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Danish identity politics and the conflicts of 'Muslim relations'

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Danish identity politics and the conflicts of 'Muslim relations'

Ulrik Pram Gad

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1 Introduction: Why shouldn't They become Us?

This dissertation studies Danish political debates on how to relate to 'Muslims'. It understands the debates as negotiations between conflicting ways of performing Danish identity by telling how 'We' differ from Muslims and what to do about that. Theoretically, the dissertation investigates how various policies for relating to the other contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other. The focus is on the specific ways in which the policy narratives invite – or does not invite – the other to future interaction and what the reactions to these invitations may be.

1.1 Empirical trouble: Danish identity meets Muslims as difference

'Muslims' appear in Danish debates and in Danish policies more often these days than ever before. A few snapshots may provide an impression of the unprecedented variety of places and roles awarded to Muslims:

First picture: Armed Danish military personnel and a Danish flag in front of a dessert sunset. Denmark was right behind the US in the 'Multi-National Force' invading Iraq in 2003.1 In Afghanistan, Denmark has – relative to its size – contributed more men to tougher tasks than most European countries.2 Whether the point of departure was a search for weapons of mass destruction or for Al Qaeda terrorists, each of the


ventures turned into a project of reconstructing a Muslim country: a state building project, a nation building project or a project of building democracy.

Second picture: A drawing of an angry bearded man with a bomb in his turban is – along with 11 other cartoons – printed in a Danish newspaper. The newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, writes that the publication is meant to communicate to Muslims that when you live in a democracy, you need to accept "scorn, mockery, and ridicule". The prime minister refuses to meet with Muslim ambassadors to discuss the matter which they see as part of an "ongoing smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and Muslims". As the Danish prime minister insisted that the freedom of expression enjoyed in a national democracy could not be limited even in a world of globalized communication, the controversy spiralled into what became known in public debate as 'the worst foreign policy crisis for Denmark since WWII'.

Third picture: A woman – possibly wearing a veil – is sitting in a class room doing a multiple choice test on Danish history and society. It might be an 'integration test' to qualify for a permanent residence permit or it might be the more advanced 'citizenship test'. The Act on Danish Nationality and the Integration Act has over the course of the last decade introduced these tests to pass – along with declarations of allegiance to Danish democracy, society and values to be signed. The point of the tests and the declarations is to make sure that only migrants with the right qualifications and the right intentions stay in Denmark. Included in the declarations to be signed is the denunciation of a series of practices – female circumcision, forced marriages, terrorism, and the like – recognizable from debates on how to integrate people with a 'Muslim culture' in Danish society. In the same period the Danish Alien

3 "hån, spot og latterliggørelse" (Rose 2005).
Act has repeatedly been tightened to 'limit the influx of aliens' – while 'Green Cards' and reduced taxation are among the tools employed to invite foreign experts to fill vacant positions.\(^5\)

These debates on 'Muslim relations' are not just a marginal phenomenon in Danish debates. The debates on what to do about the Muslims are an important way of negotiating who 'We' are. In recent years, research has found Muslims to be featured centre stage in many arenas. A political geographer went to a small provincial town to interview regular people about what 'Danishness' meant to them – and came back surprised that next to everyone immediately invoked 'Muslim culture' as a contrast necessary to answer the question (Koefoed 2006:117). A political scientist concluded on an electoral survey designed to analyse the 2001 parliamentary elections which was called in the wake of 9/11 that "Islam has increasingly become a point of condensation for animosity against strangers." (Tobiassen 2003:361, my transl.)\(^6\)

The general thrust of present Danish debates on Muslims seems to be that They ought to become like Us. At home and abroad; it would be better, if They were like Us. Denmark and the world would be better places if they could be reformed to become more identical with Us.

Such an approach to the difference of the other may, obviously, lead to conflict: If the pictures painted of Muslims in Danish debates do not resemble the pictures which the

\(^{\text{--------------------------}}\)

\(^5\) Cf. the official home page of the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, nyidanmark.dk, visited on 2009.09.03.

\(^{\text{--------------------------}}\)

\(^6\) Similar conclusions are reached by political theorist Per Mouritsen focusing on political discourse (2006:75-6, 83, 88); international politics scholars Mona Sheikh & Ole Wæver focusing on public debates (2005:31); Karen Wren conducting anthropological field work (2001:147, 156); political geographers Haldrup et al. analyzing the practices of urban everyday life (2006:174, 183); political scientist J.P.F. Thomsen (2006:188) surveying public opinion; as well as historian Jørgen Bæk Simonsen (2006[2004]:8, 14, 173ff); literary scholar Hans Hauge (2003:54); as well as Grøn & Grøndahl (2004: 15, 179; 208f), all characterizing public debate.
people painted would like to see, they are unlikely to cooperate in the reform process. The disagreement may concern both the pictures painted of present day Muslims and the pictures of Muslims as they ought to become. Furthermore the policies promoted to make Them more identical with Us may lead to internal conflicts in Denmark over whether and how to be in conflict with those painted as Muslims. But how, more specifically, does identity, policy and conflict relate?

This question has bearings beyond Denmark. On the one hand, the character of the debate in Denmark is neither unique, nor isolated from developments beyond its borders. On the other hand, the debates found in Denmark are not exact replicas of debates elsewhere in Europe or the West in general. Rather Denmark has been among the vanguard in tendencies that may be recognized in a number of countries on several 'fronts' in what could be termed the 'Muslim relations' of the West: tightening immigration laws to limit the influx of Muslims; awarding vocal Islam critics respected and responsible political positions; participating in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (cf. Aydin & Acikmese 2008). Denmark may even – by playing its part of the Cartoon Crisis – have contributed to constituting the relation between 'The West' and 'Islam' as a self-propelling conflict (cf. Buzan & Wæver 2009:269-274).

If one connects the image which Denmark presently conveys to the outside world with the image which the country have enjoyed for decades (Lawler 2007), the change appears to be extreme: To a lot of foreign observers, this new Denmark preoccupied with Muslims does not sound like the liberal, tolerant Denmark, they thought they knew.\footnote{I.a. Jonsson (2006); Sundström (2009). Cf. Nielsen (2004:15-7, ch.4, 7) who presents a detailed account of the picture painted in reports from international organizations and foreign media – but finds the picture painted too grim.}

Recent research documents that a change actually did occur. Sociologist of religion Brian Jacobsen (2008:265-8) charts how the 'guest workers' and 'alien workers' were
framed by a labour market discourse in the parliamentary debates in the 60ies and 70ies: The difference between Danes and migrants concerned the wage level and working conditions one was willing to accept – and their presence was conceived of as temporary. From the end of the 70ies, however, the presence of the 'immigrants' was gradually seen as permanent – and their difference was gradually described in terms of ethnicity, language, culture and religion. From that time, 'integration' was a central concept. During the 80ies and early 90ies, 'integration' meant that Danish society were to facilitate the different culture which the 'Danes with a different ethnic background' had brought with them. Gradually during the 90ies, however, the parliamentary discourse changed: now their different culture was what distinguished them from us – and their different culture was seen to block their integration. Jacobsen concludes that at least from the debates on the Alien Act of 1997, it was the dominant position in parliamentary debates that the responsibility for integration was basically on the shoulders of the immigrants (2008:267) – and it was generally implied that the difference discussed was Muslim culture and religion (2008:234). Since 2001, the new centre-right majority has combined the Danish People's Party who presents the Muslims as a threat, and the Liberal/Conservative government who presents their difference as one to be 'integrated' away (2008:267-8).

Like the foreign observers, a lot of Danes has not really to have gotten used to living in this 'new' Denmark: They want to have an 'old' Denmark back. There is, however, 

\[8\] Political scientist Lærke Holm basically tells the same story as Jacobsen based on roughly the same parliamentary debates, but she finds that the dominant trend of the 80ies was not only to facilitate but even to strengthen the culture of the migrants while integrating them (2007: 208-12). Furthermore, she places the shift in emphasis of the centre-right wing parties from labour market integration to national-cultural already in the late 80ies (2007:126-8, 208-10). Holm does, however, not discuss 'Muslims' specifically – probably because her research question does not focus on religion and her empirical material is limited to a period ending in 2002. Andreassen observes on the basis of an analysis of media coverage that 'migrants' and 'Muslims' have been used more or less interchangeably since the mid 90ies (2005:156ff). Cf. Jensen (1999a; 1999b); Madsen (2000).
a struggle over which 'old' Denmark is the one to long for: On the one side, Sudanese-Danish rapper Natasja Saad asks us to "give me my Denmark back / like in the good old days" with its "Copenhagen ... my colourful old friend" and its "liberality". She wants to return to a Denmark without the demand for homogeneity. On the other side, the Danish People's party asks to 'Give us Denmark back'; a Denmark in which one can walk the streets of the presently pluricultural Nørrebro without the nuisance of having to face veiled women and ethnic gangs.

Egyptian-Danish comedian Omar Marzouk trumps by thanking for a 'hate letter' accusing him of betraying his country: "Describing me as a traitor to my country must be a sign that I am finally considered a Dane ... You will never get Denmark back, it's my country now." (Marzouk 2009)

The dissertation analyzes debates in this new Denmark; debates on how it relates to the old Denmark and what kind of Denmark, it should become. The dissertation does not tell the story of how old Denmark turned into new Denmark. Rather, the dissertation tells a series of little stories of how parliamentarians and political parties in this new Denmark attempts to connect with different ideas of what old Denmark was and how new Denmark should become in the future. To complete the picture, the dissertation turns the table by looking at what roles the stories imply for the other:


11 "At beskrive mig som landsforrædder må være et tegn på, at de samme mennesker endelig betragter mig som dansker ... I får aldrig Danmark til tilbage, det er mit land nu." (Marzouk 2009).
What futures are envisioned for those casted as Muslims? And how are They likely to respond? In doing so, the dissertation adds up to its own story which points to a possible future for Danish Muslim relations – a future of radicalized conflict. The Danish narratives ask Them to become more like Us. But the way in which the invitations are formulated is likely to result in greater difference, more differences, and more conflict.

The following sections of this introductory chapter explain the premises for and the proceedings of the analysis: Section 1.2 positions the dissertation in the field of social theories valuating conflict. Section 1.3 formally introduces the philosophical, theoretical and empirical problematiques which the dissertation engages – as a way to pose its main research question. Section 1.4 lays out the project designed to answer the research question in abstract terms. Section 1.5 sketches the theoretical account of identity discourse and identity politics framing the analysis. Finally, section 1.6 introduces the individual parts and chapters of the dissertation by stating the questions they answer.

1.2 Turning trouble into puzzle: Getting conflict under control

When observing social life, social theory has differed over how to view conflict – both over what the prospects of conflict are and over how to value conflict: Among the fathers of Sociology, in the one end of the spectrum, Durkheim worried how Modern society could integrate in spite of differences stratified to produce centrifugal forces (1984[1893]). Parsons laid out how it purportedly did integrate (1970). In the other end of the spectrum, Marx prognosticated how conflict would inevitably radicalize until a final showdown – a showdown with history – would bring eternal harmony (Marx & Engels 2002[1888]). Fukuyama (1992) saw the same Hegelian end to – historical – conflicts coming by Liberalism proving itself to be the superior way to handle conflicts. Contrarily, Carl Schmitt saw the constitution of conflict as the

The ontological point of departure for this dissertation is that there is difference. Therefore there are differences. And therefore there is conflict (cf. Galtung 1978:484). Conflicts, however, may be had in many forms and with many consequences. Conflicts may range from pleasant exchanges to lethal combat. Conflicts may be orderly conducted or they may be spinning out of control. They may achieve their own life. Informed by theories of conflict and security evolving out of the study of International Relations – a realm where the most massively lethal conflicts have occurred – the normative point of departure of this dissertation is that conflicts should not have their own life: The dissertation should contribute to our engagement in conflicts becoming more reflexive. In that sense, the analysis and conclusions should contribute to keeping conflicts under some sort of management.

One of the things over which there is conflict is who are allowed to be parties to conflicts: Who are the identities in each end of difference – in each end of the differences. And at another level: who are to decide, who the identities are. That is to say: Who are the agents in the conflicts. The introduction to the empirical problematique (in section 1.1) showed how that the question of 'who we are' is closely related to the questions of 'who we were' and 'who we ought to be'. The dissertation should contribute to self-reflection on how we are creating ourselves as identical with our selves and as agents – by describing ourselves as different from others. And self-reflection on how we are – in this process – allocating roles and agency in ways which may radicalize conflict.

Derridean poststructuralism denies the possibility of success of any one overarching resolution to conflicts, not least because identity can never be settled (1988b:52f). Laclau & Mouffe (1985:ch.3) put this denial into formula by describing a social world which is not present, in the sense that the social consists only of – ultimately
impossible – attempts to achieve hegemony for one principle of ordering: Each attempt is impossible as it carries with it a surplus of meaning which will produce the challenging perspective finally entering into open conflict. The hegemonic project of Laclau & Mouffe initially promoted on the basis of this diagnosis was one of opening up to more conflict: a radical and plural democracy – i.e. the "equivalential displacement of the egalitarian imaginary to ever more extensive social relations" (1985:188). In practice this means "the elimination of relations of subordination and of inequalities" as these relations meet the demand for equality which turns relations of inequality into unacceptable relations of domination (1985:188). The task described in the context of academic Marxism (1985:ch.4) was one of articulating a series of dispersed, democratic conflicts into one popular antagonism: Even if the aim promoted by Laclau & Mouffe was no longer to end oppression once and for all, a break with the existing was still envisioned.

By the turn of the millennia, the strategic terrain seems to have changed: Now, Laclau argues the need for a new, leftist populism – not primarily to advance on neoliberalism but to counter a right wing populism formulated in ethno-nationalist terms (Laclau in Clausen 2001; Laclau 2005). And Mouffe develops a concept of 'agonism' as a way of keeping conflict within limits; a way of keeping antagonism from being configured in overly destructive, lethal – i.e. often ethno-nationalist – ways (2002; 2005).

The dissertation joins in this project, by producing an immanent critique of the debates and policies proposed: The dissertation seeks to point out when the debates risk radicalizing conflict in spite of the stated intensions of the participants. The normative point of departure of the dissertation, hence, is the responsibility of academic activities to contribute "to our living in difference and not to some of us dying from otherness." (Neumann 1999:37) The trouble is how to get conflicting identities under control. One step is to formulate the trouble in terms of a puzzle
which may be researched (cf. Bruner 1980:35; 1960; Weldon 1953:75-83): How do we study conflicts of identity?

1.3 **Problematiques and research question: Structures and dynamics contributing to radicalization**

To contribute to this project of conflict management and potential conflict resolution, the dissertation engages three problematiques: a philosophical, a theoretical and an empirical.

Philosophically, the dissertation positions itself within a conversation between – or among – social constructivists and poststructuralists on the ontological status of the other in the relational construction of identity: The conversation revolves around two questions: First; is the other merely a figure of discourse pointed out to differ from the self – or is the other an empirical agent out there intervening in the ongoing narration of the identity of the self? And secondly; is the difference of the other necessarily described as threatening or may the relation to difference be managed in other ways? The dissertation argues that these questions should be approached by designing an analytical strategy which is able to focus on, firstly, the roles and agency awarded to the other in narratives, and, secondly, the dynamics possibly radicalizing the conflictual relation.

Theoretically, the dissertation intervenes by investigating how various policies for relating to the other (dialoguing, pointing out as threat, producing knowledge, etc.) contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other. Specifically, the dissertation seek inspiration in International Relations and Anthropology to circumscribe a range of policies for relating to the other: A range of policies which accept that the relation is, exactly, a relation, and therefore – on the one hand – necessarily partly conflictual. But a range of policies which – on the other hand –
simultaneously escapes the unchecked radicalization of conflict to the point where the relation breaks down because one party is denied existence.

But first and last come the specific situation – introduced in section 1.1 – which the dissertation seeks to make sense of: The present Danish debates on Muslims. Empirically, the dissertation analyses Danish debates on how to conduct 'Muslim relations' to see whether they are prone to set off dynamics radicalizing conflict. The point of the philosophical investigation of the ontological relation between self and other as well as of the theoretical investigation of the conflictual potential of policies for relating to the other is to facilitate this analysis. Therefore, the main research question, which the dissertation engages, is:

- What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims contribute to a radicalization of conflict?

### 1.4 Research design: The premises for the analysis

The central procedure employed when answering the main research question is an analysis of political discourse on how to conduct Denmark's 'Muslim relations'. An analysis involves bringing together a set of elements – empirical material, theories, methods – in such a way that each of them are influenced by the relation to the others (Glynos & Howarth 2007:ch.6; cf. Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Exactly because the choice of elements – which empirical material, which theory, which methods to bring into play – makes a difference, each choice involves a strategic element: Every idea of what makes up the world – every ontology – makes something visible and something invisible. A theoretical account of what is important in some regard directs the attention to some dynamics and diverts attention from others. One method produces one type of knowledge while other methods produce other types of
knowledge. In sum, analysis can only be made following a series of analytico-strategic decisions.\textsuperscript{12}

These basic analytico-strategic choices are, on the one hand, informed by the research question: The focus needs to be directed where the question is directed: to Danish discourse on Muslims and its contribution to radicalization of conflict. On the other hand, the view of the world (the ontology) and the theoretical account of what goes on in the world are articulated to make certain relations visible; i.e. relations contributing to radicalization of conflict. In other words, the analytical lenses directed to focus on this empirical problematique – and the choice of the very problematique – are influenced by the normative point of departure (laid out in section 1.2): If the dissertation did not set out to 'get conflict under control’, the relevance of both the research question and the theories employed would be questionable.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} While Andersen (1994) argues the need for some eclecticism when constructing strategies for analysis under postmodern conditions, Howarth (2005:327) points to the limits of this eclecticism when he insist that "the theoretical logics and concepts employed in any putative explanans must be consistent and compatible with the underlying ontological assumptions". This is secured by "the logic of formalization" combining four aspects; "the reactivation of concepts and logics [which] turns us back to the precise problems which where originally addressed in the constitution of a particular theory"; "the deconstruction of those essentialist or deterministic aspects that make them incompatible"; and finally "abstraction and commensuration [which] consist in the elaboration of purely formal concepts and logics". While the elaboration of the concepts for the account of the ontology and theory follows the suggested pattern of formalization, Howarth's insistence on the need to reach, firstly, the 'origins' and, secondly, the 'purity' of the concepts seems a bit overstretched for a theory informed by Derrida.

\textsuperscript{13} This means that the point of, firstly, presenting ontology and theory and then, secondly, confronting them with the empirical world is not to prove that the ontology and the theory are right (or contrarily to falsify them). The point of constructing, firstly, an ontology is to have a world to observe; by explicitly describing what the dissertation may observe, a certain transparency is secured. The point of constructing, secondly, a theory is to present an account of what goes on in the world. In the case of the dissertation: an account of what may contribute to radicalization. If the analysis – when confronting the theory with empirical material – shows no contributions to radicalization, a new choice arises: We may either be happy with the empirical world because there is no radicalization; or we may start
Section 1.1 briefly introduced the first important element which the analysis articulates: The empirical terrain of Danish debates on what to do about the Muslims. A first analytico-strategic choice is methodological; it concerns the reduction of the vast material of 'Danish debates'. The dissertation elects to analyse five political debates departing in diverse policy fields: the integration and human rights of migrants and refugees; protection of the freedom of expression; counterterrorism; and Turkish EU accession. The debates involve government and opposition narratives of what is in all the debates found to be 'Muslim relations'.

The second element which the analysis articulates is already present: Even the very sketchy introduction (in section 1.1) to the empirical problematique was – as every rendition of a series of events – informed both by an idea of what entities and relations make up the world and by an understanding of what is going on: In other words; the rendition implied an ontology and a theory of what matters. In the perspective of the dissertation, the debates on Muslims are part of the performance of Danish identity in relation to difference: We define who We are by discussing who They are and by deciding how We should relate to Them. These future relations may be described in ways which produce more or less conflict.

Section 1.5 begins the explication of the analytico-strategic premises for the analysis by briefly summarising how the dissertation observes relational identity. Subsection 1.6 lays out the proceedings of the chapters of both the analytico-strategic and the analytical part of the dissertation.

evaluating what element in the combination of analytico-strategic choices produced an un-helpful analysis

14 Other policy fields could have been selected – and within the selected policy fields, other debates could bare been singled out: Different selections would have generated different narratives, but the overall impression of both variation and convergence would most likely have been the same.
1.5 Theory: Identity as relations to the other

The three subsections 1.5.1-1.5.3 briefly introduce three ways in which identity is a relational concept – along with the academic disciplines which have drawn attention to them.

1.5.1 Identity related to the other as constitutive and threatening

A first inspiration in the development of a relational concept of identity comes from post-structuralist philosophy. It deals with the way in which the relation between identity and difference is constitutive. This inspiration should lead political science to focus on the potentially damaging extreme situation in which the difference of an 'other' – someone outside identity – is pointed out as an existential threat to identity.

When viewed from a philosophical perspective, identity is a logical problem. Logically, the claim that someone is identical entails that someone else is different. In that sense, identity is dependent on difference – or, in other words, difference is constitutive to identity: If difference was not there, identity would not make sense – it would not be identity.

So difference is constitutive to identity. But at the same time, difference presents an alternative to identity. And as it presents an alternative, it presents a potential threat to identity: If something is different – why should not identity be different? Is there anything that keeps difference from spreading all over and eradicating identity?

In Derrida's phrasing, difference is the constitutive outside to identity (1988b:52f): Firstly, difference is not identity; it is something distinctively outside identity – that's the whole point of defining identity in relation to difference. Secondly, identity needs difference to be; if identity could not relate to difference, it would not be identity. Thirdly, as an alternative to identity; difference is a potential threat to identity. The consequence of this line of thought is that identity is necessarily threatened if it is to exist at all. Laclau summarizes the point when he writes that: "Every identity is
dislocated in so far as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides the condition of possibility at the same time." (Laclau 1990:39)

Potentially, this philosophical point has serious implications for political science: If any identity needs to generate a threat to itself we should expect to see nothing but threats out there. Fortunately, a good deal has been done to cut this philosophical point down to its natural size – or rather; to its social size.

One example is the way Connolly (2002[1991]:8) inserts a 'human handbrake' in Derrida's logical, philosophical equation: It might be so that identity needs a threat – but it makes a difference, that we are talking about human beings rather than abstract concepts. The necessary threat to a collective identity need not be assigned to an individual or another collective. And contrarily; when the identity in question is a human self – individual or collective – the 'others' (the individuals or collectives outside the self) need not be pointed out as existentially threatening. The logical structure of the concept of identity leaves this possibility open – but in social life such pointing out of an enemy is only a temptation, not a necessity.

Another example is the way Laclau conceptualizes 'social antagonism' as the way 'dislocation' is handled: Social life needs some stability. Therefore the constitutive outside – that which is excluded from identity, and that which is therefore both constituting and constantly dislocating identity (Laclau 1990:17) – needs to be domesticated. A primary way of domestication is the very naming of the 'antagonism' by pointing out something – someone, some difference – as responsible for the existential threat (cf. Laclau 1990:50; Clausen et al. 2000:28; cf. Torfing 1999:129ff).

15 What was arguably the first full scale analysis of identity politics in the realm of foreign relations informed by the Derridean perspective, Campbell (1992), actually does find a consecutive series of existential threats in the performance of US identity. For discussions whether this is a necessary result of the theoretical perspective employed or a contingent empirical result, see Hansen (2006:224, n.2); Neumann (1999:24-36).
When compared with Connolly's argument, Laclau's move may in the first instance appear to go in the opposite direction: Connolly says that it is not necessary to blame a specific other for the failure of identity – Laclau says that it is the primary way of handling the problem. Laclau's story, however, does not stop here. Firstly, because the very naming of the threat already represents a domestication of the threat: 'Now, at least, we know what it is that threatens us'. Secondly, because pointing out of some difference as an existential threat cannot stand alone – a countervailing logic necessarily sets in to explain why some other difference is just a matter of degree and not a radical threat to identity (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:129-144).

While the difference of the other is logically constitutive to the identity of the self, this does not necessarily mean that the other is presented as an existential threat. A series of studies in International Relations have showed how others may be 'othered' in less radical ways; as a helper, as someone in need of help, as an apprentice, etc. And within political philosophy Mouffe (2002; 2005) has – as mentioned – developed Foucault's notion of an 'agonistic relation' as an ideal of othering an opponent without denying its right to exist.

Nevertheless, as a potentially damaging extreme possibility, the construction of radically threatening Others needs to be kept in focus when analyzing identity performance. Especially it remains a task for political science to monitor potential degeneration from peaceful relations – whether they are hierarchical or equal – to violence (cf. Baumann & Gingrich 2004a; 2004b; Neumann 1998).

1.5.2 Identity articulated by narrating policies for getting the other into place

As implicated in subsection 1.5.1, there are other roles to play for an other in relation to identity than that of an existential threat. Narrative theory – the theory of how and why stories are told – conceptualizes identity not as a stable (or destabilized) structure but as a dynamic process of agency. Combined with Historiography – the history of how history is told – narrative theory points our attention to changes in the conceptualization of time in narratives. This inspiration should lead political science to focus on the way necessity and choice is constructed by articulating past experience and expectations for the future into a story about Us and Them.

Narrative theory – especially as formulated by Ricoeur (1988) – seeks to solve the problem of identity as posed by philosophy above: Identity is impossible since it is undermined by the difference it needs for its constitution – so how come that there seem to be identity anyway?

Ricoeur's answer is that the identity which is there and which has effects is narrative: "Individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history." (1988:247) To know who we are – and to be sure that we are identical with ourselves – we tell stories. And even the most simple story involves not just a self and an other – threatening or not – but a varied cast of "characters" (1988:248); a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40). A whole series of roles are presented for others – and self – to take up; a place for each self and other is produced through the telling of stories.

A story (or narrative) basically consists in the selection and articulation of a series of events from a beginning to a conclusion (Ricoeur 1988:41; 66). When the object of analysis is the performance of identity in relation to others, it becomes crucial to think through where and how to fix the 'beginning' and the 'conclusion'. Identity is performed through suggestions on what we ought to do to the other; e.g. through the
formulation of policies. And policies necessarily pertain to the future – while they are often legitimized with reference to the past (cf. Hansen 2006:21; 49).

Koselleck (1985), when summarizing his research on how 'time' has been given form to serve political purposes in different ages, suggests that we look at 'the past' and 'the future' in policy narratives in different ways: On the one hand, experience of the past are selected, described and arranged to point to the present situation. On the other hand, expectations of the future takes the form of a horizon – i.e. a line behind which we cannot see – on which we project specific prognoses or plans for the future.

Crucial for analysis becomes how necessity is produced in the narrative (cf. Hansen 2006:26): How certain events in the past involving the other is made to imply the necessity of certain decisions in the present to achieve one preferred future and avoid different futures. Necessity may be implied by the way in which time or the relation between self and other is structured in the narratives – or it may be installed by inscribing the narrative with established truths.

### 1.5.3 Identity politics as conflicting narratives of the self/other relation

As different necessities may be articulated to self/other narratives, the attention is pointed to the role which politics play in the production of identities. Both political theory and anthropology tells us, that agreement on identity is a rare phenomenon – both internally between the members of 'our identity' and externally between Us and Them. This inspiration should lead political science to focus on the dynamics coming out of these disagreements – and the feedback effects of the dynamics on the constitutive relation between self and other and on the narratives of self and others.

Laclau & Mouffe (1985) conceptualizes the social world as competing 'hegemonic projects', i.e. attempts to order the world by assigning categories to be employed, roles to be taken up and rules to be followed. As such projects are ultimately
incompatible; conflict is inevitable. In parallel with Derrida's idea of identity, no project can ever achieve total hegemony: There is always some element which does not fit the pattern imposed and which serves as the point of condensation for a counter-project. So 'inside' every identity, there is always more than one voice – and therefore more than one story trying to determine any identity, its delimitation, and its relation to the cast of others (Neumann 1999:30; Hansen 2006:77). One voice tells a story involving a self and an other – another voice replies with a different narrative involving a different version of the self and of the other. This is the first site of politics in the narration of identities; the site of 'internal' politics.

The second site of politics in the narration of identities arises from 'external' identity politics, or what Hansen calls 'discursive encounters' (2006:76). Each narrative involves a cast of self and others – and each narrative implies a 'grammar' for their interaction (Baumann & Gingrich 2004), i.e. as a structure proposed to form the continued narration of the story of their relation. When a narrative offers a role for an other the other might play the role differently than the original script implied (cf. Butler 1997). The other might seek to oppose the grammar for interaction implied in the narrative told by the Self – and impose an alternative grammar. In that sense, there is dialogue of narratives: A self tells a story involving an other – the other replies with a different narrative.

The way in which the other responds to the role which it is awarded in the narrative told by the self is, however, decisive for what kind of dynamics that may come to characterize the encounter. The response may feed back into the continuation of the narrative. If the other challenges rather than recognizes the narrative upholding the identity of the self, a dynamic of threat and conflict may ensue (Rumelili 2007:38; cf. Triandafyllidou 1998:601b; 2001; 2002:34). If the story is told by the self in a way that involves a lot of necessity, the conflict may radicalize as there is no room left to facilitate the other.
The response of the other may be so challenging that it threatens to make the story which the self would like to tell of itself impossible. In that situation one possible outcome is the breakdown of what is left of a dialogue of narratives: If the self tells a story which does not include a grammar for future interaction, because it insists on the need to eradicate the other, there is nothing left to talk about (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b; Baumann 2004:46f). In this way, the dynamics of the identity politics between self and other may feed back to create the extreme situation pictured by philosophy (in section 1.5.1) in which the difference of the other is presented as an existential threat to the identity of the self (cf. Wæver 1994).

Even if the general image of identity politics is one of conflict, inequality and domination, a qualitative difference exists between everyday 'system maintaining violence' and an radicalized conflict involving 'categorical killings' (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b; cf. Neumann 1998:18). This makes conflict management a reasonable task (Galtung 1978:488; Wæver 2003:23).

To be able to contribute to the management of the potentially detrimental conflictual dynamics, a sustained focus in the analysis of identity politics need to be on the positions awarded to the other in identity narratives; on the necessity implied in the narratives; and on the responses which the other may have to the grammars for future interaction implied in the narratives.

As the narratives involved in this 'external' identity politics (between self and other) are each also involved in 'internal' identity politics (over how to represent the self), the focus needs to include the dynamics connecting internal and external identity politics.
1.5.4 Identity configuration as relations between structure, agency and interaction

The three subsections 1.5.1-1.5.3 have represented three ways in which identity relates to an other: a constitutive relation, a policy relation, and a political relation. The relation between these relations may be summed up as an identity configuration (cf. Elias 2000[1968]; Buzan & Wæver 2009:fn.17)

Firstly, the difference of the other is constitutive to identity: If there was no exclusion, identity would be meaningless as a concept. By being excluded yet necessary for identity to be, the other threatens to reveal the contingency of identity. So when analysing identities, the analytical strategy must be able to observe the possible degeneration of the relation into one characterised by threats.

Secondly, you need to explain and protect the identity and the exclusion – and to do so, you tell stories. You cannot tell stories about yourself only; you need a cast of characters to play each their assigned role. Therefore the other – or rather; various others – will be asked to take up positions in the narrative attempts to uphold identity. So when analysing narrative agency, the analytical strategy must be able to observe the way in which necessity and choice is constructed by relating past experience and expectations for the future into a story about Us and Them. These stories are policy stories as they pertain to what we should do to achieve a preferred future.

Thirdly, the varying others pointed out to co-star the identity stories will – as part of the roles which they are told to play – be endowed with varying capacities to co-author or negotiate the continuation of the narratives. The first potential result of having more than one author of a story is conflict; i.e. the result is politics. The second potential result of politics over identity is that the conflict radicalizes to involve threats and violence. So when analysing identity politics, the analytical strategy must be able to observe the potential dynamics coming out of disagreements over the narrative distribution of roles – and the potential feed back effects of the
dynamics on the constitutive relation between self and other and on the narratives of self and others.

To account for an identity configuration involves accounting for, firstly, identity as structure; secondly, identity as narrative agency; and thirdly, it involves accounting for identity politics as the dynamics of the negotiation of the redistribution of structure and agency. Any such identity configuration must be conflictual.

1.6 **Proceedings: What questions are put where?**

Section 1.3 placed the research question of the dissertation in the context of three broader problematiques: a philosophical focusing on the ontological status of the other; a theoretical focusing on the relation between conflict and policies for relating to the other; and an empirical focusing on Danish 'Muslim relations'. Section 1.4 explained the overall design of the project which should allow the dissertation to answer the question, while section 1.5 introduced the way in which the dissertation sees identity as a relational concept involving conflict. This section presents the more specific proceedings of the dissertation.

Subsection 1.6.2 introduces the analytical Part II of the dissertation. Before the analysis may be conducted, however, the premises for the analysis and the concepts informing the analysis must be accounted for. Subsection 1.6.1 lays out how Part I of the dissertation asks three analytico-strategic questions to facilitate the analysis: an ontological, a theoretical and a methodological question.

1.6.1 **Part I: Analytical strategy – ontology, theory, methods**

**Chapter 2** establishes the ontology which the dissertation may analytically observe. More specifically, the chapter asks:

A. *What relations make up an identity configuration?*
The chapter answers this question by establishing a concept of identity as related to the other in three ways (as summarized in section 1.5): identity is constitutively related to the difference of the other; identity is performed through narration involving a cast of characters including various others; and identity is politically negotiated between various self/other narratives purported both internally and externally. A final discussion of the concepts of identity and conflict provides a criterion for what may count as a radicalization of conflict. By establishing the concept of an identity configuration as including this set of relations between identity and difference – between self and other – a world is established which may be set in motion by a more specific theoretical account and empirical observations of conflicts in identity politics.

Chapter 3 establishes a theory of what the dissertation may analytically find when observing the world of relations established (in chapter 2) with a view to cast light on the possible contributions to radicalization. More specifically, the chapter asks:

**B. What structures, articulations and dynamics in an identity configuration contribute to a radicalization of conflict?**

The chapter answers this question by developing a theoretical account of how the proposition and pursual of specific policies on how to relate to the other may contribute to a radicalization of conflict between self and other. Firstly, a typology of policies are developed on the basis of three basic 'grammars' for future interaction between self and other. The grammars are basic ways in which one may relate self and other: a) distinguishing self from other, b) acting on behalf of the other and c) producing knowledge of the self/other relation. The claim is that these basic grammars – when combined or weighed to produce a series of specific policies – serve as radically different invitations to the other to partake in the continued narration of the relation. Secondly, the chapter considers how policy narratives may be articulated with necessity. Thirdly, the chapter investigates how some of the policy
narratives are more prone than others to provoke counter-narratives feeding back to radicalize conflict.

Taken together, the ontological account of what may be observed as identity in relation to difference (chapter 2) and the theoretical account of how certain types of self/other policy narratives may contribute to a radicalization of conflict (chapter 3) constitutes an image of a world: A world of entities, relations and dynamics which the dissertation claims is worth focusing on when analysing radicalization of conflict.

**Chapter 4** explains how the theoretical world (thus established in chapters 2 and 3) may in the analysis be confronted with the empirical world of Danish identity politics (presented in chapters 5 through 9). More specifically, the chapter asks:

*C. Where and how to focus to observe the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on Muslims?*

The chapter answers this question by presenting the specific methodological choices, selections and tools employed in the analysis – and by discussing the biases and blind spots co-produced. The chapter concludes: That Danish identity discourse *itself* points out parliament and government as privileged sites for negotiating and deciding questions of identity politics. That 'the Muslim' appears central – even to debates on 'other others'. That the Danish party to the Danish/Muslim relation is hierarchically structured in a way which allows for a more focused analysis than the one which one may conduct on the Muslim party – a limited focus which, it is argued, nevertheless may reveal structures and dynamics important for the overall relation.

Finally, the chapter argues a three step reading strategy: In the first reading, the debates are approached on their own terms to observe both what appear to be at stake (what concepts and relations does the debate *revolve* around?); and what mechanisms in the discursive structure, agency and interaction appear to set off what dynamics (what makes the debate *evolve*?).
In the second reading, the analysis is summarized in terms of what policies are promoted and what grammars for future interaction with the other these policies entail. In the third reading, possible reactions from the other are prognosticated. To allow the second and third reading, each debate is interrogated with the same set of questions, designed (in chapter 4) to match the categories of the ontological and theoretical accounts of a world of identities in conflict (developed in chapters 2 & 3). In each of the analytical chapters this set of questions generate one or more Danish narratives of the past, future and necessary relations between the Danish self and a Muslim other – and lays out the premises for the negotiation of the continuation of the narrative.

All the analytical questions are – along with the foundational research question and the analytico-strategic questions of the dissertation – summarized in table 1.1. The table also provides an overview of which chapters answer each question.

1.6.2 Part II: Analysis – Danish debates on Muslims

Part II includes the five analytical chapters of the dissertation. On the one hand, the five chapters conduct parallel second and third readings as summarized in section 1.4. On the other hand, the first two of the five chapters – chapters 5 and 6 – has a special role as they introduce the basic features of the present Danish political landscape in general and of Danish debates on Muslim affairs in particular:

Chapter 5 provides a brief overview of how Danish public debates on migrants and Muslims have evolved over the last decades, and how they have reached Parliament. The chapter proceeds to analyse how the government disagrees with itself over time on the means and aims of integrating migrants and refugees. Specifically, the chapter analyses government policy papers and statements to distil the threats which the process of integration is to avert. At the outset, the government narratives are not about religion, scarcely about culture, but rather about labour market integration.
Gradually, however, 'Muslim culture' takes up an explicit and distinct role as the narratives evolve.

**Chapter 6** provides a brief portrait of the self-image and the relation to others produced in Danish identity discourse historically. The chapter proceeds to analyse a series of parliamentary debates on how to make sense of international *human rights based criticism of Danish alien policy*. The debates are based on the agreement that Denmark is a human rights pioneer. Or rather, that it should be a human rights pioneer ... or, at least, a pioneer. The point of (not) formulating the agreement on which the debate is founded is that the agreement is crumbling: The debates were characterized by opposing hegemonic projects each aiming to re-delimit Danish identity discourse.

**Chapter 7** analyses a series of parliamentary debates on two bills introduced to facilitate Danish participation in an international network of cities offering *refuge to writers persecuted* in their home country. Even if the bills were in the end unanimously adopted, the debates were characterized by sharp divisions over whose security to prioritize when championing freedom of expression in the aftermath of the Cartoon Crisis.

**Chapter 8** analyses debates on how to *prevent terrorism*. Firstly, the analysis charts how the government narratives involve a gradually more complicated cast of characters. Secondly, the analysis zooms in on two specific policy initiatives of the government which both suggest 'dialogue' as a preferred policy: a foreign policy initiative inviting the Middle East and North Africa to a 'partnership for progress and reform' and an action plan to 'prevent extremist attitudes and radicalization amongst the young' domestically. Finally, the chapter analyses parliamentary debates on how and why dialogue should be employed to counter terrorism.

**Chapter 9** analyses all formal parliamentary debates on the *Turkish application for EU membership*. Even if everyone agrees that Turkey is different, different
temporalizations and necessities inbuilt in the narratives prescribe very different policies. The chapter zooms in on the way in which Turkey is in government discourse indirectly framed as a case of 'Muslim relations' and on the possible consequences of this framing.

Chapter 10 concludes in terms of the main research question of the dissertation. Furthermore, the chapter draws implications for the theories engaged in the construction of the analytical strategy. Finally, the chapter engages in critical self-evaluation by discussing the strategic benefits and drawbacks of the analytical strategy chosen by the dissertation.
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2 Identity configuration and conflict: Discourse as structure, agency and interaction

The task for this chapter is to establish the ontology which the dissertation may analytically observe. To do so, the chapter asks:

A. What relations make up an identity configuration?

The chapter answers this question by establishing a concept of identity as related to the other in three ways: Identity is constitutively related to the difference of the other; Identity is performed through narration involving a cast of characters including various others; and Identity is politically negotiated between various self/other narratives purported both internally and externally. By establishing the concept of an identity configuration as including this set of relations between identity and difference – between self and other – a world is established which may be set in motion by, firstly, the theoretical account (in chapter 3) of what structures and dynamics may contribute to conflict, and, secondly, the empirical observations (in chapters 5 to 9) of conflicts in identity politics.

Ontologically, the point of departure for this dissertation when answering the question is that there is difference. Therefore there are differences. And therefore there is conflict. One of the things over which there is conflict is who are allowed to be parties to conflicts: Who are the identities in each end of difference – in each end of the differences. And at another level: who are to decide, who the identities are. That is to say: Who are the agents in conflict.

Within the social sciences ‘identity’ is always – whether consciously or not – shorthand for ‘identity discourse’. Literally no two persons are identical. Neither is any one of us identical with the ones we were one or two experiences ago (cf. Fink 1991). So identity is not something out there; it is not something inside either. Identity (i.e. identity discourse) is when we speak about A and B being identical. Or
when we speak or act as if A and B were identical. This means that we can only observe identity in discourse (Frello 2003:5f).

Discourse is simultaneously structure and action: Discursive structures are the result of the analytical collapsing into synchronicity of a diachronous series of utterances. There is no structure of identity behind or below the 'regularity in dispersion of utterances' – the only structure identity has is the regularity in dispersion of utterances which may be observed (cf. Foucault 1972).

When departing philosophically in post-structuralism, acts are collapsed into structure. To allow a concept of politics, however, a separate task of this chapter is to re-establish a place in theory for agents (cf. Neumann 1999:209). Hence, the dissertation insists to handle the structure/agency dilemma by observing both structure and agency – but observing both structure and agents as limited and imperfect. Furthermore, the dissertation observes separate dynamics of interaction, irreducible to either structure or agency.

In terms of academic discipline, both the point of departure and that of arrival are in political science – more specifically in the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe. Compared with other strands of discourse theory and other ways of moving 'post' structuralism, Laclau & Mouffe's has the comparative advantage of conceptualizing discourse as a political struggle involving – even consisting primarily in – competing attempts at the constitution of identities. The main thrust of the poststructuralism of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is to insist on the recurrence of politics: Total hegemony never comes – there is always a place for a counter-hegemonic project. In that sense, the approach laid out by Laclau & Mouffe works as a nice supplement to the archaeology of knowledge of Foucault which pose grand questions and answer them with equally grand sweeps. If you are interested in large scale tectonic movements, you may just go ahead. ... The problem is that a social
science practice must also be able to trace social change in smaller scale and over shorter periods of time than such historical analyses invites for (Neumann 2001:85f).

As Laclau & Mouffe stress the self-destructive course of any hegemonic project in the long run, the Foucauldian tectonic plates of discourse are opened up to politics. Or the other way around: politics is made necessarily recurring to (re-)produce discourse. This appears as an advantage against the backdrop of ontological point of

17 "[S]tiller grandiose spørsmål, og besvarer dem med like grandiose sveip. Er man interessert i tektoniske skifter i stor skala, er det bare å sette i gang. ... Problemet er at en 

18 There is never just one discourse. Therefore, a central theoretical problem in any discourse theory must be to account for the possible relations between this plurality of discourses. Neither, however, is there just one discourse on discourse. A number of conceptualizations of intertextual relationships between discourses are available to the analyst: The surplus of meaning always surrounding and challenging any discourse may be seen to organize itself to systematically attempt the re-articulation of elements of the discourse in question by fixing their meaning in a discourse organized in a different regularity of dispersion; hence, the relationship between two discursive formations is conceptualized as a struggle over the definition of a number of floating signifiers (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Alternatively, a regularity first identified in one discursive 'order' may be shown to be emulated in another 'order' imported via discursive 'genres' (Fairclough 1995:32). A third option is that a specific regularity at one 'level of sedimentation' may open to disagreements over which regularity is to be enforced at another level (Wæver 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2004; cf. Foucault 1972:67). Fourthly, a number of 'basic' discourses may be constructed to differ at one level, hence allowing each to include a number of 'variations' at another level (Hansen 2006:51-4). Fiftly, a number of relatively separate discursive or interpretative 'repertoires' may be seen to be drawn upon in the pragmatic attempts of an actor to make sense to a situation or argument (Edley 2001:197ff; Potter & Wetherell 2001:199; Wetherell 1998:400; Gad 2005:61, 97). The choice of metaphoric, however, is not a problem of fitting concepts to reality. It is a genuine choice: Any instance of intertextuality (i.e. manifest or implicit reference from one utterance to another) may, on the one hand, be said to implicate each end of the reference in the same discourse as the intertextuality can only be deemed such due to some sort of regularity. On the other hand, the re-iteration of any utterance necessarily implies a change of context (Derrida 1988a:15f; cf. Kristeva 1986:111), which implies that the regularity of dispersion has changed and we may analytically conclude that we have a different discourse. In that sense, “Even languages of the day exist ... every day represents another socio-ideological semantic ‘state of affairs’, another vocabulary ... its own ways of assigning blame and praise.” (Bakhtin 1981:291). So
departure of the dissertation: That there is difference and conflict – and that identity is something which is to be produced on this background.

In a review, Brubaker & Cooper recount the numerous ways the concept of identity is employed in the social sciences, proliferating in the 80ies and 90ies (2000:6-9). Their conclusion – or at least their sales pitch – is to advocate the abolition of 'identity' as an analytical concept, since the use of it in analysis risks contributing to the reification of the 'identities' studied (2000:5f; 25ff) and furthermore risks pressuring people with "uneven trajectories of ancestry" into these reified identity boxes (2000:5f; 10). Since the meaning of the concept is so ambiguous anyway, little will be lost by leaving it behind (2000:1).

This dissertation agrees and disagrees. Basically, the concept of identity is ingrained in academic discourse – just as it has been taken up by the objects of study of the social sciences (Brubaker & Cooper 2000:4f, cf. Briggs 1996). Certainly it plays an active role in Danish political debates. This persistence suggests that the concept of identity should be retained as a prism for analyzing a specific discursive structure and the discursive action and interaction relating to this structure.

the fixation of parts of the context which makes it possible to see the regularity in dispersion of utterances always involves a choice. The choice between such conceptualizations of intertextual relationships between given discourses is very much a choice of analytical focus (cf. Chandler 2001:195). This dissertation chooses to observe identity discourse at two levels of abstraction: Firstly, discourse is generically observed as any regularity in dispersion of utterances producing identity. This implies that there may be *Chinese boxes* of identity discourses: Within the framework of one regularity in dispersion there may be a plurality of bodies of utterances with separate regularities (cf. Jameson 1981:84). Secondly, the specific focus of the dissertation – Danish identity discourse – is delimited by the agreement – the regularity in dispersion of utterances – that there is such a ‘thing’ as a Danish identity. This agreement functions as a starting point for disagreements over what Danish identity would *more specifically* be (Gad 2005:30; cf. Haahr 2003:39). In that sense, the discursive battles are organized around Danish identity as an empty signifier in the sense of Laclau (1996b).
To escape the essentialist baggage of the concept of identity the dissertation puts in its place the concept of identity configuration to account for the relations between the various relations between identity and difference. This relational concept of identity – the notion that 'any We imply a They' – involves three relations: Firstly, philosophy tells us that identity logically implies difference; we cannot talk about something or someone being identical without implying something or someone else being different. Secondly, narrative and historiographic theory suggests that to uphold an identity we need to tell stories of who we are and how we are identical with ourselves. As stories necessarily involve a cast of more than one character, there is a role for Them as well as for Us. Thirdly, political theory and Anthropology have taught us that there is never just one story of who We are: 'We' disagree internally over who we are, whom we ought to be, and what to do to Them. On the top of our own disagreements, They tell different stories about themselves and their relations to Us than we do.

Section 2.1 begins the construction of the concept of 'identity configuration' by investigating the concept of identity as a discursive structure. Specifically, identity is found to be a double structure of void and narrative. The section finds that the intimate relation between identity and difference is best conceptualized as a double structure: Firstly, identity as a discursive structure is a void left by the exclusion of difference; a void which needs to be explained away. Secondly, identity discourse is structured as a narrative of the relationships between identity and difference. The section proceeds to develop a generic concept of self/other policy narrative as its operational concept of identity. Then the section investigates the temporality of policy narratives – and concludes by asserting the primacy of politics. The analytical consequence of the primacy of politics is a need to prioritize analysis of the present articulation of past and future.

Two concepts need, therefore, to be introduced to accompany the concept of identity as discursive structure: identity as discursive articulation and identity politics. The
introduction of these two concepts assists in cutting down the concept of identity to a more expedient size – and thereby to accommodate the worries of Brubaker & Cooper.

Brubaker & Cooper criticizes that the concept of identity for connoting a fixed entity which is not there: Identity is never complete – it always needs to be completed; it needs to be made. This is why they recommend re-focusing from identity as a structure to *identification* as a process (2000:14-17). The dissertation answers to this recommendation by conceptualizing attempts to articulate the discursive structure of identity in discursive action. Such a concept of discursive action involves the reconstruction of a place in discursive structure for a subject or agent capable of action – capable of performing the articulation of the discursive structure of identity.

Section 2.2 investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity by discursive agency. Firstly, it establishes a space for agency in structure by conceptualizing structures as limiting, enabling and incomplete. Secondly, it argues the need for agency to articulate structures in ways that facilitate future agency.

Finally, identity as structure needs – on top of identity as discursive action – yet another supplement to serve the analytical purpose of the dissertation: When the articulation of identity is not a smooth process – when there is not agreement, not one discourse on identity to identify with, not only one discursively constituted subject attempting to articulate identity – then we have *identity politics*.

Section 2.3 develops the concept of identity politics as discursive interaction. The section first discusses the recurrence of the political in the articulation of identity. Secondly, it discusses how ambiguity and segmentation may divert the political. It then proceeds to discuss the concepts of conflict and radicalization to provide the criterion necessary to answer the main research question of the dissertation. Furthermore, it discusses the division between internal and external identity politics.
to complete the dissertations account for what relations are involved in an identity configuration.

Finally, section 2.4 summarizes the triple function of the other in identity politics – the constitutive, narrative, and political relations – and argues why it is pertinent to focus the construction of the 'other ends' of the relations which make up an identity configuration.

**2.1 Identity as discursive double structure: void and narrative**

The point of this subsection is to characterize identity as a discursive structure: What is the regularity in dispersion of utterances which is identity discourse?

The answer which this section provides is that identity is a discursive double structure: Firstly, identity has the structure of a void in the sense that identity does not exist (subsection 2.1.1). Secondly, identity has the structure of a narrative: the identity which seems to exist in spite of its impossibility is there as part of a story relating identity to difference (subsection 2.1.2). Finally, the section lays out how narratives facilitate not only identity by relating it to others – but also agency (subsection 2.1.3).

Having characterized identity discourse at this basic level, the section proceeds to argue that the narrative structure is the only observable part of the double structure. Therefore, a generic concept of self/other policy narrative is provided as the operational concept of identity for the dissertation. The concept is developed through a discussion of the concepts of time, narrative and policy (in subsection 2.1.4).

Both the discussion of the narrative endowment of identities with agency and the discussion of the temporality of policy narratives point out a need to conceptualize the articulation of identity as discursive agency. Section 2.2 takes up this task.
2.1.1 Identity as impossibility and void

The relation between identity and difference has been a recurrent theme in philosophy. Logically, the claim that someone is identical entails that someone else is different. Hence, identity discourse is first and foremost about drawing boundaries and thereby including some as identical and excluding others as different (Campbell 1998:9; cf. Derrida 1988b:53). Figure 2.1 illustrates this basic constitutive relation between identity and difference.

![Figure 2.1 Constitutive relation between Our identity and Their difference](image)

One way of characterizing Derrida's deconstructive mode of thinking is as thinking to the limit (Dufourmantelle 2000:80); taking concepts to their limit where they break down under their own weight. Correspondingly, Derrida (1988b:52f) presents identity as an ultimately impossible phenomenon: Identity is never explicated as complete; it always needs something extra to complete it. This something – which is its condition of being – is simultaneously what prevents it from being realised. So the other – what is excluded from identity (discourse) is both constitutive and threatening to the identity (discourse).
Section 1.2.1 noted that any analysis of identity politics must be able to take this threat from the other to identity into account. But it also briefly discussed how Connolly and Laclau presented each their way to 'cut the philosophical threat down to its social size'. Connolly (2002:8) insisted on a 'human handbrake' when transporting Derrida's logical figure from philosophy to the analysis of social practice.\(^{19}\) In social life it is a structural possibility to point out a human individual or collective as the threatening other – but it is only a temptation, not a necessity.\(^{20}\)

Laclau on his side described (Laclau 1990:17; 50; Clausen et al. 2000; cf. Torfing 1999:129ff) a discursive structure – 'antagonism' – in which the threat to identity from outside is ascribed to a specific social other. But the very naming of the threat simultaneously to some degree domesticates the threat: A threat pointed out to

\(^{19}\) Connolly's implicit critique of Derrida runs in parallel with the warning Gingrich issues against relying too much on philosophical concepts of identity inspired by Heidegger (exemplified in 1999[1957]). Gingrich finds that Heideggerian concepts of identity by "viewing difference as separate from and external to identity exemplifies a particularly 'strong' notion of difference ... [and, hence,] tend to transform any 'weak' notions of 'other' and of 'alterity' towards their own priority for a 'strong' notion of difference." (Gingrich 2004:9; cf. Grossberg 1996). Marchart (2004) lays out how Laclau relies on Heidegger on this point – Marchart, however, acclaims the relation. Critchley (2008) fixes the problem in Heidegger to the way true identity – authenticity – demands the being-together of a particular, historically rooted people engaged in communication and struggle (2008:139-41 focusing on Heidegger 1984:384). Critchley suggests to mend the problem by correcting the characterization of death, admittedly certain, indefinite and not to be outstripped, but not – as in Heidegger – an individual, non-relational experience. Rather death is fundamentally relational: I prepare for my own death exactly when mourning the loss of an other (2008:143-4). Subsection 2.1.4 returns to the implications of this discussion for the temporality of self/other policy narratives.

\(^{20}\) Žižek (1989:93 qtd by Neumann 1999:220) contrarily insist that "'Others,' of course, cannot be reduced to empirical others; they rather point to the Lacanian 'big Other,' to the symbolic order itself." Žižek's point is that the reduction of the big Other to empirical others cannot succeed. This essentialism is discussed in fn. 61. The point of departure of this dissertation is that reduction is empirically attempted all the time – but that Connolly is right that reduction is only a temptation, not a necessity.
originate with a knowable agent is in a sense less frightening than an anxiety stemming from an indefinite threat to identity as impossible.

The point to be made here is that neither Connolly nor Laclau supplies the tools necessary to specify the alternatives to pointing out social others as threats to identity: Connolly limits himself to describing the threat construction as a 'temptation' – and by the choice of metaphoric he implies resistance to the temptation to be primarily an ethical than a strategic challenge: a choice to be made rather than a discursive construction to be erected. Laclau & Mouffe's Derridean reading of the Foucauldian concept of discourse (Grossberg 1996) produces intriguing paradoxes and aporiae and, hence, nicely points out how language – and in continuation: other forms of meaningful social interaction – is full of pitfalls. Derrida’s philosophy is good at pointing out how there is a risk that linguistic operations do not work. A Derridean approach is, however, necessarily less apt at identifying what does work – at least when employed on its own.

2.1.2 Identity as narrative – narrative as the possibility of identity

Nevertheless, Laclau & Mouffe (1985; Laclau 1990) does provide the first building stones for a conceptualization of the relation of identity to difference as something more complex than a radically threatening constitutive outside. The most notable building stones are the concept of articulation and the twin logics of equivalence and difference. Articulation in Laclau and Mouffe designates the operation of fixing a previously ambiguous element as a moment in discourse by "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice." (1985:105)

Articulations may generally follow one of two logics contributing to each their way of structuring of discourse: The logic of equivalence describes how differences are made equivalent as they are collapsed in to one opposing other in a single antagonistic relation to Identity. Contrary to the logic of equivalence, the logic of
difference describes the production of a plethora of domesticated subject positions for others to take up in a discursive formation (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:129-144). The radically threatening other is present in both ways of structuring discourse. But under the logic of difference, the radically threatening other is relegated to the outskirts of social life – while under the logic of equivalence, antagonism runs down the middle of the social space organized.

The specific way in which the second logic – the logic of difference – works remain, however, underspecified in Laclau & Mouffe: Moments in discourse may both differ from each other and be related in an infinite number of ways. To analyse the differential inscription of elements in discourse, the conceptual apparatus of Laclau & Mouffe remain too abstract (Thomsen 1997:124 cf. Corry 2000:17).

The theoretical apparatus of Laclau & Mouffe lacks specificity when it comes to analysing differential inscription as a way of organizing discourse. This lack of specificity seems to be the background for the call of Howarth – a most distinguished scholar in the Laclauian tradition21 – to explore the relationship between discourse theory and narrative theory (2005:346). And with good reason: The structure of a narrative is an effective way of organising discourse. Gottweis notes, in a review of policy analysis after the linguistic turn, that: "Th[e] power to create order is an attractive quality that makes narratives essential for the shaping of policies, the settling of conflicts, or the securing of legitimacy for political action." (Gottweis 2006:469)

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21 I admit to be guilty as charged in potentially sexist partial citation (cf. Merton 1995) by slipping from "Laclau & Mouffe" to "Laclau" when referring to the discourse theory initially presented in (1985). Most of the theoretically relevant developments discussed here have, however, been published later by Laclau alone. When the dissertation – at a later stage – turns to the concept of agonism, Mouffe is of course credited.
A narrative is a specific way of structuring discourse; a specific regularity in the dispersion of utterances. More specifically, a narrative is the result of the selection and grasping together of a series of events from a beginning to a conclusion (Ricœur 1988:41; 66).²²

Figure 2.2 illustrates this narrative relation between identity and difference; the present relation between self and other is related to past and future relations between self and other. The constitutive relation – including the spatial distinction between self and other – is explained by these temporal relations to past and future relations.

![Figure 2.2 Narrative relation between self and other](image)

Ricœur concurs with the poststructuralist point that logical identity, i.e. "identity understood in the sense of being the same (idem)", is impossible. The identity which may be observed and which may have effects is narrative identity, i.e. "identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-same [soi-même] (ipse)" (1988:246).

²² The 'grasping together' is an English rendition of Latin *comprehendere* which covers both 'to take in the meaning of something' and 'to take in something as part' (cf. Ricoeur 1988:159); connotations bringing the operation close to the Laclau&Mouffian notion of *articulation* (cf. above).
Ricœur explains why narrative identity – as opposed to logical identity – may exist: "Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, mutability" (1988:246). Hence, both "[i]ndividual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history." (1988:247)

2.1.3 Narrative identity as a structure inviting agency

Narratively produced identity understood, with Ricœur, as

Self-sameness, 'self-constancy', can escape the dilemma of the Same and the Other to the extent that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. (1988:246)

This escape – narrative identity – from the dilemma of logical identity, however, prompts two questions:

The first question is: What becomes of the other which is escaped? Or rephrased: What becomes of the difference, which Derrida claimed to be constitutive for identity? The answer is that difference has to be narrated: Difference may be narrated away so that only identity is left. Or difference may be narrated into place: The other has to be narrated into a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40); a cast of "characters" (Ricœur 1988:248) related to the identity. How this is done – how narratives includes structures of relational identity – is the focus for chapter 3.

The second question comes, as phrased by Ricœur, in two versions: "'Who did this?'; 'Who is the agent, the author?'" of the narratives constituting identity-as-ipse (1988:246). The answer which Ricœur provides is that it is the narrated self which narrates: "The subject then appears both as a reader and the writer of its own life" (1988:246). Or in other words:

The relation is circular – the historical community [in the case of collective identity]... has drawn its identity from the reception of those texts that it had
produced. The ... relation between what we may call a 'character' – which may be that of an individual as well as that of a people – and the narratives that both express and shape this character [is circular] (1988:248).

The reconstruction of the basis for your own agency is an important element in any kind of interaction.

The observation that identities narrate their own identity does not mean that we cannot listen to the stories which the discursively constituted agents tell about themselves and each others. Quite the contrary; all we can do is to take our point of departure in the subjectivities constructed in these narratives and the narratives the subjectivities construct. The implications of the answer to this second question – that the narrated self is simultaneously the one which narrates – are developed in section 2.2 as it investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity by discursive agency.23

From this discussion of Derridean philosophy and Ricœurian narratology, the dissertation brings with it two basic points on the concept of identity: Logical identity is impossible in social life – therefore narrative identity becomes evermore necessary: The discursive structure of identity is – as a necessary supplement to its foundational structure of impossibility – a narrative structure. Or in other words: Identity discourse is structured as a narrative; the regularity in the dispersion of utterances which is identity discourse includes a regularity in the construction of the relation between a series of events setting the stage for a subject in relation to a cast of other characters. The narration of this narrative identity is put in the hand of the narrated identities themselves; hence, narrative identity is a discursive structure inviting agency.

23 Furthermore, Ricoeur grants that "narrative identity is not a stable and seamless identity" (1988:248). Therefore "[n]arrative identity ... becomes the name of a problem at least as much as it is that of a solution" (1988:249). In that sense, Ricoeur would agree when the dissertation finds a need to develop (in section 2.3) a concept of identity politics as discursive interaction.
The two structures of the double structure of identity – the void and the narrative – are equal in the sense that the one needs the other. But they are unequal in the sense that the narrative is a more elaborate structure than the void. The void is a neat and simple philosophical figure: a distinction is made – prompting an explanation. The explanation – the narrative – is a more complicated structure even in the abstract. Furthermore it may take an infinite number of paths. But most importantly: if you describe the narrative, your description will include the description of the distinction producing the void. And, more pertinently, this is the only way the void may be described – apart from the naked description of the philosophical figure: As soon as you start asking questions like 'What is the difference excluded?', 'Why?' and 'To what effect?', the only possible answers are narratives.24

Therefore, when preparing for an analysis of identity as a discursive structure, the focus must be on the narrative form. But when the analysis of identity as a discursive structure should serve the wider aim of analysing identity politics, the focus should not just be on any narrative form. A standard narrative "claim[s] to relate in the present a 'past-now'" (Ricœur as rendered by McQuillan 2000c:323; italics inserted). Politics, however, is – to be a meaningful concept – directed to the future in ways which other uses of narratives are not necessarily. Subsection 2.1.4 explores how this orientation makes policy narratives – a central tool in politics – a special form of narrative, and how this special form makes the analytical focus on the present articulation of the past and the future important.

24 Compare how Kølvrå (2009:47) needs to map the 'semantic field' to find the lead concept organizing discourse. That operation, which includes the observation of causal relations constructed between the lead concept and other concepts, already includes narrative analysis in the sense developed in subsection 2.1.4.
2.1.4 The structure of temporality in policy narratives

This section has so far found the discursive structure of identity to be a double structure: It involves the structure of a void and the structure of a narrative. Subsection 2.1.3 found the narrative structure to be the one to focus on when analysing identity. The aim of this subsection is to develop the specific narrative structure of identity politics; the structure of a policy narrative. Initially, two concepts of policy narrative in political science are briefly reviewed. Inspiring as they are found, they are also found too award too little attention to the present articulation: One prioritizes the past – one prioritizes the future. The subsection, therefore, turns to philosophy to discuss concepts of time and policy. After discussing the three aspects of time – future, past, present – the section concludes how to analytically approach the temporality of policy narratives.

Gottweis, in a recent review of what he terms the 'narrativist turn' in policy analysis, finds that narratives are found on two scales: Firstly,

Political metanarratives describe general concepts and values of the social order, and provide for individual orientation and location in the symbolic universe. Metanarratives offer a conceptual framework that provides a polity and its subjects with an imagined collective political identity situated in historical time. (2006:469)

Secondly,

Policy narratives are more specific and describe the frames or plots used in the social construction of the fields of action for policy making, for governmental activities ... These frames or plots are principles of organization that govern events and give orientation to actors in a policy field. (2006:470)

A most stimulating example of how to conceptualize political metanarratives in a way relevant to this dissertation is found in Smith's 'stories of peoplehood' (2003). Smith lays out how 'peoplehood', i.e. political community, is constituted by 'stories', i.e. narratives, of power, wealth, and (ethical) worth. An important effect of a
narrative in relation to the constitution of communities is the construction of certain futures as desirable:

However well reasoned or well documented, those promises can never be more than a plausible conjecture, an imagined scenario of how the future will unfold, made credible by a certain account of the past and present that is usually selectively stylized (2003:45).

Smith's Gramscian preference for studying the political rather than social construction of narrative identity points – in line with the perspective of the dissertation – the attention in the direction of struggles between competing narratives (2003:38-42, 53-4).

Nevertheless, in Smith's analysis the focus slides to the way, in which the past is constructed. Most of the analysis focuses on how the past appears after having been structured: it re-tells the stories and analyses the structure of the stories told. In that sense too much weight is given to the past – and too little to the present.25 For the purpose of this dissertation, focus needs to be on the articulation of the past as it is constructed to make a future policy as desirable or necessary – and most of all, the focus needs to be on the present as it articulates a past and a future.

Zooming in on policy narratives, the problem reappears in different shape. In the tradition of policy analysis, policy is conceptualized as, on the one hand, an – ideally rational – way of approaching a given problem; and on the other hand, as a result of politics understood as a weighing of predefined interests taking place within a certain

25 Smith's analysis does touch upon the construction of the past by present actors as it turns to present US politics (2003:187-8, 192-3). Another problem in Smith's analytical setup is that the peoples (identities) constituted seem in Smith's rendition mainly to be acting politically in relation to themselves: The other only seldom appears in the outside end of a relation – and when the other appears, no active role is awarded. The pertinence of this problem will be clear from subsection 2.2 and chapter 3.
institutionalized *polity* (Torfing 2004:45-6). In the perspective of the dissertation, contrarily, the policy solutions, problems, interests, identities, and settings are co-constituted through a process of negotiations instantiated in more or less elaborate statements of policy narratives (cf. Torfing 2004:45-6; Hansen 2006:21). In the tradition of policy analysis, such a perspective has been summarized as 'argumentative policy analysis'.

In his review of this perspective, Gottweis observes that while

> Traditionally, the Derrida/Foucault tradition of discourse analysis has been rather critical towards the last heroic efforts of the Frankfurt School personified by Jürgen Habermas to save the Enlightenment project

he finds in policy analysis marked by the linguistic turn

> an interesting tension ... between the basically idealistic idea of communicative rationality … and the embrace of Foucault and other post-Enlightenment thinkers by many authors in argumentative policy analysis. (2006:473)

This tension is perhaps most elegantly handled by Hajer & Wagenaar. On the one hand they insist that "*conflict* is intrinsic to human communities. Policy issues are almost by definition contested." (2003:27) On the other hand their aim is that policy analysis should perform a "transformative work" (2003:29) on a situation in which traditional governmental institutions are not necessarily "capable of producing effective or legitimate solutions" (2003:29-30): In this situation, policy analysis "aims to create, through direct and active participation in democratic deliberation over concrete policy problems, to develop autonomy, or, a capacity for judgment"

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26 An informative discussion of the relation between choice and necessity in the temporality of policy may be found in Kay (2006:2-4). This approach, however, stays within a rationalistic perspective.
(2003:31). As a part of this work, it is the aim to develop new modes of conflict resolution (2003:16).

To account for the "communicative miracle" which take place when "people from widely varying backgrounds still find ways to communicate" (2006:70), Hajer introduces a most inspiring concept of narrative: A story line is a sketchy narrative which may serve as point of coalescence by allowing each actor to 'fill in the blanks' in a different way (1995:52-67; 2005:447; 2006:69-71). Hence, "A story-line ... is a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena." (1995:56)

Hajer's concept of story line, however, simultaneously awards too much attention to the past and the future – and too little to the present: On the one hand, the concept of story line undoubtedly provides a valuable tool in the post facto analysis of hegemonic coalitions once formed. It does, however, not allow a focus on the present articulation of neither the coalition27 or of the narrative holding it together, as the blanks may – by definition – not be filled in lest the coalition fall apart. In that sense, there is a bias towards the past in the analytical setup. On the other hand, it is clear that the future formation of the coalition is a premise for the past analysed.28 In that sense, the bias to the past is only established by installing in the past a bias to the future.

In sum, even if political science provides two inspiring concepts of policy narrative both intellectually related to poststructuralist discourse theory, neither facilitates the focus on the present articulation of narratives, which the dissertation seeks. The section, therefore, proceeds beyond political science to Philosophy and

27 Corry notes this weakness as the lack of an analytical strategy to account for the process of establishing the discursive coalition (2003:88).

28 Perhaps this is related to what Gottweis (2006:475) calls the "deliberative reflex" of argumentative policy analysis.
Historiography to discuss how best to conceptualize the temporality of policy narratives.

Gadamer describes the position in which the struggle with the concept of time has put philosophy in this way:

> The perplexity in which thought has become entangled is that time appears to have its sole Being in the 'now' of the present, and nevertheless, it is just as clear that time, precisely in the 'now' of the present, is as such not present. What 'now' is, is always already past. It seems incomprehensible how one is supposed to comprehend what is past, as that which no longer is, and what is the future, as that which is not yet, in terms of the being of the 'now' which alone exists in such way that the whole 'is' time. (Gadamer 1970:341 qtd. by Petersen 2008:70).

Two of the most influential philosophical treatments of time are developed by Heidegger and Ricœur: Heidegger attempts to define Being and develops a concept of time to serve this purpose – Ricœur attempts to define Time and develops a concept of narrative to serve that purpose. To assist in the discussion of these two philosophical landmarks, the dissertation seeks assistance from two Laclau'ian interlocutors: Philosopher Simon Critchley and Historian Christoffer Kølvrå, who on their part employ Philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas and Historian Hayden White to modify the inspiration they receive. To find the most apt metaphoric and strike the right balance between the three aspects of time – past, present, future – for an analysis of policy narratives, however, the dissertation turns to Historian Reinhardt Koselleck. The result is a concept of temporality of policy narrative which combines Koselleck's concepts of space of experience and horizon of expectation with Laclau's insistence on the primacy of politics. Finally, I rely on literary theorist when discussing how far to deconstruct narrative theory.

For Heidegger
Time should be grasped in and of itself as the unity of the three dimensions – what Heidegger calls 'ecstases' – of future, past and present. This is what he calls 'primordial' or 'original' time ... Temporality is a process with three dimensions which form a unity. (Critchley 2009a)

Opposed to this attempt to grasp time phenomenologically or existentially is, in Heidegger, chronological or vulgar time:

the idea of time as a uniform, linear and infinite series of 'now-points'. On this model ... the future is the not-yet-now, the past is the no-longer-now, and the present is the now that flows from future to past at each passing moment. (Critchley 2009a)

What is important to note is that true existence involves what Heidegger refers to as the "transcendence" (Schürmann 2008:120 quoting Heidegger 1984) of vulgar time: it is possible to "seize hold of the present" by performing "resoluteness"; or in other words: to "make a decision to take over the fact of who I am in a free action" (Critchley 2009a).

Ricœur's way of dealing with the relation between chronological time and existential time is on one account quite different. Instead of suggesting how to leave the one sort of time behind in preference of the other, he suggests a third sort of time to serve as a bridge between the two: Historical or narrative time inscribes the experienced, existential time in cosmic, chronological time: Narrative time is on the one hand irreversible succession; on the other hand it connects distinct points-in-time. (Rendtdorff 2000:124). Specifically, a narrative involves – as mentioned in subsection 2.1.2 – the articulation of a series of events from a beginning to a conclusion (Ricœur 1988:41; 66).

When focusing on the moment of articulation, the difference between Heidegger and Ricœur is that Ricœur sees lots of articulations: narration is near to omnipresent, while Heidegger discards most of these articulations as trite and vulgar and calls for more bold action. Nevertheless there seem to be an agreement that the only way out
of the perplexity on the question of time, which Gadamer pointed out, is a decision articulating the three aspects of time.

This dissertation follows Ricœur in conceptualizing such an articulation as necessarily narrative, i.e. as a grasping together of a series of events from a beginning to an end which sets the stage for a cast of characters. The dissertation, however, takes account of Heidegger's call for bold action in the sense that the articulation may be more or less bold; it may promote a more or less obvious continuation of available narratives.

There is, however, a more important way in which the dissertation conceptualizes narrative might be said to leave a Heideggerian impression: The focus of the dissertation is on policy narratives. Narratives may certainly be told which take place entirely (with both beginning and end) in the past. But it makes no sense to articulate a narrative entirely placed in the past as a 'policy narrative', as policy concerns something to be done in the future. "Policies are ... particular directions for action" (Hansen 2006:21 paraphrasing Shapiro 1988). Directions, notably, for action which has not yet taken place. This means that 'the present' needs to be situated among the events grasped together rather than before or after them – or in other words that 'the present' must be articulated as situated between the beginning and the end of the narrative.

A policy narrative is necessarily – at the time of its utterance – one which places 'the end' of the events to be grasped together somewhere in the future. So at the time of utterance, a policy narrative configures the utterance – and presumptively, discourse – in three aspects of time: past, future, and present. And more than that: A policy narrative necessarily situates the agents narrated into being at a specifically crucial

29 It might in principle be possible to tell a story which takes place entirely in the future – even if some (implicit) reference to a known past (which will then be placed before the 'beginning' of the story) will be probably be necessary to make the story intelligible.
point between the beginning and the end: it situates the agents at a fork in the road, at a point where time – even if it still conceptualized as chronologically progressing – widens out.

"Time ... can only be expressed in spatial metaphors" writes Koselleck (1985:273). But what metaphors allow for an analysis of policy narrative? The two proceeding subsections explain why the dissertation, when developing a concept of 'policy narrative' to employ in analysis turns to Koselleck to get the spatial metaphorics right. Koselleck arrives at his suggested metaphoric through an analysis of "the shifting classification of experience and expectation" throughout history (Koselleck 1985:271). The dissertation places 'the end' somewhere in 'the future' through the metaphor of a 'space of experience' (section 2.1.4.1) and it places 'the beginning' somewhere in 'the past' through the metaphor of a 'horizon of expectation' (section 2.1.4.2). Finally, the dissertation returns to the articulatory moment of 'the present' to sum up the analytical implications of conceptualizing identity as structured through policy narratives (in section2.1.4.3).

2.1.4.1 The first aspect of time: the future visible from the present

This subsection develops the first aspect of time – the future – to be a horizon of expectation articulated to be springing out of the present. A discussion of the roles of death, of mythical fulfillment, and of the demand for closure – all constructing definitive points of arrival for time in narratives – leads to a theoretical preference for the more indefinite 'horizon of expectation'. The proceeding subsections show how the relative undecidability of a horizon may be reduced by present articulations of the past as a space of experience.

First: Death. "Heidegger subscribes to the ancient maxim that 'to philosophise is to learn how to die'. Mortality is that in relation to which we shape and fashion our selfhood." (Critchley 2009a) Therefore, according to Heidegger,
the primary phenomenon of time is the future that is revealed to me in my being-towards-death. Heidegger makes play of the link between the future (Zukunft) and to come towards (zukommen). ... The human ... always projects towards the future. (Critchley 2009b)

The conclusion is, in the words of Heidegger, that "[temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future] Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich ursprünglich aus der Zukunft" (Heidegger 1984:327 quoted in Critchley 2008:147).

It is true that the human projects towards the future – and policy narratives do too. Heidegger's account, nevertheless, puts too much emphasis on the future – and especially one element of the future: death. It might be so that philosophy is learning how to die. But politics seems to me much more to be concerned with how to live on. Notably, as we will return to in a couple of pages: how to live on.

Part of the reason might be that politics involve collective identity, and collective identities do not face death in the same way as individuals. Death, according to Heidegger, is "unbezüglich, gewiß, unbestimmt and unüberholbar: non-relational, certain, indefinite and not to be outstripped" (Critchley 2008:143 paraphrasing Heidegger 1984). As we shall see below, Critchley takes issue with the element of non-relationality. Nevertheless, 'death' for a collective identity might be indefinite and not to be outstripped — but death does not appear certain for a collective identity in the same way as it does for a thoughtful individual. A series of scholars of nationalism and religion even suggest that the function of the narratives which constitute these phenomena is to imbue the mortal individual with a sense of immortality (Anderson 1991:ch.2; Smith 1991:161ff). The shift of weight away from certainty towards indefinity alone makes a difference for the temporal structure of policy narratives.

Contrarily, for a collective identity death may be overcome by narration. And it may be overcome exactly by continued narration. As Campbell puts it in relation to one
type of collective identity: "For a state to end its practices of representation would be... death." (1998:12) Perhaps death is the vanishing point of narration – but in different ways, when it concerns individual and collective identity: "Silence is the impossibility of meaning and the possibility of the termination of *inter-subjective* contiguity. ... Silence=Death ... However, this silence is not the end of the story; on the contrary it is the beginning. Silence is a necessary condition of the act of narrative production" (McQuillan 2000b:27; italics added). Authentic individuals might narrate-towards-certain-death – collective subjectivities narrate-to-postpone-indefinite-death. And even if silence appears to signify death, the silence of a dead collective might not be as irreversible as the silence of a dead individual. In that sense, it is necessary to allow for a more open-ended structure of temporality when developing an analytics to be employed on policy narratives.

But there are other 'ends' than death. For one, there is fulfilment. Or rather; Heidegger sees fulfilment in death – but there are other fulfilments to approach. One is the realisation of ones true identity in Utopia. Laclau introduces the concept of 'myths' in his theoretical framework as "'spaces of representation', which are designed to make sense of and suture dislocations." (Howarth 2004:261) Kølvrå develops the concept to designate a specific form of narrative with a specific kind of end: "Political myths .. always involve ... an eschatological dimension, because ... they project utopia into the future." (Kølvrå 2009:37) Kølvrå' s Lacanian point is that fulfilment in Utopia is impossible – but the desire to fill the lack and reach Utopia is what drives narration.

Agreed: The urge to reach out towards Utopia *is* in many cases an effective motor for narratives of collective identity. But is it necessarily the only one? Perhaps there are these overarching narratives holding each large scale collective together. But perhaps there are not. Perhaps there are only smaller narratives suggesting how to go on; leading to 'lesser' ends than death or Utopia. The smaller narratives may recur to grander narratives. Perhaps they have a better chance to catch on if they do so. But do
they always have to relate to grand narratives? Does one necessarily refer to one organizing suture waiting in the (impossible) end, every time one acts politically?

Kølvrå bases his argument on White who is investigating the desire for having reality be endowed with a meaning, so that we may tell a story of it in which "events seem to tell themselves" (1980:8). He finds historiography to be "an especially good ground on which to consider the nature of narration and narrativity because it is here that our desire for the imaginary, the possible, must contest with the imperatives of the real, the actual." (1980:8) Kølvrå paraphrases White to the event that "the problem with narrating history is that history as the eternal succession of events in the world does not end, but narrative as a form must end – it must at some point conclude" (2009:35; cf. White 1980:26). And the reason is that for a narrative to work, it needs to have a point: "The demand for closure in the historical story is a demand ... for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama" (White 1980:24).

I do not have any issues with this account as such; what I wish to contend concerns, firstly, scale, and, secondly, the problems involved in conceptualizing the future as part of history and the spatial metaphoric imported in this way. To specify these problems, we need to look closer at the argument White makes.

To me it seems that both the problems concerning scale and the choice of spatial metaphoric pertains to the way in which White generalizes from history writing: As an introite to his focus on the role of narrative, White enumerates a series of diacritica of good history writing:

by common consent, it is not enough that a historical account deal in real, rather than merely imaginary, events; and it is not enough that the account in its order of discourse represent events according to the chronological sequence in which they originally occurred. The events must be ... narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as
possessing a structure, an order of meaning, which they do not possess as mere sequence. (1980:9)

More specifically, "it must honor the chronological order of the original occurrence of the events of which it treats as a baseline that must not be transgressed in classifying any given event as either a cause or an effect." (1980:9; italics added) In his concluding remarks, White returns from the specific analysis of history writing to the more general problematique of his introduction and of the title of his essay – "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" to say that "this value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary." (White 1980:27; italics added)

As indicated above, two points are to be made here: One concerning size, and one concerning the specificity of an end.

Firstly, at what size may an 'end' have the critical effect of closure? Which is to say: At what scale does narrative kick in? Death may be a Big end suitable for a Big narrative of individual identity; and Utopia may be a Big end suitable for a Big narrative of collective identity. And ideal type Modern history writing, focusing on the overall political-social order (cf. White 1980:15) needs big ends to narrate big moral points.

But is not every articulation of a cause to an effect a narrative – beginning with the cause, ending in the effect? Narratives may be found on a much smaller scale aiming at much smaller ends – in every utterance connecting a cause to an effect. "It may be useful, then to define the action of a narrative as the representation of an instance, no matter how small, of ... events and existents in a chain of temporal causality or at least contingency" (McQuillan 2000b:8 paraphrasing Seymour Chatman). Such small scale narratives play a central role in the interaction of identity politics, whether or not they add up to or articulate big narratives.
Secondly, even if one never knows when Death will arrive and if one knows that one never ever arrives in Utopia, the direction is in both cases unambiguously decided. In narration, according to White, one projects a line towards a single point.

This kind of singular end is not particularly apt for an analysis designed to open up alternative futures. This may be achieved, contrarily, by pointing out the articulation of the hegemonic projection as but one among other possibilities. Singular projection is part of the construction of a future – but it cannot stand alone; it needs another metaphor to play up against. 'Horizon' is such a metaphor.

But how are the two metaphors – projection of a point and horizon – to be combined? McQuillan suggest that "the subject can construct a present as a distinct ontological region of reality ... by placing an imaginary horizon on the boundless and differential syntagm of narrative" (McQuillan 2000b:20). So you have an endless line projected; you babble along adding events to events – and then you cut it off by 'drawing down the curtain' to form a horizon. The result is that the projection stops at the horizon.

In Critchley's rendition of Heidegger, the relation is the opposite: "to understand what it means to be an authentic human being, then it is essential that we constantly project our lives onto the horizon of our death." (Critchley 2009a) In this version, the horizon is there – and we need to direct our story to reach it at a specific point. The story must be made to end at the horizon.

Both these ways of conceptualizing a horizon, however, produce points.

In the way Koselleck develops the spatiality of the future-as-expectations, the horizon is not just producing a point – it is producing a line, a line allowing for the projection of a series of alternative points. Koselleck's description of the aspect of the future as expectation begins like Heidegger's in saying that "expectation ... takes place in the

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today; it is the future made present; it directs itself to the not-yet, to the nonexperienced" (1985:272). But Koselleck does not continue the list describing the future as the not-yet and the nonexperienced to end with the single point of Death. Instead the list describing the future widens out as it directs itself "to that which is to be revealed. Hope and fear, wishes and desires, cares and rational analysis, receptive display and curiosity: all enter into expectation and constitute it." (1985:272) As "that which has yet to be made is spread over minutes, hours, days, years, and centuries; ... only the individual parts are visible" (1985:272), hence

it is more precise to make use of the metaphor of an expectational horizon ... The horizon is that line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen. The legibility of the future, despite possible prognoses, confronts an absolute limit, for it cannot be experienced. (1985:273)

The absoluteness lies not in an end point of Death but in a limit of experience.

Figure 2.3 illustrates how the first aspect time – 'the future' – may be conceptualized as the horizon of expectation visible from the present.

By insisting on the future of a narrative to direct itself towards a horizon in the sense of a line of possibilities, weight is lifted from the shoulders of the future. The weight is tilted backwards; towards the past and, not least, towards the present. Death may be articulated – as may Utopia – but it is a possibility rather than a necessity. 31 But the obligation to grasp the events together into a narrative comes not from Death but from articulation. The two remaining subsections of this section develop the spatial structure of the two remaining aspects of time – past and present – suitable for the analysis of policy narratives.

31 In chapter 3, the dissertation returns to how necessity may be articulated in narratives through specific conceptualizations of the future.
2.1.4.2 The second aspect of time: the past pointing to the present

Just as expectations are the future made present, according to Koselleck, "experience is present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered" (1985:272). Both future and past link to the present – and through the present they are necessarily articulated to each other:

> in the absence of experience, [expectation] is not to be had. When they are fulfilled, expectations that are founded upon experience may no longer involve any degree of surprise. Only the unexpected has the power to surprise, and this surprise involves a new experience. The penetration of the horizon of expectation, therefore, is creative of new experience. (1985:275)

But how to conceptualize experience as one aspect of time?

Heidegger, as described above, sees death as defining for the primacy of the future. Contrarily, Critchley, following Levinas, sees death as defining for the primacy of the past (Critchley 2008:147):
For Heidegger, the deaths of others are secondary to my death, which is primary. ... On the contrary, I think that death comes into our world through the deaths of others ... The relation to death is not first and foremost my own fear for my own demise, but my sense of being undone by the *experience* of grief and mourning. (2009a; italics added)

His conclusion is, that

the self is not the ecstasy of a heroic leap towards authenticity energized by the experience of anxiety and being-towards-death. ... Rather ... the self's fundamental self-relation is to an unmasterable thrownness, the burden of facticity that weighs me down without my ever being able to fully pick it up. (2008:143)\(^3\)

Defining for the human Being is "its basic ontological indebtedness, its guilt ... my past, my personal and cultural baggage, what Heidegger calls my 'having-been-ness' (*Gewesenheit*)." (2009b)

Critchley's analysis has consequences for the temporality of narratives of individual identity:

Expressed temporally, one's self-relation is not the authentic living present of the moment of vision, but rather a delay with respect to oneself that is perhaps best expressed in the experience of fatigue or weariness. I project or throw off a thrownness that catches me in its throw and inverts the movement of possibility. (2008:143)

The result is a primacy of the past in identity narratives: "[S]uch an inauthentic, relational self would be organized in relation to a past for which it is responsible, but which it cannot redeem" (2008:149). The past, according to Critchley – here inspired by Lacan – is the constitutive void of identity and all the mistakes that have come from trying to fill the void. And this past is basically inescapable: "a past that cannot

\(^3\) Critchley's 'thrownness' is the English rendition of Heidegger's 'geworbenheit'.

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be fully made present and, which for that very reason, will not let go and cannot be passed over in silence." (2008:149)  

So the past is explicitly awarded primacy in Critchley. A series of formulations ("cannot fully be made present"; "cannot be passed over") explicated an impotence of agency in the face of the past. To me, these phrases betray the primacy of the present in the articulation of the past.

Koselleck argues that when choosing metaphors to conceptualize the past, "it is more illuminating to speak of 'space of experience'" (Koselleck 1985:273) as "completed experience is united into a focus" (1985:272; italics added) and "experience based on the past is spatial since it is assembled into a totality, within which many layers of earlier times are simultaneously present, without, however, providing any indication of the before and after." (1985:273; italics added). The articulated structure of experience is a totality of simultaneously present layers of earlier times focused on the present.

This resulting structure of the past is produced through a process – it is united; it is assembled; it is made to focus. It is articulated to point to the present. This operation of articulation may take place again and again – but to have effect now it needs to be performed now, even if only as a repetition. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the second aspect of time – 'the past' – may be conceptualized as the space of experience focused on the present. Subsection 2.1.4.3 discusses how the third aspect of time – the present

33 Critchley insists that this inescapability of the past calls for "comic acknowledgement rather than tragic affirmation" (2008:142; cf. 149). Agreed; the acknowledgement of such an "essentially inauthentic self ... uneasy with itself ... divided against itself in the experience of conscience" (2008:149) does appear much more realistic and more sympathetic than the affirmation of Heidegger's "heroic, non-relational and constant self who achieves authentic wholeness through anticipatory resoluteness." (2009:149). Even more so when applied to collective identity: Hitler's 'heroic' leap towards self-extinction on behalf of the German volk in the last days of the Third Reich neither comes across as sympathetic, nor does it appear to have been efficient as an attempt to articulate future or identity.
– is the moment articulating the past as experience and the future as expectation. And how this articulation invariably includes an – overt or concealed – construction of alternative policies. The primacy of the present in the articulation of the past and the future means the primacy of politics.

![Figure 2.4 The 2nd aspect of time in policy narrative](image)

The past as space of experience pointing to the present ontology

### 2.1.4.3 The third aspect of time: the present articulating the past and the future

The third aspect of time dissected from the utterance of a narrative is the aspect of 'the present' articulated by the very articulation: The speech act articulates the present as connecting the past and the future as it (the speech act) articulates past, future and present.

First, each speech act articulates 'the past' pointing to 'the present'. It does so in the sense that it involves an ontology; i.e. it implies a claim concerning the way the world is at the present moment – possibly caused by how it was in the past.

Further, each speech act articulates 'the future' as a horizon of possibilities visible from the viewpoint of the present. Finally, a speech act takes the form of a narrative.
by presenting not just a static ontology and a horizon of possibilities but also a projection of the past into the future, onto a specific point of the horizon. However, it simultaneously takes the form of a policy narrative by – implicitly or explicitly – presenting more possible futures distributed along the horizon. As a policy narrative it presents the future as a choice between at least two options: One option is presented as an 'oughtology'; a preferred future which is possible if 'we' act in a specific way. One or more different options are presented as 'oughtnotologies'; futures we should avoid. These oughtnotologies may include the result of an automatic extrapolation of the past (with no action taken) and/or the result of one or more policy alternatives.

It is in the time of the articulation that necessity, contingency, possibility, and impossibility is constructed to connect a past and a series of possible futures.

White reminds us to

   distinguish between a historical discourse that narrates, on the one side, and a discourse that narrativizes on the other: between a discourse that openly adopts a perspective that looks out on the world and reports it and a discourse that feigns to make the world speak of itself and speak itself as a story. (White 1980:6-7; 1987:202; cf. Gottweiss 2006:471)

Historical and political discourses in particular are often narrativizing discourses – i.e., discourses presenting themselves as discourses without a narrator. But no discourse speaks by itself. It needs to be articulated. The aim of analysis should be the denaturalization of narrativizing articulations. It does not suffice to philosophically deconstruct in the abstract the logical square of modalities opposing necessity with impossibility and contingency with possibility; what is needed is an analysis of the practical construction and implications of the narrative production of necessities, contingencies, possibilities, and impossibilities.

Foucault writes on the role of genealogy in relation the present:

34 Cf. the critique of Derrida in Shepherdson 2009.
We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. ... [But t]he purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. (Foucault 1977:155; 162)

This dissertation commits to the same ethos, but directs the attention to the necessities of the future. More specifically, it directs itself to the relations which are articulated to be necessary to support the necessities of the future. Guided by this commitment, the focus must be on the speech act as the site of production of the narrative.

The speech act articulates the present as connecting the past and the future. It does so by presenting a specific combination of necessity and choice as necessary: Some elements of the past are projected into the future as having necessary consequences. Other elements are pointed out as contingent and thereby potential objects of intentional change; as objects ripe for policy choice. By presenting some futures as possible as the result of policy choices, it hides other futures as impossible – and it hides the choices made in constructing causes and effects and thereby deciding what constitutes necessities and what is open to change.

So the dissertation accepts that a policy narrative needs a projection to the future. But it does not award primacy to the future, as the projection does not have in advance one fixed target on the horizon of expectation; it needs to be projected, to be articulated, to be made present. In parallel, the dissertation accepts that a policy narrative needs a past of sedimented baggage. But it does not award primacy to the past, as the past needs to be selected and grasped together; it needs to be articulated; it needs to be made present.

