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Two Africas? Two Ugandas? An African “Democratic Developmental State”? Or Another “Failed” State?

Timothy M. Shaw
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Timothy M Shaw

Uganda's dramatic redevelopment over the last decade should undermine ready stereotypes of the continent's exponential decline/anarchy. Yet this growth has not been uniformly experienced in terms of different regions & classes. This study applies the concept proposed by Thandika Mkandawire (2001) to the case of Uganda, recognising that it was formulated with two particular micro-states in mind - Botswana & Mauritius. Since 1990, Uganda has transcended an unenviable history of decline & trauma to advance reconstruction & African (HIPC?) governance. Four decades after formal independence, the Ugandan case illustrates the familiar pattern of a few winners & many losers, yet some gains are more widely distributed than others; for example, UHT milk & cell-phones versus the traumas of HIV/AIDS, street children/soldiers & orphans etc. Meanwhile, fresh produce & forex transfers from diasporas come to balance traditional 'colonial' commodities as sources of export revenue, augmented by invisible, informal, often illegal, income from the Congo. In short, the pattern of human development/rights/security in Uganda is uneven as most analyses, including the invaluable UNDP HDR for Uganda, indicate. Meanwhile, what are the implications for comparative analyses/policies/practices arising from this novel African case?

…neither Africa's post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful 'developmental states' rule out the possibility of African 'developmental states' capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto (Mkandawire 2002: 289)

…the spread of the term ‘global civil society’ reflects an underlying social reality. What we can observe in the 1990s is the emergence of a supranational sphere of social & political participation in which citizen groups, social movements, and individuals engage in dialogue with each other & with various governmental actors – international, national & local – as well as the business world…global civil society both feeds on & reacts to globalization (Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor 2001: 4 & 7)

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...non-government institutions, or more generally civil society, plays a crucial role in bringing about & maintaining good governance. But if civil society is to play such a role, new processes of engagement will be required at the local, national & international levels...There is an urgent need for governments & inter-governmental organizations to examine & define the rules of engagement with civil society in the coming years (Culpeper 2001/2: 9-10)

...governance on debt was shifted slowly beyond the largely state- & IFI-centric strand of the international debt regime...the NGOs & the sympathetic fragments of the epistemic community have grown in strength & influence, resulting in a much more complex web of international governance... (Callaghy 2002: 117)

Effective governance is often the ‘missing link’ between national anti-poverty efforts & poverty reduction. For many countries, it is in improving governance that external assistance is needed – but not with a new set of poverty-related conditionalities imposed on top of existing economic conditionalities (UNDP 2000a: 8)

Lack of donor attention to how political problems pose threats to Uganda’s economic success has proved to be dangerous both for Uganda’s economy & for the possibility of sustainable democracy (Hauser 1999: 634)

This paper argues that, informed by the demise of the Asian developmental state in the mid-1990s & possible rise of an African variant in the early-2000s (Mkandawire 2001), we need to rethink the assumptions & analyses of 'comparative politics' to accommodate a range of irrefutable current phenomena such as contracting-out, ‘corruption’, flexibilization/feminization, fundamentalisms, money-laundering, narco-diplomacy, regionalisms, smuggling, the privatization of security, supply chains etcetera. These are no longer aberrations but rather central features of the political culture/economy of the majority of the world’s states, typical of regions like Africa, Central America, Central Asia, Eastern Europe etc. Furthermore, such distinctive forms of 'capitalisms' confirm that there are important differences amongst its major regional variants, not just in the 'trilateral' world - between liberal trans-Atlantic Anglo-American & corporatist continental European along with Japanese (Cox 1999) - but also 'overseas' Chinese, Latino, Islamic & 'African'. Thus the current political culture/economy of ‘Africa’ has to be situated in a range of interrelated contexts, from global to local (Shaw 1999), as presented in the first half of this paper.
Definitions of & relations among states, economies & civil societies are everywhere in flux given globalizations, regionalisms, migrations, neo-liberalism etc. Yet, as indicated in the final section d) below, contemporary texts on government, international relations and/or political science rarely so appreciate. Likewise, the post-bipolar ‘world community’ now consists of some 200 mainly poor, small, weak countries but most orthodox studies of ‘foreign policy’ fail to recognize their tenuousness or vulnerability (Khadiagala & Lyons 2001) unlike the state of analysis in the less ominous/global 'world' of the 1960s. Today, only a minority of ‘critical’ analysts focus on the ‘other’ side of globalizations (Broad 2002, Gills 2000, Klein 2000, Mittelman 2000): the regional & global networks of informal/illega trade in people & products, mafias/militias, drugs & guns etc (Cox 1999). Yet the formal governmental regimes of over half the members of the UN & World Bank exert at best a tenuous control over their territories, economies & civil societies.

