GOVERNING TO-DAY:

TOWARDS AN ANALYTICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
April 2014
The cover image is a still from the 1936 film Things to Come (London Film Productions), which is an adaptation of H. G. Wells’ 1933 novel The Shape of Things to Come (London: Hutchinson).
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................. VII
ABSTRASKT PÅ DANSK ............................................................................... IX
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................... XI

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 1

PART TWO: TO SEE AND SAY WHAT WE ARE TO-DAY............................. 27
I. TO RENDER VISIBLE ........................................................................... 27
II. THE VISIBLE-INVISIBLE ................................................................. 39
III. A “WORK-SHOP APPROACH” ......................................................... 45
  1. Analytics ......................................................................................... 45
  2. Diagnostics ..................................................................................... 49
  3. Strategies ......................................................................................... 52

PART THREE: SEEING THE PRESENT ..................................................... 57
I. RENDERING VISIBLE ............................................................................ 57
II. GENEALOGY AND THE HISTORY OF THE PRESENT ....................... 63
  1. The Provenant ................................................................................ 66
  2. The Emergent ................................................................................ 69
  3. The Present ..................................................................................... 71
III. ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT ....................... 77
  1. A Materialism of the Incorporeal .................................................. 81
  2. Problematizations ......................................................................... 93
  3. A Critical Ontology of Ourselves .................................................. 113
IV. TO RENDER VISIBLE OUR ACTUALITY ....................................... 115
  1. Towards a Genealogy of Future Emergences ................................. 117
  2. Towards an Archaeology of Problematizations .............................. 120
  3. Towards an Analytics of the Contemporary ................................... 123

PART FOUR: THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONTROL ................................ 129
I. GOVERNING TO-DAY ......................................................................... 129
II. CONTROL .......................................................................................... 137
  1. Power ............................................................................................. 138
  2. Government ................................................................................... 142
  3. Control ........................................................................................... 148
III. ARCHITECTONICS ............................................................................ 153
  1. Technology ..................................................................................... 155
  2. The Exercising of Relations of Power ........................................... 161
  3. Problematizations and Programmes ............................................. 164
IV. AN ARCHITECTURAL ANALYTICS .............................................. 171
  1. Field-work in the Present ............................................................. 173
  2. The Archaeological Four-Fold ...................................................... 175
  3. Towards an Architectural Analytics of Control ............................ 183

PART FIVE: CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 205

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................... 213
**Abstract**

*Governing To-day* denotes a domain of research, and what the thesis undertakes is a theoretical discussion of some questions of method vis-à-vis researching this domain. There are two aspects to the title that enfold one another. Firstly, “governing to-day” signposts that it is to-day that is to be governed, that it is ourselves in our actuality that form the target of government, hence it is this government of ourselves in our present that we are to enquire into. Secondly, “governing to-day” highlights the fact that it is thus the state of contemporary arts of government, government at this moment in time, in the present-day, in this time that is our own, and so forth, that forms the object of enquiry. Accordingly, “governing to-day” denotes both a government of the present and government in the present. In working through said questions of method, the thesis sketches out an approach that takes as its reference point and means of critique the “will not to be governed like that”. Consequently, the approach thus outlined is firmly situated within that rather loosely affiliated body of work that goes under the title *studies in governmentality*. Studies in governmentality have their point of departure in the research and writing of the French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault. It is primarily within the writings of Foucault that the thesis seeks to find a workaround to the problem thrown forth by the aforementioned questions of method.

The central problematic that the thesis addresses concerns the non-historical nature not only of much contemporary studies in governmentality but also in the application of Foucault’s analytics of power more generally. The problem, as the thesis conceives this, is that the “tools” employed by Foucault in his various researches were essentially tools for doing *historical* research and, by way of these methods, for posing philosophical question to the present. The central question the thesis addresses, then, is how applicable are these “tools” to questioning the present not from the perspective of its history but from the perspective of its contemporality, and thus of our actuality. In putting to one side the now overused “tool-box” approach, the thesis puts forward what it calls a *work-shop* approach. This work-shop approach approaches the writings of Foucault and others not as a box of ready-made tools to be taken up and used, but as equipment from which we can fashion our own tools with regards to the problem at hand. In working through some questions of method—vis-à-vis, the proven present, its problematizations, their programmes, and the exercising of relations of power they articulate—, the thesis proposes an approach that it calls an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control.

What is being proposed is an architectural analytics for doing *field-work* in the architectonics of control. Such field-work enquiries into the determination of the *matter* that constitutes the object and target of government; into conceptualizations of the *form* of subjectivity that matter is to be worked into; into the elaboration of the *agent* that is to transform the matter thus constituted into the form thus conceived; and into the thematization of the overall *end*, goal, or strategy of control: the *for-the-sake-of-which* the matter is to be shaped into the *form* by way of
the *agent*. The aim of such field-work in the present is to render visible the environmentality of governmentality in its, and thus our, contemporality.

This approach is then presented as being one possible way of questioning concerning contemporary governmental technologies, and to question them not from the perspective of their history (archaeology and genealogy) but from the perspective of their, and thus our, actuality, and thus as being one possible way in, by, and through which to pose questions to governing to-day.
ABSTRAKT PÅ DANSK

STYRING I DAG: PÅ VEJ MOD EN ANALYTIK AF DET NUTIDIGE

"Styring i dag" betegner et domæne af forskning, og denne afhandling indeholder en teoretisk diskussion af spørgsmål om metode vis-à-vis en undersøgelse af dette domæne. Titlen har to aspekter, der omfatter hinanden: For det første, "styring i dag" indikerer, at det er i dag, der skal styres, og at det er os selv i vores aktualitet som er målet for styringen, således er det styringen af os selv i vores nutid som vi er ved at undersøge. For det andet, fremhæver "styring i dag", at det tilstanden af nutidens regeringskunst, der danner genstand for undersøgelsen. Derfor betegner styring i dag både styring af nutiden og styring i nutiden. Ved at arbejde sig igennem disse spørgsmål om metode skitserer afhandlingen en tilgang, der tager "viljen til ikke at blive styret på denne måde” som sit referencepunkt og middel til kritik. Som konsekvens heraf, er den skitserede tilgange solitid situeret indenfor den løst knyttede samling af arbejder, der går under titlen studier i guvernementalitet. Studier i guvernementalitet har deres udgangspunkt i forskning og skriver af den franske filosof og historiker, Michel Foucault. Det er primært indenfor Foucaults værker, at afhandlingen søger at arbejde sig igennem de problemer, som førnævnte metodespørgsmål rejser.


Det, der foreslås her, er en analytik til brug for at udføre felt-arbejde i kontrollens arkitektonikker. Et sådan felt-arbejde undersøger det stof, der udgør objektet og målet for regeringen; undersøger begrebsdannelse af formen for subjektivitet som stof skal omformes til; undersøger udarbejdelsen af den agent (virkende), der skal omdanne det konstituerede stof i den udtænkte form; og undersøger tematisering af det samlede formål, mål eller strategi for kontrol; af-
hensyn-til-hvilken stoffet bliver formet i netop denne form gennem agenten (den virkende). Formålet med sådanne felt-arbejder er at synliggøre guvernementsalitetens miljøbetingethed i sin, og dermed vores nutidighed.

Denne tilgang er præsenteret som en mulig måde at forholde sig til vores nutidige styringsmæssige teknologier, og til at anfægte dem ikke ud fra deres historiske perspektiv (arkæologi og genealogi), men ud fra deres, og dermed vores egen, nutid. Dermed er afhandlingens tilgang blot en mulig måde at stille spørgsmål til styring i dag.
Firstly, I would like to give heartfelt thanks to Mia Arp Fallov, without whom this thesis that you have been kind enough to read simply would not have been possible. I would like to give special thanks to my supervisors, Kenneth Mølbjerg Jørgensen and Kurt Dauer Keller, who not only provided the usual support, guidance, enthusiasm, and encouragement throughout the PhD process, but also, made the whole thing possible in the first place by giving me confidence in my writing and the courage to begin again. I would also like to thank Mia for reading through and commenting upon sections of the thesis—her comments and support made the thesis seem both doable and worthwhile. I would like to mention my intellectual debt to Vince Miller, Jonas Larsen, Tiago Moreira, Thomas Scheffer, Nina Moeller, Martin Pedersen, Antje Gimmler, and Ana Lisa Valente for their friendship, consistent support, and challenging intellectual discussions. My thoughts go out to my parents, for never faltering in their belief in me and for their consistent support and encouragement. Last, but by no means least, my heartfelt thanks and very big hugs go to Joshua and Benjamin, not only for their patience and for understanding whilst working on this project, but also for their unconditional love and unquestioning support: I could not have done this without them.
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

We do not undertake analyses of works because we want to copy them or because we suspect them. We investigate the methods by which another has created his work, in order to set ourselves in motion.

(Klee, The Thinking Eye)

The most valuable insights are the last to be discovered; but the most valuable insights are methods

(Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ)

The thesis takes up as a central motif of studies in governmentality the critical attitude embodied in the question of “How not to be governed?” (Foucault 1996b: 384). This critical question does not concern “How not to be governed at all?”, but rather revolves around a series of question posed in relation to that other question: “How to govern?” This series poses such questions as “‘How not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of these principles, in view of such objectives and by the means of such methods, not like that, not for that, not by them?’” (ibid.). In other words, the will to govern has, since the sixteenth century, been constantly meet by the reactivation of a counter-will of not wanting to be governed by them, in that way, with those techniques, towards that end, and at that cost. What I want to do in the thesis is not to present a genealogy of the historical unfolding of this game of “How to govern?” and “How not to be governed thusly?” but, rather, to propose some tools for critiquing the former, as it is practiced to-day, from the perspective of the latter. That is to say, in using the critical work done by Foucault and others, I want to propose some tools for undertaking a critique of the micro-practices of government from the standpoint of not wanting to be governed like that. To question the will to govern and reflections upon how to govern from the counter-point of not wanting to be governed in that way is neither to question it from the side of resistance nor to put forward alternative forms of government; rather, it is to undertake an analytics of the will to govern by analysing their governmental practices, technologies, and rationalities. That is to say, it is to render visible not only what government wants but also how it wants to achieve this so as to open up a space for possible critique; critique that takes the form of not wanting to be governed like that.

Studies in governmentality have as their target, then, discourses that concern themselves with the question of “How to govern?”; to this end, they are predominantly concerned with descriptions of what “is”, and prescriptions and codifications concerning techniques or arts of governing and knowledge about “man” evidenced in technological discourses—the theoreticians schemas: the,
programmatics, diagrammatics, architectonics, and so on, concerned with the “how?” of governing. That is to say, they interrogate government not “governance” (see the discussion on page 142 below). In doing so, they not only look at the product or end result, as it were, of such schematizations—their thematic content and their effects; more importantly they look primarily at how things were made governable or, more specifically, of how they were rendered seable and sayable and thus thinkable and actionable; in short, how what is to be governed was made in the very process of being made thinkable as governable. To be rendered governable here does not only mean to be made susceptible to investigation, reflection, evaluation, calculation, and so forth; it concerns not so much a question of what is governable as it does what there is to govern and how this was made governable. That is to say, it does not deal with the question of thought in relation to pre-discursive, ready-made objects, but looks at how objects are made at the same time and through the very same processes as being made thinkable and being thought about: “how were objects made as seeable and sayable and thinkable and practicable (i.e. actionable) as governable?” That is to say, they look at what Rose and Miller (1992, 2010) call the “problematics of government”.

Such an analysis or analytics interrogates the mutual and simultaneous coming-into-being of problematizations (matters of concern) and their objects (matters of fact) on the one hand, and of problems and rejoinders on the other; rejoinders that take the form of explicit programmes. It is these programmes that codify and prescribe ways of doing things; that is to say, what is to be known and what is to be done (Foucault 2001d: 225, 230). It is these codifying and prescriptive discourses, these programmes, that Foucault calls technologies. Technologies, understood as “the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject”, constitute the domain of analysis of studies in governmentality. Technologies are prescriptions-codifications, techniques-discourses, or what Foucault once termed power-knowledge; on this view, governmental technologies or technologies of government equates to governmental power-knowledge or the power-knowledge of government. Governmentality, then, refers, simultaneously, to relations of power and to the techniques and knowledges that allow for those relations to be exercised; techniques which often not only work upon but also through and by means of techniques of self. Governmentality refers to the conducting of conducts, to ‘a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility’ (Foucault 2005: 252); governmental technologies, or power-knowledges, refer to the setting-out or laying-out of probable conduct (Foucault 2001d: 341).

In taking up this concept of governmentality, then, we will take it in its broadest possible conceptualization; a conceptualization that consists of a three-fold matrix: Firstly, it points to relations of power conceptualized as strategic games between liberties: those over whom power is to be exercised are free to act
and are thus thought of as being susceptible to having their actions acted upon. Secondly, it refers to the techniques, the tactics, and so forth, which enable those strategic relations to be operationalized and exercised: techniques that do not act directly and immediately upon either minds or bodies but aim to act upon actions by setting-out environments of probability. Thirdly, it relates to the formation not only of an object of knowledge and target of governmental intervention but also of the forms of subjectivity that are to be brought into existence. Subjectivity is conceived here not only as a relation of governed to governor but also as a relation of self to self (see, e.g. Burchell 1996; Cruikshank 1996; Rose 1996b), and so the techniques deployed to allow for the exercising of a relation of power by contemporary governmentalities are questioned according to the different and differential ways in which they colonize such relations; that is to say, not only in the ways in which government works upon the other but also the ways in which it works upon the other by getting this other to work upon themselves (i.e. through techniques of self). As Foucault put this in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, ‘if we take the question of power...[and situate]...it in the more general question of governmentality...[understood as]...a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then...reflection [up]on this notion of governmentality can[not] avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self...[On this view,]...the analysis of governmentality...must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self’ (Foucault 2005: 252).

One question to be addressed here, which has been signposted by Walters (2012), is the way in which much contemporary studies in governmentality deal with ‘contemporary history’ (ibid.: 49; see also Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011a, who state that ‘[r]ather than being genealogically-historically oriented, most of this [Anglo-Saxon] work used Foucault’s instruments to analyze processes of contemporary social transformation’, 9ff.). As Walters observes, studies in governmentality have largely ‘normalized’ (Walters 2012: 50) what was something of an aberration or anomaly in Foucault’s own genealogies of power. That is to say, whereas the larger percentage of Foucault’s genealogies of government have been historical analyses of its verticality (provenance and emergence) and horizontality (epistemic and technical matrices) since the sixteenth century, contemporary studies in governmentality, in placing emphasis upon Foucault’s analyses of “neo-liberal” arts of government that emerged post Second World War, ‘have diverged from the kind of historical methods that Foucault and his colleges usually practiced’ (ibid.). In other words, ‘this literature has situated itself firmly within the temporal horizon of the near present’ (ibid.). I would go one step further here, and suggest that much contemporary studies in governmentality—or analyses of power more generally—have even forsaken the recent past for an analysis of the contemporary itself, and do, indeed, express a “neo-liberal bias” (Walters 2008; 2012: 50). In addition, it seems to me that in
much contemporary studies in governmentality, the aforementioned critical question—of not wanting to be governed thusly—has been, at least to a certain extent, displaced. By this, I mean that this fundamental question posed by this attitude of critique, this will not to be governed like that, seems to have been consumed by a concern for providing detailed empirical descriptions of techniques. An admiral goal, in and of itself, but to what end? From an ethico-political point of view, such description losses much of it theoretical justification if it does not take on board the finalité of this critical ethos. That is, of complementing historical and/or contemporary description with a contingent normative critique that is grounded not in some abstract universal principle: “man”, but is precisely immanent to, and, indeed, imminent in, the will not to be governed in that way.

One of the central questions to be posed in the thesis is how applicable is the work of Foucault (and others) to analyzing power as it is practiced to-day in our contemporary present by questioning it from the point of view of our actuality. (In order to highlight the fact that “today” is being used in a technical sense—i.e. as a particular conceptualization of, and analytic of, “the present”—I shall revert to writing it as a hyphenated compound term: to-day, which literally means “on—the or this—day”: Old English: from to “at, on” + dag “day”.) More specifically, then, the thesis asks how applicable is that work in relation to the different ways in which it has been taken-up (appropriated), understood (interpreted), and used (applied) in the study of power generally and governmentality specifically. Another question, following of from the first, concerns the effect on Foucaultian critique, on the aforementioned critical attitude and critical question, of doing non-historical studies in governmentality. What happens to the critical question of “not wanting to be governed like that” when this question is posed not to history but to the contemporary?

I think one of the greatest strength of Foucault’s conceptualization of power, and later of government, is that it is conceptualized and studied historically. Or, stated differently, ‘it was not [Foucault’s] practice to deliver evaluations of current affairs’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiii), at least not in his book-length publications. It is its greatest strength in that posing the question of power in this way—that is, in term of a history of thought (archaeology) and a history of our present and of ourselves in our present (genealogy)—it draws our attention to the historical, local, and contingent nature of the present, of how the present was made, of contemporary thought, and above all of subjectivity, and thus raises the critical question of the exercising of relations of power to-day. In doing so, it discloses that which we have come to take-for-granted, that which has become unassuming, out-of-sight, and thus out-of-mind, that which is not seen and thus goes without saying; not because these things have been forgotten or repressed, nor because they have been masked by some interested party, but because what has come to be take-for-granted is so central to our very existence, so integral to our mundane and routine everyday practices, that we cannot (can no longer) see
it. Like the proverbial water to a fish, we are immersed in it, absorbed and surrounded by it; we are it. We no longer see what may be seen and we no longer say what goes without saying because these things are ‘below the line of visibility’ (Veyne 1998: 156).

On the other hand, I think that Foucault’s untimely use of history is, however, one of its greatest weaknesses, not in and of itself but because this central, even fundamental, question of history tends to be discarded, occluded, forgotten, or simply ignored in many of the studies of power undertaken today that employ Foucault’s conceptualization of power in some way. This sense of “untimeliness” comes from the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Mediations in which, in situating himself as a classicist, he state that ‘I do not know what meaning classical studies could have for our time if they were not untimely – that is to say, acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come’ (Nietzsche 1997b: 60). It is this sense of untimeliness that is lost to critique in much contemporary research on the contemporary. As Rabinow and Rose (2003b) conceive this ‘Foucault’s diagnosis of the present does not proceed by attempting a comprehensive analysis of these practices as they exist today, but by seeking the conditions that have made these practices possible’ (ibid.: xiii). In contradistinction to this practice, there is a general tendency in analyses that use Foucault’s work to analyze relations of power, the exercise of power, technologies of power, strategies of power, and so on, and so forth, to study power in its contemporaneity; they are analyses not of its historical conditions of possibility but of its contemporary manifestations, its actuality. That is to say, they study the present from the perspective of its own actuality. (Throughout the thesis, the term “actuality” will be used not only to denote our present, to-day, this moment in time contemporary with the moment of writing, and so on, but also to connote a particular conceptualization of our present, the present viewed from the perspective of a singularity, and so forth.)

Moreover, such studies tend to analyze the contemporary present where the phrase “the present” is substantialized as a set of circumstances, a particular condition, or as a specific state-of-affairs. Such a practice is common practice in, say, sociology—i.e. “postmodern society” (Lyotard 1984), “post-industrial society” (Bell 2008), “risk society” (Beck 1992), “the information age” (Poster 1990, 1995), “surveillance society” (Lyon 1994, 2001), “the age of terror” (Morton and Bygrave 2008)—but should be avoided when undertaking an analytics of the contemporary. Moreover, it stands in stark contrast to the fundamentally historical and non-substantive nature not only of Foucault’s own researches concerning the problem of power, problems of knowledge and truth, of governors and governed, of subject and self, and so forth, but also of other Foucaultian inspired research; for instance, some of the studies in governmentality. Here, I follow Rose (1999) and others in ‘conceiving of our present [not] as an epoch or a state of affairs,...[but rather]...as an array of problems and questions, an actuality to be acted upon and...to be made
amenable to action by the action of thought’ (ibid.: 11). That is to say, the present can and should be conceptualized as something akin to what Foucault once called ‘a transactional reality’ (Foucault 2008a: 297): a reality that not only precedes and acts as a condition of possibility for such transaction, but that is also constituted in transaction. One of the central tropes of Foucaultian critique is to render visible what is not seen and what goes without saying. The question then becomes, “How are we to do this seeing and saying for ourselves without recourse to history?”, where history is the critical tool par excellence (see O’Farrell 2005).

This disjunct—between archaeologico-genealogical histories of our present and analyses and descriptions of the contemporary present—raises a number of questions that seem to have been either passed by or by passed, and thus not raised as a problem. How applicable, for example, are Foucault’s “methods”, which are essentially methods for doing historical analyses (i.e. archaeology and genealogy), to undertaking studies of power as it is exercised to-day that question it not in terms of the historicity of it conditions of possibility but it terms of its conditions of actuality? What, if anything, is gained or lost in transposing “tools” for doing history into tools for studying our present from the perspective of itself? Or, since transposition implies reflection, of simply using such tools non-historically or even ahistorically? Looking at this more reflectively, are there any tools in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical tool-boxes—tool-boxes kitted out for doing history, albeit of a unique form—which can be taken up and effectively employed in studying relations of power as they are exercised to-day? That is to say, for undertaking a critical analytics of power without recourse to describing its historical conditions; that is, to describing the conditioned without recourse to describing what conditioned the conditioned.

Now, there are numerous different possible pathways into—and out of—the works of Foucault. There are so many diverse and promising points of departure that deciding where to begin can leave one in a vertiginous state of paralysis. And secondary studies are often of little help here, in that each new study tends to bring out a different facet of Foucault’s writing. I was going to say that what is to be presented here is not commentary, but this is not quite correct; it is a commentary, of sorts. Nevertheless—and taking on-board the citation from Klee that opened this introduction—it is only commentary to the extent that I want to investigate the work of Foucault and others in order to set us on our way. What is presented here, then, is not an explanation, and is less an exposition or explication; rather, it is more like a rumination that slowly chews-over the specific question at hand before digesting it in the form of manufacturing our own tools. To paraphrase Dean (1994: 2), but giving his sentence a different twist, “the present work is not an attempt to codify Foucault’s methods but to find out how far one can get by reflecting on them in the context of the particular problem at hand”; namely, of questioning our present and ourselves, from the stand-point
of our own actuality, in terms of power. In other words, I want to broach the question of how to go about questioning power, as it is exercised to-day, from with the perspective of our present, from within what I will call a broadly Foucaultian perspective. What I mean by this phrase not exactly “Foucault’s perspective” but a derivative thereof; that is, as something akin to what Barry, Osborne, and Rose (1996a) have called an ethos.

I think Foucault put forward, and indeed practiced, one of the most sophisticated and thought through “methods” for broaching the question of power; that is, for interrogating relations of power and the techniques that allow for their exercise. What Foucault presents us with in his writings is neither a “theory of power” (if by theory we mean an abstract set of principles that explain some aspect of reality) nor a “methodology” for studying power (if by methodology we mean a unified science of method). What is presented there, rather, is an approach or, more specifically, a number of approaches for questioning concerning relations of power and their exercise; where the very term “power” forms part of that approach (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012). This work on power was subject to constant revision and re-elaboration in Foucault’s lifetime, and it has not remained static since his death in 1984. On the contrary, it has been taken up, used, developed, and modified by numerous others; most directly in that rather loosely collected body of work that goes under the general heading of studies in governmentality (see, e.g. Arts, Lagendijk, and van Houtum 2009; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b; Binkley and Capetillo 2010; Bratich, Packer, and McCarthy 2003; Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011b; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Corbridge et al. 2005; Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1999; Dean and Hindess 1998; Hannah 2000; Inda 2005; Lemke 2012; Li 2007; Miller and Rose 2008; Nadesan 2008; Rose 1999; Walters 2012). My Foucaultian perspective will draw not only upon the work of Foucault but also on a number of texts from this extensive literature.

When I say that Foucault has produced a “method” for broaching the question of power, it is essential to get clear about this term. In talking about method, I am not thinking about “methodology”; that is, of something like a systematic treatise, or theory of method, and so on, nor a methodical procedure to follow, and so forth. Rather, what I have in mind is more like theoretical reflections that pose questions of method vis-à-vis the specific work being undertaken. On this view, methods are ad hoc constructions, but they are constructions constructed from and within a certain mode of thought. It is this mode of thought that I am calling a Foucaultian perspective. Consequently, the term “method” will be used exclusively in this sense. What I want to avoid, above all, are the pitfalls and potential dangers of falling into the trap of either “applicationism” (Walters 2012) or “Foucaultianism” (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: viii). In this context, applicationism is ‘the tendency – perhaps a habit as much as a practice – to regard governmentality [and an analytics of power more generally] as a fully formed perspective that one simply applies to a particular
area or topic’ (Walters 2012: 5). As Walters goes on to note, ‘[a]t its extreme, applicationism risks turning the analytical toolbox into a self-contained theoretical system’ (ibid.). Thus, in thinking about and reflecting upon what ‘Foucault’s thought offer[s] for the analysis of our present and our future?’, I want to avoid the tendency of ‘seeking to define a singular approach or a unique methodology which we can then apply to our current concerns’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: vii). In other words, I want to proceed not in terms of a Foucaultianism, but in terms of a broadly Foucaultian perspective. What I want to do here, then, is not to formulate a systematic procedure that can be applied to different instances but, rather, to reflect upon what this perspective might look like and how and in what ways it might be applicable to questioning our present from the perspective of our actuality, and to questioning our actuality in terms of power.

In order to counter the tendency towards applicationism, and thus by extension towards Foucaultianism, Walters calls for ‘an attitude towards research’ that takes the form of a ‘critical encounter’ (Walters 2012: 5). The problem I have with the word “encounter” is twofold. Firstly, the term denotes something like a face-to-face meeting (from Latin *incontriare* “in front of”, from *in-* “in” + *contrā* “against”, Oxford English Dictionary; OED hereafter); in other words, it suggests the meeting of two separate and discreet entities and is thus suggestive of the distinction and opposition between research subject and research object. What we need to bear in mind is that both subject and object are constituted in, by, and through such an encounter and, indeed, that such constitutions are constitutive of the encounter itself—and vice-versa; that is to say, we need to take into account, when approaching things from our Foucaultian perspective, that these things are mutual, reciprocal, and immanent to one another. Secondly, the term has connotations of an adversarial meeting or the meeting of opposing forces in conflict (OED). Now, whilst it is the case that in questioning concerning the exercising of relations of power we are questioning from a position of ‘counter-power [*contre-pouvoir*]’ (Foucault 2001b: 540), such questioning needs to avoid falling into oppositional politics, value judgements, polemics, and denunciations. That is to say, we need to avoid ‘posing the question of power in terms of good and evil [*en terme de bien ou de mal*]’, and instead question it ‘in terms of existence [*en terme d’existence*]’ (ibid.). What it means to question power in terms of existence or, rather, what such an analysis entails and how we can use this, will be explicated as the thesis unfolds.

Bearing these two points in mind, if we take “encounter” to mean ‘an unexpected meeting’ (Walters 2012: 5)—that is, if we conceptualize such an encounter as a constituted-constitutive event—that is to say, as an event in thought—, then it is in this sense, I think, that such an encounter can be critical (i.e. effective, e.g. Foucault 1998: 369-391; or in terms of an “attitude” or ethos, e.g. Foucault 1997: 303-319; see also Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996a): the will not to be governed like that.
This question of histories of the present verses present-day analyses of our actuality is only the most obvious problem in “applications” of Foucault’s “method”. In addition to this question of historicity, and perhaps derived from it, there are further questions to be asked vis-à-vis using Foucault’s conceptualizations and analytics of power for studying the exercising of relations of power in our actuality.

1 – A first set of questions relate precisely to carrying out studies of power in institutions, organizations, establishments, associations, and so forth. One of the central shifts that took place with the emergence of genealogy and the concurrent emergence of a positive and productive conceptualization of relations of power in Foucault’s thought in the 1970s, was precisely the recognition that one cannot effectively broach the question of relations of power and of its exercise, vis-à-vis thought—by looking at the internal workings of what Foucault called institutions (Foucault 2006b). Foucault’s point, I think, is not that it is not possible to pose the question concerning power in this way; rather, it is that something is missed in doing so. In relation to the kind of analysis Foucault had undertaken in History of Madness, for example, he states that, ‘I no longer think that the institution is a very satisfactory notion. It seems to me that it harbors a number of dangers, because as soon as we talk about institutions...we take the individual, the group, and the rules which govern them as given, and as a result we can throw in all the psychological or sociological discourses’ (ibid.: 15). He goes on to state that, ‘what is essential is not the institution with its regularity...but...the practical dispositions of power, the characteristic networks, currents, relays, points of support, and differences of potential that characterize a form of power, which are...constitutive of...both the individual and the group’ (ibid.). Consequently, ‘before tackling institutions, we have to deal with the relations of force in these tactical arrangements that permeate institutions’ (ibid.).

2 – A second problem with using Foucault’s conceptualization of power, and his methods for questioning it, to undertaking studies of power in organizations, institutions, and so forth, is the specific form of questioning that Foucault’s historical analyses of relations of power and its exercise took. For example, most studies of power in institutions, organizations, and so forth are what we could call studies of everyday life; that is to say, they study—ethnographically, participatorially, experientially, interpretively, and so forth—the exercise of power as it manifests itself in real-time in the day-to-day functionings and on-going activities of modern institutions: they look at what actually takes place or at what really happens, and so forth. Now, whilst this is certainly a legitimate way of broaching the question of power institutionally in its contemporaneity, it bears little resemblance either to the domain or to the method of Foucault’s own enquiries: which are neither anthropological, nor
sociological, nor ethnographical enquiries, historical or otherwise. A brief survey of Foucault’s most cited book—*Discipline and Punish*—evidences this difference.

What Foucault looks at in this study are not the day-to-day activities of what went on in eighteenth century punitive practices or nineteenth century penal institutions; what he addresses, rather, are *rules, ordinances, petitions, orders, measures, plans*, and so forth, and their *positivity* or *dispositivity*. That is to say, he examines the multiple and heterogeneous discourses and technical practices that formed the conditions of possibility of disciplinary power, and thus of the *birth* of the modern prison. This helps to explain why Foucault turns to Bentham’s (1843 [1787]) *architectural plan* for a house of inspection, rather than Howard’s (1780 [1777]; 1791 [1789]) *descriptions* of goals, houses of correction, prisons, and lazarettos, and so forth. In the former, we have an English utilitarian philosopher, jurist, and social reformer, sat at a desk in Crecheff, White Russia, in 1787, thinking about, writing out, and *diagramming* a plan for a house of inspection (Bentham 1843), an inspection-house that was never constructed in exact accordance with the original plan, but a plan that has nevertheless had profound effects upon our present and upon ourselves; I do not see how any of this could have been rendered visible and thus intelligible by way of ethnography—even those of the kind undertaken by actor-network theorists (e.g. Latour 2005; Law and Hassard 1999)—or other interpretivist methodologies; historical or otherwise. If we are to undertake an analytics of the contemporary equivalent of such programmes, how are we to go about doing this? Is it that what Foucault analyzes and describes in *Discipline and Punish* assumed the form that it did because what is expressed there took place in a time and in a place that is not our own—in short, are ethnography and interpretation ruled out because of history? I do not think so. Rather, it is that the very object of enquiry is not something that can be disclosed (rendered visible, made apparent) and thus rendered intelligible by way of such methods. For even if this event took place in 1787, there are surely accounts that could have been consulted vis-à-vis what actually took place in the various places of confinement situated throughout Europe in the late eighteenth century. And, indeed, such texts do exist. The most obvious example of the latter are those studies undertaken and published by another Englishman, the philanthropist and prison reformer, John Howard (1726—1790).

Between 1775 and 1790, Howard, a self-appointed inspector of prisons, visited numerous houses of correction, city and town-gaols, bridewells, lazarettos, hospitals, schools, and workhouses, and so forth, across England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and in “some foreign prisons”: France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany, as well as Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and elsewhere (Howard 1780; 1791). Howard not only inspected such institutions, he also talked to prisoners, to their gaolers, as well as the doctors of the time. He presents the reader not only with detailed descriptions of the condition he saw, of the condition of the prisoners, of their treatment at the hand of their keepers, but also of the design and layout of some of the houses of confinement (maps and
mechanics), along with descriptions of the practices that took place there and some of the juridical procedures involved. In other words, these materials, along with other texts such as Blackstone’s (1775 [1765-1769]), are ripe for undertaking a kind of historical ethnography of everyday life in late eighteenth century institutions of confinement. And yet, in *Discipline and Punish*, Howard is mentioned a mere three times, is discussed and referenced only once, and this is in relation to something other than his prison texts (Foucault 1977a: 123, 200); whereas Bentham (1748—1832), by way of his panoptic plan, is discussed at length, and mentioned, referenced, and noted some thirty four times (ibid.: 200-264, 316-317, 327). What we are dealing with here is, I think, not explicitly a methodological question but a philosophical one; or, rather, the choice of method is an effect of a certain philosophical ethos: ‘[p]hilosophy is a diagnostic undertaking, archaeology is a method for describing thought’ (Foucault, letter, cited in Defert 2013a: 32).

Rather than “ethnography”, we can say that what Foucault undertook was more akin to a certain kind of *ethnology*; not of “behavior” or “ideas”, however, but of *thought* and *rationality*: ‘I could define...[a form of research like my own]...as an analysis of the cultural facts characterising our culture...[as]...something like an ethnology of the culture to which we belong’; an ethnology, that is, ‘of our rationality, of our “discourse”’ (Foucault 1999: 91; see also 2002a: 411). What is of significance in this quote, which comes from an interview given not long after the publications of *The Order of Things* (in 1967), is less the appeal to ethnology (and, in *The Order of Things*, to psychoanalysis and linguistics) than the form of analysis that ethnology is said to undertake, as Foucault conceptualizes this. This form of analysis seek to by-pass the positing of “man” as an “empirico-transcendental doublet” posited by the “analytics of finitude”, and thus seek to avoid passing through the “being of man”. In Chapter 10 of *The Order of Things*, Foucault conceptualizes ethnology as a ‘counter-science’ (Foucault 2002a: 416), a “counter-science” that does not interrogate ‘man himself, as he may appear in the human sciences’, but questions ‘the region that makes possible knowledge [savoir] about man in general’ (Foucault 2002a: 412). Both ethnography and ethnology have the same etymological root in the Greek *ethnos* (“people, nation, class, caste, tribe, group”, and the like; OED). Whereas the “-graphy” suffix of the former can be said to denote writing about other cultures, and the “-logy” of the later can be said to denote the science or discourse on other cultures, the way in which Foucault conceptualizes ethnology is to invert it to mean something like a study of the discourse of a culture (*ethno* + *logy*: culture + discourse; OED), and of the thought and/or rationality inhabiting them.

Whilst it is probably the case that Foucault came to question the notion that “man” would soon be erased ‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ (Foucault 2002a: 422), I think he never gave up his aversion to “man” as an explanatory principle or interpretative strategy. Moreover, I think it is precisely this aversion that is being play-out in his appeal to Bentham rather than Howard
in *Discipline and Punish*. It is also this aversion that is appealed to in Foucault’s later writings; for instance, in the discussion of “philosophical anthropology” and “social history” in ‘Preface to *The History of Sexuality, Volume Two*’ (Foucault 1997: 200) or in his presentation of not analyzing “behaviours” or “ideas” but *problematization and practices* in the ‘Introduction’ to *The Use of Pleasure* (Foucault 1985: 10-13). This, then, is why Foucault turns to the theory-programme of the panopticon rather than a description of everyday life.

Foucault addresses just this point in ‘Questions of Method’, in which he poses the following rhetorical question to himself: ‘[y]ou say to me: Nothing happens as laid down in these “programs”, they are no more than dreams, utopias, a sort of imaginary production that you aren’t entitled to substitute for reality. Jeremy Bentham’s *Panopticon* isn’t a very good description of “real life” in nineteenth-century prisons’ (Foucault 2001d: 232). To which he replies, ‘[i]f I had wanted to describe “real life” in the prisons, I indeed wouldn’t have gone to Bentham. But the fact that this real life isn’t the same thing as the theoreticians’ schemes doesn’t entail that these schemes are therefore utopian, imaginary, and so on’ (ibid.). And this because ‘these programs induce a whole series of effects in the real: they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behavior, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things’ (ibid., emphases added; see also the discussion in ‘Omnes et Singulatim’, ibid.: 319-320). That is to say, they form those things still have value and meaning for us, even if or perhaps because we can no longer see them and thus they go without saying. What such analyses analyze, then, is not some kind of historical ethnography; we are not presented with an anthropological or historical sociological description of everyday life, à la Goffman (1961). On the contrary, what they undertake is what Foucault referred to in his later writings as a *critical history of thought* or a *materialist history of rationality*: epistemological (knowledge, science, truth) and technological (political and/or ethical) reason.

What is offered in *Discipline and Punish*, are not simply analyses of what was actually done by people to people in the day-to-day practices of eighteenth and nineteenth century punitive practices. Rather, and for the most part, what we are presented with are descriptions of prescriptions describing what is and prescribing what was to be done, what should be done, what ought to be done, and so on, and *how* these were to be done, and so forth, vis-à-vis the government of others: what we might call punitive reason. They are, in short, what Foucault termed *programmes* (what was to be done, what should be done, what ought to be done) and *techniques* (the specific ways in which what should be done, etc., were to be carried out); both of which are captured by what Foucault called “technologies of power”. Stated slightly differently, and applying a phrase from *The Use of Pleasure* to Foucault’s broader projects, the object and/or target of Foucault’s critical histories were “‘practical” texts, which are themselves objects of a “practice”’ (Foucault 1985: 12). Technologies of power are prescriptive discourses, not—or not just—physical technical devices: they are as much
contrivances as they are contraptions. Foucault was not just writing about material existence, but also about how particular forms of material existence gives rise to certain conceptualizations, practical thought, calculation, technological rationality: this is what is meant by the expression ‘a materialism of the incorporeal’ (Foucault 1981: 69). Such a project is undertaken, archaeologically, by interrogating the specific forms of thought (a history of thought), and, genealogically, by enquiring into the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought, ‘the situations that give rise to it’ (Foucault 1998: 308), and in terms of the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made or makes possible ‘the consequences it gives rise to’ (ibid.).

Hence—pace Alford (2000), Garland (1990), Semple (1992), and others—Foucault does not, for example, ‘mistake the utopian discourse of prison reform for its practice’ (Alford 2000: 134). On the contrary, commentators such as Alford et al mistake Foucault’s archaeology of discourses for analyses of actual, concrete, everyday (lived-experience?) practices. The confusion here is not that ‘Foucault presents the utopian ideals of eighteenth-century prison reformers, most of which were never realized, as though they were the actual reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (ibid.); rather, it is that readers such as Alford, Garland, and others read him as such. For Gordon (1980), this ‘misunderstanding consists in a conflation of historical levels which reads into the text two massive illusions or paralogisms’ (ibid.: 246). On the one hand, there is the ‘illusion of “realisation” whereby it is supposed that programmes elaborated in certain discourses are integrally transposed to the domain of actual practices and techniques’ (ibid.). On the other hand, there is the ‘illusion of “effectivity” whereby certain technical methods of social domination are taken as being actually implemented and enforced upon the social body as a whole’ (ibid.). In other words, the conflation resides in certain readings of Foucault, rather than in Foucault’s archaeologico-genealogical descriptions and presentation of these discourses and practices.

What most social scientific theories, researches, studies, ethnographies, and so forth, do are to formulate ways and means of understanding and/or explaining what we are, what we do, and the world in which we live (see, e.g. Foucault 1985: 10). What Foucault does is something rather different; and this difference is a history of thought analyzed archaeologically. Perhaps this is why the taking up of Foucault’s concept of power and/or genealogy is often accompanied by an additional external element; three well know example being Deleuze (Hardt and Negri 2000), Freud (Butler 1997), and Gramsci (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). My point, here, is not to criticize or problematize these specific studies, which have been highly influential in opening up new problem spaces for research. Rather, it is to pose a question that they exemplify, and this concerns the apparent need to supplement the work of Foucault with such additional elements. What Foucault’s histories can be said to study are precisely just such ways of questioning, researching, and explaining who we are, how we do things, and how we (should,
ought to) live; and specifically, the ways in which such knowledge (savoir) is connected to the exercising of relations of power (pouvoir). Specifically, he undertakes a history of thought that examines the problematizations that give rise to such enquiries and government (Foucault 1985: 10). That is to say, he studies those knowledges and those practices that deal, in one way or another, with that epistemic and technical matrix of intra-related questions concerning what Steiner (1980) has called ‘the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the good life’ (ibid.: 338, emphases added). In other words, it interrogates the connections and intra-relations between the human sciences and governmental rationalities; or, stated otherwise, of the relation there is between power and knowledge exemplified in the phrase power-knowledge (or knowledge-power, savoir-pouvoir).

We can best access this by taking up the claim made in the ‘Preface’ to Dreyfus and Rabinow’s (1983) influential exposition on Foucault’s thought. In prefacing their book, Dreyfus and Rabinow state that Foucault has come up with a new ‘method for the study of human beings’ (ibid.: xvii); true, but only if we understand this in a certain way. What Foucault’s work embodies is not a new effort to develop a method for the study of human beings, if by this we mean a questioning concerning “what is it to be human?” It is a new method for the study of human beings, however, if by this we mean a way of studying the different and differential ways in which, historically, in the West, human beings have studied themselves: in terms of relations of knowledge and science, in terms of relations of power and government, and in terms of relation to self and ethics. If this is not evident in the kinds of studies Foucault undertook—and I happen to think that it is—then it is clearly evidenced in two places.

Firstly, this way of doing things is evidenced in a comment Foucault made, vis-à-vis thought, to the effect that ‘[w]e can envisage…two kinds of philosopher: the kind who opens up new avenues of thought, such as Heidegger, and the kind who in a sense plays the role of an archaeologist, studying the space in which thought unfolds, as well as the conditions of that thought, its mode of constitution’ (Foucault 1999: 86); Foucault clearly situates himself, and is undoubtedly situated, in the latter. Secondly, there is the 1971 debate between Foucault and Chomsky (1997), which is demonstrative of such an archaeology of thought in action. In this debate, Chomsky puts forward a vision of the just society (the good life) and describes how that society is to be brought into being (the political order), both of which are premised upon his understanding of creativity being an essential and innate capacity of human beings (the nature of human nature) (see, e.g. ibid.: 128). What is interesting about this debate is the exasperation and disbelief on the part of Chomsky concerning Foucault’s criticisms of his position. Chomsky’s astonishment stems from the fact that he does not—and, from within the confines of his own position, perhaps cannot—comprehend the place from which Foucault is making his critique; that is to say, Foucault does not put forward an alternative theory of the nature of human
nature and the political order conducive to the good life, but, rather, questions the very historicity, and thus contingency, of the thought inhering in Chomsky’s own position.

Of course, it could be argued that Foucault nevertheless has an implicit or tacit, and thus unacknowledged, ontology vis-à-vis human nature (see, e.g. Han 2002). Thus, for example, it could be argued that in his discussion of Bentham’s panopticon there is an implicit understanding of what it is to be human in his description of the ways in which human beings internalize the structures or conditions in which they are enmeshed (the panoptic mechanism). This would be true were it not for the fact that what Foucault is describing here is not a real world event—i.e. a description of everyday life—but rather the logic, the reason or rationality inhabiting the thought expressed in Bentham’s discourse vis-à-vis the government of others; and, more specifically, the ways in which Bentham’s discourse constitutes the very objects of which it speaks. On this view, what Foucault is describing is not a human nature (ontology), but a historically delimited understanding of the nature of human nature which organizes not only Bentham’s understanding of the “good life” but also his schematic of the political order (technology) which is conducive to that “good life” and, more specifically, is conducive to the production of the type of persons who should populate it.

The object and target of Foucault’s enquiries, the domain of analysis, then, is not human being: his question is not “What is it to be human?” or “‘Man’?”; nor is it that set of question that gets subsumed under this philosophical anthropological question: “What can I/we know?”, “What should/ought I/we do?”, “What may I/we hope? (Kant 1992: 538; 1998: 677; see Foucault 2008b: 74). Rather, the domain of analysis of Foucault’s enquiries are precisely those inquiries that have attempted not only to provide answers to these questions, but also those discourses that have proposed or prescribed actions for conducting the conduct of others based upon or inhabited by such answers. Hence, not “What can I know?” but rather “What was/is known?” or “What is to be known?”; “How is it that what was/is known is known (and not something else)?” “How is it that what was/is known is?”; not “What should I do?” but rather, “Whatwas/is done?” or “What is to be done?” “How is it that what was/is done is done (and not something else)?”; not “What may I hope for?” but rather, “What was/is hoped for?” “How is it that what was/is hoped is hoped for (and not something else)?” and so on and so forth. This is a subtle, yet fundamental, distinction. Foucault has not come up with a winning formula for posing the question “What are we?”. Rather, the aim or objective of Foucault’s archaeologico-genealogical studies, in asking such questions as “What are we now?”, “What is our present?”, “What are we as a part of this present?”, and so forth, was to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault 2001d: 326). Stated otherwise, it looks, in a very specific way (archaeologically, genealogically), at how “the history of our thought has made
us what we are” (Foucault 1983a), or, more pertinently, of *what we take ourselves to be* in our contemporary present and in our actual relations to ourselves.

3 – A third problem concerns the specific “levels” that are the target of Foucault’s archaeologico-genealogical researches; or, stated otherwise, it concerns confusion over, and/or a flattening out or conflation of two levels at which Foucault’s critical histories work. These levels are most clearly expressed in the distinction Foucault makes between two levels of knowledge; namely, *savoir* and *connaissance*. The distinction to be drawn between *savoir* and *connaissance*, however, is not one of a difference in kind or substance (ontology) but of a difference in levels of conceivability: *savoir* is pre-conceptual; it is, to use Veyne’s metaphor, the hidden base of the iceberg (*savoir*), which is made of the same “stuff”—ice—as the visible part (*connaissance*) (see Veyne 1998). Perhaps part of the confusion between these two “levels” stems from the fact that both of these terms are translated into English as “knowledge”, and thus the distinction between *savoir* and *connaissance* is not always made clear in translation. Without wanting to go into too much detail here, since we shall return to this question later in the thesis, suffice it to say that, for Foucault, *savoir* are the practical and material condition of possibility of *connaissance*. This distinction is also played out in terms of the different targets of archaeology and genealogy respectively: in the Collège de France lecture course on *Psychiatric Power*, for example, Foucault talks of doing an archaeology of knowledge (*savoir*) and a genealogy of knowledge (*connaissance*) in which the latter is ‘the indispensable other side’ to the former (Foucault 2003b: 239; 2006b: 239). I would contend that most, but certainly not all, research that undertake studies of power—in studies in governmentality, in organization studies, and in the social sciences more generally—have as their target not the archaeological level of *savoir* (power, *pouvoir*; self, *soi*), but the genealogical level of *connaissance* (*domination, consciousness of oneself*). That is to say, they have as their target power as it manifest itself in institutions (entities, containers) and not the conditions of possibility of the exercising of a relation of power; or, stated otherwise, the conditions of possibility of governmental *rationalities* and *practices* or political reason.

4 – A fourth set of problems relate to the question concerning subjectivity. On the one hand, it should be stated up-front and without equivocation that neither knowledge (*savoir*), nor power (*pouvoir*), nor ethics (*soi*), nor discourse, nor technologies, and so forth, make, manufacture, or socially construct actual people. On the contrary, what they do or, rather, what they are looked at as doing, is what Hacking calls “making up people”, which is another way of saying they ‘create… new ways for people to be’ (Hacking 2002: 99-114, 100); they produce subject position. That is to say, they fabricate positions which people—individuals, groups, populations, and so on—may come to occupy in the real or in the imaginary: they produce positionalities. Thus, when Foucault notes in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (*The Archaeology, hereafter*), that discourses, as practices, ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972:
he does not mean that discourse makes substantive objects, or even substantive subjects as objects; rather, it is that known objects are the correlative of a discursive practice, as are enunciative modalities (or the knowing subject). As Gordon puts it, vis-à-vis power, ‘[i]t must be pointed out that the “subject”…is thought of by Foucault as a fictive or constructed entity (as are certain objects) though this does not mean that it is false or imaginary. Power does not itself give birth to actual people, but neither does it dream subjects in to existence’ (Gordon 1980: 239, emphasis added); Gordon goes on to note that ‘[t]he key here to Foucault’s position is his methodological scepticism about both the ontological claims and the ethical values which humanist systems of thought invest in the notion of subjectivity’ (ibid.).

On the other hand, in those studies undertaken by Foucault that can be said to have broached the question concerning power, either indirectly (History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic) or directly (Discipline and Punish, The Will to Knowledge), what was researched was ‘the constitution of the subject as it may appear on the other side of a normative division’ (Foucault 1998: 461, modified). That is to say, the object and target of power thus discussed were what we can call the “excluded”, the “marginalized”, the “degenerate”, or, more succinctly, the abnormal: the “mad”, “insane”, or “mentally ill”; the “sick” or “ill”; “criminals” and “delinquents”; the “sexually depraved”, the “hysteric”, or the “pervert”; and so forth. This stands in stark contrast to the object and target of power discussed, for example, in studies of power in organizations (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006; Jermier, Knights, and Nord 1994; McKinlay and Starkey 1998); studies which tend to be analyses not of dividing practices but of the world of work (ergono-politics or ergonomo-power); and thus not studies of what, by any stretch of the imagination, could be called the “abnormal”. Now, whilst it is the case that in his historical enquiries Foucault notes, for example, the ‘swarming of disciplinary mechanism’ (Foucault 1977a: 211) to spheres of life beyond the domains that dealt with what were considered to be the “abnormal”, this still begs the question of how applicable such studies are to contemporary studies of power, and of power in organization, vis-à-vis the “normal”. In such studies, what, if anything, needs modifying, and what are the possible costs of such modifications?

5 – A fifth problem concerning questioning power, is that Foucault is often approached as having provided a “theory” of power and concomitant “methodology” for studying it; namely, genealogy. Once again, this stands in stark contrast to the general thrust of Foucault’s own studies, which, despite their often authoritative tone, remained rather tentative vis-à-vis the question concerning power: both in terms of theorization and in terms of method (see, e.g. Foucault 2001d: 311). In ‘The Subject and Power’, for example, Foucault asks, ‘Do we need a theory of power?’ to which he replies, ‘Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an ongoing conceptualization. And this
conceptualization implies critical thought’ (Foucault 2001d: 327). In addition, Dreyfus and Rabinow note how, in discussions with them, Foucault stated that his conceptualization of power “remains elusive but important” (see the ‘Preface’ to Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: xiii; see also, Foucault 1988: 103ff.). As a final example, in an interview from 1978, Foucault was asked about some comments he had made concerning power in discussion with Deleuze in 1972 (Foucault 1977b: 205-217), to which he responded, ‘[i]t would be bold of me indeed if I were to tell you that my ideas on this subject are clearer now [in 1978] than at that time [in 1972]. I still believe...that the way in which power is exercised and functions in a society like ours is little understood. Of course, there are sociological studies that show us who the bosses of industry are at present, how politicians are formed and where they come from; but there are also more general studies, usually inspired by Marxism, concerning the domination of the bourgeois class in our societies. But, under this general umbrella, things seem to me to be much more complex’ (Foucault 1988: 103). It is this complexity that we attempt to render visible.

More specifically, of the two approaches developed by Foucault for doing history (archaeology and genealogy) the one that is most often cited and used in studying the contemporary exercise of power in its contemporaneity—namely, genealogy—because of the ways in which it poses its question in a vertical dimension (i.e. diachronically), is the one aspect of Foucault’s historical studies that perhaps suffers most from not doing historical research. Conversely, the method that seems to best offer some tools for studying power in its contemporaneity—namely, archaeology—is, more often than not, simply passed over. What we tend to see here are brief summaries, accompanied with reference to The Archaeology, that archaeology was the method that Foucault used in the 1960s, which was dropped in favour of the more robust genealogy in the 1970s. If we add to this mix the observation that genealogy itself is not a method (at least not in the same way that archaeology can be conceptualized as a method), but a mode of orientation and a form of historical narrative, then this problem is doubly compounded.

6 – A final problem—perhaps in part a consequence of the problems discussed above, and the problem concerning genealogy in particular; and perhaps in part a consequence of the taking up of Foucault’s work on power in the social sciences—is the use of Foucault’s descriptions of certain forms or kinds of power as being models of power, or something like ideal types (e.g. Clegg 1998: 34; for a discussion of this, see Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006: 99). When I say “ideal type”, here, I am specifically referring to how Foucault conceptualized this term (Foucault 2001d: 230ff.), which is not necessarily an accurate depiction of Weber’s use of the concept. That said, what I mean by models or ideal types, then, is the taking up and applying of such concepts as disciplinary power, pastoral power, bio-political power, liberal or neo-liberal power, or other rationalities and strategies of government, not as descriptions of historically
specific modes of exercising power, but as “models” which are imposed on or superimposed upon contemporary practices (the most obvious example being Foucault’s description of Bentham’s *Panopticon*, and his subsequent conceptualization of *panopticism*). These contemporary practices are then rendered intelligible, analyzed, and evaluated in terms of the extent to which they do or do not correspond to the model or ideal type thus imposed. What is happening here is that Foucault’s and others histories of the present are being taken—and taken up and used—not as histories of the conditions of possibility of present but as descriptions and/or depictions of the present. The problem with this is that if we undertake an analysis of power by way of the concept of discipline (panopticism) or of neo-liberalism, for example, the chances are that what we will end up finding are precisely disciplinary (panoptical) or neo-liberal arts of government. In other words, if we frame the very thing we are going to analyze as being neo-liberal, for instance, then this already points us in a particular direction, delimiting what it is we are able to see and say, thus perhaps missing what is most important, pressing, or central to what we are questioning. As Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde (2006) put it in relation to studies in governmentality, ‘[t]he orientation of governmentality work…is not ideal typification, but an empirical mapping of governmental rationalities’ (ibid.: 99).

What is being questioned here, and this list of problems is by no means exhaustive, is the very notion of application, and all the baggage that comes with this term. However, rather than approaching Foucault’s various historical descriptions of relations of power and the exercising of power as models, templates, archetypes, or ideal types, and so on, I think it is best to approach them as being historical descriptions of certain temporally (historical), spatially (geographical), and materially (practical) delimited modalities of power. It might prove useful here to differentiate, conceptually and analytically, between “model” and modality. Both “model” and “modal” have the same etymological root in mode (from Latin *modus*, OED). However, whereas the former term (Latin *modulus*: “a small measure, a standard”) refers to “measure, size, extent, quantity”, and so forth, the later term (Latin *modālis*: “of or pertaining to a mode”) relates more to “way, manner, method, fashion, style”, and the like. A model, then, can be thought of as being a copy of an object, a representation or description of a structure; it can be thought of as something that is copied or used as the basis for a related idea, process, or system; or it can be thought of as being a simplified version of something complex used in analyzing or solving problems or making predictions (OED). A modality, on the other hand, can be conceptualized as pertaining to mode or form; that is, as a way, manner, or form of doing something. Whereas model, conceptualized thus, refers, directly or indirectly, to substance, structure, or manifestation, a modality, thus conceptualized, relates to the “how?” of doing something—its mode—without necessarily referring to a referent (ibid.). As with other such distinctions and/or
differentiation made throughout the thesis, this distinction is not meant as a
generality or as something that can be abstracted from the specific problem at
hand. Rather, they are technical, analytical, and catachrestic/nominal concepts
aimed at disclosing the specificity of the object and objective of contemporary
studies in governmentality whose domain of study is the contemporary itself.

Hence, we should treat these various conceptualizations of power, and,
indeed, power itself, as being modalities not models; and what we should take
from such analyses and descriptions is not so much what is analyzed and
described (its content: the particular modality) but the specific form of analysis
and description; what Rabinow and Rose call ‘a certain ethos of investigation’
(Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiv). In other words, in “applying” Foucault’s method,
vis-à-vis his conceptualizations of and historical descriptions of power, what we
“apply” is power as a grid of intelligibility and not as what has been made
intelligible. By way of example; what I think we should take from Foucault’s
analyses and descriptions of panopticism is not the panoptic principle (either as
model or metaphor) for questioning power in our contemporary present but,
rather, the analytics of power employed by Foucault. That is to say, what we
should question, in their specificity, are (1) the ways in which it forms the objects
of its knowledge and the targets of its practice (intervention); (2) the relations
of power (antagonistic, agonistic, etc.): their governmental modalities; (3) the ways in
which it elaborates the “how” of its exercise: the techniques or tactics it seeks to
employ or deploy (its articulation of the re-con-figuration of space-time-matter,
or what I shall call environments); and (4) the overall themes or strategies it
unintentionally comes to form, but readily puts into effect. What I am calling environments here, is related to, though not identical to, Poovey’s (1995) and
Miller’s (1994) concept of ‘abstract spaces’, which they use to characterize
‘governable zones’ (see Rose 1999: 31ff.). I am not so much interested in the
different ways in which ‘space is produced and organized in the exercise of
power’ (ibid.), as I am in the ways in which space-time-matter matrices or
environments are conceptualized as spaces to be produced and organized, not
just effects of the exercise of power but as the very means in, by, and through
which a relation of power to be exercised. We will return to the theme later in the
thesis.

The point of the forgoing exposition was to highlight a number of problems
vis-à-vis analyzing relations of power, as they are exercised to-day, from the
perspective of our actuality. Rather than approach these tendencies negatively, I
want to approach them positively as being demonstrative of a very real concern:
that of broaching the question of relations of power, of the exercising of those
relations, of the techniques that allow for those relations to be exercised, and the
ends towards which such techniques are employed as these relations, exercise,
techniques, and ends are articulated to-day. What I want to do in the thesis,
therefore, is to pose the question of whether it is possible to undertake such
analyses of power—that is, to question it in its contemporaneity—that are able to
maintain not only the critical force of Foucault’s historical analyses of power but also, and more specifically, to remain faithful to the philosophical, political, and ethical *ethos* of Foucault’s critical histories. In short, I want to ask if it is possible to undertake a critical analysis of contemporary relations of power by using Foucault’s conceptualization of power but without doing history; that is, being non-historical not ahistorical. The aim of this questioning is neither to promote nor to produce an ahistorical understanding of power. Nor, however, is it to advocate doing non-historical studies rather than undertaking thoroughly historical enquiry; the latter can and should be undertaken whenever and wherever this is possible. Rather, the aim of posing this question—of moving from history to the present—is to see if it is possible to use Foucault’s conceptualizations of relations of power and some of the methods he developed to interrogate it where historical enquiry is, for whatever reason, not possible. Here, I will take the extreme situation in which historical research, even of our recent past, is not possible. If we are able to answer in the positive concerning this extreme case, then doing studies of our very recent history should also be possible. It should also be noted that in undertaking analyses of power in its contemporaneity in no way excludes using historical (i.e. genealogical) analyses done by Foucault and others, providing that they are taken precisely as genealogical histories of the present and not as ethnographic depictions of the present. What I would like the reader who has been kind enough to read what has been written to take from this exposition is not just the solutions or workarounds proposed but, more specifically, the posing of questions and the working through such positions. The aim of the thesis, then, is to make a modest contribution to the furtherance of studies in governmentality by thinking through some of the problems related to undertaking a governmental analytics of the present.

— *Method*

As Rose notes, ‘[s]tudies of governmentality practise a certain kind of empiricism’ (Rose 1999: 55): ‘analyses of governmentalities are empirical but not realist. They are not studies of the actual organization and operation of systems of rule, of the relations that obtain amongst political and other actors and organizations at local levels and their connection into actor networks and the like…studies of governmentality are not sociologies of rule. They are studies of a particular “stratum” of knowing and acting’ (ibid.: 19). In undertaking non-historical, and thus rather circumscribed, studies in governmentality—i.e. an architectonics of control—I too want to propose a certain kind of empiricism. One of the things that needs to be avoided, at all costs, in undertaking studies in governmentality or an analytics of power more generally is ‘a naturalistic counter-vocabulary’ (Saar 2008: 235, emphasis added). One way of avoiding such a vocabulary is by way of *nominal* and *catachrestic concepts*—concepts whose
‘function lies in describing…phenomena to reveal and signify their malleability and instrumentalizability and in constructing legible constellations between relations of…power on the one hand, and…knowledge on the other’ (ibid.). As Saar goes on to state, ‘deciphering these constellations is defamiliarizing and performative’ (ibid.).