For the purpose of analysing policy narratives, the dissertation insist on the primacy of politics in the sense of "taking a decision in an undecidable terrain" (Torfing 1999:304). Policy narratives present a package deal of a distinct past and one or more
projected futures. The point of analysing policy narrative is to untie the package deal presented by the articulation. By untying the package the analyst insist on, firstly, keeping the horizon of the future open for the possible projections hidden by the selected projections; and, secondly, holding the articulator responsible for the choice made.

On the one hand, like "For Heidegger, the present is not some endless series of now points that I watch flowing by. Rather, the present is something that I can seize hold of and resolutely make my own." (Critchley 2009a) So far, so good: Decisions are made. But on the other hand, for Heidegger the space opened is closed down again: "What is opened in the anticipation of the future is the fact of our having-been which releases itself into the present moment of action." (Critchley 2009a) And "this 'moment of vision' [Augenblick, Øieblick] is not just any present – it is a translation of the Greek kairos, the right moment." (2009a)

This means that if we follow Heidegger, there is just one true choice and no more analysis: "freedom consists in the affirmation of the necessity of one's mortality. It is only in being-towards-death that one can become the person who one truly is." (Critchley 2009a) As argued, the decisions narrated by collective subjectivities produce a different kind of truth.

The dissertation attempts to study present politics as Kosselleck studies past history.35 The ontology constructed should make it obvious to focus at the agents exactly at the point where the space of experience ends and the horizon of

35 Koselleck sometimes reads as if there were no present, no choice, no articulation – as if past and future is what constitutes their own relation: "expectation and experience ... simultaneously constitute history and its cognition. They do so by demonstrating and producing the inner relation between past and future earlier, today, or tomorrow." (Koselleck 1985:270). This entanglement of past pasts and past futures is, however, exactly what should be disentangled by analysis.
expectation are opened up. Or – since this is impossible, as *this* present is already past – to fix them as responsible for the just-articulated present.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 2.5 The 3rd aspect of time in policy narrative.**
The present as prognosis-and-policy articulating past experience as cause for future expectation

Figure 2.5 illustrates how the third aspect of time in a policy narrative – the present – articulates, firstly, the past as a space of experience organized to point as a cause to the present ontology; secondly, the future as an implicit or explicit choice between specific projections onto the horizon of expectations.

### 2.1.5 The structure of policy narratives and the politics of temporalization

This section set out to specify the discursive structure of identity – and found it to be the double structure of a void and a narrative. In other words, the two first relations involved in an identity configuration – understood as a relation of relations – is a *constitutive relation* between identity and difference, and a *narrative relation* between identity and difference.

Of the two, only the narrative structure of identity is accessible to analysis. Therefore, the section proceeded to develop a generic concept of policy narrative as its
operational concept of identity. Through a discussion of the concepts of narrative, time and policy, the section arrived at a concept of policy narrative to denote the articulation of a series of events – including the past as experience pointed to the present, and two or more alternative futures projected onto a horizon of expectation. The alternative futures made visible from the present included a preferred *oughtology* and one or more *oughtnotologies* to be avoided. And notably, in a policy narrative it is presented as our choice to pursue the one or the other future. The narrative relation between identity and difference may therefore be specified to be a *policy relation*.

The first task for chapter 3 is to present a theoretical account of how such a policy narrative may be configured to set the scene for a cast of characters – and in that way relate identity to others – in more or less conflictual ways. Put more formally, the task for chapter 3 is to combine the discursive structure of a policy narrative (developed in this section) with the discursive structure of a self/other relation to produce the discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative.

Furthermore, the preceding subsection concluded that when analysing a policy narrative, the aim must be to lay bare the articulatory operation taking place in the present which constructs a certain past to point to the present ontology. Foucault writes that "the attitude of modernity" constructs "'today' as difference in history". More specifically, "For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is." (1984:41) So by focusing on the present, the dissertation is complicit in modernity.

But it is complicit in modernity in a specific way. Bauman suggests that

Postmodernity is modernity coming of age: modernity looking at itself at a distance rather than from inside, making a full inventory of its gains and losses, psychoanalyzing itself, discovering the intentions it never before spelled out, finding them mutually cancelling and incongruous. Postmodernity is modernity coming to
terms with its own impossibility: a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously discards what it was once unconsciously doing. (Bauman 1991:272)

By focusing on the present and the politics of articulation, the dissertation performs the postmodern move of turning modernity on itself.

This second order representation of modernity – placing primacy in the present – does not necessarily match the self-representations involved in Danish debates on Muslims. The subjects constituted by modernity refuse to take themselves serious in a postmodern way on a daily basis. They keep on narrating their own narration – and their own choices – away and thereby narrating necessity into being. This narrating of necessity may, however, be done in different ways. And the different ways of narrating necessity may have different effects when it comes to the focus of the dissertation: the contribution to radicalization of conflict involved in the debates.

Figure 2.6 Self-Other policy narrative
Present ontology and projected 'oughtology' and 'oughtnotology'

Confronted with narration of necessity, the analytical task is to 'reopen' the future by not accepting the projection of a single future presented by the narrative. Rather the analysis should lay bare how the narrative constructs the future as a choice between an 'oughtology' and one or more 'oughtnotologies'. Figure 2.6 illustrates how the
analytical task is to insist on opening up the narratives as *policy* narratives by explicating the implied alternative futures. Chapter 3 specifies this analytical task by discussing how necessity may be articulated by temporalizations of the narrative.

However, before the dissertation may (in chapter 3) turn to the theoretical account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict, the present chapter needs to finish its account of the ontology to be observed in the first place: Subsection 2.1.3 concluded, that it is the narrated self which is doing the narration. Section 2.2 investigates the conditions and modalities of the *articulation of identity by discursive agency* – and section 2.3 develops the concept of *identity politics as discursive interaction* to complete the dissertation's account for what relations are involved in an identity configuration.

### 2.2 Identity as discursive agency: articulation to facilitate future agency

The preceding section constructed a concept of identity as discursive structure for the dissertation to observe – focusing on the structure of a policy narrative. But this discursive structure consists (only) of the regularity determined in the dispersion of the discursive acts pointing out the identity. A structure consisting of discursive acts is only upheld as long as it is re-iterated (Butler 1997:139f). Any identity consists of and is reproduced as well as modified by concrete discursive acts; utterances or speech acts but also gesticulations, physical action, and other forms of materialized discourse. For sure, the concept of identity as synchronic discursive structure laid out above was pregnant with diachrony, with (re-)production through action.

This section investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity by discursive agency. It does so to account for how the constitutive and narrative relations between identity and difference (laid out in section 2.1) are forged. Thereby it adds to the picture of relations adding up to an identity configuration – and it
allows chapter 3 to account theoretically for the different contributions to radicalization of conflict form different ways of forging 'relations between relations between identity and difference'.

More specifically, the preceding section noted with Ricœur how narrated identities are awarded agency and takes up this agency by continuing the narration. Subsection 2.2.1 specifies how this space for agency in structure allows not only re-production of the structure but involves a freedom for a subject to articulate. Subsection 2.2.2 argues the need for agency to articulate structures in ways that facilitate future agency – and discusses some of the complications involved.

Both the discussion of the space for agency in structure and the discussion of the need to facilitate future agency by structuring point out a need to conceptualize the identity politics as discursive interaction. Section 2.3 takes up this task.

### 2.2.1 A space for agency in structure

The task for this subsection is to reconstitute a space for agency in structure. The reconstitution follows the lines summarized by Wæver:

> On the one hand, discourse is 'prior' in the sense that subjects are not given outside discourse and it is only from within discourse that certain subject positions are opened up from which one can speak. On the other hand ... actors need to be conceptualised as having at least the possibility of acting strategically in relation to discourse (Wæver 2004:199).

The point of departure which the dissertation takes in post-structuralism implies a certain structuralism: a priority of structure over agency. In political science, the latest serving of full-fat structuralism was the French version of Marxism struggling to allow for an independent role for political action in relation to ideological state apparatuses determined 'in the last instance' by the economy.
In Althusser the relation between structure and agent was described as the one-way relation of ideology interpellating a subject without any possibility of resistance (Mouffe 1997b[1980]:33; Butler 1997:24). This reduction of the subject to subject positions was continued in both what has later come to be taken as the early post-structuralism of the Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge and in the first formulations of the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe (1985:115; Žižek 1990a:250; cf. Laclau & Zac 1994:37). In such a structuralist perspective, change is hard to theorize meaningfully: Either change appear to be impossible. Or change appears as the result of the unfolding of a logic internal to structure à la the Hegelian teleological dialectics inherited by Marx (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:94f; cf. Schmandt 1965:359f; 375f). Finally, change may appear as purely inexplicable.\(^{36}\)

To allow for change in a structuralist theoretical framework is to allow for an acting subject: for political articulation to occur, there need to be 'something' doing the articulation (Clausen et al. 2002:26f). Or as Skinner puts the same point in relation to speech act theory: "if we wish to do justice to those moments when a convention is challenged or a commonplace effectively subverted, we cannot simply dispense with the category of the author." (Skinner 2002:117)

But how to avoid that this acting subject escapes structure and becomes a contrary, voluntary – and, hence, equally essential – principle; a total structure in its own right? Laclau's solution to the reduction of subjectivity to structural effect has been to reinstall a subject in the discursive structure – but to install it, notably, not as a substance with positive qualities but as a lack (Laclau & Zac 1994:31). The subject is, hereafter, in Laclau formally defined as the distance between the structure and the political decision made in undecidable terrain. The structure might be pointing out a

\(^{36}\) When Neumann compares the change of discourses in Foucauldian discourse analysis with the slow collision of tectonic plates (Neumann 2001:85), change is conceived of somewhere between the inexplicable and the unfolding of an inner logic.
space of probable decisions, but it does not determine the decision. Sedimentations and institutions may install inertia in discourse – and hence impede certain forms of articulations of identity to the benefit of other articulations of identity. But even if some structures are hugely sedimented, in combination they still overdetermine each identity and prevent its closure (Torfing 1999:303). The subject is, hence, the non-theorizable distance from the discursive structure to the actual act (Laclau 1990:30, 60).  

This mechanism is described in Lacanian terms: the lack of the subject seeks to be filled; the function of the subject is to hide that it exists only in and as the attempt to cover over its own fiction; that it exists only as specific, historical acts (Laclau & Zac 1994:32). Laclau & Zac writes that: "The ego has the function of misrecognizing the impossibility of ... the ego" (1994:31): The subject exists only in the identification with ever-changing objects, positions, identities.

The term 'identification' is, however, reserved exclusively for the psychological mechanism constituting the subject (1994:31f; cf. Frello 2003:n.31). The analytical effect of this reservation is that the only thing of interest is the very recurrence of

37 In Laclau & Zac (1994:12-15) the argument goes like this: Firstly, freedom needs a subject to use this freedom. Secondly; the subject cannot by itself determine what to use this freedom for – if it could decide for itself, it would imply that the subject had delimitations to freedom build into it, and then the subject would not be free. So the subject needs to seek its determination outside its freedom – but the objectivity in which the subject seeks its determination cannot be so objective that it determines; that would imply no freedom. The solution is, thirdly, that the very organisation of the decision is freedom; the objectivity sought to anchor the determination of the subject can only be the very possibility of a decision as such, as a principle. As the determination of the subject alters objectivity by its articulation, the freedom of the subject is not exempted. Hence, the organisation of the decision is neither objective nor is it subjective – it is the crystallization of the tension between objectivity and subjectivity which keeps freedom (and, hence, subjectivity) open. (Cf. Žižek 1990a:251; Butler 1997:129; Torfing 1999:150; Clausen et al. 2002:27.)

38 Cf. Žižek (1990a:254); (Butler 1997:50), (Torfing 1999:295n.4); (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999:55).
identification: At a theoretical level there is nothing consequential to be added concerning the specific instances of identification. And analytically, access to the psyche of the other remains either discursively mediated or speculative.

Butler presents a slightly different approach to the problem of the subject; an approach which allow the subject to be directed beyond its own constitution. This 'directedness' comes at a price; a price which, however, is worth paying: When re-introducing subjectivity in structure through Lacan's notion of identification, Laclau carefully made sure that no trace of structure was left in the space of subjectivity. Not so in Butler: To her, the subject is "an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who speak as the 'I'." (1997:25) When viewed from the perspective of structure, the subject capable of acting is constituted by structure (1997:16; 27): It is constituted by the speech acts which precede it. As in Ricœur, the subjects take up the characters narrated for them and continue the narration.

Viewed from the perspective of the subject the moment of the discursive act is influenced, however, not only by the past but also by the future (1997:25); by the expectations which other discursively constituted subjects may have towards the actions of the subject in question.

39 A different – more empirically based – way out of the impasse is represented by post-colonialism (cf. chapter 3, fn.79). The mechanisms theorized by post-colonialism are imperative to focus on when studying extreme situations of near-total objectification – but of less interest when studying the agency of more privileged subjectivities.

40 The situation is nicely summarized by Bakhtin: "Instead of the virginal fullness of an inexhaustible object, the prose writer is faced with a multiplicity of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness.... [T]he object is a condensation of heterological voices among which his own voice, without which his literary nuances would not be perceived, and without which they ‘do not sound’. ... The speaker seeks to orient his discourse, and even the horizon that has determined his discourse, in relation to the horizon of the other, the one who does the understanding" (Bakhtin quoted in Todorov 1984:72; cf. Bakhtin 1981:278ff).
complex game of self-presentation and recognition implies that radical autonomy is impossible. The subject is delimited by a constitutive outside; it needs to subject itself to a set of implicit and explicit norms delimiting what it may say, how it may act (1997:133). This process is repeatedly renewed by interpelling speech acts (1997:27). The subject, hence, is not the master of its own subject position; the speech of others is subjecting it discursively by expressing expectations. The subject is resurrected, but no longer sovereign (1997:139).

The performativity – the effectiveness – of an act is not determined by the intention of the speaker. The subject is, when intending to act, dependent on – and, hence, vulnerable to – the accept of the other (Butler 1997:26). In other words: The others embody the structure which constitutes the subject when it acts.

When theorizing agency, Butler builds on speech act theory as developed by Austin and Derrida. Before Austin, language was primarily discussed as referential: Words were seen to signify things and refer to 'actual' conditions. Austin in his intervention pointed to the fact that words do not only refer but also work; they do things (1975[1962]): Words, in a certain sense, create the 'actual' conditions, which they appear to signify. Hence, the label speech acts.

Austin laid out how one, when saying something, simultaneously perform a whole series of acts (1975:133, 146f):

- Basically a locutionary act is performed: one says something (1975:98).

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43 The similar and simultaneous move by Wittgenstein (1974 [1953]) seems to be made independently of Austin (Potter 2001). Austin noted that speech acts and (meaningful) acts without words seem to work in the same way (Austin 1975:121f); as a point of departure the dissertation does not distinguish between the two in theory.
Simultaneously, the speech act may have an *illocutionary* force; one performs an act "*in* saying something" (1975:948). Illocutionary acts spring from "a certain (conventional) force" (1975:108), which is to say that when the discursive background structures are combined with the rhetorical structure of the speech act a general agreement that 'something has happened' will occur.

Finally, an act may have a *perlocutionary* effect; one may "*by* saying something" trigger an effect in the audience (1975:109; 121). Contrary to illocutionary acts, "perlocutionary acts are not conventional" (1975:121). Even if it may be difficult to distinguish act from effect in practical analysis (1975:111), this is the exact distinction between illocution and perlocution.

Austin enumerates a number of felicity conditions for a speech act to work (Austin 1975:14f; Derrida 1988a; 1988b; Buzan et al. 1998:32f; Wæver 2003:14):

- How facilitating or impeding is the discursive structure to which the speech act refers?
- How facilitating or impeding is the general and specific position of the speaker?
- How perfectly is the rhetorical figure completed?

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44 Austin's conceptualization of the relation between convention and speech act immediately translates into the dissertation' conceptualization of discursive structure and discursive agency: For a speech act to have success a convention needs to exist for it to refer to – for discursive agency to be meaningful a discursive structure needs to exist for it to refer to.

45 To warn someone does not need to have a perlocutionary effect to be successful; the speech act is complete *in* the illocutionary act. To frighten someone, to the contrary, is only successful if a specific effect has been triggered in the audience *by* the perlocutionary act.

46 The declaration of a priest only *works* because the institution of marriage already exists.

47 It is only the declaration of the *priest* which institutes marriage.
In addition Austin mentions – in a separate, subjective category – two conditions relating to the intended and the actual following up on the speech act of the speaker: The speech act needs to be seriously intended (1975:9) in the sense that the speaker intend to behave according the speech act in the future (1975:10, 15) and – when the future arrives – he actually has to do so (1975:15; Potter & Wetherell 2001:200).

Derrida, however, does away with this fourth category of felicity conditions – relating to the intentions of the speaker – as he claims that the absence of not only the audience but also of (the intentionality of) the speaker does not necessarily have any bearing on neither the illocutionarity nor the perlocutionarity of the speech act (Derrida 1988a:8; 1988b:46).

Derrida then builds on this deconstruction of perfect intentionality to undermine the possibility of perfect felicity: Perfect felicity would have to build on a total description and total control of the context of the speech act. Total control of the context of the speech act includes total control of the intention and very consciousness of the speaker – which is, as we just saw, not possible (1988a:14).

The fact that intentionality is present (only) as something which is impossible to achieve in toto – something which is endlessly deferred – is what makes the distinction between the different speech acts possible: "this differential/defering [différentielle] structure of intentionality alone can enable us to account for the differentiation between 'locutionary', 'illocutionary' and 'perlocutionary' values of the 'same' marks or utterances." (Derrida 1988b:58) Specifically, the distinction between

48 The Danish police officer needs thrice and in the name of the King and the Law to have declared a demonstration to be dissolved before one may be legally sanctioned for proceeding.
illocution and perlocution is a conceptualization of the speaker's lack of control over context (Butler 1997:15, 93). For the purpose of reconstructing a space for agency in structure the central point is that if a speech act is seen as purely illocutionary, then no answer may derail it – answers may only seek to revert it. Contrarily, as the perlocutionary effect escapes the control of the speaker, a space opens up for an answer which may revise the effect. This space may be used to point out the responsibility of the original speaker for the construction of the position in which the audience is placed (Butler 1997:12). If there is a space for an answer, a word may be 'won over' and turned around through resignification; the loss of control opens the possibility of action (1997:14, 39). It opens not for the reinstallation of a sovereign subject, but it does open a space for agency in the discursive structure (1997:15). It creates a possibility for speech acts which were not authorized by discourse at the point of departure to take upon themselves authority by reconfiguring the discursive structure in which it will afterwards – after words – be understood (1997:145; 161). The possibility for resistance to discourse is established.

49 Which means that the three remaining of felicity conditions of Austin are only relative conditions of possibility. It is impossible to theoretically exclude the success of even the most weirdly performed attempt by the most marginal actor to articulate the (within a given discursive context) most exotic rhetorical construct. Or contrarily: it is impossible to theoretically exclude the failure of the most perfectly formatted articulation by the most discursively privileged actor of the discursively most obvious construction. The analyst will after analysing the discursive situation only be able to point out the cases as probable or improbable (cf. Derrida 1988a:15). This seem to be the reason why Buzan et al. (1998) prefers 'facilitating conditions' to 'felicity conditions' when developing speech act theory for the purpose of studying 'securitization' as a speech act.

50 Even if the purely illocutionary speech act is performed collectively by author and audience, an illocutionary effect still establishes a fait accompli as the point of departure for countermoves.

96
But it is important to note how what is established is a space for resistance – not a space entirely free for the subject:

Firstly, the structure is not producing a precisely delimited position for the subject – there is a room for subjective identification and resistance: Through discursive action the subject may seek to point out new or re-configured positions for itself or for others. The actor is never unambiguously determined in one subject position in relation to one regularity in the dispersion of utterances – since the social never coagulates into such one discursive structure (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:97ff).

In this situation the actor will necessarily be placed in repeated ideological dilemmas in which the actor – to endow the situation with cohesion and meaning – needs to choose between different repertoires of meaning (Edley 2001:202ff). Actors may avail themselves of discourses as interpretative repertoires (2001:197ff); as "available choreographies of interpretative moves ... from which specific moves may be selected to fit the context most efficiently." (Jørgensen & Philips 1999:124f)

So in the place pointed out by discourse for the subject there is a repertoire of structures available of which the subject may avail itself and choose from – and, hence, reduce the insecurity stemming from the reactions of others to its actions (Potter & Wetherell 2001[1998]; Edley 2001; Gad 2005:90ff):

First, discourse is manufactured out of pre-existing linguistic resources. That is, language and linguistic practices offer a sediment of systems of terms, narrative forms, metaphors and commonplaces from which a particular account can be assembled. Secondly such an assembly will involve choice or selection from possibilities. (Potter et al. 1990:207).

51 "en tilgængelig koreografi af fortolkningsbevægelser .. hvorfra bestemte bevægelser kan udvælges, så de mest effektivt passer ind i konteksten" (Jørgensen & Philips 1999:124f).
Secondly, even if the subject *does* articulate one of the interpretative repertoires which it finds at hand, such an articulation cannot be reduced to a structural effect since a re-iterated speech act does not take up the same place in the structure as the speech act it is quoting: The very re-iteration will change the context (Derrida 1988a:15f). The meaning and force of a speech act comes exactly from the way it is breaking with its conventional context and reinscribes itself in a new context (Butler 1997:145). In the words of Bourdieu there is a *social* magic in the speech act which cannot be reduced to anything else (Butler 1997:153; Buzan et al. 1998:46, n.5; cf. Bourdieu 1991:111, 119f, 125).

To sum up the dissertation's concept of subjectivity as it constructs a space for agency in structure: The space of the subject is not a sharply delimited or fixed position allowing the analyst to judge either determination or free will. The negotiation between structure and agency is an empirically open process (cf. Edley 2001:223f). On the one hand, discursive structure is not unequivocal; the room of manouevre is not sharply defined. The subject may – through discursive acts – seek to point out new or re-configured subject positions for itself or for others. On the other hand, even if identities are in this sense all the time articulated and re-articulated, they are never constructed entirely anew. To make sense, any attempt to re-construct identity need to refer to previous discourse in a meaningful way.

### 2.2.2 The complications of structuring to re-enable agency

Having thus established the place for a post-sovereign subject in discourse – a discursively constituted, discourse constituting subject – the question immediately arises: By what means and towards what goals does this subject act? The short answer is that the subject acts with and by the discursive structures by and in which it is constituted. Even if perfectly effective intentionality has been deconstructed, intentions are still there – only their effects are systematically doubtful or perverted.
A longer answer may specify the perversion by introducing three complications: Firstly, the double function of each individual act which should be meaningful in relation to both a specific narrative at hand and in relation to the more general narratives of the subject which acts. Secondly, that a speech act may simultaneously represent more than one subject – i.a. an individual, a political party, a nation state – each with their own identity narrative. Thirdly, the problems evolving from the way an act may be effective in relation to a specific narrative but have perverse effects on other more general narratives. In sum, this subsection finds that articulating the discursive double structure of identity – void and narrative – involves the complicated navigation between the Scylla of insisting on impossible, logical identity and the Charybdis of narrating identity away in stead of in place.

Firstly, the very effectiveness of an act is complicated by the double function of every act: Basically, the immediate goal of any speech act is to continue a specific narrative in a meaningful way: it needs to refer to what has just happened and what should now be done in some specific relation. But at the same time, the more general goal of the speech act is to continue a more general narrative of the subject in an equally meaningful way. The speaker needs to perform as a reasonably consistent individual: s/he needs to avoid *dislocations* (Laclau 1990:41ff; Torfing 1999:148) of the narratives s/he is giving voice, i.e. s/he needs to uphold the conditions of possibility of the regularity in dispersion of utterances so that her/his next utterances may be meaningful without s/he being inconsistent. Neumann notes that discursively constituted and, hence, short-of-sovereign subjects act “out of intensions to position themselves as well as possible taking into consideration who they find themselves to be and what they believe they should do given that they are who they are” (Neumann 2001:164)52 This includes the intentions to uphold any privileged position these

52 “ut fra intensjoner om å posisjonere seg best mulig i forhold til hvem de holder seg for å være og hva de mener de bør gjøre gitt at de er de de er” (Neumann 2001:164)
subjects may have come to occupy. Any such position – including the very position as a speaking subject – includes reference to a certain ideal of rationality and strategic goal orientation. So each speech act involves both a specific rational intervention relating to a specific aim – and a 'meta-rational' intervention relating to the upholding of the position as an acceptable, rational subject. Figure 2.7 illustrates how the articulation of an identity narrative includes promising to articulate consistent narratives of the same identity in the future.

Figure 2.7 The articulation of an identity narrative promises consistent future narratives

Secondly, a related complication is that a speech act may represent several subjects simultaneously: When a Danish minister speaks, her/his act must constitute a credible continuation of both the narrative of her/his individual subjectivity, and of the narrative of her/his party and the government coalition it is part of, as well as in many instances of the narrative of the Danish nation state. To produce rationality and continuity in so many subjectivities may demand a lot of discursive work – or it may in some cases appear attractive to say very little.

Thirdly, a further complication is that it is not always rational arguments that work to continue specific narratives. To the contrary irrational, ad hoc arguments may be the
ones that fly.\textsuperscript{53} The result of these complications in combination is that there might be a trade-off between the short term goal of continuing a specific narrative – and the long term goal of re-constituting oneself in the position of a rational subject. Whether this trade-off is a problem, depends very much on the specific situation in which the actor acts – especially on whether someone systematically and explicitly points out specific irrationalities as a problem for the general rationality of the subject in question.

Each of these three complications involves choices for the subject considering its next act. The problem is, firstly, that the choices are not innocent. As Butler puts it: “To move outside of the domain of speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject” (Butler 1997:133). Secondly, contexts evolve – not least since contexts include other subjects acting. Therefore the action of subjects always relates to the action of other subjects; there is no action outside interaction. The very concept of agency is social: it implies a plurality. If there was only one agent, that agent would equal a determining structure. As there is more than one agent and more than one structure, there is conflict and politics. And conflict and politics make context change.

When faced with change, articulating the discursive double structure of identity – impossibility and narrative – involves the complicated navigation between the Scylla of insisting on impossible, logical identity and the Charybdis of narrating identity away in stead of in place. On the one hand – Scylla – a first reaction to change could be to point it out as a threat to identity: They change – we have to answer to that change – the answer makes us change ourselves – then we are no longer identical with our selves – we must fight change to make the threat to our identity go away. In this process, logical identity is reified by being pointed out as threatened. But the

result is not the (impossible) preservation of logical identity; rather the result is increased insecurity (Wæver 1994). On the other hand – Charybdis – an attempt at narrating a continuation of identity may be so creative and dismiss so powerful stretches of sedimented structures that it does not receive the accept and support it needs to perform narrative identity (cf. Neumann 1999:212f ; Butler 1997:162). The result may be that future identity and agency is denied.

A third strategy when faced with change is to articulate the identity narrative with necessity – and thereby limit the space which is available for the other to co-narrate. Agency has to do with a will; a will to do something with and to a structure. Agency, in that sense, always has a direction. Structure, however, also has a direction; a will if you like: It harbours inertia. Structure facilitates some kinds of action and impedes other kinds. In that sense it directs agency. Articulation of identity – as a form of agency – means making a mark in structure, so that it structures in a different way. Identity – as a form of structure – is both the mark made and what the mark is made upon. Articulating an identity narrative with the necessity of sedimented structures is an attempt to direct the future action of both self and other. Articulating necessity to ones identity narrative is a way of securing ones own future agency.

Articulating necessity may be a way of trying to avoid conflict by removing some elements from negotiation. If the other does not accept the necessities it is presented with, however, non-negotiables will invite conflict rather than defuse conflict.

2.2.3 Identity as action inviting interaction

The preceding section investigated the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity as discursive agency. Firstly, it established a space for agency in structure by conceptualizing structures as limiting, enabling and incomplete. Secondly, it argued the need for – and the complexities involved in – agency articulating structures in ways that facilitate future agency.
In sum, a conceptualization of the articulation of identity as discursive agency was developed to add to the concept of identity configuration: The discursive structure of identity consists of a regularity in the dispersion of acts – the observable regularity being the form of an identity narrative. The discursive agency of articulating identity is conditioned (facilitated and impeded) by these discursive structures. The concept of identity as discursive articulation to be employed in this dissertation includes the rational, failed rational, as well as irrational aspects of the attempts by discursively constituted subjects at reconstituting and reproducing discursive structures. The means of articulating identity is the distribution of subjectivity by the constitution of new identities and by the ongoing narration of existing identity. Articulating an identity narrative with necessity is a way of attempting to delimit the space available for the other to co-narrate.

So the actions of subjects do not take place in a vacuum. They take place in the context of discursive structures. These structures include the discursive actions of other subjects. As the concept of identity as discursive structure was pregnant with agency, the concept of articulation of identity as discursive agency performed by a post-sovereign subject is pregnant with interaction, with politics. Therefore, section 2.3 develops a concept of identity politics as discursive interaction. Thereby the section completes the account of the relations which make up an identity configuration; the ontology which the dissertation observes in the analytical part.

2.3 Identity politics as discursive interaction: co-authorship and antagonism

So far this chapter has presented concepts of identity as discursive structure and of articulation of identity as discursive agency to match the two sides of the structure/agency dilemma: The dissertation observes identity as a discursive double structure – more specifically the structure of a void and the structure of a narrative.
And the dissertation observes articulation of identity as discursive action – more specifically as the attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity by continuing existing narratives and by beginning new ones. This subsection lays out how the dissertation observes identity politics as discursive interaction. More specifically identity politics is observed as the relations between the attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity.

To account for the political relation between identity and difference – between self and other – subsection 2.3.1 first argues the recurrence of the political and politics in the articulation of identity, while subsection 2.3.2 lays out how ambiguity and segmentation may divert the political.

Then subsection 2.3.3 proceeds to discuss the concept of conflict as a way of understanding a relation and introduces ‘policies for ending the relation’ as a criterion for radicalization of conflict. In that sense the criterion necessary to answer the main research question of the dissertation is provided. Subsection 2.3.4 considers how the state as an attempt to distinguish between internal and external identity politics makes radically different conditions for the conflicts coming out of relating identity to difference.

Finally subsection 2.3.5 sums up how identity politics as discursive interaction may take on a structural character. Hence, section 2.4 may in conclusion sum up the ontology which the dissertation observes as an identity configuration consisting of a) the constitutive and narrative relations between identity and difference; b) the forging of these relations by continued narration and by the constitution of new narratives; and c) the political relations between the narratives promoted by various identities.
2.3.1 The recurrence of the political and politics when identity is articulated

The proceeding section described how a discursively constituted subject will work to uphold its position by narrating the continuation of the narrative which covers up its impossibility. Given this imperative, the openness of the situation becomes a problem: If any articulation of identity is open to challenge by the next honourable speaker, the next honourable speaker needs to be narrated into place. Depending on what kind of place this other is awarded, very different dynamics may be set off. But no place precludes politics:

![Diagram](image_url)

Figure 2.8 Political relation between different narrative relations between self and other

When identity is conceptualised as discourse we cannot but open up identity to politics (Connolly 1991.ix, 65). As identity is a discursive phenomenon rather than an essence encoded somewhere once and for all, any articulation of identity is open to challenge by the next honourable speaker. In that sense, the relation between identity and difference is irrevocably political; it involves conflict over what the constitutive
and narrative relations between identity and difference should be. Figure 2.8 illustrates this political relation between the different narrative relations between self and other.

When faced with challenge to an articulation of identity, one option could be an attempt to silence the other by exclusion: by making the other dishonourable, irrelevant, or awarding the other no place to legitimately speak from within discourse. A different option could be to incorporate the other by accommodating and offering a more or less attractive position in the hegemonizing discourse. Correspondingly two ideal types of identity policies may occur: Firstly, an articulation of identity may be challenged by Them not accepting the exclusion or the exact position awarded. Secondly, an articulation of identity may be challenged from within by 'one of Us' deserting to challenge 'our' identity.

The means available for talking back to challenge the limits of the role awarded may radically differ for the ones initially excluded compared to the ones included, especially if the exclusion is sufficiently sedimented and institutionalized. In both cases the other may be awarded a role which allows for co-authorship to the

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54 Drawing on the distinction made by Poulantzas between 'le politique' and 'la politique' (Torfing 1999:76), 'the political' refers to "the dimension of antagonism ... constitutive to human societies" while 'politics' refers to "the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political." (Mouffe 2005:9).

55 These two options mirror the two basic forms of articulation in Laclau & Mouffe: the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Cf. subsection 2.1.3 and Laclau 1997:130ff; Laclau & Mouffe 1985:131ff; Torfing 1999:33, 126ff.

56 Of course in both cases the ideal types immediately implode: In the first case if the out-of-place other includes itself and the original, excluding subject in a comprehensive identity. In the second case as the deviant voice excludes itself by deviating – perhaps only to re-include the originally including subject in a differently configured identity articulated as par of the deviation.

57 The chapter will return to this point in section 2.3.4.
continued narrative upholding the identity. Such a policy for legitimizing the other as a co-author invites politics in the form of agonism: 'I agree to disagree (seriously) with you' (cf. Mouffe 2005:52). And in both cases neglect of the limits to agency inscribed in the role awarded to the other may turn agonistic co-authorship into an antagonistic relation: Actions outside what is legitimated by the script threatens to negate the identity which was to be upheld by the narrative. Such actions need to be stopped to uphold the identity.

The important thing to notice at this point, however, is that articulation of identity is a relation between a subject and other subjects, and not just a relation between a subject and an order (cf. Neumann 1999:208). This way of conceptualizing the relation makes the answer of the other much more flexible: a discursive structure produces utterances dispersed in regularity – a discursively constituted agent may produce irregular utterances when replying to articulations of identity.

One comparative advantage of Laclau & Mouffean discourse theory over Foucault's is – as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter – that it conceptualizes discourses not as a sequence of monoliths but as an everpresent struggle: within any given social space various discourses strive to achieve hegemony by expanding the reach of each their ordering principle. The recurring fight between these hegemonic projects around the institution of a specific ordering principle is simultaneously the moment of the political; i.e. the repeated undermining of order – and the moment of politics; i.e. the repeated attempts to institute hegemony.

58 'Any given social space' should probably read 'any given social space within the parameters of Modernity' – in so far as Modernity can be defined as the quest for order set off by the reflexivity putting an end to unproblematized Tradition.
2.3.2 The ambiguity and segmentation of identity diverting the political

When subjects – each articulating their own and others' identities – are brought into interaction, some element of conflict is likely: Identity politics is set off by conflicting articulations of identity. Conflict is, however, not a necessary outcome. Firstly, there is the possibility that everyone agrees on both the inclusions and exclusions which constitutes the identities involved, on the narrative distribution of subjectivities, and on the continuation of the narratives. It is not very likely, but it remains an extreme possibility at least temporarily. Secondly, there is the possibility that one of a number of disagreeing subjects succeeds in promoting its version to total hegemony. Again, post-structuralism tells us that there is always some residual trace of difference left on which a counter hegemonic project may coalesce.

Two further possibilities of how political conflict may be diverted deserve more attention as they each involve a break with the claims to universality implicit in Laclau & Mouffe's insistence of the inevitable recurrence of antagonisms: Firstly, articulations of identity which to the outside observer seem to be mutually exclusive – antagonistic – may co-exist if they are only articulated as relevant for sharply segmented situations of social interaction. If so, the interaction diverts from identity politics in the sense that logically conflicting articulations of identity may organize each their space without entering into social conflict. Secondly, articulations of identity may be so ambiguous that they may simultaneously be part of rather different narratives. If so, the interaction diverts – at least for a time – from identity politics in the sense that logically conflicting articulations of identity are co-organizing a space in a way which – for the time – allows the interaction to proceed without resembling conflict (at least over this specific articulation of identity).

The first of the two possibilities of diverting interaction from conflict – segmentation – was originally pointed out by Barth (1969) as part of his theory of ethnicity as the social organization of cultural difference. The core of the theory is that an identity
boundary – and hence, the identity delimited – is only upheld by being made relevant as a diacriticon for relevant behaviour (1969:15). An identity can only be observed in its being deemed relevant for social interaction in specific situations and contexts. When the diacriticon has no practical consequence, the identity it delimits does not exist.

What is important for the present purpose is a specific anti-essentialism articulated in the theoretical concept of ethnicity the social organization of cultural difference – and by extension: identity as the social organization of difference: The very relevance of

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59 Barth's was one of the first conceptualisations of ethnicity which warrants the label 'postmodern' (cf. Barth 1994). Contrary to existing anthropological knowledge at the time – which conceptualized ethnic groups as basically functionally closed cultural systems – Barth focused at the drawing of and the interaction across boundaries between ethnic groups and cultures by conceptualizing ethnicity as a way of socially organizing cultural difference (Verdery 1994:40-50; Vermeulen & Govers 1994:1; Neumann 1996a:142, 166; Eriksen 1993:37ff). Ethnicity is ascribed to individuals on the basis of presumed origin according to specific diacritica to which the actors in a specific situation ascribes meaning. The diacritica does not in themselves carry any meaning – meaning is ascribed by the actors in practice: "The features that are taken into account are not the sum of 'objective' differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant ... in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied ... The cultural features that signal the boundary may change" (1969:14; cf. 1969:38). Barth's new theoretical position lead him to radical formulations like this: "What is surprising is not the existence of some actors that fall between these categories [cultures]... but the fact that variations tend to cluster at all." (1969:29). Decades later, the conclusion in Anthropology seems to be, on the one hand, that identity and difference in cultural practice does not necessarily trigger ethnic identity and delimitation (Barth 1994:16; Eriksen 2002:4, 6) – but, on the other hand, cultural differences do cluster; the clusters do persist in practice over longer time spans; and thereby they do appear obvious to take as the point of departure for rather stable constructions of identity (Eriksen 2000:10, 13, 16; 2002a:4, 7ff; cf. Vermeulen & Govers 1994:1-4). Even if Barth (1994:179; cf. 1994:5) admits that "the selection of such diacritica is far less haphazard than I may have indicated in 1969", Neumann may still conclude that theoretically such an admission "does not of course ipso facto rule out any phenomena; anything may be inscribed with meaning as a politically relevant boundary marker." (Neumann 1999:6).

60 Nothing seems to hinder the generalization of the theory from ethnicity to collective identity in the abstract: Identity may then be defined as the social organization of difference; or in other words, the regularity in dispersion of social acts relating identity to difference.
an identity – and of a diacriticon which is presently important for the articulation of this identity as distinct from difference – may be limited to certain contexts. The way in which individuals – and groups – take part in a lot of more or less conflicting discursive universes do not necessarily amount to a smooth whole: What we have is not necessarily a harmonious combinatorics (Mørck 1998:80; Barth 1989:130).

When Barth points out that "ethnic categories provide an organizational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems" (1969:14) this is valid for both geographically and temporally distant and un-related socio-cultural systems but also for socio-cultural systems so geographically and temporally proximate that a group or an individual may shuttle back and forth between them in a single day.

In theory, an individual or a group may change identity by practicing differently in relation to the identity boundary (1969:21) – provided that the alternative practice and, by implication the alternative identity, is accepted (1969:25). The theoretical demand for accept, of course, is a severely limiting criterion. But if you are really able to uphold two separate lives, bigamy may be an option in a monogamist society. Or less dramatically: If you first attend a lecture in the mosque insisting on abstinence and then have a raki to accompany your coffee at the café – it need not be a problem, unless the imam doubles as the waiter; i.e. if any social authority – whether embodied in others or in your mind – in effect covers both situations.

When trying to escape the social authorities upholding identity, it does make a difference where they are based: If the social authority is embodied in a physical other, you need to escape his gaze. If you have internalized the social authority, you need to live with diverting from the straight path. Here again, it makes a difference how the social authority insisting on identity is internalized: If it is internalized as part of your socialization, you may still negotiate with your internalized authority. If it the authority demanding identity is a biologically installed essentialism, it is
difficult to imagine how it may be escaped.\footnote{I refer here to the essentialism inherent in Lacan's description of the mirror stage. Lacan's contribution here is a rendition of how the structure of identity is biologically determined; how the mirror phase of early childhood invokes a lack; a sense of alienation that turns out to be \textit{foundational} to the recurring, ever-failing attempts to \textit{articulate identity} and, hence, fill the lack. Lacan describes how he was led to "recognize in the spatial captation manifested in the mirror-stage, even before the social dialectic, the effect in man of an organic insufficiency in his natural reality ... In man ... this relation to nature is altered by a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal months. The objective notion of the anatomical incompleteness of the pyramidal system and likewise the presence of certain humoral residues of the maternal organism confirm the view I have formulated as the fact of a real \textit{specific prematurity of birth} in man. ... This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the individual into history. The \textit{mirror stage} is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image to a form of its totality ... and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development." (Lacan 1977:4, italics in original). In the Lacanian mirror stage, the difference that makes a difference is actually not difference – it is the reflection of itself which the infant meets in the mirror. In that sense all difference is subsumed by identity (Gingrich 2004:10f) – and even if identity as the desire for identity is an empty identity, it is a biologically installed essence. One may with Neumann ask "whether scholarship which sets out to be anti-foundational, but nonetheless puts so much store in an arguably foundational category of desire ... can still be considered to be anti-foundational." (1998:14). Recent work within the Laclauian tradition generalizes the central role of the lack under the label "fantasmatic logics [which] contribute to our understanding of the resistance to change of social practices (the 'inertia' of social practices), but also the speed and direction of change when it does happen (the 'vector' of political practices)" (Glynos & Howarth 2007:145). A need for coherence need not be implanted in the biological constitution of each individual. As Neumann emphatically puts it: "I do \textit{not} share this view that humans 'need' a narrative of self for ontological reasons. My argument is only that given the state of discourse as it stands in Europe today ... for the time being, this seems to be a consequence of how discourse is formatted." (Neumann 1999:222, n.9). Given the present discursive constellations, there is no need for a biological essentialism to explain the need to appear consistent. In that sense the proclamations of Post-Modernity have not succeeded to move us beyond Modernity so far. Even if Shepherdson seems to disagree by effectively establishing a gradual transition from an early (essentialist) Lacan to a late (non-essentialist) (Shepherdson 2009), the motor of the perpetual motion of identification is in Lacan an essence universally inserted in human bodies – and not 'just', as}
discourse – i.e. at the level of intersubjective interaction – leaves a greater room for ambiguity.

This takes us to the second of the two possibilities of diverting interaction from conflict: Ambiguities may be permanent and functional for discourse (Frello 2003:99ff). As Hajer puts it:

Very often it is assumed that the meaning that the receiver 'reads' in a message is the same as the sender intended to put into the message. This assumption of mutual understanding is false. ... people talk at cross-purpose ... This is a fact of life, but, interestingly, this can be very functional for creating a political coalition in the form of a hegemonic discourse (2006:69).

In Laclau & Mouffe a number of discursive constellations may be thought as each attempting to articulate an element. But each thing, event, object, subject or utterance is – on the premises of the theoretical apparatus of Laclau & Mouffe – either articulated to discourse as a moment, or it is not (wherefore it maintains the status of an element). The distinction between ambiguity and unambiguity, between unequivocality and equivocality is – when viewed from the perspective of the discourse – a digital one: either a moment is unequivocally articulated or it is not articulated and, hence, ambiguous.62

in Derrida, an essence inserted in the Western philosophical project which culminates in Modernity. When Derrida employs the Freudian concept of 'desire', it is used as "a model ... in order to clarify" (2001:443, n.1) the structure of (Western) thought rather than as an explanation of cause and effect: as, e.g., when Derrida writes that "as always coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire. The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play ... constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. And on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered" (2001:352).

62 The theory of Laclau & Mouffe does include the concept of 'floating signifiers' – at a prominent place, even – denoting elements whose signification and fixation is the object of struggle between opposing discourses. But in Laclau & Mouffe the struggle which makes the signifier floating demands that the content of the signifier is fixed as far as each of the
Theoretically it is important to open up for the possibility that discourses struggle to 'monopolize' an element without fixating it substantially – and even that such a monopolization-as-ambiguous rather than fixed may be functional for the hegemonizing discourse (Frello 2003:99ff; Gad 2005:58ff).63

So even if conflict between articulations of identity – i.e. identity politics – is an ever present possibility, it is not a necessity. Apart from the extreme situation of total hegemony, conflicting articulations of identity may be spatially or temporally segmented – or they may be sufficiently ambiguously articulated – in ways that divert identity politics.

2.3.3 Conflict as a relation – radicalization as aiming to end the relation

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the ontological point of departure for this dissertation is that there is difference. Therefore there are differences. And therefore there is conflict. Subsection 2.3.1 explained the recurrence of the political and, hence, of politics whenever identity is articulated. In that sense, the relation between identity and difference is irrevocably political; it involves conflict over what the constitutive and narrative relations between identity and difference should be. Even if specific conflicts may (as discussed in subsection 2.3.2) be diverted, "conflict conceived of as

struggling discourses concerns (Frello 2003:82). The thrust of Laclau & Mouffe's theory is that discourses strive towards hegemony – just as the subject as a lack strives towards articulating identity by identifying. For a theory of hegemonization – as Laclau & Mouffe's – the theoretically important distinction is the one between fixation and floating, not the one between floating and appearing at random. There is no room for ambiguous articulation to discourse – without, that is, the ambiguity becoming an existential threat to the discourse (Frello 2003:73f; Gad 2005:58ff).

63 The same point is implicit in the consequence McQuillan draws of deconstruction for narrative theory: "For a narrative-mark to be able 'to tell' anything at all it must be able to tell different, or even contradictory, 'stories' when it is part of another context." (McQuillan 2000b:11).
incompatibility will not be eliminated, and … it cannot be eliminated" (Galtung 1978:491).

The aim of this subsection is to add to the picture of an identity configuration by specifying this political relation between identity and difference. As the definition of an identity configuration is 'the relations between relations', the two following subsections complete the picture by specifying the relations between, on the one hand, the political relation and, on the other hand, the constitutive and narrative relations between identity and difference.

This subsection specifies the political relation between identity and difference by translating Galtung's model of a conflict triangle into the epistemological and ontological framework of the dissertation. Reworked, Galtung's model of conflict may contribute to the delimitation of 'agonistic' policies for relating to the other from 'antagonistic' policies. Thereby the subsection provides a criterion necessary to observe 'radicalization' of conflict.

Galtung distinguishes between three corners in a conflict triangle to facilitate analysis of "patterns of mutual reinforcement or escalation in conflicts" (1978:487) and find "cues to how conflict can be managed" (1978:489). The three corners are:

- C) 'conflict' as such, formally defined as "incompatibility between goal states, or values held by actors in a social structure" (1978:486; all italics in original);
- A) 'conflict attitudes' and

The triangle is reproduced in figure 2.9 The point is that each of the three may lead to the other – and that an "escalating spiral" may ensue, when conflicting behaviour based on conflictual attitudes (or vice versa) to the 'original' incompatibility lead to new incompatibilities distinct from the 'original' one (1978:487-8).

The distinction allows Galtung to relieve the conflict as such (incompatibility) of both negative normative judgment and strategic salience:
One may say that incompatibility is something abstract, although it is concrete in the sense of leading to frustration, and that attitude may be destructive, but it is not too dangerous (to the extent that it can be contained within the system). But that destructive behavior can be brought out into the open and leads to, potentially, the most disastrous consequences. (Galtung 1978:488).

So incompatibility is neither good nor bad – it is a necessary condition. Accept of conflict understood as incompatibility, however, "does not mean that one has to accept negative, destructive conflict attitudes and behaviour" (1978:490). What may be good or bad in effect are attitudes and behaviour.

![Figure 2.9 Galting's conflict triangle](image)

As the consequences of the triangle of conflict, attitudes and behaviour is potentially disastrous,

it is obvious that something has to be done about conflict and there is no social system in the world that does not try to do something. In general we shall refer to all such efforts as conflict management. (Galtung 1978:488).
Two types of management have different ambitions: "conflict control" aims at controlling attitudes and behaviour – while "conflict resolution" aims at "resolving the incompatibility underlying the conflict, or defining the conflict" (1978:489).

Taking his point of departure in the distinction between conflict control and conflict resolution, Galtung issues a double warning. Initially, he observes "in our culture, and perhaps in most cultures" (1978:484) a widespread agreement that "conflict is bad. … Conflicts are there to be done away with" (1978:484f; italics in original). Because of this agreement, Galtung warns, firstly, that there is generally too much focus on conflict resolution compared to conflict control; and secondly, that the means of conflict resolution chosen are often the most destructive:

One way [of doing away with conflict] is to do away with the antagonist … The more vulgar method is to eliminate him physically, for instance by defining him as inferior, sub-human, as a threat to the social order, as a class enemy, etc., so that he can be segregated away, isolated or even exterminated. Then there is the more refined 'democratic' way: by permitting him to organize himself … but at the same time relegating him to a constant minority position so that he is eliminated culturally by being outvoted. (1978:485).

Two less immediately destructive versions of conflict resolution, however, "do not presuppose any kind of elimination of the antagonist" (1978:485): systems of conflict resolution and dissolution of conflicts. In the first version, "the antagonist is worked into a system of conflict resolution" (1978:485). The second version consists in the possibility of "dissolving conflicts" which "is often done by means of a complete restructuring of the situation." (1978:503)

As a final option remains "a positive view of conflict" implying that one should see the "incompatibility of goal states as a tremendous challenge both intellectually and emotionally" rather than something to be done away with (1978:490). The challenge
would consist in separating the conflict as such from destructive attitudes and behaviour.

If the relation is conflictual, yet accepted as not necessarily in need of termination, we may speak of it as an agonistic relation:

Conflict, in order to be accepted as legitimate, needs to take a form that does not destroy the political association. This means that some kind of common bond must exist between the parties in conflict, so that they will not treat their opponents as enemies to be eradicated, seeing their demands as illegitimate … If we want to acknowledge on one side the permanence of the antagonistic dimension of the conflict, while on the other side allowing for the possibility of its 'taming', we need to envisage … the type of relation which I have proposed to call 'agonism'. (Mouffe 2005:20)

Galtung's ontology need, however, to be revisited critically to make it compatible with the dissertation: Firstly, the behavioralist/psychologist metaphorics needs to be translated into the dissertation's focus on discourse. In consequence, the sharp division between conflict control and conflict resolution need to be relaxed to fit the focus of the dissertation on policy narratives projecting futures.

64 Galtung's early writings have been characterized as 'psychologically reductionist behaviorism' (Jenkins qtd. in Lawler 1995:110n.8). The paper discussed here originally dates from 1968.

65 To prepare the formal grounds for the translation, a relational concept of identity needs to be teased out of Galtung's social constructivism: On the one hand, the concept of identity implied in Galtung's concept of conflict is not relational; self and other are two self-sufficient entities each constituted in their own right before entering into the relation. Each might be bothered by the other; each might be dependent on the other. But the identities are not defined by the relation. On the other hand, however, it is clear that in Galtung each identity – self and other – may change, evolve, learn from the conflict. In that sense, the identity entering into the relation is not identical with the identity coming out of the other end of the relation. The identity is changed by the relation whether the process has been one of protracted or escalating conflict, one of elimination, one of domestication through systems of conflict resolution, or one of dissolution via restructuring: if the process changes
Concerning the translation of the ABC-triangle into the ontology of the dissertation: Firstly, the basic idea of 'conflict' as 'incompatibility between goal states' makes sense as a prognosis of future identity political interaction: two narratives advocating incompatible future self/other relations equal conflict. Conflict concerns preferred futures and futures to be avoided. Or in the vocabulary developed in subsection 2.1.4: conflict is a situation in which the oughtology of the self equals an oughtnotology of the other and vice versa. Conflict is the two mutually cancelling futures made present – in analysis or in the narratives analysed. This situation is illustrated in figure 2.10: The oughtology of one actor is to be cancelled by the oughtnotology of another actor.

Secondly, 'attitudes' has too psychological connotations. But its place in the triangle may be taken by 'policies for the self/other relation' as part of the discursive structure of identity: As a structure, policy has the same connotations of latent directedness as attitude; a policy – like an attitude – is something waiting to be realized. But as discursive structure rather than mental structure it exists only in its articulation; it is in a sense less latent – it only exists as it is articulated. Thirdly, 'behavior' translates to the discursive agency of articulating identity: the 'articulation of a policy' takes the place of 'acting out an attitude' (1978:488). In that way the positive choice of an actor to articulate a discursive structure takes the place of a relief from controlling a compulsive urge.

The alternative incompatibility mentioned by Galtung as part of his definition of conflict – that of 'values' – may be subsumed under the incompatibility of 'goal states' since it is only in the attempt at realization of the values that they conflict; and such a realization may credibly be conceptualized as a 'goal state'.

In chapter 3 the dissertation returns to what differences it may make if parties to the conflict are aware of the conflict.
Concerning the sharp distinction between conflict control (i.e. controlling attitude and behaviour) and conflict resolution (i.e. resolving or dissolving incompatibility): What Galtung describes as 'ways' of 'doing away with conflict' – whether by 'doing away with the other' or by 'restructuring the situation' – are clearly policies for future self/other relations. The brutal end of the spectrum leaves no place for a future agency of the other – contrarily the benign end of the spectrum includes a future role for the other. In the framework of the dissertation, however, the incompatibility only comes with policies for future interaction: Conflict is the incompatibility of futures – and these futures are only known by being projected in the form of policy narratives. Furthermore, the narratives and policies which constitute the incompatibility only do so by being articulated; in instances of agency. What is in Galtung's language labelled 'attitudes' may for the dissertation only be observed in 'behavior'.

When incompatibility only comes with the combination of policies which only exist in their articulation, conflict control and conflict resolution cannot be sharply distinguished. Galtung can only distinguish by reverting attitudes to the mental systems, behaviour to social systems, and conflict to the philosophical system of logics. In the ontology of the dissertation, the articulation of identity (as discursive
agency), the policies (as discursive structure), and conflict (as discursive interaction of policies) appear analytically from the same material only approached with different analytical lenses. In Galtung's optics the three corners of the triangle ought to be separated analytically and in practice. In the optics of the dissertation, they cannot.

Figure 2.11 sums up the translated ABC-triangle which should serve as a model for the analysis of feed backs between the three corners: Conflict defined as narratives projecting incompatible future self/other relations. Policies for self/other relations as structures of identity discourse. The articulation of policies as discursive agency.

![Relational conflict triangle](image)

**Figure 2.11 Relational conflict triangle**
Galtung's incompatibility specified as incompatible future self/other relations; attitude replaced by policy for future self/other relations; behavior replaced by articulation of policies. Triangle doubled to stress relationality.

Galtung's conflict triangle helps – in the reworked version – specifying how the relation between self and other is political: The relation between self and other – constituted as distinct and each narratively endowed with a capacity for co-authorship of the continuation of the narrative – is political as they project incompatible futures for the relations as part of their policy narratives.
Furthermore, the revised definition of conflict may help specify when a political relation is agonistic rather than antagonistic. For a relation to be agonistic means that the relation is accepted as a political association: This is to say that the relation, on the one hand, is political in the sense that self and other are related by projecting incompatible futures for the relation. But on the other hand, that the relation is simultaneously an association; something common with some sort of common purpose (even if only the purpose of managing itself as a relation). Radicalization of a conflict may, then, be specified as the articulation of a policy projecting a future without the relation. De-radicalization, contrarily, is the articulation of accept of the existence of the conflictual relation as not necessarily in need of termination. Chapter 3 develops this distinction through the juxtaposition of grammatical and anti-grammatical policies for future self/other relations.

2.3.4 Internal and external identity politics: The nation state

Before proceeding to explore the possible dynamic relations in the form of spill overs and feed backs between the three corners of the reworked conflict triangle – identity politics, identity as structure, identity as agency – the chapter needs to specify the units acceptable as self and other. The discussion takes as its point of departure the concept of unit implied in Galtung's distinction between intra- and interactor conflicts – and arrives at a specification of the difference the state makes as an attempt to delimit internal identity politics from external identity politics.

Galtung's distinguished (1978:486f) between intra-actor conflicts (hinging on the making of a choice to end a dilemma involving the realization of two incompatible values) and inter-actor conflicts (hinging on the control or resolution of an incompatibility of goal states). When analysing conflicts as involving questions of identity, the formulation of this distinction is, however, obfuscating.

The obfuscation is tied to the last part of the definition of conflict, which was not explicitly discussed in subsection 2.3.3: Conflict, in Galtung’s definition, is
"incompatibility between goal states, or values held by actors in a social structure" (1978:486; all italics in original). It is, however, not just so that "the conflict ... reproduces conflictual social identities" (Wæver 2009:5 representing Galtung). Most conflicts are (also) conflicts over which identities should be in conflict.

To the dissertation, the relevant social structure in which the actors are situated is the relation between self and other. As discussed (in section 2.1) the other not only constitutes identity by being excluded as different; they also co-star the narratives explaining the relation between identity and difference. And – more pertinently – as co-stars they are endowed with a capability of agency: They co-narrate the story. This means that self and other constitute the social system of the relation which is the conflict – and simultaneously constitute themselves as identities in that relation. Conceived in this way there is a theoretical place for conflict over who gets to be an actor in the social system; i.e. an actor in the conflict.68

As Galtung – writing in the heyday of the naturalized nation state (the 1978 paper originates in 1968) – moves from definition to prognosis, he sees this problematique – the conflict over who gets to be in conflict – as a "dislocation of classical loyalty patterns". This dislocation occurs as the nation state with its "clear lines of identification" must co-exist with various types of non-national identifications (i.a. the ones following migration) (1978:492). Galtung foresees that the co-existence types of identifications will lead to "less clear ways of structuring large-scale

68 In that sense the dissertation proposes as its analytical grasp on conflict what Galtung proposes as a normative approach when he advocates as part of a 'positive view of conflict' that "far from separating two parties, a conflict should unite them, precisely because they have their incompatibility in common. The incompatibility should be seen as a visible or invisible bond tying them together, coupling them to each other because their fates are coupled." (Galtung 1978:490).
conflicts" (1978:492-3). Galtung probably overstates the historical success of the nation state in actually monopolizing identification – but he is precise in his pointing to the conflict potential in a claim to monopoly on legitimate identification that does not succeed (whether it ever did or not). It is, nevertheless, fair to say that empirically the nation state has been a relatively successful attempt at such a fixation.

The nation state's tendential monopoly of identification appears most full blown when observed a) in Europe and b) from the 'outside' perspective of the international state system: "In some periods one type of political unit dominated, at others different kinds coexisted [but f]or a time (the seventeenth to twentieth centuries), politics converged on the sovereign 'nation state' as the form" (Buzan et al. 1998:143). In this 'high modernity' of the nation states, "the principle of identity ... was pursued within states. International politics became the ... realm of difference itself." (Walker 1993 qtd. by Neumann 1999:223) In these conditions "The passage from difference to identity as marked by the rite of citizenship is concerned with the elimination of that which is alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state." (Campbell 1992:36) In the event of new actors making their way into conflict, in each realm it was clear who were the relevant actors to be in conflict with; and it was clear that it was the members of this "circle of recognition" one should engage to fight ones way into the circle (Ringmar 1996:164f; cf. Neumann 1999:223).

Also from the inside, however, nation states present themselves as the obvious distinction between internal and external identity politics: One of the most significant political effects of the widespread perception of the foundational character of political communities construed as national is the tendency to imbue the nation-states built

69 It is these conflicts over the relevance of identities which Smith studies as conflicts between narratives of political peoplehood (2003:19-22) and which Sonnichsen conceptualizes as hegemonic struggles between discourses of 'primary political community' (2009).
upon them with high degrees of seemingly obvious legitimacy. Nation-states (as institutions) are experienced as infrastructures representing the organic social base existing before them and built to express them. This gives the nation-state the task of articulating the identity and interests of the nation including the task of safeguarding its sovereignty as a condition for its autonomous development. In this way the nation (as social base) and the nation-state (as institution) have – especially in Europe – become cognitively inseparable (Sonnichsen & Gad 2008:8).

Bech Dyrberg & Torfing argues that

The special quality of political institutions is that they operate on the basis of the necessary fiction of society as a totality, and that it is towards this imaginary totality which political strategies aim when striving to speak 'in the name of society' (1995:123 paraphrasing Easton 1965:54; trl. by upg).

Hence, national political institutions – in the Eastonian sense: a functionally differentiated subsystem of society responsible for the authoritative allocation of value – produces a set of discursively privileged positions which may be utilized in hegemonic struggles (1995:127f).

The nation state as a discursive structure produces, first and basically, privileged positions for the included to participate in identity politics from, and – corresponding – relatively de-privileged positions for the excluded to participate in identity politics from. Secondly, the nation state as a discursive structure points out – within its already privileged inside – a privileged text producing centre.70

70 The analytical implications of both these stratifications in relation to the focus of the dissertation are discussed in chapter 4.
2.3.5 Identity configuration: identity politics as interaction generating structure

Section 2.1 presented a constitutive and a narrative relation between self and other. Section 2.2 described how these relations are articulated by identities narratively endowed with agency. This section has specified the relations between the constitutive and narrative relations as they are articulated by different identities. In this sense identity politics is observed as the relations between the attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity.

Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 found that these relations were political – yet politics could be diverted by segmentation and ambiguity. Subsection 2.3.3 defined radicalization of a conflictual relation as marked by the articulation of a policy projecting a future without the relation; without the other. De-radicalization, contrarily, was defined as the articulation of accept of the existence of the conflictual relation as not necessarily in need of termination. Subsection 2.3.4 found the nation state to be a historically important attempt to distinguish between internal and external identity politics which produces privileged – and de-privileged – positions for relating identity to difference.

On the one hand, identity politics is process: Conceptualizing the articulation of identity in the context of interaction between subjects rather than as a relation between a subject and an order makes for flexibility in the answer of the other to the articulations of identity attempted by the subject. The flexibility, of course, is mirrored in the retort of the subject to the response of the other. When combining, the flexibility of the subjects makes for distinct dynamics of interaction – i.e. dynamics of identity politics.

On the other hand, these processes may acquire their own 'static' structural character: The processes may become structures in the sense that they may 'lock' the interacting actors in a repeated pattern of action. Furthermore these structures of interaction may
take on a recognizable direction. The structures of interaction may be structured as a radicalization of conflict or as a de-radicalization: As discursive structure is nothing but the regularity in dispersion of acts, interactional dynamics feed back into the constitutive and narrative structures of identity. In that sense, one may observe "the conflict as self-reproducing social pattern…. how the conflict sustains itself ... how the conflict has become a ‘form of life’." (Wæver 2009:5 paraphrasing Galtung)

**Figure 2.12 Feed backs from identity politics to identity narratives and articulations of identity**

Figure 2.12 illustrates how identity politics consist in the ‘spill overs’ from the articulation of identity and the structures of identity articulated – and, conversely, how identity politics may feed back to the articulation of identity and the structures of identity articulated. It is these spill overs and feed backs – these relations between relations between self and other – which the dissertation observes as identity configurations. The task of chapter 3 is to present a theoretical account of how the

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71 Buzan et al. (1998) introduces the concept of 'constellation of securitizations' inspired by Elias’ concept of configurations (or rather ‘figurations’): “The networks of interdependencies among human beings is what binds them together. Such interdependencies are the nexus of what is here called the figuration, a structure of mutually
identity configuration may be structured – i.e. how these spill overs and feed backs may contribute – to contribute to radicalization of conflict.

2.4 The triple function of the other in identity politics: constitutive outside, character of the cast and counterpart

This chapter has laid out the ontology which the dissertation observes. It did so by developing concepts of identity as discursive structure, articulation of identity as discursive agency, and identity politics as discursive interaction and relating these three concepts to form an identity configuration. An identity configuration includes the relations between the three ways in which identity is related to others: a constitutive relation, a policy relation, and a political relation:

Firstly, the difference of the other is constitutive to identity: If there was no exclusion of difference, identity would be meaningless as a concept. The difference of the other serves as the constitutive outside of identity. By being excluded yet necessary for identity to be, the other threatens to reveal the contingency of identity. So an identity configuration involves a constitutive relation between self and other.

Secondly, the identity and the exclusion need to be explained and protected – and the explanations have a narrative form. You cannot tell stories about who you are yourself only; you need a cast of characters to play each their assigned role. Therefore the other – or rather; various others – will be asked to take up positions or orientated and dependent people. Since people are more or less dependent on each other ... they exist ... only as pluralities, only in figurations.” (2000[1968]:481-2). Buzan et al. describes how “it is not the units themselves in a static way that make up the whole; it is the way their movements, actions, and policies relate to each other that forms a truly political pattern at the level of relations of relations” (1998:191, n.3); i.e. the constellation is found at the level of interactions of interactions.
roles in the narrative attempts to uphold identity. So on top of the constitutive relation, an identity configuration involves a narrative relation between self and other.

Thirdly, these varying others pointed out to co-star the identity stories will be narratively endowed with varying capacities to co-author or negotiate the continuation of the constitutive narratives: If you allow the other agency, you loose control. And you inevitably do, as even mis-recognition may serve as a platform for agency. The co-authoring other turns into a counterpart in conflict if the policy which it narrates points to a future mutually exclusive with the one you envision. So an identity configuration involves a political relation between self and other.

In that sense, identity is a discursive structure that in itself carries the constitution of an other – not only structurally undermining the security of identity by presenting an alternative – but also engaging actively with the identity by influencing the continuation of the narrative. Any invocation of identity runs the risk of the sorcerer's apprentice: You delimit your identity – and thereby delimit an other into being. You tell the story of how this delimitation of identity is – and in the cast of that story the other is awarded a role. To get the story going, you need the other to act according to the script – and thereby you award the other an agency which may be used as a platform for talking back and change the story.

The political relation between self and other may be agonistic if it accepts that these incompatible futures need to co-exist. But the conflict may radicalize into an antagonistic relation if a narrative concludes with a need to terminate the relation to secure the preferred future. Chapter 3 accounts theoretically for how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. More specifically, it accounts, firstly, for how three ‘grammars’ for future interaction between self and other may combine to delimit agonistic policy narratives from antagonistic ones; secondly, for how narratives may be articulated with necessity; thirdly, various policy narratives serve as radically different invitations to the other to
partake in the continued narration of the relation; and finally, how some of these policy narratives are more prone than others to be provoked by counter-narratives fed back to them.
Chapter 2 established the overall ontology of the dissertation as it described how an identity configuration involves three relations between identity and the difference of the other: A constitutive relation excluded the difference of the other from the identity of the self. A narrative relation explained the difference of the other into place – and, in the course of this narration, invited the other to take up a role in the narrative. Finally, a political relation engaged the other – narratively endowed with a capability for agency – in the narration of the continuation of the narrative of the relation between self and other. This political relation, chapter 2 argued, is necessarily conflictual. The conflict may, however, radicalize into an antagonistic relation if the narrative promoted concludes with a need to terminate the relation to secure the preferred future.

The task for this chapter is to theoretically account for what the dissertation may analytically find when observing the world of relations and dynamics established (in chapter 2) with a view to cast light on the possible contributions to radicalization. More specifically, the chapter asks:

B. What structures, articulations and dynamics in an identity configuration contribute to a radicalization of conflict?

The chapter answers this question by developing a theoretical account of how the structures and articulations of specific policies for how to relate to the other – and the relations between these structures and articulations – may contribute to a radicalization of conflict between self and other. This entails revisiting the elements of the ontology laid out in chapter 2 focusing on the elements which may be structured to contribute to radicalization.
Section 3.1 tends to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from identity as a discursive structure – more specifically, to the discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative. It asks:

i. *How may a self/other policy narrative be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict?*

The section develops a typology of self/other policies on the basis of three basic 'grammars' of identity/alterity. The grammars are basic ways in which one may relate self and other: a first grammar consists in distinguishing self from other; a second grammar consists in acting on behalf of the other; while a third grammar consists in producing knowledge of the self/other relation. In combination, the three grammars delimit a realm of policies which allow future interaction between two distinct entities – and three distinct ways in which the future envisioned may *not* include a relation between self and other. Furthermore, the section recollects how self/other policy narratives may be legitimized and necessitated by relating self and other along parameters of spatiality, temporality and intentionality.

Section 3.2 tends to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the articulation of identity by asking:

ii. *How may identity be articulated to necessity to contribute to radicalization of conflict?*

More specifically, the section discusses how necessity may be installed in self/other narratives either by the articulation of certain temporalities or by the articulation of sedimented structures including materiality.

Section 3.3 tends to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from irreducibly interactional dynamics. It does so by asking:

iii. *How may dynamics in identity politics be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict?*
More specifically, the section explains how different self/other policy narratives may serve as radically different invitations to the other to partake in the continued narration of the relation. Special attention is given, firstly, to how self/other policies may interpellate grammatically or anti-grammatically; and secondly, to how narratives may be told in a way which make them particularly sensitive to counter-narratives feeding back. In both cases, the result may be radicalized conflict.

Section 3.4 recapitulates the theoretical account of what structures should be kept in focus when setting out to analyse what may lead to radicalization of conflict. Chapter 4 accounts for the specific analytical choices, strategies and tools employed in the analysis of Danish debates on Muslims.

3.1 **Structures of identity radicalizing conflict: Self/other policy narratives as grammars for interaction**

Chapter 2 discussed the specific structure of temporality in a policy narrative. On the one hand, the discussion found that a policy narrative articulated a past as pointing to a present and a future. On the other hand, a policy narrative explicitly includes a choice between a plurality of futures. The conclusion was that analysis of policy narratives must focus on the present articulation of the past and the future and thereby open up for more futures. This section combines the discursive structure of a policy narrative with the discursive structure of a self/other relation – resulting in a discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative. To contribute to the theoretical account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict, the section may then ask

i. *How may a self/other policy narrative be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict?*

When aiming to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative, the structure of the relation
between self and other needs to be conceptualized to serve this aim. This entails that even when developing the concept of narrative as part of the concept of identity as discursive structure, the individual utterance of a narrative should not only be observed as a structural snapshot. The snapshot needs to be focused in a way which facilitates an analysis of how the structure works as an invitation to the other to take part in the ongoing co-narration. This means that the place of the other needs to be in focus: The relation between self and other needs to be central to the analysis and the other needs analytically to be awarded not just a position in a web of identities but a role – including agency – in a cast of characters co-narrating the story.

Subsection 3.1.1 discusses the structure of the self/other relations at heart of the debates to be analysed. The subsection reviews conceptualizations of self/other relations in IR theory, and finds the conceptualization of the self/other relation lacking with regard to the political relation between self and other. Therefore subsection 3.1.2 suggests – following inspiration from philosophically inclined Anthropology – to reorganize these conceptualizations in terms of ‘structural grammars’ for the future interaction between self and other. As a structure, a grammar invites the other to participate in a specific form of interaction; it invites the other to act in a specific way.

Subsection 3.1.3 discusses how certain futures do not involve the other in a relation. The discussion relates Baumann & Gingrich’s counter-concept of ’genocidal anti-grammar’ to the concepts of securitization and violisation (both introduced in IR). Subsection 3.1.4 analyses how three basic grammars identified in Anthropology combine to form specific policies, each issuing different invitations to the other to co-narrate the future relation. The result is a typology of grammatical and anti-grammatical policies. Subsection 3.1.5 sums up the discussion of grammars for future self/other interaction by combining the discursive structure of a policy narrative.
(developed in chapter 2) with the discursive structure of a self/other grammar to form a self/other policy narrative.

Subsection 3.1.6 seeks inspiration in conceptual history and postmodern social theory to take the operationalization the last step by singling out the specific parameters along which self/other relations may be constructed to support grammars and policies. Three groups of parameters combine to form the grammars that make up the points of departure and arrival for the self/other narratives in identity discourse: The parameters of spatiality include the diacritic for distinguishing self from other; the hierarchical distribution of their positions; and the distance between them. The parameters of temporality include the possible knowledge of the history of the relation; the permanency or historicity of the relation; and possible causality in the form of Their influencing Us. The parameters of intentionality include the possible ascription or limitation of agency to the other; the posture of the other in relation to the self; and the dialogicality of the other – i.e. the possibility of engaging in a dialogue by listening and communicating. Special attention is given to how the configuration of these parameters may install necessity in the self/other narratives as necessity installed present a less open, more conflictual invitation to co-narration to the other.

A final subsection sums up the theoretical account of the contribution to radicalization of conflict from self/other policy narratives as a discursive structure. Section 3.2 discusses other ways in which necessity may be installed in a self/other narrative.

3.1.1 Typologies and dimensions of self/other relations in IR

The IR-discipline includes since the early 90ies a debate on how best to conceptualize the relation between self, other and foreign policy. This debate has – among other things – been about how theoretically to escape the image of radically threatening others constructed to support one, monolithic identity.
One of the early applications of post-structuralism to the study of the relation between state identity and foreign policy was Campbell's study of the construction of US identity through relations to a series of threatening Others (1992). Even if Campbell expresses hope that Connolly is right that this extreme kind of othering is only a temptation (1992:78; cf. chapter 1), the image left by the analysis is one of radically threatening others constructed to support one monolithic identity (cf. Neumann 1999:24-7; Hansen 2006:38-9). Two ways have been pursued to open up the monolith to politics: one allowing for internal identity politics, one allowing for external identity politics.

One way to open up the seemingly monolithic identity constructed in relation to one, threatening other is to 'relax' the poststructuralist reflex which portrays identity as defined by the exclusion of threatening difference: Necessity is opened up to politics by allowing for disagreement on the inside of the identity as to the character of the identity and its relation to the other. Neumann (1999:30) lauds what he calls the Copenhagen Coterie of identity studies (1996a:162; 1998:16) for stressing the not-so-single character of every purported Self (Hansen 2006:77): The point is that there are different versions of the self constructed in relation to different others (cf. Frello 2003:450).

A central tool in this opening up for internal identity politics has been a more nuanced reading of Todorov's historical anthropological study of the meeting prompted by Columbus' voyage to the new world (cf. Hansen 1998:117ff; Neumann 1996a; 1996b; 1999:21). Todorov analyses a series of positions in the attempts of the Spaniards to come to grips with the possible humanity of the American Indians (1999[1982]).

To make his analysis, Todorov intimates that "we must distinguish among at least three axes, on which we can locate the problematics of alterity": First, the problematics involve a "value judgment (an axiological level): the other is good or bad, I love or do not love him, or ... he is my equal or my inferior (for there is usually no question that I am good and that I esteem myself)." Second, the problematics involve the action of rapprochement or distancing in relation to the other (a praxeological level): I embrace the other's values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify the other with myself, I impose my own image upon him; between submission to the other and the other's submission, there is also a third term, which is neutrality, or indifference.

Thirdly, the problematics involve the question whether "I know or am ignorant of the other's identity (this would be the epistemic level); of course there is no absolute here, but an endless gradation between the lower or higher states of knowledge." (1999:185; italics in original, underlining added)

Finally, the central maxim remains "There exist, of course, relations and affinities between these three levels, but no rigorous implication; hence, we cannot reduce them to one another, nor anticipate one starting from the other." (1999:185)

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73 Todorov's axiological level is constructed asymmetrically, as "there is usually no question that I am good and that I esteem myself" (Todorov 1999:185). As a statement generalized beyond Todorov's case, this is empirically doubtful (cf. Gad 2005:61-4).

74 The organization of each axis may, as well as the ease of their combination, be debated (cf. Connolly 1991:42f; contra Hansen 1998:117ff; Neumann 1999:21ff; Frello 2003:95ff; 148ff; Gad 2005:54-6 – and subsection 3.1.6 of this chapter). Most significantly, Hansen discards with Todorov's 'epistemic' axis as "When dealing with contemporary international security what is at stake is not a massive difference in factual knowledge but competing interpretations of factual knowledge articulated around different sets of ideas of how we can speak about security, community, history, responsibility and identity" (1998:125). In stead she retrieves from Todorov's formulation an 'OntologicalU axis' covering the constitution of the identity/difference of the other in relation to the self. The overall validity
On the one hand, Todorov's taxonomy is most helpful as it puts into play distinctions which are imperative to look for in the analysis of identity discourse. On the other hand, it involves some limitations which stem from the way it presents the question of alterity as one which is basically unilaterally decided (cf. Rumelili 2007:31). Even if Todorov did not merely set out to reinforce the myth of European superiority, the case analysed is one with a rather definitive winner.\textsuperscript{75} Related, the story told is one of a relation in which the agency of the other is not featured as very important: It is implied, that the answer of the Indians to the images put forward by the Spaniards did not have any significant bearing on their final articulation of identity. Finally and related, the choice involved in the policies proposed is not one which presses itself on the Spaniards with urging necessity: It was not the Indians who suddenly popped up in Andalucia – quite contrarily; the Spaniards went quite far (geographically) to seek up the choice of 'what to do to the other'. One option remained that they returned home and let the other be; such a policy would have made the continuation of the narrative less pressing.\textsuperscript{76} 

So the specific case analysed seem to be at least one reason why the analytical opening up to internal politics is accompanied by the closing down of the space for external identity politics – that is, the space for the answer of the other. This image of the articulation of identity as an 'internal affair' is repeated by Hansen in her 1998

\textsuperscript{75} Pagden (1999:xii); cf. Frello (2003:96, n.52).

\textsuperscript{76} Even this choice would have requested a reconfiguration of the construction of Christianity as the universal goal of all mankind. On the individual level, this is the conclusion of later Las Casas (Todorov 1999:193). Connolly stresses how universality is what reduces strategies of 'tolerance' to a tactical awaiting the right moment for conquest, conversion or elimination to finally solve the problem of difference (1991:42f)
thesis focusing empirically on another geographical expedition from a dominant self – this time to the Balkans.\textsuperscript{77}

Even if Todorov is featured less prominently in Hansen's 2006 book version, the perimeters which Todorov laid out to delimit the problematique is still in place: The theoretical framework describes a configuration of a self related to an other to legitimize a policy of the self towards the other (2006:21). The conceptual framework of the 2006 book does include the possibility of analytically staging a \textit{“discursive encounter”} which \textit{“contrasts the discourse of the Self with the Other’s ‘counter-construction’ of Self and Other”} (2006:76). Substantially, however, there is no theoretical account of how the voice of the Other could find a place within the discourse of the self.

Neumann diagnoses this blind spot of poststructuralism as the way identification \textit{“is conceptualized as an affair between a subject and an order, and not as an affair between a subject and an other. Poststructuralists, therefore, do not have an intersubjective take on the process of identification”} (1999:208f).

The lack of place for the agency of the other is manifest also in the specific analytical lenses, Hansen constructs to engage the empirical material: The lenses do not in a

\textsuperscript{77} Hansen (1998:113) notes that the identity of the West has both an internal and an external side – but these are the relations as constructed \textit{in} discourse; e.g. when a discourse both poses "the West" in an external relation to "the rest of the world" and negotiates the relationship between "Europe" and "the US". Hansen (2006:30) lays out how there are external constraints to the deliberation of identity and policy – but these are the established identities and policies "situated within, or products of, older and competing discourses". There is no place in the theory for an other to speak from. Kristensen (2009) takes this approach to an extreme by developing what he labels "reflexive subjectivism" as a framework for constructing a genealogy of how NATO's 2001 move 'out of area' was made possible; in his analytics both the outside other (i.a. USSR) and the internal subaltern part of the self (Europe) speaks only through being reacted and referred to in mainstream US discourse, which may – hence isolated from any necessary outside confrontation – unfold according to its own inner possibilities. A Foucauldian Hegelianism, so to speak.
definitive way preclude the analysis of a series of narratives told in turn by self and other – but neither are the lenses focused specifically to this task. An inbuilt asymmetry distracts attention from the possible agency of the other.

Hansen contends that

At the grandest philosophical scale, space, time, and responsibility are the big concepts through which political communities – their boundaries, internal constitution, and relationship with the outside world – are thought and argued. Even abstract discourses constitute subjects by situating them within particular boundaries, by investing them with possibilities for change or repetition, and by constructing ethical relations. (2006:46; note omitted)\(^78\)

So if we describe the relation constructed between a self and another in terms of spatiality, temporality, and ethicality, we should be well equipped for analysing the relation in general. The terms in which the three analytical tasks are described, however, skew the description of the relation in the direction of the self.

The spatial relation is, as developed by Hansen, truly symmetrical in its operation; it concerns the constitutive borders – territorial or social – between self and other (2006:47): When some entity is denominated, an outside is by definition symmetrically produced. Asymmetry comes from the way one of the sides to the distinction is positively marked while the other is negatively marked – the prototypical example being the inside and the outside of the nation state.

The temporal relation also comes across as a symmetrical concept – even if the symmetry comes only after completing all the steps of the analytical operation rather than from the analytical concept itself. Hansen writes:

\[\text{------------------}\]

\(^78\) The note refers to the organization of the chapters of Walker (1993), which partly coincides with the three 'big concepts'.

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one might ask first, how the temporality of the Other is constituted in relation to the
temporality of the Self: if the Other is constituted with a temporal identity similar to
the one of the Self, or if it is articulated as an object in a time different from the one

What is prescribed are; first, that parallel analyses are made of the self and of the
other – then that the result of these analyses are related through comparison. Here, of
course, asymmetry often re-enters as the analytical result.

The ethical relation, however, is not at all constructed as a symmetrical concept with
equal focus on the two sides of the relation: "The focus of discourse analysis on
articulations of ethical identity implies ... a concern ... with, in short, the Self's
articulation of (non)responsibility toward the Other." (2006:50) Here, the analysis
suggested is relational – but it is not symmetrical: What should be investigated is the
construction in discourse of the responsibilities of the self (towards, i.a., the other) –
not the implicated responsibilities of the other (towards, i.a., the self).

This is why especially the description of the last of Hansen's three relational
dimensions – the ethical relation – skews the analytical setup: The analytical grid
prepared for analysis does not involve a place from which the other is expected to act:
It produces a snapshot of the discourse of the self; a snapshot which may be repeated
to produce a dynamic account of the development of the discourses of the Self (cf.
Hansen 1998:364). But not a snapshot which analyses the invitation issued to the
other to partake in interaction – or one which analyses the response of the other. In
that sense, it does make a difference whether the other is theoretically constituted as
part of a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40) or the other is narrated into a cast of
"characters" (Ricoeur 1988:248).

It is an undeniable achievement of Hansen to provide a framework which "can be
used as a way of more systematically comparing and discussing discourses which
share major elements yet differ in small, but still important ways." (Hansen
A series of examples and analyses provided exemplifies how a minor difference in the construction of one dimension of the self/other relation may legitimize a different policy towards the other. Nevertheless: the more important the differences are in terms of theoretical effects, all the more important is it which differences are systematically produced by the analytical grid. The response of the other is not one of them.

In contrast to Hansen, Rumelili (2004; 2007) moves beyond the perimeters which Todorov laid out for the problematique; i.e. the self in relation to an other involving a strategy of the self. In other words, she opens up the image of a monolithic identity related to threatening difference by focusing not on internal but on external identity politics.

Rumelili takes her cue from Connolly's remark that identity is "vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them." (1991:64; cf. Rumelili 2007:31) Especially, according to Connolly, the complexities of the self/other relation includes variations in the extent to which the voice of difference is heard as that with which one should remain engaged or as a symptom of sickness, inferiority, or evil; variations in the degree to which self-choice or cultural determination is attributed to alter-identities (1991:65).

In other words; the ascription of agency to the other is crucial to the description of the self/other relation. Both in terms of the very capability of agency and of the legitimacy of the agency.

Rumelili describes the relation between self and other as including three "constitutive dimensions", which appear to be organized diachronically (2007:38-43). Firstly, self describes the "nature of difference" between self and other as seen from the perspective of the self. Basically two options are presented: Either the identity relation is "inclusive" as the decisive characteristics are presented as "acquired" – or
the relation is "exclusive" as the characteristics are presented as "inherent". Secondly, the "response of the other" – the second 'constitutive dimension' – may either challenge or recognize the representation performed by the self. A challenge may set off a dynamic of threat and conflict – unless the challenge may be handled by the self in the third 'constitutive dimension'; the "social distance maintained between self and other".

The immediately appealing side to Rumelili's theoretical setup is the way it creates a place in discourse to speak from for the other. The theoretical setup therefore focuses the analytical attention on the aspects of the discursive self-construction which the other would want to reply to. The flip side seems to be, that Rumelili collapses whatever synchronic relation to the other constructed by the self into one axis: 'nature of difference' as either acquired or inherent. And in relation to her main empirical interest – EU's relation to Turkey – this is a suitable place to economize with concepts. Rumelili develops a conceptual grid to fit her specific problematique: regional inter-state community and order – and in this problematique the state as a unit is the obvious object of temporalization. The distinction between characterising the other as permanently non-self and 'temporarily less-self' does, however, not beyond the state-centric problematique produce sufficient information to make sense of neither the invitation to co-narration nor the response of the other.

79 Or rather: For some others. "Morocco has so far" for undisclosed reasons "not been able to successfully resist the construction of its identity as geographically non-European." (2007:64). Theoretically, Rumelili bases the opening of the discursive structure of the Self to the co-authorship of the other in postcolonialism – more specifically in Bhabha’s concept of mimicry (2007:32). Bhabha's point is that "the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite)" performed by subalterns in colonial circumstances – the very way in which it is undecidable whether a mimic performance is an unsuccessful attempt to copy the dominant discourse or rather a conscious mockery – opens a space for agency (1994:85). Rumelili (2007) does not develop the theoretical implications explicitly; it seems, however, to work in parallel with the opening constructed theoretically in this dissertation (in chapter 2) by way of Butler’s queer feminism and Ricoeur's narratology.
This dissertation has as its focus the complex Danish debates on Muslims. The task for this chapter is to account theoretically for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the identity narratives, the articulations of identity, and the identity political dynamics of these debates and the identity configuration they are part of. These three relations more or less mirror Rumelili’s three ‘constitutive dimensions’ – but it would not suit the analytical purpose of the dissertation to follow Rumelili in reducing the complexity of the structure of the self/other relation to the question of inclusion/exclusion. More detail is needed in the conceptualization of the synchronic self/other relation. Here Hansen's three dimensions will work as a handy point of departure for working out the parameters of the self/other relation.

Before the dissertation turns to this task in section 3.1.6, a third way to organize self/other relations deserves to be developed. This way of analytically organizing the self/other relations are, on the one hand, synchronic snapshots. But, on the other hand, the snapshots are diachronically inclined in the sense that what is in focus, is the way they point to the future. This way of organizing self/other relations are rudimentarily present in IR; a couple of examples will suffice:

As mentioned, Rumelili contributes a dichotomous typology: Either an identity is inclusive and "can possibly be acquired by any state if it fulfils certain criteria." (2007:38) – or it is "exclusive, and assumed to be based on some inherent characteristics." (2007:38)

80 In Rumelili's discussion it is implied that inclusiveness equals universalistic pretentions (2007:52–3). This might be empirically correct as far as liberal identities – the one of the EU as well as the one of the US – are concerned. But the possibility of an inclusive identity offering itself to the other without insisting should not be ruled out.
Balkanization). On the other hand, the policy advice is in general terms often recognizable from other contexts and the pedigree is often one which has produced offspring beyond the specific analytical context (Civilization, Clash, Romanticism, Gendering, Genocide, Orientalism). Obviously, the discourses identified in the analysis recur to broader, even more sedimented discourses on how to relate to others.  

Diez sketches a summary of "some of the strategies of constructing 'self' and 'other' in international politics" and includes four types: "[r]epresentation of the the other as an existential threat ('securitization')", "[r]epresentation of the other as inferior", "[r]epresentation of the other as violating universal principles", and "[r]epresentation of the other as different". Simultaneously, however, he characterizes the three first as "approximations" or "variants" of each other (2005:628). In the concluding remarks concerning one of the cases – EU’s relation to Turkey – he notes that EU's "discourse is not unidirectional, but multifaceted, and cannot be easily controlled. It empowers EU actors, but it also empowers other actors to remind EU politicians of their words." (2005:633) This last point deserves to be lifted out of its status as an ad hoc conclusion. It needs to be the central focus in the analysis of the representation of self/other relations. Specifically, it needs to be the organizing principle when constructing a typology of synchronic self/other relations.

Therefore the following subsections (3.1.2 through 3.1.4) proceeds to develop a typology of synchronic self/other relations to facilitate the analysis of the contributions to radicalization of conflict from self/other policy narratives as part of the discursive structure of identity. It does so by importing from Anthropology the

81 Kølvrå (2009:49) argues a parallel move by warning against prejudicing one's analysis by applying typologies – but a few pages down the text he advocates utilizing secondary literature to generate working hypotheses as "We need not of course approach these questions in total naivety." (2009:50-1).
concept of grammars for self/other interaction and combining it with the concept of securitization.

Subsection 3.1.5 combines the resulting synchronic structure of grammatical relation between self and other with the structure of temporality in policy narratives. Finally, subsection 3.1.6 returns to a discussion of the parameters of the grammatical structure of self-other relations.

3.1.2 Structural grammars of identity/alterity in Anthropology

So the challenge when analysing identity as structure, is to do so in a way which focuses on the way in which the structure projects the agency of the self and invites the agency of the other: identity is articulated in relation to one other rather than to an order. To produce this analytical focus, recent Anthropological theory suggests reading the synchronic relation between self and other as 'grammars for interaction'. In this way the analytical focus is directed to the invitation – or the lack thereof – to mutual co-authorship of self/other narratives.

Eriksen presents the job of the Anthropologist as an intellectual to protest against attempts to present identity as based in digital essentialism – the notion that identity/alterity is an either/or question excluding the possibility of hybridity. The primary tools in the deconstruction are to point out paradoxes and to present alternative conceptualizations of identity/alterity relations (1995:117ff). This dissertation seeks inspiration in this Anthropological aspiration for alternatives to binary otherings in the concept of 'grammars of identity/alterity', developed by Baumann & Gingrich (2004a; 2004b; Baumann 2004).82

82 Their project is akin to the one of Eriksen (1995), only more theoretically developed. Their point of departure is a critique of concepts of identity/difference inspired by Lacan (via Spivak) and Heidegger (via Derrida) respectively. (Cf. the discussion in fn. 19 & 61).
The concept of 'grammars' are theoretically developed by Baumann & Gingrich to denote "classificatory structures or ... schemata" (2004a:ix) which are "used as guides as to how different discourses order the relationship between self and other" (Baumannnn 2004:19). On the one hand, a grammar is a synchronic structure: it relates self and other as they are constructed to be in the present. On the other hand, a grammar is always a grammar for the future interaction: it is a structure suggesting how interaction should proceed – and, notably, suggesting how each side should act to produce the interaction prescribed.\(^83\)

As alternative ways to relate identity and alterity – rather than as a digital or binary choice of either/or – Baumann & Gingrich present three basic grammars which they

\(^83\) In constructivist IR Milliken (2001) has used the concept of grammar in a related, yet different, way: Through "grounded theorising" (2001:9) she deduces from "a history of sequences of moves and countermoves that, for the participating governments, constituted their interaction" (2001:14) a "conflict grammar" for the Korean War describing how groups of "state managers defined state activities and assembled their interaction into an ordered sequence of exchanges". The resulting "grammar" is "an interpretative theory of permissible combinations of categories for actors, acts, effects, etc. in the Korean War social context." (2001:9). The grammar deduced consists of a "lexicon" for the "practical ontology" of the parties: "a set of definitions of, and rules of combination for, action phenomena in the Korean War" (2001:14f) mainly describing the "semantics of state conflict: the types of actions and other phenomena that are meaningful to governments: the types of actions … meaningful to governments; … and how they understand them to be typically related" (2001:15). Milliken's aim when constructing the 'grammar' as a structure for the unfolding of the whole conflict is to be able to study "'situations that are given' (such as conflict interactions during the Cold War)" by answering the following rather structuralist question: "what else could have been done according to the 'rules of the game' that participants recognised and were following?" (2001:10) – the participants being a well-defined group, as "undertaking interactions of this kind is the specialised province of state rulers ... authorised to determine ... which conflict situation their state faces." (2001:22). This dissertation does not focus on a government-government relation of war in the context of the Cold War (in which Milliken shows that there is a grammar "recognised and followed") – but at the diffuse Muslim relations of a 'Denmark' to which a state claims a monopoly of representation which cannot be upheld (which means that the whole interaction is very much a question which grammar should be followed, and who the 'participants authorised' to be on the 'other' side should be).
label Orientalism, Segmentation, and Encompassment. The grammars, they admit, has been adapted "quite ruthlessly" from three "classic social theories" each developed from empirical studies in diverse cultural contexts by academic "'ancestors'" (Baumann 2004:19): Edward Saïd's account of Western construction of the Orient; Evans-Pritchard's study of the social organization of the Nuer; and Louis Dumont's analysis of the Hindu caste system. Each of these studies produces an original way of relating self and other. In that sense the theoretical labels and the 'ancestors' serve as metaphors for the logics described rather than direct suppliers of exact theoretical concepts.

