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Towards a Theory for Re-framing Pan-Africanism: An Idea Whose Time Has Come

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Towards a Theory for Re-framing Pan-Africanism:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come

Mammo Muchie

"I have often been accused of pursuing a "policy of the impossible." But I cannot believe in the impossibility of achieving African union any more than I could ever have thought of the impossibility of attaining African freedom... Africa must unite. We have before us not only an opportunity but a historic duty."

(Nkrumah 1963: 231)

Abstract
The article argues for re-launching the debate on Pan-African unity to recapture the lost ground and make good the opportunity cost incurred by Africa in choosing the minimalist aims of settling for fragile and weak states with an equally enfeebled Organization of African Unity. It reviews the clash between Afro-pessimism and Afro-optimism in relation to the possibility of a continental unity as a feasible alternative to the African malaise. The construction of a Pan-African identity through the development of a shared goal and social and historical experience of struggling to lifting up Africa from its untenable status as a marginal, oppressed and largely written-off continent is a timely undertaking as an alternative to ethnic involution, social decay and fragmentation. While state actors have made many Pan-African declarations, actual movement towards Pan-Africanism seemed to be inversely proportional to the number of declarations by African leaders in their now ritual meetings annually at the behest of the Organization of African Unity. Unity is not an act. It is a process which comes by a sustained fostering of communication, conversation, deliberation, dialogue, coordination, cooperation and solidarity amongst the population in Africa as equal and different African citizens based on a sustained development of a shared African identity, consciousness and interest irrespective of color, creed, racial origin, nationality, region and so on. On thebasis of the evolution of a shared conception of an African identity and interest Pan-African movements which can sustain and deepen a Pan-African project need to be encouraged from every part of the continent.

Rescuing the Pan-African Idea from the Clashes between Afro-Optimism and Afro-Pessimism

A change will be possible when the feeling of defeat is defeated (Loppes 1995: 37). Afro-pessimists stress the enormity of the problems that divide Africa rather than that unite it, and start with a presumption of self-defeat allowing the

African crises to prey on their judgment and limit their imagination. After de-colonization this Afro-pessimist temper oppressed the African imagination. Afro-optimists seem to say despite the many differences there is much to unite and forge a shared destiny with in Africa, and notwithstanding the numerous economic, social and political crises, there is a way out for Africa. The optimists can be said to have defeated at least the feeling of being defeated by seeing possibility for renewal despite the prevailing despair and human dereliction afflicting large swathes of the African continent. Except for a brief period immediately after de-colonization, the African continent has suffered as much from material crises as from pessimistic projection on the capacities and possibilities of Africans to shape their own future.

Many of the current heads of states are readily willing to carry out rhetoric on the need for African solidarity while being totally unwilling to invest practically to bring that unity failing singularly to behave and act to foster that same solidarity. That hypocritical stance is as much a problem to African disunity as the forces whose interest appears to lie in the oppressive continuation of African fracturing and fragmentation. Stressing differences as unbridgeable, exaggerating problems and lacking imagination and intellectual stamina, many African leaders are satisfied as long as they have a political real estate with a few million people to rule over. While many would acknowledge the desirability of a continental unity of some form, they neither seem to think it possible nor are they fully persuaded that a continental unity can be a viable proposition. Some commentators even go to the extent of dreaming up essentialist discourses for the failure of African solidarity and lack of organizational spirit and confidence. They often reduce the problem of the African crises to the essentialism of what they call African character and culture. But such reductions cannot answer why Africa's growth rate was higher in the 60s than the present day newly industrializing countries (Barratt-Brown 1995: 47). Africa's crises have intellectual, political and economic reasons much of which has been a relic from the incomplete decolonization of the continent. That this is the case can be attested from the unchanging vertical links between African states and former colonial powers arresting the development of any horizontal link between each other. About 85% of Africa's total exports are marketed in the industrialized countries of the North compared to 75% of Latin America and 68% for South and East Asia (Http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/033.html 1998: 13). Only a very small fraction of officially recorded exports, of about 3 and 6%, goes to other African countries (ibid.). Even intra community trade in the economic region of West African States (ECOWAS) was a mere 4.9% in 1988 (ibid.). When one reads such figures one is justified to doubt all the declarations, cooperation schemes and conversations to forge continental unity. After 40 years of decolonization the pattern of vertical linkage and virtual absence of horizontal inter-African linkages is an indictment.

Paradoxically it is precisely to decolonize economically and culturally that a unified strategy was thought to be a viable alternative in the 1960s by such leading theorists of Pan-Africanism such as K. F. Nkrumah. Africa must unite or perish was Nkrumah's famous exhortations. He wrote: "Just as our strength lies in a unified policy and action for progress and development, so the strength of the imperialists lies in our disunity. We in Africa can only meet them effectively by presenting a unified front and a continental purpose." (K. Nkrumah 1963: xvi) He added, "Our freedom stands open to danger just as long as the independent states of Africa remain apart." (K. Nkrumah, 1963: xvii) These words were spoken at the time when the possibility to reject the casual tearing of the continent at the 1885 Berlin Conference otherwise known as the European Scramble for Africa was open in the 60s when something like 32 of the current states were gaining flag independence. That historical moment offered opportunities which are not available now. Nkrumah captured with extraordinary foresight the importance of the moment of political decolonization: "Here is a challenge which destiny has thrown out to the leaders of Africa. It is for us to grasp what is a golden opportunity to prove that the genius of the African people can surmount the separatist tendencies in sovereign nationhood by coming together speedily, for the sake of Africa's greater glory and infinite well-being, into a Union of African States." (Ibid.: 22-222) He kept insisting that Africans must make "superfluous and obsolete" the "territorial boundaries which are the relics of colonialism," because the "forces that unite (Africans) are greater than the difficulties that divide us at present." (ibid.: 221) The price for speaking so well for Africa was to be paid by his own overthrow.[1] The pursuit of Pan-African goals in the face of opposition from powerful forces by using a newly independent and fragile state naturally was frought with difficulties. If Nkrumah exhibited some tendencies for personality cult and restrictions in civil liberties, it has to be seen in the context of his overall project, the tension of the time and the contradictions involved in leading a historic Pan-African movement while being saddled with the task of managing an economy and state of Ghana. That contradiction exposed Nkrumah to fatal vulnerabilities. When all is said and done his record on the whole is clean-in the sense of not doing what all African leaders became to see as their right to do-stashing national wealth in private banks for their own use. That was not Nkrumah's vice.

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[1] The CIA operative involved in planning and executing the coup in 1966 has now publicly admitted that they were involved actively to get rid off him; see John Stockwell(a former CIA officer), In Search of Enemies, published in 1978 who exposed CIA involvement in the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana and murdering Lumumba in the Congo. Also see the BBC II Film, Black Power, shown during the Winter of 1992 where those involved admitted active US intervention to bring the downfall of Nkrumah. That this CIA operative, The US intelligence community and their Ghanaian associates can freely admit and still at large shows how much they feel they can ignore Africans.

His lack of personal corruption largely vindicates Nkrumah's record despite criticisms of his handling of Ghana's domestic difficulties which were more a result of external pressure than any weaknesses and mistakes on the part of Ghana's policy makers.

