Discourses and Processes of Gendering in the European Public Sphere

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PREFACE

The present gender report is a joint collaboration of the EUROSPHERE Gender Group (EGG). The present EGG has participation of scholars from different national teams and work packages; Robert Sata, the Central European University, Hungary, Alberto Arribas Lozano and Aurora Álvarez Veinguer, Granada University, Spain, Monika Mokre, the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Lise Rolandsen Agustín, Helene Pristed Nielsen and Birte Siim, Aalborg University, Denmark. The EUROSPHERE gender group has been involved in numerous discussions about the present gender report. The EGG has commented on the structure, design and analysis at the meetings at the general EUROSPHERE conferences and at a separate gender group meeting, for example in Aalborg June 25, 2010, and in Budapest, January 2011. All of the members have one way or the other been involved in the gender report and some of the EGG members have contributed with separate chapters. Helene Pristed Nielsen and Birte Siim are responsible for the final editing of the report and take the sole responsibility for any mistakes made.

Aalborg University, May 9, 2011

Helene Pristed Nielsen & Birte Siim
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PART 1

State of the Art: Gender, Intersectionality and the European Public Sphere

Birte Siim

1 Introduction
The gender work package (WP) focuses on the role of gender groups and the role of gender-related concerns in the articulation of the European Public Spheres. The Gender Work Package has a double focus: First, it aims to analyse the gender issue as a horizontal issue, which concerns all the social and political actors across the selected sites, i.e. political parties, SMO/NGOs, media and think tanks. Secondly, it aims to analyse the gender issue as a separate policy issue in relation to the two key concepts addressed in the EUROSPHERE project: citizens’ attitudes to ethno-national diversity and to the European Public Sphere (EPS). The state of the art must serve as inspiration for the cross-national and trans-national gender analysis (WP 7) as well as for the final comparative analysis (WP 8).

The state of the art gives an overview of competing theoretical paradigms, models and key concepts and reflects upon methodological challenges and issues regarding the study of gender and the European Public Sphere\(^1\). One main observation is that the academic debate about gender/diversity and the EP/EPS tends to be divided in two approaches addressing different issues: One group focuses on the challenge from diversity and multiculturalism to democracy and the welfare state and from this perspective scholars have proposed ‘diversity’ models, which are usually linked to the nation state (Kymlicka 1995; Phillips 2007; Modood 2007). The other group focuses on the challenges from globalism and trans-nationalism and from this perspective scholars have proposed transnational and multidimensional models, which do not address diversity within the nation states (Soysal 1994, Beck 2002).

\(^1\) The report is based upon the conclusions from participants of the EUROSPHERE team, including conference papers and EUROSPHERE working papers (see Fiig, 2008; Mokre 2008; Siim, 2009; Agustin 2009 & Pristed 2009).
The chapter is divided in three sections: The first section addresses the issue of diversity/difference and ‘the turn to diversity’ focusing on the intersections of cultural diversity with gender. It first presents different approaches and models to diversity/multiculturalism and gender focusing on Will Kymlicka, Tareq Modood, Susan Moller Okin and Anne Phillip’s contributions. Secondly, it presents two influential models to rethink the Habermasian concept of the public sphere and to include gender and marginalised social groups proposed by Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young. It discusses similarities and differences between the models in relation to four key dimensions of democracy; participation, process, communication and outcome (Marx Ferree 2008), which we suggest can serve as an inspiration for the methodological debates and as guidelines for the comparative studies.

The second section addresses debates about diversity in the European public spheres (EPS), and discusses two different models to include gender proposed by Ulrike Liebert and Judith Squires inspired by both deliberative democracy and intersectional perspectives. It concludes that the study of gender and the EPS must address two main challenges: one is to overcome the dualism in the existing diversity models between concerns for gender equality and concerns for other kinds of diversities. The other is to overcome the dualism in democratic diversity models between the national and transnational arena.

The third section gives an overview of key issues in the feminist debate about intersectionality. The focus is on three key issues; a) the difference between structural and constitutive approaches, b) between additive and constitutive intersectionality, and c) between different analytical levels. It concludes that the intersectionality approach is a potential strategy to include gender in the diversity approach in EUROSPHERE’s comparative analyses, which explicitly addresses the intersection of gender and different kinds of diversity. The conclusion returns to the double challenge from trans-nationalism and diversity and discusses models which aim to include gender and diversity in the public sphere through a democratic model which is both multilayered/multilevel and intersectional.

2 Rethinking the Public Sphere from the perspective of gender and diversity

This section reviews two main issues in the rethinking of the public sphere from the double perspective of gender and diversity: The first section gives an overview of theoretical approaches to address gender and diversity in democratic theory. The focus is on the ability of
the competing models to address the double concern for gender equality and other forms of diversities and inequalities. The second section briefly reviews the main criticisms of the Habermasian approach to the public sphere and the proposals to rethink the model from the double perspective of gender and diversity. The focus is on the strengths and weaknesses of two influential models of the public sphere that has addressed the inclusion of women and marginalised social groups in democracy by Nancy Fraser (1997) and Iris Marion Young (1990).

2.1 Competing diversity models

Diversity and multiculturalism has come on the academic as well as on the political agenda during the last fifteen years. The debate about multicultural citizenship was sparkled by Will Kymlicka’s analysis inspired by the Canadian case (Kymlicka 1995) and focused on ethno-national diversity. Other scholars have criticised this model for neglecting gender inequalities (Okin 1999) and religious diversity (Modood 2007).

Judith Squires (2007) has recently discussed the challenge from ‘the turn to diversity’ to gender theory and research and feminist scholars have proposed strategies to overcome the unitary bias in social and political theories. Ange-Marie Hancock (2007) has made a useful distinction between unitary, multiple and intersectionality approaches to difference and diversity. Unitary approaches address one primary category, for example gender, race/ethnicity or class, and tend to neglect other kinds of diversities and inequalities. Multiple and intersectional approaches both address more than one category and the categories matter equally; but in the multiple approach the categories have a predetermined relationship to each other, whereas the relationship between categories is an open empirical question in the intersectional approach (2007;64).

In spite of the political retreat from multiculturalism, there is a growing academic and political interest in issues of diversity and in relations between cultural diversity and gender equality. One example is the debate in political theory about ‘minorities within minorities’ (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005, Phillips 2007) that raises questions about the power and representation of women and vulnerable persons within minorities. This is a serious concern that has contributed to make the models of democracy, public sphere and democratic communication more sensitive not only to the power relations between the majority and minorities and to the representation of minorities, but also about strategies to give voice and influence to minorities within minorities.
One of the most comprehensive models addressing the diversity of cultural and national groups is through the multicultural paradigm, for example Will Kymlicka’s influential theory of Multicultural Citizenship (1995). Kymlicka is a Canadian political theorist whose theoretical approach transcends liberalism, because it is premised on a combination of individual rights and the communitarian approach emphasising the protection of collective rights. The concept of multicultural citizenship (1995) presents a strong defence of *ethno-cultural group rights* for indigenous peoples, like Aboriginals and American-Indians, and the *poly-ethnic rights* of new immigrant groups to be protected by the state. The strength of Kymlica’s approach is the focus on ethno-cultural group rights for indigenous people. The later notion of ‘diverse citizenship’ (Kymlicka & Norman eds. 2000) expands this approach and presents a more comprehensive frame for analysing different kinds of minority groups and different forms of minority rights. Kymlicka has presented a multiple approach to diversity, which neglects issues related to gender or religion.

Another influential model has been presented by *Tariq Modood* (2007), who has criticised Kymlicka’s liberal bias and the lack of attention to the role of religion and religious groups in the public space. Modood has introduced an alternative conception of political multiculturalism based on the idea of ‘difference’, ‘multi’, equal dignity and equal respect. He emphasises the novelty of the ethno-religious mix in Western democracies and focuses on the inclusion of Muslims in contemporary conceptions of democratic citizenship. The main argument is that the accommodation of minorities must recognize groups, not just individuals, at the level of; ‘identities, associations, belonging, including diasporic connections; behavior, culture, religious practice etc.; and political mobilization’ (p 50). The strength of this proposal is the focus on the role of religion and on the inclusion of Muslims in Western democracies, but it neglects the relation between religion and gender.

*Rainer Bauböck* (2008) has proposed a defence of diversity within a framework of rights that includes cultural groups with a focus on public policies rather than on political ideas. This approach distinguishes between multiculturalism as a set of political ideas on the one hand and public policies that address social facts on the other hand. It is presented as a constructivist approach, which emphasises that the facts of cultural diversity are themselves socially constructed rather than naturally given. Bauböck differentiates between psychological, sociological and normative culturalism and discusses how normative political theory has responded to the challenge from diversity by navigating between culturalism and statism. His model is presented as a contextualised liberal defence of multiculturalism, which is not primarily normative but a political justification for institutional arrangements (2008;
15). One of the main points in Bauböck’s approach is that cultural diversity should not be regarded as normative ideals or political goals, but should instead be seen ‘as a background condition to which a differentiated system of citizenship rights responds and ... as the outcome of collective actions and societal processes that are enabled by a framework of such rights’ (19-28). The proposed model of rights in the context of diversity is premised on three basic values 1) cultural liberties, 2) equality and 3) self-government right. He emphasises that these rights can be stated in both individualist and universal terms and that group-differentiated and collective rights can be justified by both moral individualism and universalism.

Bauböck’s multi-culturalist and egalitarian model within the framework of rights is both institutional, contextual and transnational, because it argues for group-differentiated rights for groups whose members are simultaneous stake-holders in several political communities (Bauböck 2008;29). The model focuses primarily on accommodation of cultural diversity of minorities but claims for equality, which include exemptions, protection against discrimination, public support of recognition and special political representation, can in principle be extended to other kinds of inequalities. The strength of Bauböck’s approach is the focus on diversity and inequalities according to culture, religion as well as to nationality, but it is debatable how the model can be extended to address inequalities according to gender and sexuality. The conclusion is that although some models address multiple inequalities they do not address the intersections of gender and diversity.

2.2 Multiculturalism and gender equality

The multicultural paradigm was first criticised by the American feminist scholar Susan Moller Okin in an influential article with the provocative title: “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” (1999). Here she claims that there is a contradiction between multiculturalism, defined as protection of the cultural rights of minorities and women’s rights. This provoked an intense debate in the US (see Cohen, 1999), which later spread to Europe. She emphasised that minority groups often have patriarchal religion and family structures, and on this basis she argued that minority rights should not be defended as a strategy to achieve gender equality and improve women’s rights. The claim was that group rights, exemplified with forced marriages and polygamy, are potentially and in many cases also in practice anti-feminist and harmful for women. First, group rights strengthen men’s patriarchal control over women in minority cultures, and second it is the most powerful men who formulate the interests, values and practices of the group.
Many scholars interpreted Okin’s article as an attack on the multicultural paradigm and group rights from a liberal feminist perspective. She was also criticised by feminist scholars arguing that her approach was premised upon an essentialist perception of ‘culture’ that forced minority women to choose between ‘my rights and my culture’. Okin’s approach was read by many as a liberal defence of universal gender equality against cultural diversity. She has later qualified and contextualised her position explaining that she is not against collective rights per se. She has emphasised that one of her main points was that women should have a voice in negotiations between the majority and minority cultures about groups rights (2005; 88-89).

Kymlicka’s approach focuses on ethno-national and ethno-cultural diversity and does not address gender differences. In his response to Okin, he distinguishes between external restrictions of the majority and internal restrictions of individual rights within minority groups. He argues that the state should only protect the collective rights of minorities against the majority through external restrictions on the majority, for example through representation and language rights, but the state should not defend collective rights that impose 'internal' restrictions of individual rights/autonomy within the group (1999; 31-34). Kymlicka argued that feminism and multiculturalism are potential allies in a struggle for a more inclusive concept of justice based upon a combination of individual and collective rights that takes account of both gender-based and ethnic diversity.

The debate was followed by a growing concern in political and gender theory framed as “the paradox of multicultural vulnerability”, i.e. that vulnerable social groups’ needs and interests can be undermined by group rights (Shachar 2000; 200). It was emphasised that women and other vulnerable groups must have a voice and influence in both minority cultures and in society (see for example Eisenberg et. al. 2005; Modood et. al. 2006). Scholars agreed that women in minority cultures need to be respected both as culturally different from the national majority and to be treated as equals by both the majority and minority cultures.

One key issue in the debate is how to deal with ‘the hierarchy of principles’. Anne Phillips (2005) has noticed that there is often a hierarchy of human rights principles in social and political theory. Liberal pluralism emphasises the diversity of ideas and have usually been less interested in the diversity of social groups, whereas liberal feminism have been interested in gender equality and has only recently addressed cultural and religious diversity between social groups. Migration theorists have given priority to universal principles of ethnic/racial equality above gender equality, whereas gender equality takes often becomes a non-negotiable principle in feminist theory (119).
In her most recent book Anne Phillips (2008) has introduced an alternative diversity model premised on ‘multiculturalism without culture’. Here she argues that egalitarians should be committed to both sex equality and at least some version of multiculturalism. According to Phillips the conflicts between sex equality and the values of a particular cultural tradition are not deep value conflicts but rather political conflicts between two equality claims – one is religious, ethno-national, cultural equality and the other is gender equality. The main point is that conflicts between competing equality principles are contextual and need to be negotiated between social and political actors. She finds that rights should primarily be attached to individuals and that the main issues are about discrimination ‘the multicultural question is– whether existing legislation is biased towards the cultural identities or religious beliefs of particular groups? Laws and rules that enjoy majority support may reflect a cultural bias’ (2008;166).

Phillips discusses different political responses to the subjugation of women within cultural and/or religiously defined groups: a) Regulation, b) exit and c) dialogue. Dialogue is seen as a preferable approach to multicultural dilemmas – where people from different cultural backgrounds explain to each other why they favour particular law and practices, and develop the skills of negotiation and compromise that enable us to live together. The stated aim of the book is to restore a form of multiculturalism that can create greater social equality across groups and which at the same time places the individual at the core, thus upholding central feminist goals and visions. The proposed diversity model does address gender and ‘groups’ and ‘culture’ are not fixed entities but understood in a fluid way and the rights that matter in developing a case for multiculturalism are those of individuals not groups. The critical question is whether a diversity model can rely solely on individual rights and discard collective rights and the notion of cultural groups?

The ‘contextual turn’ which has made political theory more sensitive to the national variations in rights and value conflicts is promising from a comparative gender perspective. European research has confirmed the basic arguments in Phillips understanding of multiculturalism and feminism as competing equality claims (see Lister et al. 2007). From this perspective conflicts between gender equality and recognition of cultural diversity, for example around marriage and divorce rules, express political and contextual dilemmas which should be resolved through negotiations. The debate about gender and cultural diversity has also raised important issues about individual and collective rights, about the hierarchy of principles and about strategies to solve conflicts between them, which need to be explored further by comparative research.
To sum up: This section illustrates that the dominant approaches have not overcome the problematic dualism between models addressing diversity and models that address gender inequality. Political theory has proposed models that address multiple diversities/inequalities both ethno-national, cultural and religious ‘diversity’ but fails to address the intersections between diversity and gender inequalities. It is thus a challenge for both political theory and gender theory to develop diversity approaches able to overcome the dualism between models dealing with gender as the primary category and those dealing with ethno-cultural, national and religious diversities. Phillips’ approach to diversity represents an attempt to overcome the dilemmas between cultural diversity and gender equality through a deliberative model based on political negotiations and legal rights frames. It is, however, premised primarily upon individual rights and attempts to do away with cultural groups. To the extent that inequalities have structural roots they cannot be addressed solely within an individual rights frame and if inequalities have specific logics they need to be addressed by different theoretical frames and policy logics. The ‘contextual turn’ in political theory is a fruitful basis for addressing the specific challenges from Europeanization and migration and developing research strategies able to explore the intersections between gender, ethnicity and religion from a comparative European perspective (Lister et al. 2007; Siim & Squires 2007). The next section moved from issues of diversity to address democratic issues related to the public sphere.

2.3 Gender, Diversity and the Public Sphere
This section gives an overview on key issues, which are central to comparative investigations of gender and the European Public Sphere. It presents key points in the rethinking the concept of the ‘political’ and the public-private divide from a gender perspective seen through the lens of two influential scholars the American philosopher Nancy Fraser’s and the democratic theorists Iris M. Young (1990, 2000).