Baumann & Gingrich match the three grammars with the basic modalities of figurative language which, according to White (1973), organize Historiographic writing: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.

The Grammar of Orientalism describes a "reverse mirror-imaging" (Baumann 2004:19) mode of relating identity to alterity: Some elements – or most elements – in Our identity are said to be mirrored in Theirs:

"what is good in us is bad in them, but what got twisted in us remains straight in them" (2004:20). The orientalist grammar is metaphorical in the sense that it compares a whole with a whole.

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84 Other appropriations of Saïd and his concept of Orientalism have taken other directions. Most other readers stress the unequivocal hierarchy between self and other implied to be central to Orientalism (cf. Diez 2005:628). This hierarchy is possible but not necessary in Baumann’s version of Orientalism.

85 Baumann & Gingrich comes close to dividing Orientalism into two versions: a hierarchizing version working as a metaphor comparing two wholes to the benefit of the self, and a self-ironic version self-identifying with the negative traits allocated by the other (2004b:198-9). As will be clear from the analysis of the theoretical concepts employed in the proceeding subsection, the metaphor of a metaphor seems to be most suitable. The ironical attitude may, to my mind, be articulated to each of the grammars, even if the self-irony seems to be articulated most easily to the strict distinctions of Orientalism.
The Grammar of Encompassment describes a mode of relating identity to alterity by "hierarchical subsumption" (2004:25) in which “the putatively subordinate category is adopted, subsumed ... into the identity defined and, as it were, owned by those who do the encompassing.” (2004:26): Our superiority allows Us to see that even though They insist on being different from Us, They are actually a (subaltern) part of Our identity. The grammar of encompassment works as a synecdoche by reducing othered wholes to parts (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:198).

The Segmentary Grammar describes a mode of relating identity to alterity by "a logic of fission or enmity at a lower level of segmentation, overcome by a logic of fusion or neutralization of conflict at a higher level of segmentation” (Baumann 2004:22): A We/They-relation on a basic level may be accompanied by a simultaneous agreement on a common We at a higher level opposed to yet another They. In that sense, the segmentary grammar plays metonymically with the wholeness of parts and the partialness of wholes (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:198).

Figure 3.1 reproduces the way Baumann & Gingrich illustrate the three grammars graphically.

Gingrich & Baumann discuss whether the three grammars are in some sense logically exhaustive of the possible combinations of relations between self and other (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:198f). More interesting than logical exhaustiveness, however, is whether the three concepts allow thinking beyond the digital self/other relation. On the one hand, each of the concepts – if employed on their own – stays within a binary logic: Orientalism, in a sense, is binary par excellence.

86 In the end, Baumann & Gingrich keep the framework theoretically open for more possible grammars (2004b:198) – and during the development of the theory a "transcendent grammar of love" (Baumann 2004:42) is mentioned just as a rudimentary "binary grammar of 'we are good, so they are bad'" (2004:19) is described as a pretext to the anti-grammar discussed in section 3.1.3.
Encompassment needs the digital distinction to postulate its hierarchy. Segmentation induces the proliferation of digital distinctions – but the distinctions need to be there.

Figure 3.1 The three grammars: Orientalism, Segmentation, Encompassment as illustrated by Baumann & Gingrich 2004

Baumann & Gingrich stress, however, that the three grammars may be found "in mutual interaction and as rival logics" (Baumann 2004:47) shaping "processes of selfing/othering" (2004:46). More specifically, they shape these processes as

They provide a repertoire of structures through which to put forward arguments about self and other; but it is crucial to stress that all grammars are always at the disposal of all social actors, and it is precisely the constantly shifting invocations and revocations of each grammar that matter in the social processes of selfing and othering as we can observe them empirically (2004:31).

Section 3.1.4 develops one way in which the grammars interact. It does so by combining the grammars to produce a typology of policies for relating to the other.

First, however, one more important element in Gingrich & Baumann's theoretical apparatus needs to be introduced – and modified – to the benefit of the task of this section; i.e., to account for contributions to radicalization from discursive structures. This has to do with a crucial point concerning the grammars: That they are
grammatical. The crucial point is that even if these conceptualizations of the relation between self and other are fraught with hierarchizations, dominance, and power – they each point out some kind of place for the other to speak from, even if it is a subordinated, dominated, and disempowered position (2004:46f). They each include two positions – one for the self and one for the other. They are relational. But not all imagined futures are relational.

3.1.3 Anti-grammar and securitization

Gingrich & Baumann delivers the concept of interactional grammar with the counter-concept of anti-grammar closely articulated to physically violent policies such as genocide and categorical killings. Even if this counter-concept is not the only way of envisioning futures without a relation between self and other, its close affiliation with violence makes it an important focus for identity political analysis.

Furthermore, the concept of 'genocidal anti-grammar' invites articulation with a conceptualization in International Relations of a specific type of self/other relation; the securitized relation: When an other is securitized – pointed out as an existential threat to the self – it is very difficult to see the relation as implying a grammar for future interaction. To the contrary; an obvious policy option towards a securitized other – an other pointed out as an existential threat to you – is the elimination of the other. That policy conclusion is, however, not the only one possible to apply to a securitized relation. A securitized relation need not necessarily end up anti-grammatical: re-opening a space for dialogical co-authorship becomes a crucial task in such 'anti-grammatical' situations.

Baumann portraits "the breakdown of all three grammars [as] a return to the anti-grammar of: 'we are good, so they are bad' with the genocidal conclusion: 'we must live, so they must die" (Baumann 2004:42). The result is "categorical killings" (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:195). Difference turns into radical otherness exactly when the grammars cease to work: "In situations of genocide, the Other is turned
from being a necessary, if undervalued, partner in the process of collective selfing into an obstacle to selfing that must be removed by indiscriminate violence." (Baumann 2004:47)

This criterion is mirrored in Neumann's call to add the concept of 'violisation' to the theoretical apparatus of the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization: A securitization is attempted when an existential threat is pointed out to a valued referent-object along with the means for the aversion of the threat – and securitization has succeeded when the relevant audience accepts the breaking of rules involved (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). The rhetorical figure of securitization is, along with the securitizing agent and the audience, illustrated in figure 3.2.

![Figure 3.2 The speech act of Securitzation](image)

When someone gives in to the temptation to point out a sociological other as the constitutive threat to ones identity, a special situation occurs in which both the threat and the referent-object is narratively endowed with agency: The securitizing agent speaks on behalf of the self (whether everyone included in the self agrees or not) – and the threat pointed out may (whether intended or not) eavesdrop and react to being pointed out as a threat. This situation is illustrated in figure 3.3. "Violisation" is to
denominate the process in which not only security status but "the use of force" is added to politics in the form of large-scale violence: war (Neumann 1998:18).

Neumann and Gingrich & Baumann agree that not all violence crosses the threshold which they try to define: Neumann grants that "identity is already violised for example when an asylum centre is arsonised and people die as an effect" (1998:18). But even as the concept of violisation is suggested to cover "the cases where large-scale violence is actually in evidence", the article focuses on the outbreak of war, and Neumann suggests that "societal violence which is not intended to impinge on the question of state borders may be bracketed" (1998:18). This dissertation opts to remove the brackets and follows the generalization performed by Baumann & Gingrich. Firstly, they grant "that there is system-immanent or system-maintaining violence" (2004b:195). Secondly, however, a qualitative threshold is passed when "the exceptional violence of irretrievably anti-grammatical selfings/otherings ... aim to annihilate the other" (2004b:196).

![Figure 3.3 Securitization as othering](image)

The other pointed out as existential threat (possibly) doubles as a (possibly) unintended co-audience of the speech act.
This criterion in Baumann & Gingrich is followed by a second diacriticon which they argue coincide with the first one (genocidal violence): Genocide is made possible, when the construction of a group *no longer* follow “the conventions of othering the other by one or another of the three grammars and thus to define identities and alterities as mutually constitutive and at least residually dialogical.” (Baumann 2004:46, italics added) The choice of the labels 'grammar' and 'anti-grammar' is explained by analogy:

> Just as linguist's grammars make the difference between sentences meaningful to others and sentences unintelligible to others, so the grammars of identity/alterity spell the difference between otherings that are *meaningful* to the others and the ungrammatical otherings that are *unintelligible* to the othered because it insists on the annihilation of the other (2004:46; italics added).

The distinctions 'residually dialogical'/non-dialgoolal' and 'different/existential threat-which-must-be-eliminated' coincide as "The denial of the right to be different turns into a denial of the right to be." (2004:47) Or phrased differently; the "different grammars do entail different directions and degrees of dialogical potential" (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:194); but "only at the threshold of empowering the anti-grammar of dehumanization ... identity and alterity ceased to be conceivable as mutually constitutive or potentially dialogical." (2004b:197)

Constructing a self/other relationship by playing on the three grammars, hence, implies a structural openness to the other as a co-author of the discourse of the self – even if the openness is small and the space for reconstruction delimited. The conceptual pair grammar/anti-grammar, hence, establish a theoretical platform for and delimitation of the agency implied in both Bhaba's concept of mimicry (as

87 The distinction is discursively protected when system-immanent violence – by contrast – is "represented in dominant discourses as a form of dialogue or communication" and hence insisted to be grammatical (2004:197): 'We are sending them a message by punishing them'.
suggested by Rumelili, cf. subsection 3.1.1) and the agency achieved via the alternative, yet partially parallel theoretical way by Butler’s queer feminism (cf. Gingrich 2004:9 and chapter 2).

Recall Butler's definition of the subject as "an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who speak as the 'I'" (1997:25), and, hence, "constituted by discourse, but at a distance from oneself" (1997:33f) from where "it is clearly possible to speak with authority without being authorized to speak" (1997:157). Also for Butler, however, the possibility remains that "one can be 'put in one's place by such speech, but such a place may be no place" (1997:4, 137). The anti-grammar of genocide is the extreme denial of place for the other in the narrative of the relation between self and other.

If an other is constructed as a dehumanized, existential threat, then no place is left to speak from: "What ever they do or say in their defence, they are wrong and will not be accommodated within any of the established grammars." (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:196) But annihilation of the other may, contrary to what Baumann & Gingrich implies, not be an automatic response to the pointing out of the other as a threat. Not even to the pointing out of the other as an existential threat.

The Copenhagen School of security theory suggests that a securitization – the conversion of a problem into a security problem – involves the pointing out of an existential threat to a valued referent object. It also, however, suggests that when you point out an existential threat, you need to follow up with an extraordinary means to its aversion – at least if you want to stay in authority (Wæver 1995). But the policy need not be the annihilation of the other. Huysmans observes that when targeted at an identity category

securitization makes constructive political and social engagement with the dangerous outside(rs) more difficult. It also has a tendency to inscribe predispositions towards violence in social relations. ... In ... security framing, individual[s...] become indexes
of a collective force. ... Under these conditions dialogue and constructive engagement will become more difficult (Huysmans 2006:57-8)

Difficult, but not necessarily impossible.

In that sense, 'securitization' may be discerned as a limit of grammatical othering; a last resort (or: last exit) before genocidal anti-grammar. The policy of securitization closes down the dialogical openness to the other – but large scale categorical killings is not a necessary conclusion.  

Grammars lay out the conditions for the co-authorship of the other in self/other narratives – anti grammar denotes the extreme case where there is no possible voice for the other as there is no legitimate life for the other. Securitization defines the limit where the dialogue is closing down but the termination of life is not pointed out as necessary.

Closer inspection, however, may find a variation of ways in which relational grammars for the future may break down. More ways than may be accounted for satisfactorily by the single counterconcept of genocidal anti-grammar. Subsection 3.1.4 analyses how the three basic grammars may combine to form a typology of policies for the future relation of self and other – and finds how grammar may break down in three distinct ways.

88 When Buzan et al. (1998:32) refers to 'the grammar of securitization' as a felicity/facilitating condition of a securitizing speech act, this structure is also a grammar for action – albeit a more specific act, namely for the speech act of securitization. In Austinian speech act theory, reference is often made to the importance of performing perfectly the conventional 'grammar' institutionalized in discourse allowing the speech act to work; i.a. a grammar-for-the-speech-act preceding the speech act. As implied above, what I have in mind in this discussion is the grammar-for-subsequent-action included in the speech act. 'The policy of securitization' as understood by the dissertation – i.e. as a involving a specific combination of the basic grammars for relating to the other – may be installed by successfully following the grammar of the securitizing speech act.
3.1.4 **A typology of policies based on grammars of interaction**

This subsection analyses the logics of the three grammars with a view to produce a typology of policies for relating to the other. The typology is presented in the form of a map of policies.

The analysis proceeds by examining what kind of specific policies for relating to the other each of the basic grammars have as their *condition of possibility* – and in parallel; what kind of policies for relating to the other which constitutes the *condition of impossibility* of the grammar: If you relate to the other according to, e.g. the grammar of Encompassment: What is the first thing, you need to do? What is the last thing, you should do? And what kind of policy for the future could you promote to save the basic grammar if approaching its impossibility?

Furthermore, the analysis discerns in each grammar a 'point of diffraction' – a specific way of structuring identity, articulating identity, or interacting in identity politics – which directs the grammar in question in the direction of either the one or the other grammars. A series of 'combined' policies are, in that way, made visible.

![Diagram of policies](image)

**Figure 3.4 Building a map of policies by combining grammars of self/othering**

Baumann & Gingrich's illustrations of the three grammars inserted using the three sides of the triangle as baselines.
To begin the construction of the map, the three basic grammars each form the base of an axis. To recollect the three logics, the graphical illustrations of the grammars are placed in a triangle in figure 3.4: Orientalism produces mirror-images of self and other; Encompassment subsumes 'other' as subsidiary part of self. Segmentation allows flexible inclusion/exclusion of other in self at various levels of abstraction. Having, thus, delimited the map to be filled out, let us proceed to the first step of the analysis focusing on the conditions of possibility and impossibility of each of the grammars.

Figure 3.5 Conditions of Orientalism

The grammar of Orientalism insists to mirror Our qualities with Theirs. What is the condition of possibility of mirroring? What kind of policy for relating to the other must one perform to mirror? Orientalism only makes sense, if the distinction between Us and Them is upheld: For a dissertation on self/other relations, this may read a bit trivial. In the light of the proceeding analysis of the two other grammars, it is not.
sense, a policy of distinguishing is the condition of possibility for Orientalism. And in the same sense, hybridity constitutes the condition of impossibility of Orientalism: If self and other – according to the diacriticon insisted on by the specific version of Orientalism – gets so mixed up that the projection of distinction becomes meaningless, then Orientalism breaks down. Figure 3.5 illustrates the conditions of possibility (distinguishing) and impossibility of the grammar of Orientalism (hybridity).

Orientalism need, however, not be successful. The other – and the self – may not stay in each their place, nicely distributed on each their side of the distinction between identity and difference. The situation may, hence, approach hybridity. If nothing is done, hybridity may prevail, and orientalism would loose its meaning. The foundation on which Orientalism erects itself is a diacriticon – when the diacriticon collapses, Orientalism ends. Beyond the breakdown of distinction lies – as one specific form of anti-grammar – the policy of indifference: a careless refraining from distinguishing.

Figure 3.6 Policies of and beyond Orientalism
Faced with hybridity, however, the Orientalizing self could also very likely react to protect Orientalism. Such a defensive reaction might very well be to insist on a policy assimilating the hybrid other to self. If successful, however, the paradoxical result of an assimilatory policy aiming to protect Orientalism would be the annulment of not only hybridity but also otherness and thereby the very distinction foundational to Orientalism. Figure 3.6 illustrates the policies making the grammar of Orientalism possible (distinguishing), its paradoxical policy of last resort (other-assimilation), and the anti-grammatical policy beyond it (indifference).

Let us proceed to the grammar of Encompassment; what is the condition of possibility of a grammar insisting that the other is really a subordinate part of the self? Encompassment only makes sense, if the self articulates a will to subordinate the other. In that sense, a policy of acting on behalf of the other is the condition of possibility for Encompassment. You need to be able to articulate the encompassment – to represent the other – for Encompassment to be meaningful.

And in that sense, paralysis constitutes the condition of impossibility of Encompassment: If the self is so powerless – absolutely powerless, or powerless relative to the power of the other – that it cannot execute its intentions (on behalf of the other), then Encompassment breaks down. Figure 3.7 illustrates the conditions of possibility (agency) and impossibility (paralysis) of the grammar of Encompassment.

Faced with paralysis the self may – to save some kind of agency – turn to a policy of self-assimilation to the other: By obtaining part in the capability for agency which the other has proven to have, the self may be saved from paralysis. The paradoxical result of saving agency by self-assimilation, however, is the annulment of the agency of the self foundational to Encompassment.

\[90 \text{ An example: When Denmark proved itself incapable of defending itself honourably on the 9th of April, 1940, some Danish nationalists joined the nazi occupiers to contribute to their strength and gain a share in their glory.} \]
Beyond the breakdown of the capability to encompass lies – as a second specific form of anti-grammar – the policy of unconditional love distracting oneself from any individual intentionality (cf. Baumann 2004:42). The foundation on which Encompassment erects itself is an intentionality directed to towards the other. When this intentionality collapses, Encompassment ends. Figure 3.8 illustrates the policies making the grammar of Encompassment possible (agency on behalf of the other), its paradoxical policy of last resort (self-assimilation), and the anti-grammatical policy beyond it (unconditional love).

Finally, Segmentation; the grammar which allocates identity and alterity flexibly by fusing and distinguishing between comprehensive and particular identities. What is the condition of possibility of the grammar of Segmentation? Segmentation only makes sense, if the there is a variety of diacritica available. The flexibility distinctive of Segmentation arises from the production of a series of distinctions. In that sense, a policy of producing knowledge about the relevance and irrelevance of distinctions in various situations is the condition of possibility of Segmentation.
You, however, need to allocate resources for producing the complex of distinctions which constitutes the possibility for flexibly contracting and expanding the relevant We. One crucial resource for knowledge production is time. If distinction is to be made now there is no time to produce knowledge of possible selves or others. There is no time for employing any of the specific operations producing knowledge: empirical investigation, recourse to authoritative sources, negotiation, etc. Therefore urgency constitutes the condition of impossibility of Segmentation: In conditions of urgency, Segmentation breaks down as a grammar for future interaction between self and other. Figure 3.9 illustrates the conditions of possibility (producing knowledge) and impossibility (urgency) of the grammar of Segmentation.

The self which relates to the other by segmentation will face urgency as a threat. If the other is seen to be occasioning the urgency, the other becomes the threat. In that situation, an obvious choice for the self is to turn to a policy of securitization which consists in pointing out the other as a threat to the knowledge production constituting the self engaged in practices of Segmentation. The paradox of securitizing to secure Segmentation, however, is that the urgency implied when constructing a need to
protect oneself from an existential threat annuls the possibility of knowledge production necessary for Segmentation.

Figure 3.9 Conditions of Segmentation

The foundation on which Segmentation erects itself is temporality – when temporality collapses, Segmentation ends.

Figure 3.10 Policies of and beyond Segmentation
If there is no time for producing knowledge, only distinction and action is possible: Orientalism insisting on distinction between Us and Them – and Encompassment insisting on Us acting on Their behalf. Distinguishing now and acting now. If we know who the other is, and the other is the one threatening us – only one course of action is possible. Shoot now and ask questions later. Beyond the breakdown of temporality lies – as a third specific form of anti-grammar – the policy of genocide or categorical killing; the dedicated eradication of the other. Figure 3.10 illustrates the policies making the grammar of Segmentation possible (producing knowledge), its paradoxical policy of last resort (securitization), and the anti-grammatical policy beyond it (categorical killings).

![Diagram: ORIENTALISM, SEGMENTATION, ENCOMPASSMENT]

**Figure 3.11 Conditions of grammar**

Figure 3.11 charts the policies which constitutes and the conditions of possibility and impossibility of the three grammars.91 The figure, hence, specifies the limits of

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91 One may, on the one hand, note the similarities of the typology developed with Todorov's typology of self/other relations in the sense that Todorov's ontological axis is parallel with the Orientalist distinction and its collapse; Todorov's epistemic axis is parallel with the temporality allowing Segmentation and its collapse; and Todorov's axiological axis is parallel with the intentionality articulated by Encompassment and its collapse. It is, however, also important to notice the differences: Firstly, that the typology of the
grammatical othering and show that grammar may break down in three distinct ways leading to three distinct types of anti-grammar.

In figure 3.12, the policies beyond and the policies paradoxically seeking to save the conditions of possibility of the three grammars are inserted to complete the first stage of the construction of a map of policies.

Figure 3.12 Policies of and beyond grammar

It is useful, however, to insert one more distinction to make the typology of policies more nuanced. The remains of this subsection investigate how the grammar combined two and two produces three 'combined' polices. It does so in two steps: Firstly, it is argued how 'points of diffraction' points each grammar in the direction of each of the other grammars. Secondly, it is argued how a 'combined policy' constitutes the meeting point between each couple of grammars. In figure 3.13, the dissertation developed by the dissertation is entirely on the level of discourse: In Todorov, the epistemic axis concerns knowledge possessed or not possessed of the other as s/he is (cf. Hansen 1998:125). In the dissertation, Segmentation hinges on knowledge produced – in different ways, yes; but this knowledge always co-produces the other in the discourse of the self. Secondly, the crucial difference is that the typology of the dissertation is developed specifically to facilitate the analysis of the possible co-authorship of the other. In Todorov the agency of the other is inconsequential (cf. subsection 3.1.1).
three graphical illustrations of the grammars are re-inserted in the map of policies in a way which graphically suggests the points of diffraction in relation to each grammar.

Figure 3.13 Points of diffraction for grammars
Baumann & Gingrich's illustrations modified to illustrate the point of diffraction in each grammar.

Orientalism diffracts over the question whether self or other is positively valued when mirroring each other. If the other is negatively valued, the distinction foundational to Orientalism is made primarily to disengage: why engage with someone less valued? This points the policy choice in the direction of Encompassment; of acting on behalf of the other, to keep it from influencing the self negatively.

If, contrarily, the other is positively valued, the distinction between self and other may be constructed to allow a delimited self to engage with the other. This points the policy choice in the direction of Segmentation; of getting to know the other, possibly to learn. As the very distinction between self and other is the foundation of

92 Note that Todorov's typology of self/other relations is blind to this, as his point of departure is that the self is always valued higher than the other (cf. subsection 3.1.1).
Orientalism, the policies must in both cases insist on the other as externalized: The other is something else than the self; its difference places it outside.\footnote{Again, this may read a bit trivial. But in the light of the proceeding analysis of the two other grammars, it is not. And the non-triviality is what constitutes the politics of separating internal and external identity politics (cf. chapter 2) in a way which ensures constant conflict (cf. subsection 3.3.1).}

Encompassment diffracts over the way the other responds to the self acting on its behalf: If the other protests by insisting to act on its own behalf – maybe even by insisting on behalf of the self – then self’s intention to act must be \textit{violently} implemented. This points in the direction of Orientalism; the policy choice is pointed in a direction of upholding distinction. When the will of other to represent the self threatens to erase the will of the self to represent the other – then the answer is to insist on keep up distinctions.

If contrarily the other accepts that the self acts on behalf of it, then self’s intention to act need not turn openly violent. The intention of the self to act on behalf of the other is implemented \textit{ideologically}.\footnote{This concept of ideology does not imply any notion of 'false consciousness' on the side of the other; only that the other submits itself in accordance with its own identity narrative.} If so, the policy choice is pointed in the direction of Segmentation; in direction of accepting the legitimacy of the position from which the other articulates its accept. As the very capability to act on behalf of the other is the foundation of Encompassment, the policies must, however, in both cases insist on limiting the independent agency of the other.

Segmentation diffracts over the \textit{type of knowledge} produced when moving up and down the ladder of fusion and fission. If the knowledge produced concerns the \textit{differences} between self and other, \textit{fissions} between a self and an other are constituted: The more differences between Us and Them are produced to coincide, the more it seems that the distinction between Us and Them is \textit{the} important
distinction. So fissions point the policy choice in the direction of Orientalism; in the direction of confirming the distinctions produced by this grammar.

If contrarily the knowledge produced concerns our identity, a fusion of lesser selves and others is facilitated: If We and They are the same in this and that regard – then the distinction between Us and Them might not be so interesting. If so, the policy choice is pointed in the direction of Encompassment; in the direction of affirming that our differences may be subsumed under an encompassing identity. As the very production of knowledge, however, is the foundation of Segmentation, the policies must in both cases insist on allowing the other some form of agency: If the other is not allowed any agency, it may not be engaged in a way which allows it to make a mark on common narrative. If the other is not allowed to make a mark, there is no way of producing distinctions; i.e. there is no production of knowledge.

Figure 3.14 summarizes how the points of diffraction of each grammar points the policy conditioning its possibility in the direction of one of the other grammars. What remains is to see in which 'combined policies' the grammars meet on each side of the points of diffraction.

Figure 3.14 Policy diffraction of grammars
Recall how Orientalism diffracts over the valuation of the other: negative valuation points to policies of disengagement – positive valuation points to engagement. Encompassment diffracts over the response of the other: protest points to violence – accept points to ideology. Segmentation diffracts over the type of knowledge produced: production of differences points to fission – production of identity points to fusion.

When Orientalism distinguishes the negatively valued other from the self to disengage, while Encompassment violently acts on behalf of the other in spite of its protest, the result is a policy of *monologue*: Only one voice may legitimately speak.

The policy of monologue is rather far removed from Segmentation as it does not imply any of the openness to the other which is a precondition for producing new knowledge. The self performing a monologue is in no need to produce knowledge of the other: The other is already known; known to be of less valued; known to be inclined to act contrarily to her/his own true interest.

When Orientalism, contrarily, distinguishes the positively valued other from the self to engage, while Segmentation seeks knowledge of differences, the result is a policy of *dialogue*: Two voices are envisioned to engage in an orderly interaction in which both parties are open to the other.

The policy of dialogue is rather far removed from Encompassment as it needs to allow the other a liberal measure of agency: The other needs to be allowed agency to engage the self in a way which leaves marks on the interaction. The marks of the other are needed as objects of knowledge production. Therefore the self engaging in a dialogue needs to restrain its own intentionality to allow a room for the intentionality of the other: The intentionality of the other is positively valued and necessary. If there is no room for the other to articulate its intentionality, there is no production of
knowledge about the differences between self and other - the only knowledge produced is confirmation of the identity of a self.\textsuperscript{95}

When Segmentation, contrarily, seeks knowledge of identity, while Encompassment acts ideologically legitimized on behalf of the other with its accept implied, the result is a policy of \textit{agonism}. A policy of agonism foresees an interchange in which, on the one hand, the other has a legitimate place: the place of the other is legitimate as the other is supposed to use this place to accept the place it is awarded. The other is expected to accept the primacy of identity over difference; and accept that the self ultimately affirms its encompassment. But, on the other hand, agonism simultaneously implies an interchange in which the other is illegitimately at liberty to articulate its intentionality to subvert the order. The other, paradoxically, gains the liberty to subvert by initially accepting the legitimacy of the delimitated place it is awarded to speak from.

The policy of agonism is rather far removed from Orientalism as it needs to allow identity and difference to be flexible concepts rather than unequivocally distinguished from each other: The self engaging in agonistic interchange needs to keep up this flexibility to be able to produce new knowledge about the differences and identities. The need for knowledge comes not from an urge to learn from a positively valued other, but because the other is acknowledged as a legitimate opponent: You need to know your opponent to be able to strategically engage it. When seeking to articulate your will on behalf of the other, you need to know his/her possible reaction.

\textsuperscript{95} Galtung takes this policy to its extreme in which it self-assimilates the will of the self into the dialectical constitution of a future common self (1996:78-84). He opposes dialogue to \textit{i.a.} debate, which is less directed towards future synthesis (1988:72, 84). In that sense, Galtungian dialogue is anti-grammatical – while the dissertation's concept of dialogue would equal Galtung's concept of debate.
The three 'combined' policies resulting from the combination of the diffracted grammars are inserted in the map in figure 3.15: Monologue combines disengaging from the negatively valued other with acting violently on behalf of the other. Dialogue combines engaging with the positively valued other with seeking knowledge of the difference of the other. Agonism combines acting ideologically on behalf of the other with seeking knowledge of the identity of the other with the self.

![Combined policies diagram](image)

**Figure 3.15 Combined policies**
Gammars directed towards each other by points of diffraction, combining to form three policies

Figure 3.16 completes the tasks which the subsection posed for itself; to construct a map of policies for relating to the other developed on the theoretical basis of Baumann & Gingrich's concept of grammars for self/other interaction. On the one hand, the map delimits a realm of grammatical policies for relating to the other: The grammatical policies are delimited by allowing Firstly, a basic distinction between self and other; secondly, two distinguishable wills each seeking to act in and on behalf of the relation; and thirdly, an at least a residual possibility to seek knowledge of the other to potentially relativize the difference of the other. Within these limits, the policies may be more or less black and white, more or less insisting, and more or
less curious – but they all allow a future interaction between two distinct yet mutable entities.

![Diagram of self/other relations](image)

**Figure 3.16 Map of policies for self/other relations**

On the other hand, the map delimits three distinct anti-grammatical policies: The futures pursued in each of these policies are ones in which there is not a relation between self and other: Categorical killings seeks to eliminate the threatening other. Unconditional love erases the intentionality of the self. Indifference gives up distinguishing self from other.

Obviously some policies are more prone to radicalize conflict than others when meeting the policies for the future relation promoted by the other. A negative image is more likely to be protested than a positive one. If someone wants to dispossess you of your agency, you are likely to counteract. Furthermore, the liminal policies may produce each of their specific conflictual response. Subsection 3.3 investigates these dynamics systematically as part of the account for the contribution of identity politics to radicalization of conflict.
3.1.5 The concept of self/other policy narrative

Let us recapitulate the discursive structures of temporality in policy narratives (laid out in chapter 2) and of self/other relations read as grammars (as reconstructed in this section) – and then combine the two structures into a structure of a self/other policy narrative.

Firstly, a policy narrative grasps together a 'past' pointing to 'the present' ontology – and it further articulates a choice between two or more 'futures' (an oughtology and and one or more ougthnotologies) projected on a horizon of possibilities visible from the viewpoint of the present. (Recall how this structure was illustrated in figure 2.5 in chapter 2).

Secondly, the relation between self and other works as a grammar for interaction more or less dialogical – i.e. the relation may be described as more or less open to the co-authorship of other when developing the future relation. The openness – the grammaticality, the dialogicality – is conditioned by the relation being conceived of as a relation between distinguished entities (to facilitate Orientalism) with each their intentionality (to facilitate Encompassment) placed in time (to facilitate Segmentation). If we take advantage of the temporality thus inbuilt in the structure of the relational grammar, we may implant a snapshot of it on the graphical illustration of a narrative.

Figure 3.17 illustrates the present articulation of a relation between a self and an other (distinguished by Orientalism) to have had a common past (allowing Segmentation to have produced knowledge of differences and unity). Furthermore, a common future is projected (as the result of the combined intentionality of the two: the will of the self to Encompass the other expressed as specific policies for its relation; and the co-narration which the intentionality of the other may be expected to articulate).
Figure 3.17 A grammatical self/other relation articulated as ontology at t₁

A *self/other policy narrative* combines the two structures: Both the past, the present and the futures grasped together have the form of a grammar for self-other interaction. This makes for stories like this: 'In the past, the relation between us and them was structured like this, implying this form of interaction – this has led to the present relation between us and them, implying that form of future interaction – and therefore we now have a choice between following that grammar, which would lead us to that unwanted relation with them – or following an alternative policy option, which they will answer with an alternative mode of action, and in combination it will lead us to a preferred relation with them.' This combined structure is illustrated in figure 3.18.

Every statement of a self-other policy narrative – a story of what we should do to them – implicitly or explicitly involves this complex of a temporal structure grasping together at least four synchronic structures of self-other relations; a past relation pointing to the present relation suggesting a future relation and one or more alternative relations. If a self/other narrative – as the one illustrated in figure 3.19 – projects only a single future, the task of the analyst is to find the necessity articulated
in the narrative and reopen the space for politics closed down by the elimination of the possibility of alternative futures.

Figure 3.18 The structure of a self/other policy narrative involving agency on both sides
Combining the structure of a policy narrative with the structure of self/other relation

The analytical benefit of this way of conceptualizing self-other policy narrative is that it is sensitive to the character of the agency ascribed to the other. Each of the

96 The analytical complication of this way of conceptualizing self-other policy narrative is that the analysis involves temporalities on two levels: There is a temporality implied in each relational grammar; and there is a temporality implied in the narrative grasping the relational grammars together. To be more specific: The first level of temporality concerns the individual grammatical relation. Each grammatical relation between self and other – whether placed in the past, in the present or in a future – involves the fixation of a past leading to this relation and the choice between alternative future relations. The second level of temporality concerns the description of the narrative grasping together the grammatical relations. The grasping together of a series of grammars to form a narrative places each of the grammars in the past, in the present or in a future – while each grammatical relation retains its own configuration of past, present and futures. To be specific: The past leading to the present had its own past and it had the present present as part of at least one of its futures. And each of the futures possible when viewed from the present must have the present (and the past of the present) as its past – but each of the futures will have different futures. These separate temporalities of the individual relational grammars may – or may not – be explicated in the present articulation. Most often they will not be explicated: the
relational grammars described as part of the policy narrative – and each of the steps from structural relation to structural relation – involves some idea of how the other will re-act to the actions of the self. The idea may be that they will not react – either in the sense of continuing their course irrespective of our actions, or in the sense that their course will change in a mere cause-effect way as a result of our actions. Or the idea may be that they adjust their course as they reflect on the relation being a result of interaction.

Figure 3.19 Self/other narrative of necessity

Projecting a future relation in which the other is described as threatening the existence of the self means proposing an alternative future relation in which extraordinary action is taken against the other. This would be a securitizing self/other demand for consistency of the subject entails that the grammars for future interaction articulated in the future will be consistent with the one articulated in the present. Two examples concerning the past and the future respectively may clarify the point: Firstly, when one explains why one has turned out to be wrong concerning some question, the argument will typically be a narrative of how – from one's vantage point in the past – certain elements of the past or certain possible futures were not visible. Secondly, one might argue the need to act in the present to create a situation in the future where one possesses a certain knowledge (of the past or of the future) which entails the possibility or impossibility of certain future futures.
policy narrative. One possible extraordinary means to reach an alternative future is the elimination of the other. This would be a genocidal self/other policy narrative.  

3.1.6 Combining parameters to narrate grammars and policies

To reap the analytical benefit involved in an analytical strategy sensitive to the agency of the other we need to return to what Hansen called 'the big concepts at the grandest philosophical scale' through which identities and their relation to others are thought. These parameters are the building blocks available when narrating the relation: As you relate self and other along a parameter, you explain the difference of the other; you legitimize your story about what to do about it; you may install necessity in the story by relating self to other in specific ways along a parameter or along a combination of parameters.

But on what parameters is one to focus? When approaching the empirical material in focus of this dissertation (Danish debates on Muslims) while keeping the aim of

97 Gingrich & Baumann overstress the reach of anti-grammatical othering as they intimate that "the exceptional violence of irretrievably anti-grammatical selfings/otherings ... not only aim to annihilate the other, but implicitly and compulsively abolish the former self" as the other is a necessary part of the construction of the identity of the self (2004:196). After genocide, the other eliminated will immediately still be there, related to the identity of the self through their common past as the other which we have eliminated. This is at least how the narrative must be told from the present vantage point of the proposers of genocide. In principle it might be possible in some future to construct a past which includes neither the genocide nor the other – and hence position oneself as a present identity without any relation to the eliminated other. But as Derrida reminds us: "Ghosts haunt places that exist without them; they return to where they have been excluded from." (Dufourmantelle 2000:152). And, as chapter 2 discussed – an identity needs some other to be.

98 The instalment of necessity may, as we recall from chapter 2, be attempted to insulate certain discursive elements from negotiation – but articulation of necessity may also raise the stakes of conflict if the necessity is not accepted.

99 What are the 'big concepts' through which we conceptualize the world? Does it make sense to construct at final list of the big concepts; to include a specific limited number à priori? When surveying analyses based on conceptual history and discourse theory, a far reaching consensus seem to arrive at two points: Firstly, that we need three big concepts.
Lots of lists include three concepts – not two, not four, but three. Secondly, on the various shortlists two concepts reappear: Space and time. What concept is awarded the third spot, however, varies. Concerning the general preference for trinities: On the one hand this preference might be a tribute to the limited analytical capacity of the average academic: If anyone tries to conduct and communicate an analysis organizing something along more than three dimensions, things get too complicated for the audience to follow. If creative, you may visualize three dimensions in a coordinate system (cf. Chilton 2004) or a table (cf. Hansen 1998:120; Gad 2005:55) without certain communicative breakdown. On the other hand, one might speculate that the same goes for the cognitive capacity of the average human being: three dimensions are the maximum manageable – and if this is so, then perhaps human interaction might 'actually' tend to be organized along trinities of parameters. Along the same line, one might speculate that three is also the number of dimensions organizing space as accessible to the human visual and tactile sensations; this might make 'three dimensions' a 'sign which is good to think with' (cf. Neumann 2001:66 paraphrasing Lévi-Strauss). This line of reasoning would lead to an accept of the first big concept as a universal: Space – constituted along three dimensions – seem to be such a good sign to think with, that it structures the way we think about the second safe spot on the shortlist of big concepts: Time is invariably conceptualized in spatial metaphors (Koselleck 1985:273; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Chilton 2004:57). But things get complicated if one wants to fix three universal 'big concepts'. One example is the way Koselleck bases his begriffsgeschichte on a universal need for any semantic field to order a temporality (in terms of past/present) and a spatiality (in terms of in/out) – and as a third universal; a notion of hierarchy (1990:122ff; cf. Petersen 2008:71). Hierarchy, however, is a spatial metaphor: up/down is as spatial as in/out. More pertinently, if the analysis is to remain open to conceptual change, the concepts themselves need to be included in the analysis and, hence, cannot serve as universal: even these categories for evaluation of conceptual change must be read out of the empirical material (Petersen 2007:71). In this radicalisation of Koselleck's approach the (self-)diagnosis of the modern condition is expanded to include even the categories in which the conceptualisation of change is to be evaluated. So the parameters one must put to work in analysis depend on what are appropriate to the field. Appropriateness depends on the aim of the study. Nevertheless Petersen reads out of her empirical material exactly the two no longer universal categories (temporality and spatiality) as central to her analysis and to conceptual change in the empirical field. A different problem may occur if one starts by pointing out certain concepts as 'central' to the empirical material: one might need to leave the parsimony of the trinity behind. One example is the way Andersen – to analyse the institutionalization of ideals – conceptualizes a 'narrative order of discourse' arranged around a series of distinctions "which I find to be central" (1994:28; trl. by upg) and ends up with five distinctions: inside/outside, up/down, past/present, subject/object and helper/opponent (1994:28-33). The two last distinctions – which Andersen takes from discourse and narrative theory – are of central to the problematique of this dissertation too.
series of concepts appear central. The dissertation elects to organize the analysis of the interactional self/other policies in a trinity of trinities.

The basic trinity encompassing the three lesser trinities consists of the conditions of possibility for the three grammars of self/other interaction discussed in subsection 3.1.4: Recall that to facilitate Orientalist grammar, spatial distinction needs to be included. And to facilitate Segmentation, temporality needs to be included. Finally, to facilitate Encompassment, intentionality needs to be included. By including these three parameters, the analysis may account for how self/other policy narratives are placed within or beyond the limits of grammatical othering. The way the trinity of parameters of relationality constitutes the conditions of possibility for the three grammars is illustrated in figure 3.20.

![Diagram of Trinities and Parameters]

**Figure 3.20 Basic parameters of relationality**
Diachriticon, temporality and intentionality as conditions of grammatical relations

So the three basic parameters of relationality observed are: spatiality, temporality, and intentionality. Each basic parameter includes yet a trinity of parameters:

- Difference needs to be established *spatially*: What is the relevant *diacriticon* for distinguishing between identity and difference? Is there a *hierarchy*
between identity and difference? Is there a physical distance between identity and difference?

- Spatially differentiated, temporal aspects of the identity/difference-relation may be added: Is the Other said to causally influence the Self? Does the relation have a known history? And what is the historicity of the Other; specifically, is it said to have a capability for change relevant for the relation?

- Finally arises the question of intentionality: Does the Other assume a positive or negative posture in relation to the Self? Is the Other described to embody the free will of an independent agency or is it reduced to mere structural effect when the relation to the self is concerned? And finally is the Other – as the result of combining historicity and agency – characterized by a possible dialogicality; i.e. the capacity of engaging in a two way interaction with a view to possible modification of the relation and the identities? The questions concerning the intentionality of the Other is – of course – mirrored by a self-description of the posture, agency, and dialogicality of the Self in relation to the specific Other.

Each of the questions point to a parameter along which the relation between self and other may be described, adding to the specification of the policies combining the basic grammars for future interaction between self and other at a specific point of time in the narrative. The three groups of parameters are briefly discussed in the following subsections.

3.1.6.1 Parameters of spatiality: diacriticon, hierarchy, distance

This subsection discusses three parameters of spatiality contributing to the construction of a grammar for future interaction: Firstly, it discusses the foundational parameter of diacriticon and the relativization or partial annulment of it implied in the grammars of encompassment and segmentation. Secondly, it discusses two spatial
parameters important to the construction of specific self/other grammars and to the instalment of necessities in these grammars: the parameters of hierarchy and distance.

The double structure of identity as discourse introduced in chapter 2 – identity as void; identity as narrative – has at its base a spatial metaphor. The Orientalist operation of distinguishing between something included as identical and something excluded as different is thought as a spatial operation (cf. Hansen 2006:47): two sorts are allocated to two spatially distinct piles. Both structures combined in the double structure are necessarily constructed spatially. Firstly, when the distinction between identity and difference is made, a void to be filled is left in identity – or as Rumelili puts it: "how we think of 'who we are' are conditioned by prevailing understandings of how one ought to be a self: cohesive, distinct from ... others" (Rumelili, n.d.:4; italics added). Identity involves an effective ideal of solidity and distinction – qualities only imaginable as spatial – and this spatial ideal is left unfulfilled. Secondly, the construction of a narrative is dependent on the distinction between included and excluded as well (Andersen 1994:28-33); otherwise there would be no distinct roles or role-takers: "The simple use of 'we' and 'you' establishes a boundary and is in this respect a condition of possibility determining the capacity to act." (Koselleck 1985:159f) The focal point of the analysis of the foundational parameter of spatial ontology is the diacriticon pointed out as relevant for distinguishing between identity and difference.

What is important to note, is that this foundational, spatial parameter of being distinct – of having a distinct identity; an identity different from other identities – is one of the qualities fought over in identity politics. To uphold distinction is not a given affair – as one may meet a grammar of encompassment through which the other insist that there is no to separate identities: The self claims that the other is identical with the

100 We return to this crucial parameter – the capacity to act – in subsection 3.1.6.3.
self (cf. Hansen 1998:117f). This construction seems on the face of it to be somewhat paradoxical: When accepting that identities appear only as discourse, how may something be constructed simultaneously as identical and different?

The answer is, of course, that discourse never exists in the singular: There will always be struggles over representation. The simultaneous construction of something as identical and different provides, hence, the penultimate basis for internal and external identity politics (cf. subsection 3.3.1): the struggle over what identity discourses should count leaves their mark in the individual narratives partaking in the struggles. Therefore the analysis must be able to observe how the relevance of individual diacritica – and the identities made distinct by the diacritica – varies in different situations (Barth 1969; cf. chapter 2).

The means with which this fight over the relevance of diacritica and identities is conducted include the other parameters of spatiality, temporality, and intentionality as well as the way in which they are combined. Identity may be displaced from the present by being placed in the past or in the future.101 Or a presumptively distinct identity may – along with the relevance of the diacriticon demarcating it – be annulled by being included in an encompassing, hierarchically superior identity.

A second spatial parameter is, as suggested by Koselleck, hierarchy. Most if not all relations between self and other implicitly involve an ordering of self and other in a hierarchy. Or rather; it may order self and other in a number of hierarchies. A vertical positioning of self relative to other – the one over the other or the two on a par with each other – may be ascribed according to more than one criterion. And more hierarchies may be established simultaneously.

Most notably hierarchies of truth, power, and moral value may be constructed to interfere with each other – or they may be constructed to coincide or support each

101 More on this in subsection 3.1.6.2.
other by being entangled beyond disentanglement. For example, opposing hierarchies of strength and worth may be simultaneously implied in the distinction between centre and periphery: The centre may in colonial discourse be strong and good as related to a weak and morally inferior periphery; post-colonial discourse affirms the hierarchy of power while reversing the hierarchy of worth – thus attempting to perform a reconfiguration of the hierarchy of power. Todorov seems to construct his axiological level to describe moral value (Todorov 1999:185; cf. subsection 3.1.1) – but a separate point of his analysis is the way the true, the good, and the powerful often merges in the self-description of the Spaniards. Contrarily, Smith (2003) retells narratives of power, wealth, and ethical worth separately – implying separate hierarchies. Andersen suggests focusing on hierarchies of authority and responsibility (1994:28-33 referring to Bauman 1990:144); both categories which may involve both normative and descriptive qualities. The point to be noted here is that an analysis must be sensitive to different hierarchies possibly constructed simultaneously.

A third spatial parameter is distance. Or, once again; distances in the plural: The territorial distance between us and them may be zero (as we may share a territory) while the social distance is upheld (as they are upholding a 'parallel society' within this shared territory). When Rumelili analyzes the relation between the EU and Turkey, she focuses on the two entities as politico-territorial entities. She may therefore focus on the "social distance maintained between self and other" (2007:38-43) as both 'stay in their territorial place', so to speak: Close, being neighbours – but

102 Chilton seems to go very far to uphold his trinity, as he (2004:54-61) collapses the "epistemic true", the "deontic right" and the "Self-negating Other" into one “composite” scale of “modality” to combine with the two dimensions of space and time. "Modality", as I understand the text, would amount to the 'posture' discussed as part of the parameters of intentionality (in subsection 3.1.6.3).
nevertheless territorially distinct. Other analyses have included – as part of the relation between Europe and Turkey – the construction of Turkish migrants in Germany and other countries; in such a perspective, the territorial and territorial distances combine in altogether different patterns. A crucial and sedimented diacriticon aiming to establish and uphold both social and territorial distance – as well as cultural, legal and other forms of distance – is, of course (as discussed in chapter 2), the national diacriticon.

Important necessity-effects may be achieved from combining spatial parameters: Derrida describes how a superior position in a hierarchy of moral value may be legitimized by (zero) distance (in terms of both space and time) in "ontological" reasoning, i.e. “an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general” (2006[1993]:103). An even more aggressive necessity-effect comes out of linking distance and hierarchies of worth and/or truth in 'universalizing' reasoning: the argument that this is not just true and/or valuable here (as in ontopological reasoning) but true and/or valuable everywhere. A claim to universality in effect places dissent as impossible or illegitimate (cf. Koselleck 1985:161ff).

103 At least distinct when viewed as politico-territorial units. As geographical and historical identities, things are more complicated. Not to mention culture.


106 Koselleck analyses what he terms 'asymmetrical counterconcepts' of selves and others; a narrative involving only two roles which between them exhausts the social universe. It appears very difficult to uphold such a distribution of roles for a protracted period of time – save in the case of a securitization closing down the voice of the other: "It is characteristic of counterconcepts that are unequally antithetical that one's own position is readily defined
In sum: A *diacriticon* for demarcating identity from difference is, on the one hand, the foundational spatial parameter for describing the relation between self and other – and as a consequence hereof it is, on the other hand, fought over in identity politics. Two further spatial parameters – hierarchy and distance – serve as efficient means for installing necessity in the self/other policy narrative. 'We are better/stronger than Them, therefore we may… They are close, therefore we must…'

3.1.6.2 **Parameters of temporality: causality, history, historicity**

Once spatially differentiated, the relational grammar may be temporalized. Any temporalization implies placing the relational grammar in a narrative – but a few basic forms of micro-narratives may be discerned. A relational grammar may, hence, be described along three basic parameters of temporality as it involves causality, history, and historicity.

One basic narrative made possible by a temporalization of the self/other relation – one parameter of temporality in the description of a policy for future interaction – is *causality*: Does the other influence the self – or is its existence inconsequential? An influence may be positive or negative – threatening or 'inspirational' (Triandafyllidou 2002:34; cf. Rumelili 2004). Causality – no matter if positive or negative – implies importance: If the other influences you, it is difficult to ignore the other.

A different parameter of temporality of the relational grammar is that of *history*: Does the relation between self and other have a history? Is the past of the other (and its relation to the self) described as known? Or is it unknown, whether enigmatic or just so far not deemed worthy of interest? Purported knowledge of the other's past may be

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by criteria which make it possible for the resulting counterposition to be only negated.” (Koselleck 1985:163). Symmetrical counterconcepts, to the contrary, may be posed in existential conflict (1985:197), but they may also be peacefully segmented (1985:172f).

107 Notably, causality does not necessarily involve intentionality or agency on behalf of the other. We return to these parameters to in subsection 3.1.6.3.
utilized to project certain futures as more probable than others – or even some futures as certain. Lack of knowledge of the other may spur an urge to study its past and its present. Attempts to get to know – to imagine, project, prognosticate – the future of the other and of the relation will often articulate known pasts of the other.

A third parameter of temporality of the relational grammar is *historicity*: Is the character of the relation between self and other permanent or capable of change? Permanence may be ascribed to both ends of the relation – and/or to the relation itself. In parallel, capability of change may be attached to the self, the other and/or to the relation as such (cf. Hansen 2006:48). Rumelili (2004:37) describes how the historicity of the relation is formed by – and formats – the historicity of both ends to the relation: One option is the permanence of a self/other relation involving a self excluding an other as 'permanently non-self' due to inherent characteristics. A different option is the changing (even dissolving) relation between a self ready to include an other deemed only 'temporarily less-self' due to acquired characteristics. The possible change may occur in the form an unfolding of a predetermined inner logic. Or change may occur as possible due to malleability: Self, other or the relation as such may be describes a changeable; as something self and/or other may work on.

In sum: Three temporal parameters – causality, history, and historicity – serve as efficient means for installing necessity in the the self/other policy narrative: 'They influence Us, therefore we must… We know that They are X, therefore We must…. They never change, therefore We must…'

**3.1.6.3 Parameters of intentionality: agency, posture, dialogicality**

Finally comes the whole point of placing the self/other relation within a narrative. The point is that placing self and other within the parameters of spatiality and temporality makes it possible to observe the relation between self and other as a grammatical relation; as a grammar for interaction. As discussed (in chapter 2 and in subsection 3.1.6.1 and 3.1.6.2), spatial constitution and temporal narration makes it
possible to conceive of self and other as intentional agents posed in relation to each others. Spatial constitution and temporal narration makes three parameters of intentionality possible: agency, posture, and dialogicality.

What is discussed in this subsection as three parameters of intentionality has been conceptualized in numerous analytical configurations. Foucault's archaeology of knowledge (1972) all but discards with any meaningful form of agency by distributing its content to two other categories: Firstly, the category of 'enunciative modality' denotes the place in discourse from which an utterance is uttered (1972:50ff). Secondly, the category of 'strategy' accounts for a broad sense of directedness (1972:64ff). In Foucault, neither enunciative modality nor strategy imply agency as such – except from the 'agency', so to say, performed by the structure determined by its 'strategies'. Such a 'directedness' or 'will' of structure could perhaps better be termed 'intentionality'. Both agents and structure may, in that sense, be endowed with intentionality (cf. Nelson 2003:§19).

In Ricœur's theory of the narrative, spatiality and temporality is organized to facilitate a specific form of intentionality: agency. The question could, with Andersen (1994:28-33), be phrased: Is the entity in question described as a subject capable of manipulating other entities – or solely as a manipulable object? Is an independent subjectivity of some sort ascribed – or is the relation between self and other an attempt at objectification; a reduction of the other to a structural effect bereft of any independent subjectivity? Where the macro-perspective of Foucault's archaeology of knowledge democratically cancels out all agency, the post-colonial problematique par

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108 Others have taken up this conceptualization under the label 'subject position'.

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excellance is, after Saïd (1978) exactly how it may take a specific configuration of the self/other relation to cancel the agency of the other.¹⁰⁹

So ‘intentionality’ as a concept including the directedness of both structure and agency seems, on the one hand, to be somewhat more directed than Foucault's enunciative modality. On the other hand, it is somewhat less specific regarding the direction of the intentions than Hansen's concept of responsibility (cf. subsection 3.1.1). Responsibility is directed towards someone — towards self or towards some other. Intentions do not need to be directed at someone; it may be directed at an object. Furthermore, even intentions which happen to involve an other need not be grounded in an intention measurable on a scale ranging from responsibility towards the other to lack of responsibility towards the other. The intensions may be directed elsewhere and merely coincidentally be involving the other in question. In that situation, ’posture’ may be a better metaphor: An other may be posed aggressively, affirmatively or indifferently towards me without the posture involving any intentions — the posture may be a structural effect or it may be an un-intentional side-effect of intentions directed at someone or something else.

A positive posture may, however, be ascribed to the other as the result of a deliberate choice of the other to assume a positive attitude towards the self. This would amount

¹⁰⁹ Or when viewed bottom up: the possibility of subjectivity under near-total hegemony. Saïd (1978) investigates what might be counted as one extreme case: the near-to completely successful objectification of the colonial subject. On the one hand, the position of the colonial subject in the hierarchy of subjects and objects is so, that it is almost impossible for it to speak (cf. Saïd, 1978:34f). On the other hand Saïd — in an explicit polemics against Foucault (1978:22f; cf. Neumann 1999:15) — insists that the individual author may make a difference. The individual author, that is, who is from the outset empowered by discourse. Spivak (1988) lays out just how difficult it is for the colonial subject to get post-objectification — without leaving the identification with the co-colonized behind. The subaltern may not speak — as subaltern. By acquiring a voice — i.a. by entering academia — the subaltern enters the hegemonic discourse and loses its status as subaltern. Hence, the subaltern remains without voice. As discussed in fn. 79, Bhabha is more optimistic when it comes to possible subaltern agency.
to the role of a helper or even a friend. In parallel, a deliberately negative posture would be that of an opponent or an enemy.\textsuperscript{110} The other may, however, "pose a challenge" (Triandafyllidou 2002:34) without any bad intentions. The other may be described as causally influencing the self by its mere existence – or by its actions or intentions directed elsewhere: Positively, its existence as source of inspiration may pose a challenge. Negatively, its mere existence as a huge power concentration may (even if inattentive to the self) be presented as a threat (Triandafyllidou 2002:34).\textsuperscript{111} Whether a challenge from an other is positive or negative – and whether it occurs as a structural effect or from deliberate agency – it may be constructed to trigger a specific distribution of responsibility for dealing with the challenge on behalf of the Self.

Finally, given the constitution of self and other as distinct entities each endowed with some sort of agency, a third parameter of intentionality becomes possible: \textit{Dialogicality}. This parameter concerns the capability to engage in a two way interaction with a view to possible wilful modification of the relation – and thereby the identities. Is the other engagable or unreachable? Is the self willing to engage in self-reflection? Does it make any sense to try to communicate with the aim of achieving a joint reflexive process concerning the relationship?


\textsuperscript{111} Rumelili's third dimension of the self/other relation concerns, as described in subsection 3.1.1, "how the other responds to the construction of its identity" on a spectrum from recognition to resistance (2004:37f). The effects on the self of the 'response' of the other are not dependent on the 'response' being deliberate or intentional. An (inadvertently) challenging posture may have the same effect as a deliberate negative response worthy of the label 'resistance' – just as an inadvertently reaffirming posture may have the same effect as the deliberate positive response of 'recognition'.

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The concept of dialogicality employed in the dissertation obviously owes to Bakhtin. In Bakhtin, dialogicality is the name for the relationality of every identity. The dissertation moves the quality of dialogicality from the identity to the relation. Dialogicality is a way for the self to construct the relation between the self and the other. To construct a dialogical relation the self must describe both self and other as capable of receiving input. Implied in such a construction is a willingness to (at least reflect on whether self or other should) engage in the self-reform necessary for transformation of the relation. Dialogicality, hence, needs to be founded on agentiality and both sides of a relation between distinct entities.

In sum: The distribution of agency is a crucial parameter of intentionality in the description of the relation between self and other. In its extreme, the distribution of agency sets out two radically different positions from which to protest the construction of the relation: In the position of an object you have no legitimate voice. In the very different position of a subject you have a voice (necessarily limited but nevertheless, you do have a voice). Being crucial, the distribution of agency and subjectivity is – intimately related to identity – fought over in identity politics. Posture is another parameter of intentionality. Especially when configured negatively – as a threat, or even an existential threat – the ascription of a posture to the other

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112 Bakhtin's critique of Hegel is that the relation between self and other in Hegelian dialectics is actually monological as the end point is one of synthesis; of unity: There is, finally, only one voice unfolding (cf. Neumann 1999:14 quoting Kristeva 1986:58). In contrast to dialectics, Bakhtin's position is that every utterance is always dialogical in the sense that more than one voice is present. Even if there is not more than one voice explicitly present, then more voices are at least present as the implicit context (past and future) which the speaker is inadvertently orienting himself to. Nevertheless, an utterance may "postulate" to perform "a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular 'own' language … as well as a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual" (Bakhtin 1981:269). In that sense, according to Bakhtin, 'centripetal forces' postulating monologue and 'centrifugal forces' revealing dialogicality meet in every utterance (1981:270-2).
may serve as an effective means for installing necessity in the self/other narrative. Necessities installed are, as mentioned, generally potential points of conflict. But necessities installed by the means of pointing out existential threats, however, are especially tricky points of conflict: When the posture of an other is described as existentially threatening to the self, it is (as may be recalled from subsection 3.1.3) next to impossible to construct the relation along the third parameter of intentionality: dialogicality. This third parameter of intentionality in the construction of the relational policy – dialogicality – is potentially decisive for the dynamics of interaction as it opens the possibility of a joint self-reflexive management of the relation. (This line of reasoning is pursued in section 3.3).

First, however, the analytical lenses focused on identity as a discursive structure constructed in this section need to be summed up (in subsection 3.1.7) and the analytical lenses to focus on the articulation of identity as discursive action needs to be constructed (in section 3.2).

3.1.7 **Self/Other policy narratives inviting or averting the agency of the other**

The task assigned to this section was to account theoretically for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from identity as discursive structure. It did so by analyzing how self/other policy narratives may be structured to imply different grammars for future interaction between self and other.

The section described the form of a self/other policy narrative to consist in the combination of two structures: The structure of temporality of a policy narrative (developed in chapter 2) – and the structure of a self/other relation. It did so to facilitate a focus on the implied future interaction between self and other. The specific future envisioned by a policy is grammatical insofar as it involves a combination of three basic grammars: a) a grammar of distinguishing self from other (Orientalism), b) a grammar of acting on behalf of the other (Encompassment) and c)
a grammar producing knowledge of the self/other relation (Segmentation). Analysing the self/other relation constructed by looking for the implied combination of interactional grammars means focusing the analysis on the conditions for future interaction between self and other. In combination, the three grammars delimit a realm of policies which allow future interaction between two distinct entities – and three distinct ways in which the future envisioned may not include a relation between self and other.

A series of obvious candidates for contributions to radicalizations appear in this map of self/other policy narratives:

Firstly, any policy interfering with the agency of the other – by Encompassment insisting on acting on behalf of the other – is more likely than not to meet some kind of resistance.

Secondly, any policy legitimated by an Orientalist mirroring of a positively valued self with a negatively valued other would seem to invite protest.

Thirdly, policies combining Orientalism and Encompassment in prescribing violent disengagement from the other – in the form of securitization or outright categorical killings – are likely to be perceived as threatening by the other.

Fourthly, the two assimilatory policies – other-assimilation and self-assimilation – warrants further consideration: Other-assimilation appeared as the paradoxical reaction of the Orientalist self faced with hybridity. Self-assimilation appeared as the paradoxical reaction of the Encompassing self faced with paralysis. These policies may provoke an other who wants the relation intact as a relation between two distinct wills.

Finally, the very flexibility of Segmentation – allowing oscillation between in- and exclusion – might frustrate those who want to conclude identity politics.
Even if such a series of obvious candidates for contributions to radicalization present
themselves, the section cannot finish the account of contributions from identity as a
discursive structure. The reason is that no structure can produce a conflict by itself;
conflict only comes with the response of an other. Therefore, the chapter needs to
put the final account of the contributions to radicalization of conflict from discursive
structure aside for section 3.3. In this final section the policy narratives articulated by
the self meets the response of the other in identity politics. How conflictual this
meeting turns out to be, hinges not only on the relation *per se* narrated between self
and other. It hinges also on how the narrative is articulated with necessity. So before
we may turn to discursive interaction the dissertation needs to consider the
contribution to radicalization of conflict from the discursive articulation of identity
with necessity.

Subsection 3.1.6 has already begun this discussion by noting how self/other policy
narratives could be articulated with necessity by constructing the synchronic relation
between self and other along certain parameters in specific ways. More gener-
ally, the subsection discussed how specific combinations of interactional grammars are
narrated along a series of parameters of spatiality, temporality, and intentionality to
legitimise various policies of the self towards the other. Figure 3.21 summarizes how
a grammar for future interaction between a self and an other may be described along
the three types of parameters. Section 3.2 continues the discussion of how necessity
may be articulated to various elements of self/other policy narratives. In other words,
the two proceeding sections account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict
from the articulation of identity with necessity and from identity politics.

113 To take an extreme example; a genocidal self/other relation in which the self describes
the other as existentially threatening the other and projects a future concluding with
'categorical killings'. Such a way of narrating the relation immediately appears as a way of
radicalizing conflict. In principle, however, even to securitization an answer exists which
would defuse conflict: If the other commits suicide, there is no conflict.
We
They
Temporality:
• History
• Historicity
• Causality
Spatiality:
• Difference
• Hierarchy
• Distance
Intentionality:
• Agency
• Posture
• Dialogicality
Policy:
• Agency
• Posture
• Dialogicality

Figure 3.21 Parameters of relational grammar
A relation between self and other may be described along three parameters of spatiality, three parameters of temporality and three parameters of intentionality.

3.2 Articulations of identity radicalizing conflict: Installing necessity

As discussed in chapter 2, discursive action includes the rational, failed rational, as well as irrational aspects of the attempts by discursively constituted subjects at reconstituting and reproducing discursive structures. Articulation of identity is the subcategory of discursive action aimed at the discursive structure of identity. The aim of articulating identity is the distribution of subjectivity by the constitution of new identities and by the ongoing narration of existing identity.

This section sets out to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the articulation of identity. Specifically, the section asks:

ii. How may identity be articulated to necessity to contribute to radicalization of conflict?

To answer the question, the focus needs to be on the articulation of identity with a view to observe how subjects may strategically seek to install necessity in the self/other policy narratives they promote. Necessity, firstly, has the potential effect of
stopping internal identity politics. If necessity is installed, certain elements of the narratives are presented as 'non-negotiables'. Necessity therefore, secondly, has the potential effect of closing down – as far as concerns the necessitated element – the possibility of self-reform, self-reflection and dialogicality in relation to the other; i.e. in external identity politics. Necessity successfully installed stops debate internally – and it attempts to limit the space of co-narration of the other. If the other does not accept to be muted on the element invested with necessity, the instalment of necessity transports conflict from internal identity politics to external identity politics. Figure 3.22 illustrates the effect of articulating necessity to a narrative.\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure3_22.png}
\caption{Self/other policy narrative articulated to necessity}
\end{figure}

Consistency is projected into future articulations of narratives by the agent

Necessity may be installed in a policy narrative in various ways: As pointed out in subsection 3.1.6, necessity may be installed via the formation of the self/other policy narrative as such; i.e. via the specific way in which the relation constructed between self and other presents itself as an interactional grammar. I.a. when Their posture is described as threatening to Us; or when Their presence in a territory described as

\textsuperscript{114} When read in continuation of figure 2.7.
Ours is presented as a infringement of our rights or our identity. These – and other – ways of relating Them and Us are presenting specific elements as necessary to include in the future narration of the relation.

This section investigates two further ways in which elements may be presented as necessary in the continued narration of a relation. Firstly, necessity may be articulated via the temporalization of a narrative. Necessity articulated by temporalization is discussed in subsection 3.2.1. Secondly necessity may be installed via the articulation of the inertia of sedimented discourse. This way of articulating necessity – not in but to the structure of the self/other policy narrative – is the focus for subsection 3.2.2.

3.2.1 Installing necessity by the temporalization of narratives

Chapter 2 noted how narratives may be narrativized when it "feigns to make the world speak of itself and speak itself as a story." (White 1980:6-7) In this way, narrativizing discourse installs necessity in the world by letting the world tell how things are or will be articulated – rather than presenting how things are being articulated to form the world. Chapter 2 took this as an occasion to generally focus the analysis of the dissertation on such articulating away of the articulation. The overall modus of analysis is to uncover the way elements are made necessary by covering up the way they are made necessary.

The most basic way of constructing necessity in a narrative is to fixate one specific future as the inescapable consequence of the past: simple cause and effect. Such a 'causal necessity' annuls the policy character of the narrative. It does not rule out action. It just leaves action futile as it will have no effect; the effect being determined by the cause in the past. Not a very bright prospect for a politician who, by trade, earns his living from proposing action under the name of policy. Such a temporalization places too much weight on the past to appear satisfactory in modernity: It cancels out the sense that our actions now may have an effect. If the
past determines, we are – as a collective – out of control. However, a series of more complex temporalities are available to a measured narrating away of the narrating present by discursively re-allocating primacy to either the past or the future.

Koselleck describes the modern ideologies – the -isms – as programs for the future with disregard for the past: The necessity of the future projected by these -isms comes from an explicitly made choice awarding more value to this future than to that future. It seems even today that in most political debates references to courses of events more than a couple of decades ago come across as peculiar. In some debates, these modern '-isms' live on.

As a politician you may, however, prefer a different version of necessity than the necessity of cause and effect or a necessity depending on a choice. You might prefer a 'you would be stupid not to'-necessity. In this kind of necessity, the narrative is structured by grasping together a past with a policy proposed in the present leading to a future goal which is implicitly constructed as undisputed. Necessity comes not as un-avoidable; neither does it come as the result of a choice; it comes across as unobservable.

115 Koselleck describes how this is implicated in the modern temporality of progress: the past is largely irrelevant as 'everyone knows' that 'everything has changed' (cf. Koselleck 1985:277). Specifically, the '-isms' which turned Modernity into a programme are "[c]oncepts of movement [which] ... open a new future. ... All concepts of movement share a compensatory effect, which they produce. The lesser the experimental substance, the greater the expectations joined to it. The lesser the experience, the greater the expectations: this is the formula for the temporal structure of the modern, to the degree that it is rendered a concept by 'progress'." (Koselleck 1985:288). Koselleck explains the conditions of possibility of the progressive –isms with "[T]echnical innovations and discoveries in early modernity" which made for "a consciousness of difference between traditional experience and coming expectation." (Koselleck 1985:277). Hence, "[t]he opening of a new horizon of expectation via the effects of what was later conceived as 'progress'" moved "[t]he objective of possible completeness, previously only attainable in the Hereafter, [so that it] henceforth served the idea of improvement on earth ... Henceforth history could be regarded as a long-term process of growing fulfilment which ... was ultimately planned and carried out by men themselves. ... the effects anticipated by plan or prognosis became the titles of legitimation of political action" (Koselleck 1985:278-9).
unquestionably good. There are alternatives – but they are not a question of choice; they are unquestionably bad. Therefore present action is necessary – and the direction of the present action is necessary. In this version of necessity the articulating present is not totally wiped out, but it is all but dominated by the necessity of the future articulated. The effect of this way of constructing necessity is to legitimize the proposed policy – and to de-legitimize any alternatives (whether they are mentioned explicitly or only implied). The result is de-politicized narratives advocating that what is left of lesser choices should be left to those best capable of managing the road to the future implicitly accepted by all.

But the -isms of modernity and the technical narratives are supplemented with new -isms of postmodernity. As Friedman has poetically put it:

"Modernity moves east, leaving postmodernity in its wake; religious festival, ethnic renaissance, roots and nationalism are resurgent as modernist identity becomes increasingly futile in the West. In the ... confusion, ...the periphery and margins of the system also react in ... a complex combination of Third and Fourth world strategies. (Friedman 1992:360)

As indicated by the words chosen – renaissance, roots – the temporality of these movements are different from the typical modern temporality described by Koselleck:

Taken at face value, the temporality of some of these new -isms is circular rather than linear: They propose not the constitution of a future Utopia but the *re-storation* of a lost Golden Age.\textsuperscript{116} It goes without saying that a construction of such a Golden Age to be restored relies heavily on a present narrating away of past experience.

\textsuperscript{116} Like the typical nationalist narrative, according to Smith (1991:161; cf. Gad 2005:81f). Hence, a narrative of restoration does not conform to the temporality of historical myth, which is still linear: myths, according to Kølvrå, "do not simply contrast a pre-communitarian chaos to a utopian present, but, as an integral part of ideology, they project
A very different – and more extreme – way of dealing with the past consists in making experience totally irrelevant. If the point of arrival is the only sure thing, then the point of departure looses significance. As 'religious festival' has returned as resonance room for policy formulations, this *eschatological* temporal figure has made a surprising comeback.\footnote{Koselleck describes how this temporality worked for the Puritans as they "draw their overwhelming force from anticipation of the future; since this was not susceptible to refutation through contrary experience, it was constantly open to repetition. That which today is ruled out by negation will be regarded in the future as superseded. A dualism temporalized in this manner sorts out possible experiences and opens up a horizon of expectation that is quite elastic." (Koselleck 1985:186).}

Yet another way to prioritize the future in the articulation of a narrative makes the need to analytically dissect the attempted closure even more pertinent: the *security* narrative. Recall (from chapter 2) the difference between the way in which individual and collective identities narrates towards death: Authentic individuals, according to Heidegger, narrate-towards-certain-death – collective subjectivities, according to Campbell, narrate-to-postpone-indefinite-death. One specific modality of articulating collective identity might, however, implicate narration-towards-death in its narration-to-postpone-death. A narrative which *securitizes* an identity – by pointing out an existential threat to the identity along with the means to avert the threat – tells how we may to survive as ourselves (Wæver 1994) when confronted with otherwise certain 'death'.\footnote{Buzan et al. note as "a trivial but rarely noticed feature of security arguments: They are about the future, about alternative futures – always hypothetical – and about counterfactuals. A security argument always involves two predictions: What will happen if we do not take 'security action' (the threat), and what will happen if we do" (1998:32).}

A security narrative directs the narrative towards a single *immediate utopia* into the future." (Kølvrå 2009:37). Whether Utopia is placed in the present or in the future, the movement from chaos to Utopia is still linear. In contrast the recreation of a lost golden age constructs temporality as circular.

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117 Koselleck describes how this temporality worked for the Puritans as they "draw their overwhelming force from anticipation of the future; since this was not susceptible to refutation through contrary experience, it was constantly open to repetition. That which today is ruled out by negation will be regarded in the future as superseded. A dualism temporalized in this manner sorts out possible experiences and opens up a horizon of expectation that is quite elastic." (Koselleck 1985:186).

118 Buzan et al. note as "a trivial but rarely noticed feature of security arguments: They are about the future, about alternative futures – always hypothetical – and about counterfactuals. A security argument always involves two predictions: What will happen if we do not take 'security action' (the threat), and what will happen if we do" (1998:32).
almost present – end with the aim of avoiding it. A security narrative, hence, includes both kinds of narration in the shadow of death – the narration-towards-death and the narration-to-postpone death. And their combination conceals the quality of the narrative as a policy narrative involving different possible futures. The concealment is achieved by two means: Firstly, by means of an extreme version of the 'you-would-be-stupid-not-to-necessity' effectively cancelling out any alternative policy proposals: If we do not follow this policy proposal, we will not be here to remedy our mistake. Secondly, by means of the urgency created by placing the expectational horizon of the future – beyond which it is impossible to see – very close to the present: If we do not stop talking and act now, it will be too late.

Table 3.1 summarizes the different ways in which self/other policy narratives may be articulated with necessity by temporalization. The temporalizations tilt the weight of the narrative away from the present articulation – mainly towards the future, but by installing specific constancies also towards the past.

In sum, the future bears most of the weight when the various forms of narrativizing narratives conceal their articulation. Nevertheless, they depend on the past. Most often they rely on the construction of specific constancies to be decisive: Even if 'everything changes', 'We' are identical with the ones we have always been – or 'They' are inescapably as we know that they have always been. The installation of such a specific permanence works as a necessity delimiting the ongoing narration. Not in the sense that it determines or defines the future in toto – but in the sense that it makes certain futures impossible. Certain futures are impossible since certain elements are immune to policy. This kind of temporalization relies on the articulation of

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119 In contrast to the temporal structure of a myth which (as discussed in chapter 2) directs the narrative towards a single end in the distant future with the aim of achieving it.

120 Subsection 3.1.4 argued that this temporal structure characteristic of security narratives is connected to the way securitization works as a limit to grammatical self/other-relations.
sedimented discourse. The construction of specific constancies depend on the articulation to self/other narratives of taken-for-granted ideas of what the world looks like, which is not part of the discursive structure of a self/other narrative as such. This installation of necessity via the articulation of sedimentation is the focus for subsection 3.2.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporality</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
<th>Necessity produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cause-effect</strong></td>
<td>Defining</td>
<td>Action irrelevant</td>
<td>Defined</td>
<td>Necessity of future produced by necessity of past.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Progressive  
  –isms**         | Of little importance      | Action crucial but dependent on choice | **Oughtology**: explicitly good  
                        |                           |                          | **Oughtnotology**: explicitly bad                       | Necessity of action dependent on choice of oughtology |
| **You would be stupid not to** | Given                  | Action obvious           | **Oughtology**: implied universal validity  
                        |                           |                          | **Oughtnotology**: delegitimized                         | Necessity of action made obvious by implied universal validity of goal |
| **Restoration**   | Defining                  | Action defined           | **Oughtology**: defined by future-as-past  
                        |                           | by future-as-past        | **Oughtnotology**: delegitimized                         | Necessity of action made obvious and validity of goal implied by future-as-past |
| **Eschatology**   | Irrelevant                | Action irrelevant        | **Oughtology**: necessary  
                        |                           | or determined            | **Oughtnotology**: impossible                           | Necessity of future self-referential                      |
| **Security**      | Given                     | Action crucial           | **Oughtology**: implicit universal validity  
                        |                           | and necessitated by     | **Oughtnotology**: explicitly catastrophic               | Necessity of action and validity of goal explicitly co-constituted by reference to oughtnotology |
| **Specific  
  constancy** | Delimiting                | Action limited by        | Certain elements defined    | Necessity of certain elements make certain futures impossible |
                        |                           | past                      |                             |                                                         |

Table 3.1 Different types of necessity produced by different temporalizations
3.2.2 Installing necessity by articulating materialities

Subsection 3.1.6 pointed out how necessity may be implied in the specific way in which the relation constructed between self and other presents itself as an interactional grammar. In that sense, it focused on the necessities articulated as present in the present relation between self and other. Subsection 3.2.1 discussed how necessity may be articulated to the narrative via temporalization concentrating on ways which tilt the weight of the narrative to the future. This subsection focus on the articulation of necessities of the past: It discusses how necessity may be installed in a narrative via the articulation of the inertia of sedimented discourse.

The point of departure for the discussion in this section is that both agency and structure – as noted in subsection 2.2.2 – has to do with a will. Both agency and structure always have a direction: Agency wants to direct structure in a certain direction. And structure harbours inertia in the way it facilitates some kinds of action and impedes other kinds. Structure directs in a combination of two ways: Firstly, structure is formatted to direct in a specific direction. Secondly, however, structure directs in the direction it is formatted to direct by the force of the inertia inscribed in it. Agency may seek both to re-format the structure and it may seek to install new inertia.

This subsection, firstly, briefly discusses a series of metaphors employed to account for inertia: recursivity, sedimentation, institutions, and materiality. Secondly, the subsection presents three ways in which necessity may be installed in narratives via the articulation of materiality: the naturalization of objects, the formalization of language, and the interpellation of subjectivity.

The point of departure for the dissertation is that the individual speech act is recursive cf. Andersen 2003b:319): This means, on the one hand, that it is capable of articulating itself to previous operations. It may seek recourse in the authority of established discourse. On the other hand, to have made a lasting mark, it is dependent
on future speech acts to articulate themselves to it. It needs to establish itself as something which other speech acts seek recourse to.

It is, however, crucial to what previous structures the speech act is articulated – how the new intervention is framed. The basic mechanism of framing as a discursive strategy is to place a thing, event or utterance in some category, on the basis of which action may then be taken (Brown & Yule 1983: ch.7.6). The thing, event or utterance is articulated to discourse in a specific way – facilitating some possible consecutive articulations while marginalising others. By contextualizing an object, a specific world is created as relevant for it; a specific ontology is instituted.121

But what are the conditions of this politics of framing? What structures are more prone to be articulated than others? What articulatory attempts are more likely to succeed than others?

Foucault describes in the abstract how discourses may be layered as he describes how

[a] whole group of relations forms a principle of determination that permits or excludes, within a given discourse, a certain number of statements: these are conceptual systematizations, enunciative series, groups and organizations of objects that might have been possible (and of which nothing can justify the absence at the level of their own rules of formation), but which are excluded by a discursive constellation at a higher level and in a broader space. (1972:67)

Also in the abstract, Laclau employ Husserl's metaphor of sedimentation when he conceptualises the layered character of discourse: "any political construction takes place against the background of a range of sedimented practices" (Laclau 1990:35). A conclusion to a question on one level of discourse may be sought by recourse to a

121 The means of framing may be subtle: A narrative may be condensed into a single metaphor implicating the self/other relation relation and the narrative (Mottier 2000; 2008).
more sedimented layer of discourse (cf. Kosselleck 1985:285): The answer may be inferred from a more sedimented discourse (Fairclough 1992:84).  

If we, however, ask Laclau what accounts for the conjunctional sedimentation of this – as opposed to that – discursive constellation; or what accounts for the articulation of this – as opposed to that element, the response is highly generic "The answer is: the unevenness of the social." (Laclau 1996:43)  

Laclau passes lightly over a

122 Holm (1993; 2001a; 2001b) and Wæver (2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2004) combines Foucault's idea of layered discourses with Laclau's metaphor of sedimentation to facilitate a study of the compatibility of national identities permitting European integration. Compared with Foucault's general statement, Holm & Wævers intervention consists in a formalization of the relations between the levels – and in the re-introduction of the actor. The point of departure for Wæver's intervention is that in (post-)structuralist analysis the meaningfulness of orders (whether labeled 'epistemes', 'discourses', or 'structures') are approached synchronously. In such a situation, change may only be conceptualized as a 'leap' to the next synchronous snapshot. By introducing a concept of the layered quality of discursive structure – by "placing the discourses as Foucauldian boxes inside each other" "placere diskurserne som Foucauldianske kasser indeni hinanden" an analysis of change within continuity (up to a certain point) is allowed (2000b:286f). Furthermore a conceptualization is achieved in which opposition to dominating discourse and marginalized discourses may be incorporated at a deeper level: Political opponents and competing hegemonic projects need to relate to each others and to the same elements if they want to advance on each others (2000b:286f). If an actor is caught between two discourses the least rigid one will be modified (2000b:287, 293). Wæver intimates that the metaphor of 'deeper' and 'surface' does not implicate that 'deeper layers' of discourse are more true or that they are binding for 'surface' discourse – the 'depth' refers only to the degree of sedimentation (2000b:287).

123 As two distinguished Laclauians explain: "social logics are always contextual entities, arising in particular historical and political circumstances. This means we can add little more to social logics by way of conceptual substance at this level of abstraction" (Glynos & Howarth 2007:137). Laclau generally privileges political processes (Corry 2000:17) over social structures (Thomsen 1997:kap.5). The political is ascribed primacy in the sense that all social relations are constituted through political practice (Jensen 1997:189; Torfing 1999:69ff). Laclau seems, on this background, to focus his theoretical investigations on these processes of politicization. In other words, Laclau does not award great attention to the processes of de-politicization leaving certain discourses unproblematic and, specifically, the qualities of discourse which keeps certain elements unproblematicized. This tendency might be explained by the point of departure of the theory in critical, Marxist discourse: Firstly, Laclau continues the critical ambition by focusing on the emancipatory effects of politicization (Torfing 1999:96, 247f; Bech Dyrberg et al. 2000b:337). Secondly,
theoretical problematique crucial for practical analysis: the specification of the “relative degrees of institutionalization of the social” (Laclau 1990:223, italics in original). To account for the varying inertia of sedimentations or institutions, we need to look beyond Laclau.

In his presentation of discourse theory Neumann suggests institutions to be conceptualized as “symbol based programmes which regulates social interaction and has a materiality” (Neumann 2001:80). Materiality, according to Neumann, is an important source of inertia in discourse. Neumann takes his departure in the dictum that the main point of discourse analysis is to provide a method which is capable of analysing the linguistic and the material in one holistic perspective. This is done by understanding discourse as both a linguistic and a material phenomenon. (Neumann 2001:81)

The background in the Marxist logic of determination makes the establishing of the autonomy of politics particularly important (Torfing 1999:ch.1). The under-theoretization of the structure has especially been criticized as it has contributed to the impression of an 'unbearable lightness of postmodernity'. It has been taken to imply that the always-already structured point of departure for discursive politics only has little influence (Thomsen 1997:kap.5) as the inertia involved in discursive structures is played down. It is in this vein that Laclau may be criticized for studying politics in an institutional vacuum (cf. Bech Dyrberg & Torfing 1995:120).

124 "Symbolbaserte programmer som regulerer sosial samhandling og som har en materialitet" (Neumann 2001:80).
125 "Hovedpoenget med diskursanalyse er å frembringe en metode som kan analysere det sproglige og det materielle i et helhetsperspektiv. Dette gjøres ved å forstå diskurs som både et sproglig og et materielt fenomen" (Neumann 2001:81) Neumann refers to the infamous passage where Laclau & Mouffe deals with the question of materiality. Let us, for once, quote the passage at length: "The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought ... the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists ... we will affirm the material character of every discursive structure. ... What constitutes a differential position and therefore a relational identity certain linguistic elements, is not the idea of the building-stone ... but the building-stone ... as such. ... The linguistic and non-linguistic elements are not merely juxtaposed, but
But just because you insist on analysing linguistic and material elements in a holistic perspective, "the difference between the linguistic and the material does not disappear for that reason." (Neumann 2001:81)\(^{126}\) To the contrary; "The material world resists when one tries to change it" (2001:80),\(^ {127}\) and hence,

Material objects are hard (but, as most of us know from experience, not impossible) to 'explain away'. Therefore certain representations will be more inert when they are subjected to attempts to change them; signs which are 'good to think with' ... and representations of material objects will often be among them. (2001:66)\(^ {128}\)

But how does it matter that discourse is material? And how does it matter that discourse is embodied in different ways; in different forms of materiality? These questions are often left out of focus – even if they are central to the study of the

constitute a differential and structured system of positions – that is, a discourse. The differential positions include, therefore a dispersion of very diverse material elements. ... The practice of articulation ... cannot consist of purely linguistic phenomena; but must instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discourse is structured." (1985:109). While short versions of the quote are often taken to mean that the distinction between material and non-material does not matter – the passage actually says that it does matter that discourse is material. Still, the division between materiality and non-materiality is only available to us through the rhetorical invocation of it. As Miller’s recollection of the Western tradition of thinking on materiality shows, it is a matter of philosophical self-positioning whether it is the materiality as such or the discursive construction of the concept and limits of materiality in a specific instance which induces the inertia of materiality in discourse (cf. Miller 2005). Even if materiality ‘as such’ does not matter, the Western tradition of thinking materiality as given is so sedimented that its invocation installs inertia. Things accepted as material are endowed with a *ceteri paribus* constancy.


\(^{127}\) "Den materielle verden gjør modstand, når man forsøker å forandre den." (Neumann 2001:80).

\(^{128}\) "Materielle gjenstander er vanskelige (men, som de fleste vet av egen erfaring, ikke umuligt) å 'bortforsklare'. Enkelte representasjoner vil altså være tregere å forandre enn andre; tegn som er 'gode å tenke med’ ... og representasjoner af materielle gjenstander vil ofte være blant disse." (Neumann 2001:86).
sedimentation of discourse and thereby to the study or discursive articulations dependent on sedimented discourse.

Materiality endows institutions with inertia in at least three basic ways relevant for this dissertation: Firstly, discourse may acquire materiality as physical objects are structured to facilitate and impede specific patterns of social interaction (Neumann 2001:85). Secondly, structures of meaning become observable for the analyst as they acquire the materiality of writing and speaking as media for language (cf. Neumann 2001:80-3). Thirdly, individual cognitive structures based on experience with social interaction might constitute a ‘materiality of the mind’. The subsection concludes by very briefly discussing each of the three materializations and the way their articulation installs necessity in narratives.

Firstly, the *naturalization* of objects. If a discourse has articulated materiality by an adaption of the physical structures to the social practice prescribed by discourse it is more difficult to alter the discourse in question. Or as Hajer puts it: "[P]eople do things with words ... settings do things with people too." (Hajer 2006:72) Correspondingly, a speech act may seek to install necessity in a narrative by articulating the materiality of naturalized objects: On the one hand, the articulation naturalizes the objects which are implied to exist. On the other hand, the objectivity of the objects implied appears in the narrative as something necessary. Some things cannot be denied; these things need to be accounted for in any attempt to continue the narrative.\(^{129}\)

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\(^{129}\) When you arrive at an airport, you have to present the physical object of a passport identifying you. If you cannot, certain social practices will place your body in a proscribed physical environment. In parliament, partially distinct physical infrastructures are available to MPs, to the general public, and to various categories of officials in between. Only MPs will, e.g., be allowed to speak in the plenary sessions.
Secondly, the formalization of language.\textsuperscript{130} Formality involves making structures of meaning explicit. It often means writing the structures down, i.e. endowing them with a specific form of materiality.\textsuperscript{131} The result of explication is a reduction of the degree of ambiguity. Furthermore formalization often implies a prioritization of procedure over substance.\textsuperscript{132} Formalization in isolation would probably make the discourse more inert by making unintended, incremental change more difficult.\textsuperscript{133} The result of 'making explicit' might, however, sometimes contrarily be an increased reflectivity which could facilitate decisive change. In this way formalization could actually decrease the inertia of discourse. A speech act may seek to install necessity in a narrative by articulating the materiality of formalized writing: On the one hand, the articulation could claim that 'we should not have this substantial discussion; we should just adhere to the established conclusion or follow the established procedures for concluding the matter'. On the other hand, any such recurrence to formality reproduces the conclusions and procedures for recurrence at a later stage in time. The

\\textsuperscript{130} Neumann (2001:84) warns that the classic distinction between formal and informal institutions has been awarded too much weight, so that entire disciplines of the social sciences have made themselves blind to the one or the other side of the distinction. Formality, however, does make a difference. Not necessarily if one is concerned with the substantive form of configuration of the discourse and its institutions, norms or roles – but definitively if one is concerned with the inertia of the discourse.

\textsuperscript{131} Within certain settings even the materiality of oral speech will do.

\textsuperscript{132} These elements summing up to a definition of formalization is taken from Andersen (1994:34), who as a final element in the definition includes an articulation to systems of sanction (judiciary systems at the societal level or internal bodies of e.g. an organization). The subsection returns to this question immediately below when discussing the third way of articulating materiality (interpellation).

\textsuperscript{133} Hajer notes that "In political reality, to argue against routinized understandings is to argue against the institutions that function on the basis of specific, structured, cognitive commitments. ... Although it seems true to say that institutions function only to the extent that they are constantly reproduced in actual practices, these routinized institutional practices tend to have a high degree of salience." (Hajer 1995:57-8).
articulation, thus, seeks to isolate certain elements from re-narration: They are (written down) as they should continue to be.

Thirdly, the *interpellation* of subjectivity: Once a subject is discursively constituted as a set of roles, expectations, and as a space of agency,\(^{134}\) this subjectivity involves an instinct of self-preservation. (cf. Neumann 2001:164).\(^{135}\) A speech act may seek to install inertia in a narrative by articulating such pre-established subjectivity. As discussed in chapter 2, a certain level of 'consistency' is demanded of the subject. The problem, of course, is who defines in relation to what the consistency is required. Althusser discussed the articulation of the subject as *interpellation*; the speaking a subject *into* its place (cf. Mouffe 1997a:24). In the language of institutionalism, interpellation aims at defining which appropriateness is to frame the 'logic of appropriateness' for the thus interpellated subject. Interpellation structures materiality and interaction towards the reception of the actions of the once-constituted subject: Both other subjects but also material infrastructure are *expecting* a once-constituted subject to act – and act in some ways rather than in other ways. In that sense, interpellation seeks to install inertia in a narrative by making a subject continue the narration according to specified necessities. If interpellation works, the necessities are not a problem; they are just naturalized. Section 3.3, however, discusses how 'failing' necessities may contribute to radicalization of conflict if interpellation does *not* work in a straight forward way.

\(^{134}\) No matter how the constitution of a subject is conceptualized; as the result of a constitutive antagonism, as a differential inscription of a subject position, or as the recurring-but-ever-failing identification with a lack.

\(^{135}\) Andersen includes in his definition of formalization and institutionalization of ideals that they are 'sanctioned' (Andersen 1994:34-5). If there were no inertia of the subject, the concept of sanctions would make no sense
3.2.3 Articulating identity to stop debate – displacing identity politics

This section has discussed the instalment of necessity through temporalization of narratives and through the articulation of narratives with materiality.