In the aftermath of the erstwhile Asian miracle/model, we need to reflect on resulting analytic & policy insights: were 'Asian values'/the 'Singapore School' merely an intellectual disguise or subterfuge for Asian (essentially 'Overseas Chinese') 'cronyism' (Crawford 2000)? Might the African initiative/renaissance supersede that in Asia a decade later? Is Thandika Mkandawire's (2001) formulation of an African democratic developmental state a chimera? Could the juxtaposition of Asia 1990s & Africa 2000s throw creative light on developmental experiences/lessons/policies? In particular, are HIPC & NEPAD compatible, leading to an original framework for an innovative form of local to continental African developmental governance?

I turn first to the global-local dimensions of Uganda as an emerging democratic developmental state, before turning to an analysis of its current HIPC governance.

Global

First, just as states are highly heterogeneous – from Switzerland & Singapore to Somalia & Sierra Leone – so likewise are non-state actors. The two non-state ‘corners’ of the ‘governance’ 'triangle' (Commonwealth foundation 1999: 16) include global corporations & local micro-enterprises along with informal & illegal enterprises as well as formal & legal. Thus it is imperative to recognise that ‘global capitalisms’ are in fact heterogeneous rather than homogeneous: relationships around the governance triangle vary between Anglo-American ‘liberal', European 'corporatist', Scandinavian welfarist & Asian varieties, notably Chinese (mainland
& ‘overseas’) versus Japanese…with Africa having its own distinctive form of for-profit structures, increasingly impacted by South African capital & brands.

Similarly, NGOs vary from familiar global INGOs to very local grassroots organizations (Desai 2002, Van Rooy 2002). In particular, NGOs can be distinguished in terms of whether they are primarily engaged in policy advocacy as think tanks or service delivery as subcontractors although most do both in varying proportions. Major INGOs have become increasingly engaged with international agencies in the UN & IFI nexuses in terms of both advocacy & subcontracting (Nelson 1995 & 2002). And such legal arrangements are matched by illegal transnational networks amongst mafias, militias, private armies etc (Cox 1999, Mittelman 2000).

‘Global civil society’ is very heterogeneous (Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor 2001, Glasius, Kaldor & Anheier 2002) with global social movements coming to play increasingly salient yet quite incompatible roles. On the one hand, many contemporary INGOs have been the sources of new global issues, such as ecology, genetic engineering, gender, global warming, international criminal court, landmines, ozone-depletion, small arms etc (van Rooy 2001) & now ‘blood diamonds’ (Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000). These have led to major global coalitions such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) which resulted in the ‘Ottawa Process’ (Hubert 2000, Tomlin 1998), now replicated in the ‘Kimberley Process’. But they have also advanced ‘anti-globalization’ sentiments as reflected in the ‘battle of Seattle’ against the MAI & subsequent alternative summits & counter-demonstrations at major global & regional summits (Klein 2000, Van Rooy 2001, www.attac.org, www.nologo.org).