The empiricism put forward here follows on from Foucault’s claim that he is ‘an empiricist’ (Foucault 1988: 106); but the kind of empiricism to be practiced here needs to be separated out from some conventional ways of thinking about this term. It needs to be distinguished, that is, from epistemological debates concerning the “methodologies” of the social sciences, from Anglo-Saxon empiricism and its fetishism of the facts, and from the valorisation of (lived) experience and the denigration of theory, and so forth (see, Rose 1999: 12, 55). Rather, the empiricism being proposed here ‘is a method of inventivity, the invention of concepts as objects of an encounter, a here-and-now encounter which produces ever new, ever different “heres” and “nows”’ (ibid.; see, Deleuze 1994: xx; see also Walters 2012). The kind of empiricism I propose and that we are to practice when undertaking an analytics of the contemporary is what we will call conceptual empiricism. Such an empiricism builds what Deleuze calls “nominal concepts” or ‘[c]oncepts with finite comprehension’ (Deleuze 1994: 14). Such concepts, which ‘intervene to resolve local situations…change along with the problems’ (ibid.: xx) they address. My use of concepts, however, is not just nominal; it is also catachrestic (Spivak 1996). Catachresis connotes the improper use of words, the application of a term to a thing which it does not properly denote, or the abuse or perversion of a trope or metaphor (OED). Spivak calls the ‘proximate naming’ of things catachrestic (ibid.: 143). Regarding what she takes to be Foucault’s nominal and proximal naming of “power”, Spivak states that “‘[p]ower’ in the general sense is therefore not only a name, but a catachresis. Like all names it is a misfit. To use this name to describe a generality inaccessible to intended description is necessarily to work with the risk that the word “is wrested from its proper meaning”, that it is being applied “to a thing which it does not properly denote”’ (ibid.: 145-146). The use of catachrestic concepts here is designed precisely to throw into relief what we think we know about the concepts we use, to get us to think about our use of such concepts, and to think about the work that such concepts can perform.

I have a passion for etymology, which will be use it to build “nominal and catachrestic concepts”, concepts that are to be used as tools for rendering visible a particular stratum of the contemporary in its contemporaneousness. Etymology is used here, however, not to recover the essential meaning of a term by excavating is lost origin (à la Heidegger) nor to describe its historical and sematic embedding (à la Derrida) but to open-up the possibilities not so much of what a term can mean, but of the work and of the kinds of work it can be expected to perform. In doing this, I am following Rose’s observation that ‘concepts are more important for what they do than for what they mean’; that is to say, for ‘the way
in which they are able to provide a purchase for critical thought upon particular problems in the present’ (Rose 1999: 9). For instance, my use of the term “present” here does not name a contemporary set of objective conditions, a situation, or a state-of-affairs, but conceptualizes the present as a conjuncture, as what Walters calls a ‘pluralized entanglement of many times’ (Walters 2012: 113), but also of many spaces and places, of many modes of thought and regimes of practices, of what we are (no longer) and what we are (in the process of) becoming, of problems and rejoinders, of relations of power and relations of resistance, of subjectivity and truth, and so forth. In other words, the present is conceptualized as a complex matrix of multiple and heterogeneous entanglements. Etymologically, present (from the Latin *praesens*) means “being there”, but it can also mean “at hand” (from *praef- “before” + esse “to be”: literally, “to be before”). But the term also has another meaning in which it carries the sense of a “thing offered or given” (OED). In my use of the term, I am less interested in what it means than the work it can be expected to perform. On the one hand, it, along with other synonyms such as “to-day”, the “contemporary”, “actuality”, and so forth, is being used in the fairly conventional and unproblematic sense of “this point in time”, “existing at the time of speaking or writing”, that is our *actualité*; on the other hand, it is used to conceptualize our actuality it terms of the “being there” of what has been “given” to us.

Likewise, “power” does not name a thing that is the object of our enquiry; it is a way of looking, of rendering visible, it is a grid of intelligibility. Equally, and as we shall see, “control” does not characterize a set of practices (where to look), it conceives a problem space of and for research: it is a way of looking; it is a perspective that is perspectival, it is an inquisitorial concept. These terms are neither definitions (a precise statement of the essential nature of a thing) nor representations (ideal types, states-of-affairs) nor exactly characterizations (the marking out of the precise form of a thing); they are concepts or conceptualizations: ‘[a] concept is a brick. It can be used to build a courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: xii). Concepts are perspectival; they do not erase reality (they are not idealist), they render visible; as such, they are partial, selective, and biased.

If the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be said to have witnessed what Foucault called ‘the “governmentalization” of the state’ (Foucault 2007b: passim), then from the late 1970s onwards what we have seen and, indeed, are seeing is something like the privatization of government. By this I do not only mean a shift from public to private ownership, from state-run to for-profit as well as not-for-profit organizations, but also a shift from public to private in terms of a move from the collective and social to the individual and the personal. That is to say, we are witnessing—and, in fact, are an integral part of—are reconfigurations of the relations of governor to the governed, and vice-versa, and a rebalancing of the relation of all and one (‘Omnes et Singulatim’). Unlike the governmentalization of the state, which, for the most part, is now settled, this
de-governmentalization or, perhaps better still, this re-governmentalization of the state, or, in any case, this privatization of government, is on-going, in-process, in-formation, and so forth, and so it is unclear when and where it will end, and if and how it will shape up into an overall strategic formation, drift, or pattern. In other words, ‘[w]hat counts is that we are at the beginning of something’ (Deleuze 1992a: 7). Since we are neither in the middle nor at the end of something, but at a particular conjuncture, marked by a specific disjuncture (beginning, not origin), we need to be circumspect about the kinds of claims that we can make. What this means is that we need a certain kind of circumspective conceptualization: the conceiving of “catachrestic and nominal concepts with finite comprehension”.

— Outline

The thesis is presented in five parts. The foregoing discussion outlined the problems to be addressed.

In Part Two, I situate the work of Foucault by looking not for a central thematic but for what I take to be a certain philosophical problematic. This philosophical problematic is posited as being a mode of rendering visible what we are, what we say, and what we do. The central problematic of the thesis—broaching the question of power from the perspective of the present—is then reworked through this philosophical way of seeing and saying and thinking and doing. Problems of applying such an approach non-historically, though not ahistorically, are considered.

In Part Three, I examine two modes of rendering visible used by Foucault: genealogy and archaeology. Genealogy is approached not as a method or methodology but as the aim or finalité of Foucault’s project, which is to furnish a genealogy of the subject. Archaeology, for its part, is discussed as being the method of such a project. In working through what takes place in the genealogical and archaeological moments of Foucault’s work, I seek to re-figure each in such a way as to make them available for questioning the present order of things from within that very order, and thus for questioning the exercising of relations of power as they are to be exercised to-day.

Part Four rethinks the concept of power, through the concepts of government and governmentality, as control. Control is presented as being an empty concept to be filled out by way of empirical enquiry. This enquiry is presented as taking the form of an analysis of the programmatic aspect of technologies of government: their architectonics. Reconfiguring the programmatic aspect of government as an architectonics, and taking up the concept of control, both gives us an object of enquiry and a field in which to work. I call such analytical field-work in the contemporary an architectural analytics, and the aim of such an analytics is to render visible the relational aspect of control by disclosing the techniques in, by, and through which that relation is to be exercised.
Part Five concludes the thesis by drawing the above together and thinking through the possible costs and benefits of such an approach.
PART TWO: TO SEE AND SAY WHAT WE ARE TO-DAY

Why does man not see things? He is himself standing in the way.

(Nietzsche, Daybreak).

I. To Render Visible

Out of a certain methodological rigor, and much to the chagrin of those of us who would seek to grasp what it was he was doing, Foucault never really defined his concepts, his technical termes d’art. When he did offer a view upon them, this was nearly always either in relation to the particular project at hand (the lectures at the Collège de France are exemplary instances of this) or given in interviews in response to a particular question or a specific set of questions. Where such responses do take place, and where they are presented in an extended form, what we are invariable presented with are a series of things that such concepts are not (e.g., Foucault 1972). Again, this, no doubt, is down to the aforementioned methodological rigor, which, perhaps counterintuitively, refrains from pinning things down. This is only counterintuitive, however, if we fail to recognize that Foucault’s modus operandi, or one of his many modi operandi, is not to close things down by setting boundaries or by encasing concepts in definitions, but to ‘open things up...to complicate, not simplify...to multiply lines of investigation and possibilities for thought’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: vii). In short, the task is to open-up problem spaces with and by way of what I, following Deleuze (1994) and Rose (1999), will call nominal concepts (for a discussion of the creative or inovative aspect of such concepts, see Rabinow and Rose 2003b: x-xii, xv). Since to “define” (from Latin de- “completely”, “thoroughly” + finire “to bound”, “to limit”) is “to bring to an end”, “to determine”, “to settle the limits”, and so forth (OED), it would, in fact, and from such a position, be counterintuitive to formulate such definitive definitions. Consequently, when approaching the work of Foucault, we should perhaps rescind from trying to narrow down what such concepts denote, what they signify, or what they mean, and so forth, and instead try to figure out what such concepts do in the specific work in which they are employed or, and more specifically, of what we can do with them in our own work.

In reflecting upon questions of method vis-à-vis questioning our present from the perspective of our own actuality, in thinking about how to look at ourselves from where we are and where we stand, can we simply take up and apply, as is, some notion or other of what Foucaultian archaeology and genealogy are? Not only is this latter question open to oft-times contentious
debate, using either of these concepts, separately or together, to elaborate the present, and to do so from the perspective of to-day, without any reflection upon the work that each does and that they do together, and upon their applicability to such a task, is, I contend, a highly problematic and questionable enterprise. The alternative to this, however, is not to pin down, as systematically and precisely as possible, what these terms mean. Rather, it is to conceptualize what these concepts do or can do or, more importantly, of what we can do with them. There is not, therefore, an attempt made here to state what it was that Foucault was really doing, or to make claims, on his behalf, about what he meant when he said what he said. Rather, I am working in the field of what we can call a Foucaultian problematic. There is a particular kind of reading that I want to avoid here; this type of reading attempts to discern a common thematic running throughout all of Foucault’s writings: Dreyfus and Rabinow’s “interpretive analytics” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983), Elden’s “mapping the present” (Elden 2001), Han’s “transposition of the transcendental” (Han 2002), Mahon’s “genealogical problematic” (Mahon 1992), Rajchman’s “ethic of free thought” (Rajchman 1985), Sheridan’s “political anatomy” (Sheridan 1980), and so forth, and, of course, the almost ubiquitous “critical ethos”. For whilst it is certainly possible to read Foucault in these and many other ways—though not in any way at all—I do not want to follow this path.

When I say, as I will go on to do, that Foucault rendered visible, I am not attempting to find a central thread that will tie his various researches into madness, illness, political economy, criminality, government, and sexuality, and so forth, together, stitching the patchwork into a coherent whole—or to criticize it for its failure to maintain such coherence. Needless to say, this kind of “quilting” performs an essential and important task; but it is not my task. In other words, I do not want to approach it in terms of being a philosophical—or political or ethical—doctrine or even an œuvre; rather, I want to approach it as being a practice; specifically, as being a political, ethical, and philosophical practice of rendering visible. To render visible, then, is not being taken to be a central thematic but as a philosophical problematic: “How are we to render visible the order of things from within the very order of the contemporary order of things?”

What I am attempting to get at here can be made clearer by way of Oksala’s (2010) claim concerning ‘Foucault’s politicization of ontology’ (ibid.: 445). Oksala claims that ‘Foucault’s thought accomplishes the politicization of ontology with two key theoretical moves. The first is the contestation and provocation of all given and necessary ontological foundations...The second...is thus the exposure of power relations and their constitutive role in our conception of reality’ (ibid.). This, or so it seem to me, is a fairly accurate depiction or, in any case, is a useful description of the work that Foucault undertook. However, rather than proceed in this way—that is, in terms of making claims on behalf of Foucault and the work he undertook—I want to move in another direction by asking how we can
put that work to work, what kinds of work we can expect it to do, and thus what kinds of work we can expect to do with it.

Of course, both approaches require a certain amount—and a certain kind—of commentary, but the emphasis shifts from the one to the other in that we become less focused upon what it was that Foucault did or upon his own interpretations of what he did or of trying to reconstruct such interpretation, and so forth, and become much more attuned and thus more attentive to what it is that we can do or that we want to do with the work of Foucault as we understand this. Thus, for example, instead of stating that “Foucault’s thought accomplishes the politicization of ontology”, I would want to say something like “I want to politicize ontology, and I want to do this by taking up and developing some of the themes and concepts worked out and worked over by Foucault”. This is, undoubtedly, a subtle but nonetheless important distinction; it is also a distinction that it is not always easy to maintain, and that is thus not always maintained. By way of example, when I set up the central problematic of the thesis—that concerning questioning our present from the perspective of itself—by drawing attention to a statement Foucault made in The Archaeology that states ‘it is not possible for us to know our own archive’ (Foucault 1972: 130), what I am saying is not “because Foucault said this then it must be true and therefore it must be respected; consequently, we should give up all attempts to know our own present from the selfsame standpoint”. Rather, what I am saying is that “this statement opens up a problem space in which we can do some work; a space in, by, and through which we can reflect upon the problem at hand”.

Here, somewhat ironically, the thesis takes as its guide some comments Foucault made in 1967 concerning commentary and criticism: ‘contemporary criticism’, Foucault notes, ‘is formulating a sort of new combinative scheme with regard to the diverse texts that it studies, its object texts’ (Foucault 1998: 286). Such criticism is neither ideology critique, deconstruction, hermeneutics, nor some other form of discourse analysis, etcetera, but is, rather, a re-combinatorial construction: ‘[t]he formal relations that one discovers in this way are not present in anyone’s mind; they don’t constitute the latent content of the statements, their discreet secret. They are a construction, but an accurate construction provided that the relations described can actually be assigned to the material treated’ (ibid.: 287). In this way, we are freed from the authority and authorial intent of the author: ‘[t]he formal relations that one discovers in this way are not present in anyone’s mind; they don’t constitute the latent content of the statements, their discreet secret. They are a construction, but an accurate construction provided that the relations described can actually be assigned to the material treated’ (ibid.: 287). On this view, and in this way, something new and inventive, yet objectively correct, can materialize: ‘[w]e’ve learned to place people’s words in relationships that are still unformulated, said by us for the first time, and yet objectively accurate’ (ibid.). Thus, neither deconstruction nor reconstruction but a re-combinatorial construction, said by us for the first time; in other words, this is my own invention. With this in mind, we
are freed to pursue our discussion unconstrained by the constraints of pure commentary, whilst all the while attempting to remain within the confines of what can objectively be stated. Such an approach refrains from polemics and pedantics and yet is an attempt to get it right.

To begin, I claim that neither archaeology nor genealogy are methodologies in the conventional sense of this term. They do not laydown or layout clearly demarcated principles and procedures that we must follow; nor are they underpinned by an explicit theory (ontology) or built upon a clearly defined theoretical edifice concerning what *is*. Rather than theory there is experimentation (hypothesis and testing); and rather than methodology there are questions of method (perspective). Better still, and perhaps demonstrating a debt to Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, both archaeology and genealogy, or so it seems to me, are more like two different *ways of looking*, of *seeing* and *saying*, of *thinking* and *questioning* too, of *rendering visible*; they are perspectives that are perspectival. However, this is not an analysis of “*phenomena*” (i.e. the relationship between conscious and world; the way a subject perceives an object, etc.; analyses which invariable pass through the “being of “*man”” but of *events* (where this terms has the sense of an event in the history of “our” thought); that is, they are analyses of the relation between *events* and *thought* (where thought is an ‘act that posits a subject and an object’, Foucault 1998: 459). Taking up this schema, what is presented here is an experimentation and a questioning of method vis-à-vis questioning our actual present from the perspective of this present itself. The goal is not to produce either a theory of power or a theory of method; nor is it to produce a methodology, fixed once and for all time, for broaching the question of power and/or government. A key tenant of Foucault’s critical output, and a key for interpreting that output, is *specificity*. Hence, we need to be *specialized* in our approach to questioning concerning contemporary governmentality. What we are questioning concerning are methods for analyzing relations of power, the objects that are the target of their intervention, the relation of governor to governed, the techniques that permit those relations to be exercised, and the forms of reality, modes of existence, and types of subjectivity that such techniques seek to bring into being; and to question all this as it is practiced to-day form the perspective of our own contemporality.

The principle aspects of the taking up of the question concerning power that I specifically want to interrogate are threefold, and each concerns a question of method. Firstly, it concerns the question not only of the substantiality of power, but also of having some kind of ontological commitment to a thing called or named “power”; that is to say, it is a question that concerns Foucault’s *nominalism*. Secondly, it concerns the relation of archaeology to genealogy and vice-versa; more specifically, it concerns whether genealogy should be viewed as a method in its own right or as more of an orientation and framework that
orientated and framed Foucault’s critical histories. Third and lastly, and more importantly, it concerns the question of the relationship between the critical and the historical or between critique and history: given that Foucault’s critical tool *par excellence* was history, is it possible to do Foucaultian critique without doing history? The point of such an exercise is not to criticise others for their appropriation, supposed incorrect interpretations, or to reproach them for their questionable applications; the point, rather, is to demonstrate the cost for the analysis of such appropriations, interpretations and/or applications, and to point to how things could, perhaps, be done differently. In other words, what is to be presented here is not a corrective, but is more like starting afresh and conceptualizing what we might call “first principles”. What I am interested in here, is not just a question of being faithful to the letter of Foucault’s texts, chapter and verse. Rather than being solely concerned with the question of correct interpretation, I am just as much more concerned with the cost/benefit of conceptualization and application, and, indeed, of the application of such conceptualizations. That is to say, I am not only concerned with interpretation but also, and perhaps more so, with utilization; or, rather, since these are not mutually exclusive, I am interested in doing an interpretation in terms of utilization.

1 – Whilst it is generally acknowledge that, for Foucault, power is not a substance—that is to say, it is not a *thing* that can be possessed, but is an agonistic and non-egalitarian *relation* between people—it is the particular *modality* of a specific *relationality*—there is, perhaps, an unacknowledged ontological commitment to a “thing” called power contained within the very expression “analytics of power”, or other such expressions: this is why I prefer the phrase “studies in governmentality”, although there are problems here too. This is aptly demonstrated in a text written by Hoy (1986) in which he ‘situate[s] Foucault’s conception of “power/knowledge” in relation to other attempts to clarify the nature of power, particularly by comparing it with the procedure of “ideology criticism” as developed by the Frankfurt School and more recently by the Oxford social theorist Steven Lukes’ (ibid.: 123). The main problem here, as I see it, is the view that Foucault’s conceptualizations and analytics of power are somehow commensurable ‘with more traditional social theory’ (ibid.: 123-124). I want to suggest the opposite; namely, that Foucault’s conceptualization of power is, indeed, incommensurable with other “theories of power”—social, critical, or otherwise—precisely because they are *theories*. Theory requires a referent, but Foucault’s conceptualization of power has no referent. Thus, whilst it is acknowledged that, for Foucault, power is non-substantive, that it is not only negative but also positive and productive, and so forth, there is still a potential to ascribe to Foucault an ontological commitment to a thing called power. Such a potential is evidenced in Hoy’s claim that Foucault’s ‘analytics of power is not intended to tell us what power really is, but only *where to look*’ (ibid.: 135, emphasis added). For Spivak, in such formulations, ‘a general, naturalized
referent for the word “power” is tacitly presupposed and, indeed, attributed to Foucault’ (Spivak 1996: 143). Spivak goes on to note that ‘[i]t is as if, although Foucault's interests are not realist, he [nevertheless] has an ontological commitment to a thing named “power”’ (ibid.). Spivak’s comments concerning Hoy’s statement, and other similar formulations, is instructive in that she does not criticise the supposed deficiencies of such formulations but, rather, notes the alienness of Foucault’s conceptualization of power and the paleonymy of language. That is, the historical and semantic embedding, and thus the apparent naturalness and unmotivatedness, of language on the one hand, and the ‘functions of any subject’s relationship to language’ on the other (ibid.: 144).

What I want to take from Spivak’s discussion is less the criticism of a certain position—after all, Hoy’s text is now close to thirty years old—and more the continuing problems posed of the paleonymy of language (re: both of and in). The consequences of such paleonymy—or the cost, if you will—for analyses of power are central. For to even talk of “analyses of power” or “studies in governmentality” is demonstrative of the problems posed by language; this problem is doubly compounded, for example, in those studies which aim to undertake analyses of power in organizations (see, for example, Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006: 5ff.). That is to say, not only do such formulations pose a “thing” that can be analyzed (power), they also locates that thing in a “place” or “space” (organizations). Such a formulation is not only demonstrative of the potential pitfalls of an unacknowledged ontological commitment to a thing named power, it also demonstrates the problems posed by language vis-à-vis an ontological commitment to entities called organization(s). This stands in stark contrast to Foucault’s claim that “power does not exist” (“Le pouvoir, ça n’existe pas”, Foucault 2001b: 302, see also, 340ff.; in addition, see Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 105ff.). Taking this claim seriously has serious consequences for broaching the question concerning power, and no more so for the form that such questioning will take. Principally, if power does not exist, “How can one undertake an analysis of it?” Since there is nothing—no “thing”—to undertake an analysis of, how can we question power.

What we can do—and, I think, what Foucault and others do—is to undertake what Foucault called an analytics of power. The term analytics here has connotations of a form of analysis that breaks-down, dissects, or de-composes, a de-struction, to use Heidegger’s term, though not a deconstruction in Derrida’s sense of this term (see Foucault 1997: 118). Power—or, rather, relations of power—for its part, is taken, “nominally” or nominalistically, as a word that lends itself to naming ‘a complex strategical situation in a given society’ (Foucault 1978: 93): it is the “proximate naming,” by way of a “catachrestic nominalism” (see, Spivak 1996), of the articulation of agonistic and nonegalitarian relations and technologies and rationalities of government (“conducting conducts” and arranging probability, Foucault 2001d: 341, modified). As Foucault put this in The Will to Knowledge, ‘[w]e must, no doubt, be nominalist: power, it is not an
institution, and it is not a structure, it is not a certain strength \textit{[puissance]} of which some are endowed: it is the name that lends itself to a complex strategic situation in a given society’ (Foucault 1978: 94, modified). I would go one further here and say that power is not so much a “name that lends itself to a complex strategic situation”, as it is a name that lends, gives, or attributes itself to a description of or to describing “a complex strategic situation”; or, perhaps better still, to the means—the approach, the way of seeing and saying—by which one undertakes such an analytical description: one describes things \textit{in terms of} power. As Rose (1999) puts it, vis-à-vis government, ‘[g]overning…should be understood nominalistically: it is neither a concept nor a theory, but a perspective’ (ibid.: 21, emphasis added).

An analytics of power, then, breaks down or de-composes the complex strategic situation that power lends itself or gives itself to naming by dissecting it into its constituent elements and constitutive aspects; it breaks it down into its often humdrum and mundane, sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting and contradictory, but always multiple and heterogeneous, components, positions, and dispositions. An analytics of power scrutinises the \textit{micro-physics} of such complex strategical situations. As we shall see, one undertakes an analytics not—or not only—because of some philosophical debt to Kant (Djaballah, 2008) or Heidegger (Rayner, 2007), but because the exercising of relations of power themselves tends to be analytical (i.e. it de-composes, it breaks things, time, space, bodies, processes, movements, etc., down in to their simplest and most rudimentary elements). This is especially true of disciplinary power: ‘[d]iscipline organizes an \textit{analytical} space’; it is an ‘\textit{analytical} arrangement [aménagement] of space’; an ‘\textit{analytical} partitioning of time, gestures, and bodily forces’; ‘a meticulous and ever more \textit{analytical} observation’ (Foucault 1977a: 143, 203, 221, 227, emphases added). It is called an analytics of power not because of some thematic choice concerning a theory of power and a concomitant method for studying it (genealogy), but because the exercising of relations of power, technologies of government, governmentalities, and so forth, themselves tend to be \textit{analytical}. In other words, there is neither an ontological nor an epistemological commitment to a thing called Power (with a capital “P”). On this view, to undertake an analytics of power, vis-à-vis an analytics of programmes, is not simply to do an analysis of power, it is to undertake analyses \textit{in terms of} power. That is to say, it is a form of analysis that breaks down breakdowns (problematizations) and responses to such breakdowns (programmes). It is a mode of enquiry that analyse programmes by de-composing their com-posing (from Latin \textit{com}—“together” + \textit{poser} “to place”, hence to place together; OED) of composites (or the en-framing of what is thus enframed, see Elden 2001) that aim to have the function of \textit{dis-posing} (from Latin \textit{disponere}: “put in order, arrange, distribute”, from \textit{dis-} “apart” + \textit{ponere} “to place”; hence, to place apart in the sense of ordering, controlling, regulating, and so forth, arranging; \textit{aménagement}; OED). Or, stated otherwise, it de-composes the positing together (Ge-stell) of what is
posed together (Gestell) in a dispositive (see Heidegger 1977: 15n14, 19n17; Elden, 1998: 105-106, 142; 2001: 78-79, 110-111; Rojcewicz 2006: 90-110; see also the discussion on page 185 below).

Power is not the naming of a referent—it is not exclusively used as a noun—but an approach—i.e. as a verb. Pace Hoy, or, more specifically, the formulation his text expresses, a Foucaultian analytics of power does not tell us where to look but is, rather, a way of looking: ‘the point of view of power is a point of view of method…it [is] a way of approaching things. Nothing more’ (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106): power is a perspective that is perspectival. On this view, one does not undertake an analysis of power, in organization or elsewhere; one does analyses ‘made in terms of power’ (Foucault 1978: 92, emphasis added). Because the exercise of relations of power itself tends to be analytical, and because the condition of possibility of power are the conditions that renders its exercise intelligible (Foucault 1978: 93; see also, Spivak 1996: 147), to undertake analysis “made in terms of power” is to undertake an analytics of power. Of course, such a solution does not do any ‘solving or denying’ of the problem of paleonymy (Spivak 1996: 144), but it does acknowledge the problem.

2 – This talk of an analytics of power leads us on to a second question; this concerns the interrelation between archaeology and genealogy. It does so because to suggest doing analyses made in terms of power begs the question of how one undertakes such an analytics on the one hand, and why one should undertake such an analytics on the other. That is to say, or so I will argue, it raises the question of archaeology and genealogy respectively. In this section, we will deal with archaeology; in the following section, genealogy.

If we not only view relations of power non-substantively, but also without any epistemological or ontological commitment to a thing named power (or to things called organizations), then how are we to question concerning power, its exercise, technologies, strategies, and so on, and so forth? What “method” is “applicable” to the study of such a conceptualization of power? We can attempt to answer this question in a roundabout way by looking at how Foucault questioned concerning power; that is, to look at the form or modality (way of seeing and saying, of looking and questioning, of rendering visible, etc.) of his analyses and not just their content. Now, there has been a tendency, perhaps much less prevalent to-day, of breaking down Foucault’s critical histories into three distinct, and often discontinuous, phases, each with its own object, and each with its own method. This series runs as follows: 1960s, an archaeology of knowledge; 1970s, a genealogy of power; 1980s, a problematization of ethics (e.g. Davidson 1986). Implicit—or not so implicit—in these narratives is the imposition of the notion of discontinuity onto Foucault’s own critical thought. The part of the story we are concerned with here, concerns the so-called move from archaeology to genealogy. This story has slightly different versions: one is of the failure of archaeology and its replacement with a more robust genealogy; another is of the assimilation of archaeology into genealogy; and yet another
concern the supplementing of archaeology with genealogy. What each and all of these versions of the story tacitly presuppose, however, is that genealogy is itself a method or methodology (the same goes for problematization and ethics, but that does not concern us here.)

This way of understanding the trajectory of Foucault’s thought, because of the way it delimits archaeology to the 1960s and the question of knowledge, and situates the questioning of power in the 1970s and genealogy, removes the question concerning relations of power form the remit of archaeological research. This, or so I will argue, has a certain number of ramification and implications for anyone wishing to broach the question concerning power, historically or otherwise; not least of which is that it overplays the significance of genealogy for such undertakings. In contradistinction to the aforementioned understanding, I contend that Foucault only ever had one method, if we can even call it this, and this method (i.e. approach, perspective, etc.) was an archaeology of knowledge (savoir); also occasionally referred to by Foucault as an ‘archaeology of silence’ (Foucault 2006a: xxviii), an ‘archaeology of the medical gaze’ (Foucault 1973, modified), an ‘archaeology of the human sciences’ (Foucault 1970), an ‘archaeology of thought’ (Foucault 1999: 86), an ‘archaeology of discourse’ (Foucault 1997: 123), an ‘archaeology of the emergence of power’ (Foucault 2003a: 26), an ‘archaeology of historical knowledge’ (Foucault 1998: 284), an ‘archaeology of geographical knowledge’ (Foucault 1980: 67, 192), an ‘archaeology of psychoanalysis’ (Foucault 1978: 130), and an ‘archaeology of problematizations’ (Foucault 1985: 13). The point being that all these instances denote an archaeology of savoir or of savoir-pouvoir (or of savoir-pouvoir-soi).

The first thing to note here, vis-à-vis an analytics of power, is that Foucault never used the phrase “genealogy of power”. This phrase is an exemplary instance of a term or phrase being used and propagated in the secondary literature finally being attributed back to the primary source of that literature. It is perhaps this process, along with commentaries on the essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, that has led to the presupposition that not only is genealogy *a* method, but that it is *the* methodology Foucault used in his historical studies of power. If we look a little closer at Foucault’s work concerning the period—roughly, the first two-thirds of the 1970s—in which he is supposed to have made a shift from an “archaeology of knowledge” to a “genealogy of power” then something quite interesting materializes. However, rather than detail the numerous instances in which Foucault discusses the relation between archaeology and genealogy (see, e.g. Foucault 1981; 1997: 11ff., 17ff.; 2006b: 239, 256n13; 2003a: 26, 26n*, 332ff.; 2003c: 11-12; all of which demonstrate a much greater degree of consistency in Foucault’s thought regarding archaeology and genealogy than he is often given credit for), we can look at just two, which embody the form, if not the exact content, of the others.

In a lecture Foucault gave to the French Society of Philosophy in 1978 called ‘What is Critique?’ (Qu’est-ce que la critique ?) he states that, ‘the word knowledge
and…the term power [pouvoir]…does nothing other than cover a whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely to induce behaviours [comportements] or discourses’ (Foucault 1996b: 394, modified; see also, Foucault 2007a: 60). Here, Foucault situates not only an analysis of knowledge (savoir) but also that of power (pouvoir) at ‘the level, more or less, of archaeology’ (Foucault 1996b: 395, modified; see also, Foucault 2007a: 61). That archaeology is presented as the method for questioning both knowledge (savoir) and power (pouvoir)—and also, somewhat later, the relation to self (rapport à soi)—is supported in what Foucault states in a discussion following a lecture he gave at the Berkeley History Department in 1983 on the theme of The Culture of the Self. In this discussion, Foucault was asked about archaeology, genealogy, and the possible relation between them. He stated that “I use those two words in very different meanings and in order to indicate two different sets of problems”, and he goes on to clarify this by stating that archaeology “deals with a set of discourses”, whereas “genealogy is both the reason and the target of analyzing those discourses as events”. He concludes his answer to this question by stating that, “genealogy is the finality of the analysis, and archaeology is the material and methodological framework”. Following this explication, Foucault was asked, “so, you never stopped doing archaeology?” to which he replied, “no! I never stopped doing archaeology, and I never stopped doing genealogy; genealogy defined the target and aim of the work, archaeology indicates the field in order to do genealogy” (Foucault 1983b; in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault presents a similar understanding of the work that he undertakes when he presents it as being ‘genealogical in its finality [finalité] and archaeological in its method’, 1997: 315, modified).

What should be clear from this brief exposition—which is intended to do no more than raise a question regarding the notion that Foucault abandoned a failed archaeology in favour of a more robust genealogy, and that genealogy is the methodology for studying power—is not only that Foucault can be read as never having not stopped doing archaeology but also, and more specifically, that firstly, archaeology can be read as being Foucault’s only method (perspective), and that, secondly and consequently, archaeology can be read as being central to Foucault’s analytics of the exercising of relations of power. That said, why would we want to read Foucault in this way, that is, against the grain of what Gutting (2002) has called the “convention wisdom” of dividing Foucault’s work into three distinct periods? Of the litany of problems that are the effect of this schematization, the one that concerns us here is that, as noted, it removes the questioning of the exercising of relations of power form the remit of archaeological research and, by extension, from a materialist history of rationality or thought, because it situates both of these purely under the heading of genealogy. Posing the problem as we have done above allows us to (re)read
archaeology as being Foucault’s only method—genealogy, as we shall see, being both a form of historical narrative and a critique of the present. Consequently, archaeology, as a tool for analyzing technology, offers the intelligibility key for posing the question concerning the exercise of relations of power in the present.

3 – As noted, archaeology is, to a certain extent, *synchronic* in that it deals with events or with discourse and discourses as events or as series of events: it analyzes *technologies* as events. Genealogy, for its part, is much more *diachronic*; it weaves these events or series of events into the historical fabric that forms the backcloth—or, at any rate, part of the materiality—of our present: it is a diagnostic of how the present became logically possible. Stated otherwise, it questions concerning the different and differential ways in which our past both ‘engenders and is incorporated in a certain conception of the present’ (Gordon 1980: 241). This is made evident, to a certain degree, by the respective levels at which archaeology and genealogy work or the respective levels that are the target of archaeological and genealogical looking and questioning. These levels can be evidenced by way of the distinction discussed above that Foucault draws between *savoir* and *connaissance*; where archaeology is “an archaeology of *savoir*”, and genealogy is “a genealogy of *connaissance*” (Foucault 2006b: 239, 346, see also 378).

Archaeology question *savoir* which ‘refer[s] to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period[, and concerning a particular domain,] for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated [by a subject]’ (Foucault 1972: 15n2). *Connaissance*, for its part, refers to ‘the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it’ (ibid.); and so a genealogy of *connaissance* (or of what Foucault later called *veridiction*: a history of the “politics of truth”, 2001d: 13, 131-133; 2007a: passim) presents a particular narrative of the historical trajectory of such *connaissances* vis-à-vis ourselves and our contemporary conjuncture: a genealogy of the subject, a history of the present, a history of truth, a historical ontology of ourselves, and so forth. On this view, genealogy is not a method as such, but is more like an orientating framework and a form of historical narrative; it is the reason for doing archaeological study: it is a form of what Dean (1994) calls *critical and effective history*. What the addition of genealogy adds to the mix, or so it seems to me, is a complexification of the causality of Foucault’s historical narration; it emphasizes the contingency of the past and thus of the present, and it situates relations of power as being one point from which the present arrives (not origin, but the multiple and heterogeneous events from which the present arrived).

In broaching the question of archaeology and genealogy in this way, we are lead on to the question of history and critique, and of what cost to critique of not doing historical analyses but, rather, analyses of our contemporary present, vis-à-vis power, from the perspective of our contemporary conjuncture itself. Put simply, genealogy, as a history of the present, constitutes the diagnostic part of Foucault’s critical histories: genealogy is a diagnostic, and what it diagnoses is
the to-day of our contemporary present (Deleuze 1992b). Archaeology, for its part, is a form of analysis; it constitutes the analytical part of Foucault’s critical histories (ibid.). The problem concerning genealogy and doing contemporary analyses of the exercising of relations of power, as it is exercised to-day, is that in order to be able to do genealogy, and hence critique thus understood, one requires a difference: one has to be able to ask ‘[w]hat difference does today introduces with respect to yesterday?’ (Foucault 1997: 305); that is, where yesterday does not refer to the day before to-day, but rather to a prior conjuncture in which things were seen and said and thought and done otherwise than they are to-day. And the reason for describing this difference, and the historical formations from which this difference emerged, is to disclose the partiality and contingency of the present; it is to demonstrate that there is neither universality nor necessity (i.e. transcendental) concerning the form of our current practices: the practices of psychiatry, medicine, punishment, government, sexuality, and the relation to self, for example. If what we are analyzing are not the historical formations of such practices—the multiple and heterogeneous conditions that form the conditions of possibility of disciplinary power, for instance—but questioning a practice as it is practiced to-day from the perspective of this to-day, then what constitutes the hook that will enable us to do critique? It is to this question to which we now turn.
II. The Visible-Invisible

We shall try to render visible, and analysable, that immediate transparency that constitutes the element of…[our]…possibility.
(Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*)

Foucault once said that ‘[t]he only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest’ (Foucault 1980: 53-54). This, it seems to me, is precisely the position that one should take up in relation to Foucault’s thought. It is the only position that really grants to such thought its full force and critical weight: ‘I would like my books to be a sort of *tool-box* in which others can go rummaging to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own domain. [...] I do not write for an audience, *I write for users*, not readers’ (Foucault 2001a: #136, 1391, 1392, my translation, emphasis added; see also, Foucault and Deleuze 1977; 1996a: 149). And what Foucault says of his own use of Nietzsche (‘if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest’, Foucault 1980: 54) is equally applicable to our use of Foucault. With this in mind, I want to move beyond the now over-used and over-worked “*tool-box approach*” in relation to the writings of Foucault and others. Rather, I want to approach their work on power and/or government by way of what I will call a “*work-shop approach*” (see, e.g. Dean 1996). In an interview from 1975, Foucault stated that, “[a]ll my books, whether *History of Madness* or the one we’re talking about [i.e. *Discipline and Punish*], are, if you like, little tool boxes [*petites boîtes à outils*]. If people want to open them, use a particular sentence, idea, or analysis like a screwdriver or wrench in order to short-circuit, disqualify or break up the systems of power, including eventually the very ones from which my books have issued...well, all the better!’ (Foucault 1996a: 149). Whereas the tool-box approach seeks to appropriate such “tools” from the aforementioned writings (e.g. discourse, practice, technology, discipline, bio-power, panopticism, advanced neo-liberalism, governing-at-a-distance, etc.), I want to think this appropriation differently.

All tools are made using other tools or equipment; my work-shop approach aims to reflect upon what this equipment is so as to be able to think about this making, and to think about how such making may allow us to manufacture tools specific to our particular projects: a kind of *bespoke* tool-box approach, if you will. That is to say, I approach the work of Foucault and others less in terms of a box (container) containing *ready-made* tools (content) than as a work-shop equipped with equipment from which we can fashion our own tools. The advantage of the term “work-shop”, here, is that it not only denotes a place of manufacture (production, construction, fabrication, etc.), it also has connotations of a meeting place for the purpose of discussion, collaboration, and experimentation. In both
instances, my work-shop approach points to a space or place in which industrial work can be done (industrial: from early Latin *indostruus*; from *indu* “within” + stem of *struere* “to build”; OED; hence to build within the frame-work on power and/or in governmentality.)

The principle piece of equipment that I am going to be employing here are the different and differential ways in which ‘Foucault “rendered visible”’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: viii, emphasis added). But what does this mean? Or, to be more precise, what does rendering visible entail? What Rabinow and Rose are appealing to here, perhaps by way of Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342), is the famous statement, made by the Swiss artist Paul Klee (1961). In this statement, Klee states that ‘[a]rt does not reproduce the visible, but makes visible’ (ibid.: 76).

The term “art” in this statement denotes “graphic art”, and what Klee was highlighting is the way in which ‘the very nature of graphic art…lures us to abstraction’ (ibid.). The point Klee is making is that ‘[t]he purer the graphic work…the less well-suited it will be to the realistic representation of visible things’ (ibid.). As we shall see, it is certainly the case that Foucault’s work can be conceptualized by way of the concept of “making visible”; and, as we shall also see, this sentence from Klee can help us to conceptualize what this entails. Nevertheless, it can only do so on condition that we put aside what Klee was getting at with this statement and take it up and use it in another way; which is to say, in our own way. I want to take up Klee’s sentence, then, not in the direction of abstraction—quite the obverse—but as a heuristic with which to conceptualize our Foucaultian perspective as itself being perspectival. That is to say, as a way of seeing, as a way of saying too; as ways of seeing and saying that “make appear” (*faire apparaître*) or “render visible” (*rendre visible*); as a “grid of intelligibility” (*grille d’intelligibilité*) for “rendering intelligible” (*rendre intelligible*) way of seeing and saying and thinking and doing. The phrase Foucault seems to have used most is “faire apparaître” (there are far too many instances to cite here, and they run from *History of Madness* to the *History of Sexuality*), which I translate as “to make appear” (or “to make apparent”). However, since for something to appear means for it “to come forth into view, *to become visible*” (OED), to “render visible” and to “make appear” are more or less synonymous was of saying the same thing, and I will use them in this way.

We can say that to *re-produce the visible*—and the “the” is important here—is to *re-create* or *re-construct* what is already *visible* to us and, more specifically, is *seen* by us and then to *re-present* it to ourselves in whatever form this re-production takes: text, schematic, painting, graphic, sculpture, and so forth. The prefix “re-” in each of these verbs denotes “again” and thus has connotations of something being “done for a second time” (OED). Hence, to reproduce the visible is to make us see what we already see, and perhaps to get us to see what we see in new and novel ways; that is, to get us to see what we already see differently. Now, to make or render visible (minus the “the”) could be understood as a practice that seeks to make visible what is not visible; that is to say, as an attempt
to get us to see what, for whatever reason, we cannot see because it is not visible to us: by way of microscopes, telescopes, oscilloscopes, and stethoscopes, and so forth. Here, it would be a question of making visible what is not visible and not seen; this is not Foucault’s, and thus our, modus operandi. ‘Making appear what one does not see’, Foucault once noted, ‘can sometimes be the effect of using a magnifying instrument’, on the other hand, ‘to make seen what one does not see can also be to shift level, to address a level that hitherto was not historically pertinent, [a level] which had neither moral, nor aesthetic, nor political, nor historical value’ (Foucault 1980: 49, modified, emphases added).

In moving to this other “level”, our Foucaultian perspective aims to render visible or make appear that which is precisely visible but unseen or, more specifically, not seen. Whilst I am playing upon visuals concepts and metaphors here, to keep with the notion of rendering visible, it should be noted that “to not see” is contiguous with “to not say” or with “that which goes ‘without saying’” (see Veyne 1998). Here, it is a question of rendering visible what is visible (from Latin visibilis: “that may be seen”; from visus, past participle of videre, “to see”, OED) but invisible; what we might call the visible-invisible (what may be seen-but is not seen). To render visible, in this sense, then, is not to move towards the lure of abstraction; it is to move towards concretion. To render visible is to make appear the mundane empirities of our present and of ourselves; it is to make visible, and thus to render intelligible, the material and practical conditions of possibility of our present and of ourselves; it is also to make legible the material and practical conditions that our present and ourselves make possible. The differentiation between the visible and the invisible here is not of the order of the “manifest” and the “latent” or the “overt” and the “covert”, and so forth, but is more of the order of the gestaltian figure/ground in which ground is not a foundation that founds but is a background that recedes as the figure advances.

Paul Veyne (1998), Foucault’s one time student and colleague, uses the metaphor of ‘the “concealed base of the iceberg”’ (ibid.: 150) to help describe, and to get us to think about, what is visible to us but not see by us: ‘[i]f practices are, in one sense, “hidden” and if we may provisionally call them the “concealed base of the iceberg,” it is quite simply because “practice” shares the fate of nearly all our behavior…: we are often aware of it, but we have no concept for it’ (ibid.: 153-154). Veyne’s metaphor is useful in that it helps us to see that what is visible to us but not seen by us is made up of the same “stuff” as what we do see: ‘the concealed base of an iceberg is not some agency [(like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of production)] that is different in nature from the exposed tip; it is made of ice, like the rest…[and, consequently, it]…is accounted for in the same way as the rest of the iceberg’ (ibid.: 156). However, this iceberg metaphor is unhelpful in that it suggest that we do not see what we do not see because it is in some sense “submerged”; hence the image of surface and depth, and all the adjectives describing what we do not see as being “concealed”, “hidden”, “heavily veiled”, and so forth; hence too, the suggestion that what is
hidden, and so on, is *hidden in depth*. Now, whilst it may be the case that we do not see what we do not see because ‘it is below the line of visibility’ and is thus ‘largely preconceptual’ (ibid.), this is not because it is “hidden in depth” but because it is *hidden in plain sight*; that is to say, it is because it is ‘too much on the surface of things [*trop à la surface des choses*]’ (Foucault 1996a: 58; the full sentence reads: ‘I attempt to render visible [*rendre visible*] what is invisible only because it is too much on the surface of things’). Rather than employ all these terms concerning depth and masking, what is visible and yet invisible is invisible because, to use Heidegger’s term, it has *withdrawn*: ‘[t]he peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [*zurückziehen*] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically’ (Heidegger 1962: 99 [H. 69]).

Etymologically speaking, to render (French: *rendre*) is “to give back”, “to return”, or “to recompense” (from Latin *reddère*: “to give back, return, restore”: from *red-* “back” + *dare* “to give”, OED). Hence, to “render visible” is to give back visibility to *that which is visible but invisible or not seen*; which is to say, it is to give back visibility to *that which is precisely visible*. What is made visible is not something invisible, if by this term we mean something that has been masked or covered over, something that has been forgotten or is a secret, or something hidden or that has been made to look like something else (i.e. the distortion of *the* truth). On the other hand, if we take invisible in the etymological sense of “unseen” or “not seen” (from Latin *invisibilis*: “unseen”, “not seen”; from in- “not” + *visibilis*, OED), then to render visible or make appear is to give back visibility to what may be seen but is not seen. The sense given to “invisibility”, then, is not that of the title of H. G. Wells’ (1897) classic *The Invisible Man* (i.e. of someone that is materially and physically present but cannot be seen because they are masked, cloaked, or veiled); rather, it has the sense of someone who is materially and physically present, and who is perfectly visible, out in the open, as it were, and yet remains unseen or who is not seen (like an introvert at a party who withdraws to a corner or a secret agent who has been trained to blend in, it has connotations of being indistinguishable, unexceptional, bland, generic, nondescript, and so forth). That is to say, invisible means not seen because it does not stand out, because it does not register, because it is part of the background furniture of the world and, because of this very fact, remains unnoticed.

In addition, the terms “appear” or “visible” in the phrases “make appear” or “render visible” should not be conflated with the purely ocular, with sight or perception, with what is seen by the eyes, and so forth. On the contrary, it refers to practices, processes, and procedures that are as much conceptual as they are perceptual, as much practical as they are theoretical, as corporeal as they are cognitive, as material and they are immaterial, and so forth. On this view, to render visible by bringing the visible-invisible back to visibility is to bring it into *awareness*, to make *apparent*; it is to render the pre-conceptual conceptualizable. What we aim to render visible, and thus to make appear, is *what renders visible*
into appearance; what we aim to make to appear, and thus render intelligible, is that which comes to appearance as intelligible. For example, and in relation to psychiatric practices and the birth of the asylum (e.g. Foucault 2006a, 2006b), Foucault stated that ‘[i]n the fields of initial differentiation, in the distances, the discontinuities, and the thresholds that appear within it, psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object—and therefore of making it manifest [faire apparaître], nameable, and describable’ (Foucault 1972: 41). In other words, what we are attempting to make visible are the different and differential ways in which things have come into appearance, have been made visible, and thus rendered intelligible, as something to be known, as something to be governed, or as some aspect of ourselves to be reflected upon and transformed. On this view, archaeology (and genealogy) is not simply a way of analyzing practices of seeing and saying (see Shapiro 2003); it is, itself, a practice of seeing and saying, of rendering visible and intelligible, and so forth.

This task of rendering visible—of giving back visibility to what may be seen but is not seen because it is too much on the surface of things—is essentially a philosophical task: ‘[i]t has long been known that the role of philosophy is not to discover that which is hidden [ce qui est caché], but to render visible [rendre visible] that which precisely is visible; that is to say, to make appear [faire apparaître] that which is so close, which is so immediate, which is so intimately bound to ourselves that, because of this, we do not perceive it’ (Foucault cited in Lemke 2012: 73-74, whose translation has been slightly amended). To render visible and/or make appear, then, are tasks that are neither scientific (whose task it is ‘to make known what we cannot see [de faire connaître ce que nous ne voyons pas’), Foucault 2001b: 541), nor social scientific (this is no “sociology of power”, Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106; see also Dean 1996; Rose 1999), but philosophical; and, vis-à-vis an analytics of power, it is the task of an analytical philosophy of the political (‘La philosophie analytique de la politique’, Foucault 2001b: 534ff.).
III. A “Work-shop Approach”

But what is to be rendered visible in this way? And, more specifically, how is what is to be rendered visible to be made apparent? It is here, I think, that we begin to get at the non-central core around which our Foucaultian perspective must orbit. Whilst it should be clear from the above that this has something to do with our present (“What are we to-day?”), and ourselves (“What are we to-day?”), what is to be rendered visible are the relations that obtain—or, for Foucault, the relations that have obtained historically—between subject and object, and the relation of this relation to what Foucault called ‘the “games of truth” [les « jeux de vérité »]’ (see Foucault 1998: 459-463). More concretely, to render visible our present and ourselves by rendering visible subject-object relations, the true-false relations, and the relations between these, is not simply to look at what is (i.e. in terms of ontology); rather, it looks at what is made (i.e. in term of technology). More explicitly still, it looks at what is made (object, subject, technique, environment, etc.; knowledge, truth, domination, and so forth) by looking at what went into its making (i.e. practices—discursive or not). As Veyne puts it, ‘[w]hat is made…is explained by what went into its making at each moment of history; we are wrong to imagine that the making, the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made’ (Veyne 1998: 160-161).

1 Analytics

Rather than taking what appears to us as a transhistorical natural object (i.e. “madness” or “illness”; “life”, “labour”, or “language”; “crime” or the “economy”; “population” or “sexuality” etc.), and then look at the variant historical practices through which this object has been approached, Foucault inverts this process not only by looking at how different objects (and subjects) have been made historically, but also by looking at what, at certain specific historical conjectures, went into their making. That is to say, instead of taking a natural object and looking at the differing historical attitudes (sensibilities, mentalities, mind-sets, world-views, and so forth) towards it and through which it has been approached, Foucault looked at the historical practices (discursive or not) from which a multiplicity of objects—which may all go under the same name: “madness” or “crime”, etc.—have been made intelligible for a specific kind of subject: ‘In considering statements in themselves, we will not seek, beyond all these analyses and at a deeper level, some secret or some root of language that they have omitted. We shall try to render visible [rendre visible], and analysable, that immediate transparency [si proche transparence] that constitutes the element of their possibility’ (Foucault 1972: 112, emphases added).

There are two dimensions to rendering visible or making appear. On the one hand, there are the attempts to render visible ‘the modes according to which the subject was able to be inserted as an object in the games of truth’ (Foucault
this is what we can call the *archaeological dimension* of rendering visible (Foucault 1998: 461; 1985: 11-12)—it is the “method” of rendering visible the relations that obtain between subject and object and games of truth (Foucault 1997: 315). On the other hand, there are the attempt to render visible “what our present is” (Foucault 2007a: 130) and “what we are to-day” (Foucault 1999: 91); this is what we can call the *genealogical dimension* of the analysis (Foucault 1985: 11-12)—it is the *finalité*, aim, or purpose of rendering visible, and what it aims to render visible is our present and ourselves (Foucault 1997: 315). Our work-shop, then, is not only equipped with tools for rendering visible, it is equipped with two specific types of equipment: archaeology and genealogy. These tools, however, should not be thought of as occupying two different sections of our work-shop dedicated to two fundamentally different tasks; rather, they constitute two different dimension of the same space or grid. The tools we can manufacture with them may be different, but they fit together to form an overall way of rendering visible and thus of making apparent and, by extension, of rendering intelligible.

In addition to these two dimensions, however, there is a third dimension that cuts across them, and this concerns three different sets of practices, which themselves render visible and intelligible the objects, subjects, and regimes of truth respective to each: these concern *knowledge* (*relations de savoir*), *power* (*rapports de pouvoir*) or government, and *ethics* (*rapport à soi*) or self. Archaeology and genealogy are two different yet interrelated modes of rendering visible, of making what is visible but not seen seeable and sayable; knowledge, power, and self (or truth, governmentality, and ethics) are three different yet interrelated *points of view* from which to render visible; they are three ways of looking at and of making appear what is not seen and what goes without saying seeable and sayable. The term I am most interested in here is “power” or *pouvoir* and, specifically, the way in which Foucault conceptualizes power not merely as an object of study, but as a way of posing questions: power as a point of view of method (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106).

The French term *pouvoir* can be translated as a noun: “*power*”, or as a verb: “*to be able*” (Elden 2001: 106); as Spivak notes, ‘in its various conjugations, *pouvoir* is the commonest way of saying “can” in the French language’ (Spivak 1996: 150-151). When Foucault uses the term “power” (*pouvoir*), it is always used as shorthand for *relations de pouvoir* (Foucault 1997: 291), and he studies these relations by looking at the techniques, tactics, mechanism, and so forth, that *allow* for their exercise or that *enable* these relations of power to be exercised (Foucault 2007a: 135). What the term power captures, then, is both a *relation* (*relation(s) de pouvoir* or *rapport(s) de pouvoir*) and a *technique*: ‘[t]he exercise of power consists in “conducting conducts” and in arranging probability’ (Foucault 2001d: 341, modified, emphasis added; this important sentence will be discussed in more detail in Part Four of the thesis). Thus, *pouvoir* is a tidy little concept for thinking about and questioning relations of power and the techniques that allow for these
relations to be exercise; or, stated otherwise, for capturing, in a single term, the exercising of relations of power. However, as the second part of the aforesaid quote makes clear—i.e. “arranging probability”—, there is a further sense of “to be able” encapsulated in Foucault’s use of the term pouvoir: probability. One way of thinking about this additional aspect runs as follows: ‘if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those things with that something which are possible within and by the arrangement of those lines’ (Spivak 1996: 151). Another, perhaps more straightforward or prosaic, way of thinking about this is to say that [t]o be governed is not...to have a form imposed upon one’s existence’, rather, it is ‘to be given the [very] terms within which existence will and will not be possible’ (Butler 2004: 314). In other words, ‘[p]ower is exercised not only subject to, but through and by means of conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245-246), which aim to bring about conditions of probability. Thus, from our Foucaultian perspective, power not only denotes forms of relations and techniques of constraint; it has connotations of forms and techniques of constraint that enable, but that enable only within the delimited and thus limited terrain of this constraint (hence “arranging probability”). In addition to the two senses of pouvoir noted above, then, Foucault’s conception, use, and analysis of this term ‘attempts to capture this creative, productive sense [of power], rather than merely the forceful, repressive sense’ (Elfen 2001: 106) of this term (i.e. puissance).

Hence “power”, as a translation of pouvoir—and not of puissance, the latter of which has connotations of “(brute) force”, “strength”, “might”, “potency”, and so on—, is a highly compact and polysemic concept that captures not only relations of power and the techniques that allow for those relations to be exercised, it also conceptualizes those techniques as productive of subjects and objects because productive of environments (at least in terms of their intent); that is to say, of the very reality (or environmentality) in which such subjects and objects may appear. As Foucault put this in Discipline and Punish, ‘[w]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge [connaissance] that may be gained of him belong to this production’ (Foucault 1977a: 194, emphases added). This is why we should pose the question of power not in terms of ‘good and evil’ (i.e. in terms of puissance) but ‘in terms of existence’ (Foucault 2001b: 540). However, pace Spivak (1996: 152), I do not think Foucault operationalizes the same kind of analytical and conceptual distinction between pouvoir and puissance as he does between savoir and connaissance. Rather, if there is an equivalent term to connaissance in relation to pouvoir, then this term is domination (see Elfen 2006: 59).

Hence to render visible, from the point of view of power, is to render visible a relation of power (conducting conducts, governmental modality), the techniques the enable that relation to be exercised (tactics, arranging probability),
the type of reality it seeks to bring into existence, the types of objects to be known and to be governed, and the modes of subjectivity that the exercising of a relation of power seeks to enable; that is to say, what it aims to make probable or actually makes possible (reality, objects, subjects, knowledge, etc.). In other words, “power” is an exemplary example of all of Foucault’s technical *termes d’art* in that it is a polysemantic manifold that does not provide a unitary definition (a theory of power), but is a conceptualization that draws together an assemblage of associated and interrelated concepts. Whilst archaeology looks at the forms of these relations, techniques, knowledges, and so forth, genealogy looks at the material and practical conditions of possibility (their *provenance*) of their formation (their *emergence*), and at the material and practical conditions that they actually, but unintentionally, make possible (not their product but their *effects*); which is to say, our present and ourselves. It is here that we arrive at the central problematic of the thesis.

The practice of rendering visible our present and ourselves, by way of making apparent the formations, forms, and transformations of objects, subjects (governmental modalities), techniques, and strategies, and so forth, is a practice that aims to make appear, by giving back visibility and thus intelligibility, to that immediate transparency, which, because it is too much on the surface of things, and is thus so intimate to what we are, to what we say, and to what we do—it is what we are, say, and do—we cannot (can no longer) see it. Making visible what can be seen but is not seen is a bit like the scene in the 1999 film *The Matrix* where Laurence Fishburne’s character, Morpheus, tries to explain to Neo, played by Keanu Reeves, what the Matrix is: “The Matrix is everywhere, it’s all around us, here even in this room. You can see it out your window or on your television. You feel it when you go to work, or go to church or pay your taxes... Unfortunately, no one can be told what the Matrix is. You have to see it for yourself” (Wachowski and Wachowski 2000: 300, emphasis added). The problem is, unlike Neo, we cannot be “freed” from our matrices by being extricated from them; in other words, we cannot see our matrix for ourselves from its outside, from a position of exteriority. Nevertheless, like Neo, in order to be able to see it for ourselves, we need to detach ourselves from ourselves and from our present in some way, so as to grant ourselves the sight needed to see ourselves in our present. To be able to return the visible-invisible to visibility, consequently, requires that we somehow loosen ourselves from that which is so intimately bound to ourselves—what we are, say, and do—that we cannot see it; that is, we somehow have to create a critical distance between ourselves and our present and what we are, say, and do to-day so as to be able to see ourselves and say to ourselves what we are, what we say, and what we do to-day.

As is generally well known, Foucault performed this critical distancing by way of history, that is to say, by way of archaeological and genealogical enquiry. This is not simply an appeal to history, however, but a posing of philosophical question to history and of historical questions to philosophy (Foucault 1997: 201-
of undertaking detailed historical analyses of the concrete and historical a priori, the positivities, dispositivities, and effectivities of historically specific regimes of practices (discursive or not), and by using such historical analyses to render visible and thus intelligible ourselves in our present actuality. The central question to be addressed in the thesis, vis-à-vis questioning our present and ourselves from the perspective of our present and ourselves in terms of power, is “How are we to do this seeing for ourselves?” That is to say, “How are we to render visible?” The central problem here, and the central problematic to be addresses in the thesis, is that we cannot simply transpose “Foucault’s methods”, which are essentially methods for doing history or historical analyses, and “apply” them to our present and ourselves from the stand-point of our actuality. Since, the problem to be attended to here is not one addressed to how Foucault did historical analyses (this will be dealt with later in the thesis) but questions how we might take up these ways of seeing and saying to question our present form its own actuality and ourselves from our own actuality, and since, as Dean notes, ‘[t]here are no a priori grounds…on which one could justify “doing” history’ (Dean 1994: 23), the central problematic to be addressed here does not concern the viability or otherwise of Foucault’s approach to history but concerns his very use of history. That is to say, I am less concerned here with the mechanics of doing archaeology and genealogy than I am with the reasons or theoretical justifications for doing and/or using history as a practice of rendering visible.

2 Diagnostics

From the first, Foucault characterized his work as a diagnosis of the present (see, e.g. Foucault 2006a: xxxii; 1973: xix; 1970: xxvi; 1972: 131), famously describing it in Discipline and Punish as a ‘history of the present’ (Foucault 1977a: 31), and yet, Part II of The Order of Things aside, these works rarely describe, analyse, or comment upon the present in which they were written. We get numerable descriptions of the humble beginnings of that which is still ‘familiar to us today’ (Foucault 2006a: 504), of that ‘from which we have not yet escaped’ (Foucault 1973: 198), and that ‘still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge’ (Foucault 1970: 420-421), and so on, and so forth. But most of these studies abruptly stop at a horizon—usually before the end of the 19th Century—they seem unwilling or unable to go beyond: a point that should be neither overplayed (e.g. Baudrillard 2007: 34) nor underemphasized. When Foucault did comment upon, describe, and/or analyse his own present to any great extent, this was invariably in interviews. Thus, whilst the aim or objective of Foucault’s critical output was this diagnosis of the present, the ways in which he undertook this was by way of an historical analytics that rendered visible thus making a diagnostics possible.

This, at least, is how Deleuze (1992b) formulates Foucault’s philosophical activity: ‘[i]n each [dispositive] we have to untangle the lines of the recent past
and those of the near future: that which belongs to the archive and that which belongs to the present; that which belongs to history and that which belongs to the process of becoming; that which belongs to the analytic and that which belongs to the diagnostic’ (ibid.: 164). Here, the past, history, and the archive are elements of an analytics; the near future, the present, and the process of becoming all belong to a diagnostics. As Deleuze goes on to note, ‘[i]n most of his books [Foucault] specifies a precise archive...But that is one half of his task...He formulates [the other half] explicitly only in the interviews which take place contemporary with the writing of each of his major books: what can be said nowadays about insanity, prison, sexuality?’ (ibid.: 165). The principle point to be drawn from Deleuze’s description is that this latter task, that of diagnosis, ‘required a different form of expression from the lines which were drawn together in his major books’ (ibid.: 166).