Necessity may be installed in a narrative by a temporalization: If the past or the future is articulated as decisive for the narrative, the importance of the present articulatory operation is concealed. Necessity may be installed in a narrative by configuring physical objects to support it: The objects are, simultaneously, naturalized. Necessity may be installed in a narrative by formalizing it; by inscribing it with the materiality of speech or written text. Necessity may be installed in a narrative by interpellating pre-constituted subjects to partake in it. If sufficient inertia is engaged, necessity-effects may stop internal debate on elements of the narrative or the narrative in toto.

If you, however, structure your action so that it promotes a narrative in which the other is ascribed agency, you inscribe the inertia of the subjectivity of the other in your narrative: You invite the other to partake in the continued narration of the narrative – but the other's co-narration may follow its own directions. As the inertia of the subjectivity of the other does not necessarily point in the same direction as the inertia of other elements inscribed in the narrative to stop internal debate, the result may be a radicalization of conflict in external identity politics. Or in other words: The result may be the displacement of conflict from internal to external identity politics. Therefore section 3.3 now proceeds to discuss how to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from dynamics inherent in identity politics.

3.3 Identity politics radicalizing conflict: Spill over and feed backs from conflictual co-authorship

As discussed in chapter 2 identity politics involves the dynamics and feed backs between the attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity.
These dynamics between the attempts at redistribution of subjectivity are, on the one hand, recurrently political as they appear in conflict. On the other hand, political conflicts may be diverted by segmentation of interaction or by performing the articulation of identity ambiguously.

This section sets out to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from identity politics. Therefore, it asks the question:

iii. *How may dynamics in identity politics be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict?*

To answer the question, the section needs to focus on identity politics with a view to discerning connections to the structures of identity and to the articulation of identity but also possible radicalizing dynamics at the level of interaction itself. More specifically, the section explains how policy narratives may serve as radically different invitations to the other to partake in the continued narration of the relation. Special attention is given, firstly, to how self/other policies may interpellate grammatically or anti-grammatically in ways which radicalize conflict according to distinct dynamics. Secondly, attention is given to how narratives may be told in a way which makes them particularly sensitive to counter-narratives feeding back and how distinct sensitivities may contribute to radicalization and de-radicalization respectively.

First, however, subsection 3.3.1 argues that the very attempt to constitute a distinction between inside and outside – between internal and external identity politics – necessarily generates conflict. The argument takes its point of departure in the analysis of the points of diffraction of three basic grammars for future interaction between self and other: Orientalism, Encompassment, Segmentation (as discussed in subsection 3.1.4). More specifically, the point is that the points of diffraction on the one hand facilitate the meeting of the three basic grammars in the three combined policies of Dialogue, Monologue and Agonism. But, on the other hand, these
combined policies are systematically conceived of as internal affairs when approached from one of the basic grammars conspiring to produce the policy – and as external affairs when approached from the other basic grammar.

The proceeding subsections takes up the two main analytical concepts developed in the discussions of identity as structure and identity as articulation: the grammars for self/other interaction involved in self/other narratives (from section 3.1) and the necessity articulated to self/other narratives (from section 3.2). The point of taking up the discussion of the lenses is to specify the identity political dynamics which the grammars and the necessity may set off. Subsection 3.3.2 discusses how the policies for future self/other interaction may interpellate the other grammatically or anti-grammatically – with different conflict dynamics as result. Subsection 3.3.3 discusses how the articulation of – or the lack of – necessity to self/other narratives may transport conflict from internal identity politics to external identity politics.

A final subsection (3.3.4) discusses the possible ways in which a self/other relation may turn reflexive – facilitated by insight, agreement, and dialogicality – and the possible contribution of reflexivity to the de-radicalization of conflicts. Subsection 3.3.5 sums up the consequences of the discussion of identity political dynamics in terms of analytical strategy.

### 3.3.1 The distinction internal/external as conflict generator

Chapter 2 noted how the nation state historically has been relatively successful in claming a monopoly on legitimate identification. This success may now be reformulated – and relativized – in the terms developed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The point is that the very distinction between internal and external identity politics necessarily leads to conflict; at least as long as the relation between self and other is residually grammatical.
The first thing to notice is how the international system of nation states has articulated sufficient necessity in a single Orientalist distinction – the one between national/alien – to award this distinction a leading role in the modern project of sorting everything into orderly boxes. The distinction national/non-national is – still – the basis of a lot of other distinctions. The success of this one distinction is evident in the way the two other grammars for self/other relations have been subordinated to it: Knowledge production has historically been organized in separate academic disciplines specialized in knowing Our History and Their Cultures respectively. Agency on behalf of the other was systematized in the discourse of war between nation states (Bartelson 2010) – and the discourse of colonialism claiming that They were not ready to act on behalf of themselves (cf. Said 1978:ch.1.IV). Colonialism claimed that They were not capable of having their own nation states – present development policies add a 'yet' to the narrative.

The second thing to notice is how the relational grammars (introduced in section 3.1) may be employed to specify the terms of the conflict over who gets to be an actor. More specifically, it may explain why there is necessarily a conflict over who gets to be an actor in the conflict – as long as the conflict is grammatical. Recall (from subsection 3.1.4) that for a self/other policy to be grammatical all three grammars need to partake in organizing the relation. This means that there need to be distinction, the self need to act on behalf of the other, and the self needs to produce knowledge of the relation. When elements of all three grammars need to be present simultaneously, it means that the policy pursued must be a combination; i.e., an articulation of the 'pure' policies constituting the conditions of possibility for each of the grammars. Hence, the policy pursued – as long as we stay within the perimeters of grammatical otherings – must oscillate between dialogue, monologue, and agonism. The explanation for the re-currence of the conflict over who gets to be part in the conflict is that each of these combined strategies looks differently from the
perspective of the two grammars co-organizing them: Monologue, dialogue, and agonism each look like an internal affair from the one side while it look like an engagement with the other from the other side:

Orientalism is constituted by seeing any engagement with the other as external identity politics. Encompassment is constituted by seeing any engagement with the 'other' as internal identity politics (as it sees the other as really a subordinate part of the self). This means that the policy of monologue, when approached from protested Encompassment is conceived of as an internal monologue telling a subordinate protester to get back in the legitimate place. Contrarily when approached from Orientalism monologue a means of disengaging the other by excluding him from dialogue.

Segmentation is constituted by switching from seeing the other as identical or different depending on the level of fission or fusion. The point of diffraction directing Segmentation towards either a policy of dialogue or a policy of agonism, however, also directs Segmentation to systematically view the other in the opposite way than the grammar it meets: Dialogue is an external affair when seen from Orientalism reaching out to listen to a positively valued other. Contrarily dialogue is an internal affair when seen from Segmentation looking out for differences within identity. Agonism is an internal affair when it – seen from Encompassment – allows a circumscribed place for the subordinate other. Contrarily Agonism is an external affair when it – seen from Segmentation – looks out for the identity uniting across differences.

So as long as the policies for engaging with the other are grammatical, there is, firstly, a place from which the other may spur a conflict over how to be a part in the conflict. But regardless of whether the other uses this place to protest, there are, secondly, tensions inbuilt in the grammars which keeps the distinction between inside and outside from fixating. This situation is illustrated in figure 3.23.
Figure 3.23 Dislocation of the distinction internal/external
Combined policies appear internal and external from each side of the point of diffraction.

The two subsequent subsections (3.3.2 and 3.3.3) discuss the spill over mechanisms from what is in this way contingently constituted as 'internal identity politics' to 'external identity politics'.

3.3.2 Policies interpellating grammatical and anti-grammatical conflicts

This subsection discusses how distinct policies for relating to the other – organized by the way they combine the basic grammars for future interaction – may set off distinct dynamics of conflict by the way in which they interpellate the other.

Recall (from section 3.1) how each self/other policy narrative involves a specific combination of grammars for the future interaction of self and other. The concept of grammar was meant to convey the invitation issued to the other to partake in the continued co-authoring of the narrative in circumscribed ways.

Juxtaposed to grammars for future self/other interaction was 'anti-grammar' foreseeing no future interaction. A corollary of grammatical otherings was that they are at least residually dialogical: As long as there are two entities endowed with at
least residual distinction, will and temporal extension dialogue remains a possibility. This begs the question: How do we avoid anti-grammatical closure and keep dialogicality open? Are some of the grammars better than other in this regard? The point of taking up the discussion is to specify how distinct grammars may set off identity political dynamics contributing to radicalization of conflict.

Baumann & Gingrich claim that the evaluation of the grammars cannot be done in the abstract alone (2004b:194). Nevertheless, they offer some preliminary thoughts:

Encompassment tends toward a monologue ... Segmentation tends toward dialogue [however, only] among those perceived as 'equivalent' ... it does exclude those who cannot be accommodated ... Orientalizing ... stands somewhere in-between the monological and the dialogical in so far as its more intelligent versions do harbour the potential of ... mirroring the self in the other. (2004b:194)

The final judgment is that "The grammars ... are not better or worse in themselves, but relatively better or relatively worse, depending on agency in context." (2004b:194)

The task of this chapter has basically been to specify the 'agency in context' by conceptualising identity discourse as structure, agency, and interaction to allow for a more detailed analysis. Section 3.1 pointed to the importance of the policies combining the grammars of interaction - and the policies marking the limits between grammar and anti-grammar. This subsection considers that part of the context of the individual statement of a policy for self/other relations which consists in the interactional dynamics between policies promoted by various actors.

A policy for future self/other interaction may in principle involve a de novo narration of a role for an other: A new narratives may issue an open invitation for 'anyone' to take up a new role. It is, however, more likely that the role is intended for someone already present. Perhaps the first version of the narrative looks open – but as the seemingly open invitation fails to attract anyone, a second or third version of the
narrative may be more specific in who ought to take up the role. This specified other is talked into taking up a specific new role. Or, in the vocabulary developed in section 3.2; interpellation attempts to articulate the inertia of a subjectivity – pre-constituted elsewhere – in the self/other narrative. In this case the other will have its own identity narratives more or less in conflict with the narrative interpellating it: The result is a conflict of futures projected by different combinations of interactional grammars. As self and other adjust their stories to the way in which the other takes up – or does not take up – the role awarded, the interpellatory attempts evolve. The conflict of futures evolves. This narrative 'pursuit' of the other to successfully interpellate may take up recognizable forms. Distinct dynamics may follow from the ways in which different policies attempt to interpellate.

Butler (1997) and Hage (2008) draw attention to differences in the ways in which interpellation may misrepresent relative to the preferred self-representation of the other. Butler formulates the general condition of misrepresentation so that "One is still constituted by discourse, but at a distance from oneself." (Butler 1997:33f) The distance, however, may be shorter or longer – and the road 'home' may be configured

136 On the one hand, interpellation involve what Chilton discusses as strategies of (de-/)legitimisation and (mis-/)representation: Any interpellation involves awarding legitimacy to some actors and some actions and de-legitimising other (potential) actors and actions. And any interpellation aims at representing some actors into being and, hence, the mis-representation of others (and even the mis-representation of the actors which are represented). On the other hand, these strategies appear in Chilton’s rendition as either truly representative or mis-representative of the subject in question as determined in an Habermasian style coercion-free speech situation (cf. Chilton 2004:46; 54ff). Such a yardstick can hardly be provided – at least not an extra-discursive one. Misrepresentation as measured against intra-discursive – or intra-interactive – yardsticks remains, however, an important discursive strategy: If you are able to force your construction of your opponents position upon him, he will by definition have a harder time continuing the struggle than if he is able to choose his own armour and battleground. In that sense, the difference between misrepresentation and delegitimization of the Other disappears.
in different ways. One may *in different ways* meet invitations to play roles which one does not seem fit to be casted for.

The conclusion to section 3.1 identified a series of policies for self/other relations as possible contributors to radicalization of conflict. The remaining part of this subsection discusses how these policies may lead to radicalization of conflict along different routes: Firstly, a conflictuality of non-interpellation departing from Encompassment. Secondly, a conflictuality of negative interpellation departing in Orientalism valuing the other negatively. Thirdly, a conflictuality of violent disengagement from the other. Finally, the conflictuality of two types of paradoxical interpellations – of assimilatory policies and of unchecked relativist Segmentation.

First, any policy interfering with the agency of the other by involving some element of Encompassment is likely to meet some kind of resistance. If you insist on acting on behalf of the other, you rely on the self-erasure of the other to avoid conflict all together. 'Non-interpellation' excludes by not presenting an other with any subjectivity of relevance at all (Hage 2008:503): The role presented is co-circumscribed that it reduces the other to an object or to a structural effect of the position awarded. In that sense, it follows an anti-grammar denying a relation between self and other.

If the narratives you tell about yourself do not fit the ones permitted by others in any way, one possible result is silence. In the first instance, the result may be silence as one perceives to have received no authorization to speak (in a specific discursive context): "one can be 'put in one's place by such speech, but such a place may be no place" (Butler 1997:4, 137). In the second instance, the result may be silence because resistance implies to high a risk or prize as society has institutionalized a series of means for dealing with the deviant; people who do not act as proscribed (1997:139; cf. Hansen 2000; Foucault 1961).
The silencing of non-interpellation points out a position where any protest turns threatening. In the first instance for the interpellating narrative; and therefore possibly in the second instance for the protesting non-interpellated other: Because the reformulated version of the narrative has to take into account that a voice breaks what was supposed to be silence. In that sense the non-interpellated becomes a securitized position; a position from which speech presents an existential threat – in the first instance to the silencer, and therefore in the second instance to the silenced. In that sense, a protest against non-interpellation may lead to a policy of securitization – and on to violent anti-grammar.

Figure 3.24 Conflictuality I: Non-interpellation

Non-interpellation may be partial: Agency may be delimited by necessities articulated to a narrative which seek to bar the other interpellated from interfering with certain elements of the future. And in a sense non-interpellation is most often a gradual condition: Only the total self-erasure of the self would bestow unchecked agency on the other. Figure 3.24 charts the policies involving non-interpellation on the map of self/other policies.

Secondly, any policy legitimated by an Orientalist mirroring of a positively valued self with a negatively valued other would seem to invite protest. 'Negative
interpellation' awards the other in question a subordinate role (Hage 2008:503). Figure 3.25 charts the policies producing negative interpellation on the map of self/other policies. This type of interpellation produces a sense of being marginalized from community; of not belonging to it (Hage 2008:503). Necessity combined with a grammar of Encompassment, it produces a socially outside but territorially inside position from which one may attempt "to speak with authority without being authorized to speak" (Butler 1997:15).

![Diagram showing the relationships between Orientalism, Grammars of Self/Othering, and Policy of Othering]

**Figure 3.25 Conflictuality II: Negative interpellation**

Thirdly, policies combining Orientalism and Encompassment in the proscription of violent disengagement from the other – especially in the form of securitization or outright categorical killings – are likely to be perceived as threatening by the other. These policies are charted in figure 3.26.

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137 In principle, a parallel may be found in an overly positive interpellation. At first, this might not give rise to problems. The second round following a disappointed first round of positive interpellation, may be a negative interpellation. This game may be played strategically in the sense that an overly positive interpellation may be issued explicitly while expecting 'disappointment'. This would result in the 'mis-interpellation' discussed below.
Figure 3.26 Conflicting III: Violent disengagement

A genocidal interpellation does not just point out no future place for an other; it points the presence of the other out as a threat to be eliminated. It projects an immediate future in which the other is physically eliminated from the position s/he holds now. Provided that the interpellator is capable of implementing its oughtology, there will be no future for the other. The only immediate end to the conflict is if the other is unilaterally capable of effecting an immediate dissociation, i.a. by physically fleeing the confrontation. Every other immediate response will either involve a reverse genocidal interpellation of the original interpellator – or it will demand that the answer violently articulates the inertia of materiality to win time.

A securitized interpellation also means that an other is pointed out as a threat which should be averted by extraordinary means. But what the other is met with is not the promise of immediate physical elimination. Elimination seems to be a possibility – but it is not necessary. It is not a reassuring interpellation – but it is not as definitive as the genocidal one. When interpellating you as an existential threat, chances are that the interpellator will dismiss your possible attempts to engage him/her in a dialogue. A countersecuritization is an obvious choice – but you may still hope that other
measures than elimination will be chosen to avert the threat you are represented to pose.

Fourthly, the two assimilatory policies – other-assimilation and self-assimilation – warrants further consideration: Subsection 3.1.4 discussed how other-assimilation appeared as the paradoxical reaction of the Orientalist self faced with hybridity. Self-assimilation appeared as the paradoxical reaction of the Encompassing self faced with paralysis. These policies may provoke an other who wants the relation intact as a relation between two distinct wills. Such an other may dis-interpellate:

[T]he consciousness necessary for obeying an ideological demand also produces the capacity or ability for avoiding or misunderstanding such forms of cultural domination. The capacity for interpellation within social systems thereby implies the presence of dis-interpellation as a basis for resistance (Stauth & Turner, 1988:92).

Dis-interpellation would in this case imply the denial of the assimilation of self to other – either by insisting on Orientalist difference, on post-Orientalist indifference and hybridity– or on the continued production of differences implied in Segmentation. Both self- and other-assimilation are at the outset measures to protest when control over the co-narration is slipping through the fingers of an actor: Other-assimilation is a policy to protect Orientalism against hybridity and indifference. Self-assimilation is a desperate reply to paralysis faced with a powerful other. When such policy narratives are met with dis-interpellation securitization would seem to be an obvious continuation to the narrative. Only the direction of the securitization differs: Unsuccessful other-assimilation would point out the un-assimilable other as the threat in the narrative of the self. Denied self-assimilation risks pointing out the self as the threat in the narratives of the other.

Finally, the very flexibility of Segmentation – allowing oscillation between in- and exclusion – might frustrate those who have as a priority the very bringing identity political negotiation to a conclusion. Hage discusses how 'mis-interpellation' begins
by pointing out a place for the other – only to withdraw the invitation when the place is taken up. In principle this could follow any kind of grammar: If a subordinate position following from a grammar of encompassment appears attractive, even the invitation-to-and-denial-of such a position may be mis-interpellating. But the defining characteristic of Segmentation is especially prone to produce this kind of interpellation: Incessant production of distinctions without any will or guiding privileged distinction lapses into a relativism which, firstly, in itself be provoking to some; secondly, be utilized strategically to deny the other a point of attachment for narration.

Mis-interpellation, writes Hage, gives rise to a sense of being marginalized within a community, a sense of disappointment with the community one thought one belonged to (2008:503f). A far more destructive combination in which you see your identity denied and, hence, threatened by the narrative that you thought it was – you were – made for. Contrary to non-interpellation, the other has in the situation of a mis-interpellation been awarded a position involving agency. And contrary to negative interpellation, it is not the position awarded which is protested – it is, at first, the non-awardance of the position, which is protested: The carrot is accepted – but its withholdance is protested, in some cases by the rejection of the carrot. The result may be that one discards the narrative which one at first wanted to be articulated by to the benefit of narratives and identities in open conflict with this first narrative (2008:507). It may, in other words, result in a radicalization of the other; it may make the other take up a position of a radically threatening other. In that sense, the first

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138 Hage describes the difference between the non-interpellation of traditional racist nationalism and the mis-interpellation of present integration policies like this: In mis-interpellation society begins by hailing the individual by the Althusserian 'Hey you, citizen'. The answer 'Yes, it is me', however, is met with the reply 'No, Piss Off. It is not you I am calling'. Non-interpellation, in contrast, gives rise to narratives of 'being treated like an animal' as society does not hail at all (2008:504).
narrative has produced a response of the other which presents itself in the continuation of the narrative as a security problem. The policies likely to mis- or dis-interpellate are charted in figure 3.27.

![Figure 3.27](image)

**Figure 3.27** Conflictuality IV: Paradoxical interpellations of other- and self-assimilation

All types of interpellations may set off conflicts. All grammatical and anti-grammatical policies may be protested – and they may be protested in ways which make it difficult for the self to continue its narrative. But some policies are better suited to *receive* protest and continue without degenerating into radicalization: the spectrum reaching from Dialogue to Agonism, dominated by but not collapsed into the basic grammar of Segmentation. This spectrum of policies interpellates the other as a positively valued independent agent worth interacting with and worth listening to – without giving up the claim of an independent agency for a (somewhat) distinct will of the self necessary to interact with, value and listen to the other.\(^{139}\) This section of the map of polices for self/other relations is highlighted in figure 3.28.

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\(^{139}\) The specification of this spectrum of policies does not entail any normative position on neither the policies nor the possible others to which one may direct them – *except* what
To sum up: The dynamics inherent in the policies discussed may be specified – even if only in dissimilar ways: Non-interpellation will – if protested in spite of difficulty – probably lead to an instantly radicalized conflict. Negative interpellation will lead initially to conflicts over the diacriticon for delimiting internal from external – as a pretext to a conflict over valuation. Genocidal interpellation makes de-radicalization of conflict – and a return to grammatical self/other relations – very difficult. Securitizing interpellation begs counter-securitization – but despite the urgency implied other responses are still possible even if there is no guarantee that they will work. Dis-interpellation denying – in one way or the other – the identity narrative promoted risks provoking securitization of the unassimilable. Mis-interpellation could lead to many types of reactions – but one possibility is that it would lead a few of the mis-interpellated to take up radically conflictual counter-identities. Table 3.2 summarizes the contribution to radicalization of conflict involved in the types of interpellation discussed.

follows from the stance taken to conflict as such in chapter 1: that conflict should not be allowed to escape control altogether.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpellation</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-interpellation</td>
<td>Total: <em>Objectification</em></td>
<td>Acting on behalf of the other...</td>
<td>The narrative of the self does not award the capability of agency to an other. The other acts – and forces its agency on the narrative of the self.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gradual: <em>Domination</em></td>
<td>... as far as the other allows</td>
<td>The narrative of the self only awards the other insufficient agency to counter the will of the self. The other acts to subvert the will of the self.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partial: <em>Delimitation</em></td>
<td>... on specific issues</td>
<td>The narrative of the self articulates certain regions as necessary and thus insulated from the agency of the other. The other questions the necessity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative interpellation</td>
<td>Distinguishing Us from Them: Valuing the other negatively</td>
<td></td>
<td>The narrative of the self values the other negatively. The other values itself positively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violently anti-grammatical interpellations</td>
<td><em>Genocidal interpellation</em></td>
<td>Categorical killings</td>
<td>The narrative of the self projects a future in which the other is eradicated. The other does not commit suicide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Securitized interpellation</em></td>
<td>Securitization</td>
<td>The narrative of the self constructs the other as an existential threat to the identity of the self. The other does not flee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradoxical interpellations</td>
<td><em>Dis-interpellation</em></td>
<td>Assimilation / Self-assimilation</td>
<td>The narrative of the self projects a future in which the other is assimilated to self (or vice-versa). The other resists the assimilation to protect the distinction – or hybridity – of the identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Mis-interpellation</em></td>
<td>Producing knowledge of the other: Flexibly of identity and difference</td>
<td>The narrative of the self offers a role to the other. The other accepts the role – which is instantly retroactively denied.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Types of conflictual interpellation inherent in selected self/other policies.
This completes the discussion of the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the discursive structure of identity. The section may now turn to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the discursive articulation of identity.

3.3.3 **Necessity spilling over conflict from internal to external identity politics**

As discussed (in chapter 2) the articulation of identity includes the attempts by discursively constituted subjects at reconstituting and reproducing discursive structures. One tool in the articulation of identity is the articulation of self/other narratives with necessity (cf. section 3.2). This subsection discusses how the articulation of necessity to self/other narratives may 'transport conflict' from internal identity politics to external identity politics. And how necessity not installed in internal identity politics may also spur external identity political conflict. In that sense, the discussion specifies how the necessity – or the lack of necessity – may contribute to the radicalisation of conflict by setting off identity political dynamics.

Basically, the articulation of necessity has the potential effect of stopping internal identity politics. When an element of a narrative is articulated as necessary, the point is to have it removed from debate. If successful, the articulation of necessity, therefore, has the effect of closing down internal conflict.

Along with internal conflict, however, the possibility of self-reflection and self-reform are closed down: Certain things are the way they are and cannot be discussed. As self-reflection and self-reform is made impossible, dialogicality in relation to the other is restricted: It is much more difficult to be open to demands from the other if the objectives of the demanded reform are pre-articulated with necessity. In that case, necessity successfully installed may transport conflict from internal identity politics to external identity politics. A series of specific dynamics of internal identity politics may contribute to the articulation of necessity.
Firstly, the *primacy of the extreme* in internal identity politics. Wæver recalls how ‘peace processes’ … get de-railed by extreme groups on one side who manage to convince sufficiently many on their side that the other side remains a mortal threat, that ‘they’ still harbour radical visions that would eradicate ‘us’, maybe not physically as persons but certainly socially as community, identity or functioning society. … Generally, conflict processes are much more influenced by extreme – unlikely but very dramatic – scenarios at the fringes than by the cool calculation and balancing of the different more likely scenarios that play too much of a role in most conflict analysis. (Wæver 2009:6 citing empirical examples in n.15)

As Wæver describes, by drawing up unlikely but catastrophic futures, an extreme voice may articulate a policy with necessity. Such a policy made necessary may constitute a highly conflictual invitation for interaction with the other.

Secondly, a dynamic which may be characterised as *pre-empted consistency* may facilitate the success of extreme voices in defining the invitation to interaction conveyed in external identity politics: As discussed (in chapter 2) an actor needs to uphold a measure of consistency over time to be considered credible. To have a better chance of upholding consistency in the future, the actor in question might try to avoid installing too much necessity in the present: Flexibility appears to be functional for future consistency. In other words, the actor in internal identity politics may employ articulate an *ambiguous self-interpellation* in an attempt to defer the choice between articulating oneself as identical with A or B. This strategy, however, involves the risk of leaving the definition of ones consistency in the hands of others: When you refrain from choosing A or B, others may have a greater chance of succeeding in imposing their demand for a specific consistency on you. Such an imposition may be performed by framing the choice as 'one of a kind'; a kind of which you have in other instances chosen A. In the context of an authoritative deferral of articulating identity,
an extreme voice may stand a better chance at installing necessity in a conflictual narrative.

Necessity installed may transport conflict from internal to external identity politics. But internal identity politics may also radicalize external conflict when necessity is not installed.

Basically, Hajer notes that

political actors must constantly reckon with the fact that what they say at one stage to one particular public will often, almost instantaneously, reach another public that might 'read' what has been said in a radically different way and mobilize because of what it heard. (Hajer 2009:9-10; all italics in original)

One cannot be sure that ones interventions intended to influence internal identity politics stay 'back stage'. Interventions in internal identity politics may – under a series of distinct circumstances – be read in external identity politics.

First of all, if a conflictual policy is advocated in internal identity politics and never effectively stopped credibly from structuring the internal debates – then this extreme voice may perform interpellation in external identity politics whether authorized or not. Extreme voices may present themselves as representing the self. And it may by the other be taken to define the identity and the policy it proposes for future interaction with the other. This problem of un-authorized interpellation has to do with the lack of monopoly of any identity over its own representation – even of the most sedimented hierarchy, i.e., the nation state. Privileged as it might be, the nation state cannot control who speaks in its name. Much less can it control who is perceived as speaking on its behalf.

The unauthorized, extreme voice need, however, not be interpreted as representing the self per se to have interpellatory effects. The very fact that internal identity political debates are not stopped may spur mis-interpellation: If a conflictual policy is
repeatedly advocated in internal identity politics and never authoritatively de-legitimized – then the other may doubt not only who represents the self but also what policy is really pursued. One moment, a conciliatory voice is heard – followed by an aggressive voice the next moment. Even if the individual voices of internal identity politics are each consistent, the presence of – and the accept of the presence of – extreme voices among a plurality of voices may have effect in external identity politics. The effect may likely be mis-interpellation.

Finally, extreme voices presenting themselves as speaking on behalf of self and other may engage each other in a ‘dialogue of the extremes’. The very presence of extreme voices on the one side promoting extreme policies for future interaction make the extreme voices on the other side more credible. Such a dynamic may effectively erode the possibility of a dialogical centre (cf. Sheikh & Gad 2008).

In sum, conflicts in external identity politics may be radicalized by both the way in which the identity narratives involved are structured and by the way the articulation of identity is performed. To be more specific: Subsection 3.3.2 discussed how specific policies for future self/other interaction may be narratively configured as more or less dialogically, and, hence, interpellate the other in a more or less conflictual way. This subsection discussed how conflictual spill over from internal identity politics may appear both as a consequence of internal debate being stopped by an articulation of identity successfully installing necessity in the policies presented in external identity politics – and how conflictual spill over may appear from debates not being stopped, in which case extreme voices in internal identity politics may effectively come to represent the self in external identity politics. Table 3.3 summarizes the dynamics contributing to spill over of conflict from internal to external identity politics.
Spill over from necessity installed in internal identity politics

| Internal necessity makes external conflict | Necessity installed in internal identity politics stops internal conflicts but transports conflict to external identity politics |
| Primacy of the extreme (in internal identity politics) | Necessity installed in internal identity politics by extreme voices promoting extreme scenarios |
| Pre-empted consistency | Necessity installed by extreme voices when central actors perform ambiguous self-interpellation |

Spill over from lack of necessity in internal identity politics

| No front stage /back stage | Internal identity politics transparent to external identity politics |
| Unauthorized interpellation | Extreme voices may present themselves as representing – or be taken to represent – self in external identity politics |
| Mis-interpellation by plurality of voices | Accept of the presence of extreme voices in internal identity politics may lead to doubt over who represents and over what policy is pursued |
| Dialogue of extremes | Extreme voices of two identities play up against each other |

Table 3.3 Dynamics contributing to spill over from internal to external identity politics

3.3.4 The reflexivity of identity configurations

The first subsection argued that conflict is a necessary corollary of any distinction between inside and outside. On this background, the preceding subsections discussed ways in which, firstly, identity structures and, secondly, the articulation of identity with necessity may contribute to radicalization of conflict in external identity politics. This subsection proceeds to discuss conflictual dynamics departing in the interaction of external identity politics. More specifically, the focus is on the possible contribution from various dimensions of reflexivity – insight, agreement, dialogicality – to radicalization or de-radicalization of conflictual relations.

The point of departure for this subsection is the point of arrival of chapter 2: That identity politics is a process which may acquire its own regularity in dispersion of
acts; its own structural character. These structures of interaction may take on a recognizable direction: The structures of interaction may be structured as a radicalization of conflict; or as a de-radicalization. Figure 3.29 and figure 3.30 illustrate how feed back from identity politics to identity as structure and individual articulations of identity may radicalize and de-radicalize conflict respectively.

![Diagram of interaction dynamics](image)

**Figure 3.29 Radicalizing feed backs from identity politics**
to identity narratives and articulations of identity

One way of approaching the question of interactional dynamics is through asking what it takes to stop a dynamic. Galtung proposes, as one extreme way of intervention in a conflict, that an outside "conflict dictator … imposes a solution" (1996:105). The opposite extreme is "dissociative nonviolence" (1978:563n.27) which is the result of "Dissociation: disintegration, fission: The conflict parties do not communicate but separate, dissolving their formation." (1996:104; italics removed) These two extreme types of intervention in effect end the conflict by dissolving the relation as a relation: Dissociation means that the relation ends. In the extreme, an outside imposition of a solution ends the relation in the sense that the two parties in

\[\text{140 In principle the structures of interaction may also be structured to uphold the same level of conflict.}\]
conflict cease to be constituted as separate entities capable of agency; in stead they are subordinate elements determined by the 'dictator'.

Figure 3.30 De-radicalizing feed backs from identity politics to identity narratives and articulations of identity

Between from these two extreme options any intervention in a conflict as a relational structure – by a party to the conflict or by an outsider – requires communication. This communication may be more or less dialogical (Galtung 1996:104-5). Between the two extremes, all the communicative interventions aim to uphold the relation as a relation by de-radicalizing it – hence following Galtung's preference: "far from separating two parties, a conflict should unite them, precisely because they have their incompatibility in common." (1978:490)

The point of this subsection is, firstly, that such a self-reflexivity of a relation does not necessarily lead to de-radicalization. And, secondly, that it is achieved only at the cost of reifying the relation as a relation. This conclusion is reached by considering how the relation between self and other may be characterized on three dimensions of reflexivity – and how these dimensions of reflexivity may relate to radicalization/de-radicalization. The prospects for de-/radicalization may be related to: Firstly, the insight of the parties in the conflict in the conflict, they are part in. Secondly, whether
the parties agree or disagree over what the structure of the conflict is. Thirdly, whether both parties construct the relation as mutually dialogical.

Firstly, it may make a difference for the future of the conflict whether the actors recognize the configuration which they are part of. An insight in the conflict which they are part in may make it possible to de-radicalize it, should they want to.

A classical point in IR security theory is that a relation defined by threat/defence may give rise to 'security dilemmas' (Herz 1950; Wæver 1994; Roe 1999): The one party takes action to secure itself – the defensive actions are, however, perceived as threatening by the other party, who must then secure itself – which the first party perceives as a threat, etc. Figure 3.31 combines two instances of the rhetorical figure of securitization to form a security dilemma: The means which actor 1 employs to avert threat 1 to referent-object 1 equals threat 2 aimed at referent object 2 which make actor 2 employ means 2 which unfortunately equals threat 1...\(^{141}\)

![Figure 3.31 The structure of a security dilemma](image)

\(^{141}\) Cf. the illustration of the figure of a securitization in figure 3.2.
Notably, this is a dynamic which may take place without the parties to it realize it: To perceive a threat implies only to have insight in the existence of a conflict – not necessarily to have insight in the structure of the relation, not to mention the dynamics of the relation. The result is that the conflict may spiral into radicalization. The radicalization may either proceed to (mutual) anti-grammatical action – or it may stabilize at some level of incompatibility acquiring some structural permanence of a conflictual configuration.\(^{142}\)

Insight into the structure of the conflict makes active self-reflection possible in the sense that one may evaluate 'the action performed by ones action'.\(^{143}\) Such insight and self-reflection need, however, not lead to the dissolution of the conflictual configuration. To the contrary, it might make the actor-in-conflict even better at interpellating the other in ways that keep the conflict alive.\(^{144}\) Nevertheless, insight into the structure and dynamics of the relation does open a possibility for self-reform: If you do not realize what your own actions effect, it is difficult to reflect on it and

\(^{142}\) Buzan & Wæver – in a discussion of their theoretical equivalent of a configuration – specifies that "The larger scale elements of constellations are generated by a variety of actors who may or may not be conscious of the social structure they have created and which their behaviour sustains, changes or erodes." (2009:286).

\(^{143}\) In that sense, a security dilemma – and one way out of it – may be described with Hajer as */positioning effects*: actors can get 'caught up' in an interplay. They might force others to take up a particular role, but once others are aware of what is going on, they might also try to refuse it ... This positioning not only occurs at the level of persons but can of course also be found among institutions or even nation-states." (Hajer 2006:73). McQuillan warns that "the subject to be more fully informed of the experience represented by the narrative-mark, it must also read the counternarratives which both contest and constitute the narrative-mark" (2000b:24) McQuillan goes on to quote Said: "The point is that contrapuntal reading must take account of both processes, that of imperialism and that of resistance to it, which can be done by extending our reading of the texts to include what was once forcibly excluded." (1993:79 qtd. in 200x:24). Increased insight into the identity narratives promoted by the other is central when seeking insight in the conflicts one find oneself caught up in.

\(^{144}\) An obvious example would be the way extremes voices may be even better at keeping a 'dialogue of the extremes' – and thereby the conflict – going (as discussed in subsection 3.3.3) if they know what they are doing.
communicate the reflections even if you do find yourself in a situation which you would like to change. Even if there is no necessary link between insight and self-reform – insight still facilitates dialogicality, once an actor is caught in a conflict configuration.

Secondly, it may make a difference for the future of the conflict whether the actors agree or disagree over how the conflict which they each find themselves involved in is structured.

One extreme option is that the parties – whether they each are aware of the others’ point of view or not – agree to both being in the conflict, what it is about, and how it should be conducted through interaction. Milliken describes by the label assemblage how – even when engaged in conflict – "people structure their interactions to make them orderly sequences of exchanges that unfold over time … through enacting rounds of interaction" (2001:16; italics in original).145 For such a well ordered assemblage to unfold presupposes a basic agreement on what the conflict is about. But more pertinently, it presupposes an agreement on how 'a conflict' – or just how 'this conflict' should evolve; i.e. an agreement on i.a. what constitutes an aggressive move, what constitutes a concession, and what constitutes a conciliatory move. Such an agreement might occur if the parties have been in the conflict for a long time, if they know each other in other ways, or if they have parallel experience with conflicts in similarly sedimented social systems. Or the orderly exchange of an assemblage may not occur if the agreement is only partial or due to lack of good intentions.146 Agreement on what the conflict is about, however,

145 Cf. n.83.
146 Cf. the scene in Tim Burton’s (1996) Mars Attacks in which a) the Martian's arrive and are translated to say "We come in peace"; b) a greater in the Human crowd frees a dove; c) the Martians shoots down the dove and the crowd (accessible at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsXnK0ouTL8&NR=1, visited 15 December 2009).
facilitates dialogicality as it facilitates that the responses of the other make the sense intended in the narrative told by the self.

Thirdly, it may make a difference for the future of the conflict whether both parties construct the relation as mutually dialogical. Openness to the input of the other – and envisioning a parallel openness in the other – facilitates self-reflection and self-reform to the benefit of de-radicalization. Even if it necessitates neither.

Subsection 3.1.3 found – when discussing the concept of grammars for future self/other interaction implied in self/other policy narratives – that a grammar of securitization constituted the limit between, on the one side, (residually) dialogical grammars, and, on the other side, anti-grammar proscribing categorical killings. Subsection 3.1.6.3 found – when discussing the parameters of self/other relations summing up to interactional grammars – that to construct a self/other relation as dialogical, the narrator must describe both self and other as capable of receiving input and as willing to (at least reflect on whether self or other should) engage in the self-reform necessary for transformation of the relation. The remaining part of this subsection discusses how the relation may become self-reflexive if each side constructs the other as dialogical. Furthermore, it is pointed out that this self-reflexivity is achieved at the cost of reifying the relation as a relation, i.e. a relation between two parties whose distinctiveness (rather than the diacritica of their distinctiveness) is reified.

Galtung poses as a prerequisite for conflict de-radicalization that each end of the relation should not polarize. … [but] keep in contact with the opponent rather than avoid it; try to establish a dialogue with him rather than isolating from him or fighting him. Try to stem the tide towards black-white thinking, rather than indulging in the luxury of the traditional and destructive conflict stereotype. Try to let conflicting images of reality,
one from the antagonist and one from oneself, coexist in one's mind – at least until further development leads to major revisions in the images. (1978:501)

Galtung pushes the argument to the extent that an important quality in relation to conflict de-radicalization is to "be able to tolerate ambivalence" (1978:502). Actually, in the future, he speculates (in 1968), "'tolerance of ambivalence' is not merely going to be an interesting and laudable property, it will become a necessity for survival … Tolerance of it may in fact be too little; [Man] may have actually to like ambivalence." (1978:502)\(^{147}\)

Wæver warns, however, that when setting out to get a securitized relation back into the agonistic spectrum of conflict, insistence on ambivalence may very well be counter-productive:\(^{148}\)

> A securitized situation does not contain the openness that allows for a redefinition of identities. When the parties to a protracted conflict see themselves as existentially threatened, it is not the time to come to them and problematize the concept of their national or religious identity, show its constructedness and contingency. (Wæver 2009:6; cf. Buzan et al. 1998:120f)

So de-securitization may require a measure of strategic essentialism (cf. Hall 1996a). In parallel; to have a dialogue, you need to have two distinct entities. Dialogue is, after all, still a relation.

\(^{147}\) A rather stark demand when contrasted to national high modernity in which "Men really love their culture, because they now perceive the cultural atmosphere (instead of taking it for granted), and know they cannot really breathe or fulfil their identity outside it." (Gellner 1983:111). Perhaps the contrast is still too stark considering the way the national principle including its demand for cultural homogeneity still (as discussed) performs its work as it is sedimented in the institutions of the nation state.

\(^{148}\) Neumann comes close to claiming that the same warning is valid for all identity political interventions (1999:209-216).
So when the aim is conflict de-radicalization, dialogue is, on the one hand, at once a means and an end: dialogue as interaction may – and to transform the conflict it must – feed back to reconfigure the grammars of future self/other interaction involved in the identity narratives told on both side. On the other hand, even if dialogicality facilitates dialogue and dialogue facilitates self-reform in the direction of dialogicality, neither are the philosopher's stone guaranteeing de-radicalization: neither a performed openness to the other nor an exchange actually taking place need lead to self-reform. But a self-reflexive relation at least has the chance of choosing to perform a reform of itself.\textsuperscript{149}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tr>
<td>Insight</td>
<td>In existence of relation –</td>
<td>In structure of relation –</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In dynamics of relation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogicality</td>
<td>Self or other described as dialogical –</td>
<td>Relation described as self-reflexive</td>
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Table 3.4 Dimensions of reflexivity in identity configurations
All three dimensions are always partial. High score on one dimension may facilitate higher scores on other dimensions - but the dimensions are neither dependent nor determining each others.

To sum up: Insight into the conflict and agreement on the structure of the conflict among its parties may facilitate dialogicality, self-reflection and self-reform. Table 3.4 summarizes how the reflectivity of a conflict may be characterized along three dimensions: insight, agreement and dialogicality. Even perfect self-reflexivity of a relation does, however, not guarantee self-reform and conflict de-radicalization. And the collective self-reflectivity of mutual dialogicality is achieved only at the cost of

\textsuperscript{149} Normatively the decision whether to facilitate insight and dialogicality must rely on either trust in the parties to be able to 'handle the truth' and use both in a benevolent way. Or it may rely on trust not in the effect of speaking 'truth to power', but of speaking 'truth about power' in the sense that the parties will have a harder time radicalizing conflict in the context of the 'disclosure' of the consequences of their agency.
reifying the relation as a relation, i.e. a relation between two parties whose distinctiveness (rather than the diacritica of their distinctiveness) is reified.

3.3.5 Feed backs from identity political dynamics

This section set out to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from identity politics. To do so the discussion, firstly, focused on connections between, on the one hand, the structures of identity and the articulation of identity, and, on the other hand, identity politics. Secondly, the discussion focused on possible radicalizing dynamics inherent at the level of interaction.

Subsection 3.3.1 argued that the very attempt to constitute a distinction between inside and outside – between internal and external identity politics – necessarily generates conflict. The argument took its point of departure in the analysis of the points of diffraction of three basic grammars for future interaction between self and other: Orientalism, Encompassment, Segmentation. More specifically, the points of diffraction on the one hand facilitate the meeting of the three basic grammars in the three combined policies of Dialogue, Monologue and Agonism. But, on the other hand, these combined policies are systematically conceived of as internal affairs when approached from one of the basic grammars conspiring to produce the policy – and as external affairs when approached from the other basic grammar.

The proceeding subsections discussed the two main analytical concepts developed in the discussions of identity as structure and identity as articulation: the grammars for self/other interaction involved in self/other narratives and the necessity articulated to self/other narratives in internal identity politics.

Subsection 3.3.2 specified how policy narratives may serve as radically different invitations to the other to partake in the continued narration of the relation. Basically, the interpellation is always partly misfiring – but it may miss its target more or less and with more or less potential for radicalization of conflict.
The different types of (unsuccessful) interpellation are prone to set off different conflictual dynamics. Non-interpellation denies the other agency (altogether or on specific issues) – and any act, the other may nevertheless perform, involves a potential for radicalization of conflict. Negative interpellation values the other negatively compared with a positive self valuation – and the other reversing this valuation involves a potential for radicalization of conflict over inclusion/exclusion. Genocidal and securitized interpellations already involve radicalized conflict – but an attempt from the other to de-radicalize is more or less hopeless as answers to the two kinds respectively. Dis-interpellation may be the result of assimilatory policies; the other reacts by insisting to uphold the distinction or hybridity of identities. Mis-interpellation involves a sequence of offering the other a role; the others' accept of the role; and the retroactive denial of the role once offered to the other – frustration may lead the other to take up radically conflictual counter-identities.

Subsection 3.3.3 discussed relations between, on the one hand, the articulation of necessity to self/other narratives in internal identity politics, and, on the other hand, external identity politics. A series of specific mechanisms were identified which may contribute to transport conflict from internal identity politics to external identity politics. Basically installation of necessity in a self/other narrative may serve to stop debate (and, hence, ease conflict) in internal identity politics. But by necessitating certain elements of the narrative, the potential for radicalization of conflict in external identity politics may become higher: As more elements of the identity narrative are necessitated, less room for co-narration is left to the other.

The lack of closure in internal identity politics may, however, also spill over conflict to external identity politics. Extreme voices may present themselves as representing – or may be taken to represent – the self. Or the very plurality of voices in internal identity politics may result in mis-interpellation of an other.
Finally, subsection 3.3.4 discussed the possible ways in which a relation may turn reflexive – facilitated by insight, agreement, and dialogicality – and the possible contribution of reflexivity to the de-radicalization of conflict. The discussion concluded that insight into the conflict and agreement on its structure facilitates dialogicality, self-reflection and self-reform. Even perfect self-reflexivity of a relation does, however, not guarantee self-reform and conflict de-radicalization. And the collective self-reflectivity of mutual dialogicality is achieved only at the cost of reifying the relation as a relation between two distinct entities.

3.4 Identity configurations self-radicalizing and de-radicalizing

This chapter set out to account theoretically for the possible contributions to radicalization from the way an identity configuration is structured. It did so by revisiting the individual elements of the ontology laid out in chapter 2 focusing on the elements which may be structured to contribute to radicalization. Specifically, the focus was, firstly, on how the discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative may be structured to issue different invitations to the other to co-narrate the future relation. Secondly, the focus was on how necessity may be installed in the narratives by structuring temporality or by articulating the narrative with materiality. Thirdly, the focus was on the relations between, on the one hand, the structures of the policy narratives and the articulations of necessity, and on the other hand, the dynamics of identity politics. This section briefly summarizes the contribution of these three foci to facilitate the development of their analytical implications in chapter 4.

Section 3.1 developed a typology of self/other policies on the basis of three basic 'grammars' of identity/alterity. The grammars are basic ways in which one may relate self and other: a first grammar consists in distinguishing self from other; a second grammar consists in acting on behalf of the other; while a third grammar consists in
producing knowledge of the self/other relation. In combination, the three grammars delimit a realm of policies which allow future interaction between two distinct entities – and three distinct ways in which the future envisioned may not include a relation between self and other. These 'anti-grammatical' policies in each their way involve existential threats to self or other. Furthermore, the section recollected how self/other policy narratives may be legitimized and necessitated by relating the present self and other along parameters of spatiality, temporality and intentionality.

In sum, when Danish narratives on Muslims are to be assessed for their contribution to radicalization of conflict, the analysis of identity politics will focus on

- the parameters of difference constituted between self and other.
- the future relations narrated between self and other.
- possible threats constructed involving the other.

Section 3.2 discussed how necessity may be installed in self/other narratives. One option is the articulation of certain temporalities which conceals the present articulation by tilting attention towards necessities in the past or in the future. An different option is the articulation of materiality in various forms – notably the naturalization of physical objects, the formalization of written text, or the interpellation of pre-established subjectivities. The interpellation of pre-established subjectivities, notably, makes the narrative dependent on the collaborative co-narration of the other.

In sum, when Danish debates on Muslims are to be assessed for their contribution to radicalization of conflict, the analysis of the articulation of identity will focus on

- the installation of necessity in narratives by temporalization.
- the installation of necessity in narratives by the articulation of materiality.
- the interpellation of pre-established subjectivities as an attempt to articulate materiality and install necessity.
Section 3.3 discussed how conflicts in external identity politics may be radicalized by both the way in which the identity narratives involved are structured and by the way the articulation of identity is performed: The policies for future self/other interaction implied in the identity narratives promoted may be configured more or less dialogically, and, hence, interpellate the other in distinct more or less conflictual ways. And conflictual spill over from internal identity politics may appear as a consequence of internal debate being stopped by an articulation of identity successfully installing necessity in the narratives presented in external identity politics. But conflictual spill over may also appear from debates not being stopped, whereby extreme voices in internal identity politics may in effect come to represent the self in external identity politics.

Furthermore, the section discussed how conflicts may acquire their own life. The discussion concluded that even if there is no necessary link between a party gaining insight in the conflict and that party engaging in self-reform, insight still seems to be a condition for dialogicality. Finally, the section found, on the one hand, that dialogue as interaction may – and to transform the conflict it must – feed back to reconfigure the grammars of future self/other interaction involved in the identity narratives told on both side. On the other hand, even if dialogicality facilitates dialogue and dialogue facilitates self-reform in the direction of dialogicality, neither guarantees de-radicalization. A self-reflexive relation has, however, at least the chance of choosing to perform a reform of itself.

In sum, when Danish debates on Muslims are to be assessed for their contribution to radicalization of conflict, the analysis of identity politics will focus on

- the spill over – in the form of various kinds of interpellation – from the self/other narratives and from the way in which the narratives are articulated with necessity,
- the feed backs from identity politics to the structures and articulation of identity dependent on the way in which the parties reveal insight in the dynamics of the
conflict; engage in self-reflection on behalf of the relation; and the dialogicality of this self-reflection.

Chapter 4 develops the analytical implications of this theoretical account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict.
4 Analytical choices, selection and tools

To recapitulate; chapter 1 posed the main research question, which the dissertation seeks to answer:

- What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims may contribute to a radicalization of conflict?

Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 accounted ontologically and theoretically for a world of entities, relations and dynamics which the dissertation claims is worth focusing on when analysing radicalization of conflict. The task for the present chapter is to explain how this theoretical world may – in chapters 5 through 9 – be confronted with the empirical world. More specifically, the chapter asks:

C. Where and how to focus to observe the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on Muslims?

The chapter answers this question by presenting the specific methodological choices, selections and tools employed in the analysis – and by discussing the biases and blind spots co-produced.

Firstly, concerning the most basic choices of focus and attention, the chapter asks: Why accept the Danish nation state as the institutional frame for identity political negotiations? Why focus on Danish political debate as it may be found in parliamentary negotiations and government statements? Why a focus on 'the Muslim' as the other in question?

Secondly, concerning the selection of the specific debates for analysis, the chapter asks: What exactly make a debate qualify as a debate – and what makes it qualify as a debate on 'Muslim relations'? And why select these specific debates to read?

Thirdly, concerning the specific analytical tools employed when engaging with the texts, the chapter asks: Why read these debates in the ways they are read?
Finally, concerning the biases and blind spots: Why the difference in treatment when focusing on Denmark and 'the Muslim'? And what kind of knowledge is it that the dissertation produces?

4.1 Analytical choices: Political debates on Muslims – is that all there is to Danish identity?

The dissertation analyses Danish-Muslim relations as they are constructed in political discourse, i.e. in the debates of the Danish parliament, Folketinget and in government statements. Now, one might legitimately ask, 'Is that all there is to Danish identity?' After all, Danish identity may be produced everywhere; at the dinner tables and in the primary school, at the grocery store and by the public pool, in the newspapers and on the internet, in courts and in international politics. Furthermore, a lot of others may be pointed out beside the Muslim ones.

So, this section asks, why accept the Danish nation state as the institutional frame for identity political negotiations? Furthermore, why focus on Danish political debate as it may be found in parliamentary negotiations and government statements? And finally, why a focus on 'the Muslim' as the other in question?

Chapter 3 found that as long as the policies for engaging with the other are grammatical, there is, firstly, a place from which the other may spur a conflict over how to be a part in the conflict. But regardless of whether the other uses this place to protest, there are, secondly, tensions inbuilt in the grammars which keeps the distinction between inside and outside from fixating. Nevertheless, empirically it seems – as discussed in chapter 2 – reasonable to take as the point of departure for analysis that the nation state constitutes a comparatively successful attempt to institutionalize a single Orientalist distinction between inside and outside.

At least when the analysis concerns Denmark, the nation state has institutionalized itself as a relevant distinction between internal and external identity politics – and it
has acquired a privileged position on both sides of the distinction: It is – by articulating materiality in numerous ways – making itself a contingent but effective focal point of both identity politics inside and identity politics outside itself. Contingent in the sense that this position is not necessary; it could have been different – but contingent also in the sense that it *is not* different; the nation state *does* take up this position. This privileged position makes it difficult to ignore an invitation to conflict issued from a nation state. And this is what warrants placing the Danish nation state in the focus of the analytical lenses of the dissertation.

Furthermore, the privileged position of the nation state allows it a certain freedom in defining its preferred partner in conflict; in defining what other to relate to. Connolly observes that

> The primary targets of state negation are most functional if (a) they can be constituted as evils responsible for the threats to the common identity, (b) their visibility might otherwise signify defects and failings in the established [civic] identity, (c) they are strategically weak enough to be subjected to punitive measures, and (d) they are resilient enough to renew their status as sources of evil in the face of such measures. (1991:207)

When reading Danish identity discourse, 'Muslims' seem – as a collective asserting its own unity and importance while differing over the consequences, aspirations and leadership over the important unity – to fit this check list. This is what warrants placing *'the Muslim'* as the other to which Denmark relates in an asymmetrical identity political conflict over who gets to be part of this relation.

The privileged position of the nation state is, however, not unconditional. Firstly, even if privileged the nation state does not constitute a unitary actor: there are actors in conflict both inside and outside the nation states. Secondly, even if privileged the nation state does not monopolize the relation between inside and outside. Thirdly, even if privileged the nation state does not monopolize its own representation. In
sum, it is not just so that internal identity politics may spill over to external identity politics and external identity politics may feed back to internal identity politics – what is at stake in the process is also the re-constitution of the national identification as the primary one and, hence, of the nation state as a discursively privileged point of identification. This privileged, yet conditioned position of the Danish nation state is what warrants placing the Danish debates on how to relate to Muslims in analytical focus.

More specifically, the dissertation focuses its analysis on the debates on Muslim relations in the political system. It does not base this choice on any claim of a causal relation between the debates of the political system on the one hand and media or wider public debates on the other, irrespective of the direction of possible causal relations. Rather, the choice of analytical material for the dissertation is made by choosing to take the discourse studied seriously:

Danish national identity is intimately related to ‘its’ nation state; in its own self-understanding the nation built the welfare state to nest the unfolding of its inner qualities (Hansen 2002:51f, 60f, 69, 80ff). Even if the elite might be feared to let ‘the people’ down (Hansen 2002:58, 60f; Haahr 2003:40), the state is basically ‘ours’ and ‘we’ elected ‘the politicians’ to make the state do ‘us’ good. The discourse itself points out the institution of the Danish state as pivotal in Danish identity discourse (Bertramsen et al. 1991).

As noted, there will always be struggles over representation; even if the state is pointed out as the locus of authority on behalf of the nation. When these struggles concern what identities count and how to delimit the identities in question, we have identity politics. Danish identity discourse, however, points out a privileged site of popular sovereignty; i.e. a site privileged both for disagreement and – more pertinent – for deciding disagreements on what is and ought to be Denmark: The Danish nation has institutionalised a parliament to frame these and other kinds of struggles. This
position of parliament – initially as the two chamber Rigsdagen; since 1953 as the
unichamber Folketinget – has been unchallenged since the King's last substantial
Government executes. Or, when parliament has decided to award the government
with a room for discretion: Government decides and executes – parliament controls
and sanctions. Including parliamentary negotiations and government policy
statements as the primary empirical material seems to be a way of taking the nation’s
own self-description seriously. This is what warrants a focus on parliamentary
negotiations and on texts referred to in parliamentary negotiations.¹⁵₀

¹⁵₀ The selection of parliament and government as the primary site of discourse does indeed
carry a number of problems and limitations with it: First, the selection of the
institutionalised representatives for Denmark as the primary site of investigation
systematically prioritizes one We – i.e. the Danish – over other possible We’s. But such a
priority seems historically rather uncontroversial when keeping the dominant position of the
nation state in present days in mind (Billig 1995; Smith 1998; Sonnichsen & Gad 2008).
Furthermore, the head-on attempts to deconstruct or denaturalize the nation state – in
general or in the Danish case – have not had any widespread effect in the empirical world
(Østergaard 2006:64, 72; Hauge 2009; Neumann 1999:212f). As Butler has put it; "The
desire not to have an open future can be strong." (1997:162). Hence, politically one might as
well choose a less ambitious aim. And most importantly, the analytical focus does not
preclude the construction of other We’s by the ones whom Danes have institutionalized to
represent them – other We's which may or may not carry the potential to disturb the Danish
nation state as primary object of identification. A second limitation arises when combining
A) the priority given to the political system when selecting the material to be analyzed with
B) the religious character of the other implied in focusing on the construction of 'the
Muslim': With these à priori prioritizations, the dissertation does risk to overlook other
dynamics of othering. As Barth (1969) pointed out, different diacritica may be deemed
relevant in different situations. By giving priority to religion and politics in the research
focus and by the selection of empirical material respectively, the dissertation risks
systematically generating diacritica which relate religion and politics. The best answer to
this challenge to the analytical setup of the dissertation is that the articulation of an
encounter between (Their Muslim) religion and (Our secular) politics – which seem in
Danish identity discourse to be construed as two functionally differentiated subsystems best
kept apart – activates such a huge range of re-articulations, that it (partially) structures the
most diverse debates. Actually, the Muslim is so solidly placed centre stage that it serves to
further marginalize already marginalized issues: When the new government took office in
So, to answer the questions posed in the beginning of the section: No the dissertation does not cover all there is to Danish identity; Danish identity is produced in relation to Muslims beyond the debates of the political system; obvious examples would be: everyday life (Koefoed 2006) and the media (Hervik (ed.) 1999; 2002; Hussain et al. 1997; Madsen 2000). And the production of Danish identity involves other others than the Muslim (Hansen 2002; Haahr 2003; Berendt 1983). But to focus on parliament and government is to take Danish identity discourse seriously – and the Muslim Other does appear central these days.\footnote{A discussion of the strategic risks and benefits of this decision is initiated in subsection 4.4.2 of this chapter and taken up in the concluding chapter.}

4.2 Selection for analysis: Why these debates?

Section 4.1 argued why the dissertation focuses its analysis on Danish parliamentary debates and government statements on Muslim relations. This section asks: What exactly make a debate qualify as a debate – and what makes it qualify as a debate on 'Muslim relations'? And why select these specific debates to read?

The debates analysed vary in both qualitative and quantitative format: Some are situated exchanges between parliamentary representatives on a specific text (i.a., a report, a policy proposal, or a bill) within the formal delimitation of one point on the 2001, it dismantled the Ministry of Housing, effectively marginalizing the housing sector from political priority. The main housing related issue to reach the political agenda has been how to counter 'ghettocification' – that is the concentration of ethnic minorities in suburban social housing projects (Ministeriet 2004: Regeringens strategi mod ghettoisering, accessed 26 August 2009, available at http://www.nyidanmark.dk/bibliotek/publikationer/regeringsskiftelser/2004/regpub_ghettoisering/index.htm). Recently, the Minister for Employment who is also the Minister for Gender Equality, argued that immigrant women was her main priority as their problems were the main gender equality problem in Denmark. (Støjberg, I. 2009: 'Diskussion om fokus på ligestilling', interview in DR P1 Morgen, 2009.06.16 07:09, http://www.dr.dk.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/P1/P1Morgen/Udsendelser/2009/06/16/094311.htm, visited 2009.09.04.) This line of reasoning has served to marginalize concern for gender equality among ethnically Danish women (Andreassen 2005:165ff; Pedersen 2009).
agenda on a specific date of a plenary session. Other debates are prolonged, dispersed exchanges on an issue meandering in and out of different media for months or years (– departing in parliamentary plenary sessions on specific proposals or general debates but switching to i.a. committee reports, written questions to the minister and resulting answers, media coverage, etc.).

What nevertheless delimits each of them as debates is that the participants agree to disagree in the sense that they refer to each others as referring to the same issue – even if they do not agree on what the issue is or on what the conclusion to the debate should be. A debate is characterized by involving an agreement which facilitates a disagreement (Gad 2005:32). In some of the debates, different actors are disagreeing with each others across the parliamentarian spectrum. In other debates, actors – most pertinently; the government – are disagreeing with them selves over time.152

Not every participant in these debates would agree when the dissertation contends that these debates are on 'Muslim relations' – let alone that they sum up to an overall debate on Denmark's 'Muslim relations'. Actually, a common denominator for the debates is that some – in some debates even most – of the participants appear as actively working to keep the debate in question focused on something else than Muslims; or focused on 'Muslims'-as-something-else-than-Muslims.

Granted, all the debates are also debates on issues apart from Muslims – or rather; on issues other than but not apart from Muslims: The dissertation claims that in Denmark it is currently not possible to debate the issues analysed without articulating them as related to Muslims – at least one should articulate the issue as possibly articulated to Muslims by an opponent. Presenting textual evidence for such an

152 Especially, chapters 5 and 8 give more attention to the different self/other policy narratives which the government has told about the 'same' issue – whether the narratives are told interchangeably or the one narrative has superseded the other – than to the debate between different identity politicians.
indirect articulation of a relation as Muslim, of course, constitutes an analytical challenge. But it is a challenge that can only be met in analysis. It cannot be solved once and for all on the level of analytical strategy, as it is impossible à priori to finalize a catalogue of possible articulations that would produce 'a Muslim'.

Related to the question of what constitutes a debate on 'Muslim relation' is the question whether one should analyse high profiled debates on controversial issues – or one should seek up debates which does not reach the headlines.

Concerning the low profile end of the spectrum, there is a true dilemma at one level: There are lots of 'Muslim relations' in the everyday life of Danes and in the integration measures of the Danish states. Even if thinking in terms of Us and Them may be learned so thoroughly that it has to become inscribed in bodily practice (Pedersen et al. 2006) – there are also everyday practical relations which ignore the distinction and the tensions it raises (Hedetoft 2006a:419f). But at another level, the analytico-strategic dilemma fades. In relation to public and especially parliamentary debates, seeking up non-controversial debates misses the point: Any implication in a debate of something which might be framed as 'Muslim' involves moving into what could be termed 'the shadow of a future controversy'. When an actor in Danish identity politics foresee that a debate may come to be articulated as a debate of 'Muslim relations', s/he needs to take into consideration that s/he may soon be caught in high pitched controversy (cf. Mandaville 2008). So in that sense, there is no low key debate on 'Muslim relations'; if an issue is articulated as 'Muslim', it is already – at least potentially – high pitched.

Still remains the part of the dilemma concerning whether one should analyse the most high profiled and high pitched debates. Or to be specific: Why not focus the analysis on the debates on the Cartoon Controversy? As the debates on the Cartoons and the
controversy itself has already been scrutinized from a diversity of angles, however, the dissertation prefers to add to the understanding of the events indirectly by focusing on debates which made the cartoons and the controversy possible; and on debates which – as will be clear from the analyses – were partly structured as evaluations of processes leading to and following the cartoons.

Between these two extremes – debates seemingly avoiding controversy and the controversy par excellence – the dissertation chooses a diversity of 'normal controversy' debates: 'Normal controversy' both in the sense that controversy is the normal when debating how to relate to Muslims, and in the sense that the controversy is not at its most extreme. The 'normal' level of controversy chosen allows room for an analysis answering to the research question posed in chapter 1 in terms of the theoretical account of chapter 3: What structures and dynamics may contribute to a radicalization of conflict? Analysing a debate at its highest pitch might have given more insight in how the normal is turned into the extreme; the chosen focus conversely produces a picture of how extreme, the normal has turned.

The debates chosen are diverse in the sense that they take their departure in different policy fields as they are institutionalized in the government bureaucracy and the division of labour between parliamentarians. The point of selecting debates in diverse policy fields is not to compare the debates in any formal sense. Rather the point is

153 Spiegelmann (2006); Holm (2006); Hedetoft (2006b); Beck-Jørgensen (2006); Rynning & Schmidt (2006); Jensen (2006); Qvortrup (2006); Modood et al. (2006); Hansen & Hundevadt (2006); Larsen & Seidenfaden (2007); Larsen, H. (2007); Rytkönen (2007); Lægaard (2007b); Lawler (2007); Lehtonen (2007); Lindeklilde (2007); Olsen (2007); Ammitzbøll & Vidino (2007); Keane (2008); Lagouette (2008); Andreasen (2008); Langer (2008); Powers (2008); Davies et al. (eds) (2008); Meer & Mouritsen (2009); Triandafyllidou (2009); Petersen (2009); Sløk (2009); Gregersen (2009); Feldt (2009); Ridanpää (2009); Müller et al. (2009); Holmström et al. (2010); Rostbøll (forthcoming).

154 The rationale behind the need for diversity is not a formal 'maximum variation case selection' (Flyvbjerg 2006:230) or 'diverse case selection' (Seawright & Gerring 2008:301). Seawright & Gerring notes the relation of the methodological choice of selecting 'diverse
to supply a diversity of specific instances of debate to compare with the world of entities, relations and dynamics which chapter 3 claimed to be worth focusing on analytically, when analysing radicalization of conflict. In that sense, it is more important that the debates analysed take their point of departure in a variety of policy fields than the exact selection of the one debate over the other. Even more so, as a separate point of the dissertation is that each of the debates develops from its point of departure to resemble policy narratives of other policy fields.155

More specifically, the dissertation analyses five instances of debate on what is found to be 'Muslim relations'. The debates depart in five different policy fields: integration (chapter 5), immigration (chapter 6), cultural policy (chapter 7), security policy (chapter 8), and foreign policy (chapter 9).156 Other policy fields could have been selected – and within the selected policy fields, other debates could bare been singled cases' to Mill's logical 'method of agreement and difference' (1872; cf. Seawright & Gerrring 2008:fn.3), another name for comparison – a name which, however, stresses that you need a category of 'fruit' to make a meaningful comparison of apples and oranges. The dissertation does not postulate a generalization to neither other Danish debates on Muslims than the ones analysed nor beyond the Danish debates. Rather the dissertation limits itself to comparing the theoretical account of structures and dynamics which may radicalize conflict with the specific debates analyzed.

155 The concluding chapter discusses how this tendency is a symptom of the condensation of a variety of relations into a single relation to a Muslim other – and how this in itself involves a potential for conflict radicalization.

156 Chapters 5 and 6 stand out as they do not only provide each an analysis of a debate. They also briefly introduce the political landscape and identity discourse which produces the Danish 'Muslim relations'. This special status awarded to chapters 5 and 6 is purely instructional in the sense that the dissertation needs to communicate these basic features of the Danish political landscape; rather than doing this in a separate chapter this is done while introducing the two first debates. The special status in the text of the dissertation implicates neither that the debates are 'paradigmatic' in the sense that they are meant to constitute an ideal type for the reader to recognize (cf. Flyvbjerg 2006:230ff) nor that they are 'emblematic' in the sense that they constitutes a model or frame of reference for the way the actors conduct other debates (cf. Hajer 2006:68). The status of all the debates – including the ones analysed in chapters 5 and 6 – are equal in the sense that they all form part of a convergent Danish debate on Muslim relations (cf. the concluding chapter).
out: Different selections would have generated different narratives, but the overall impression of both variation and convergence would most likely have been the same.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the debates selected for analysis: Firstly, by listing whether each chapter provides an analysis of synchronic disagreements across the parliamentarian spectrum and/or an analysis of the government’s disagreement with itself over time. Secondly, it summarizes how the debates a) all relate to Muslims – while b) taking their point of departure in a variety of policy fields. (As the table also summarizes the analytical questions posed to the debate in the specially designed first reading, the table is inserted in the end of subsection 4.3.1).

4.3 Analytical tools: How to read the debates?
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 argued the general choice and specific selection of material to focus on. This section turns to the specific questions which are posed to the material to let it meet the theoretical categories developed in chapter 2 and 3. The section asks, why the dissertation reads the debates selected in the way they are read – bearing in mind that the point of the reading is to contribute to the main research question of the dissertation:

- What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims may contribute to a radicalization of conflict?

The central contribution of the theoretical account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict (chapter 3) was the importance of how a self/other policy narrative may be grammatical or anti-grammatical; i.e. how the narrative works (or does not work) as an invitation to continued co-narration. Crucial in this regard is the position of self/other security narratives as describing a liminal policy; a policy narrative which denotes the end of grammar as it closes down the invitation to continued co-narration by pointing out the other as a threat to the continued existence of the self.
When approaching the material selected for analysis bearing in mind the central concept of grammar for future interaction, the dissertation performs three readings of each debate:

A first reading approach the debate as much on its own terms as possible. This first reading basically asks what the debate is about.

The second reading articulates the world found in the debate with the world of entities, relations and dynamics which chapter 3 claimed worth focusing on when analysing radicalization of conflict. It does so by posing a series of questions designed to operationalize the categories developed in chapter 3. The questions basically sum up to 'what is the self/other policy narrative(s) promoted in this debate?' These questions are developed in subsection 4.3.2.

The third reading turns the table to look how the narrative described sounds for the other invited – or not invited – to co-narrate the continuation of the narrative. Subsection 4.3.3 explains what it means to ask 'how does the narrative interpellate' – and to what degree such a question may be answered by analysing the material selected.

**4.3.1 First readings: What is the debate about?**

The first readings performed in each of the analytical chapters attempt to capture what is at stake in the debate in focus: What concepts and relations does the debate revolve around? And what mechanisms in the discursive structure, agency and interaction appear to set off what dynamics: What makes the debate evolve?
Each of the chapters employ a selection of the ontological categories accounted for in chapter 2 to characterise the debates as debates:¹⁵⁷

1. What agreement forms the basis of the debate?

What disagreements are formed on the basis of this agreement?

With what tools are the disagreements negotiated?

Certain strands of conversation analysis propose that the analyst should approach the empirical material without any prejudices (cf. Schegloff 1997). This is hardly possible – and attempts to do so anyway may be (self-)deceptive (Wetherell 1998). Each of the chapters 5-9 are the result of an iterative process back and forth between 'theory' and 'empirical material'; back and forth between induction and deduction. The first readings of the debates were performed at an earlier state in this iterative process than the second and third reading; therefore each analytical chapter presents its own set of categories employed.¹⁵⁸ And for the same reason the first readings appear more inductive than the second and third reading: When the debates were first approached 'on their own terms' the material was observed through the general conceptual lenses presented (in chapter 2) as the ontology of an identity configuration – rather than through the more specific conceptual lenses presented (in chapter 3) as a theoretical account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. The reason why the analyses of the chapters are nevertheless presented in the language of chapter 3 is, of course, that the first, open

¹⁵⁷ Cf. the definition of a debate provided in subsection 4.2.

¹⁵⁸ A central characteristic of qualitative investigations is that the main categories of the analytic cannot be clear at the beginning of the process (Dahler-Larsen 2008:18). This means, contra Popper and Positivists before him, that 'the context of discovery' should be visible in the text as part of 'the context of justification': The proceedings and conclusions gain validity not (only) from a stringent method but (also) from the relevance of the associations helping the (re-)construction of the analytical strategy (2008:18).
readings turned out to produce specific kinds of stories which may be told in categories suitable for narratives of contribution to radicalization of conflict.

Table 4.1 summarizes the analytical categories employed in the first reading of each debate – along with the way in which the individual debate meets the criteria for selecting debates for analysis (as discussed in subsection 4.2). What debates are in focus? Who are the parties to the debates? How does the individual debate live up to the fixed criteria for selection (that they are about a 'Muslim relation')? How does the individual debate contribute to the selection of debates departing in a 'diversity' of policy fields? What analytical categories is the individual debate submitted to in the first reading?

4.3.2 Second reading: What is the self/other narrative?

In the second reading, each debate is summarized on the terms of the theoretical account (presented in chapter 3) of what structures found in an identity configuration may contribute to radicalization of conflict. In short, the second reading asks three kinds of questions to characterize the self/other narratives promoted in the debate as it is presented in the first reading: What are the present, future, and necessary relations of the narrative.

Firstly, to describe how the narrative implicates the present relation between self and other, the second reading asks:

159 An alternative strategy would have prescribed approaching the material directly with the analytical tools of the second reading (after having skipped the first reading). The benefit of this alternative strategy would have been to allow more strict formal comparisons over time and issue areas and between different debates. The benefit of only applying the narrative lenses of the second reading after having filtered the material through the first reading is that the analysis is concentrated on the narratives most important to the specific debates; i.e., the narratives specifically involved in the struggles over what is at stake in the specific debates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch</th>
<th>Debate in focus</th>
<th>Parties to debate</th>
<th>Selection of debates</th>
<th>Analytical categories employed in first reading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Integration of migrants and refugees</td>
<td>Government narratives over time</td>
<td>Gradually increased role of 'Muslim culture' and Islam as causes in narratives of integration</td>
<td>Integration policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 6  | HR based criticism of criteria and procedures for residence permits | Parliamentarian landscape | Need to limit influx to allow integration (which, according to ch. 5, is increasingly a question of 'Muslim culture') + Need to protect against 'Muslim' practices | Immigration policy | a) Rationales for action and responsibility  
b) Legitimizing narratives  
c) Articulation of materiality  
d) Projects for re-delimitation of discourse |
| 7  | Refuge to foreign writers whose freedom of expression is infringed | Parliamentarian landscape | Cartoon crisis explicit context + Declaration denouncing 'Muslim' cultural practices | Cultural policy | a) Self/other security narratives  
b) Diacritica for exclusion |
| 8  | Dialogue as terrorism prevention | Government narratives over time + Parliamentarian landscape | Dialogue across religio-cultural difference + Targeted at 'Muslims in danger of radicalization' | Security policy | a) Self/other security narratives  
b) Reflexivity |
| 9  | Turkish EU accession | Parliamentarian landscape | Allusion to 'Muslim' problems | Foreign policy | a) Temporalization of the difference of the other  
b) Diacriticon for exclusion |

Table 4.1 Overview of debates analyzed
2. Along what parameters is the Muslim described as different from 'Us'?

Is the Muslim in question presented as a threat? If so; to what exactly?

The relation between self and other may – as detailed in chapter 3 – be described along parameters of spatiality, temporality, and intentionality: Basically, the relation is constituted by an exclusion from identity on some criteria, and the relation is described in a series of relational terms of space (What distinguishes Us from Them, Their hierarchical position vis à vis Ours, Their distance to Us); time (Our common history, Their effect on Us, Their possible development relative to Ours); and intentions (Our and Their capabilities to act, Their posture vis à vis Us, Their willingness to listen to Us).

At a synthetic level, if the Muslim is presented as a threat, this may be an obvious contribution to radicalization of conflict. Other ways of characterising the Muslim and the relation between Us and Them may involve a conflictual potential as well. Contrarily, if the Muslim is presented as someone with whom you may engage in a meaningful dialogue, the immediate potential for conflict is lower.

Secondly, the relation is told as a policy narrative which lays out what we should do to them to achieve a preferred future configuration of the relation. To describe how the narrative implicates alternative future relations between self and other, the second reading asks:

3. What future relations between 'Us' and Muslim others are preferred?

What futures are to be avoided?

What policy is suggested to achieve the preferred future and avoid other futures?

E.g., a policy of 'leaving alone' immediately contributes less to radicalization of conflict than one of 'conquering'.

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Thirdly, to describe how necessity is inscribed in the narrative, the second reading asks.

4. How is this policy proposal necessitated or legitimized by the – past, present and future – relations described between 'Us' and the Muslim other?

How is materiality articulated to make certain facts the necessary point of departure and arrival for the debates?

E.g., a policy which is presented as necessary due to an unalterable quality of the Muslim is potentially contributing more to conflict than one presented as optional.

In sum, the second reading lays out how the self/other policy narrative analysed prescribes a specific future interaction between Us and Them: The relation between Us and Them is presented to be in a specific way at this moment – while a different relation is sought to be realized in a future moment. The development from this moment to the future moment is sought through some proposed action – and the other is asked to agree or participate by acting in a specific way.

4.3.3 Third reading: How does the self/other narrative interpellate?

The third reading focuses on how the narrative(s) promoted in the debate interpellate the other. It attempts to turn the table by describing reactions to the roles narrated for the other to take up. This third reading asks:

5. What roles are offered to Muslim others and what future interaction is implied in the policy narratives promoted?

Do the narratives told indicate feedback from others responding to roles and grammars for future interaction?

A carefully circumscribed role awarded to the Muslim – and the very specific policy for future interaction it entails – may contribute to radicalization of conflict, as it makes the discretion left to the Muslim when playing his/her role very limited.
Indications in Danish debates of *active* protest against the grammar point to the realization of such a potential for radicalization. Contrarily, indications in Danish debates of *passive* protest – in the sense that no one takes up the assigned 'Muslim' role may point to a different route to radicalization in the sense that the unilaterally told Danish narratives may start 'chasing' Muslims by continuing the narrative by explaining why no Muslims took up the role.

This third reading is partly straightforward, partly symptomatic (Althusser & Balibar [1968]1970:354-5; Jameson 1981), and partly speculative: Firstly, even if the material read consists of only Danish debates, it may still include Muslim voices or representations of Muslim voices. Secondly, even if the Muslim voices are neither included nor represented, they may still have left their mark on the narratives told – even if the narratives work to repress these marks. Thirdly, the dissertation allows itself a measure of qualified guessing on the basis of a theoretical knowledge of the self/other narratives promoted by various groups of people casted as 'Muslims'. It does so, as refusals or modifications of a policy for future interaction and the roles implied are likely to provoke some kind of feedback into the continued narration – and into the internal politics of this narration. In that sense, any proposition of a grammatical or anti-grammatical policy for future interaction constitutes the first step of the identity political dynamics which is the overall focus of the dissertation.

4.4 *Biases and blindspots: What kind of knowledge is produced?*

So far this chapter has concentrated on presenting what the methodological choices, selections and tools allow the analysis to see. This section discusses the most important blind spots left by these decisions and argues that the knowledge produced qualifies as social science.
4.4.1 What a difference a state makes: Asymmetrical analysis of identity politics

The most important blind sport of the dissertation, obviously, is produced by the difference in treatment when focusing on Denmark and 'the Muslim' respectively. On the one hand, the theoretical framework of the dissertation points to the importance of identity politics – and the definition of identity politics include the external dynamic interaction between narratives of the relation between self and other as they are presented by representatives of self and of other (cf. chapter 3). On the other hand, the analytical focus of the dissertation is unilaterally on Danish debates – i.e. on the internal politics of one of the parties to the external politics.

When judging the value of such a contribution, the conditions for analysing each end of the relation need to be taken into consideration. As described in section 4.1, Danish identity discourse points out a privileged place for staging and concluding on debates on policies; the Folketinget. But where would one find a relevant, parallel institution on the Muslim side? Certainly, there is no scarcity of self-proclaimed representatives of Islam and Muslims – internationally (Pultz 2009; Waardenburg (ed.) 2000) and nationally (Kühle 2004; 2009). Islamic discourse claims a unity which is patently not there. Where should one turn to analyze 'Muslim' debates on how to conduct 'Danish relations'?

One may note that Islam and Muslims are diverse – and then pick one Islam anyway: Hidden in a cross-secterial conspiracy of Islamofascists (Mozaffari 2007; cf. Crone et al. 2008). Burried in Qur'anic text (Magaard 2007). Exemplified in various versions of 'Euro-Islam' reform theology (Crone 2010). Personified in the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden (Buzan & Wæver 2009) – or in individual, intellectual, veiled or un-veiled women (Christiansen forthcoming). All these picks may, depending on the specific purpose of the study, be legitimate and relevant. But none of them represent a discursively privileged arena for the internal identity politics of Islam. The point is
not that 'Denmark' is a monolith. But 'Muslim debates on Denmark' is structured in a markedly less hierarchical and centred way than 'Danish debates on Muslims'. Such an asymmetrical relation makes it even more interesting what roles the – hierarchically structured – Danish side presents for the – dispersed – Muslim side to take up. Because the interaction necessarily takes place primarily on the conditions laid out by the structured side to the relation.

Evidently, a relational dynamic is best observed by observing both ends of the relation. However, even observation of each of the ends may produce important knowledge of the relation: Imagine a TV transmission covering a game of volleyball with only one camera focusing on the one side of the net. This coverage would still provide important knowledge of the game if it showed that the team in focus consistently missed the ball. And it would be equally significant to know if this team consistently delivered the ball to one specific position on the other side of the net. In parallel; for a relation to be dialogical requires dialogicality in each part of the relation. If, contrarily, one party characterizes the other by invectives or denominates it as a threat, the chance of a dialogue is scarce – however the other party reacts. And less unambiguously aggressive narrations of the other also imply a more or less limiting grammar for the subsequent interaction. So, even an analysis of one end of a relation may contribute to an analysis of a relational dynamics. Perhaps it is impossible to radicalize a conflict all by yourself. But you may do your part to make de-radicalization impossible.

4.4.2 Performing ... Politics, Science? Criteria for validity

The asymmetrical analysis and the blind spot it produces is related to the normative bias induced by the trouble to which the dissertation is formulated as a response. Chapter 1 mentioned how the normative position of the dissertation prescribes a contribution to turning the Danish debate on Muslims away from radicalizing conflict. With this normative point of departure, the dissertation must be read as
performing the same kind of articulatory operation as it studies: It grasps together a beginning and a series of alternative ends to form a policy narrative by highlighting certain choices as choices to be made and glossing over others as covered by necessities.

In that sense, the dissertation constitutes a constructive move: "No help for it: language is always on the side of power; to speak is to exercise a will to power: in the space of speech, no innocence, no safety." (Barthes 1986:311 qtd by McQuillan 2000b:25) Pertinently, the audience to which this speech act is directed is Danish; therefore the bias.

Fortunately, the constructive move does not in itself deprive the dissertation of its scientific credentials: no matter how much scientists or politicians insist, politics and science does not constitute two mutually distinct spheres. All scientific interventions are political; not all political interventions are scientific.

Rather, paraphrasing Rorty, it is so that 'science is what our peers will let us get away with saying' (cf. Rorty 1980:176). The point is, of course, that 'our peers' will not let just anything pass. In that sense, it is "not enough just to tell stories"; one has to "establish the provenience of the story" (Czarniawska 1998:17). To pass as science, an intervention needs to articulate the institutionalized social practices of science (Wetherell 2001:397; Dahler-Larsen 2008:84; 105; cf. Derrida 1988c:150f).

For a speech act to be successful it needs a convention to which it can refer – even if "[g]etting away with things is essential, despite the suspicious terminology" since it

Andre Sonnichsen reminds med that the renowned methodological dictum of Feyerabend ([1975] in Delanty & Strydom 2003:81-4), 'anything goes', distinctively did not concern individual scientific interventions – it concerned the research programmes to which individual interventions refers.
may create new conventions (Austin 1975:30). The criteria delimiting what one may get away with vary from academic discipline to academic discipline; within the social sciences they vary from philosophical position to philosophical position (Delanty & Strydom 2003). This dissertation reports a qualitative inquiry. It constructs data as data as part of the development of its analytical strategy aiming at deontologization (Andersen 1999:13ff). But such a philosophical point of departure still carries obligations concerning the conduct and presentation of research (cf. Andersen 1999:15ff; Hansen 2006:9ff; Knorr-Cetina [1993] in Delanty & Strydom 2003:419f). One ambitious place to start, when assessing the academic merits of a

161 This is basically what Laclau acknowledges when he seem to view his articulation of Lacanian tropes rather as a part of a hegemonic project than as a matter of philosophical compatibility (1999:59). It is what Bhabha performs when he meets a critique of his eccentric reading of Lévinas with the words "but it works for me". (Q&A session at a symposium on The Conditions of Hospitality, University of Stavanger, September 8, 2008.) And it is what Foucault defends when he claims that "The only valid tribute to [anyone's] thought ... is precisely to use it, to deform it... And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful ..., that is of absolutely no interest." (qt'd in Scheurich & McKenzie 2005:861). Compare the answer Hubert Dreyfus gave to Bent Flyvbjerg when asked how one recognize a paradigmatic case: "Heidegger says, you recognize a paradigm case because it shines, but I'm afraid that is not much help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell what is a better or worse case – of a Cézanne painting, for instance. But I can't think there could be any rules for deciding what makes Cézanne a paradigmatic modern painter. ... It is a big problem in a democratic society where people are supposed to justify what their intuitions are. In fact, nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you have to make up reasons, but it won't be the real reasons." (qtd in Flyvbjerg 2006:232). Flyvbjerg's response is that "Like other good craftspeople, all that researchers can do is use their experience and intuition to assess whether they believe a given case is interesting in a paradigmatic context and [NB, /latex] whether they can provide collectively acceptable reasons for the choice of case." (2006:233). When, however, the text that needs to pass is a doctoral dissertation, the power structures involving the candidate and the committee are differently configured (cf. Kvale 1989:86) than when an academic superstar responds to a critical audience: the rite de passage of the defence means not only that the dissertation is constituted as science but also that the defendant is constituted as scientist, as peer.

162 This dissertation would certainly not pass the criteria of all traditions and philosophies of social science. A concern with reliability and validity of data presupposes a fixed ontology to be depicted; that data exist as data independently of the investigation (Dahler-Larsen 2008:81f; cf. Andersen & Enderud 1990:82f w. Kvale 1990:233-6; Svenning 1996:61ff).
text which subjects other pieces of text to myopic reading, could be with Dahler-Larsen (2008) who recommends an "active perspectivism" as a way to conduct qualitative investigation. It involves an active and explicit reflection on the conditions of constitution of the perspective taken up and on the co-constitution of the object of inquiry (2008:110).

To insist to be performing science while acknowledging the contingent, self-referential character of both the scientific institutions as a whole and of the individual scientific investigation requires us to explicate our combination of contingency and stringency: Contingency first and foremost forms the conditions of the inquiry in the way that data does not constitute itself in any definite way; they are constructed as data by the choices made in the investigation (2008:91ff). Stringency forms the condition of the inquiry as part of the scientific investigation in the way that the analyst, to perform science, need to communicate both internal coherence and coherence with institutionalized scientific criteria of seeking truth in a rational way (2008:104ff). Brought together this mean that the analyst must, firstly, communicate the choices made; secondly, explicitly lay out which blind spots the choices produce; thirdly, avoid making choices that sum up to an internally incoherent inquiry; fourthly, follow through in a rigorous way whatever choices made (2008:111).

In this way, a 'craftmanship' validity becomes pivotal; does the work present itself as the work of a skilful scientific craftsman, who knows what s/he is doing? (2008:85). In Dahler-Larsen, the craftsmanship criterion of validity is supported by (and supports) three further criteria: transparency (is it clear what you have done?); heuristics (have you found out something new?); and certain forms of communicative validity (do others recognize your findings?). Contrarily, Dahler-Larsen dismisses pragmatic validity (have you found out something useful? for whom?) as irrelevant (2008:89). I will, firstly, deal with transparency, and then, secondly, relate the question of pragmatic validity to the criteria of heuristics and communicative validity.
in relation to certain audiences. This combination will constitute the main criterion of success-as-science for the dissertation.

The ideal of transparency imply that the data constructed by the analytical strategy, while condensed, is nevertheless re-presented in toto in the form of a (preferably single page!) display (2002:41; 46ff). This ideal perfectly exemplifies a paradox as it is both inescapable as an ideal and impossible to realize. This is clear from the way a demand for transparency implies two problems:

First, to adhere to this – in principle laudable – principle, I contend, the story one will be able to tell must remain rather simple. Strict adherence to this criteria means that you may a) transparently display only a simply structured material and/or b) if the material is complicated in structure, transparently display only a very limited quantity of material. The transparency principle, hence, limit qualitative investigations to deal with very limited case studies as Dahler-Larsen advocates (2008:46). To constitute an alternative to this kind of self-imposed myopia, the dissertation needs to accept a certain measure of reduction of the material which is not transparent. More specifically; it violates Dahler-Larsen's 'rule of inclusion' – which would imply that every utterance of relevance should be accounted for.

163 And the material is complicated, for as Foucault mentions in his discussion of discursive change and transformations "The appearance and disappearance of positivities, the play of substitutions to which they give rise, do not constitute a homogenous process that takes place everywhere in the same way. We must not imagine that rupture is a sort of great drift that carries with it all discursive formations at once" (1972:175).

164 It is not bad – and definitively need not be inconsequential – to study small numbers, small cases and small amounts of text. But it leaves too much generalization as the prerogative of qualitative studies bound by a less reflexive practice concerning the reduction of data (cf. Dahler-Larsen 2008:18).

165 This does not amount to allowing across the board retouching. First; the dissertation violates the 'rule of inclusion' only in the case of the odd outlier; it does not allow itself the exclusion of the dominant constructions in the discourse singled out for investigation. This means that if the dissertation narrates a transformation of discourse A from constructing X
A second problem with Dahler-Larsens ideal of transparency stems from the way the display – and the ambition to represent data in toto – is meant to discipline the analyst to "bound" the data; to explicate the criteria for delimitation of the data (2008:38; 42; 46). On the one hand, the dissertation has done so by defining itself as a study in the construction of Muslims in Danish political identity discourse. On the other hand, the delimitation is immediately violated as the parliamentary negotiations and government statements explicitly refer to – articulates meaning produced by – interventions from outside parliamentary and government texts: bureaucratic texts, media reports, scientific interventions, letters from 'regular people', 'common knowledge', etc. The data does not respect the delimitation constructed by the analytical strategy.166

What is left of a demand for total transparency in the construction of data is basically an ethical demand which is distinct for academic interventions and which distinguishes them from (other kinds of) political interventions: By posing as science, I commit myself to make choices transparent – including choices leading to in-transparency.

Having acknowledged the validity of the ideal of transparency – and/but partially excused itself – the dissertation now formulates its own primary criteria of success by reconfiguring the remaining three criteria discussed by Dahler-Larsen; respondent validity, heuristics, and pragmatic validity.

166 This should come as no surprise as "the questioning of the boundaries of a 'well-defined' text suggests that the textual process not only extends into, but is dependent upon, the contextualising referential apparatus which contains and makes possible that textual unit." (McQuillan 2000b:10).
Dahler-Larsen (2008:83f) reduces the value of validating ones analysis by confronting it with the primary producers of data (typically 'respondents') in two ways: Firstly, by noting that they do not always want to stand by their earlier utterances. Secondly, by pointing to the very denaturalizing aim of inquiry: it makes no sense to ask respondents to validate your analysis if the point of the analysis is to make explicit the implicit conditions of possibilities of their discourse. Asking a hostile respondent to agree to his/her disclosure is, however, not the only way to relate to respondents. We will return to this immediately.

Dahler-Larsen (2008:87) presents as a criterion of heuristics the question whether the inquiry has brought "new knowledge, insight or perspectives". This obviously begs the question; new to whom? In the context of the discussion of heuristics, the audience for novelty relevant to Dahler-Larsen seems to be the scientific peers. In his discussion on pragmatic validity, the 'critical' potential in relation to the social practice or lives of the ones studied by qualitative scientists is acknowledged (2008:87f). But the critical potential is seen to emerge exclusively from the craftsmanship of the inquiry; not from taking up pragmatic 'standpoint' validity as a criterion for science. Dahler-Larsen here polemicizes against what has become a standard hand book of qualitative science (Denzin & Lincoln 2000) which insist that qualitative research must "study the world always from the perspective of the gendered historically situated, interacting individual" and that

From this complex commitment flows [as an integral part of the research programme] the liberal and radical politics of qualitative research. ... a politics of liberation must always begin with the perspective, desires, and dreams of those

167 Kvale mentions in relation to psychoterapeutic practice that "Freud ... accepted neither the patient's yes or no at face value. In addition, he recommended more indirect forms of validation by observing the patient's subsequent reactions to an interpretation" (1989:87).
individuals and groups who have been oppressed (2000:1047f; quoted by Dahler-Larsen 2008:23).