The presentation is structured around Myra Marx Ferree’s approach, which asks four key questions for the study of the public sphere:

- **Who** should participate and on what occasions? (participation)
- **What** should be the form and content of their contributions to the public discourse? (process)
- **How** should the actors communicate with one another? (communication)
- **What** are the desired outcomes of the process? (outcome)
From a historical and comparative perspective the public sphere is a social sphere next to the institutions of markets, states and families, and the economy, the political and the private/intimate are different spheres of human activity. The contextual turn emphasises cross-national approaches to political theory (Bauböck 2008), and from a comparative perspective it is useful to differentiate between different spaces that are connected to different places and localities. From a gender perspective the public/private divide has been one of the key problems, because the private family with its cultural practices, norms and values, about marriage and divorce has been regarded as an important ‘political’ arena for reproducing gender roles (Fraser 1990). Civil society has been another crucial arena for empowerment of women’s political agency (Young 1990).

The criticisms of the public sphere model proposed by Fraser and Young are both inspired by deliberative democracy and have many similarities: They share a social constructionist approach to the public sphere and an emphasis on the contingently nature of every aspect of the political process (Ferree et al 2002; 307) and the power of discourse. Both are critical of the Habermasian model’s idealization of the public sphere and claim that the universalist ideal of the public sphere hides particularism and oppresses diversity and difference. They have proposed alternative models of the public sphere based upon principles of heterogeneity and diversity that recognize and empower women and marginalised social groups and emphasised the key role of civil society as well as the interactions between the public and private arena of the family for developing a democratic public sphere (Fraser 1990). In spite of these similarities in their criticism, there are a number of differences worth emphasising.

Nancy Fraser has proposed an alternative model for a new post-bourgeois conception, which aims to expand democracy and centre politics from parliament to civil society. The objective is to include the concerns and issues of women and marginalised social groups in democracy. The model has four elements: 1) an emphasis on social inequality, 2) expansion of the notion of the public from a single public sphere to a multiplicity of publics, 3) inclusion of ‘private’ interests and issues and 4) a differentiation between strong and weak publics (Fraser 1990; 77). She has proposed a comprehensive model for social justice based upon three normative principles: Redistribution, recognition and democratic parity (2003) premised upon universal principles that link social equality, cultural diversity and participatory democracy. It is a universal frame, which is limited in the sense that it does not address the particularities of places and spaces.
Fraser has recently addressed the new challenges to notions of normative legitimacy and political efficacy in a post-Westphalian world (2007) and what sort of changes would be required to imagine a genuine critical and democratizing role for the transnational public spheres under current conditions. She focuses on the changes in the inclusiveness condition of who participates and in the parity condition of how the actors engage with one another (20). She claims that if inclusiveness is interpreted as ‘the all-affected principle’, it is potentially a critique of political citizenship connected to the nation state as the condition for inclusion and legitimacy and an argument for transnational public spheres. The argument is that a public sphere theory that wants to serve as a critical theory in a post-Westphalian world must rise to the double challenge: to create new, transnational public powers and to make them accountable to new, transnational public spheres (2007;23). This can potentially add a new trans-national dimension to Fraser’s model, which would be able to address the specific political institutions of the EU (Bauböck 2008). The EU-case illustrates the contradictory nature of inclusiveness and legitimacy dimension in the creation of EU-polity.

Iris Marion Young has proposed a normative democratic model of the public sphere, which aims to give voice and influence to diverse sectors of the public sphere, especially women and marginalized social groups. She has introduced a model based upon ‘the politics of difference’, which is based upon inclusion ‘from below’ and on the empowerment of social and political actors (Young 1990). Young’s model is different from democratic models premised upon inclusion of marginalised groups ‘from above’, for example Anne Phillips’ model ‘a politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995) and to some extent also Nancy Fraser’s model. Young and Fraser have presented different models to include diversity of political groups, arenas and forms of participation in democracy in order to create a real pluralism in politics, both premised on the belief that women and marginalised social groups would contribute to invigorate political life, because their experiences and perspectives would bring new issues and concerns onto the public agenda.

Young’s communicative theory of democracy (1990) is a comprehensive approach based upon difference and diversity aimed to include marginalised social groups in democracy through mobilization and organization in civil society. Democratic communication is central to this model, and she proposes that communication should be expanded in two ways:
1) Diversity in social perspectives, culture or particularistic adhesions must be seen as resources for the democratic debate rather than a sign of division that needs to be overcome.

2) Democratic communication must be expanded to include not only rational arguments but many different forms of communication like greetings, rhetoric and stories (Young 1996: 120).

The model presents a strong critique of universal models of democracy from a social constructivist perspective, because they are based upon a hypothesis about common interests and common group identities, which has become increasingly problematic. Universal theories are criticized for being exclusive and normative, because they do not include diversity between women and within social groups and do not challenge existing race- and class privileges. They therefore tend to neglect the new differentiations based upon race/ethnicity, sexuality and generation, new political projects and new overlapping identities.

Young has introduced a strong normative vision about a pluralist and differentiated democracy based upon a heterogeneous public. Her inclusive democracy model links democratic principles of inclusion of diversity with a sociological and multidimensional approach to power that recognizes structural power relations as well as the 'empowerment' of marginalised social groups (Young 1990, 2000). Like Fraser Young’s approach emphasises the primary role of civil society from a perspective of discursive and communicative democracy.

Young’s approach stresses that ‘communication action’ is the basis of the public sphere and the focus is on the interaction of actors as ‘agents of change and agency of change’. Political communication is understood relatively broadly as – ‘touching, seeing, hearing, smelling, talking, writing, gesturing and reading’, although speaking, writing, listening, and reading are the most common ways to communicate. One of the key points in Young’s rethinking of the model of the public sphere is that communication restricted by unequal power relations and communication and dialogue is limited by the dominant discourses. The study of power relations thus becomes a crucial research dimension, especially the discourses, rule and social norms in the dominant cultural and political institutions within which the public sphere is articulated but she is also concerned with violence and rape and with women’s oppression in the private arena of the family.

2 Young’s sociological approach to power includes different dimensions of power/oppression in relation to different arenas: a) oppression at the labour market, b) subordination in the family, b) marginalisation in society, c) violence in the private and public arenas and d) symbolic oppression in the media site (Young 1990; 2000; 48-65).
To sum up: The models resemble each other in relation to Ferree’s four dimensions; participation, process, communication and outcome. The difference is that Fraser’s model is concerned with processes and outcomes, while Young is more concerned with participation and communication. To some extent they complement each other, because Fraser’s approach aims to restructure the public arena ‘from above’, while Young’s approach aims to empower citizens and change politics ‘from below’. It is a problem that both approaches have an American bias and do not explicitly address the EPS. This may explain that they are premised on assumptions about alliances between women and marginalised social groups and on a dualism between civil society associations and political institutions. Future research needs to challenge the American bias of the public sphere models through research addressing the nature of European public spheres, the history of European political institutions and analyse the practice and identities of European citizens.

3 Gender, Diversity and the European Public Sphere

This section gives an overview of theories, models and strategies aimed to include diversity and gender in the European public sphere (EPS) and to gender the European diversity model. The EU approach to equality and diversity has recently moved from focusing primarily on gender equality policies to addressing multiple inequalities. Feminist scholars have made important contributions to the feminist debate about the implications of the EU focus on diversity and multiple inequalities. Some scholars have focused on the new potentials for intersectional analyses while others have been more critical of this shift towards diversity (Squires 2007, Verloo 2006).

The first section focuses on two approaches, which address the contradictory aspects of globalization and Europeanization for gender equality: One is Ulrike Liebert’s proposal to overcome the European citizenship paradox through the deliberative model focusing on procedures of deliberative negotiations that include both women and minority groups (Liebert 2007). Another approach is Judith Squires’ proposal to include gender in the European ‘diversity’ model based upon an intersectionality perspective.

3.1 Gendering the European Public Sphere

The development of the EU polity, including the recent EU enlargement, has increased migration and diversity within the EU. It has been followed by a ‘turn to diversity’, which has provided new conditions for giving voice and influence to diverse and marginalised social
groups. The development has had contradictory implications within and outside the EU: It has at the one hand made it easier for EU-nationals to move across borders and for EU public policies to address discrimination according to gender, race/ethnicity, sexuality, age and handicap, and on the other hand it has made it more difficult for 3rd country nationals to be included in the EU.

_Peter Kraus_ has recently discussed the political challenge of ‘complex diversity’ focusing on the ethno-national and cultural aspects in present day Europe. The focus is on cultural diversity and he draws a useful analytical distinction between diversity and _inequality_: ‘Inequality leads to differences that may well be unjust and, in such a case, should be overcome; diversity, in contrast, points at ways of being different that must be tolerated or deserves protection’ (Kraus 2009; 9). He distinguishes between majorities and ‘old’ (national and indigenous) minorities and ‘new’ (immigrant) minorities and argues that the concept of ‘complex diversity’ points at a social and political context in which diversity has become a multidimensional and fluid empirical phenomenon (2009; 10). He offers a critical interpretation of the dominant approach towards diverse identities which is connected to the dynamic of European integration and proposes a new approach to diversity, which cultivates the different layers of diversity and a new European politics of diversity, which recognizes the situatedness of our identities. Kraus’ approach addresses multiple diversities, which deserves protection, while gender approaches usually address unjust inequalities which should be overcome.

Gender research has also explored this contradictory logic of Europeanization. For example that gender equality can on the one hand be threatened by diversity but at same time Europeanization also represents new possibilities for gender equality, which has become part of a new transnational diversity agenda (Squires 2007). The growing emphasis on the double goal of diversity and gender equality in the European Public Sphere (EPS) raises new research issues: One issue is to rethink existing diversity models for the EPS to include concerns for gender equality. Another is to develop diversity models able to address inequalities in relation to gender and diversity, for example through the intersectionality approach.

The various models of the EPS represent different approaches to Europeanisation and transnationalism in relation to the four dimensions of the public sphere presented earlier: a) participation, b) process, c) communication, and d) outcomes. On the analytical level it is possible to identify two main approaches to gendering the EPS, which in practice often overlap: One gender model emphasises the deliberative democratic processes and women’s voice and aims to _empower women as social and political actors_ and stimulate their political
presence and influence in the public sphere (Liebert 2007). It is often premised on rethinking the family and the public-private divide with the aim to transform gender issues and interests into public concerns (Verloo 2007). The other model emphasises the intersections of gender with other categories and aims to restructure public institutions and public policies, for example gender and diversity mainstreaming (Squires 2007).

Ulrike Liebert (2007) has presented a comprehensive framework for gendering the European public sphere by restructuring democratic citizenship. Although Liebert’s model addresses EU institutions and public policies as well as the deliberative democratic processes her main focus is democratic citizenship. Liebert’s approach aims to shed light on the basic “European citizenship paradox” – to create equality between different European nationalities. This paradox emerges as a result of the tensions between EU citizenships norms – for example of equality and non-discrimination – and member-state practices in the context of regional disparities and social inequalities that market integration arguably deepens.

In a recent article Liebert (2007) notes that most of the literature on European citizenship has remained “ungendered” being un-sensitive to issues of equality and gender relations. Here she identifies the modern ‘gender paradox’ defined as the necessity to reconcile universal ideals of equality and the postmodern emphasis on diversity. The objective of her analysis is to develop European citizenship to accommodate the gender paradox in the context of (multi)cultural diversity (14). She proposes to use a gender differentiated equality of rights as a strategy for assessing four transnational European citizenship conceptions: 1) the liberal market citizenship, 2) the republican citizenship, 3) the cosmopolitan citizenship, and 4) the deliberative citizenship (15-19).

Assessing the four citizenship models through the lens of gender equality Liebert argues that a purely liberal, republican or cosmopolitan citizenship model all appear to fail to resolve this paradox. The problem with the liberal market model is the emphasis on economic efficiency and the ignorance of social, and gender based differences and migrating individuals with care responsibilities, which would contribute to erode social welfare rights. The problem with the republican model is the emphasis on creating a supranational European identity and a homogeneous community, which eclipses gender differences and cultural diversity. The problem with cosmopolitanism is that it was not built ‘from below’ by citizens and not on a European consensus supporting the EU. She concludes that only a deliberative European citizenship that include procedures based upon recognition of different collective identities would be able to overcome the European citizenship and gender paradox, because it focuses on ‘governance not on government’ (Dryzek 2000). “From a feminist perspective, a
deliberative European citizenship conception promises women and feminist movements an equal voice and, thus to do better than others in reconciling claims for individual equality and the needs for the protection of gender based difference” (Liebert 2007; 19). According to Liebert, the deliberative citizenship model transcends the other models in three respects: 1) It counteracts the exclusionary bias of the liberal market by expanding civil society deliberation and participation in EU governance, 2) it avoids the harmonizing and homogenizing assumptions of the republican model, 3) it leaves it to deliberating social constituencies to negotiate conflicting norms depending on places and spaces.

Liebert’s approach to European integration and EU citizenship focuses on the EU as a provider of gender and minority rights. Her deliberative model aims to stimulate citizens’ engagement in transnational debates about European issues through procedures of deliberation, stakeholder representation and participation for ongoing processes of negotiation (436). The main focus of this citizenship model is on women’s empowerment as social and political actors, and the model is premised on deliberative negotiations, which is interpreted as the best strategy to solve the conflicts between gender equality and cultural diversity minority groups. Liebert’s EU citizenship model resembles Young’s deliberative model but the strength is the historical and contextual approach to EU institutions, specifically on EU equality policies. She is relative optimistic regarding the EPS and does not explore the limitations of EU-governance, the unequal power relations between women citizens and EU-polity and the intersection of gender with other differentiating categories.

Judith Squires’ (2007) presents a more critical approach to the EPS. Her recent book gives an overview of the global gender equality breakthrough by national governments, international organizations like the UN and by transnational structures like the EU. Her analyses of the political strategies to institutionalize gender equality in the EU focus on the contradictory logic of globalization and Europeanization: On the one hand, feminist concerns have contributed to the transformation of institutional norms and practices, but at the same time basic concerns about social rights and democratic justice have been supplanted by arguments and ideologies of “women’s social utility” (3). The main point is that there exists a new global gender equality agenda spread by three key strategies; gender quotas, women’s policy agencies and gender mainstreaming, focusing on presence, voice or process respectively. Squires’ is worried that the feminist emphasis on ‘voice’ is gradually disappearing and instead ‘presence’ and ‘process’ come to function as indicators of parity participation.
Squires’ observes that there is a new political emphasis away from an isolated focus on gender inequality towards an increasing interest in multiple inequalities. She shows how the European ‘turn to diversity’ is followed by a growing concern to devise institutions and laws to address multiple inequalities (Squires 2007; 160). This is illustrated by recent developments in the EU, which is one of the main institutions for mainstreaming multiple inequalities. The EU in Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty recognizes six strands as requiring measures to combat discrimination: sex, racial and ethnic origin, disability, age, religion and sexual orientation. According to Squires, these equality strands forms the basis for a new political diversity agenda. The implications are first that nation states should address not only one form of discrimination but multiple forms of discrimination and secondly that they need to consider the interaction between strands. As a result policies to combat multiple intersecting forms of discrimination are emerging as central political priority across EU member states. Squires emphasises that the diversity agenda has largely taken the form of an antidiscrimination strategy to address race inequality and disability and has not yet addressed issues of outcome and that EU mainstreaming processes have not yet addressed multiple inequalities.

Squires’ proposes a participative-democratic model based upon an integrated approach to gender and diversity mainstreaming (163-178). The main argument is that the concept of intersectionality is more precise than the concept of diversity, because it focuses attention on the locations at which or processes by which marginalised groups experience not only multiple but also particular forms of inequalities. According to Squires (2010) there are three potential forms of interaction between different equality strands: competing (where separate strand vie against one another), cumulative (where separate strands are thought to overlap) and combined (where intersectional discrimination is recognized as qualitatively distinct from the sum of its discriminatory parts). Squires’ presents a participative-democratic model of gender and diversity mainstreaming as an alternative to mainstreaming processes based upon identity-politics: “for without inclusive deliberation as to what gender equality entails – and therefore what form gender equality policies should take – the pursuit of gender equality can itself become an exclusionary process, undertaken for considerations of utility rather than justice” (Squires 2007; 177-78).