Whilst admittedly Nkrumah's record in handling Ghana's economic and political affairs may be contested and subject to debate, his Pan-African commitment was remarkably consistent and speaks to the generations-past, present and future - with incisive and piercing clarity. Nkrumah saw clearly the historical importance of casually rejecting Africa's humiliation by a celebration and festival of African unity. He saw the redeeming value of resistance, defiance and courage in an African burst into world history. He kept driving home with prostelyzing zeal that he is willing to sacrifice Ghana's sovereignty for the larger good of Africa's rebirth. The more he wrote, spoke and organized, the more he exposed himself to the forces that harbored ill-intention and ill-thought to Africa. They won, he lost. Recently before he died, Nyerere recognized the errors of those who saw lurking behind Nkrumaha's messianic and evangelical thrust for African union a simple ambition for personal aggrandizement. Nigeria and the Francophone and some of the states grouped around a meeting they held in Monrovia opposed Nkrumah's project to turn Africa's moment of political decolonization into a real festival for the complete rejection of the divisive consequences of the European 1885 Berlin Treaty: a historical blight which still afflicts Africa's destiny. While letting slip such a "golden opportunity or moment" to reject emphatically the casual tearing up of the continent was not bad enough, the post-colonial elite seems contented to make do with the apparatus of colonial oppression protecting itself to continue a shameless pillaging, plunder and robbery for the sole purpose of self- enrichment while the vast majority of the people in Africa remain poor. According to the World Bank, the population in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) living below $1.00 a day (PPP[2] 1985 prices) was 179.6 million (1987), 201.2 million (1990), 218.6 million (1993) (World Bank 1996). In percent population terms, 38.5 % (1987), 39.3 (1990) and 39.1 (1993) (ibid.).

The alternative arrangement to African unity is the attempt to entrench within the arbitrary borders carved by those who used divide and rule as a strategy for the imperial domination of Africa and set up evidently poorly crafted mostly non-viable states retaining much of the colonial baggage, albeit in an attenuated form. Africa turned into the hands of a transnational elite allied to a local elite. They created a political economy for mutual survival largely paying scant attention to the vast population which remain largely excluded from well-being development. If there is any failure of purpose, vision, imagination and actual

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[2] purchasing power parity index.

progress, it is the failure of those who inherited the post-colonial mantle. It cannot be seen as the failure of Africa. It is the intellectual, moral and political failure of the twin elites-local and transnational pure and simple. The political and to a certain extent the academic elite in Africa is the most dangerous and irrelevant lacking humility, self-reflexivity and any worthy theory of justice and ethics for serving the population starting from the least advantage majority. It is precisely greed and selfishness that stunted the imagination for building real unity and solidarity. The first Prime Minister of Nigeria is said to have insulted Nkrumah by attributing falsely a motive that he wished to take away Nigeria's sovereignty (Barratt-Brown 1995: 128). That is why the imagination of a continental unity and purpose is the road that was aborted by those who were greedy (the internal elite) and those who benefit by Africa's disunity and fragmentation (the elite from the old colonial power camp and others).

Right now, what Nkrumah spoke of 36 years ago is beginning to resonate with increased vigor. South Africa's ANC long experience in struggle produced some leaders of a moral stature unequaled in the world. Mandela has become Africa's hero and his successor has quickly put a wider African signature to their victory. Optimism for Africa's future seemed to have come with the birth of the new South Africa.

The African Renaissance from South Africa: Can It revive African Unity?
The most significant positive development for Africa after the end of the cold war is the emergence of South Africa from its apartheid era exclusion and isolation. South Africa accounts for 44 percent of the total GDP of all Sub-Saharan African countries, and 52 per cent of its industrial output." (Castells 1999: 122) In 1993 real GDP per capita in SSA excluding South Africa was US$1,288 billion, while South Africa alone GDP was $3,127 billion (ibid.). It has thus three times the GDP of the combined GDP of the entire SSA sub-region.

On the one hand, South Africa needs the rest of Africa to avoid being pushed aside itself from the harsh competition in the new global economy, on the other the South African connection will help to insulate the weaker African economies by providing an alternative to the global economy. The relationship between South Africa and the rest of Africa can be mutually beneficial if both sides develop a Pan-African outlook, perspective and shared goal and interests. The problem is thus twofold: First, South Africa has to evolve a Pan-African perspective from the debris of its apartheid past involving all sections of its communities. Second, the rest of Africa sees value in the South African connection an important prod to enter the world economy on terms, for a change, not dictated against Africa's best interests.

Thus if South Africa evolves a clear Africa role, opportunities exist to adding new energy and vitality to conversations regarding the revival and renewal of African unity. Something like a second edition of Pan African ideals, potentialities and projections under the changed circumstances of the time can be fostered. This will open the opportunities for South Africa and its leaders to utilize their hard-earned reputation to repair Africa's fractured identity, unity, future and destiny. Indeed it will be a shame if this reputation is squandered unwisely and the effort of adding South Africa's influence, wealth and power to Africa is not aligned or coupled with fostering unity, cooperation, coordination and solidarity amongst the peoples, states, societies, communities and individuals of Africa. To their credit, South Africa's new leaders have lost no time in seizing the historical moment of the country's emergence from apartheid era exclusion to talking up Africa's opportunities by coining the optimistic phrase of an "African Renaissance." How far this contribution becomes a reality or dissipates into thin air like the earlier and similar hope encapsulated in the equally attractive phrase: "the African wind of change" of the 60s-remains to be seen. At least the rhetoric of renaissance by Mbeki has revealed a broad intention and willingness to create public awareness in South Africa to shoulder a wider African role. Whether others in Africa will welcome this South African purpose to play a leadership role is still early to say. This welcome initiative and rhetoric from South Africa ought to be heard and a progressive response to it from other African countries is necessary and to be expected. Others should try to see the positive value of a substantial commitment from South Africa's leadership to steer every aspect of South Africa's energy to serve Africa's purposes as part and parcel of serving its own national purposes. It is when South Africa retreats from an African role by being seduced or allured to other trappings that criticism would be justified. At the moment Mbeki's idea of an "African Renaissance" should be promoted. If he pursues this idea with a seriousness, total self-mobilization and certainty of a Nkrumah, there will be no doubt that those who do not wish Africa to rise for one reason or another would target him for extinction too. If talk of an African Renaissance is simply a rhetorical flourish without any conviction, those who find Africa's unified potential a problem can live with him. It is thus crucial that South Africa's leadership continue to talk up Africa's aspirations and their contribution in it.

Other Africans can either fear or see it as a bonus to have South Africa's power on the side of Africa's future. It is difficult to trust a number of African heads of states who are jealous of their position to allow South Africa to play the full role it should play in Africa. If feared the threat from it will be felt and African leaders will work to frustrate South Africa from playing a positive role. If accepted opportunities to build Africa's future in new and imaginative ways will be broadly open. Which choice will be made remains an open question. It takes both sides to manifest a more generous and much more imaginative disposition,

willingness and tolerance to build Africa irrevocably. History often opens such rare opportunities once in a while. South Africa's coming home to Africa is such an important historical moment, if not equal to the decolonization of the continent in the 60s, at least as nearly important enough. Here is another test for African imagination. If the forces of foresight and vision win, South Africa has the potential to revive the lost opportunities of the 60s. If the forces of surrender and enclave-state egoism and mentality win, we are back to the drawing board. One hopes imagination and moral purpose will win over cynicism and selfishness.

Is Nigeria Stopping Being the Giant without an African Purpose?
Another significant development is the emergence of Nigeria as a budding democracy. The slow and ponderous move of Nigeria - an African giant - from military rule to democratic and at least electorally confirmed government is a plus not just for that country but also more widely for Africa. The emergence of Nigeria as a democratic power is no light matter with respect to reckoning possibilities in building Africa's future. Its emergence must be seen against the background of Africa which has been largely written off by the media and other Afro-pessimistic commentators as a place where "practically nothing works." The late but seemingly certain emergence of Nigeria as a young democracy has given stimulus to the optimistic scenario of building Africa's future. Nigeria has not exploited its potential power, wealth and influence in building itself and the continent. If the current direction brings out the full potential of Nigeria of its role in Africa, this can only be a positive reinforcement of the hopeful trend coming from South Africa. There are good reasons that the current leadership is different from the old venal military sort in Nigeria. Abasenjo has also lost no time before he declared a wider African role by his "New Dawn for Africa" speech. We can safely agree that there is a sort of democratic turn in Nigeria though it is still early days how that country's capricious political life will settle ultimately.