The fact that Dahler-Larsen even after criticizing Lincoln & Denzin still consider them sufficiently peer to cite one of them as founding part of the basis for his intervention (2008:24) gives courage to let this dissertation pose its own criteria of success as science by combining the criteria of heuristics, respondent validity, and pragmatic validity in a way different from Dahler-Larsen's: The dissertation has succeeded as a scientific – and political – intervention if it succeeds in helping the some of the subjects studied (Danish identity politicians; the actors producing Danish identity) to recognise themselves in a new way. More specifically; recognize themselves in a new way by sharpening their sense of the rhetorical tools they themselves and the ones they count as their representatives utilize (cf. Czarniawska 1998:13). Recognize the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of their utterances – and thereby recognize the role which they play in generating conflicts over identities. Or to quote Foucault: "Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult." (Foucault 1988[1981]:155)

4.5 Summing up the analytical strategy

This chapter has laid out how and where to focus analysis to allow the theoretical world accounted for in chapters 2 and 3 to meet the empirical world in the analytical chapters 5 through 9.

Concerning the basic choices of analytical focus, the chapter concluded: That Danish identity discourse itself points out parliament and government as privileged sites for negotiating and deciding questions of identity politics. That 'the Muslim' appears as the central other to which Danish identity is related. That the Danish party to the Danish/Muslim relation is hierarchically structured in a way which allows for a more focused analysis than the one which one may conduct on the Muslim party – a limited
focus which, it is argued, nevertheless may reveal structures and dynamics important for the overall relation.

Concerning the specific selection of debates for analysis, the chapter argued that it is up to the analytical chapters to show how the debates selected are all on Muslims relations. Furthermore the debates are diverse in terms of the policy fields from which they depart. Finally, a definition of ‘debate’ was provided which included both actors debating with themselves over time and different actors debating across a political spectrum.

Concerning the analytical tools with which the debates are met, the chapter argued a three step reading strategy: In the first reading, the debates are approached on their own terms to see what appear to be at stake (what concepts and relations does the debate revolve around?) and what mechanisms in the discursive structure, agency and interaction appear to set off what dynamics (what makes the debate evolve?). In the second reading, the analysis is summarized in terms of what policies are promoted in the self/other narratives and what grammars for future interaction with the other these policies entail. In the third reading, possible reactions from the other are prognosticated. As the approach employed in the first reading is comparatively inductive, each analytical chapter presents their own set of categories employed (summarized in table 4.1). To allow the second and third readings, each debate is interrogated with the same set of questions (summarized in table 1.1), designed to match the categories of the ontological and theoretical accounts of a world of identities in conflict (developed in chapters 2 & 3).
5 Muslims as a security problem in Danish integration discourse: Peace, welfare, culture

Part I of the dissertation presented the ontological, theoretical and analytical framework for the analysis. This chapter begins the analytical Part II by introducing the basic features of the Danish political landscape and by analysing debates on the concept of integration.

5.1 Introduction: Averting the Muslim threat – beyond terrorism

On September 11, 2001, terrorism suddenly moved up 'the international security agenda', no matter according to which criteria such a thing may be arranged. Among the first experts called to the TV studios were social scientist who had done research on the terrorism in Western Europe of the 70ies. Quickly, however, they were substituted in front of the cameras by experts on international relations and Middle East area studies. A terrorism, which calls itself Islamic, had become widely accepted as an international security problem.

To some IR academics such a phenomenon would count as somewhat paradoxical to focus on: Only few would contend that the odd terrorist attack poses a serious threat to the survival of Western states – and to hard core adherents of the 'realist' tradition in IR theory, this is what security is about: The survival of states. Others apply a broader perspective by including the security of the individual. This clearly makes terrorism a security problem – along with a number of the countermeasures taken by states.

A third perspective is the one presented by the so called Copenhagen School which studies security – not by weighing threats to states against threats to individuals, but by analyzing 'securitizations', i.e. by observing, how and when something is turned
into a security problem. Analyses informed by this perspective had by 2001 for almost a decade described how political actors were turning refugees and migrants into a security problem (Wæver 1993). While these security problems might be conceived of as 'foreign policy' in the sense of dealing with what is constituted as foreign, they were hardly part of 'international relations. A separates point of this perspective is, however, that constructing something as foreign and threatening is intricately part of constructing ones own identity (Wæver 1994; cf. Connolly 1991; Campbell 1992; Neumann 1999; Huysmans 2006; Hansen 2006).

This chapter analyzes how Muslims – in official Danish discourse – are implied to constitute threats. As its first reading of the debates, the chapter asks: What is it exactly that must be defended from the Muslims? And what is the answer to the threats?

More specifically, the chapter analyses government policy narratives on integration of refugees and migrants included in oral and written policy statements of the government. The debate analysed is internal to the government in the sense that the agreements constituting the debate are between the various narratives which the government has been telling. In that sense, the focus is on the disagreement between different government narratives on integration – made possible by the agreement on the imperative of integrating migrants and refugees. The category selected to make the disagreement visible is the 'self/other security narrative': The chapter reads the narratives in which the governments describe what integration entails to serve as the necessary means to avert a threat to a valued referent-object. Or in other words, it asks: What does the government say that 'We' need to do to 'Them' to get Them integrated – and why is it important? Even if at the outset, the narratives are not about religion – and scarcely about culture, but rather about labour market integration – 'Muslim culture' and 'Islam' gradually takes up explicit and distinct roles as the narratives evolve.
What is it that Muslims threaten? The answer to this question is more complicated than the iconic date of 9/11 would suggest. To set the stage for the analysis of just how the complications arise, section 5.2 introduces the Danish parliamentary landscape as it presents itself when debating Muslim relations. By zooming in on the narratives told by the government on how to engage Muslim others, the rest of the chapter completes the more nuanced picture of the Danish debates on integration.

Section 5.3 takes a step back to discuss the criteria for judging when Muslims are made a security problem. The discussion takes its point of departure in the Copenhagen Schools theory of securitization. Its point of arrival, however, is a concept of securitizing self/other narrative including not only narratives which points out an other as an existential threat to the self – but also narratives which provoke answers that in the continued co-narration are likely to produce new security problems.

Sections 5.4-5.8 analyses official Danish discourse on integration as it is manifested in policy papers and statements from government ministers. More specifically, section 5.4 characterizes the debate on Muslims by singling out how they are pointed out as threats to the peaceful society, welfare and culture. Section 5.5 identifies the first threats to peaceful society – threats intruding from outside. Section 5.6 follows the merging government narratives of the threats to welfare and culture. Section 5.7 introduces two background narratives – one of the functionality of homogenous culture; one of the universal validity of Our values – which are articulated to add legitimacy to the need for cultural integration. Finally, section 5.8 charts how the merging narratives – by involving the threat from the home grown terrorist – end up awarding both culture and state roles diametrically opposed to the ones awarded at the outset.

Section 5.9 concludes by performing a second reading of the debates – as described in chapter 4 – in terms of the theoretical account of how a an identity configuration
may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. The final section (5.10) performs the third reading of the analytical strategy, focusing on how the narrative(s) promoted in the debate interpellate the other. More specifically, the section discusses how the identity political strategies of Danish Muslims may spark further securitization when meeting this reconfigured official Danish integration narrative.

5.2 Danish debates on integration of Muslims

The Danish debates on integration are often – as presented in subsection 5.2.1 – described as two neatly divided camps: Culturalists vs. Multiculturalists. Subsection 5.2.2 opens up the two camps by sketching the history of the debates over the last decade of the old millennium and the first decade of the new and by introducing the political parties who are the main actors of the Danish identity political landscape.

5.2.1 Danish debates on integration: Two camps?

The Danish debates on integration are often presented as a confrontation between two discourses Culturalism and Multiculturalism (cf. Stjernfeldt & Eriksen 2008): In terms of the diacriticon distinguishing Us from Them, religiously defined culture, the two discourses agree. The discourses also agree that the physical distance between Us and Them is negligible; They are Here among Us - or at least They are very close to Us, even if They might live in ‘parallel societies’. The fundamental difference between Culturalism and the Multiculturalism springs from the way hierarchy is (not) constructed: Where Multiculturalism presents the different cultures as being of equal worth, Culturalism is decidedly ontological: The very fact that ‘We’ were ‘here’ first makes Us superior. Further, according to Culturalism They are causally influencing Us; They are known to be at odds with everything we stand for.\(^{168}\) And

\(^{168}\) Stolcke has diagnosed the basic tenet of this construction as "the 'problem' is not 'us' but 'them,' 'We" are the measure of the good life which 'they' are threatening to undermine, and
They are probably not capable of changing – as long as They as individual Muslims are under influence of Islam, their agency is almost reduced to a structural effect of their religion. The posture of this structural determinant, hence, becomes crucial – and it is, at times, described as aggressively challenging, even decidedly destructive of everything Danish/European/Western. Hence, no dialogue is possible due to ill will on the part of the Other. In terms of basic grammar for self/other relations Culturalism is first and foremost Orientalist in its insistent distinction between Us and Them. As the other is valued negatively, the policy preference of Culturalism tends towards Monologue often tilting into Securitization.

In contrast, Multiculturalism prioritizes the grammar of Segmentation: these different Cultures are – or should be – equal in and equally recognized by the state: The cultural We and the cultural They are both part of a larger We; we share a state and a society. The ideal type Multiculturalist policy for cultural plurality within the nation state is one of Dialogue: Another fundamental of Multiculturalism is the insistence on the dialogicality of all groups.

The completion of this analytical schematic would prescribe that the Multiculturalist position should insist on, firstly, the permanence of the cultural groups and, secondly, on the reduction of individual agency to structural effect: As in ideal type Culturalism you are defined by your immutable culture – only from the Multiculturalist perspective, your culture is as fine as mine. Here, however, the symmetry with Culturalism breaks down: Empirically it is very difficult to find a consistent voice for full blown Multiculturalism.\(^\text{169}\) Obviously, there are sufficient recognisable tropes for this is so because 'they' are foreigners and culturally 'different'" (1995:2). She labels it 'cultural fundamentalism'.

\(^{169}\) In contrast to what Stjernfeldt & Eriksen (2008) claim, Holm – based on analysis of parliamentary debates – notes that "the idea that integration should take place by awarding group rights to refugees and immigrants at no point challenged the dominant concept of integration which was primarily oriented to the individual" (2007:214; my transl.).
Culturalists to (re-)construct this favourite opponent of theirs – but it is equally possible to reconstruct the purportedly ‘Multiculturalist’ positions as prescribing a grammar of Encompassment employing a version of ‘repressive tolerance’ towards the difference of the other while waiting for the other to self-assimilate to Our (universally preferable) way of life: The capability of change of the other is frequently stressed – just as the *lack* of causal influence of Their presence on Us (at least when talking of any characteristic of society beyond taste in cuisine).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.1 The domesticated twin others of Culturalism and Multiculturalism**

Perhaps only two things keep the *notion* of Multiculturalism alive: Firstly, Multiculturalism has become a label for any opposition to the securitizing tendencies of Culturalism (the opposition summing up to a rather inefficient attempt at a discourse of de-securitization). Secondly, the perfectly symbiotic relation which ideal type Multiculturalism has with Culturalism as its official opponent: By agreeing to disagree on premises which systematically make it loose in every debate,
Multiculturalism has served Culturalism well.\textsuperscript{170} The symbiosis of the domesticated twin others of Culturalism and Multiculturalism is illustrated in figure 5.1.

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.2.png}
\caption{Carving out a space for integration narratives without culture}
\end{figure}

This chapter claims that a presentation of the Danish identity political landscape in terms of the two camps of Culturalism and Multiculturalism is too simple to account for the structures and dynamics which may contribute to radicalization of conflict. Primarily, a more nuanced picture of the narratives told by the government is necessary. In between the self-reproducing symbiosis of the discourses of Culturalism and Multiculturalism, two governments – first, one under Social-Democratic leadership; now, one headed by the Liberal party – has tried to carve out the room for an alternative policy of integration by talking at little as possible about culture. This

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{170} Wren (2001) and Hervik (2004:247) find culturalism to be dominating in Danish media and popular discourse. Hedetoft (2006a: 419-20; 2006c:1, 6) and Emerek (2003) – relatedly – find that ‘integration’ in official Danish discourse includes a substantial measure of cultural assimilation. Haldrup et al. (2006) find culturalist popular discourse to be mutually constitutive with a number of everyday practices of othering Muslims which they label \textit{practical orientalism}.
\end{flushright}
project is inserted in between the two usual suspects in figure 5.2. Talking ‘as little as possible’ about culture has, however, gradually turned out to be ‘a lot’.

The government narratives have evolved from shying away from culture – and in a parallel move; shying away from the state – to embracing both. This evolution may be described by looking at what Muslim threats 'integration' is meant to ameliorate. That is why this chapter asks how Muslims constitute a security problem.

Before the chapter may proceed to answer this question, a concept of what constitutes security problem is needed – just as a more detailed map of the identity political landscape which the government is manoeuvring is needed. A map of the Danish parliamentarian landscape is (in subsection 5.2.2) related to shifts at the most general level of Danish debates on migrants. The concept of security in the context of migration politics is discussed in section 5.3.

5.2.2 Animosity against strangers spreading and condensing on Muslims

This subsection portrays the Danish political landscape from two perspectives: Firstly, the substantial debate on migrants and Muslims from 1990 to 2010 is characterized on the most abstract level. Secondly, the institutional conditions for the debates – in the form of the composition of Parliamentary factions – are described.

If one reads Danish debates sufficiently broad – from marginal publications of the 80ies; via the letters to the editors of populist tabloid Ekstra-Bladet and conservative broad sheet Jyllands-Posten in the 90ies; to the nooks and corners of the internet in the new millennium – one may find strangers, aliens, immigrants, and Muslims pointed out as threats to literally everything. It is, however, beyond doubt that two movements have made a difference:

Firstly, a considerable shift has taken place over the decades both concerning what one may say about 'the strangers' and concerning who may – or rather: must – say it.
Animosity against strangers has moved from a marginal status to a position close to hegemony. This movement has taken place via the tabloid campaigns of *Ekstra-Bladet* in the mid-90ies (Hervik (red.) 1999); via the foundation of the Danish People's Party in 1995 and its election to parliament in 1998; via the dependency of the centre-right government on the votes of the Danish People's Party for its parliamentary majority after 2001; and via the adaption of the social democrats and the Socialist People's Parties to the rhetoric of the new alien policy (Jacobsen et al. 2007).

Secondly, animosity against strangers has condensed around religious difference. It is no longer 'strangers', 'aliens', or 'refugees and immigrants' whom are pointed out as the problem: It is the Muslims (Jacobsen 2008:234, 267-8). To the extent that the older concepts – or euphemisms like 'new Danes' or '2nd g's' – are used, they increasingly have a semantic density around 'Muslims' (Andreassen 2005:256ff; Hastrup 2004:105; cf. Ardener 1989:169). In this connection 9/11 and the falling twin towers has served as a symbol for the condensation. Furthermore, the bombings on the London underground at July 7, 2005 and the related concept of 'home grown terrorists', as well as the Cartoon Crisis and the related concepts of 'culture struggle' and 'value struggle' have served to link religion, integration, and counterterrorism across the distinction between domestic and foreign policy.\footnote{171}

Since the 1970ies, Denmark has a tradition of coalition governments often constituted by parties commanding only a minority of the votes in parliament. Most often the social liberals – at times joined by a couple of other small centre parties – have decided whether to join the social democrats to the left or a coalition of the liberal and the conservative party to the right. More often than not, one or two parties either on the far left or on the far right have been supporting the government without

\footnote{171 The analysis returns to this below.}
appointing ministers. For the better part of the 80ies, the centre parties went to the right – in the 90ies, they went to the left.

Alien policy did play an important role in Danish national politics in the 80ies and 90ies – but rather in the parliamentarian manoeuvrings than in electoral politics. In 1983, the social liberals – while supporting a centre-right government from the outside – formed a majority with the left to reform the Alien law to the benefit of asylum seekers. The coalition government – including the conservatives and the liberals – finally voted for the reform, mainly to keep the social liberals onboard (Brøcker 1990:339). The conservative minister for justice, however, subsequently denied a group of Tamil refugees their rights to family reunification (Hornslet 1992). These illegal decisions caused him to be the first Danish minister in 85 years to be impeached and convicted for abusing his office. The centre parties took the 'Tamilgate' as an occasion to switch sides and join the social democrats in 1993. The change of governments was made without calling an election. During the 90ies, a series of the elements in the 1983 regulations benefitting asylum seekers and migrants were gradually reversed, while increased emphasis was put on the need to 'integrate' the 'strangers'. Both processes were impelled by social democratic mayors residing over suburban housing projects with high concentration of people born outside Denmark.

Alien and immigration policies were, however, marginalized in electoral politics through the 80ies and most of the 90ies. Only the Progress Party campaigned actively on the topic, combining extreme positions on both public spending and migration. The 1998 elections, however, were very successful for the newly formed Danish People's Party. The DPP had grown out of the turbulent Progress Party, but the right wing platform had been reshuffled to combine nationalism in EU and alien policy with an economic policy branded as old style social democracy.
The general condition of the centre parties functioning as a switch board between centre right and centre left governments was dramatically altered in the 2001 elections. The liberal party – one of the two main contenders for the office of the prime minister – for the first time actively campaigned on migration and integration policies. Therefore the 2001 elections became the first general elections campaign fought over alien policy (Mikkelsen 2008:168). The centre-left government lost its parliamentary majority. Contrary to the traditional situation, the centre parties could not even provide the necessary votes to provide a centre-right government with a parliamentary majority. In stead, the liberals and the conservatives formed a new government depending on the DPP for its majority.

The parliamentary majority of liberals, conservatives and the DPP survived the 2005 and 2007 elections. In both elections, the immigration and integration policies were featured centrally. Even as the two elections saw a boost of each their centre party campaigning primarily on the need to provide a centre-right majority without relying on the DPP – especially in immigration and integration policies – such an alterative majority did not materialize. Meanwhile, the social democrats have gradually formulated immigration and integration policies in line with the government policies. Lately they have been joined in this move by the largest left wing party, the Socialist People's Party. Presently, the combined centre parties have collapsed to poll at historically low figures – while seemingly pondering over how to formulate alien policy in a way which does not disqualify them from entering into post-election coalitions with their preferred partners be they to the right or to the left. Left as an unconditional opposition to the main stream in these matters is only a tiny left wing alliance.

The 'Culturalism vs. Multiculturalism' image of the Danish debates on Muslims only really covers the DPP and this tiny left wing outfit. As table 5.1 shows, this leaves 5/6 of the parliamentarians trying to formulate other narratives – perhaps somewhat less,
if one discounts the odd liberal, conservative and social democrat joining Culturalism; the social liberals when they insist on resisting Culturalism; and the odd social democrat and socialist relapsing into Multiculturalism.

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Table 5.1 Composition of Folketinget after general elections 1998-2007

Government coalitions coloured dark – parties supporting to secure parliamentary majority coloured grey. Factions consistently upholding culturalist and multiculturalist positions are italicized. Not included in the table are 4 MPs elected in Greenland and the Faroe Islands; usually three of them caucus and/or vote with the left and one with the right. 90 MPs make a majority (88 discounting the North Atlantic MPs). A number of MPs have left the party they were elected for during the term – none of the defections have in these periods had any lasting effect on the majority constellation. (www.folketinget.dk, accessed 1 March 2010)

The analytical focus of this chapter is neither the Culturalist narratives promoted primarily by the DPP, nor, for that matter, the Multiculturalist counter-narrative. The focus is on the attempts to formulate narratives on integration without talking culture. More specifically; the focus is on the most important attempts: The ones promoted by the government – which, on the one hand, at times explicitly distances itself from the DPP, but which, on the other hand, cannot afford to alienate the supporting party.

Beginning the analysis in 2001 is, on the one hand, an obvious choice because of both 9/11 and the change of government from centre-left to centre-right. On the other hand, the significance of 2001 should not be overstressed: The new government continued, developed and implemented a series of thoughts and ideas put into play by
the preceding government\textsuperscript{172} – especially by taking over its so called 'Think tank on challenges to the integration effort in Denmark'. The present government primarily needs to articulate Culturalism directly in the form of its institutionalized voice in parliament, the DPP – the previous government attempted to articulate Culturalism in the electorate and in the organizational structures of the social democratic party. The establishment of the 'Think tank' in 2000 was one way of doing so: A select group of experts was assigned to evaluate the integration effort and advice the Minister of the Interior on how to improve it. To do so, it needed to explicate a definition of integration. The new government let the experts continue their work, reassigning them to the newly formed Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Through the years 2001 to 2007, a series of reports from the 'Think tank' analysed various aspects of integration.\textsuperscript{173} As will be clear from the analysis in this chapter, the reports were an important part of the political debate. And it will be clear that the concept of integration in both the reports and the in the debates evolved.

5.3 What is a security problem?

Before we may approach the debates and the policy papers and statements of the governments, we need, however, to clarify the analytical lenses to be employed in the first reading of the texts. Section 5.3 takes up this task by developing the concept of security narrative. It does so by asking what constitutes a security problem – and by discussing the answers to this question provided in debates over the Copenhagen School of security studies.

\textsuperscript{172} The three consecutive prime ministers Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (soc.dem.), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (lib.), and Lars Løkke Rasmussen (lib.) are not related.

\textsuperscript{173} The reports of the 'Think tank' are available at the home page of the Ministry of Integration, http://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-dk/Integration/forskning_og_udvikling/taenketanken.htm accessed 1 December 2009.
5.3.1 Securitization

So, what is a security problem? According to the Copenhagen School of security studies a securitization implies that the solution of a problem is made the number one priority and that extraordinary measures are legitimized – as the problem involves an existential threat to something valued (the 'referent-object'). In this perspective a securitization is successful when the application of extraordinary means to avert the threat is accepted by a relevant audience (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; cf. chapter 3).

Traditionally, state sovereignty has been the typical referent-object and the extraordinary means have been military – at least when the threat was coming from another state. But in addition one may easily list threats – from without or within – to the security and integrity of the state which have been met by security services, states of emergency, etc.

![Diagram of the threat construction of a securitizing move](image)

**Figure 5.3 The threat construction of a securitizing move**

The first point of the Copenhagen School is that audiences may accept the use of the rhetorical figure (existential threat + referent-object + extraordinary means) in other circumstances, with other referent-objects than 'the state as such'. Threats may be
pointed to 'the nation', 'the economy', or 'the climate'. This rhetorical figure – the threat construction of a securitizing move – is illustrated in figure 5.3. A second point is that by the use of this specific rhetorical figure – no matter what the referent-object is – one often turns to the state and its well-established toolbox of extraordinary means to avert threats.

Often but not always. Threats to various types of referent-objects and various extraordinary means set the stage for various conflict dynamics. A classical point in IR security theory is that threats to/the defence of sovereignty may give rise to 'security dilemmas' in which the one party takes action to secure itself – the defensive actions are, however, perceived as threatening by the other party, who must then secure itself – which the first party perceives as a threat, etc. (Herz 1950).

When the threat pointed out is not directed to sovereignty but to an identity – i.a., a national or ethnic identity – the risk of a destructive dynamic is even greater: When the military is involved, it is – at least in well-organized states – quite clear who is in charge of pointing out threats and employ extraordinary means: It is state business. When the issue concerns threats to softer identities the range of possible 'securitizers' – and even the range of who may take extraordinary action – is much wider (Wæver 1993): Opposition groups may instigate all kinds of defensive measures on behalf of the nation – but without the blessing of the state – ranging from the symbolic joining of hands to form chains across borders via community singing to corporal attacks on migrants.

Adding to this opening up of security to politics, identities are impossible to keep identical: Any change, slide or pollution may potentially be pointed out as a threat to identity. And by pointing to the failure of identity, defensive measures will contribute to increased insecurity (Wæver 1994, cf. Derrida 1988b:52).

When focusing this article on securitization of Muslims, one may imagine Muslims to be pointed out as a threat in a lot of different ways. As a traditional security threat
one would imagine the Turkish army marched up at the gates of Vienna or (when threatening Denmark:) by the obsolete border post where the highway crosses into Jutland from Germany. Employing a broader concept of security one may also be able to observe Muslims pointed out as threats to a variety of elements central to Danish identity – or, for that matter, observe Muslims pointed out as a specific threat to the environment or the economy, etc.

In parallel, the means presented to avert each specific threat may vary. Muslims may be inscribed into a traditional security discourse evolving around the defence of the physical border, clandestine services, restriction of civil liberties, and (as a last resort:) physical violence. But other means for the aversion of the threat may also be pointed out: cultural rearmament, reformed welfare legislation, etc.; ways which may not count as extraordinary in any meaningful sense of the word when viewed in isolation.

When actual analysis is to be conducted, the question of what constitutes a means as extraordinary is complicated: What if the extraordinary is institutionalized; may it still count as extraordinary? (cf. Buzan et al 1998:24; Wæver 2003:26f). And what if there are rules for when rule-breaking is allowed? (cf. Werner 1998:5ff). Perhaps it is of more practical analytical use to say that the ordinary way of doing politics is constituted by what is lifted out of the ordinary by means of securitization (Huysmans 2006:ch.8).

5.3.2 Security discourse

So the next question is how far one may stretch the criteria of the Copenhagen School before it no longer makes sense to talk about a problem as a security problem. One answer to that question follows from Huysmans analysis of migration and asylum as a security problem in the EU (2006:ch.5). His analysis describes how the situation is rather complex.
First of all, more than one securitization concerning migrants is at play in the EU: A threat is pointed out to 'internal security';\textsuperscript{174} a threat is pointed out to the welfare state; and a threat is pointed out to cultural identity. Secondly, it is not the migrant as such which is pointed out as the threat in any of these threat constructions: it is the terrorist and the criminal hiding amongst the migrants which is pointed out as threats; the will and abilities of the migrant to contribute to the economy; and the cultural habitus of the migrant. Thirdly, neither of these threats are necessarily accepted as acutely existential in isolation.

But the migrant—fourthly—ends up inscribed in a security problematique anyway. Partly because the various threats are articulated to migration:

\begin{quote}
[I]mmigration and asylum are powerful political categories. ... They are not a single category identifying a single force that threatens survival of a political community, whether defined in terms of identity or sovereignty. They exist more as floating signifiers that have been inscribed with connotations of danger, unease and fear that can refer to different groups of people ... and different social dynamics related to migration and asylum (Huysmans 2006:83).
\end{quote}

Migration is furthermore inscribed in a security problematique by the way the individual threats are linked exactly in their way of distributing fear and trust; administer inclusion and exclusion; as well as in their way of predispose for violence (Huysmans 2006:51). Being pointed out as a direct threat is only one way of

\textsuperscript{174} Huysmans' concept of 'internal security' refers to the fight against 'abuse' of the free movements of the Internal Market – in which immigrants are linked to border-crossing crime (weapon, drugs, terror, etc.) (Huysmans 2006:71; cf. Bigo 1994). In a national Danish context this link – as we will return to below – shows itself as a threat to the peaceful society.
becoming a security problem; inscription in a broader discourse of (in)security is another way of being the target of extraordinary means.\textsuperscript{175}

5.3.3 Securitizing narratives

On the one hand, this chapter basically tells the same story about the linking of threats as does Huysmans' in his analysis of the EU – even if the story has different implications as its focus is on 'Muslims' rather than 'migrants'. On the other hand, the reason why the chapter concludes that official Danish discourse on Muslims is securitizing does not coincide with Huysmans'. The argument in this chapter is that the analysis needs to focus on the dynamics of discursive interaction: A discourse also qualifies as securitizing if it systematically produces reactions which will present themselves in the discourse as security problems.

When the analytical focus is on identity,\textsuperscript{176} one important question is: Who fixes identity? Or rather – as identity is never fixed once and for all: Under what circumstances is identity negotiated. As laid out in chapter 2, a narrative about ones identity necessarily includes a series of 'others' in relation to whom one is (cf. Ricoeur 1988:246ff). A series of roles, which 'others' are expected to play, are described as a necessary part of the narrative. The description of these roles may leave more or less room for improvisation: When the floor is yours, you may use it for saying something different than expected – even if the risk implied in (and the consequences of) diverting from the script may be more or less dramatic (Butler 1997:133).

\textsuperscript{175} In such a broader perspective there is no doubt that securitization of migrants (Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002) as well as Muslims (Aydin & Acikmese 2008) is rather widespread in the Western world.

\textsuperscript{176} One may argue that securitization is always (also) about identity (cf. Neumann 1998:16-7). It does, however, make a difference, whether the analytical focus is on identity or on, e.g., sovereignty.
This chapter analyzes how official Danish narratives describe Muslims as threats—and how they describe what 'we' should do to 'them' on that occasion. In the first reading, the focus is on whether and how Muslims are pointed out as threats. But in the second and third reading, the focus is moved to the roles thereby described for Muslims—and what answers may be formulated from these speaking positions. The aim is to discuss whether some of the roles are so tightly circumscribed that it is impossible to use them as a platform for a reply which departs from the script—without the answer working as a threat to the Danish identity which the roles were described to interact with. Such a situation would amount to a 'securitized identity configuration' in which two identities are locked in mutually narrating each other as threatening.\footnote{As noted in chapter 2, Buzan & Wæver (2009) develops the concept of 'constellation' to denote to (or more) mutually reproducing securitizations on a macro scale. No theoretical barrier appears to hinder the application of the concept on a micro scale (cf. Wæver 1994). No matter what, the analysis of this chapter may contribute an analysis of a part of a macro constellation upheld by various forces presenting themselves to represent the West and Islam respectively (cf. Buzan & Wæver 2009; and chapter 10).}

5.4 **Muslims as security problems in official Danish discourse**

So what is it exactly—according to Danish official discourse—that must be defended from the Muslims? And what is the answer to the threats? Subsection 5.2.1 sketched two very general movements in Danish debates on integration: Firstly, that a wider part of the political spectrum expresses animosity against strangers. Secondly, that the animosity has gradually condensed around the difference of Muslims. These two movements, however, do not necessarily imply that government representatives exclaim that 'Muslims are an existential threat to Denmark—so we have to implement this and that draconic measure towards Muslims'.\footnote{Even if backbenchers of the government parties at times come close (cf. eg. MP Pind, lib., 2008).} Bearing in mind, however, the
modification suggested by Huysmans of the analytical setup of the Copenhagen School, even threats and means to their aversion presented in less dramatic phrasing must be included in the analysis: They may feed into and add up to a less tightly knitted discourse of (in)security, and thereby contribute in a more abstract way to legitimizing drastic measures. To this argument for widening the focus may be added that even a more diffuse narratives of threats and countermeasures may – in the dynamic perspective advocated by this dissertation – give rise to 'Muslim' answers which in conjunction with the Danish threat narratives result in further securitization.

When the threshold of what discursively constitutes a security problem\textsuperscript{179} is lowered as described above, the question may be reversed to be more operational in practical analysis: What kind of countermeasures does the government seek legitimization for to avert Muslim threats? What is it that 'we' (Denmark) has to do to 'them' (the Muslims) to protect ourselves?

A first cluster of answers are narratives of 'integration': Muslims need to be integrated in the Danish society. A second cluster of answers start out as narratives of the prevention of terrorism – but end up telling about the integration of Muslims too.

In his opening speech to parliament immediately after the inauguration of the new government in 2001 the prime minister put three threats into play; the threat to the peaceful society, the threat to the welfare society, and the threat to cultural identity.\textsuperscript{180}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{179} As whenever doing research which combines security and an othered identity in the same sentences, it is important to note that this is not an analysis of whether or not Muslims in some objective sense is posing a threat to Denmark. Contrarily it is an analysis of, firstly, whether or not – and if so; how – Muslims are discursively pointed out as threats and thereby produced as a security problem, and secondly, what this discursive production effects in terms of 'second round' security problems (cf. McSweeney 1996; Buzan & Wæver 1997).

\textsuperscript{180} These are basically the same three threats identified by Huysmans in his analysis of the securitization of migration and asylum in the EU;
\end{flushright}
It is an important investment in the future to have Danish alien policy back in order. For years a lax alien policy has been conducted – a policy which is now putting the Danish society under pressure. It is a problem that half the immigrants in Denmark are out of job. And it is a problem that there are groups of young second generation immigrants who are strained by serious crime. A number of them are rejecting the values on which the Danish society is built. And they reject integration in the Danish society. We have to realize these facts. We have to tighten our alien policy. Otherwise a growing opposition will evolve between the population groups in the Danish society. Being a peaceful and harmonic people is emblematic to Denmark. That is the way it should be in the future too. It is not so that we shall be identical all of us. Of course not. There has to be freedom to differer. But we have to build a strong society where there is a community around some basic values and attitudes. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.04)\(^{181}\)

So Danish welfare is threatened by the low employment rate of the immigrants; the peaceful Danish society is threatened by their crime; and the Danish community of values is threatened by someone rejecting the values. The three threats are presented as connected – but the specific connections are unclear: What group of "them" of whom "a number" reject the Danish values – is it only the criminal second generation immigrants or does the group include the unemployed? In what direction is the

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causality: is it a job that leads to Danish values or is it the other way around? And what is most important? And what is it exactly which will put an end to the peaceful society?

In the following years a series of distinct integration narratives may be distinguished in government policy papers and the interventions of cabinet ministers in parliament, in the press, and in public appearances. Each of the narratives describes a relation between the good which is threatened, the source of the threat, and the necessary countermeasures. In that way each narrative leave a more or less distinct set of roles to take up for the one who is to be integrated.

The threat to the peaceful society is narrated in three ways: First, two parallel narratives on the criminal second generation immigrant and on the intruding terrorist – later, a narrative on the 'home grown' terrorist. In between are a series of attempts to tell stories that articulate the threat to welfare and the threat to culture. These central integration narratives on culture and welfare are, however, reconfigured – in a rather surprising way – when they are merged with the narrative on the threat from the home grown terrorist.

5.5 The first threats to the peaceful society: intrusion

The threat to the peaceful society in the form of crime only takes up very little space in the first initiatives of the new government – in the field of integration.\textsuperscript{182} In stead the matter is treated as an integrated part of a more general reform of the penal code. The threat is to be averted by adjusting the incitement structures facing the individual – primarily negatively in the form of more severe punishment, but also positively in the form of supplying alternative possibilities.\textsuperscript{183} Only one initiative is targeted

\textsuperscript{182} Crime is mentioned in a subordinate clause on page 16 in (Ministeriet 2002).

\textsuperscript{183} Ministeriet (2002:16).
directly at the ethnic background of the criminal: penalty is in more cases to include the discontinuation of the residence permit for non-citizens.\textsuperscript{184}

Even if the connection forged by the prime minister between crime and the rejection of Danish values is not explicitly present in policy papers and legislative initiatives in the field of integration, the connection is re-established in various parliamentary debates:\textsuperscript{185} The crime rate is a consequence of values which have migrated to the country from outside.

Another threat to the peaceful society – the terrorist – demands reactions which qualify as extraordinary no matter what yardstick we may apply.\textsuperscript{186} At first, however, the threat is not directly aimed at Denmark:

\textsuperscript{184} VK-regeringen I (2001); Regeringen (2002); VK-regeringen II (2005:33).

\textsuperscript{185} Even when the parliamentary debate is occasioned by a survey documenting that members of ethnic minorities dissociate themselves from a series of specific crimes by a larger proportion than ethnic Danes (cf. Folketinget 2007.04.26).

\textsuperscript{186} To the DPP, the two threats to the peaceful society are the same as Muslim crime is a small scale form of Islamic terror “[T]he effort to be made against terror must not only be targeted at the persons already caught by terror networks but has to attempt to forestall such things from happening at all. In this context it is important to severely crack down on criminal, young immigrants moving in circles where crime and Islamic fundamentalism are mixed. It is well known that for example the Hizb-ut-Tahrir is recruiting young Muslims on the street level, often young Muslims offending against the law. … Terrorism may be defined in different ways. One definition is that terrorism is characterized by violence and speculation in fear being used to further a political opinion or a political aim. Another definition is that terror is crimes threatening, undermining or outright destroying the political, economic, or social structures of the countries. The riots we have seen in Paris are frightening; it might not be terror but it is frightening. It is not terror in the original meaning of the word but it is, anyhow, a mob rule which is terror in embryo. The unrest in Rosenhøj near Århus is, of course, of an altogether different scale, but these problems too are caused by the lack of respect for authorities and for the society which the immigrants ought to be part of. It is the lack of respect for the authorities which boosts the seeds of terror” ”[I]ndsatsen mod terror [skal] ikke alene ... rette sig mod de personer, som allerede er blevet indfængt af terrornetværk, men også skal forsøge at foregrinde, at noget lignende overhovedet sker. I den forbindelse er det vigtigt at slå hårdt ned på kriminelle, unge indvandrere, der færdes i et miljø, hvor kriminalitet og islamsk fundamentalisme
When we engage ourselves in the solution of the problems of the world, it is, i.a., because we have some fundamental values of what is fair and equitable ... That is why we have shown solidarity with the USA and other countries in the international fight against terrorism. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.04)\(^{187}\)

The countermeasures presented are, firstly, fighting terrorism with military means 'out in the world' together with the USA;\(^{188}\) secondly, to make sure that the terrorists do not get in side Denmark;\(^{189}\) thirdly, to keep him under surveillance, catch and persecute him if he does anyway.\(^{190}\)

Quite soon, however, the narrative on the threat from the terrorist is changed so that the referent-object of the threat in a more clear way includes 'us'. The government explicitly points out terrorism as the threat taking over from the existential threat of the Cold War:

\(\text{\ldots} \)

\(^{187}\) "Når vi engagerer os i løsningen af dennes verdens problemer, så er det jo blandt andet, fordi vi har nogle grundlæggende værdier om ret og rimeligt. ... Derfor har vi vist solidaritet med USA og andre lande i den internationale kamp mod terrorisme." (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.04).


\(^{190}\) At first, by passing new anti-terror legislation (Folketinget 2002.05.31).
The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different than the ones we faced during the Cold War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is no longer an all-destructive nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global terror networks or desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the international community. Terrorism today is a real and essential threat to populations everywhere in the world. (Regeringen 2003:2)\textsuperscript{191}

These initial narratives on both crime and terror may be summed up to say that They come from outside with values allowing or inducing Them to commit crime and terror. Thereby They threaten Our peaceful society. Therefore We must stop Them from intruding and make it harder for those who nevertheless get inside to follow Their values. The threat construction of this narrative is illustrated in figure 5.4.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5.4.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{Figure 5.4 The threat to the peaceful society}

\textsuperscript{191} "Det 21. århundredes trusler er fundamentalt anderledes, end dem vi stod overfor under Den Kolde Krig og de første år efter Murens fald. Mareridtet er ikke længere den altødelæggende atomkrig, men massivt ødelæggende angreb fra globale terrornetværk eller desperate regimer, der har stillet sig uden for det internationale samfund. Terrorisme er i dag en virkelig og væsentlig trussel mod befolkningerne overalt i verden." (Regeringen 2003:2).
At the same time it is important for the government to make clear that the threat does not emanate from Islam or Muslims as such:

Some in Denmark were swift to declare war on the large part of humanity which professes more or less to the world religion of Islam. We have, of course, to distance ourselves from such a generalization and such throwing suspicion. Individual Muslims in Denmark should not suffer from this. Terrorism shall not be answered with new persecution of more nations. It is the criminals who shall be hunted for with every mean compatible with our conception of justice. (Hornbech, MP, lib. in Folketinget 2002.01.31 11:35)

After the bombing of the London underground in 2005 and the Cartoon Crisis in 2006, this dissociation is placed in a new light by the concept of 'home grown terrorists' and by the linking of local and global threats in one and the same 'value struggle'. By then the threat is aimed at 'us-Denmark' and not just at the more non-committal 'us-who-shares-values' and 'us-the-populations-everywhere-in-the-world'. We will return to this below.

5.6 Narratives of threats to culture and welfare

First, however, we need to chart the central debate on Danish integration policy. This central debate pertains to the importance of labour market integration relative to cultural assimilation. What is it that needs to be protected; welfare or culture? Or if both; how are the two threats connected?

5.6.1 What is the threat to culture: Their culture or multiculturalism?

It is well known that the DPP which supports the government in parliament every now and then point out Islam, Muslim culture in the abstract or specific 'Muslim' practices as threats to Danish culture among a series of other referent-objects (cf. Jacobsen 2008:267f). The threat construction of this basic DPP narrative is illustrated in figure 5.5. This threat construction forms the background for the phrasing repeated time and again by the first minister for integration in the centre-right government: "I have repeatedly said that I am not minister for shower curtains, veils and [pork] liver pâté in kindergardens." (Haarder, Min.f. Intgrt., lib., in Folketinget 2004.05.11 13.25)\(^{193}\) The words served as an explanation for why he would not take action against Muslim cultural traits said to threaten this or that practice implied to be emblematic for Danish culture.

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193 "Jeg har gentagne gange sagt, at jeg ikke er minister for badeførhæng og tørklæder og leverpostej i børnehaver." (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Folketinget 2004.05.11 13.25).
imply that there is no threat to avert. The threat described by the government is aimed at the function of Danish culture as that which sets the rules of the game on Danish soil:

Danish culture is more important than other cultures. When I as a minister for education put the biblical narrative centre stage in religious instruction [literally: Christian studies; -/upg] it was clearly an act of discrimination. One needs to be familiar with the biblical story, and one needs to be acquainted with other religions. This is discrimination and this is the way it should be. The same way in the Danish lessons; there one read Danish literature – it is more important than foreign literature. So, I contend, all this talk of equality of cultures and equality of religion – it is nonsense... Well, Denmark is a Danish society. It is the Danes who decide in Denmark. And we are, as well, the ones who decide how many should be let in... Isn't this discrimination? Of course it is discrimination. (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Hardis 2002)\textsuperscript{194}

In this way the source of the threat is formally displaced from specific Muslims and Islam as such to the accept and protection of minority cultures promoted by an abstract multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{195} After this displacement the threat at first stems – rather than from Muslims – from parties promoting ideals of integration like this:

\begin{center}
\textsuperscript{195} This threat may, of course, also be found in DPP narratives.
\end{center}
integration is a mutual process which needs to be based on equal opportunity and absence of discrimination [which demands that] society makes room for a plurality of cultures and ... that the possibilities for the ethnic minorities to communicate knowledge of their culture and conditions in Denmark are strengthened. (SPP in Folketinget 2000.11.23)\(^{196}\)

Discrimination may be regarded an extraordinary countermeasure – but the very point of this intervention of the Minister for Integration is to present discrimination as something non-ordinary, as a normal course of action. In that sense the pointing out of multiculturalism as a threat serves to constitute 'Danish culture' as the normalized framework for political community.

And then again: It is not just multiculturalism and the way it places cultures on equal footing which constitutes the threat. Multiculturalism is, as illustrated in figure 5.6, a threat because it allows Muslim culture to threaten Danish culture. Because the concept of culture implied is digital (Eriksen 1995) in the sense that culture is an either/or question. Culture comes as a package deal: You either take it or leave it:

[T]he parents are entirely outside the Danish society. This means that the children grow up in a vacuum, suspended between two cultures: The culture of the native country is of no use in Denmark, and they are bared from the Danish culture by their behaviour. (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Dørge 2003)\(^{197}\)

\(^{196}\) "integration er en gensidig proces, der skal baseres på lige muligheder og fravær af diskrimination [hvilket kræver] at samfundet giver plads til mangfoldighed i kulturer, og ... at man styrker etniske minoriteters muligheder for at formidle viden om deres kultur og forhold i Danmark" (Beslutningsforslag fra SF in Folketinget 2000.11.23).

So when the minister retells the perfect integration narrative, it goes like this:

The Chinese are perfect immigrants because they fulfil the only criteria for integration: integration in the labour market. It is an entrepreneurial culture where one has to contribute before one may consume. And there is no one demanding that they dispose of their culture as long as they prove themselves able to work and participate in the Danish community... If all immigrants were like the Chinese, my job as Minister for Integration would be deeply superfluous. (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., [2002] in Surrugue & Astrup 2004)

The point of establishing this ideal is that not all immigrants are like the Chinese. Not all migrants have the Chinese culture which – according to the Minister – does not bar them from working and participating in society. So the government needs a narrative about the connection between the threat to Danish culture and the threat to

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Danish welfare. Such a narrative comes in a series of versions. At first, welfare comes out on top – later, things gradually get more complicated.

5.6.2 The state – and culturalism – as threats to welfare

In the first formulations of an integration policy of the new government, focus is unambiguously on the labour market: "To the government there is no doubt that a job is the key to successful integration." (Ministeriet 2002:1)\(^{199}\)

This 'rationalist' narrative points out the low proportion of aliens in jobs as a threat to the way the welfare society is financed and to its ability to compete in the world market. In this narrative a citizen able to provide for himself is a well-integrated citizen. The low proportion of immigrants in active in the labour market is a threat to Danish welfare:\(^{200}\)

If we satisfactorily accomplish the task [of integration] it will increase employment and reduce public spending on social security. If we do not succeed we will have an increased pressure on the economy of the welfare society while we at the same time risk a society with labour shortage. (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:section 2.2)\(^{201}\)

\(^{199}\) "For regeringen hersker der ingen tvivl om, at et arbejde er nøglen til succesfuld integration." (Ministeriet 2002:1). Even when the text does not present labour market integration as exhausting the concept of integration, it is not culture but political participation which is the necessary supplement: "A job is an important road to integration, but it does not do the trick on its own. Integration is also about being able to participate in others parts of societal life, so that the individual new citizen may enter into work in civil society associations and school boards." (2002:1).

\(^{200}\) And welfare is not just a technical way of ordering things – it is a central element in the identity of the Danish nation state: The solidary Danish people has built for itself a welfare society to nest the unfolding of its inner qualities (Hansen 2002:51f, 60f, 69, 80ff).

\(^{201}\) "Løser vi [integrations]opgaven tilfredsstillende, vil det øge beskæftigelsen og nedbringe de offentlige sociale udgifter. Lykkes det ikke, får vi et samfund med et voksende pres på velfærdsamfundets økonomi, samtidig med at vi risikerer et samfund med mangel på arbejdskraft." (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:section 2.2).
But notably, in this narrative the welfare society and the immigrant is in the same boat as his exclusion from the labour market is a threat aimed at both:

In Denmark all citizens must have equal access to work life and the societal life – including our new citizens who have come here as refugees and immigrants. ... Today an all too large share of our new citizens are outside the labour market. If the affiliation to the labour market of the new citizens was the same as that of the rest of the population, 60,000 more persons would be in jobs. (Ministeriet 2002:1)  

The first version of the narrative is that the threat comes from the exclusion, as illustrated in figure 5.7. And the source of the threat is not the one excluded but someone else doing something to the excluded.

Figure 5.7 The threat to welfare

This first narrative is also the first narrative about the connection between cultural integration and labour market integration. This, the first narrative of the government

202 "I Danmark skal alle borgere have adgang til arbejds- og samfundslivet – også vores nye borgere, der er kommet hertil som flygtninge og indvandrere. ... I dag står en alt for stor andel af vore nye borgere uden for arbejdsmarkedet. Hvis de nye borgeres tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet var den samme som den øvrige del af befolkningens, ville der være 60.000 flere personer i arbejde." (Ministeriet 2002:1).
on the connection between cultural integration and labour market integration, begins when "The vast majority of new citizens arrive in the country wanting to contribute an effort to create a new life for him or herself in Denmark." (Ministeriet 2002:2)²⁰³

The common threat to Danish welfare and the new citizens come from the "clientification" performed by the welfare state to the new citizens (Ministeriet 2002:2).²⁰⁴ The countermeasures proposed are, first the deconstruction of harmful bureaucracy, and, secondly, a reconstruction of the incitement structures greeting the new arrival. The point of both is to get the immigrant (or his children) in job as soon as possible.²⁰⁵

The obvious way to fit culture and religion into this narrative is awarding it the role of an irrational distraction:

It is remarkable that employers who have experienced new-Danish apprentices quickly forget about the cultural background of the apprentices. In the humdrum of everyday life it is professional and social abilities which are important (Beskæftigelsesministeren, Frederiksen, lib., 2002b) Therefore it is about making space and room for everyone, disregarding the colour of skin and names sounding foreign. One of the problems is the massive focus on religion, culture and tradition. (2002a)²⁰⁶

²⁰³ "Langt de fleste nye borgere kommer til landet med ønsket om at yde en indsats for at skabe sig en ny tilværelse i Danmark." (Ministeriet 2002:2).

²⁰⁴ "[K]lientgørelse" (Ministeriet 2002:2).

²⁰⁵ Ministeriet (2002:2ff).

²⁰⁶ "Det er jo bemærkelsesværdigt, at de arbejdsgivere, der har erfaring med nydanske elever meget hurtigt 'glemmer' elevernes kulturelle baggrund. I den grå hverdag er det ikke kultur, men faglighed og social kunne, der er vigtig." (Beskæftigelsesministeren, Frederiksen. lib., 2002b); "Derfor handler det om at skabe plads og rum til alle, uanset hudfarve og fremmedklingende navn. Et af problemerne er den massive fokus på religion, kultur og tradition." (2002a).
A misguided focus on cultural difference – culturalism – is a threat, albeit a minor one compared to clientification. This second threat should be countered by everybody taking up a more relaxed approach to cultural differences and by more interaction across cultural difference. The place awarded to culture as a secondary threat is illustrated in figure 5.8.

But a narrative involving such an outspoken hostility to culturalism is not viable in the long run, when one is simultaneously attempting the articulation of a narrative awarding Danish culture the double position as that which is threatened and in itself an important countermeasure to the threat.207

Figure 5.8 The threat to welfare from Culturalism

One way of making ends meet is the paperclip method: just listing the two aims of integration: What is decisive is labour market integration – but there is also this other

207 The new government is, as mentioned, specifically dependent on the articulation of this narrative as it is dependent on forming a majority in parliament with the DPP. The preceding government attempted – in a more tentative way – the articulation of the narrative by way of its resonance in the electorate.
threat in need of countermeasures in the form of another kind or element of integration. This method gives rise to texts rattling off like this:

in our opinion it is the following social conditions which are decisive for whether we may speak of a successful integration: Education, employment, and self-supportance.

... One of the goals of a successful integration is that the foreigners endorse some fundamental values and norms in Denmark. (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:sections 2.4; 2.11)\textsuperscript{208}

Figure 5.9 illustrates how – according to the 'paper clip' texts – a process of 'integration' should avert threats to both welfare and values without explaining how the two are related.

\textbf{Figure 5.9 The paper clips connection between labour market and cultural integration}

No narrative connection between labour market integration and cultural integration – only related by listing

\textsuperscript{208} "[D]et er efter vores opfattelse følgende sociale forhold, der er afgørende for, at man kan tale om en vellykket integration: Uddannelse, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse ... Et af målene for en vellykket integration er, at udlændinge tilslutter sig og efterlever nogle grundlæggende værdier og normer i Danmark." (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:sections 2.4; 2.11).
Another version relates the two types of integration causally so that labour market integration will in the end lead the immigrant to the learn the Danish values. This is illustrated in figure 5.10.

**Figure 5.10 Labour market integration as a means to cultural integration**

### 5.6.3 Relating culture and welfare by letting welfare lead to culture

Over time, however, a narrative surfaces which constructs a causality in the opposite direction: Labour market integration is still the central aim – but to reach the aim, cultural integration is needed. At least **certain** central culturally and religiously based values, norms, and practices must be left behind as they exclude competing Danish values, norms, and practices (cf. Stolcke 1995:4). The shift to this new narrative is explicated in a report from the government 'think tank on challenges to the integration effort':

In the first report of the Think Tank the endorsement of fundamental values and norms was not emphasized as one of the most important goals for a successful integration a par with education, employment and self-supportance. The experiences and inquiries obtained since 2001 seem, however, to indicate that values and norms should be ascribed a larger significance ... The point that foreigners should endorse fundamental values and norms does not in itself mean that foreigners have to give up
their original culture, e.g. religion, attire, or cuisine. This may, however, be necessary if insistence on the original culture is in conflict with values and norms in Denmark to such an extent that foreigners cannot participate on equal footing in working life and societal life in other respects. (Ministeriet 2007:4)

In this new narrative, the culture, religion, values and norms of the individual immigrant ends up as a threat to Danish welfare. The threat construction of this narrative is illustrated in figure 5.11.

Figure 5.11 Cultural integration as a means to labour market integration

The weight of the countermeasures is gradually shifted over the years. Initially "diversity management" and local, "practical solutions which satisfy everyone" are

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209 "I Tænketankens første rapport blev tilslutningen til grundlæggende værdier og normer ikke fremhævet som et af de vigtigste mål for vellykket integration på linje med uddannelse, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse. De erfaringer og undersøgelser, der er kommet til siden 2001, synes imidlertid at vise, at værdier og normer skal tillægges større betydning ... At udlandinge skal tilslutte sig grundlæggende værdier og normer indebærer som udgangspunkt ikke, at udlandinge skal opgive deres oprindelige kultur, fx religion, påklædning eller madkultur. Dette kan dog være nødvendigt, hvis en fastholdelse af den oprindelige kultur strider mod værdier og normer i Danmark i et sådant omfang, at udlandinge ikke kan deltage på lige fod med danskere i arbejds- og samfundsivet i øvrigt." (Ministeriet 2007:4; cf. Ministeriet 2003:kap.4.2.3).
mentioned (Ministeriet 2003:kap.4.2.3). Later, as we shall see, a more clear allocation of roles and responsibilities is explicated.

5.7 Back-up narratives

Before the government narrative clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, it has been 'beefed up' by articulating two more abstract narratives: A functionalist narrative focused on 'cohesive force' points out cultural homogeneity as a prerequisite for welfare. An exceptionalist narrative about Denmark as a pioneer nation points out Danish values as universally valid. Though the two narratives may at first seem at odds, they – as described by Mouritsen (2006:78ff) – both add weight to the same countermeasure: the spread of Danish values.

5.7.1 Functionalism: Plurality as the threat to welfare

The 'functionalist' narrative pivots around the concept of 'cohesive force'. Like the narrative which constructed cultural integration as a means to labour market

210 "[H]åndtere mangfoldighed... praktiske løsninger, som tilfredsstiller alle." (Ministeriet 2003:kap.4.2.3).

211 Mouritsen analyses the two narratives under the labels 'instrumental homogeneity' and 'particular universalism' as part of a discussion of national and civic values as they are related in debates on Muslims. Hedetoft sketches elements of both narratives – focusing, however, primarily on functionalism – in an analysis of Danish policy, media and public discourse on integration 2003:3; 2006a:398, 401, 407). Lægaard (2007a) discusses the particular universalism of Danish liberalism as a form of nationalism.

212 Peter Gundelach reminds me (pesonal communication, 2008.05.25) that the established sociological terminology has 'social cohesion' for the Danish 'sammenhængskraft'. I have elected to retain the literal translation 'cohesive force' because of the connotations which the phrase carries in Danish: Firstly, 'cohesive force' is something that is temporally and causally situated before cohesion; it is a force which effects cohesion. Secondly, omitting the prefix 'social' allows 'cohesion' to articulate either 'social', cultural', or both; a specific polyvalency which is active in the narratives presented by the prime minister. This lack of specificity is different from the established sociological use of 'social cohesion' which in English denominates the social cohesion across cultural plurality – and which has allowed a twin concept of 'cultural cohesion' to be mainly applied in organizational and management
integration, this narrative presents the national economy (and the welfare goods it allows) as the threatened referent-object. But this narrative does not explain a competitive economy with a high employment rate only:

The government will suggest ... specific steps with a view to strengthen our competitive force and our cohesive force. Cohesive force; that is to secure a society that hangs together. A society in which there are not too great social or economical divisions. ... But cohesive force is also to secure a society that hangs together in terms of values. One of the strengths of the Danish society is that we - despite differences in opinion on a series of specific questions - nevertheless build on a common foundation of certain fundamental values. Some of these values are challenged these days. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.06.15 9:10)

Economical success for a nation comes from being competitive – and a decisive factor in Denmark's ability to compete is the trust among people made possible by cultural homogeneity. The threat in this narrative is not individual unemployment but cultural difference as such. And cultural difference is not just any link in the causal chain; it is the source of the threat:

studies to denominate the need for an organization not to be pluricultural. The Danish 'cohesive force' allows – as we shall see – both a threat from cultural plurality as such and a threat from lack of social cohesion across cultural plurality

213 "[Regeringen vil foreslå]... en række konkrete ... skridt, som skal forstærke både vores konkurrencekraft og vores sammenhængskraft. Sammenhængskraft, det er at sikre et samfund, der hænger sammen. Et samfund, hvor der ikke er for store sociale og økonomiske skel. ... Men sammenhængskraft er også at sikre et samfund, der værdimæssigt hænger sammen. En af styrkerne i det danske samfund er, at vi trods forskellige holdninger til en række konkrete spørgsmål dog bygger på et fælles grundlag af visse fundamentale værdier. Nogle af disse værdier bliver udfordret i disse år." (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.06.15 9:10).

214 The point is that in Danish political debates the concept of ‘cohesive force [sammenhængskraft]’ did not always have these twin implications. The concept was originally articulated into the discourse of the prime minister as a means to explain a shift in the overall socio-political aim: At the 2004 congress of the Liberal party, the prime minister
distanced himself from his earlier vision of a minimal state by saying: "I have come to the conclusion that social cohesive force [sammenhængskraft] and only a little inequality is a competitive issue" "Jeg er nået til den erkendelse, at social sammenhængskraft og kun lidt ulighed er en konkurrenceparameter" (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Hein 2004). In his ‘state of the realm’ address to parliament on the 24 February 2005, the prime minister maintained this concept of cohesive force as a means to bridge social cleavages: "We can and we shall not compete on wages. ... we shall compete on knowledge, ideas and the ability to adapt ... We need, however, to realize that not everyone is equally well-equipped to meet the challenges of an ever-tougher competition. So we need to beware that our society is not divided into two groups; an elite capable of handling every challenge and a residual group in perpetual risk of unemployment and social problems. So we are facing a double task. We have to strengthen Denmark as a knowledge society ... and we have to make sure that all groups in the Danish society are brought onboard. ... I am convinced that we will be able to accomplish this double task so that we secure a Danish society in which there is not too large a social and economical inequality. I propose that we all unite around an ambitious strategy which can make Denmark a leading knowledge society and the most competitive society in the world." "Vi kan og skal ikke konkurrere på lønnen. ... vi [skal] konkurrere på viden. På idéer. Og på evnen til at omstille os. Vi må imidlertid se i øjnene, at ikke alle er lige godt rustet til at møde udfordringerne fra den stadig stærkere konkurrence. Vi skal derfor være meget opmærksomme på, at vort samfund ikke bliver splittet op i to grupper med en elite, der kan klare det hele, og en restgruppe, der hele tiden er udsat for stor ledighedsrisiko og sociale problemer. Derfor står vi over for en dobbelt opgave. Vi skal styrke Danmark som et vidensamfund, så vi fortsat kan høre til blandt de mest velstående samfund i verden. Og vi skal samtidig sikre, at alle grupper i det danske samfund kommer med. ... jeg er overbevist om, at vi kan løse denne dobbelte opgave. Så vi sikrer et dansk samfund med en stærk konkurrenceevne og med en stærk sammenhængskraft. Et samfund, hvor der ikke er for stor social og økonomisk ulighed. Jeg vil lægge op til, at vi alle samles om en ambitiøs strategi, der kan gøre Danmark til et førende vidensamfund. Og til verdens mest konkurrencedygtige samfund." (Rasmussen, PM, lib., R1, 2005.02.24 10:15). An analysis dated in the spring of 2005 focusing on the reconfiguration of the ideology of the Liberal party and the concept of cohesive force may, hence, credibly leave integration of immigrants out of the account. Four months later in the final general debate before parliament broke for the summer, it was not only social cleavages that needed to be bridged to secure the cohesive force of the society; in addition, cultural cleavages needed to be mended. This double concept of cohesive force – as something opposed to both social and cultural divisions – are, however new to the prime minister, not invented from scratch. Half a decade earlier, then Social Democratic Minister for Social Affairs Karen Jespersen warned against the threat arising in the form of a new “social and cultural underclass” that was coming into being in the ghettos: “The strength of the Danish welfare society is that we are so homogenous and have a great cohesive force. ... But if there are large groups with entirely different values in a neighbourhood, then our society starts falling apart.” “Styrken ved det danske velfærdsamfund er, at vi er så homogene og har stor sammenhængskraft ...
a minority among the immigrants have become more religious – and ... they have become so in a way that may be of significance for the integration. We need to take this seriously... Why is it important to integration to talk about values? Because education and jobs are not enough. If we want to keep the cohesive force in the Danish society, everyone needs to know and observe the fundamental rules of the game. (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib., 2007)²¹⁵

In that way the referent-object threatened in the functionalist narrative is still welfare – but cultural homogeneity is (qua a necessary link in the causal chain narrated) co-promoted as a valuable good. This allows the narrative an enhanced compatibility with purely culturalist narratives. The threat construction of the functionalist narrative is illustrated in figure 5.12.

5.7.2 Exceptionalism: Their values as a threat to our (common) values

The exceptionalist narrative describes how Denmark – by virtue of its history and culture – is uniquely disposed to act as an example to the world: The narrative equals a series of specifically Danish values and practices with the universally good. In that sense this second narrative seeks recourse to sedimented elements of Danish identity discourse constituting Denmark as a humanitarian example to the world (cf. chapter 6).

Men hvis der i et område bliver store grupper med helt andre værdier, så begynder vort samfund at falde fra hinanden" (Jespersen, Min.f. Soc.Affairs, soc.dem., in Olsen 1999). Soon before the Liberal prime minister re-articulated the concept of ‘cohesive force’ to include cultural values, Jespersen broke with the Social Democrats and developed the concept in a book (Jespersen & Pittelkow 2005). Before the general elections of 2007, she joined the Liberal party whom she shortly represented as Minister for Welfare.

²¹⁵ "[E]t mindretal blandt indvandrerne er blevet mere religiøse, og det er på en måde, der kan have betydning for integrationen. Det skal vi tage alvorligt. ... Hvorfor er det vigtigt for integration at tale om værdier? Fordi uddannelse og job ikke er nok. Hvis vi skal bevare sammenhængskraften i det danske samfund, skal alle kende og overholde de grundlæggende spilleregler." (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib., 2007).
Mouritsen focuses his analysis on the possibility of Muslims’ citizenship on two arguments adding to Danish exceptionalism (2006:79-83). The first argument claims that the Lutheran version of Christianity is a precondition for differentiating between politics and religion - and thereby a precondition for freedom (Berg-Sørensen 2006).

On the one hand, Christianity liberates politics from religion: "It is Christianity which constitutes the distinction [between politics and religion] … the preaching of Jesus makes it possible [for us to] discuss politics and agree or disagree about politics without the matter going 'sacral'." (Fergo, Min. f. Church, lib., 2003:4)

On the other hand, Christianity liberates people from salvation becoming a political project: "Without gospel salvation becomes a political task. Political ideologies will reign freely over people’s souls." (Hornbech, lib. chair of parl. Comm. on the Church,

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216 "Det er kristendommen, der sætter sondringen [mellem religion og politik]. ... Jesu forkyndelse er med til at gøre det muligt [at vi] kan diskutere politik og være enige eller uenige om politik uden at der går 'hellighed' i sagen." (Fergo, Min. f. Church, lib., 2003:4)
If, the story goes, Christ had not already taken care of salvation, an attractive – and dangerous – market would be open for political projects offering the prospect of salvation.

The second argument, which Mouritsen presents, claims that democracy and equality in Denmark – by virtue of, i.a., the folk high schools and the co-operative movement – has developed into a form of life. On top of freedom, equality and democracy the same argument may be identified in relation to other central concepts (cf. chapter 9). The threat construction of the exceptionalist narrative is illustrated in figure 5.13.

![Figure 5.13 The exceptionalist narrative](image)

Integration as a means to realize universal values

An especially forceful narrative is constructed when the prime minister articulates the exceptionalist narrative with the functionalist:

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218 The two arguments are tied together by, i.a., two prominent figures: Grundtvig og Hal Koch; by their substantial national and theological messages as well as the roles they are awarded in historical narratives (cf. Mouritsen 2006:80f).
As a small, peaceful country – where the people is homogenous and where the borders of language and country nearly coincide – we have very special conditions for influencing with our values. We have a deeply rooted democracy which is not just based on certain formal institutions and laws, but exists as a culture in the Danish population. One may introduce institutions and laws but it is of no use if there is not a very strong democratic culture deep in the population. ... Conversation is an important part, we are very consensus-orientated, and we prefer to take the views of minorities into account. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, in Ib 2003:16)219

The effect of this link between functionalism and exceptionalism is triple: Firstly, an image is developed in which Denmark is a perfectly calibrated nation state in which the boundaries of the state, the nation, the territory, the culture, the language and the religion coincide. This national self-image becomes, in the narrative promoted by the prime minister, a precondition for perfect freedom and democracy. Secondly, that perfection places on the shoulders of Denmark a special obligation to export our knowledge and values to the rest of the world:

It is not a form of cultural imperialism in which our way of thinking is forced upon other peoples. But we do have an obligation to be on guard for freedom and human rights – and with that also to try to spread it to other parts of the world in which one does not have peace and freedom, and where the human rights are violated. To me

there are certain entirely fundamental values – which one may call universal – which are not to be repressed. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16)²²⁰

Thirdly, the way others outside Denmark does *not* live up to the ideal national package deal constitutes a threat to the universal realisation of universal values:

But one need to be patient when it concerns the Middle East since there are a lot of historical, cultural and religious barriers, and it might be so that one must for a considerable span of time accept forms of democracy which do not in all regards fully live up to what we in Europe and the USA understands by this concept. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16)²²¹

In the early versions of the narrative, the threat against the universal values is not acute. But, as we will return to, the threat appears more pertinent when linked directly to terror and when the terrorist is home grown.

### 5.7.3 Freedom; an offer you can't refuse

Just as the combined functionalist and exceptionalist narrative legitimizes Danish 'systems export’, the way in which Denmark embodies universal values legitimizes more heavy handed integration measures at home.

Observers of the Danish welfare state have noted a recent change in the governmental techniques employed. Central to the function of the welfare state is now the induction of a ‘duty to be free’ in its clients (Andersen 2003a:114-23). When this tendency


²²¹ "Men man bør være tålmodig, når det gælder Mellemøsten, for der er mange historiske, kulturelle og religiøse barrierer, og det kan også godt være, at man i en rum tid bliver nødt til at acceptere former for demokrati, der ikke i alle henseender lever fuldt op til, hvad vi i Europa og USA forstår ved begrebet" (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16).
meets the narratives of integration, it acquires the form of an obligation to secure the *drittwirkung* of certain human rights which the state takes upon itself: the rights of the individual are not – as human rights traditionally – threatened by the state but by others in the civil society. More specifically the state obliges itself to free Muslims from their culture – whether or not the individual realize that it is oppressed or not:

We must help the individual immigrant woman to live an active life and we must change the opinion of both men and women for the benefit of integration... It is related to another worrying tendency... that is, the coming generations. Turkish and Pakistani descendants have not gotten closer to Danish values and norms entirely as it could be expected taking into account that they have grown up in Denmark. This shows that there is still a need for a strong integrating effort. A huge challenge is still ahead of us... We have long ago left the naïve belief of earlier times that everything will solve itself by itself. (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib,. 2007)

The government’s ’think tank’ allocates the responsibility so that, on the one hand, it is so

that the aliens take responsibility themselves for becoming a part of the Danish society and that they accept they myst change certain of the values of the country of origin to be integrated (Ministeriet 2007:25)

while on the other hand


222 "Vi skal hjælpe den enkelte indvandrerkvinde til et aktivt liv og have ændret holdninger hos både mænd og kvinder til gavn for integrationen. ... Det hænger også sammen med en anden bekymrende tendens ... nemlig de kommende generationer. Tyrkiske og pakistanske efterkommere har ikke nærmest sig danske værdier og normer helt som man kunne vente, i forhold til at de er vokset op i Danmark. Det viser, at der fortsat er behov for en stærk integrationsindsats. Vi har stadig en stor udfordring foran os. ... Vi har for længst forladt tidligere tiders naive tro om, at det hele løser sig af sig selv." (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib,. 2007).

223 "[A]t udlændinge selv tager et ansvar for at blive en del af det danske samfund, og at de accepterer, at de må ændre visse af oprindelseslandets værdier for at blive integrerede" (Ministeriet 2007:25).
we in Denmark – to a much greater degree than is the case today – draw the attention
to and inform [oplyser] about Danish culture and way of living as well as about what
norms and unwritten rules we have in Denmark. (2007:25)²²⁴

It does, however, not suffice to 'draw attention' to our values; it is necessary that
we in Denmark dare to make clear demands on the aliens that they must endorse
fundamental values in the Danish society and that we lay down clear guidelines
which they ... must accept. (2007:26)²²⁵

For the demands to reach the target group, the street level bureaucrats of the welfare
state must be deployed:

Teachers, social workers and other persons in concact with aliens on a daily basis
should ... in their daily work make direct and distinct demands on the aliens that they
must endorse the fundamental values in Denmark. (2007:27)²²⁶

While the initial integration narrative of the government was in 2001-2 that the
welfare state with its clientification was threatening the (labour market) integration,
six years later the conclusion is that the welfare state is the necessary countermeasure
against the threat aimed at cultural homogeneity.²²⁷ The welfare state needs in one

²²⁴ "[V]i i Danmark, i langt højere grad, end tilfældet er i dag, gør opmærksom på, hvilke
grundlæggende værdier det danske samfund bygger på og oplyser om dansk kultur og
²²⁵ "[A]t vi i Danmark tør stille klare krav til udlændinge om, at de skal tilslutte sig
grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund, og at vi udstikker klare retningslinjer, som de
... må acceptere." (2007:26)
²²⁶ "Pædagoger, lærere, sagsbehandlere og andre personer, der dagligt har kontakt med
udlændinge, bør ... i deres arbejde stille direkte og tydelige krav til udlændinge om, at de må
²²⁷ The Think Tank on Integration in its report suggested that clear instructions and
guidelines were produced for the employees in individual institutions and municipalities
(Ministeriet 2007:27). The parliamentary debate on the report, however, concluded by
calling for "[that it is discussed locally how one is to relate to how to handle conflicts of
and the same move to avert the threat which Muslim culture poses to the freedom of each Muslim individual – and thereby against the universal realization of the universal value of freedom. The threat construction of the fused functionalist and exceptionalist narratives is illustrated in figure 5.14.

**Figure 5.14 The fused functionalist and exceptionalist narratives**
State employed to secure Danish universal values

The Danish values are offered to the Muslims as a possibility – but by being a possibility of universal value, it is actually ‘an offer you can’t refuse’. And like the Godfather, the government cannot afford not to deliver on the offer, lest Culturalism is to make more demands for assimilation. The employment of state power is needed to make migrants live up to their potential by integrating to universal values. This novel role for the state is stressed when the threat from the home grown terrorist must be averted too.
5.8 The second threat to the peaceful society: Home grown

In the aftermath of the bombings on the London underground on July 7, 2005, it was clear that the narrative on the threat from the terrorist had changed. Whereas September 11 prompted the need for Danish solidarity with the US, the aim of the terrorist has now moved to be aimed at a much closer 'we': "In Denmark terrorism is a threat to society, to the values it is built upon, and to the individual citizen" (Espersen, Min. f. Justice, con., in Folketinget 2006.03.31).  

At the same time the narrative included new means to avert the threat. The prime minister still stresses the need for every “necessary means for fighting terrorists and terror networks” (ibid. 15:20) abroad and at home. But after allocating the responsibility for the London bombings to 'home grown' terrorists, another task is presented as urgent:

We have to prevent support and recruitment for terrorism ... through an active integration policy at home ... We have to prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology of extremists (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.11.16 15:15-20).

The narratives of the threat to the peaceful society is in this way explicitly merged with the narrative of the threats to cultural homogeneity – and the integration measures is definitively a part of the "broad spectrum" (Ministeriet 2008:29) of measures employed to prevent terrorism. The home grown terrorist is, however, not

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228 "I Danmark er terrorismen en trussel mod samfundet og de værdier, som det bygger på, og mod den enkelte borger." (Espersen, Min. f. Justice, con., in Folketinget 2006.03.31).
229 "[N]ødvendige instrumenter til at bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk" (ibid. 15:20).
230 "Vi skal forebygge opbakning og rekruttering til terrorisme ... gennem en aktiv integrationspolitik herhjemme ... Vi skal forebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af ekstremisternes ideologi" (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, in Folketinget 2005.11.16 15:15-20; cf. Regeringen 2003:13).
231 "[B]redspektret" (Ministeriet 2008:29).
an isolated threat. To the contrary, it is part of a broader threat which now – also – emanates from 'home'.

After the Cartoon Crisis following the publications in daily *Jyllands-Posten* of 12 caricatures commissioned to 'scorn and ridicule' the followers of the prophet Muhammed, the narratives are tied together even tighter across the distinction between foreign and domestic politics. Employed is the concept of 'value struggle'.

The prime minister strikes up his opening speech in 2006 in two ways: Firstly, he ties 9/11 and the Cartoon Crisis together as two episodes in a narrative of the fight against the same threat. Secondly, the freedom of expression – immediately resonating with the context of the Cartoon Crisis to everyone in the audience – is posed as the decisive front in that struggle:

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked four airplanes in the USA. Thousands of innocent human beings were killed. And ever since, the world has not been the same. Over the last five years it has become clear that we are in the middle of a global value struggle. It is not a value struggle between cultures or religions. It is a values struggle between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, between democracy and dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral. We must actively support freedom and popular rule. We have to guard our rights and freedoms. Guard the right to choose how we want to live our life. Guard the freedom of expression – the most important of all rights and

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232 The concept of 'value struggle' developed in the rhetoric of the prime minister, out of the concept of 'cultural struggle'. As was the case with 'cohesive force', the PM initially employed the concept without any articulation to 'Muslim relations': The cultural struggle was in his 1993 book advocating a "minimal state" envisioned as part of a struggle to free the citizens from the state by eradicating their "slave mentality" in relation to the "social state" (Rasmussen 1993).
freedoms. It is important that we make it clear to ourselves what type of extremist forces we are facing. (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04)\textsuperscript{233}

The prime minister then employs the words “The global value struggle is taking place in Denmark too” (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04)\textsuperscript{234} as a bridge to listing problems relating to "extremists" and "fanatical fundamentalists" in Denmark. Finally, he links these problems to challenges to labour market integration by saying that:

It is difficult to reach fanatical fundamentalists through better integration. But we may and must prevent the medieval thoughts and opinions of fundamentalism from having a fertile ground in Denmark. Therefore it is very crucial that the young Danes with an immigrant background get an education, get a job, get equal opportunity and a fair treatment in the Danish society. (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04)\textsuperscript{235}

The new counterterrorism narrative produced, hence, takes the direction illustrated in figure 5.15: Labour market integration should prevent fundamentalism.


\textsuperscript{234} "Den globale værdikamp foregår også i Danmark." (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04).

\textsuperscript{235} "Det er svært at nå fanatiske fundamentalister gennem bedre integration. Men vi kan og skal hindre, at fundamentalismens middelalderlige tanker og holdninger får grobund i Danmark. Derfor er det meget afgørende, at de unge danskere med indvandrerbaggrund får uddannelse, får job, får lige muligheder og en fair behandling i det danske samfund." (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04).
5.8.1 Back to multiculturalism\textsuperscript{236}

Nevertheless the narrative presenting integration as a means to counter terrorism departs from a distribution of roles in which "Danish Muslims and immigrants in Denmark are decisive allies in the fight against terrorism."\textsuperscript{237}

Therefore it is decisive for the success of the narrative that these allies play the role which they are awarded. The ministry of Integration – in its 2008 draft "Action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people" – finds that Culturalism may be a threat to the participation of the allies:

[Our t]hrowing suspicion on ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in the propaganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For

\textsuperscript{236} The merging of integration policies with counter-terrorism policies – and the involved policies of dialogue sketched in the last subsections of this chapter – is the focus of a more detailed analysis in chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{237} "[D]anske muslimer og indvandrere i Danmark er afgørende allierede i kampen mod terrorisme." (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.11.16 15:20).
this reason too it is important that suspicion of being part of the problem is not thrown on anyone able to contribute to the solution (Ministeriet 2008:13).238

The result is a narrative involving elements of both inclusion of difference and two-way dialogue - combined to resemble the very multiculturalism which was initially pointed out as a threat. Now inclusion and dialogue is a necessary means to avert the threat from radicalization. The threat construction of this narrative is illustrated in figure 5.16.

![Figure 5.16 Dialogical inclusion as a means to counterterrorism](image)

**Figure 5.16 Dialogical inclusion as a means to counterterrorism**

### 5.8.2 Bring the state back in

The next episode of the narrative, however, involves a necessary measure of control and surveillance. First of all focused on the 'poorly integrated' already in focus as 'criminal second generation immigrants'. Secondly, however, these measures are also focused on what appears to be 'well-integrated' Muslims: They must, on the one hand,

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be included and engaged in dialogue. But simultaneously they are nevertheless potential terrorists exactly because they are Muslims. This task demands vigilance in the street level bureaucrats of the welfare state – but it also demands that they are aware of their limitations so that they may call in the necessary expertise to assist:

To judge whether it is a case of violent radicalization or just political or religious interest demand such a highly specialized knowledge that it will be impossible for the individual [crime-prevention] worker to distinguish. (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11)²³⁹

The narrative, thus, continues as the government – to avert the culturally based threat to the peaceful society – turns to the very multiculturalism, which was initially presented as a threat to Danish culture. But as multiculturalism still involves a threat, it is necessary to employ the very welfare state which was initially presented as a threat to labour market integration. The resulting narrative institutionalizes a set of procedures for surveillance and control of the limit of acceptable cultural and religious difference – the limit of who may be included and who may be engaged in dialogue without endangering the peaceful society. This threat construction involved in this final twist of the government integration narrative is illustrated in figure 5.17. On the background of this narrative, the conclusion must be that – even if the government does not explicitly point out Muslims as an existential threat in the sense of the Copenhagen School – Muslims are nevertheless implicated in a security discourse as threatening along the lines described by Huysmans in his analysis of EU discourse.²⁴⁰ And if they are not, they will – as we shall see in section 5.10 – probably implicate themselves.

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²⁴⁰ A discourse which, notably, also spins itself around the government narrating it in the sense that it awards roles to the welfare state and to Multiculturalism almost diametrically opposite the one pointed out for it by the government at the point of departure.
Before turning to this sketching of possible identity political dynamics, section 5.9 distils the picture of the envisioned future interaction presented to the Muslim other by Danish debates on integration.

![Diagram showing the relationship between Dialogue, Exclusion, Inclusion, Fundamentalist opinions, Peaceful society, Muslim difference, Employ state to control]

**Figure 5.17** The need to control Muslim difference to allow dialogical inclusion as a means to counterterrorism

### 5.9 Conclusion: 'As little culture as possible' means a lot

So what are the contributions to radicalization of conflict from the way the government's concept of integration evolves in its statements and policy papers? How are the present and future relations presented and necessitated?

The distance between Us and Them is nil: They are here – and Their presence influences Us. The influence is – if nothing is done – negative; hence the need for a policy of integration to change the prospect of the future. The diacritica for distinguishing Us from Them are double: On the one hand, basically to be in the target group for 'integration', you need to be of non-Danish descent. As the narratives evolve, it is clear that Muslims are the prime target. On the other hand, it remains unclear to what extent it is the aim of 'integration' to abolish the distinction between Us and Them. Initially when dealing with the threats against the peaceful society and
the welfare, the differences which need to disappear are the differences in crime rate and unemployment rate. When the threats are articulated as pertaining to culture and values, it is less clear what difference may survive the process of integration.

A central rhetorical strategy employed to make the narratives meaningful is recourse to sedimented elements in Danish identity discourse: Denmark is implied to be an exemplarily peaceful society, as a pioneer welfare state, and as a culturally homogenous society. The necessity of integration is installed by pointing out oughtnotologies involving Them threatening each of these elements by not being integrated: the threats to welfare and to culture are primarily placed in the future while the threat to the peaceful society is already present (and more severely so as the narratives evolve).

No matter what element of Danish identity 'integration' is meant to protect, it is implied that the relevance of the distinction between Us and Them will be diminished by successful integration – and that it should diminish by Them becoming more like Us (in one or more respects): The hierarchy is to Our advantage, even if the legitimization of the superiority of our ways vary from ontopology via functionalism to universalism. Their identity is presented as changeable – and Their posture towards Us is in the balance: if not properly integrated, they threaten our peaceful society, our welfare or our culture.

The success of the process of integration – and thereby Their future posture – is, however, not only for Us to decide: They are awarded a critical agency in the sense that it is basically Their choice and responsibility to integrate or not. All We can and must do, is to construct the incentive structures to be most facilitating to their choice. In that sense, They are presented as dialogical: We may influence Their choice.\footnote{Whether We need to be dialogical too – and, hence, be open to Their influence – is more doubtful: The final twist of the narrative (promoting integration as a means to counter}
Basically, however, the grammar of Encompassment dominates the way the future interaction between self and other is envisioned: We monologically communicate that They should become (more like) Us.

In sum, the invitation to future interaction presented to the Muslim other by the evolving official integration narratives is, on the one hand, simple: We expect you to integrate – that is to become more like Us. On the other hand, the details of the role for the Muslim are everything but simple: Firstly, it is not clear when 'more like us' is enough. Nor is it, secondly, clear what kind of integration is the important one (labour market or culture). In the end, the impression may very well be that integration can never be successful. Firstly, We present the other with a highly conflictual policy for future interaction. Secondly, We in effect imply that it the other is probably not able to play its part.

The final section 5.10 considers what kind of response such an invitation to future interaction may provoke.

**5.10 Perspectives: Counternarratives as security problems**

The third reading of the concepts of integration implied in the government narratives of identity and security asks in which ways the narrative may meaningfully be continued. On the one hand, any continuation of a narrative depends on how the ones awarded a role in the narrative partakes in the continuation. On the other hand, such a partaking must take its point of departure in exactly that: The taking up of a part, a role presented by the narrative – whether the taking up leads to a take-off from the role, to taking issues with the role, or to taking exception to the way it is described.

terrorism) gestures in that direction – but as hinted at (and detailed in chapter 8) the gestures might be withdrawn by the implied need to keep the partner engaged in dialogue under surveillance.
As the aim of this analysis is to identify contributions to radicalization of conflict, the specific aim of this part of the analysis is to identify limits to which kinds of continuations, the narrative can handle without producing more securitizations. And even more pertinent: to identify security dilemmas. I.e., situations in which the official Danish narrative on what to do about – and do to – Muslims produces perspectives of the future which – all, many, some, a few – Muslims insist that they can only meet with a 'counter-securitization'. And where the answer to the existential threat posed by the official Danish narratives (according to this specific Muslim identity narrative) is continuing the spiral by posing a threat to the Danish narrative.

Ghassan Hage, in an analysis of the limits to multiculturalism as a form of governmentality (2008) points to two mechanisms which may be relevant to the Danish situation. The mechanisms may, however, here set in earlier than in Hage's analysis, in so far as multiculturalist strategies are, when push comes to shovel, a rather limited feature of the Danish narratives.

Firstly, even the most far reaching multiculturalism is not a narrative of equal cultures. To the contrary, it is a narrative on how to make sufficient room for the other culture to flourish in a way which does not make it feel threatened on what it finds to be decisive for its identity. The precondition for this narrative is that there is still a 'neutral' frame set by the majority culture (2008:498). This is the reason why even the most far reaching multiculturalisms presents themselves to be threatened by 'the seriously religious Muslim' – Hage's label for those Muslims who insist on the space for Islam must in principle be unlimited (2008:505). And this is the reason why there is no big difference between old school demands for assimilation and "the new milder form of asserting the need for immigrants (meaning primarily Muslims) to adopt the 'core values' of particular nations" (Hage 2008:507).

This mechanism has quite clearly been at work in the trouble which 'seriously religious' Muslims have met when engaging in party politics: Even when declaring
themselves willing to endorse a party platform without any substantial reservations, the theologically phrased discursive work they need to do, exclude them from the eligible (Hervik 2002; Jørgensen forthcoming). It is not possible to be simultaneously 100% Dane and 100% Muslim. The official Danish narratives demand that one choose or at least prioritize between the two.

Secondly, Hage draws attention to differences in the way various types of nationalism performs exclusion: Traditional, culturalist nationalism either does not welcome aliens at all – or openly awards them a subordinate role. Such 'non-interpellation' or 'negative interpellation' obviously produces a sense of being marginalized from community; of not belonging (2008:503f).

Present day official nationalism, however, does actually often award what appears to be an equal role for the alien. It may be a 'multiculturalist' role which appears immediately equal. Or it may be a role in a 'process of integration' which places equality at the end of a process of adjustment. Here, however, a problem may arise as the alien happily accepts and takes up his role – only to be refused: 'The role wasn't meant like that – it wasn't meant to be played like that or by someone like you.' Perhaps one more demand was added to the list adding up to 'well-integrated'. This type of 'mis-interpellation, writes Hage, gives rise to a sense of being marginalized within a community, a sense of disappointment with the community one thought one belonged to (2008:503f).

That mechanism obviously appears in a Danish context – not the least because the roles in the Danish integration narratives shift according to the threats in need of aversion. The threshold for 'successful integration' is an incessantly moving target. And the question is whether 'successful integration' – on the terms of the narrative – is possible at all, when the Muslim background may produce a distinct need for vigilance on the part of the welfare state. Is it possible for a Muslim to escape the role of a potential threat?
Hage, finally, describes how the two mechanisms may reinforce each other: When the 'well-integrated' Muslim finds that his or her way of playing the role is questioned – the result may be "assimilation or recognition fatigue" (2008:507). And in that situation, an identity as a 'seriously religious Muslim' may appear as an attractive alternative (2008:507f).

If this choice is made, Danish narratives of integration have been securitizing: They have produced an answer which in their own continuation may best be told as a threat. And the threat, notably, is produced without the 'seriously religious Muslim' engaging him or herself in terrorism or denouncing democracy: The mere act of formally departing in Islam when reasoning ones way to democracy is a threat to the narrative. You may begin your argument for democracy in Jesus, in Jahve, or in the nature or dignity of Man – but not in Muhammad. Because a 'seriously religious Muslim' is not to be trusted. The answer to that threat may be yet another round of demands to be 'fully integrated' as well as the surveillance necessary to confirm the integration – which may instigate yet another round of dissociation.

The way to break this destructive spiral involves attention to its existence, as

> it is precisely when faced with authoritarian forms of requirements to assimilate that people create protected spaces where they can express and live their cultures outside the authoritarian gaze demanding conformity. (Hage 2008:507).

The pains taken to formulate an invitation to dialogue when writing the counter-radicalization action plan (Ministeriet 2008) may be interpreted to signal such an attention – even if the plan did not succeed in escaping the spiral. In the same way, one may find reason for optimism in the answer of the new prime minister when pressed to engage himself in the 'value struggle':

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242 Cf. Hervik 2002; Jørgensen forthcoming; and chapter 8 of this dissertation.
Well, I would like those girls to take off their veil. But I would like them to do it themselves. Because if I should be the one doing it, two more would start wearing the veil in protest for every one taking it off. That is my approach. And it is not because I do not see the challenge that I do not want to force them. I flatter myself that it is actually because I do see the challenge. (L.L. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Krause-Kjær 2009:268)\(^{243}\)

A few months later, however, the government decided that since

the burqa and the niqab does not belong in the Danish society ... the government urges that existing rules and possibilities for actually limiting the use of the burqa and the niqab are fully exploited. (Regeringen 2010)\(^{244}\)

To understand this backtracking, the proceeding chapter zooms out and reads Danish parliamentary debates on Alien policy as not just parliamentary manoeuvrings but as a struggle to renegotiate the limits of Danish identity discourse. This is the perspective chosen for the first reading of chapter 6.

\(^{243}\) "Altså, jeg vil jo gerne have de dør piger til at tage tørkædet af. Men jeg vil gerne have dem til at gøre det selv. For hvis jeg gør det, vil der dagen efter være to mere, som tager tørklæder på i protest. Det er min indfaldsvinkel. Og det er ikke, fordi jeg ikke kan se udfordringen, at jeg ikke vil tvinge dem. Jegilder mig ind, at jeg faktisk er, fordi jeg kan se udfordringen" (L.L. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Krause-Kjær 2009:268).

\(^{244}\) "Burqa og niqab hører ikke hjemme i det danske samfund ... regeringen [opfordrer] kraftigt til, at de eksisterende regler og muligheder for faktsik at begrænse brugen af burqa og niqab anvendes fuldt ud" (Regeringen 2010).
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6 Explaining away international criticism of human rights practices: A rhetorical tight-rope secured by a concrete block

The preceding chapter 5 began the analytical Part II of the dissertation by introducing the basic features of the Danish political landscape and by analysing what threats are meant to be averted by policies of integration. This chapter continues the analysis of Danish debates on Muslims by, firstly, introducing basic features of Danish identity discourse and, secondly, analysing the struggle over its re-delimitation as it is played out in debates on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

6.1 Introduction: Avoiding dislocation in internal identity politics

When the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, issued a report on his visit to Denmark in 2004, the criticism of a number of specific elements of Danish policy towards immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities spurred much debate. At the centre of the most heated debate were a number of specific restrictions to family reunification introduced by the new parliamentarian majority after the 2001 elections as well as the (lack of) procedures to secure a transparent administration of the rules.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the way in which the Danish politicians have received this human rights based message from Europe. Or in other words: how an articulation of Danish identity voiced by an other in external identity politics is debated in internal identity politics. Contrary to chapter 5, the focus is on the variety of narratives promoted across the parliamentary landscape rather than on a variety of narratives promoted by the government at different points in time. The disagreement between the parties in the debate pertains to how to make sense of international
human rights based criticism of Danish alien policy – based on the agreement that Denmark is a human rights pioneer. Or rather, that it should be a human rights pioneer ... or, at least, a pioneer. The point of (not) formulating the agreement on which the debate is founded is that the agreement is crumbling: As the analysis shows, the debate is characterized by opposing hegemonic projects each aiming to re-delimit Danish identity discourse.

The chapter shows this in its first reading of the debate. The first reading asks three questions:

- What are the rationales for action and responsibility discursively awarded to the (Danish state) self and (Muslim migrant) other?
- What are the narratives legitimizing the framing of the HR based criticism?
- And how is materiality articulated by the actors to install necessity in their own narratives and avoid necessity in the narratives of their opponents? Especially the distinctions delimiting the categories of politics and jurisprudence appear to be of crucial importance to uphold in specific ways.\(^\text{245}\)

The empirical material covered by the analysis reported in the next section of the chapter all relates to the proceedings of the Danish Parliament, Folketinget, on this criticism.\(^\text{246}\)

\^\text{245} The choice of these distinctions was not made due to prior theoretical or historical knowledge; the distinctions were pointed out as relevant by the empirical material.
\^\text{246} The material analysed in this chapter is listed in the references section of the chapter. The material consists of parliamentary debates which include references to the criticism voiced by the CoE Commissioner for HR in his 2004 report. Included are also the related questions posed by MPs to minister and the ministers’ answers and material referred to by the ministers in their answers. Furthermore, the newspaper articles explicitly referred to in the debates are included. Finally, the written reactions by Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, annexed to the Gil-Robles report when submitted to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly are included. The
Initially, the chapter establishes the background for the empirical analysis by introducing (in section 6.2) the basic contours of Danish identity discourse and (in section 6.3) the Alien legislation debated. Sections 6.4-6.6 presents the analysis of the debates: Firstly, section 6.4 lays out the human collectives constructed in the parliamentary debates as self and other – along with the propensities for action narratively awarded to them. Secondly, section 6.5 lays out the identity narratives promoted in the debate to get the criticism from the European other back in place. Thirdly, section 6.6 charts the negotiations of the distinction between law and politics (which appear to be of crucial importance for the politicians to uphold) by focusing on the framing of the critical reports and other physical objects.