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3 Article 13 states that the “Council "may take appropriate action to combat discrimination base don sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation". This was also included in the Treaty of Lisbon. For analysis of European gender equality policies see Lombardo & Verloo 2009.
Mieke Verloo has summed up the criticism of the recent EU move from a primary focus on gender equality, towards policies that address multiple inequalities. She points at three basic concerns: a) The assumed similarities of inequalities, b) the need for structural approaches, and c) the political competition between inequalities (Verloo 2006: 214). The main criticism is that ‘one size fits all’ approach to multiple discriminations is problematic because it ‘is based upon an incorrect assumption of sameness or equivalence of social categories connected to inequalities and of mechanisms and processes that constitute them’ (223). Verloo’s alternative strategy to (in) equality mainstreaming is to address differentiated inequalities through a diversity mainstreaming strategy, which focuses on developing more complex methods and tools. Squires’ participative-democratic model of gender mainstreaming goes one step further. It discusses not only what mainstreaming should be as a process, but also who should be the actors in the process, and who has the power to define what mainstreaming is or should be.

The tensions and conflicts between gender equality and ethno-cultural diversity should be addressed by models, strategies and on the level of practical politics. Squires’ deliberative approach to gender and diversity mainstreaming is an example of integrated model, which views the diversity agenda not as a threat to gender equality, but as a strategy to empower women who have not been part of the dominant gender equality discourses, for example immigrant, minority women. Section III gives a brief overview of the key issues in the academic debate about intersectionality approaches. It argues that intersectionality can contribute to overcome the dualism in political theory and research between diversity models and gender models.

4 Gender, Diversity and Intersectionality in the European Public Sphere

This section gives a more detailed overview of key issues in the academic debates about intersectionality, which has travelled from the US and has become an influential perspective in European gender research (Verloo 2006, 2007; Yuval-Davis 2006, 2007). The final section reflects on the notion of intersectionality in relation to EUROSPHERE’s diversity approach.

The concept of intersectionality has become an influential feminist approach across disciplines, methodologies and epistemologies, and it has inspired theoretical and methodological debates about relations between gender and diversity and about the intersections of different kinds of differences (See EJWS 2006). It is widely recognized that the intersectionality approach to study difference is important to study social relationships,
because it addresses the intersections of race/ethnicity, gender, class and other categories of difference (Hancock 2007). Intersectionality is a multifaceted concept, which has recently been used to analyse differences within the EU diversity and mainstreaming agenda (Squires 2007; Verloo 2006). The aim is to conceptualize multiple forms of inequality, difference and diversity, including differences among women, focusing on intersections between gender and other kinds of inequalities (see EJWS, 2006).

Intersectionality is different from the diversity approach, because it studies multiple and intersecting categories of differences, often with a focus on inequalities. It was originally developed by black feminist scholars in the US and the UK as a way to articulate intersections between gender and race/ethnicity, between capitalism, racism and patriarchy, between multiple identities and group politics (Crenshaw 1989). Kimberlee Crenshaw’s original intersectional approach explored structural and political dimensions of intersectionality, but during the 1990s intersectionality was adopted by poststructuralist approaches analysing how different categories intersect focusing on discourses and identities.

The aim of the intersectionality approach is to conceptualize differences and to address multiple inequalities, intersecting categories of difference and overlapping identities. The debates within gender theory have raised a number of important issues, for example: how many categories to address, what is the relationship between the categories, how are categories conceptualized, what is the presumed make-up of each category, what level of analysis is considered feasible in a single analysis and what is the dominant methodological approach (Hancock 2007)? On this basis Hancock has made the aforementioned distinction between three conceptual approaches to the study of race, gender, class and other categories of difference in political science: a unitary approach with one dominant category, a multiple approach with more than one category and a static relation between the factors and an intersectional approach with more than one category and a dynamic interaction between factors (2007; 64).

One controversial issue refers to the tensions between the so-called ‘systemic’ approaches focusing on intersecting inequalities and ‘constructivist’ approaches focusing on intersecting discourses and identities (Prins 2006). Myra Marx Ferree (2009) has recently proposed an alternative approach which she calls ‘interactive intersectionality’. It acknowledges that national political histories of interpreting and institutionalizing class, race and gender as dimensions of inequality are open opportunity structures which influence discourses in interactively intersectional ways (Ferree 2009, 87-88). The strength of this
approach is the dynamic and institutional nature of intersectionality, where the dimensions of inequality themselves are dynamic and changing.

Another controversial issue concerns whether intersectionality should be interpreted as additive or a constitutive process at the individual and institutional level framed either by identity or transversal politics (Squires 2007; 161-63). It is argued that a focus on ‘identity politics’ generates an additive model of intersectionality in which the axis of discrimination and inequality tends to be analytically distinct, whereas a more dialogical approach to diversity advocates strategic alliances based upon transversal politics (Yuval-Davis, 2006; 2007). The analytical strength of the additive approach is the acknowledgment of the distinctive nature and different logics of each inequality strand. It has, however, been criticised as a static model that tends to freeze identities in empirical analysis. This is contrasted to the transversal approach, which is perceived as more dynamic aimed at creating strategic alliances between social and political actors. The strength of this approach is the emphasis on horizontal and vertical communication and on the formation of new collective identities.

The third issue refers to the debate between universal theories and categories and particularist or contextual categories. A number of scholars have argued that the meaning of diversity/difference and intersectionality must be contextualized, because the key categories, class, race/ethnicity and gender acquire different meanings according to time and place (Knapp 2005; Prins 2006; Phoenix 2006; 28). This point has implications for the studies of diversity/differences and intersectionality issues at the regional, national and transnational level. Nira Yuval-Davis’ approach to gender and nationality, citizenship and ‘politics of belonging’ represents one of the few attempts to conceptualize intersectionality from both an intersectional and a trans-national perspective (2006; 2007). She claims that human beings are members of multiple social and political communities and argues that social differences expresses different axis of power and should be analysed on different analytical levels, institutional- and organisational, structural and individual levels of identities and experiences.

A number of European research projects⁴ have recently introduced the concept of intersectionality as part of the critical frame analysis of European gender equality policies. The objective is to study how the intersection of gender with other inequalities is framed in official policy documents, for example in relation to prostitution, migration, homosexual rights and anti-discrimination (Lombardo & Verloo 2009; 71-79). The results indicate that

⁴ The intersectionality perspective has become key elements of the MAGEEQ and QUING-projects both supported by the European Commission (see Lombardo, Meier & Verloo 2009; Lombardo & Verloo 2009).
there are both potential and tensions using the concept of equality in relation to other inequalities than gender. Lombardo and Verloo observe that there was hardly any presence of intersectionality in the analysed documents on gender equality. They emphasise that the problem is not one of mere absence, because they found many cases of active biases towards other inequalities, for example presenting the configuration of race/ethnicity/country of origin in racist/ethnocentric ways in the national contexts analysed.

5 EUROSHERE’s Gender Work Package (GWP)

The Eurosphere project (http://eurospheres.org/) has developed a methodological design for studying the EPS premised on the diversity approach. This approach is based upon the notion of otherness rather than difference: “Whereas “difference” signifies disparity between persons or between groups, or between both, “otherness” signifies both disparity and commonality” (Eurosphere Working paper 03). The projects’ empirical focus is on attitudes of social and political actors towards ethno-national diversity and towards the EPS. The objective of the first Gender Action Plan (GAP)\(^5\), which later became part of the Gender Work Package, was to analyse gender and intersectionality as integrated part of the diversity approach to the European Public Sphere.

EUROSHERE’s gender work package addresses the study of gender in relation to diversity as well as to the EPS. One key challenge is to compare how gender interacts with other kinds of diversity on the four different sites and to be able to distinguish between diversity/difference as a positive category to be preserved and protected and diversity/difference as inequality to be overcome. Another challenge is to link the analysis of social and political actors with the institutional data and to study the dynamic intersections between structures, political institutions and identities of social and political actors. Finally it is a challenge to link the various country reports, which focus on national histories, institutions and discourse, with the trans-national European level and to study the interconnections between the regional, national and transnational European arena.

To sum up: We suggest that the ‘contextual turn’ in political theory and the intersectional approaches in feminist theory have implications for comparative European research: First universal discourses about diversity and gender equality should be sensitive to particular contexts, including the diversity of spaces, places and social groups. Secondly,

\(^5\) The first Gender Action Plan: *Gender, Intersectionality and the European Public Sphere* was adopted by the general assembly in Istanbul in December 2007 and revised in November 2009 as part of the new Gender Work Package adopted at the General Assembly in Budapest in January 2009 (see ch. 2).
comparative European research should contribute to overcome the gap between theoretical models about the EPS and empirical research of the EPS. The dominant models of the public sphere have focused primarily on the political institutions, processes and discourses and only recently on ‘becoming Europeans’ (Sassatelli 2009). They have neglected the underlying structural power relations (Bacchi 2009) as well as the study of peoples’ daily lives, for example the dimension of ‘lived citizenship’ (Lister, 2003; 3), i.e. the meanings that citizenship actually has in peoples lives and the ways in which people’s social and cultural backgrounds and material circumstances affect their lives as citizens.

One of the aims of EUROSPHERE’s approaches, models and research about the EPS is thus to link studies at the individual micro-level, meso-level studies of organizations as well as macro-level studies of country-contexts with the trans-national European level. For example through an ‘actor-institution-structure’ model that integrates studies of structures, institutions and discourses with studies of people’s everyday life on the national and transnational European level.

6 Conclusion: The double challenge from diversity and transnationalism

The European ‘turn to diversity’ represents new opportunities to rethink theories, models and strategies based upon unitary approaches, for example focusing on gender with analyses of ethno-cultural diversity, and develop multiple or intersectional approaches to gender and diversity. The ‘transnational turn’ represents an opportunity to rethink normative democratic and gender theory capable of overcoming unitary and purely national approaches and include diverse groups of citizens in democratic negotiations and dialogues at the transnational EU level.

This chapter argues that the dominant approaches and models to diversity and the EPS tend to be divided in two relatively separate groups: One group has been concerned primarily with the challenge from diversity and has proposed sophisticated national models, for example Kymlicka and Modood, but have failed to address the transnational level. Another group has been concerned with globalisation and post-nationalist trends and has proposed multilevel, transnational models, but has not adequately addressed issues of diversity/difference and intersectionality. It is a general objective for Eurosphere to study political developments and integrate models from the double perspective of diversity and the EPS. And it is a specific aim for the GAP to overcome the division between diversity and
gender approaches and models at the sub-national, national as well as at the transnational European level.

The selected approaches to the public sphere and EPS represent both universal and contextual approaches: The universal models of the public sphere aim at overcoming the tensions in gender justice between equality and diversity and at including citizens in negotiations about social justice. For example Nancy Fraser’s model of social justice which includes three dimensions; recognition, redistribution and participation. Her recent work addresses the challenges to the public sphere in a post-Westphalian world and the new transnational conditions but does not explore the implications for the EPS. The more contextual models aim at rethinking multilevel, transnational approaches inspired by the specific nature of the European Public Sphere. For example Ulrike Liebert’s citizenship model rooted in recent developments of the EU polity and policies. In spite of the common criticism of the public/private divide in the original Habermasian model, it is worth noticing that none of the revised models have taken up the serious challenge of ‘becoming Europeans’ on the level of people’s/citizens’ daily lives and lived cultures.

Globalisation and Europeanisation has put the relation between the global, national and local on the research agenda and has challenged the dominant social and political theories premised on the nation state, including theories of democracy and the welfare state. Studies of the European Public Sphere in a post-Westphalian world need to develop research strategies able to overcome what Ulrich Beck (2002) has called ‘methodological nationalism’. This refers to ‘the explicit and implicit assumption that the nation-state being the power-container of social processes and the national the key order for studying major social, economic and political processes’. Beck’s alternative strategy is to organize a ‘historically sensitive empiricism’ to study the ambivalent consequences of globalization in cross-cultural and multi-local research networks.

Nira Yuval Davis’ work has addressed both diversity and trans-nationalism. She has proposed an intersectional and multilayered citizenship model with participatory politics of citizenship and transversal politics, based upon dialogues between different groups of women about political values, as the key elements. The multilayered framework of citizenship based upon participatory politics and concerns for democratic diversity and gender equality reaches from the local to the national trans-national level of politics. This approach could be a useful starting point for addressing the specific nature of the European Public Sphere and European citizenship. This would mean studying the dynamic interrelations between the specificity of transnational political institutions and the diverse national experiences of European citizens.
PART 2

Methodological Reflections and Design

Birte Siim

1 Introduction

Gender and Intersectionality are central issues in the EUROSPHERE project. It is, however, a major challenge what strategies to choose in order to integrate the gender perspectives in this large and complex comparative European research project. Whether to adopt a ‘horizontal’ model, which would ideally integrate gender across the different work packages, or a ‘vertical’ model which would include the gender dimension in a separate work package. At the General Assembly in Budapest, January 2009, it was decided to introduce a separate gender Work Package, the WP7. The objective was to strengthen the general sensitivity towards the gender dimension across the whole EUROSPHERE project in order to provide a solid basis for a systematic integration of the gender dimension within the different work packages.

One general aim of the Eurosphere gender report is to confront the theoretical approaches, concepts and models about gender, diversity and the public sphere with empirical research. The Gender Action Plan (GAP) addressed the study of gender relations as a horizontal issue on all communicative spaces. The starting point of the GAP was a focus on three broad research areas, which address different analytical dimensions:

1. Where are the women? (Visibility/invisibility - power/influence/powerlessness)
2. Gendering as a process (How are things gendered? Is public sector/politics masculinized? And family relations feminized? etc.)
3. Gender and diversity

6 Gender was originally designed to be a horizontal perspective of the EUROSPHERE project to be integrated across the different work packages with Birte Siim as the responsible scientist in cooperation with Aysegul Altinay. With this model in mind, The Gender Action Plan (GAP) was written by the two responsible scientists Altinay and Siim and adopted by the general assembly in Istanbul in December 2007.
7 With the adoption of WP 7 with Birte Siim as the responsible scientist it was also decided to create the Eurosphere gender group with participation of scholars from different national teams and work packages; Robert Sato, the Central European University, Hungary, Alberto Arribas and Aurora Alvarez, Granada University, Spain, Monika Mokre, the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Helene Pristed Nielsen and Birte Siim, Aalborg University, Denmark. The gender group has been involved in discussions about the present gender report. The Gender Group has commented on the structure, design and analysis in the gender report at the meetings at the general EUROSPHERE conferences and at a separate gender group meeting in Aalborg June 25, 2010. The gender group has been involved in discussions about the present gender report. The Gender Group has commented on the structure, design and analysis in the gender report at the meetings at the general EUROSPHERE conferences and at a separate gender group meeting in Aalborg June 25, 2010.
From this starting point the present Gender Work Package (GWP) has further elaborated the present research questions, which will be addressed the following section. The objective of the GWP is to analyse these research questions on the basis of EUROSPHERE’s interview and media data as well as institutional data from 16 European countries. The interview data explores the attitudes of social and political actors on the four different sites; social movement organisations/NGOs, political parties, think tanks and the media, in relation to the selected policy areas: a) the Reform Treaty, b) (European) citizenship and identity, c) mobility, migration and asylum policies and d) European enlargement. The data refers to different methodological levels as well as to different units of analysis; the individual, social and political actors and public spaces.

2 Research questions
The double aim of the Gender Work Package has been to assess the inclusion/exclusion of women from the national and European public sphere and to assess the importance of gender concerns in relation to diversity on these sites. The GAP thus addresses the role of women as social and political actors and the role of women’s organisations by looking at women’s position on the four selected sites. The underlying hypothesis is that gender makes a difference for the attitudes of European social and political actors and opinion-makers towards the four selected policy areas, and it is further assumed that women would probably have different positions in the different organisations and on the selected sites and that gender related concerns would have different meanings and be of different importance for social and political actors on the different sites.