And From Libya Comes A Clear Message: The Sahara Does Not Divide But Can Unite Africa
The recent addition of Muamer Al-Gadafi to the Pan-African voice is another milestone to reverse the voices of disunity, fragmentation and African enfeeblement. The Libyan leader called an extraordinary session of the Organization of African Unity to revive back on the agenda something like Kawme Nkrumah's 1963 Pan-Africanist vision of a "united, proud, strong, and commanding" Africa. Forty-three African states attended the summit in Sirte, Libya between September 8-9, 1999. Libya's initiative has been acclaimed as having rekindled the energies for a Pan-African alternative to the continent's current fragmentation. In a speech justifying why a special Summit of the OAU is required, Gadafi made some important conceptual clarification regarding the

relationship of Arab and African identity. He said, "We do not deny that racially or historically we are Arabs. But politically and geographically we are Africans for thousands of years until the last migration 944 years ago. The migration of Bani Hilal and Bani Salim. We are Africans. We are Africans since our forefathers emigrated over land (Bir...Bir) that is why they were called Berbers." (PAM News March 1999: 9)

He added emphatically that, "The Libyan people as from today should know that they are an African people. You are in Africa. You are Africans. Anyone who is on African soil and does not accept his African nature should leave Africa. Anyone who does not like the black color of the African should ask himself what his white color achieved for him. The color whatever you call it and which is found in North Africa, from Egypt through to Mauritania. If the peoples who exist from Egypt to Mauritania do not wish to belong to Africa and the nationality of Africa and integrate into Africa and share her destiny they should leave. Africa is for Africans." (ibid.) Following from the reappraisal that Libyans and generally Arabs within the African continent are Africans, Gadafi recommended that "all borders should be erased to the nationals of Africa from Pretoria to Tripoli, ... in order to "unite one thousand tribes... into the United States of Africa." (ibid.)

If as Libya, all the other Northern African countries share an African identity along with or combining with their Arab identity, it will make the effort to re-frame Pan-Africanism much easier. It is not clear whether Libya's leader's conversion to Pan-Africanism is loss of complete hope in Arab nationalism or a genuine commitment to add Arabs as part and parcel of Africa's destiny. Regardless of the reasons which prompt this commentary from Gadafi, it contributes to a new dialogue between Arab Africa and the rest of Africa. And that dialogue should help to put firmly behind us the nasty roles Arab traders played in the slave trade, and look forward to a new partnership and new relationship as equal and different people.

Some New Sceptical Voices Have Lent Their Support
Though skeptical himself, Museveni has lent his voice to Pan-African ideals. He has spoken of a Bantuphone Africa to break up Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone Africa. Though not sold to the idea of continental unity, his public pronouncements suggest a Pan-African orientation. In addition in Uganda there is a Global Pan African Movement with the patroniship of Yoweri Museveni which is working to prepare the 8th Pan-African Conference sometime in the year 2000. Barbados has set up a Governmental Pan-African Commission. Ghana has extended citizenship rights to diasporic African Americans. All of these activities - though distinct and different - suggest some moves are being

made to counter the negative state of fragmentation and disunity with which the African continent has often been described.

OAU at ABUJA in 1991 Declared Pan-African Measures
In 1963 Nkrumah saw with extraordinary foresight what Europeans did not see then even for their own good themselves. They were tinkering with a union of coal and steel in the Treaty of Rome trying to harmonize custom and tariff regulation. Nkrumah called for Africa which the Pan-European seemed to have taken for themselves and implemented one by one while rejecting and in fact actively fighting not to get it implemented in Africa. In his report on a "Continental Government for Africa," he stated three objectives: a) a common market of a united Africa; a common currency, a monetary zone and a central bank of issue, b) a unified security with a combined military and defense strategy with an overall land sea and air defense command for Africa, and c) "If we in Africa set up a unified economic planning organization and a unified military and defense strategy, it will be necessary for us to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of our continent." (Ibid.: 219-220) Nkrumah fully appreciated the value of seeking the rise of Africa to world affairs: "The unity of Africa and the strength it would gather from continental integration of its economic and industrial development, supported by a united policy of non- alignment, could have a most powerful effect on World Peace." (Nkrumah 1963: 222)

After a quarter of century of Nkrumah's admonition, the Treaty at Abuja, Nigeria (3.6.91) was signed at the 27th Summit of the OAU establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). The Treaty contains 106 articles, and provides a time table for implementing " ...the phased removal of barriers to intra-African trade, the strengthening of the existing regional economic groupings, and other steps towards African economic cooperation," and the formation of an "Africa-wide monetary union and economic community by the year 2025." (OAU 1991) The Abuja Treaty for setting up the African Economic Community did not state any protocol of implementation but curiously Article 4 states six stages of implementation which together take a period of 34 years. Stage 1 is said to take five years to strengthen regional economic communities and establishing new ones. Stage 2 is said to take eight years to stabilize tariffs, customs duties and other barriers to intra-community trade; strengthen sectoral integration, coordinate and harmonize activities of the regional organizations. Stage 3 is said to take ten years to set up free trade areas within each regional community. Stage 4 is supposed to take two years in establishing an Africa wide customs union, with common external tariff, by harmonizing regional tariff and non-tariff systems. Stage 5 is supposed to take four years by establishing an African Common Market through the adoption of common policies in

agriculture, industry, transport; and the harmonization of monetary, financial and fiscal policies. Stage 6 is supposed to take five years to finalize the African Common Market through the consolidation of the common market structure; the establishment of an African Monetary Union, African Central Bank and single African currency; and creation of a Pan-African parliament elected by continental universal suffrage. Implementation of the final stage for setting up of the structure of African multi-national enterprises. All together a Pan-African ideal similar to the one being set up in Europe now is predicted to take thirty-four years (ibid.).

None of the leaders who signed the treaty at Abuja should be there in the year 2025 if both democracy and the biological clock were to have the final word on the matter. The Abuja declaration picks up Nkrumah's ideals very late. Perhaps it is better late than never. The question is whether those who signed to it have half the fraction of Nkrumah's political will, imagination, intellectual courage, foresight, commitment and discernment. Or is this a belated imitation of the Pan-European incremental project and approach of economic community building? The time frame for each segment appears precise but curiously there is no protocol of implementation, neither are the relevant bodies of implementation specified. The speed at which the world is moving, a generation to form an economic community given the exigencies of Africa's crises seems far too long. While such reservation are legitimate to pronounce, the fact that African leaders were able to pick up Nkrumah's views again and relate it the concept of an economic community is intrinsically worthwhile. The matter of interest is that the Pan-African idea is alive and remains on their agenda. If this state level desire to closer integration is complemented by a movement from civil society the momentum to abbreviate the plan of a generation to set an economic community probably will be accelerated.[3]

While there are enough indicators of a positive trend towards Pan-Africanism, the old problems which frustrated the efforts of the 60s are still around posing formidable barriers to the realization of a Pan-African ideal. Externally the major powers may not find the emergence of a strong and united Africa an attractive proposition. The best to hope for from the external world is some hypocritical understanding. Internally the major difficulty is the seemingly unending economic, political, security and cultural crises in Africa.

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[3] Pan-Africanism evolved as an elite movement. The first four Pan-African conferences were organised by Du Bois from the diaspora. It was the 5th Pan-African Conference in 1945 in Manchester that some of the post colonial leaders such as Kenyatta and Nkrumah were included. Since then two other Pan-African conferences have been held. The 8th Pan-African Conference is being planned for next year. The first Pan African conference was held in 1919 organised by the American scholar Du Bois, who died at the age of 95 as a Ghanian citizen.

Some Formidable Barriers against a Pan-African Ideal?

While the desire for Pan-African integration has been always strong, the actual moves to forge unity have been undermined by the continued and protracted security, economic and political crises afflicting every region of the continent. A theory of Pan-African unity must reckon with the formidable barriers which can potentially disrupt any best-laid plan. History cannot be made as Africans choose. They have to contend with the existing security, political and economic circumstances which are largely a consequence of external and internal clashes of interest. There is no economic, political, social and cultural level playing field to erect a Pan-African edifice which will endure.

