relation to the vulnerable position of immigrant women (Siim & Skjeie 2008). In this way the two parties have diverted the question of gender equality into an ethnic minority issue, concerned mainly with the incomparability of cultural values, the role of Islam in the West and the condition of Muslim women.

In Sweden gender equality is not given a specific place in the key policy documents of the Sweden Democrats, but subordinated to its ideological framework and women are also underrepresented in comparison to other Swedish parties (about 20 percent of its members and 15 percent of its parliamentarians). In a recent study of how these women legitimize their experiences, Mulinari & Neergaard (2014) find that the construction of who is perceived to be a citizen, at the core of social policy visions in a globalised world, provides a tension in the definition of who deserves care. The ideology of the party illustrates a shift from universal care for all, to care ‘for our own’, connected to the ambition to expand the care for our own native born citizens. The study interprets this as a form of racist care with two variants. The first is related to the analysis of welfare chauvinism, whereas the second is linked to an ethno-pluralist understanding in which caring also extends to the racialised other, who is encouraged to return to their home country, for their own good. Care is according
to them salient for two reasons. Firstly, care plays a central role in the Nordic welfare states. Secondly, the informants explain their participation in the party by the positive value of caring rather than by the negative value of racism. The SD informants in the study also construct their exclusion and separation from the racialised other, not only as caring for their own native born citizens, but as a way of preserving their purity from the ‘other’. On this basis Mulinari and Neergaard conclude that there is a need to identify the role care has historically played in legitimating relations of power.

European perspectives on Scandinavian nationalisms

Following Özkirimli nationalist parties create a lineage from the past, through the present by means of this reference to history and demonstrate by extrapolation into the future the diachronic presence of the nation. They also divide the world into homogeneous and fixed identity positions, notably as this concerns women from ethnic minorities and especially those from a religious minority of Muslims on the one side and a positive valorization of the nation and identity on the other side. These theoretical points about women/mothers being used as embodiments of the homeland are still important but arguably they need to be reframed in the Scandinavian context. Here gender equality is not only embedded as part of national politics and belongings. In addition welfare politics no longer primarily conceives women ‘as mothers’ but as ‘working mothers’. In the formulations of Scandinavian nationalist parties’ formulations of gender equality modernity is symbolized by the positive valorization of native born citizens who embody the dominant values of gender equality, while tradition is framed by a negative valorization of Muslim migrants who embody the patriarchal values of their culture and need to be assimilated in to the dominant version of gender equality and democracy.

The paper has used Scandinavian case to illustrate the changes in nationalist claims on gender equality and women’s rights. Claims by Right wing populism in Scandinavia are deeply embedded in the national histories, political institutions and cultures, including particular understandings of welfare, the family and gender equality politics (Siim & Skjeie 2008; Meret & Siim, 2013a; 93; Siim & Stoltz, 2015). Despite the differences the three nationalist parties refer to the history of the working class and perceive themselves as heirs of Social Democracy, and research show that both The Norwegian Progress Party and The Danish Peoples Party have become de facto working class parties (Meret & Siim, 2013b). The support for the classical values of Social democracy and the welfare state is connected to the particular Scandinavian versions of nationalism, which since the 1970s include the belief in gender equality and women’s wage-work. The claims for individual values of gender equality and exclusive national welfare can also be identified in contemporary European nationalisms although the emphasis on Conservative family values and motherhood tends to be stronger in Continental Europe (Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer 2015).

One question could be to compare the differences and similarities which can be identified in claims made by Scandinavian nationalists about gender equality and women’s rights and claims made by other nationalist parties across Europe. One similarity is that the framings of all nationalist parties are based on exclusive nationalist understandings of welfare, care and gender equality premised on differentiated citizenship rights between native citizens and third country nationals (Siim & Mokre 2013). One difference could be that in Scandinavia welfare is no longer premised on the family and on women’s caring role as mothers within the
family but on women’s wage work. Social rights are individualized and the welfare state has taken over (part of) the responsibility for care for children, the sick, elderly and disabled. The recent studies of Scandinavian nationalist parties illustrate that these parties are supportive of welfare, premised on working mothers and public responsibility for care work (Meret & Siim 2013b). Arguably the Scandinavian case represents a ‘best case’ for the claim for reframing gender and nationalism although research indicates that a similar framing is visible in other European countries (Sauer et al 2015).