The research questions pertaining gender and diversity in the European Public Sphere (EPS) address gender relations on different communicative spaces and focus on different levels of analysis. The research areas have later been specified into the four research questions below. On the methodological level they refer to differences at the level of nation states regarding welfare/gender and migration regimes (the macro-level), to the different mobilisation, organisation and articulation of social and political actors at the four selected sites; political parties, SMO/NGOs (the meso-level) as well as to differences at the level of the individual (the micro-level), and not least to the role of the trans-national EU-level.
• To explore and explain the role of gender groups in the articulation of the national public sphere(s) and in relation to social and political spaces and if and how they interact, cooperate and negotiate with ethnic minority groups.
  o This question is first analysed on the basis on information in the elite Interviews and secondly through qualitative case studies of gender actors including immigrant and minority women's organisations, thereby comparing similar organisations in different countries.

• To explore and explain the role of gender related concerns in the articulation of the national public sphere(s) and how they relate to issues of diversity in relation to social and political spaces.
  o This question is addressed first by giving an overview of the gender composition of the different organisations, differences between political parties, social movements, media actors and think tanks. Secondly by focusing on strongly voiced opinions about gender equality or intersections of gender and ethno-national diversity

• To explore and explain the role of gender groups in the articulation of the European Public Sphere (EPS), e.g. how they cooperate and negotiate with ethnic minority groups.
  o This question is addressed by analysing gender actors and women’s organizations among the selected organisations at the European level, e.g. The European Women's Lobby or the gender group in EP.

• To explore and explain the role of gender-related concerns in the articulation of the European Public Sphere and how they relate to issues of diversity and especially to ethno-national concerns.
  o This question is addressed by analysing the gender perspective of a larger social movement, e.g. the European Social Forum, by looking at descriptions on internet and possibly identifying women's subgroups.

In order to answer these research questions, the Gender Work Package plans to supplement elite interviews and media studies with qualitative case study and in depth analysis of gender
actors as well as with cross-national macro-level analysis. The gender work package comprises both a comparative and a transnational perspective. On the **comparative level** it aims to carry out qualitative case-study of gender actors based upon cluster-analysis of selected countries inspired partly by the conclusions in the national country reports and partly by focusing on ‘the most similar’ or ‘the most different’ method. One example would be comparisons of national women’s organisations as The Danish Women's Council [Kvinderådet] with similar selected organisations from Bulgaria and Turkey (Pristed 2010). At the **transnational European level**, the aim is to carry out comparative qualitative analysis of gender actors among the selected organisations, e.g. The European Women's Lobby (EWL) and the Committee of Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (the FEMM committee) in EP, and analyse gender sub-groups and gender perspectives of larger social movement, e.g. the European Social Forum, by combining document analysis with interview data. Finally, the interview data makes it possible to identify whether there are prominent men or women across the different sites with strongly voiced opinions about gender equality and intersections of gender and ethno-national diversity.

### 3 Research design

The research design explains how the research questions should be analysed on different analytical levels and on the selected sites based upon a combination of institutional data, interview data with social and political actors in political parties, social movements, think tanks and the media, as well as the quantitative and qualitative media analysis. As noted above there are specific challenges, issues and questions connected to carrying out analyses at different analytical levels as well as on the different sites, and one of the main challenges has been to analyse the tensions between the national level country reports and the (transnational) EU spaces.

The research design includes the following analytical dimensions:

**3.1 Access/power/political agency**

This dimension in the gender work package refers to women as social and political actors and to women’s organizations on the national and European Political Spheres (EPS). The objective is here to explore issues of access/presence/power and political agency. This actor-oriented perspective has a quantitative as well as a qualitative dimension, which include a number of sub-questions, e.g.:
• How many women in each organization and where are they positioned?
• How many selected female interviewees in each organization?
• What kind of positions do they hold?
• What kind of arguments, issues, priorities and strategies are introduced?
• What are the identities and belongings of the actors?
• The role of gender groups in the articulation of the domestic and European Public Spheres
• Are gender-related concerns present/absent in the articulation of the domestic and/or EPS and if so what are these concerns?

The quantitative empirical questions, which refer to power relations and attitudes, are relatively simple to answer as this information is contained in the already completed database and simply could be processed according to our focus. At the media site they may refer either to questions about women as social and political actors or to female sources in the media data (see ch. 3). In general they may refer both to whether and how gender is an issue as well as to whether and to what extent gender as a social category matters for explaining the attitudes of social and political actors, or to what other factors are more important? (see ch. 4)

The qualitative analysis may include both document analysis and analysis of interview data. It aims to explore arguments, issues, priorities and strategies within the selected organisations and - if possible - to identify if there are any conflicts between the leadership and the opposition, as well as between the leadership and ordinary members/rank-and-file. The analysis explores the attitudes, identities and belongings of the actors and may include both a collective and an individual dimension. Last but not least, it explores the role and presence/absence of gender groups in the articulation of the public sphere and whether organisations and actors express gender-related arguments and concerns in the articulation of the European Public Sphere – or not.

The qualitative analysis of the role of gender groups in the articulation of the European Public Spheres is based primarily on the self-understanding expressed in the elite interviews. This will be supplemented with qualitative case-studies of gender actors and additional data and secondary sources. Identities and belongings of actors will be primarily based upon interviewees’ self-descriptions in the interview data.
3.2 Framing process/national and gender discourses

The second dimension in the gender wok package refers to the framing of gender as an issue as well as to the relative importance of gender issues for social and political actors. The objective is to analyse to what extent and how gendering occurs as a process on the selected sites. Is gender considered to be an important issue? What is understood as a ‘woman’s issue’ and how do social and political actors on different arenas and in different national contexts articulate ‘gender equality’? This dimension includes the following five main aspects, which can be interpreted as analytical steps:

The first step explores – the silencing or naming of gender in relation to diversity – and it refers to how social and political actors in different organisations and on different sites understand and articulate gender and diversity. It asks whether gender is believed to be part of diversity or not; and whether gender is mentioned or not mentioned in relation to diversity in the documents or in the interviews.

The next step identifies the framing of gender issues, e.g. positive or negative framing of gender equality/justice. It asks if gender issues are mentioned – and if so how they are framed. Whether women are stereotyped and/or marginalized or empowered? How important the principle of gender equality/discrimination is in relation to recognition of religious diversity/equality or recognition of cultural diversity/equality? Whether gender equality or gender justice is a good thing, or if other kinds of diversity/equality – discrimination/inequality are perceived to be more important? What are the perceptions of the EU-public sphere and the role of EU polity in relation to gender equality policies?

The third step identifies and analyses coherent discourses, for example from interview data with political parties – where the dominating national discourse claims that ‘we’ the majority have already achieved gender equality in opposition to ‘them’ the migrant minorities who are backward and traditional because of their religion and culture. It looks for possible counter discourses, which represent a critique of the dominant discourse – e.g. that we the majority have not achieved equality – that gender equality is not a specific national value but a universal principle – that culture is not static but dynamic – that gender intersects with age/generation and nationality?

The fourth step identifies similarities and differences in the framing of discourses in different communicative spaces, for example between the dominant discourse in the media and in the political parties.

Last but not least the analysis aims to identify the role of gender-related concerns in the articulation of the European Public Sphere (EPS). Are there specific gender discourses
connected with the transnational arena and how are they related to issues of diversity and especially to ethno-national concerns? Can we identify dominant discursive patterns, which may emanate from or influence the national arenas? Is it possible to identify any counter-discourses at the EU-level? What, if any, are the linkages between the discourses at the national and the transnational levels of analyses?

3.3 Intersectionality
The aim of the Eurosphere project is to identify the contextual understanding and articulation of diversity by social and political actors in different organizations and on different sites, and in addition to identify what kind of diversities are being named as the most important, e.g. culture, ethnicity or religion, how it is talked about and why. One main objective of the gender work package is to map out the intersections of gender with ethno-national diversity, culture and religion in different national contexts. The project distinguishes between diversity, which can be a positive concept to be enjoyed, and inequality between different social groups. The concept of intersectionality is employed as a methodological approach to address intersections between inequality creating social categories, for example gender, class, ethnicity/race (see ch. 1).

This approach can be divided in different steps:
- The first step identifies the different kinds of intersections empirically on the basis of the national elite interviews.
- The second step analyzes whether and to what extent they express unequal power relations and inequalities, e.g. between majorities and minorities, in different national contexts as well as on different sites taking into account the specific national institutional and political opportunity structures, gender and migration regimes.
- The third step analyses how the intersections between gender and ethno-national, or gender and culture/religion, is being used in the different documents and interviews: What kind of framing is articulated in national contexts and across Europe. Whether and to what extent it is possible to identify national discourses and differentiate between exclusionary and inclusionary framings of intersectionality, i.e. intersections of gender with ethno-national diversity in national public spheres and Euro-spaces?
4 Methodological Reflections: Challenges and Limitations

The research questions address issues on different methodological levels of analysis and the research design for the gender work package aims to integrate the interview, media and institutional data at the meso-level with macro- and micro-level analysis. The strength and focus of the Eurosphere design and data and the present gender report is, however, on the meso-level comparing similarities and differences of women’s inclusion/exclusion as social and political actors on the four different sites and comparing how actors articulate gender concerns in different organisations and on the four different sites. The perspective is to be able to carry out a more comprehensive gender analysis, which will be able to explore in greater detail intersections between policies, discourses and practice, explore the activities, discourses and identities of social and political actors on both the collective and individual levels in greater detail at the next stage.

On the cross-national comparative macro-level the focus is on welfare, migration/citizen and gender regimes and on the effects of the different political institutions and opportunity structures for gender relations on the national and supranational level, including possible linkages between the two. One approach has been to select a cluster analysis, which is based either upon ‘the most similar’ or ‘most different’ research design. This approach explores ‘path dependency’ as well as ‘path breaking’ in gender relations. One group of research question compare barriers and potentials in the opportunity structures e.g. for minority women as social and political actors in different contexts, e.g. comparing hypotheses based upon existing regimes with the clustering found in our material. One of the main issues is the analyses of the dominant discourses about and framings of minority women in selected organisations. One example is whether minority and immigrant women, for example Roma or Muslim women, are perceived as the problem or the solution, ‘as culturally and religious problems’ or ‘as bearer of integration’ by different social and political actors?

The macro-level analysis aims to combine ‘cluster’ analysis based either upon ‘the most similar’ or ‘the most different’ research design. It explores ‘path dependencies’ as well as ‘path breakings’ of gender relations and gender concerns based upon secondary data from a number of European gender research projects, e.g. the VEIL Project, [http://www.univie.ac.at/veil/Home3/index.htm](http://www.univie.ac.at/veil/Home3/index.htm), MAGEEQ, QWING and FEMCIT.

The national country reports contain valuable information regarding the macro-level, which include overviews of political institutions, institutional data (IDS) and interview data, for example about differences in gender relations and the understanding of gender issues in Europe between North-South and East-West, between continental and liberal European
countries. In addition we plan to use data from European gender projects in order to analyse the macro-level, for example from the VEIL-project (see Kilic, S., Saharso, S, & Sauer, B. 2008). The secondary data will be used to evaluate the political and discursive opportunity structures (POS and DOS) and get additional information about migration/citizenship, gender and welfare regimes.

As noted above EUROSPHERE’s elite interviews address primarily the meso-level focusing on the activities, discourses and identities/belongings of collective actors in political organisations, social movements and networks. Here the objective of the analyses is to explore women’s mobilisation and participation and identities within different organisations, e.g. compare their participation and representation in social movements and political parties; compare differences in the intersection of gender and diversity across the different sites. These analyses address the following questions: Where are women present/absent (political parties and social movements); where are they absent (in the media and think tanks); what groups of women are visible? What are the interrelations between women in the majority and women from old and new minority groups? Which groups of women have the power to represent whom and what is the rationale?

The meso-level includes questions about the representation of women in different organisations, (number, position), their activities, discourses and self-understandings, as well as on different sites. At this level the present gender report compares the (collective) positions of women in different organisations, i.e. concerning their participation, actual and symbolic representation and identities. On the organisational level the question is where women as a group as well as individuals are positioned in the formal and informal organisational structure. Are there formal or informal women’s groups within the organisation? What are considered to be women’s issues and concerns and who defines them? Is gender equality a concern for the organisation and how is it defined?

The micro-level addresses the activities, attitudes and identities of the individual as social and political actors. It addresses the different subject positions of different social and political actors. This level includes the mapping of women’s positions within the organisations and their self-understandings of this position. At the micro-level the gender work package identifies subject positions and identities are in this case based solely upon the

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8 The EUROSPHERE project contains 16 countries which include 3 Northern European countries, Norway, Denmark and Finland; two Southern European countries, Italy and Spain; three Eastern European/Post-communist countries, Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria; five continental European countries, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and France; and two liberal welfare states, U.K. and Estonia.
9 For an overview of methodological considerations related about women as a source and gender as a theme specifically to the media site see ch. 3.
interviewees own self-understanding, e.g. a difference between the interviewees own attitudes and the official discourse of the organisations. The aim is to identify the individual’s formal or informal position within the organisation and to compare this position within the organisation with the interviewees own self-understanding.

*The trans-national European level* explores what kind of cooperation and around which issues gender groups cooperate, as well as if and how they cooperate with other organisations concerned with ethno-national diversity. It first addresses the role of gender-related concerns in the articulation of the European Public Sphere and how they are related to issues of diversity and especially to ethno-national concerns. To what extent and how do gender groups and ethnic minority women participate within and to what extent to they influence the European polity and social and political European arenas? This set of questions will be addressed via interview data.

One interesting question to pursue in greater detail would be to explore possible spill-over effects in terms of participation between the national, Euro-spaces (and between the different sites). How and why? The second set of questions regarding spill-over processes can only be analysed on the basis of case-studies of gender actors in women’s organisations, or possibly gender actors within the social movements (or the women's group in the EP). This would require further qualitative analysis based upon in depth and narrative methods.

One of the overall objectives is to compare how gender and diversity intersects across the four selected public arenas, whether it is possible to identify important differences between them. The national country reports and data base have together provided a comprehensive overview of similarities and differences in citizens’ political involvement and attitudes towards diversity and relation to the public spheres and social and political arenas, which forms the background for the comparative analyses. One main challenge is to explore how relations between gender and diversity intersect not only on the national but also on the transnational and sub-national public spaces.

### 4.1 Challenges

The overall theoretical and methodological approach of the gender work package and the EUROSPHERE’s data collection and analysis tools is guided by an inter-sectionality approach, which explores how gender interacts with other types of positions and belonging focusing especially ethno-national diversity. One of the transversal methodological challenges for the gender work package is thus to explore systematically how gender equality issues intersect with other differentiating factors like ethno-nationality, religion and culture; in
national policy processes as well as in relation to the EU-citizenship and EU-polity. We assume that the intersectional effects of gender have had a significant impact on citizens’ involvement. One of the hypothesis is that the intersectional effects of gender on citizens’ involvement in European politics, their attitudes towards diversity and their orientation towards different models of public sphere is influenced by the different communicative public spaces they attend as well as by the organizations they are members of.

Intersectionality has been used as a methodological approach and it has been a major challenge for the gender work package to define intersectionality as an analytical and normative concept and to be able to differentiate between different forms of intersectionality. One preliminary definition of *exclusionary intersectionality* is a discourse which emphasise one form of inequality (e.g. gender inequality) while at the same time exacerbating other inequalities (or inequality creating mechanisms) among other categories (e.g. between ethnic groups). This may exacerbate differentiations for example between majority and minorities. One preliminary definition of *inclusionary intersectionality* is a discourse, which recognizes the intersections of different inequality creating categories, and the potential negative consequences for strengthening inequality (in diversity) (Christensen & Siim 2010).

### 4.2 Limitations

The methodological limitations of the Eurosphere data in relation to the gender analysis concerns both the kind of the questions asked and the specific selection of respondents. First of all one important limitation for the gender analysis concerns the main focus of the questionnaire on two key concepts ethno-national diversity and the European Public Sphere (EPS). One implication is that the questionnaire has only a few questions about the interrelations between diversity and gender, or on interrelations between gender and the EPS, and even fewer questions focusing exclusively on gender equality and women’s issues.