Unity, coordination, cooperation among states can be facilitated if the economic and political situation is broadly similar in the countries concerned. If the economic and political circumstances are so uneven and divergent this makes it harder to design social arrangements which will be seen as fair, just, ethical and equitable. If all states share the norms and standards of a democratic social arrangement, the barriers to fostering integration will be easier compared to a situation where there are authoritarian dictators, monarchists, military regimes and other species of government. It is therefore important to review the existing political, economic and security circumstances in Africa before suggesting a theory of Pan-African integration for the continent.

A difficult obstacle is one related to the quality of leadership in Africa. Knowledge and those who have it appear largely shunned. Those who come to power often by using terror tend to abhor knowledge and knowledge producers. The leaderships stand condemned in depriving society the benefit of a knowledge guided development. The absence of such a culture of leadership is a key barrier to recognizing a wider African association to confront problems directed at Africa. Part of the reason which can explain why leaders consign themselves to making minimalist noises in the form of declaration and show literally no political will to implement what they declared in the annual Organization of African meetings is related to the poverty of leadership in Africa. A key example which shows that African leadership is poor can be illustrated if one takes the extraordinary shelving of the Lagos Plan Action and the subsequent flocking to embrace the ideas coming from the World Bank's Berg Report on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action was a long-range plan for Africa's integrated structural transformation (1980-2000). The Berg Report stipulated that each country should come one by one out of which on present reckoning 35 of the over 50 states have qualified for IMF- World Bank loans. The condition for loan qualification is contingent upon acceptance of the terms and conditions contained in the structural adjustment package recommended by these

institutions (Muchie 1999: 19-24). The Lagos Plan of Action contains economic and political ideas for Pan-African integration which are still valid (Muchie 1999: 12). It was not to be funded by the Bretton Woods System. Its blue print stated the following principles: a) making the well-being of people as the center-piece of policy, b) eradication of poverty, c) structural industrial transformation and diversified production, d) self-reliance by building strong national economies, dynamic regional and continental co-operation and e) integration into the world economy on the basis of antecedental national, regional and even continental integration. "up to this day, this blue print contains valid analysis and the right prescriptions for African countries to transform their economies." (ECA 1991) In fact the World Bank's Berg Report came as a "counter- blast" to the Lagos Plan of Action (M. Barrat-Brown 1995: 129-132). Here is thus a clear case where African leadership showed a bifurcation between word and action and posturing and commitment. African leaders rhetorically are for Pan-Africanism while in reality they manifest hardly any credible will to make moves even if these may be small to build a Pan-African alternative to the continent's future. As Nyerere pointed out they seem not willing to let go of the trappings of power: a 21 gun salute, walking on a red carpet and other benefits from holding power. As long as they continue to make bifurcated moves, the leaders of Africa will remain major problems in constructing a Pan-African ideal and future in building Africa's "infinite well-being." (Nkrumah op. cit.)

The political barriers to integration include the shallowness of the democratic roots even in those countries that have carried out elections. Change of power from one set of elite to another almost invariably involves violence except in a few states. And that provides a formidable barrier to prepare a political level field to design sustainable institutional arrangements for Pan-African integration. Fragile democracy is not the best space to fashion an enduring Pan-African architecture. Thus the political foundation or norm for inter-African state cooperation is weak as the relationship between political leadership and the population in each African society is. When thought to re-frame Pan-Africanism is considered, it has to take on board these negative constraints and barriers into account. At least they cannot be ignored. In addition the African military has not fully retreated. While it may be forced to validate its intervention with a democratic facade, it has not exhausted its ambition to come back. This is partly reinforced by the continuing economic and political crises which encourage the military to spoil for political office.

There are also some formidable economic barriers related to historical peculiarities of Africa's insertion in the world economy and current export-orientated policies imposed by the external donor agencies. To start with, colonialism in Africa did not do a Hong Kong or Taiwan for Africa. It left nearly in every African country weak industrial structures and low level of

industrial diversity and depth. Sub-Saharan Africa's share of global GDP to global population has continued to decline: from 0.27 in 1970 to 0.29 in 1980 to 0.17 in 1985 and 0.14 in 1990 and 0.10 in 1995 and 0.10 in 1996 (World Bank 1997). The per capita GDP of SSA between 198-90 was (-0.9)% and grew worse to (-1.3)% between 1991-95(Castells 1998: 83). Its export share dropped from a 3% share of world exports in 1950 to a 1.1% in 1990 (ibid.). As a destination of world export, Africa's share declined from 3.1% in 1980 to 1.5% in 1995 (ibid.). World imports, terms of trade and relative position of shares in trade, investment, production and consumption showed similar decline. A clear indicator that the continent did not industrialize is that less than 10% of the workforce of the SSA region is employed in industry (ibid.).

African agricultural and food production have declined. Population is growing at a higher rate than agricultural production. Some 76% of the export earnings of SSA come from agriculture. The social consequence of this lack of industrialization, agriculture decline and weak linkage with world economic trends is dereliction of a majority of African humanity. Standards of living are said to have fallen by nearly 25% since 1960. Unemployment is rising. In 1985 at the deepest point of the crises some 47% of the population were below the poverty level. ILO estimated that real wages have declined between 50% and 60% since the early 80s in most countries (ibid.: 93).

More worrying is failure by most African states to deliver services, support industrial and agricultural production and improve the well-being and livelihood of people. Failure of most African states to have the ability and the political will to engage in any meaningful radical social project for the benefit of the least advantage makes injustice and gross inequity to waste human resources. The state is more of a burden than a support to the population becoming itself a factor for the disintegration of the lives of the population.

Another barrier is the endemic nature of conflict and violence in Africa turning virtually the continent into a security no-go area. Much of the security hazard is related to the prevailing economic ruin and poverty afflicting large sections of the population of Africa. As stated at the outset, some twenty-two countries suffer the open sore of conflict. Of these, some countries like Niger, Nigeria and Liberia may become countries where conflicts can start. Countries like Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Congo Kinshasa, Congo Brazzaville, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho have civil conflicts that entailed some form of military intervention by other African states. Ethiopia and Eritrea are in an interstate conflict situation (African Research Bulletin, 1999). The continent is thus sizzling in an active state conflict from civil war to interstate war. The most outrageous aspect to the conflict is that children as young as seven years of age have been armed as child-soldiers (UNICEF 1999).

UNICEF claims that of the 300,000 children-soldiers, 120,000 are from Africa (ibid.). Mass recruitment of child soldiers has taken place in Angola, Burundi, the two Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda (ibid.). Tens of thousands have been reported to have been forcibly recruited. The worst offender is Sierra Leone where child soldiers less than nine years old took part in a two week reign of terror by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in January, 1999, in which thousands of civilians were killed, thousands more had their hands cut off and more than 2000 were raped (ibid.). In Uganda children including girls have been abducted by the Rebel Lord's Resistance Army (ibid.). Rehabilitation and reintegration of demobilized children is difficult. Perhaps there is nothing more repugnant and morally offensive than using children who should be in school to be soldiers.

While some non-mineral wealthy countries are in a conflict, some key mineral wealth holding countries seem to attract conflict. For example, in Angola and also in Sierra Leone, it has been reported that companies have fueled the conflict rather than attenuate it. One would have thought they would recommend stability, but the story suggests that in fact they find that the prevailing instability is lucrative to them. For example UNITA in Angola under Savimbi controls the diamond rich part of Angola. Angola has some of the best diamond fields in the world "80% are of the highest gem quality." (TWR No.103: 37) From 1992-1997 UNITA is said to have ran the biggest diamond - smuggling operation using the proceeds to buy arms. Despite the UN sanctions, many observers have reported that diamond dealers are continuing to trade with rebels. Diamond fields which were handed to the Angolan Government from UNITA control were recovered by armed action by UNITA. The Angolan Government on its part uses the oil boom to finance its own war effort. There is no sign it is running out of cash. It appears that the dropping out of super power competition has been replaced by corporate and conglomerate competition (e.g. diamond magnets against oil magnets). The situation in the Congo which attracted so many types of interference in the past and the present is largely due to the mineral wealth of the Congo basin (ibid.). There, too many companies are involved now, as in the 60s the Union Minerale played a pivotal role in financing the mineral rich Katanga (now Shaba) to secede (ibid.). This action paved the way for Lumumba's assassination. While this may be an isolated case, there seems to be new actors in the form of corporate power on the scene. Companies, mercenaries and armed dealers are continuing in the post cold war period to benefit from the state of conflict in Africa making the ending of these conflicts much harder.