In the essay in which the above remarks are made (‘What is a dispositif?’), Deleuze cites what he calls ‘a fundamental passage’ from The Archaeology, which, he claims, ‘is valid for the rest of Foucault’s work’ (ibid.: 165). I reproduce the passage here—of which Deleuze cites only the second half (beginning with ‘The analysis of the archive...’) —because of the way in which it captures, and is thus demonstrative of, the problem at hand; vis-à-vis questioning the contemporary political order of things from within that very order of things.

It is evident that we cannot exhaustively describe the archive of a society, a culture, or a civilization; nor even, no doubt, the archive of an entire epoch. On the other hand, it is not possible for us to describe our own archive [il ne nous est pas possible de decrere notre propre archive], since it is from the interior of its rules that we speak...The archive is not describable in its totality; and it is inescapable in its actuality [i.e. in our present]. It gives itself in fragments, regions and levels, all the more, no doubt, and with greater precision, the more time that separates us from it...And yet how could this description of the archive justify itself...if it persisted in only ever describing the most distant horizons? Should we not approach as close as possible this positivity...and this archive system that allows us to speak today about the archive in general? Should we not illuminate, if only in an oblique way, that enunciative field of which it is itself a part? The analysis of the archive, then, comprises a privileged region: at once close to us, but different from our actuality, it is the border of time that surrounds our present, that overhangs it and indicates it in its otherness; it is what, outside us, delimits us. The description of the archive deploys its possibilities...from the discourses that have just ceased to be our own; its threshold of existence is established by the cut that separates us from what we can no longer say, from that which falls outside our discursive practice...In this sense, [an analysis of the archive] is applicable as a diagnostic of ourselves. Not because it would allow us to draw up a table of our distinctive traits and to sketch out in advance the figure we will have in the future. But [because] it deprives us of our continuities; it dispels this temporal identity where we like to look at ourselves to ward off the ruptures of history...The diagnostic, thus understood, does not establish the facts of our identity by the interplay of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourse, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks. That difference, far from being forgotten and discovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and that we do (Foucault 1972: 130-131, modified, all emphases added).
May I be excused for citing such a lengthy passage; the reason for doing so is that it both demonstrates and captures the critical question and thus unfolds the problem space in which we are to work: “If we cannot describe our own archive, how can we describe what we are to-day from within the confines of our own actuality?”

Preferring to let this passage speak for itself, I do not want to comment upon it beyond drawing attention to the italicized sentences. Firstly, and quite clearly and categorically, it states that “it is not possible for us to know our own archive”; in other words, it is not possible for us to render visible our own visible-invisible. Secondly, and consequently, the only access that we have to our own archive, the only way to render visible our actuality, is by way of those “discourses that have just ceased to be our own”, and this because it makes visible our own archive by noting the difference from what it no longer is. Which means that, from the perspective of archaeology, and indeed of genealogy, the closer we get to our own actuality, the harder it is for us to render visible and intelligible and thus to describe that actuality vis-à-vis our visible-invisible.

This is made clearer in an interview from 1967, in which, in discussing The Order of Things, Foucault notes that he can ‘define the classical age in its particular configuration by the twofold difference that contrasts it with the sixteenth century, on the one hand, and with the nineteenth century, on the other’ (Foucault 1998: 293). This is not so, however, when it comes to what Foucault calls the modern age (‘which begins around 1790 to 1810 and goes up to about 1950’): ‘I can define the modern age in its singularity only by contrasting it with the seventeenth century, on the one hand, and with us [in our actuality], on the other hand’ (ibid.). He concludes by noting that ‘[i]t is a matter of pulling oneself free of that modern age…whereas for the classical age it’s only a matter of describing it’ (ibid.).

On this view, the only access we have to questioning our own actuality, when questioning it from the perspective of itself, is by philosophizing with a hammer (Nietzsche 2005: 136, 153ff.): ‘as soon as we are obliged to question the words that still resonate in our ears, that are mingled with those we are trying to speak, then archaeology, like Nietzschean philosophy, is forced to work with hammer blows’ (Foucault 1998: 293). But is this really the case? Is the only way to question our present and ourselves, from where we are and where we stand, by way of the brute force of the pounding blows of a hammer? Or are there more subtle tools than hammers to be employed? We shall address these questions in more detail in Part Three of the thesis.

As noted above, this problem of the proximity between what is to be questioned and described and our own actuality is not purely a restriction pertinent to the so-called archaeological period but, as Deleuze noted, is equally applicable to all of Foucault’s work, and hence to genealogy. Genealogy, as a history of the present and a historical ontology of ourselves, is a diagnostics—and a strategies—of the present, not a description and less still a depiction of either our present or ourselves in our actuality. As Foucault put it in his essay on Kant and Enlightenment, critical history asks ‘What difference does today introduce
with respect to yesterday?’ (Foucault 1997: 305). In other words, whilst The Archaeology is the only place in which Foucault framed his work in terms of an analysis of the archive (i.e. ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of statements’, Foucault 1972: 130), the point being made about certain historical configurations, ourselves in our present actuality, and the relation of such an analyses to historical description, runs through all of Foucault’s critical and effective histories.

3 Strategics

The foregoing discussion has been designed to raise but one question: “How to research our own actuality from the perspective of this actuality? “How are we to question the contemporary order of things from within that very order?” Or, more specifically, “How to question the exercising of contemporary relations of power from within the contemporary itself?” and to do all of this without recourse to historical research. As I hope the foregoing discussion has made clear, this is by no means a straightforward question, and is certainly not a question of the unproblematic “application” of Foucault’s “methods”. Whilst, at a strictly empirical level, it may be possible—and relatively unproblematic—to take up the work of Foucault and others as a box of ready-made tools and apply them to contemporary concrete phenomena; at a more philosophical level, and specifically of posing the philosophical problem of present, and of how to question that present by establishing some critical distance from it, is anything but a given. The sentence that rings between our ears in thinking through such application, and that poses a question to be asked and opens up a problem space within which to work, is that “it is not possible for us to describe our own archive”. Now, whilst this may be said to be a problem of archaeology, to which genealogy was the solution, I do not think that this is the case. That is to say, I think that it is a problem not only for archaeology but also for genealogy.

Like the later appeal to genealogy, archaeology already begins with a problem in our own present: ‘[t]his kind of research is only possible as the analysis of our own subsoil...[;] the subsoil of our modern consciousness of madness...[or the subsoil of our consciousness of meaning]...If there were not something like a fault line in this soil, archaeology would not have been possible or necessary. In the two cases these are the critical analysis of our own condition’ (Foucault 1998: 263, emphasis added). The take up of genealogy—which I think neither replaced nor displaced archaeology, but takes over a number of its themes and problems whilst simultaneous supplementing the kinds of historical narrative it is possible to make—turns around two interlinked but differential conceptualizations of historical description and present actuality. Archaeology, as practiced in The Order of Things—and, to a certain extent, as described in The Archaeology—, questions and analyzes the horizontal axis of historical transformations (Foucault 1991a: 58-59; 1998: 285); that is to say, in this work, it deals almost exclusively with the synchronic. Now, whilst this synchronicity ‘provides us with a snapshot,
a slice through the discursive nexus’ (Bevis, Cohen, and Kendall 1993: 194), this slice can be quite broad, encompassing years, decades, or even centuries. On the other hand, archaeology, as practiced in History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, also dealt with the vertical axis of historical mutation (Foucault 1997: 202; 1998: 285, 382). It is this vertical (i.e. diachronic) axis, I contend, that genealogy takes over and supplements, and not archaeology per se. And, I would wager, that it is this aspect of archaeology—the aforementioned diagnostic aspect of archaeology—that Foucault was referring to when he stated that his ‘archaeology owes more to Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism properly so called’ (Foucault 1998: 294).

In other words, pace Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 79ff.), I do not think archaeology was a methodological failure that was unseated and supplanted by a more robust Nietzschean genealogy. On the contrary, I think The Archaeology, as a reflection upon and extension of the analysis undertaken in the previous works, and especially of Part II of The Order of Things (Foucault 1996a: 65ff.; 2001a: 1274, ‘The Order of Things became The Archaeology of Knowledge’, which, in turn, became ‘a dynastics of knowledge [dynastique du savoir]’; see Faubion 1998: xxxiii; and the translator endnote in Foucault 2010: 169n6), was rather successful in what it set out to do; that is, not to situate itself between the transcendental and the historical (Han 2002), but to avoid the category of the transcendental altogether (Webb 2005a, 2013; cf. Thompson 2010). I do not want to get into a discussion here concerning the transcendental and/or the empirical/historical in the work of Foucault; in addition to the works just cited, such a discussion can be had in the debate between Koopman (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), and McQuillan (2010) and Thompson (2010). That said, one of the key terms of The Archaeology is “dispersion”, and one of its principle insights is that causality is multiple and heterogeneous; that the more one looks the more levels, temporalities, spatialities, materialities, and practicalities multiply; that there is no terminus to such research, only more detail: Foucault described the epistémé, for example, as ‘a space of dispersion’, as ‘an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships’ (Foucault 1991a: 55). Perhaps it is this observation that led Foucault to take up, in his own idiosyncratic way, Nietzsche’s perspectivism and hence genealogy. That is to say, unlike Borges’ (1999) cartographers, we can never map a territory in toto, and thus the particular mapping that takes place—the lines drawn, the scale and the detail, the key to understanding, and so forth—is undertaken from a particular perspective, a perspective formed and informed by way of a particular conceptualization of the present; a conceptualization of the present formed and informed by way of the questioners particular relation to that present; a present that is not only to be mapped but also transformed.

On this view, the taking up of genealogy is not a consequence of the failure of archaeology, as worked out in The Archaeology, but of its relative success (see, e.g. Defert 2013b: 274; Webb 2013: 162ff.). For Webb, The Archaeology works out a form of analysis that recognizes that ‘[t]here are conditions underpinning
knowledge, and they are historical, not transcendental; but their history cannot be levelled down to that of empirical events’ (Webb 2013: 11). ‘Foucault’s challenge’, Webb continues, ‘is to explain what status they do have, if they are neither transcendental conditions nor empirical causes’ (ibid.). Webb views Foucault as having largely responded to this challenge, even if he ‘did not solve the problem once and for all’ (ibid.: 162). On this view, then, The Archaeology not only made the emergence of genealogy possible, it also made possible the manifold and differentiated ways in which archaeological and genealogical modes of enquiry were taken up, combined, deployed, and employed by Foucault in his proceeding works. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Foucault’s so-called archaeological period, a period that is said to culminate in The Archaeology, is that knowledge itself is perspectival. By perspectival, here, I do not mean a fixed constitutive subject looking at the same natural object from many different points of view but, rather, that there is a complex relation between subject and object in which each is mutually constituted by way of the material and practical conditions—i.e. the concrete and historical a priori—of that relation (see, e.g. Foucault 1998: 459-463), and, moreover, that such ‘conditions may be transformed by the conditioned to which they give rise’ (Webb 2013: 162). In other words, the achievement of Foucaultian archaeology is the thought that the relations between subject, object, and conditions (i.e. practices) are immanent and mutually constitutive.

What takes place from Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France (Foucault 1981) onwards, is the double gaze of archaeology and genealogy (see, e.g. Foucault 2013: 225; 2006b: 13, 238-239; 2003c: 10-11). This is clearly demonstrated in Foucault’s Collège de France lectures; it is also evidenced in the first of Foucault’s last two publications, in which he frames his project precisely as having both archaeological and genealogical dimensions. In this text, and in presenting a retrospective perspective of his overall project—a project that analyzed neither ‘behaviors [empirical] or ideas [transcendental], nor societies or their “ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being gives itself as [that which] can and must be thought and the practices from which they [said problematizations] are formed’—Foucault stated that ‘the archaeological dimension of the analysis permits the analysis of the forms of problematization themselves’, whilst ‘its genealogical dimension, [permits the analysis of] their formation from practices and their modifications’ (Foucault 1985: 11-12, modified, emphases added). That is to say, the archaeological axis analyzes, horizontally or synchronically, the forms of problematizations themselves, whilst the genealogical axis analyzes, vertically or diachronically, the practices out of which forms of problematization are formed (their provenance) and through which they and the practices from which they arrived are modified and transformed (their emergence).

The reason for this shift, then, is not that archaeology deals with the discursive and genealogy brought in the whole question of the non-discursive
(reading *History of Madness* and *The Birth of the Clinic* should dispel this myth), nor is it that archaeology did not pose the question of power, which is said only to emerge with genealogy. Rather, it is the way in which each poses the philosophical question of the problem of the present; as Dean (1994) puts it ‘*The Archaeology* gives no explicit account of how the historical description of the positivity of discourse is to be mobilised in terms of current purposes and issues’ (ibid.: 17). This, according to Dean, is because ‘while [archaeology’s] “positivism” may well be a technique capable of finding the level proper to its objects, it remained incapable of articulating its own purposes and relation to the present’ (ibid.: 18). On this view, whilst ‘archaeology could reflect upon its own *theoretical effects* it could not, however, ‘account of its *strategic* purposes’; genealogy, as Dean notes, ‘is far better placed to do so’ (ibid.).

Whereas archaeology seemed content to diagnose our present by describing the conditions of possibility of the ground or the sub-soil beneath our feet, genealogy—perhaps taking up Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach (‘philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’, Marx 1977: 158), but giving it a Nietzschean twist—is not only concerned with diagnosing the present by describing its sub-soil, but also with using such diagnoses to effect a transformation. That is to say, it not only diagnoses the present, it strategizes our actuality (see, e.g. Foucault 2007a: 64-65). Whereas archaeology had noted that it was due to a certain rift in our own sub-soil that made archaeological analyses of the past possible, genealogy notes that analyses of our past could be used to bring about possible transformations in our present. The point, however, is that neither Foucaultian archaeology—as thematized in *The Archaeology* or later—nor Foucaultian genealogy—whether that of Nietzsche or that of the Kant of ‘What is Enlightenment?’—give descriptions of the present from the stand-point of this present itself.

Whilst it is possible to endlessly debate whether or not we can have access to our own archive (or, to put it another way, whether we can have access to the visible-invisible of the contemporary order of things by means of and in terms of this very order), if we are taking Foucault seriously (and since we are talking about using his “methods” generally and his analyses on power specifically, then presumable we are), then this question of rendering visible and legible what we are to-day by way of the historical conditions that have made us what we are cannot simply be by-passed when taking up the question of rendering visible, legible, and intelligible our present not from the perspective of its history but from the perspective of our own current actuality, from of contemporality. On the other hand, we cannot simply dismiss or give up such questioning based on, or because of, what Foucault said or did. Rather, we have to take it up for ourselves as a question to be posed and a problem to be addressed.

The principle problem, as I see it, is a question of finding some method or other, some *approach*, to give it its correct name, which will give us the same kind of critical distance to our present that Foucault’s use of history and of historical
analyses gave to him. How, for example, are we to render visible the subject-object relations and their relations to true-false relations in contemporary discursive and non-discursive practices? How can we use such practices to render visible the present when it is these very practices we are attempting to render visible, and to do so in term of the different and differential ways in which they constitute their objects, form their subjective modalities, conceptualize their techniques, and thematize their strategies. And how can we do this without recourse to either transcendental conditions or, in any case, to the meaning giving subject, on the one hand, and empirical causes, if by this terms we mean the manifest or that which is both visible and seen, on the other. Rather, what we need to describe is the materialism of the incorporeal contemporary with the practices we are to question. Are there any tools, then, in Foucault’s tool-box, or in those of studies in governmentality more generally, that will enable us to do such work? Failing this, can we mobilize such equipment to manufacture our own tools that will provide us with the critical distance require to render visible our present and ourselves? From our Foucaultian perspective, such a detachment cannot be objective, if by this we mean what Haraway (1988) called a ‘god-trick’; that ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 1996) that sees ‘everything from nowhere’ (Haraway 1988: 581; vis-à-vis governmentality, see Dean 1996)]. Rather, critique has to question our own actuality and contemporary governmentality from within the current order of things. It is to a working through and working out of this problematic, by way of a discussion of the mechanics of Foucaultian genealogy and of Foucaultian archaeology, to which we now turn.
PART THREE: SEEING THE PRESENT

The concern to say what is going on...is not so much inhabited by the desire to know how it could take place, everywhere and always; but rather by the desire to figure out what hides underneath this precise, floating, mysterious, absolutely simple word: "today".

(Foucault, 'For an Ethics of Discomfort').

I. RENDERING VISIBLE

Foucault began the first of two lecture delivered in English at Dartmouth College on the 17th and 24th of November in 1980, entitled 'About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self' (Foucault 2007a: 147-167, 169-191), with a brief résumé of the work he had been doing for the previous twenty or so years; in doing so, he presented the following schematic: '[T]he aim of my project is to construct a genealogy of the subject. The method is an archaeology of knowledge [savoir], and the precise domain of the analysis is what I should call technologies. I mean the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject' (ibid.: 152, emphases added). In our deliberations on questioning power and government in their contemporality, in thinking about how to question it from the perspective of both the will not to be governed like that and from our own present, I will take this passage as both our point of departure and as a schematic that will organize the structure of the remainder of the thesis. That is to say, I will broach the questions concerning the Objective, the Method, and the Domain of an analytics of contemporary governmentality, of what I will call an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control. In this part of the thesis, we will look at the aim and method; in Part Four, we shall explore the domain.

Now, it is certainly the case that Foucault gave many such presentations of his overall project; not all of which converge. The reason for employing this one as our starting point and organizing principle is not that it best captures the essence of Foucault's critical output but that, in detailing the aim or objective, the method, and the domain of analysis in the way that it does, it best suits our purpose. As noted, in commenting upon Foucault's thought so as to forge our own tools, my aim is to be neither polemical nor pedantic; it is, however, an attempt to get it right. What is meant by this is not the disclosing of the one and only correct reading of Foucault but, rather, a productive recombinatorial reading that nonetheless attempts to remain faithful to what we will call a Foucaultian ethos. In other words, my aim is not to legislate upon how I think the work of Foucault should or must be employed; it is not a question of imposing
limits upon its use, but of recognizing and acknowledging both its limits in use but also its potential for other uses.

1 – Concerning the aim of what Foucault calls his project, this is to construct a genealogy of the subject. Foucaultian genealogy is not simply a synonym for history, nor is genealogy more generally simply history ‘correctly practiced’ (e.g. Nehamas 1985: 46). Rather, genealogy is ‘history differently practiced’, and this difference ‘can only be accounted for philosophically’ (Saar 2008: 297). There is, of course, no single or fixed meaning, no sole monolithic definition, to be ascribed to genealogy. Saar (2002), for example, notes three layers to genealogy: genealogy as history or historical method; genealogy as critique or evaluation; and genealogy as a kind of writing or genre. Similarly, Walters (2012: Ch. 4) identifies three styles of genealogy: genealogy as descent (which should read provenance); genealogy as re-serialization and counter-memory; and genealogy as the retrieval of forgotten struggles and subjugated knowledge (ibid.: 112). Evidently, these do not represent three hermetically sealed watertight containers; the different layers or styles mingle with one another and intermingle with each other. Nonetheless, there are three central thematics that cut across this ‘multi-layered conceptual practice’ (Saar 2002: 232) or these three stylistic variants. The first is the question concerning the subject and subjectivity (see ‘The Subject and Power’ in Foucault 2001d): “what are we today?” The second is an orientation towards and an overriding concern for our contemporary present, for our actuality, to-day (see the essays collected in Part 1 of Foucault 2007a): “what are we to-day?” And the third concerns transformation: on the one hand, it concerns transformation vis-à-vis the one doing the questioning in questioning their own present (see the first lecture of Foucault 2010); on the other hand, it concerns the implications and transformations of the one reading such questioning: its audience (see ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’ in Foucault 2001d). Whilst the first two points are more or less accepted, it seems to me that the two elements comprising the third are often overlooked.

In addition to the above, neither Saar’s nor Walters’ nor any other depiction of genealogy that I have read has been of much use when it comes to actually thinking about doing research; that is to say, concerning the actual “how?” of doing or “applying” genealogy (Dean 1994: 14). This, however, is not a deficiency of such depictions; rather, it is that genealogy is not, in and of itself, a method, at least not in any conventional sense of this term, nor, I might add, is it a method in the way in which archaeology can be conceptualized as a method. On the contrary, and as Foucault notes in the aforecited passage, it is the finalité (end goal, purpose, aim, objective, etc.) of his project; and this finality was to render visible “the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (see the reference on page 15 above). The genealogical aspect of Foucault’s work, then, is diagnostic and strategic; it asks “What are we to-day?” (diagnostics) and “How might we be otherwise?” (strategics). A genealogy of the subject (a history of the present or a historical ontology of ourselves) is to be re-
worked here into what I will call “field-work in subjectivity” that is, at one and the same time, field-work in the present: contemporary subjectivity or the subject in its contemporality. What we have to locate is a non-historical diagnostics; or a diagnostics that uses genealogies done by others but that does not do its own historical research.

2 – As the aforesaid passage goes on to note, the means by which one undertakes a Foucaultian genealogy, however conceptualized, is by way of an archaeology of knowledge (savoir). It is the absence of archaeology in studies in governmentality specifically, and/or in an analytics of power more generally, I think, that has created a vacuum or void that has been filled either by the importation of all kinds of methods or methodologies (social scientific or otherwise: interpretivist, ethnographical, etc.), or the wedding of Foucault to other theorists, philosophers, and/or researchers (i.e. Freud, Gramsci, Wittgenstein, etc.). Taking on-board Foucault’s statement to the effect that the method by which one undertakes a genealogy of the subject is by way of an archaeology of knowledge (savoir), I want to rehabilitate and reintegrate archaeology back into studies in governmentality specifically, and into an analytics of power more generally. Proceeding in this way will, I think, help us if not to answer the question then at least to pose it vis-à-vis how to go about doing such genealogies of contemporary governmentalities. Saar, for example, views The Archaeology as being ‘arguably insignificant’ to Foucault’s genealogy (Saar 2002: 233); and archaeology, as a method, is very rarely mentioned in books on or about governmentality. This, even though the central questions posed by such studies: “Who or what is to be governed?” “Who governs what?” “With what techniques?” [and] “To what ends should they be governed?” (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006; see also Dean 1999; Rose 1999), are arguably archaeological questions; that is to say, they question the object of government, the modalities of government, the techniques of government, and the ends of strategies of government.

The point here, however, is not to criticise genealogies of governmentality, but to think about, and to demonstrate the centrality of archaeology to such thought concerning the “how?” of genealogy and of doing studies in governmentality. Genealogy is, undoubtedly, a way of doing history, of questioning provenance and emergence, of doing critique through counter-memory, struggles, and subjugated knowledge, and so forth, but the way in which genealogy does all of these things, at least in the work of Foucault, is by cutting-out and stitching together events or series of events, and these events, or an analysis thereof (événementalisation: “eventialization”), are the province of archaeological research (see Foucault 1996b: 393-395; see also 2001d: 226ff). What we have to do is to treat our present and ourselves—our contemporary actuality from which we question our own present—as an event or as a series of events; that is, as events in contemporary thought.
An archaeology of knowledge (savoir) is not discourse analysis (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xxi), it does not analyse such discourses as psychiatry, clinical medicine, linguistics, biology, and political economy, criminology and penology, and so forth. Such knowledge would be designated by Foucault by the term connaissance. What an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) analyses, as this is articulated in The Archaeology, and as later taken up by genealogy, are the concrete and historical a priori, the conditions of possibility, the material and practical space in which a specific positivity emerged, and thus from which a particular discursive formation was formed or from which it arrived. Thus, for example, the savoir of madness is not psychiatry; rather, it is that whole practical (punitive and therapeutic, Foucault 2006a: Part One) and discursive (medicinal, ibid.: Part Two) ensemble out of which and from which all the “psy-” sciences (connaissances) could emerge (ibid.: Part Three): not just psychiatry, but also psychology, psychoanalysis, psychosurgery, psychopharmacology, psychometrics, and so forth (see, e.g. Rose 1989, 1996a). In other words, all these “psy-” sciences have their conditions of possibility in seventeenth and eighteenth century punitive and therapeutic practices dealing with madness and medical discourses on madness, and in nineteenth century discursive practices concerning mental illness. Likewise, the savoir which gave rise to the birth of the prison was not criminological or penological discourses; rather it was that whole ensemble of disciplinary techniques—monastic life, military drill, schooling, the factory, hand writing, posture and gait, handling a rifle, the plague town, etc.—that made the positivity or, rather, the dispositivity of discipline possible, and thus made prison and the punitive reason inhabiting it both thinkable and practicable; that is to say, a reality that was simultaneously to be brought into existence and to be acted upon.

This is why Foucault also calls an archaeology of knowledge “a history of systems of thought” (Foucault 1997: 9, 201), a “materialism of the incorporeal” (Foucault 1981: 69), “a critical history of thought” (Foucault 1998: 459), or “a materialist history of rationality” (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 102, 106), and so forth; it interrogates the materialism (practices or the concrete and historical a priori) of the incorporeal (the thought inhabiting practices—discursive or not). Archaeology maps out the space—the savoir—in which something became thinkable and the space in which that thought unfolds; that is to say, how something became thinkable—in a rational, calculative, statistical, and/or administrative terms—in the specific ways in which it was thought: vis-à-vis power, how something became thinkable as governable. In a sense, genealogy performs a double operation; it looks at formation and transformation; at provenance and emergence; it looks not only at the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought but also at the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made or makes possible (Foucault 1985: 11-12). Archaeology, for its part, examines the form of the thought thus thought.
3 – The precise domain that an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) analyzes
in order to do a genealogy of the subject, Foucault states, is the domain of
technology; where technology is understood as “the articulation of certain
techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject”. Technology is the
field in which one works when doing archaeologico-genealogical enquiry.
Technology, here, does not refer to the technological devices in, by, and through
which a programme of government is implemented and institutionalized. Rather,
and in relation to epistēmē and tekhnē, it refers to ‘a practical rationality governed
by a conscious goal’ (Foucault 2001d: 364). In relation to the government of the
self, this refers to the articulation of knowledge (savoir) and techniques of self; in
relation to the government of others, which is our object of study, it refer to the
intra-relation between knowledge (savoir) and power (pouvoir), to knowledge-
power or power-knowledge. Since we are to discuss the domain of our
Foucaultian perspective in Part Four of the thesis, I will not discuss it in any great
detail here.

What is being proposed here is not an analytics of power in general but a
study in governmentality; albeit a very specific and circumscribed study in
governmentality. I am going to broach this question of technology—of discourse-
technique—by way of the concept of governmentality, which, to a certain extent,
came to displace, but not replace, that of power-knowledge (Foucault 2010: 4-5).
In a lecture from 1980, Foucault informed his audience that the trajectory of his
analyses of the history of thought ‘was more or less organized, or revolved
around, the notion of dominant ideology’ to which he highlighted two successive
displacements. Firstly, ‘from the notion of dominant ideology to that of power-
knowledge’, and secondly, ‘from the notion of knowledge-power to the notion of
government by the truth’ (The quote is from an as yet unpublished lecture given by
Foucault on the 9th January 1980 entitled On the Government of the Living. It is
cited by O’Farrell on the “Foucault Resources” website: http://www.michel-
conceptualizes government ‘in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for
directing human behavior’ (Foucault 1997: 81). It is important to remember here,
however, that what an archaeology of knowledge undertakes is a (critical) history
of (systems of) thought, or a materialist history of rationality. And so, when
Foucault talks about techniques and procedures, I take him to be talking about
the different and differential ways in which these have been thought, of the
material and practical conditions of possibility of this thought, and of the
material and practical conditions that this thought, thus thought, made possible.

So far, we have looked at how Foucault’s analytics of power does not tell us
where to look for power but operationalizes relations of power as a way of
looking at their exercise. We have noted how the work that Foucault undertook
was a practice that attempted to render visible and make appear certain
historical, and thus contemporary, practices, which, through becoming so
integral to our very existence, we cannot or can no longer see. And we have seen
how this practice aims to give back visibility to what is invisible by way of an archaeological analytics and a genealogical diagnostics (and strategics). In this part of the thesis, I want to explore in more detail the mechanics of these analytic and diagnostic/strategic practices. In looking into the work that these respective practices undertook by way of our work-shop approach, I want to think about how can we manufacture our own tools for questioning the exercising of relations of power in its, and our, actuality. In taking up the framing of Foucault’s work in terms of its aim (*finalité*) and method, I begin by unpacking what I take to be the structure of Foucaultian genealogical diagnosis by focusing upon two aspect of genealogical historiography evidence in the essay ’Nietzsche, ‘Genealogy, History’; namely, *provenance* and *emergence*, and then discuss their relation to the present. I then follow this by looking at how archaeology—as both an archaeology of knowledge (*savoir*) and as an archaeology of problematizations—undertakes a history of thought. Specifically, I look at the work archaeology performs in rendering visible the work of thought by way of a close reading of the ‘Preface’ to *The Order of Things*. This reading is undertaken through the heuristic of Heidegger’s conceptualization of the ontological difference. Having unpacked the structure of genealogical diagnosis and the archaeological analytics of thought, I then turn to using the equipment provided by the foregoing exposition to manufacturing some tools that can then be used for thinking about how to question the exercising of relations of power in their actuality from the perspective of our contemporality.

To get ahead of myself somewhat, the ”solution” to the problem posed by genealogy and archaeology—of what they do and, more specifically, of how they do it—to non-historical analyses vis-à-vis the aforecited questioning of power, will be to undertake an *archaeology* that renders visible *problematisations* evidenced in what I will call *provent forms of existence*; provent forms of life that are themselves rendered visible not by way of a genealogical history of the present but by way of what I, following Rose (2009), will call *a genealogy of possible or potential futures emergences*.
II. Genealogy and the History of the Present

"Genealogy has to be invented anew as situations change.
(Rabinow and Rose, 'Foucault Today')

What are we today? What is this instance that is ours? What is our actuality? What is my actuality? And what am I doing when I speak about this actuality? What is happening today? What is happening right now? What is happening around us? What is our present? What is the present field of possible experiences? (see, e.g. the text collected in Part I. of Foucault 2007a). This series of questions, in one way or another, haunted all of Foucault’s writings from History of Madness to the final volumes of the History of Sexuality. And yet, as noted, Foucault never really discussed his own present—i.e. his own actuality contemporary with each writing—in any of his major book-length publications. Rather, what we are presented with are historical studies of the past, of our past, that are aimed at a diagnosis of the present, an analysis of our own reality or actuality. These studies pose, historically, the philosophical question of the present: ‘[n]o doubt the most infallible philosophical problem is that of the present time, of what we are at this precise moment’ (Foucault 2001d: 336, modified). There are three separate yet interrelated questions to this mode of enquiry: “What are we today?”, “How did we become what we are?”, and “How might we be otherwise?”. Foucault, following Nietzsche, calls this mode of enquiry genealogy. In other words, genealogy is not only a diagnostic (“What are we today?”), and “How did we become what we are?”), it is also strategic (“How might we be otherwise?”); it is the latter, I think, that marks its departure from, and an important difference to, Foucault’s archaeology of the 1960s (see Dean 1994: 17-18).

Foucaultian genealogy, however, is neither a fixed set of coordinate for mapping history (Bevir 2008; Cook 1990; Davidson 1986; Krupp 2008; Mahon 1992; Owen 1996; Saar 2002; Spiegel 2001; Visker 1990, 1995; Wilson 1995), nor a definitive set of features to be mapped: possible genealogies include, but are not limited to, a genealogy of knowledge (connaissance) (Foucault 2006b); a genealogy of abnormality (Foucault 2003a); a genealogy of knowledge (savoir), a genealogy of racism (Foucault 2003c); a genealogy of technologies of power (Foucault 2007b); a genealogy of the modern state (Foucault 2008a); a genealogy of the subject, a genealogy of the modern subject (Foucault 2005); and a genealogy of truth-telling in the political field (Foucault 2010, 2011). It is, nevertheless, and as Foucault practiced it, a mapping of history that maps the present (Elden 2001) and it maps the present so as to map-out ourselves, and there is, nonetheless, a certain structure to genealogical diagnosis. It is this structure that we shall explore here. The reason for examining the structure of genealogic diagnostics is
neither purely to provide a commentary on Foucault’s method, nor simply to copy Foucaultian genealogy. Rather, it is to grasp the arrangements of Foucaultian genealogy in order to set us on our way, so as to invent a new mode of genealogy relevant to and relative to our own situation.

As discussed previously, genealogy, like archaeology, is one of the modalities deployed by Foucault’s for rendering visible, but the way in which it renders visible is by recourse to our history and the different and differential ways in which our past both engendered and is incorporated in a particular conceptualization of our present. In addition, I have also noted how such recourse to history is blocked to us when we attempt to question our present whilst being delimited to a stand-point situated within the limits of our own contemporality. What I want to do in looking at the structure of genealogical diagnostics/strategics is to take it up not as a ready-made “tool” to be deployed, but as a piece of equipment to be employed in manufacturing our own tools. The tools I seek to fashion are being manufactured in order to give us a particular critical purchase upon our own present when grasped from the perspective of itself. In looking at the structure of genealogical diagnosis, I will focus upon three elements constitutive of that structure; three elements which we can then employ in our own way to question the present from the perspective of to-day.

What is presented here does not aim to provide a definitive statement concerning what genealogy is (I should be so bold); nor does it pose directly the question of the relation of genealogy to archaeology (e.g. in terms of asking “Did genealogy supplement, appropriate, or replace archaeology?”); rather, what is presented here is a reworking of some of the themes of genealogy in light of the problem at hand. As noted, this problem concerns the “how?” of doing non-historical research from within the frame of a Foucaultian perspective; that is, not research that is un-historical or ahistorical but research that does not take the past, even the recent past, as its principle and primary domain but, on the contrary, that takes our present as the field in which we are to work (diagnostics), and to work upon our present and the possible futures it embodies from the perspective of itself (strategics). In other words, I am less concerned with providing a definition of what genealogy is, than I am with thinking about what genealogy does or, more specifically, about what we can do and thus of what we can do with it vis-à-vis the aforementioned problem.

It is generally recognized that Foucaultian genealogy is, in some way or other, related to Nietzschean genealogy. However, and despite Foucault’s claim to be ‘simply Nietzschean’ (Foucault 1988: 251), Foucaultian genealogy is no simple or straightforward appropriation, replication, or repetition of its forebear. Rather, there is a complex interrelation and interplay between genealogy as practiced by Nietzsche (e.g. 1996) and genealogy as practiced by Foucault. Moreover, Foucaultian genealogy—and its relation to archaeology—did not remain static throughout Foucault’s writings, but was subject to continuous revaluation and modification. This can be seen, for example, in the adjustment
from war as an analytic of relation of power conceptualized as “antagonistic relations” (Foucault 1977a, 2003c) to government as an analytics of power conceptualized as “agonistic relations” or “strategic games between liberties” (Foucault 2007b, 2008a). It can also be seen in the complementing of a genealogy of morals (Foucault 1978; see also, 1988: 48; 2001d: 224) with a genealogy of ethics (Foucault 1985, 1986; see also, 1997: 253-280, 281-301). Hence, the response to the question “What is Foucaultian genealogy?” would be “Which one?”

In taking up the statement given in the reference cited above concerning genealogy (i.e. as being the aim of Foucault’s project: a genealogy of the subject), and its relation to archaeology (as its method) and technology (as its domain), what I want to do in this chapter is to look at the structure of genealogical diagnostics, where genealogy is conceptualized as a diagnostics of our present and thus of ourselves—that is, as both a history of the present (Foucault 1977a: 31) and a historical ontology of ourselves (Foucault 1997: 262ff., 315ff.; 2010: 20-21)—as well as a strategics concerned with being otherwise. In proceeding in this way, I do not want to present a description of genealogy in toto; rather, I want to focus upon three aspects of genealogical diagnosis (i.e. the provent, the emergent, and the present) that I see as being pertinent to undertaking an analysis of our contemporary present from the perspective of this present itself (and ourselves). And I want to take-up these three aspects as constituting the aim, and thus the framework, of our project; that is, as a version of a genealogy of the subject framed not in terms of being a history of the present but orientated towards what Rose calls ‘a history of potential futures’ (Rose 2009: 5, emphasis added).

In order to detail the structure of Foucaultian genealogy, I am going to look at the 1970 essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (Foucault 1998: 369-391). Now, strictly speaking, this essay is neither a treaties on methodology nor a reflection on method but is what Dean calls a ‘form of intellectual labour performed on Nietzsche’s writings’; that it to say, it is ‘not primarily a statement of Foucault’s method’ (Dean 1994: 17, see also 14). Nevertheless, in discussing provenance (Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung) in relation to Nietzschean genealogy, the essay does give us something to work with vis-à-vis what I have called the structure of genealogical diagnosis, by which I mean a specific mode of rendering visible certain practices in which things were rendered visible. In addition, the reading we are presented with in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ concerning these two aspects bears more than a passing resemblance to some of the central claims of The Archaeology. This, of course, may be due to the influence of Nietzsche upon this earlier text, but then The Archaeology cannot simply be reduced to a single influence, which points to the possibility that there is a broader tendency being played out in both of these texts; it is this tendency that I want to plug-into.
1 The Provenant

In his discussion of provenance and emergence in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, Foucault explicitly situates Nietzsche’s use of these terms in opposition to his use of the term “origin” (origine, Ursprung), and thus in opposition to a metaphysics of origin and, by extension, to what Dean calls ‘synthetic philosophies of history’ (Dean 1994: 4, 18, see Ch. 3 for a fuller discussion). Whilst it is possible to translate Herkunft as “descent” (as in the English translation of this text; see, Foucault 1998: 373; see also, Nietzsche 1996: 4), the French term that Foucault uses is not descente but ‘provenance’ (Foucault 2001a: 1008). Because of the possible associations of “descent” with such notions as “lineage” or “pedigree” (see Geuss 2001), I shall use the English equivalent of the term used by Foucault—this being provenance. Moreover, provenance, which etymologically denotes “to come forth” (from Latin provenire; from pro- “forth” + venire “to come”; OED), is more in line with Foucault’s exposition than are either “descent” (with its connotations of moving from a higher to a lower form) or “pedigree” (with its connotations of lineage and noble breeding). A term related to provenance, but now obsolete, is proven, which has the sense of “to come as proceeds or produce” (OED). We can use this term to conceptualize provenance not only as those practices, discourses, events, and so on, from which what emerges arrives, but also in the sense that what arrives in such an emergence arrives as something produced, as the proceeds of a procedure or process. In conceptualizing provenance as the coming forth of what emerged (i.e. Entstehung; what is “brought forth”, its “formation”, its “birth [naissance]”), then, it has the sense of the material and practical conditions—the “background” (which is another possible translation of Herkunft)—, from which something arrives or the sense of “where things come from”: an emergence arriving from (en provenance de) humble beginnings (bescheidene Herkunft).

On this view, genealogical research on provenance in not unrelated to archaeological research on the conditions of possibility, the concrete (Foucault 2006a, 1973) and historical a priori (Foucault 1970, 1972; 1998: 460) of a practice (discursive or not), and, above all, on dispersion (e.g. Foucault 1998: 297-333, passim; see also Webb 2013: 34ff.). Understood thus, provenance (Herkunft) has clear correlations to what, in The Archaeology, Foucault called a ‘system of dispersion’ (Foucault 1972: 37): genealogy ‘seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect...to form a network that is difficult to unravel’ (Foucault 1998: 373). In other words, provenance, humble beginnings, are pre-subjective (ibid.). Genealogy, in attempting not to unpick this complex network, but to follow certain threads pertinent to the analysis, an analysis framed by way of a particular perspective of the present ‘goes in search of the beginning—of the innumerable beginnings that leave that hint of colour, that mark almost effaced that cannot deceive a little historical eye’ (Foucault 2001d: 374, modified). As such, genealogical research on provenance ‘allows the recovery, under the unique aspect of a character or a concept, of the proliferation
of events through which (thanks to which, against which) they were formed’ (ibid., modified). Since Foucault did not provide us with a “treaties” on genealogy, in the way he did with archaeology, we can thus use some aspects of the discussion in The Archaeology to flesh out genealogical research on provenance (on the fleshing out of genealogy with some of the vertical aspects of archaeology see Foucault 1991a; 1998: 297-333; and 1981).

Provenance, when this refers to the formation of an object or a series of objects, for example, seeks to map out ‘the common space in which diverse objects stand out and are continuously transformed’ (Foucault 1998: 313). This space is mapped out by way of its ‘surfaces of emergence’, its ‘authorities of delimitation’, and its ‘grids of specification’ (Foucault 1972: 41-42) through which an object—discursive or practical—comes forth. A surface of emergence refers to that practical space or those practices within which a certain object first came to light. Thus, for example, Foucault notes that ‘[i]n the case of nineteenth century psychopathology, they were probably constituted by the family, the immediate social group, the work situation, the religious community’ (ibid.: 41), and so forth. In other words, it refers to those practices in which an object came to be problematized as an object to be known and as a target of governmental intervention. The authorities of delimitation refer to the formation of specific groups who are then able to delimit, designate, name, and established what was thus problematized as an object (ibid.); that is, as an object of human scientific investigation and of punitive and/or therapeutic intervention: psychopathology, medicine, criminology and penology, juridical discourse, and so on, and so forth. Lastly, the grids of specification refer to the schemas according to which what was to be known and what was to be governed were organized, divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, hierarchized, derived from one another as objects of knowledge and targets of intervention (ibid.: 42). That is to say, it refer to ‘both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done and codifying effects regarding what is to be known’ (Foucault 2001d: 225).

Likewise, in relation to the formation of what, in The Archaeology, Foucault called ‘enunciative modalities’ (Foucault 1972: 50-55), and what we can call governmental modalities (enunciation + technique): modes of subjectivation. This refers to who is speaking or acting: psychiatrist, doctor, prison warder, and so forth (ibid.: 50); to the sites from which and through which they speak or act: asylum, hospital, military barracks, prison, and the like (ibid.: 51); and the relation that obtains between the speaking, acting, governing subject and a domain or group of objects conceptualized as both object to be known and the target of a governmental practice (ibid.: 52); or, stated otherwise, of the relation between those who are to be governed and those who are to govern. The same goes for concepts (ibid.: 56ff.) or techniques, and thematic choices or strategies (ibid.: 64ff.).

One of the dimensions that genealogy supplements in relation to an archaeological analytics of the formation of objects is that at the root of this
formation is not just a ‘regular existence’ (Foucault 1998: 313), ‘systematicity, theoretical form, or something like a paradigm’ (Foucault 1980: 113) but, as History of Madness had already made clear, a relation of power that takes the form of strategic games between liberties, a governmental modality that seeks to operationalize that relation, and forms or structures of domination. And the analysis of statements (énoncés) is supplemented with the analysis of techniques; that is to say, in looking at and rendering visible, and thus intelligible, “the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject”; or, to put it succinctly: power-knowledge—pouvoir-savoir. One thing to bear in mind here, is that the term “énoncé” can be translated as both “to say, to express, to state” and “to set out, to lay down”, and so forth. It is this double meaning that allows us to correlate statement and technique; a correlation whose significance will become clearer when discussing government as both a relation (conducting conducts) and a technique (arranging probability) that are analyzed archaeologically.

Consequently, research on provenance (that is, on where things arrived from, on their concrete and historical a priori), ‘does not found/ground, quite the contrary: it disturbs what we perceived immobile, it fragments what we thought united, it shows the heterogeneity of what we imagined [to be] in conformity with itself’ (Foucault 1998: 374-375, modified). And this includes our present, our history, and, above all, ourselves: ‘[g]enealogy, as an analysis provenance, is therefore the articulation of the body and history. It must show the body totally imprinted by history and history ruining the body’ (ibid.: 375-376, modified).

The task of genealogy, as this pertains to provenance, ‘is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present’; rather, in following ‘the complex chain of provenance [la filière complexe de la provenance]’, the task is to ‘maintain that which took place in the dispersion that is its own’ (ibid. 374). In other words, genealogical research on provenance seeks to map out the multiple and heterogeneous humble beginnings and the different and differential ways in which they became posited together in what is posed together and thus ‘gave birth to what exist and has value for us’ (ibid.). By proceeding in this way, we ‘discover that at the root of what we know and what we are there is not truth and being, but the exteriority of accidents [découvrir qu’à la racine de ce que nous connaissons et de ce que nous sommes il n’y a point la vérité et l’être, mais l’extériorité de l’accident]’ (Foucault 1998: 374, modified; the English translation of the final sentence makes it sound as if it is truth and being that are rooted in the exteriority of accidents, whereas it is what we know and what are that are thus rooted).

Genealogical research on provenance, then, aims to map out “systems of dispersion”, the “concrete and historical a priori”, the “multiple and heterogeneous ensembles”, the humble beginnings, and so forth, from which what was formed, arrived; hence all the references to “birth”: the birth of the asylum (Foucault 2006a: 463ff.), the birth of the clinic (Foucault 1973), the birth of
the prison (Foucault 1977a), the birth of social medicine (Foucault 2001d: 134-156), the birth of bio-politics (Foucault 2008a); it is this birth that the term emergence refers to.

2 The Emergent

As well as being translated as “emergence”, Entstehung can also be translated as “appearance”, “development”, “formation”, “nascency (birth)”, and so forth. Etymologically, emergence has the sense of “to bring forth” (from Latin emergere “rise out or up”, “bring to light”; from ex- “out” + mergere “to dip”, “to sink”). On this view, it not only has the sense of a sudden appearance, arising, or coming to light, or as something being brought forth (OED), it also has the sense of “to come into being” (i.e. “genesis”, see Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012): ‘Entstehung designates...emergence [l’émergence], the point of sudden arising [le point de surgissement]. It is the principle and law of a singular appearance’ (Foucault 1998: 376, modified). Even though genealogy take as its point of departure a problematization in the present, and thus questions provenance and emergence from the point of view of a particular conceptualization of the present, the emergence to be described cannot be explained by what exists for us to-day: ‘[j]ust as we are all too often inclined to seek provenance in a continuity without interruption, we would be wrong to give an account of emergence by [recourse to] its final term. As if the eye had appeared, since the beginning of time, for contemplation; as if punishment had always been intended to make an example’ (ibid., modified; Nietzsche 2006: 50-51).

Rather than account for the past in terms of the present, genealogy undertake a history of the present (Foucault 1977a: 31); consequently, what is present in our present is ‘nothing more than the current episode of a series of servitudes [d’asservissements]’ (Foucault 1998: 376, modified). What genealogical research on emergence aims to render visible is the birth of a pure singularity: ‘the singularity of madness in the modern Western world, the absolute singularity of sexuality, the absolute singularity of our moral-legal system of punishment’ (Foucault 2007a: 63). And it describes such events as being the conditions of possibility of ‘the elusive singularity of the present’ (Rabinow 1997: xviii).

For Foucault, emergence, the birth of a singularity—the asylum, the clinic, the prison, etc.—always occurs or takes place within the play of ‘a certain state of forces’ (see e.g. Foucault 2006b: 345). At the time of writing ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, or, in any case, not long thereafter, Foucault conceptualized such forces in terms of adversarial conflict, battle, and war; as antagonistic relations (see, e.g. Foucault 1977a: 308; 2003c: passim) rather than the agonistic relations he came to associate with governmentality. The difference here is between an antagonistic relation in which forces are mutually and actively opposed in a struggle against each other (from Greek antagonistes, from anti- “against” + agonizesthai “to struggle”, from agon “contest”) and an agonistic relation (i.e. minus the “anti-”) in which forces compete against each other in a
kind of game (OED): ‘[r]ather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an “agonism”—of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation’ (Foucault 1998: 342).

Hence, the difference is the difference between a field of battle (Foucault 1977a: 290, 308) and a playing field. Whether one employs the model of war, or the schema of government, or even the concern to take care of oneself, as an interpretive strategy, genealogical research on emergence ‘must show the game, the manner in which these forces struggle against one another’ (Foucault 1998: 376, modified). In other words, what is to be accounted for is not so much the play of regularities, but a ‘relation of power as the a priori of practices’ (Foucault 2006b: 345). In accounting for the multiple and heterogeneous beginnings (the conditions of possibility, the concrete and historical a priori, the dispersion, etc.) from which an emergence arrived, and in accounting for the specific formation of a pure singularity, genealogical research has to describe ‘the entrance of forces...their eruption’, by detailing ‘the leap with which they jump from behind the scene onto centre stage’ (Foucault 1998: 377, modified): that is, from provenance to emergence. What genealogical research on emergence aims to render visible, then, are the different and differential ways in which ‘the subject that knows [le sujet qui connaît], the objects to be known [les objets à connaître], and the modalities of knowledge [les modalités de connaissance] are so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge [pouvoir-savoir] and their historical transformations’ (Foucault 1977a: 27-28, modified).

Genealogical research on provenance and emergence—and before it archaeological research on dispersion and formation—is what prevents the analysis from being reduced to either transcendental condition: structures of consciousness, transcendental philosophy, philosophical anthropology—or empirical causes: the empirical order of things, the human sciences, social history (Foucault 1997: 200ff.; see also Webb 2005a; 2013). For whilst the proven constitutes conditions, conditions that are empirically causal in that they form the conditions from which what emerged arrives; these conditions are not located in the subject (they are sub-individual and/or pre-subjective), and their effects are not reducible to empirical causes. This is because both conditions and causes do not determine, in a deterministic way, what follows, they merely lay-out a space in which the emergence of what emerged was made possible by its provenance. That is to say, what happened, what was made, was contingent. Etymologically, contingent means “to touch together” (from Latin con- “together” + tangère “to touch”), and it denotes “having contact or connexion”, but it also has connotations of “happening or coming by chance; not fixed by necessity or fate; accidental, fortuitous” (OED). Contingent, then, does not mean arbitrary; it means conditioned by conditions but not causally determined or necessitated by said conditions. In other words, contingency is opposed to necessity; it has the sense that what happened was contingent upon certain conditions, but these
conditions only made what happened possible, that they are neither
deterministic nor made necessary. The task for the genealogist—and, indeed, for
the archaeologist—is to describe how, out of all the possibilities that these
conditions potentially made possible, what materialized transpired and not
something else: how what was said was said and not something else; how what
was done was done and not something else; how what was thought was thought
and not something else, and so forth. In addition, it has to account for how what
was said, done, thought, and so on, were said, done, and thought in the
particular ways in which they were said, done, and thought, and not in some
other way.

These conditions (dispersion, provenance, concrete and historical a priori)
set out a space of possibility in which something could come into existence
(emergence), but they neither determine that existence nor necessitate its birth;
they merely made it possible. In addition, these conditions can only really be
rendered visible by way of the retrospective or regressive gaze (Foucault 2007a:
151) of the genealogist who is situated within a particular conceptualization of
the present. For example, all the practices discussed in the section on ‘Discipline’
in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977a: 135-288) did not cause the prison to
come into existence; the prison was an effect of these causes, not their product
(Foucault 2007a: 64; see also 2001d: 278). Or, to be more precise, they are effects
produced if by the latter we mean “brought forth” (from pro- “forth” + ducere “to
bring”, OED), and not the execution of a design that results in the intended
product. Rather, in coming to form a much broader horizon of practices (an
epistemic and technical matrix of discourses and practices) of the disciplinary
kind, they opened up a space in which prison became seeable, sayable, thinkable,
and practicable. In other words, these dispersed, multiple, heterogeneous
practices constitute the conditions of possibility for the formation of a
disciplinary dispositive, and it is out of this disciplinary dispositivity that the
prison emerged, from which it was formed, and which gave to it its birth. These
conditions are not reducible to empirical causes, however, due to the fact that the
possible genealogical mapping of the provenance of an emergence is, potentially
at least, without end: the more one looks, the more interrelated and interconnected
discourses, techniques, practices, and events, and so forth, one
finds—this is what is meant by dispersion.

3 The Present
There is a third element, often implied but rarely discussed, which is the raison
d’être or finalité, to use Foucault’s term, for doing genealogical research. And this
concerns the different and differential ways in which proven and emergent forms
of existence still have value and meaning for us: that is to say, of the ways in
which our past is present in a particular conceptualization of our present, and the
ways in which our past both engenders and is incorporated in this
conceptualization. There are two elements to this history of the present and
historical ontology of ourselves; in asking “What are we to-day?”: it undertakes a genealogical diagnostics; in asking “How we became what we are” it also poses the question of “How might we be otherwise”: it undertakes a genealogical strategics (see, e.g. Foucault 2007a: 60-65).

Genealogy, then, is a perspective that is perspectival; it starts from the position that ‘everything in the world is at least in principle connected to everything else’ (Nehamas 1985: 79; see also, Nietzsche 1968b: #634). How objects are constituted, how subjects capable of knowing such objects and having dealings with them are formed or modified, how certain knowledges and techniques are articulated and employed by the subject and deployed in relation to the object, and how all of this is drawn together in, by, and through the constitution or thematization of the specific goals of a particular practice; these are all the effects of a certain cutting specific to that practice (Foucault 1977a: 27-28): psychopathology, clinical medicine, linguistics, biology, political economy, criminology and penology, sexology, liberal and neo-liberal government, ethics, and so forth. That is to say, certain of these relations are emphasized, certain others withdraw, whilst others still are ignored or, since ignored implies a conscious intent, perhaps we should say go unnoticed and slip into the background. In looking at what was/is made, we have to look at what went into the making; this means, we have to look at how certain connections came to be made, how what was drawn together and woven into the fabric of our world came to be drawn together, how certain relations came to be taken as given whilst other relation were not taken at all.

What we have to render visible are the combinations and re-combinations, the configurations and reconfigurations, that draw together certain relations, intra-relations, inter-relations, and correlations. How is it, for example, that certain types of behaviour came to be thought of as criminal and articulated in juridical and punitive practices whilst other types of behaviour were not? How is it that certain types of behaviour came to be categorized as mental illness, and came to be articulated upon certain juridical and curative practices on the one hand, and articulated upon psychical, social, neurophysiological, and biochemical process on the other? How did particular aspects of sexual activity come to be articulated upon certain ethical practices of the self on the one hand, and related to the essential kernel of the very truth of our being on the other? “Things” here, then, does not denote substances, attributes, qualities, characteristics, and so forth (which are all effects of a certain cutting: i.e. connaissances) but connote relations. If everything in the world is interconnected, which connections come to be made, taken as pertinent, or emphasized, and thus which relations come to be taken as given vis-à-vis a particular practice or an ensemble or regime of practices? It is this taken-as-given that we have to turn into a question; that is, to transform ‘the constative [in]to the subjunctive…the necessary [in]to the contingent’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xix).
Nevertheless, even here, the possible relations that may be mapped in describing the birth of a singularity that still has value and meaning for us from multiple and heterogeneous conditions are immeasurable. One of the central questions posed in The Archaeology was how to describe the unity of a discursive practice (Foucault 1972: 31ff.). The answer given there is that the unity of a discursive formation is given in a certain regularity of which it is possible to describe the laws or rules of formation: its positivity. What genealogy adds to this (and I am not entirely sure whether it supplants it or supplements it) is that what is to be described, vis-à-vis the unity of a particular regimes of practices, is related to the particular perspective on the present which formed the point of departure for the analysis: ‘[t]hat punishment in general and the prison in particular belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson that I have learnt not so much from history as from the present’ (Foucault 1977a: 30). Therefore, out of all the possible things to be mapped, what is mapped, the coordinates that are to be described, the events pertinent to the analysis, and so forth, are dependent upon one’s point of departure in a particular conceptualization of the present. This is one reason that genealogy is described as being a history of the present; it is also why Foucault described such histories as “fictions” (Foucault 1980: 193; 2001d: 242; see Bellour 1992; O’Leary 2009; Rayner 2003; Smith 1994); that is, as something invented that is, nonetheless, objectively accurate (see the discussion on page 29 above). The task of genealogical research on provenance and emergence is to describe how what came to be (statement + technique = technology, etc.) came to be what it was and not something else; the way in which this is done, from a Foucaultian perspective, is by doing a history of its making not as a product but as an effect (Foucault 2007a: 62). It is precisely this mode of rendering visible our present and ourselves which is lost to us when we do such rendering from the perspective of our actuality.

If we look at Discipline and Punish, what made possible the emergence of the prison—made possible, mind; not causally determined—was a whole dispersion of disparate practices—both discursive and non-discursive—which, nonetheless, were cut across by a certain rationality; that is, by both a rationale (justification) and reasoned reflection (calculation)—Foucault called this rationale discipline: discipline is the positivity or, rather, the dispositivity (Foucault 1980: 197) from which the prison was born. In other words, just as The Order of Things sought to show how ‘the naturalists, economists, and grammarians [of the Classical age] employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories’ (Foucault 2002a: xii), so Discipline and Punish sought to show how practices as different as schooling, monastic life, clinical medicine, military training, and the organization of work, as well as prison, and so forth, are all inhabited by a certain rational technique vis-à-vis governing others, and in doing so, it demonstrates a certain isomorphism between the ways in which these disparate practices formed the target of their practice, established their governmental modalities, formed their techniques, and
thematized their strategies. What made possible the birth of the prison was, therefore, a much broader set of disciplinary practices and techniques than those taken up, invested, deployed, and employed in, by, and through punitive reason.

This “more” is what is captured by genealogical research on provenance. The formation of the prison, the specific technique it uses, and of the various discourses of prison reform, penology, criminology, and so forth that it deploys and employs are mapped out by way of genealogical research on emergence. The ways in which not only the formation and emergence of the prison but also this broader disciplinary rationality came to be present in a certain conceptualization of our present, that is, as something that still has values and meaning for us, this is the element of a genealogical strategics; in posing the question concerning what we are and how we became what we are, it aims to show that what we are has been made, that it is contingent, and thus that it can potentially be unmade and possibly remade. In other words, and in addition to these two questions, it poses a third question: how might we be otherwise; how can we unmake and thus remake ourselves. The effects that such strategic analyses aims to bring about is not simply that we think differently about the prison or some other such practice, nor is it specifically to transform what it is we think about; rather, it aims to transform how we think about these things and, consequently, to transform ourselves: this is why Foucault called his book ‘experience books’ rather than ‘truth books’ (Foucault 2001d: 246; see, e.g. O’Leary 2008; 2009; Rayner 2003).

Provenance seeks to map the ‘network of contingencies from which [an emergence] emerges’ (Foucault 1998: 450). Emergence, as a moment of arising, points to an historical mutation; however, what emerges or arises is not, of necessity, something totally new, rather, it can, and often is, a reconfiguration and reorganization, a drawing together of things that were previously disparate, isolated, unrelated, and so forth, or that were related in different ways; and, because of this very process, what arises, what is brought forth are new objects, new subject positions (enunciative, governmental, and/or ethical modalities), new concepts and techniques, and new strategies. Genealogical history, as regressive history, goes from a problem in the present to the emergence of a singularity—e.g. the birth of the asylum, the birth of the clinic, the birth of the prison, etc.—to what made that emergence possible: its provenance. It maps out the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought (provenance) and the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made possible (a singular emergence, the present); it maps out the conditions of possibility of that which ‘gave birth to what exist and has value for us’ (Foucault 1998: 374). Archaeology, to which we now turn, analyzes the thought made possible by and thus inhabiting an emergence conceptualized as a singularity: a history of thought or an archaeology of problematizations.

An analytics of provenance looks at those local and contingent, multiple and heterogeneous practices out of which an emergence arrives or from which the birth of singularity is brought forth; and analytics of emergence looks at
problematization as an event in which a tipping point is reached, an event horizon as it were, or a critical mass, in which the overall ways of seeing and saying and thinking and doing relative to a specific domain of practices become a problem to which more general solutions are presented. An emergence is thus the reorganization in depth of prior sets of practice. Whilst emergence designates or names a singularity, provenance is not singular, but nor is it plural: it is manifold; it connotes local, contingent, and heterogeneous multiplicities. Genealogy, as a history of the present and as a historical and critical ontology of ourselves, is the analysis of the birth of a singularity born from a manifold heterogeneity, of a singularity that still has value and meaning for us: ‘as opposed to a genesis oriented towards the unity of some principal cause burdened with multiple descendants, what is proposed instead is a genealogy, that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather the effect’ (Foucault 2007a: 64).