Another important limitation concerns the selection of organizations as well as the selection of actors within the specific organisations. The media data concerns three newspapers and two networks collected within a specific period and can thus be the basis for a representative media analysis. However, the analysis of selected political parties, social movements and think tanks includes a small sample selected according to specific criteria, which are not representative of women within these organisations. This has several implications: There is a bias in the selected gender actors within the political organizations as well as in the selected women’s organizations. One way to deal with this bias in discourse analyses is to combine the analysis of interviews data with the document analysis.
To sum up: The implications of these methodological limitations are that most of the findings are explorative. However, we expect that the findings will be able to raise interesting questions back to the theoretical approaches, concepts and models. The gender report will address the methodological limitations and biases by discussing the validity of the findings and confronting our findings with research results from similar European projects. In the following chapters we keep the limitations in mind and specify the reservations that follow from the different methodological biases in the beginning of each chapter. In the concluding chapter we return to the state of the art and ask what we have learnt about diversity models and about gendering the public sphere.

5 Conclusion
Integrating gender as a transversal dimension in the Eurosphere project is a theoretical and methodological challenge. It is premised upon a close cooperation between the different work packages and based upon the results from the previous European gender projects. This process is not finished and the present gender report therefore only contains the first preliminary results of the gender analysis. Part of the present gender analysis is premised on the national country reports (WP3). The central part of the analysis concerns, however, the cross-national investigation of social movements/NGOs, political parties, think tanks and media actors in 16 countries, which is part of results from WP 4, 5 and 6. This part addresses the relation between gender relations on the national and transnational levels and of the intersection of gender and ethno-national diversity and some of the results are included in following chapters of the gender report. The final part of the gender analysis will focus exclusively on the role of gender groups and gender concerns in the European Public Sphere based upon conclusions about EURO-spaces and trans-national spaces (WP 8) and will be addressed in more detail at the next stage. One of the future challenges will be to identify possible links between attitudes towards gender and diversity and attitudes towards the EPS.
PART 3
Discourses and Processes of Gendering in the European Public Sphere

Helene Pristed Nielsen & Lise Rolandsen Agustín

While large parts of the data collected for the EUROSPHERE project still remain unexplored in terms of content that may be relevant for the gender perspectives on the project, this section of our report provides an overview and discussion of the empirical conclusions and theoretical contribution we at the present stage can conclude on. The section is structured according to themes that have emerged out of different previously undertaken smaller analyses by researchers affiliated with the project.

The conclusions are driven by the empirical findings, but we have ordered our presentation of them according to various theoretical points raised in chapter 1. Hence, our first set of conclusions pertains to the questions of gendered discourses about national and European belonging and about ethnic minorities. While the conclusions are empirically driven, they also contribute to highlight the theoretical contributions of the project in terms of its efforts to overcome the dualism in existing diversity models between concerns for gender equality and concerns for other kinds of diversities (see chap 1). This dualism is challenged by the intersectional approach taken in several of the empirical analyses, and we discuss how the project has contributed to a theoretical development towards distinguishing between inclusionary and exclusionary forms of intersectionality.

10 The project overall consists of data collected in 14 EU member states + Turkey and Norway, as well as data collected among Brussels-centered transeuropean actors. Data has been collected among various types of actors (political parties, social movements/NGOs, think tanks and media) and in various forms (document analyses of organizational homepages and other output, in-depth interviews with opinion makers within individual organizations, media data collection in the form of surveillance of newspaper and broadcast news). For each selected actor, the project has generated an Institutional Data Report based on analyses of organizational homepages and other written output. In addition, structured interviews have been carried out with prominently situated respondents within each organization. Subjects covered include respondents’ notions of ethno-national diversity, preferences on a number of EU policy areas, and conceptions of public sphere. Answers have subsequently been coded into the database. In addition to these procedures, each national team has written a report describing findings and synthesizing responses from each their national setting, and contextualized responses in relation to relevant national, historical, political and social characteristics. These country reports are all available from www.eurospheres.org
Our second set of conclusions circulates around the importance of context for impacting upon discourses and processes of gendering within the data set. We discuss how both the national and organizational contexts matter for the answers we obtain regarding attitudes to gender, diversity and European integration. However, our analyses also demonstrate that the respondent’s own gender is a contextual aspect of the interview situation which most often does not matter in the framings of discourses and counter-discourses about gender and gender equality. The existence of dominant and counter-discourses is shaped by the national and organizational context in which the data is collected, and the contextual turn as discussed p.9 highlights the continued importance of paying attention to the national level, even though the overall research aim of the project concerns the existence of one or several European Public Sphere(s).

Finally, we have a third set of conclusions relating to the transnational dimension and the EU as a special type of multi-level polity. This is where the project’s theoretical contribution to overcoming the dualism between the national and the transnational arena (p.3 above) comes closest to empirical fruition, but also where we have eventually included more new data which goes beyond the original data collection efforts of the EUROSPHERE project itself. Inspired by theories of intersectionality, in this section we focus upon transnational social movements addressing questions of gender and ethnicity as well as the relationship between European integration and equality in diversity.

In general, it is important to stress in this introduction that while conclusions below are based on a variety of analyses, they are not carried out according to uniform criteria, nor are they uniformly or solely based on EUROSPHERE data. Several possible analytic paths within the data set remain unexplored – for example we would have liked to utilize the country reports more systematically to trace national discourses about gender equality – and on the other hand, we also base some of the conclusions below on additional data in the form of reports and online text collected either subsequent to the original data collection period to follow up on more recent developments (for example Pristed Nielsen forthcoming), or data collected with the purpose of more clearly mapping contentions about minority women’s inclusions in the European Public Sphere (for example Rolandsen Agustín and Roth forthcoming).

We will highlight where and why we have gone beyond the original data as we present findings below. Each section starts with a paragraph presenting the key empirical findings, which are then put into the contexts of respectively the theoretical discussions of chapter 1 and the methodological discussions of chapter 2.
1 Gendered discourses about national and European belonging

The most immediately obvious empirical finding of the EUROSPHERE data when regarded within the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 1 is how gender and ethnicity interrelate in the discourses about national and European belonging. Based on empirical analyses of data from the Danish data set collected for the project, we conclude that the national and European identity discourses are, to a large extent, gendered both in relation to the non-European outsiders and the immigrant outsiders within. Hence discourses on gender equality, ethno-national diversity and European integration among high-level Danish politicians are intertwined both in the national and in the European identity constructions (Rolandsen Agustín 2009; see also Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010).\(^\text{12}\) Gender equality is often voiced as both a Danish and a European value, whereas there are ambiguous statements about the extent to which there is a connection between gender equality and perceptions of Islam as either a religion or a culture (Pristed Nielsen 2010a).\(^\text{13}\) Specifically for the Danish case, we trace a very strong national party political discourse, which is most clearly contested by non-political party actors (Pristed Nielsen 2010a, Rolandsen Agustín 2009). These initial findings of gender equality being articulated as both national and European values were later corroborated by comparative analyses (see below).

A common trait in the discourses of the party political actors included in the data set is to highlight \textit{ethnic minority women as a distinct category} or, as we have phrased it in previous analysis, ‘symbolic border guards’ of the national community (Rolandsen Agustín 2009). Hence, in the Danish case national and European membership categories are constructed through the exclusion of the gender unequal ‘other’. Bygness (2011) discusses how these processes take place both at the meso- or organizational level, and at the macro-level, when implementing gender equality policies across the EU. The ‘other’ is gendered, for instance, in terms of how male and female migrants are referred to: the category of ‘(ethnic minority) woman’ is used symbolically as identity and integration bearer as the inside gender equal progressive identity is constructed vis-à-vis the migrant gender unequal and old-fashioned outsider. Educated young minority women are, in particular, constructed as the cultural bearers of integration into the Danish society. The membership categorizations are mostly

\(^{12}\) The analysis undertaken in Rolandsen Agustín 2009 is based upon interviews with 20 Danish high-level politicians. The paper examines gendered framings in the interviewees’ responses to the EUROSPHERE interview questionnaire. The analysis undertaken by Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010 is amongst other data based upon interviews with 93 interviewees in 19 political parties across Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland and Spain. This analysis also traces discourses about gender equality that are intertwined with national and European identity constructions.

\(^{13}\) Pristed Nielsen 2010a builds on interviews with the leaders of 14 Danish organizations included in the EUROSPHERE data set. Methodologically the piece is inspired by Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) ideas about microscopic examinations of data. This led to a close examination of the appearance of words and phrases in conjunction with the terms ‘gender’ and/or ‘equality’.
based on cultural and religious criteria, which means that gender equality becomes a matter of culture or religion. However, the excluded identity categories against which the national identity is constructed vary, and religion is contested as a criterion for membership categorization. Several lines of division can, thus, be detected: between Christians and Muslims, between Catholic and Protestants, and between the religious and the non-religious (Rolandsen Agustín 2009).

Similarly, we analyze how Danish organizational leaders across the sites of political parties, social movements, think tanks and media speak about gender and how they frame their discussion of gender equality in relation to other difference creating categories as well as different cultural markers such as ‘Danish’, ‘European’ or ‘Islamic’. The findings show that ‘gender equality’ is very rarely found in conjunction with discussions about ‘religion’, whereas searching for the words ‘Islam’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘scarf’ very often lead to statements that include references to gender. In other words, gender equality is not framed as a religious value, but Islam is framed as a culture/religion that is highly influential on the position and participation of women within society. However, viewpoints about this issue differ in terms of the established connection (or the lack hereof) between gender equality and perceptions of Islam as either a religion or a culture. Nevertheless, statements intersecting gender equality and Islam share the common trait of presenting the question as one of safeguarding interest – whose interests differs from respondent to respondent (Pristed Nielsen 2010b).

Concerning the construction of national and European communities of belonging based on the articulation of discourses on gender equality and ethno national diversity, our analysis of the interviews with Danish politicians furthermore shows that gender equality is both defined as a European value and as a national value. In the latter case, gender equality is clearly intertwined with the idea of ethno-national diversity, as integration is interlinked with gender equality values which are defined mainly in terms of women’s integration into the labour market as an aspect of the Danish gender equality norm (Rolandsen Agustín 2009).

The analysis of interview data from the Danish organizational leaders shows that there is no link between the respondent’s own gender and perceptions of gender equality as a Danish/European/religious value, and the profile of the organization in terms of its position on the political left or right is more important than the respondent’s own gender, in the sense that organizations belonging on the political left wing are less prone to consider gender equality as

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14 The viewpoints raised in the interviews allow no distinction between Islam as a culture or as a religion.
15 However, some interviewees react against this as a normative ideal and the idea of attributing positive values to the ‘European’ per se.
specific Danish or European trait (Pristed Nielsen 2010a). These findings, again, contribute to the national and European identity constructions vis-à-vis contextualized notions of the outsider. In this regard, divisions are also created on a regional basis, where Northern Europe is thought to be more developed in terms of gender equality than Southern and Eastern Europe, followed by the non-European countries (Rolandsen Agustín 2009, Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010).

The analyses carried out in the EUROSPHERE project regarding the gendered discourses about national and European belonging refer, to a large extent, to the Danish interview data. It remains an open empirical question to what extent it is possible to generalize these conclusions to other European countries. However, analyses of other European countries carried out within the VEIL project show that the stereotyping of ethnic, especially Muslim, minorities is highly gendered and that gender equality (and homosexual rights) has become a discourse used as a weapon against minorities. These findings refer specifically to the debates and regulations of Muslim women’s headscarves in Denmark and the Netherlands: white Danish and Dutch majorities are framed as ‘gender equal’ and, thus, being Danish/Dutch becomes equal with practicing gender equality (see Andreassen & Lettinga forthcoming; Christensen & Siim 2010).

Linking these empirical findings to the theoretical and methodological considerations presented in chapter 1 and 2, we argue that intersectionality is framed in both inclusionary and exclusionary ways. We define inclusionary intersectionality as the recognition of intersections of different inequality creating categories, and the potentially negative effects of this interplay for the ultimate objective of strengthening equality (in diversity). Exclusionary intersectionality, on the other hand, emphasises one form of inequality (e.g. gender inequality) at the expense of others, thus discursively exacerbating majority/minority inequalities among other categories (e.g. between ethnic groups) (Christensen & Siim 2010, Siim 2009, Rolandsen Agustín & Siim forthcoming). Similarly, Pringle (2006) uses the term ‘abusing intersectionality’ to emphasize how certain coupling of categories, such as gender and ethnicity, can be applied to exclude marginalized groups.

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16 Questions to explore further in this regard could be, for example, whether or not counter (or minority) discourses exist in the different countries and within which sites, as well as the content of these counter discourses in terms of gender and diversity.
17 We will return to the question of national contexts and their importance in terms of the empirical findings in section 2 (below).
18 The VEIL project (Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies, 2006-2009) analyses headscarf debates and regulations in eight European countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Turkey). See www.veil-project.eu
Our empirical analyses feed into these theoretical considerations by underlining the importance of intersectional dimensions in the analysis of gender equality and diversity in the European public sphere, as well as the need to differentiate the notion of intersectionality when addressing the discursive interplay between ‘gender’ and ‘ethno national diversity’ or ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. We have found numerous examples of both inclusionary and exclusionary uses of intersectionality in the data material of the Danish case. Particularly, inclusionary intersectionality is articulated in the data material when the simultaneous oppression of several kinds of inequality creating categories (ethnicity, nationality and gender, in this case) is considered in relation to the development of integration efforts. Exclusionary intersectionality, on the other hand, is usually articulated when an interviewee focuses on the fight for gender equality while, at the same time, underlining the ‘us/them’ division and strengthening it through the gender equality argumentation. In other words, the use of the intersecting categories tends towards exclusion of the ethnic minorities and not the ‘equality in diversity’ which would be the normative aim of an inclusionary use of intersectionality (Rolandsen Agustín & Siim forthcoming).

As pointed out in chapter 1 (state of the art), the different inequality creating categories should not be considered equal in nature, i.e. it is necessary to differentiate between them in terms of their substance (see also Verloo 2006, and Kraus 2009). Similarly, the notions of inclusionary and exclusionary intersectionality should not be regarded as equally relevant for all types of intersections. They emanate from a particular empirical basis, namely that of the discursive interplay between gender and ethnicity, culture and religion, and the notions seem to be particularly relevant when addressing these categories and their intersections. Similarly, their presence in different national contexts and organizational sites should be a matter of empirical scrutiny parallel to the ones presented here. The relevance of differentiating between inclusionary and exclusionary framings of intersectionality in relation to the categories of gender, ethnicity, culture and religion may be explained with reference to the (discursive) construction of national communities and spheres of belonging. In other words, it appears to be particularly pertinent to add this nuanced perspective on intersectionality in relation to discursive articulations of insider and outsider categories (‘us’/’them’) based on the categories of gender and ethnicity.
2 Context matters
When we in this section discuss to which extent ‘context’ impacts upon interview responses in the Eurosphere data, it is important to underline that we in this connection understand ‘context’ to be the circumstantial aspects of the interview situations – i.e. the country in which the interview was made, the organization which the respondent represents and finally the respondents own gender. It is also important to underline that the analyses referred to in this section rely on quantitative as well as qualitative approaches to analyzing the contents of the Eurosphere database.

A consistent finding in all the analyses undertaken for the work in WP7 has been that national context matters very much for how discourses and processes of gendering take place and are expressed within the material. Hence we observe the presence of a strong ‘Nordic discourse’ in the material, which relates to the notion of ‘spreading the Nordic model of gender equality’. In her discussion of two Norwegian EU campaign organizations, Bygness (2011) demonstrates the presence of ‘an implicit North-South hierarchy, which frames some areas, nations and cultures as more gender-equal and women-friendly than others’. This discourse is especially prominent within Finnish and Norwegian data, and to some extent it can also be found within Danish and even Spanish replies - in the latter case with the reverse implication that ‘we’ need to learn from ‘them’ (Weide 2008, Bygness 2011, Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010). Similarly, we find that conceptions of citizenship among our respondents are (still) very much influenced by nation-state formations (Pristed Nielsen 2011a).