Reframing gender equality, citizenship and social justice
The paper has argued that the theoretical approaches to gender and nationalism need to be reframed in order to understand the articulation of gender in contemporary European neo-nationalism premised on exclusive notions of citizenship formulated against the migrant other. It has used Scandinavian nationalism as a case to demonstrate that liberal values of gender equality and women’s rights have increasingly replaced the focus on the family and motherhood as central values in nationalist politics of belonging. Notions of gender equality and individual rights are also key aspect of European discourses, policies and belongings and research indicates that the particular Scandinavian cases can contribute to understand new elements of gender equality and individual rights in nationalist projects across Europe.

The Scandinavian political landscapes have changed and contemporary welfare nationalisms in both mainstream and Rightwing variations rest on contradictions: It is associated with positive valuations of gender equality and women’s rights, while at the same time being premised on distinctions between welfare for native citizens and migrant minorities. For Rightwing nationalist parties this has led to claims that gender equality is mainly an ethnic minority issue and that ethnic minorities must adapt and assimilate to the dominant gender model premised on women’s wage work and public responsibility for welfare including care work.

The paper has argued that in order to understand the challenges posed by contemporary nationalisms in Scandinavia, as elsewhere in Europe, gendered approaches to nationalism need to evolve beyond notions premised on women’s traditional family roles and motherhood. The claim is that the association between Scandinavian nationalisms and the universal welfare state is premised on notions of gender equality and women’s individual rights, which can also contribute to understand new elements of contemporary nationalisms in other European countries.

The empirical and theoretical conclusions can inspire reflections about the normative links between welfare, citizenship and gender equality policies. The paper proposes that the differentiated perceptions of welfare rights for native citizens and immigrant women and men are crucial for contemporary democratic struggles over redistribution, recognition, representation and participation. It has identified the tensions between 1) an exclusive form of welfare and solidarity for native born citizens only, as expressed by the nationalist parties, and 2) transnational and global versions of gender equality and justice. Researchers concerned with notions of welfare, citizenship and gender equality beyond the national territory/borders have started to reframe social justice from transnational and global perspectives (see e.g. Fraser 1990; 2007). From a normative perspective the reconstruction of citizenship must be both transnational and multilayered to be able to address
inclusionary and exclusionary processes and framings of citizenship within and beyond the nation state (cf. Yuval-Davis 2011; Siim 2013).

One influential transnational approach is proposed by Nancy Fraser (2007) who claims that in order to reconstruct democratic theory in the current ‘post-national constellation’ it is necessary to problematize the national frame and reflect upon the notion of ‘transnational public spheres’. The approach rests on the analytical claim that the public spheres are increasingly transnational or post-national with respect to each of the constitutive elements of public opinion: The who of communication, the what of communication, the where of communication and the how of communication, and finally the addressee of communication, which is no longer Westphalian state power but a mix of public and private transnational powers. According to Fraser, a public sphere theory understood as a critical theory in a post-national world faces a dual challenge: to create new, transnational public powers and to make them accountable to new transnational public spheres (cf. Fraser 2007, 23). This approach to social justice would require a paradigm shift from ‘a theory of social justice’ to a view on justice as participatory parity focused not only on the ‘what’ of justice but also on the ‘who’ and ‘how’. Fraser’s normative model to social justice premised on universal principles of social equality, cultural diversity and participatory democracy (1990: 77).

Fraser’s approach can contribute to address the European citizenship paradox although it may seem utopian given the current political and economic European landscape. The approach is premised on a theoretical critique of the national bias of hitherto held concepts of the public sphere and an analytical claim about the possibility of transnational public spheres being able to make transnational public powers accountable. According to Fraser a transnational citizenship can be based on the analytical claim that decisions affecting ‘the fate of all’ should be taken on the transnational level and that all ‘subject to the law’ should be able to influence the law. EU is a multilevel polity based on universal values of anti-discrimination according to nationality, religion, age, sexuality, gender and disability, and gender equality is firmly enshrined in EU treaties. In spite of this EU citizenship is still based upon differentiated rights for native born citizens, nationals of EU member states and Third country nationals. In contemporary Europe struggles about political issues concerning EU citizen who are ‘subject to the law’ with implications for ‘the fate of all’ pertaining redistribution, recognition and representation should arguably be addressed and solved at the multilevel EU-level rather than solely by national governments.
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