In turn, major global corporations increasingly seek to insulate themselves from popular pressures/boycotts through a variety of strategies: from association with the UN Global Compact to corporate codes of conduct, ethical as well as fair trade initiatives, strategic alliances with certain IOs or NGOs etc. Thus many of the MNCs which feature in Naomi Klein’s No Logo (2000) in terms of being targets of anti-corporate campaigns - eg McDonald’s, Nestle, Nike, Shell etc - are most active in the UN Global Compact (www.unglobalcompact.org, Parpart & Shaw 2002)!

One novel aspect of South-North trade in the new global political economy is ‘supply chains’ which link local producers to global markets in novel ways in a variety of sectors, including ‘new’ horticulture etc, in a novel form of 'partnership' (Bendell 2000, Murphy & Bendell 1997). Typically these link producers of fresh flowers, fruits & vegetables to major supermarket chains & use IT for
communication & airfreight/containers for transportation (Ponte & Gibbon 2003). These in turn are open to pressure from advocacy groups over ecology, gender, labour etc, leading to Ethical Trade Initiatives & Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (www.publishwhatyoupay.org) as well as Fair Trade, conditionalities over gender, housing & labour practices etc, as is apparent in thumb-print sketches of sources of specialized coffee beans in Aroma, Costa, Second Cup, Starbucks: ‘chain governance’ (www.gapresearch.org).

There is a growing revisionist debate about whether the three 'corners' of the governance triangle are really separate or are rather different points along a continuum. Certainly, there is continuous communication & interaction along the three sides of the triangle, yet there is also some autonomy at particular times in particular instances over particular issues. In short, notwithstanding the continual possibility of cooptation, many actors at all levels in the governance nexus do maintain a degree of independence, as increasingly demanded by their stakeholders. Thus, the state is not entirely diminished: in some sectors, at certain times, under specific regimes & conditions, it can be 'strong', albeit in association with other state & non-state actors.

**Continental**

The first few examples of developmental states were authoritarian. The new ones will have to be democratic, and it is encouraging that the two most cited examples of such 'democratic developmental states' are both African - Botswana & Mauritius. (Mkandawire 2001: 310)

Second, inter- & non-state relations in Africa are changing at the turn of the century (Khadiagala & Lyons 2001) because of globalization/neo-liberalism extra-continentally but also because of new threats/leaders intra-continentally, now advocated in terms of an ‘African Renaissance’ - from African Union & African Economic Community to New African Initiative (NAI)/New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (www.dfa.gov.za) - & resonance within the G8 community -Africa Action Plan - (www.g8.gc.ca), reinforced by bilateral Blair & Chretien (see below) 'initiatives' for the continent. These may inform & legitimise regional peace-keeping responses to resilient regional conflicts. And they might even facilitate, perhaps unintentionally, non-state definitions of 'new' regionalisms such as ecology, ethnicity, brands, religions, sports etc (Parpart & Shaw 2002). These may extend legitimacy to new African developmental states & their related NEPAD ideology (Taylor & Nel 2001).
Coinciding with such promising developments are moves away from orthodox structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) & conditionalities towards poverty-reduction programmes. SAPs were widely criticized as being onerous & ineffective. Given the pressures on the IFIs, as well as the sequence of Asian, Russian & Argentinian ‘crises’, they moved towards special programmes for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC I & II). To qualify, African regimes had to meet SAP terms & design acceptable poverty reduction strategies in association with civil society.

In the case of Uganda, one of the few currently successful HIPC cases, in the late-1990s the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) acted as an intermediary between state & private sector on the one hand & civil society on the other at both design & implementation stages, moving from policy advocate to policy agent or subcontractor, achieving the status of an authoritative epistemic community’ (Callaghy 2002). As UNCTAD (2000: 148) indicated in a ‘box’ (#7) on the Uganda case, the latter's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was founded on four pillars:

i) creating a framework for economic growth & transformation; ii) ensuring good governance & security; iii) directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their income; & iv) directly increasing the quality of life of the poor.