Starting with the finding of a ‘Nordic discourse’, particularly the Danish parts of the data set, but to some extent also the Norwegian and Finnish parts are the parts which have been most closely scrutinized in terms of looking for discourses and processes of gendering. While this selective bias could potentially contort results in the direction of detecting the presence of a Nordic discourse, we remain unconvinced that this is the main explanation for the detection of this discourse. Firstly, because the presence of such a discourse is in line with our theoretical expectations (Verloo and Lombardo 2009, Andreassen and Lettinga forthcoming, Christensen and Siim 2010), secondly because it is such a strong discourse and it is found by so many different authors (Weide 2008, Bygness 2011, Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010), and thirdly because this finding is supported by other recent European projects about gender and gendered discourses such as the VEIL-project (Rosenberger and Sauer, forthcoming).
The excluded identity categories against which the national identity is constructed vary from country to country and respondent to respondent. But divisions are often created on a regional basis by Nordic respondents stemming from Finland and Denmark (Weide 2008, Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010) or Norway (Bygness 2011), where Northern Europe is thought to be more developed in terms of gender equality than Southern and Eastern Europe, followed by the non-European countries. This, again, contributes to the national and European identity constructions vis-à-vis contextualised notions of the outsider. It has been highlighted, for instance, how the Danish welfare state context, the significance attributed to the contribution to and participation in the general society, as well as the idea of homogeneous communities play important roles in the discursive constructions of integration, diversity and gender equality (Rolandsen Agustín 2009). National factors such as level of immigration, dual-breadwinner models/traditions for women’s labor market participation and levels of ‘women-friendly welfare states’ (Hernes 1987, Borchorst and Siim 2008) play a role for the opinions of the interviewees, including the interviewees from the social movements, who seem otherwise generally less bound by dominant national discourses than the political party respondents. The analyses by Mokre and Pristed Nielsen (2010) clearly reveal a North/South (Finland/Spain) discourse regarding gender equality, and it further highlights the impact of the (perceived) presence (Denmark, Austria) or lack thereof (Bulgaria) of immigrant minorities within the national context of the respondents. Furthermore, the presence of Roma minorities (Finland and Bulgaria) in several cases impact on respondents’ understanding of the possible connection between diversity and gender equality. Based on these observations, we conclude that systematic geographic clustering of countries when approaching analyses of gender equality questions would probably lead to findings of consistent differences.

Such a systematic clustering of countries was undertaken in Pristed Nielsen (2011a), where the methodological approach was inspired by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller’s (2002) notion of ‘methodological nationalism’ which they define as ‘the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world’ (2002: 301). This particular analysis was made as a response to a conference call which included the question: ‘Does the concept of citizenship restrict our imaginations and limit our horizons within nation-state formations?’19. Drawing on EUROSPHERE data from Denmark, Hungary, Spain, Turkey, France, and the Netherlands to obtain geographical spread, the question was addressed on the basis of answers from 311 interviews with opinion-makers across these 6

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countries. The analysis focused on replies to questions about attitudes to citizenship acquisition, dual citizenship and EU citizenship.

As Wimmer and Glick-Schiller discuss under the heading ‘Defining the object of migration studies’, methodological nationalism means that ‘migrants become a special object of policy-making’ and research because ‘they destroy the isomorphism between people, sovereign and citizenry’ (2002: 309) and hence questions of loyalty may arise. When searching for the term ‘loyal’ in the 6 country sample used in the analyses in Pristed Nielsen (2011a), we find 21 different respondents who are recorded to raise this issue. However, it is interesting to note that out of these, only 11 connect citizenship with loyalty (for example when a male Danish respondent is recorded to hold the view that ‘Citizenship is about loyalty and you cannot be loyal towards two countries’\(^{20}\)), whereas the remaining 10 actively disassociate citizenship and loyalty (as when a female Danish respondent is recorded to hold the view that ‘There is no problem, dual citizenship cannot be regarded as an expression of illoyalty’\(^{21}\)).\(^{22}\)

These examples are not random. Looking at the profile of the 21 respondents linking the concept of loyalty to citizenship (whether seeing or rejecting a connection), we observe that a staggering majority are from Denmark (10 out of 21), whereas the remaining countries are represented with 6 quotes from the Netherlands, 2 from France and 1 from each of Turkey, Spain and Hungary. This suggests that a linking of loyalty and citizenship is a common occurrence in Danish public discourse – and even those objecting to this conceptual link, feel a need to express it\(^{23}\). The examples are also typical in the sense that it is mainly men who do see a connection (9 out of 14 male respondents), whereas it is mainly women who actively distance themselves from this idea (5 out of 7). In sum, the respondents who primarily fit Wimmer and Glick-Schiller´s notion that dual citizenship challenges notions of loyalty are males from Denmark – partly, but not solely, explicable by the fact that the Danish team included the nationalistic Danish Association in the data set, and interviewed four male members of this organization. Overall, the findings in Pristed Nielsen (2011a) highlight the continued importance of national contexts for understanding interview responses\(^{24}\), and national context appears to hold greater explanatory power than either respondents´ gender or organizational affiliation.

\(^{20}\) Coder’s summation of viewpoint, rather than direct quote.  
\(^{21}\) Coder’s summation of viewpoint, rather than direct quote.  
\(^{22}\) This trend towards acceptance of dual citizenship is confirmed by other research (Faist and Kivisto 2007)  
\(^{23}\) Also, 5 out of the 6 Dutch respondents who mention loyalty disclaim any connection to citizenship.  
\(^{24}\) Considering that the issue under discussion here is citizenship, this was to be expected (Koopmans 2000, 2005)
We observe that attitudes to citizenship acquisition, dual citizenship, union citizenship and general immigration policies are (still) to a very large extent influenced by the horizon of nation-state formations. However, there is a high degree of acceptance of dual citizenship (even in Denmark, where the most skeptical respondents on this point are found). Although the analyses do point to national context as important for understanding respondents´ attitudes to questions of political citizenship, we observe no direct link between current national legislation on dual citizenship and respondents´ attitudes. We consistently find that Denmark and Hungary are the two countries in which respondents´ most consistently indicate the importance of the nation-state for determining citizenship. But even in countries where replies are less closely linked to traditional conceptions of the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, we observe answers clearly explainable by considering the nationality of respondents. Hence, Spanish replies are interpretable by considering the country´s close historical links with countries in Latin America, and Turkish replies seem interpretable by considering the presence of a Turkish diaspora within the EU (Pristed Nielsen 2011a). Furthermore, in line with Wind´s (2009) results, we do observe a degree of acceptance of direct access to Union Citizenship (mostly among Turkish and Spanish respondents), although it is perhaps doubtful that the wider normative and empirical ramifications (Bauböck 2007) of this phenomenon is understood by respondents.

Out of the three aspects of the interview situations concerning the respondent´s gender, organizational affiliation and national context, the latter often constitutes a relevant framework for explaining attitudes expressed during the interviews. Nevertheless, the organizational context does matter for interpreting the EUROSPHERE interview data. In fact, a major contribution of the EUROSPHERE project is the empirical demonstration of how important it is to look beyond traditional sites of public sphere participation when it comes to documenting discourses and processes of gendering – in this case within the EU. As discussed in chapter 1, theoretical contributions by Fraser (1990) and Young (1990) lead to models of the public sphere and public sphere participation which open up for more inclusive approaches to Who should participate and on what occasions? (participation), What should be the form and content of their contributions to the public discourse? (process), How should the actors communicate with one another? (communication), What are the desired outcomes of the process? (outcome) (Marx Ferree 2002). While these theories have been dominating feminist discussions about public sphere participation for quite a while, our empirical results indicate how broadening one´s scope beyond political party discourse documents the
existence of wide variety of discourses and counter-discourses (Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010 and Pristed Nielsen 2010a and 2010b).

For example, we can demonstrate the existence of a hegemonic political discourse within Denmark that gender equality is something ‘we’ (ethnic Danes) have learned in opposition to ‘them’ (immigrant women, Muslim women, non-Nordic countries within EU) (Rolandsen Agustín 2009). This dominant discourse prevails more or less across the spectrum when looking only at the political party respondents, whereas the broadening of the scope to include media, think tanks and social movements clearly demonstrates the existence of a counter-discourse within the non-political party-based political left. Whereas the political parties show a difference in degree in terms of the adherence to the dominant discourse (with the Socialist People’s Party being the furthest away from the mainstream), true opposition to the dominant gender equality discourse within Denmark is to be found outside of politics in the classical sense. We thus find the most outspoken opposition to the official discourse in interviews with individual respondents from New Agenda (think tank), Politiken (media) and Denmark’s Social Forum (social movement). Hence, counter-discourses are actor-specific and the sites are internally diverse, but with the least internal variation among the political party respondents (Rolandsen Agustín 2009, Pristed Nielsen 2010a and 2010b).

Both the analyses by Pristed Nielsen (2010a and 2010b), which looks at all sites of data collection (think tanks, media, political parties and social movements) in Denmark alone, as well as Mokre and Pristed Nielsen (2010), which look only at political parties and social movements, but in five different countries (Denmark, Bulgaria, Austria, Finland, and Spain) point to how discourses among political party respondents show much lesser variation than among social movement respondents. When looking at differences between actor types, social movements clearly deliver the most dispersed answers regarding attitudes to diversity and gender equality compared to political party respondents. The social movements are a site of contestation of dominant discourses (della Porta and Caiani 2009), but also a site in which our actor selection, including both pro-and anti-diversity organizations, heavily influences the dispersal of viewpoints. The picture for political parties is much less rich than the one for social movements, simply in terms of how many answers we get from these respondents, their length and the variation in the viewpoints expressed. This may be due both to gender equality issues being a rather second order priority for several political party respondents, and it may also be due to a methodological bias induced by political party respondents possibly having

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25 This is also in line with other research (della Porta and Caiani 2009)
less time to spend in an interview with a researcher. However, given the otherwise rich content of many of these interviews, we propose that the main explanation is partly due to lack of attention to gender equality issues and partly due to party discipline, as well as the fact that political parties represent the mainstream of representative politics, whereas the more deliberative and contestation oriented nature of civil society opens up more possibilities for a variety of (counter)discourses to emerge.

The sites are internally diverse but with the least (internal) variation among the political party respondents, and the counter-discourses are actor-specific. Furthermore, the profile of the organization in terms of its position on the political left or right is more important than the respondent’s own gender. The respondent’s gender is an aspect of the interviews which we might theorize would matter for the finding of possible counter-discourses. But the picture here is rather muddled, and is best answered by referring to the conclusion in chapter 5 (containing descriptive statistical analyses of the entire interview dataset). Here we conclude that gender matters, but not in itself. Thus, Pristed Nielsen (2010a and 2010b) show that the profile of the organization matters more than the respondent’s gender for demonstrating the existence of counter-discourses. And Pristed Nielsen (2011a) shows that female respondents are more likely to endorse dual citizenship and less willing to distinguish between the origin of immigrants when answering questions about immigration policies. However, this in no way documents that gender issues play any role in conceptions of citizenship.

The general conclusion about the impact of contextual aspects remain that national context and organizational profiles are highly important for understanding discourses and processes of gendering in the European public sphere, whereas the respondent’s gender does not generally appear to be of great influence on results. Overall, women´s voices do not constitute a strong collective counter-discourse within the data set, and even though we do point to the organizational level as the place to locate counter-discourses to the dominant national ones, analyses presented in chapter 6 below demonstrate that even the six women´s organizations within our sample do not constitute a strong let alone coherent counter-discourse within the European Public Sphere.

3 The Transnational Dimension and the EU as a Multi-Level Polity
In this section we focus upon transnational social movements, addressing questions of gender and ethnicity, as well as the relationship between European integration and equality in diversity. The analyses we base this section on are more clearly than some of the others
inspired by theories of intersectionality, insofar as their methodological approaches and data sampling have also been designed to meet these theoretical insights.

In addition to national actors, the EUROSPHERE project collected information about transnational actors. Among these, the WP7 team has particularly focused on the discourses and processes of gendering within the two transnational social movements European Network against Racism [ENAR] and the European Women’s Lobby [EWL]. Investigating the organizational discourses, structures and interactions highlight how the EU constitutes a multi-level polity, and hence present a particular set of political opportunity structures which set the scene for how these organizations carry out their work and take into consideration intersectional dimensions of this work. As an example of how EU legislation and policy focus influence the room for manoeuvre for these transnational organizations, we observe how the EWL has increasingly taken initiatives regarding minority women (compare Pristed Nielsen 2010c with Pristed Nielsen forthcoming, and see Rolandsen Agustín 2008, 2011 and Rolandsen Agustín & Roth forthcoming).

Related research shows that the transnational panorama of women’s organizations mobilizing at the European level around gender and ethnicity is characterized by one strong actor, namely the European Women’s Lobby, and an increasing number of minority organizations. The latter typically define themselves and their constituencies on the basis of intersectional notions of gender and ethnicity (Rolandsen Agustín 2011). The mobilizing strategies used by these transnational organizations are dynamic and change according to the interactions between the different organizations, as well as between the organizations and the European Union. The constraints and possibilities which result from the institutional context with which they interact, i.e. that of the EU, enhance and limit both the discourses and the practices of the organizations (Rolandsen Agustín 2008).

The gender oriented organizations were initially reluctant to take up the integrated approach to inequalities as suggested by the European Commission (i.e. addressing all inequalities together) (ibid.), but the European Women’s Lobby has increasingly taking in these ideas in order to initiate activities and policies combining gender and ethnicity concerns while maintaining a strong focus on gender as a particular inequality category (Pristed Nielsen forthcoming, Rolandsen Agustín 2011, Rolandsen Agustín & Roth forthcoming).

26 Besides institutional data reports and interview material, this publication builds on further document analysis of homepages and publications from these two organizations, including documents released subsequent to the EUROSPHERE data collection period.

27 References to Rolandsen Agustín (2008, 2011) and Rolandsen Agustín & Roth (forthcoming) in this section do not rely on EUROSPHERE data. Rolandsen Agustín (2011) is, however, to some extent inspired by discussions on theory and methodology undertaken within the EUROSPHERE project at large and the Aalborg team in particular.
However, multiple strategies are envisaged by both minority and majority organizations in their attempts to represent and mobilize diverse constituencies. Thus, several strategies are combined such as coalition-building across differences, intersectional agenda-setting within EU policies, inclusion of minority voices in mainstream organizations as well as self mobilization and representation among minority women (Rolandsen Agustín & Roth forthcoming).

Pristed Nielsen (forthcoming) includes a discussion of how the theoretical concept of intersectionality has moved through both time and space from the US in the 1980s to a contemporary EU context, which amongst other things highlights how the EU is a context which shapes discursive opportunity structures for framing questions of intersectionality. During this transatlantic journey, the concept has undergone several modifications, which we also consider as being played out in the empirical results stemming both directly from EUROSPHERE data as well as supplementary data applied in the analyses discussed in this section. Some of the important points here include how intersectionality has acquired a paradigmatic status (Hancock 2007) and how, in the US, intersectionality has often been used to uncover vulnerability and constraints, and seen as a source of disempowerment, whereas Davis claims that European feminists have used the concept to look for agency and disrupt static notions of intersectionality (Davis, 2009).

On the basis of both interview data collected for EUROSPHERE as well as supplementary interviews with representatives of EWL, Women Against Violence Europe, Black European Women’s Council and Young Women from Minorities (Rolandsen Agustín 2010, 2011 and Rolandsen Agustín & Roth forthcoming) and analyses of supplementary documents from ENAR and EWL (Pristed Nielsen forthcoming), we conclude that several transnational organizations orient themselves towards these theoretical developments. While we propose that this is a rather recent shift (Pristed Nielsen forthcoming and Rolandsen Agustín 2011), we do see evidence of organizations including progressively more nuanced intersectional considerations in their policy developments and general orientation/communication to the outside world (Bach et al 2010). In fact, we propose here that the EUROSPHERE project in itself has to a small extent contributed to this awareness raising, both through the actual process of interacting with the said organizations during the data collection phases, but also through continuously maintaining a dialogue of mutual benefit.

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28 The issue is discussed with a particular reference to a Scandinavian context by Christensen and Siim 2006
for example through EUROSPHERE’s international conferences as held in Osnabrück in 2009 and Brussels in 2010.

Further, on the topic of the EU as a multi-level polity, we have been looking at the relation between attitudes to EU integration and gender equality and anti-discrimination legislation. Here, analyses of data from number of countries within the data set - Norway (Bygness 2011), Denmark, Bulgaria, Austria, Finland, and Spain (Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010) - trace an interesting general tendency within the data to regard EU regulation of questions of gender equality and anti-discrimination as a legitimate policy intervention, regardless of respondents’ or organizations’ general pro- or anti-EU profile. The only consistent exception to this pattern is the self-proclaimed nationally oriented organizations within the data set. This is a remarkable result. It seems that irrespective of the individual or organization’s overall stance on European integration, EU level regulation of anti-discrimination laws in general and gender equality mechanisms in particular are considered a legitimate area for the EU to intervene in, also by those social movements most clearly pursuing an agenda of contestation of the political framework for the EU.