As a way of looking, of rendering visible, genealogy corresponds to ‘the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, divides, disperses, that leaves differences and the margins at play—a sort of dissociating glance capable of dissociating itself,...of effacing the unity of that human being that is supposed to bear the sovereignty of its past’ (ibid.: 379, modified). It is a glance that ‘reintroduces into becoming everything we had thought immortal in humans/man [...] to the extent that it introduces discontinuity into our very being’ (ibid.: 379, 380, modified). Whilst we cannot show, either by description or by demonstration, how the present was made when questioning it from the perspective of itself, in referring to the work of Foucault and others we can surly accept that it was made, piecemeal and willy-nilly; that is to say, contingently. In other words, we can acknowledge that there is nothing determinative, necessary, or universal in what we are—or take ourselves to be—, what we do, and the world in which we live; that all of these things, which seem to us to be so stable, durable, almost inevitable, are contingent upon our history and the different and differential ways in which our past is present in a particular conceptualization of our present (i.e. the present itself is manifold). In other words, whilst we may be doing non-historical research—that is, researching the present from the perspective of itself—, this does not mean that such research is un-historical or ahistorical. It simply means that our perspective toward the present and on the present moves in a different direction; and this direction is what we, following Rose (2009), can call a “genealogy of potential futures emergences” of “possible future presents”. To undertake such a genealogy is to pose questions to a tomorrow that will never come and that we will never know.

We shall leave all this to one side for the moment, and turn our attention to archaeology and the history of thought. We will return to both it and the discussion on archaeology in the concluding section of this part of the thesis.
III. Archaeology and the History of Thought

Philosophy is a diagnostic undertaking, archaeology is a method for describing thought.

(Foucault, letter)

From 1970 until his death in 1984, Foucault held a chair at the Collège de France which was given the title *Histoire des systèmes de pensée* or “History of Systems of Thought” (see Paul Rabinow’s ‘Introduction’ to Foucault 1997). What does Foucault mean by thought? What is a system of thought? What does it mean for thought or for systems of thought to have a history? How is an analysis of the history of thought critical? How does one go about doing such a critical history of (systems of) thought? And what is the relevance of a history of thought to us? What does it do and what can we do with it in questioning the contemporary order of things from within that order? Since we are attempting to see if it is possible to re-make Foucault’s analyses of history into analyses of our contemporaneity, is it possible to translate Foucault’s critical history of thought into a critical analysis of contemporary thought? In order to address these questions, and this last question in particular, we will first have to get a handle on what Foucault meant by thought. Having done this, we can then broach the question of the possibility of re-figuring a critical history of thought into a critical analysis of contemporary thought.

At this point, you may well be asking what all this has to do with the question concerning power, which, after all, is concerned with how some attempt to conduct the conduct of others. In response to this question, I would beg your indulgence. Since I am arguing that Foucault’s conceptualization of relations of power can only be properly understood by situating it within the broader scope of a history of thought, we first need to get clear about what this history of thought is. Furthermore, since we are enquiring into whether or not it is possible to employ some of the equipment Foucault used in his historical analyses of relations of power to manufacture our own tools for analyzing relations of power in their contemporaneity, we first need to examine whether or not it is possible to transform a critical history of thought into critical analyses of contemporary thought. Thus, in this chapter I address the latter of these questions.

Taking as our point of departure a passage from the original ‘Preface’ to *The Order of Things*, I will attempt to ascertain the “level” at which or upon which archaeological research works, how this “level” is played out in the distinction Foucault makes between *savoir* and *connaissance*, and why this level is of interest to the archaeologists of knowledge (*savoir*) and power (*pouvoir*), of discourse, of problematization, and of technology. In doing so, I hope to gain an understanding not so much of what Foucault meant by “thought” but more what
a history of thought does and of what it means to do “a history of thought”, and thereby construct our own analytics of thought. In our endeavour to get a handle on the specific “level” of archaeological research, I shall draw upon Heidegger’s notion of “the ontological difference”; that is to say, his conceptualization of the differentiation between “being” and “beings” (Heidegger 1982). Now, strictly speaking, given Foucault’s comments vis-à-vis Heidegger in his final interview—’[f]or me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher…[m]y entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger (Foucault 1988: 250ff.)—this is not adding a supplemental to Foucault’s thought. However, and having said that, my intention here is not to invoke Heidegger so as to indicate his possible influence upon the thought of Foucault; nor is it to stage what Milchman and Rosenberg (2003) call an Auseinandersetzung or “critical encounter” between Heidegger and Foucault, however admirable this may be; nor, finally, is my objective to combine their respective works so as to arrive at a third synthetic position. Besides which, it would simply be absurd to reduce the complexity of a thinker like Foucault to one primary influence, even one as complex as Heidegger. Not only is it possible to state that Foucault’s thought is intensely Kantian (e.g. Djaballah 2008; Han 2002), intensely Nietzschean (e.g. Mahon 1992; Owen 1994; Shapiro 2003), and intensely Heideggerian (e.g. Elden 2001; Rayner 2007); into this heady mix can be thrown The Annales School, Althusser, Bachelard, Bataille, Binswanger, Blanchot, Canguilhem, Cavailles, Deleuze, Dumézil, Freud, Hegel, Klossowski, Levi Strauss, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, and Raymond Roussel, to name but a few.

The reason for not wanting to proceed in this way is that I want to avoid the inevitable distractions that would result from such a form of enquiry. In short, there is neither presumption nor argumentation concerning the possible relation between the thinking of these two thinkers. More exactly, Heidegger’s conceptualization of the ontological difference or, rather, a certain underplayed aspect of that differentiation, which did not seem to have greatly concerned Heidegger himself, is being taken up and employed as an intelligibility key with which to render intelligible Foucault’s thought on thought. That is to say, I take up this aspect of the ontological differences as a conceptual tool, as a heuristic device, with which and through which to render intelligible and thus more usable Foucault’s conceptualization and analytics of thought. The objective being, moreover, to render intelligible Foucault’s conceptualization and analytics of thought in such a way as to make them available for undertaking critical analyses not of thought’s history but of our own present contemporary thought. In summary, the reading that I undertake here is perspectival, which is another way of saying it is motivated; and this can only ever mean that it is “partial,” “selective,” and “biased”.

As noted, the aspect of the ontological difference that I am to employ here is, I think, rather marginal to Heidegger’s broader concerns. As far as I have been able to ascertain, it was only discussed to any great extent in two places; firstly, in
the section of *Being and Time* that looks at ‘Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general’ (Heidegger 1962: specifically, 95-104; see also, 286-288, 406, 410); and secondly, in the section of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* that deal with ‘The Temporal interpretation of being as being handy’ (Heidegger 1982: 303-313). In addition, my reading of this aspect of the ontological differentiation is informed as much by Dreyfus’s (1991, specifically Ch. 4) account of this as it is by Heidegger’s discussion. Since I am employing the ontological difference as a conceptual device with which to construct an understanding of Foucault’s conceptualization of thought, it behoves me to say something regarding my understanding of, and taking up of, the ontological difference. Of course, whilst a certain form of scholarship deals with the correctness of such interpretations, in what follows, I am more interested in what work this analysis allows us to do that I am with concerns of learnedness or erudition.

1 – My motive for taking up and using a certain aspect of the ontological difference is that I saw in it a way to think about, and thus to get a handle on, what it is that Foucault does with such concepts as “thought,” “materiality,” and “rationality,” and so forth, and thus what doing a “critical history of thought” entails. Using this heuristic “apparatus” in this way, thus discloses one possible way of situating Foucault’s “analytics of power” within this form of enquiry. As noted, my aim is not to ask “where did he get this or that from?” but, rather, to make the concepts of thought, materiality, rationality and, consequently, the conceptualization of power, more intelligible and thus, accordingly, more usable.

2 – My taking up of the ontological difference is, to a certain extent, uncomplicated. By this I do not mean that it is simplistic; rather, I mean that I am not concerned here with the different ways in which Heidegger himself questioned concerning the ontological difference (by way of “De-sein,” by way of “being”) or attempted to move beyond this differentiation (by way of “appropriation”). On the contrary, I simply take up the differentiation of the ontological difference as a heuristic without questioning it in and of itself. To do otherwise would make the thesis too burdensome and derail the focus from focusing upon the question at hand: namely, that of questioning the exercising of contemporary relations of power from within the perspective of our own actuality.

3 – I take it that the ontological difference designates or discloses the differentiation between “being” (Sein) and “beings” (das Seiende, the things-that-are) or, stated otherwise, between “the being of entities” and “entities” themselves or, as a final approximation, between what Heidegger called “the clearing” and “what shows-up in the clearing” (Heidegger 1962: 171; 1993: 217-265).

4 – Da-sein (there-being, being-there), which is often taken as a synonym for “human beings”, is being understood here not as a synonym for “people”—either individually or collectively—but, rather, to refer to “a form of life” or “the modes of existence” of a people.
5 – I take it that historical, cultural, and practical “ways of existing” embody and express historically, culturally, and practically specific understandings of being (ontology), and that Da-sein has a dim or implicit awareness of this understanding (the pre-ontological). Here, and despite the fact that in The Order of Things Foucault stated emphatically and categorically that ‘[i]n any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice’ (Foucault 1970: 168), there can be no question of ontology being a unity that unifies all experience (fundamental ontology); rather, ontology is approached as being a dispersed multiplicity of diverse, diverging, intersecting, and overlapping local and/or regional ontologies (see Dean 1996; Rose 1996c); a position taken up in The Archaeology (Webb 2013: 56). That is to say, there is no appeal to transcendental conditions here; neither structures of consciousness nor empirical causes.

6 – Furthermore, I take it that the term “understanding” here does not, or does not only, denote mental comprehension but, understood etymologically (from under “among, between” + standan “to stand” + ing), connotes “standing in the midst of” (OED). I also take “being,” as “be-ing,” to mean the enactment of “what is” (i.e. in the same way that skiing is “to ski”, that is, the act of traveling on skis; or that singing is “to sing”, that is, the act of making melodic sounds with one’s voice, etc.). Consequently, I take it that an “understanding of being” means something like standing in the midst of the enactment of what is; and, indeed, as connoting such standing as being an integral part of said enactment.

7 – I take the ontological difference, as the differentiation between being and entities, as being disclosive of three different modes of the being of entities: Zuhandenheit, Unzuhandenheit, and Vorhandenheit; and of three different kinds of entities that have these ways of being: Zuhanden (to-hand), Unzuhanden (un-to-hand) and Vorhanden (at-hand). “Zuhandenheit” has been variously translated as readiness-to-hand, handiness, or availableness, and “Zuhanden” as ready-to-hand, handy, or available; “Unzuhandenheit” as un-readiness-to-hand, unhandiness, or unavailable; “Unzuhanden” as un-ready-to-hand, unhandy, or unavailable; “Vorhandenheit” as presence-at-hand or occurrence and “Vorhanden” as present-at-hand or occurrent (see Heidegger 1962; 1982, 1996; see also, Carman 2003; Dreyfus 1991). In following Dreyfus (1991), I will use available(ness), unavailable(ness), and occurrent(ness) to refer to these three modes of the being of entities and the entities that have these modes of being. Available (from avail + able), has the sense of “able to be effectual, serviceable, or of use” (OED); unavailable thus has the sense of not able to be of avail in the aforesaid way; whilst occurrent has the sense of something presenting itself (from Latin occurrere, from ob “against, toward” + currere “to run”); thus occurrent has the sense of extent: a “standing forth, prominent, visible”, that is as something “standing above a surface” and so “standing forth to view” (OED).
8 – In addition, I take it that the first two ways of being and the entities that have these ways of being are ontological, whilst the third is what Heidegger called merely ontical (merely, here, is not used in a derogatory or pejorative sense, but more in terms of “just standing there”); and that both the ontological and the ontical have their condition of possibility in an ontology.

9 – Lastly, I take the ontological difference as disclosing three modes of comportment of Da-sein towards the entities that have the aforementioned ways of being: (i) “non-thematics circumspective absorption” towards the available; (ii) from “deliberate coping to involved deliberation to theoretical reflection” towards the unavailable; and (iii) “thematic cognition” towards the merely occurrent or extant (Dreyfus 1991). This description thus describes my understanding of the ontological difference as described by Heidegger (1962, 1982) and discussed by Dreyfus (1991).

10 – Finally, I should reinforce a point here: in taking up this conceptualization of the ontological difference, I want to deploy certain Heideggerian schemes without being either committed to, or being held to commit to, any general Heideggerian position. My taking up of the above understanding of the ontological difference, which is not taken up in term of influence or appropriation but as an experimental heuristic that opens up the question of problematizations, will be embellished upon and elaborated in more detail as the chapter progresses.

1 A Materialism of the Incorporeal

The specific passage from the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things that I take up as our point of departure here, concerns Foucault’s discussion of those people whose ability to use language has been impaired by aphasia (a “disorder” caused by brain damage). The passage concerns ‘certain aphasics’, who ‘when shown various differently colored skeins of wool on a table top, are consistently unable to arrange them into any coherent pattern’ (Foucault 2002a: xix). What Foucault is drawing attention to here is the way in which the surface of the table top ‘in which things are normally arranged and given names’ is ‘unable to serve in [the aphasics] case as a homogeneous and neutral space in which things could be placed so as to display at the same time the continuous order of their identities or differences as well as the semantic field of their denomination’ (ibid.: xix-xx). Foucault notes that within this simple space, ‘the apsiatic will create a multiplicity of tiny, fragmented regions in which nameless resemblances agglutinate things into unconnected islets; in one corner, they will place the lightest-colored skeins, in another the red ones, somewhere else those that are softest in texture, in yet another place the longest, or those that have a tinge of purple or those that have been wound up into a ball’ (ibid: xx). But this order is, for the aphasics, too unstable and/or fragile to be maintained, and ‘no sooner have they been adumbrated than all these groupings dissolve again’, and this because ‘the field of identity that sustains them, however limited it may be, is still
too wide not to be unstable’ (ibid). The aphasics, endlessly grouping and regrouping the different skeins, arranging and rearranging them, configuring and reconfiguring different islet becomes ‘more and more disturbed’, finally ‘teetering on the brink of anxiety’ (ibid).

What Foucault is drawing our attention to here, as with his description of Borges’ quote from “a certain Chinese encyclopaedia” also presented in the ‘Preface’, is not just the aphasics inability to create and maintain order, but also, and more specifically, the apparently neutral rectangular surface of the table-top that acts as both background and support for such orderings. We could also say that Foucault uses this example to demonstrate both the contingency of a particular mode of order and the transience of such orderings. In other words, the aforesaid passage is used to differentiate between the table top—the background and support of order—, what is so ordered, and the act or practice of grouping the particular groupings arranged within the space or upon the surface—on the “top”—of the table: empirical orders.

— Fundamental Codes

We can clarify this differentiation—between the background and support of order and the empirical orders or practices of ordering—by recourse to further passages from the ‘Preface’. We can begin by looking at how Foucault presents “order” itself. In the ‘Preface’ he states that ‘[o]rder is both that which is given in things as their inner law, the secret network in accordance with which they as it were, gaze at one another, and that which only exists through the grid of a glance, attention, language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of being stated’ (ibid.: xxi, modified). There are possible overtones here of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference, and although I do not wish to read this in terms of influence, as noted, it may be instructive to see how this parallel unfolds.

Firstly, order is posed in terms of two dimensions: on the one hand, there is that which is given in things themselves, which we shall discuss in a moment; on the other hand, there is that which only exists through the grid of practices—“seeing” and “saying” (on the “seeable” and the “sayable”, see Deleuze 1988: 47ff.)—where order manifests itself: as we shall see, this “grid” is what Foucault called the “empirical”, and it is governed by what he called the “fundamental codes of a culture”. This can be read as invoking something like the differentiation between “beings” and “being” that the ontological difference names, and the understanding of being which this differentiation expresses. Secondly, what is given in “things” themselves is a hidden network that determines how they face or interact with one another. There are clear parallels or correlations here with Heidegger’s notion of “equipment”, in which equipment is what it is only in its relation to other equipment or to an equipment
contexture (Heidegger 1982: 309), environment, or world: the aforementioned “hidden network.” Thirdly, order manifests itself in the space of a grid that has no existence beyond a glance, attention (an examination), a language; in short, beyond that grid of intelligibility—the fundamental codes of a culture—inhabiting practices: for Heidegger, being is not itself an entity—it is what makes entities show-up as being the entities that they are. These practices are governed by what Foucault called ‘the fundamental codes of a culture,’ which has connotations of the understanding of being of that being for which being is an issue for it: namely, Da-sein (“there-being”).

This is made clearer in the passage that follows: ‘[t]he fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices—establish, from the start, for every man, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and in which he will find himself’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, emphasis added, modified). Since the notion of the “fundamental codes of a culture” is an expression used exclusively in The Order of Things (see Webb 2005a, 2013), and since its place in the broader Foucaultian lexis is somewhat marginal, I take “fundamental” here to mean “basic” [fondamentaux], as in basis or base, as in the foundation or base of a building, but also as in the primary principle or groundwork of a system: that is to say, I take it to mean “primordial”. Similarly, I take “code” not to mean something like intentional programming but, rather, to mean that which unconsciously, pre-reflectively, and/or pre-conceptually governs practices: “code” understood as organising principle; that is, as the pre-ontological understanding of being.

Of course, when dealing with the work of Foucault, “fundamental” or “primordial” cannot mean “origin” or “original” (for a critique of the metaphysics of origin see Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Foucault 1998: 369-391) but, rather, the ground-work of that which sets something on its way: the arkhé, that is the prefix of archaeology. Here, arkhé is taken as a polysemic term embodying a multiplicity of meanings: from the most concrete: ‘the arche of a plant lies in the soil from which it is nourished’; to the concrete: ‘in the sense of birth or generation’; to the more general: ‘“foundation” or “ground,” whatever institutes and sustain the site for a thing’s existence’; to the most general and abstract sense of “grounding”: ‘the element or principle of a thing, which although undemonstrable and intangible in itself, provides the conditions of the possibility of that thing’ (see Sandywell 1996: 142ff.). Interestingly enough, arkhé has a further set of connotations, which relates it to ‘rule, governance, or political direction’ (ibid.: 144ff.). We will return to this understanding of the arkhé of a thing and its relation to our understanding of archaeology in Part Four of the thesis.

Since, as Dreyfus (1991: 16) notes, for Heidegger our everyday practices—way of life/form of existence—embody an ontology, it is not absurd to see in these “fundamental codes” or the apparently neutral surface of the table-top, a
correlate of what Heidegger called an understanding of being. Stated otherwise, the table-top itself can be correlated to what Heidegger called “the clearing” (the specific understanding of being embodied in practices); that is, that “illuminated” space in which what shows-up shows-up as “something”, as being what it is; or, more specifically, as being this “thing” that it is and not something else (on this “as-structure”, see, Harman 2002: 68ff.). This ties in with Dreyfus’s observation that ‘Heidegger calls the unnoticed way that the clearing governs activity, its “unobtrusive governance”’ (Dreyfus 1991: 191; the reference is to Heidegger 1993: 236).

Given that the notion of “fundamental codes” does not sit well with either Heidegger’s conceptualization of the understanding of being (there is no codification here, as such) or with Foucault’s later work, and given that the influences upon Foucault’s thought were many and varied (I am thinking specifically of Cavaillès, Bachelard, and Canguilhem here; see, e.g. Gutting 1989; Kusch 1991; Thompson 2008; Webb 2005a, 2013), it is possible to see in this notion of “the fundamental codes of a culture” a composite grid of intelligibility intended to invoke something like the ungrounded ground that grounds what is (or what comes to be). The ‘important point’ about “groundless grounds”, as Braver (2012) puts it in his text on Wittgenstein and Heidegger, ‘is that both terms are in effect: while the grounds of all thinking lack the kind of foundation philosophers have long dreamt of, and thus are groundless, they still function as grounds for finite creatures like us’ (ibid.: 11). From our Foucaultian perspective, the groundless grounds that ground are historically constituted; that is to say, they are neither located in transcendental conditions nor empirical causes but are, nonetheless, constituted in, by, and through historical processes.

— Empirical Orders

The differentiation Heidegger makes between being and beings is, anyway, not so original. If taken as the ground (being) and what is grounded (beings), then there are parallels or analogies between this differentiation and other dualisms such as the Kantian founding/founded, the Marxist base/superstructure, the Freudian unconscious/conscious, the structuralist langue/parole, or the Gestalt ground/figure, and so on. In each of these pairs, the former term is what constitutes the latter or the latter terms are specific expressions of the former, and so forth. What I think is original in Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference is not so much the differentiation itself, but the working out of that differentiation and the analytic that this makes possible. Specifically, what I take to be the basic insight here is the way in which Heidegger’s working out of the ontological difference discloses three modalities of differentiation between the being of entities and the entities that have these ways of being: availableness/the available, unavailability/the unavailable, and occurringness/the merely occurring. For Heidegger, the being of those entities that are to-hand—whether available or
unavailable—is ontological, whereas the being of those entities that are merely at-hand is ontical. I take the way in which entities are—ontological, ontical; to-hand or merely at-hand—to be historically, discursively, and practically constituted; that is to say, they are the “effect” of specific historical, discursive, and practical understandings of being (plural).

It is through the clearing, then, that what shows-up shows-up as what matters, understood in both senses of this term: that which materialises (matter), and that which is cared about, in one way or another (that with which we are concerned or that which becomes a point of concern). In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ Heidegger has this to say about the clearing, ‘[i]n the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings. This open centre is therefore not surrounded by what is; rather, the lighting centre itself encircles all that is...That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out within what is lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees’ (Heidegger 2001: 51-52). Thus, the clearing is that space in which we dwell in which what shows-up for us, shows-up as being this being that it is. Moreover, what shows-up at this “level” (and by “level” here, I mean level of involvement and/or absorption) shows up as being available or ready-to-hand: the aforecited “empirical orders”. Furthermore, it is possible to correlate the ways in which these fundamental codes govern our everyday practices—its “unobtrusive governance” or that which “establish for every man the empirical orders (availableness or readiness-to-hand) with which he will be dealing”—with what Heidegger referred to as our ‘pre-ontological’ understanding of being (Heidegger 1962: 32).

The “fundamental codes of a culture give to every man the empirical orders with which he will be dealing,” and govern those empirical orders, because every man already has an implicit, pre-conceptual (i.e., sub-individual, pre-subjective) understanding of what these fundamental codes are; in other words, every man (e.g. Da-sein) has a pre-ontological understanding of being. It is this pre-ontological understanding of “what is” that “governs” the different ways in which “we” comport “ourselves” towards “beings”: that is to say, towards such entities as language, perception, exchanges, techniques, values, practices, and so forth. It should be noted here that “pre-ontological” does not denote before or prior to the ontological—i.e. in temporal succession—but, rather, connotes our dim or implicit awareness of “what is” prior to this awareness being disclosed or made explicit by ontology—or, as we shall see, by way of a problem. In Being and Time, Heidegger states that, ‘[h]ere “Being-ontological” is not yet tantamount to “developing an ontology”. So, if we should reserve the term “ontology” for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein’s “Being-ontological” is to be
designated as something “pre-ontological”. It does not signify simply “being-ontical”, however, but rather “being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being” (ibid., my italics; see also Dreyfus 1991: 16ff.).

— Empirical Sciences

The fundamental codes (ontology) that govern the empirical orders (the ontological: availability), however, are only half the story; the other half of the story are those explanations that attempt to explain as explicitly and as exactly as possible the different schemas of order (the ontical): ‘[a]l...the other extremity of thought, there are the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what principle can account for it, and why this particular order has been established and not some other’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii). Scientific theories, philosophical interpretations, universal laws, principles, a particular order; these can be read as correlates of what Heidegger called the ontic: pure occurrence that deals with entities that are merely occurrent: that is, “objects” that are “things” ‘abstracted from their practical context’ and understood ‘as existing independently of us and our understanding’ (Carman 2003: 122, 136). That is to say, the (scientific) knowledge (connaissance) concerning the nature, properties, qualities, characteristics, and so forth, of specific extant beings or of occurrent entities as such: their size and shape, the materials from which they are made, their composition and structure, their weight and density, their colour and texture, and so on, and so forth.

Thus, what Foucault presents in the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things can be understood in terms of, or by reading it through and in relation to, what Heidegger called “the ontological difference” (Heidegger 1982; see also Han 2002: 54ff.). That is to say, it can be rendered intelligible by way of the differentiation disclosed by the ontological difference between ontology (fundamental codes), the ontological (availability: empirical orders), and the merely ontic (occurrence: scientific theories, philosophical reflections, and so forth).

The relationship between the fundamental codes of a culture that are both the background and support of empirical orders of things on the one hand, and the scientific theories and philosophical reflection that explain order on the other, is that the former (ontology, pre-ontological) are the condition of possibility not only of the empirical orders (the ontological) but also of the scientific theories and philosophical interpretations (the ontic). As Heidegger notes, ‘[t]he ontological difference says: [a] being is always characterized by a specific constitution of being’ (Heidegger 1982: 78). As Stuart Elden puts this, ‘ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, it is the knowledge of the sciences, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, [it is] the a priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences’ (Elden 2001: 9). But the a
priori here are not a synthetic *a priori* or *a priori* structures of consciousness; rather, they are material conditions of existence: historical *a priori* means the historical material conditions of possibility, and thus of existence, of empirical knowledge. On this view, ontic knowledge is formed on the basis (is founded in or grounded in) the ontological, which is itself grounded in the material conditions of existence of a set of practices that embody a particular understanding of being: *ontological knowledge* is the *condition of possibility of ontic knowledge*. Foucault discusses something along these lines in *The Birth of the Clinic* in which, for example, the transformations in the ontical forms of the medical gaze (*le regard médical*) are based upon shifts at a “deeper” level; that is, in transformations not only in medical practices but also in social, economic, and political practices, and thus in the ontology these practices embody: Foucault talks, for instance, of a ‘*formal* reorganization, *in depth*...that made clinical experience possible’ (Foucault 1973: xiv).

—— *“Median Region”*

Nevertheless, Foucault’s project was not Heidegger’s project. Heidegger had a single goal: the relentless, tireless, and tenacious pursuit of the “meaning of being” which he undertook, at least in his later works, through a history of being (for a different reading of the relationship between *The Order of Things* and the work of Heidegger, see Schwartz 2003). Ultimately, Foucault’s studies were not phenomenological but archaeologico-genealogical: his project, if we can use this term in relation to his work, was neither an existential analytic of *Da-sein*, nor was it a more general history of the meaning of being; it was, rather, a historical ontology of ourselves and a critical history of thought: is asks “How did the history of our thought make us what we are?”. We have to be clear about the object of Foucault’s historical studies before we can ask the question of the tools he used to undertake such studies, and whether or not it is possible to manufacture our own tools for undertaking our own studies of our contemporary. One thing that should be noted here, is the way in which Foucault’s studies avoided any recourse to “the being of man”, where “man” is understood, by way of the analytic of finitude, as an empirico-transcendental doublet (Foucault 1970: Part II; see also Thompson 2008; Webb 2005a, 2005b, 2013).

What most theories, researches, studies, ethnographies, phenomenologies, and so forth, do is to formulate ways and means of understanding who and what we are, what we do, and/or the world in which we live. In such studies, “man” is not only the objects of knowledge; “s/he” is also the subject who knows (Foucault 1970: 312). What Foucault did was something rather different. As noted, what is expressed there is a way of studying the different and differential ways in which, in the West, human beings have attempted to study or have studied human beings. That is to say, Foucault questioned the historicity of the different ways in
which “we” have questioned and come to understand “ourselves”, and what
were the effects of this historical questioning in, on, and upon our present. More
specifically, Foucault did not study consciousness (either structured internally or
structured by external conditions), meaning, or what is a thinking being (Was ist
der Mensch?), but attempted to study the thought and rationality inhabiting
practices (see Foucault 1997: 199-205).

When Foucault details material and practical conditions, these are not
empirical causes (conditions of existence) that structure behaviour (social
relations) or ideas (consciousness); they are the concrete and historical a priori of
thought (Foucault 1985: 11ff). Hence, there is recourse to neither “philosophical
anthropology” (‘a general theory of the human being’) nor “social history”
(‘economic and social context’) but, rather, to the domain of thought and its
history (ibid.: 200; see also 1998: 459-463). As Foucault put this in a discussion
following the lecture on ‘The Culture of the Self’ at Berkeley in 1983, his problem,
‘is not the history of behaviour, the pattern of behaviour, the rules of
behaviour…[and so forth]…it is not a problem of social history, it is a problem of
thought’ (Foucault 1983b). This is a subtle yet fundamental distinction. As noted,
it is why Foucault turned to Bentham (1995 [1787]) and not Howard (1780, 1791)
in Discipline and Punish (see the discussion on page 10 above). Foucault did not
come up with a winning formula for posing the question “what is it to be
human?” Rather, the aim or object of Foucault’s archaeo-genealogical studies was
‘to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings
are made subjects,’ and his work ‘dealt with three modes of objectification that
transform human beings into subjects’ (Foucault 2001d: 326). The first studied the
human sciences and moved in the direction of the epistêmê; the second and third
studied power and self respectively and moved in the direction of tekhnê (we
shall elaborate on epistêmê and tekhnê and the distinction between them in Part
Four of the study).

Perhaps this is why there is no “ontology”, as such, in Foucault’s writings
(see, e.g. Han 2002; the original title of Han’s book, L’Ontologie manquée de Michel
Foucault, translates as something like “The Missing—Lacking or Failed—
Ontology of Michel Foucault”). By this, I mean that Foucault was not trying to
disclose who we are or what the world is; rather, the questions he poses concerns
“what our present is”, and how it, and thus ourselves, became what it is or what
we are. This is why there is no theory of knowledge (connaissance) in Foucault’s
writing but, rather, an archaeology of knowledge (savoir); it is also why there is
not a theory of power (puissance) in Foucault’s studies but, rather, an analytics of
relations of power (rapport de pouvoir); it is why, moreover, there is no theory of
the subject (consciousness) in Foucault’s writing but, rather, a questioning of
ethical practices and relation to self (rapport à soi). In short, there is no theory per
se in Foucault; there are only “questions of method” and a general organising
framework. Stated otherwise, there is an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) or
critical history of thought on the one hand and, on the other hand, a genealogy of

88
the subject or a history of the present and a historical ontology of ourselves. Foucault’s historical studies were, as he put it, “genealogical in their finality (“What are we to-day?”) and archaeological in their method (“How did the history of our thought make us what we are?”)” (see Foucault 1997: 315ff.; 1983a). If we are to remake or reconfigure the finality (finalité) and method of Foucault’s historical studies into the aim and method for doing contemporary studies of our contemporary, then we will have to rethink and reconfigure archaeology and genealogy respectively.

Since Foucault’s archaeological studies focused primarily upon the human sciences, and since, as we have noted, such sciences are ontical, then it would seem that Foucault’s project was not ontology, fundamental or otherwise, after all, but was, rather, a study of the ontic sciences. However, this is not exactly correct either; whilst Foucault certainly studied ontic knowledge, he studied their formation, transformation, and mutation and, consequently, he did not remain at this level. What Foucault investigated, to the extent that this can be discerned from the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things, was something like the space that opens up between the ontological (empirical orders or the availability) and the ontic (scientific theories or the merely occurrent). This space is described in the ‘Preface’ in the following way: ‘between these two regions [ontological empirical orders and ontic scientific theories], so distant from one another, lies a domain which, even though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is nonetheless fundamental: it is more confused, more obscure, and probably less easy to analyse’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, my italics, my gloss in brackets). And the reason for focusing upon this intermediary yet fundamental domain—the in-between of the empirical orders and scientific knowledge (connaissance)—even if this is less easy to analyse, is that ‘[i]t is here that a culture, imperceptibly deviating from the empirical orders (ontological) prescribed for it by its primary codes (ontology), instituting an initial separation from them, causes them to lose their original transparency, ceases to let itself be traversed by them, loses its fondness for their immediate and invisible powers, [and] frees itself sufficiently to notice that these orders may not be the only or the best possible ones’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, modified).

When a culture is given this discrepancy between the primary codes and its empirical order, when there is a disjuncture between that which governs and what is governed, such a culture then ‘finds itself faced with the brut fact that there is, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things that are in themselves orderable, that belong to a certain mute order; in short, [it finds itself faced with the fact] that there is order [bref qu’il y a de l’ordre]’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii, modified). In short, that is, it finds itself given order. However, when Foucault states that, through this initial separation, disjunction, and loss of transparency a culture finds itself faced with the fact that there is order, we should not read into this that a culture finds a transhistorical, universal, or unchangeable, order: “Being” (with a Capital “B”). Rather, we should read this as saying that a culture discovers that the codes governing the empirical orders given to it (the pre-
ontological) and the theories that explain them (the ontic) were based upon a prior ordering of things (a particular historical understanding of being) and that this order is neither the only possible form of order nor necessarily the best one. In short, and in this very process, the culture then comes upon another order; that is, “this culture then finds itself faced with the stark fact that there is order:” which is to say, it is given order.

This is confirmed when the text continues ‘[a]s though emancipating itself to some extent from its linguistic, perceptual, and practical grids [i.e. those empirical orders governed by the fundamental codes], the culture superimposed on them [the empirical orders] another kind of grid which neutralized them, which by this superimposition both revealed and excluded them at the same time, so that the culture, by this very process, came face to face with order in its primary state’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii). That is to say, in those barely noticeable shifts in which “a culture imperceptibly deviates from the empirical orders prescribed for it by its primary codes,” that culture’s pre-ontological understanding of what is, and the ontic knowledge built upon this ontology, is thrown into relief or revealed, and, in this very process, is excluded by way of the emergence of a new order of things. As Foucault states, “[i]t is in the name of this order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the basis of this order, regarded as a positive ground, that general theories as to the ordering of things and the interpretations it calls for will be built (Foucault 2002a: xxii, modified). It is on the basis of being given a new understanding of being (there is order: ontological knowledge) that new scientific theories and philosophical interpretations (ontical knowledge) will be formed.

The space that opens up when a culture deviates from the empirical orders given to it by the primary codes thus seems to disrupt not only those primary codes and the empirical orders they govern, but also the scientific reflections on order itself that they make possible. Foucault refers to this space as a “median region” (région «médiane»): ‘between the already “encoded” gaze and reflexive knowledge [connaissance] there is a median region that sets free order in its very being [...] This “median” region..., in so far as it manifests the modes of being of order, can be given [give itself] as the most fundamental...[I]n every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the naked [bare] experience of order and of its modes of being’ (Foucault 2002a: xxii-xxiii, modified, my italics). This “median” region, as a domain situated between the empirical orders governed by the basic codes of a culture and reflexive knowledge (connaissance), is, as noted above, intermediary. This means that it not only sits between the empirical and knowledge (connaissance) but also that it acts or mediates between them and, in that very mediation, it “manifests the mode of being of order”; and this is why, for Foucault, it is fundamental. As Foucault notes, The Order of Things employed a form of analysis that attempted ‘to rediscover on what basis knowledge
[connaissance] and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge [savoir] was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards’ (Foucault 2002a: xxiii).

The “middle” or “median region” then is neither the ontological (the empirical orders: positivity) nor the ontical sciences (empirical knowledge: connaissance); rather, it is that space in which our pre-ontological understanding of what is loses its transparency, poses problems, comes to be questioned, and becomes transformed. In short, what an analysis of this “median region” examines is what Foucault referred to as historical mutations in knowledge (savoir). History of Madness, for example, examined the ‘rapid mutation which, in the space of a few years, brought to the surface of the European world a new knowledge and new treatments for madness’ (Foucault 2006a: 460, emphasis added). The Birth of the Clinic analyses ‘an essential mutation in medical knowledge’ that took place ‘at that turning point in the eighteenth century’ (Foucault 1973: xviii, emphasis added, see also xi, xv, 51). The Order of Things examines ‘the mutation that occurred in the entire Western episteme towards the end of the eighteenth century’ (Foucault 2002a: 224, emphasis added). Discipline and Punish examines ‘the mutation of the punitive system [that took place] at the threshold of the contemporary period’ (Foucault 1977a: 139, emphasis added). And The Will to Knowledge, as a final example, examines the ‘mutation [that] took place [concerning ‘the technology of sex’] at the turn of the nineteenth century’ (Foucault 1978: 117, emphasis added).

What each of these studies interrogates, then, are these transformational spaces in which the empirical orders governed by a historically specific cultural table top undergoes a mutation and transmutes and transforms into another table top; thus giving rise to a different set of empirical orders (positivity) and attendant scientific theories (empirical connaissance). Figured by way of the ontological difference, archaeology can be said to questions those historical mutations in knowledge (savoir) that open up when the availableness of a culture (it historically specific understanding of being) losses its transparency, and thus when the ontic knowledge (connaissance) built upon a cultures pre-ontological understanding of “what is” lose their self-evidence, comes to be questioned, and comes to be replaced or supplanted. In short, what Foucault questioned, can be rendered intelligible by noting the difference disclosed by the ontological difference. Accordingly, what Foucault means by the “concrete” (Foucault 2006a, 1973) or “historical a priori” (Foucault 2002a, 1972), is precisely this “middle region” between the ontological (the empirical orders) and the ontic (reflexive knowledge); it is this in-between in which there are mutations and transformations in and of knowledge (savoir). Thus, Han (2002) is right to note that Foucault does not assimilate the fundamental codes of a culture (its ontology) to the historical a priori (its empirical orders or the available) and that he
does indeed distinguish between the two; pace Han, however, this does not equate to some impossible third way (ibid.: 54ff.).

From the above, and bearing in mind that we are not equating but correlating, heuristically, Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference with Foucault’s characterisation of thought, we arrive at the following:

1 – The “basic” or “fundamental codes of a culture” can be correlated with what Heidegger calls (a cultures) understanding of being.

2 – That these “codes” or “understandings” govern the entities that all of us—including scientists and philosophers, etc.—deal with in our daily lives, and, in fact, governs our very orientation or comportment towards what is. That is to say, that what Foucault calls the “empirical” can be correlated to what Heidegger calls availableness/the available, and that both of these are ontological.

3 – That what Foucault terms reflective knowledge—empirical knowledges, scientific theories, philosophical reflections, etc.—can be understood as correlates of what Heidegger characterized as the ontical sciences or ontic knowledge; that is to say, theoretical reflection can be correlated with what Heidegger called extantness/the extant.

4 – That the emergence of a separation between the codes of a culture and its empirical order, or when there is a disjunct between what governs and that which is governed, can be correlated to Heidegger’s reflections upon those moments or events in which on-going activity is disturbed, and of the kinds of entities that we deal with and that have this way of being. That is to say, what Foucault denotes as the “median” region can be correlated to what Heidegger calls unavailability/ the unavailable. Needless to say, it is this fourth point, the “median” region where things breakdown, where on-going practices are interrupted, and thus where what we have been dealing with now stands in our way, that is of primary concern to us here.

For Heidegger, such disruption in which that which was to-hand becomes more and more un-to-hand, or how what is unobtrusive become more and more obtrusive is privative; however, the privative here is merely one way of clarifying what he calls the positive (Heidegger 1982: 309). Privative, here, does not mean private—i.e. as opposed to public—but rather has the sense of being deprived; it has the sense of “the taking away or removal of something”. Hence, privative here does not mean individual or personal but the unobtrusiveness becoming obtrusive (OED). Likewise, positive is not used in the sense where it would be opposed to the negative, but rather denotes when something is “formerly and explicitly laid down or imposed”, “expressed without qualification”, “stated explicitly”, and so forth (OED). Heidegger calls the sciences, which deal not with being but with beings, positive sciences. They are positive because ‘they posit the beings with which they are occupied’ (Hofstadter 1982: xxix, emphasis added); in Foucault’s terminology, they posit ‘a subject and an object’ (Foucault 1998: 459).

What Foucault’s archaeological studies research, then, are the concrete and historical a priori, the positivities, and the discursive formations from which
positive empirical sciences—or other regulative, coordinated, and comprehensible activities—arrive. The positivity of a discursive formation refers to a ‘four-level system which governs a discursive formation’ (Foucault 1998: 321); and this four-fold refers to what The Archaeology designated as (1) the formation of objects (Foucault 1972: 40-49), (2) the formation of enunciative modalities (ibid.: 50-55), (3) the formation of concepts (ibid.: 56-63), and (4) the formation of strategies (ibid.: 64-70); what Foucault earlier called ‘objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options’ (Foucault 1991a: 54, 56-57) or the ‘referential’ (Foucault 1998: 314), the ‘enunciative divergence’ (ibid.: 315), ‘a theoretical network’ (ibid.: 318), and ‘a field of strategic possibilities’ (ibid.: 320). The “positivity” of a discourse is what makes it ‘possible, in a group of statements, to register and describe one referential, one type of enunciative divergence, one theoretical network, [and] one field of strategic possibilities’ (ibid.: 321). When one can identify such a positivity ‘then one can be sure that they belong to what can be called a discursive formation’ (ibid.). In addition, ‘[t]he ensemble thus formulated from the system of positivity, and manifested in the unity of a discursive formation, is what might be called a knowledge [savoir]’ (ibid.). In short, it is the ‘the systems of positivity’ that both ensures the unitary grouping of a discursive formation and allows for its intelligibility. But what gives rise to such positivities, formations, and knowledge; from whence do such formations, transformations, and mutations emerge; and to what do they give rise?

2 Problematizations

There is a term that Foucault’s uses throughout his writings, but which only comes to full significance in his later thought, that aptly captures this “middle” or “median region” that not only The Order of Things but also History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic and also, I think, Discipline and Punish, The Will to Knowledge, and the redefined History of Sexuality sought to address. This term is “problematizations”. We can clarify this situation by way of a second point of departure, this time coming from the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, in which Foucault introduces a number of ‘Modifications’ concerning his earlier work (Foucault 1985: 3-13). Foucault used a number of avatars for the historical a priori, amongst which was what the later Foucault called the “games of truth” (see the ‘Introduction’ to Han 2002; see also O’Farrell 2005: 62ff.). In ‘Modifications’, Foucault states that his concern for many years has been an analysis of the “games of truth”, and he characterizes such an analysis as analyzing ‘the games of truth and error through which being constitutes itself historically [l’être se constitue historiquement] as experience; that is to say, as that which can and must be thought’ (Foucault 1985: 6-7, modified, my italics). Somewhat later in ‘Modifications’, Foucault goes on to state that the target of such analyses was ‘not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies,” but the problematizations through which being gives itself [l’être se donne] as that which can and must be thought and the practices from which they are formed’
(Foucault 1985: 11, modified, problematizations and practices are italicised in the original, the other italics are mine; see also Dean 1996: 214-215).

From this and the preceding citation, we can paraphrase Foucault’s statements so that they now read that his analyses are of the specific ways in which “being constitutes itself” historically as that which can and must be thought” by way of “the problematizations through which being gives itself as that which can and must be thought”. Nevertheless, despite the obvious Heideggerian overtones of these passages, and of my paraphrasing of them, Foucault’s reference to “being” is not exactly the same as Heidegger’s being or, at any rate, it is used in a much more restrictive or delimited sense. For Heidegger, being refers to the being of entities per se; whereas, for Foucault, being refers not to the being of beings in general, but to those being for which being, and especially its own being, is an issue for it; namely, human beings or Da-sein: “[f]or Heidegger, it was through an increasing obsession with techne as the only way to arrive at an understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with Being. Let’s turn the question around and ask which techniques and practices constitute the Western concept of the subject’ (Foucault 2007a: 152; see also Dreyfus 2003: 30ff.). Stated otherwise, it refers to the historical understanding of human “being” that is constitutive of human “beings”, which is itself constitutive of the understanding of human beings as “subjects” and “objects”. Earlier in this same ‘Introduction’, for example, Foucault states that ‘the proper task of a history of thought’ is to ‘define the conditions in which human beings “problematisen” what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live’ (Foucault 1985: 10): specifically, they problematize the human being of human beings. Similarly, in a text written under the pseudonym “Maurice Florence”, Foucault characterizes the archaeological study of knowledge (savoir) as only dealing with those “games of truth” ‘in which the subject itself is posited as an object of possible knowledge [savoir]’ (Foucault 1998: 460, modified). We shall return to the significance of the formation of objects and the formation of subjects (enunciative modalities) to the archaeological research of savoir, and thus to a history of thought, below.

Returning to the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault situates the analyses of forms of problematizations within the domain of archaeological research, whilst genealogy addresses itself to the practices from which forms of problematizations are formed, modified, and transformed: ‘The archaeological dimension of the analysis is used to analyze the very forms of problematization; its genealogical dimension, their formation from practices and their modifications’ (Foucault 1985: 11-12, modified). It is unclear whether the last “their”, the one pertaining to modifications, is pointing to the practices from which forms of problematizations are formed or to the forms of problematizations themselves, or to both. The published English translation (‘The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to analyse the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyse their formation out of the practices and the modification undergone by the latter’, ibid.) makes it
seem as if genealogy analyses the formation of forms of problematization out of practices and of how such forms of problematization modify the practices from which they were formed (which would then have the appearance of something like a dialectic). My more literal translation suggests that genealogy analyses the formation of forms of problematization from practices and the modifications of both forms of problematization and the practices from which they were formed. On this view, what genealogy analyses is not just the modification of practices but also the modifications of forms of problematizations in practice. The difference is subtle, I admit; whereas the published English translation places the emphasis upon the modification of practices, my revised translation places the emphasis upon the modification of forms of problematizations in practices; that is, on the synchronous transformations (horizontally within an epistemic and technical matrix: “torture” or “punishment” or “discipline”) and diachronous mutations (vertically from one epistemic and technical matrix to another: from torture to punishment to discipline, etc.) in knowledge (savoir).

The paragraph that immediately follows the above citation is equally vague on this point: ‘[t]here was the problematization of madness and illness arising out of social and medical practices, and defining a certain pattern of “normalization;” a problematization of life, language, and labor in discursive practices that conformed to certain “epistemic” rules;…a problematization of crime and criminal behavior emerging from certain punitive practices conforming to a “disciplinary” model; and a problematization of]...sexual activity and sexual pleasures...through practices of the self, bringing into play the criteria of an “aesthetics of existence”’ (Foucault 1985: 12). Note that the chronology of these examples is the same as Foucault’s book length studies: History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, Discipline and Punish, and The History of Sexuality series. Note too, how we have a repetition of provenance and emergence in that certain forms of problematization are formed from, or arise out of, specific sets of practices; but whether normalisation, epistemic rules, a disciplinary model, aesthetics of existence, and so forth, refer to the modification of practices, the modification of problematizations, or both of these, remains less clear. What we can say is that forms of problematization are formed from practices, and since practices embody an ontology (being constitutes itself historically by giving itself to be thought), problematizations cannot be identified with or be correlates of this ontology. Perhaps we can also say that normalisation, epistemic rules, a disciplinary model, aesthetics of existence, and so on, are correlates of ontic knowledge (i.e. connaissance); which would tie into Foucault’s statement concerning doing a genealogy of connaissance.

This would seem to be the expression of an earlier version of the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure (‘Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume Two’) in which Foucault states that the analyses of experience, and in this instance the experience of sexuality, analyses ‘the correlation of a domain of knowledge [savoir], a type of normativity, and a mode of relation to the self; it
means trying to decipher how, in Western societies, a complex experience is constituted from and around certain forms of behavior: an experience that conjoins a field of knowledge [connaissance]..., a collection of rules..., and a mode of relation between the individual and himself (Foucault 1997: 200). Note here that the “domain of knowledge (savoir), “type of normativity (pouvoir),” and “relation to self (rapport à soi)” are all situated at the same level, that is, at the level of savoir; whilst the “field of knowledge (connaissance),” the “collection of rules (domination),” and the “relation between the individual and himself (consciousness of oneself and others)” are, likewise, situated at the same level, only now it is at the level of connaissance. Note too, that the thrust of the paragraph is that the former “axes” are the condition of possibility of the latter. This would seem to confirm our hypothesis that epistemic rules, normalisation, aesthetics of existence, and so forth, are ontical. On this view, forms of problematizations occupy that same “middle region” between the ontological (i.e., empirical orders) and the ontic (i.e., theoretical reflections on order) discussed in The Order of Things. What is also clear from the above passage is that archaeology deals with or analyses these forms of problematization, and that this analysis addresses those “events” in which there is or has been an “effective problematization by thought”. Thus, we have archaeology, problematization, and thought.

A number of questions remain to be addressed before we go into more detail about the level of archaeological research, a history of thought, and problematizations. Firstly, there is the question concerning Foucault’s differentiation between savoir and connaissance and of how this differentiation is relatable to the ontological difference. Secondly, there is the question concerning the formation of objects and the formation of subjects, and their relation to an archaeology of savoir or a (critical) history of (systems of) thought or a materialist history of rationality. Lastly, there is the question of the relation of savoir/connaissance and subject/object to problematizations, thought, and its history.

— Savoir/Connaissance

The difference and differentiation between savoir and connaissance can be rendered intelligible by way of a passage in which Foucault attempts to clarify the work that archaeology undertakes. Firstly, he states that this term, archaeology, ‘designates not exactly a discipline but a domain of research’ (Foucault 1998: 261). He then clarifies this domain by stating that ‘in a society, different bodies of learning [les connaissances], philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices, and police activities, mores—all refer to a certain implicit knowledge [savoir] special to this society’; that ‘[t]his knowledge [savoir] is profoundly different from the bodies of learning [des connaissances] that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories,
and religious justifications, but...is what makes possible at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice; and that it is ‘this knowledge [savoir] that [Foucault] wanted to investigate, as the condition of possibility of knowledge [connaissance], of institutions, of practices’ (ibid.: 261-262). The conceptual and analytical distinction that Foucault draws between savoir and connaissance, then, would seem to be fundamental not only to his researches, but also to our own attempt to get a handle on archaeology, problematizations, and thought (and thus on relations of power or governmentality). However, as is so often the case with Foucault’s technical termes d’art, there is little or no sustained discussion of this differentiation, not even in The Archaeology.

In his ‘Introduction’ to the second volume of Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Faubion (1998) states that Foucault’s use of savoir and connaissance, although they ‘take on technical nuances of their own,’ are never ‘at great variance with ordinary French’ (Faubion 1998: xxviii, cf. Sheridan Smith’s comments cited below). ‘Savoir,’ Faubion notes, ‘is at once a verbal and a nominal form—“to know” as well as “knowledge”’ (Faubion 1998: xxviii). He goes on to note that its general sense is related to such English expressions as “awareness”, “cognisance”, and especially “savvy”. Connaissance is a noun, and has the verbal form of connaître; it corresponds to such English terms as knowledge (learning), acquaintance (familiarity with), and also cognition and consciousness. Faubion suggests that for Foucault, savoir refers not to things known but, rather, to ‘things to be known, one way or another, with less or greater rigor from one instance to the next’ (Faubion 1998: xxix, emphasis added). Whereas connaissance, in its technical usage, ‘consistently evokes modes of knowledge tied to highly developed apparatuses of justification and mode of competence supported by well-crystallised apparatuses of “background training”’; here, Faubion notes, ‘connaissance always has its closest affinities with science’ (Faubion 1998: xxix).

Sheridan Smith, the translator of The Archaeology, offers the following slightly different description of Foucault’s employment of these terms: ‘Connaissance refers...to a particular corpus of knowledge, a particular discipline – biology or economics, for example. Savoir, which is usually defined as knowledge in general, the totality of connaissances, is used by Foucault in an underlying, rather than an overall, way (Sheridan Smith, cited in Foucault 1972: 15n2, my italics). Sheridan Smith then presents Foucault’s own clarification regarding his usage of these terms (presumably given by Foucault to Sheridan Smith when he was translating the book): ‘By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated’ (Foucault 1972: 15n2). Note that savoir refers to the necessary conditions for subject (“enunciative modality”, in the language of The Archaeology) and object to be given to connaissance; in other words, savoir already refers in some way to subjects and objects. However, and taking into consideration the above
discussion of this term, it refers not just to subject and object but, rather, to objects to be known (that is, to their formation), and to the formation of subjects capable of knowing such objects. This point is made clearer in the only sustained discussion that I have been able to find, in English translation, regarding the different ways in which Foucault employs savoir and connaissance: this comes from an interview with Trombadori given in 1978 (Foucault 2001d: 239-297).

In this interview, Foucault states that ‘I use the word “savoir” while drawing a distinction between it and the word “connaissance”. I see “savoir” as a process by which the subject undergoes a modification through the very things that one knows [connaître] or, rather, in the course of the work that one does in order to know [connaître]. It is what enables one both to modify the subject and to construct the object. Connaissance is the work that makes it possible to multiply the knowable objects [les objets connaissables], to manifest their intelligibility, to understand their rationality, while maintaining the fixity of the inquiring subject’ (Foucault 2001d: 256). Foucault goes on to note that the target of archaeological research is ‘precisely a matter of recapturing the construction of a connaissance, that is, of a relation between a fixed subject and a domain of objects, in its historical roots, in this movement of savoir which makes the construction possible’ (ibid.). Now, this work that one does in order to know (connaître), this savoir that is the condition of possibility of connaissance, and which involves the processes of modifying the subject and constructing the object, I argue, is precisely what Foucault called the “work of thought” (Foucault 1997: 118ff.). “Thought”, here, does not denote the act of thinking, mental activity or faculties, the formation and arrangement of ideas in the mind, structures of consciousness, cognition, and the like (which would invoke “a general theory of the human being” and thus imply a “philosophical anthropology”), nor does it donate the structuring of consciousness, and so on, by way of the material conditions of existence (which would invoke the “economic and social context” and imply “social history”), but connotes an “act that posits a subject and an object” (see, e.g. Foucault 1997: 199-205; 1998: 459-463).

It is here that an archaeology of knowledge (savoir) becomes if not synonymous with a critical history of thought or materialist history of rationality then certainly contiguous with it; that is to say, whilst these phrases are not exactly identical, they are very closely allied: ‘[i]f what is meant by thought is the act that posits a subject and an object, along with their various possible relations, a critical history of thought would be an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations constitute a possible knowledge [savoir]’ (Foucault 1998: 459, emphases added). Note that thought is an act that posits a subject and an object and the relation between them, that a critical history of thought is an analysis of the conditions in which such an act of positing a subject and an object and the relations between them is actionable, and that the relations thus posited constitute knowledge (savoir): “savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or
that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated”. Note too, that what constitutes a possible knowledge (savoir) is not just the positing of a subject and an object, but specifically the posing of a relation between them.

Elden (2001) has suggested that there is a parallel between the difference established by Foucault between savoir and connaissance, and the distinction Heidegger makes between ontological and ontic knowledge (ibid.: 99). In making this parallel, Elden suggests that ‘[f]or Heidegger, the question of being is an ontological question, which aims “at ascertaining the a priori conditions...for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities” – ontic knowledge’ (ibid.; the citation in double quotation marks is from Heidegger 1962: 31). Thus, ontology is what makes ontic knowledge possible; ontology is the a priori of ontic knowledge. The parallel with Foucault’s differentiation of savoir from connaissance, as Elden formulates this, is as follows: ‘[j]ust as Heidegger read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason not as a theory of ontic knowledge (an epistemology) but rather of ontological knowledge (an ontology), so too must we understand Foucault’s archaeology as a theory of ontological knowledge (savoir) rather than of ontic knowledge (connaissance)’ (ibid.). Elden goes on to note that for Kant and the early Heidegger, questioning the conditions of possibility of knowledge (the a priori of knowledge) was ‘radically ahistorical’, but that for Nietzsche, the later Heidegger, and Foucault, this question becomes fully historical; that is to say, ‘ontology is historicized as a historical ontology’ (ibid.), which questions not the a priori of knowledge but the “concrete and historical a priori” of knowledge. The problem here is that I do not think this reading, whilst compelling, holds for very long; and it does not hold for very long for a very specific reason, which we shall return to in a moment. Preliminarily, we can say that whilst Foucault’s work can be said to be a historical and critical ontology of ourselves, as Elden notes elsewhere, this is not an ontology ‘of “what is?” but one of “how what is is?”’ (Elden 2005: 356). On this view, Foucault’s work is not just concerned with what is made but also, and more specifically, with what went into its making and, to this extent, the target of that work, so it seems to me, is not explicitly ontological but technological.

As we shall discuss in more detail below, strictly speaking, for Heidegger, in our everyday comportment towards entities—that is to say, in our dwelling within a particular set of practices that embody a pre-ontological understanding of being—there are no subjects and objects (see Dreyfus 1991). On the contrary, in such a pre-ontological mode of comportment, there is simply the “there-being” (Da-sein) of a ‘non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand [availableness] of a totality of equipment’ (Heidegger 1962: 107). Now, strictly speaking, Foucault’s archaeology—and, by extension, his critical history of thought—is pre-eminently concerned with examining formations: of “objects”, of “subjects” or what The Archaeology referred to as “enunciative modalities”, but also of
“concepts”/“techniques”, as well as “strategies” (Foucault 1972: 40ff., 50ff., 56ff., 64ff.; 1998: 459ff.; see also Faubion 1998). Moreover, the difference between savoir and connaissance is fundamental to this investigation; therefore, neither can be a correlate of the ontological, as such.

— **Objects, Subjects, and their Formation**

The madman was not a ready-made transhistorical object simply awaiting discovery by the classical age, but nor was this object an invention of the doctors or physicians of the day. Rather, the madman was the product of certain definable material conditions (not only what The Archaeology delineates as “surfaces of emergence”, “authorities of delimitation”, and “grids of specification”, Foucault 1972: 40ff.; but also what Foucault referred to as ‘social, economic, or political processes’, see, e.g. Foucault 1997: 117). The object of archaeology is to retrospectively define and describe these material conditions of existence as the conditions of possibility of such objects, knowledges (savoirs) as the conditions of existence of knowledges (connaissances) and discourses —this is what is meant by “historical a priori”. It is also important to grasp what Foucault does and does not intend by the terms “subject” and “object”, and of the modality of their formation in the formation of a relation between them. For Foucault, the possible relations between a subject and an object or a domain of objects is not a relation between a self-sufficient mind—a self-certain or self-transparent subject (Descartes), a transcendental consciousness (Kant), a transcendental ego (Husserl), etc.—and an independent reality composed of natural objects. Nor is it one of natural ready-made self-standing objects being represented as mental content in the minds of constituent subjects. Rather, for Foucault, the problem of the subject, the object, and the possible relations between them, is three-fold:

1 – The first problem relates to what he calls the subjects ‘mode of “subjectivation”’; that is to say, it examines ‘what the subject must be, to what condition it is subject, what status it must have, what position it must occupy in the real or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge [connaissance]’ (Foucault 1998: 459, modified). This mode of the subjects “subjectivation” is dependent upon the type of knowledge (connaissance) involved.

2 – The second problem concerns what Foucault referred to as the objects ‘mode of objectivation”; it consists in ‘determining under what conditions something can become an object for a possible knowledge [connaissance], how it may have been problematized as an object to be known [connaitre], what procedures of cutting it may have been subjected, the part of itself that is considered pertinent (ibid.: 460, modified), and so forth. The mode of an objects “objectivation” is dependent upon the type of knowledge (savoir) involved.
3 – The third problem relates to the mutual development and interconnection of modes of objectivation and modes of subjectivation in, by, and through which “games of truth” come into being (ibid.). Previously, we noted that, for Foucault, the “games of truth” referred to those “games of truth and error through which being constitutes itself historically as that which can and must be thought”. Foucault now characterizes the “games of truth” ‘not [as] the discovery of true things but the rules according to which what a subject can say, à propos certain things, depends on the question of true and false’ (ibid.). There are clear parallels here between the modes of objectivation and modes of subjectivation and what The Archaeology called “the formation of objects” and “the formation of enunciative modalities”; thus demonstrating the continuity of these archaeological questions.

This series of questions posed by a critical history of thought—‘which are those of an “archaeology of knowledge”’ (ibid. emphasis added)—do not concern ‘just any game of truth’, but, as noted, concern only ‘those in which the subject itself is posited as an object of possible knowledge [savoir]’ (ibid. modified), and thus the principle question being asked of such “games of truth” is ‘[w]hat are the processes of subjectivation and objectivation that make it possible for the subject qua subject to become an object of knowledge [connaissance], as a subject?’ (ibid.). Subjects here are not socially constructed; they are modified or transformed as enunciative (or technical, governmental, or ethical) modalities, that is to say, as subject positions. Nor are the objects that are posited socially constructed; they are constituted as discursive objects of a possible knowledge (connaissance)—or as the target of intervention of a possible relation of power (or as an object of self-reflection). Thus, subject and object are not socially constructed by way of the linguistic fixing of meaning or by social conditions of existence; they are modified and/or constituted in, by, and through the work of thought.