Thus Uganda is something of a model in terms of designing a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) & then maintaining momentum through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in collaboration with a wide network of ministries, NGOs, international organizations & NGOs, both local & global. According to UNCTAD (2000: 143): The PRSP is intended to be a country-owned document prepared through a participatory process which elicits the involvement of civil society, other national stakeholders & elected institutions. ‘Ownership’ in this context refers to the Government’s taking the lead in the preparation of PRSP, including the animation of the participatory process (which is expected to increase public accountability) & the drafting of the action plan.

Such a poverty reduction network constitutes an example of partnership for rural development as advocated by IFAD in its *Rural Poverty Report 2001: the challenge of ending rural poverty*: a mix of state-NGO-private sector governance facilitated by decentralization.

Similarly, given its recent espousal of ‘human security’, countries like Canada commit more resources to the continent than ‘national interest’ alone would justify,
in part because of notions of ‘human security’ & in part given concerned diasporas. As Chris Brown (2001: 194) suggested, at the turn of the century: As a continent where human security is manifestly at risk, Africa came to figure more prominently in Canada’s foreign policy during 2000 than a narrow examination of national interests might suggest.

**National**

Third, patterns of ‘governance’ in Africa - increasingly inseparable from the notion of a democratic developmental state - are in flux at all levels – local to continental - & all sectors – from state & corporate to non-governmental organisations (NGOs); ie the three 'corners' of the governance ‘triangle’. Contemporary notions of governance have a variety of conceptual, ideological, institutional, political & theoretical sources & correlates (Jenkins 2002, Quadir, MacLean & Shaw 2001). Governance on this continent as others varies over time & between regions (Reinikka & Collier 2001, Shaw & Nyang’oro 2000). And it reveals similarities & dissimilarities with other continents. As elsewhere, notions of comparative politics/development have evolved profoundly over the last decade as the mix of ‘globalizations’ & ‘liberalizations’ have impacted in cumulative ways. The focus on state has been superseded by recognition of diverse & changeable patterns of governance reflected in concepts like public-private partnerships, networks, coalitions etc (see, for example, [www.copenhagencentre.org](http://www.copenhagencentre.org), [www.unglobalcompact.org](http://www.unglobalcompact.org)) (Fowler 2002, Mbabazi, MacLean & Shaw 2002).

The debate continues over whether ‘globalization’ does offer some opportunities for some African states, civil societies & companies at all levels, with the more optimistic ‘liberals’ insisting that it does, despite all the negative evidence & press over the last two decades (Makhan 2002, Nsouli & Le Gall 2001, Reinikka & Collier 2001) Nevertheless, if SAPs generated much scepticism even defeatism on the continent, then their *de facto* successor, offering a distinctive form of globalization - negotiated debt relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) (Anena 2001, Gariyo 2001, [www.udn.or.ug](http://www.udn.or.ug)) - is leading to a novel form of governance. As Callaghy (2001: 138 & 142) suggests: …all HIPC debt relief is now to be tied directly to poverty reduction. This is to be ensured by the creation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSps) put together by debtor countries in consultation with civil society groups. If seriously implemented, this new process could be an important change in international governance on debt, aid & development more generally & may have major implications for the unfolding of democratization processes in Africa & elsewhere.
The UDN continued to grow & increase its capabilities. By 2000 it had more than sixty members as well as strong ties to the Uganda Joint Christian Council & business, student & labour organizations…it was becoming very active in coordinating civil society participation in the PRSP process, which it was doing with the help of Northern NGOs. Lastly, it had improved its own organizational capabilities & was running its own independent website.