Section 6.7 sums up the basic struggle taking place in parliament in terms of attempts redefine Danish identity. Section 6.8 concludes by performing a second reading of the debates in terms of the theoretical account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. Finally, section 6.9 performs the third reading focused on how the narratives promoted interpellate the other.

6.2 Reading Danish identity as discourse

In order to understand the reactions of the Danish politicians to the criticism by the Human Rights Commissioner, a basic picture of the Danish identity discourse which frames the reception is needed. Hence, this section will recollect the basic contours of Danish identity discourse.

As discussed in chapter 2, the concept of ‘discourse’ employed in the dissertation originates with Foucault who defined a discourse as a “regularity in the dispersion of utterances” (1972:38). Danish identity discourse is delimited by the agreement – the
regularity in dispersion of utterances – that there is such a ‘thing’ as a Danish identity. This agreement functions as a starting point for disagreements over what Danish identity would more specifically be (cf. Haahr 2003:39).

Chapter 2 also laid out how the claim that someone is identical entails that someone else is different; that any identity is constructed in relation to one or more others. The disagreements allowed by the agreement constituting Danish identity discourse often take the form of debates over which others we should relate ourselves to, and how the relation is and ought to be. But even as the debates in this way appear as 'foreign policy debates' they implicitly produce and reproduce notions of who we are.

Danish identity has, over the years, had a number of different others pointed out as primary reference. Most prominently, the Danish nation state has been opposed to Sweden and Germany as competing nation states – and the Danish nation state as the primary point of identification has been challenged by, first, the proletarian internationalism embodied in the Soviet Union and, later, the European integration process. During the 90ies, the ‘stranger’, the ‘alien’ or the ‘immigrant’ has been awarded a steadily more prominent role. Today (as noted in chapters 1 and 5) the ‘Muslim’ is arguably a central other in Danish identity discourse. The prominent place which 'Muslims' take up in Denmark's relations to its neighbours – Sweden, Germany, and the European Union247 – testifies to the importance of Muslim relations:

For centuries, Denmark has competed with Sweden for the domination of the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltic Sea. Since the middle of the 19th century a romanticist Scandinavianism has morphed into a pragmatic cooperation between the

247 Protests may be raised that the EU is not a 'neighbour' to Denmark since Denmark is part of the EU. In Danish parliamentary debates, however, this is both true and it is not true as two "opposing constructions of the EU, 'EU as our community' and 'EU as something different from the Danes', display considerable stability" (Sousa 2010:264).
Nordic welfare states. For the last decade, however, the most heated public debates across Öresund has focused on the two countries' very different approach to multiculturalism (Hedetoft et al. 2006; Sundström 2009).

Denmark was historically constituted as a nation state when a series of wars with German states resulted in the 1864 defeat at Dybbøl and the loss of Schleswig. In 1920, the weak German Reich agreed to a plebiscite which returned the Northern, primarily Danish Speaking, part of Schleswig to Denmark – and the nationalist Grænseforeningen [The Border Association] was formed to support the Danish minority 'left' in German Southern Schleswig. In 2007, this association felt the need to re-brand itself under the slogan "For an open Danishness" to distance itself from right wing chauvinism and promote Dano-German relations in the border region as multicultural ideal.248

During the 70ies and 80ies Danish nationalism mainly oriented itself to the opposition against membership of the European Union. The greatest victory of the opponents to EU – including both right wing nationalists and left wing self proclaimed internationalists – was the Danish No in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish and the European establishment handled the situation by arranging four 'opt outs' exempting Denmark from the Euro, the common defence policy, and from the supranational aspects of collaboration of the Justice and Home Affairs. Today, a broad majority of the Danish parliament would like to abolish these opt outs by referenda – except for one element: When negotiating the Lisbon Treaty,

the government made for a more narrow opt out from the JHA which would allow Denmark to uphold its tight immigration and asylum policies (Adler-Nissen 2008).

So even in the politics surrounding Denmark's relations to its historically central others – Sweden, Germany, and the European Union – 'Muslim affairs' play a surprisingly central role today. Islam as a radically threatening other is, however, not a novel phenomenon: In the incarnation of 'the Turk' it played a decisive role in the narratives constituting Christendom and Europe as relevant entities in the post-Roman era (Neumann 1999:ch.2). This character of 'the Turk' had a distinct revival in Denmark – inspired by German theology – during the protestant reformation (Jørgensen 2005:172; Lausten 2010). So there are repertoires of discourse available for constructing the Muslims as a threatening other – only they have not been widely activated for decades, perhaps centuries.

Over the years this variety of others has been placed in contrast to a series of positive characteristica ascribed to Denmark. Denmark has generally been portrayed as populated by a homogenous and solidaristic Danish people [folket] (Haahr 2003:27f, Sjørslev 2007; cf. Gullestad 2002:ch.3). In Denmark, the people have built for itself a welfare state to nest the unfolding of the inner qualities of the nation (Hansen 2002:51f, 60f, 69, 80ff). Thereby, the state and the nation have been conceptually intertwined to a degree exceeding even the European nationalist average (Hansen 2002:60, 78; Haahr 2003:35, 37). Hence, the Danish state basically belongs to the Danish people – even if part of the narrative is, that the people might be let down by the elite (Hansen 2002:58, 60f; Haahr 2003:40).

The Danish fusion of cultural nation and welfare state is seen as an example to the world (as discussed in chapter 5). Denmark is constructed as a humanitarian pioneer country (Browning 2007). First, the world could learn a lot from Denmark about how to order domestic society (Hansen 2002:76f): Denmark did not need revolutions to create a welfare society (cf. Hansen 2002: 60). And on the top of it all, Danes see
themselves as modest and *hyggelige* [cosy] people (Dencik 2006) with a enlightened, tolerant attitude to difference (Enoch 1994). Second, Denmark is – trailing perhaps only her Nordic brethren (cf. Hansen 2002:68) – in front when it comes to working actively to make the rest of the world an equally nice place. As an observer of the process establishing Danish development aid put it: "the national welfare state [must be] projected out on the international level" (Henning Friis quoted by Kaur-Pedersen 2008:74). Danes are in the absolute top of the global per capita development aid donor list (Bach 2008). Denmark has a long tradition of contributing to UN peace keeping. And Denmark actively promotes democracy and human rights (Hansen 2002:59).

On the one hand, this series of characteristica has been 'packaged' by various narratives to form a holistic picture of Denmark (as exemplified in chapter 5). On the other hand, the list of characteristica constitutes – when the package is opened – a repertoire of discursive resources which may be re-articulated in new narratives. As part of such re-articulations, some elements are awarded more prominent places than others – and some may be excluded altogether.

The self-understanding of Denmark as tolerant at home and benevolent abroad has in recent years repeatedly been challenged (Nielsen 2004; Lawler 2007). One of the significant early instances was the criticism by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to the Danish policies on immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities. This chapter analyses the struggle over what elements to prioritize and what elements to exclude when rearticulating narratives to make sense of the criticism.

6.3 Danish Alien Policy: Concentric fortifications

Before proceeding to the analysis of the parliamentary debates, this section introduces the specific context of the Human Rights based criticism; i.e. the Danish Alien legislation as it has been reformed by the new centre-right government after 2001.

Basically, there are three ways to get to live in Denmark: You may come to work, you may be granted asylum, or you may be granted family reunification with a spouse (or a parent) already living in Denmark. In all three cases, the first residence permit will be temporary. Later, you may qualify for a permanent residence permit and even later for citizenship. The rules in effect constitute concentric fortifications around the geographical territory of the Danish nation state and its social and legal community. The fortifications, however, include both palisade sections especially difficult to force, drawbridges, and gates wide open. Which part of the fortification meets you depend, firstly, on whether you seek work, asylum, or family reunification; secondly, on your country of origin. The intention of this section is to give the reader a feeling for how Aliens are welcomed should they want to live in Denmark. The focus is especially on where the fortifications are erected to be specifically tall. The message of the section is the thrust of the regulations as such rather than the individual detail.250

If your country of origin is Nordic, you are free to enter and stay. If your country of origin is in the EU251 you may work and reside in Denmark under the EU regulations on free movement. If you are from outside the Nordic countries and the EU and you seek work, your chances first depend on whether your skills are needed on the Danish

250 The description in this section summarizes the rules as they are welcoming the foreigner on the official home page of the Ministry for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, Nyidanmark.dk, visited 2009.09.03.
251 Plus Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
job market – the need, notably, being so urgent that your profession is currently experiencing a shortage of qualified professionals or the job you are offered has a gross annual pay of no less than appx. 50,000 €.

If you want to seek asylum the first fortification you meet is that it can only be made by a person physically present in Denmark. Which means that you need to get into the country before you can apply for asylum. Currently, only two primarily Muslim countries are included in the list of countries whose citizens may enter Denmark without a visa: Malaysia and the tiny oil sultanate Brunei. The list of 'visa countries' is divided in three: the 'tourist group', the 'immigration group', and the 'asylum group'. Currently, a dozen Muslim countries are in the tourist group – most of them Arabic oil states or post-Soviet countries in Central Asia. Citizens from these countries are eligible for visas for tourist-related visits without invitation or economic guarantee. Another dozen Muslim countries are in the 'immigration group' – including Turkey, Lebanon, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Citizens from these countries may be asked for an economic guarantee of appx. 8.000 € to make sure that they leave Denmark again. And most citizens from most of these countries are normally only let in if they have a personal or familial relation in Denmark.

The 'asylum group' consists only of primarily Muslim countries – and as the name of the group suggests, it includes the countries presently 'producing refugees': Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Pakistan, Somalia, stateless Palestinians. Citizens from these countries are generally only granted visas if they are spouses, children

252 A separate annual quota of 500 residence permits is allotted to UN refugees, i.a., according to the refugee's "chances of settling in Denmark and benefiting from a residence permit. This involves looking at such factors as language skills, educational background, work experience, familial situation, network, age, and motivation" (Nyidanmark.dk, http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/coming_to_dk/asylum/quota_refugees.htm, accessed 21 December 2009). Criticism has been voiced that this criterion of 'potential for integration' is being used do disqualify Muslims from getting quota status (Fogedby 2008).
under the age of 18 or parents of someone with a residence permit. Iraqi and Somali citizens will normally only be granted a visa if a family member in Denmark has died or suffers from a life-threatening illness.

If you get a visa – or if you somehow find a way to Denmark without a visa – you may apply for asylum. If, however, you have been in contact with authorities in another EU country, you will – according to the procedures of the Dublin Treaty – be returned to this country and have your application processed there.253 If your application is processed in Denmark, two procedures may be followed: If your application is considered 'manifestly unfounded' by the Immigration Service, you may only contest the decision with the support of the Danish Refugee Council (an NGO).254 If your application is not immediately found manifestly unfounded, it is processed by the 'normal procedure' based on a factual and individual assessment of the statement provided by the asylum seeker as well as general information about conditions in the country of origin. If the application is rejected by the Immigration Services, the Refugee Appeals Board will make the final ruling; appeals to the courts are not possible. Finally, if you are not eligible for asylum you may be granted temporary residence on humanitarian grounds by the Ministry, if you suffer from a serious physical or psychological illness for which the necessary treatment cannot be obtained in your country of origin, or – under certain conditions – if you are part of a family with young children who come from a nation at war.

The final way to enter Denmark is by marrying. If you – as a Danish citizen – marry a non-European foreigner, your partner may be granted family reunion provided that you and your partner fulfil certain conditions: There must be no doubt that you have

253 Other 'safe third countries' to which you may be returned include the US, Canada, and Switzerland.

254 Furthermore, there is an oral, 'expedited version of the manifestly unfounded procedure' applicable to asylum seekers from countries where persecution is deemed highly unlikely.
entered into your marriage voluntarily. You must both be over the age of 24. Your combined attachment to Denmark must be greater than your combined attachment to any other country (– unless you have held Danish citizenship for 28 years or resided legally in Denmark for more than 28 years beginning in early childhood). You must have accommodation of adequate size at your disposal – which means, firstly, that you need to own it yourself or if you rent your accommodation, the period must extend at least three years on; and secondly, that each person sharing the residence must have half a room and 20 sq. metres at disposal. You may not have received social security benefits within the last 12 months, and you must post a bank-backed collateral of appx. 8.000 € to cover any social security paid to the spouse within the first seven years of legal residence. Furthermore you may not have been convicted of violent acts against a former spouse or partner within the last 10 years.

After seven years of legal residence, you may be granted a permanent residence permit – provided that you have completed the introduction programme as dictated by the Integration Act; that you have passed the integration test; that you have held a full-time job for 2,5 years; that you have passed a Danish language test suited for people with a limited educational background; that you have not been sentenced to two or more years in prison for i.a. drug offenses, trafficking, murder, assault or rape; that you do not have any overdue public debt; and that you have signed the integration contract and a declaration about your commitment to integration and active integration in Danish society.

When you have had residence in Denmark for a continuous period of at least 9 years you may apply for Danish citizenship – provided that you still live up to the demands listed above; sign a declaration in which you swear allegiance and loyalty to Denmark and the Danish society and declare your willingness to observe Danish
legislation and respect fundamental Danish principles of law; report all criminal offences (including "regardless of the amount, an old fine for shoplifting or a speeding fine") committed in Denmark or abroad; renounce your present nationality; have not been sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months or more (– shorter sentences only delays the procedure); have not received any social security within the last year at all and only for six months within the last five years; have passed a Danish language test suited for people with a high school education or equivalent graded "D" or better; passed a multiple choice citizenship test to prove your knowledge of the Danish society and of Danish culture and history.

This listing completes the background presentation of the way non-European aliens who wants to live in Denmark are welcomed. The debates analysed in this chapter focus on only a tiny corner of this greeting; the parts debated in the aftermath of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights criticising Danish Alien legislation.

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255 More on this in chapter 7.

256 This criterion has been tightened in consecutive rounds since 2001, bringing the number of naturalizations below 1000 per year. After the latest agreement to further tighten the regulation – to be implemented in 2010 – the speaker on naturalization for the DPP no longer sees the need for further tightening (Krarup in DR 2010).

257 The parliamentary debates analysed in this chapter dealt with the criticism raised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. The debate on the L78 revision of Aliens Act focused, firstly, on two specific points raised which the government chose to follow while noting their inconsequentiality (Ministry of Integration etc. 2004.11.26, Proposal L78 pp. 10, 25, 29; cf. Nørby, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15): a) a tiny modification of the procedures for appointing the Refugee Appeals Board, and b) the inclusion in the very text of the law of a number of specific exclusions – already practiced – from a general refusal of family reunification, needed to ensure the right to family life. Secondly, also included in the L78 and, hence, in the debate were a number of proposals not related to the criticism raised but (contrarily) meant to further limit the access to Denmark. These proposals most prominently included a) a prolonged waiting period for permanent residence permit and citizenship for persons having worked illegally; b) a modification of the motivational measures aimed at refused asylum seekers resisting repatriation; and c) the introduction of a right for the authorities to make enquiries about the health situation of persons seeking residence permit on humanitarian grounds without the consent of the person in question.
6.4 Human collectives-in-relation: rationales for action and responsibility

This section outlines the way the relation between the Danish self and the 'alien' other is constructed in the debates. The focus is, firstly, on the types of agency ascribed to the other, and, secondly, on what responsibilities the construction of the aliens put on the shoulders of the representatives of the Danish state.\(^{258}\)

The ‘aliens’ are discursively equipped with a very simple basic rationale for agency: The most important impulse of these aliens seems to be their wish, firstly, to get their foot inside and, secondly, to stay inside Denmark (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Krarup, DPP, L78, 2005.03.04 12.20; 12.30).\(^{259}\) This impulse to stay in Denmark explains the importance of the motivational measures aimed at making refused asylum seekers stop resisting repatriation (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Kjær, con., L78, 2005.03.04 12.20; 12.35). As “[i]t is their choice” to resist repatriation (Min.f. Integration

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The F9 debate was specifically focused on the human rights based criticism. Apart from the criticism as such and the reactions to it by the government, the debate focused on specific points made by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights concerning: a) the restrictions on family reunification of spouses in marriages where one of the parties has not reached the age of 24 introduced to protect young people against forced and arranged marriages; b) the restrictions on family reunification of children aged 15 to 17 introduced to protect them from being sent on re-education journeys to their home country; c) the alleged discrimination in family reunification matters due to ethnic background (since 28 years of citizenship or comparable affiliation with Denmark is required) or due to property (since a financial guarantee of 50,000 DKK is required); and d) the lack of transparency in the administration of the rules for family reunification due to the lack of public annual reports.

\(^{258}\) Initially, the focus will be on the dominant discursive construction of the ‘strange’ other; voiced opposition to this construction will be noted in the footnotes.

\(^{259}\) This construction casts a reflection back on the Danish Self which, hence, appears to be a most attractive place to be. A challenge to this image is articulated when the image of Denmark as a pioneer welfare state is said to be ruined by the present alien policy – a ruin claimed to dissuade immigrants, especially the most well educated ones, from wanting to go to Denmark (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F32, 2006.03.28 19.35).
the Danish authorities need to modify the incentive structures.261

Those aliens who are allowed to stay in the country are said to have a “potential for integration”, but do not necessarily seem to have the impulse to realise the potential by themselves; hence, the need for the Danish authorities – on behalf of Denmark – to discipline the alien to do so (MP Simonsen, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.15).262

On the background of these two propensities for action in the other – the urge to enter and stay, and the lack of urge to realize the potential for integration – the Danish authorities present for themselves two responsibilities. Firstly, the responsibility to limit the influx of aliens. And, secondly, the responsibility to discipline the aliens who are anyhow allowed to stay in Denmark to realize their potential for integration. Furthermore, one more responsibility rest on the shoulders of the Danish authorities in relation to aliens: They should protect children and youngsters against their alien parents in relation to a number of practices:

- The authorities have a responsibility to secure that the children of refused asylum seekers are not abused by their parents: “It would undermine the system [of

260 "Det er deres valg." (Min.f.Integration Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.00). This is challenged on the grounds that it is an “unfair” "ikke rimelig” treatment – at least for some – since they are actually not able to go to their country of origin (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.45).

261 The impulse to stay in Denmark in parallel explains the importance of the introduction of a right for the authorities to make enquiries about the health situation of persons seeking residence permit on humanitarian grounds without the consent of the person in question (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Krarup, DPP; Min. Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.20; 12.30; 12.55). This, however, is said to constitute an infringement of her/his most intimate personal space (MP Klint, soc.dem., L78 12.25; 2005.03.04 12.40); while at the same time risk worsen the relations between doctor and patient (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.45). On the contrary, it is claimed, the “point of departure must be that an applicant who wish to have his/her application considered wish to contribute to the illumination of the case” (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.45).

262 What ‘integration’ means in Danish debates is the focus for chapter 5 of the dissertation.
repatriation] if parents with children can just say that, well, they don’t care. ... [T]he parents should consider what kind of situation they are putting their children in" (Min Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.05). The point is that as the children cannot be forced to leave, and as the children are protected by a right to family life and my, neither can their parents be forced to leave.

- The authorities have a responsibility to protect youngsters from being sent back to their country of origin (or, in some cases; their parents’ country of origin) on “re-education journeys” when their parents perceive them to be in danger of being ruined by Danish culture (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2004:26).

- The authorities have a responsibility to protect youngsters from being entered into ‘forced, quasi-forced and arranged marriages’ with persons from their (parents’) country of origin (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2004:26; MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25).

The invocation of the two last practices in the government’s narrative of the necessity of a bill frames the explicitly alien other as implicitly Muslim. This hints at the self image of Denmark as a homogenous nation state with a single national culture (cf. section 6.2 and chapter 5) as the main reference for the need to limit the influx.

To sum up: The aliens are endowed with the basic impulse to get inside Denmark and stay there, if possible – and they are endowed with cultural traits revealing its implicitly Muslim character. The basic responsibilities of the Danish state authorities

263 "[D]et vil undergrave [repatrierings]systemet, hvis forældre, der har børn, bare kan sige, at så kan de jo bare være ligeglade ... forældrene skal overveje, hvad det er for en situation, de sætter deres børn i.. " (Min Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.05; cf. MP Simonsen, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.20).

264 The responsibility of the state may alternatively be constructed as concerning more directly the wellbeing of the children (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.00).
seem to be to limit the influx of aliens, to discipline the ones that are let in to integrate, and to protect their children from their parents.

6.5 Narratives: disagreements within Danish identity discourse

Within the limits of Danish identity discourse – i.e. the agreement, that there is such a thing as a Danish identity, and that it is structured roughly to include the elements sketched in section 6.2 – a number of competing positions are disagreeing over how Danish identity should more specifically be configured. The disagreements may be observed by focusing on small policy narratives describing how Denmark is in its relation to the alien other and to other others. Most notable in the debates analysed is - apart from the alien other – a European, humanitarian other.

These statements about what Denmark is may be analyzed as policy narratives. The reason is that the statements often implicitly involve causalities based in the past and they involve choices between futures: They imply what Denmark should be and why.

The most significant struggle in these debates circles around the compatibility of two narratives; a narrative of international norm abidance and a narrative of limiting the influx of aliens. A third narrative of humanitarianism and a fourth narrative of national sovereignty are played out, and held back respectively to support each of the two most significant narratives – while at the same time threatening to undermine them.

The narrative of international norm abidance has as its core policy that it is important for Denmark to abide by international norms, especially when inscribed in international conventions which Denmark has signed. In all instances, it seems that the interventions seek to articulate this narrative to the self image of Denmark as a pioneer country (cf. section 6.2). Sometimes the narrative explicitly continues to lay out the alternative 'oughtnotologies' which are to be prevented. It may continue to
claim that Danish norm abidance is a prerequisite to the promotion of human rights norms abroad (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.00). It may go on to argue that norm abidance is important since contravention may damage the image of Denmark abroad (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.00; 9.10). Or it may be weaved into the narrative of humanitarianism described below (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10). But mostly the narrative is a dead end; it does not refer explicitly to anything beyond the need to abide by international norms: No reasons are mentioned (MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.50). Either because the reason is to be understood implicitly or because norm abidance has become an end to itself. When the specific wording of an intervention by one of the government party representatives occasionally seems to leave the necessity of international norm abidance in doubt (MP Simonsen; lib.; MP Kirk, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.50; 12.40) s/he is quickly called back in line by an opponent (MP Lidegaard; soc.lib.; MP Østergard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.05; 12.40).

The narrative of limiting the influx of aliens has as its core a policy of distinguishing: It says that it is important to secure that fewer aliens make their way across the borders; be they asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants or reunified family members – and that aliens who might have made it across the boarder should, if no compelling reason arises to the contrary, be returned (MP Simonsen; lib.; MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 9.50; 10.25). The narrative regularly depart from the proposition that limiting the influx is necessary to allow for the integration of the aliens already present in Denmark (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem.; MP Kjær, con., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25; 11.50) – but this preamble is most often left implicit (i.a. MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25).

In general the speakers representing the parties in government (the conservatives and the liberals) as well as the social democrats struggle to insist that the two main narratives are compatible; that Denmark may limit the influx of aliens (in the texts
analysed mainly by limiting the right to family reunification) and at the same time abide by international conventions on human rights (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.05; 10.25).

The speakers representing the social liberals – and less prominently, the speakers representing the two left wing parties – challenge the compatibility of these two narratives: They claim that it is not possible to limit the influx and abide by international norms at the same time. One of the discursive resources for challenging the compatibility is the material objects of the papers embodying the criticisms articulated by the various human rights institutions (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 11.55). The chapter will, in the section below, return to the question of how this challenge is handled by the government and the social democrats.

Another cue for challenging the compatibility (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 11.20) is the fact that the speakers representing the Danish People’s Party also support the compatibility between the two narratives – even if they at the same time voice a narrative of national sovereignty (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.20; 11.40). The narrative of national sovereignty explicitly challenges the narrative of norm abidance by insisting that nothing should be above the Danish people, the Danish parliament and the Danish government (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.20; 11.40). The story basically goes that 'True democracy [folkestyre] should not be limited by anything not rooted in the solid reality of the people; if needed, Denmark should quit the international human rights conventions' (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.25; 11.40).

To support the norm abidance narrative, both the social liberal and the left wing speakers voice concern that the present conditions for immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities are inhumane (MP Gade, soc.; MP Arbo-Bærør, UL, F9, 2005.04.29 10.20; 11.05). The story is that 'Denmark is a humanitarian country; therefore we should treat aliens humanely – and the need to limit the influx does not trump this'.
Occasionally a social democrat joins in this narrative of humanitarianism (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.30). More often than not the social democrat in question is teased by a speaker for a government party or Danish People’s Party with reference to the priority of the narrative of limiting the influx (i.a. MP Skaarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 10.50). When seldom applied to a social liberal or a left wing speaker this disciplining manoeuvre has an altogether different ring to it; on these occasions less seems to be at stake since the speaker at the receiving end of the disciplining has already positioned her/himself outside the agreement that a limitation of the influx of aliens is of paramount importance (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25). The social democrats, it seems, have placed themselves in a conspicuously constrained position by trying to combine not only the narratives of international norm abidance and limiting the influx of aliens, but also the narrative of humanitarianism (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25). The government party speakers appear less vulnerable to attacks departing from the narrative of humanitarianism (MP Østergaard, soc.lib.; MP Kjær, con., F9, 2005.04.29 11.55).

Figure 6.1 Positions in identity political landscape in human rights/alien policy debates
To sum up: The speakers for the government parties and – even more fragilely; the social democrats – struggle to keep the narratives of international norm abidance and of limiting the influx of aliens compatible. The right wing speakers agree, but their back up is perceived as ambiguous as they frequently supplement the narrative of international norm abidance with a narrative of national sovereignty. The social liberal and left wing speakers attack the compatibility of limiting the influx and international norm abidance. Among other tools applied in the attacks is a narrative of humanitarianism for which the social democrats seem to have a weakness. The identity political landscape of the debates is summarized in figure 6.1. Section 6.6 analyzes how framing through negotiation of distinctions and categories is one of the strategies used in the battle over, whether the narratives are compatible or not.

6.6 Framing to avoid dislocation

The speakers for the government parties and the social democrats work to uphold the compatibility of the narratives of international norm abidance and of limiting the influx of aliens. Enter a report from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and subsequently a report from The Danish Institute for Human Rights. Both paper piles include written texts questioning exactly the compatibility of international human rights norms and the effort to limit the influx of aliens to Danish territory, at least in the legal form currently promoted by these parties. These reports appear in the debate as physical things that need to be either explained away or at least framed in such a way that they do not dislocate either of the narratives or their compatibility. This subsection analyzes the discursive battle of framing these reports and other potentially dislocating items.

The main item which needs to be framed in the debates is the criticism endowed with the materiality of writing by various human rights institutions and jurists. The framing of this criticism takes up a prominent place in the discursive struggles. More specifically, this part of the struggle aims at controlling the limits of the category
‘politics’ and certain categories bordering hereon. The limits of these categories are not given.

The central categories in play in this battle of framing are, on the one side, ‘politics’ [politik], and on the other, a series of different concepts opposed to ‘politics’: ‘jurisprudence’ [jura], ‘civil service [embedsværket/embedsmændene/de ministerielle jurister]’, and ‘neutral expertise’.265 The relevant basic distinction constructed is between politics as subjective and jurisprudence as objective.266 No one, however, seems to be willing to defend the existence of jurisprudence totally cleared of subjectivity, i.e. politics (MP Gerner, soc.lib.; MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.30; 11.30; 11.40). Just as the use of the label ‘populism’ as an invective indicates that some minimal measure of objectivity, however defined, is needed in politics (MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.20). Nevertheless, the framing of positions and papers as either (subjective) political points of view or (objective) legal reasoning is decisive.

Two actually existing and one hypothetical pile of paper were framed in the debate:

- The criticisms included in the reports of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the Danish Institute for Human Rights were for all practical purposes discursively placed in the same pile.
- The other pile consisted of a memo written by civil servants (in the Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of

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265 More categories are employed – but the ones mentioned seem to be the pivotal. The right wing and the social liberals/left wing respectively are much more at liberty than the government parties or the social democrats to attack the constructions of these distinctions. Hence their liberal use of categories like ‘propaganda’ (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.30), ‘political culture’ (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 12.30), and ‘(dis)honesty [(u)hæderlighed]’ (MP Gade, soc.; MP Langballe, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 12.40; 12.45).

266 Cf. Andersen (2000:71f) on the need for politics – and for the civil service – to delimit themselves reflectively from each other.
Foreign Affairs) to counter the criticism and a series of related answers from the ministers to parliament committees.

- A third pile of paper was – if the motion proposed were carried by parliament – to be produced by a panel of “independent experts” examining the criticisms raised by the human rights institutions.

The most unambiguously clear framing of the reports by the human rights institutions were made by a speaker for Danish People’s party. His main intervention in the debate deserves to be quoted at some length:

[The foundations for the 1983 Aliens Act was] poor jurisprudence originating in idealist abstraction and unearthly idealism… The foundation for the criticism of the present alien policies is jurisprudence of an equally poor and equally politically/ideologically character. This includes first and foremost the criticism by the [Danish] Institute for Human Rights... Gil-Robles relates in the same way. He too belongs in a political/ideological context. (MP Krarup,, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15)²⁶⁷

Hence, to the speaker the criticism is political.

The opposite framing – that the criticism should be taken as jurisprudence, if not objective then at least neutral – is rarely taken up with a comparable enthusiasm.²⁶⁸


²⁶⁸ In one instance, the Danish Institute for Human Rights is named “independent” "uafhængige" (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 12.20). Contrarily, the social
Within the discursive settings analyzed it is hardly possible meaningfully to insist that the criticism raised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the Danish Institute for Human Rights is based only on legal reasoning and not reflecting a political standpoint.  

The second pile of paper had on top of it a memo written by the government lawyers to counter the criticism by the human rights institutions. The authors of the memo were described by a speaker for the Danish People’s Party as “conscientious and meticulous”, if not objective (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.30; 11.40). The opposing social liberal, social democrat and left wing speakers refrained from

democrats’ speaker does not find the director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights suited to a seat on the panel of independent experts since “he is a party to this case” “han er parthaver i denne sag” (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 11.00).

269 This tendency to waiving the invitation to label the Human Rights institutions independent or neutral might be due to the specific discursive setting of the debate: The social liberals and the left wing had teamed up with the social democrats to make a motion for a parliamentary decision. The platform on which the parties could meet only included the need to have an independent expert panel examine whether the criticism voiced by the human rights institutions did actually point to concrete instances of Denmark breaking the European Convention on Human Rights. Hence an explicit insistence on the impartiality and neutrality (let alone objectivity) of the criticising bodies might threaten the fragile cohesion of the opposition alliance. Either way the conclusion is the same: in the specific discursive situation it is near to impossible to successfully insist that these human rights institutions present ‘pure’ jurisprudence rather than (just) a political standpoint. The background for this discursive de-legitimization of the human rights institutions falls without the scope of this analysis. It could very well be the result of the debacle following the attempt by Danish People’s Party to have the then Human Rights Centre closed in the wake of the 2001 elections. In stead the Human Rights Centre re-emerged as the Danish Institute for Human Rights within the organizational framework of a newly formed Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights.

270 “[S]amvittighedsfuldt og redeligt” (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.30; 11.40; cf. MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25). The adjectives chosen leaves the interpretation open to the listener if the qualities of the civil servants in question – conscientious and meticulous – are directed towards the law as such or towards the task given by the people to the present parliamentarian majority and the government to limit the influx of aliens. Which, though, for the moment has similar consequences.
explicitly challenging the quality of the memo. In stead they argued for ‘lifting from
the shoulders of the civil servants the burden of being the impartial judges on the
work they have themselves done on behalf of the government’ (MP Gerner, soc.lib.;
MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25; 9.45; 11.05). Hence, the opposition
argued, there is a need for a third pile of paper produced by a panel of independent

The speakers for the government parties walk a rhetorical tightrope when framing the
piles of paper in a way which allow them to insist on compatibility: The narrative of
international norm abidance implies that Denmark needs to take the criticism
seriously, because Denmark has agreed in the Council of Europe to the workings of
the Commissioner of Human Rights, and at the UN General Assembly to the Paris
Principles and thereby to have an independent human rights body (cf. MP Meldgaard,
soc.dem.; MP Kjær, con., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25; 11.50). So this is exactly what is
said:

\[
\text{We have – every time – looked at the criticism presented. The lawyers in the Ministries of Integration and Justice have gone through the criticism, so we look at it every single time, so we are sure that we abide by the international conventions. (Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 13.10)\textsuperscript{271}}
\]

The criticism of the human rights institutions is fine jurisprudence – we’ve taken it
seriously by looking through it – and the jurisprudence of the civil service is fine as
well. What remains is politics:

\[
\text{The final assessment is a political question. … The assessment of when a rule expresses a fair weighing of means and ends is primarily a matter for the legislators,}
\]

\textsuperscript{271} ”Vi har hver gang forholdt os til den kritik, der har været. Juristerne i Integrationsministeriet og Justitsministeriet har gennemgået kritikken, så den forholder vi os til hver evige eneste gang, så vi er sikre på, at vi overholder de internationale konventioner.” (Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 13.10)
and the government finds the weighing of means and ends in the alien policy to be fair. (Min. Hvilshøj lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10)272

This assurance is materially backed up by a majority in parliament waiting to vote to reject the decision proposed by the opposition.273

What is left to do for the opposition speakers is to try to introduce other physical items for the majority speakers to explain away. Firstly, opposition speakers complain that the government actively works to avoid having similar papers from human rights institutions, not least the European Court of Human Rights, materializing – not by generally deciding family reunification cases in accordance with the conventions but by adjusting the decision in specific cases taken up by the European Court of Human Rights to avoid a 'guilty' verdict (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 12.40) and by refusing to make public an annual report on the cases decided (MP Gade, soc.; MP Østergaard, soc.lib.; MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, F9, 2005.04.29 12.40; 12.50).

272 “Den endelige vurdering er et politisk spørgsmål... Vurderingen af, hvornår en regel er udtryk for et rimeligt forhold mellem mål og midler, er i første omdag et anliggende for lovgivningsmagten, og regeringen mener, at der er et rimeligt forhold mellem mål og midler i udlændingepolitikken.” (Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10) Support for this position – that the rest is politics – is sought by recourse to the last part of a quote from the responsible head of department at the Institute for Human Rights: “We see ourselves as the independent instance and we have already done an independent inquiry. It is a political question [whether there should be a panel of independent experts].” "Vi opfatter os selv som den uvildige instans, og vi har allerede lavet en uafhængig undersøgelse. Det er et politisk spørgsmål" (Birgitte Kofod Olsen quoted by MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25; cf. Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10)

273 This show of power is directly challenged by a social liberal speaker claiming that “the political culture of this country has since 2001 evolved in such a way that a unified opposition are not even admitted an expert opinion of an issue brought up for discussion … We want a different culture” " den politiske kultur i det her land siden 2001 har udviklet sig på en måde, så man ikke engang kan få den indrømmelse, at den samlede opposition kan få en ekspertvurdering af et område, som er til debat … Vi ønsker en anden kultur" (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 12.30).
Secondly, the speakers for the government parties and Danish People’s Party are put to discursive work by the opposition speakers seeking to install necessity in the narrative of humanitarianism by introducing cases where individual human beings are said to have been denied their human rights. The majority speakers do, however, get these cases back in the category where they supposedly belong: Individual cases should not be considered in parliament but by an impartial civil service, not least since confidential details of the individual cases cannot be discussed in public (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Krarup, DPP; Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.20; 13.20).

Several individual cases were mentioned and described, some even by name (MP Østergaard, soc.lib.; MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, F9, 2005.04.29 11.05; 12.10; 12.50). In one instance, a married couple having been denied family reunification is pointed out as physically present in the strangers’ gallery of the parliament (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.35). This is countered by the government and right wing speakers characterizing the move, firstly, as an attempt to make the parliamentarians engage in deciding in individual cases (MP Krarup, DPP; Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 13.20). Secondly, as "doing ... populism on individual cases" (MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.10). The very dragging individual cases into public is indeed “morally indecent” – not because of the potential infliction of the privacy of the individual involved but because it is “impossible to argue against it, it is therefore also indecent to argue with” (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 13.20).²⁷⁵

To sum up: While the Danish People’s Party insist that the criticism by the human rights institutions is based not on legal reasoning but on a political standpoint, the speakers for the opposition do not counter this by characterizing the ministerial papers as poor jurisprudence. Rather, this decision should be left to a body of

²⁷⁴ "[K]øre ... populisme på enkeltsager" (MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.10).
²⁷⁵ "[M]oralsk uanstændigt ... umuligt at argumentere imod, det er derfor også uanstændigt at argumentere med" (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 13.20).
independent experts. The speakers for the government parties insist that both are jurisprudence to be taken serious, only the ministerial argument is conclusive. Hence, the narratives of international norm abidance and of limiting the influx are compatible. This rhetorical tightrope is secured to the concrete block of a parliamentary majority ready to conclude the debate by voting on which conclusion is correct.

6.7 Moves to reconstitute the limits of Danish identity discourse

On the background of the constructions of the 'alien' other and the responsibility of the authorities representing the Danish self (laid out in section 6.4), the clash of narratives and the struggle to control the distinctions upholding their compatibility (analysed in section 6.5 and 6.6) may be reread as a struggle to redefine Danish identity discourse: The debate involves two projects aiming to redraw the limit of what may meaningfully be included and excluded from accounts of what ‘Denmark’ is:

On the one side, the social liberals and the left wing aim to let the narrative of international norm abidance overrule the importance of upholding the cultural homogeneity of the Danish nation state. The self-understanding of Denmark as a pioneer country in the service of good might serve as resonance to this move.

On the other side, the Danish People’s Party works to exclude the human rights from Danish politics. In this process they juxtapose a series of positive articulations:

Danish – people [folk] – democracy [folkestyre; literally: people’s rule] – reality

to a series of negative articulations:

international – human rights – propaganda – tyranny – idealism
The Danish Institute for Human Rights and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, both being part of the "goodness industry" (MP Krarup, DPP, L78, 2005.03.04 12.30)\textsuperscript{276}, fit nicely into the negative series. Obviously the chains are easily prolonged to include the parties within parliament; so that the Danish People’s Party are privileged as mouthpiece for ‘the people’, while the Social Liberal Party and the parties on the left wing are “weighed and deemed too light” (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.20).\textsuperscript{277} And as it appears from the metaphors employed in the remains of the quote from the speaker for Danish People’s Party (which the section 6.6 promised to let this section complete); this is serious business:

[I]t is justified to point out [the 1983 Aliens Act] as one of the most fatal events in modern Danish history. Here, the Danish people were derived of their right of primogeniture by lawyers and politicians always taking the side of ideas against reality or, which amounts to the same thing, taking the side of the strangers against the Danes. … [The legal philosophical base of the 1983 Aliens Act] is not only poor jurisprudence originating in idealist abstraction and unearthly idealism, but it is also a token of an abuse of the people whose reality bears the brunt of these abstract ideas. The 1983 Aliens Act was ... a national catastrophe, a kind of rape of the Danish people whose fatal consequences we are only now beginning to grasp. (Krarup, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15)\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{276} '"Godhedsindustrien" (MP Krarup, DPP, L78, 2005.03.04 12.30).
\textsuperscript{277} '"Vejet og fundet for let" (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.20; cf. MP Langballe, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 12.45).
Figure 6.2 illustrates the distinction which both moves attempt to establish – from each their side. The boldness of the move by Danish People’s Party could indicate that it has less dire prospects than the move by the left wing and the social liberals: Whereas the DPP's move (the claim that nothing should be above the sovereign Danish nation state) is made explicitly, the opposition move (Denmark should not necessarily be culturally homogenous) is not explicated but only implied by prioritization.

**Figure 6.2 Two moves to reconstitute Danish identity discourse**

DPP moves to exclude humanitarianism and international norm abidance – left wing moves to exclude cultural homogeneity

Furthermore, even the 'pioneer image' element of Danish identity discourse is articulated by the DPP; only the substance of the example which Denmark is to the world is altered:

idealistisk abstraktion og overjordisk idealisme, men det er også udtryk for mishandling af det folk, der skal lægge ryg og virkelighed til de abstrakte ideer. Udlændingeloven af 1983 var en ... national katastrofe, en slags voldtægt af det danske folk, hvis skæbesvangre følger vi først nu begynder at begribe." (Krarpur, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15)
the societies around [us] are a matter of fact backing what has happened in Denmark [i.e. the limiting of the influx of strangers] 100 % up. [...] We] are regularly approached by foreign politicians who would like to copy what has happened in Denmark because they themselves have this very, very huge problem .... Really, a lot of foreigners come to Denmark to find out how we handle the alien legislation and, then, copy it in their own countries. (MP Kjærsgaard, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.35) 279

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**Figure 6.3 Expansive version of DPP narrative**

DPP moves to exclude humanitarianism – and to include re-configured version of international norms and Danish pioneer role

Figure 6.3 illustrates this expansive version of DPP's nationalist narrative. So far, however, the government parties and the social democrats insist to represent a Danish

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279 "[De omkringliggende samfund faktisk bakker hundrede procent op om det, der er sket i Danmark. ... [J]ævnligt får [vi] henvendelser fra udenlandske politikere, som gerne vil kopiøre det, der sker i Danmark, fordi de selv har det meget, meget store problem ... Der er rigtig mange udlandinge, som kommer til Danmark for at finde ud af, hvordan vi håndterer udlændingelovgivningen, og derefter kopierer den i deres egne lande." (MP Kjærsgaard, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.35)
identity which is both a pioneer country in relation to human rights and at the same time has its unique homogeneity protected by limiting the influx of Muslims.  

6.8 Conclusion: Keep out

How does the way in which Danish/Muslim relations are structured in the debates on the CoE HR Commissioner's criticism of Danish Alien legislation contribute to radicalization of conflict? How are the present and future relations presented and necessitated?

In the discourse articulated in the debates on criteria for entrance the immediate diacriticon explicitly distinguishing Us from Them is Danish citizenship. A hierarchy is implicit in the sense that We, the Danes, may decide over Them, the non-Danes. The distance between Us and Them is small since They are figuratively at our borders. Therefore They potentially influence Us – and the influence of those of Them who have already entered is implied to be manifest. In the context of these debates, the essential propensity for action which They are known to have, is that they want to – and will do next to anything to – get inside and stay in Denmark. The background for this propensity is not explicated – but it does not appear alterable; only the incentive structures which this inclination is playing up against may be altered. Their posture towards Us is constructed as immediately affirmative in the sense that Our country is such an attractive place to be that They want to be here too. But their affirmation is simultaneously a challenge, since Their entrance is implied to be a problem. As their agential capacity seems to be limited to a rather blunt utility function, the question of a possible dialogue never occurs as relevant.

A supplementary agreement featured as a basis for the debates, however, hints at a different – yet partially coinciding diacriticon for distinguishing between Us and

\[280\] Lately, the SPP has accommodated this position too without explicitly embracing it.

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Them: They are also known to have an inclination for treating their women and children in authoritarian, paternalistic ways. More specifically They force their children into marriages and send their children on ‘re-education journeys’. These practices are – by recurrence to broader Danish debates – flagging the Muslim culture of the aliens in question. This reference simultaneously reinstates the hierarchical position of the Danish self above this Muslim other in two ways: Firstly, such practices are valued negatively. Secondly, they are placed at a stage in human development which We have risen above. The debates analysed in this chapter do not discuss the question of whether Muslims have the capability of changing the inclination to engage in such practices; only the incentive structures needed to make Them refrain from the practice are at issue.

In relation to both diacritica for distinguishing Us from Them – citizenship and religio-cultural essence – the narratives combine the grammars of Orientalism and Encompassment: Orientalism is inherent in the way that They are outside and (medievally) Muslim, and We are inside and (modern) non-Muslims. At the same time, Encompassment is active in as much as Our hierarchical superiority (morally in being modern, materially in being in control of our state) allows Us unilaterally to allocate Them to a subordinate position without consulting them.

However, an institutionalized yet ambiguous securitization underlies the debate in its entirety: They do not (oughtnotology) want to stay in Their place (oughtology). Hence, it has been necessary to apply the extraordinary measure of diverting from the Alien policies in place for the period from 1983 to 2001. This 1983 legislation has been unquestioned from the perspective of international human rights and may count as ‘ordinary‘ in the sense that Danes are used to view their state as humanitarian pioneers. Diversion from this legislation has been necessary to avert the threat from the aliens wanting to get inside Denmark. The threat is aimed at the possibility of ‘integrating’ the aliens already in Denmark; this possibility is supposedly hampered
by the arrival of more aliens. What the process and aim of ‘integration’ are – and, hence, what the referent-object of the securitization is – remains unsaid in these debates.\textsuperscript{281}

The government speakers insist on the compatibility of, on the one hand, limiting the influx of aliens and, on the other hand, adhering to international human rights norms. Thereby they seek recourse to two sedimented elements of Danish identity discourse: the cultural homogeneity (in a somewhat muted way in these debates) and the image of being an example to the world (in a somewhat restricted way, since the content of the example is not to be mentioned).

The speakers for the right wing make the cultural homogeneity element of the narrative explicit. In addition they imbue the government’s insistence on compatibility with a certain ambiguity as they, on the one hand, agree that limiting the influx is compatible with international human rights standards, while, on the other hand, find the abidance with international human rights regulations less important than – or even detrimental to – national sovereignty; another well-sedimented element in Danish identity discourse.

In sum, when the majority concludes the debate, the policy for future interaction presented to the other at the border is a very simple one: We expect you to show up – you may expect that our preference is to deny you entrance; anyhow the decision is ours alone. There is no need for a dialogue: we already know your preferences and you will not influence ours, no matter what you say. As the Alien other is not supposed to be present on Danish territory, this relation only gets conflictual if the other shows up anyway and does not leave when told to do so.

\textsuperscript{281} Chapter 5 analysed debates explicitly discussing the question.
6.9 Perspectives: Referring to universality as a strategy in Denmark

At first sight, all the narratives on family reunification and permanent residence are about the intruding alien other. These narratives, however, co-construct roles for other others as well: Most importantly, the efforts made to keep their spouses, family members, friends, and compatriots out implicitly relay two messages to the aliens who has been permitted to reside in Denmark: Firstly, that it would have been best if they too had stayed away. Secondly, that they – residence and citizenship or not – are not equal to the proper Danes: They do not have the same right to see their spouse, family members, friends and relations as the Danes. As this category of others is – legitimately – present on Danish territory, this way of narrating the difference may contribute to radicalization of conflict.

In the debates analysed in this chapter, however, the situation of this other is not represented as a distinct target group when it comes to human rights infringements: Even the opposition speakers encompassed legally present aliens in a larger group of persons without access to their spouses etc. – a group including ethnic Danes: Rather than challenging ethnic discrimination directly – as suggested by the CoE HR Commissioner – the opposition challenges the legislation referring to individual human rights. This suggests that the right of Danes to a culturally homogenous Denmark as an element in Danish identity discourse is so sedimented that it is hard to challenge explicitly.

This sedimentation has two implications: Firstly, unless the other chooses a strategy of cultural self-assimilation, some measure of conflict seems inevitable. Secondly, when unmediated universalism meets nationalism, universalism looses. Universalism needs to be articulated as Danish to have a chance. Chapter 5 showed how such an articulation of Denmark as embodying universal values makes a potent legitimizing
narrative. This chapter has demonstrated the weakness of a hegemonic project in the name of a universality in conflict with Danish identity.

Chapter 7 pursues the question of human rights in the context of Danish Muslim relations: It analyses debates on protection of foreign writers whose freedom of expression is infringed – a question which quickly turns out to be a Muslim question.
Parliamentary negotiations

Written questions no. S 4783, 4784 and 4785 of 19 July 2004 and No. 5069 of 18 August 2004 by Anne-Marie Meldgaard (S); written answers of 30 July, 31 August and 6 October 2004 by the minister for integration (Bertel Haarder, V)

Written question no. S 4833 of 28 July 2004 by Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen (RV); answer of 9 August 2004 by the prime minister (Anders Fogh Rasmussen, V)


Speaking notes for the minister for refugee, immigrants and integration (Bertel Haarder, V)’s answer to question A of the Folketinget Committee on Alien and Integration Policy, 29 October 2004

Written answers of 3 November 2004 by the minister for foreign affairs (Per Stig Møller, KF) to oral question raised in the Foreign Affairs Committee on 27 October 2004 concerning the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

Plenary negotiations 16. November 2004, question No. US 10 and interventions by Anne Bastrup (SF), oral answers by the minister for integration (Bertel Haarder, V)

Written answer of 25 November 2004 by the minister for refugee, immigrants and integration (Bertel Haarder, V) to questions 13-16 raised by the Folketinget Committee on Alien and Integration Policy on 2 November 2004

Proposal L78 by the Ministry of Refugee, Immigrant and Integration affair of Act on revision of Aliens Act, etc., sent to the Folketinget Committee on Alien and Integration Policy 26 november 2004, Almindelig del - Annex 53

Plenary negotiations 4 March 2005, 1st reading of L78 (Act on revision of Aliens Act, etc.), interventions by Irene Simonsen, (V), Karen J. Klint (S), Søren Krarup (DF), Henriette Kjær (KF), Morten Østergaard (RV), Steen Gade (SF), Frank Aaen (EL), and the minister for integration (Rikke Hvilshøj, V) (12:15-13:05), accessed 2 June 2010, http://www.ft.dk/samling/20042/lovforslag/l78/beh1/forhandling.htm?startItem=-1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005): Skriftlig redegørelse om Europarådets virksomhed og Danmarks deltagelse heri [Written report on the workings of the Council of Europe and the participation of Denmark herein], no date, April
Written answer of 26 April 2005 by the minister for refugee, immigrants and integration (Rikke Hvilshøj, V) to question 28 raised by the Folketinget Committee on Alien and Integration Policy on 20 April 2005

Plenary negotiations 29 April 2005, 1st reading of F9 (Debate on government initiatives in response to criticism from The Institute for Human Rights of the Aliens Act, including the administration thereof by the authorities), interventions by Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen (RV), the minister for integration (Rikke Hvilshøj, V), Jens Rohde (V), Jesper Langballe (DF), Irene Simonsen (V), Søren Krarup (DF), Peter Skaarup (DF), Pia Kjærgaard (DF), Henriette Kjær (KF), Torsten Schack Pedersen (V), Eyvind Vesselbo (V), Jens Kirk (V), Morten Østergaard (RV), Jørgen Arbo-Bæhr (EL), Martin Lidegaard (RV), Christine Antorini (S), Anne-Marie Meldgaard (S), Steen Gade (SF), Søren Espersen (DF), Anne-Mette Winther Christiansen (V), Ellen Trane Nørby (V), Charlotte Fischer (RV), Hüseyin Arac (S) (19:35-19:40), accessed February 2006, (not available 19 May 2010 due to technical problems on www.ft.dk)

Written question no. S 2744 of 22 February 2006 by Morten Messerschmidt (DF); written answers of 7 March 2006 by the minister for foreign Affairs (Per Stig Møller, KF)

Plenary negotiations 2 March 2006, 1st reading of L153 (Act on protection from dismissal due to organisational affiliation), interventions by Erling Bonnesen (V), Jørgen Arbo-Bæhr (EL), Elisabeth Geday (RV), Torsten Schack Pedersen (V) (11:30-11:35)

Plenary negotiations 28 March 2006, 1st reading of F32 (Debate on international competition for qualified labour), intervention by Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen (RV) (19:35-19:40)

Other empirical material


Original version


Thomsen, C.B. (2004): “”Denmark, though, is not a closed country””, interview with Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, p. 1 in section 2 of Politiken, 30 July
7 Conditions for hospitality or defence of identity? Asking writers in need of refuge to recognize Danish values

Chapters 5 and 6 introduced basic features of the Danish political landscape and of Danish identity discourse. Furthermore, chapter 5 analysed how 'Muslim threats' were constructed to the peaceful society, to welfare and to Danish culture – and how these threats legitimized extraordinary means to their aversion, not least since Denmark embodies universal values. Chapter 6 laid out how cultural homogeneity as an element in Danish identity discourse was difficult to negotiate away – even when the consequence of prioritizing homogeneity was to provoke a critique for infringing human rights. This chapter zooms in on an extreme combination of the two tendencies: What is most important to protect; the cultural homogeneity of Denmark – or the lives and freedom of foreigners promoting the very same universal values which Denmark is said to embody?

7.1 Introduction: Setting out to protect the other

As one of the last decisions before it disassembled for the summer break in 2008, the Danish Parliament, Folketinget, passed two bills to facilitate the participation of Danish municipalities in the International Cities of Refuge Network. On the face of

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282 To facilitate the participation in the International Cities of Refuge Network, two bills were proposed: One, presented by the Minister for Culture, amended the Literature Act to allow municipalities to spend money on hosting the writers; another, presented by the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, amended the Aliens Act to allow the writers in question into the country in the first place. This analysis is based on the government presentations of these bills, the parliamentary debates, and the reports of the parliamentary committees scrutinizing them, as well as the consultative statements by NGO’s etc. and answers by the ministers to the questions of the committee made public in the reports. Included are also earlier parliamentary debates explicitly referred to in the debates on ICORN.
it, yet another country opens its borders to writers targeted with threats and persecution.

As it were, however, the debates in parliament and the detailed legal text framing this show of hospitality both reveal that Danish hospitality is far from being "unconditional." The debate, the legal regulations, and the very problematique of freedom of expression in Denmark are placed squarely within a discourse on "Muslim relations".

As a condition for refuge in Denmark any writer granted "refuge" under the umbrella of ICORN in Denmark now has to sign a rather peculiar document – a "Declaration on recognition of the fundamental values of the Danish society" (cf. the appendix to this chapter). The writer thereby declares, i.a., to "understand and accept the fundamental values of Danish society"; to “protect the Danish democratic principles” including non-discrimination and the condemnation of terrorism; and finally to be aware that s/he is obliged to leave again within two years. This chapter takes this puzzling document as its point of departure and relates it to the discursive situation in which it was produced.

As in chapter 6, the analysis focuses on the variety of narratives promoted across the political landscape. The issue under debate is framed as an instance of 'Muslim relations' in two ways: First, as the question of protecting persecuted writers is explicitly articulated to the Cartoon Crisis. Second, as a declaration to be signed by the writers granted refuge is designed to protect Denmark against certain 'Muslim practices'.

The parliamentary disagreement over whose security to prioritize when inviting persecuted writers to seek refuge in Denmark is based on an agreement that Denmark is a champion of the freedom of expression. The disagreement is in the first reading analysed by asking, first (as in chapter 5), what self/other security narratives are promoted; secondly, what diacritica are employed to delimit other from self – and to
what effect. The first reading, thus, proceeds in three steps: Section 7.2 focus on whom the 'good' and the 'bad' guys are made to be, when the Danish parliament discusses writers in need of refuge. Section 7.3 asks whose security is important in the debates. Section 7.4 analyses the difficulties involved in making the Muslim an other by explicating 'fundamental values' as diacritica for exclusion

Section 7.5 performs the second reading to assess the contribution to radicalization from the structures of the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on Muslims. A final section (7.6) performs the third reading focused on the interpellatory effects of the narratives and debates – and briefly considers the strategic tasks which any proponents of the hospitality towards Muslim strangers – in Denmark and beyond – will encounter.

7.2 Who are the good guys? And who are the bad guys?

In his initial presentation, the Minister for Culture stated that "This bill is presented to show that Denmark supports the struggle for freedom of expression and open, democratic societies which takes place outside the borders of our country." In their contribution to the committee reports on the bills, the government parties claimed that "Denmark, after facilitating this arrangement, will be in the forefront of spreading freedom of expression." This assertion describes Denmark as a nice place to live in – and, conversely, places evil oppression somewhere outside Denmark. But more than that: it presents Denmark as a benevolent agent capable of doing and furthering good deeds beyond its borders.

283 "Lovforslaget er fremsat med henblik på at markere, at Danmark støtter den kamp for ytringsfrihed og åbne demokratiske samfund, der foregår uden for vores lands grænser." (Mikkelsen, Min.f.Culture, con., in presentation of L157).

284 "Danmark med denne ordning vil være med allerforrest, når det gælder ytringsfrihedens udbredelse." (lib. and con. members of Committee reports on L151 and L57).
In many ways, there exists a general agreement in parliament on this picture of reality: "Our freedom of expression is, on the whole, unlimited" (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 14:08) At the very least, everybody seems to concur that Denmark is a "country which has many a time been pioneering exactly when it comes to freedom of expression" (MP Mortensen, soc.dem., 2008.04.15 14:02).

So Denmark is on the side of Enlightenment. At first sight, the opposing dark side consists of oppressive states, since "in many countries those in power want to control the opinion of the citizens of the country and how it is expressed" (MP Christensen, lib., 2008.04.15 13:39). Hence, "certain writers … are persecuted for being critical towards the system ruling the country they are living in" (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 14:08).

The opponents of freedom of expression, however, need not be states. A critical attitude towards the state is not the only reason for persecution; another reason may be that "they write or in other ways express themselves about something that is not accepted where they live" (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15, 14:08). Moreover, "the dictatorship" which "many writers are fighting to oppose" (MP Christensen, lib.,

285 Only a few, minor problems (e.g., for civil servants disagreeing with their political bosses, cf. MP Ammitzbøll, 2008.04.15 13:59) are mentioned.
286 "Vores ytringsfrihed er stort set ubegrænset." (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 14:08)
287 "[L]and [som] mange gange har været foregangsland, netop når det drejer sig om ytringsfrihed" (MP Mortensen, soc.dem., 2008.04.15,14:02).
288 "Magthaverne i mange lande vil have hånd i hanke med, hvad landets indbyggere mener, og hvordan det kommer til udtryk." (MP Christensen, lib., 2008.04.15 13:39)
289 "[V]isse skribenter ... bliver forfulgt, fordi de er kritiske over for det system, der er herskende i det land, de bor i" (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 14:08).
290 "[D]e skriver eller på anden vis ytrer sig om noget, der ikke er accepteret det pågældende sted." (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15, 14:08)
need not be a state; it might be an ideology or another system of thought.

The Minister for Culture himself sets the context straight:

We have seen it here at home too, most recently the plots to kill cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. It is a shame, and terrible to think about, that even in this society we find forces who might want to eliminate a cartoonist just for expressing opinions diverging from their own (2008.04.15, 14:27).

Or, in the more radical formulation of a speaker for the Danish People's Party: "[T]he freedom of expression has within the last decades come under pressure in the Western World, especially from extremist Muslims" (MP Henriksen, DPP, 2008.05.23, 11:34).

With this framing of the Cities of Refuge debates as a sequel to the Cartoon Crisis, it is clear that the debates are part of the ongoing struggle to define Denmark’s 'Muslim relations'. Some opposition parties' speakers try to correct this framing by distinguishing between good and bad manifestations of the freedom of expression: "This is about freedom of expression where it means something, where people have been fighting state power, and not just ... trying to speak against people you dislike in

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292 "Vi har jo også set det herhjemme, senest med mordplanerne for tegneren Kurt Westergaard. Det er skammeligt, og det er forfærdeligt at tænke på, at der også i dette samfund er kræfter, som måske vil en satiretegner til livs, blot fordi vedkommende udtrykker nogle andre holdninger end dem, de selv har." (2008.04.15, 14:27) Kurt Westergaard drew the cartoon of an angry bearded man with the bomb in the turban in the Jyllands-Posten; the cartoon most often found offending (cf. Spiegelmann 2006).

293 "[Y]tringsfriheden de seneste årtier er kommet under pres i den vestlige verden fra specielt yderliggående muslimers side." (MP Henriksen, DPP, 2008.05.23, 11:34)
a hateful way" (MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05). But as it is part of the government's platform to articulate 'Muslim relations' with the nationalist DPP, these attempts to give the debate a different turn proved unsuccessful.

The then secretary general of the United Nations took the cartoon incidents as occasion to characterize Denmark as a "country which has recently acquired a significant Muslim population, and is not yet sure how to adjust to it" (Anan 2006). It would, however, be more precise to say that 'some in Denmark' are not yet sure how to deal with the new situation. At least the Danish People's Party seems quite sure about how Denmark should adjust to the new situation. Hints as how this may look like can be found in the above mentioned "Declaration on recognition of fundamental values of the Danish society," the committee reports, and the records of the parliamentary debate. We will return to this in section 7.4.

The point to be made here is that the rest of the Danish political actors are – as Kofi Annan suggested – rather unsure when it comes to the question of how to relate to the recent increase of the Muslim population. Meanwhile, the DPP has moved in and filled the vacuum left by the equivocality of the government parties and the discordance of the opposition. They have set the conditions for the debate – the 'conditions for hospitality'. These conditions pertain to security: the security of the writers but, more importantly, the security of Danes – and by no means only the security of Danes in times of terror. What is at stake is the security of Danish identity in times of global migration.

294 "Det her handler om ytringsfriheden, hvor den betyder noget, hvor mennesker har kæmpet imod statsmagten, og ikke bare ... [om at] prøve at tale imod folk, som man ikke bryder sig om, på en hadefuld måde." (MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05)
7.3 Security for whom? Refuge for … refugees?

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET is the Danish acronym) plays a double role in the parliamentary debate on the writers in need of refuge. For the opposition parties it is important to make sure that the intelligence service takes care of the security of writers who might need protection even in their Danish refuge – and that the state pays for their protection (i.a. MP Mortensen, soc-dem., 2008.04.15, 13:46).295

The DPP, however envisions another role of the intelligence service. As a condition for their support of the bill, they want to make sure that "the alien in question is in advance security checked by the PET" and that "the alien in question may be refused without further explanation if the PET finds that he constitutes a threat to Denmark." (Committee report on the bill to amend the Literature Act, p.3)296 The Minister for Culture assures that "[W]e shall not just roll over and wait for others to take over our

295 The issue of the economy involved in hosting the writers in general was another point of contention in the debates. At first, the entire burden of hosting the writers was put on the shoulders of the municipalities – while the national funding was only to be used for publications and PR related to the writer while in Denmark. Only when in 2009 parts of the national funding was reallocated, the first municipalities agreed to invite foreign writers (cf. http://jp.dk/indland/aar/politik/article1905151.ece; http://www.aarhuskommune.dk/view/forside/view_col1_forsideliste?_page=nyhed/8302072; http://www.kum.dk/sw90006.asp; accessed 28 December 2009).

296 "[D]en pågældende udlænding på forhånd sikkerhedstjekkes af PET [og ...] den pågældende uden begrundelse kan afvises, såfremt PET vurderer, at den pågældende udgør en trussel mod Danmark" Furthermore, they insist that "the alien in question is falling within provisions for expulsion ... if [he] abuses the stay in Denmark ... e.g., by engaging in criminal activities." "den pågældende udlænding er omfattet af udlændingelovens regler om udvisning ... såfremt udlændingen misbruger opholdet i Danmark ..., f.eks. begår kriminalitet" (Committee report on the bill to amend the Literature Act, p.3)
right to express ourselves and our democracy” (Minister for Culture, con., 2008.05.23, 11:20).

Both the provisions advocated by the opposition and the provisions advocated by the DPP make sense if your chosen danger is immediate and comes in the form of the violent Islamist: he might try to curb our freedom and way of life as an assassin killing a writer or as a terrorist blowing up a commuter train. The government assures that the PET will cater to the security of the writers (Minister for Culture, 2008.04.15, 14:41) and protect the Danes against potential violent attacks (Minister for Integration’s answer to questions no. 8 & 9 reprinted in the report from Committee on Integration).

When it comes to the duration of hospitality, however, the security of Danish cultural identity wins over the security of the individual writers. The writers are not allowed to stay and possibly compromise the homogeneity of Denmark. The International Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN) has members in a number of countries. But one cannot help noticing that Norway houses a greater number of writers than any other country. One reason may be that the hospitality which Norway extends to the writers in need of refuge is more generous than that of other countries: If a writer is accepted as in need of refuge by ICORN and invited by a Norwegian city, s/he is granted asylum under Norwegian law. A number of opposition parties in the Danish parliament suggested that Denmark do the same (MP Krag, soc., 2008.04.15, 15:07; MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., s.d. 15:11; MP Clausen, red/green, s.d. 15:17). On this point, however, the government – as well as, notably, the leading oppositional party, the Social Democrats – chose to follow the DPP: Within two years, the new arrival should return home.

297 “[V]i ikke bare skal lægge os ned og vente på, at andre overtager vores ret til at ytre os, vores demokrati.” (Mikkelsen, Minister for Culture, con., 2008.05.23, 11:20)
Actually, the nature of the stay offered in Denmark will be nothing of an asylum:

Writers etc. have under existing regulation the same possibilities as other foreigners to apply for and possibly attain asylum in this country if they have had to flee from their homeland due to persecution, but a special option to do this should not be offered (Government’s remarks to bill no. L 131, p. 3).

The stay of the writer will rather be like a stay allowing time to work or educate oneself. And the writer is not considered a refugee – s/he has "more features in common with ... aliens coming to this country as workers or students and whose basis for residence is temporary and connected to a specific activity." (Ibid.) In conclusion, a warning is expressed against using the term ‘persecution’ and against using it too much and over-interpreting it. We are after all not talking about asylum here.... We are talking about that you are granted permission to stay according to a very airy criterion for very special reasons and when part of a very special group (Minister for Integration, 2008.04.15, 15:22).

In this matter, Danish language comes to the aid of the government since a 'city of refuge', when translated, does not refer to 'refugee'. A refugee is a flygtning in Danish, someone fleeing – while a city of refuge is a friby, a 'free city', connoting frirum (free

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298 "Forfattere m.fl. har efter de gældende regler mulighed for - på lige fod med andre udlændinge - at søge om og eventuelt opnå asyl her i landet, hvis de har måttet flygte fra deres hjemland på grund af forfølgelse, men der bør ikke skabes en særlig adgang hertil." (Government’s remarks to bill no. L 131, p. 3)

299 "[F]lere træk til fælles med ... udlændinge, der kommer her til landet som arbejdstagere eller som studerende, og hvis opholdsgrundlag er midlertidigt og knyttet til en bestemt aktivitet." (Ibid.)

300 "[A]dvare imod glosen forfulgte, og at man altså bruger den i for høj grad og overfortolker udtrykket. Der er jo netop ikke tale om asyl her ... Der er netop tale om, at man efter et meget luftigt kriterium af helt særlige grunde, og når man er en helt særlig gruppe" (Hornbech, Minister for Integration, lib., 2008.04.15, 15:22)
space); and even fritid (spare time). In general, in the government's terminology, the writers to whom hospitality is offered or granted are not 'persecuted writers' but 'writers whose freedom of expression is infringed upon in their homeland'. Especially the Minister for Integration painstakingly avoids calling the writers 'persecuted' (cf. 2008.04.15, 15:27) – an attribute too closely related to the language of international law on refugees. Thus the clash of concepts is not as acute – since rhetorically not so obvious – in Danish as it might be in English.

The point to be made here is that it is of the utmost importance for the government not to undermine the efforts made to 'limit the influx of aliens' (cf. chapter 6). Therefore, the final point of the declaration put in front of the writer at arrival urges the writer to repeat that

I am aware that my stay in Denmark as part of the Cities of Refuge arrangement is temporary and that it is intended that I shall return to my homeland. The purpose of my stay is, hence, to allow me to practise my literary activities in Denmark for a period of time, while afterwards return to my homeland.\footnote{\textit{[J]eg ved, at mit ophold i Danmark som led i fribyordningen er midlertidigt, og at det er hensigten, at jeg skal vende tilbage til mit hjemland. Formålet med mit ophold er således, at jeg får mulighed for i en periode at udøve mine litterære aktiviteter i Danmark for derefter at vende tilbage til mit hjemland.}}\\

The importance of making sure to get rid of the guest again warrants two considerations – one on the future, one on the past. Together the considerations imply that the narrative of hospitality is trumped by a narrative of defence. Firstly, Derrida (2000) examines the possibility of a pure, unlimited hospitality. For every practical purpose, however he finds it necessary to have a law to distinguish guests from

\footnote{\textit{[J]eg ved, at mit ophold i Danmark som led i fribyordningen er midlertidigt, og at det er hensigten, at jeg skal vende tilbage til mit hjemland. Formålet med mit ophold er således, at jeg får mulighed for i en periode at udøve mine litterære aktiviteter i Danmark for derefter at vende tilbage til mit hjemland.} Two notes on the translation of this excerpt: First, the passive Danish form of “it is intended” is kept in the English version, since it is a way of camouflaging agency and responsibility typical of Danish bureaucracy. Second, the extension of the sentence “while afterwards return to my homeland” does not make grammatically sense in Danish, but serves the purpose of including the return in the purpose of the stay.}
parasites (Derrida 2000:59). This necessity points to the way in which the quality and duration of the entire stay of the guest is condensed into the situation of the arrival. In this light, the Danish ‘show of hospitality’ demonstrates that the shadow of the future sometimes entirely eclipses the moment of arrival – the moment of hospitality.\textsuperscript{302}

Secondly, the importance of making sure to get rid of the arriving stranger points to the rhetorical (?) question put by Derrida: “Perhaps only the one who endures the experience of being deprived of a home can offer hospitality?” (Dufourmantelle 2000:56). Denmark often prides itself of a 1000 years long history as a Kingdom. Its borders have moved – mainly to shrink the territory – but what today counts as Denmark has, in the eyes of many Danes, served as their homeland since time immemorial. Denmark may simply not be suited to offer hospitality; it might only be suited to "show that [it] supports the struggle for freedom of expression" (italics added)\textsuperscript{303} as the Minister for Culture put it when introducing the law. If so, the list of values in the declarations presented to the writers of refuge is not meant to be the precondition to hospitality (i.e. the minimal recognition given by the stranger in return for an open door). It might simply be designed to ward him off by interpellating him negatively; by radicalizing her as an other.

Figure 7.1 illustrates how time – past and future conspiring – is collapsed to eclipse the moment of hospitality; the present moment of articulation. A securitized future closes down the space for seeking knowledge about the other and leaves definition of the other to an Orientalist grammar ruling unchallenged in the construction of the past: As we know who the Muslim is – and we know that only danger may come out

\textsuperscript{302} In that sense, Gullestad is both right and wrong when she notes (2002:100, n.57) that Derrida concentrates on the immediate reaction to a guest as s/he arrives.

\textsuperscript{303} “[M]arkere, at Danmark støtter den kamp for ytringsfrihed” (Min.f.Culture, italics inserted, cf. fn. 283).
of engaging him – we welcome him with a monologue designed to end the engagement.

Figure 7.1 Time collapsed in narrative of defence to eclipse moment of hospitality

7.4 The difficulty of making Muslims other

If you see yourself as the main character in a heroic narrative, defending yourself against terrorists and against floods of migrants, then it is obviously important whom you are offering hospitality to. Derrida (2000:26f) insist that hospitality can manifest itself only as conditional; usually, you at least ask the stranger for his name before inviting him in. In Denmark, however, some more conditions have to be met.

Actually, the declaration, which the writers are required to sign upon arrival, is a caricature catalogue of the vices of Muslims, as they permeate Danish debates on integration. As a caricature it has the same interpellating effect as the drawing of the prophet published by Jyllands-Posten. Denmark awards the immigrants the hospitality of permanent residence or citizenship on condition that they give up a series of cultural traits. But notably not, as Derrida remarks à propos the case of Algeria, that they give up "what they thought of as their culture" (2000:145; italics added). The cultural traits they are asked to give up by the Danish declaration are the
ones that we identify them by. Why would you want someone to declare that he does not hit his children, unless you expect him being inclined to do just that?

Thus, according to said declaration, Muslims can be expected to

- violate Danish laws
- undermine the Danish democratic principles in every respect
- disrespect the freedom and personal integrity of the individual
- disrespect and oppress women
- disrespect freedom of expression and religion
- discriminate on the grounds of race and skin colour
- threaten and scorn other religious and sexually oriented groups
- disrespect and oppress children (especially girls) to make sure that they do not grow up to be capable of making their own decisions
- support acts of terrorism (or at least refrain from assisting the authorities in preventing them)
- harbour no commitment to Danish society or democracy.

Indeed, the list in the declaration that people seeking permanent residence in Denmark (after being granted family reunion) are confronted with is even more comprehensive. These Muslims are expected to

- commit or at least threaten violence against their spouses
- circumcise their daughters
- use force to marry their children against their will
- hit their children.

From the reports of the parliamentary committees we can deduce that the DPP actually wanted to further expand the list of the declaration that refugee writers have to sign, as they might

- behave in a disorderly manner
- assume a brazen and disrespectful attitude toward Denmark and the Danes
and, finally, (as one of the prominent problems connoted with Muslims) he(!) might

- bring along more than one wife.

Let us leave the question of polygamy aside and rather focus upon the DPP’s demands for orderly manners, humility, and respect for Danes. This demand was not included in the final version of the declaration. This because, as the Minister for Culture remarks;

[D]ictators hate art; they are afraid of it. ... They believed that they could eliminate the nuances and make people uniform.... But it is so that art and culture and writing insist on nuance; insist on the existence of things not just black and white. They insist on complexity, on showing us the ugly and the provoking and the things in our minds and hearts where the dictators have no access. (Minister for Culture, con., 2008.04.15, 14:21)

A DPP member of the parliament Committee on Culture asked the Minister

how to secure that the persecuted writer when in this country is primarily occupied with literary activities directed towards his/her homeland – where the literary freedom is infringed – and not towards entirely different countries, e.g. Denmark, the USA, or a third country? (additional committee report dated 28 May 2008, app. 11, q. 15, p. 4)
The Minister in his answer reassured him that "[p]robably a persecuted writer invited to come to Denmark as a sanctuary with everything paid for will not feel occasioned to criticise his host country." He added, however, that since the aim of the Cities of Refuge arrangement is to promote freedom of expression, the writers must be able to speak and write freely, even if they might come up with criticizing conditions in Denmark or other third countries. (Minister for Culture, con., answer reproduced in additional committee report dated 28 May 2008, app. 11, p. 4)306

For the Minister of Integration, however, things are a bit more complicated. Due to the complexities at hand, it is necessary to quote her at some length:

[W]e cannot demand from our citizens that they must love the law or that they must love democracy – and had we been talking about asylum seekers ... we could not have demanded this kind of declaration. Because in Denmark, you are allowed to be opposed to democracy. But here we are talking about a very specific, very airy and far-reaching basis for residence compared to the one we grant when dealing with refugees and family reunions et cetera... [W]riters are people using the word as a weapon, and we might as well be honest and say: We are talking about a political agreement, and we are talking about not letting someone in who will use the word to break down the Danish society... I have been eying through this declaration to make sure that there is no obligation to be a democrat, and we are not talking about that you have to love democracy – but you do have to respect and subject yourself to democracy when you are let in here on this far-reaching basis for residence. That is the reason why I can defend this and why I am of the opinion that it is right that we

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let the writer think for a moment if it is the right country he is coming to – and that we do not down right let in a fifth column who is after all not individually persecuted in the sense of the provisions for refugees under the Aliens Act (Minister for Integration, 2008.04.15, 15:22).307

Consequently, the point of the list to be signed by the writer is not primarily to set the minimal conditions for hospitality. It is, rather and foremost, a defence against a fifth column entering to feed on the welfare state before finishing it off by turning it into a totalitarian sharia state. Not just parasites who feed on the host, as Derrida discussed, but parasitoids who will, in the last instance, kill the host.

However, will requiring a signature on such a declaration help keeping the parasitoids out? In an earlier debate, parliament discussed introducing something similar to – yet different from – a "Green Card," i.e., a work permit: a "Love Card" allowing you to love. The idea was that if a Danish citizen were solemnly to declare that s/he loves a partner they have met abroad, then said partner should be awarded a 'Love Card'

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307 "[V]i kan jo ikke kræve af vores borgere, at de skal elske loven, eller at de skal elske demokratiet, og havde der været tale om asylansøgere ... kunne vi ikke har forlangt sådan en erklæring her. For det er tilladt i Danmark at være imod demokratiet. Men her er der altså netop tale om et ganske specifikt, særlig luftigt og vidtgående opholdsgrundlag i forhold til dem, vi ellers har, når det drejer sig om flygtninge og familiesammenføringer osv. ... [F]orfattere er nogle, der bruger ordet som våben, og det kan jo lige så godt sige ærligt her: Der er tale om en politisk aftale, og der er tale om, at man altså ikke lige her lukker nogen ind, som vil bruge ordet til at nedbryde det danske samfund. ... [J]eg har altså også selv prøvet at kigge den erklæring igennem for at være sikker på, at der altså ikke er nogen tvang til at være demokrat, og der er slet ikke nogen tale om, at man skal elske demokratiet, men man skal altså respektere og undergive sig demokratiet, når man kommer med det her særlig vidtgående opholdsgrundlag. Det er grunden til, at jeg godt kan forsvare det og mener, at det er rigtigt, at vi lige lader den forfatter tænke sig om, om det er det rigtige land, han vil tage til, og at vi ikke ligefrem lukker femte kolonne ind, som jo ikke er individuelt forfulgt efter udlændingelovens flygtningebegreb." (Minister for Integration, 2008.04.15, 15:22).
allowing her/him temporary residence.\footnote{Currently this is not always possible even if you marry your beloved, since for family reunification to be granted the provisions of the Aliens Act requires that the joint affiliation of the couple to Denmark be greater than to any other country (cf. chapter 4) – which, by simple math, it is not if you have met your partner in her/his home country and s/he has never been to Denmark.} In the debate on Cities of Refuge, the DPP speaker – now in favour of a declaration on fundamental values – was reminded that he had dismissed the declaration of love with the words "People will sign anything to get into Denmark" (MP Henriksen, DPP, quoted by MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.05.23, 11:38).\footnote{"Folk vil skrive under på hvad som helst for at komme ind i Danmark" (MP Henriksen, DPP, quoted by MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.05.23, 11:38).}

Thus, rather than preventing parasitoids from abusing the host country, such a list of values represents an attempt to merge identity politics with security politics: it serves the construction of an existential threat – a radical other – to legitimize extraordinary means to defend identity; an identity which paradoxically needs the other to define itself (Wæver 1994). Even if the list of Danish values is carefully monitored by a respectable liberal intellectual – which the Minister for Integration admittedly is – the very existence of the list, and the act of listing work to turn Muslims into others.

The declarations and lists analysed in this chapter are but one of the results of the insistence in Danish debates on the existence of 'fundamental values of Danish society' which Muslims are suspected to disregard and even undermine. The explication of such fundamental values as criteria for inclusion and exclusion, however, implies a danger – the danger of excluding the wrong persons. During the debates on the Cities of Refuge, a recent parliamentary debate on the values of immigrants was brought to memory as a speaker for an opposition party exclaimed
that "it would be a relief if the MPs from DPP would sign the declaration in question" (MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05).³¹⁰

This earlier debate (2007.04.26) focused on the values of migrants compared to the values of Danes.³¹¹ In this earlier debate on Danish values special attention was awarded to one MP for the Danish People’s Party, theologian Søren Krarup. During decades as a maverick right wing intellectual, he has renounced or violated more than a couple of the values which was now listed as fundamental to Danish society. Among some of those that he had taken issue with in book-length showdowns were those of human rights and democracy. In the parliamentary debate, however, Krarup concentrated his defence on newspaper reports accusing him (when asked questions carefully crafted to the purpose) of having failed to unambiguously accept homosexuality and to universally denounce the death penalty.

This problem is not new to Krarup; he has accustomed himself to explaining how his old radical formulations are consistent with his present voting in parliament after he changed career from self-styled intellectual outcast to de facto responsible for government policies. In the debate on Danish values, Krarup argues that the criticism of his digressions from political correctness amounted to hairsplitting – or that they refer only to highly hypothetical situations.³¹²


³¹¹ The debate was put on the agenda of the parliament on the occasion of a report from the government 'think tank on the challenges to integration' (cf. chapter 5) reporting an opinion poll style survey.

³¹² Another argumentative strategy employed by Krarup amounts to a perfect illustration of the Lacanian concept of jouissance (re-introduced into English language political theory by Slavoj Žižek as 'enjoyment'), defined as "pleasure in unpleasure"; ...the paradoxical satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium of the "pleasure principle".... The hatred of the Other is the hatred of our own excess of
What is significant, however, is the two effects Krarup's example had on the debate: In the first instance, the effect was that the reach of the concept of Danish values was restricted. In the second instance, however, this first effect was annulled in the sense that discriminative exclusion is in effect upheld. Let me explain:

The debate on fundamental Danish values culminated in a frontal attack by the opposition on the very concept of ‘Danish values’ which was by the government put up as a threshold for integration. The point of departure of the attack was the inclusion by the speaker for the Liberal party of most migrants as Danes – and the derived exclusion of a minority:

luckily there is a large group which I call Danes with immigrant background who have both respected and adopted the values in Denmark and the way of life and democracy and everything that comes with it. We also have a small group which is problematic (MP Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26, 10:30).313

enjoyment.... [T]he fascinating image of the Other personifies … what … prevents us from achieving full identity with ourselves (1992:194-6). A text book example of jouissance is found in this quote by Krarup explaining his change in position on whether parents should be legally allowed to hit their children: "What makes it so terribly difficult to talk about the right of chastisement today is, that we have been swamped by a culture for which violence – the holy right of the man to beat his wife and children black and blue – is natural. This means that the Danish tradition for the right of chastisement has been more or less compromised by a Muslim tradition which is so different." "Det, der gør det så forbistret vanskeligt at tale om revselsesret i dag, er, at vi er blevet oversvømmet af en kultur, for hvilken vold - mandens hellige ret til at banke sin kone og børn gule og blå - er naturligt. Og det vil sige, at den danske tradition for revselsesret er blevet mere eller mindre kompromitteret af en muslimsk tradition, der er ganske anderledes" (MP Krarup, DPP, in Seidelin 2005). In this case, protection of Danish identity requires us to painfully relinquish a piece of Danish culture.

By combining the exclusion of those who do not accept “the values in Denmark and the way of life and democracy and everything that comes with it” with the long list of specific value questions of the surveys reported by the think tank, speakers for the opposition parties could claim that Krarup violated these values.

Even if Krarup's explanations were accepted by the speaker for the Conservative party (MP Kjær, con., F37, 2007.04.26, 14:05-.10), she denied that her party had

a community of values with Danish People’s Party. We [merely] have a good working community with Danish People’s Party and we also share some common values; otherwise we would not have been able to agree on so much as we have agreed on. (MP Kjær, con., F37, 2007.04.26, 13:55)" 314

The speaker for the Liberal party in a similar manoeuvre contracted the concept of ‘fundamental norms’ to the most basic ones and, hence, referred the remarks by Krarup to a less destructive level; the level of ‘opinions’:

I have a community of values with everyone – I suppose – in this parliament. All of us in here are Danish citizens subordinated to what is to me a very high set of values which consist within the framework of the Constitution. But I cannot find a single one of you in here with whom I am in agreement concerning all opinions. ... [T]he fundamental values are: everything that lies within the text of the constitution. (MP Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26) 315

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315 "Jeg har et værdifællesskab med samtlige - går jeg ud fra - der sidder her i salen. Vi er alle sammen herinde danske statsborgere, der er underlagt et for mig meget højt sæt værdier, nemlig bestående inden for grundlovens rammer. Men jeg kan ikke finde en eneste af jer herinde, som jeg holdningsmæssigt er enig med alt i. ... [D]e grundlæggende værdier er: Det er alt det, der ligger inden for grundlovens tekst." (MP Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26)
So in the debate, the concept of 'Danish values’ was pushed back to include only the ‘fundamental values’ enshrined in the Constitution.

At first it seems, indeed, to be a difficult task to make the Muslim other by listing values. The second point is, however, that it nevertheless still works. Even if Søren Krarup's values may be characterized as un-Danish, nobody seriously wants to deport him or take away his citizenship. But when a young woman with brown skin, wearing a hijab or not, born and raised in Denmark, does not renounce the death penalty in the most hypothetical society of all hypothetical societies (e.g. in an Islamic Utopia, where everyone lives in perfect adherence to the will of Allah), then she is considered not Danish – she turns into the other (Hervik 2002; Larsen, R.S. 2007; Jørgensen forthcoming).

7.5 Conclusion: Negative interpellation as a reflexive policy

So what are the contributions to radicalization of conflict from the way the persecuted writers are debated? How are the present and future relations presented and necessitated?

An undisputed basis for the debate is the need to promote freedom of expression abroad. For the government and the right wing the need to limit the influx of aliens is also beyond debate.

In the interventions of the government representatives the diacriticon for distinction between Them and Us is, at one level, citizenship. And again this is not the only criterion since the point of the debate and the legislation is to allow some of Them to enter. Some, but not all: It is OK for Them to disturb us but not to act as a fifth column. The list of values to be signed at the entrance is flagging the Muslim

316 As it was in the debates on the Human Rights based criticism of Danish Alien legislation analysed in chapter 6.
character of Them – and this flagging reproduces the civilizational hierarchy between Their authoritarian and medieval practices and Our democratic and modern ditto. The distance is implied to be short: They seem to be lined up, ready to enter Our territory. It is implied that Their presence – especially if They are the radically other-version of Them – will be felt. The very listing of values which They are to embrace presents itself as founded on a knowledge of what They would most likely be doing if no list were presented for signature. It is not clear whether the other is described to be capable of change or to be permanent. Whether the posture of the radical version of the other – aggressively challenging – is a structural effect (of Islam) or an individual choice is not explicated. But dialogicality *is* implied to be present in the less-than-radical Others. Only a precondition for you – as a Muslim – to be accepted into dialogue is that you, literally, promise to stop beating your wife: You must accept the picture painted of 'the Muslim' by explicitly distancing yourself from it.

The basic interactional grammar in the government narratives is Orientalist; the policies proposed is generally one of keeping the radical other distinct from Us by keeping Them outside. The grammar of Encompassment is, however, relevant as far as concerns the less-than-radical other; s/he needs our protection – and with him/her we may engage in a dialogue. We may even, when protecting, accept hearing counter-narratives which we dislike. We will, however, not listen to them in the sense of taking them in with a view to considering self-reform. The distinction between the radical and the less-than-radical other complicates the cast of characters of the narrative since the less-than-radical other is defined in terms of religiously defined culture (Islam) – while the radical other is defined in terms of religiously defined ideology (Islamism).\(^{317}\)

\(^{317}\) The implications of this distinction is in focus for the analysis in chapter 8.
On the one hand, the oral interventions of the government seek recourse to a sedimented element in Danish identity discourse; the self-image of being an example to the world when it comes to democratic values. On the other hand, the list of Danish values to be signed and accepted by the writer upon arrival extends the set of sedimented elements to which recourse is sought: Recourse is sought, primarily, to the self-image of being an exemplary democratic country (threatened by Islamists) – and, secondarily implied; to the self-image of being a culturally homogenous nation (threatened by the influx of Muslims).

The DPP suggests, firstly, as a diacriticon for the less-than-radical other to be allowed in, that s/he should behave in a reverent way; secondly, that the list of values diacritical for distinguishing the radical other should be extended with yet another Muslim characteristic on unacceptable in Denmark. Both suggestions add to the Orientalist grammar and both add to its tendency to securitization. The narratives of the opposition contrarily concentrates on Our responsibility to protect the less-than-radical other – and on the value for Us of the dialogue thus made possible. The narratives of the government, in sum, seek to unite the two sedimented elements of Danish identity discourse preferred by the DPP and the opposition respectively: homogeneity threatened by Muslims and being an example to the world. The articulation of the two narratives is in this debate, however, rather external: In the oral debates, the government mainly agrees with the opposition – at times, the government even explicitly distances itself from the DPP. In the texts of and procedures instituted by the law, however, the narratives of DPP are to a large degree facilitated.

7.6 Perspectives: Hospitality as a strategic task

The very premise for the debate is that there is a conflict between Us and the Islamists – and that you need to choose our side to be accepted as a partner in dialogue. If you do not, there is not position to speak from in Denmark. In that sense,
the debates – the Minister for Culture's insistence on accept of criticism of Denmark disregarded – should not facilitate conflict in the first instance: The ones who could be expected to engage in conflict will most probably not enter the territory on this ticket. In the second instance, however, the way in which Muslims already in Denmark – and Muslims abroad without any intention to ever go to Denmark, for that matter – is co-interpellated by the listing of 'Muslim' practices and values may contribute to radicalization of conflict.

The way in which the distinction between Islam and Islamism is upheld in the narrative promoted by the government – through the demand for a signature on the declaration on fundamental Danish values – in effect annuls the very same distinction. It does so by asking the other to explicitly dis-interpellate himself from a specific narrative of otherness: it asks the arriving stranger to sign up to a characteristic of a Muslim and simultaneously distance himself from that identity. Otherwise s/he cannot hope to be accepted as the one he might always have thought he was.

The very inclusion in the declaration of a list of values is, on the one hand, employing a negative interpellation of the other as a rhetorical strategy to ward of possible intruders. On the other hand, this interpellation is seeking recourse to formality in the sense that the form of the declaration to be signed presents itself as bureaucratic routine. The combined effect is that the formalization doubles the effect of the interpellation by making it exceedingly difficult to talk back.

In Of Hospitality, Anne Dufourmantelle stresses the political role of philosophy in being granted the right to philosophize about absolute, utopian hospitality without a fixed purpose or a practical agenda (2000:66). True; if we want to keep the political debate high-ceilinged, someone needs to keep the pillars supporting the ceiling erect and tall. So there is a role for speculative philosophy. We should, however, also heed Derrida's call for giving "place to a determined, limitable, and delimitable – in a
word, to a calculable – right or law ... to a concrete politics and ethics” of hospitality (2000:147-8). In order to do so, we need to make ourselves familiar with the strategic terrain we intend to intervene in. In the words of anthropologist Daniel Miller, though coined in a different context: "Having shown that we can be philosophers, we need the courage to refuse this ambition and return to ethnographic empathy and ordinary language" (2005:15).

This ambition, firstly, points out an important role for what might be termed "strategic studies," conceived of as identifying openings in the discourses of politics, of media, of everyday life – openings for articulating just a little more 'real life' hospitality. Such a task needs to be based on analyses of the specific strategic terrain into which we choose to intervene; a terrain saturated with fears and strategies of defence. Utopian idea(l)s and moral principles alone will not do. Even if they may be shown to systematically break down under their own weight. Or perhaps because they can be shown to do so. We need to analyze the present processes of othering – to identify opportunities for turning the radicalized other into a less-than-radical other, into a foreigner to whom conditional hospitality can – should – be offered.

Secondly, any specific intervention on behalf of hospitality requires a turn away from essentializations, and toward hybridity: We need to insist that it is possible to be both Danish and Muslim; simultaneously a democrat and a Muslim. But, as Frello warns: "if the concept of hybridity gives rise to an indifferent celebration of difference it creates blindness to the unequal power relations always involved" (2005:101, my transl.). Thus this turn also, finally, implies deliberately prioritizing some forms of hybridity over other forms: we need to include democratic Muslim Danes, and exclude Danish non-Muslim non-democrats.