For the sake of argument, let us say that savoir, in its nominal form—knowledge—and perhaps used in a catachrestic and nominalistic way, refers to the ontological; that is to say, to those background sets of practices that embody an understanding of being. In its verbal form, however, savoir refers not to “knowledge” but, rather, to “to know”. On this view, Foucault’s archaeology is primarily addressed to savoir in its verbal form; consequently, we should not really talk of an archaeology of “knowledge” (or a will to “knowledge”) but, rather, of an archaeology of “to know” (or a will “to know”). Thus, neither thought nor savoir, in its verbal form, can be correlates of ontology since, as noted above, there is neither subjects nor objects at this “level” (i.e. at this level of involvement and thus at this level of awareness). However, connaissance does seem to be a correlate of ontic knowledge, as Elden claimed, since at this “level” we do indeed find both fixed subjects and a domain of (occurrent) objects. On this view, both “thought” and “savoir” seem to occupy that “median” and intermediary “region”, that space between the empirical orders governed by the fundamental codes of a culture and that cultures scientific theories or philosophical
interpretations—the difference of the differentiation of being and beings—that The Order of Things designates as the target of archaeological research.

— The Discursive and the Non-discursive

Another element of Foucault’s thought that needs some clarification before we finally come to a discussion of problematizations and an analysis of its forms, is the distinction he is said to make between the discursive and the non-discursive: specifically, that archaeology deals with the former, whilst genealogy deals with the later; and, by extension, that since genealogy refers to the non-discursive, and genealogy analyses power, that the analysis of power must also be an analysis of the non-discursive. This, or so it seems to me, is the standard reading, for example, of the analysis undertaken in Foucault’s so-called genealogical text par excellence: Discipline and Punish. We will discuss the discursivity of Foucault’s analytics of power in later in the thesis; here, I simply want to set the stage for this later discussion.

In a seminar following a lecture that Foucault gave at Berkeley in 1983 on the theme of ‘The Culture of the Self’, Foucault states that the general theme of his research is a ‘history of thought’ (Foucault 1983b). He goes on to state that ‘thought cannot be disassociated, of course, from discourses’ and, more specifically, that ‘we cannot have any access to thought—either to our own present thought, to our…contemporaries thought, or, of course, [to the] thought of people of previous periods,…but through discourses’ (ibid.). He concludes by stating that ‘that is the necessity of the archaeological consideration’ (ibid.). Since the only access that we have to thought, as Foucault conceived this, is through discourse or discourses, the necessary target of a critical history of thought, therefore, must be discourses. So, what of the non-discursive?

In a moment, we will discuss in more detail Foucault’s notion of problematization and its relation to thought and, hence, to the discursive. For now, we can simply note that what gives rise to such problematizations is precisely the realm of the non-discursive or, in any case, of one possible conceptualization of this domain. Problematizations or, rather, specific forms of problematization, emerge out of practices (provenance, the concrete and historical a priori, etc.). Now, these practices can be practiced for a long time before there is what Foucault calls an ‘effective problematization by thought’ (Foucault 1997: 118). What gives rise to such forms of problematizations are ‘social, economic, or political processes’; processes whose ‘only role is that of instigation’ (ibid.: 117). These social, economic, and political processes (e.g. demographic explosion, shift from agriculture to industry, transition from mercantilism to liberalism, etc.), whose only role is that of instigation—that is to say, initiating or activating an effective problematization in, by, and through thought, but not determining the directions such problematizations and their rejoinders will take (ibid.: 118)—are precisely what Foucault meant by non-
discursive practices. *The Order of Things* notwithstanding, all of Foucault’s historical studies—those dealing with knowledge, those dealing with ethics, and, yes, those dealing with power—took these non-discursive processes into account. However, that is only one possible figuration of the non-discursive; the other conceptualization is what we might call the *effects* of thought. Whereas the former conceptualization of the non-discursive looks at the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought—its concrete and historical *a priori*—this latter conceptualization looks at the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made or makes possible. Here, the non-discursive becomes synonymous with the institutional, which, nonetheless, is still, at least in part, discursive (Foucault 1972: 67ff.; 1980: 197ff.). By institution(al), Foucault had in mind ‘[e]verything which functions in a society as a system of constraint and which isn’t an utterance, in short, all the field of the non-discursive social’ (Foucault 1980: 197-198). On this view, genealogy does, indeed, examine the non-discursive conditions of possibility of discourse and the non-discursive conditions that discourse make possible: the institutional; however, and as we shall see, this does not mean that an analytics of the exercising of relations of power focuses exclusively upon non-discursive practices.

The emphasis placed upon the differentiation between the discursive and the non-discursive is, I think, largely a product of secondary commentary, and is the result of comprehending Foucault’s analyses of discourse as being something like a linguistic analysis of language; hence the oft taken-for-granted assumption that the distinction to be drawn between the discursive and the non-discursive is a differentiation between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, between text and context. On the other hand, Foucault himself does not seem to have given such import to this distinction. In discussing his notion of the dispositif, for example, Foucault state that ‘[i]t doesn’t much matter for my notion of the [dispositive] to be able to say that this is discursive and that isn’t. If you take Gabriel’s architectural plan for the Military School together with the actual construction of the school, how is one to say what is discursive and what is institutional? That would only interest me if the building didn’t conform with the plan. But I don’t think it’s very important to be able to make that distinction, given that my problem isn’t a linguistic one’ (ibid.: 198, emphasis added). What Foucault does place emphasis upon, however, are practices *per se*—discursive or not—and the role that they play in instigating the formation of forms of problematizations and their rejoinders and, consequently, of the formation of discourses (see, for example, Foucault’s discussion on thought and practices in Foucault 1997: 199-205). On this view, then, the non-discursive is both multiple and heterogeneous cause and singular effect of the discursive, whereas the discursive itself refers to specific forms of problematizations and their rejoinders that take the form of explicit programmes.
— Forms of Problematization

Let us begin by looking at how Foucault characterizes problematizations, relate and compare this characterisation to the foregoing discussion of the “median region” presented in the ‘Preface’ to The Order of Things, and then see how we can understand this notion of problematization—the “middle region”—and it’s relation to thought by way of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference. We can begin by situating the question concerning problematizations within the project of what Foucault called a history of thought. Foucault presented this in the following way in an interview with Paul Rabinow in 1984 (‘Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations’): ‘[f]or a long time, I have been trying to see if it would be possible to describe the history of thought as distinct both from the history of ideas (by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation) and from the history of mentalities (by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action). It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought—this was what one could call the element of problems or, more exactly, problematizations’ (Foucault 1997: 117). Thus a history of thought—which, as we have noted, is analogous to an archaeology of knowledge (savoir)—proceeds by way of analyses of problematizations; what in the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault referred to as an archaeology of problematizations. What, however, is a problematization?

We have, in fact, already noted this above: it is that space that opens up when a culture, or a specific set of practices with a culture, “imperceptibly deviates from the empirical orders prescribe for it by its primary codes”, “superimposes on the primary codes another kind of grid”, and, on this new basis, “criticise the primary codes and renders them partially invalid”. In other words, a history of thought, undertaken by way of an archaeology of problematizations, ‘tries to analyse the way institutions, practices, habits, and behaviour become a problem for people who behave in specific sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, who engage in certain kinds of practices and who put to work specific kinds of institutions’ (Foucault 2001c: 74). In other words, an analysis of problematizations analyses those historical events in which the “empirical orders with which we deal”, which are governed by the “fundamental codes of a culture”, essentially “breakdown”. It analyses ‘the way an unproblematic field of experience or set of practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar and out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions’ (ibid.). On this view, a ‘history of thought...is the history of the way people begin to take care of something, of the way they became anxious about this or that for example, about madness, about crime, about sex, about themselves, or about truth’ (ibid.). The distinction that Foucault makes between these unquestioned, familiar, silent
practices—the empirical orders and their basis in a fundamental code—and thought itself is revealing. Foucault notes that ‘[w]hat distinguishes thought is that it is something quite different from the set of representations that underlies a certain behavior; it is also something quite different from the domain of attitudes that can determine this behavior. Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals’ (Foucault 1997: 117, emphases added).

Thinking this through the foregoing discussion of the ontological difference, “thought is what allows us to “step back” from our non-thematic circumspective absorption in on-going activity, and to present this on-going activity to ourselves, or to have it presented to us, as an “object of thought”. For these transparent, unquestioned, and familiar on-going activities, activities that we do not see “because they are too much on the surface of things”, to have become an object of and for thought something quite specific has to have taken place: ‘for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it’ (ibid.). It is clear that thought does not refer to what takes place in the silent practices (circumspective absorption towards the available); rather, thought inhabits practices to the extent that those practices have become problematic, when the visible-invisible begins to lose its invisibility; or, rather, thought is both immanent to (and, indeed imminent to), and an effect of, a certain form of problematization.

Stated otherwise, “thought” refers neither to the fundamental codes of a culture (ontology), nor to the empirical orders prescribed by these codes (the ontological), nor, moreover, does it refer to philosophical interpretations or scientific theories, and the like (the ontic), for which the codes act as their condition of possibility. Rather, thought refers to those events in which the empirical orders and the theories or interpretations that explain them, which are governed by the basic codes of a culture (time and place) becomes problematic and are given to (be) thought; that is to say, when there has been an “effective problematization in, by, and through thought”. Thought is the act of “stepping back” in which the previously silent habits—the empirical orders governed by the fundamental codes—are presented to us as “an object of thought”. This stepping back, however, is not a conscious stepping back into disinterestedness and abstraction—it is more concrete that this. Rather, the “step back” is simply the act of stepping back from doing what was being done or, more specifically, a stepping back from doing what was being done in the specific way in which it was being done because something has intervened or disrupted such on-going activity, because something now stands in our way; something that is conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive.
There are clear parallels or correlates (but not identity or isomorphism) here, in Foucault’s conceptualization of the way in which familiar and unquestioned practices become a problem, with Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference, as discussed above. More specifically, there are parallels with Heidegger’s descriptions of the ways in which that difference discloses the movement by which the available (to-hand)—by becoming conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinate—becomes what Heidegger calls the unavailable (un-to-hand) and, ultimately, becomes the merely extant (at-hand). Now, strictly speaking, the ontological difference does not designate the difference between the ontological and the ontic; or, rather, it does designate this difference but it designates it in a very specific way. What the ontological difference states is the difference between “being” and “beings”, or between the ground and what is grounded, or between the clearing and what shows-up in the clearing, and so forth. We can better understand the differentiation made by the ontological difference by way of what, in Being and Time, Heidegger calls Zuhanden and Zuhandenheit (Heidegger 1962: 98) on the one hand, and Vorhanden and Vorhandenheit on the other (ibid.: 48, see also 67ff., 91ff.). Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit refer to the specific mode of being of entities, and the entities that have these specific ways of being are referred to as Zuhanden (to-hand) and Vorhanden (at-hand). For Dryfus, these two sets of terms specifically designate two particular ways of non-human being; ‘[t]here are two basic ways of being. Being-human, which Heidegger calls Dasein, and nonhuman being. The latter divides into two categories: Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit’ (Dryfus 1991: xi).

For Harman, however, these two sets of terms refer to two different modes of being of any entity whatsoever, including the being of human beings (Harman 2002: 9). Foucault’s position, as conceptualized here, would seem to be closer to Harman’s than it is to Dryfus’s since he is concerned with the different ways in which human being, in the figure of “man”, has been constituted as an object for knowledge (objet pour un savoir) and as a subject that knows (sujet qui connaît) in the formation of a domain of knowledge (connaissance) (Foucault 2002a: 340; 1966: 247). What these terms—Zuhanden(heit), Vorhanden(heit)—point to are specific human orientations or modes of comportment towards entities; that is to say, towards what shows-up in the clearing. And the relation to the ontological difference is that the former sets of terms—availableness/available—pertain to the ontological (Zuhanden(heit)); whilst the latter—extantness/extant—denote the merely ontic (Vorhanden(heit)). Now, there is a third set of terms, which we will be primarily concerned with here, that occupy a “middle region” between Zuhanden(heit) and Vorhanden(heit): that is to say, “between” the ontological and the ontic—or the difference of the ontological difference. As noted above, this “middle region” denotes a mode of being that Heidegger refers to as Unzuhandenheit (“unavailableness”), and the entities that have this way of being are called Unzuhanden (“unavailable” or “un-to-hand”). As suggested above, this
latter pair of terms seems to have been rather marginal to Heidegger’s broader concerns, and the reading of it presented here is more indebted to Dreyfus’s (1991) reading of Heidegger than it is to Heidegger (1962, 1982) himself.

Heidegger’s starting point is neither conscious theoretical reflection (thinking without doing) nor purely practical activity (doing without thinking) but, rather, ‘our “dealings” in the world and with entities within-the-world’: ‘[t]he kind of dealing which is closest to us...not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of “knowledge”’ (Heidegger 1962: 94, 95). The mode of comportment towards those entities that get taken up, used, produced, and so on, that we encounter in such concernful dealings are what Heidegger calls availableness and the entities that have this mode of being are called available. At this level—i.e. at this level of involved absorption—there are no subjects and objects as such; nor, strictly speaking, are there “human beings” handling or manipulating “things”. As Nietzsche once famously put it, ‘there is no “being”’ [i.e. substantive substratum] behind doing, acting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction imposed on the doing—the doing itself is everything’ (Nietzsche 1996: 29; for a slightly different translation, see Nietzsche 2006: 26). That is to say, there is no substantive constituent subject manipulating self-standing natural objects; rather, there is simply an on-going activity: the there-being or being-there (Da-sein) of a non-thematic circumspектив absorption of an involved doing things with the “stuff” (Zeug: “equipment”) given in order to move towards a specific outcome: Heidegger’s “in-order-to”, “towards-which”, “with-which”, “for-the-sake-of-which”, and so forth (see, e.g. Heidegger 1962: 95-122).

In our average everyday encounters with entities we encounter are not mere “things” but “stuff” (Zeug); that is, “equipment” that can be taken up, manipulated (in the none-pejorative sense of this term), and used to get something done. This stuff is not limited to tools such as hammers, screwdrivers, and wrenches, but refers to anything which can be manipulated and/or of which we can say “it is”: thus not only hammers and nail but also ideas and concepts, mythical figures and fictional characters, institutions and organizations, theories and practices, and so on and so forth. Heidegger calls this stuff “equipment”: ‘[w]e shall call those entities which we encounter in concern “equipment”. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of equipment—namely, its equipmentality’ (ibid.: 97). Now, strictly speaking ‘there “is” no such thing as an equipment’ (ibid.). Rather, equipment is only equipment in relation to other equipment. Since ‘equipment is essentially “something-in-order-to”’ (ibid.) it can only be the equipment that it is in relation to the totality of equipment—its equipmentality—of this “in-order-to”: ‘[e]quipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other
equipment: inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room’ (ibid.). In other words, a piece of equipment is what it is and, in fact, that it is at all, is what it is in terms of its relation to other stuff and in terms of what this stuff is to be used for: ‘[w]hat and how it is this entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its involvement’ (Heidegger 1982: 283).

Both our concern and the entities we manipulate in concern are subordinated to this in-order-to, and the more we are involved in doing what we are doing, in using the things we are using to get done what needs to be done, the more engrossed we become in doing, the more both our practices and the stuff that we use become transparent: ‘[d]ealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the “in-order-to”. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection’ (Heidegger 1962: 98). The entities that we encounter in absorbed circumspection are ‘not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing’ but as entities that are available; that is to say, that are to-hand. Those entities that have the mode of being available, ‘in order to be ready-to-hand,’ must ‘withdraw;’ so too must the practices themselves and, indeed, the practitioner; that is, they become transparent: ‘[t]he ready-to-hand [available] is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand [availableness], it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically’ (ibid.: 99). Heidegger continues by noting that ‘that with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered’ (ibid.). As noted above, in such skillfully, routine, and habitual employment of equipment, or in our non-thematic circumspective absorption toward the available, there are, strictly speaking, neither subjects nor objects; there is merely an ongoing-activity. Rather, it is when such on-going activity is interrupted or disturbed in some way that subjects (thematic consciousness) and objects (the extant or occurant) first begin to show forth and reveal themselves—that is, to emerge. It is through such interruptions in ongoing activity that we take a “step back”, or are called forth to take a step back, from said on-going activity, and to present that activity to ourselves, or to have it present itself to us, as an “object of thought”.

Heidegger describes three way in which such disturbances come about and in which the available progressively becomes more and more unavailable and, in so doing, finally announces the merely occurant or extant. These disturbances are: (1) “conspicuousness” (Auffälligkeit, which could be translated as “peculiarity” or “abnormality”), (2) “obtrusiveness” (Auffringlichkeit, which could be translated as “intrusiveness”), and (3) “obstinacy” (Aufsässigkeit, which could be translated as “insubordination”, “rebelliousness”, or “recalcitrance”) (ibid.: 102-107). As
Heidegger states, ‘[t]he modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand [occurrentness] in what is ready-to-hand [available]’ (ibid.: 104). As Dreyfus formulates this, these ‘three modes of breakdown’ constitute the ‘increasingly serious disturbances in which a conscious subject with self-referential mental states directed towards determinate objects with properties gradually emerge’ (Dreyfus 1991: 71). Stated otherwise, it is through such breakdown, interruption, and possible cessation that what shows-up in the clearing shows-up as a problem to be addressed; it is here too, where we get the formation of objects and the formation of subjects (enunciative and/or technical modalities).

1 – **Conspicuousness:** when entities that have the mode of being available are encountered as unusable, ill-suited to the task at hand, or simply damaged in some way, that equipment has the mode of being something conspicuous in that it shows itself as being something unavailable. Such an encounter, however, is not yet thematic: ‘[w]e discover its [the equipment’s] unusability…not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous’ (Heidegger 1962: 102, my gloss in brackets). Heidegger goes on to state that with such malfunctioning equipment ‘[p]ure presence-at-hand [occurrentness] announces itself…only to withdraw’ in that ‘it is put back in to repair’ (ibid.: 103). The occurrentness of such equipment announces itself, but only temporarily since either the equipment is repaired, or it is replaced, or some other equipment is used. Consequently, the disturbance is short lived, and thus ‘no new stance on the part of Dasein is required’ (Dreyfus 1991: 72).

2 – **Obstinacy:** When equipment is obstinate, there is a move from a mode of deliberate coping—i.e. circumspection—to one of involved deliberation. When equipment is neither broken nor missing but nonetheless stands in the way of our doing what we are doing, that equipment has the mode of being obstinate, since it prevents us from going on with our on-going activity: ‘[a]nything which is un-ready-to-hand [unavailable] in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else. With this obstinacy, the presence-at-hand [occurrentness] of the ready-to-hand [available] makes itself known in a new way as the Being of that which still lies before us and calls for our attending to it’ (Heidegger 1962: 103-104). In this way, what was transparent becomes more explicit; because something stands in the way of on-going activity, we deliberate on how to proceed and engage in reflective planning: ‘[t]he scheme peculiar to [deliberating] is the “if-then;” if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed’ (ibid.: 410; see also Dreyfus 1991: 72). Heidegger calls such long-range planning “envisioning” (ibid.).

3 – **Obtrusiveness:** Equipment is obtrusive when it is missing or not “to-hand”; that is, when it is unavailable or un-to-hand. When equipment is obtrusive
in this way, there is a transition from involved deliberation and its concern to a mode of theoretical reflection and its objects—the extant or occurrent. In other words, we move closer to a substantive constituent subject reflecting upon self-standing independent objects: ‘[t]he more urgently we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand [unavailability], all the more obtrusive does that which is ready-to-hand [available] become—so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand [availability]. It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand [occurrent] and no more’ (ibid.: 103). In such a situation, we either enter a deficient mode of concern in which we just stand and stare at that which is just-occurrent-and-no-more or we take on a new detached mode of comportment towards entities in which we take on a ‘theoretical stance towards things and try to explain their underlying causal properties’ (Dreyfus 1991: 79).

As Dreyfus goes on to note, ‘[o]nly when absorbed, on-going activity is interrupted is there room for such theoretical reflection (ibid.). Theoretical reflection is a mode ‘of knowing...[that]...has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way’ (Heidegger 1962: 94). Dreyfus suggests that Heidegger wants to stress three points concerning theoretical reflection. We can state these three points in the following terms: we move from dealings-with to (1) having-to-deal-with to (2) having-to-think-about-dealing-with to (3) purely thinking-about-that-with-which-we-deal. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think of this in terms of a linear, progressive succession, and for a number of reasons. For Heidegger, it is our dealings-with the available that are the conditions of possibility both for our having-to-deal-with or having-to-think-about-dealing-with the unavailable and our merely thinking-about-that-with-which-we-deal: the occurrent.

Moreover—and going back to Foucault—, for Foucault, it is the median region between the empirical and the theoretical that is not only most fundamental but also intermediary; that is to say, that mediates between these two domains. Thinking of this in terms of formations, transformations, and mutations of knowledge (savoir) – when things break down in the most severe way, when entities becomes totally unavailable, then the very entities with which we are having-to-deal-with, having-to-think-about-dealing-with, or merely thinking-about-that-with-which-we-deal are open to developments, modifications, and transformations; and so too are the “we” who are having-to-deal-with what is “conspicuous”, having-to-think-about-dealing-with what is “obstinate”, or merely thinking-about that which is “obtrusive” in response to an effective problematization in, by, and through thought. For example, in Western society’s dealings-with a certain population whose behaviour has always been viewed, in one way of another, as being problematic has variously dealt with that population in terms of folly, in terms of madness, and in terms of mental illness (Foucault 2006a). However, it is not that these things emerged prior to the practices which subsequently came to deal-with them; rather, a domain of practices emerged for dealing-with this group of individual who behaviour came
to be seen as problematic and only subsequently became thought of as being in error, as being mad, or as being mentally ill: objects, as Veyne notes, are the correlates of practices, and not vice-versa.

Since it is here, in these moments of breakdown, that subject and object emerge or are formed, and since, for Foucault, such formations are the condition of possibility of connaissance or ontic knowledge, we shall call this third mode of being of unavailableness, the entities that have this way of being (the unavailable), and the mode of comportment towards such entities (theoretical reflection) "pre-ontical" (see, e.g., Spivak 1996: 148). The "pre-" here, denoting prior to or, indeed, the a priori of, ontic knowledge (connaissance). The pre-ontical is still something ontological in that the conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy of the unavailable is something still inhabited by the available. However, it is pre-ontical in that it is here that subject (theoretical reflection) and objects (the unavailable that announces the merely occurrent) of knowledge (savoir) are formed, and that are the a priori of the subject and object of knowledge (connaissance) and of a domain of knowledge (connaissance). Hence, pace Elden (2001), savoir does not denote the ontological and connaissance the ontical; rather, we can say that savoir in its nominal form—"knowledge"—can refer to the ontological but that in its verbal form—"to know"—it refers to what I have called the pre-ontical, and that connaissance (domination, consciousness of self) does, indeed, denote the merely ontical. By extension, we can also say that pouvoir refer to this same level as savoir, and thus that it too denotes the pre-ontical (i.e., the concrete and historical a priori or the provenance from which an emergence arrives).

What is significant here is not just that with conspicuousness, obstinacy, and obtrusiveness, the available losses its availableness in being something unavailable, thus announcing the purely occurrent, but also the broader equipmental contexture of what these things were being used for—their equipmentality—is lit-up, as it were; and, as we shall see, in certain events modified and/or transformed: '[w]hen equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the "in-order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. But when an assignment has been disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose—then the assignment becomes explicit' (Heidegger 1962: 105, second emphasis added). In other words, with the announcement of the occurrent in the breakdown of on-going activity concerned with the available, what is also thrown into relief is the whole set of background practices—the in-order-to, with-which, for the sake-of-which, etc.—or the whole 'equipmental contexture' (Heidegger 1982: 309) of which they formed a part. To put this in other words, the visible-invisible is lit-up and becomes something merely visible.

For Heidegger, this transition from the available to the unavailable to the merely occurrent takes place in everyday ongoing activities, and it is a transition in which the switch from one mode to the other is itself an on-going activity:
when the pen I am using runs out of ink I have to stop and think, look for a new pen, take it up, and then continue writing, and so forth. For Foucault, problematizations refer to much broader and more general cultural processes, which, although questioned at the micro-practical or micro-physical level, nonetheless bring about historical transformations and historical mutations in a culture. It is perhaps here that the parallels or correlates between the breakdown disclosed by ontological difference and an analytics of problematizations itself breaks down. Nevertheless, I think the parallel is useful as one possible way of unpacking Foucault’s conceptualization of problematizations in, by, and through thought. That is to say, of describing the “how” of “the way an unproblematic set of practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar and out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions”. Stated otherwise, it helps us to think about those “problematizations through which being gives itself as that which can and must be thought”. And, in addition, is help us to conceptualize, and thus analyze, the ways in which effective problematizations by thought gives rise to specific forms of rejoinders that take the form of explicit programmes. In other words, problematizations, conceptualized thus, are what can grant us the critical distance to ourselves in our present that will grant us access not to our own archive in toto but, proximally and partially, and through the programmes that are a response to such problematization, and their descriptive and prescriptive aspect, to render visible something of what we are, what we do, and the world in which we live.

What is thrown forth by way of such problematization is not just subjectivity but human being, which is to say, forms or modes of existence, or ways of being human, albeit local and regional forms of existence. Since what is problematized are specific ways of doing particular things with “stuff”, and since these ways of doing things are what both inhabit and perform forms of existence, it is these forms of existence that are problematized; moreover, it is modes of existence that are proposed as a means to overcome, by-pass, or work-around the conspicuousness, obstinacy, and obtrusiveness thrown forth by a problematization. In analysing, analytically, the specific form of a particular problematization by questioning the programmes that are its rejoinders, in analyzing both the descriptive and prescriptive elements of such theory-programmes, what may be disclosed is both that which ‘we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming’ (Deleuze 1992b: 164). In other words, it enables us to produce a ‘drawing of what we are and what we are ceasing to be’ and, at the same time, to outline a ‘sketch of what we are becoming’ (ibid.)
3 A Critical Ontology of Ourselves

Whereas Foucault’s work of the 1960s can be said to have focused primarily, though not exclusively, upon the question concerning conditions of possibility—i.e. the conditions of possibility of exercising certain specific relations of power—, from the start of the 1970s onwards, there was a shift of emphasis as it began to look at the different and differential ways in which ‘[p]ower is exercised not only subject to, but through and by means of conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245-246). That is to say, it not only looked at the material and practical conditions of possibility in which and from which certain discourses and practices emerged, it also looked at those discourses and practices which attempted to bring into existences certain material and practical conditions and, moreover, it looked at the real but unintended effects of such programmes: the material and practical, epistemic and technical conditions they actually brought into existence. It is these discourses and practices that Foucault called technologies; technologies that are the effect of and a response to certain forms of problematization. It is in this sense that what we are questioning concerning is not ontological but technological or, as stated earlier, it is ontological only to the extent that it is technological (i.e. pre-ontical): not “what is” but nor simply “how what is is”; rather, it looks at specific programmes that attempt to fabricate reality, programmes whose unintended effect were what went into the making or constitution of what is: the present (see Gordon 1980).

Of course, the ontological difference can only be taken up as a trope, an analytical device, a nominalist and catasthetic conceptual tool, or as a heuristic technology of and for thought. To do otherwise would not only go against the grain of the ethos of Foucault’s work and thought, it also runs the risks of a metaphysics (Heidegger 2002; see also Dreyfus 2003; Han 2003; Stambaugh 1969). Foucault, above all, historicized. To posit the ontological difference as anything other than a tool or a technology of and for thought would be to posit an ahistorical or, in any case, a transhistorical structure. For whilst one may comprehend the ontological difference historically as an historical ontological difference—that is to say, whilst one may undertake a genealogy of historically distinct ontological differences—one would still, nonetheless, be positing a transhistorical differentiation: being/beings, ontological/ontic, (un-)
availableness/extantness, and so forth.

And even if we reject a totalising, single unified understanding of being in preference to multiple ontological differences, we are still, once again, positing a dualism. There is nothing necessarily wrong with either of these alternatives, in and of themselves; however, to employ them in this way would be counter to the philosophical, political, and ethical ethos of Foucault’s work and thought: it would be to accept transhistorical dualism (the transcendent and the empirical?) and thus metaphysics, all of which Foucault sought to bypass. On this view, the historical ontological differences would be just a modern or
contemporary way of understanding; and it should only be deployed, at least in relation to the work of Foucault, with this understanding up front and in clear view. Therefore, we do not propose the ontological difference—or the difference (the / ) of the ontological difference—as a description of the real (fundamental ontology) but, rather, ontological differences as a grid of intelligibility for understanding the formation of the real: a critical and historical ontology.
IV. To Render Visible Our Actuality

In each [dispositive] it is necessary to distinguish what we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming.

(Deleuze, 'What is a Dispositive?')

Having laid out the foregoing understanding of the structures of genealogical diagnosis and archaeological analytics, what tools are available in each respective approach to questioning the present, in and of itself, from the perspective of itself? As should be evident from the above, both archaeology and genealogy have a complex relation to certain conceptualizations of the present that they both, in their own way, attempt to render visible and thus intelligible, to what they analyze, diagnose, and strategize. As should also be clear, neither archaeology nor genealogy broach the question of the present directly, that is, from the perspective of the present itself, and certainly not in terms of presenting detailed descriptions or depictions of our contemporary actuality. Rather, they undertake historical research in the horizontal and vertical dimension respectively. This is clearly demonstrated in what is taken to be Foucault’s genealogical text par excellence: Discipline and Punish. Even a quick glance at the contents of the book is demonstrative of this dual dimension. The four parts of the book deal, horizontally, with successive epistemic and technical matrices, and the rationality inhering therein, of four historically (and geographically) specific punitive practices: “torture” (supplice), “punishment”, “discipline”, and “prison”. However, it also traces, vertically, the conditions of possibility of the emergence of the prison, as a historically singular figure, from the foregoing practices (its provenance); that is, as a singularity that still has value and meaning for us in our own time: ‘[t]his book is intended as a correlative history of the modem soul and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which it masks its exorbitant singularity’ (Foucault 1977a: 23). In other words, the book as a whole can be read as detailing the conditions of possibility of a particular conceptualization of our present; or, at least, of the present in which the book was written (i.e. 1974): ‘[t]he history of this “micro-physics” of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern “soul”’ (ibid.: 29).

Indeed, most of Foucault’s book length studies follow a similar plan or schematic. The exceptions—The Birth of the Clinic, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self—, merely cover one such epistemic and technical matrix: roughly 1780-1820, classical Greek culture, and Greco-Roman culture of the first two centuries of our era, respectively. Of course, and a statement made in The Order of Things aside (‘[i]n any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one
episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge’, Foucault 1970: 168), the horizontal dimension is not representative of an epoch, cultural totality, Weltanschauung, mentality, sensibility, or spirit of an age, and so forth (Foucault 1972: 15; see also 1991a: 55), but merely of a time and a place in which what was seen and said and thought and done, were seen and said and thought and done in contemporaneously similar or analogous ways but in ways differently to other times and places, and, specifically, to our own time and place. In addition, the horizontal dimension does not disclose a monolithic, fixed, stable, and mute order, but describes a series of transformations; transformations that eventually give way to historical mutations. Thus we can see how the horizontal and the vertical, the synchronous and the diachronous, the archaeological and the genealogical, and so forth, are stitched together forming a tight descriptive web in undertaking a history of the present and a historical ontology of ourselves. And whilst such history is undertaken from a perspective in and on the present, neither the synchronous analytics nor the diachronous diagnostics nor the contemporary strategies describes our present or ourselves from the perspective of our present and ourselves.

Hence, we seem to have arrived at a dead-end; such historical studies act as a diagnostics of our present that strategize that present in terms of the possibility of it being otherwise, but they do so by rendering the present visible not in its own terms but in terms of an analytics of its historical, material, and practical possibility. This apparent dead-end, however, is only the case if we were to take up archaeology and genealogy, as is; that is, as ready-made tools. If, on the other hand, we broach them in terms of our work-shop approach—as equipment from which to fashion our own tools—, then two possible openings appear. The first opening came about through my reading of the ‘Introduction’ to Rose’s (2009) The Politics of Life Itself—in which he proposed to undertake not a history of the present but ‘a cartography of an emergent form of life’ that took the form of ‘a history of the potential futures it embodies’ (ibid.: 5)—and then thinking this through in terms of the forgoing discussion of the diagnostic structure of genealogy. The second opening suggested itself in working the concept of problematizations through the ontological difference, and in thinking about what a problem is, how such problematizations can be conceptualized as a form of breakdown in on-going practices, and how such breakdowns may grant us the critical distance we need to pose the question of our present and ourselves from within the perspective of our own actuality. That is to say, these two openings offer us the aim and the method of undertaking an analytic of our actuality, and thus of the exercising of contemporary relations of power, undertaken from the point of view of our own present. It is to a discussion of these two possible openings to which we not turn.
1 Towards a Genealogy of Future Emergences

In the ‘Introduction’ to *The Politics of Life Itself*, and in relation to the specific research being undertaken there, Rose notes that ‘I do not think we can proceed simply by applying the now familiar tropes of genealogy and “histories of the present”’ (Rose 2009: 4). For Rose, the task of such genealogical work, that of destabilizing the present by pointing to its contingency, no longer ‘seem[s] such a radical move’, and this because, for him, ‘our own moment in history is one of maximal turbulence’ (ibid.: 5). In such a moment, in which the present always already presents itself as contingent, what is required, according to Rose, is ‘to emphasize continuities as much as change, and to attempt a more modest cartography of our present’ (ibid.). This mapping of the present, in emphasizing continuities, would not ‘seek to destabilize the present by pointing to its contingency, but to destabilize the future by recognizing its openness’ (ibid.). This form of enquiry, ‘in demonstrating that no single future is written in our present,...might fortify our abilities...to intervene in that present, and so to shape something of the future that we might inhabit’ (ibid.). This double move, of situating the present as a condition of possibility of a potential future, and as the possibility of intervening in the formation of that future, thus offers to us the opportunity for a diagnostics and a strategics. That is to say, it open up a space the we may occupy as the objective of our questioning concerning the contemporary order of things from within that very order and the potential futures it embodies. Rose thus calls his book, and the kind of work that is done there, ‘a preliminary cartography of an emergent form of life, and a draft of a history of the potential futures it embodies’ (ibid.). Whilst I differ from Rose vis-à-vis his depiction of genealogy, I find his call for a history of emergent futures both promising and suggestive, vis-à-vis questioning the present from the perspective of itself.

Since, relatively speaking, our present is neither more nor less in flux that it ever was, and since the contemporary is always already a certain conjecture of our history and our future— ‘what we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming’ (Deleuze 1992b: 164; see also 1992a; 1995: 174-175; 1998)—, that is to say, it is already a transformative event, it seems to me that genealogy is always pertinent and, if not quite necessary, then certainly applicable in rendering visible certain aspects of how we have become what we are, how we came to do what we do, and how the world in which we live was made possible. That is to say, since genealogy is a history of our present, and since our present is not fixed but is always on the move, genealogical histories will always be pertinent to describing the difference that to-day introduces with regards to yesterday. If Foucault, or someone else, were to sit down to write a history of the birth of the prison from the perspective of our present (i.e. the present of 2014 and not 1974), would we still be presented with the same historical narrative, the same genealogy, as is presented in *Discipline and
Punish (see, e.g. Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiii)? In other words, would the focus of the study still be a political technology of the disciplined body, or would it place its emphasis upon some other such technology: pedagogics, therapeutics, confessional techniques, incitations to attaining one’s full and true potential, and so forth. I will leave this as a hypothetical question, since I merely want to point out that genealogical analyses are always pertinent to undertaking histories of our present.

However, I also find Rose’s conceptualization of a history of potential futures both suggestive and promising vis-à-vis the particular problem at hand, especially when we think such a mode of enquiry through the forgoing discussion of the structure of genealogical diagnostics, apropos provenance (Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung). Whilst Rose calls for a cartography of the present that seeks to map out emergent forms of life that point to potential futures, what I want to suggest, in taking up and reworking this, is doing field-work in the present that maps out proven forms of life that point to potential future emergences. Here, it is not so much a question of doing a history of potential futures, as it is a question of doing what I will call a genealogy of possible future emergences and potential future presents.

What we have to map out is not the emergence or birth of a singularity that we are not able to predict and cannot possibly know, but the contemporary dispersion—or elements or an element thereof—of practices (and the materialities, discourses, and techniques they embody) that may or may not be portent of such a potential future emergence. Just as genealogy does not take a “things” final term as being its cause or origin, so we cannot take what will be brought forth (the emergent) as being caused by what is coming forth (the proven). Rather, we have to leave what may be brought forth in abeyance as an open possibility or potentiality and thus as an open question. Instead, we can question concerning what certain “authorities” want to happen, of the different and differential ways in which they figure and/or reconfigure the real as both a problem space to be intervened and as an actuality to be brought into existence, and of the knowledges and techniques that they seek to deploy concerning these ends. That is to say, we have to remain within the field of dispersion that our present is and maintain that field in the dispersion that is proper to it; we have to remain within the humble beginnings of a future that may never come and that we will never know; within the provenance, the concrete and “contemporary” a priori, from which such potential future emergences may (or may not) arrive. In other words, the field in which we are to work is not that of emergence or Entstehung but that of the proven or the provenant, of Herkunft. This is our Nietzschean/Foucaultian ‘Herkunfts-hypothesen’ (Nietzsche 1892: viii; Foucault 1998: 371; translated as ‘hypothesis on the genealogy of morals’ in Nietzsche 1996: 6; and as ‘hypothesis on descent’ in Nietzsche 2006: 5-6; but also as “genealogical hypothesis” and “hypothesis concerning origins”, see, e.g. Acampora 2006: 14n7). That is to say, it is our provenance-hypothesis or hypotheses
on provenance. Hence, not ‘a preliminary cartography of an emergent form of life and the possible futures it embodies’ (Rose 2009: 258-259, emphases added), but an analytics of the present by way of field-work in provenant forms of life (i.e. existence in the broad sense of form of life) and the possible future emergences they may embody. The aims, however, are the same: ‘[t]o open the possibility that, in part through thought itself, we might be able to intervene in that present, and so to shape something of the future we might inhabit’ (ibid.: 259).

If genealogy, understood at once as a history of the present and an historical ontology of ourselves looks at provenance and emergence—the coming forth of what is brought forth; the multiple and heterogeneous points from which an emergence arrives—then a genealogy of possible futures looks at the coming forth from which what may be brought forth might arrive. However, as with the causality in genealogical histories of the present, there is neither a determinative nor a necessary causal chain between what is (the proven present) and what may be (a future emergence or a future present). Of course, that latter mode of genealogy—as a history of potential futures—looks at contemporary struggles but not in order to do a regressive history of their conditions of possibility, but precisely in order to take them up themselves as being the conditions of possible of potential futures. In other words, rather than doing an analytics of the past so as to do a diagnostics that strategizes the present, we can do analytics of the present so as to undertake a diagnostics of possible futures; a move that strategizes both the present and its potential or probable futures. As Rose notes, such an enterprise ‘is always a risky exercise’ (Rose 2009: 4); not least because, as Foucault astutely observed, ‘things never work out as planned’ (Foucault 2001d: 231). In other words, in analyzing those plans, programmes, schemas, diagrams, and so forth, whose goal or teleology is the formation of certain conditions of existence, we need to be cognizant of the fact that there is no direct causal link between dispositivities and their effects, between the dispositive and the effective.

Obviously, and quite intentionally, posing the aim of the project in terms of undertaking field-work in the provenance of potential future emergent forms of life is somewhat ironic, since it is not possible—i.e. it is impossible—to know what events, what material, discursive, and technical configurations, what practical arrangements, what specific composites of provenant forms of existence will give rise to a future emergence, that is to say, to an event in the future history of our thought. This is no futurology, and so the reason for positing the aims, and thus the orientating framework, of questioning the present from the perspective of itself in this way is, then, not to predict what the future will be—and thus what we will be—; nor is it to speculate on what we may become, what we might do, and what the world in which we may live might possibly look like. On the contrary, framing the project in terms of being a genealogy of potential futures is to do two things. On the one hand, it is to signpost our aim of describing the present, of rendering visible what “hides underneath this precise,
floating, mysterious, absolutely simple word: to-day”. On the other hand, it is to signpost a certain methodological prescription and precaution in describing to-day; it sounds a cautionary note vis-à-vis not substantializing the present as something that is solid or fixed, that is stable or complete; that is, it takes the present as being neither beginning nor end but as a certain conceptualization of a specific conjunction. As noted above, genealogy is perspectival, which means that there is no single and definitive answer to the question of “what our present is” and thus of “what our future might be”. It is also to take note that what we are describing—the proven present as condition of possible future emergence—is in-process or in-formation, and that the tomorrow to come will never be as we think precisely because of the work of thought. In other words, the aim of such a diagnostics is not so much ‘to destabilize the present by pointing to its [historical] contingencies’, but nor it is exactly ‘to destabilize the future by recognizing its openness’ (Rose 2009: 5). Rather, what we aim for sits somewhere between these two critical tasks: it is to broach the question of the proven present and of what we are to-day in terms of becoming.

The aim of such study is to be “untimely”; which is to say, ‘acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come’ (Nietzsche 1997b: 60). If the task of (Nietzschean and) Foucaultian genealogy is to get us to think differently about where we are by looking at where we arrived from, then the task of a genealogy of potential future emergences is to get us to think about where we are by looking at where we are going or, rather, by looking at where various authorities are attempting to take us, and thus where we are attempting to take ourselves, all the while being fully cognisant of the fact that “things never work out as planned”.

2 Towards an Archaeology of Problematizations

To question the present from the perspective of our own actuality in terms of a genealogy of possible future emergences is to question the present as the proven; that is, as being the provenance from which such future emergences may arrive. But how should we approach the present conceptualized as the proven? This raises a number of questions: “Which practices do we analyse?”, “How do we locate such practices?” “How do we know the practices we have thus located are pertinent?”, “How do we known that these practices, and not some others, will come to form the conditions of possibility of potential futures?” One of the central elements of genealogical diagnosis is a technique for questioning our past that works through the schema that just because something was dropped from the historical record, does not mean that it had no effects (Gordon 1980). For example, Bentham’s architectural plan for a house of inspection never materialized, and had been largely dropped for the historical record prior to it being excavated, analyzed, and described by Foucault, both in his Collège de France lectures and in Discipline and Punish. And yet, as these descriptions show, it nonetheless had an effect upon the history of our present and, subsequently,
upon our present itself. Consequently, ‘because non-realised programmes tend to be dropped from the official record, it becomes all the more important and fascinating to investigate what may have been the mode of their real but unprogrammed effects’ (ibid.: 248). We can turn this around an state that because it is not possible for us to predict, and thus to know, what will be the real but unprogrammed effects of present-day technologies of power, of the techniques and discourses of contemporary governmental programmes, all such programmes are, at least in potentia, targets of and for analysis. Field-work in the proven present is ‘neither a set of speculations about the future nor a…meditation on the present’; rather, ‘such speculations and meditations’ form the object that we are attempting to analyze (Rose 2009: 3). Hence, any discourse that has as its concern the directing of human conduct is open for analysis; be it self-help books; treatise on how to raise one’s children; guidance concerning pedagogics or therapeutics; medicinal discourses concerning the health of a population or on being responsible for one’s own health; texts on management, leadership, or organizational practices, or legislation a the level of political sovereignty. All these things, and everything in between, are open to analysis providing that they deal, in some way, with the question concerning the conducting the conduct; either conducting the conduct of others, conducting one’s own conduct, or both at the same time.

In addition to questioning discourses that have as their target the directing of human conduct, another aspect that marks such discursive formation off as being pertinent for analysis is that in doing the former, they can be read as responding to a problem in the particular domain to which they are addressed. And it is here, I think, the a Foucaultian conceptualization of problematizations can be taken up, modified, and employed as a tool in, by, and through which we can gain a critical purchase upon the present conceptualized as the proven. In other words, it is by way of the foregoing conceptualization of Foucault’s concept of problematization that we may be granted the critical distance to ourselves that will allow us to render visible the invisible that we are and that we do.

Etymologically speaking, “problem” denotes “to throw forward” (from pro “forward” + ballein “to throw”; OED). On this view, and as a technical (i.e. conceptual and analytical) term, a problem throws forth that which was previously out of sight and thus out of mind, as a question; it throws into relief the on-going activity in which we were circumspectly absorbed. On this view, problematization names this process of throwing forth or of being thrown forth; it makes that which is not seen and goes without saying seeable and sayable. Problematizations, thus understood, do not disclose what has been forgotten, masked, or hidden; they simply throw forth that which was visible but unseen and verbalizable but unsaid (e.g. Veyne’s hidden base of the iceberg). Thus understood, Foucault’s conceptualization of problematization has a certain kinship with, though is not identical to, Heidegger’s descriptions of the ways in which what was “to-hand” (Zuhanden) becomes “un-to-hand” (Unzuhanden), and
in that very process become that which is merely “at-hand” (Vorhanden). Problematization connotes those events in which ways and means of seeing and saying and thinking and doing, ways and means that may have been practiced for a long time, that were commonplace and thus to a certain extent obvious, taken-for-granted, out of sight and thus out of mind, as it were, unproblematic and thus unthought suddenly become a problem. It interrogates those events in which that which went without seeing and saying, things being what they were, no longer make sense, things being what they are. It is these events that signpost an effective problematization in, by, and through thought. In undertaking an archaeology of problematizations, what we are interested in are not so much the conditions of possibility that bring forth such events, nor the possible conditions for which such events came forth, but the rejoinders to such problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes. That is to say, for methodological reasons, since we are questioning the present from the perspective of itself, we are less interested in the question concerning formation, than we are in the question concerning conceptualization. Or, stated otherwise, we are only interested in the question of formation to the extent that this is disclosed in programmes that are the rejoinders to problematizations. In addressing discourses that have as their target and object the conducting of conduct, and in looking at how these discourses can be read as specific rejoinders to particular problems, the discourses themselves may disclose something of the problem to which they are a response. In doing so, they may tell us something about the visible-invisible inhabiting the on-going activity that has thus been disturbed. In addition, in attempting to respond to the specific form of problematization, such discourses present us with certain prescriptions and codifications regarding what is to be done and what is to be known. That is to say, they render visible what various authorities want to happen, and as such, reveal something of the direction in which we are moving. On this view, they disclose or render visible something of what our present is; that is, its provenance. This concerns not only how a problem was thought but also, and more specifically, of how thought intervenes, of how questions were posed and answers given. It is through effective problematizations by thought that objects appear, that subjects capable of knowing and dealing with objects are modified or transformed, that techniques and knowledges are articulated, and that ends and goals are proposed. It is these discourses, programmes, or technologies of power that form the domain of analysis that a genealogy of potential future emergences analyzes by way of archaeological analytics of problematizations.

Such programmes, and the technologies of power they articulate, are exemplary expressions of the present present, of the problematizations of thought expressed therein, and of a schematic of a possible future present; they are aspects of contemporary actuality that may form the conditions of possibility of a potential future emergence; that is to say, they signpost the space/place from which a future emergence may arrive.
3 Towards an Analytics of the Contemporary

I noted above that the aim of Foucault’s project was a *genealogy of the subject*, that the method was an *archaeology of knowledge*—which I took in the direction of an *archaeology of problematizations*—, and I noted how I was going to use this schema as both a point of departure and an organizing principle for working through how we might employ these to manufacture some tool for ourselves in undertaking an analytics of the contemporary. Now ‘[t]he purpose of genealogically directed history’, Foucault notes in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, ‘is not to uncover the roots of our identity but, on the contrary, to relentlessly dissipate it’; on this view, genealogy ‘does not undertake to locate the unique hearth from where we come,…[but seeks]…to *make appear* [faire apparaître] all the discontinuities that cross us’ (Foucault 1998: 387-388, modified, emphasis added). A genealogy of the subject, however, is not exactly a “genealogy of subjection/subjectivation”; rather, to do a genealogy of the subject is to do ‘a history of the different *modes* of subjectivation of human beings in our culture’ (Foucault 2001d: 326, modified, emphasis added). The means by which one undertakes such a Foucaultian genealogy of the subject is by looking at one or more of three *modes* of objectification/subjectivation: knowledge, power, self (ibid.; see also 1997: 262ff.). The difference or distinction that can be drawn between modes of objectification and modes of objectivation (*modes d’objectivation*) on the one hand, and modes of subjection (*mode d’assujettissement*) and modes of subjectivation (*modes de subjectivation*) on the other, is not always clear in Foucault’s writings (see, e.g. Foucault 1998: 459ff.; 2001d: 326ff.). This, I think, is not due to some lack or failure of analytical rigor but is, rather, a by-product of the highly complex relations, interrelations, and correlations between subject and object.

Firstly, for example, there are the different ways in which the subject is made either an object of knowledge, or a target of political intervention, or, additionally, as an object of or for self-reflection. Secondly, there are the different ways in which being made object constitutes subjects: the living, speaking, labouring subject, for instance; or the mad, ill, or docile subject; or, on the other hand, the subject conscious of themselves and others. Lastly, there are the modifications of the subject in the processes of coming to know the object (e.g. enunciative modalities), or in acting upon the actions of others (governmental modalities), or in acting upon one’s own actions (ethical modalities). Now, these are not three separate processes but have complex interconnection and interrelation that need to be unpacked empirically.

For the sake of clarity, lets us take up the view of technology as referring to *the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject*, that modes of objectification/subjection deal with the formation of objects and subjects as correlates of technologies of power, and that modes of objectivation/subjectivation deal with the different ways in which the self relates
to itself as an object and constitutes itself as a subject by way of technologies of self. In the former, subject and object, are the correlates of power-knowledge; in the latter they are the correlatives of self-knowledge. The distinction that can be drawn, then, between these two two-fold modalities is that the former modalities—objectification, subjection—are, to a certain extent, passive: they relate to how human beings are constituted as object and subject or ‘how we have indirectly constituted ourselves’ (Foucault 2001d: 403); it ties into the notion of subjection (assujettissement), though not necessarily subjugation (i.e. domination). The latter modalities—objectivation, subjectivation—are more active; they relate to how human beings are directed to constitute themselves as subject and object or ‘[h]ow…we directly constitute our identity’ (ibid.: 404; see also Kelly 2009: 87ff.; Rabinow 1996: 7ff.). In order to save time and space, I shall refer to “objectification” and/or “objectivation” as “modes of objectification” and “subjection” and or “subjectivation” as “modes of subjectification”. What needs to be born in mind when reading these terms, however, is that they refer to both the passive and active sense of constitution, and that that which is being invoked when these terms are used should be evidenced from the context within which it they are used, vis-à-vis the forgoing differentiation.

To get back to the point I was making regarding a genealogy of the subject, such a genealogy is not a history of subjectivity, as such, but is more like a history of the different modes in, by, and through which subjectification and objectification take place. That is to say, to do a genealogy of the subject is to do a genealogy of the different modes of subjectification by looking at the different modes of objectification. Hence to do a genealogy of the subject, as this pertains to an analytics of power or studies in governmentality, is not to undertake a “genealogy of power”; rather, it is to undertake ‘a genealogy of technologies of power’ (Foucault 2007b: 36, emphasis added), since it is by way of an analytics of governmental technologies that we are able to disclose the modalities of objectification and thus render visible the modes of subjectification. That is to say, in order to be able to do a genealogy of modes of subjectification by looking at one or more of the three modes of objectification, we need to render visible the specific forms of problematization in, by, and through which the subject, qua subject, has been problematized as an object and, more specifically, we have to interrogate those rejoinders to said problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes, programmes in which the thought, thus thought, unfolds and through which their rationality is disclosed.

In posing these questions historically, we pay attention to the specific ways in which human being constitutes itself by giving itself as that which can and must be thought, and we look at the practices from which such a problematization arrived and through which such a problematization is modified and transformed (e.g. Foucault 1985: 11-13). In posing these questions non-historically, which is to say, in questioning the present from the perspective of itself, however, we are more or less limited to questioning the specificities of the
forms of problematizations themselves and, where this is possible, to disclosing something concerning the practices from which they were formed. That is to say, we are delimited to questioning the proven present and its forms of problematizations by interrogating contemporary discourses that construct programmes for the formation of some future present and for the formation of the kinds of people who will inhabit it.

Now, the subject, for Foucault, is something of a fictive or constituted entity (see Gordon 1980). Foucault never talks about the actual making of real people. Rather, he asks how and in what ways discourses that formulate programmes for the formation of the real conceptualize the forms or kinds of subjectivity they want to bring into existence and thus to populate said real. What such a mode of enquiry ask is: what material is to be worked upon or worked over in the formation of such subjects, what discourses concerning the subject do they call upon (human sciences) and/or contribute to, what techniques are to be deployed and/or employed in the formation of such subjects and the realities they are to inhabit, and what is the being of human beings that is the telos of their prescriptive practice. Here, it is not a question of asking what the subject is, or how people resist, or how individuals form self-identities, vis-à-vis resistance, and so forth. Rather than putting forward a theory of human being, or of looking at the constitution of actual individual human beings, it enquires into the different and differential modes in, by, and through which human beings are to be made subjects by enquiring into the different and differential ways in which human being gives itself as that which can and must be thought: how is human being given to human beings as an object of thought, and how are human beings made subject through thought itself, how has human being been problematized as a question to be posed and as an answer to be worked through and given, and what might be the effects of such problematizations and programmes.

As Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke (2011a) put it, ‘[g]overning means creating lines of force that make certain forms of behavior more probable than others’ (ibid.: 13), and what we are to question in studies in governmentality are the programmes that want or attempt to programme these lines of force, that attempt to architecture the real or environ environments: arrange probability. However, this does not mean undertaking an enquiry—ethnographical, interpretivist, or otherwise—concerning how people actually move within such line of force (ibid.). Rather, it means enquiring into the “how” of how people are incited, induced, encouraged, directed, conduced, and so forth, into moving within said lines. That is to say, the focus of studies in governmentality, or of an analytics of power more generally, ‘is on the interrelations between regimes of self-government and technologies of controlling and shaping the conduct of individuals and collectives’, and ‘not on what human beings governed by these regimes and technologies actually say and do’ (ibid.). As Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke go on to state, studies in governmentality undertakes ‘a “genealogy of subjectification”…[; they]…do not retrace transformations of subjectivity, but
the way in which the subject has become a problem at certain historical moments and which solutions have been arrived at…[.] they do not ask what the subject is but which forms of subjectivity have been invoked, which modes of knowledge have been mobilized to answer the question of the subject, and which procedures laid claim to’ (ibid.: 14-15). In other words, such studies do not research subjectivity but, rather, enquire concerning the “modes of subjectification”, and they do this by questioning the “modes of objectification” in, by, and through which human beings are—or are to be—made subjects.

A central aspect of such an enquiry is, of course, resistance, but resistance here is conceptualized in a very specific way. As Nealon (2008) notes, ‘[b]y far and away, “resistance” remains the humanist or neohumanist concept most consistently affirmed in so-called post- or antihumanist thought’ (Nealon 2008: 94). Nealon quite skilfully unpacks the so-called problem of resistance in Foucault, and he does so by tackling that other supposed lack in Foucault’s researches and writings: agency. For Foucault, so it seems to me, discursive formations, regimes of power, and ethical modalities of the self, and so forth, whilst being the effect of human activity and practices are, more or less, and for the most part, out of our hands; that is to say, whilst they are undoubtable the effects of human agency—people doing things with stuff—they are not the product of a human agent (efficient cause). Things act, and because things act they interact, which means they act upon the actions of each other, and because they act upon the actions of each other they are not only able to act in unison they are also able to act against each other, which is to say, they resist each other. In other words, an action upon an action always already implies an action upon the act that acts upon, which is to say, it already implies resistance. Thus, what constantly needs to be born in mind is ‘the strictly relational character of relations of power’ (Foucault 1978: 75).

Here, however, I do not think it is the case that “resistance comes first” and that power is a response to said resistance (Nealon 2008: 104), but nor is it that power comes first, and resistance is a response to power; rather, relations of resistance, relations of power, and the possible relations between them are immanent and mutually constitutive. Resistance, like the term power, is a name then lends itself to naming a complex strategical situation but from the other side, as it were. As Foucault puts it, resistance is ‘the other term [l’autre terme] in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite [vis-à-vis]’ (Foucault 1978: 96, modified), and like a relation of power, resistance too comes from below. In other words, like power, resistance has multiple and heterogeneous humble beginnings; it too is sub-individual or pre-subjective (Foucault 1978: 95-96). And like the relation between government and critique or between the will to govern and the will not to be governed thusly, resistance ‘only exists in relation with something other than itself’ (see Foucault 1996a: 383); that is to say, that which it is resisting; which is another way of saying ‘some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, [or] institution’ (Butler 2004: 304). On this
view, resistance is less like a heroic manning of the barricades (Nealon 2008: 110; Rose 1999: 279) and is more like the conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive breakdowns that give pause for thought, and thus give rise to problematizations in, by, and through thought, on the one hand, and, on the other, to rejoinders to such problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes. Hence, it is the interplay between resistance—in the form of the conspicuous, the obstinate, or the obtrusive—and order that gives rise both to the thought (subject, object, and the relations between them) and to the rationality (reason and rationale) articulated by and thus inhabiting governmental technologies and their programmes.

As Foucault notes, a certain practice may have been practiced for a long time before there is an effective problematization by thought; and thus the task of an analytics of thought, and thus of programmes of power and the technologies that express them, is precisely to account for the specific form of said problematization. That is to say, the task is ‘to define the conditions in which human beings “problematize” what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live’ (Foucault 1985: 10). There were, for example, both “odd people” or people with diseases and certain practices that dealt with them (see Hacking 2002: 99ff.) long before there was an effective ‘problematization of madness and illness arising out of social and medical practices’ (Foucault 1985: 12). The task of a genealogical diagnostics, then, is precisely to account for the “how” of this problematization: how did it come into existence, what instigated it, what form did it take, and what responses did it provoke, what urgent need were these responses a response to, in what ways did being give itself as that which can and must be thought, what were the practices from which it was formed and through which it was modified and transformed, how was this thought thought, in what space did the thought thus thought unfold, how was the problem deliberated, what calculations were made, and what rational responses were given, and so forth.

Since we are dealing with the question concerning the governmental, and since what government seeks to govern is, ultimately, the conduct of human beings, it follows that what is conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive, here, is human being. To question the proven present by way of its problematizations, then, is to enquire into the different and differential ways in which human being constitutes itself in, by, and through giving itself as that which can and must be thought and, by way of the rejoinders to such problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes, to the different and differential way in which that thought intervenes and the way in which thought, thus thought, unfolds, vis-à-vis knowledge, power, self. Such a problematization may occur at different levels and within different domains: it may, for instance, concern how we problematize and conceptualize the “nature of human nature”; it may concern how we problematize and conceptualize the “good life” (the “good society”), it may concern how we problematize and conceptualize the “political order” conducive to this “nature” or that “good life”; or it may concern a combination of these or
some other aspect of what “we” are, of what “we” say and do, and of the “world” in which “we” live. In the last instance, however, such problematization invariable come back to the being of that being for which being is an issue for it. Hence, what needs to be questioned, analytically, is the specific form of problematization and the particular forms of conceptualization as these inhabit discourses that propose programmes for the formation of the real or of some future present.

On this view, then, “strategic games between liberties” are the “stuff” from which problematizations are made, and in response to which discourses that construct programmes for the formation of a present or future present are formed. If there were no resistance, by which I mean resistive forces, then there would be no need for control, and thus no need for programmes of control. Resistance is the alpha and omega of relations of power and vice-versa. The relation between relations of power and relations of resistance is not one of binary opposition: “resistance/power” but one of a “face-to-face”, vis-à-vis, encounter. They are less like two sides of the same coin and more like a mirror image of each other or like the two sides of a Möbius strip: ‘resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault 1978: 95). Whilst there is a veritable treasure trove of technologies of power—those reflected, deliberated, calculated, and rationalized techniques and discourses concerning the subject whose articulation constitute governmentality—there is neither an epistêmê nor a tekhnê of resistance. Technologies of power seek to bring into existence a certain political order of things (conducting conducts) by prescribing and codifying the setting-out or laying-out of specific order to things (arranging probability), but no such discourse exists, vis-à-vis resistance. For if such a discourse were to exist, it would no longer be a discourse of resistance but would merely be another governmental technology: the will not to be governed thusly or like that is not a will to be governed like this or in this way. On the one hand, then, we could say that to undertake an analytics of the exercising of relations of power or a study in governmentality is always already to be doing an analysis of resistance. On the other hand, however, because there is no tekhnê of resistance, as such, and from within the confines of a study in governmentality, we cannot account for it in the same ways in which we can account for technologies of power or governmentalities vis-à-vis an analytics of problematizations and programmes. It is to a working through of the form that an analytics of the latter may take, vis-à-vis questioning the contemporary order of things from with the contemporary order, to which we now turn.
PART FOUR: THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONTOL

I have been trying to make visible the constant articulation I think there is of power on knowledge and of knowledge on power.

(Foucault, ‘Prison Talk’).