Regarding differences and similarities between actor types, we see that nationalist oriented social movements and political parties alike agree in their skepticism about European integration; this position is shared by a few respondents belonging to non-nationalist organizations. We distinguish here between EU-skeptical and EU-contesting organizations (della Porta 2009). The former wish to abolish the EU as a policy making level, whereas the latter call for democratic reform of the EU-system. EU-skeptic positions can be found in all 5 countries, but they are especially prominent among Danish social movements, where several interviewees see a negative correlation between European integration and gender equality. This means that there are social movement respondents within the Danish data set (most clearly found within Denmark’s Social Forum) who are EU-skeptic (according to the above definition) but are non-nationalist (in fact, rather post-nationalist, in the sense of calling for global regulation of anti-discrimination and equality policies). Among Spanish respondents from both social movements and political parties, we see a tendency to highlight the difference between legal provisions and policy practices, which constitutes a different way of expressing skepticism, but does not question the relevance of EU-level regulation of anti-discrimination and gender equality legislation (Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010).
4 Conclusions
While the researchers involved in the EUROSPHERE Gender Work Package have already undertaken a series of analyses of the data material, many more ideas remain to be pursued. One obstacle for the qualitative analyses of data from a gender perspective has been the lack of a strongly integrated concern with gender issues in the questionnaire. This lack has partly been balanced by the inclusion of extra material both from renewed data collection efforts and from referring to findings of other large trans-European research projects focusing on gender and the EU.

Despite these limitations, the present chapter demonstrates how the EUROSPHERE project has made independent contributions to our knowledge about the interconnections between European integration, gender equality discourses and processes of gendering within the European public sphere. The strongest conclusions here pertain to the documentation of gendered discourses about national and European belonging, discourses that in some cases serve to demarcate the outsiders within and outside the nation state and/or the EU. Secondly, our analyses document the continued relevance of the respective national contexts for understanding the interview data, a context which together with the organizational context seems to explain more than the respondent’s own gender. Our elite female respondents in the EUROSPHERE data set in no way orchestrate a coherent voicing of gender issues within the EU. And finally, our data set documents, on the one hand, that transnational civil society organizations increasingly incorporate intersectional concerns and, on the other, that irrespective of organizational pro- or anti-EU stances, EU level regulation of gender equality legislation is most often considered legitimate by our respondents.
PART 4

Gender, Diversity, and the (absent) Images of Europe: A Descriptive Analysis of Women's Social Movement Organizations

Alberto Arribas Lozano, Nayra García-González & Aurora Álvarez Veinguer

1 Introduction
This paper presents some preliminary findings for Eurosphere Work Package 7: Gender, Intersectionality and the European Public Sphere. In its previous phases, the Eurosphere project has carried out interviews with social and political actors (think tanks, print media, social movements, and political parties) around three main axes: Diversity, European Polity, and the European Public Sphere. Among these we can find the discourses of 47 Social Movement Organisations coming from 16 different countries. The following document is a qualitative-comparative review of the discourses gathered by the Eurosphere project by means of interviews with representatives from social movements organisations whose work focus on gender issues in different parts of Europe: one Nordic country, two post-communist countries, two different Turkish organizations - one based in cities in Central and Western Turkey, and the other one based in Southeast and Eastern Turkey -, and one continental country:

- Women’s Alliance For Development, WAD (Bulgaria),
- WOMEN'S COUNCIL (Denmark);
- Ni Putes Ni Soumises, NPNS (France);
- Nők A Nőkért Együtt Az Erőszak Ellen, NANE (Hungary);
- Association to Support Women Candidates in Political Parties, KA-DER (Turkey);
  and,
- Women’s Centre, KAMER (Turkey).
Eurosphere’s interview is split into five blocks: Block I Diversity in General with 2 questions; Block II Ethno-National Diversity, with 7 questions; Block III the EU Polity and Institutions, with 6 questions; Block IV European Polity and Institutions, with 17 questions; and Block V the European Public Spheres with 20 questions for the media organisations and 14 for the remaining organisations. The selected - and subsequently analysed - number of questions for this paper has been necessarily narrowed down so as to cover the most relevant extracts for Eurosphere’s main axes; hence, we have chosen two question from the first block, five from the second one, two from the third and four from the last block, i.e. 13 questions in total. The diversity of answers within each organisation has prompted an analysis produced at the level of individual respondents rather than at the organisational level; for that reason, we should bear in mind that we are presenting descriptive narratives from 25 respondents (24 women and 1 man) addressing internal divergences and differences that emerged inside each organisation.

Without further ado, next is an introduction of the social movement organisations included in the report, in order to contextualise their responses.

2 Interviewed Women's Social Movement Organisations.

2.1 Women's Alliance for Development (WAD), Bulgaria.
http://www.women-bg.org

The main goal of WAD is to fight for and defend gender equality and partnership of the sexes by working on furthering equal opportunities for women and men, accommodating diversity in all its aspects, regardless the differences in sex, social status, ethnic origin, health status, age, sexual orientation, marital status, religion. Founded at the end of 1996 by a group of 13 women, leaders of independent NGOs, the background of WAD members hovers around human rights, gender equality, environmental protection and civil society development. Six years later, WAD succeeded in establishing a highly respected Resource Centre, which specialised in the area of gender and development, and offered information, communication, consultancy and training services to a broad variety of civil society organisations. In 2000 WAD initiated the National Network for Equal Opportunities (NNEO), which brought together around 60 NGOs across Bulgaria. Since 1997 WAD has been one of the active members of the Karat Coalition for Regional Action, as well as a member of the Network of East West Women. Moreover, in 1999 WAD joined the Gender Task Force for the countries of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe.
At present, WAD works at all levels: local, national and transnational, to: raise public awareness about gender issues, improve women's access to economic resources; provoke positive reactions towards the equal participation of women in decision-making processes at local, regional and national level; promote sustainable development through cross-sector cooperation and partnership with government on the implementation of National Plan for Action; increase the impact of East-European women in global consultative and European integration processes through transfer and adaptation of know-how from Western democracies; exchange ideas and encourage pro-active networking within international and regional networks. They do so by offering information resources and a specialised reference library, as well as consultancy on issues of organisational strengthening of NGOs, advocacy for legislative amendments and positive actions by the government to remove structural reasons for gender inequality; gender expertise, monitoring the implementation of the international human rights treaties and provision of alternative reports and statements. *Five women from this organisation have been interviewed.*

2.2 Ni Putes Ni Sumises, France  
http://www.niputesnisoumises.com

Ni Putes Ni Sumises (NPNS) was founded in March 2003 as a mixed, feminist and laic movement, after the women's march for equality and against ghettos. This was a symbolical manifestation against violence against women that summoned over 30,000 people in Paris and gathered others who marched through 23 French towns. This organisation intends to stir popular consciousness and mobilise civil society. NPNS was the first organisation to speak loudly about controversial issues such as the social segregation endured in French suburbs, religious fundamentalism and gender discrimination.

In a very short period of time, it has become one of the most media-visible NGOs in France. The founder of the organisation, Fadela Amara is today a public personality who holds the Secretary of State for urban policy position, an important post in French institutions. In the past years they have caught the public's attention especially when discourses around *laïcité* emerge, since it has been the organisation's main political fight to protect women from religious fundamentalism. As a consequence, the organisation has been questioned for drifting from radicalism to becoming an ally of the State. The departure of the first leader of the organisation to the Government was criticised by the Socialist Party and by some members of the association, leading some members to create a different organisation called “Insoumise”
which currently works on the same subjects, especially women's rights. *Five interviews were done within this organisation.*

### 2.3 The WOMEN'S COUNCIL, Denmark

http://www.kvinderaadet.dk

The WOMEN’S COUNCIL is the largest women’s association in Denmark and an important member of the European Women’s Lobby (member organisation of the European Social Platform). When in 1899, the WOMEN'S COUNCIL in Denmark was established, it stood beside other women's organisations in their struggle for the liberation of women; however, the Danish women’s movement as such has since the 1990s been fragmented and has more or less disappeared as a collective entity. The WOMEN’S COUNCIL has been selected as an NGO/SMO actor because this old national institution is one of the few remaining women’s organisations, and it has even acquired a new outstanding role in relation to the EU and in the international political arena, to a great extent through the European Women’s Lobby. Today, the WOMEN'S COUNCIL in Denmark is the umbrella organisation for 45 organisations - equal status committees of the political parties, trade unions, and professional women's groups, migrant and refugee women, women's studies researchers, youth organisations, religious and humanitarian women's organisations - with more than one million members (out of a total national population of approx 5½ million). It represents women’s interests – social, professional, economic and cultural - through consultations and in a number of official councils and delegations. It is constituted as a common platform for the development of democracy and equality; diversity issues focus on the rights of ethnic minority women and the dialogue among women beyond ethnic differences. A national umbrella organisation for immigrant women has recently been formed (founded in September 2009) with the name Ethnic Minority Women's Council. It is an independent organisation, yet strongly linked to the WOMEN’S COUNCIL. The latter has no particular policy on the EU (pro/anti), but works through the EU (and the UN) to influence policies and advocate women’s interests. Likewise, the association does not have specific political ties to the parties and the members cover a broad range of organisations. *The analysis includes the discourses of four female members of the organisation.*
2.4 Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen (NANE), Hungary
http://www.nane.hu

NANE's beginnings date back to 1994. Since its establishment, the association operates a hotline for victims – women and children – of domestic violence; other important objectives of the organisation are to disseminate information about violence against women through leaflets, billboards and media campaigns; ending the human rights violations and the threat of violence against women and children through advocacy, personal support services and public education. Their range of influence has expanded and now comprises the promotion of amendments to laws and public administration reforms in areas where the current regulations do not guarantee equal protection under the law for victims of domestic violence, i.e. women and child abuse. Furthermore, it plays a major role in the social debate of almost all policy documents targeting women, such as the 2002 and 2007 CEDAW Shadow reports, or the 2003 Equal Opportunity Act. Among the organisation’s successes was its petition to outlaw marital rape, which was ruled favourable by the Hungarian Parliament in 1997.

NANE is a small organisation, currently with 3 full-time and 1 part-time employees and some volunteer members, who join occasionally for certain projects. It has no male members - although they can be part of the so-called supporting members. Although its employed staff is very small and eventually seems to overlap with lay-leadership, NANE is very active and maintains good connections with former members. Herta Tóth, a former member of NANE is currently the Secretary of the HWL, the first democratic umbrella organisation founded by women’s NGOs to promote gender issues in the European Union. It is not easy to become a member of NANE: one has to be determined enough to take an 80 hours-long help-line training course followed by a 24 hours long practice on the hotline; according to the written agreement which states that members will carry out the job at least once a month for at least a year, or a minimum of 4 hours a month volunteer work for the association. NANE has a number of ‘partner organisations’ and actively encourages members to participate in their joint projects, especially its Hungarian networking partner, Hungarian Women’s Lobby (Női Érdek) and it’s international networking partner, Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE); the European Women's Lobby is its main trans-European partner. Other partners include Habeas Corpus Workgroup, Amnesty International Hungary, the Centre for Reproductive Rights (CRR), etc.

NANE claims that the government’s actions on gender equality policies are scarce and ad hoc in nature; measures taken are formal and only serve the purpose of façade. Prior to Hungary's accession to the European Union (2004), the organisation gained visibility in
politics when NANE organised its most far-reaching campaign targeting the legislative and law-enforcement bodies. This had been a key period, when political leadership was extremely keen on issuing better legislation related to gender equality. Regarding current policy issues, NANE has been especially interested in the implementation of the CEDAW Convention and its Optional Protocol in Hungary. Visibility of the organisation is also helped by the fact that NANE leadership is regularly elected in the HWL, the national level women’s umbrella organisation as well as into leadership positions. *Five women from this organisation have been interviewed.*

2.5 Women’s Centre (KAMER) and The Association to Support Women Candidates in Political Parties (KA-DER), Turkey


Women’s organisations have been key actors in Turkey’s democratization process. The first street demonstration after the 1980 coup was a march by women protesting against domestic violence. During the recent period of legal reform (as part of the EU accession process), some of the central debates and changes (particularly in the civil code and the penal code) has had to do with women and gender. Women’s organisations have also been critical in addressing issues related to ethno-national diversity, while bringing together women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds for joint campaigns and projects. Since October 2004, women’s organisations in Turkey have been involved in the European Women’s Lobby, becoming a full member in 2005. Among the numerous women’s organisations are: KAMER (organised mainly in Eastern Turkey) and KA-DER (organised mainly in Central and Western Turkey). Focusing on two women’s organisations based in eastern and central-western Turkey has allowed us to develop a comprehensive outlook on issues of ethno-national diversity as they play themselves out across the East-West divide (a major divide in the ethno-national axis in Turkey).

**KAMER** was founded in the Kurdish populated Diyarbakir province in 1997 to fight against gender-based violence and to empower women economically, socially and politically. Ever since, it has spread throughout 23 provinces of Southeast and Eastern Turkey, which has been a war zone since the 1980s, reaching more than 30,000 women. It has established 23 women’s centres, seven day care centres, and numerous women-run businesses; has saved the lives of more than 100 women faced with threats of honour-killings between 2003 and 2006, and has become active in national and international policy-making on preventing gender-based violence. Bringing together women from different groups, KAMER provides a unique example of political organizing across ethnic, religious and sectarian lines. KAMER has also
been active at the European level, working with women’s groups in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, as well as actively participating in the European Women’s Lobby. *Four KAMER's members were interviewed.*

Founded in 1997, KA-DER is a non-partisan organisation, considered to be the first political movement of women in the country. KA-DER has 17 branches in major cities, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Eskisehir, Samsun, Adana and Manisa (i.e. cities in central and western Turkey). The number of its membership exceeds 3,000 (the Ankara branch where Eurosphere conducted the interviews has 250 members) and comprises both women from various political parties and those with no party affiliations at all. Consequently, due to this mandate to work across party lines, KA-DER has brought together women from diverse backgrounds and political affiliations, including academics, journalists, politicians, advertising specialists and activists working in the field. Rather than becoming a mass organisation, KA-DER's goal is to increase the representation of women in all elected and appointed positions within decision-making bodies. More specifically its objectives are empowering and encouraging women to develop strategies for effective and equal participation in local and national parliaments and to be represented at all decision making bodies; collaborating with other women’s NGOs and women’s branches of political parties to enhance the position of women at decision making levels; providing training, supporting campaigns for possible candidates and appealing to the political parties to increase the number of women nominees; promoting a gender equality perspective into all institutions that make up society. The organisation finances itself via membership fees; subscription fees; donations and gifts; projects, as well as profits from meetings, performances and a number of activities such as excursions, sports competitions, concerts, balls, and conferences. *Two respondents were interviewed from this organisation.*

3 Block I & II: diversity in general and ethno-national diversity

[Only selected questions]

**Questions V1.1: Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society?, and V1.2a: Which groups’ claims are more important than others’ according to the respondents?**

There are no relevant patterns with regard to question V1.1. Focusing on question V1.2a, the analysis points towards a dividing line between those organisations that - thinking about diversity - consider that some group-specific claims should be given priority: KAMER (except for one respondent), KA-DER, and NANE, mentioning gender, ethnicity, sexual
orientation and so on; and those organisations considering that diversity is about equality and equal treatment of citizens and not about groups’ differences, and therefore no group-related priority should apply: NPNS and WAD (except for one respondent).

It is interesting to see how this axis seems to cross the WOMEN'S COUNCIL, with half of the respondents rejecting the prioritization of group-specific claims, and the other half defending it; in this context, it is worth noting how one of the WOMEN'S COUNCIL interviewees underlines that, as a matter of fact, group-related claims - regarding gender, disability, religion, ethnicity, age and sexual orientation - have already been prioritised at EU and UN levels.

Questions V2.2a and V2.2b: Is ethno-national diversity an advantage for society? Is ethno-national diversity a disadvantage for society?