‘HIPC governance’ by definition involves the state negotiating Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes with a range of non-state actors at local to global levels, in the Uganda case facilitated by the Uganda Debt Network, itself a heterogeneous coalition of (I)NGOs, think tanks, religious groups etc. In the process of so negotiating & facilitating HIPC governance, the UDN has itself been somewhat transformed not only in status, but also in practice - not just advocacy but also delivery – raising issues about cooption etc (Nelson 1995 & 2002). And certainly, redevelopment has not been evenly distributed across Uganda: the north (61% support for multiparty politics) remains more impoverished & alienated than the south (39% support for multiparty politics in the West) as reflected in opinion polls as well as support for opposition parties & guerrilla movements (Sunday Monitor, 3 February 2002). Conversely, Museveni gets most support for his handling of the political debate from the West (52%) & least from the North (30%). In short, there are profound limits to 'democracy' even in today's Uganda….yet these may be increasingly excused in relation to 'developmental' success; ie the trade-off between economic & political 'liberalizations'.

Further, given the influential role which the donors play in today's Uganda, there may be a danger in them tending to divide NGOs into delivery or advocacy types as both varieties are needed to make governance more efficacious & accountable (Lister & Nyamugasira 2003). Moreover, there may be a danger in privileging civil society overly to the detriment of formal, multi-party politics: civil society, especially when legitimated or reinforced by global donors/media, can 'squeeze out' other democratic processes like elections?

The distinctively 'Ugandan' debate about Movement versus multiparty politics is not separable from the parallel discourse about occasional formal elections versus continuous civil society activity/advocacy. As John Makumbe (1998: 305) suggests: For most of Africa, …civil society would include trade unions; professional associations; church & para-church organizations; resident, student, business & other special interest associations; the media; & various types of NGOs.
Whilst he recognizes the weakness of contemporary civil society in much of the continent, including its tenuous democratic features, Makumbe (1998:317) concludes that with extra-continental support it can continue to develop: The resurgence of civic protest in virtually all sub-Saharan African countries since the late-1980s has resulted, inter alia, in the transformation of the continent’s governance & political systems, with civic groups in most of these countries demanding that their governments be democratic, transparent & accountable to the people. Although much has already been achieved, much also remains to be done if Africa is to have an effective & vibrant civil society.

Similarly, extra-continental actors are also increasingly concerned about the continent in part because of a variety of non-state connections, from diasporas/refugees to biodiversity, conflicts, drugs & guns, sustainability; hence the debates in Canada at the turn of the millennium about Angola, Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan etc involving civil societies, communities, companies, media etc as well as the government (Brown 2001, Van Rooy 2001).

Finally, to conclude this section, Kevin Dunn (2001: 46 & 49) has chided orthodox analysts about their increasingly outdated & inappropriate analytic approaches which reveal a lack of nuanced understanding of distinctive patterns of dynamic, mixed-actor governance on the continent: Just a few of the labels attached to the African state over the past decade or so include ‘failed’, ‘lame’, ‘fictive’, ‘weak’, ‘collapsing’, ‘quasi’, ‘invented’ & ‘imposed’, ‘shadow’, ‘overdeveloped’ & ‘centralized’, ‘swollen’, ‘soft’, ‘extractive’ & ‘parasitic’, premodern’, & ‘post-state’…What needs to be recognized is that the African state is not failing as much as is our understanding of the state.

Local

Finally, fourth, given decentralization & urbanization, the local level of governance – city & community - is of growing importance for human development/security & reveals similar patterns of partnership to the other levels; ie increasing roles of non-state actors in terms of service delivery etc. As we will see in the case of Mbarara municipality & county, subcontracting to local companies for education or to local NGOs for AIDS hospices etc has become commonplace. Over the last decade there has been +/-10% growth in Western Uganda, albeit from a very weak base post-Amin/Obote II regimes. This has advanced both human development & human security. The former is defined by the UNDP (1994: 13) as expanding human capabilities & choices whilst minimizing vulnerabilities & the latter (UNDP 1994:
24) as ‘freedom from fear & freedom from want’: human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life & dignity’. (UNDP 1994: 22)