Switching identity politics to revolve around a different distinction – i.a. away from Dane/Muslim to Democrat/Non-Democrat – is, however, not an easy task to
accomplish. This difficulty ends up in focus when chapter 8 analyses how the concept of dialogue is employed to describe policies to counter terrorism.
References

Parliamentary negotiations


15 April 2008, 1st readings of L131 (Amending the Aliens Act to allow temporary residence in relation to the Cities of Refuge Arrangement) and L137 (Amending the Literature Act to facilitate the Cities of Refuge Arrangement)

23 May 2008, 2nd readings of L131 and L137

12 June 2008, 3rd readings of L131 and L137

Reports from parliament Committee on Integration of 13 May 2008 concerning bill L131 and from parliament Committee on Culture of 14 and 28 May 2008 concerning bill L137

All material concerning L131 and L137 is available via http://www.ft.dk/samling/20072/lovforslag/L131/index.htm#dok and http://www.ft.dk/samling/20072/lovforslag/L137/index.htm#dok, accessed 21 May 2010

Other empirical material


nyidanmark.dk and newtodenmark.dk, official homepages of Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs, accessed on 4 August 2008

Appendix: The Declaration

Erklæring om anerkendelse af de grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund

Navn: _____________________________________________

Udl.nr./personnr.: ____________________________

Jeg erklærer herved, at jeg anerkender de grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund.

Jeg erklærer derfor følgende:

- Jeg vil på alle måder overholde den danske lovgivning og værne om de danske demokratiske principper.
- Jeg respekterer det enkelte menneskes frihed og personlige integritet, kønnenes ligestilling og tros- og ytringsfriheden, som er grundlæggende i Danmark.
- Jeg ved, at diskrimination på grund af bl.a. køn eller hudfarve og trusler og hånd mod grupper på grund af bl.a. tro eller seksuel orientering er ulovlige handlinger i Danmark.
- Jeg anerkender, at mænd og kvinder har lige pligter og rettigheder i Danmark, og at både mænd og kvinder skal bidrage til samfundet.
- Jeg anerkender, at der i Danmark skal være lige respekt og udfoldelsesmuligheder for alle børn - både piger og drenge - så de kan vokse op til at blive aktive og ansvarlige medborgere, der er i stand til at træffe deres egne valg.
- Jeg anerkender, at det danske samfund tager skarpt afstand fra terrorisme, og at enhver borger bør bekæmpe terrorisme bl.a. ved at bistå myndighederne i det forebyggende og opklarende arbejde.
- Jeg anerkender, at aktivt engagement i det danske samfund er en forudsætning for demokratiet.

Jeg erklærer også, at jeg ved, at mit ophold i Danmark som led i fribyordningen er midlertidigt, og at det er hensigten, at jeg skal vende tilbage til mit hjemland. Formålet med mit ophold er således, at jeg får mulighed for i en periode at udøve mine litterære aktiviteter i Danmark for derefter at vende tilbage til mit hjemland.

Dato:__________________           Underskrift: ________________________________
Declaration on recognition of the fundamental values of the Danish society

Name: _____________________________________________

Foreign national’s ID/Civil registry number: ______________________

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I understand and accept the fundamental values of Danish society.

I thus declare as follows:

- I shall comply with Danish legislation and protect the Danish democratic principles in every respect.
- I respect the freedom and personal integrity of the individual, equal opportunities for men and women, and freedom of speech and religion which are fundamental constitutional rights in Denmark.
- I understand and accept that discrimination on the grounds of race and skin colour and threats and scorn against groups on the grounds of religion or sexual orientation is illegal in Denmark.
- I understand and accept that men and women have equal obligations and rights in Denmark and that both men and women shall contribute to society.
- I understand and accept that in Denmark all children shall be given equal respect and self-expression – be they boys or girls – in order for them to grow up and become active and responsible citizens who are capable of making their own decisions.
- I understand and accept that Danish society strongly condemns acts of terrorism and that any citizen has an obligation to fight terrorism amongst others by assisting the authorities through prevention and investigation.
- I understand and accept that active commitment to the Danish society is a precondition for democracy.

I also declare that I am aware that my stay in Denmark as part of the Cities of Refuge arrangement is temporary and that it is intended that I shall return to my homeland. The purpose of my stay is, hence, to allow me to practise my literary activities in Denmark for a period of time, while afterwards return to my homeland.

Date: _______________ Signature: _______________________________

The translation from the Danish is partly copy-pasted from the "Declaration on integration and active citizenship in Danish society" on the official home-page of the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs. Where the "Declaration on recognition of the fundamental values of the Danish society" differs from this original declaration, the author has done the translation. The “understand and accept” of the official English version presented to writers to sign carries more specific and binding than the Danish “anerkende” which cover both the English “recognize” and “acknowledge”.
8 It takes two to Tango: Danish concepts of dialogue as counterterrorism

Chapter 7 laid out how the security of Danish homogeneity is prioritized over the security of foreigners. Even when the foreigners need protection because they practice values which are presented as universal and whose exceptional embodiment Denmark is described to be. To ameliorate this situation, the chapter concluded by calling for pragmatic, strategic interventions to supplement principled, universalist declamations. This chapter demonstrates the difficulty of such an attempt to switch policies away from securitization of cultural identity – even when the attempt is performed by the discursively privileged voices of government.

8.1 Introduction: Narrating the self-reform of the other

On September 11 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked 4 planes in the USA. Thousands of innocent human beings were killed, and ever since, the world has not been the same. During the last 5 years it has become clear that we are in the middle of a global value struggle. It is not a value struggle between cultures or religions; it is a value struggle between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, between democracy and dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral... The strongest force in this struggle is the desire and demand of millions of oppressed people for freedom. We saw that in Iraq when 12 million Iraqis defied the terrorists and went to the ballots ... We have to help Africa so that young Africans see a hope, see a future, see rich possibilities in their own country, so that they are not attracted to extremism, so that they do not end up on the wrong side of the global value struggle. The global value struggle takes place in Denmark too. .. Fortunately it is so that the great majority of Danes with an immigrant background ... are contributing positively to the Danish society. ... But there are also a few extremists who seem to hate the society which have secured their political freedom and material safety. ... We must not out of naïve and happy-go-lucky tolerance show
understanding towards or facilitate religious fanaticism or political extremism. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2006.10.03 12.05-12.15)\textsuperscript{319}

In these sentences featured prominently in his 2006 ‘state of the realm’ speech, the Danish prime minister summarized what the government took to be the conditions for the long term counterterrorism policy of the Danish government: Most Muslims are waiting to be our partners in emancipating both themselves and us from extremists threatening us and oppressing them. Terms like ‘partnership’ and ‘dialogue’ has become part of the self-description of specific government policies to counter terrorism.

The etymology of the word ‘dialogue’ – originating in Greek διά (‘across/inter-‘) and λόγος (‘speech’) – suggests that it denotes an inter-action across two or more distinct entities.\textsuperscript{320} In Danish government discourse they are, however, generally describing a


one way street: We have something that the Muslims need (and most of them want); partnerships and dialogues are means to implement this already defined goal.

This chapter analyses how the use of the term ‘dialogue’ in government policies on counterterrorism have gradually changed to include more instances of two-way interaction – and places the government narratives in the context of parliamentary positions on what 'dialogue' is and ought to be. While the tendency of giving weight to policies of dialogue in government policies surfaced first in foreign policy formulations, it has recently been taken further in an integration policy document. The agreement forming the base of the disagreements analysed is that terrorism should be prevented – and that some kind of relation exists between terror and Muslims in general (even if the disagreement includes exactly what the relation is). In the first reading of the debates, the disagreement is analysed by showing how the self/other security narratives gradually turn more reflexive. The most unlikely result of the merger of counterterrorism policies and integration policies, then, is not an intensified securitization of integration policy but a relative de-securitization of counterterrorism. It will, however, not amount to an a-securitization of neither.

Section 8.2 briefly recollects the concept of identity as a discursive structure developed in chapter 2 while beginning the analysis of the chapter. Firstly, the section relates the theoretical concepts of philosophical and sociological others. Secondly, the section lays out how the way in which the authorities formulate narratives on the radically threatening terrorist other implicates less-than-radical others. Specifically, narratives of partnership and dialogue involving less-than-radical others in counterterrorism serve as a supplement to policies of elimination and control. Section 8.3 examines how the term ‘dialogue’ may – when used in counterterrorism policies – imply either monologue, inclusion, or interchange between two different entities.

Section 8.4 analyses how a concept of dialogue as a two-way interchange spurs the need for control and monitoring the limits to the difference of the party invited into
dialogue. Section 8.5 lays out how the need to control and monitor implicated in the efforts of the government to position itself as defenders of Danish identity between an opposition calling for Self-reform and a supporting right wing party putting the possibility of reforming the Muslim other in question.

Section 8.6 concludes by summing up the contribution of the chapter to the overall aim of the dissertation: This second reading assessed the contribution to radicalization from the structures of the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on Muslims. A final section 8.7 evaluates – as the third reading – the strategic situation for Muslims wanting to revise the script for the role as less-than-radical others they are awarded by the counterterrorism and integration policies.

8.2 Radical others and less-than-radical others in narratives of self-defence

This section lays out how authorities need to formulate narratives on the radically threatening terrorist other (subsection 8.2.1); how these narratives gradually implicate less-than-radical others (subsection 8.2.2); and how they seem to gradually award more agency to these less-than-radical others (subsection 8.2.3).

8.2.1 The Terrorist as radical other and the responsibility of government

Chapter 2 laid out how identity needs difference to be; you cannot deem someone identical without deeming someone else – some others – different. As long as everyone agrees on who’s identical and who’s different – who are included as We; who are excluded as this kind of They and as that kind of They – and everyone agrees that that’s the way things should be; no problem. Problems arise when not everyone agrees. Everyone never does.

The problem with disagreement is that the allocation of various others in boxes does not merely affect Them. As our identity is constituted in relation to their difference, redefinition of others affects our identity too.
In philosophical terms, a radical other is that which prevents you from being the one you ought to be. Philosophically speaking there is always another other – even another radical other – since identity as a concept implies that any change, any difference, any impurity can be pointed out as a threat to identity.

And threats to identity will be pointed out. If no one names an identity, it is meaningless to conceive of its existence. So identity exists only in discourse; only as part of the construction of meaning. But why explicate identity if it is unproblematic? If an identity is not explicitly problematic, it does not exist – and the moment it is brought into existence, it is necessarily made a problem (Wæver 1997:328-9; Žižek 1992:197; Derrida 1982).

If a specific group of people – a sociological other – is pointed out as that which prevents you from being the one you ought to be, that other is radicalized. Another way to put it is that the other is securitized; i.e. pointed out as a security threat: The other is no just said to be different from you but said to constitute an existential threat to your identity (Connolly 1991:8). In Danish parliamentarian debates, one such sociological other securitized to be a radical other is ‘the terrorist’. Terrorists, terrorism, and terrorist acts are repeatedly explicitly pointed out as a threat to Denmark, Danes, and key elements in Danish identity.321 They are characterized by a variety of invectives.322 And they are routinely dismissed and condemned as an introit

321 "[T]errorism is a threat to society, to the values it is build upon, and to the individual citizen [terrorismen en trussel mod samfundet og de værdier, som det bygger på, og mod den enkelte borger.]" (Min. f. Justice Espersen, con., L217, 2006.03.31). "The terrorists we know today want to fight democracy and the rule of law. [De terrorister, vi kender i dag, ønsker at bekæmpe demokratiet og retssikkerheden. ]" (MP Barfod, UL., F7, 2005.11.16, 18.20).

322 “The threat No. 1 of the future [fremtidens trussel nr. 1]” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10); “abominable [modbydelige]” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10, MP Jensen, soc.dem., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10; MP Messerschmidt, DPP, F1, 2005.04.06, 16:25; 17:00); “brutal [brutal]” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10); “evil [ondskab]” (MP Jensen, soc.dem., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10); “bestial [bestialsk]”
to the interventions of each party spokesman. Indeed, the government point out terror as the threat defining our security:

The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different than the ones we faced during the Cold War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is no longer an all-destructive nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global terror networks or desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the international community. Terrorism today is a real and essential threat to populations everywhere in the world. (Regeringen 2003:2)

Existential threats you need to handle if you are in charge (or want to be put in charge) – at least if the referent-object against which the threat is posed is worth defending (Wæver 1995). If you are in government (or in politics, in which case you want to be in government) you will want to stay in authority. To do so, you need to tell how you want to fight off existential threats against the entity you represent. You need to tell a plausible story about your choice of policy. These two mandatory sequences in a securitizing narrative are illustrated in figure 8.1.


323 “Nothing may, after all, apologize or legitimize terror” "intet kan jo undskyldte eller legitimere terror.” (MP Bastrup, soc., F7, 2005.11.16 18:10) and “Terror is always an indefensible act and an act that always needs to be condemned.” "Terror er altid en uforsvarlig handling og en handling, der altid må fordømmes.” (MP Hoydal, Faroes, F7, 2005.11.16 18.30). Even as a prelude to arguing a relatively de-radicalized picture of terrorism: “The Red/Green Alliance wants a world without war and terrorism. Any decent human being condemns terrorism.” (MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, R1, 2005.10.06 17:35).

324 "Det 21. århundredes trusler er fundamentalt anderledes, end dem vi stod overfor under Den Kolde Krig og de første år efter Murens fald. Mareridtet er ikke længere den altødelæggende atomkrig, men massivt ødelæggende angreb fra globale terrornetværk eller desperate regimer, der har stillet sig uden for det internationale samfund. Terrorism er i dag en virkelig og væsentlig trussel mod befolkningerne overalt i verden." (Regeringen 2003:2)
In Denmark, the immediate reactions in 2001-2 to the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington focused on ‘fighting the terrorists’. This involves policies of control and elimination – illustrated in figure 8.2.

Domestically policies of controlling the possible activities of terrorists included the intelligence services being allowed a series of new operational modes. The policy of physically eliminating terrorists was primarily employed abroad by joining the US
efforts in Afghanistan. As policies for dealing with others, both control and elimination have long traditions (Todorov 1999:132-45; Lindqvist 1992; Foucault 1978).

“In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral”, claimed the prime minister (cf. quote above). Only seldom, however, a story can be told of a one-on-one showdown between you and the evil other. And even if a story may be based on an allocation of roles between the two possibilities of ‘Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’, most often a more sophisticated distribution of roles is needed (cf. Hansen 2006:40). Generally, for such stories, you need a cast of characters – a cast of less-than-radical Others (Hansen 1998). Different policies invite different less-than-radical Others to participate. Such a diversification of roles for others is illustrated in figure 8.3.

![Figure 8.3 Diversification of roles in security narrative: Inviting different less-than-radical others](image)

**8.2.2 Counterterrorism policies constructing less-than-radical others**

As time has passed, bringing new events in the Middle East and European capitals, the spectrum of Danish counterterrorism narratives have become more complex. Correspondingly, the cast of different less-than-radical others needed to take up their
roles in an evermore “broad spectrum” (Regeringen 2009b:4, 12, 33) of counterterrorism policy narratives has expanded.

In 2005, in a debate in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombing of the London underground, the Danish prime minister explained that

The overall strategy of the government ... involves three parts: We have to prevent support and recruitment for terrorism through our international involvement and through an active integration policy at home; we have to fight terrorists and terror networks and cut off their access to money and materials; and then we have to prepare ourselves for the fact that a terrorist attack may take place (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15; cf. Regeringen 2003:13).\(^{325}\)

It is clear from the interventions of the prime minister and his ministers in the debate that policies of elimination and control are still central: domestically, the Minister for Justice presents a new catalogue of “necessary means for fighting terrorists and terror networks” (ibid., 15:20).\(^{326}\) But the relative weight of the spectrum – not least in the foreign policy part – is tilted towards “long term” (ibid., 15:15).\(^{327}\) Policies involving less-than-radical others: “Through our active foreign policy we seek to counter the circumstances out there, in the World, which may provide a breeding ground for support for terrorism.” (ibid., 15:15)\(^{328}\) Abroad the measures include foreign aid (to prevent terrorists from legitimizing their deeds by reference to global injustices) and

\(^{325}\) ”Regeringens overordnede strategi består ... af tre led: Vi skal forebygge opbakning og rekruttering til terrorisme gennem vores internationale engagement og gennem en aktiv integrationspolitik herhjemme, vi skal bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk og afskære dem adgang til penge og materialer, og så skal vi forberede os på, at terrorangreb kan finde sted; det kræver et robust beredskab, der kan mindske konsekvenserne af et terrorangreb." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15).

\(^{326}\) "[N]ødvenlige instrumenter til at bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk." (Ibid., 15:20).

\(^{327}\) "[L]angsigtet" (Ibid., 15:15).

\(^{328}\) "Gennem vores aktive udenrigspolitik søger vi at imødegå de forhold, der ude i verden kan danne grobund for opbakning til terrorisme." (Ibid., 15:15)
“peace keeping operations” like “the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan” aiming “to integrate them in the international cooperation, including the cooperation to fight terrorism.” (ibid.) In parallel, an "active integration policy at home" (ibid., 15:15) aims to “prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology of extremists” (ibid., 15:20).

The others in focus for these counterterrorism policies are less-than-radical. But these others are, nevertheless, others. It might be possible for them to be included in some We – but it is not a sure thing, and it is an open question what kind of We they may be included in. The less-than-radical others are relatively de-securitized in comparison to the highly securitized radical Other. But they are not a-securitized (Wæver 1998); they are still discursively inscribed in a security problem. We need a policy towards Them, to make sure that They do not somehow end up as radically other; end up as part of the existential threat to Our identity. We need to reconstruct Their subjectivity – to re-form Their identity and Their propensity for action – to be sure to have Them on Our side.

There is a long history of European and Western attempts to have others reformed – most prominently to resemble the model, i.e. the reformer (cf. Todorov 1999). Depending on what sort of diacriticon is the threshold for identification the policies can be identified as conversion (religion), enlightenment (knowledge), or modernization (mode of production). What holds these policies of reformation together is that We have a certain characteristicon which We believe They should

330 "[E]n aktiv integrationspolitik herhjemme" (Ibid., 15:15).
331 "[F]orebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af ekstremisternes ideologi" (Ibid., 15:20).
have as well. Sometimes some of Them agree – sometimes They do not. Which warrant more or less coercive means to implement the policy. The policy of reforming the other is illustrated in figure 8.4.

![Figure 8.4 Policy of reforming the other to become less radical](image)

If They are constructed as split between, on the one hand, the masses which agree to have a need to be more like us and, on the other hand, a group of oppressors (the radical other of the masses) who does not (cf. Hansen 2006:114), a policy of reform can be termed as one of *emancipation*: "We have to take on our shoulders the responsibility to help and secure that also the Iraqi population will have a democratic and free country to live in." (MP Behnke, con., F7, 2005.11.16 17:40)\(^{332}\) This policy of emancipation is illustrated in figure 8.5.

Policies of elimination, control and reformation are effectively one-way affairs: You do something to Them; Their possible actions are only conceptualized as counter-active re-actions to be dealt with accordingly. When it comes to policies of

\(^{332}\) "Vi er nødt til at påtage os det ansvar at hjælpe og sikre, at også den irakiske befolkning får et demokratisk og frit land at leve i." (MP Behnke, con., F7, 2005.11.16 17:40; cf. prime minister A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2003.10.07 12:30).
emancipation, however, there are limits to what kind of action of the other that may be discounted in this way. Hence the need arises to engage these less-than-radical others in partnerships and in dialogue to secure that their action benefits the common goal of their emancipation.

Figure 8.5 Policy of emancipation of a less-than-radical other co-threatened by the radical other

8.2.3 Why partnership and dialogue? The other as an active character

Policies of elimination and control are, as described in the previous sections, supplemented by policies of reform and of emancipation. Policies of emancipation are, however, more convincing if an other can be constructed to actively participate in its own emancipation. If so, policies of emancipation may turn into policies of partnership. Andersen concludes a study of partnerships as second-order contracts between the state and non-state entities\(^{333}\) by describing the complex relation between freedom and obligation constructed in the partnership:

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\(^{333}\) Including partnerships between 1st and 3rd world NGO’s as part of state orchestrated development aid (2008:42ff).
What partnerships seek to establish is ... the partner’s freedom to commit to assuming responsibility for the partnership. Partnerships represent an attempt to formulate mutual obligations concerning the self-creation of individual partners as responsible for and relevant to the partnership. It concerns the obligation to create yourself as a free and independent partner for the partnership – obligation towards the freedom in the image of the partnership. ... [I]t requires freedom reintroduced as obligation, but at the same time it has to presuppose freedom since otherwise there could be no obligation towards freedom. (Andersen 2008:106)

As time passes, the immediately chosen policies of elimination and control have been sought implemented without any determinate success. Simultaneously, policies of partnership are featured more and more prominently in the communication of the Danish government.

In the post-7/7 debate in late 2005, the prime minister talked about two relationships in terms of partnerships; one abroad and one at home: As part of the active foreign policy

we have, by The Arab Initiative begun an important dialogue with the Arab countries and Iran. The Initiative supports local reform aiming at more free and democratic societies – a development which the government finds to be decisive in the prevention of further radicalization. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15)\footnote{’[V]i [har] med Det Arabiske Initiativ startet en vigtig dialog med de arabiske lande og med Iran. Initiativet støtter lokale reformer i retning af mere frie og demokratiske samfund, en udvikling, som regeringen finder afgørende i forebyggelsen af yderligere radikalisering.’ (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15) The official English translation of what is in Denmark literally presented as The Arab Initiative is “Partnership for Progress and Reform” between Denmark, the Middle East, and North Africa. Gradually, the English title is shortened to "Danish Arab Partnership Programme” (cf. Ministry 2009).}

Domestically, the contribution to counterterrorism from the active integration policy builds on the premise that

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\footnote{421}
Danish Muslims and immigrants in Denmark are decisive allies in the fight against terrorism. Together we can win this fight. We shall prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology of the extremists – and that requires us to promote dialogue and counter radicalization in certain Muslim quarters. (Ibid., 15:20)\textsuperscript{335}

The policy of partnership in the fight against the radical other is illustrated in figure 8.6.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure8.6.png}
\caption{Policy of partnership with a less-than-radical other to fight the radical other}
\end{figure}

Both partnerships are described by the prime minister as involving 'dialogue'. On the one hand, 'dialogue' connotes a certain openness springing from an interchange between two distinct entities. On the other hand, partnerships as a policy – even the ones involving dialogues – generally presuppose a common goal; a goal defined by the party articulating the partnership.\textsuperscript{336} Either because the initiator explicates the

\textsuperscript{335} "[D]anske muslimer og indvandrere i Danmark er afgørende allierede i kampen mod terrorisme. Sammen kan vi vinde den. Vi skal forebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af ekstremisternes ideologi, og det kræver, at vi fremmer dialogen og imødegår radikalisering i visse muslimske miljøer." (Ibid., 15:20).

\textsuperscript{336} Karlsen & Villadsen describe a proliferation of dialogue as governmental technology in the Danish welfare state. On the one hand, they note that "They all require, initiate and
goal which the partner has to agree to aim for. Or because the initiator embodies a quality which the partner – by entering into the partnership – aims at acquiring. This tension between openness and predestination makes for intricate contractions and expansions. Figure 8.7 illustrates a policy of two-way dialogue with the less-than-radical other as part of a partnership aiming to reform the radical other.

Figure 8.7 Policy of dialogical partnership with a less-than-radical other to reform the radical other

The Arab Initiative was originally conceived of in 2003 as a part of a comprehensive foreign policy document but was only effectively launched to the public in 2005 and evaluated and adjusted in 2006 in the aftermath of the Cartoon Crisis. The parliament debated the initiative and the evaluation on 24 May 2006. Following a operate through a form of self-analysis or self-reflection, which aims at producing particular kinds of self-insight and self-awareness ... The objective is to fill the room with individual's authentic statements, but the conversational space is already pre-shaped by regulatory procedures." (2008:359-360)

338 Parallel texts in (Udenrigsministeriet 2005) and (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).
second evaluation process,\textsuperscript{341} the initiative was re-launched in late 2008.\textsuperscript{342} The government texts presenting the Arab Initiative on its own premises explicitly ascribe the prioritization of the aims to \textit{the Arab Human Development Report}, which is introduced as "published by the United Nations Development Programme and written by a team of Arab researchers and political analysts" (Ministry 2005:3; 7: 2009:4).

Only when presented within the frame of counterterrorism, the bulk of the specific sub-policies included in these policies of partnership – in the Arab Initiative and in the action plan to counter radicalization – appear within the basically asymmetrical logic of reform towards an aim predefined by us (to counter terrorism). Even when framed as counterterrorism the term ‘dialogue’, as we shall see, sometimes implies a less lopsided relation between self and other.

The domestic policies of partnership and dialogue were slower to evolve in the discourse of the present government. The articulation – in government policy statements at least – of counterterrorism policies and general policies of integration of migrants was only cemented after the 7/7 London bombings had propelled the concept of ‘home grown terrorists’ into the debate in 2005. Until then the government had primarily sponsored a classical economically Liberal concept of integration focusing on labour market integration and including some attentiveness to grievances like discrimination (cf. chapter 5). The immediate reaction to 7/7 – soon followed by the Cartoon affair – was to supplement the labour market efforts with a more culturalist concept of integration bordering on cultural assimilation through a focus on a steadily growing list of ‘values’ fundamental to Danish society (cf. chapters 5 &

\textsuperscript{340} Folketinget, plenary negotiations 24 May 2006, 1\textsuperscript{st} reading of F45 (Debate on The Arabic Initiative [Partnership for Progress and Reform]).

\textsuperscript{341} Skadkaer Consult (2009).

\textsuperscript{342} Parallel texts in Udenrigsministeriet (2008) and Ministry (2008); also available in Arabic and French.
Recently, however, a government policy paper suggested a partial shift to policies of dialogue in integration narratives. The paper departed in counterterrorism considerations and was named “A common and safe future. An action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people.”

Two reasons for applying policies of partnership and dialogue are presented in this paper:

The first reason is that if We – Denmark – shall be able to successfully communicate to potentially radicalized Muslims (in Denmark and in the Middle East), we need partners. We need non-radicalized Muslims to communicate to potentially-radicalized Muslims since

[w]hen it concerns working on the opinions and norms of a person who is not yet quite settled in questions of identity – or who is already marked by rooted extremist ways of thinking – the dialogue taking place face to face is key. (Ministeriet 2008:30)

And, as we shall see, the ethnic and religious 'colour' of the face is implied to make a difference. Abroad “there might be a need for an increased involvement of the Danish resource base with roots in these regions in the international engagement of Denmark” (2008:10).

For instance,

Efforts should be made to give Muslim populations in various countries factual knowledge on Danish foreign policy, conditions for Muslims in Denmark and cooperation between the West and the Muslim World. In order to ensure this, an

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343 Parallel texts in Regeringen (2009a) and Government (2009) – based on a civil servant report prepared for consultations (Ministeriet 2008).

344 “[N]år det gælder om at bearbejde holdninger og normer hos en person, der har uafklarede identitetsspørgsmål, eller som allerede er præget af fastgroede ekstremistiske tænkemåder, er den dialog, som foregår ansigt til ansigt helt central.” (Ministeriet 2008:30).

345 ”[D]er kan være behov for en øget inddragelse af den danske ressourcebase med rødder i disse regioner i Danmarks internationale arbejde.” (Ministeriet 2008:10).
Arabic speaking staff member is employed, inter alia to establish contact with the Arab media. (Government 2009:17)

Domestically, there is a need for teaming up with partners enjoying Muslim authority: “Representatives from Muslim communities in Denmark ... may exert influence in their local communities.” (2009:17) Therefore, a "well organized and democratically based leadership in the individual religious community has ... the potential to reach large proportions of the religious sectors." (Ministeriet 2008:39)

But there is also a need for imbuing state authority with Muslim authority by teaming up with Muslim employees: "Yet another element that may contribute to increasing the contact and trust between the police and the citizens of pluricultural background is ...increasing the recruitment of applicants to the police of other ethnic background than Danish" (2008:39).

In parallel, “Teachers with a multicultural background will be able to work as role models for children and youth with a similar background” (2008:44). Since the ethnically Danish Denmark cannot reach the target groups by itself, a partnership with someone more alike the potentially radicalized Muslims is needed.

The second reason for choosing a policy of dialogue is that exclusion (also in the forms of perceived exclusion and self-exclusion) is “a threat to the cohesive force” of the Danish society (2008:10, 11f; cf. chapter 5). As the popularized presentation of the action plan to counter radicalization explains: “The danger occurs when the

346 "En velorganiseret og demokratisk baseret ledelse i det enkelte trossamfund har desuden potentiale til at nå ud til store dele af de religiøse miljøer." (Ministeriet 2008:39)
347 "Et yderligere element, som kan medvirke til at øge kontakten og tilliden mellem politiet og borgere med flerkulturel baggrund, er ... at øge rekrutteringen af ansøgere til politiet med anden etnisk baggrund end dansk." (Ministeriet 2008:39)
348 "Lærere og pædagoger med flerkulturel baggrund vil kunne fungere som rollemodeller for børn og unge med tilsvarende baggrund" (Ministeriet 2008:44).
349 "[T]russel mod sammenhængskraften" (Ministeriet 2008:10).
reality which young people experience comes to look like the message which the
Islamists want to sell.” (Nyidanmark 2008(2):10)  

Hence,

[our t]hrowing suspicion on ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in the
propaganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For this
reason too it is important that suspicion of being part of the problem is not thrown on
anyone able to contribute to the solution. (Ministeriet 2008:13)

So we need to affirmatively include Muslims to avoid their self-radicalizing
exclusion. This is where the counterterrorism policy of dialogue might end up
reconstructing the integration narratives so far told by the government which have
primarily been a one-way street of Their adjustment to Our ways (cf. chapter 5).

8.3 Concepts of Dialogue

Inclusion of sceptics and the self-excluded are, however, not a straight forward task.
Furthermore these two reasons to dialogue do not warrant a complete switch to
policies of uncontrolled dialogue.

Firstly, the government writers name one of the specific sub-policies “disagreeing
dialogue” (Government 2009:17) to distinguish it from other kinds of dialogue.
This special category leaves the impression that other kinds of dialogue do not
involve disagreement. In that sense, the use of the category underlines the need to pay
attention to the way the word ‘dialogue’ is utilized in Danish political discourse on

350 "Det farlige er, når den virkelighed, de unge oplever, kommer til at ligne det budskab, islamisterne gerne vil sælge" (Nyidanmark 2008(2):10)
351 "Mistænkeliggørelse af etniske eller religiøse grupper kan bruges aktivt i den propaganda, som vi ser fra dem, der er modstandere af et mangfoldigt demokratisk samfund. Også derfor er det vigtigt, at ingen, der kan bidrage til løsningen, mistænkeliggøres for at være en del af problemet." (Ministeriet 2008:13)
352 "[U]enig dialog" (Ministeriet 2008:34; Regeringen 2009a:17)
integration and counterterrorism. Hence, the following sections zoom in on concepts of dialogue as monologue (subsection 8.3.1); dialogue as inclusion (subsection 8.3.2); and finally dialogue as interchange in need of counterparts (section 8.3.3).

Secondly, the policy for future interaction implied in a narrative of dialogue opens a space for the other whom one is engaging. And the space opened up is greater than the space opened up by a narrative of partnership on a predefined road towards a predefined goal. Nevertheless, there are still limits that need to be controlled. This need to monitor the other engaged in dialogue is the focus for section 8.4.

8.3.1 Dialogue as Monologue: deferring dialogue

In Danish discourse on integration, the word ‘dialogue’ is – contrary to what the etymology of the word would suggest – most frequently used to denote a one-way process of one entity acting on another. The distribution of agency in such a policy of dialogue as monologue is illustrated in figure 8.8.

First of all, in the government action plan on prevention of radicalization the word “dialogue” is often accompanied by “enlightenment”. Even if a headline says “dialogue” the content of the policy might be “enlightenment”. One example is how the description of "dialogue and information" initiatives abroad include "efforts to

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353 In parallel, the need to stress the element of mutuality in “Mutual integration in the civil society associations” "Gensidig integration i foreningslivet" (2008:14, 41; italics added) highlights how ‘integration’ in Danish discourse at the point of departure equals Their assimilation to Our ways. The specific initiatives listed under this heading does – irrespective of the heading – only include measures to equip Them to engage in Our unmodified organizational forms.

354 Lindekilde conceptualizes two logics of dialogue and deliberation observed in Danish debates during the Cartoon affair as ‘monological’ and ‘multilogical’; both often termed ‘dialogue’ (2007:4f; 20).

355 (Ministeriet 2008:34, 35, 37; Government 2009:11-17). Literally ‘oplysning’ means ‘enlightenment, but it may also – less drastically – be translated ‘informing/information’.
promote a nuanced and objective understanding of the relations between the West / Denmark and the Muslim World" aiming to "give ... factual knowledge" (2009:16-7) – but no two way interaction. In this instance the label ‘dialogue’ is either void or substantially described to denominate a monologue.356

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8.8 Dialogue as monologue**

A policy of one-way information is frequently accompanied by an analysis of the distribution of knowledge claiming that We have the truth and They are plain wrong: "[T]he cartoon affair has ... shown ... that Arab populations have a scanty knowledge of our society and not the least of our great effort and engagement in the region." (MP Poulsen, lib., F45, 2006.05.24 16:45)357

356 The description of domestic "dialogue and information" involves that "the young people should be made familiar with facts" via "targeted information activities", "information meetings", "information material", "targeted use of the internet". But it also involves that "The young people should also feel that they have the opportunity to make their opinion known and that someone is listening – even if they will not always agree." (Government 2009:15f).

357 "[T]egningesagen har ... vist, at arabiske befolkninger har et alt for ringe kendskab til vores samfund og ikke mindst vores store indsats og engagement i regionen." (MP Poulsen, lib., F45, 2006.05.24 16:45)
Misinformation, propaganda, misunderstandings and problems of communication constitutes important parts of the complex of problems of which extremist opinions are also a part. ... A comprehensive plan will be drawn up for information and communication on the government’s and other authorities policies and efforts in areas like integration, the conditions for religious communities, Denmark’s engagement in the outside world, etc. ... It is ... a key challenge that normal channels of information does not necessarily reach the young people whom one as a public authority wants to engage in dialogue. (Ministeriet 2008:57)\textsuperscript{358}

Secondly, a series of educational measures are listed which aim at securing that grown ups as well as primary school children (in public and especially private – i.e. Muslim – schools) acquire the “societal goals and values” (2008:43)\textsuperscript{359} and “the ability to see a question from all sides and the knowledge of democratic dialogue and argumentation.” (2008:45f)\textsuperscript{360} In these instances there might be a two-way dialogue somewhere in the horizon – but the immediate policy remains monological.

A third primarily monological variation implies dialogue to be simultaneously a central part of both a) the goal of enlightenment and b) the means to achieving that goal:

"The purpose [of the Arab initiative] was to establish a Ubasis for a broader dialogueU with the countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa and, Uhence, ..."

\textsuperscript{358} “Misinformation, propaganda, misforståelser og kommunikationsproblemer udgør væsentlige dele af det problemkompleks, som ekstremistiske holdninger også er en del af. ... Der udarbejdes derfor en samlet plan for information og kommunikation om regeringens og andre myndigheders politikker og indsatser på områder som integration, trossamfundenes forhold, Danmarks engagement i omverdenen m.v. ... Det er ... en helt central udfordring, at de normale informationskanaler ikke nødvendigvis når ud til de unge, man som offentlig myndighed vil i dialog med." (Miniseriet 2008:57; cf. Nyidanmark 2008(2):13)

\textsuperscript{359} “[S]amfundsmæssige mål og værdier” (Ministeriet 2008:43).

\textsuperscript{360} “[E]vnen til at se en sag fra flere sider og kendskabet til demokratisk dialog og argumentation.” (Ministeriet 2008:45f).
contribute support to the development of democratic and economic reformUs ... [T]he initiative shall focus far more on support to the forces who want to develop free media, free communication, spreading of information [oplysning; literally: enlightenment] and knowledge. An enlightened population has a better possibility for independently making up its mind and thereby for choosing. Knowledge is power – and therefore access to Uknowledge isU for the Arab populations Uthe master key to choosing democracy and dialogue Urather than dictatorship and violence. (MP Christmas-Møller, con., F45, 206.05.24, 17:30; underlining added)³⁶¹

In other words; we may – by means of engaging Them in dialogue – support Their way towards a stage of development where They are able to choose dialogue as a preferred means of interaction. If this stage is reached, the difference of the other is reduced sufficiently for other to be ready for inclusion in two-way interchange.

The effectual deferral of inclusion in two-way interchange is what unites concepts of dialogues-as-monologue: Now you listen and do as We say – later you might be ready speak in a way that is worth listening to. The way in which narratives of dialogue-as-monologue interpellates the other does not play very well with narratives of dialogue-as-inclusion and dialogue-as-interchange: These narratives are in the focus for the following two subsections.

8.3.2 Dialogue as Inclusion: precarious invitations

Inclusion of non-radicalized Muslims in partnerships and in society in general is central to the Danish government’s policies for countering terrorism. To have

³⁶¹ "Formålet var at etablere en basis for en bedre dialog med landene i Mellemøsten og Nordafrika og dermed at bidrage med støtte til udvikling af demokratiske og økonomiske reformer ... [I]nitiativet kommer til at fokusere langt mere på støtte til de kræfter, som ønsker at udvikle frie medier, fri kommunikation, spredning af oplysning og viden. En oplyst befolkning har bedre mulighed for selvstændig stillingtagen og dermed for at vælge. Viden er magt, og derfor er adgang til viden de arabiske befolkningers hovednøgle til at vælge demokrati og dialog frem for diktatur og vold." (MP Christmas-Møller, con., F45, 206.05.24 17:30).
someone accept invitations to be included, however, it is seen as decisive that they do not feel patronized.

The domestically focused government action plan to counter terrorism proposes the establishment of a “Dialogue forum against militant extremism” (Ministeriet 2008:34; Government 2009:17; italics added) – that is, it invites partners who are free to engage in a partnership with an obligation to the predetermined goal defined by the partnership: "The aim of the effort is ... to promote the understanding of the partners in dialogue that countering violent radicalization is a common interest and a common responsibility." (Ministeriet 2008:34-5)

But securing the inclusion of someone who is currently reacting to perceived exclusion by further self-exclusion is not easy: One means to the implementation of dialogical inclusion envisioned is the establishment of community centres. A central argument for basing these centres in public libraries is that "they are physically located locally where the young are, and ... they are offered openly without presenting themselves as a social service or inferring with the dignity of the receiver." (2008:37)

In parallel, the authorities need to downplay authoritative encompassment and upgrade understanding and respect to invite for inclusion:

The police needs to an even higher degree than today to focus on understanding culture [to facilitate t]he police’s dialogue with young people – not least young

362 "Målene for indsatsen er at ... fremme dialogpartnernes forståelse af, at imødegåelse af voldelig radikalisering er en fælles interesse og et fælles ansvar." (Ministeriet 2008:34f)

363 "[M]edborgercentre"; literally: co-citizen centres.

364 "[F]ysisk befinner sig lokalt, hvor de unge er, samt at de er åbne tilbud, der ikke fremtræder som et tilbud fra de sociale myndigheder eller antaster modtagerens værdighed." (Ministeriet 2008:37)
Danes with a pluricultural background - [which] is of essential significance for a respectful and trustful relation (2008:39).  

Similarly, the policy of including Middle Eastern Muslims is precarious:

Concerning the work in the Muslim world it is especially important that the effort is not perceived as ‘cultural imperialism’ and that it does not get an aura of religious missionary work. The renewal must be done in respect for local values and in a way supported by the affected populations. Only in that way is there a prospect for its success. (Regeringen 2003:16)

Hence, Denmark does not insist on neither the point of departure, the point of arrival, nor the route in between – only the general direction and overall intention needs to be right: ”There is no single recipe for democratic development... The starting points as well as the outcomes of every process of development will always be those of each of the nations involved." (Ministry 2005:4)

In sum, we need in a non-authoritative and non-coercive way to invite partners to freely engage – as far, as much, and as deep, as they want to – in their own obligation to the project to liberate themselves.

But how is the invitation to inclusion of difference envisaged to be issued without authority and coercion? Firstly, domestically there is a need for an instant performance of the inclusion of difference; a celebration which in itself performs the inclusion: ”A visible campaign will be carried out celebrating democratic cohesion,

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365 "Politiet bør ... i endnu større omfang end i dag have fokus på kultur-forståelse [...for at facilitetere] Politiets dialog med de unge – ikke mindst unge danskere med flerkulturel baggrund – [som] er af væsentlig betydning for et respektfuldt og tillidsfuldt forhold" (Ministeriet 2008:39).

diversity as well as the common and mutual responsibility for a good society with opportunities for all and respect for the individual." (Government 2009:16; cf. Ministeriet 2008:36)

But, secondly, more important are the long time performative mechanism of individuals who "experience positive fellowship" (2009:19) and therefore "feel that democracy offers them opportunities, responsibility and recognition" (2009:11). The result is that they "acquire democratic competencies" (2009:19) including "the ability to partake in democratic processes and to resolve problems through dialogue as well as respect for the views of others and knowledge of other cultures" (2009:17). Among the specific sites of learning are civil society associations (2009:19), student’s councils (Ministeriet 2008:40f), public housing resident democracy (Government 2009:22), and even “practical lessons in local democracy in prisons” (2009:23).

Similarly in the international efforts, the very process of dialogue itself is seen as a mechanism of inclusion; not only inclusion in a practical community of interaction but also inclusion in the set of values which is to frame the partnership:

The government’s overall goal ... is to support reforms and progress in the Arab countries ... and promote political dialogue between parties in these countries and Denmark. These two objectives are seen as two sides of the same coin. ... This implies that the vast majority of activities under the programme will be developed and carried out in partnerships between Danish and Arab organisations [...] since partnerships between Danish organizations and institutions ... and their Arab counterparts ... leads to natural dialogue on questions of reform (Ministry 2005:7, 9).  

367 Two specific examples are exchange of students, research cooperation, exchange of curricula, etc., between universities and co-production and exchange between journalists (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:23).
So the word ‘dialogue’ may mean an invitation to inclusion through experiencing participation. It is a delicate task to formulate such an invitation, since it needs to downplay the very hierarchical relation involved in Our supplying the goal, terms and resources for the relationship. Nevertheless, the point of a dialogue-as-inclusion is not to facilitate interchange between two independent entities. Rather it is to facilitate the inclusion of the other in the self (at least as certain diacritica are concerned). This concept of dialogue is illustrated in figure 8.9.

![Figure 8.9 Dialogue as inclusion](image)

However, as the quote above continues; The Arab Initiative includes a different kind of projects as well: "[D]ialogue projects proper are to diminish clashes of opinion and create contacts across divisions which would not necessarily have been crossed otherwise." (Ministry 2005:9; underlining added)³⁶⁸ This ‘dialogue proper’ involves two-way interchange between different entities. Dialogue as a two-way interchange implies Our need to listen to what the other say, even if it was originally intended that

³⁶⁸ The Danish text has “bryde meningsmodsætninger [literally: break contrasts of opinion]” where the English text has "diminish clashes of opinion" which could imply a policy of inclusion rather than one of interchange (Udenrigsministeriet 2005:9).
we should do the talking. This concept of dialogue is illustrated in figure 8.10 and is the focus for the next subsection.

![Figure 8.10 Dialogue as two-way interchange](image)

**8.3.3 Dialogue as Interchange: the need to listen to have counterparts**

In the evaluation of the Arab Initiative, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes “the proper intention of dialogue [as]: mutual exchange of experience and broadened horizons on both sides” (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:10; italics added) – e.g. a two-way interchange between different entities. This definition occurs in the text presented to parliament, however, only in passing. It occurs as a justification for what in the text appears to be an unforeseen need for self-development on the part of the Danish NGOs as part of the process of establishing partnerships: "[M]any of the Danish organizations have had to learn and conclude their own experiences during the cooperation with the Arab partner." (2006:10)\(^{369}\) The MFA in parallel recollects from a survey of Middle Eastern perceptions of Denmark in the aftermath of the Cartoon

\(^{369}\) "[M]ange af de danske organisationer har skullet lære og drage egne erfaringer under samarbejdet med deres arabiske partnere" (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:10).
affairs "an expressed wish for a dialogue in which there is a true reciprocity ... in which both parties as a point of departure recognize the existence of differences and show a will also to relate to the problems of ones own society." (2006:13)\textsuperscript{370}

These examples testify to the force of the very word ‘dialogue’: If you invite some other to a dialogue, you run the risk that they demand it to be a two-way interaction. And if you engage in a two-way interaction by not only speaking but also listening, you might meet demands for your self-reform – even if the aim of your invitation was the reform of the other.\textsuperscript{371}

In domestic policies of integration, the need to listen as part of a policy of dialogue is, i.a., negotiated through the handling of alleged discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities. A report from a government think tank on integration is instructive in how charges of discrimination have been constructed as \textit{not} worth listening to: Firstly, “\textit{the actual discrimination}” is next to impossible to measure. Secondly, while “\textit{the perceived discrimination}” may be an actual “barrier against important aspects of integration” this perceived discrimination is, however, “subjective” and, hence,

\textsuperscript{370} "[E]t udtrykt ønske om dialog, hvor der er en ægte gensidighed ... hvor begge parter i udgangspunktet anerkender eksistensen af forskelle samt udviser en vilje til også at forholde sig til problemerne i ens eget samfund." (Udenrigsinisteriet 2006:13).

\textsuperscript{371} Marie Koch Wegter, who has hands-on experience with the Arab Initiative from her work in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intimates to me that the Initiative was always so performed in the Middle East (personal communication, 2009.10.05). The analytical strategy of the dissertation gives me no basis for judging in that question. The analysis of the dissertation pertains to how parliamentary debates and government texts referred to in these debates constructs the interactional grammar and policy narratives. When presented to parliament, the government formulated narratives of a primarily one-way project for Their reform with the pre-defined aim of countering terrorism. Hence the need to explicitly describe how it – post-Carricatures – is not so, \textit{and} to present it in a way which conveys the impression that it is not \textit{so anymore}.\textsuperscript{370}
“reservations need to be made” to reports of it (Ministeriet 2006:12, 13, 93; italics in original).\(^{372}\)

In the early days after the present liberal/conservative government came into office, the worry that discrimination might hinder labour market integration was indeed primary to the Minister of Employment:

we have difficulties listening to people who do not speak proper Danish, i.e. standard Danish. We are not tolerant towards anything else than fluent Danish. ... We have to consider if our habitual thinking [on what constitutes perfect Danish] stands in the way for getting a share of the new-Danish manpower. (Beskæftigelsesministeren 2002)\(^{373}\)

But in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 London bombings and the 2006 Cartoon affair, the worry of discrimination and the need to listen took second place in policies of integration. A statement from the same minister dating early 2008 is exemplary. According to the minister, perceived discrimination does constitute a problem but the main mistake to be corrected is that the majority community has not been decisive in demanding cultural assimilation of minorities:

Out of misguided kindness we have for years wrapped the immigrants up in cotton wool. We have called it cultural differences and let things slide while imagining Denmark as a multicultural society. ...[Y]oung people of different ethnic background do experience discrimination. ... It is no use. Integration is a common responsibility and the trades and businesses do have part of the responsibility. ... [But] a lot of the

\(^{372}\) "[D]en faktisk diskrimination", "den oplevede diskrimination", "en barriere for ... meget vigtige aspekter af integrationen", "skal tages med forbehold" (Ministeriet 2006:12, 13, 93, italics in original).

\(^{373}\) "[L]ytte til folk, der ikke taler rigtig dansk, dvs. rigsdansk. Vi er ikke tolerante overfor andet end flydende dansk. ... Vi skal se om vanetænkning [om hvad der udgør det perfekte dansk] forhinder os i at få del i den nydanske arbejdskraft." (Beskæftigelsesministeren 2002)
integration problems are about people who have moved to Denmark but do not
engage in society. It might be about linguistic barriers but it is also about having -
and not the least about sticking to - different values and norms. ... [C]ulture and
religion may curb the daily well-being and development in the workplaces.
(Beskæftigelsesministeren 2008)\(^{374}\)

A few months later, however, the action plan to counter radicalization has as a central
point that it is "important to strengthen the efforts to counter discrimination – and to a
higher degree also concentrate the efforts towards neutralizing the diffuse sense of
discrimination apparently felt by some young people." (Ministeriet 2008:32)\(^{375}\)
The inclusion of the word ‘apparently’ in the sentence derives the listening part of
this policy of dialogue-as-interaction of some of its thrust: ‘We hear that you claim to
perceive to be discriminated. We acknowledge that this perception is a problem. But
we don’t really believe that the perception is correct.’ So the immediate solution to
this problem remains a one-way policy: “It is necessary to communicate in a more
clear way what is done and what possibilities the young people have.” (2008:32)\(^{376}\)
The very need to counter not only (hard to measure) ‘actual’ discrimination but also

\(^{374}\) "I misforstået venlighed har vi gennem mange år pakket indvandrerne ind i vat. Vi har
kaldt det kulturforskelle og har ladetstå til ud fra en forestilling om Danmark som et
multikulturelt samfund. ... [U]nge med anden etnisk baggrund oplever diskrimination. ...
Det nyttet ikke. Integration er et fælles ansvar, og virksomhederne har en del af ansvaret. ... [M]ange af integrationsproblemerne handler jo om mennesker, der er flyttet til
Danmark, men som ikke engagerer sig i samfundet. Det kan handle om sprogbarrierer, men
også om at have – og ikke mindst holde fast i – forskellige værdier og normer. ... [k]ultur og
religion kan bremse den daglige trivsel og udvikling på arbejdspladserne." (Beskæftigelsesministeren 2008).

\(^{375}\) "[V]igtigt at styrke indsatsen mod forskelsbehandling - og at man i højere grad også
sætter ind på at modvirke den diffuse følelse af forskelsbehandling, som nogle unge
tilsyneladende føler." (Ministeriet 2008:32)

\(^{376}\) "Det er nødvendigt, at det kommunikeres klarere, hvad der gøres, og hvilke muligheder
de unge har." (Ministeriet 2008:32).
(subjective) ‘perceived’ discrimination constitutes, however, an openness to listening as part of dialogue.

And more generally the action plan to counter radicalization explicitly embraces a policy of two-way dialogue between differing partners:

   The objective is to strengthen the 'disagreeing dialogue' by entering into dialogue with individuals who represent controversial views. Often, it is precisely these individuals who have the best chance of influencing the attitudes of the young people who are in a process of radicalisation, in a non-violent direction. (Government 2009:17)

But over what are we disagreeing? What kind of difference is it that we have in relation to this other; this other which We are inviting to a two-way dialogue? It is clear, that the difference of the counterpart – which is to be upheld – pertains to culture and religion: "Let us recognize that there is difference between our cultures and let us not believe that we have to remake each others. Muslims shall not be Christians and Christians shall not be Muslims." (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 18:15)377

A substantial difference of culture and religion is needed to constitute a relevant counterpart in dialogue – but it is not enough. Neither is the overall commitment to an aim of non-violent interaction in itself enough. For dialogue to be meaningful, this religio-culturally different yet non-violent counterpart needs to be ‘able to influence’ – and if it is not by itself able, we need to empower it: “the effort need to build on partnerships, competence building and strengthening the moderate and constructive

377 "Lad os erkende, at der er forskel på vores kulturer, og lad os lade være at gå rundt og tro, at vi skal lave hinanden om. Muslimer skal ikke blive kristne, og kristne skal ikke blive muslimer." (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 18:15)
forces.” (Ministeriet 2008:53) And if the counterpart is not present, we may need to constitute it:

Although many young people are active participants to democracy, there are, unfortunately, quite a few young people – especially among those with multicultural backgrounds – who do not use it or see its possibilities. The Government wishes to establish a forum for young people with different cultural backgrounds who are involved in associations or networks that are engaged in democracy, civic citizenship or intercultural activities. (Government 2009:20)

Among the functions of this network is that it should work as a "Mouthpiece for young people with pluricultural background in questions of current interest, including advice to ministries, organizations etc." (Ministeriet 2008:42)

Existing groups too may enter into partnerships to enjoy both the status as a partner in dialogue and material support:

The government ... will strengthen the dialogue with the Muslim religious communities about how extremism may be countered. Through a partnership – involving among other things advising, organizational and possibly economic support – work may be done to support those Muslim groups who want to contribute an effort against extremism and abuse of their religion. (2008:59)


379 “Talerør for unge med flerkulturel baggrund om aktuelle spørgsmål, herunder rådgivning i forhold til ministerier, organisationer m.v.” (Ministeriet 2008:42). This way of constituting counterparts is a well known strategy for the corporatist Danish state. Examples include the state initiation of the Danish Consumer Council in 1947 prompted by a need for the state to have an interest based organization to counterweigh commercial and agricultural interests.

380 “[R]egeringen vil styrke dialogen med de muslimske trossamfund om, hvordan ekstremismen kan modvirkes. Gennem et partnerskab med blandt andet rådgivning, organisiatorisk og eventuelt økonomisk støtte kan der arbejdes for at understøtte de muslimske grupper, der ønsker at yde en indsats mod ekstremisme og misbrug af deres religion.” (Ministeriet 2008:59)
There is, however, no such thing as a free lunch. The status and material support come at a price:

Danish Muslims should be assisted in the development of a code of conduct ensuring that extremist forces do not use mosques or Islamic cultural centres as a platform for spreading undemocratic views or recruiting members. (Government 2009:25)

Main priorities are that the abilities and competences of the imams shall be further developed; that mosques shall be centers which promote cohesive power, citizenship and dialogue; that there shall be responsibility and transparency; and that added access to mosques shall be given to women and youth. (Ministeriet 2008:59)

To sum up: As one of the policies to counter terrorism, the government proposes to engage non-radicalized Muslims in dialogue. As the other is engaged in dialogue, the government needs to make explicit a concept of dialogue as a two-way process; i.e. a process including listening on Our part. The government even wants to engage in ‘building’ counterparts for this dialogue. The difference of the counterparts relevant to engage in two-way dialogue, however, needs to stays within certain limits. These limits to the difference of the other engaging in dialogue – and the need to monitor the limits – are the focus for the next section.

381 In the end, there was no lunch: The proposed "support" to Muslim religious communities was in the final version of the action plan downgraded to a "dialogue" (Government 2009:25).

382 "[H]ovedprioriteter er, at imamernes evner og kompetencer skal videreudvikles; at moskéer skal være centre, der fremmer sammenhængskraft, borgerskab og dialog; at der skal være ansvarlighed og gennemsigtighed; og at der skal være øget adgang til moskéer for kvinder og unge." (Ministeriet 2008:59)
8.4 Staying in control: the need to monitor the limits of dialogue

Inviting an other into a dialogue understood as monologue is relatively harmless; the worst thing that may happen is that the other does not listen and does not reform himself. If you can ignore the resilience of the other, no harm is done. Inviting an other into a dialogue understood as inclusion or as a two-way interaction involves stakes that are immediately higher since you have awarded the other a platform to speak from: You have legitimized the interventions of the other in advance. So faced with a two-way dialogue a need arises to control the direction of the dialogue. To control the dialogue, you need to limit the agenda which is to be engaged by the other invited; you need to limit the difference of the other invited; and you need to monitor that the other stays within the limits of difference.

Concerning the agenda of the dialogue, one pitfall is that the other might ask you to re-make yourself. While the action plan suggests establishing a “contact unity for dialogue between the authorities and religious communities” the dialogue is in the same very move limited to focus on “the scope of the activities of these [communities]” (Ministeriet 2008:38). We will have a dialogue – but there is only one point on the agenda: ‘You’.

383 Such a resistance to an attempt of a one-way remaking of an other might in itself constitute a problem for the remaker, since it challenges the value of the direction of remaking; ie. the universality of the values of the Self (cf. Rumelili 2004; 2007). This lack of recognition of the self might spur re-conceptualization of the crucial elements of the self-conception (Gad 2008) – or it might provoke a regression to a policy of elimination.

384 “[E]n kontaktenhed for dialog mellem myndigheder og trossamfund om rammernefor disse virke.” (Ministeriet 2008:38). So, as a comment to the plan of action submitted to the Ministry suggests “The description of assignments of the ... contact unity concerns to a higher degree ... UninformationU rather than ... UdialogueU proper” “Beskrivelsen af opgaverne for ... kontaktenhed[en] vedrører ... i højere grad ... UoplysningU frem for ...
Controlling the agenda of dialogue by explicitly listing it in advance is one way of trying to stay in control. Another way is to limit who is invited to join the dialogue. Such a limitation is repeatedly performed in highly abstract terms invoking a heavy load of liberal, Western political philosophy. The action plan to counter radicalization says i.a.: "Our common endorsement of the fundamental values of the society – freedom, equality, and mutual responsibility for all – is ... a precondition for our differences to be able to thrive in a good way." (Ministeriet 2008:12; cf. Regeringen 2009a:4; Government 2009:17)\(^{385}\)

The Arab initiative delineates its invitation in words of similar origin:

Dialogue must build on mutual respect. Cultural and religious differences must be recognized within the framework of the universal human rights. Religious and cultural values and traditions may never serve as an excuse for depriving the individual human being of its freedom or rights. Where extremism in one way or another is placing itself in the way of democracy and respect for human rights, Denmark shall actively support the forces working for tolerance and respect for the individual human being. (Regeringen 2003:14)\(^{386}\)

Wherever exactly the limit for acceptable difference is drawn, the limit needs to be monitored – as this concerns others potentially radical, i.e., a potential existential

\(^{385}\) "Vores fælles tilslutning til samfundets grundlæggende værdier om frihed, ligeværd og gensidigt ansvar for alle er ... en forudsætning for, at vore forskelligheder kan trives på en god måde." (Ministeriet 2008:12).

threat to our identity. In the action plan to counter radicalization, the government allot some attention to this question of controlling the counterparts in dialogue. Both in relation to the Muslim Danes in general (the majority of whom are, as we may recall, “decisive allies” in the fight against terrorism), and in relation to the specific partners for specific dialogues.

In relation to young people the well established local cooperation on crime prevention involving schools, social services, and police should “raise attention to signs of radicalization ... to improve the possibilities for implementing preventive measures” (Ministeriet 2008:30) including “targeted and individual preventive talks” (Government 2009:12) to signal that we know who you are. This raised attention should be supplemented with “[m]entoring schemes focusing on young people and identity issues” equipped to “assist the young person in finding a more constructive direction in life” (Ministeriet 2008:31), and a "Network for school principals addressing democracy education and extremism" (Government 2009:18) which may be "used as an active tool, so swift reaction may be taken if radical activities should blaze up" (Ministeriet 2008:44).

Waiting for the problems to make themselves visible will, however, not do. Spot tests will have to be made:

[S]chools should prepare the students for living in a society with freedom and democracy. ... [A] report should be elaborated to form the basis for an assessment as to whether there is a need to modify the relevant independent school legislation. As part of this process, a series of inspection visits to 25 selected schools will be carried out." (Government 2009:18)

387 "[H]øjnet opmærksomhed på tegn på radikalisering ... [for] at forbedre mulighederne for iværksættelse af tidlige præventive foranstaltninger" (Ministeriet 2008:30).

The serious trouble with monitoring the limit of acceptable difference, however, is that no matter where one is looking for it, it is difficult to tell. It concerns only slight differences on the part of the other hard to tell for Us as outsiders:

to distinguish between radicalization and ordinary religious interest is difficult. ... To judge whether it is a case of violent radicalization or just political or religious interest demand such a highly specialized knowledge that it will be impossible for the individual [crime-prevention] worker to distinguish. (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11)\textsuperscript{389}

As the difference is hard to tell, the partners in partnerships and counterparts in dialogue need to make themselves transparent for monitoring.

In general, "Well organized religious communities, characterized by transparency ... may contribute positively to the Danish society." (Ministeriet 2008:38)\textsuperscript{390} The closer, the target group is to radicalization, the closer monitoring is needed of the less-than-radical other we need as a partner or counterpart in dialogue:

[A]ppointing more imams [to work in prisons] ... may contribute to countering radicalization of Muslim inmates. Imams working in prisons shall pass a thorough process of approval to secure that they have the necessary abilities in Danish language, knowledge about the Prison Service and insight in Danish societal conditions. Furthermore the imam’s opinion on the Prison Service need to be evaluated and in each case a security assessment shall be made. Clerical actions and sermons shall take place in Danish [a list of exceptions omitted -/upg]... It must be

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\textsuperscript{389} "[A]t skelne mellem radikalisering og almindelig religiøs interesse er svært ... At vurdere, om der er tale om voldelig radikalisering eller blot politisk eller religiøs interesse, kræver en så højt specialiseret viden, at det for den enkelte medarbejder vil være umuligt at skelne." (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11)

\textsuperscript{390} "Velorganiserede trossamfund, som er kendetegnet ved gennemsigtighed ... kan bidrage positivt til det danske samfund." (Ministeriet 2008:38)

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possible for the prison officers to follow every clerical action and if necessary record them, e.g. with a view to translation. (2008:52)\textsuperscript{391}

By institutionalizing a set of procedures for monitoring the limits of acceptable difference it is clear that the position of the Muslim less-than-radical other engaged in dialogue is not really a de-securitized position. The terrorist radical other is an overtly securitized figure. Concerning the less-than-radical Muslim other, the securitization is institutionalized in procedures of monitoring as a necessary supplement to the policies of inclusion and dialogue. Figure 8.11 illustrates the need to control the difference of the less-than-radical other from degenerating into radical otherness.

![Figure 8.11 The need to control the limits of difference of the less-than-radical other to allow a policy of dialogue](image)

391 "[A]tt ansætte flere imamer [i fængslerne]... kan være med til at modvirke radikalisering af muslimske indsatte. Imam, der virker i fængslerne, skal igennem en grundig godkendelsesprocedure, så det sikres, at de har de nødvendige danskfærdigheder, kendskab til Kriminalforsorgen og viden om og indsigt i danske samfundsforhold. Endvidere skal imamens holdning til Kriminalforsorgen vurderes, og der skal i hvert enkelt tilfælde foretages en egentlig sikkerhedsvurdering. Gejstlige handlinger og prædikener skal foregå på dansk [en liste af undtagelser udeladt /upg] ...Personalet i fængslerne skal have mulighed for at følge med i alle gejstlige handlinger og eventuelt optage disse, hvis det skønnes nødvendigt, eksempelvis med henblik på oversættelse." (Ministeriet 2008:52)
The next section lays out how it is necessary for the government to perform this re-
securitization. The necessity comes from the need to articulate, on the one hand, the
necessity of securing identity with, on the other hand, the possibility of dialogue with
an other potentially asking you to change.

8.5 Dialogue as Clash – Dialogue as Appendix to self-
engagement

The government articulates policies of two-way dialogue – only to supplement them
with measures to monitor the limits of the difference to be allowed in dialogue. This
articulation is part of the governments positioning of itself as the defenders of Danish
identity by reforming the other – between a right wing party doubting the possibility
of reforming the other and an opposition promoting self-reform.

The monitoring comes explicitly as an answer to Danish People’s Party:

[C]oncerning the immigrants who are to participate and co-operate in this project [the
Arab Initiative]: How do we secure that the people we are cooperating with – who
have a connection to the Middle East and who live in Denmark and who might even
be Danish citizens – are not identical with the imams who to a very high degree tore
it for Denmark [during the Cartoon Crisis]? (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24
18.25) 392

392 "[M]ed hensyn til de indvandrere, der skal deltage og medvirke i det her projekt [Det
Arabiske Initiativ]: Hvordan sikrer vi nu, at de folk, som vi samarbejder med her, der har en
forbindelse til Mellemøsten, og som bor i Danmark og måske oven i købet er danske
statsborgere, ikke er identiske med de imamer, som i høj grad ødelagde det for Danmark
[under tegningkrisen]?" (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 18.25) Aggressive
confrontation with Islamism is not the monopoly of Danish People’s Party. MP Naser
Khader, who won fame during the Cartoon Crisis, left the social liberal party to form his
own with a platform including a policy on Islamism, radical or not, which supplied the
headline “Dialogue? Stuff it! [Rend mig i dialogen]” (Khader in Johnsen 2008). After
leaving also his own splinter party behind, his tough stance has caused trouble in his new
role as spokesperson on integration policy for the conservative party which he took up by
The DPP repeatedly questions if Muslims are at all capable of reform; capable of democracy:

even if Denmark is the victim of the [Cartoon] conflict and the Arab world is the perpetrator it is us who kindly hold out our hand as an invitation to reconciliation and dialogue and we even pay for it. ... [I]t is likeable that we in the democracies ... stubbornly against all odds insist that even in the Arab countries there must be a possibility for popular rule and development. ... [T]he DPP accepts the continuation of the Arab initiative ... not the least because the government has intimated to us that ... the initiative is simultaneously of great significance for the security of Denmark. It is ... to the benefit of Denmark, that as many countries as possible become democratic countries. (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 17:10)

To support that dialogue aimed at reforming the Muslim world is a responsible counter-terrorism policy, the government works to redraw this image of a Western civilization clashing with a Muslim one into a clash between civilization (in the West and in the Muslim world) on the one side and fundamentalism on the other side:

The clash of civilizations which many fear will destroy a calm development of the world in the future is taking place right now UwithinU the Muslim civilizations where fundamentalists will damage the many good forces in the Arab world who – like we do – seek stability, security, and progress and who see it as decisive to have the countries opened up politically and economically and thereby contribute to

proposing a ban on burqas – a ban which the Minister for Justice, a co-conservative, later found unconstitutional.

393 "[S]elv om Danmark er konfliktenes offer, og den arabiske verden er gerningsmanden, er det os, der elskværdigt rækker hånden frem til forsoning og dialog og tilmed betaler. ... [D]et er sympatisk, at vi i demokratierne ... stædigt mod alle odds holder fast ved, at der selv i de arabiske lande må være en mulighed for folkestyre og udvikling. ... Dansk Folkeparti ... accepterer en fortsættelse af det arabiske initiativ ... ikke mindst, fordi regeringen har ladet os forstå, at ... initiativet samtidig [er] af stor betydning for Danmarks sikkerhed. Det er ... til Danmarks fordel, at så mange lande som muligt bliver demokratiske lande." (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 17:10; cf. MP Langballe, DPP, in Pedersen 2006)
weakening Islamism and stopping the terrorism destroying their everyday life. (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 16:30; underlining added)\(^{394}\)

But this redrawn clash is taken by the opposition as an invitation to venture into an extrapolation so that the DPP is excluded from civilization and relegated to the extremist outside:

[I]f one wants to enter into a dialogue, you may start the dialogue by throwing mud at the others and then wonder why it comes to nothing. ... I believe that the Danes to a very high degree are of the opinion that they would like to get rid of the fools – that is the ones who have organized themselves in Islamic Jihad and Hamas and the like; extremist religious groupings on the one side, and the Danish People’s Party constantly contributing such generalizations on the other side. (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24,17:15)\(^{395}\)

This postulated policy of mutual engagement between civilizational clashers may even be labelled a ‘dialogue’ on its own terms:

The Danish People’s Party and the political Islamists we see in the Middle East are feeding each other and feeding on each other and creating a confrontational dialogue

\(^{394}\) "Det civilisationernes sammenstød, som mange frygter vil ødelægge en rolig verdensudvikling i fremtiden, finder nu sted inde i de muslimske civilisationer, hvor fundamentalisterne vil skade de mange gode kræFTER i den arabiske verden, der ligesom vi ser det som afgørende at få Mellemøsten konstruktivt med i globaliseringsprocessen, og som søger stabilitet, sikkerhed og fremgang, og som også ser det som afgørende at få åbnet landene politisk og økonomisk og dermed bidrage til at svække islamismen og stoppe terrorismen, der ødelægger deres hverdag." (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 16:30; cf. MP Kofod, soc.dem, F45, 2006.05.24 17:05)

\(^{395}\) "[H]vis man vil i dialog, kan man godt starte dialogen med at svine de andre til og så undre sig over, at der ikke kommer noget ud af det. ... Jeg tror, danskerne i meget høj grad synes, at de godt snart vil være fri for tossehovederne - altså både dem, der har organiseret sig i Islamisk Jihad og Hamas og sådan noget, ekstreme religiøse grupperinger på den ene side, og så det Dansk Folkeparti, der konstant også er med til at bidrage med nogle generaliseringer på den anden side." (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24,17:15; cf. MP Kofod, soc.dem., F45, 2006.05.24 17:15; MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.2417:25)
from which ordinary people are suffering and which is damaging the attempts of other people ... to create dialogue and international [literally: inter-popular] understanding. (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:55) ⁹⁶

So to the opposition parties, the alternative is between ‘confrontational dialogue’ and ‘dialogue and understanding’. But in this alternative, the dialogue becomes an appendix to understanding – and the substance of understanding is already established. The questions to be asked of the other in dialogue are largely rhetorical: "The question is if Denmark today has at all the moral authority necessary to make a useful effort in this area." (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45) ⁹⁷

Equally, the answer of the other to come out of the dialogue is known before any dialogue is initiated: "Denmark has come out [of the Cartoon affair] with a reputation which makes it more difficult to promote some of the things related to democracy" (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24 17:40). ⁹⁸

And so it must be, if the conclusion – that We need to engage in Self-reform – is known from the beginning:

These solutions require corrections to our foreign policy; to our foreign policy alliances, and to our development aid, etc. They require real integration with real, equal opportunities when it comes to education, jobs, and housing, and hence real

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⁹⁶ "Dansk Folkeparti og de politiske islamister, vi ser i Mellemøsten, jo nærer hinanden og lever af hinanden og skaber en konfrontatorisk dialog, som går ud over almindelige mennesker, og som skader andre menneskers forsøg ... på at skabe dialog og mellemfolkelig forståelse." (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:55)

⁹⁷ "Spørgsmålet er, om Danmark overhovedet i dag har den nødvendige moralske autoritet til at kunne gøre en nyttig indsats i det område." (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45)

⁹⁸ "Danmark er kommet ud med et omdømme, med et ry, der gør det sværere at fremme nogle af de ting omkring demokrati" (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24 17:40).
and robust prospects for the future on equal footing. (MP Baastrup, F7, 18:10-15; cf. MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 17:35)\textsuperscript{399}

Implied in such a narrative is that the other may have rational grievances – even if they are echoed in the grievances voiced by the radical other. The point of this redistribution of rationality between self and other is that we may only hope to influence the other to reform himself if we do forego with an example to follow: "If our message of democratization and respect for human rights are to have any effect it is necessary that we ourselves live up to those standards – and unfortunately Denmark does not." (MP Lund, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45)\textsuperscript{400}

So in this policy promoted by the parliamentarian opposition, dialogue basically amounts to an appendix to Self-engagement.

Contrarily, if you see yourself to embody qualities which are to be protected against change, any opening to others will only compromise your identity. Even if the other whom we engage in dialogue is not the radical other; if the less-than-radical other reproduces the demands of the radical other, the result remains the same: "[T]he terror has won if [we] are not willing to do what needs to be done when terrorism and the terror networks demand. Is [the honored member] really willing to give in to

\textsuperscript{399} "De løsninger kræver ændringer i vores udenrigspolitik og udenrigspolitiske alliancer og i vores ulandsbistand m.v. De kræver reel integration med reelle, ligeværdige muligheder for uddannelse, job og bolig og dermed virkelige og håndfaste fremtidsmuligheder på lige fod." (MP Baastrup, F7, 2005.11.16, 18:10-15; cf. MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24 17:35).

\textsuperscript{400} "Hvis vores budskab om demokratisering og respekt for menneskerettighederne skal have nogen effekt, er det nødvendigt, at vi selv lever op til disse standarder, og det gør Danmark desværre ikke." (MP Lund, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45; cf. MP Helveg Pedersen, soc.lib., F45, 2006.05.24 18:00)
terrorism and let the threat of terror mean that one decline from doing something” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:40).

In this situation, dialogue must be an appendix to a different form of self-engagement; not to self-reform but to self-fortification:

We do ... not want a multicultural Denmark. We find that Danish Christianity, history, culture and conception of democracy shall be the foundation upon which Denmark rests. We need to be better at dialogue ... and in that dialogue we shall dare to say who we are. The presence of people of another ethnic background and a different religious faith shall not make us give up what is ours. (MP Hornbech, lib., F18, 2000.11.23)

As the government is not inclined to put its preferred policies of elimination, control and emancipation in question, it needs to control the limits of what input may come out of the supplementary policy of dialogue. Hence, dialogue is in parliamentary negotiations reduced to a rhetorical appendix to self-engagement either in the form of an anticipated post-scriptum legitimizing self-reform or as an occasion for self-fortification. The form of dialogue prescribed by the opposition – an anticipated post-

401 “[T]erroren har vundet, hvis [vi] ikke er villige til at gøre det, der skal gøres, når terrorismen og terrornetværkene kræver det? Er [det ærede medlem] virkelig villig til at give efter for terrorismen og lade terrortruslen betyde, at man afstår fra at gøre noget” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:40). In this quote not only this or that quality of the Self is put into question; the very capability of agency is at stake: If we listen to possible demands of an other and retract from this course of action, we will have lost the capacity to act altogether – since the same demand is also one of the demands of the radical other. (Cf. MP Langballe, DPP, US108, 2004.04.13; MfA Møller, con., US108, 2004.04.13; MP Langballe, DPP, F7, 2005.11.16, 17:40-45; MP Espersen, DPP, F7, 2005.11.16, 19:10).

402 “Vi ønsker ... ikke et multikulturelt Danmark. Vi finder, at dansk kristendom, historie og kultur og demokratiopfattelse og vore frihedsideer stadig skal være det fundament, som Danmark hviler på. Vi skal blive meget bedre til dialogen .. og i den dialog turde sige, hvem vi selv er, og efter hvilke værdier vi har indrettet samfundet. Tilstedeværelsen af mennesker med anden etnisk baggrund og anden religiøs tro skal ikke få os til at opgive vort eget.” (MP Hornbech, lib., F18, 2000.11.23)
scriptum to self-reform – does, however, uphold the structural opening to the other. Even though we have initially not waited to actually listen; if the partner in dialogue actually says something it will be difficult to decline listening. We are advocating change legitimated by Their supposed grievances – so it will be harder to ignore, should They intervene.\footnote{The MFA, on the basis of surveys in Jordan and Egypt, concedes that “the impression of Denmark has changed as a result of the [Cartoon] affair. From giving relatively positive associations to a liberal and open minded welfare society, Denmark is today closely associated with the ‘West’ under the leadership of the USA which is typically perceived to be cynical and of moral double standards.” “opfattelsen af Danmark er ændret som resultat af [tegninge]sagen. Fra at give relativt positive associationer til et liberalt og frisindet velfærdssamfund, associeres Danmark i dag tæt med det 'Vesten' under ledelse af USA, som typisk opfattes som kynisk og dobbeltmoralsk.” (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:13). The MFA’s conclusion to this problem is, however, not to choose a policy of dialogue but one of enlightenment: “It will take a sustained effort to reestablish a positive image of Denmark with a point of departure in the real [sic] Denmark as a peaceful, Scandinavian country.” "Det vil blive et langt sejt træk at reetablere et positivt image for Danmark med udgangspunkt i det reelle Danmark, som et fredeligt skandinavisk land." (2006:14). Even if the final conclusion to the analysis is that “living in strict accordance with our own principles will probably be the most efficient lever for the recovery of the trust and credibility in the cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries.” "stringent efterlevelse af vore egne principper formentlig være den mest effektive løftestang for at genvinde tillid og troværdighed i samarbejdet med de mellemøstlige lande." (2006:27), the recommendation highlighted in the executive summary is “To make an increased public diplomacy effort to communicate motives and values for the Danish engagement in the Middle East and to present the Arab Initiative as a part of a comprehensive Danish foreign policy for the Middle East which to an equal degree prioritizes the security political and socio-economic aspects.” "At der gøres en øget public diplomacy indsats for at kommunikere motiver og værdier for det danske engagement i Mellemøsten og for at præsentere Det Arabiske Initiativ som del af en samlet dansk udenrigspolitik for Mellemøsten, der i lige så høj grad prioriterer de sikkerhedspolitiske og socio-økonomiske aspekter." (2006:3).
8.6 **Conclusion: Dialogue framed by securitization**

How does the way in which Danish/Muslim relations are structured in the debates on dialogue as counter terrorism contribute to radicalization of conflict? How are the present and future relations presented and necessitated?

For the government, at the point of departure, the diacriticon for distinguishing Us from Them extends to two opposing chains of equivalence constituting an antagonism: We embody sensibility and enlightened values which are morally better than Their extremist, fundamentalist darkening. They are spread around the globe; both outside and inside Denmark – and They are threatening both Us and not-so-radical others. The radically other – the terrorist – seem beyond repair: The only option seem to be elimination or control as the terrorist is actively threatening Us determined by a set of ideas (which is, on the one hand, an ‘ideology’ but, on the other hand, has some relation to ‘religion’). Dialogue is, hence, out of the question in both ends of this relation. Therefore, when relating to the terrorist, the policy is one of Securitization: We must expel the radical other from the territory of the nation state and annihilate the radical other in the rest of the world.

The Terrorist as radical other, however, does not appear in a vacuum in the government interventions: A cast of less-than-radical others are differentially inscribed in the narrative as objects for policies supplementing the primary policy of elimination of the radical other. The diacriticon for the distinction between self and these less-than-radical others is religiously defined culture. Initially, a hierarchy is established so that elements of Their way of organizing society is valued as inferior to Ours – therefore They should become more like Us. Simultaneously, however, it is imperative not to imply a hierarchy of cultures or religions. Otherwise the invitation issued could be counterproductive. The result is somewhat tense: The diacriticon for distinction involves religion/culture – but the hierarchy is implied to be defined by a-cultural, societal organization. Physically They are both distant – in the Middle East –

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and close to Us; inside Our nation state. As fertile ground for the production of radical others – terrorists – They influence Us. They are capable of change – alas, in both directions: There is a chance that they could become (more like) Us. A radicalization to terrorism remains, however, another possibility.

The basic policy in relation to the less-than-radical others, hence, becomes one of Their reformation; i.e. a harmonization as concerns certain diacritica. It is implied that Their attitude towards Our way of doing things, is fundamentally affirmative – only their independent agency towards this goal is impeded by the radical others. Therefore the policy is one of Their engagement in Their own reformation through ‘partnerships’.

Especially when it comes to the reformation of not-that-much-less-than-radical Others, the cooperation of the somewhat-more-less-than-radical Others becomes urgent: The gap to communicate across is not as wide for Them as it is for Us. The sensitivity of communicating an absence of hierarchies, however, makes for the staging of a policy labelled 'dialogue'; a concept which is primarily employed to promote decidedly one-way harmonizing measures. At times the concept of 'dialogue' is, nevertheless, opened up to imply two-way interaction between distinct units. The opening presents itself in the text as a reluctant rejoinder to the answer of the other resisting Our negative interpellation by seeking recourse to sedimented layers of meaning related to the concept of ‘dialogue’. In that situation, it is difficult to insist on a 'dialogue' being kept one-way.

In terms of grammars the construction of both the synchronic structure and of the diachronic reconfiguration is highly complex: At one level, We stand in an Orientalist contrast to Them. At a higher level of Segmentation, however, We and the less-than-radical others are one against the radical other. At the highest level, however, We decide: Should some of Them protest against this picture, Encompassment allows Us to see that They are wrong in their self-description. So wrong that the less-than-
radical other may in the last instance be securitized if They insist on not cooperating. The ability of the grammar of Encompassment to trump any apparent equality is clear from the way that the less-than-radical others need to submit to a certain measure of monitoring to make sure that They are not radicals in disguise.

The DPP questions the capability of change of Muslim societies by seeking recourse to Orientalist tropes sedimented by an Islamology based in Christian theology. They nevertheless reluctantly accept the policy of (preferably one-way) dialogue as a means to civilizing the Muslim world.

The opposition parties aim at re-constituting the antagonism constituting the discourse by inscribing the DPP in the chain of equivalence involving the extremist other – while simultaneously de-radicalizing the Islamist other by awarding him a measure of rationality. Without explicitly assigning the government to the outside of Our identity, it is implied that Denmark under the centre-right government is ‘beside itself’. Denmark, hence, has to re-realize it’s ‘real self’ by performing a different foreign policy and a different policy of integration. By performing differently, Denmark will be able to promote humanitarian values abroad (cf. chapter 4 & 5). Hence, self-reform is a precondition for presenting a policy better able to perform Encompassment of the other.

The government parties and the DPP, on the contrary, present the suggested self-reform as a threat: Our identity – and even our very capability of agency – will be jeopardized if we accommodate Them: Even if our self-reform is an answer to the demands of less-than-radical others, the partial coincidence of these demands with the demands of the radical other (the terrorist) makes them unacceptable. The prescribed policy is another kind of self-realization: Since the real self is already present (even if threatened) the answer is a ‘self-fortification’ indicating the need for assimilation inside the nation state.
Controlled difference is needed for dialogue to be possible. Inside the nation state the degree of difference accepted is lower and the measures of control necessary higher than across the border. The potential for conflict, accordingly, is higher if the less-than-radical other insist on entering our territory – and if s/he, having entered, insist on equality disregarding cultural background. The final section 8.7 prognosticates what kind of response such a policy for future interaction may provoke.

8.7 Perspectives: Radicalizing invitations to monological dialogue

Since 9/11, the Danish government has presented narratives of elimination and control to counter terrorism – supplemented, increasingly after 7/7 and the Cartoon affairs by narratives of reform and liberation. The narratives of liberation have involved narratives of partnership and dialogue. Recently, dialogue was increasingly implied to be a two-way interchange between different and differing entities. Domestic narratives of integration have taken its point of departure in the perceived religio-cultural homogeneity of Denmark: Cultural diversity represented by Muslim migrants has been pointed out as a threat to this central element of Danish identity discourse. In this context of integration seen as one-way assimilation, a turn to dialogue could be significant.

Let us, however, turn the tables and see how the narratives of dialogue look from the perspective of the less-than-radical other: Muslims in the Middle East and in Denmark are invited to engage in a dialogue with the Danish state. Most of them will probably agree to the aim: To avert terrorism.

As you read through the invitation you have just received, you find that the agenda of the dialogue is long and detailed; that a number of the specific points of the agenda involves monologues recited by the invitor; that you are supposed to perform in specified ways before and after arriving at the table; and that a series of measures will
be taken to monitor your behaviour and utterances. You also notice that you are only invited because you are perceived to be well-connected to or at least in command of special skills allowing you to communicate with potential terrorists. Or maybe you are invited because you are seen as a potential terrorist yourself...

Would you – if identified as a Muslim – accept the invitation? Many would probably not (cf. Mach 2006:4) and there is a danger that the framing of the invitation might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy by pushing a few of the, hence, potentially-radicalized others in the wrong direction (Danish Institute for International Studies 2008:2). So in that sense, the net effect of the initiative could turn out to be negative.

Should you – as someone identified as a Muslim – accept the invitation? That is a truly difficult strategic question. On the one hand, as Judith Butler notes; if one is awarded a position "at a distance from oneself" (1997:33f) one may react using that position as a platform for speaking back; i.a. by insisting to be included (cf. 1997:91), since "it is clearly possible to speak with authority without being authorized to speak" (1997:157). On the other hand, a role awarded in a securitized narrative is particularly circumscribed: When attention is pre-focused to consider any deviation from the script for potential radicalization, creative improvisation is not easy. The crux of the matter may, however, be what happens if you do not accept the invitation for dialogue. If no one takes up the invitation issued to dialogue, the invitor needs to come up with an alternative story to explain and try to solve that problem. Such an alternative story might include a renewed invitation to dialogue revised to be more hospitable. But the way the invitor continues the narration of the relation may just as well close down even the possibility of a circumscribed dialogue. Perhaps the relevant question is if there is any other way to resist the delimitation of an identity than to insist on redrawing its limits from within (cf. Butler 1997:140).

Such a strategic consideration might conclude differently, depending on whether the invitation to dialogue is issued as part of what is sedimented as internal or external identity politics: The 2006 evaluation, adjustment and debates of the Arab Initiative resulted in slightly more weight to policies of two-way dialogue. This recalibration dominates the communication of the initiative as it was re-launched in 2009. Whether enough show up for the dialogues envisioned by the domestic invitations to make sense in the continued narrative remains to be seen. As does the government's reaction if no one shows up; whether the continuation of the narrative will be a reformulated invitation – or a different story.

The analytical design of the empirical analysis of the dissertation does not allow final judgment on whether the narratives involving one-way 'dialogues' reaches Muslims in Denmark or in the Middle East as an effective interpellation. Concerning the counter-radicalization action plan, a heated public debate among cabinet ministers left the impression that any mentioning of dialogue in the same sentence as terrorism or Islamism was controversial (cf. Hardis 2009). In terms of specific policy initiatives neither the debate among the ministers nor the consultation process changed much. But when the civil servants initial report (Ministry 2008) is compared with the final version sanctioned by the government (Government 2009), the most striking change is that it is less narrative: There is less explanation why the individual policy initiative should be promoted – less talk of what the policies should do and how they should achieve their goals. The main impression left is very abstract: that we need to involve in dialogue with Muslims to stop terror, even if some of them are controversial partners in dialogue.

Concerning the Arab Initiative, two different tracks of communication seems to become more and more distinct: On the one hand, when telling stories of how to deal with the less-than radical other (the average Middle Eastern Muslim), the Arab Initiative is presented as "demand driven" (Ministry 2008:3; italics in orig.), based on "equal partnerships" (2008:4; italics in orig.) and oriented towards the realization of goals defined by the other (on a general level as represented in the Arab Human Development Report; specifically as "formulated by Arab governments and non-governmental organisations." (2008:3) And two goals of "dialogue" and "reform" – which was in the original launch described as "two sides of the same coin" (2005:7) – is now just listed side by side. On the other hand, when telling stories about how to deal with the radical other (the terrorist), the Arab Initiative is included as a dialogical partnership ultimately contributing to the higher aim of preventing terrorism (cf. Udenrigsministeren 2008; Regeringen 2009b:31). The analytical setup of the dissertation does not allow judgment on the interpellatory effects – but in general one may (with Hajer 2009:9-10) warn against believing that the back stage of internal identity politics may be kept separate from the front stage of external identity politics.

406 As the programme is now described as having "the objective to establish a basis for improved dialogue, understanding and cooperation between the Arab region and to support existing local reform processes in the Middle East." (2008:2).

407 Even when departing solidly outside the counter terrorism framing, terrorism is difficult to keep away from entering the story (cf. Wass 2009).

408 Marie Koch Wegter (personal communication 2009.10.05; cf. fn. 371) intimates me that it does not, as mutual dialogue has been the core of the Arab Initiative in practice from the beginning. The latest evaluation (‘review’) of the Arab Initiative concludes on the basis of comparative study of Middle East reform programmes like the Arab Initiative that "The success of The Arab Initiative may, finally, be ascribed to the egalitarian approach on a series of levels." "Endelig kan DAIs succes tilskrives den ligeværdige tilgang på flere niveauer." (Skadkaer Consult 2009:30). The project comparing Middle East reform programmes focused, however, only on the programme formulations, not how the policies were practiced (cf. Schlumberger 2009).
politics. The Cartoon Crisis – including its implications for the Arab Initiative – seems to confirm the validity of this warning.410

Anyhow, if you accept your role in a narrative of a partnership – dialogical or not – aiming at your own reform, you cannot be sure that the role will be available for you. The invitation may be revoked. Chapter 9 analyses a debate over whether the invitation to Turkey to join the EU should be revoked. The debate concerns the nature of the difference of Turkey: Whether it is temporary or permanent – whether the relevant difference is religious or not.

409 The 2009 evaluation of the Arab Initiative asks the MfA to develop a more clear strategy for communicating the policies, principles and guidelines of the Initiative (Skadkaer Consult 2009:25). This might have the unfortunate effect of alienate either the Danish People's Party or potential Middle Eastern partners.

410 In the domestic context, 'speaking with two tongues' may relegate you to the position of a radical other – at least if you are a Muslim (cf. Lindeklde 2007).
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9 Will Turkey ever become European? The difficulty of deferring decision

Chapters 5 and 6 analysed debates on how and why it is a problem that Muslims are coming to and staying in Denmark. Chapters 7 and 8 analysed debates on how to deal with potential perpetrators and victims of ‘Muslim violence’. The chapters all found narratives insisting that it would be best if They become more like Us – but jumping from one diagnosis of the need for reform and one prescription of how to secure reform to another. While some voices doubted that Their reform is possible at all. This final analytical chapter analyses a debate on exactly this: Whether the reform of a Muslim other is possible.

9.1 Introduction: Muslimizing by pre-emption

This chapter analyses debates on Turkish membership in the Danish parliament, Folketinget. The fundamental agreement in parliament is that Turkey is different. The central disagreement concerns the temporalization of the difference; whether Turkey is temporarily backward or permanently different. Turkey is constructed as different from Europe in two ways: either as irreparably different or as potentially

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411 The material analyzed was selected by asking the search engine on the web page of the Danish parliament, Folketinget, to report all plenary session negotiations combining words including ‘tyrki*’, ‘eu*’ and ‘medlem*’ (i.e. ‘Turk*’, ‘Eu*’ and ‘member*’) before 1 January 2007. The subject was featured in a number of parliamentary debates, most prominently in the debates on proposed parliamentary resolutions specifically focusing on Turkish membership of the EU (B 175 in May 2004; B17 in October 2004; and B34 in February 2007) all tabled by Danish People’s Party, but the subject also surfaced in a number of general EU debates (F7 in November 2000; F21 in January 2001; F37 in February 2003, B24 in April 2004; F39 and F40 in March 2004; L137 in April 2005; L26 in October 2006) and on the occasion of the prime minister’s annual ‘state of the realm’ address (R1 in October 2003; October 2004; and October 2005). The full list of debates is included in the references section below. A number of quotes from politicians originating in other parliamentary material or reported by newspapers – and explicitly referred to in the parliamentary debates reported by the search – have been included.
capable of concluding a process of civilization; capable of by becoming identical. Between these two narratives the government is working to carve out a middle ground by insisting on a strategic inconclusiveness: It is to remain an open question whether or not Turkey is endowed with the capacity to change sufficiently to allow accession. Only in this way may the government today articulate both culturalist domestic sceptics and European norms of ‘culture blindness’ without risking inconsistency when finally, some day, having to conclude.

The insistent inconclusiveness is, however, pre-empted by a demand put to the government to be consistent in relation to Turkey; consistent in relation to Turkey as yet another instance of ‘Muslim relations’. The Muslim character of Turkey – and hence its otherness in relation to Europe – is implied by the selection of themes recognized as central to other debates on 'Muslim relations'. In this way, a conflictual policy for future interaction between the EU and Turkey is imposed on the Danish government.

The proceeding section 9.2 lays out how the production of national identity in the context of intertextually related self/other-discourses may be the bi-product of a specific dynamics shaping intertextuality as it unfolds in the discourse of professional politicians. A series of distinct mechanisms conspire to produce the result; a) the demand for consistency of actors makes for b) a functional role of inconclusiveness involving c) a pitfall of 'imposed consistency' which – in the debates analyzed – is actualized by d) the rhetorical device of thematic allusion to e) diacritica demarking Us from Them in different policy fields.