Thus the overall picture that emerges is that military action and violence both internal and inter-state have been rife. The Organization of African Unity continues to mediate on all these conflicts but its resolutions are often

ambiguous and do not seem to be taken seriously and implemented by the parties in conflict. The expected reduction in the violence threshold in Africa did not happen. Unfortunately, this pervasive and perverse conflict conflagration seems to back up those who say that talk of Pan-Africanism is more of a "pipe dream" rather than a feasible alternative. An OAU backed by a strong security system could have had a chance to contain conflict in the continent.

Each state is vulnerable to outside interference and does not have the security capacity to neutralize hostile activities against it. Nkrumah did recognize this fact and insisted on a united defense and security arrangement as part of his drive for a continental unity. A united defense force without the spectacle of military intervention in African politics would have enhanced Africa's power and invulnerability to the numerous instigation of destabilization directed at the weak and fragile states. Unfortunately when the OAU was formed African countries settled for the parcellation of the African continent by confirming rather than rejecting the same external design which split one family from another. In doing so they showed a singular lack of imagination and intellectual, moral and political courage. They decided to do their own thing and occasionally meet by setting up a very weak forum and secretariat with neither a big idea nor a large budget. There is no political or economic barrier to African States from the OAU which they cannot easily and costlessly ignore. The OAU lacks authority being a rather toothless outfit whose authority has been undermined by the very unpredictability and chaotic instability of the states constituting it. Thus it is no exaggeration to say the OAU was from its inception an abortion of Pan-Africanism rather than its renewal and further development.

There is also another formidable barrier related to the identity crises in Africa. The continent is not only an ethnic mosaic, it has been usual to divide the continent in cultural terms. Those colonies which have been imposed upon by France are called Francophone. Those dominated by Britain/England are called Anglophone, and those ruled by Portugal are called Lusophone and those north of the Sahara belong to the Levantine world. This continued cultural division makes it harder to develop a dynamic integrated African culture centered on the concept of an "Afro-philia". The latter simply means the rejection of Afrophobia and the emergence of an African anchored cultural identity where

Africans in the world

Africans into the world as slave conscripts, maids, servants, attendants, soldiers, laborers, refugees, skilled Africans fueling the brain drain, some as migrants in search of new opportunities etc

People of the world in Africa

People flowing into Africa as "explorers", missionairies, slave traders, imperial "civilizors", investors, consultants, settlers, tourists etc.

1. Those people of African origin scattered mainly in Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean may be claimed to constitute "Cultural Africa".
2. Those who have settled in Africa from various parts of the world and made permanent homes there belong to "Continental Africa" despite the origin of their initial migration to Africa.
3. "Continental Africa" in the pursuit of the goal of creating the concept and reality of an "emancipated Africa".
4. Africans need to integrate with the world on the basis of a status as an emancipated people and not forced and oppressed people, as they have been from time immemorial.
5. Cultural Africa continues to face racism; Continental Africa suffers from domination, exploitation, violence, conflict, poverty and marginalization.
6. The build up of Continental Africa helps to reduces the discriminatory threshold in cultural Africa.
7. Assistance by Cultural Africa to Continental Africa partly serves its own emancipation.
8. In principle other races can become part of Africa. The only condition on the settler population is that they develop an African attitude. The litmus test is that they accept, endorse and promote the emancipation of Africa. If they cannot do that, they can be criticized legitimately for not being on the side of the rise of an African interest and emancipation.
9. Build a new African identity and emancipatory potential in the continent from both the positive experience of Africa´s ancient history of relative success and the negative history of oppression since 1500. This will provide the direction to write a new African Constitution like the American and French ones.
10. A common industrial an communication program for the continent can be developed on the basis of a shared African attitude and identity by all in the continent. Re-framing Pan-Africanism along this line of thought should engage scholars, politicians and academics and all those who are taking Pan-African orientated initiatives from within and outside the continent.

Africans are confident and comfortable being African without disparaging others and their cultures. Why culture has become an issue is related to the continued association vertically between the group of African countries which were under Britain and France to them respectively rather than to each other. This has added to the failure to stimulate horizontally inter-African integration. Political decolonization did not include the decolonization of cultural domination. In fact the suggestion by Nkrumah to replace colonial languages by at least the selection of one language from each region of the continent did not seem to have got a hearing. The languages of the OAU were chosen as English, French and Arabic. The choice of one of the languages, e.g. Zulu language in the South, KI-

Swahili in the East, Arabic in the North and Hausa or one of the West African languages for the OAU were rejected.

Given the European imperial and racist rejection of Africans from 1500 to the present time: 400 years of slavery, plus 100 years of colonial irrational partition, and another 40 years of super power rivalry and continued indirect interference-identity formation and self-worth construction is specially more significant to build the African person and citizen in Africa than elsewhere in the world. Culture and identity formations in Africa are part of the self-liberation of the African. When Africans express "philia" for external powers, by the same token they may be rejecting their pride in being African. Some may even harbor inner hate and phobia making it easier for them to submit to forces who dominate them rather than working with other Africans as their equals. The idea of killing Afrophobia and creating an enduring Africa-philia is central to any Pan-African project. This issue of restoring an African "philia" is linked to creating an African consciousness sufficiently robust culturally to sustain a Pan-African economic and political dynamic culture.

Some African states now are suffering from the unattractive hazard of ethnic involution and dispersion. After nearly forty years of "nation-building" the post-colonial state has not managed to forge a nation called Somalia, Liberia. Sierra Leone, Rawnda, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and so on by a dissolution of the mosaic of criss-crossing ethnic loyalties. The alternative to a failed nation-building project and ethnic corporatism is Pan-Africanism. What needs attention is focusing energy and thought on the determinants and necessary intellectual, moral, political and practical preparation to create rapidly the economic and political and moral resources to decolonize Africans culturally by crystallizing an African-wide interest and making people comfortable living with their African identity, sense and sensibility.

From the brief outline of the barriers, one gets some compelling evidence to buttress the worst features of an Afro-pessimist frame of mind. That is what information does. It is too much negative political and economic information about Africa - a continent largely written off for being a dumping ground for anything negative from HIV-Aids to what have you. There is nothing surprising if such an information overload makes one a pessimist. The optimist may notice this negative information, but he refuses to use this information to limit his horizon, his projection of the ideal, the possible, the imaginable, the visionable. He refuses to murder imagination with the dead- weight of information. His insight lies in seeing that the enormously negative information can be changed by striving to make positive facts and new information. I shall therefore say that a Pan-African imagination is exactly an ideal to work for, a project to mobilize intellectual, political, social, economic, moral and cultural resources to give

shape and design to it. The very fact that so many of these barriers described above exist should stimulate and incentives us to enter the search for new avenues and new perspectives to deal with the problems where other remedies have been tried and failed.

Thus the negative picture outlined above as "formidable barriers" argue paradoxically not against African unity but what the lack of it has done to limit Africa's well-being and freedom. They are more like signs and calls urging those who wish Africa well to hurry and unite the continent. Problems have compounded and multiplied precisely for failure to build solidarity amongst Africans. Part of the reason why a revival of Pan-Africanism is essential has to do with the fact that there is no way these barriers will be removed unless a bold and imaginative step is taken to surmount them. Such barriers cannot be solved by pragmatic tinkering within the framework of post-colonial irrational fragmentation. They require a change of framework and a fresh start of unity and inter-African solidarity.