This paper draws, then, from a variety of interrelated disciplines & debates - from political science/economy & international relations to African, development & security studies - to which I return at the end. It seeks to juxtapose generic concepts like 'civil society' & 'governance' with cases drawn from Africa. While it concentrates on the Great Lakes Region (GLR), it reflects analyses & debates from Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (Villalon & Huxtable 1998). In particular, I juxtapose notions drawn from the overlapping HIPC, African developmental state & NEPAD genres. I also bring in notions of human development/security given their salience in the contemporary continent (Hampson, Hillmer & Molot 2001, UNDP 1994 & 1999). And I particularly reflect on peace-building & reconstruction in today’s Uganda – the roles of NGOs & think tanks – given my continuing position as visiting professor at the new Mbarara University of Science & Technology (MUST) in Western Uganda.

a) Civil society & the state in contemporary Africa: beyond liberalization

At the start of the twenty-first century, NGOs are engaged in service delivery and/or policy advocacy from local to global levels (Clark 2002, Desai 2002, Nelson 2002) leading to 'partnerships' of multiple types (Fowler 2002) which impact the state, whether it seeks such links or not: ‘NGOs create alliances & networks to place pressure on the state’ (Desai 2002: 497)

One side of the governance 'triangle' - that between the state & civil society - is focused on democratisation or 'political liberalisation'. By contrast, the other side - that between the state & private sector' - is preoccupied with 'economic liberalisation' or privatisation. How compatible are these two forms of 'liberalisation'? Furthermore, both impact the bottom, horizontal axis of the triangle, that between the two non-state elements: ie civil society & private companies. In short, there appears to be something of a stand-off (contradiction?) between global competitiveness and a democratic deficit: which is primary for local & global interests/institutions?

In such a fluid context, the roles of 'think tanks' as well as NGOs (eg spectrum in Uganda from Private Sector Foundation & Economic Policy Research Centre (see more below) to Centre for Basic Research (CBR) & UDN versus 'old’, established research institutions like the Makerere Institute for Social Research (MISR) at
Makerere, are in flux, as indicated in the broad-based (winning?) coalition supporting the PRSP process (UNCTAD 2000).

HIV/AIDS has also led to innovative civil society-state/corporate relations in Uganda as elsewhere on the continent. NGOs have been active in financing hospices for the dying, prevention campaigns, orphanages for children without parents etc; & MNCs are increasingly active in terms of infected workers (www.businessfightsaids.org). The stand-off between civil society & the state over HIV/AIDS in South Africa is not replicated in Uganda (www.tac.org.za) as the Museveni regime has been in the vanguard of straightforward communication/education (Barnett & Whiteside 2002), leading to the regional Great Lakes Initiative for AIDS.

b) Civil society & the economy in contemporary Africa: beyond privatization

'African capitalism' in contemporary Uganda is quite distinctive & different from that elsewhere. It includes not only traditional & contemporary 'colonial' commodities & supply chains but also informal (& illegal?) & formal regional exchanges. It thus now includes fruit, horticultural & vegetable exports as well as coffee & tea; and to the region it includes electricity, Coca Cola, Mukwano soap products, UHT milk etc. And in addition to serving as an entrepot for Central African resources, it also serves as a conduit for informal coltan, diamonds & gold out & guns & other basic needs in. The mix of legal & illegal is problematic & controversial, with the UN contributing to the debates. But clearly, the Ugandan economy as a whole gains from the Congolese conflict/expeditionary force (Muller 2003).

In addition, the termination of apartheid has enabled South African capital, franchises, links, technologies etc to enter Uganda, so competing with local (African & Asia), British/European & Asian capitals: Century Bottlers' Coca Cola franchise, MTN cell-phones, MNet cable & satellite TV, Nandos & Steer fastfood franchises, Woolworths upmarket shopping (two branches in the 'new' Kampala), Shoprite supermarket & Metro Cash-& Carry wholesaling, South African Breweries etc.