The first reading of the debates, therefore, focus on, firstly, the temporalization of, and secondly, the diacritica delimiting the difference between Us and Them. The following section 9.3 argues that Turkey is – in the Danish debates – not just another case of EU enlargement, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. Section 9.4 sketches the three main discourses in the Danish debate on Turkey; a ‘culturalist’ discourse
depicting Turkey as essentially different; a ‘civilizationalist’ discourse painting a picture of a Turkey capable of catching up with European standards; and an ‘official’ discourse deferring the choice between culturalism and civilizationalism.

Section 9.5 notes how official Danish discourse explicitly relates the question of Turkish EU accession causally to the integration of Muslim migrants and to global Islam. Section 9.6 points out how thematic allusions to diacritica known from discourses in these related policy fields are made in debates on Turkey in ways effectively Muslimizing Turkey.

Section 9.7 concludes by performing the second reading assessing the contribution to radicalization from the structures of the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on Muslims. The final section 9.8 prognosticates that the official discourse of inconclusiveness is being pre-empted to exclude of Turkey by allusion to cultural difference – and performs the third reading by characterizing the kind of interpellation which such a 'coded' discourse may produce.

9.2 Foreign policies producing national identities and consistent actors

If discourse is defined as regularity in the dispersion of utterances (Foucault 1972:38) a number of discourses – a number of regularities – may be analytically discerned in any material. If intertextuality means that any text, any utterance, refers to other texts, other utterances, other discourses (Kristeva 1986:36-7, 111; Todorov 1984:60; Shapiro 1989:11; Hansen 2006:56),412 intertextual relations between these various

412 Kristeva warns that “The term intertextuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources’, we prefer the term transposition because it specifies that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of ... enunciative and denotative positionality.” (Kristeva 1986:111). The ‘study of sources’ included in the analysis of this chapter purports to live up to the standards of a study in
discourses may be conceptualized in a number of different ways. If every utterance is an attempt, however ultimately impossible, to arrest the flow of meaning by establishing a specific complex of intertextual relations (cf. Kristeva 1986:41), then a central task for political analysis is to uncover the mechanisms at work in political debates (cf. Czarniawska 1998:13).

The discourses of any society are stratified into “a multitude of concrete worlds, a multitude of bounded verbal-ideological and social belief systems” (Bakhtin 1981:288). This section describes a specific dynamic shaping intertextuality in the context of two such stratifications; professional discourses and policy fields. More specifically it analyses how in the discourse of professional politicians a demand for consistency may pre-empt strategic inconclusiveness across policy fields. This observation is particularly relevant to the analytical task of the dissertation – the assessment of the contribution to radicalization from the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on Muslims – as the dynamic allows extremist voices to 'hijack' the debate in a way which imports a policy for future self/other interaction to a policy field, which is more conflictual than the alternatives left open by the inconclusiveness promoted by the central actors.

A first principle of stratification concerns the 'professional': the language of the lawyer, the doctor, the businessman, the politician ... these languages differ from each other not only in their vocabularies; they involve specific forms for manifesting intentions, forms for making conceptualizations and evaluation concrete." (1981:289)

A second principle of stratification of discourse concerns different policy fields institutionalized as part of the discourse of the professional politician: Different ministries are responsible for formulating and implementing the different bodies of transposition by showing how the intertextuality does re-articulate the positions of both Turkey and Denmark.
policies in relation to different objects of regulation and strategies of interaction, and various parliamentary committees and party speakers discuss these bodies of policies. In that sense relatively distinct policy fields are constituted in which differing narratives may be told without interfering (cf. subsection 2.3.2).

For instance, integration policies are performing the nation state in relation to the migrant other inside the state – in parallel to foreign policies performing the nation state in relation to other states outside the state. While both sets of policies perform ‘integration’ of identity in relation to something deemed ‘foreign’ to the nation state, they are nevertheless institutionally kept apart to a certain degree: Different ministries are responsible for formulating and implementing the two bodies of policies, and different parliamentary committees and party speakers are responsible for discussing the two bodies of policies. In that sense ‘foreign policy’ and ‘integration policy’ constitute two relatively distinct policy fields, in which different narratives may be told.

If, however, the two policy fields are being brought together – by the government, by the opposition in parliament, or by pressure or events external to the political scene – a dislocation may be the result (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:ch. 3; Hansen 2006:31ff). Such a destabilization may involve not just one or more of the discourses in each of the policy fields but also the subject positions of the actors voicing the discourses (cf. subsection 2.2.2).

Upholding identity – of a nation state and of a rational actor representing the nation state – involves discursive work in the form of explanation and narration, since identity as a concept imposes on itself a logic of consistency: If you want to be accepted as being identical to yourself, you need to act in a way that is accepted as ‘identical’; you need to be and talk consistently over time as well as in relation to ‘different’ issues. You need – in relation to different others – to perform a self, that may be counted as identical.
A number of audiences may judge the performance of identity and consistency: the others (states and migrants) may under specific circumstances be allowed to talk back in consequential ways (Butler 1997; Rumelili 2007; cf. ch. 2.1.1.3); in electoral democracies, the citizenry judges frequently; in parliamentary democracies the government has an immediate need for a parliamentarian majority to accept its narratives of the self/other-relations of the nation state. The analysis of this chapter focuses on this most immediate audience and how it shapes the intertextuality of government discourses in a four step dynamics.

a) The demand for consistency – i.e. regularity – posed to professional politicians

A first rule of subjectivity in modernity is the need to appear consistent; if an actor jump from discourse to discourse – if you say A the one moment and B the next – s/he will not be taken as trustworthy. Since contexts evolve it is not enough merely to re-iterate the same utterances; a measure of rationality acceptable to the audience is needed in countering new arguments, incorporating newly imported situations, problems, facts etc.

Each profession has its own institutionalized thresholds and control mechanisms for securing consistency and rationality. Bakhtin diagnoses, in a late piece from the 70ies, that "Irony has entered into all the languages of modern times ... Man in modern times does not declaim but he speaks, that is, he speaks with restrictions. Declamatory genres are essentially preserved as parodic or semi-parodic ingredients ... The uttering subjects of high declamatory genres – priests, prophets, preachers, judges, leaders, fathers-patriarchs, etc. have left life." (Bakhtin in Todorov 1984:102)

Perhaps the one ‘p-word’ left out Bakhtin’s list – politicians – have survived, if not as a novelistic character to be taken serious due to his inherent qualities then definitively as a character of social life which even the ironic academic need to take seriously due to the politicians effectiveness as an actor. We might not care if Julio Iglesias declares his love – but we need to care if George Bush declares his enmity.
The transparency secured by public access, media surveillance and party competition leads to the constantly repeated choreography of Danish parliamentary debates which makes this specific institution rather well disciplined and the demand for consistency rather high.

b) The functional role of inconclusiveness in the face of a demand for consistency

Secondly, this high demand for consistency makes certain forms of inconclusiveness functional: To be able to appear consistent in the future when dealing with issues you do not fully control, one strategy is to secure yourself a room of manoeuvre. A measure of present inconclusiveness is, hence, functional to future consistency: Saying A-or-B today leaves room for saying both A, B, A-or-B, most-likely-A etc. tomorrow without appearing inconsistent.

c) The pitfall of 'imposed consistency' when upholding inconclusiveness.

Thirdly, such inconclusiveness may, however functional it is in relation to avoiding inconsistency, involve the risk of leaving the definition of consistency in the hands of others. No utterance can explicate the total context necessary for its understanding; parts of the meaning must be inferred by the audience (Brown & Yule 1983:chs.2.1.3, 7). But when you refrain from explicating context X rather than context Y, other actors may succeed in imposing their demand for a specific consistency on you by inferring a specific context as relevant for understanding your utterance. If you have already in this other context imposed on you chosen A – then you will suddenly appear inconsistent if you now choose B.

d) The rhetorical device of ‘thematic allusion’

Finally, this pre-emption of the inconclusiveness by inferring a specific context may be achieved by a variety of rhetorical means: Neither actors in nor analysts of identity politics can once and for all develop a complete inventory of decisive discursive resources available for effective articulation in a given social context. The
intertextual presence of another discourse may range from “full presence” or “explicit dialogue” to “the most discrete allusion” in which the re-activated discourse “receives no material corroboration, and yet it is summoned forth ... because it is held available in the collective memory of a given social group.” (Todorov 1984:73) In the debates analysed, a context of 'Muslim relations' is summoned forth by allusion to themes from debates on other 'Muslim relations'.

e) The discursive figure of ‘diacritica hindering integration’

More specifically, the pre-emptive conclusion to the insistently inconclusive narrative articulated by the government is inferred by allusion to diacritica – i.e. criteria for deciding inclusion/exclusion (Barth 1969) – known from the debates on integration policy and global Islam to separate Muslims from Danes. Hence, by listing diacritica said to hinder Turkey in integrating in Europe which parallels known lists of diacritica said to hinder Muslim migrants in integrating in Denmark and the integration of global Islam in the Western world, a picture of ‘a Muslim’ is ‘summoned forth’. Turkey is in this way inferred to be yet another instance of ‘Muslim relations’ – and its integration is inferred to be yet another impossible case.

In sum, the inference of the conclusion that Turkey is irreparably different takes the form of a subtle allusion

• not by quotation ('You have acknowledged that Muslim migrants won't integrate – Turkey won't either');

• not by implication of problems by explicit assignment of qualities ('Turkey is Muslim", i.e. '...and Muslims won't integrate') (cf. Hansen 2006: 56f);

• but by the mere suggestion of themes recognizable from other debates on 'Muslim relations' ('Violence against women is a problem in Turkey'; i.e. '...as we know is always a problem with Muslims, so other known 'Muslim problems' – including Their resilience – probably also applies to Turkey').

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9.3 Not just another enlargement: Turkey as different

On the one hand, the Turkish application for membership of the European Union is handled exactly like any other membership application: according to the Copenhagen criteria and aiming at the *acquis*; i.e. the implementation of the entire body of EU legislation in the new member states. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Turkish application is *not* handled like the applications dealt with so far. The EU member states *did* unanimously agree to open accession negotiations in October 2005. But simultaneously the negotiations have renewed interest in the ‘forgotten Copenhagen criteria’; the capacity of the Union to absorb new member states.\(^{413}\) Apart from the fact that Turkey is the most populous country to apply for membership of the EU so far, the reluctance to embrace Turkish membership is most often assigned to its being ‘different’ due to its Muslim population. The way in which Denmark stands out on these two dimensions – enlargement and 'Muslim relations' – point to radically narratives on Turkish membership:

Firstly, Denmark has a decidedly pro-enlargement record (Friis 2003: 284; Schimmelfennig 2001:50; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002:51). Denmark has been promoting the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU which – along with the *acquis* – is generally conceived of as ‘culture blind’; i.e. they do not demand a specific culture as a criterion for membership. Furthermore, Denmark supported that the late Constitutional Treaty was drafted without reference to any specific religion (cf. Adler-Nissen & Knudsen 2005:212-4); likewise its resurrected incarnation, the Lisbon Treaty.

\(^{413}\) As stated in the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993: ”The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.” (European Council 1993:13).
However, the way in which the Commission develops the concept of ‘absorption capacity’ in a special report annexed to its November 2006 communication on the enlargement strategy highlights that the back door – or perhaps; the front door – is still open to cultural arguments against Turkish accession. The Commission reminds that

Democratic legitimacy is essential to the EU enlargement process. Every key decision leading to a country’s accession is taken unanimously by the democratically elected governments of the Member States and candidate countries. National parliaments ratify the decision. ... Democratic legitimacy also means a Europe which listens to the expectations of its citizens and addresses their concerns through adequate policies. For any of its policies, including enlargement, the EU has to win the support of its citizens. (Commission 2006a:23)

This, secondly, point to the relevance of the debates on Denmark’s ‘Muslim relations’ for its stance on Turkish EU membership. Since 9/11 Islam has in the Danish debate increasingly been constructed as the condensation point of cultural difference in Denmark and globally. Hence, the way in which Danish identity is constructed in relation to Muslims – Muslim migrants or Muslims in international politics – may pull the Danish narrative on Turkish EU accession towards the opposite conclusion than the one suggested by the narrative of the Danish stance to EU accession in general.

Just a quantitative glance at Danish debates makes it clear that Turkey is not seen as a simple continuation of the 2004 enlargements: It has spurred far more debate than any other applicant country. The Danish parliament only began debating Turkish

\[414\] Cf. chapters 1, 4 & 5.

\[415\] The search engine Infomedia.dk covering all Danish print media reports more articles on Turkey than the sum of articles mentioning Ukrainian, Albanian, Bosnian, Macedonian, and first in line Croatian EU membership, both in 2004-6 and in 1996-2006. Furthermore, the
EU membership in 2002 – after the events of 11 September 2001 and in the immediate shadow of the final negotiations of the Eastern enlargement during the Danish presidency.416

A qualitative analysis of the debates show that the common basis for any Danish discourse on the topic is that Turkey is different from Europe in a way which makes Turkish accession a problem. As stated by the present prime minister: "[I]t is clear that Turkey is a society which is substantially different from the traditional European societies." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., US27, 2002.11.20 12:20)417

Actually, the only statement in the material analyzed that comes close to denying difference between Turkey and Europe is uttered by a rather marginal figure in Danish politics, Peter Brixtofte, a former mayor of suburban Farum for the liberal government party who was ousted for corruption charges, but who has – as one of the still standing positive achievements – a record of successfully integrating Turkish articles on Turkey are generally discussing the specific case, while the articles reported on other prospective member states often just mention the individual case as a part of a listing or brief overview of the states waiting in the accession line. (Searches combining 'tyrki*/ukrain*/alban*/bosni*/makedon*/kroat*', 'eu*' and 'medlem*'.) The Danish parliament has not had any debates on individual membership applications within the last ten years – except on Turkey's (cf. fn. 411).

Before 2002, Turkey and the EU were scarcely mentioned in the same sentence in the Folketing. Not even the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country by the European Council in Helsinki in 1999 spurred parliamentary debate (searches on www.ft.dk, cf. fn. 411). The Danish newspaper debates show the same pattern: The number of leading articles in national dailies mentioning the EU Turkey relationship was five or less p.a. in the first half of the 90ies rising to appx. 10 p.a. in the last half of the 90ies. 2001 saw just 1 (a week before 9/11); the debate only took off again in May 2002 producing in that year 41 leading articles (mostly connected to the Copenhagen enlargement summit). Since then minimum 30 articles have been published p.a. with an all time high of 89 in 2004 (most during EP election campaign or around the summit decision to open negotiations (searches on Infomedia.dk, cf. fn. 415).

"[D]et [er] klart, at Tyrkiet jo er et samfund, som er væsentlig anderledes end de traditionelle europæiske samfund" (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., US27, 2002.11.20 12:20)
immigrants in the labour market. He is furthermore known to have commercial interests in Turkey. He claimed that

Turkey is a part of Europe. It became so 80 years ago when it had a leader named Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk, father of the Turks. He introduced a modern constitution separating religion from the state – contrary to Denmark where we have a state religion. They introduced the European alphabet, women were enfranchised, and they were forbidden to wear veils in public buildings. (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00)\textsuperscript{418}

Worth noting is, firstly, that the basis for his inclusion of Turkey in Europe is its substitution of a number of cultural practices known from Danish debates on integration to be Muslim (cf. chapters 5 & 7) with 'European' practices. So a digital division between Europe and Muslim is upheld, only Turkey is allocated to the European side. Secondly, even this most inclusive voice modifies the inclusion of Turkey in Europe by implying that Turkey is not yet truly European: "80 years ago Turkey took the first step towards being a part of Europe, and now they are proceeding modernizing the legislation." (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00)\textsuperscript{419}

So the regularity in dispersion of utterances delimiting Danish political discourse on Turkey is that Turkey is different.

\textsuperscript{418} "Tyrkiet er en del af Europa. Det blev det for 80 år siden, da det havde en leder, der hed Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk, tyrkernes far. Han indførte en moderne forfatning, hvor man adskilte religionen fra staten - i modsætning til i Danmark, hvor vi har en statsreligion. Man indførte det europæiske alfabet, kvinderne fik stemmeret, og man forbød, at de kunne gå med slør i offentlige bygninger." (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00)

\textsuperscript{419} "For 80 år siden tog Tyrkiet et meget vigtigt skridt i retning af at blive en del af Europa, og nu fortsætter man med modernisering af lovgivningen." (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00)
9.4 **Absolute cultural difference, civilizational latecomer or inconclusiveness**

On the basis of the agreement that Turkey is different, three narratives separate themselves from each other by disagreeing at another level: The point of separation is what future of the difference should be projected; whether the difference is described as (1) an absolute, irreparable cultural difference between Turkey and Europe or (2) as a temporary delay of a civilizing process common to Turkey and other European countries – or (3) whether the answer to this question is to be left open.\(^{420}\)

Firstly, a *culturalist* narrative depicts Turkey as *essentially* different from Europe. Turkey, according to this discourse, is a Muslim country and whatever they do Turkey will therefore never be European: "Turkey’s culture in no way agrees with the cultures of the European peoples" (MP Kjærsgaard, DPP leader, R1, 2005.10.06 13:45).\(^{421}\)

Mostly the difference is articulated as one of 'culture' but occasionally the centrality of 'religion' (i.e. 'Islam') in this cultural argument is explicated:

> [T]he cultural aspect also gives rise to even more worry. The cooperation in the EU and the European democracies are based on the Christian values ... Even though there is in Turkey a clear division between state and religion, it may very well show itself to be unstable since forces in the country are working at weakening the division, and

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\(^{420}\) Ifversen (2005) identifies culturalism and civilizationalism as the two basic discursive modes of talking about Turkey's difference in relation to Europe in a number of Danish newspaper articles from 2004-5 on Turkish EU accession. These same two modes of discourse on Turkey are also identified in a broader European context by Rumelili (2004:44).

\(^{421}\) "Tyrkiets kultur stemmer på ingen måde overens med de europæiske folks kulturer" (MP Kjærsgaard, DPP leader, R1, 2005.10.06 13:45).
the EU cannot include a declared Islamist state rule. (MP Videbæk, Chr.dem., B175, 2004.05.19 18:25)\textsuperscript{422}

The culturalist narrative is consistently told by members of the nationalist Danish People's Party, cautiously by members of the marginal Christian democrats, and every now and then by the odd member of the government parties and the social democrats.\textsuperscript{423}

Secondly, a \textit{civilizationalist} narrative counts not a number of incompatible cultures (in the plural) but \textit{degrees of one} civilizational process. According to this narrative Turkey is an apprentice in relation to the universal values embodied by and radiating from Europe:

[T]he fact that the prospect was held out to Turkey at an earlier point in time – very long time ago, actually all the way back in the 60ies – that there might some time be negotiations with them, and that we have from the 90ies seriously said to Turkey that if they fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, democracy, human rights and economic development, then we will be prepared to give a date for the start of negotiations; this fact has had a huge positive effect in Turkey ... We have as Europeans a unique chance to support and strengthen this development (MP Holmsgaard, SPP, B17, 2004.11.25 16:05).\textsuperscript{424}

\textsuperscript{422} "[D]et kulturelle aspekt [giver] også anledning til endnu mere bekymring. EU's samarbejde og de europæiske demokratier er baseret på de kristne værdier ... Godt nok er der i Tyrkiet en klar adskillelse mellem stat og religion, men den kan meget vel vise sig at være ustabil, idet kræfter i landet arbejder på at svække den adskillelse, og EU vil ikke kunne rumme et erklæret islamisk statsstyre." (MP Videbæk, Chr.dem., B175, 2004.05.19 18:25)


\textsuperscript{424} "[D]et, at man på et tidligere tidspunkt, faktisk meget langt tilbage, helt tilbage i 1960'erne, begyndte at stille Tyrkiet i udsigt, at man måske på et tidspunkt kunne forhandle
The civilizationalist picture is painted by members of the centrist social liberal party and the left wing Socialist People's Party and Unity List.

Thirdly, members of the liberal and conservative government parties as well as the social democrats work to carve out the room for what could be termed an *official* narrative. This narrative has as its raison d’être to defer the answer to the question whether Turkey is irrevocably culturally other or a civilizational latecomer. On the one hand, this third narrative articulates more nakedly what the two first narrative have in common: It states that (present day) Turkey is different from Europe. On the other hand, it differs on the temporalization of the difference: It insists on leaving open whether Turkey is doomed to stay different or Turkey may become European at a later point in time:

[T]he answer is, if one asks if the Turkey we know today may become a member of the EU, a very clear answer: No, the Turkey we know today cannot. The next question one may pose is: Well, can Turkey in 15-20 years become member of the EU? To that question one has to answer that no one today is in a position to say anything about that because it depends entirely on what will happen in the course of the 10, 15, 20 years, how ever long time it may take. One need to realize that if

\[\text{med dem, og det, at man så for alvor fra 1990'erne har sagt til Tyrkiet, at hvis de opfylder Københavnskriterierne, demokrati, menneskerettigheder og økonomisk udvikling, så vil vi være indstillet på at give en startdato for, hvornår vi kan påbegynde forhandlingerne, har haft en meget stor positiv effekt i Tyrkiet ... Vi har som europæere en enestående mulighed for at understøtte og styrke denne her udvikling} \] (MP Holmsgaard, SPP, B17, 2004.11.25 16:05)

\[\text{425 Bliddal & Larsen (2006) labels this third discourse 'official scepticism'. In addition to the three discourses mentioned so far they identify in Austrian and Danish parliamentarian and media debates a fourth (pointing out Turkey as a threat to the integration process of Europe by widening beyond the scope of deepening) and a fifth (depicting Turkey as a necessary element in the completion of the multiculturalist project of Europe). These two discourses are only marginally represented in Danish discourse (2006:73, 81) and scarcely in Danish parliamentary discourse, since the discourses which they need to resonate (Euro-federalism and Multiculturalism) are very seldom met in Denmark (cf. Hansen 2002 and chapter 5 respectively).} \]
Turkey at some point in time gets closer to being qualified for membership of the EU it is because Turkey have in the meantime introduced 80,000 pages of EU legislation in its national legislation and we will, hence, in any case be speaking of an entirely different Turkey than the one we know today. It will, if I may say so, be a European Turkey. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2005.10.06, 19:50-19:55)426

To sum up: The official narrative on Turkey is that ‘we’ – Denmark, the EU and the West – should do everything in our power to let civilization reach Turkey; but in the end, Turkey may turn out culturally Other anyway. The conclusion is, when talking of Turkey, decidedly left open. This inconclusiveness makes it possible for the government to keep open the possibility of adjusting to whatever decision taken by the EU member states in relation to Turkey without being judged to be inconsistent and in the mean time not provoke a sceptic electorate and its voice in parliament; the DPP on which the government relies for its parliamentary majority.

9.5 Relating Turkey to Muslim migrants and global Islam

Section 9.4 laid out how the official Danish narrative on Turkey in relation to the EU stays clear of deciding whether Turkey is permanently culturally other or a civilizational latecomer. This section and the following section 9.6 take its departure in the way in which official narratives on integration of migrants and global Islam have to a greater degree made that choice concerning Muslims in general. This

section describes how the question of Turkey’s integration in Europe is explicitly constructed as related to these narratives, while section 9.6 shows how the three relations – Denmark/migrants, Europe/Turkey, and The West/Islam – are inferred to be varieties of the same species.

If, when reading official discourse, you look for utterances explicitly referring to Turkey as Muslim or to its difference as being of an absolute cultural or religious quality, you do not find many. Before taking office, however, the future prime minister was quoted: "I cannot imagine Turkey being a member of the EU. Politically, economically and culturally it would be a strange bird in the cooperation, and a Turkish membership could make the cooperation unstable." (future PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2000:227)

As prime minister he – with the responsibilities of the office – assumed the official discourse of wait-and-see: "[S]ince Turkey had become a candidate country it should of course be treated as every other candidate country." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353)


428 "[N]år Tyrkiet nu engang var et kandidatland, skulle det naturligvis behandles som alle andre kandidatlande" (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353). Bliddal & Larsen (2006) notes the change of wording between the two editions of the biography of the prime minister as a 'change of conviction'. The change has been noted in the debate as well, leading a culturalist to make this more general comment: "Well, there has been a tendency for politicians in opposition – broadly, in other EU member states as well – to agree that Turkish EU membership was not such a good idea, and that therefore you've talked about perhaps even 50 years out in the future etc., but as soon as you're in government, you get a different opinion; then it's the new politicians in opposition who are sceptic." "Altså der har været en tendens til, at oppositionspolitikere sådan bredt også i andre EU-lande har været enige om, at det ikke var så god en idé med tyrkisk EU-medlemskab, og at man derfor har snakket om måske endda 50 år frem i tiden osv., men når man så kommer på regeringsbenkene, får man en anden opfattelse, så er det de nye oppositionspolitikere, der er skeptiske." (MP Dahl, DPP, F21, 2003.01.08 16:25). In the 2009 EP elections campaign,
He did, however, give the official narrative a decidedly culturalist twist as he explained his stance during the 2002 EU enlargement summit in Copenhagen:

[T]he EU had in 1999 decided that Turkey should be a candidate country. My view was that – given that this decision was taken – it could have damaging political consequences in Turkey if one were suddenly to change that. My fear was that it could prepare the ground for extremist Islamist forces in Turkey. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353)429

In this way the geopolitical position of Turkey is read through the lenses of a global conflict between the West and Islam:

[W]e need to have a discussion of security politics and we need to include a security political aspect in the question. Because I would rather not that Turkey turns to another part of the world, turns to Islam, once again turns to sharia legislation, at a

MP B. Bendtsen took up the Culturalist narrative – after leaving the conservative party chair and the position as vice-premier minister.

429 "EU [havde] i 1999 besluttet, at Tyrkiet skulle være et kandidatland. Min opfattelse var, at når først den beslutning var truffet, kunne det få skadelige politiske virkninger i Tyrkiet, hvis man pludselig ændrede på det. Min frygt var, at det kunne skabe grobund for ekstremistiske islamiske kræfter i Tyrkiet." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353). Bliddal & Larsen (2006) notes the change of wording between the two editions of the biography of the prime minister as a 'change of conviction'. The change has been noted in the debate as well, leading a culturalist to make this more general comment: "Well, there has been a tendency for politicians in opposition – broadly, in other EU member states as well – to agree that Turkish EU membership was not such a good idea, and that therefore you've talked about perhaps even 50 years out in the future etc., but as soon as you're in government, you get a different opinion; then it's the new politicians in opposition who are sceptic." "Altså der har været en tendens til, at oppositionspolitikere sådan bredt også i andre EU-lande har været enige om, at det ikke var så god en idé med tyrkisk EU-medlemskab, og at man derfor har snakket om måske endda 50 år frem i tiden osv., men når man så kommer på regeringsbenkene, får man en anden opfattelse, så er det de nye oppositionspolitikere, der er skeptiske." (MP Dahl, DPP, F21, 2003.01.08 16:25). In the 2009 EP elections campaign, MP B. Bendtsen took up the Culturalist narrative – after leaving the conservative party chair and the position as vice-premier minister.
point in time where Turkey has after all gotten so far, as it has. (MP Rohde, lib., F18, 2005.06.15 10:30-10:35)\textsuperscript{430}

So according to the official narrative it was in fact the Muslim element of Turkish identity which constituted the reason for \textit{negotiating}. But this does emphatically \textit{not} equal a reason for actually \textit{letting} Turkey \textit{in} the EU.

Like the relations of the Western world to global Islam, the policy field of integrating Muslim migrants in Denmark is explicitly linked to the question of Turkish accession to the EU: "It will be harder to solve the problems related to integration [of migrants] in Denmark", if the strict Danish regulation of family reunification is undermined by Turkish EU-citizens being allowed to move freely across the borders. (former PM P.N. Rasmussen, soc.dem., in Ulrichsen 2004)\textsuperscript{431}

Even for some proponents of Turkish EU membership, the prospect of changing Turkey entirely before its accession is the only way to get rid of this threat of Turkish immigration:

If we see a well functioning and economically far more well situated country in 20 years, or how long we should be talking of, it is exactly a question if there is such a great reason for worrying if a lot of Turks will come to the other European countries. I think it might be an unfounded worry ... There might even be Turks here in Denmark who chose to go home because they may suddenly see a sensible

\textsuperscript{430} "Vi er også nødt til at have en sikkerhedspolitisk diskussion og et sikkerhedspolitisk aspekt med ind i det her. For jeg vil nødigt se et Tyrkiet, som vender sig til den anden del af verden, vender sig til islam, igen vender sig til sharialovgivning, nu hvor Tyrkiet trods alt er nået så langt, som det er." (MP Rohde, lib., F18, 2005.06.15 10:30-10:35). Further examples include PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., US27, 2002.11.20 12:20.

\textsuperscript{431} "[H]vis de stramme danske familiesammenføringsregler bliver undermineret af tyrkiske EU-borgere, der frit kan bevæge sig over landegrænserne. "Så bliver det sværere at løse integrationsproblemerne i Danmark" frygter Poul Nyrop Rasmussen" (former PM P.N. Rasmussen, soc.dem., paraphrased and quoted in Ulrichsen 2004).
So, potential Turkish integration in the EU is explicitly said to be of consequence both to the relationship of the West to the Muslim world and to the integration of migrants in Denmark. In that sense the policy fields are articulated by a narrative of causality. Section 9.6, however, discerns a more subtle intertextual articulation of the narratives.

### 9.6 Muslimizing Turkey

As described in section 9.4 and 9.5, the official Danish narrative insists on not deciding whether it is possible for Turkey to integrate in Europe, while explicitly linking the question to questions of integration of Muslim migrants in Denmark and the relations between Islam and the West. This section shows how the inconclusiveness concerning Turkey’s capability of change is pre-empted by thematic allusion to diacritica which excludes Muslims from integration: The Muslim world from integration in the Western world, and Muslim migrants from integration in Denmark. These three questions are inferred to be varieties of the same species.

By pointing out the Muslim as different, Danish identity is constructed as pertaining exactly to what distinguishes Us from Them. In that sense, when Muslims – incarnated in migrants to Denmark and in global Islam – are said to be different, a series of diacritica are in the same movement constructed as key constitutive features of Denmark. This section describes how differences are constructed in relation to,

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432 “Hvis vi ser et velfungerende og økonomisk langt mere velsitueret land om 20 år, eller hvor meget vi nu taler om, er det netop et spørgsmål, om der er så stor grund til bekymring for, om der kommer en hel masse tyrker til de andre europæiske lande. Jeg tror, det måske er en ubegrundet bekymring ... Der vil måske endda være nogle tyrker her i Danmark, som vælger at rejse hjem, fordi de pludselig kan se, at der er en fornuftig økonomisk og politisk udvikling i deres oprindelige hjemland” (MP Antonsen, lib., B175, 2004.05.19 17:45).
firstly, Denmark’s basic mode of collective identification; secondly, its basic form of social interaction; thirdly, its basic form of social organisation; and fourthly, its basic mode of knowledge production. By thematic allusion Turkey is implied to relate to Europe in parallel ways – the relation being another instance of ‘Muslim relations’. Official discourse, however, does not accept the parallel to include a fifth difference in relation to the basic form of rationality of government.

A first difference of the Muslim is said to pertain to the basic mode of collective identification. Since Grundtvig – a 19th century vicar who became the leading figure of Danish nation building – the Danish nation has been conceived of as a folk, a people which has during centuries organically constituted itself based on a linguistic community. In our post-Babel predicament, according to Grundtvig, the only way to be human is the national way (Lundgren-Nielsen 1992: 96ff). The Grundtvigian concept of nationally boxed folkelighed is re-produced in contrast to the universality of the ummah which in the depictions of Islam is said to command primary allegiance.

Muslim immigrants and refugees do, however – according to the Danish Alien Act expressing official discourse – have a “potential for integration” in the Danish society and nation state. But as they do not necessarily have the impulse to realise the potential by themselves, the Danish authorities need – on behalf of Denmark – by a number of measures to discipline the strangers to do so.433

This diacriticon – the lack of will to integrate – may in the debate on Turkey be recognized in the description of the cause that is pointed out behind the slow speed of the civilization process: "Turkey will not be a member of the EU. And this is how it should be as long as the progress is so limited. I simply cannot imagine that the rest

433 Cf. chapters 5 & 6.
of us should go as far – and relax our demands so considerably – as Turkey demands.” (MEP Riis-Jørgensen, lib., 2006)

The reason that the negotiations drag out is – according to the liberal MEP – that 'Turkey demand' a 'relaxation of the demands' concerning human rights. This only makes sense if Turkey is seen not to share the same values as the EU; they adhere to different values. So the reason why civilization does not work is that their values are essentially not the same as ours. The contrast to the description of the new East and Central European member states is stark; they were presented as Europeans – eager to re-integrate; their Europeannes only temporarily suppressed for 40 years of Soviet rule. Turkey – like the Muslim migrants in Denmark – lack the impulse to integrate.

A second difference of the Muslim is said to pertain to the basic form of social organisation. Hal Koch, a Grundtvigian theologian, described in a prominent Danish theory of democracy (1945) an egalitarian democracy as not just a form of governance but a way of life (cf. Mouritsen 2006:81; chapter 5); a concept that was – contrasted by the German occupation of WWII – immediately understood to be specifically Danish.

The Danish egalitarianism is re-produced in contrast to the patriarchalism said to be inherent in Islam hindering equality in gender and generational relations (Wren 2001:147-8). In Denmark the headscarf of ‘the Muslim woman’ – an object spurring the most diverse debates in many European countries including Turkey (cf. Göle 2006:250) – are mainly discussed on the premises that freedom means that the

434 "Tyrkiet kommer ikke med i EU. Og det skal heller ikke kunne lade sig gøre, så længe fremskridtene ikke er større. Det er simpelthen urealistisk at forestille sig, at vi andre skal strække os så langt og lempe vores krav så betragteligt, som Tyrkiet kræver det." (MEP Riis-Jørgensen, lib., 2006)

435 Along with issues like female sexual mutilation, differentiated education of boys and girls and details of everyday life like whether shower curtains should be provided for kids to screen off their nudity while showering after phys. ed.
individual has a duty to be free from certain cultural traditions rather than the freedom of the individual from interference by the majority or the state. The same Muslim patriarchalism is said to deprive children of autonomy in relation to their parents who arrange or force marriages and ‘re-education journeys’ to the homeland of the parents upon their children (Mouritsen 2006: 86; chapters 5 & 7). In addition to being contrary to Danish egalitarianism these ‘Muslim’ practices are said to counteract integration respectively by repeatedly importing un-acculturated youth for marriage and refreshing alien culture in the youth brought up in Denmark and, hence, supposed to be integrating.

The very invocation of this complex of problems frames Turkey as Muslim: "[I] see huge problems in relation to the dominant conception of the female sex in Turkey." (MP Christmas-Møller, con., R1, 2004.10.07 19:30)

A third difference of the Muslim is – immediately related to the difference in the basic form of social organisation – said to pertain to the basic form of social interaction. It concerns the way problems and disagreements between majority and minorities are said to be dealt with by Us and Them respectively (cf. chapter 8). The purported absoluteness of Islam is said to cause that Muslims are prone to fight and kill both Us and each other. When a religion is based on an absolute truth, there is, according to this narrative, no possibility of compromise – unlike when as in Christianity contradiction and negotiation is inscribed directly in the scripture (through the Gospel being told differently by four evangelists). This in turn


437 Examples referring to generational conflicts include former PM P.N. Rasmussen, soc.dem., in Ulrichsen 2004.

438 Even proponents of integration – of Muslims in the Danish society and of Turkey in Europe – submit to the normative primacy of Christianity on this point: “[I]t is in a sense correct that it is an anomaly to speak of Christian fundamentalists.” "[D]et er for så vidt
explains why They needed to seek asylum here in the first place and/or why their countries are so poor that they want to move here (cf. Hervik 2004:254; Langballe in Pedersen 2006).

The way Turkey is dealing with its Kurdish minority (which double as a Kurdish-Turkish minority in Denmark) is mainly brought up by the right wing and left wing opposition parties. Whatever the exact occasions for speaking of ethnic minorities in relation to Turkey, the effected connotations are negative – both in relation to internal Turkish matters and to the relationship between Denmark and Turkey: They are – unlike Us but like other Muslims – not able to settle their differences through peaceful compromising:

According to [Turkish prime minister] Erdogan this broadcaster [ROJ TV, broadcasting out of Copenhagen] is controlled by the Kurdish PKK movement and encourage terror ... [T]he Turkish embassy here in this city has asked the police to investigate the matter. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S968, 2005.11.23 13:05)439

A fourth difference of the Muslim is said to pertain to the basic mode of knowledge production. During the Cartoon Crisis, freedom of speech was by the Danish government epitomized as unlimited especially in relation to religiously legitimized practices and prohibitions.440


440 Cf. Mouritsen (2006:87); Hedetoft (2006b:1-2); (2006a:413); Wren (2001:157) and chapters 5 & 7. Even though Danish law includes regulation of both blasphemy and hate speech (Mouritsen 2006:70), and even though the unlimited freedom seems only to apply to Danes advocating unlimited freedom and practice of speech: attempts – especially from Muslim groups – to question the legitimacy of legal limits or the appropriateness of any
Occasion was also found to make this point in relation to Turkey:

I do not find that it was wise, the démarche by the 11 ambassadors [of Muslim countries in relation to the caricatures of the prophet Muhammed published by Jyllands-Posten], and I would like to add that I especially find that the Turkish ambassador should have reflected twice taking into consideration that Turkey is applying for membership of the EU. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S492, 2005.11.02 13:25)\(^441\)

Other complexes of infringements of the freedom of speech were discussed within the framework of the debate on Turkish membership; the conclusion, however, was clear on both Danish identity and Turkish otherness: "We have in this country one hundred percent respect for freedom of the press and for freedom of speech, and I have made it clear that this must apply to Turkey as well." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S968, 2005.11.23 13:05)\(^442\)

So even when a specific Turkish infringement of the freedom of expression pertains in no way to Islam – but i.a., as in this quote, to alleged questioning of national unity – the occasion is taken to articulate a difference between Denmark and Turkey. A difference which by the very articulation to the question of freedom of expression is

particular exercise of the right of expression are constructed as attacks on (the first-class Danish version of the universally good of) liberal democracy as such (Wren 2001:157; Lindekilde 2007).

\(^{441}\) "Jeg synes ikke, det var en klog henvendelse, de 11 ambassadører [fra muslimske lande i forbindelse med de karikaturer, Jyllands-Posten trykte af profeten Muhammed] kom med, og jeg vil også gerne sige, at jeg ikke mindst synes, at den tyrkiske ambassadør måske skulle have tænkt sig om to gange i betragtning af, at Tyrkiet er ansøgerland til at blive medlem af EU." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S492, 2005.11.02 13:25).

\(^{442}\) "Her i landet har vi hundrede procent respekt for pressefriheden og for ytringsfriheden, og jeg har gjort klart, at det også må gælde for Tyrkiet." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S968, 2005.11.23 13:05)
connected to the Cartoon Crisis and, thereby, inscribes the Turkish side – qua infringing – as Muslim.\footnote{Further examples include – in relation to the Cartoon Crisis - MFA Møller, con., in European Affairs Committee 2006:2, 4-5; and in relation to article 301 of the Turkish penal code; PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S493, 2005.11.02 13:30.}

At one point in the debates on Turkish EU membership, however, the government resists the construction of an excluding diacriticon. In discourses on other 'Muslim relations' a special organization of the relation between politics and religion is presented as necessary for Danish identity as a democracy: A strict division between a personal realm of faith organized by the Church and a realm of societal interaction regulated by the state is claimed to be necessary for liberal democracy to flourish. Even Lutheran Christianity needs to be kept on track by a state church (cf. Mouritsen 2006:79-80; Sheikh & Wæver 2005:29-33). Islam, contrarily, is presented as a law-based religion without any secular division between private affairs and politics (Mouritsen 2006:70-1, 80, 82; Hedetoft 2006b:1; Hervik 2004:254). Muslims, hence, are different in relation to the basic form of rationality of government in Denmark (cf. chapter 5).

Given that it is accepted by official discourse that a religiously defined culture is part of the problem with Turkey, it comes – especially when bearing in mind this particular Danish construction of secularism – as no surprise that culturalists propose a radical othering of Muslim Turkey by implying that a Muslim population needs a harsh military disciplining to keep up democratic appearances:

> [W]e must count ourselves lucky that the military still has a good deal of influence in Turkey, for if it did not ... it would amount to us having a fundamentalist state today. … [T]he popular masses [folkedyb] are, and will probably stay for centuries to come, of a Muslim and fundamentalist mentality. Does [the honoured member] really think
that you may in the course of the next, say, 15-20 years rip the religious soul out of such a huge population? (MP Langballe, DPP, B17, 2004.11.25 15:30)

The speaker for the government party, however, rebuffs the suggestion that military repression is needed to keep Islam in its place: "I believe that one may be a Muslim without being a fundamentalist. ... I simply do not understand how it is possible to sit as a politician in a Danish parliament and say that the only way to uphold democracy is by the power of the military." (MP Antonsen, lib., B17, 2004.11.25 15:30)

A possibility for the radicalization of Turkey is, however, implied to be inherent in its Muslim identity:

[W]hat we do in any case risk by excluding the Turks; by saying: 'You do not belong here with us', is that they turn to Islam. So they will turn to fundamentalism, since we will be showing them that there is no hope for them in a democratic, in a Western world, and that is incredibly dangerous. (MP Rohde, lib., R1, 2004.10.07, 15:15)

Proponents of integration -- of immigrants in Denmark and of Turkey in Europe -- do protest against the way Islam, migrants and security concerns are articulated as parallel: “It is of historical importance that Turkey may now open the negotiations on its accession which have been prepared for 40 years. ... Despite difference, despite religion, democratic principles are valid for the community which the EU is. ... We know that forces in Denmark and in the Folketing want to hinder this development. Some members of the Folketing are
The explicit framework of reference for the critical attitude to Turkey in the official Danish discourse remains the Copenhagen Criteria and the EU acquis. But even so, the specific points of contention listed when debating are all repetitions from discourses othering Muslims domestically or in global affairs. The way in which a negative conclusion is argued is illustrated in the comments by a liberal MEP who took the 2006 Commission progress report on the accession process as the occasion to deflect from supporting Turkish membership:

First of all there are marked lacks in relation to freedom of religion and speech in Turkey, i.a. in relation to article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code which prohibits utterances critical of the Turkish state. An article which the EU countries have – out of consideration for the freedom of speech – in no uncertain terms called on the Turkish government to change. Without success, however. Lately, the Turkish prime minister, Erdogan has refused to meet the pope, as Erdogan was supposedly of the opinion that the pope had spoken out as a critic of Islam. That did not fall on fertile Turkish ground. Examples like these make it difficult to see a community of values between the member states of the EU and the Turkish state at the moment. The other main problem concerns human rights. Violence against women seems, among other things, to be an area in which the launch of a crackdown is needed. In addition one still hears a lot of complaints about torture in Turkish prisons and especially of the building an image of an enemy of human beings in the Danish society and in Europe by derogatory and insulting terms of abuse aimed, among others, at Muslims. ... These are forces which are contributing to making integration a very, very difficult cause, also in the Danish society.”

"Det er af historisk betydning, at Tyrkiet nu kan indlede de optagelsesforhandlinger, som der er gået 40 års forberedelser forud for. ... Uanset forskellighed, uanset religion, gælder de demokratiske principper for det fællesskab, som EU er. ... Vi ved godt, at der er kræfter i Danmark og i Folketinget, der vil forhindre den udvikling. Nogle medlemmer af Folketinget skaber et fjendebillede af mennesker i det danske samfund og i Europa ved nedsættende og forhåndende ringeagtsytringer, bl.a. om muslimer. ... Det er kræfter, der er med til at gøre integrationen også i det danske samfund til en meget, meget vanskelig sag" (MP Jelved, soc.lib. leader, R1, 2005.10.06 16:05-16:25). Further examples include MP Arnold, soc.lib., B17, 2004.11.25 16:25-16:30; MP Auken, soc.dem., L26, 2006.10.10 14:20.
difficulties of the Kurdish minority. Human rights seem at times to be a vague concept in Turkish terminology. That is a problem since human rights are not an area where we can or will compromise. Third comes the case of the divided Cyprus. (Riis-Jørgensen 2006) 

Of a choice of basic elements of democracy, political rights are featured – not civil-military relations or independence of the judiciary. Of a choice of political rights, freedom of religion and speech is highlighted – and they are highlighted in connection with each other so that the freedom of speech problematics involves religion as in the Cartoon Crisis, which a Danish audience would have fresh in memory. The religious group whose freedoms are implied as infringed is Christian – not for instance the Alevi. Of a choice of infringements of individual and collective rights, the rights of women – known from the Danish debate on immigrants to be an issue with Muslims – is featured before i.a. torture and the rights of the Kurdish minority. Cyprus – which was the formally most problematic element in the Commission report and caused the subsequent partial freeze of the negotiations between the EU and Turkey – is downgraded to third place. In sum; the issue of

Turkish EU membership is inferred to be an instance of Our relation to Muslims by the listing of ‘problems which hinder Muslims from integrating’.

To sum up: On the one hand, the ‘Muslim framing’ of Turkey does not bring with it all potential negative connotations into official discourse: Even though culturalists attempt to rule out democracy in Turkey due to its Muslim population, these associations are not accepted by official discourse. That Turkey is different is, on the other hand, never questioned – and that the difference pertains to its Muslim population is implied by thematic allusion to excluding diacritica known from debates on the integration of Muslim migrants and the relations between the West and Islam.

9.7 Conclusion: Pre-empted by allusion to diacritica for exclusion

So what are the contributions to radicalization of conflict from the way in which Turkey's possible EU accession is debated? How are the present and future relations presented and necessitated?

A Culturalist narrative presents the diacritic for distinguishing Us from Them to be one of religiously defined culture; They are Muslims and We are Secularised Christians. At least in Europe, Our culture is better than Theirs. They should, hence, stay outside Europe and not intrude on Us. If They do not stay outside, They will influence Us in a negative way – we know that from history. And They seem (as long as They are Muslims) not to be able to change. Their posture towards our way of doing things is supposedly negative. The basic grammar is Orientalist: Their integration in the EU irrespective of Their cultural difference is projected as an oughtnotology as it constitutes a radical threat to Our identity. Necessity is installed in the narrative by recourse to elements sedimented by an Islamology based in Lutheran theology.
A Civilizationist narrative presents the diacriticon as one of degree of civilization or modernization: They have not come as far as Us – and in that sense they are inferior to Us: The inferiority is, hence, not essential to Them. Quite the contrary; They are known to have undergone an impressive development. Provided that They continue this civilizing process, They will end up being (like) Us. And Their inclusion may even be beneficial to us. Their posture in relation to Us is generally affirmative – as they choose Europeanization – and They are presented as open to dialogue as a means to acquiring the traits pointed out to constitute modernity. The need for our own dialogicality is less pronounced, since We and They supposedly agree on the goal (i.e., Their reform) – and since we have already reached this goal. The policy for future interaction presented by Civilizationalist discourse is, thus, basically one of Encompassment with a goal of establishing a future grammar of Segmentation (according to which They may be a member state within the EU on a par with others). The narrative is invested with necessity by recourse to an idea of European superiority sedimented by Enlightenment philosophy.

As a third option, an official narrative of inconclusiveness refuses to decide on the question of Their capability of change. By implication the narrative also refuses to decide on the character of the difference and the determinant of the agency of the other (is it only a question of modernization or is there an underlying difference of culture determining both the stage of modernization and the possibility of agency?). The possibility of dialogue is insistently kept open – and in a sense the stakes are higher than in the Civilizationalist narrative since the possibility of a difference not to be overcome is kept open. The narrative, hence, at the face of it poses the two basic grammars of Orientalism and Encompassment as alternatives of equal plausibility. This construction, however, is dependent on avoiding the decision on the historicity of the other. The discourse – defined by the regularity in dispersion of utterances
consisting in the insistence on indecision – will break down at the moment of decision.\[448\]

However, decision – and, hence, the termination of the narrative of inconclusiveness – is sought pre-empted by seeking recourse to other narratives on Muslim relations – specifically narratives on the integration of Muslim migrants in Denmark and the integration of the Muslim World in the West. In these narratives the diacritica – basic mode of collective identification (We are national - They are religious universalists); basic form of social interaction (Our egalitarianism vs. Their patriarchalism); basic form of social organisation (Our consensus-seeking vs. Their conflict-generating absolutism); basic mode of knowledge production (Our freedom of expression vs. Their religious taboos) – are via culture tied to religion. Recourse is, hence, indirectly sought to elements sedimented by theologically based Islamology. And as Their religion is – in the parallel discourse on integration of migrants – implied to be a structural determinant of individual agency, there is no capability of change (save the unlikely conversion or the almost as unlikely secularization).

The main line of defence for the narrative of inconclusiveness when faced with this attempt at pre-emption is paradoxical: It claims that since They are at the risk of self-radicalization, we need to keep insisting that the option of civilization is not precluded. But since They are at the risk of self-radicalization, we need also to keep insisting that the process of civilization is not completed. In effect, the prospect of

\[448\] A supplementary rhetorical strategy consists in seeking recourse to formality; i.e. the fact that a formal invitation has been awarded to Turkey, and that we have to stay true to this commitment. This strategy is truly supplementary: On the one hand, it completes the narrative of why we have to insist: because otherwise the EU would live up to its own norms – and Europe needs to be trustworthy in prioritizing words over swords, because that is Europe's main attraction (cf. Manners 2002). On the other hand, the very explication of this argument devalues the central part of the narrative: That We and They agree on Us helping Them successfully. If things were just evolving smoothly in that direction, there would be no need for promises; everyone would just agree.
Their self-radicalization reaffirms the Culturalist discourse in claiming that They constitute a threat. The role presented to the Turkish other is one of prolonged – perhaps eternal – apprenticeship under tight supervision (concerning the direction) and monitoring (for digressions).

To sum up: The debates were structured as an exchange between a Civilizationalist narrative prognosticating Turkish assimilation to European standards and a Culturalist narrative prognosticating the permanence of Turkish difference. The aim of the government interventions seem to be to uphold a position deferring the choice between these two narratives. The point that Turkey presently is different from Europe is, however, beyond dispute. The official deferral of the decision on the permanence of Turkish difference was, however, pre-empted by pointing out that Turkey suffers from a series of 'Muslim problems'. As a result, the policy for future interaction presented to Turkey is a choice between conversion, exclusion or prolonged apprenticeship.

9.8 Perspectives: The deferred mis-interpellation of coded discourse

Official Danish discourse on Turkish EU membership – adhered to by a broad parliamentary majority – explicitly insist on not concluding whether Turkey is capable of overcoming its difference by civilizing itself. The question of Turkish EU-membership is, however, explicitly constructed as having implications for two instances of ‘Muslim relations’; the integration of Muslim migrants in Denmark and the relations of global Islam to the Western world. And the question of Turkish EU-membership is itself implicitly framed as yet another instance of Muslim relations by thematic allusion to diacritica known in other policy fields to exclude Muslims.

Turkish EU membership, hence, risks ending up as ‘collateral damage’ of identity politics originating in other policy fields. The damage done to Turkish EU-
membership is ‘collateral’ in two ways. First, the main target for othering is not ‘Turkey’ but ‘Muslims’. The allusion to diacritica excluding Turkey as ‘Muslim’ implies that Turkey will – regardless of any progress on the ground measured by Copenhagen criteria or acquis standards – be ‘guilty by association’: By association to Muslim immigrants presented to be a problem for Denmark (cf. Jung 2005:8; and chapters 5 & 6). And by association to a picture of Islam constructed to serve Christian theological purposes (cf. Simonsen 2006:ch. 8; Said 2002:ch.1.III & 3.III; chapter 6).

Second, the exclusion of Turkey-as-Muslim is collateral in the sense that it is not necessarily intended by the representatives for the government parties. It might be so; we have no way of knowing the true intentions of individual actors. But this way of framing Turkey might as well be a structural consequence of a dynamics that shapes the way intertextuality works in professional political discourse: The government parties need to appear as consistent actors. To prepare for being consistent tomorrow in relation to different possible conclusions, a measure of inconclusiveness today is functional. Upholding inconclusiveness implies, however, the risk of pre-emption: a specific consistency might be constructed for you to adhere to. When you imply Islam to be decisive in determining the agency – or at least the propensity – of Muslims in some policy fields, then why not in when considering Turkey?

After all,

The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker populates it ... And not all words for just anyone submit equally easily to this appropriation ...: many words stubbornly resist ...; they cannot be assimilated into his context and fall out of it ... Language is ... populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of others. (Bakhtin 1981:293-4)

Therefore, "Instead of the virginal fullness of an inexhaustible object, the prose writer is faced with a multiplicity of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the...

When speaking of Turkey in a Danish context, words like ‘freedom of speech’, ‘violence’, ‘minority’, ‘women’, ‘migration’, ‘integration’, and ‘secularism’ are not at the free disposal of the government (or of the opposition, or of representatives for Turkey, for that matter). These words resonate with meanings induced into them by other speakers – or by the same speakers in debates in ‘different’ policy fields. And when debating Turkey, the sound which they resonate is that of the Muslim Other.

The option remains, however, that the effective Muslimization of Turkey corresponds to the intentions of the proponents of the official narrative even if they explicitly insist on inconclusion. If so, the rhetorical strategy described as 'thematic allusion' equals what Wodak (2007) discusses as a 'coding' of discourse: the deliberate construction of a system of ambiguous pseudonyms to stand in for forbidden articulations.

'Coded' discourse is intended not to interpellate outsiders: it is intended to work on a select audience. Coded discourse might even be intended to reinforce this audience as a separate identity by means of the selection performed by the subtlety. Chandler describes – in relation to commercial communication – a kind of intertextuality employed which may serve as an example:

In order to make sense of many contemporary advertisements (notably cigarette ads such as for Silk Cut) one needs to be familiar with others in the same series. Expectations are established by reference to one’s previous experience in looking at related advertisements. …Instant identification of the appropriate interpretative code serves to identify the interpreter of the advertisement as a member of an exclusive club (2001:200).

In identity politics such a subtly coded discourse furthermore isolates from critique from outside the interpretative community – either because the coding is so
impenetrable that it precludes the outsiders from getting the message, or because the coding makes the message formally acceptable even if it carries connotations which are unacceptable (Wodak 2007; cf. Solomos & Back 1995). As outsiders penetrate the code – and perhaps persecute or prosecute the coder – new codes may be introduced, and the analyst may find himself pursuing a moving linguistic target.

Therefore, a coded discourse produces an interpellation which is difficult to counter – first and foremost because it is elusive. If the code is broken by an unprepared outsider, it most probably happens gradually. It does not – as mis-interpellation would in its standard version – say 'Come here' only to say 'Piss off', when you come (cf. section 2.4). Rather it says 'Come here' while it simultaneously mumbles 'Piss off' – and if you react by asking 'Err, what were you mumbling?' the reply would be 'What? Nothing, nothing at all'. At first, the interpellatory effect may be the unease produced by the doubt whether one really heard something or one was hallucinating. Later, if the mumbling continues, one probably gets the message and the result is mis-interpellation.

This chapter completes the analytical part of the dissertation. What remains is to conclude on the theoretical, empirical and strategic contributions of the dissertation.
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15 April 2003, 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) reading of B24 (Act on more openness in the Folketing’s dealing with EU matters) (10:30-10:50)

23 April 2003, debate on S2881 (Question regarding the breach of confidence by the prime minister) (15:15-15:20)

23 April 2003, debate on S2882 (Question regarding the knowledge of the foreign minister) (15:20-15:25)

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\(^{449}\) Links only included when quotes from the debates are included in the text of the chapter.
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Other empirical material


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10 Conclusion: Dangers of difference – dangers of making difference go away

This chapter concludes the dissertation in three steps:

Section 10.1 concludes the dissertation's engagement with the philosophical and theoretical problematiques central to its analytical strategy: Firstly, the conversation between social constructivists and poststructuralists on the ontological status of the other in the relational construction of identity. Secondly, how various policies for relating to the other contribute to radicalization of conflict between self and other. It does so by recollecting the marks left on the philosophical positions and theories engaged by the strategic work (in chapters 2 and 3) to prepare the theories for the analysis.

Section 10.2 concludes the empirical analysis by answering the research question of the dissertation: The Danish narratives of Muslim relations involve a series of conflictual interpellations which contributes to radicalization. The conclusion is reached by recollecting and combining the second and third readings of the selected Danish debates on Muslims to characterize their contribution to radicalization of conflict. The section, firstly, summarizes how the narratives involved in the Danish debates construct the present, future and necessary relations between the Danish self and the Muslim other. Secondly, the section notes a couple of important dynamics of internal Danish identity political negotiations: the difficulty of staying in the middle of the road – and a draft towards Culturalism. Finally, the section characterizes the interpellation of the other which these narratives and debates perform in conjunction.

Finally, section 10.3 engages in critical self-evaluation by discussing the strategic risks and benefits of the analysis performed.
10.1 Theoretical implications

Chapter 1 placed the dissertation within two problematiques extending beyond the specific empirical analysis – a philosophical and a theoretical one:

Firstly, the dissertation placed itself within a conversation between – or among – social constructivists and poststructuralists on the ontological status of the other in the relational construction of identity: The position of the dissertation has been that any diagnosis of an identity political situation should be able to account for the triple function of the other in relation to identity: the other is the constitutive outside to identity; the other is a character of the cast of identity narratives; and the other is co-authoring the continuation of the narratives. Especially when the aim of the study is to assess contributions to radicalization of conflict, none of these relations may be left out of focus.

Secondly, the dissertation has investigated theoretically how various policies for relating to the other contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other. The dissertation intervened by circumscribing a range of 'grammatical' policies for relating to the other; policies which envision a future interaction involving the other – and three distinct realms of anti-grammatical policies; policies which envision no future interaction between two distinct entities.

This section concludes the engagement by summarizing how the ontological and theoretical discussions have contributed to the central philosophical positions and theoretical debates engaged. Subsection 10.1.1 accounts for the position of the dissertation in relation to the concept of identity. Subsection 10.1.2 does the same in relation to the concept of discourse and the structure/agency dilemma. Subsection 10.1.3 summarizes how the dissertation conceptualized the temporality of policy narratives to prepare for analysis. Subsection 10.1.4 recollects the intervention of the dissertation in the way foreign policy is analyzed as performative identity discourse. Finally, subsection 10.1.5 represents the central, original theoretical contribution of
the dissertation: The typology of policies for relating to the other in grammatical and anti-grammatical ways.

10.1.1 Identity as configuration: the triple function of the other

When accounting for the ontology to be observed, the dissertation (in the opening lines of chapter 2) took its point of departure in the existence of difference and conflict – and that identity is something which needs to be produced on the background of difference. When dealing with this production, the dissertation noted the critique of the proliferation of the concept of identity within the social sciences (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). As a response, the dissertation proposed a more nuanced conceptual apparatus to do the analytical work assigned to the concept of identity: Inspired by Elias (2000[1968]) and Buzan & Wæver (2009) the analytical focus was on an identity configuration as a set of relations between relations. Specifically, an identity configuration – as defined by the dissertation – consists of a) the constitutive and narrative relations between identity and difference; b) the forging of these relations by continued narration and by the constitution of new narratives; and c) the political relations between the narratives promoted by various identities. This conceptualization makes for an analysis of the triple function of the other in identity discourse (summarized in section 2.4): Firstly, the difference of the other is constitutive to identity. Secondly, the other is awarded a role in the cast of characters of the narratives explaining the difference. Finally, the other co-starring the identity narratives is endowed with agency and a capacity to co-author the continuation of the narrative.

10.1.2 Reconstructing discourse theory: agency, diverting the political, narrative as differential inscription

When approaching the structure/agency dilemma, the dissertation took its point of departure in the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe (1985; 2002; Laclau 1990).
Both the reduction of the subject to subject position (1985) and the Lacanian reduction of the subject to a lack (1990; Laclau & Zac 1994) was found analytically unhelpful. As an alternative inspired by Butler's speech act theory (1997) and discourse psychology (Potter & Wetherell 2001) the subject was partially resurrected. Not as a sovereign subject, but as a more complex relation between, on the one hand, discursive structures facing the subject in the form of expectations and accept of others, and, on the other hand, a will to perform identity acceptably consistent (section 2.2).

This move, however, partly disables one of the two essentialist 'motors' which keeps Laclau & Mouffe's discursive universes from coalescing: The will to order inherent in the subject's everpresent search for identity. In parallel, the dissertation disabled the other essentialist 'motor': the omnipresence of dislocation. Inspired by Barth (1969) and Frello (2005) the dissertation insists that segmentation and ambiguity may be functional for discourse in ways which effectively postpone dislocation (subsection 2.3.2).

Taken together, these two modifications detract from the parsimony of the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe – to the benefit of analytical purchase: When theoretically allowing for a bit more stability of context and strategic subjectivity, it is possible to analytically focus on what does work when agents attempt to use language strategically stead of philosophically insisting that it does not work. In other words, the dissertation follows Neumann's call that "Having bettered constructivism in killing off the sovereign subject, poststructuralist analyses should nonetheless be able to account for the subjects that are still there." (1999:209)

To account analytically for these resilient subjects the dissertation (in section 2.1.2) followed up on the call of Howarth to combine discourse theory with narrative theory (2005:346): Narrative, the dissertation suggests, is a specific discursive form – a regularity in the dispersion of utterances – which consist in the articulation of a series
of events setting the scene for a cast of characters endowed with at least some capability of agency (cf. Ricœur 1988). The narrative form, then, is one way of specifying what is underspecified in the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe: narrative is one way in which elements may be inscribed in discourse as yet another orderly difference rather than a radically threatening one. And narrative is not just any way of specifying what differential inscription may mean: It is a specification which accounts for 'the subjects that are still there' even if no longer sovereign.

10.1.3 The temporality of policy narratives: focusing analysis on the present articulation

Turning to policy analysis, the dissertation (subsection 2.1.4) found a need to specify the distinct temporality of policy narratives. Policies concern the future. More than that, policies involve choice between a number of futures: oughtologies worth achieving and oughtnotologies to be avoided. Combining elements from Heidegger's, Ricœur's, and Koselleck's philosophies of time the dissertation defines a policy narrative as the positioning of the narrator in a present by articulating, firstly, the past as a space of experience organized to point as a cause to the present ontology; and secondly, the future as an implicit or explicit choice between specific projections onto the horizon of expectations. The analytical task of policy analysis, the dissertation proposes, must be to focus on the articulatory operation. In that sense, the present politics is awarded analytical primacy over the past and the future.

10.1.4 Foreign policy: Focusing analysis on interpellation

Turning to the specific empirical focus of the dissertation – self/other policy narratives – the dissertation followed Neumann's call for focusing analysis on interpellation.

450 In that sense, narrative seem to be a discursive form cutting across what Glynos & Howarth discuss as three types of logic involved in social science explanation; social, political and phantasmatic logics (2007:ch.5)
identification not just "as an affair between a subject and an order, [...but] as an affair between a subject and an other." (1999:208) It did so by importing the concept of grammars for future interaction from Anthropology (Baumann & Gingrich 2004) into the tradition in International Relations for studying foreign policy as performative identity discourse.451 In the context of the analytical framework proposed by the dissertation the concept of grammars focuses analytical attention on the way in which specific self/other policy narratives invites (or does not invite) the other to co-narrate the continuation of the narrative (subsections 3.1.2-3). Various forms of such infelicitous interpellations may – as noted by Butler (1997) and discussed by Hage (2008) – set off various forms of conflictual dynamics to shape the future of the relation (subsection 3.3.2).

10.1.5 Grammatical policies – anti-grammar as radicalization of conflict

The central, original theoretical contribution of the dissertation pertains to a problematique, acute to social sciences from political theory via International Relations to Sociology and Anthropology: how various policies for relating to the other contribute to radicalization of conflict between self and other. On the basis of three basic grammars for future interaction between self and other, distilled from social analysis by Baumann & Gingrich, the dissertation constructs a typology of policies for relating to the other (subsection 3.1.4). Furthermore, the dissertation develops a criterion for what would count as radicalization of conflict related to the basic grammars (subsections 2.3.3, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4):

The first of the three basic grammars, *Orientalism*, mirrors self and other: What is good in the one is bad in the other and vice versa. This grammar depends on a policy of *distinguishing* between self and other – and it breaks down in case of *hybridity*. Self may then give in to hybridity by pursuing a policy of *indifference* – or self may attempt to save purity by a policy of *assimilation*. The second grammar, *Encompassment*, insist on subsuming the other. This grammar depends on a policy of *acting on behalf* of the other – and it breaks down in case of *paralysis*. Two reactions to paralysis present themselves: Self may give in to a *self-forgetting love* or seek part in the other's overwhelming capacity for agency by *self-assimilation*. The third grammar, *Segmentation*, flexibly allocates identity and alterity by fusing and distinguishing between comprehensive and particular identities. This grammar depends on *the production of knowledge* of self and other – and it breaks down in case of *urgency*. To save knowledge production from urgency, a paradoxical reaction may be *securitizing* the other who provokes the urgency – or self may jump right to a policy aiming to end the relation by *physically eliminating* the other.\(^{452}\)

As the point where each of the grammars breaks down is specified, a range of 'grammatical' policies for relating to the other is delimited from three distinct realms of anti-grammatical policies.) *Inside* this limit, the policies imply futures in which self and other are engaged in some sort of more or less conflictual interchange (be it a monologue, a dialogue or an agonistic struggle).

A narrative prescribing a policy *outside* the limit of grammar implies a future with no interaction involving an other distinct from the self. Such an anti-grammatical policy may imply an immediate radicalization of conflict (as implied in physical elimination). Or it may interpellate in a way which invites a reaction that in turn

\(^{452}\) For an overview; cf. figure 3.16.
radicalizes the continuation of the narrative (i.a., if the other insist on difference – or hybridity – in the face of a demand for assimilation).

The limit grammar/anti-grammar may – developed in this way as a limit between policies for the future relation – serve as a specification of the limit between agonistic and antagonistic relations which Mouffe seeks to develop (2002; 2005). It may in parallel serve as a specification of the limit between conflict resolution (aiming to end the conflictual relation) and conflict management (involving the preservation of the relation, only preferably as a less destructive conflict) inconsistently sketched by Galtung (1978; 1996).

10.2 Diagnosing the present – projecting the future

The philosophical repositioning and the theoretical interventions of chapters 2 and 3 (summarized in section 10.1) allowed the analytical intervention in the empirical problematique of the dissertation – present Danish debates on how to conduct Muslim relations – in chapters 5 through 9.

This section concludes the empirical analysis by answering the research question posed in chapter 1. The conclusion takes the form of a recollection and combination of the second and third readings of the selected Danish debates on Muslims. First, subsection 10.2.1 summarize the present, necessary, and future relations between the Danish self and the Muslim other according to the narratives involved in the Danish debates. Then subsection 10.2.2 notes a couple of important dynamics of internal Danish identity political negotiations. Subsection 10.2.3 characterizes the interpellation of the other which these narratives and debates perform in conjunction. Finally, subsection 10.2.4 sums up the answer to the research question by
characterizing the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on how to relate to Muslims.  

10.2.1 The present, necessary and future relations presented by Danish narratives on Muslims

On the one hand, it is not always the Muslim difference which appears as the most crucial difference in Danish debates on Muslims. One example is that when debating access to Denmark – to Danish territory and to the Danish welfare society – citizenship is the first relevant diacriticon (ch. 6). Another example is how territorial presence may make a difference between life and death in the context of counterterrorism; if you are deemed a terrorist in Denmark, you may end up in jail – if you are deemed a terrorist 'out there, in the world', you may be hunted down and killed (ch. 8). A third example is that when debating integration, having a job was for a time promoted as the decisive criterion of success (ch. 5). Finally, when applying for membership of the EU, the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis lists lots of demands to live up to – without ever mentioning culture or religion (ch. 9).

On the other hand, the Muslim difference does make a difference in all the debates analyzed. Only it differs from debate to debate what kind of difference the Muslim difference makes; it differs whether the difference is explicitly or implicitly Muslim; and it differs whether there is agreement that the Muslim difference should make a difference: In the debates on access to Denmark (ch. 6 & 7) the non-citizens turn Muslim as soon as the reasons for limiting their mobility across the border are explicated: We need to stop Them from performing a series of 'Muslim practices' – at least They should not be allowed to perform them in Denmark. In the evolving government narratives on integration (ch. 5), cultural and religious difference is

453 The research design of the dissertation does not allow generalization neither to other Danish debates on Muslims than the ones analysed nor beyond the Danish debates.
gradually awarded a more prominent role as something which need to disappear or at least become less pronounced. The necessity of making cultural difference disappear or at least smaller is installed by presenting the difference as a threat; to the peaceful society, to welfare, to Danish culture and values. It is clear from the specific practices which must be integrated away – and from the articulation to terrorism – that the cultural difference is constructed as Muslim. As the Muslim difference is articulated to terrorism, it is doubtful if any difference may remain without being narrated as potentially posing a threat (ch. 8). And as the difference is Muslim, it is doubtful if it will go away – because as Muslims, so the story goes, They are guided by Islam to stay different (ch. 9).

The general thrust of Danish narratives on Muslims seems to be that They ought to become like Us: It would be better, if They were like Us. If They do not reform to become like Us – if they will not or if they cannot – Their difference constitutes a threat to Us. More or less severe; more or less urgent (ch. 5, 6, 7 & 8). So if Their difference is permanent, They should be monitored or kept out. Also 'out there', however, it would be better if They were like Us – even if the task of reforming the other out there seems more difficult and less urgent than at home (ch. 5, 8 & 9).

The Danish People's Party explicitly promotes the security narratives, i.e. narratives involving existential threats to revered referent-objects and extraordinary means to averting the threats (ch. 6, 7, 8 & 9). The government parties generally formulate narratives of assimilating the other (in relation to certain diacritica) which does not explicitly securitize but implicitly accept the threat construction as the reason for the need to reform the other (ch. 5, 6 & 7). Or the government parties end up telling paradoxical narratives which, on the one hand, promotes policies of dialogue and explicitly attempt to de-securitize, while on the other hand uphold a security framing as the reason for de-securitizing (ch. 8 & 9). The opposition parties produce a variety of narratives – both across time and across the party spectrum: Generally, the social
liberals and the left wing parties does not take the danger or even the relevance of the Muslim difference as a point of departure (ch. 6, 7, 8 & 9) – but in some debates, the danger and relevance are not explicitly challenged either (ch. 6 & 7). The social democrats on some occasions (primarily when debating domestic politics) joined the government (ch. 6 & 7) – on other occasions they followed the other opposition parties (ch. 8 & 9).

### 10.2.2 Dynamics of internal Danish politics of 'Muslim relations'

Concerning the dynamics of internal Danish politics of 'Muslim relations', a first observation to be made is that it is difficult to uphold a position 'in the middle of the road'.\(^{454}\) The difficulty, however, presents itself in very different ways in the debates analysed: When the government attempts to carve out a space for a narrative of integration between Culturalism and Multiculturalism (ch. 5), the narratives, over time, end up talking culture anyway. When debating the human rights of migrants and refugees (ch. 6), the government – and to an even larger degree, the social democrats – place themselves under serious constrains by insisting on the compatibility of international norm abidance and the legal reforms aiming to limit the influx of aliens. When debating refuge for persecuted writers (ch. 7), the government articulates the protection of the writers and the protection of Danish identity in such an external way that it is difficult to claim that they are in deed telling one narrative. When the government attempts to defer the decision whether the difference of Turkey is temporary or permanent (ch. 9), the indecision is pre-empted by thematic allusion to other instances of 'Muslim difference'.

\(^{454}\) When I employ 'middle of the road' as a metaphor here, the 'middle' does not refer to any position objectively in the centre of some universally valid map. Rather it applies to the structure of the debates analysed, which tends towards "the normal form of the dialogical... in which two opposing discourses fight it out within the general unity of a shared code" (Jameson 1981:84).
A second observation is that it seems to be particularly difficult to stay clear of Culturalism in the Danish debates analysed: The government narratives on integration (analysed in ch. 5) were initially formulated to be as little about culture as possible. Gradually, however, 'as little as possible' turned out to be 'a lot': Labour market integration came to be presented as dependent on a measure of cultural assimilation. And counterterrorism became a matter of handling religiously defined cultural difference; by integrating the difference away, by dialoguing across the difference, and by monitoring the limit of acceptable difference (ch. 8). When the legal framework for granting refuge to writers was finalized (ch. 7), no doubt was left that both the writers and their persecutors were expected to be Muslims – and that this quality constitutes them as potential security problems. The government's position of 'wait and see' in relation to Turkey was pre-empted by thematic allusions framing Turkey as Muslim and implying that Turkey is therefore permanently different (ch. 9).

On the one hand, both the tendency to slide away from the middle of the road and the tendency to slide in the direction of Culturalism could be related to the particular parliamentary situation since 2001: The centre-right government depends on the nationalist DPP – so its narratives of Muslims need to be accommodated. On the other hand, a tendency noted in the debates on Turkey indicate broader discursive pressures: When relieved of the responsibilities of government (in relation to the EU mainstream), the liberals, conservatives and the social democrats each turn the thumb down on Turkish membership and more or less directly frames Turkey in Culturalist terms. The same pressure could lie behind the reluctance of the opposition when it comes to explicitly prioritizing international human rights standards over the need to
protect Danish homogeneity (ch. 6). And the pressure could lie behind the swift movement which the present prime minister made: Right after taking office, his stated preference was to leave the decision to take of the veils to 'those girls' themselves – soon after, however, he 'urged that existing possibilities for limiting the use of the burqa and the niqab are fully exploited' (ch. 5). The research design of the dissertation does not allow any final judgment on the mechanisms behind; it only allows the dissertation to note what appear to be a systematic erosion of any attempted middle position and a magnetism of Culturalism.

10.2.3 The interpellations of Danish narratives and debates on Muslims

The Muslim difference makes a difference in relation to Danish identity discourse. The narratives of what the difference means and what should be done about it might be told primarily for an 'internal' audience. But the narratives inevitably reach the ears of the other. Firstly, because the other is an internal affair: The other is among Us. Some of Them even claim to be part of Us. Secondly, because the back stage of identity politics cannot be separated from the front stage in a world of globalized communication. What interpellations does the Danish narratives and debate on Muslim relations produce for the other? The analytical chapters identified narratives which interpellated in a series of conflict prone ways: negative interpellations, non-interpellations, mis-interpellations, demands for dis-interpellation, and securitized interpellations (cf. subsection 3.3.2):

455 Outside the texts in focus for the analytical chapters of the dissertation, the adaption of the major opposition parties to the alien and integration policies of the government and the DPP points in the same direction.

456 The research design of the dissertation does not allow final judgment on whether the roles described and ascribed reaches 'the Muslims' or how they react to the roles. The conclusions of this subsection are extrapolated from the analysis of the Danish side of the identity political relation.
Firstly, the narratives on limiting the influx of strangers and on integration (ch. 5 & 6) imply that the presence of Muslims is a problem: It would be better if You were not here. Furthermore, the narratives on limiting the influx (ch. 6) have the implication that persons descending from Muslim countries are not equal citizens: You do not have the same rights to see or live with Your relatives as other citizens. Finally, the difference between the Muslims and the secularized Christians is constructed to be a temporalized hierarchy: Muslims are medieval – Danes are Modern (ch. 6, 7 & 9). The interpellation produced by this version of the grammar of Orientalism is decidedly negative.

Secondly, the government narratives of integration and of limiting the influx leave the impression that it is not possible to be simultaneously 100% Dane and 100% Muslim. The official Danish narratives demand that one choose or at least prioritize between the two (ch. 5 & 7). In that sense 'integration' – no matter what the exact goal and threshold – involves some element of assimilation or submission. The grammar of Encompassment non-interpellates in relation to important aspects of life: In certain matters, Your preferences and agency are not wanted – only are they accepted if Your preferences are Ours, and Your agency leads You in the direction of Our preferences.

Thirdly, the threshold of integration is a moving target: Over time, the official threshold has been raised and 'culturalized' (ch. 5). Adding to the ambiguity is the way in which voices in Danish debates – voices that are both tolerated and awarded with influential positions – doubt that the Muslim is at all capable of integration (ch. 5 & 9). In that sense, there is a risk of mis-interpellation following a situation in which a Muslim reaches out for a position as included ('well integrated') which is presumably offered – only to experience that the offered position is immediately taken away as yet another diacriticon of difference is introduced to be integrated away.
Fourthly, among the thresholds of integration presented – to the new arrivals and to the ones applying for permanent residence or citizenship – are a number of 'Medieval' practices. The Muslim is told to implicitly self-identify with these practices – only to be able to distance him/herself from them and thereby perform a proof of integration (ch. 7; cf. ch. 5). The specific design of the demand, however, leaves the impression that rather than to secure integration, the aim of this deliberately negative interpellation is to ward off the new arrival.

Finally, the difference of the Muslim is not just a problem – it is a threat (ch. 5, 6, 7 & 8). Whether the threat is existential and whether the means needed to avert the threat are extraordinary is a matter of whose narratives you listen to: If you listen to the DPP; no doubt that threats are existential and some means extraordinary. If you listen to the government, the matter is less clearly presented. Or rather; the government security narratives involve a more differentiated cast of characters ranging from the radically threatening terrorist to various degrees of less-than-radical others. But even if a Muslim is 'well-integrated' and 'a decisive ally in the fight against terrorism', the Muslim difference remains – in official narratives – a potential security problem which needs to be monitored (ch. 8; cf. ch. 9).

10.2.4 Structures and dynamics of Danish debates on Muslims contributing to radicalization of conflict

So, subsection 10.2.1 briefly summarized the Danish narratives on Muslims to say that 'it would be better, if They were like Us'. Subsection 10.2.2 identified a first tendency in the Danish political landscape – when debating Muslim relations – to have difficulty when trying to stay in 'the middle of the road'; and, as a second tendency, to follow a draft to the Culturalist side when diverting from the middle of the road. Subsection 10.2.3 listed a variety of conflictual interpellations meeting the Muslim listening to Danish debates on what to do to him/her; a variety of roles to play in future interaction or – in some narratives – rather a variety of actions to
submit to. Now, how may the relations between these relations – this identity configuration – be characterized in terms of contributions to radicalization?

Firstly, as already noted as part of the analytico-strategic considerations in chapter 4, the core relation in the configuration – Denmark/Muslims – is not symmetrical: One side is a bureaucratically hierarchical state. What is implied to be the other side is – if it is an entity at all – without a privileged voice (in spite of claims to the contrary). The lack of a privileged centre on the Muslim side makes it quite easy to 'pick a Muslim voice' to represent the totality to be whatever part is needed for a narrative. But the lack of a privileged centre also makes it difficult to effectively dismiss a voice claiming to be – or being pointed out as – the centre. Furthermore, the Danish side – supposedly hierarchical – allows a plurality of voices to speak on its behalf. The voice supposed to be authoritative – the government – in a series of debates passively or actively facilitates the interpellations of DPP's narratives even when they distance themselves from them. When combined, these characteristics of the two sides makes it rather easy to establish a 'dialogue of the extremes' which may radicalize (or at least hinder the de-radicalization of) the conflict.

Secondly (as noted in subsection 10.2.1), various Danish narratives point out Muslims as threats – and they thereby (as noted in subsection 10.2.2) perform securitized interpellations of Muslims. When you perceive yourself to be pointed out as a threat in need of aversion by extraordinary means, a natural reaction would be to perceive the extraordinary means as an existential threat to yourself. If Muslims – all, some, a few – react to a securitized interpellation by counter-securitizing, then the

457 E.g. when the government promotes the 'cities of refuge' arrangement for persecuted writers – while accepting the DPP's demand for a declaration on Danish values to be signed by the writer; a declaration designed to keep the Muslim writers out (ch. 7). Or when the government, on the one hand, insists that the jury is still out on the question of whether Turkey may ever qualify for EU membership, while, on the other hand, accepting the framing of Turkey's problems as Muslim problems.
configuration will have the structure of a security dilemma. On top of this, the same Danish narratives may very well mis-interpellate in the sense that they hold out the prospect of accept as 'well-integrated' while effectively deferring the actual accept. As discussed (in chapters 3 and 5) mis-interpellation may provoke a few to actively dis-interpellate by taking up counter-identities. The Danish narratives may, hence, very well end up producing for themselves responses which can only – in the continued Danish narration – be explained as threats. If they actually produce such answers, they are not just securitized narratives but may properly be characterized as securitizing narratives. Both these two characteristics – a) the configuration is structured as a security dilemma; b) the configuration includes a relation in which (at least) one side systematically invites answers which are perceived as threats – justify that the configuration analysed may be characterized as a security configuration.458

Two caveats, however, are necessary in relation to this characterization: One in relation to the configuration's status as a security configuration – one in relation to its status as a configuration in its own right.

Firstly, even if the configuration analysed is securitized it is not (only) a configuration of relations between securitized relations. The configuration was approached and analysed as an identity configuration; a relation of the relations between identity and difference: The constitutive, narrative and political relations between identity and the difference of the other. The analytics was, hence, kept open as to whether and how much these relations would be securitized; i.e. cast in terms of existential threats and extraordinary means to their aversion. The analysis showed that – in spite of tendencies towards polarization and Culturalism – narratives protesting or ignoring securitization and narratives presenting alternatives were in

458 Or in the vocabulary of securitization theory; security constellation (Buzan & Wæver 2009).
deed present (ch. 6, 7, 8 & 9). It could even describe the pains taken by the government to tell a-cultural and de-securitizing narratives, however infelicitous or short lived they turned out to be (ch. 5, 8 & 9). So in that sense, the space has not been closed down for identity narratives more hospitable to difference.

Secondly, the configuration analysed in this dissertation does not uphold the relations between its relations in a vacuum. It is clearly (ch. 5, 7, 8 & 9) related to the global configuration of macro-securitizations in which "a political West and a religiously-speaking Islamic opposition ... manage to confirm each other’s threat and enemy images sufficiently well that the conflict is self-propelling." (Buzan & Wæver 2009:274) On the one hand, a more thorough examination of this global connection would probably be necessary to account for the some of the inputs to and inspiration behind what is in this dissertation read as Danish debates.

On the other hand, this dissertation may contribute a detailed analysis of one set of relations – minor, perhaps, but with its occasional fifteen minutes centre stage – to the study of this global conflict configuration. When considering strategies for more hospitality to difference, awareness of these relations to the overall configuration may, on the one hand, temper optimism. On the other hand, awareness of these relations may also induce a sense of responsibility: There is a relation between, on the one hand, the Danish debates on Muslims and, on the other hand, that overall configuration of conflicts which should not be allowed to turn itself into a clash of civilizations. But it is not a one-way relation; the way in which we speak and act co-constitutes the difference between clash and peaceful co-narration. And it constitutes

459 Buzan & Wæver avoids labelling this global constellation by noting that "Notable by its complete absence is any label for the whole constellation except for Huntington’s not entirely appropriate ‘clash of civilizations’. " (2009:269; cf. Hauge 2009:17; Huntington 1993). I would rather characterize his label as 'entirely inappropriate'. Or perhaps an even better characteristic would be that the label is 'appropriating' in the sense that Huntington, by the very labelling, appropriates the conflict configuration for his own purpose.
the difference between the coalescence of 'civilizations' and the grammatical interaction of a plurality of differences.

10.3 Strategic self-evaluation: Studying change and/or complicit in constitution?

Having concluded the theoretical and empirical interventions of the dissertation (in sections 10.1 and 10.2), what remains is the evaluation of the dissertation read as a strategic intervention in the current Danish identity political predicament. In the introductory chapter, the empirical field of the dissertation was characterised as 'Danish debates on Muslim relations'. This could be taken to mean that the aim of the study was to chart a process completed; to document the change from one discourse of identity/difference to another discourse focusing on the Muslim. The aim of the dissertation could have been to establish one overall narrative of transformation of the discourse on Danish identity in relation to Muslims. For a number or reasons, the dissertation does not do so.

Figure 10.1 Family resemblance of narratives of Muslim relations

First of all; it does not add up. There is not one monolithic discourse on Danish identity in relation to Muslims. There is not one discourse on Muslims – not even if
only the actors most obsessed with Muslims were studied. But the dissertation points to a family resemblance (in the sense of Wittgenstein 1995[1958]:§§65-9) between discourses relating Danish identity to differences of an implicitly or explicitly Muslim character across policy fields and across actors. Figure 10.1 illustrates such a family resemblance between a group of discourses – each structured as policy narratives grasping together an ontology constituted by the past including the choice between two policy alternatives (an oughtology and an oughtnotology): None of the narratives are identical; yet they form a family by sharing resemblances in couples.

**Figure 10.2 Intensified family resemblance of narratives of Muslim relations**

Furthermore, the dissertation hints that the family resemblance of discourses relating Danish identity to Muslim differences is intensified across policy fields and actors. It still does not add up – but it adds more up than it did before. For example, the 'semantic density' of the category of Migrant is more and more (but still not exclusively) 'Muslim'. Just as the point of departure for more and more (but not all) parliamentarians is that it is necessary (to accept that you have) to be 24 years old to be reunified with your non-Western spouse in Denmark. The dissertation is, in that sense, a close-up study in the becoming rather than the being of a discourse of radicalized Danish identity/Muslim difference. The development is illustrated in
figure 10.2; more elements are articulated in the same way in the – still – different discourses.

Secondly, to make the claim that discourse A has taken the place of discourse B, a study different from the one conducted should have been devised. A less myopic study of change could either have taken the form of an ahistorical analysis comparing two synchronous discursive structures – a before and an after – or it could have taken the form of a genealogy tracing the elements presently articulated elements along their disparate stretches of rhizome. In stead of these formal diachronic analyses, the dissertation zoomed in on a series of the specific reconfigurations – as well as the clashes of construction, and discursive struggles surrounding them which forms and forms part of the overall re-configuration towards tighter family ties between the discourses on Muslim relations.

But why would the dissertation claim to take as its point of departure a discourse which it simultaneously claims has not coalesced; a discourse which the normative position of the dissertation furthermore explicitly dislikes? The answer is, evidently, to serve as a warning. To warn, the dissertation in a sense combines two analytical strategies: Firstly, the one of Said, who in Orientalism (1978) distilled the essence of a discourse to allow the colonized to attack its roots head on. And, secondly, Galtung, who focused on the self-supporting dynamics of conflict to impartially advice on their dismantling (1978; cf. Wæver 1997:366f). It warns that the coalescence of a Muslim Other in Danish and Western discourse constitutes the springboard for a vicious spiral of conflict – which We may still avert if We change Our course of action. But bearing in mind the Thomas theorem – "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Merton 1995:380) – it also warns that it might not be necessary for a discourse on a Muslim other to 'actually' coalesce to have
effects: If someone interpellated as Muslims – a few or a lot – perceive themselves to be interpellated negatively by one overarching discourse on Muslims, this may suffice to radicalize the spiralling conflict.

One cannot, however, control what others do with the text one produces (Derrida 1988a; 1988c). In the same way, the dissertation runs the risk of ending up as complicit in the constitution of a discourse on Danish identity in contrast to the Muslim other. The dissertation willingly runs this risk after assessing and specifying its audience: While the hard core of Islamophobes is probably out of reach, a broad mainstream of Danes, migrants, Westerners, Muslims, Christians, Copenhageners, responsible human beings could be hoped for to accept that the very logic of conflicting identities is more dangerous than any of the identities posed in conflict (cf. Wæver 1997:332): The dangers of trying to make difference go away – at least in some of the ways it is done – is likely to be more dangerous than the differences in themselves. Especially, this broad mainstream should be receptive as it is only a

Roy (2004) finds that Muslims in Western Europe increasingly self-identify primarily as Muslims rather than as migrants, nationals of various 'home countries' or otherwise – partially as a response to the dominant discourses where they live, but also articulating the insistence in Islamic theology and tradition on the unity of the Ummah. The research design of the dissertation does not provide a voice for those self-identifying in this way. That is one of the prices paid to be able to perform the analysis which the introductory chapter found normatively pertinent.

A couple of examples will do: Firstly, the concept of Orientalism – once coined as a critique of essentialism – has been utilized as a point of departure for a counter-essentialism from Arab and Turkish nationalists against any criticism (Necef 2003). Secondly, the concept of 'societal securitization' has been taken to legitimize what it was meant to study: the defence of identity and the destructive dynamics following (Buzan & Wæver 1997; cf. McSweeney 1996).

Pedersen & Tjalve are right when they follow Rorty in ridiculing the philosopher confronting Milosevic with his philosophical conclusion; that Milosevic's policies do not draw the logical consequences of an empty ontology and the irreducibility of the other (2000:47). But that does not mean that philosophical and social science arguments do not work with a less entrenched audience.

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marginal few who explicitly have 'conflict' as a goal. Projecting a prognosis of radicalized conflict could therefore resonate and make a difference as an immanent critique.

Edwin Ardener likened the texts of an Anthropologist trying to translate from other systems of meaning with the voice of a prophet trying to explain the barely incomprehensible future, he has seen, to an audience questioning his sanity.

Prophets do not predict the future, in the terms of the present. Rather, they foretell a present reality before it has been accommodated in the collective representations, and in language. ... The anthropological condition is equivalent to this; in narrating and writing the other, the anthropologist is author to a reality. (Hastrup 1989:224; 228; cf. Ardener 1989:ch.9)

Implicit in the normative position taken up in chapter 1 is a hope that the analysis of the dissertation may serve as a warning: The dissertation seeks to warn of the consequences of the choices made by Danish identity politician. A warning does have a chance to work, since "[t]o set up a prognosis means to have already altered the situation from which it arises. Put another way, the previously existing space of experience is not sufficient for the determination of the horizon of expectation." (Koselleck 1985:275) There is a space for political action. This space is taken up every time someone narrates a past and a future. Including when the dissertation does so.


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Abstract

This dissertation studies Danish political debates on 'Muslim relations' as interacting policy narratives. Theoretically, the dissertation investigates how various policies for relating to the other contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other by the specific ways in which they invite (or does not invite) the other to future interaction. The dissertation analyses debates on integration and human rights of migrants and refugees, counterterrorism, freedom of expression, and Turkish EU accession. The analysis concludes that there is not one single, securitized discourse on Danish identity in relation to Muslims. But the narratives promoted are structured to produce future interaction leading in that direction.

Resumé (in Danish)

Denne afhandling analyserer danske politiske debatter om forholdet til 'muslimer' som gensidigt påvirkende politik-fortællinger. Teoretisk undersøger afhandlingen hvordan forskellige politikker, for hvordan forholdet til den anden skal være, bidrager til radikalisering af konflikt mellem selv og anden i kraft af de særlige måder hvorpå den anden inviteres (eller ikke inviteres) til fremtidig interaktion. Afhandlingen analyserer debatter om indvandrerre og flygtninges integration og menneskerettigheder, terrorbekæmpelse, ytringsfrihed og tyrkisk EU medlemskab. Analysen konkluderer at der ikke findes en enkelt sikkerhedsdiskurs om dansk identitet i forhold til muslimer – men de fortællinger, der fremmes, er struktureret på en sådan måde, at de lægger op til fremtidig interaktion, som leder i dén retning.