Towards a Theory for Re-framing Pan-African Integration
The ideas expressed by the early Pan-African thinkers have become the road not taken now. In a sense the prevailing state of conflict in the continent is a mirror showing the cost of not taking an imaginative leap in the first place at the time of political decolonization. As noted earlier Nkrumah had argued for continental integration at the very moment when the continent was going through a historical transition from colonial rule to political independence. He said such historical moments come with opportunities and dangers. If Africans do not seize the opportunities, they would expose themselves to danger. On 1961 he wrote his book "I speak for Freedom" where he tried to establish the sociological reasons for Africa's integration. In 1963 he wrote, "Africa Must Unite" where he stated the case for an African Common Market to complement the Union of African States. He even committed Ghana's "faith in African Unity" and said that "we have declared our preparedness to surrender the sovereignty of Ghana, in whole or in part, in the interest of the Union of African States and territories as soon as ever such a union become practicable."[4] Any honest theorization of Pan-African integration has to revisit the thinking of its most courageous and intellectually far-sighted proponent. Without bringing Nkrumah's thoughts and his sacrifice, any re-visiting of Pan-Africanism will be incomplete. Indeed Nkrumah was a rare leader in Africa. He had written more books than he had time to govern Ghana. It is rare that leaders write with such foresight and creativity while they run the ship of state. They often write memoirs after they retire. He is unique in having produced enormously original ideas such as the idea of a monetary union with one African currency of issue-a novel idea in the

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[4] Nkrumah, in a radio broadcast to Ghana , March 6, 1960.

early 60s. It is so novel that the economist who predicted the European nations will create a single currency has been rewarded with a Nobel Prize this year!

The early discussion in creating a social, economic and political arrangement by Nkrumah and others is still relevant. A theory of Pan-Africanism should therefore begin by confirming the essential validity of much of the insight from the progressive leaders of the 60s. The maximalist unitarian ideas so consistently espoused by Nkrumah and others have not been tried. Had these ideas been tried, Africa would have had problems. But these would have been problems related to making the unity function and strengthen. The alternative trajectories based on inheriting the 1885 Berlin Conference's colonial maps on Africa and some tentative moves to make some regional integration did not create the necessary and sufficient conditions to prevent external interference and increase the internal relevance of governing elite to the disadvantaged majority. Since the factors that unite Africa are more than that divide the continent, a useful starting point for reframing Pan-Africanism is to pick up the ideas that were prevented to shape continental institutions such as the OAU. A theory of Pan-Africanism should also attempt to enrich the new optimism coming from South Africa, Libya and Nigeria for a grander vision to lift the continent from its present predicament.

A theory of Pan-Africanism should identify how equality can be established in the context of recognition of difference, and how liberty can be forged amidst cultural variety, religious difference and differential resource and ecological endowments, and how solidarity can flourish from the development of a shared sense of African identity. Without developing an African identity, it is not easy to sustain a Pan-African initiative, perspective for solidarity and a movement for unity. The key to a theory of Pan-Africanism is to forge a shared value and vision worthy enough to shape, mediate and put in place effective mechanisms for resolving intractable conflicts and stimulate and inspire the capabilities of citizens and communities in order to achieve harmony consistent with a shared conception of an African identity. A shared conception of an African identity should be a universal value which is not detained by partial interests, cultural particularisms, state-nationisms, ethnic primordial loyalties, racial classifications and other desultory practices, capable of commanding moral and political authority, much like Christ, Mohammed and Budha commanded religious authority. Such a shared conception is necessary to develop and provide overriding expression to the African identity of African citizens without giving offense to their numerous other identities. Such metaphysics related to the project of providing expression to African identity will be necessary to forge a Pan-African ideal out of the numerous state- nations, racial groups and ethnic groups in the continent. Fortunately, the post- colonial remonstration to form "nations out of the states carved by colonial boundary- making" has not

succeeded. Settling political and economic arrangement on a foundationional idea of an African metaphysics expressing an African identity has been the road not taken and needs to be picked up once again. The key is to bring up the generations from every African country by adding an African identity to any other identity each individual wishes to profess or express. The African identity should provide the shared basis or focal imagination for building the African citizenship of all those living, working and constructing a future in Africa. All out civic education to foster the African identity of Africans across the continent is part of the realization of a Pan-African imagination.

It does look odd to define an ontological fact that can be described as an African identity and/ or an African interest. First let me allude to what may not be admitted to define an African identity and that is: an African identity should not be defined or fixed biologically. It should be defined as a process of social construction and historical experience. If we bring genetics, race and biology into it, it will be difficult to compose unity. Social experience is much more dynamic and fluid and while biological determinism is static. Social experience can accommodate a range of group types from any race, Arab, Jew, gentile, Black, Caucasian, Brown and Yellow. There must be a home for each of these types in Africa as there is a place for any type of person in the USA, Israel and some of the multicultural European societies. If people make a home in Africa, bear children, work and contribute honestly to Africa's wealth and power, they should not be excluded because of their biological differences and because of the wrongs their ancestors inflicted on the majority African population. It is their current attitude and their readiness to add an African identity to their own other identities and prepare to live as equal and different citizens that is the relevant data to consider.

The challenge is how to learn to select amongst the numerous identities which Africans have the one that provides individuals and communities maximum intellectual, moral, political, material and humane advancement. And that identity can be selected without undermining the diverse identities which an individual acquires in her life time. An Arab, White, Brown and Black African does not have to degrade her racial identity when developing African identity and consciousness. Each can retain its distinct and diverse identity and evolve a shared conception of being African on the basis of their common challenges, experiences and destiny as Africans. Where intelligence and imagination helps is in searching and selecting that identity in the choices to be made for settling the principle of major political association in order to promote African well being and freedom.

Pan-Africanism as a social and political arrangement is best suited to provide the broad framework for Africans to evolve an identity as equal but different

citizens. On the broad framework it provides a constitution which is ethically worthy, politically practicable and intellectually imaginative can be framed bringing together diverse groups and challenging them all to forge a non-fractured future and destiny. An African identity provides them with the capabilities to build the vast economic and political resources of the continent. And this choice, when made, has to confront the continuation of colonially imposed hyphenation such as Anglophone and Francophone as unacceptable for any one wishing to build a Pan-African framework for Africa's development and de-colonized future. Even those who have made a home from their origin in France and England have to shed their Anglophone and Franchophone feelings and develop what I shall describe as an "Africaphone" identity. Africaphone or Africa-philia is the same thing as having an African consciousness and it is the moral, political, intellectual and cultural minimum required to forge a Pan-African perspective. While the Pan-African movement should be a broad church reflecting spatial, regional, cultural, racial, linguistic and ethnic variations, diversities, varieties and creativities, its core must be built from the oppressed African majority. That will provide stability to the movement despite the problems related to the time needed to shed completely Afrophobia notions inherited from an oppressive history.

A key issue for theorizing Pan-Africanism is to identify and discover a founding principle to give shape and substance to Africa's hopes and aspirations by rejecting the oppressive past. A theory of Pan-Africanism has to grapple with establishing some principles for evolving a shared goal to pursue an African solidarity and union. It is not the first time that disparate and heterogeneous communities come to join for the pursuit of a shared goal. Many continental powers like USA and Russia have agreed on some founding principles to erect constitutional architectures to glue together different and diverse communities to carry out peaceful and broadly ethical lives. There is no reason why Africa cannot design a constitutional order to found a Pan-African union. To say that Africa is to suggest that constitutional principles and arrangements can be developed to foster and re-frame the Pan-African ideal for our times. Once such foundational principles are identified and described, I shall consider an outline of a theory has been sketched without going into a deep explanation of the details of the numerous factors, pressures, opportunities and threats which compel a Pan-African move to be infinitely desirable more than other ideas which are also ethically worthy to construct social arrangements.