Such alternatives lead towards new opportunities & to new regionalisms: beyond established inter-state East African Community (EAC), now augmented by East African Legislature & onto new security provisions, & Great Lakes Region (GLR) to flexible non-state forms of regionalisms defined by ecologies, ethnicities, infrastructures, technologies, viruses etc.
c) Governance in contemporary Uganda: beyond peace-building to human development/security?

For Uganda, the future looks too ghastly to contemplate. The elections have not only confirmed the traditional divide between the south & the north but, more critically, opened another internal divide within the NRM. These are very sensitive issues which will require delicate handling if Uganda is to avoid a return to the lawlessness of the 1970s & 1980s. The wild card in this whole question remains the generals returning from the DRC (Ajulu 2001)

Human development/security at the turn of the millennium in a small ‘fourth world’ state like Uganda at the periphery is a function of the balance between the local/national & the global/regional (Shaw 1999). And at all levels, ‘governance’ is dynamic rather than static: the balance among state, economy & civil society varies between levels & over time. Uganda has made a remarkable comeback in the last 15 years in terms of basic human development/security, at least for most of its regions (Baker 2001, UNDP 1998). But the sustainability of such an ‘African renaissance’ is problematic unless a judicious balance is maintained among patterns of governance at all levels. In particular, the notion of 'national development' is problematic when the 'gap' between, say, Kitgum to Kabale is rather wide (Baker 2001, UNDP 2000) as indicated in the continued tensions & violence (Erhart & Ayoo 2000, UNDP 2000)

Local governance offers a variety of advantages over centralised government but accountability, transparency etc need to be continually demanded/monitored: onto democratic decentralisation? And governance at the local level may require a continually changing mix of state & non-state resources & relationships (Kasfir 1998 & 2000) as our own work on Mbarara suggests (Mbabazi & Shaw 2000, Mbabazi, MacLean & Shaw 2002).

d) Lessons from/for governance in Africa at the start of the 21st century

The official, optimistic scenario emerging from Uganda in the early-21st century in terms of African or HIPC governance is that of a continuous negotiation among corporations, NGOs/networks, state & partnerships involving new capital/franchises/technologies & commodity/supply chains etc. By contrast, the critical, pessimistic preview suggests arbitrary decision-making, exponential corruption, state violence etc, as reflected in growing concerns re accountability,
transparency etc (Lewis & Wallace 2000). Nevertheless, given Uganda's comeback in the 1990s, are there lessons to be learned for local to global decision-makers?

Here, I look briefly into possible lessons for established disciplines such as political science (PS), international relations (IR) & political economy (PE) as well as for interdisciplinary fields such as African/Development/Security Studies. In terms of orthodox cannons, case studies like contemporary Uganda suggest the imperative of going beyond the state & formal economy & examining myriad links between these & the non-state/-formal: real triangular forms of mixed actor governance? And in terms of more recent interdisciplinary perspectives, there is a need to reflect on new issues/relations around developing countries & communities, so questions of traditional & 'new' security cannot be separated from the GLR etc. Indeed, Uganda in the 21st century as in the 19th & 20th suggests the imperative of situating 'external' challenges & opportunities in the context of state-society relations…what we now know as 'globalisation' (Dunn & Shaw 2001)? The place of new, poor, small, weak states in a globalizing, let alone turbulent, world is crucial for analysts & citizens alike.

As Callaghy (2001: 144) concludes in his suggestive study of ‘HIPC governance’ in Uganda, somewhat parallel to the continents centrality in anti-landmine & -blood diamond coalitions: …Africa has been central to the evolution of the international regime on public debt, although not its primary driving force. New actors & processes have been unleashed in response to Africa’s plight that might significantly alter the way the larger development regime functions. In the long run, the most significant changes may well not be HIPC itself, but rather the new processes & transboundary formations that it helped to unleash.
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