I. Governing To-Day

The question that has been the driving force of this thesis is the question concerning the applicability of Foucault’s histories of thought and histories of the present—vis-à-vis his conceptualizations and analytics of relations of power and his diagnoses and strategizations of the present—to posing such question to the present from the perspective of the itself. Thus far, we have positioned Foucault’s histories as being a mode of enquiry that renders visible, we have looked at two such forms of making visible (genealogy and archaeology), and we thought these through in terms of manufacturing some tools for questioning the exercising of relations of power evidenced in the contemporary orders of things from within the perspective of this very order. We have arrived at the following aims and methods: to undertake field-work in present-day subjectivity by questioning the provent present in terms of its problematizations and their rejoinders, which take the form of explicit programmes. What I want to do in this, the penultimate part of the thesis, it to look at how all of this relates to questioning relations of power, as they are exercised to-day, from the perspective of this to-day.

I noted at the start of the thesis that questioning the exercising of contemporary relations of power from the perspective of the present itself was to be a form of questioning that took up a position within a certain “will not to be governed like that”. I also noted that in proceeding in this way, I wanted to propose some tools for critiquing the “will to govern”, as this is expressed in multiple and heterogeneous programmes, in such a way as to maintain them in the dispersion that is proper to them. Reactivating this counter-will in studies in governmentality, in questioning the will to govern from the stand-point of ‘counter-power’ (Foucault 2001b: 540), is neither to write from the perspective of resistance nor is it to write about resistance—historical or otherwise—as such. Not writing explicitly about resistance or resistive forces is a criticism that is often levelled at Foucault and those who have followed in his wake, and specifically those who work from the within the field of studies in governmentality. However, such criticism fails to take into account that there is no tekhnē (nor epistēnē) of resistance (see, e.g. Nealon 2008: Ch. 5). On the contrary, and in contrast to discourses, programmes, and/or technologies of government, resistance tends to be more extemporized than rationalized. That is to say, whereas the will to govern is expressed through rationalized knowledge
and calculated techniques, through reflected and deliberated, diagrammed and schematized discourses, and the like, resistance tends to be much more, how should we put it... ad hoc, makeshift, grass-roots, informal, improvised, and so forth (none of the adjectives really captures what I want to say, and all have the potential to naturalize and/or substantialize resistance; let us say that these are catastrophic and nominal concepts). On the other hand, to take a stand within counter-power, to question the will to govern from the position of the counter-will not to be governed thusly, is not to take up a position exterior to relations of power; that view from nowhere, which would allow us to see clearly and to criticise government from the perspective of truth. Rather, it is precisely to broach the question of the ‘government of men [sic] by truth’ (Foucault, unpublished lecture from 9 January 1980, cited on http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/2004q.html, under April 2004).

As we shall see, and from within the confines of the Foucaultian perspective laid out in the forgoing chapters, there is no outside of power, there is no domain of liberty in which relations of power are suspended, and thus from which one could attack power. However, pace Fraser (1989: Ch. 1-3), Habermas (1987: Ch. X), and others, there is no “crypto-normativity” here; but there is what we might call a certain contingent normativity. The normativity of contingent critique is not based upon universal or even “new” generalized normative criteria, but is immanent to what is thus being critiqued. As Foucault put it, ‘critique only exists in relation with something other than itself’ (Foucault 1996a: 383). Or as Butler rephrased this, ‘[c]ritique is always a critique of some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, institution’, consequently, ‘it loses its character the moment in which it is abstracted from its operation and made to stand alone as a purely generalizable practice’ (Butler 2004: 304, emphases added). Of course, one can always apply what one takes to be a universally valid normative framework to criticize practice—past or present, since they are universal—if one is willing to accept the resultant anachronism. However, one of the things that Foucault’s work works towards is precisely the de-naturalization and thus to render uncertain certain aspects of the epistemic and technical matrices that we inhabit and thus that inhabit us, and this includes the practice of criticism and the normative frameworks through which it seeks to judge. Moreover, this is anything but at odds with the empirical insights to be gained from Foucault critical histories of the present, since such insights result not in normative confusions but in an understanding that the norms inhabiting such frameworks are themselves historical through and through.

On this view, critique is not one thing; it is neither universal nor generalizable but is itself a historical practice that takes place with the very epistemic and technical matrix, or that particular aspect of this matrix, that is thus being critiqued. In other words, ‘we will not be able to define [critique] apart from the various objects by which it itself is defined’ (Butler 2004: 306). The point here is not that critique, and the normative criteria it employs, are culturally and
temporally relative. Rather, critique, in being conditional upon what it is a critique of, is more complex than a simple relativism would allow; it is contingent. To be contingent means that both critique and the normative frameworks it employs do not exist independently by themselves but in dependence on something else. In other words, there is no normative framework independent of what is being questioned, and from which what is being questioned can be interrogated. In addition to this, critique, as practiced by Foucault, does not do any judging at all. It does not question power in terms of good and evil, legitimate or illegitimate, and so forth, but rather in terms of existence and the acceptability, in terms of ones willingness to accept the cost, of such forms of existence. The task of Foucaultian critique, then, is not to criticize the present and judge it in reference to universally valid normative frameworks. Rather, it seeks to attempt to render visible the forms of existence that certain programmes of power sought or seek to bring into existence, to render intelligible the potential costs of such forms of existence, and then to leave it to others to work out whether or not they deem these forms of existence, and their costs, to be acceptable or not. In other words, not only is there no judgment here, there is no legislation either.

Pace Fraser (1989: 17-34), Foucault clearly describes the contingency—and thus the dependent existence—of critique, and of critique as a questioning in terms of cost and acceptability, in his 1978 lecture, ‘What is critique?’ (Foucault 1996b; 2007a: 41-81). In this lecture, Foucault discusses or, in any case, describes, the imminent and mutual constitution of the “will to govern” and “the will not to be governed like that”, and thus details how both emerge, historically and practically, from within and out of the same epistemic and technical grid. What Foucault describes in this lecture, then, are a number of historically specific modes of the interrelations and correlations of the will to govern and the will not to be governed thusly, and thus of the relationality of governmentality and critique on the one hand, and of critique and the normative frameworks it employs on the other. Firstly, Foucault observes that ‘at a time when the governing of men was essentially a spiritual art or an essentially religious practice linked to the authority of a church, to the magisterium of Scripture, not wanting to be governed in that way was essentially seeking in Scripture a relationship other than the one that was linked to the operating function of God’s teaching. To not want to be governed was a certain way of refusing, challenging, limiting (said as you like) the ecclesiastical magisterium’ (Foucault 1996b: 385, emphasis added). Secondly, Foucault notes that ‘not wanting to be governed in this way is [also] not to accept these laws because they are unjust, because they are antiquated, or because they hide an essential illegitimacy under the more or less threatening splendour given by their present-day sovereign. From this point of view, critique is thus, in the face of the government and the obedience it demands, to oppose universal and indefeasible rights to which every government...will have to submit. In short, this is where one finds the problem of natural law’ (ibid.,
emphasis added). Lastly, he describes how “not wanting to be governed” is, of course, not accepting as true what an authority tells you to be true, or at least it is not accepting it as true because an authority tells you that it is true. Rather, it is to accept it only if one thinks oneself that the reasons for accepting it are good. And this time, critique finds its anchoring point in the problem of certainty in the face of authority (ibid., emphasis added).

In the first mode, the critique of ecclesiastical rule is essentially ‘biblical’; in the second mode, the critique of natural law is essentially ‘juridical’; and in the third mode, the critique of authority takes the form of ‘not accepting as true what an authority tells you to be true’ (ibid.). These ‘games of governmentalization and critique’ are historically immanent and mutually constitutive. Or, stated otherwise, the normative grounds for critique are both immanent to and thus contingent upon what is thus being critiqued. These normative grounds do not stand outside or above what critique takes as its object, they are not positioned in a place free from power and opulent with truth; the will not to be governed thusly is formed within the same epistemic and technical configuration as the will to govern. Thus, working within the space of “the will not to be governed like that” is not to apply universally valid standards of criticism based upon notions of universal human rights and an essential human nature, but nor is it to practice this form of criticism blindly and without being cognizant of the fact; that is, by way of a crypto-normativism (Fraser 1989: Ch. 1-3; Habermas 1987: Ch. X). It is to question the formation, articulation, institutionalization, and/or instrumentalization/operationalization of certain discourses that concern themselves with the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the “good life”. Practising this form of critique is to acknowledge that critique is contingent, and that what it is contingent upon is precisely that which it is questioning critically (see Butler 2004). This form of critique ties into the notion that Foucault did not apply an ‘immutable, systematic, and universally applicable method’ (Machado 1992: 17) but, rather, practiced ‘a mode of research which, inasmuch as it cannot be fixed into a rigid canon, means that it is able to learn from its sources’ (ibid.). Which is to say, it is able to learn from what it is researching, questioning, and, consequently, critiquing.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that all of Foucault’s enquiries began life with and/or within a problem in the present; that is to say, in the present-day practices contemporaneous with their being questioned, practices that were already susceptible to mutability because ‘some of the given-ness of established ways of thinking and acting [were] already coming into question’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xiii): psychiatry and anti-psychiatry, medicine and the crisis of medicine, prison and prison riots, governmentality and neo-liberalism, sexuality and identity politics, ethics and a lack of ethics, and so forth. Nevertheless, there is more going on here than simply imposing present-day normative criteria, anachronistically, upon past events, practices, discourses, and the like. Rather, what is to be questioned historically has to be questioned from the perspective of
the time and place in which it took place: the reformers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have to be read in terms of the practices of torture and execution they were criticizing, and not judged by present-day notions of inalienable human rights. On the one hand, then, there is the historical play of governmentality (the will to govern) and critique (the will not to be governed like that); and, on the other hand, there is our critique of governmentality, which is related to, though not identical to, the aforementioned form of critique. A central question to be posed, vis-à-vis our own critique, is ‘[w]hat is the relation of knowledge to power such that our epistemological certainties turn out to support a way of structuring the world that forecloses alternative possibilities of ordering?’ (Butler 2004: 307). Or, since we are not questioning the present in terms of its past but are to pose the question of the future in terms of its present, paraphrasing Butler, we might ask, ‘what are the relations of knowledge (savoir) to power (pouvoir) and of power to knowledge such that the ontological and epistemological certainties that certain authorities want to bring into existence turn out to support ways of environing environments that foreclose alternative possible worlds?’ Or again, critique might ask “what is this prescribed order of things whose very conditions of possibility excludes other possible orders?” In other words, Foucaultian critique starts not from universal criteria of judgment but from a position aptly summed up by Klee when he stated that ‘whilst we may not live in the best of all possible worlds, in its present form, this world is surely not the only world possible’ (Klee 1961: 92; cited in Rabinow and Rose 2003b: xxvii).

Hence, to do a critique from the stand-point of counter-power and of the will not to be governed thusly is neither to employ standard normative frameworks for critique nor to offer alternative forms of government. Rather, it is to undertake critique in terms of existence, to practice such critique, as a critique of the exercising of relations of power, from within or at least in relation to such and such a power relation, and to do so by attempting to grasp the techniques and knowledges that will allow for that relation to be exercised, the procedures to be deployed and employed in the directing of human conduct. As Rose puts this, ‘[t]o analyse...power through the analytics of governmentality is...to start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques’ (Rose 1999: 20). In other words, to question power, by way of the will not to be governed thusly, is to question it in the direction of thought and rationality. However, as noted above, thought is not cognitive activity but an act that posits a subject and an object and a possible relation between them, and rationality is not to be questioned on the basis of its deviations into the irrational but in terms of its deliberations, calculations, schematizations, and conceptualizations.

Bentham’s plan for the panopticon, for example, was discussed, described, and analyzed by Foucault without recourse to Bentham’s biography, psychology,
or social context (the “being of “man’”); rather, it was interrogated by recourse to
the broader epistemic and technical matrix—the dispositive—in which it was
situated and of which it was an expression (see Foucault 1991a: 58). That is to say,
it was questioned in terms of the domain of a history of thought in which the
panopticon, and its practices and goals, became thinkable and practicable,
conceptualizable and actionable. Here, it is not simply a question of the “how?”
of government but is, rather, a question of the “how?” of governing what there is
to govern, and of how these came about. On this view, power is a perspective
concept; it is a way of looking, of rendering visible; it looks at how things are made
and/or conceived of as being governable and what went into their making, it
looks at how things are rendered thinkable as governable: ‘[a]n analysis of
governmentalities…seeks to identify [the] different styles of thought, their
conditions of formation, the principles and knowledges that they can borrow
from and generate, the practices that they consist of, how they are carried out,
their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing’ (Rose, O’Malley,
and Valverde 2006: 84). It is to question the formation, conceptualization, and
elaboration, within politico-technological discourses and programmes of
government, of the articulation of techniques and discourses about the subject;
or, stated otherwise, of the articulation of the nature of human nature and the
political order conducive to the “good life”.

Questioning the proven present by way of the problematizations it both
evidences and addresses (i.e. by way of the rejoinders to such problematizations
that take the form of explicit programmes), might enable us to grasp two things.
On the one hand, in describing that which they are working against (i.e. the
specific form of problematization), they disclose that which we are and thus
render visible that which we are ceasing to be. On the other hand, in prescribing
that which they aim to bring about, as both a target area of governmental
intervention and a governable reality to be brought into existence, they disclose
something concerning where we are going and thus make visible that which we
are in the process of becoming (see Deleuze 1992b). Either way, they tell us
something about our present conjuncture, and thus about the will to govern
inhabiting our contemporary present. Programmes, as rejoinders to specific
forms of problematization, often name and describe the form of the problem that
they address and to which they are a response. In doing so, they disclose
something of the order of thing contemporaneous with them. In addition, as a
rejoinder to said forms of problematization, they disclose something of the
ordering of things to come. Of course, things never work out as planned, and so
it is not possible to speculate on or upon the shape of things to come, but we can
broach such programmes as being the provenance or as an aspect of the
provenance of a possible or potential future emergence. In any case, such
speculation, where this is made, can only be posed as a question and not as an
affirmation.
Such local and regional epistemic and technical matrices, in attempting to programme both a target area of governmental intervention and a governable reality to be brought into existence, in planning for the conducting of conducts by way of the environing of environments (i.e. programming horizons of probability; see below), can be questioned in terms of the ontological and epistemological certainties they aim to bring about; that is to say, in terms of the ways in which they propose to work upon an open field of possibilities so as to produce a closed or more or less circumscribed field of probability. Subjecting such planned for certitude to critique is to render visible their mechanism as forms of constraint that enable, and one of the things they enable are certain forms of subjectivity in which the self relates to itself in relation to the codifications of conduct that are the telos of a particular programme. This relation of self to self, however, contains within itself, precisely in its relation to said prescriptions and codifications, not only forms of obedience and obligation, but also the very seeds of not wanting to be governed like that. Questioning such programmes in terms of the futures they wish to programme into existence, and thus in terms of the very forms or types of existence they want to environ or architect, opens up the possibility of interrogating them in terms of a reactivation of the counter-will of not wanting to be governed thusly, which, in turn, opens up the possibility of being able to intervene and thus to transform the possible futures we may come to inhabit. Such a critique is not crypto-normative but this is not to say that it does not have normative principles. It is just that these principles are themselves constituents of, and thus are part and parcel of, the same epistemic and technical grid from which the will to govern arrived. This form of critique, then, is contingent upon what is being critiqued; and it does not judge what it is questioning in terms of wright or wrong, good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate, and so forth but, rather, in terms of existence, dangerousness, and cost: given the epistemic and technical matrix that certain authorities want us to inhabit, and thus to inhabits us, what are we willing to accept, what are we not willing to accept, and what are we not prepared to accept at all at any cost, and so forth.
II. Control

In a society of control, a politics of conduct is designed into the fabric of existence itself, into the organization of space, time, visibility, [and] circuits of communication.

(Rose, Powers of Freedom).

Having broached the question of the aim and the method of our Foucaultian perspective, as this pertains to posing questions to power as it is exercised to-day from the perspective of to-day, in this part of the thesis, I want to broach the question of the domain of analysis on the one hand, and how we question this domain by way of the aforementioned aim and method on the other. As noted in the Introduction to the thesis, for Foucault, “power”, in the substantive sense of this term (le pouvoir), “does not exist”; and as I went on to note, this raises the question of how one can do an analysis of it. I also noted how, pace Hoy (1986), Foucault’s analytics of power does not tell us where to look but is more like “a way of approaching things”; which is to say, a way of looking: hence, not where to look but how to look or, in any case, one possible way of looking, of rendering visible: ‘if power is in reality an open, more-or-less coordinated (in the event, no doubt, ill-coordinated) cluster of relations, then the only problem is to provide oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power’ (Foucault 1980: 199, emphases added). In this part of the thesis, in posing the apparently simple but in point of fact rather complex question “what is power?” we are going to look more closely at applying this way of looking. Of course, this question—“What is power?”—is somewhat ironic. As Foucault put it in Society Must be Defended, ‘because the question: “What is power?” is precisely a theoretical question that would provide an answer to everything…the issue is to determine what, in their mechanisms, in their effects, [and] in their relations, are these different [dispositives] of power that are exerted at different levels of society, in different domains, and with such a variety of extensions?’ (Foucault 2003c: 13, modified). That is to say, posing this question already points us in the wrong direction. That is to say, it [i]s misguided’, and this because ‘as a discursive strategy [it is] condemned in advance to set the analysis of power on a wrong course’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984: 255; see also Foucault 1980: 87-88, 198-199; 1982: 785-786). However, in posing this question in this way, it both throws into relief the conventions and taken-for-granted assumptions inhabiting normative frameworks for questioning concerning power and thus throws into relief the very object of such a mode of questioning.

To ask a “what is…?” question is to ask after being; which is to say, it is to move in the direction of (a realist) ontology. But a Foucaultian conceptualization of power does not question ontology; it questions technology. In other words, I think we have to understand Foucault’s conceptualization of power
technologically; that is to say, in terms of ‘the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject’ (Foucault 1993: 223; 2007a: 152) as these pertain to problematizations and programmes. If we pose the question “What is power?” or if we attempt to do an analysis of power, in organizations or elsewhere, then we are inevitably led in the direction of an ontology (essence), and, perhaps inevitably, to a metaphysics of power. That is to say, we are led to search for it (the source of power), to locate it (as a substance), to finding out who has it and who does not (as a possession), and to look at what those who have it do with it (e.g. Mintzberg 1983). Moreover, we are ultimately led in the direction of producing a theory (ontology) of power and a methodology (epistemology) for studying it. Needless to say, Foucault would earmark such an approach as being indebted to a sovereign and juridical notion of power (and/or an analytic of finitude).

If, on the other hand, we take Foucault’s nominalism seriously and grasp “power”, conceptually and analytically, as being nothing more, and nothing less, than a name that lends itself to describing “a complex strategic situation in a given society”, then another path opens up for us to explore; one in which we do not ask what power is or undertake an analysis of it but do analyses in terms of power. Now a relation of power is not a social relation, nor is it an economic relation; it is a relation inhabiting these and all other forms of human relations (sexual, religious, racial, gendered, familial, ethnic, medical, punitive, organizational, etc.), and it can be analyzed as such and in those terms. This is not to reduce all human relations to relations of power (as happens, for example, with “the social”); it is to say that power is an aspect, but one aspect, of all such relation. All human relations, then, are inhabited by relations of power, but in the vast majority of these relations, there is a certain free-play or to-and-fro of the power relation. What we need to analyze are precisely those events in which some seek to capitalize on these relations; events in which this fluidity starts to solidify or congeal; literally, to establish or institute a fixed or, in any case, a more-or-less circumscribed relation of power. It is these rigid or less flexible relations that are to be broken down and analyzed in terms of power.

1 Power

To make this somewhat clearer, we can say that what Foucault means by “a complex strategical situation” is, essentially, a situation in which one or more people attempt to govern the conduct of one or more other people: what Foucault called ‘strategic games between liberties’ (Foucault 1997: 299). It is not, however, ‘simply a relationship between “partners”, individual or collective; it is a mode of action of some on some others’ (Foucault 2001d: 340, modified, emphasis added). Hence, what is at stake here is not a substantive power that has a source, that can be possessed, and that can wielded, but a relation of power (a relation between an act that acts upon an action and an action that is thus acted upon) on the one hand, and an exercising of power (the specific modality of acting upon actions or of
actions being acted upon) on the other. Or, stated otherwise—since the above formulation make it sound as if “relation” and “exercise” where separate and discreet—a relation of power only comes into existence when it is exercised: ‘[p]ower’, by which Foucault always means relations of power, ‘exists only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action’ (ibid.).

Hörnqvist (2010) claims that a distinction needs to be made ‘between power as a relation and power as an activity’ (ibid.: 1). He goes on to claim that ‘[t]he concept of power is ambiguous as it can refer to both’, and that ‘Foucault exclusively studied power as an activity, which was not always kept separate from the notion of power as a relation’ (ibid.: 2). As I hope to demonstrate, since the exercising of power is an exercising of a relation of power—indeed, it is the exercising of that relation—, one cannot study one without the other. Moreover, Foucault did not study power as an activity (if what is meant by that is something like a sociology of everyday life) but as a rationality (technologies of power). Pace Hörnqvist, there is no ambiguity here. Exercising power is exercising a relation of power: the exercise of power is what brings into existence a relation of power; and a relation of power is what enables the exercise of power—in other words, whilst the relation and the exercise are irreducible each to the other, they are nonetheless immanent in each other and thus mutually constitutive of each other.

Hence, the principle question to be asked here is not a “what is...x?” question so much as it is a “how?” question (Foucault 1978: 97; 2001d: 336; 2003c: 28-34): how what there is to be governed is, and how it is to be governed. As Foucault put this in ‘The Subject and Power’, such “how?” question are posed ‘not in the sense of “how does [power] manifest itself?” but “how does it exercise itself?”’ (Foucault 2001d: 337, modified). If what we are questioning is not how does power manifest itself but how does it exercise itself, then what is meant by the exercising of power here? If by “manifest itself” we mean “reveals itself”, “shows itself”, “displays itself”, “disclose itself”, “makes itself evident”, and so on, and if the intelligibility key of the analysis of power is not what is thus revealed, disclosed, evidenced, and so forth, then how can we have access to it; in other words, how are we to analyse the “how?” of power? Foucault’s answer to this question is that ‘[a]ddressing the theme of power through an analysis of “how” is...to give oneself as the object of analysis relations of power and not power itself’ (Foucault 2001d: 339, modified). In other words, it is not “power” that is exercised but an unequal, asymmetrical, or nonegalitarian “relation”, and what is to be questioned is the “how?” of exercising that relation. The aim and method of an analytics of power, then, is ‘[t]o grasp the material agency of subjugation’; in addition, it is to question such agency ‘insofar as it constitutes subjects’ (Foucault 2003c: 28). And so the kinds of question to be posed in such an analytic are “How is that relation to be exercised?” “What knowledge and what techniques are to be deployed and/or employed in directing human conduct?” and “How did this become so?” Or, stated slightly differently, ‘Who or what is to be
governed?...How should they be governed? To what ends should they be governed?” (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006: 84-85; see also Dean 2010: 33, 37-50), and so forth.

In order to clarify this point, we can contrast our Foucaultian conceptual analytics of power with Dahl’s (1957) intuitive sociological ‘concept of power’. Dahl’s concept of power, like Foucault’s, conceptualizes power as a relation between people; but that is where the similarity ends. Dahl conceptualizes the power relation as a relation in which ‘A has power over B to the extent that he [sic] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (ibid.: 202-203). A first differentiation is that in Dahl’s formulation “A has power over B”, in other words, power is conceptualized if not exactly substantively then, at a minimum, as something that someone can have (i.e. as a possession). In a more Foucaultian conceptualization of relations of power, on the other hand, one or more people exercise power over others; that is, they do not have power, but occupy a position within a nonegalitarian relation. A second, and much more significant, differentiation is that in Dahl’s formulation “A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. This contrast with a more Foucaultian way of conceptualising this relation as a relation in which one or more people attempt to govern the conduct of others by working upon an open field of possibilities in such a way as to reconfigure it into a closed, semi-closed, or more-or-less delimited field of probability; and it attempts to conduct the conduct of other, by way of the above, so as to induce in them the conducting of their own conduct. Bearing in mind that we are working at the level of formation and conceptualization—that is, at the level of what various authorities want to happen—and not at the level of actualization, a more Foucaultian way of looking at this is that what B would want to do is probably what A wants B to do. Stated otherwise, whereas Dahl views the power relation as an imposition (e.g. A imposes a form of existence upon B: i.e. if it was not for the imposition of A, B would do otherwise), Foucault conceptualizes relations of power not as a relation in which one has a form imposed upon one’s existence, but as a relation in which one is given the very terms in, by, and through which only certain forms of existence will and will not be possible (e.g. Butler 2004); or, rather, in which certain forms of existence will be more probable than not. On this view, ‘[p]ower is exercised not only subject to, but through and by means of conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245-246): this is what is meant by a the “setting-out or laying-out of probability”.

What Dahl’s formulation implies is that there are forms of existence which grant access to a thing called power (the source of power to be exploited, the means at their disposal, the amount of power they have, and the scope of their power), and there are forms of existence in which access to power is more limited, delimited, or is non-existent. Then, it is simply a question of looking at how those who have access to power impose that power upon the existence of those who do not: through force or coercion, threat or promise, and so forth. In
other words, it is simply a question of analyzing the *manifestations* of power: managers manage, supervisors supervise, leaders lead, and so forth. For Foucault and others, by way of contrast, there is no such privileged domain; a relation of power comes into existence in its exercise; and that exercise ‘consists in “conducting conducts” and in arranging probability’ (Foucault 2001d: 341, modified, emphasis added). That is to say, that the relation of power, as a grid of intelligibility for doing analyses in terms of power, is conceptualized as a relation in which some attempt to conduct the conduct of other by exercising that relation, and that the exercising of this relation, the technique that allows for that relation to be exercised, takes the form of a laying-out or setting-out of probability (*à aménager la probabilité*).

Foucault looked at two general modalities of exercising relations of power; what we might call an *anatamo-politics of the human body* and a *bio-politics of the population* (Foucault 1978: 135-159; 2003c: 239-263). However, these should not be thought of in terms of the *micro* and the *macro*. Rather, any distinction that can be drawn between different “levels” are differences in the scale of what is being analyzed, and not differences in the form of analysis, which, whatever the level or scale (individuals, groups, populations), is still that of a “*micro*-physics” of power (Foucault 2007b: 119n*, 358; 2008a: 185ff.; see also Senellart 2007: 381ff.). Hence, *pace* Jessop (2011), what is ‘scalable’ here, if we can even use such a term, is the scale of what is being analyzed, and not the point of view of method of analysis. In other words, whether one is analyzing the practices inhabiting a prescriptive discourse prescribing how to handle a rifle: demeanour, gate, the sequence of movements to be followed, etcetera (Foucault 1977a); or whether one is discussing the practices contained, for example, in discourses concerning office design and office management and analyzing the possible relations between them: Taylorism, *Bürolandschaft*, cubicle, and so on (see, e.g. Hofbauer 2000); or whether one is describing the practices evidenced in a discourse offering advice concerning the practices and techniques of governing a population: its salvation, its health, its economy, and so forth (Foucault 2007b, 2008a); the point of view of method is the same, and this point of view of method is that of a micro-physical analysis of the exercising of relations of power; or, more specifically, of the thought or rationality inhabiting such practices. This is precisely what is meant by “an *analytics* of power”: not because it is ‘determined by’ the level or ‘the sector of the scale’ to be analyzed, but because of the perspective of method: ‘the analysis of micro-powers is not a question of scale, and it is not a question of a sector, it is a question of a point of view’ (Foucault 2008a: 186). In other words, power, government, governmentality, and so forth, are not so much the object of enquiry as they are the grid of intelligibility, the mode of rendering visible, of said enquiry.
2 Government

It may help here to clarify the terms government and governmentality, without delimiting them and thus limiting their application by defining them, by putting forward a number of conceptual and analytical differentiations. A first clarification can be made, for example, by differentiate government from “governance”; a second by differentiating governmentality understood in the sense of encapsulating and combining thought, relations, discourses, techniques, and rationalities of government and governmentality understood as “mentalties of government”, and a third and finally, by differentiating between a narrow and broader analytical conceptualization of governmentality. Before going on to broach these three differentiation, however, it may prove instructive to look at the etymology of the concept. Here, I am not attempting to recover the terms lost origin, nor to excavate the words semantic embedding; rather, I want to think about the kind of work it does as a concept (see, e.g. Foucault 2007b: Lecture 5, 8 February 1978), and thus what we can do with it. The verb “to govern” stems from the Latin gubernare (“to steer a vessel, hence to direct, to rule, to govern”) which is itself “a nautical borrowing from Greek kybernan: “to steer or pilot a ship”, from kybernētēs “steersman, governor, pilot, or rudder”, “navigator”, “helmmsmanship” (OED). The Greek kybernan is also the root of the term cybernetics, which although often associated with Wiener (1961, 1989) was first used in the modern era by Ampère (in 1834, ‘cybernétique’) to denote “art of government” (Ampère 1834: 140ff.). Thus, rather than referring to those administrative bodies that govern modern nation sates, the sense of government employed here has this sense of guiding, steering, piloting, directing, and so forth: ‘techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour: ggovernment of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of a state, or of oneself’ (Foucault 1997: 81).

1 – Taking government and “governance” first, we can note a difference between the suffixes “-ance” and “-ment” applied to the verb “to govern”. The former suffix, the “-ance” in governance, is applied to the verb “to govern” in order to form “nouns of action”; the latter, the “-ment” in government, denotes either “the result or product of the action of the verb” or “the means or instrument of the action” (OED). It is the second sense of the latter—the means or instruments of governing—that I intend here in questioning relations of power, by way of the concept of governmentality, as these are to be exercised to-day (i.e. in the present present) from the perspective of this to-day in which they are to be exercised (i.e. field-work) As we shall see, the first sense of the suffix “-ment” relates more to a diagnostics and strategies of the effective than it does to the disposing and inclining aspect of the dispositive (these terms will be discussed below); that is to say, it relates to analyses of the consequences of institutionalizing relations of power and of the instrumentalization of their real but unintended effects (i.e. states of domination; see below). In everyday
parlance, in their etymological and semantic embedding, and maybe in certain academic discourse more generally, the distinction that has just been drawn between government and “governance” is, perhaps, of little significance. However, conceptually and analytically, in undertaking studies in governmentality, we can differentiate between the actual action or manner of governing the day-to-day lives of individuals, groups, populations, and the like, on the one hand, and a “system by which a thing is to be governed” on the other; that is to say, between governance and government.

Whilst the term governance aims to describe, analyze, and explain the realities and actualities of day-to-day governing, and to evaluate such governing in terms of good or bad governance, and so forth; government(ality), in focusing upon “the means or instrument of the action” by looking at what various authorities want(ed) to happen, describes a certain aspect of the real that does not always get the attention it deserves. Let us say that, for the sake of analysis, we can differentiate between manifestations of power, on the one hand, and the “how?” and “what?” of power—in terms of how the latter has been thought, in terms of the “how?” of government, and in terms of the “what?” of what there is to govern—, on the other (see Foucault 2001d: 337). The concept of governmentality conceptualizes “arts of government”; ways of thinking government; the deliberations, calculations, and schematizations inhering in governmental technologies; and, above all, the thought and governmental rationality inhabiting such technologies. The notion of governance, by way of contrast, refers to what we might call the concrete and everyday instances of governing, the minute-by-minute procedures and actual processes of the whole messy business of actually governing people and institutions; it refers not to the art of government but to the actuality of actually governing. This differentiation is clearly played out in Foucault’s appeal, in Discipline and Punish, to the writings of a late eighteenth century British utilitarian philosopher rather than the descriptions of a late eighteenth century British philanthropist and prison reformer.

As noted previously (see the discussion on page 10), in writing a history of the prison, Foucault turned to Bentham’s detailed architectural plans that sought not only to diagram a house of inspection but also to programme certain techniques for conducting the conduct of others (Bentham 1843). Howard, by way of contrast, undertook what we would now call an ethnographic study of prisons, gaols, and hospitals, asylums, lazarettos, and the like, across Britain, Ireland, and the rest of Europe (Howard 1780, 1791). Foucault’s turning to Bentham was not simply the product of doing historical enquiry, since he could just as easily have made use of the historical document produced by Howard (as he does, for example, in History of Madness). What I think is taking place here is not just the penchant of the historian for documents but is, rather, an effect of a specific philosophical question as this pertain to what is to be questioned and the “level” at which such analyses are to work. This philosophical question relates to
the “being of “man”” first discussed by Foucault in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (Foucault 2008b), then in Part II of The Order of Things, and again in his later writings in which he describes his project as undertaking two negative tasks vis-à-vis the study of forms of experience. The first of these two negative tasks was ‘a “nominalist” reduction of philosophical anthropology together with the notions it is able to support’; the second negative tasks was ‘a displacement in relation to the domain, the concepts, and the methods of the history of societies’ (Foucault 1997: 200, modified). Foucault introduced a third but positive task, vis-à-vis such an analysis, and that was ‘to bring to light the domain where the formation, development, and transformation of forms of experience are able to take their place’, and this domain was the domain of ‘a history of thought’ (ibid., modified). In other words, Bentham set-out an art of government, Howard described the actual acts of what we would now call governance. In writing Discipline and Punish Foucault turned not Howard but to Bentham, and this because what Foucault undertook was not a history of ‘behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies”’, but a history of ‘the problematizations through which being gives itself as that which can and must be thought and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed’ (Foucault 1985: 11, modified).

If we are to preserve the specificity of the object of studies in governmentality, it is important to maintain this distinction between an analytics of the discourses and techniques, the technologies or arts of government, on the one hand, and analyses of the practices and practicalities of governance, on the other. Conflating government with governance (as happens, for example, in Walters 2012), as these have been differentiated and described here, blurs the specificity of studies in governmentality, which does not study the “everyday practices of governance” but “arts of government”. What we are dealing with here is not a sociology of power, a sociology of rule, a sociology of governance, and so forth, but a history of thought and rationality, as these pertain to exercising relations of power, by way of studies in governmentality (see Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 106ff.; see also Dean 2010: 28ff.; Rose 1999: Ch. 1).

2 – This emphasis upon the domain of thought and rationality ties into the second point of clarification noted above, in which it is important to make a further distinction between two notions of governmentality: governmentality as governmental rationality or rationalities of government, and governmentality as governmentality or mentalities of government. The contraction of the terms “govern(ment)” and “mentality” would seem to derive from Gordon’s (1987), perhaps off-the-cuff, remarks to the effect that “governmentality” is ‘a term that one might…unpack, in the vocabulary of Lucien Febvre, as “mentality of government”’ (ibid.: 297). However, according to Senellart (2007), contrary to the interpretation put forward by some German (e.g. Lemke 2001) and Anglo-Saxon commentators (e.g. Dean 1999; Rose 1999), ‘the word “governmentality” could not result from the contraction of “government” and “mentality”’ (Senellart 2007:
This is because, as Senellart states, “governmentality” derives from “governmental” in the same manner as “musicality” derives from “musical” or “spatiality” derives from “spatial”, and so on (ibid.). By extension, “mentality”, would thus refer to the states or condition of being “mental”; that is, “of or pertaining to the mind” or “that which is of the nature of mind or of mental action”, and so forth (OED).

In taking up Senellart’s point, Kessl and Kutscher (2008) note that “[s]emantically “governmentality” denotes the way of governing – like “musicalité” (musicality) denotes the form of music and the way of being able to make music, or ”spatialité” (spatiality) denotes the formation of spaces (ibid.: 23, my italics). The Annales School, implicitly invoked by Gordon with his reference to Lucien Febvre, undertook social histories covering long-term durations (la longue durée) that focused upon the intellectual worldviews of common people; that is, their “mentality” (mentalité). Foucault did not do a history of mentalities, attitudes, worldviews, and so forth; he was not writing about the wider mind-sets of past cultures, social groups, or peoples, nor how these mind-set affect contemporary worldviews. What he wrote was neither a history of ideas (Foucault 1985, 2001c) nor a history of mentalities (Foucault 1972) but a history of thought or of systems of thought, a critical history of thought, a materialist history of rationality, an archaeology of savoir, and so forth, that questions the materialism of the incorporeal (Foucault 1981). It is important here to distinguish between thought (pensée), as conceptualized by Foucault, and ideas (idées), mentalities (mentalité), world-views (Weltanschauung), and so forth, more generally. Looking at mentalities, rather than rationalities, takes us back to analyzing substantives: mental character or disposition, outlook, kind or degree of intelligence, and so forth, or the material conditions of existence that form or structure consciousness, and the like (cf. Dean 2010: 24ff.). That is to say, it takes us back to doing analyses of behaviours, ideas, societies, ideologies, and so forth. In other words, governmentality has nothing to do with consciousness: pace Dean (2010), I do not think that it address ‘how we think about governing’ (ibid.: 24, emphasis added) so much as it questions what has been thought vis-à-vis what there is to govern and how to govern it (Foucault grappled with this issue in the ‘Forward to the English Edition’ of The Order of Things, where he talked about replacing ‘X thought that…’ with ‘it was known that…’, see Foucault 2002a: xiv-xv). On this view, if governmentality is a neologism compounding two terms, those terms have to be government and rationality (government and reason, to govern rationality), and not govern and mentality; where the latter term refers to the states or condition of being “rational”; that is, “of or pertaining to reason”. Hence, government as this pertains not to mental activity but to rational thought.

3 – A final clarification can be had by differentiating between a narrow sense of government/governmentality and a broader understanding of these terms. It is certainly the case the Foucault’s conceptualizations of government and of governmentality went from being rather restricted notions to becoming
more or less synonymous with an analytics of power per se (see the discussion of this shift in Senellart 2007), and it may prove instructive to play upon this difference. That is, the difference between governmentality as this pertains to questions of political reason and political sovereignty, and governmentality as a synonym for an analytics of power more generally. On the one hand, then, governmentality can be thought in a narrow sense in which government is differentiated from questions of sovereignty, and questions of discipline: in a lecture from 1978, the publication of which kick-started studies in governmentality (Foucault 2001d: 201-222), Foucault states that ‘in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government’ (ibid.: 219). We can mark a differentiation between sovereignty, discipline, and government by noting the differences between the notions of “determination”, “imposition”, and “conduction”. If there is determination then there is no open relation of power; an example of this “negative” conceptualization of power would be the deductive practices of sovereignty (see, e.g. Foucault 2003a: 48); that is, those juridico-political practices that say “no” or that “take away” (Foucault 1978: Part Five; 2003c: lecture from 17th March 1976). If there is not determination but there is imposition then there is no relation of government; an example might be the reductive practices of discipline; those anatamo-political practices in which processes, bodily movements, and the movement of bodies, and so forth, are reduced to the bare minimum required—that is to say, to the most efficient means (Foucault 1977a: Part Three). If there is neither determination nor imposition, however, then we have a relation of government, and discourses and practices of governmentality (see Rose 1999, especially Ch. 2). In this third differentiation, government is delimited, analytically and conceptually, to those actions that act upon the actions of free subjects, and only insofar as they are free (Foucault 2001d: 340-342), in order to get such subjects to act upon their own actions (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 105-106); it is a conducting of the conduct of others inducive of or conducive to the conducting of one’s own conduct. On this view, government is neither determinating nor imposing; it is disposing—it is neither deduct nor reductive; it is inductive and conducive.

The concept of power, then, captures a number of singular modalities of its exercise: sovereign power, disciplinary and/or anatamo-political power, and various modes of governmentality power. What I am interested in here is a subset of this third modality. This third modality can refer to pastoral power (Foucault 2001d: 298-325, 326-348); to mechanisms of security (Foucault 2007b: first three lectures); to bio-political power (Foucault 1978, 2003c, 2008a); to noso-political power (Foucault 2001d: 90-105); to liberal or neo-liberal arts of government (Foucault 2007b, 2008a), or to advanced liberalism (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b; Dean 1999; Donzelot 1979a; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 1999); and so forth. However, since we are questioning concerning government not historically (i.e. archaeologico-genealogically) but from the perspective of the present (i.e. architecturally), none of these terms may apply. Whilst, in their different ways,
these modalities of exercising relations of power, these different discourses and techniques, may be said to form the conditions of possibility of our present, they do not describe or depict that present; they merely describe the contingencies that have made it possible. What we are to question, in questioning concerning the present order of things from within that very order, are relations of government that are in-process, or that are in-formation.

It is here that we broaden out the question of governmentality from its narrow focus upon question of political reason and political sovereignty to an analytics of power more generally. Since we are posing questions to power in the present present vis-à-vis its problematizations and programmes, we are going to take up the question of governmentality both in the more narrow sense of governing through induction and/or conduction or through what Rose (1999) calls “freedom”, and in the broader sense of an analytics of power more generally. In addition, the focus of our modified version of studies in governmentality will thus not be sovereignty, discipline, or the various modes of governmentality, understood in the narrow sense, but will question the exercising of relations of power by way of the concept of control. Since we are attempting to describe what is under construction, in-process, or in-formation, and the like, the concept of control nominalistically and proximally names the object of our enquiry. What it names is not so much a “complex strategical situation” but rather, and more specifically, complex tactical sites. Control, here, is not a type of power—ideal or otherwise; it is a sub-set of a governmental analytic that is delimited to analyzing tactics: the programmatic-technological aspect of government (not a diagnostics of technology per se, nor a strategical analysis of the instrumentalizations and/or operationalizations of the effects of the implementations of technologies and relations of power—see below—in particular, but an analytics of specific dispositives, of the technology-programmes of government).

The domain to be analysed in terms of the present present and its problematizations, then, is government not governance. Government, here, is being understood in the narrow sense which distinguishes it from both sovereign and disciplinary power in that it conceptualizes the exercising of a relation of power not as an action that acts directly or immediately upon others, nor as an action that imposes itself upon the actions of others, but as an action that acts upon the actions of others so as to get them to act upon their own actions. This narrow sense of government is then to be expanded into a broader understanding of government, which is now conceptualized as a more general analytics of power. What I think we need to avoid in questioning concerning the exercising of contemporary relations of power in this way are predefined and/or ready-made models, conceptualizations, analyses, and so forth, of said relations and the techniques that allow for their exercise. That is to say, we have to put aside all notions of sovereignty, discipline, pastoralism, bio-politics, liberalism and its avatars, and so forth; at least in the first instance. At some point, we may
even have to put aside the conceptualization of the exercising of a relation of power as a conducting of conducts that acts upon actions. In other words, if we want to render visible the specificity of a particular present-day technology of government, if we want to render intelligible the kinds of relations, techniques, and rationalities specific to it, we need to undertake an analytics of that programme, and not impose upon it pre-conceived concepts and their conceptualizations.

As noted at the start of the thesis, we need to be specialized. What this means in not that we need to become specialists, if by this term we mean an authoritative authority, but that we need to be specialized understood in the etymological sense of “special” derived from “species” (from Latin speciālis “particular”, from speciēs “form, kind, sort”, OED). To be specialized, in this sense, means that we need to maintain things in the dispersion that is proper to them, and thus render visible the specific figurations of the particular technology under consideration. Only after having undertaken a detailed description of the specific relations, knowledges and techniques, and rationalities evidenced in a particular programme of power can we begin to think about how and in what ways it may or may not relate to other more historical modalities of exercising relations of power. Only when we have rendered visible and thus intelligible the specific technology that will allow for a particular relation of government to be exercised can we start to think about whether it is merely a repetition of prior forms, whether or not it modifies certain aspects of prior configurations of government, whether or not it combines certain elements of different regimes of government and not others, or whether it lays out something novel and innovative, and thus radically new and not seen before. Taking this “unknown” on board, and in order to give us an object of enquiry, I am going to call this unknown but to be rendered visible and thus intelligible exercising of contemporary relations of power “control”.

3 Control

The nominal and catachrestic concept of “control” is designed to designate two things: Firstly, it signpost the fact that what we are questioning is the contemporary; that what we are to do is field-work in, on, and upon the present; that we are questioning the present from the perspective of itself; and that what we are to investigate is an order of things—discourses, techniques, programmes, technologies, and so forth—that is in-process. On this view, it is designed, at least in part, to move beyond not only the now sterile, overburdened, overused, and overworked notions of “panopticism” and “disciplinary power”, but also such concepts as bio-politics, liberalism, welfarism, neo-liberalism, advanced liberalism, and so on. That is to say, it is being used to mark a difference from other established, institutionalized, and/or instrumentalized forms of exercising relations of power. For whilst these terms me be used, adjectively, to name what is now passed and/or settled, they ought not be used to name and/or describe
what is *in-transition*. Secondly, and following of from the above, “control” is being used to act as a *placeholder* to be substituted and filled-out by concrete empirical enquiry (i.e. the aforementioned field-work). On this view, “control” is, by design, an empty concept, because it is a skeletal concept that is to be fleshed-out by way of field-work in the contemporary. It neither presupposes nor preconceives. It does not name or designate a natural object (a referent), nor is it an abstraction representing the essential characteristics or traits of a regime of practice (ideal type). It is not a model, archetype, or ideal type to be imposed *on* or superimposed *upon* the present; it is a question to be posed to the present.

Discipline, for example, proximally and nominalistically names a relation of power or, in any case, a certain form of such a relation, because it names the techniques—or the modality thereof—in, by, and through which that relation is to be exercised. Discipline thus names a relation of power because it names the techniques that allow for that relation to be exercised. The concept of control performs the same function, but whereas Foucault was able to name and differentiate between certain modalities of exercising a power relation—and this because he was describing what was, for the most part, over and done with—because what we are to question are things that are in-transition or in-process, it is not possible to give a definitive name to the different techniques we are to describe. That is to say, since we are questioning multiple and heterogeneous technologies in the dispersion that is proper to them, knowledges and techniques that may or may not agglutinate into an overall thematized strategy, I propose the term *control* to provide us with an object of enquiry. Control is thus the object of a study in governmentality that is to undertake an analytics of the contemporary by way of field-work in the present. Such an enquiry does not take as its point of departure pre-conceived notions of discipline, bio-power, or liberalism and its avatars. Rather, it seeks to disclose conceptualizations of the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the good life inhering in programmes and/or technologies of control by rendering visible the discourses and techniques in, by, and through which this nature, that order, and thus that form of life are to be realized.

A precedent for the former type of usage of control can be found in Deleuze (Deleuze 1992a, 1992b; see also Rose 1999: Ch. 7); however, I would want to separate my use of this term from Deleuze’s notion of “societies of control”, which tends towards substantializing control as a *state-of-affairs*. For example, Deleuze state that the ‘socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception, would have to be categorical and to describe what is already in the process of substitution from the disciplinary sites of enclosure’ (Deleuze 1992a: 7). Or, as he stated this elsewhere, ‘the disciplines which Foucault describes are the history of what we gradually ceasing to be, and our present-day reality takes on the form of dispositions of overt and continuous *control* in a way which is very different from recent closed disciplines’ (Deleuze 1992b: 164). However, whilst Deleuze’s concept of control is useful for marking a
distinction between it and prior institutionalized and/or instrumentalized forms and types of exercising relations of power, I would want to replace Deleuze’s rather abstract and generalizing formulations with concrete empirical detail: “What are the specific techniques and knowledges in, by, and through which some propose to govern the conduct of others?” Government, here, is not only related to those relations of power that aim to govern what we might call the marginalized (i.e., the abnormal, the indigent, the indolent etc.); it connotes all those micro-practices in which some attempt to get others to conduct themselves by being conducive to or inductive of the conducting of one’s own conduct in particular, delimited, and specified ways.

As Deleuze himself put it, ‘[t]o untangle [disentangle] the lines of a dispositive is, in each case, to draw up a map, a cartography, [it is] to survey unknown lands, and this is what [Foucault] calls “field-work” [“work in the field”, “work on the ground”]. We must be located on the same lines that not only make up a dispositive but traverse it and carry it along, from north to south, from east to west, or diagonally’ (Deleuze 2007: 338-339, modified; perhaps Deleuze was referring to Foucault 1998: 450). In other words, we not only have to grasp such mechanisms of control at their inception, we also have to remain at the level of their specificity by undertaking field-work in particular dispositives (we shall return to this notion below). What this means is Deleuze’s notion of “control” ‘should not be understood sociologically, but in terms of the emergence of new possibilities and the complexification of the old’, in which the various ‘metaphors’ employed by Deleuze ‘function more as hypotheses than conclusions’ (Rose 1999: 234-235). Here, I follow Rose when he states that there is ‘no overarching “post-disciplinary” logic, but rather a multiplication of possibilities and strategies deployed around different problematizations in different sites and with different objectives’ (ibid.: 240). On this view, then, ‘[w]e should not emulate sociologists by seeking to chart the emergence of a “post-disciplinary” society’ (ibid.). Rather, ‘we should seek to identify the emergence of new control strategies and the reconfiguration of old ones’ (ibid.). But whereas for Rose such an analysis is ‘genealogical not sociological’ (ibid.: 242), from the perspective detailed previously, the analytic being put forward here, whilst not being sociological, is archaeological in its method and genealogical in its finalités.

Nevertheless, and bearing in minds all this specificity, control, as the object of study, can be studied by taking up some of the concepts and thematics of an analytics of government—not as a historical analytics that diagnoses and strategizes the present, but as an analytics of the contemporary that seeks to diagnose and thus to strategize the future. In what follows, in taking up the narrow sense of government and poising it as a question in terms of the broader understanding of this term, in posing questions to government and governmentality as these are laid out in the present present by way of the rejoinders to its problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes, and in posing such question from within the order of the present-day order of things,
we will now look in a little more detail at the concepts of control (relations of power or conducting conducts) and technology (the exercising of relations of power—the discourses and techniques that allow for that relation to be exercised—or environing environments), and of how to question them, vis-à-vis the contemporary, by way of what I will call “the architectonics of control”.
III. Architectonics

[In undertaking the internal and architectonic analysis of a work (be it a literary text, philosophical system, or scientific work)...one has already called back into question the absolute character and founding role of the subject. (Foucault 'What is an Author?').

I have never been entirely satisfied with the emphasis placed by studies in governmentality upon the phrase “the conduct of conduct(s)” (conducting the conduct of..., conducting conducts, etc.), and for the following reasons. To me, what the expression “the conduct of conducts” expresses is the relational aspects of relations of power or governmentalities. That is to say, it names the specific form of relation of power, which is not deductive or reductive but conductive of the conduct of other in that it acts upon the actions of others so as to induce in them the conducting of their own conduct, as this is laid-out or set-out in a technical programme. Specifically, it designates ‘a form of activity [i.e. “conducting”] aiming to shape, guide or affect [i.e. “to conduct”] the conduct [i.e. “the actions”] of some person or persons’ (Gordon 1991: 2). What this phrase is emphasizing, or so it seems to me, is the distinction that can be drawn, conceptually and analytically, between “strategic games between liberties” (freedom or an open field of possibilities) and “states of domination” (that which is ordinarily called “power”). Or, to be more specific, in names a relation that sits between, and thus is related to, games of power and states of domination. Thus, for example, whilst the actions of a king torturing and executing a failed assassin might correctly be called a state of domination, the desired effect of this act, however, is to act upon the actions of others: the spectators of the spectacle. In other words, whilst torture, execution, or other forms of overt violence are certainly the means by which a sovereign relation of power is exercised, it is also more than this, since the aim of the theatre of spectacular might is to conduct the conduct of others by acting upon their actions in such a way as to induce in them the conducting of their own conduct. Is this, then, an act of sovereignty or an act of government? Likewise, disciplinary power, as exemplified by the panoptic principle, is an imposition, but it is an imposing that aims to have its effect by being conducive to and inductive of the conducting of one’s own conduct. It aims to produce its effect through the architecturing of a spatio-temporal grid in which those subject to it internalize the constrains of power: ‘[h]e who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribed in himself the relation of power in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection’ (Foucault 1977a: 202-203). In other words, this is an exercising of a relation of power in which the exercising of that relation,
whilst being an imposition, is also taken up and exercised by the one subjected to it. That is to say, the conduct of conducts acts upon the actions of others in such a way as to be conducive to and inductive of the conducting of one’s own conduct. Again, is this a disciplinary relation of power or is it a form of government? In other words, the phrase “conducting of conducts” both names and describes the relation of power, but it does not disclose the “in such a way” of that relation; that is to say, it describe the exercising of that relation, but does not disclose the techniques and tactics, the processes and procedures, and so forth, that allows for that relation to be exercised.

What is of interest here, then, is not just these strategic games between liberties or these states of domination but also the governmental discourses and techniques, the governmental technologies that allow for the conducting of conducts. Whilst the starting point of such an analytics, the point of departure of the analysis, if you will, is the perspective of power as strategic games between liberties, and whilst the aim of such an analytics is to disclose how and in what ways these strategic games of power congeal or agglutinate and come to form states of domination, thus making possible a diagnostics and hence a strategization of the present and of present-day forms of subjectivity, the actual analytic itself is of the different means by which a power relation is to be exercised and that allow for or enable that relation to be exercised. That is to say, what an analytics of power analyses are the governmental technologies to be deployed and/or employed in governing others; where the term “technology” precisely designates the articulation of discourses and techniques or power-knowledge. This is because it is in, by, and through an analytics of such technologies that we are able to distinguish between one modality of exercising a relation of power and another, as well as to describe the possible institutionalization of such relations, and the effectivity and instrumentalization of said relations conceptualized as states of domination. In other words, one analyzes the conducting of conducts not in and of itself but by way of an analytics of the techniques and discourses that allow its exercise. Such an analytics enquires into the programmatic aspect of a technology of power that seeks to work out, plan, set-out, and lay-out, and so forth, a spatio-temporal matrix of probability (e.g. Foucault 2001d: 341; ‘à aménager la probabilité’, Foucault 2001b: 1056); what I will call the architecturing of environments of probability or, more succinctly, environing environments. To be more specific still, what we need to analyze is not just the discourses and techniques, the epistemic and technical matrices, but also the thought and rationality not underlying or grounding these techniques but inhabiting them: for example, not just the architectural plan, the architecting, or the actual architecture of the panopticon, but what we might call its architectonics: the grammar, as it were, of these pro-grammes and dia-grams for exercising relations of power.

Relations of government, technologies of government (thought), and rationalities of government or governmentalities (to employ the polysemic term
that encapsulates all of these), are as much acquisitive as they are inventive. In questioning concerning the methods of exercising a relation of power or arts of government—i.e. the architectonics of control—we have to take into account that these are not simply unique inventions, but nor are they merely established techniques and knowledges applied to new domains. On the contrary, they are just as much re-con-figurations as they are figurations and configurations: they take elements from here and there, as well as inventing new methods. Historical research has the possibility to map out this “here and there”; non-historical research of the contemporary, on the other hand, is delimited to mapping out the figurations of knowledge and discourse, techniques and tactics, and so forth, evidenced in programmes that have as their goal the environing of environments of control; that is, of conducting the conduct of others by technologically inducing these others to conduct their own conduct. An analytics of government or studies of governmentality, then, ‘must distinguish relations of power understood as strategic games between liberties—in which some try to determine the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be determined or try to determine the conduct of the others—and the states of domination, which are what is ordinarily called the power’ (Foucault 1997: 299, modified). The ways in which it does this is by way of an analytics of technologies of power: ‘between games of power and states of domination, you have governmental technologies’ (ibid., modified). And an analytics of these technologies ‘is necessary, because it is often through such techniques that states of domination are established and maintained’ (ibid.). In a moment, we will look a little closer a conceptualizing and analyzing the techniques that allow for the exercising of a relation of power; that is, not just the conducing of conduct but also the arranging of probability. Before this, however, I first want to specify the concept and conceptualizations of technology.

1 Technology

The differentiations noted above between government and governance, and between thought/rationality and mentality, equally apply to how we conceptualize and analyze technology vis-à-vis governmental technologies or technologies of power. In other words, since we are taking up and working with a concept of technology, conceptualized by Foucault as “the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject”, as these pertain to conducting the conduct of others, then technology needs to be thought precisely in terms of thought and rationality. Consequently, what I want to do here is to broach the question of technology and to discuss how this term is not delimited to, and thus limited to describing, concrete material devices, mechanisms and machines, instruments and apparatuses, appliances of various sorts, and so forth. What I want to put forward is the notion that the term technology—understood etymological in terms of tekhnē—refers just as much, if not more so, to incorporeal contrivances (in the sense of “to devise, invent,
design”, “to excogitate”) as it does concrete material contraptions. Another way to conceptualize this is by way of a distinction, often made in studies in governmentality, between technologies, programmes, and strategies. This distinction, derived from Donzelot (1979b) and developed by Gordon (1980), proposes that, in undertaking an analysis not of power but in terms of power, ‘it is necessary to keep in mind a basic distinction between three...general orders of event: that of certain forms of explicit, rational, reflected discourses; that of certain non-discursive social and institutional practices; and that of certain effects produced within the social field’ (ibid.: 246; see Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006: 85ff.).

Whilst I agree with the general thrust and overall logic of Gordon’s ‘exegetical fiction’ (Gordon 1980: 242), I think that the terminology, and, more specifically, the conceptualization of this terminology, can be re-worked to our advantage. Specifically, I think that we need to re-think and re-situate the concepts of technology. Whilst Gordon conceptualizes these three general orders of events in terms of “programmes” (discourse, the discursive, the conceptual), “technology” (the non-discursive, the practical, the institutional), and “strategy” (real but unintended effects, instrumentalization), I think it more expedient, vis-à-vis questioning the present from the perspective of itself, to re-think them in terms of programmes (articulations), institutionalizations, and instrumentalizations, and to conceptualize technology not as one instance in this chain but as encapsulating all three levels or orders of events. The reason for this re-naming, re-figuring, and re-conceptualizing is that, in taking up Foucault’s conceptualization of technology as the articulation of the epistemic and the technical, I do not think that technology explicitly and exclusively denotes or, in any case, is delimited to describing the realm of the non-discursive. To understand technology as referring to the non-discursive, the practical, the institutional, and so forth, is to delimit the concept of technology to material devices, apparatuses, contraptions, and the like. Rather, I think that the concept of technology encapsulates each of these moments: technology in is programmatic aspect, technology in its non-discursive institutional aspect, and technology in its strategic or instrumental aspect. Moreover, each of these orders or levels of events, vis-à-vis technology thus re-conceptualized, have a form of rationality specific to it. In addition, in conceptualizing technology in this way, and in conceptualizing the programmatic aspect of technology by way of its etymological relation to tekhnē (and thus to epistēmē), will enable us to get at what I will later call the architectonic aspect of technologies of power; that is, at what Donzelot, following Pasquino, called “theory-programmes” (Donzelot 1979b: 77).

Architectonics, as the ‘programmatic field’ (ibid.: 78) in which we are to work, will be mapped out by way of what I will call an architectural analytics. Broaching the question concerning technology in this way, allows us to blur the distinction, without erasing it, between thinking and doing, thought and practice, the material and the incorporeal, and so on.
Thinking this slightly differently, technology should not be delimited to institutional and/or non-discursive practices and programmes to the discursive and/or conceptual (Gordon 1980: 252). It seems to me that Foucault’s concept of technology, conceptualized as the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourses about the subject, or power-knowledge, is a conceptualization that precisely seeks to overcome the antinomies of theory and practice. ‘This style of research’, Foucault once noted, ‘avoids all problems of anteriority of theory in relation to practice, and vice-versa’, and this because it deals ‘with practices, institutions, and theories on the same plane and according to their isomorphisms’ (Foucault 1998: 262, modified, emphasis added). Placing this conceptualization of orders of events in a somewhat different ordering, we can say that they run from their formation (from multiple and heterogeneous techniques and discourses: e.g. the plague town, schooling, handwriting, handling a rifle, layout of a factory or hospital, etc.), to their articulation in specific technological programmes (e.g. treaties and reforms concerning penal imprisonment), to the technological institutionalization of such programmes (e.g. the prison; discipline), to their real (intended and unintended) effects, and, finally, to the technological instrumentalization of these effects. Of course, this should not be thought, exclusively, as a linear process; rather, what we have are a number of levels or orders of events that run simultaneously; sometime conjointly, sometime separately; sometime working in tandem, sometime working in opposition; sometime moving at the same pace, sometime at different speeds; and so on, and forth.

An analysis of the disjunct between a programme (e.g. panopticon) and its implementation and thus institutionalization is what Foucault terms strategies (Foucault 2007a: 65): ‘[t]hese programmes don’t take effect in the institutions in an integral manner; they are simplified, or some are chosen and not others; and things never work out as planned’ (Foucault 2001d: 231, emphasis added). This disjunct, he goes on to note, ‘is not one between the purity of the ideal and the disorderly impurity of the real, but that in fact there are different strategies which are mutually opposed, composed and superposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects which can perfectly well be understood in terms of their rationality, even though they don’t conform to the initial programming: this is what gives the resulting [dispositive] its solidity and suppleness’ (ibid.: 232). By taking up Gordon’s highly accomplished and sophisticated conceptualization, vis-à-vis the discursive, the non-discursive, and the effective, but rethinking these terms in a way that avoids differentiating between the conceptual (discursive) and the practical (non-discursive), or at least thinks these differently, gives us a powerful set of tools to be able to think about and analyze the thought and/or rationality inhabiting each level or order of events: the programmatic, the institutional, and the instrumental.