I shall identify a founding principle for developing a shared African identity from Africa's unique history of sustained oppression. From such unique experience of the majority population in Africa emerges a human value which is universal; a value of standing for justice and freedom, against exploitation, recognition of equality as equal and different persons and a value for fostering

human well being. Paradoxically Africa's experience of oppression provides the value premise for universal human freedom. It is the rejection of absolutist and feudal oppression which gave birth to the ideals of the French Revolution which became enshrined as the Universal Human Rights. It is resistance and defiance against British colonial oppression which gave birth to the American constitution. It should be the rejection of the imperial-colonial casual tearing up of the African continent which should give birth to the African constitution. Resistance and defiance against oppression provide the political, moral and intellectual resources for writing the constitution of African unity and solidarity. The alternative to lack of resistance is the uninterrupted and still active domination and oppression of Africa which took a nasty form since the time of slavery during the year 1500. Africa has more reason to burst into history as a unified entity than those who made the French or American Revolutions, given the unending context of its oppression. In the defiance of this oppression can be laid the foundation of a shared historical and social experience to forge an equally shared identity. Thus Africa's oppression paradoxically frames the contours for generating an emancipatory imagination. I say from the depth of Africa's history of oppression, one can discover the source for erecting the founding principles to generate a positive African identity and consciousness. Pan-Africanism is thus not an instrumental value useful for economic and political construction. It is a more substantial doctrine embodying the intellectual and moral force of a community defying a sustained system of oppression (while changing its form and never changed its character) denying Africa's humanity and liberty.

Some might wonder how the principles of Africa's liberation can be fixed from the cruel hands of oppression directed against it. It is paradoxical, but history never moves on a straight line. Africa's common challenge is its unmitigated oppression. The latter provides the resource for evolving a shared sense of identity. From the reservoir, current and flow of Africa's liberation, the continent attains a moral stature of world-significance. Pan-Africanism as an embodiment of Africa's liberation frames Africa's human, moral, political value. Africa becomes a towering giant morally well beyond the reach of any culture just as Mandela by his near generation imprisonment bestowed on his nation a moral presence unsurpassed anywhere at the present time.

Africa becomes a unified entity because it emerges as a moral community by subscribing to the principles resisting oppression, with a value commitment for liberation of humanity, a community of discernment for freedom and justice for the wretched of the earth because it is itself the wretched of the earth. It has experienced inferiority complex which is hard to expel or heal which should make it sensitive to all those who suffer discrimination. It has been rejected as sub-human which should give it ethical sense to stand behind the rejected,

dejected, suppressed, oppressed and exploited. It has been robbed of its personality and forced to wear white mask on black skin-making its values bifurcate between African tradition and European cultural imitation. And that should provide it with resources to oppose violence from the personal to the organized, including the silent violence of poverty.

Africa faces the challenge of not reading its history for the purpose of cataloguing the rate and volume of its victimization, but to glean from it the resources of its liberation and to assist all those who find themselves in its situation everywhere. Africa has been violated, disfigured, fractured, and broken. Developing a perspective of an intelligent commerce with that ugly past, Africa should turn negativity into positivity, problems into challenges, a dreadful past into a happy present and future. Where it was broken, it must mend, where it was disfigured, it must figure and stand out, where it is violated and fractured, it must recompose and stand tall and move forward. Africa should not dwell in the past, it must learn from the past to live and claim the gifts and opportunities of the present and protect itself from the dangers of the future.

There is thus one overriding reason for taking Africa as one entity despite the diversity, ethnic variety, geographical and cultural dissimilarities- and that is the indiscriminate historical inheritance by Africans: slavery, colonialism, partition, continued uninvited and unwelcome interference and being spoken at rather than spoken to- to date. Name it, Africa has experienced all these. While the internal injustice is unacceptable, the externally induced injustice has gone on and on. It does not seem it will stop if Africans do not do something about it by organizing themselves and creating a movement to confront and overcome it. Pan-Africanism will make sense if it is placed within this larger framework. A theory for re-framing it makes sense if the external impact though differentiated affecting different groups and regions differently (i.e., certainly no homogenous affair) is taken to be qualitatively equivalent in establishing the condition of oppression, and by the same token providing Africa the moral standing for human liberation. The political, psychological economic and cultural experience for Africa is for all practical purposes qualitatively similar - a point, which I surmise, justifies looking Africa as one entity. Even if there are exceptions, there is value in imagining this African community as an ideal projection, a potentiality, an anticipation and imagination to come to terms with and overcome an oppressive past and continuing negative present. Every African should have an interest and ought to engage in the construction of a dynamic identity by the defiance, resistance and overcoming of the peculiar oppression directed at Africa. It is the peculiarity of Africa's oppression which provides the shared basis for constructing an African identity for liberation. Pan-Africanism becomes the shared imagination, value, vision or ideology of a collective African rejection of a peculiar oppression. It is the language of resistance and

defiance to build Africa on a new foundation of liberty, humanity and "infinite well-being."

Claiming Africa's past should not be an exclusively African predilection. It should be any one who finds in that gross injustice and wrong a clarion call to work for justice. Those in Africa whose ancestors and even themselves were engaged in the feast of this oppression should undergo a change of consciousness. They should develop an African consciousness because they are in Africa which continues to suffer from a peculiar oppression. And no matter how much they try to escape, they cannot but notice the open sore of a continent. And if they wish to widen this sore, they have no place. If they feel their future will be subjected to an oppressive condition, because of what is directed at Africa, they ought to assist the Pan-African revival by withdrawing their passive or active support to oppression. What comes against Africa will affect them one way or the other. The weaker the continent is the more their own opportunities will be affected. It is not easy to cash in forever if violence and conflict disintegrates Africa's social and economic fabric. They need to evolve not just a bifocal national imagination but also a new African identity. A pre-requisite for African consciousness is developing a general African identity and interest and not retain Chinese, Indian and European aspirations which translate in using Africa for the benefit of others. Subscription to African interest is another way of saying that the primary loyalty of any of the population groups who have decided to make for themselves and their children a future in Africa, should work to make Africa rich and strong. If their relationship to Africa is instrumental built on the intentionality of using Africa's resources to build the place of their origin, then they have problems in relating to Africa and maintaining loyalty to it. This "interest and consciousness" should be de-racialized. That means that native Africans should be willing to admit others. But others must be willing to demonstrate primary loyalty to Africa. Such a movement will lead to a shared goal and understanding. If there is a strengthening Pan-African movement, it will encourage different identities to evolve a stronger African identity.

Recognition of an oppressive past whether by those who continue to suffer from it, and by those who were issued from those who made others suffer is a moral minimum to admit one for developing an African consciousness in itself. An African consciousness for itself will be engagement for liberation and justice because of this shared past; a way of escaping and transcending this past by the ideal projection of a Pan-African unification. From Africa's history of oppression can provide all Africans irrespective of color, creed, ethnic origin, location and language an essential unity to their human identity. From Africa's historical tradition (however ugly, offensive and negative) comes the African opportunity for freedom from the dead weight of this oppressive past.

Developing a shared collective memory of this past does not mean the oppression was felt uniformly. For some it requires simply the admission that Africa's current possibilities have been severely limited by a past which denied African humanity and liberty. For most it is the intense feeling that such oppression must be rejected. And there is strength in a unified voice to bring about an effective rejection and an African purpose.

Otherwise there should be creative tension, plural debate to shape the understanding of the past in order to project the emancipatory possibilities of the present and future.