As we shall see in a moment, the term “architectonics” is to be used to specifically designates the programmatic aspect of technologies of government;
that is, what various authorities want or wanted to happen, their “theory-programmes”; “control” is to be used as a way to materialize—that is, to render visible—the exercising of relations of power without substantializing power. One reason for proposing the notion of control has been signposted by Donzelot (1979b) who, in asking ‘how is one to exorcise this substantialization of power?’, replies, ‘[p]erhaps through abandoning this very term power, the trouble with which, one can clearly see, is to contain welded to it the idea of an instrument and an agent’ (ibid.: 77). As we shall see in the concluding chapter to this part of the thesis, the phrase architectural of control is being taken up and used precisely to put forward a conceptualization of instrument as agent and to analyze such instruments—techniques and discourses—as being the agent of transformation. The distinction that I draw between technologies and programmes, then, is not one of kind or general order of events but of formalization and articulation; the latter as being but one aspect of the former in which the former articulates ‘certain forms of explicit, rational, reflected discourses’, ‘discourses which construct programmes for the formation of social reality’, ‘discourses whose object-domains are defined simultaneously as a target area of intervention and a functioning totality to be brought into existence’ (Gordon 1980: 245, emphasis added). What Gordon refers to as technologies—“certain non-discursive social and institutional practices”—smacks too much of concrete technological devices, of contraptions rather than contrivances; the order of historical events that he refers to by means of this term would, I think, be much better captured by the concept of institutionalization; that is, the concrete implementation and/or material instantiation of certain programmatic technologies, their actual take-up in institutional settings; or, stated otherwise, the tactical deployment of the “articulation of certain techniques and of certain kinds of discourse about the subject”. What would be analyzed here is technology in its institutional aspect.

Technology, thus understood, traverses the discursive/non-discursive divide without erasing it; it cuts across and criss-crosses both the discursive (conceptual) and the non-discursive (practical); programmes—architectonics—are explicitly discursive, although, the distinction is not so important here. The implementation of a programmatic technology—its institutionalization—also criss-crosses the discursive/non-discursive divide; but, again, the distinction is not important here. One of the distinctions to be drawn between the discursive and the non-discursive is that the latter term ‘is generally applied to every kind of more-or-less constrained, learned behaviour’ (Foucault 1980: 197). That is to say, ‘[e]verything which functions in a society as a system of constraint and which isn’t an utterance, in short, all the field of the non-discursive social, is an institution’ (ibid.: 198). Therefore, the only time in which a strong distinction is to be drawn between the discursive and the non-discursive, the only time attention needs to be paid to it and in which it needs to be analyzed, is when there is a disjunct between a technological programme and its deployment or institutionalization, and the employment of such a programme in reality, its
instrumentalization; that is to say, when things do not work out as planned (Foucault 2001d: 231; 1980: 198; Donzelot 1979b: 77-78; Gordon 1980: 251). It is this disjunct between the aim or goal—the teleology—of a technological programme and its effects in the real that a strategic analysis of the technological instrumentalization of the real comes into force.

Here, we need to separate out and mark a difference between “strategic games between liberties”, which are the point of departure for an analytics of power, and a “strategic analyses” or strategies, which questions states of domination. Concerning the latter, there is no simple direct causal logic between a programme, its institutionalization, its effects in the real, and its reintegration into the programme by way of instrumentalization. One of the reasons Foucault calls what happens “effects” rather than “products” is because the notion of “production” implies the intentions of the producer: initial plan, working upon material, the means used, and the end product produced, and so forth. However, because “things never work out as planned” we should refer to what actually materializes in the deployment and employment of a programme not as its product but as its real but unintended or unprogrammed effect. The distinction that is being drawn here—between an explicit programme and its real world effects—is a distinction between what we can call the dispositive and the effective. In addition, it also ties in with the conceptualization of a programme as a response to an urgent need, that is, as a specific response to a form of problematization (see, e.g. Foucault 1980: 194-196), a response that takes the form of a prescriptive scheme or plan draw up prior to its execution. Here, the concept of a programme is used in the etymological sense of something “written” beforehand (from Greek: pro- “before” + graphein “to write”, OED).

The French term dispositif has an English equivalent that shares the same etymology, if not exactly the same broader meaning, as the French. This term is the aforementioned dispositive. Both French and English terms are related to the Latin dispōnēre: “to put in order, arrange, distribute” (from dis- “apart” + ponere “to put, to place”, OED; see also Agamben 2009; Bussolini 2010; Deleuze 1992b). The advantage of using this term to translate the French, as opposed to “apparatus”, “device”, “deployment”, “set-up”, “social apparatus”, and so forth (see the ‘Translator’s Note’ in Foucault 2006b: xxiii), is that it not only denotes “disposition” or “appointment”, it also has connotations relating it to “dispensing” or “inclining”. On the one hand, this term avoids any hard distinction between the conceptual and the practical; on the other hand, and in the latter sense of “having the function of directing, controlling, or disposing of something”, and thus of “relating to direction, control, or disposal”, it is “often opposed to effective, and so nearly = preparatory, conducive, contributory” (OED). Situating the programmatic aspect of technology or architectonics within the dispositive, rather than the effective, both highlights and signposts the ways in which such programmes aim to dispose or incline by being preparatory, conducive, or contributory to certain dispositions or inclinations. As an aside
here, it is interesting to note that Elden (1998) takes Foucault’s concept of dispositif ‘to be a translation and utilisation of Heidegger’s Ge-stell’ (ibid.: 5; 2001: 110-111; see also Agamben 2009: 12ff., who notes the etymological similarity between the German stellen and the Latin ponere). I would rather say that Ge-stell refers to the positivity of a dispositivity, to the com-posing of a composite which seeks to dis-pose; or, stated otherwise, to the placing together of that which is placed together in order to place apart (i.e. set-out, laid-out, or arranged), which is to say, to lay-out probability. On this view, Foucault’s use of dispositif would seem to have more in common with Heidegger’s notion of Bestand—understood in the sense of disposing (see Rojcewicz 2006: 83ff).

If the concept of positivity refers to that general space of knowledge (savoir) in which different discourses come to pose to the same kinds of objects, speak from the same styles of enunciative modalities, employ the same forms of concepts, and deploy the same types of strategies (Foucault 1972; 1998: 297-333), then the concept of dispositivity, in addition to encapsulating the concept of positivity and supplementing the epistemic with the technical (Foucault 1980: 196-197), also moves to the other side of the equation, as it were, and describes what various authorities want or wanted to happen. It is called a dispositive when such programmes or governmental technologies refer to the same kinds of governable objects, seek to govern from the same styles of governmental modalities, employ the same forms of governmental techniques, and deploy the same types of governmental strategies. In other words, it captures the notion that the exercising of relations of power are not only subject to, but are also exercised through and by means of conditions of possibility (Gordon 1980): the French dispositif, in addition to denoting “device”, “mechanism”, and so forth, also connotes “plan of action”. A strategic analysis or strategics (Foucault 1996b) refers to and analyses the unintended consequences of the actual deployment and employment of technological programmes. That is to say, it analyses the effectivity of a dispositivity; not specifically in terms of their particular and practical every-day use (analyzed in terms of governance and by way of interpretive methodologies or ethnographies), but in terms of their real but unprogrammed effects in, on, and upon the real, and in terms of the disjunct between the institutionalization of a technological programme, its effects in the real, and the reintegration of the effective back into a programme by way of the instrumentalization of the effective real (see Gordon 1980: 250ff).

It is important here to re-invoke the distinction, made above, between governance and government; strategics is still an analytic of government. As Gordon notes, ‘the concepts of strategy, programmes, and technologies of power serve to analyze not the perfect correspondence between the orders of discourse, practices, and effects’—that is, between what I have called a the programmatic, the institutional, and the instrumental—‘but the manner in which they fail to correspond and the positive significance that can attach to such discrepancies’ (ibid.: 247). But as he goes on to state, this discrepancy should not be broached in
terms of ‘the gulf between the intentions of a human agent and the results of their actions’ (ibid.) but, rather, in terms of this disjuncts ‘real but unprogrammed effects’ (ibid.: 248). Lastly, ‘[w]hereas programmes/technologies of power [and their institutional deployment] have essentially to do with the formation of the social real, strategic activity [i.e. employment] consists in the instrumentalization of the real’ (ibid.: 251). In other words, the former are dispositive, whereas the latter are effective. As we shall see, because we are questioning the present from the perspective of itself, and since we are thus questioning the exercising of contemporary relations of power from the perspective of their programmatic or architectonic modality, we are, at least to a certain extent, debarred from questioning the effective or strategic aspect of technologies of power. Rather, what we can question is how such technologies aim to bring into being certain forms of existence by structuring certain forms of reality; that is, their dispositivity. Whilst the foregoing conceptualization of the dispositive and the effective does not entirely accord with Foucault’s use of these terms, since my aim is not to furnish a commentary upon Foucault but to put his work to work by manufacturing our own tools, and since we are to apply those tools to the present by working in the present, this conceptualization does accord with our working in, on, and upon the present as the provent and not the emergent.

2 The Exercising of Relations of Power

As noted, then, in the governmentality literature, government is invariably defined as a “conduct of conduct(s)” (notable examples being: Dean 1999; Donzelot 2008; Gordon 1991; Hindess 1997; Lemke 2012; Nadesan 2008; Rose 1999; Walters 2012). This description of government seems to have been taken up from Foucault’s 1978 Collège de France lecture on ‘Governmentality’ (Foucault 1991b; see also 2007b, 2008a), and propagated by Gordon’s (1991) influential introduction to The Foucault Effect: ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’. There is, however, another instance in which Foucault conceptualizes the exercise of power not only in term of the form of its relation (conducting conduct) but also in terms of the forms of techniques that allow for that relation to be exercised (what I will call environing environments). In the original French, this sentence reads: ‘L’exercice du pouvoir consiste à «conduire des conduites» et à aménager la probabilité’ (Foucault 2001b: 1056). The sentence comes from the essay ‘The Subject and Power’. Now, there are two things to note about this essay. The first is that this essay was written by Foucault to help clarify his work on power to an American audience and, in that sense, can be read as something like a definitive statement on the subject of power (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: xiii; see also Gordon 2001: xii). The second point is that this essay consists of two parts: ‘Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject’ and ‘How Is Power Exercised?’ The first part of the essay was written by Foucault in English; the second part, however, was originally written in French and then translated into English for publication in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s (1983) book on Foucault (see Foucault
The sentence just cited comes from the second part of the essay; which is to say, it was originally written in French.

There are two alternative versions of this sentence available in English translation: The first reads, ‘[t]he exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’ (Foucault 1982: 789; 1983c: 221). The second reads, ‘[t]he exercise of power is a “conduct of conducts” and a management of possibilities’ (Foucault 2001d: 341). As noted, the first part of this conceptualization (the ubiquitous “conduct of conduct(s)”, “guiding the possibility of conduct”) has been chiefly taken up and developed by studies in governmentality. The second part of the sentence (“putting in order the possible outcomes”, “managing possibilities”), however, whilst perhaps implicit in some studies in governmentality, has tended to be almost universally ignored. I have, for example, come across just three instance of its full citation (Dean 2007: 82; Kelly 2009: 66; Rayner 2007: 106). Yet ever here, the second part of the conception has been passed over without further discussion. But it is here, I think, that we find Foucault at his most interesting and insightful.

I translate this sentence as ‘The exercise of power consists in “conducting conducts” and in arranging (setting-out, laying-out) probability’. There are three things to note here. Firstly, note that in my modified translation that in exercising a relation of power that that exercise “consists in” (consiste à) as a practice and not “consist of” as a substance. The second point to note is that the term aménager, as a transitive verb, has the sense of “to fit out” an office”; “to lay out a park”; “to develop or redevelop (renovate) an area”; “to plan or to work out a timetable”; to equip, to furnish, and so forth; thus aménager has the sense of arranging things: space, time, matter. The third point to note is that in the original French, Foucault does not talk about “putting in order the possible outcome” or “managing possibilities”. Rather, what is stated there is the “laying-out” or “working-out” of probability. Note here that the term probability is singular (probabilité) not plural; this signposts it as a technical term, and relates it to inductive reasoning and statistical inference.

Now, to say that something is possible means that it could happen (from Latin possibilitās, from possibilis: “that can be done”, from posse: “be able”; OED). It is not to say that it will happen or that it is likely to happen, it just states that it is possible or that it is not impossible. By way of contrast, to say that something is probable is to say that it is more likely to happen than not; in other words, probability is a measure of the likeliness that an event will occur. Bearing in mind that etymology is being used here as a way of building nominal concepts, etymologically speaking, probability (from Latin probābilitātem) derives from probable (from Latin probābilis) which has connotations of being “worthy of approval”, “pleasing”, “agreeable”, “acceptable”, and so forth (OED). So, as a technical term, which is to say as an analytical and conceptual term, probability not only denotes “likely to happen” but also connotes “likely to happen in an acceptable way”. To “manage possibilities”, then, would be to create the
conditions in which something could take place, to make it that it can happen. To “set-out, lay-out, or work-out probability”, on the other hand, is to attempt to structure things in such a way as to not only increase the likelihood that something will in fact take place or that it is likely that it will happen, it is to arrange or organize things in such a way as to make it more-or-less certain—in all probability—that it will happen, and that it will happen in the planned for way, which is to say, in an acceptable way. Hence, “managing possibilities” and “arranging probability” connote two very different modes of thought and to fundamentally different sets of practices. On this view, and working within the framework of the latter, the exercising of a relation of power consists in a practice that attempts to conduct the conduct of others by arranging things in such a way as to increase the probability that certain prescribed and approved forms of conduct will come into being.

Since this is the only place in which Foucault formulates things in exactly this way, I do not think we can read too much into this vis-à-vis Foucault scholarship (although Foucault used the term aménager, or various conjugations thereof—aménagé, aménagement, aménageait, etc.—, throughout his writings); I do, however, think that we can take up this conceptualization and use it as an analytic for broaching the question concerning the architectonics of control.

Here, then, we can conceptualize the exercising of relations of power as conducting conducts and setting-out or laying-out probability. Stated otherwise, we can say that the architectonic aspect of control names the organization of things (reconfiguring the space-time-matter of environments) in order to guide or direct the ways in which others conduct themselves, and to do so in such a way that certain forms of conduct are more likely to be produced than other inappropriate or less appropriate forms of behaviour. In other words, power does not act directly and immediately upon bodies (Foucault, 2001b, p. 340); rather, it acts upon others indirectly, mediatively, kinetically, synaesthetically, cybernetically, and so forth, by way of environments (e.g. the panoptic mechanism). In fact, we could say that government is that action that shapes, transforms, or reconfigures an open field of possibilities (freedom, in Foucault sense of this term) into a delimited, demarcated, or more-or-less circumscribed field of probability; a field in which action, thus acted upon, becomes more-or-less probable. Re-figuring this conceptualization of power, then, we could say that the exercising of relations of power consist in conducting conducts and in environing environments; it is this formulation that I shall employ from now on.

Exercising a relation of power, conceptualized thus, then, is not determinate and deductive, as with sovereign and juridico-political power; but nor is it imposing and reductive, as in the case of discipline and anatamo-political power; rather, it is conducive and inductive; it is, in short, dispositive. Specifically, conducting the conduct of others is only possible—and can only be said to constitute a relation of control—when those others whose actions are to be acted upon or whose conduct is to be conducted are potentially free to act and conduct.
themselves. An architectonics of control names those prescriptive discourses that attempt to dispose or incline by transform an open field of possibilities into a closed or more-or-less circumscribed field of probability; that is by architecting or envoirning environments of control.

Hence, the full characterization of the exercising of relations of power, as conceptualized here, is that it consists in “conducting conducts” and it consist in “environing environments”: not just governmentality but also environmentality. It is this aménagement (and réaménagement), this arrangement or organization (or reorganization or reworking), this architecting or envoirning environments of probability, this environmentality of governmentality that the term architectonics nominally conceptualizes and catasthetically names. Control is a way of looking at human relations in which some attempt to conduct the conduct of others; architectonics—or the rationality of envoirning environments as a means of conducting conducts—names the field in which we are to work when doing field-work in the contemporary by way of an architectural analytics of control.

3 Problematizations and Programmes

As Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke (2011a) note, programmes of power, government, or control, and so forth, ‘are both descriptive and prescriptive’ (ibid.: 11, emphasis added). On the one hand, ‘they always presume a reality that they describe and problematize’ (ibid.); on the other hand, they conceptualize said reality ‘as a target area for intervention and a functioning totality to be brought into existence’ (Gordon 1980: 245). That is to say, they both describe what is, and prescribe what will be; which is to say, what they want to happen. Now, although such discursive and technical programmes are ‘practical rationalit[ies] governed by a conscious goal’ (Foucault 2001d: 364), they are not to be questioned by way of consciousness—neither that of the programmers nor that of those whose conduct they intend to programme: ‘relations of power are simultaneously [à la fois] intentional and non-subjective’ (Foucault 1978: 94, modified). In other words, an analysis of programmes is neither ideology critique nor a critique of hegemony. That is to say, it has nothing to do with unmasking the truth, nor with deconstructing the sematic embedding of words, nor with uncovering the fixing of meaning, nor with unpacking how ideas insidiously insert themselves into consciousness. On the one hand, in talking of programmes, the focus of interest is not on the so-called programmer—that is, on the biography, psychology, or social context, and so forth, of the one who programmes: the programmist, architect, or chief builder (see Foucault 1991a: 60–61). On the other hand, such an enquiry does not presuppose that human behaviour can actually, definitely, and definitively be programmed or even that it is programmable. As Miller and Rose (2008) put it, the effects of such programmes are ‘not the “realization” of a programmer’s dream’, and this because ‘[t]he “real” always insists in the form of resistance to programming; and the programmer’s world is one of constant
experiment, invention, failure, critique and adjustment’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 39).

Rather, in enquiring into the descriptive, prescriptive, and codifying elements of a programme, what we are interested in are their architectonics and the ways in which such technologies attempt or, rather, propose to programme human conduct by programming, architecting, or environing environments. What I am interested in or, rather, what I am proposing we investigate are the programmatic elements of such programmings: the different and differential ways in which they place together what is placed together in order to be placed apart; their savoir, the thought they embody or that inhabits them; the knowledges they draw upon or employ; their logical and calculative rationale, vis-à-vis techniques; and the like. Here, the term “programme” accords with the sense of the word that emerged in the early nineteenth century of “a definite plan or scheme” (OED); it describes the codified and prescriptive discursivities, schematics, and/or diagrammatics that set-out or lay-out not only what is to follow (i.e. what is to be known and what is to be done) but also what is to be brought forth into existence (the formation of the real). Principally, since we are questioning human relations in terms of power, and since power is being conceptualized as government—that is, in terms of strategic relations of power and the tactics that enable those relations to be exercised, tactics or techniques that do not act directly or immediately upon bodies but act upon actions by way of environing environments—what I am interested in are those ‘discourses which construct programmes for the formation of a social reality’ (Gordon 1980: 245). For whilst we most certainly do not live programmed lives, let alone live in a programmed world, we do, nonetheless, ‘live in a world of programmes’ (ibid.). And whilst things may not turn out as planned, these dispositional technological programmes nevertheless have real-world effects.

On this view, a relation of power is not A getting B to do something that B would otherwise not do; rather, the exercising of a relation of power or, in any case, the programmes that set forth such exercise, are “world” making...: ‘[i]f we say that all human practices are possible only within relations and subject to conditions which are only finitely modifiable at a given point and time, then the exercise of [relations of] power can be conceived as the general aspect of practice within which these relations and conditions function as a material and a terrain of operation’ (ibid.: 246-246, emphasis added). Power is exercised through and by means of conditions of possibility to the extent that the exercising of a relation of power aims to work upon an open field of possibilities so as to re-configure it into a closed, delimited, or, in any case, more or less circumscribed—i.e. environed—field of probability: power not only constrains; it enables. Hence, what we are questioning when we question concerning architectonics are the tactical techniques, the setting-out or laying-out—the aménagement—that works open possibilities into pre-defined probability; that is to say, of probable action, conduct, deportment, comportment, and so forth.
What we have to avoid in analyzing programmes of power by way of fieldwork in contemporary architectonics of control are what Gordon calls ‘two massive illusions or paralogisms’ (Gordon 1980: 246). The first is the ‘illusion of realisation’; the second the ‘illusion of effectivity’ (see the discussion on page 13 above). One the one hand, we have to beware the pitfalls of conflating programmes with the domain of actual techniques; on the other hand, we likewise have to beware the supposition that these techniques are actually implemented and enforced upon a pre-given real. This is by no means to say that programmes are never actually deployed, nor is it to say that they are never employed. Rather, it is to acknowledge that ‘things never work out as planned’ (Foucault 2001d: 231, emphasis added), and to follow through on the implications of this in our analysis. Now, whilst it is possible to account for the actual practical and institutional deployment and employment of technologies of power and their forms of realization and effectivity genealogically (taken as a history of the present), it is not possible to do so—or, in any event, our ability to do so is severely limited—when questioning contemporary architectonics of control from the perspective of their, and thus of our own, present. This is simply because these programmes are, as it were, in-formation or in-process; they are what is taking place now, and not something that is more or less and for the most part over and done with; they are prevalent (problematizations) and dispositional (programmatic), not “emergent” and “effective”.

In addition to the above, we also need to recognize that programmes/architectonics not only lay-out what is to be done (viz. techniques for bringing into being the political order conducive to the “good life”), they also set-out what is—to be—known (viz. discourse concerning and the nature of “human nature” and thus the very conceptualization of the “good life”): “[e]very programme...either articulates or presupposes a knowledge of the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and/or which it is calculated to bring into being. The common axiom of programmes is that an effective power is and must be a power which knows the objects upon which it is exercised...[and] the condition that programmatic knowledge must satisfy is that it renders reality in the form of an object which is programmable’ (Gordon 1980: 248). This is the principle question: “How do programmes of control seek to architecture or environ reality?” “How do they render matter into a material form that is thought to be programmable and thus controllable?” “How is the fabric of the world to be woven not only into a material that is governable but also into a materiality that governs?” More specifically, “how are these materialities made thinkable in terms of government?” “What are the ways of seeing and saying and thinking and doing that transform beings into entities, entities which are then taken to be programmable and thus governable?” And “how are these ways of rendering visible, and so forth, articulated with techniques of control vis-à-vis technologies of power?” “What is the relation between something being made thinkable as governable/controllable and the articulation of techniques of
government/control?” That is to say, “how are they made thinkable in terms of
government (calculable, accountable, administrable, rationalizable, actionable,
conductive, inductive, etc.), and thus how are they thought governmentally in
terms of arts of government?”

Architecture here not only signposts ‘the art or science of building or
constructing edifices of any kind for human use’ (OED 2009), it also designates
the art of constructing such edifices for the use of humans or, at least, for
directing—i.e. programming—their conduct. “How does environing
environments seek to programme not only conduct but also the conducting of
one’s own conduct?” In fact, one could say that it is through constructions for
human use that such constructions make use of humans, and do so in specific
sorts of ways. The use of the term “architecture” (and derivations thereof) is
being used here not only with reference to the kind of analytics that Foucault
practiced in relation to his analysis of Bentham’s architectural plan for a house of
inspection—minus, that is, an analysis of its historical emergence—but also to
maintain a link to that analytic being an archaeology of the domain of technology
(i.e. the arkhē and the tekhnē of that analysis). In calling the programmatic element
of technologies of power the architectonics of control, I want to do two things.
Firstly, in calling programmes or the programmatic aspect of technology
“architectonics”, I want to draw attention not only to rules of conduct, and so on,
but also to its programmatic element, to the sense of laying out, of setting things
out, arranging, and so on, planning, schematizing, systematizing, and so forth:
organizing. Secondly, in calling the exercising of relations of power “control”, I
want to emphasise that what we are questioning concerning are contemporary
programmes of power that are in-process or in-information; that is to say, that are
not yet settled, fully realized, established or instituted, or effective and
instrumentalized.

An architectural analytics of programmes of power or field-work in the
architectonics of control is neither ontological nor existential; or, rather, it is only
either of these to the extent that the reason of programmes is the architecturing of
the real or the environing of environments or existential contextures. That is to say,
to the extent that they aim to bring into being not total institutions but
circumscribed environments, environments that not only constrain but also, and
through the very act of constraint, environ horizons of possibility that structures
existential probability; not just conditions of existence but also forms of existence
that are synergetic, symbiotic, and, more specifically, symbiotrophic with such
conditions. Thinking this through by paraphrasing Butler’s (2004) statement to
the effect that “to be governed is not to have a form imposed upon one’s existence,
but to be given the very terms within which certain forms of existence will be
more or less probable”, whilst a more ontologically orientated study might
attempt to look at existence delimited by these terms (perhaps taking the terms for
granted), an architectural analytics looks at the giving of these terms themselves
and the forms of existence they imply.
But what do we mean, explicitly, by programmes of power or of government or, more specifically, by the programmatic/architectonic aspect of such programmes? It is questionable that there can be a “government of things” in the sense of government used here. Since government is being understood as the human conducting of human conduct so as to get humans to conduct themselves, it implies not only a question of will but also of reflective practices. Since inanimate matter has no will and cannot reflect upon its own actions one cannot really govern things in this sense of the term (although see Callon 1986). It is also questionable that we can talk of a “government of non-human animals”, since although animals have a type of will in that they can be stubborn and resist, and so forth, it is questionable to what extent they are able to reflect upon their own actions in the way that we humans can (i.e. it is reflexive rather than reflective). On this view, Barad (2007), for example, is correct in calling the work of Foucault and others—most notably Butler—anthropocentric, but this is not quite the put-down she intends. It is anthropocentric in that it is concerned with how and in what ways human beings have attempted to understand and to govern themselves. This does not mean that such analyses are anthropological (philosophical) since the mode of description does not pass through the consciousness of human beings, nor does it mean that non-human actants—sentient or non-sentient, animate or inanimate—are not taken into consideration. What it does mean is that what we are questioning is the human understanding of human being vis-à-vis the human will to govern human beings. What we are concerned with are discourses that concern themselves with and are expressive of understandings of the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the good life. What this does not mean is attempting to put forward an understanding of what we are, of what the world is, and of what we are in the world thus understood. On the contrary, we are concerned with unpacking and describing just such understandings, not with producing them. That is to say, what we are questioning concern is technology, not ontology, it is technological not ontological; or it is only ontological to the extent that it is technological: not “what is?” but “what is made and what went into its making?” or “how what is came to be”: a historical ontology of ourselves.

Government here is not only related to those relations of power that aim to govern what we might call the marginalized (i.e. the abnormal, the indigent, the indolent etc.), nor is it explicitly and exclusively tied to political sovereignty and the state (the narrow concept of government); rather, the broader conceptualization of government and governmentality employed here connotes all those practices in, by, and through which some attempt to get others to conduct themselves in particular, delimited, and specified—i.e. in probabilistic—ways. Programmes, being expressive of discourses concerning the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the good life, cover a broad spectrum of practices and knowledges that deal with the government of oneself and others. Whilst programmes are discursive, they are not exclusively verbal or
textural: they concern any practice—discursive or not—that is dispositional; which is to say, that is preparatory or contributory to disposing or inclining, that is inducive or conducive, and so on, and so forth. Such discourses may be prescriptive texts concerning, for example, a plan for social housing, the design of a shopping centre, or the laying-out of an office, as these plans, designs, layings-outs, and so forth, concern attempts to structure, direct, guide, or lead the actions and/or conducts of others.

But these discourses could just as easily concern the actual building, structure, or layout of these and other environments. Such environments not only include physical structures, planned or built, but also less tangible structures such as systems of classification, accounting, evaluating, promotion, insurance, taxation, consumptions, and so on, and so forth. Systems that whilst appearing less tangible are nevertheless equally material and practical. What we are concerned with here, though, is the thought or rationality—calculative, instrumental, technical, etc.—inhabiting these discourses, and not peoples actual behaviour (the ways in which we go about our everyday lives when we act, react, or interact with and within such environments). What we are concerned with, in questioning concerning the architectonics of control, are not the realizations and effectivities of such discourses (the emergent), which would require a more historically orientated form of enquiry, but rejoinders to problems that take the form of explicit programmes (Foucault 2001a: 225, 229ff.). It is these programmes of power that the phrase architectonics of control proximally and catachrestically names and nominalistically conceptualizes. Genealogy, when it questions both provenance and emergence historically, is concerned with the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought (provenance) and the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, made possible (emergence). What we are concerned with, in question the exercising of contemporary relations of power from the perspective of the proven present, is thought itself; that is, the act that posits a subject and an object and the possible relations between them, and the rationality (the reasoning and the rationale) inhabiting explicit programmes—discourses, techniques, tactics, etc.—of control in, by, and through which governors (subject) aim to govern (are related to) the governed (object). Moreover, because such programmes are both descriptive and prescriptive, they are disclosive of certain conceptualizations concerning both what we are (ceasing to be) and thus that which we are (in the process of becoming).
The discourses that Foucault analyzed when researching the exercising of relations of power were, for the most part, either descriptive or, more specifically, prescriptive discourses (see, e.g. Foucault 1985: 12). That is to say, they were either descriptions describing what was done or, much more frequently, prescriptions and codifications prescribing what was to be done, what could, should, or ought to be done, and so on, and codifying what was or what was to be known, and so forth, vis-à-vis conducting the conducts of others (Foucault 2001d: 223-238, passim). Even in describing descriptions of what was actually done—i.e. a “hysteric” being subjected to a ten-month routine of twelve hour daily baths (Foucault 1973: ix), the torture and execution of a “regicide” (Foucault 1977a: 3-6), or a “madmen” being subjected to cold showers (Foucault 2007a: 147-148), etc.—these tend to be analyzed not in terms of the biographies, psychologies, or the political, social, and/or economic contexts of the persons involved, nor in terms of the meanings that such actors attribute to their actions or that can be attributed to their actions, and so forth, but it terms of the specific techniques used, the type of knowledge involved or produced, and the particular ends sought. These descriptions and/or prescriptions, then, are analyzed in terms of the different means by which they, in attempting to conduct the conduct of others, arranged, laid-out, or fitted-out environments of probability. That is to say, Foucault’s analytic of power—which is not an analysis of power, but analyses done in terms of power—deals with prescriptive processes or procedures or, perhaps more accurately, with the discourses and techniques embodied in or within what Foucault called practices; discursive or not. Such procedures or practices can be anything from the aforementioned subjections to the arrangement of beds in a hospital to the opening up of a few corpses in pathological anatomy; from the layout of a military camp to the correct posture for handwriting or the cellularity of monastic life; from practices of examination, judgement, and ranking to an architectural plan for a house of inspections; from procedures of confession and therapeutics to techniques of self; and so on and so forth.

The ways in which Foucault analyzes such descriptive and prescriptive discourses is by drawing out or disclosing the thought (subject/object) and/or rationality (reason) inhabiting such procedures or practices. That is to say, an analytic of power deals with the immanent materiality of rationality. That is not to say that it views ideas as matter or ideality as materiality. What it implies is two things: Firstly, it signpost a form of enquiry that examines the material and
practical—i.e. social, economic, political, and so forth—conditions of possibility not of consciousness or behaviour but of thought itself. Secondly, it views all such ideality, knowledge, thought, rationality, and so on, as inhabiting material practices and thus as being embodied in specific materialities (see, e.g. Dean 1996). What Foucault questions when questioning thought and its rationality is not “who was thinking”, “what they thought”, or “how it was possible for them to think what they thought”, and so forth (Foucault 1991a: 59). Rather, what is questioned is the very fact that there was/is thought, and that thought is a thing of this world. More specifically, in questioning thought historically, Foucault asks how is it that what was thought was thought and not something else. Thus, for example, when Foucault poses the question “who is speaking?” this “who” is not being posed in terms of a person’s biography, psychology, and so forth, but it terms of the condition to which they are subject, they status they must have, the position they must occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge [connaissance], in order to be able to say what they say, to do what they do, and in order to have what they say and do accepted (see, e.g. Foucault 1998: 459). Posing the question of thought and its rationality in this way is to look at both the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought and rationality on the one hand, and to look at the material and practical conditions that thought and rationality, thus thought and rationalized, made or makes possible on the other: ‘I study things like a psychiatric asylum, the forms of constraint, exclusion, elimination, disqualification, let us say, the reason that is always precisely embodied, embodied in the form of a doctor, a medical knowledge, a medical institution, etc., exercised on madness, illness, un-reason, etc., what I study is an architecture, a spatial disposition, what I study are the disciplinary techniques, the modalities of training, the forms of surveillance, still in much too broad terms, but… what are the practices that one puts in play in order to govern men, that is, to obtain from them a certain way of conducting themselves?’ (Foucault, Gordon, and Patton 2012: 105, emphases added).

Bookended by this mode of rendering visible, which I have previously called genealogical, is an analytic of thought and/or rationality itself. In relation to an analytics of power, this latter archaeological mode of enquiry addresses itself to an analytics of explicit programmes that are responses or rejoinders to specific forms of problematization. Regarding an analytics of programmes of power or governmentalities, this archaeology of problematizations examines the practices that are to be put into play in order to govern human beings; it studies the government of human beings by looking at the government of human being. Note here that to govern human being is not to have power over others; it is to exercise a relation of power in such a way as to induce in said others certain forms of conduct; that is, certain forms of human beings conducting their own conduct. In questioning technological programmes of power, such an analytics ask what thought (subject/object) inhabits such prescriptions, and how are such
prescriptive practices rationalized (reason, rationale, rationality)? Such an approach questions thought and rationality not in terms of how they ground or undergird such practices, but how they inhabit them: “What thought and reason are embodied in a specific “practice” of government? “What is the rationality inhabiting a specific “art” of government?” Or simply put: “What is their governmental?”

In thinking through some questions of method, vis-à-vis rendering visible the programmatic aspects of contemporary technologies of power from the perspective of the present present and its forms of problematizations, I have called the specific field in which we are to work the architectonics of control. As noted, control names the form or modality of the relational aspect of a relation of power to be brought into existence (conducting conducts); architectonics names the prescriptive or programmatic aspect of technologies of power, the techniques that will allow for a relation of power to be brought into existence and thus exercised (arranging probability or environing environments). Since I have called the domain in which we are to work, analytically, the “architectonics of control”, it follows that an analytics thereof can be called an architectural analytics. It is to a discussion of this form of analysis that we now turn.

1 Field-work in the Present

I have called the field in which we are to work, then, architectonics and the analytics of this domain an architectural analytics, and I have do so not only because the two elements that make up these terms (architect: from Greek arkhitekton) maintains a link to both archaeology (arkhi from arkhē) and technology (tekton from tekhnē), but also because the former relates to questions of power (arkhein: “to rule”) whilst the latter relates to both fabrication and art (tek:- “to weave, to fabricate, to make”; tekton: “builder, carpenter”; tekhnē: “art”) and to the theoretical praxis linked to these (OED; see Heidegger 1977: 12-13; see also Sandywell 1996, on tekhnē: 118-119, and arkhē: 142-146). That is to say, the arkhi of architectonics relates to conducting conducts and the thought inhabiting such positing, whilst the tekton of architectonics relates to environing (i.e. fabricating or architecting) environments of probability and the rationality or rationalities inhabiting such a practice. In addition, these terms signpost that what we are questioning concerning is not just the epistemic nor merely the technical but their joint articulation, one upon the other. An architectural analytics of the architectonic of control, then, aims to render visible and thus intelligible the arkhē and the tekhnē inhering in and/or embodied by programmes of control. These and associated terms are being taken up and used so as to both differentiate what we are doing from Foucault’s and other’s historical analytics, diagnostic, and strategic, but also to maintain a link with and/or connection to such historical work.

In questioning these descriptive, prescriptive, and codifying discourses, what we are to question are the different and differential ways in which they
conceptualize a domain that is simultaneously a problem space, a target area of intervention, and a functioning environmentality to be brought into existence. It is the prescriptive and codifying aspect of technologies of government—their programmes—and their aim to build environments (the conditions of existence we are to be given) that are both the ends and the means of the governmentalities we are to question and that I am calling their architectonics. Environments here are not just geometric or geographical spaces to be produced; they are “worlds” to be brought into existence. On this view, they are akin to what Heidegger called an ‘equipmental contexture’ (Heidegger 1982: 162ff., 293ff., 303ff.), or what we can call an existential contexture: they are environments that seek to set-out, lay-out, or arrange horizons of probability. The aim of an architectural analytics of the architectonic of control, then, is to render visible this contexture and the forms of existence it seeks to make probable. Rather than think of architecture as pertaining to or denoting the master-builder (the grand architect; i.e. Bentham), I would rather think of it in terms of or as connoting the laying-out of techniques of control (political order), discourses about the subject (i.e. knowledge of “man” and the nature of human nature), and the kinds of worlds they seek to make (the “good life”): given a certain knowledge of “man” and of the nature of “his” nature, what constitutes the “good life”; given this knowledge and this nature and thus this form of life, what constitutes the political order (techniques of control) that will be conducive to actualizing that nature and thus realizing that life.

As an analytic, the “method” by which such discourses are to be interrogated seeks to breakdown, to dissolve the techniques (pouvoir) and knowledges (savoirs) that are both drawn together and that are to be drawn together and set apart in the prescriptive building or architecting of such environments. The reason for putting things in this way, for employing this kind of terminology, is, at least in part, to overcome, by clarification, the kinds of reading that read into the work of Foucault, for example, a conflation between what certain persons, groups, authorities, institutions, and so forth, want to happen and what may actually transpire. In referring to these codifications and prescriptions which codify and prescribe what is to be known and what is to be done as the architectonics of control, I aim to signpost the fact that these are theoreticians schemas, political blueprints, governmental diagrams, and so forth, whose aim is not only to govern but to govern how things transpire and to increase the likelihood that what will transpire will do so within a certain bandwidth of acceptability (see the first lecture in Foucault 2007b). In short, they are proven, problematizing, and programmatic; which is to say, they are not yet, and may never be, emergent, effective, let alone present or actual.

In questioning concerning the exercising of a relation of power, it is important to remember that this is just one aspects of Foucault’s broader critical and effective historical ontology of ourselves. In ‘The Subjects and Power’, for instance, Foucault notes that his project, conceptualized as a genealogy of the
subject, was to undertake ‘a history of the different modes of subjectivation of human being in our culture’ (Foucault 2001d: 326, modified). Foucault goes onto note that he looked at ‘three modes of objectivation that transform human beings into subjects’ (ibid, modified): the objectification of the subject in the discursive practices of the human sciences (Foucault 1970); the objectification/objectivation of the subject in the dividing practices of the asylum (Foucault 2006a), the clinic (Foucault 1973), and the prison (Foucault 1977a); and the objectivation of the subject by themselves in practices of self (Foucault 1985, 1986). In other words, Foucault questioned three modes of subjectification and/or subjectivation by analyzing three modes of objectification and/or objectivation: knowledge, relations of power, and relation to self. Foucault referred to the inter-relationality of these three modes of subjectivation as a ‘matrix of experience’ (Foucault 1997: 204), and suggested that whilst it is possible to analyse each aspect separately, in doing so, the other two elements should be constantly borne in mind. In short, an effective ontology of ourselves should examine all three relata, though not necessarily in equal measure.

2 The Archaeological Four-Fold

In thinking about how to question the architectonics of control architecturally, I want to put forward two sets of correlations. Bearing in mind that the aim of Foucault’s project was a genealogy of the subject, that the method was an archaeology of knowledge, and that the domain of analysis was technology, by which he meant the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject, I want to propose the following. Firstly, I want to suggest that there is a certain correlation between the different ways in which Foucault questioned knowledge, power, and ethics (Foucault 1972, 1978, 1985); secondly, I want to suggest that there is a certain correspondence between the ways in which Foucault questioned these three domains and the Aristotelian four-fold of obligation (Aristotle 1992) and thus the Heideggerian four-fold of technology (Heidegger 1977). In thinking these correlations through each other, I then want to see how this can be “applied” to doing an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, where control is to be questioned from the perspective of to-day. In this section, we will look at the correlation between the different ways in which Foucault questioned knowledge, power, and ethics; in the concluding section that follows, we will then see how this corresponds to the Aristotelian/Heideggerian four-fold on the one hand, and how it can be applied in undertaking an analytics of the contemporary on the other.

— Knowledge

In The Archaeology, in looking back over the work he had previously undertaken (i.e. Foucault 2006a; 1973, and; 1970, respectively), Foucault put forward four rules of discursive formation. These concern: (1) the formation of objects, which
maps out ‘the displacement of boundaries which define the field of possible objects’ (Foucault 1991a: 56); (2) the formation of enunciative modalities, which details ‘the new position and role occupied by the speaking subject in discourse’ (ibid); (3) the formation of concepts, which designates ‘a new mode of functioning of language with respect to objects’ (ibid.: 57); and (4) the formation of what Foucault called strategies, which illustrates ‘a new form of localization and circulation of discourse within society’ (ibid.; for references to The Archaeology, see the citations on page 93 above). What these four rules of formation were designed to evidence where the material, practical, and discursive conditions of possibility—the concrete and historical a priori—for the formation of discursive formations; of how a heterogeneous multiplicity, in its dispersion, came to form a positivity (savoir), and thus a discursive formation, and therefore the formation of certain “sciences” (connaissance) (for a shorter version of this, see Foucault 1998: 297-333). The rule of the formation of objects describes the surfaces of emergence, the authorities of delimitation, and the grids of specification, which gave a discursive formations its objects (Foucault 1972: 40-42). The rule of the formation of enunciative modalities looks at the formation of a certain style of speaking; it describes who is speaking, the institutional sites from which they speak, and the relation of subjects to objects (ibid.: 50-53). The rule of the formation of concepts look at how a number of different discourses come to employ the same kinds of concepts; it describes their forms of succession, their forms of coexistence, and their procedures of intervention (ibid.: 56-59). Lastly, the rule of the formation of strategies looks at the construction of a common theme or thematic; it looks at the points of diffraction of discourse, at the economy of the discursive constellation, and at the function that the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices (ibid.: 64-68).

I do not want to go into a detailed discussion here of the labyrinthine arguments put forward in The Archaeology (for such an extended discussion, see, e.g. Cousins and Hussain 1984; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Gutting 1989; Major-Poetzl 1983; and especially Webb 2013). What I will say is that what is presented in The Archaeology is neither a theory of method nor a treatise on methodology, as such, but is more like a theoretical reflection concerning questions of method: as Foucault notes, what is presented there ‘is not an exact description of what can be read in [History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic], or The Order of Things (Foucault 1972: 16). In addition, and as noted previously, I do not think that what was worked out there was an abject failure (e.g. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 79-100; Han 2002: 38-69) but, following Webb (2013), can be read as being rather successful in what it set out to do; and, moreover, that it was this relative success that made Foucault’s later moves to genealogy, technology, problematization, and the like, possible. The repetition (e.g. Han 2002) of Rabinow and Dreyfus’s thinking vis-à-vis the methodological failure of archaeology has meant that it has now become common-place, that is to say, obvious and taken-for-granted. This argument, for example, was not put forward in a text (Cousins and Hussain 1984)
more-or-less contemporaneous with Rabinow and Dreyfus’s book, but which has been much less influential in the secondary literature. Rather than frame the transition from Foucault’s work of the 1960s to his work of the 1970s and after as being one in which it was *because* archaeology was a methodological *failure* that Foucault *had* to make the switch to genealogy to one in which it was *due* to the very *success* of archaeology that made the take up of genealogy *possible* (Webb 2005a, 2013). Nealon, for instance, goes as far as to state that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* itself ‘is or enacts’ the transformation from archaeology to genealogy; it does not “represent” that transformation’ (Nealon 2008: 98).

That said, what I am explicitly interested in, here, is the transposition of these four archaeological rules of formation to the four rules of questioning power presented in the ‘Method’ chapter of *The Will to Knowledge*, on the one hand, and to the four aspects of techniques of self, as these are presented in *The Use of Pleasure*, on the other. Now, I am not suggesting that there is identity or isomorphism here. Nor am I suggesting that, in a sense, Foucault always did the same thing. Rather, what I am suggesting is that there is a certain correlation or correspondence in the form or mode of questioning evidence is these three texts and in the four sets of questions each proposed that is open to exploration in thinking about how to question the exercising of contemporary relations of power, and of how to do this by way of what I have called an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control that is, at one and the same time, an analytics of the contemporary.

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**Power**

Taking *The Will to Knowledge* first, in the chapter on ‘Method’, Foucault puts forward four rules to follow vis-à-vis questioning the exercising of relations of power—in this instance, in questioning the relation of power-knowledge and discourses on sexuality. These four rules are as follows: (1) the rule of immanence; (2) the rules of continuous variations; (3) the rule of double conditioning; and (4) the rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses (Foucault 1978: 98-101, rule 2 modified).

1 – In describing the immanent relationality of power to knowledge and vice-versa, Foucault states that ‘[i]f sexuality was constituted as a domain of knowledge [connaitre], it is from the relations of power [relations de pouvoir] that have instituted it as a possible object; and, in return, if power [pouvoir] was able to take sexuality as a target, it is because techniques of knowledge [savoir] and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it’ (ibid.: 98, modified). In other words, in describing the formation of objects, we not only look at the surfaces of emergence, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification that were the conditions of possibility of its formation, we also look at each and all of these as being infused with relations of power. In short, in describing the formation of objects, ‘[w]e will start… from what might be called the “local foci
“foyers locaux” of power-knowledge [pouvoir-savoir]’ (ibid., modified; see Spivak 1996: 149-150).

2 – Concerning the rules of continuous variations, this concerns not only the enunciative modalities of the discursive, but also what we might call the governmental modalities of technology. Just as research on the formation of enunciative modalities looked at the formation of ‘a certain style, a certain constant form of enunciation’ (Foucault 1998: 314) and of ‘the situation that it is possible for [the subject] to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups of objects’ (Foucault 1972: 52), so an analysis of governmental modalities examines ‘the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process’, and of the ways in which relations of power ‘are “matrices of transformations”’ (Foucault 1978: 99). Here again, in questioning the modalities of power-knowledge, we not only question who is speaking but also who or what is acting, the institutional sites from which they speak or act or from which they are to speak and act, and the relation of governor (subject) to governed (object) and the constant modifications and continual shifts in these strategic games between liberties: ‘[t]he condition of possibility of power, or, in any case, the point of view that can render intelligible its exercise...is the moving base of relations of force that, by their inequality, constantly induce states of power’ (ibid.: 93, modified).

3 – In taking up the rule of double conditioning, vis-à-vis the exercising of a relation of power, we look at the mutually constitutive inter-relationality between tactics and strategy. Here, rather than enquire into the formation of concepts, or in addition to such an enquiry, the task is to question the articulation of techniques and the mutually constitutive interrelationality between the specific techniques of power and particular strategies of power. As Foucault puts it, ‘one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work’ (ibid.: 100). In questioning these techniques and the strategies that both make them possible and that they make possible, we can take up the archaeological enquiry into the formation of concepts and rethink this in terms of tactics or techniques by questioning their forms of succession, their forms of coexistence, and their procedures of intervention.

4 – Lastly, we turn to the rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses. This rule points us in the direction of the articulation, one upon the other, of power and knowledge, of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject, as these are articulated in technologies: ‘it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together’ (ibid.). But it also describes how the different discourses and techniques are thematized into an overall drift or pattern, of how a ‘multiplicity of discursive elements...can come into play in various strategies’ (ibid.). Just as with the archaeological questioning of the formation of strategies, we can question the points of diffraction of discourse, the economy of the discursive constellation, and the function that the discourse under study seeks to
carry out in a field of non-discursive practices, that is to say, in institutions. Rather than pose these merely in the direction of the epistēmē, they are to be posed in the direction of both the epistemic and the technical; which is to say, in the direction of technologies of power, the programmes that articulate them, and the governmental thematics or strategies that they aim to make possible.

Obviously, there is no tight seamless fit here between The Archaeology and The Will to Knowledge, but I did not intend there to be. Rather than isomorphism there are a certain number of correspondences and correlations that suggest that these four archaeological questions—vis-à-vis objects, subjective modalities, concepts or techniques, and strategies—are pertinent to an architectural analytic of the architectonics of control. This case is made stronger when we take into consideration the four aspects of techniques of self, as these are detailed in The Use of Pleasure, and discussed in ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’ (Foucault 1997: 262-266).

— Self

In Chapter 3 of the ‘Introduction’ to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault differentiates between three different modes of questioning “morality”: by way of an analysis of the ‘prescriptive ensemble [of] a “moral code” (as questioned in his earlier studies); by way of an analysis of ‘the real behavior of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them’ (as would be questioned by a more sociologically orientated enquiry); and lastly, by way of analysing ‘the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code’ (Foucault 1985: 25-26). In reference to this latter “ethics-orientated” morality, Foucault details ‘four major aspects’ (Foucault 1997: 263) of the relation to self. These concern: (1) the determination of the ethical substance; (2) the mode of subjection; (3) the forms of “elaboration” of ethical work; and (4) the teleology of the moral subject (Foucault 1985: 26-28; see also, 1997: 262-265). That is to say, vis-à-vis “ethics-orientated” morality, they concern what Foucault called ‘its ontology, its deontology, its ascetics, [and] its teleology’ (Foucault 1985: 37). Thinking these through the four archaeological rules of formation, whereas the rules presented in The Archaeology attempt to describe the formation of objects, concepts, and so forth, the four aspects of techniques of self detailed in The Use of Pleasure attempt to describe the prescriptive element of the formation of oneself. That is to say, whereas the former described how things were formed historically, the latter describes the historicity of how things should or are to be formed vis-à-vis oneself. Bearing this in mind, let us now look at these four aspects of the techniques of the relation to self.

1 – Ontology, here, questions the determination of the ethical substance by looking at ‘the way in which the individual must constitute such or such a part of itself as the principle material of its moral conduct’ (Foucault 1985: 26, modified).
In questioning the ‘prescriptive texts’ (Foucault 1985: 12) that prescribe how one should relate to oneself in terms of the determination of the ethical substance, it looks at how such prescriptions task the individual with the following question: ‘[w]hich is the aspect or the part of myself or my behavior which is concerned with moral conduct?’ (Foucault 1997: 263). In short, it looks at how individuals are lead or directed to constitute this or that part of themselves or of their behaviour as an object both for self-reflection and self-transformation in that it determines the material to be worked upon and worked over in the formation of oneself as a moral subject. It does not look so much at the formation of objects, but at how one should form a certain aspect of oneself as an object of self-knowledge and self-government.

2 – Deontology concerns the mode of subjection. It looks at prescriptions concerning ‘the way in which the individual establishes its relation to a rule and recognizes itself as being related to an obligation to implement it’ (Foucault 1985: 27, modified). Or, stated otherwise, it questions ‘the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations’ (Foucault 1997: 264). What we are dealing with here is not so much the formation of enunciative modalities, but with how one should form what we might call a certain ethical modality. Here, the question is not “who is speaking?” or “from where do they speak?” but, rather, “what do I, as an ethical subject of my moral actions, need to be in order to be able to speak, to act, and so forth?”. However, it does concern the relation of subject to object; only here the object is the subject itself for itself.

3 – The forms of elaboration of ethical work, or ascetics, enquires into the prescriptive element which prescribes the ‘ethical work that one carries out on oneself, not only to make one’s behaviour conform to a given rule, but to try to transform oneself into the moral subject of one’s conduct’ (Foucault 1985: 27, modified). We are not dealing here with the formation of concepts but with the elaboration of the techniques one is to employ to transform oneself. That is to say, we enquire into the prescriptions that prescribe ‘the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects?’ (Foucault 1997: 265). Again, these can be broached by looking at their forms of succession, their forms of coexistence, and their procedures of intervention.

4 – Lastly, an analytics of the teleology of the moral subject starts from the observation that ‘an action is not only moral in itself and in its singularity, it is also [moral] by its insertion and the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct’, and so it questions how and in what ways such prescriptions ‘leads the individual…to a certain mode of being characteristic of the moral subject’ (Foucault 1985: 27-28, modified). In questioning prescriptive texts who object is the direction of ones relation to self, the question we are to pose is how these texts prescribe ‘the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?’ (Foucault 1997: 265). Whilst it is probably a stretch to call this strategy, it does bear some of the elements of the ways in which Foucault thought about the formation of strategies, and specifically the formation of an overall thematic,
drift, or pattern within which the moral subject, in its ethical relation to itself, is to insert itself within the broader drift or pattern, and of the ways in which ones ability to govern others is dependent upon one’s ability to be able to govern oneself. In other words, it questions the function that the moral conduct under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices.

As with the correlations between The Archaeology and The Will to Knowledge, there is no seamless juxtaposition here. But like that correspondence, there are clear correlates between the ways in which The Archaeology poses the four rules of discursive formations and the ways in which The Use of Pleasure proposes to analyze the relation of self to self by way of the above four aspects of that relation. What this demonstrates or, in any case, what it suggests is not that Foucault always did the same thing—the difference noted between the three four-fold questions posed to knowledge, to power, and the ethics respectively shows that this is not the case. Rather, what it highlights is the import of this archaeological four-fold to all of Foucault’s critical histories, and thus to his studies in governmentality, whether this is a study of the government of other, a study of the government of the self, or a study of their combination.

What is correlative here is not so much the specific questions as a certain way or style of posing said questions. Such questioning does not question natural objects but looks at their formation; either how they were formed or how they are to be formed. Likewise, it does not pose questions to a self-transparent or constituent subject but looks at the formation of subject positions or looks at how the subject should be formed in relations of power or form itself in relation to itself. The third set of questions look at techniques—in the form of concepts, tactics, or ascetics—and it questions how they were formed or how they are to be deployed vis-à-vis the government of others or formed in governing oneself. The last archaeological set of questions looks at how such formations—of objects, subject, and techniques—coagulate or agglutinate into an overall pattern as this pertains to the formation either of the sciences (e.g. biology, political economy, philology), or of a certain modality of power (e.g. discipline, bio-politics, liberalism), or a certain mode of being (e.g. the beautiful life, renunciation of oneself, realizing one’s true potential).

Having noted and detailed a certain correlation between the ways in which Foucault posed questions to knowledge, to power, and to ethics archaeologically, I now want to turn our attention to the ways in which this correlation correlates to the Aristotelian four-fold of obligation and, more specifically, how Heidegger thought this four-fold in relation to technology. Since I am not concerned with influence, intellectual history, or in asking “where did he get this from?”, whether Foucault took this archaeological four-fold from Aristotle, Heidegger, both, or neither is a moot point here. The reason for posing things in this way, is that in taking up the archaeological four-fold and thinking it through the question concerning technology might provide a set of questions to be posed to the programmatic or architectonic aspect of contemporary technologies of
power—in terms of the knowledge-power-ethics matrix—when questioned from the perspective of the present itself. Whereas The Archaeology placed its emphasis upon conditions of possibility in the form of formations, Foucault’s analytics of power looked at the ways in which the exercising of a relation of power was not only subject to, but was to be deployed and exercised through and by means of such conditions. His later work on ethics flipped to the other side, as it were, of this formation and looked at how things were to be formed vis-à-vis the relation to self. It is this latter way of questioning that I want to focus upon here by looking at how things are to be formed, but I want to take this not only in the direction of ethics, but also in the direction of the exercising of relations of power and of questioning this from within the contemporary order of things.

In addition, whereas The Archaeology looked at the four rules of formation in relation to the epistêmê, I want to rework them, by way of the four-fold of technology and the four aspects of technologies of self, in the direction of the tekhnê of technologies of power; that is to say, their programmatic or architectonics aspect. Whereas epistêmê is concerned with what we might call pure theoretical knowledge—such as that concerning life, labour, and language discussed in The Order of Things—tekhnê is more practically orientated. Tekhnê, as Foucault understood it, concerns ‘a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal’ (Foucault 2001d: 364). That is to say, tekhnê is related to doing or practices but not in the sense of what is actually done or is actually practiced (building, producing, manufacturing, etc.). Rather, tekhnê is related to practices in that it is a form of theoretical knowledge that orientates and directs such doings and practices: ‘what the Greeks mean by techne is not the application but the theoretical knowledge that makes the practical application possible’ (Rojcewicz 2001: 61-62). As Rojcewicz put it, ‘[f]techne is indeed more practical than episteme, but the practical aspect of techne, its practical role, is not manipulation but is merely the guiding or ordering of the process of manipulation’ (ibid.: 61). One of the problems, as I see it, with the different ways in which Foucault’s conceptualisation of power has been taken up and used, is that it has been taken up and used as an analysis of empeiria—i.e. in term of what was actually done (historically), and what is actually being done (contemporaneously); which is to say, in terms of manifestations—and not as a description of tekhnê. The field in which we are to work—that is, the domain in which we are to do field-work—is a certain ‘stratum’ of the real, vis-à-vis ‘knowing and acting’ (Rose 1999: 19), and not a physical place or geometrical space. The distinction between the technical and the empirical, understood as manifestation, is made clear in the following: ‘[w]hoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth…This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or house, with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from this gathering determines the manner of its construction. Thus what is decisive in tekhnê does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as
manufacturing, that *tekhnē* is a bringing-forth (Heidegger 1977: 13, emphasis added). In other words, what studies in governmentality practices is a certain empiricism vis-à-vis thought and not an analysis of the empirical; what it analyzes, by way of example, would be the *invention* of “the social” (e.g. Donzelot 1993) and not the social itself.

It is also interesting to note here that Heidegger signposts a certain correlation between *epistēmē* and *tekhnē*: ‘[f]rom earliest times until Plato the word *tekhnē* is linked with the word *epistēmē*. Both words are names for knowing in the widest sense’ (ibid.). Thus both terms demonstrate a certain correlation with Foucault’s use of the term *savoir* (see, e.g. Foucault 2007b: 150-151), and thus of *savoir-pouvoir*, and, by extension, *savoir-pouvoir-soi* (knowledge-power-self). Given ‘that techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for *the arts of the mind* and the fine arts’ (Heidegger 1977: 13, emphasis added), this relates *tekhnē* to thought on the one hand, and hence to rationality on the other. That is to say, is relates *tekhnē* to the theory-programmatic aspect of technology, which sets-out or lays-out what is to be done and what is to be known and thus is prescriptive of the environing of environments of probability. As Foucault put it is ‘Questions of Method’ it concerns ‘programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of “jurisdiction”) and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of “veridiction”’) (Foucault 2001d: 225, see also 230): that is to say, vis-à-vis the government of other, it refer to the articulation of power (*pouvoir*) and knowledge (*savoir*). As noted previously, the term *articulate* here means not only to express or to state, but also to conjoin; hence, technology refers to the joining together of power and knowledge: to power-knowledge or *pouvoir-savoir*—both of which are questioned at ‘the level, approximately, of archaeology [le niveau, à peu près, de l’archéologie]’ (Foucault 2007a: 61, modified; 1990: 49).

### 3 Towards an Architectural Analytics of Control

It has been noted (see, e.g. Dean 1996: 225; Deleuze 1988: 104, 147n26; O’Leary 2002: 85; Rayner 2007: 122) that the four aspects of technologies of self, detailed above, map onto or correlate with Aristotle’s four forms of obligation (Aristotle 1992: Book II, Ch. 3 & 7) and, by extension, with Heidegger’s discussion of these, in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (Heidegger 1977: 3-35; see also Rojcewicz 2006), as the four-fold of technology (or, indeed, the four folds enfolded in, by, and through technology, see Dean 1996; Deleuze 1988; Rose 1996c). What has not been noted, however, is the similarity, parallelity, or correspondence between the four aspects of practices of the self, and thus the aforementioned four-fold of obligation/technology, and the archaeological four-fold outlined above. Note here that I do not say equivalence, identity, or isomorphism, but *correspondence*. I use this particular word in the double sense of a certain correlation between the abovementioned four-fold ensembles (Aristotle’s, Heidegger’s, and Foucault’s: in *The Archaeology, in The Will to*
Knowledge, and in The Use of Pleasure), on the one hand, and thus of the possibility of establishing a dialogue or exchange between them, on the other. The reason for wanting to approach things in this way—by way of the parallellarity of these three four-fold ensembles—is to work out how we might question the domain of technology (that is, the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject), as this pertains to questioning power-knowledge or techniques of government and the human sciences, by reconceptualizing an archaeology of knowledge and/or of problematizations in the direction of what I have called an architectural analytics. In thinking through the aforementioned four-folds, I am not so much attempting to synthesize these three positions (Aristotle’s, Heidegger’s, Foucault’s) into a forth as I am attempting to advance a better, and thus more usable, conceptualization of archaeology (as architectural analytics), of the programmatic aspect of technology (as architectonics), and of questioning the latter in terms of power (as control) from the perspective of today.