Africans are perfectly entitled to read their past in order to remove the legacies of the rejected past. It sounds counter intuitive to theorize Africa's contours of liberation from oppression. And there is no suggestion that if "oppression can be a foundation to provide African unity" it must be good. No, that implication is totally wrong. Oppression limits human freedom and is morally, intellectually and politically repugnant. The most significant data of Africans' collective experience is their oppression. If it had not happened it would have been infinitely preferable, but the deed is done. What I am suggesting is that we can lament this fact or courageously design a foundation for an emancipatory constitution which unifies and liberates all from the unique particularity of African humanity, justice and liberty. This is also not saying that there are no other factors such geography that can be employed to constitute a Pan-African future. It is to say nothing is more powerful and all encompassing as Africa's shared experience of oppression. It is also not a romantization of oppression, it is in fact the opposite - it is to find the resources of anti-oppression from the history of oppression itself. It is a defining criterion to include and exclude those who recognize an African interest, direction and future. Those who do not admit this elementary fact about the African temper cannot justify claiming admission to being Africans. If Africa's indignity is not their concern, Africa should not be concerned for them. The only person who wishes to insulate herself/ himself when Africa suffers indignity is the person who has not developed an African interest or consciousness. Oppression thus serves as a selection mechanism as well as the foundation for writing the Africa constitution.

What I am suggesting can be supported by those who have theorized the will to a renaissance without being discouraged by a depressive environment which Africa finds itself now As Lewis Mumford said history can be likened to a reservoir of human experience out of which each generation can identify the main currents and flows (Mumford 1944: 243). Africa should try to select, as Nkrumah did in the 60s, the main current and flow which resolves the essential tension of Africa's historical oppression which still endures under different guises. Africa must learn and imagine, and mobilize and organize (not agonize!),

symbols, icons, heroes, episodes from that oppressive past to create a reservoir of potentialities to build Africa's future by the handiwork of Africans themselves.

That Africans learn to mount an intelligent commerce with Africa's own historical past means the same thing as converting their current victimization's into a potential current, flow and resource for Africa's liberation. What is needed is the development of an African consciousness. For this a sea-change in attitude is essential. This change will pave the way to see why a political association on an African identity on a continental scale is feasible and an alternative. A Pan-African movement involving communication amongst citizens, political parties, mass organizations, women's associations, consumers and producer networks, farmers associations, learned and R & D societies, trade unions, professional associations, agencies for communication, transport and infrastructure building, manufactures associations and educational and cultural institutions should mushroom across regions and eventually the continent. Pan-Africanism is perhaps the only alternative to rescue Africa. Everything else has been tried and it had not lifted Africa up. I*t is time to try new avenues and new perspectives*. Pan-Africanism as an ideal to bring people, economies, countries, states, learning institutions together should be given a chance. I say, bring Nkrumha back, and renew Africa's future on Africa's terms and let us share the will to bring "Africa's unity with Africa's renaissance now."

Concluding Remarks
Pan-Africanism is being revived from every part of the continent. A new opportunity exists to re-frame it to provide feasible moves to make it happen faster. Besides the foundational reason that I have selected, there are many compelling circumstances facing Africa which demand Africans to band together or perish one by one.

Post-colonial Africa has failed to make political associations which free the human being from all forms of constraints and disadvantages to increase well-being freedom, well-being agency, functioning and capability. What I shall describe subtractive well-being (e.g. torture, routine human rights abuse, etc.,) and divisive well-being (e.g. politicizing ethnic/ primordial loyalties, violence of ethnic cleansing etc.,) prevailed foreclosing the freedom and opportunities for human basic well being (food, shelter, clothing) and additive well-being (spreading education, health service provision and enhancing African humanity, liberty and the basis of self-respect by revealing agency for public life beyond individual and family well-being concerns). This failure makes search for an alternative extremely urgent.

The state led nation building project has not included the majority. It has no deal for them. It has been felt by them largely an organization of oppression and well-being subtraction and divisiveness rather than addition and multiplication. It has been experienced by the vast majority of Africa's population as a hazard and danger to the security to their well-being development.

The introduction of election by the military and civilian elite in Africa does not mean democracy in Africa. A sustainable democratic transition in Africa remains to be built yet. That is to say, democracy is still a long way off in the deeper sense of freeing the African disadvantaged population from the economic, social and political constraints universally imposed upon them by the formal and informal condominium of transnational and African elite. Perhaps a window to democracy has been open; the door to it yet remains to be found and opened in order to forge an African society of liberty, human well-being, capability, functioning, dignity and humanity.

Conflict remains endemic. South Africa may provide another useful lesson for the continent in terms of conflict management through reconciliation, truth commission models of justice provision however imperfect this may be, democratization and perhaps employing traditional and modern authorities in some meaningful partnerships. Conflict avoidance, conflict controlling and conflict deflection strategies have to be integrated in any Pan-African project.

Perhaps the most important constraint is that Africa faces a global economy which has discriminated against it from the 1500. Africa faces a global economy being largely at the margins of it. Meanwhile liberal ideas which try to covert the entire global economic space into one gigantic bazaar or "free market" are dominant. They are pushed by what has now come to be known as the "Washington Consensus" whose ideas has dominated those who demand stabilization of balance of payments (IMF), medium term loans for investment (World Bank) and a mixed and contradictory signal of openness and regulation for trade (WTO). Such globalization comes with winners and losers. And Africa is not a winner. Like the losers globalization is likely to bid down Africa's living standards and quality of life as a marginalized factor much as bidding down the living standard of such a non-scarce factor, labor-throughout the world. The only way to counter this is the way Germany countered the cheap goods that undermined its economy from Britain by creating a larger African market through Pan-African integration.

Pan-Africanism has to be re-thought not in terms of a union of Governments, but more as a shared goal, potentiality and ideal to generate the political resources to bring peoples, economies, cultures and communities together. Instead of looking to the existing states to unite (the top), it is helpful to think of how the unity of

the peoples, regions, economies, learning systems and communities can be forged. States must be asked to facilitate this unity process and not become themselves barriers. Beyond this objective, it may not be wise or feasible to coerce states to unite when they are so diverse and fail to share some basic norms for an African-wide unity at the state level to unfold and become sustainable.

There is the question of making Pan-Africanism work where there are still formidable barriers. But once principles are agreed the issue of how to construct workable social arrangements will require the principle of consent of those engaged in the journey of discovery and building a common future. The Pan-African social arrangement must work not only if particular groups are able to achieve transcendence of the limits of the nation-state by the creation of an African-wide economic, political and security center but also with the creation of the most tolerant local governance arrangements suitable to the cultural, ecological and economic peculiarities of the communities which are allowed to self-define themselves. There is scope to define the rights of the citizen by the creation of an African wide legal and human rights, laws and principles. An open and learning perspective and dynamics of institutional innovation should be built in the Pan-African social arrangement. As long as a dynamic, flexible and decentralized arrangement with consent has been agreed as a way of forging unity, the Pan-African ideal will be a highly desirable alternative to the current chaos in Africa.

Children across the continent must grow by being weaned on an educational curriculum built on Afro-philia and Pan-African ideas. They must not be undermined by an educational design which threaten their self-esteem and self-worth. The educational system needs to be re-orientated to serve an African humane purpose.

A radical social project to change the condition of poverty of the majority population in Africa should be on the Pan-African agenda. The selfish elite of Africa along with the international syndicate that sustain it including the nearly 2000 international Non Governmental Organizations operating in Africa should be challenged with the ideas, visions and strategies of building Africa from the moral position and theory of justice of making the least advantage to enter the space of advantage and capability as equal citizens of Africa. Their own political economy to reproduce themselves has gone on by increasing poverty in Africa. A continental approach to Africa's problems should be able to lay the foundation of a self-reliant and selective external intervention approach. This will make Africans to put on the agenda their own issues and not the issues which come with gifts from the donors.

The OAU should write the African constitution embodying the principles of Africa's identity and aspirations. For that to happen it has to be reconceptualized to develop executive, legislative, judiciary and other functions to create the African-wide legal, judicial, political and economic systems. As it is presently, it does give African leaders the opportunity to meet and not much else. This, at a time when the world is forging ahead and Africa is lagging behind. The OAU has to be re-thought in light of the concept of a re-framed Pan-Africanism.

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