As noted, it has been suggested that following the publication of The Archaeology, Foucault began to move away from a failed archaeology (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Han 2002) and, at the start of the 1970s, took up and developed a more robust Nietzschean genealogy. This process is said to have resulted in Foucault’s most genealogical text: Discipline and Punish. Certainly, genealogy has taken the lion’s share when “applying” Foucault’s “methods”, and this has indeed been to the detriment of archaeology. The objective here, however, is not to downplay the significance of genealogy but, rather, to rehabilitate archaeology. I am much more concerned with the way in which, due to the emphasis placed on genealogy, archaeology has been side-lined, overlooked, or, more often than not, simply forgotten about. What I want to do here, then, is to take up the ugly duckling of Foucault scholarship and to develop it—that is, to re-develop it in the form of an architectural analytics—as a way of questioning contemporary technologies of power—in the form of an architectonics of control—from the perspective of the present.

Programmes of control are both descriptions regarding what various authorities take to be (i.e. what is) and codifications/prescriptions concerning what various authorities what to be (i.e. what will be), vis-à-vis the nature of human nature and the political order conducive to the “good life”. Unlocking their architectonics, by way of an architectural analytics, is merely a question of decoding and de-scribing their articulations of these discourses about the subject and techniques of transformation and control. As an general orientating framework for such enquiry, a framework grounded in genealogies done by Foucault (particularly Foucault 2007b, 2008a) and others (e.g. Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1999; and especially Rose 1989; 1996a, 1999), it is possible to say that modern technologies of power are increasingly exercised not only through techniques of determination (sovereignty), imposition (discipline), and/or inducement (bio-
politics) but also through ever more subtle colonizations of the techniques of self. Whilst this is certainly an empirical question—vis-à-vis the specificities and details of the knowledges and techniques to be deployed—, let us say that the exercising of contemporary relations of power has at its disposal multiple and heterogeneous discourses and techniques, and that what we need to analyze is not only the re-combinations and reconfigurations of these, and the invention of ever new modalities, but also the colonizations by technologies of control of techniques of self.

— **The Epistêmê and Tekhnê of Technology**

In his *Physics*, Aristotle (1992: 28-31, 37-39) present what are often taken to be four forms of causation: (1) the *causa materialis*, (2) the *causa formalis*, (3) the *causa efficiens*, and (4) the *causa finalis*. These are sometimes referred to as "the matter", "the form", "the agent", and "the end" of causality; what Heidegger called *hyle*, *eidos*, *logos*, and *telos*, respectively (Heidegger 1977: 7-8). In his discussion of the Aristotelian four-fold, vis-à-vis technology, Heidegger (1977: 6-12) questions the thought that posits these as causes (the Latin *causa*), and instead suggests that they should be read as four ways of being obliged or indebted (the Greek *aition*). Heidegger uses the example of a silver chalice to describe how the produced sacrificial vessel is indebted to the matter (silver), the form (chaliceness), the agent (deliberation), and the end (sacred rite). Understood in terms of being obliged, what a thing *is* is indebted (1) to the matter (*hyle*) from which it is formed; (2) to the aspect (*eidos*) of the form it assumes; (3) to the careful consideration or thought (*logos*) which, in drawing *hyle*, *eidos*, and *telos* together, brings forth that which is brought forth; and (4) to the kinds of activity (*telos*) for which the finished thing is to be used (ibid.: 6-9). This, for Heidegger, is the essence of ancient technology (see Rojciewicz 2006: Part I). To-day, and in relation to technical devices and the physical/natural sciences, Heidegger claims that matter has been reduced to the raw material upon which form is imposed; that form is the instrumentality and disposability (and we might add consumability) the we imposed upon matter; that the agent—who, for us, is no longer one element amongst four, but is the only genuine causal agent—is reduced to being the one who imposes form onto matter; and the end is reduced to a thing being both at our disposal (consumable) and disposable (thrown away). This, for Heidegger, is the essence of modern technology (see ibid.: Part II): we no longer think in terms of obligation but in terms of causality, in which causality as a four-fold is reduced to one—the agent or efficient cause (a metaphysics of subjectivity).

Heidegger’s narrative, then, charts a historical transformation from an active letting or abetting (the four-fold of obligation) to an all-encompassing imposition, to the com-posing (*Ge-stell*) of disposables (*Bestand*); that is to say, to the com-posing or syn-thesizing (*Ge-stell*) of composites or synthetics (*Gestell*)
whose only existence is as disposables (Bestand), that is, as being both at our disposal and disposable. This understanding of Ge-stell and Bestand, which are usually translated as “enframing” and “standing-reserve” respectively, is taken from Rojewicz’s discussion of Heidegger’s essay on technology (ibid.: 103–5, 84-89, respectively). However, in using them, I am not implying that they are the correct translation or that they are a better translation, and so forth; but nor am I explicitly saying that they are a more usable translation. Rather, I am taking them up and using them because they are useful in a different way. In other words, understanding Ge-stell as com-posing can and may be used in conjunction with an understanding of this term as “en-framing/enframing” (Elden 2001: 78-79) in that questioning the drawing together (Ge-stell) of what is drawn together (Gestell) also questions the “en-framing” of what is thus enframed: ‘[t]echnologies of government, techniques of the self[…] should be analyzed not simply as instruments but as part of a frame (a Ge-stell, in Heidegger’s sense) in which questions of who we are, of what our being is composed, of what we would like to emerge[…] appear’ (Dean 1996: 226). In addition, whereas these terms were, for Heidegger, linked exclusively to the emergence of modern technology, to the extent that Foucault can be said to have taken them up and used them, they were taken up and used as a tools for questioning different technologies in different times and at different places (see Elden 2001).

More specifically, Foucault’s historical narrative, which runs from sovereign power to the emergence of pastoral form of government, disciplinary power, biopolitical power, and so forth, can be said to move in the opposite direction to Heidegger’s, in that it maps a historical transformation from an all-encompassing imposition (sovereignty and juridico-political power) to something like a directed active letting or abetting (neo-liberal governmentality or what Rose calls advanced liberalism, see Rose 1996b; see also Miller and Rose 2008: 199-218). Stated otherwise, just as Heidegger described the reduction of the four-fold of obligation, vis-à-vis modern technology, to a single causality, the so-called efficient cause, in which form is actively imposed upon passive matter by a creative and responsible agent or subject; Foucault describes a process in which a single source of power which imposes itself upon the governed (e.g. the right to take life or let live, see Foucault 1978: Part Five) is displaced by multiple and heterogeneous elements—elements in which the object and target of power-knowledge comes more-and-more to be not just a passively constituted element of power-knowledge but actively constitutive of government: as Cruikshank (1996) puts it, we should not ‘underestimated the extent to which we are already self-governing’ (ibid.: 235). Certainly, Foucault’s historical description is not one that narrates the replacement of sovereign power by either anatamo-political or bio-political power, but describes the emergence of the latter, and of their imbrications with and colonizations of the former (see, e.g. Foucault 2003c: 249). Hence, unlike Heidegger’s narrative, it does not take the form of epochal rupture and discontinuity but of infiltration and colonization. In addition, we need to be
much more specific in drawing out the finer details of what is meant by modern
technologies of power being something like a directed active letting or abetting;
which, as we shall see, has correlates to, but is distinguishable from, Heidegger’s
description of ancient technology. What this suggests is that, pace Rayner (2001,
2007), Foucault’s historical narrative does not closely follow Heidegger’s. Or, to
be more specific, what it suggest is that we should avoid imposing such schemas,
historical, ideal typical, or otherwise, upon the object of our enquiry but should
let that enquiry itself render visible the specific mechanism of the exercising of
contemporary relations of power.

In undertaking an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control,
what is to be questioned are discourses that put forward programmes for the
formation of a future present. Such discourses and the programmes they
articulate are to be question in terms of their dispositivity; that is to say, in terms
of their being disposing and inclining. What is to be questioned when
questioning such disposing and inclining is the placing together of what is placed
together in order to be placed apart. Stated otherwise, what is to be questioned is
the com-posing and en-framing (Ge-stell) of what is composed and enframed
(Gestell), so as to dispose and incline (conducting conducts and environing
environments). In other words, what is to be interrogated in not only the drawing
of things together (Latour 1990) but also the simultaneous setting of things apart
(the aménagement) vis-à-vis what is thus composed. That is to say, not only
thought but also rationality; not only com-posing but also dis-posing (not only
savoir—the pre-ontical—but also connaissance—the merely ontic). As the
foregoing discussion of the archaeological four-fold signpost, of all the things
that are posed together and enframed in the composition of a dispositive (in the
arranging of probability so as to conduct conducts) there are three interrelated
questions that mark themselves out, and each has four aspects. These questions
concern knowledge (savoir), relations of power (pouvoir), and relation to self (soi);
and the four aspects relevant to each concern what I will call the matter, the form,
the agent, and the end of dispositives of control that articulate programmes of
conduct and thus disclose their architectonics. Whilst the first question relates to
the epistemic, that latter pertain to the technical (knowledge-power, knowledge-
self). In practice, what we are actually dealing with is a matrix of experience that
in articulating certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse about the subject
conjoins knowledge-power-self.

The four-fold of matter, form, agent, and end roughly correspond to the
ontology, deontology, ascetics, and teleology of the relation of self to self, as
discussed above (see Rayner 2007: 122), and thus, by extension, they can be
mapped onto the four archaeological question posed not only to ethics, but also
to knowledge and to power. What I want to explore here are what I shall call four
“probes” of architectural research; they are not specifically concerned with
obligation, causation, or rules of formation, but with conceptualization, and they
are being discussed as possible questions to be posed vis-à-vis enquiring
concerning the architectonics of control. It is this method of probing that I am calling field-work; it questions concerning the matter, the form, the agent, and the end of control. The archaeological four-fold, when posed by way of an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, can be posed both in the direction of the descriptive element of a programme—the ways in which it described what is—and in the direction of the prescriptive element of such programmes—the ways in which the prescribe what will be, or what is to be known and what is to be done; that is to say, what various authorities want to happen.

— Matter

The matter refers to the “stuff” out of which something is produced (Aristotle 1992: 38): ‘that out of which as a constituent a thing comes to be is called a cause; for example, the bronze and the silver and their genera would be the cause respectively of a statue and a loving-cup’ (Aristotle 1992: 28). Heidegger refers to this stuff as ‘hyle’ (Heidegger 1977: 7) and, for him, the statue and loving-cup would be indebted or obliged to the bronze and silver from which they are respectively made. Matter, then, refers to the material or substance, and so forth, from which a thing is fashioned. Translating this into a Foucaultian perspective, matter refers to the modes of objectification (i.e. objectification and objectivation), that is, it refers to the ontology of the articulation of tekhnē and epistēmē or to the different modes by which a certain aspect of human being is made an object of knowledge, an object of relations of power, or an object of relations to self. It refers to the different and differential ways in which a certain aspect of human materiality is made an object of the human sciences on the one hand, and of political and/or ethical practices, on the other. And it refers to the ways in which a matter of concern (problematisation and its objects) becomes a matter of fact (discourses that are taken to be true).

What we are concerned with, here, is not some substantive, self-existent, material that pre-exists its shaping into form by an agent; rather, what Foucault’s archaeology addresses is the formation of matter in the form of objects. As Foucault put this in relation to his study of madness: ‘[t]he unity of the discourses on madness is not founded on the existence of the object “madness”, or on the constitution of a unique horizon of objectivity; it is the series of rules which make possible, during a given period, the appearance of medical descriptions (with their object), the appearance of a series of discriminatory and repressive [and productive] measures (with their particular object), and the appearance of a set of practices codified in prescriptions or medical treatments (with their specific objects)’ (Foucault 1998: 313; see also Foucault 1972: 40, 47). Note, here, that this presentation describes knowledge, power, and—to the extent that prescriptions or medical treatments often involve self-management—ethics.

188
This is clearly expressed by the way in which Foucault talks of the determination of the ethical substance. It concerns those practices in which the individual is incited or directed to constitute a certain aspects of itself, its actions, or its behaviour as the principle material of its moral conduct. As noted, the principal question here is what ‘is the aspect or part of myself or my behavior which is concerned with moral conduct?’ (Foucault 1997: 263). As Hacking puts it in his essay on ‘Self-Improvement’, matter refers to the ‘stuff that you worry about if you are a moral agent’ (Hacking 2002: 117, emphasis added): pleasure, intentions, desire, and so forth (Rayner 2007: 122). Transposing this to our architectural perspective, what we are seeking is not the essence of a thing—its inherent properties—taken as referent, but nor is it the space or field of practices from which an “object” (a referential) comes to be formed; its condition of possibility conceptualized as ‘the common space in which diverse objects stand out and are continuously transformed’ (Foucault 1998: 313). Whereas Foucault’s archaeology was primarily concerned with describing the formation of objects (of knowledge, of intervention), what we are interested in is how the articulation of epistêmê and tekhnê works ‘not only subject to, but through and by means of conditions of possibility’ (Gordon 1980: 245-246). That is to say, since our enquiry is non-historical, and thus cannot map out the surfaces of emergence from which certain delimited and specified objects were formed, what we can question are the ways in which discourse or the programmatic aspect of technologies of power determines the object that is the target of such conditioning.

The matter, here, not only concerns matters of fact but also matters of concern (see Latour 2004). What we are questioning are the different and differential ways in which certain aspects of reality—and invariably we are talking about human matter—are carved out and isolated, designated and analyzed, and so on, through effective problematizations by thought (matters of concern), how this matter is presented as that which matters, and thus as that which is to be invested by power (matters of fact). That is to say, through processes in which certain aspects of behaviour or conduct, certain maladies of the mind or the body, certain propensities or predispositions, or certain abilities or capacities, and so forth, are cut out from the fabric of the world as what comes to matter: that is, in the double sense, as what matters or comes to be an object of concern and what, through that very process, materializes as the object of concern.

In other words, vis-à-vis the architectonics of control, in questioning what Dean (1996) calls the ‘governable substance or material’ (ibid.: 222), it ‘concerns what we seek to govern in ourselves and others’ (ibid.) or, stated otherwise, it questions how a certain ‘aspect of the other is constituted as the prime material of their conduct’ (Owen 1994: 159). Or, since a relation of power is a relation in which some conduct the conduct of others so as to obtain from them a certain way of conducting themselves, the question should be “What aspect of human conduct has been constituted by a technology of power as the principal material of/for the conducting of one’s own conduct?” The question to be asked here, then,
does not concern an object—i.e. pre-given, ready-made, or fully-formed matter; a substantive referent, etc.—, it is to determine what matters; that is, what is the concern, what is the object of concern, and thus what is the determination of the substance of control. Is this material conceptualized as active or passive; as corporeal (the body) or incorporeal (the soul); is it to be determined, imposed upon, or is it pregnant with a form that is to be actively let or abetted, albeit in a directed way; and so on? Is it an object of knowledge, of governmental intervention, or something to be formed by the self in its relation to itself as this relation pertains to a relation of power, and so forth?

As Dean notes, this ‘governable substance is a materiality drenched with thought’ (Dean 1996: 222), and so what we are dealing with here is a materialism of the incorporeal: ‘[i]t is…not a question of either a pure materiality or a pure ideality; it is both and at once’ (ibid.). By way of example, Dean asks us to ‘consider the mundane practice of dieting’, which is a practice not only concerned with governing a materiality: ‘the body and its intake of food’, exercise, and the like; it is also associated with a whole body of knowledge concerning the chemical makeup of the food we eat, the bio-chemical processes of digestion, and the ‘physio-chemical constitution of our bodies’ (ibid.). Another example would be an organization attempting to increase efficiency through productivity. This not only includes governing a materiality: the “entrepreneurial self”; it also includes a whole raft of social and psychological knowledge of the workplace (e.g. Rose 1989: Part Two). In questioning the substance of control, then, we enquire into the ways in which various authorities ‘seek to act upon a materiality rendered governable through a grid of intelligibility and calculation’ (Dean 1996: 222), which is to say, through the articulation of certain kind of discourse about the subject and certain techniques.

The series of question that may be asked, vis-à-vis that matter of a programme of control, can be re-worked from the forgoing discussion concerning the archaeological four-fold as these concern knowledge, power, self. What we are to describe here are not the rules of formation but rather the descriptions, prescriptions, and codification, as these are articulated and conceptualized, concerning the matter of control.

a) “How and in what ways does the discourse under study describe the ways in which an aspect of human being—what we are, what we say, what we do—has been problematized as an object to be known, as a target of governmental intervention, and/or as an aspect of self-reflection?” “What forms of conspicuousness, obstinacy, and/or obtrusiveness have given rise to such a problematization, what forms of thought has this problematization given rise to (codification), and what forms of rationality are expressed there (prescription)?” What we have here is not an object that is identical to itself, but a dispersion, and the aim here is to ‘show where these individual differences, which, according to the degrees of rationalization, conceptual codes, and types of theory’, have been ‘designated and analysed’ and accorded the status of an object (Foucault 2002b:
45). Such surfaces of appearance, or the space of problematization thus mapped out, may be constituted by ‘the family, the immediate social group, the work situation, a [particular] community’, or at the level of population, the biological existence of the human species, its sexual practices, its criminal behaviour, its health and well-being, its economic and social life, and so forth. What we are to enquire into here, are the different and differential ways in which, ‘[i]n these fields of initial differentiation, in the distances, the discontinuities, and the thresholds that appear within it, [governmental] discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable’ (Foucault 2002b: 46).

b) Next, we can describe the various authorities that are able to perform such a delimitation. These may be constituted by medicine; the law and penal law; religious authority; the various “psy-“ sciences; the various “social” sciences; economics, management, and accounting; ergonomics and cybernetics; genetics, and so forth. That is to say, they concern specific areas of expertise and the professions, or those to whom we grant or to which has been granted a certain authoritative status. What we are dealing with here are what, in The Will to Knowledge, Foucault called the “local foci” of power-knowledge; that is, the relations that obtain between governors and governed or between those who aim to govern and those who have become the target of government: between patient and doctor, prisoner and prison warder, school child and teacher, employee and employer, penitent and confessor or the modern equivalent thereof, and so forth. In other words, these local foci of power knowledge may be constituted by an institution possessing its own rules, by a group of expert individuals constituting a profession, by a body of knowledge and practice, or by certain recognized authorities, philanthropic individuals, pressure groups, charities, and the like (Foucault 2002b: 46). It is such authorities that delimit, name, and establish an object of concern as an object of concern; or that transform a matter of concern into a matter of fact (Foucault 2002b: 46).

c) Finally, we must ask “how these various authorities were able to specify, or how and in what ways they specified, the objects thus delimited?” “What perceptual, moral, and ethical grids of specification were articulated and/or conceived?” These are the systems, schemas, diagrams, modes of comprehension, grids of intelligibility, styles of thought, and so forth, in, by, and through which ‘the different “kinds of [object]” are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another, and designated as object of governmental discourse: as objects to be known, as the target of governmental intervention, and as the substance of self-reflection (Foucault 2002b: 46). What is specified, instituted, determined, here is or can be constituted by the soul; human faculties, propensities, capacities, limits; the body; the life and history of individuals, the health and well-being of populations, the “flesh”, the body of the child, the economy as a transactional reality, and so forth, or they may be constituted by
The series of questions to be ask here, vis-à-vis an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, pertain to the specificity of the strategic games between liberties that have given rise to said problematization: what forms of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy have given human being to thought, what were the surfaces of emergence from which they arrived (as these can be gleaned from the discourse under study by analyzing its descriptions of what is); what modes of objectification have been posited, what local centres of power-knowledge are involved, what authorities of delimitation were able to delimit, name, and establish the object of governmental concern; and how and in what ways have these object been made, how has matter come to matter and, through that very process, become an object of knowledge, a target of governmental intervention, and/or the substance of self-reflection. Such questions not only concern the different and differential ways in which an object has been problematized as an object to be known, or the conduct of the others has been problematized vis-à-vis what various authorities want to happen, but also, and perhaps more and more so, they concern the problematization of the conducting of one’s own conduct, of the ways in which individuals do, or do not, conduct themselves. In other words, this not only concerns how we are indirectly constituted by the imperatives of power-knowledge, it also concerns how such imperatives direct us to constitute a specific aspect of ourselves as the governable substance of our own actions and to form a relation to ourselves vis-à-vis this aspect and this substance. That is to say, we have to account for the ways in which we are not only passively constituted by knowledge technologies and technologies of power but also how we are lead or directed to actively constitute ourselves, to know ourselves, and to take care of ourselves, through technologies of self.

— *Form*

The *form* refers to the shape or aspect that matter is to be worked into; for Aristotle, form refers to ‘what the thing is’ (Aristotle 1992: 38); or, more specifically, form ‘is the account of what the being would be, and its genera’ (Aristotle 1992: 28). Heidegger calls the form that matter is to be worked into its “aspect” or *eidos* (Heidegger 1977: 7); it has connotations not only of the outward appearance of a finished thing but also, and more specifically, of the *idea* of the form that matter is to be worked into (ibid.: 20). In other words, form is the conceptualization of form pre-existing the working of matter into the form thus conceived.

Translating this into a question concerning the architectonics of control, we can say that *form* refers to the *modes of subjectification* (i.e. subjection and subjection); it refers to the *deontology* of the articulation of *tekhnē* and *epistēmē*. 
Form is difficult to unravel because what we are dealing with here is a complex of interrelated modes of subjectification. Firstly, it questions how being made object of knowledge, target of governmental investment, or aspect of self-reflection makes subjects; secondly, it question the subjected subjects relations to itself vis-à-vis the codification of conduct and its recognizing its relation to a mode of obligation; thirdly, it questions the modification of the subject that is to know the object, that is to govern the target, and, in doing so, that is to form a relation to itself; lastly, it looks at the complex interplay between these modes of subjection and modes of subjectivation: governed-governor-self.

To describe the form that matter is to be worked into, then, is to describe not only the conceptualization of this form (the determination of the governable substance so as to constitute a ‘governable subject’, Dean 1996: 223), it is also to describe the different ways in which the subject is formed by way of its relation to certain arrangements of obligation. In describing this obligation, and the subjects relation to it, we not only have to describe how the subject is lead to recognize their relation to such an obligation, we also have to flip to the other side of the equation, as it were, so as to be able to describe the formation and/or conceptualization of this form of obligation itself. That is to say, we have to move from a description of one form of subjectification (subjection) to a description of another form of subjectification (modification); from the formation of the object, and thus the subject, to be known to the formation of the subject capable of knowing or who knows the object. However, since it is the form that matter is to be worked into that we are primarily concerned with questioning here, we can analyze form not only in terms of how it has been conceived, but also in terms of a relation of power that takes the form of the subject being related to an obligation, and thus to a description of how this obligation is conceptualized, how it gains it authority, and thus its acceptability, and so forth, on the one hand, and, on the other, of how, in recognizing its relation to this obligation, the subject is lead or directed to constitute its self-relation.

As with matter or the form of objects, due to an approach that approaches things from the perspective of the present, we cannot look at the formation of governmental modalities but have, instead, to look at their mode of articulation and conceptualization, of how the form that matter is to be worked into is conceived not only in relation to those who are to conduct the conduct of others but also in relation to those whose conduct is to be conducted and in relation to the conducting of one’s own conduct (the mode of subjection). What we are concerned with here is ‘the “mode of obligation”’, that is, ‘with the position we take or are given in relation to rules and norms, with why we govern ourselves and others in a particular manner’ (Dean 1996: 224). The principle question to be asked here, then, is “‘What is the form of subjectivity that matter, as object of knowledge, target of political intervention or investment, and/or of self-reflection and transformation is to be worked into?’ “What form is to be imposed upon or, more specifically, geared-into matter?” Is it to be subservient, docile,
interdependent, or independent? Is it something to be determined (subjected), imposed (normalized), or brought-forth (realized and actualized)?

Taking our cue for the forgoing discussion of the archaeological four-fold as this pertains to knowledge-power-self, we can pose the following series of questions.

a) “Who is to be governed?” “Who is spoken about?” “Who is to have their actions acted upon?” “Who is to be incited and/or invited to establish a relation to themselves in relation to a codification of conduct and to recognise themselves as being related to an obligation to implement it?” This series of question can be posed both retrospectively in terms of descriptions of forms of subjectivity being problematized (dependent, inflexible, inactive, intransigent, etc.) and prospectively in terms of prescriptions concerning the types or forms of subjectivity to be brought into existence (or, if matter is conceptualized as being pregnant with form, to be brought forth, that is, pro-duced: independent, flexible, active, etc.). “Who” here does not refer to a psychological entity, but nor does it refer to the actual making of people. Rather, it designates the formation of a position that the subjected subject may come to occupy.

The flip-side of this question concerns not only “Who is speaking?” but also “Who is to govern?” “Who is to direct the conduct of the other so as to lead them to conduct themselves?” As noted above, “who”, here, does not refer to a psychological entity, with a biography, and an economic and social context; rather “[t]he problem is to determine what the subject must be, to what condition it is subject, what status it must have, what position it must occupy in the real or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge [connaissance]’ (Foucault 1998: 459, modified). Thus, not an individual psychology but a position (Foucault 1991a: 58), a position invested with authority, with the right to tell the truth, and with the right to have what is said accepted because it is invested with authority and truth: psychiatrist, doctor, economist, biologist, philologist, prison warden, psychologist, an expert, subject to pedagogic norms, legal conditions, in a position that functions in relation to society as a whole.

b) We can also ask, “What are the institutional sites in which the subjected subject is to be governed?” “Are these sites already established or are they something that has to be modified or brought into being?” “Are they closed institutions or more open networks and relays of related institutional settings?” Does governing involve what Millar and Rose call ‘governing at a distance’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 18; Rose 1996b: 56; 1999: 111). What we are dealing with here is a perceptual field that is at one and the same time a field of intervention, and the relation between the seeable and the sayable and the thinkable and doable: systems of registration, notation, description, classification, statistics, teaching, information, hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, the examination, other theoretical domains, other institutions. Again, the other side of this question or series of questions concern the institutional sites from which
the one that is speaking or who is to govern speaks or are to govern. More specifically, it concerns the status and authority granted to those who speak or who are to act, and thus the acceptability of what they say or what they propose to do. In other words, it concerns those institutional sites ‘from which this discourse derives its legitimate source and point of application (its specific objects and instruments of verification)’ (Foucault 2002b: 56).

c) A final set of question which it is possible to ask here, concerns not only the ways in which ‘[t]he positions of the subject are...defined by the situation that it is possible for them to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups of objects’ (Foucault 2002b: 57), but also the opposite relation. In other words, in involves the strategic games of liberty and the attempts to codify and thus to solidify these relations into relations between the governed and government and between those who are to govern and those whom they are to be governed. Here, ‘we must not look for who has the power...(men, adults, parents, doctors) and who is deprived of it (women, adolescents, children, patients); nor for who has the right to know and who is forced to remain ignorant’; rather, ‘[w]e must seek...the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process’ (Foucault 1978: 99).

What we are to question here, then, is a ‘mode of subjection [that] signifies the relation of the other to a rule and its obligated practical exercise which the conducting of conduct requires’ (Owen 1994: 159). Or, more specifically, what we are questioning concerning is the mode of conceptualization of the principle governing the art of governing; that is to say, how is the object (matter), as object of knowledge, as the target of political intervention, and the object of self-reflection, is conceptualized as a subject (form), and what is the principle governing the working of matter into form. On this view, and unlike Husserl, Heidegger, and the Frankfurt school, for example, power not only takes the form of an objectification (the constitution of matter) but also of a subjectification (the working of matter into form): it concerns what Dean calls ‘the governable subject’ (Dean 1996: 223). Here, however, it is not simply a matter of form being imposed upon matter; rather, matter—i.e. the human material that is subject to procedures of objectification and, simultaneously, of subjectification—has come to be conceptualized more and more as being pregnant with a form that is in need of realization, actualization, expression, fulfilment, and so forth. That is to say, the exercising of contemporary relations of power is less a determining or an imposing than it is a gearing-into what are taken to be inherent or characteristic human propensities, dispositions, tendencies, capacities, and so on, and so forth. Furthermore, it is less a question of imposition because the principle causal agent is no sovereign imposing his will, but nor it is a question of imposing a pre-defined norm onto human matter; rather, it is a question of gearing-into matter in which the subject itself is one of the principle agents of transformation.
— Agent

The agent concerns the human or non-human, animate or inanimate, sentient or non-sentient, living or non-living agency—the environment or conditions of possibility that environ horizons of probability, the existential contexture, etc.—that is to be deployed in order to work matter into form and thus to make human beings subjects. That is to say, it deals with ‘the work of government or the governing work’ (Dean 1996: 222). For Aristotle, the agent concerns ‘the thing which effects the change’ (Aristotle 1992: 38): ‘[t]he primary source of the change or the staying unchanged: for example, the man who has deliberated is a cause, the father is a cause of the child, and in general that which makes something of that which is made, and that which changes something of that which is changed’ (Aristotle 1992: p 28-29). Heidegger refers to this as logos (Heidegger 1977: 8), and so it refers just as much to the discursive as the non-discursive. Here, it is not a question of the one who deliberates or the agent who wields an instrument but the whole instrumentarium as agent. The agent, then, has connotations of the agency in, by, and through which change or transformation occurs or is to occur. When approached in terms of tekhnē it refer not only to that which is employed or is to be deployed in order to effect change, but also, and more specifically, to the thought, deliberation, calculation, rationalization (i.e. logos) inhabiting such practices. That is to say, it concerns the deliberated practical aspect of “a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal”.

Translating this into our architectural analytics, the agent refer to what we can call the modes of elaboration, to the logos of the articulation of tekhnē and epistēmē, to the articulation and elaboration of the techniques that are to work matter into form, and of the ways in which multiple and heterogeneous techniques are com-posed and come to form an overall tactics specific to the discourse under study. It does not concern an idea existing in someone’s head—the silversmith, the sculpture, the architect—but to the agency in, by, and through which matter is to be shaped into form. Here, we are not referring to some humanist notion of agency, but to the specifics of the techniques (architectures, timetables, procedures, movements, feedback mechanisms, etc.), which are to be deployed in order to transform matter into form and the knowledge informing and informed by these techniques; that is to say, the particular arts of government to be deployed in the government of others. Here, it is not a question of an agent wielding an instrument, but of instrument as agent; what we are concerned with is not an agent—efficient cause—that wields and instrument but precisely this instrumentarium conceptualized as the agent of transformation.

In broaching the question concerning the epistēmē and the tekhnē of technologies of power, from the perspective of the present, what is sought is not so much ‘[t]he system of the appearance and distribution of enunciative modes’ (Foucault 1972: 79). Rather, it is the ‘objectives, the strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it proposes’ (Foucault 2007b: 36). That is to say,
what we can question are the tactics arrangements and not just statements (or, perhaps we can say that what we are dealing with are tactic-statements). Relating this to questioning concerning the tekhnē of technologies of power, we can begin by observing that what ‘[w]e must seek...[are]...the pattern of modifications which the relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process’, and this because ‘[r]elations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are “matrices of transformation”’ (Foucault 1978: 99). What we should question is the thought or rationality inhabiting the tactics of power, ‘that is, the techne which are deployed not only to bring the other’s conduct into compliance with a certain rule, but to attempt to transform the other into the subjugated subject of their behavior’ (Owen 1994: 159). Taking up the thematic of The Birth of the Clinic, this involves practices of seeing and saying, and taking up one of the thematics of Discipline and Punish, vis-à-vis discipline, it involves procedures of intervention such as hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and the examination; that is to say, in involves ways of seeing and saying and thinking and doing that are, at one and the same time, practices of intervening and transforming: it ‘refers to all the means, techniques, rationalities, forms of knowledge and expertise that are to be used to accomplish the enfolding of authority’ (Dean 1996: 222-223). In describing these techniques and, more specifically, of how various disparate techniques come to be com-posed into an overall tactical arrangement or tactical field, we can look at:

a) The forms of succession of the agent that brings about or is to bring about the change. What is being asked here are the different and differential ways in which various techniques and their tactical combination are problematized, descriptively, as being inefficient, ineffective, too costly, outdated or outmoded, and, on the other hand, the prescriptive articulation of the techniques to be deployed and employed so as to work matter into form. Regarding the latter, we can look into the various technical series: the various types of dependence between the techniques proposed, and the various schemata through which these techniques are to be combined to form a series. These techniques not only concern techniques that are to act upon the actions of the other, they also concern techniques that lead said other to act upon their own actions.

b) The forms of coexistence of these techniques with a much broader technical field: techniques formulated elsewhere; techniques that relate to different domains of objects, different fields of intervention, and different types of discourses; techniques which may be discussed, taken up or rejected, combined or modified, and so on and so forth.

c) The forms of intervention refers to the fact that of all the techniques detailed and discussed or that are available to a particular programme, only some are presented and proposed (to the exclusion of others). And thus what we have to be attentive to is that the techniques thus proposed make it possible to specify each programme of control, and to differentiate it from others. In addition, we also need to describe how the techniques that are proposed are
thematized and/or systematized and thus whose unity comes to form a broader tactical field of practices.

In other words, what we are dealing with here are the ways in which discourse that put forward programmes for the formation of a future present that seek to replace older techniques with new ones, borrow techniques from other domains, and combine these techniques into a broader tactical arrangement. Of course, we also need to account for the relation between the specific tactical configuration (the agent) and the broader strategic imperative (the end) of a programme of control, and vice-versa. That is to say, we need to account for the double conditioning of the agents by the end and of the ends by the agent. What has to be accounted for here is not only the articulation of certain techniques vis-à-vis the government of others but also their articulation with techniques of self, of the different ways in which governmental technologies seek to colonise and mobilise certain aspects of technologies of self.

— End

The end is primarily concerned with the for-the-sake-of-which; for Aristotle, the end is ‘what the thing is for’ (Aristotle 1992: 38): ‘a thing may be a cause as the end. That is what something is for, as health might be what a walk is for’ (Aristotle 1992: 29). Heidegger refers to this as telos (Heidegger 1977: 8). It concerns what we can call the overall objective—the conscious goals, as it were—of a specific discourse or technology of power; it refers to what we can call the modes of thematization, to the telos or teleology of the articulation of tekhnē and epistēmē. It denotes not only to the ways in which the matter, the form, and the agent are com-posed and thematized into an overall dispositional strategy, but also to the ways in which the subject—as subject and object—is to be inserted, or is to comes to insert itself, into an overall governmental drift of pattern. Again, Foucault’s archaeology was concerned with the formation or determination of what he called thematic or strategic choices (Foucault 1972: 79): ‘what permits the individualization of a discourse and gives it an independent existence is the system of points of choices which it offers from a field of given objects, a form of determinant enunciative scale, and from a series of concepts [read techniques] defined in their content and use’ (Foucault 1998: 320). Transposing this into an architectural way of seeing and saying, then, it is not so much a predefined end that predetermines the matter, the form, or the agent, as it is an end that comes into being through the thematization of these three rules of formation. That is to say, they open up a space or practical field in which multiple and heterogeneous practices congeal or coagulate into ‘a common institutional, administrative or political drift and pattern’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984: 85).

In relation to ethics, the telos, or end, of ethical life corresponds to the mode of being that is the goal of ethics. As Rayner notes, ‘for the ancient Greeks, the telos of ethics was self-mastery in order to permit the government of self and
others’, for the medieval Christians, it was ‘self-purification for the sake of immortality’, and for us moderns, it is ‘authenticity, understood in relation to scientific or philosophical knowledge of human nature’ (Rayner 2007: 122). For Foucault, whilst ‘an action is not only moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also moral by its insertion and the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct (Foucault 1985: 27-28, modified). We can reformulate this in relation to questioning concerning technologies of power in the following way: the telos of domination refers to the kind of being which power-knowledge relations attempt to produce.

In relation to control, it refer to ‘the telos of government, that is, the aim, end, goal or design, the plans into which they fit, the mode of being we hope to create, what we hope to produce in others’ (Dean 1996: 224). To adapt Foucault, we might say that ‘a subjugated action aims towards its own accomplishment, but also aims beyond the latter to the establishing of a subjugated conduct that commits the other to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the subjugated subject’ (Owen 1994: 159). Hence, there are two interrelated ways of looking at this: on the one hand, there are the theactics of what we might call an overall strategy (i.e. panopticism); on the other hand, there is the theactics of the kinds of object of knowledge (connaissance) and the kinds of subjects of power that are to be produced by way of the aforementioned strategic power-knowledge formation (i.e. docility). In relation to knowledge (savoir), we can call it the formation of theactics; in relation to power, we can call it the formation of strategies (in relation to ethics, it is called teleology). It is this thematic aspect that such terms as “panopticism” or the phrase “disciplinary society” proximally and nominalistically name. The teleology of control, then, refers to how certain modes of conduct are to be ‘incorporated in[to] a pattern of activities and knowledge leading to a specific matrix of ends, means, mode of being, or, as Max Weber would have put it...[into a]...Lebensführung or “conduct of life”’ (Dean 1996: 224; see also Gordon 1987).

Possible questions to as here concern “the points of diffraction of programmes”, “the economy of the programmatic constellation,” and the “function the programme under study is to carry out in a field of non-discursive practices”.

a) The points of diffraction of programme under study refer to “points of incompatibility”: two or more tactical fields may be conceived but which cannot work together without ‘manifest contradiction or inconsequence’ (Foucault 2002b: 73); “points of equivalence”: two or more dissimilar tactical arrangements may be conceived which, whilst manifestly not the same, may be used interchangeable or as alternatives; and “points of equivalence”: the ways in which a coherent system of matter, form, and agent has been derived.

b) The economy of the programmatic constellation accounts for how, out of all the different possibilities discussed in a particular programme, out of all the partial groupings, regional compatibilities, coherent architectures, and so forth, that what is proposed is proposed and not something else. It also seeks to situate
the programme under study into a broader discursive field to which it belongs or may belong. What relations of analogy, opposition, complementarity, differentiations, and so forth does the programme being analyzed have with other such programmes?

c) The function that the programme under study is to carry out in a field of non-discursive practices” can be question by drawing attention to what the various authorities under discussion want to happen, and how, in drawing together the matter, the form, and the agent, they seek to bring into existence not only a future present, but also the kinds of subjects that will fit into and occupy this present. In short, we need to question the different and differential ways in which what is being constituted or, in any case, what is being put forth, is not only modes of existence but also a broader existential context in which these forms of existence are to be inserted, or are to insert themselves, and in which they may come to take their place.

The matter relates to what is to be governed; the form relates to who is to be governed; the agent relates to how this who and this what are to be governed; and the end relates to the for-the-sake-of-which that the what is to be shaped into the who by way of the how. Or, perhaps another way of rendering this is that matter relates to that aspect of the self that forms the problem of government, and that form refers to the ways in which individuals are to be invited or incited, induced or conduced, into forming a relation to themselves in, by, and through this materiality as both a matter of concern and a matter of fact. That the agent not only refer to the various techniques in, by, and through which the actions of the governed are to be acted upon, but also the techniques in, by, and through which individuals and invited and incited, and so on, to act upon their own actions, that is, to govern themselves, and the different and differential ways in which these two types of techniques—of others, of self—compose to form an overall tactics. And of the ways in which the matter, the form, and the agent form a composite that is to disposes and/or inclines: a dispositive.

What is being accounted for here is not just the different ways in which what is placed together (composed) and, in that very process, is placed apart (arranged) vis-à-vis matter, form, and agent, but also the different and differential ways in which matter, form, and agent come to be placed together in what is placed together and thus placed apart, and, in addition, the ways in which this happens vis-à-vis the relation of the discourse under study to both other discursive practices and the non-discursive institutional. In other words, what has to be accounted for is a whole complex of entangled and enmeshed relations, interrelation, and correlations; derivations, dependencies, interdependencies; oppositions, obstructions, and contradictions; mutual support, co-dependencies, overall theematics: in short, the ways in which matter, form, and agent come to form an overall governmental drift or patter. In other words, tactics—as composites of specific articulations of discourses and techniques—need to be reconstructed in terms of their being com-posed in
strategies, that is, as being ‘a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies’ (Foucault 1978: 100). That is to say, we must interrogate such discourses both at the level of ‘their tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects of power and knowledge [savoir] they ensure)’ and at the level of ‘their strategic integration (what conjunctions and what relations of force render their utilization necessary in such and such an episode of the diverse confrontations that take place)’ (Foucault 1978: 102, modified).

Of course, not all of the questions have to be asked, and these are not the only questions it is possible to ask. What we are dealing with is a complex entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous relations, and what has to be accounted for is the ways in which these relation come to form the objects, the subjects, the tactics, and the strategies of a particular programmes of control and the architectonics it expresses. Here, we could say that matter and form—or object and subject—relate to the arkhē of the architectonics of control, whilst the agent and the end relate to the tekhnē of the programmatic aspect of a discourse that puts forward a programme for the formation of a future present; it refer to the “practical rationality governed by a conscious goal”. These are less like questions to be posed directly (“What is the matter of such and such a programme?”, “What is the form of this or that architectonics?”, etc.) than they are a general way of posing specific kinds of questions that orientate the ways in which we are to approach the specific discourse at hand. That is to say, they are a particular way of rendering visible, and thus of rendering intelligible, the thought and rationality inhabiting a programme of control and the architectonics it articulates. On this view, and somewhat like genealogy and archaeology, an architectural analytics is not so much a methodology as it is a method. That is to say, it is an approach, a way of seeing and saying, of thinking and doing, of posing questions and describing the modes of objectifications, the modes of subjectification, the modes of elaboration, and the modes of thematization as these are articulated in programmes of control.

In other words, such questions do not form a procedure that must be followed, a checklist to be ticked off when completed. They are more like an orientating framework that frames the types of questions and the form of these types of questions when questioning human relations in term of power. To question human relations in terms of power is to question such relations as relations of force. Relations of force, here, do not necessarily mean juridical relations or relations of war, but relations questioned in terms of government. To question such relations in terms of government is to question them in terms of the different and differential ways in which some attempt to conduct the conduct of others, in which these others resisting such attempts or, in turn, attempting to conduct the conduct of those who are attempting to conduct their conduct, and in which the latter, in turn, resist such attempts, ad infinitum. A relation of force here is not bodies colliding, but action upon an action, and vice-versa. Such a process
does not form a “dialectic”, but is more like an on-going conversation, a dialog, which is less like a ‘face-to-face confrontation’ and more like ‘a permanent provocation’ (Foucault 2001d: 342, emphasis added); provocation, here, being a name that lends itself to the action of provoking, that is, of calling forth (Latin pro- “forth” + vocare “to call”, OED).

I noted how this set of questions is related to the Aristotelian four-fold of causality/obligation and, consequently, to the Heideggerian four-fold of technology. Taking a pointer from the later, Dean notes how such questioning ‘begins with the questions raised by human beings about being’ (Dean 1996: 225); or, to be more specific, questioning technology form a Foucaultian perspective, it looks as the questioning by human beings of human being (Foucault 1985: 6-7, 11-12). As such, it ‘captures Heidegger’s formative insight that “the question of the meaning of Being must be formulated” (Dean 1996; the citation is from Heidegger 1962: 24, H. 5). What this signifies is that the meaning of being cannot be separated from the form of questioning that questions the meaning of being. Consequently, in undertaking an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control, what we are to question ‘is not the way identities and selves are formed through a naturalistically conceived process of socialization, but the forms of interrogation, or questioning, of what we are and do within [the] horizon of…specific and…given practices’ (Dean 1996: 225). What this means is that what should be questioned is not specifically behaviours or ideas but the problematizations of certain kinds of behaviours and/or specific types of ideas or, more specifically, the specific form of such a problematization. Forms of problematization are to be interrogated by questioning their rejoinders that take the form of explicit programmes. And such programmes are analyzed by looking at their descriptions of what is and at their prescriptions of what will be.

In highly schematic form, and taking organizations as our reference point, we can say that the material that is to be worked upon and worked over by contemporary architectonics of control is taken to be pregnant with form, and that the key element here is not so much action as it is interaction; that the form that matter is to be worked into is not compliant docility but a certain circumscribed creativity (enthusiastic, motivated, entrepreneurial, innovative, unconventional, thinking outside the box, etc.) that is to be brought forth and keyed-into; that the agent is not reduction (restriction of movement—corporeally, spatially, temporally—, training and dressage, normalization through surveillance, etc.) but the reconfiguration of environments (spatial, temporal, material; corporeal and cognitive; kinetic and kinaesthetic; ergonomic and cybernetic, etc.) that are designed (programmed) to be conducive to and inductive of free-flowing movement, communication, and exchange: interaction (e.g. Bürolandschaft); and that the end sought is efficiency, only this is sought not reductively through the removal of all that is surplus to requirements and through the imposition of pre-defined and normalized activity but by way of the market and productivity.
Another way to think about this is to say that the matter conceptualizes the nature of human nature, whereas the form conceptualizes the realization and/or actualization of said nature. Likewise, the agent conceptualizes the political order conducive to the “good life”, whereas the end conceptualizes the good life itself; it is the for-the-sake-of-which that matter is to be shaped into form by way of an agent. Of course, there is no linear logic or causality here; rather there is what Foucault called the immanence of power and knowledge (and ethics), the continuous variations of the relations of power, the double conditioning of tactics by strategy and of strategy by tactics, and the tactical polyvalence of discourse in the formation of a thematized and strategized for-the-sake-of-which.

These four “probes”, which can be posed retrospectively in terms of description and prospectively in terms of prescription, are not meant to be formulaic or systemic; they do not detail four questions or sets of questions that have to be asked, independently or in conjunction, when undertaking an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control. That is to say, they are not designed to produce such statements as: “the matter of this technology of power is...x”; “the form is...y”; “the techniques used are such and such”; and “the ends sought are this or that”, and so forth. Rather, what we are dealing with here is a tight entanglement that is difficult to untangle, and so these probes are meant to be more like an overall orientating framework, a way of seeing and saying, of questioning and critiquing too, in, by, and through which to render visible the arkhē and the tekhnē inhering in and/or embodied by a particular programme of control and of the potential futures and modes of existence it seeks to bring into being. They are designed to help us think about how such a programme conceptualizes, descriptively and prescriptively, the material that is to be worked upon and worked over in, by, and through a relation of power; the forms of subjectivity to be brought into being or to be abetted by way of that relation; the specific techniques, and their composition into tactics, in, by, and through which matter is to be worked into form or through which the form inhering in matter is to be brought forth—that is, which allow for that relation to be exercised; and the overall forms of existence and/or modes of being that are the goal of a specific technology of power. These are to be question not only in terms of the prescriptive and codifying aspects of the architectonics of control but also in the ways in which such prescriptions and codifications are a particular response to a specific form of problematization, and of the particular form of problematization to which they are a rejoinder.
PART FIVE: CONCLUSION

It is the possibility of control which gives rise to the idea of a purpose. But mankind has in reality no purpose, it functions, it controls its own functioning, and it continually creates justifications for this control. We have to resign ourselves to admitting that these are only justifications.

(Foucault, “Who are you, Professor Foucault?”)

There can be no real sense of concluding here, if by this we mean a summary of findings. What has been presented in the above is nothing more than a rough draft, the broadly sketched outline of a possible opening. What I set out to do was to pose a question, or a series of questions, and to pose it without any intention of providing an answer, let alone the answer. Rather, the aim was to work through the question, to see which paths it opened up for us to follow, and to see how, in posing the question thus, it threw into relief the problem at hand. In writing the thesis, I was quite happy to let each part of the study, in working through this series of questions from slightly different angles, to do the work it set out to do and then to let that work drop into the background, as it were, and remain implicit in what followed. What I want to do here, in winding up the thesis, is to make these connections explicit in order to specify where we have arrived.

Studies in governmentality practice a certain form of critique that analyzes the will to govern from the position of counter-power and the will not to be governed like that or thusly. The critical tool, par excellence, of such studies, as these have been practiced by Foucault and others, is history. And yet much contemporary studies of governmentality pass over the kinds of historical practices practiced by Foucault and other for studies of the more recent past and the near future or even of the present itself questioned from within the confines of its own frontiers. Rather than criticise such non-historical, though not ahistorical, studies negatively, in terms of not being faithful to Foucault, or in terms of misinterpretation, misappropriation, and misapplications, and so forth, I wanted to approach this positively as being expressive of a genuine concern. This concern concerns questioning the exercising of contemporary relations of power, as they are to be exercised to-day, from the perspective of theirs and thus our contemporality; that is to say, in their own terms. And so an object of enquiry came into view, designated its frontiers, set out its terrain, and posed itself in the form of a question: if, how, and in what ways might we be able take up and use the work of Foucault and others in order to be able to carry out field-work in, on, and upon the present. This is something of a tall order given that Foucault’s work was historical through and through, and that history itself is more than just an object of enquiry; it is, in itself, the means of critique. That said, and the statement

205
in *The Archaeology* concerning it not being possible for us to know our own archive aside, there is nothing explicit or implicit in Foucault’s writing, or in those of studies in governmentality more generally, the would rule out such a question before it had even been posed. The first risk I took, then, was in thinking that taking up the work of Foucault and others in this way was at least a possibility.

In working through this question or this series of questions—working through mind, and not answering, as such—I wanted to move beyond two modes of appropriation. The first is the taking up of Foucault’s historical descriptions of certain modalities of exercising relations of power as either being depictions of the present or as being something like models and ideal types, which can be superimposed upon the present. The second was to forgo the now overused trope of the tool-box approach, which was replaced by what I called a work-shop approach. Taking these two together, the aim was not to see how we could “apply” Foucault’s “method”, as is, but to work out what took place there and to see if we could fashion some tools for ourselves for researching the environmentality of governmentality in our contemporality. The second risk taken, then, was that doing field-work not of the present but in the present would require a major re-think that moved beyond a simplistic Foucaultianism and/or a mere applicationism. Working out what took place in Foucault’s analytics of power and in studies in governmentality more generally, re-thinking these in terms of the question at hand, and then fashioning some tools for ourselves, was undertaken in three ways.

This involved, firstly, working out not so much a general thematic as a certain philosophical problematic in the work of Foucault. The aim here was not to find a central thread that ran through all of Foucault’s work, and which would stitch them together into a unified and coherent whole (quilting). Rather, it was to disclose a certain philosophical *ethos* that was practiced by Foucault’s in his diverse writings, and to do so in such a way as to make it available, and thus usable, in broaching the question of the exercising of relations of power in the contemporary order of things and to do so from within that very order. What was disclosed here was that, in their diversity, Foucault’s researches on madness and the asylum; illness and the clinic; life, labour, and language and the human sciences; crime and the prison; governing and governmentality; sexuality and ethics; and so forth, practiced a certain mode of rendering visible. What was rendered visible is that which is visible but not seen. Here it is not that what we do not see has been forgotten, has been buried beneath layer of semantic embedding, or has been masked by some interested party. Rather, what is rendered visible—vis-à-vis what we are, what we say, and what we do—is invisible precisely because it is too much on the surface of things: it is what we are, what we say, and what we do. That is to say, it is visible but unseen, and so the question then becomes “how do we make this visible-invisible visible to ourselves?”
Rendering visible, conceptualized here as a Foucaultian philosophical practice, does not pass through consciousness; either in terms of internal structures of consciousness or in terms of the internal structures of the objects experienced by consciousness. But to render visible, in this way, is also not to undertake an analysis of behaviour, attitudes, mentalities, sensibilities, and the like; that is to say, it does not look at the external conditions that structure consciousness. On the contrary, what is questioned is thought, and what Foucault undertook was a history of thought. Thought, here, is not questioned in terms of mental or cognitive activity, and is thus not questioned in terms of who is thinking, what they thought, or in terms of the political, economic, and/or social context that gave rise to what they thought. Rather, thought is questioned in terms of there being thought, of thought as an event, and thus of thought being a thing of this world. What is questioned here is that such and such a thing has been thought, and that what was thought was thought and not something else. That is to say, to render visible is, on the one hand, to enquire into the material and practical conditions of possibility of thought and the material and practical conditions that thought, thus thought, makes possible, and, on the other hand, to undertake an analytics of the thought thus thought. That is to say, it is to practice genealogy and archaeology respectively. The second move made, then, was to look at genealogy and archaeology as two different modes of rendering visible. In making this second move, I took up a certain conceptualization of Foucault’s project, which conceptualised it as having the aim of a genealogy of the subject, as having an archaeology of knowledge as its method, and of studying the domain of technology conceptualized as the articulation of certain techniques and certain kinds of discourse concerning the subject.

In taking genealogy first, I looked at Foucault’s essay on Nietzsche, and from this, proposed an analysis of what I called the structure of genealogical diagnosis. This structure involves a certain mode of historical enquiry that diagnoses the present by looking at its provenance and emergence. Provenance, here, names the field of dispersion, of the heterogeneous multiplicity, from which a certain emergence arrives; emergence, on the other hand, names the bringing forth of a singularity, a singularity that is still present in our present. Undertaking a diagnosis of the present in this way, that is, in terms of its contingency, enabled Foucault to strategize the present as an open field of possibility (we are freer than we think we are). I noted here, that this structure of genealogical diagnosis requires a difference, that this difference was the difference that to-day introduced with regards to yesterday, and that in questioning the present from the perspective of itself this form of enquiry was closed off to us. What was required here was a re-thinking of genealogy and of inventing a new genealogy for ourselves; or, in any case, of reconfiguring it, specific to our concerns. This was done by moving the slide-rule, as it were, to a different position and instead of undertaking a history of the present what was proposed, following Rose, was a history of the future. However, this was not to

207
be a history of emergent futures but a history of future emergences; that is, a history that conceptualises the present as provent. In other words, what was proposed was a questioning of our present that conceptualized that present as a field of dispersion from which or out of which a future emergence, and thus a future present, might arrive. Formulating the aims of the project in this way enables us to do two things: Firstly, it enables us to render visible the present not by looking at where we arrived from but by looking at where certain authorities want to take us. Secondly, it prevents us from speculating about what our future will be or, worse, predicting the shape of things to come; that is, it helps us to avoid the inherent dangers of futurology. Here, genealogy is neither a method nor a methodology but is more like an orientating framework that frames our orientation towards the present.

But how are we to question the present conceptualized as provenance? “How are we to interrogate the provent present?” This entailed a move from the aim of our project to its method; from a genealogy of the subject to an archaeology of knowledge (savoir). What was proposed here was the taking up of Foucault’s archaeology, re-thinking it in the direction of an archaeology of problematizations, and looking at how questioning the provent present in terms of its problematizations and their rejoinders may, indeed, grant us access to our own archive (the visible invisible that we are, say, and do), albeit in finite form. In thinking through the kinds of analytical work an archaeology of problematizations can do, vis-à-vis questioning the present from the perspective of itself, by way of a certain aspect of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference, I conceptualized problematizations as both a break-down in ongoing activity and thus as throwing forth or rendering visible the visible-invisible inhering in such activity. Conceptualizing and analyzing problematizations in this way is one possible way in which to disclose that which we are (no longer) and, by way of analyzing the rejoinders to said problematizations that take the form of explicit programmes, make visible something of what we are (in the process of) becoming. Questioning the provent present by way of an analytics of its problems and their rejoinders is thus one possible way of being able to see and say what we are to-day and what our present is. Of course, such an approach cannot disclose the present in its totality, but is can render visible certain aspects of the present in their specificity, thus maintaining the provent present in the dispersion that is its own.

Following this, the exercising of relations of power was re-thought, through the specificity of the concept of government and of governmentality, by way of the concept of control. The reason for putting forward this concept is that what it names in an unknown, which is to say, as something that is to be rendered visible by way of empirical enquiry. Or, stated otherwise, it is to give ourselves an object of study that does not rely upon preconceptions of what it is we are researching. In other words, it is to bracket out certain established and/or instituted modalities of exercising a relation of power—such as discipline, bio-politics, liberalism and
its avatars, welfarism, and so froth—so as to get at the specificity of the particular programme being studied. Following on from this, and in light of the problematic laid out there, the programmatic aspect of technologies of power was re-thought in terms of an architectonics of control. Reconceptualising government not just as conducting conducts but also as laying out or arranging probability, the notion of architectonics is designed to disclose the relationality of programmes of control by interrogating the specific techniques, tactics, and so forth that will allow for that relation to be exercised. Giving ourselves control as the object of enquiry and architectonics as the field in which we are to work has been worked out in such a way as to be able to render intelligible the *arkhē* and the *tekhne* inhering in such programmes and thus as rendering visible the exercising of contemporary relation of power by way of field-work in the contemporary.

Taking up the aim, method, and domain worked out thus, I then put forward a way of undertaking such an analytics by way of what I called an architectural analytics. In working through what I took to be a certain correlation between four types of questions Foucault posed to knowledge, to power, and to ethics, and noting a certain correspondence between this archaeological four-fold and the Aristotelian four-fold of obligation and, more specifically, the Heideggerian four-fold of technology, I put forward four question by which to undertake an architectural analytics of the architectonics of control. What was suggested here is that in questioning relations of power as they are to be exercised to-day from the perspective of this to-day, we can question four-forms of conceptualization that concern the matter, the form, the agent, and the end of the programmatic aspect of a technology of control. What is being proposed here, then, is an architectural analytics for doing field-work in the architectonics of control. Such field-work enquiries into the *matter* that constitutes the object and target of power; into the conceptualization of *forms* of subjectivity that matter is to be worked into; into the elaboration of the *agent* (tactics) that is to transform the matter thus constituted into the form thus conceived; and into the thematization of the overall *end*, goal, or strategy of control; the for-the-sake-of-which matter is to be shaped into form by way of said agent. What I think we can render visible in this way is the ways in which such programmes of control conceptualize the nature of human nature and the form of its realization and/or actualization in the establishment of a certain political order conducive to what it takes to be the “good life”.

One of the central thematics of the thesis has been a discussion of the very complex causality and anything but straightforward historical logic to Foucault’s histories in which he attempts to describe the transformations and mutations between formation, articulation, institutionalization, and instrumentalization. One of the costs of questioning the present from the perspective of itself is that this complexity is lost to us or, in any case, become much more simplified. On a more positive note, on the one hand, in attempting to describe the present from
the perspective of itself and its possible future emergences, we are freed from such a complex causality. On the other hand, since we are questioning the present in terms of the possible future emergences and thus potential future presents it embodies, this complex causal logic still applies because things never work out as planned, and so it is not possible for us to predict or even to speculate upon the shape of things to come. Thus whilst this complex causality is lost to us in terms of the detail of historical description, it is also what prevents us from regressing into futurology.

Another central thematic of the thesis, perhaps more as a subtext than overtly stated, is that what has been presented here occludes the combination of a Foucaultian analytics, diagnostics, and strategies, with more interpretivist or ethnographic modes of enquiry and their respective research methodologies. This has not been put forward from an anti-sociological stance. Rather, it is the effect of a perceived incommensurability between the work of Foucault and such methodologies. My concern here is that in using the work of Foucault to interpret interviews, for example, it is difficult to see how one could separate out the thought and rationality inhering in a programme, that is, its architectonics, from the opinions, desires, meanings, and beliefs, and so forth, of the interviewee. It is also difficult to see how such an approach could be reconciled with Foucault’s critique of the analytic of finitude. The problem with ethnographic studies, on the other hand, is somewhat different, although not unrelated. Here, the problem would be that what is being observed by way of ethnography is not only the manifestations of power, but also that the practices being observed may not, and quite often will not, conform to the original programme. And this because things never work out as planned. But it is also difficult to see how such ethnographies could render visible the real but unprogrammed effect and the different ways in which they are reintegrated, by way of instrumentalization, back into the original programme. My point here is not that such approaches are impossible. Rather, and given Foucault’s aversion to interpretation (i.e. passing through the “being of “man””), it is both difficult to see how this could be done and, in any case, it is a highly problematic enterprise to betroth the work of the former to the methods of the latter.

Analyzing relations of power from the perspective of the present by way of an architectural analytics that questions the matter, the form, the agent, and the end of an architectonics of control can be seen to be a more effective way of drawing out the thought and rationalities evidenced in prescriptive discourses prescribing the exercising of those relations than can be demonstrated by the imposition of a late eighteenth century political programme upon present-day practices. These questions, however, are not formulaic; they are analytical. In drawing attention to the four aspects of the exercising of contemporary relations of power, such an architectural analytics better captures the “how” or, better still, the thought inhabiting this “how” and the rationality it expresses, of such practices than does an appeal to and the application of models, archetypes, or ideal types, and the
imposition of these upon the present. Let us say, remaining at an all too general level, that contemporary technologies of power are ergonomically designed; that there is a fit between these technologies and the “minds”, bodies, and activities that they seek to direct; that they attempt to gear-into us as our conduct is guided by them; that they attempt to conduct our conduct by inducing in us a conducting of our own conduct; and that they attempt to do this not through determination or imposition but through disposition; that is, by environing horizons of probability. The question left for us to work through is how various authorities want this to happen.
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