When it comes to thinking about advantages and disadvantages of ethno-national diversity for society, responses could be summarised as follows:

1) All respondents but four emphasise that ethno-national diversity has many more advantages than disadvantages. Two respondents (NANE's ref. 2031 and WOMEN'S COUNCIL ref. 699) argue that diversity in itself is neutral and that there is no normative status that could be attached to it; KAMER's ref. 2037 claims that ethno-national diversity has proved to be problematic for the daily activities of the organisation; and KA-DER's ref. 835 considers that ethno-national and cultural diversity (multicultural mixture) have a negative impact on society, and argues for an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation.

2) The advantages mentioned are related to manifold dimensions of social life: cultural richness, more flexibility and tolerance, social mobility, economic development, more freedom and pluralism, less rigid identities and more reflection upon self-identity, more interesting life, diverse influences and ideas fostering individual and social learning, more gender equality, wider horizons, and better food.

3) Except for the above mentioned respondent, diversity is never considered as a disadvantage in itself, but there is a common understanding that it could become a disadvantage for society under certain circumstances, which are strongly connected to contexts of (re)production of social inequality and/or reinforcement of power relationships, which make it difficult for different groups to live together. Other factors that have been underlined by the respondents as potentially turning diversity into a disadvantage are: the ghettoization of groups; the institutional failure to
implement and enforce the superiority of law and human rights in social life; the absence of interaction and dialogue amongst groups (which could turn diversity into a challenge for social cohesion, gender equality, the labour market, and so on and so forth); and the rise of extreme right groups promoting ethnic and religious discrimination.

**Question V2.3: Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state?**

Regarding the need for the State to regulate diversity-issues, we find that respondents from KAMER, NPNS, WAD, and KA-DER, consider that the state should remain neutral, treating all groups in the same way, and ensuring and enforcing equal access to opportunities and resources for everyone; with only some divergences inside the organisations regarding the potential benefits of implementing positive discrimination measures for specific groups (i.e. women) in particular situations. Whereas, on the other hand, NANE and the WOMEN'S COUNCIL (again, with some internal divergences) believe that the State should not remain neutral, and that specific initiatives, measures, programs, and laws should be made for the groups needing special support.

**Question V2.5: Should public institutions be adapted to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities? What should be the limits of such adaptation?**

As to the question of whether public institutions should adapt to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities, the organisations are divided in two groups. On the one hand, KA-DER, KAMER, NANE, and the WOMEN'S COUNCIL agree that public institutions should be reorganised in order to meet the needs of ethno-national minorities: NANE's interviewees affirm that such adaptation should take place at all possible levels; KA-DER and KAMER's respondents underline the relevance of language - linked to women, ethnic minorities and migrants - as a means of exclusion/inclusion, and demand the presence of translators and the recognition of minority languages; and the WOMEN'S COUNCIL respondents stand for adaptation and flexibility, and emphasise that such processes must be implemented at local levels in order to meet local needs. On the contrary, WAD's respondents consider that institutions have already made enough efforts to deal with diversity issues and that no further adaption should be made; and NPNS's interviewees underline that the main point is that every possible measure for adaptation should ensure integration and avoid the risk of groups’ isolation (specially for the women within those groups).
Question V2.6a: Are there certain aspects of ... (e.g. Danish) way of life and certain institutions that immigrants have to adapt to?

Regarding the question of immigrants’ adaptation, there is an insistence on the importance of the enforcement of law, but the discourses are quite varied, and it is not easy to find common patterns amongst the organisations. The WOMEN'S COUNCIL's respondents stand for an ideal of integration through dialogue and mutual learning, but underline that there are certain things that cannot be compromised and that immigrants have the obligation to abide by the law. WAD's respondents show a more assimilationist approach, they do not mention any bidirectional processes but stress the need for immigrants to obey the laws, and to adapt to local language and to State institutions. Several NANE’s respondents mention the importance of accepting the legal system, but there is a general view that the definition of a country's lifestyle is a problematic issue, and that there is no Hungarian life-style that immigrants should adapt to. KAMER interviewees claim that immigrants should respect some cultural values and beliefs of the receiving country, but they embrace a notion of integration where both nationals and foreigners have to accept each other, and where immigrants are not expected to reject their own cultural traditions. And KA-DER's interviewees highlight that it is more important to facilitate integration than to demand adaptation; whereas NPNS respondents seem to reject the concept of adaptation, but they claim that immigrants have to integrate through learning the language and respecting the French republican laws. It is worth noting the lack of criticism towards the countries' legal framework, and the strong legitimation – or absence of problematization- of national juridical contexts. Along the same lines, there are other elements that are also missing from the discourses - surprisingly enough, bearing in mind the nature of these social actors– such as for example views on education or civil participation as crucial dimensions of integration processes.

4 Block III: The EU polity and its institutions

Question V3.1: In which direction should the EU Polity develop in the future?

The diversity of views within the organisations and, most of all, the high proportion of respondents who claim to have no defined opinion on this issue or to lack the necessary information to answer the question, lead us to think that the EU polity and its institutions is not a topic of discussion within the organisations. This finding somehow challenges the recent literature on Europeanization of social movements, which emphasises the need to analyse the ways in which Europe and the opposition to and/or critique of the directions of European integration are framed by SMOs, underlining the importance of the symbolic construction
(discourse, communication) around Europe, and claiming that civil society actors are not merely adapting to the changing political context but also bear and develop specific visions of ‘what’ Europe is and should be about (della Porta & Caiani, 2009). Such specific visions of Europe seem to be missing here, and along the same lines, it is worth noting that only three respondents, two from WOMEN'S COUNCIL and one from NPNS, both Western European based organisations, mention the often-discussed issue of the democratic deficit of the EU project.

**Question V3.3: What further positive or negative developments do you expect with regard to the impact of European integration on gender equality?**

There is wide consensus among all organisations underlining direct links between European integration and gender equality, most respondents arguing that integration and the harmonisation of the laws and regulations at the EU-level can only benefit gender equality and women's rights.

For most respondents integration has already had (and will have) a positive impact on gender equality in terms of women's involvement and leadership in politics and political parties, in decision-making bodies, and in business, as well as in the creation of new opportunities for developing new projects, and in the elimination of biased or sexist discourses in school books and curriculum.

On the other hand, several respondents claim that when it comes to gender equality - which is part of the basic understanding of the EU as a community - there is still a long distance between rhetoric and action or practice.

**5 Block V: European Public Spheres**

**Question V 5.1: Is there one common European communication space today?**

The responses to this question show the difficulty of grasping the (potential) EPS in practical terms. Most respondents consider that there is no common European communication space today. Both NPNS and the WOMEN'S COUNCIL’s respondents say that the emergence and consolidation of an EPS is not possible in so far as there is a clear lack of political coordination at the EU level. Some respondents, on the other hand, state that the EPS exists and that there are plenty of information being shared and joint decision-making being articulated at transnational levels, though according to KA-DER interviewees, this has more to do with organisational and personal efforts than to the EU’s institutional support. Multi-
level EPS is the most called for structure, and recurrently specific/specialised fields/areas/spheres are acknowledged in terms of platforms and communication spaces (what NANE’s respondent ref. 2034 calls “thematic public spaces”).

**Question V5.2: If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?**

Most organisations consider that the EPS - to the extent that it is believed to exist - is exclusive and to a great extent also elitist.

- WAD and NANE’s respondents think that the West excludes the East.
- KAMER, KA-DER and NANE's respondents claim that there are several obstacles that impede the full participation/inclusion of organisations in the EPS, underlining language and internet access and skills.
- NPNS and NANE’s interviewees affirm that women are excluded from the EPS in relation to men.
- KAMER and KA-DER say that the absence of economic resources hinders organisations from being part of the EPS, and it is worth noting that KA-DER explicitly complains about the bureaucratic difficulties to apply for European funds.
- WOMEN’S COUNCIL underlines that the EPS only includes a particular profile: urban, youth, elite and middle class participants.

**Questions 5.7/8: Which other organisations does your organisation collaborate the most with, on which issues and why?**

All organisations collaborate to some extent in international networks, and some have very strong trans-European links. In fact, most organisations of this sample are working partners

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29 WAD from Bulgaria works together with its partner Karat Coalition for Regional Action, the European Women’s Lobby (main trans-European partner), UNIFEM, Coalition for Equal Opportunities, Academic society, Animus, Gender project for Bulgaria, etc.; it founded the National Network for Equal Opportunities (NNEO); member of Network of East West Women, Huairou Commission with the new SHINE (women's grassroots) network for CEE, AVIVA; 1999 Gender Task Force for the countries of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, etc.; Women’s Council from Denmark is a member of the European Women’s Lobby (member organisation of the European Social Platform); Parliamentarian representation (specifically the Danish Parliamentarian Britta Thomsen), European Economic and Social Council. At a national level members are all part of other organisations, the gender equality advisory board, political contacts; the mainstreaming network (overseeing Danish implementation of EU gender mainstreaming legislation); the consumer council, etc.; NPNS from France, has 25 committees at the national level and 6 at the international level. Each of the committees in its own country or region has its own contacts and networks. The committee from Brussels for example, is working a lot with the European Women’s Lobby. At the central unit, the organisation prioritises more the coordination of women’s lobby in France. In Europe, NPNS is working a lot with Italy, Spain and Sweden, but also has partnerships with Germany on secularism. Their networks exceed the European space by means of Euro-Mediterranean collaboration, in Morocco and in Congo associations working for the literacy of young girls in rural areas, in Quebec and Chilli networks for the sensibilization to violence against women. Some of the organisations mentioned with which they collaborate at different levels are: Aurore Network, Clair Logis, Youth housing, neighbourhood schools; Hungarian NANE’s main trans-European partner is the European Women’s Lobby. Apart from that, it collaborates with Austrian women's organisations; Global Fund for Women; Violence Against Women Europe; Amnesty Hungary; International Law Enforcement. At national level they work with the Hungarian Police,
with the European Women's Lobby. Most of them point out that the reasons to collaborate with other organisations are common goals, views and interests.

This intense level of networking at EU level must be understood as an effort to adapt to the challenges and opportunities of EU’s multilevel governance. In an attempt to overcome the material costs of mobilizing transnationally, since frames and organisational structure still remain basically anchored in the nation-state level, these organisations create and partake in dense networks of transnational contacts that allow them to access, contribute to, and produce a wide range of material, informational, and symbolic resources attempting to increase the impact and effectiveness of their collective action. (della Porta & Caiani, 2009)

This dense networking is in and by itself an example of EPS building. Nonetheless, the fact that these organisations coordinate their action to address European institutions especially via lobbying - as their membership at the European Women's Lobby (EWL) shows - is in some way problematic, and raises crucial questions regarding the actual capability both to influence European policy-making and to advance the formation of European collective actors. In their analysis of the campaign run by the EWL to impact on the EU’s Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) held in 1996, Helfferich and Kolb (2001) emphasise that the EWL was only able to influence European policy-making because it was successful in coordinating a multilevel campaign together with its affiliated organisations at the national level, in a process that they define as multilevel action coordination, since: “Groups that limit their activities to Brussels can too easily […] lose touch with their national affiliates, and lack influence on their targets 'inside the ring' precisely because they lack the legitimacy of vibrant contacts with the grassroots” (2001: 158). Along the same lines, Tarrow claims that without links and mobilizing capacity at the member-states level, lobbies might “prosper in Brussels largely because it is in the interest of the Commission that they do so, for they provide both information for policy-making and legitimization for the European project” (2001: 250). This point should be kept in mind if the aim of the Eurosphere project is to analyse the contribution of social and political actors to the articulation of an inclusive European Public Sphere, as well as the elements that facilitate or obstruct such an articulation.

government's institutions for gender equality. It played a leading role in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the New York Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, the Beijing Platform of Action and the 1993 UN General Assembly Resolution on the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women; **in West-Central Turkey, KA-DER** has also been involved in European-wide women’s platforms, initiating the first links between the European Women’s Lobby and women’s organisations in Turkey. They also coordinate with other individual national women’s’ networks in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries; **in the Eastern area, KAMER** since October 2004, it has been involved in the European Women’s Lobby, becoming a full member in 2005. It has also been active at the European level, working with women’s groups in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden.
6 Conclusions
Summing up on conclusions from this qualitative-comparative analysis on the selected women's social movement organizations, several major points seem relevant:

6.1 Regarding diversity:
- There is a general view that diversity has many more advantages - in both normative and material dimensions - than disadvantages for a society. Along the same lines, there is a common understanding that diversity could become a disadvantage for society under certain circumstances, which are connected to contexts and processes of (re)production of social inequality and/or reinforcement of power relationships.
- When it comes to assessing the impact of the EU-project on gender diversity, the dominant perception is that the EU project is a key actor in the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights.

6.2 Regarding the views on the European Public Sphere:
It is important to underline the combination of three elements which raise crucial questions with regard to the possibilities of articulation of an inclusive EPS:
- The fact that social actors that are actively involved in the process of EPS-building through dense trans-European networking, recurrently state that there is no EPS, and that the existing communication spaces are exclusive and elitist;
- The absence of elaborated (shared or contested) images of EU's future development; and,
- The risks attached to addressing EU institutions especially via lobbying (EWL), which could obstruct the actual formation of European collective actors.

6.3 Regarding intersectionality:
The analysis points towards several debates which remain open and that are central to the issue of intersectionality:
- The role of the state in regulating diversity: should the state remain neutral, treating all groups in the same way, and ensuring and enforcing equal access to opportunities and resources for everyone? Or should the state intervene, implementing positive discrimination initiatives, measures, programs, and laws for specific groups in particular situations?
- The need to adapt public institutions to meet the needs of ethno-national minorities: should public institutions be reorganised in order to avoid situations of diversity-related exclusion? Or have institutions already made enough efforts to deal with diversity issues?
- The extent to which immigrants have to adapt to the receiving country's way of life and institutions. On this point, we would like to underline once again the strong importance given
to the enforcement of law and the subsequent legitimization of national legal systems/frameworks, which seems somehow surprising for us considering that social movements are by definition contentious actors which have historically included the challenge to law as a key part of their repertoires of action.

These three debates could be reflecting tensions - a certain dualism - between the “gender model” and the “diversity model”, and should be further analysed in future works as a key research topic within Eurosphere Work Package 7: Gender, Intersectionality and the European Public Sphere.
PART 5

Women as Agents: Does Gender Matter in the EUROSPHERE Interview Data?

Jaroslav Košťál & Helene Pristed Nielsen

This chapter provides an overview of some quantitative characteristics of the Eurosphere interview data, with a specific view to addressing the first two broad research areas of The Gender Action Plan (GAP 2009), namely ‘where are the women?’ and ‘gendering as a process’. As the rationale behind the entire work-package is that we assume gender matters for the overall research questions of the project, we start by describing the gender distribution in our sample, using a methodology based on descriptive statistics. We then proceed by investigating whether we observe any gendered differences in how respondents react to a number of questions in the interview guide, in order to assess whether the respondents and actors may or may not participate in processes of creating or upholding gendered discourses. Hence, we consider two aspects of whether gender matters for the overall research questions of the project: I) women’s position/presence within the organizations, and II) gender differences in attitudes towards key questions in the interview guide.

1 The gender distribution in the Eurosphere interview sample

Concerning how many women are found within our sample, and which positions they hold, it is important to take note of the fact that the respondents for the project were not randomly selected. Organizations among the 16 participating countries were chosen according to specific guidelines. Each partner prepared a report making suggestions for the selection of social and political actors within their own national setting, as well as specific suggestions for

30 These are (from http://www.eurospheres.org)
- examining the factors that are challenging the fabric of European democracy
- identifying options relevant to optimizing citizens’ involvement in the European democratic processes
- assessing different strategies for strengthening of its inclusive democratic, plural institutions
interview respondents. Guidelines for selecting organizations and identifying relevant respondents within them were:

**For political parties:** include both mainstream (government and opposition) and maverick parties. Seek to obtain interviews with organizational leader, opinion leader, internal opposition leader and internal ‘group’ leader.

**For social movements:** include both pro- and anti-diversity organizations, both pro- and anti-EU organizations, encouragement to include women’s organizations. Seek to obtain interviews with organizational leader, opinion leader, internal opposition leader and internal ‘minority’ leader.

**For think tanks:** include both contract research institutes, universities without students, and advocacy think tanks. Seek to obtain interviews with organizational leader, research leader and a prominent researcher working in a field related to the Eurosphere themes.

**For media:** include two main newspapers (if possible, supporting each their political wing), and one ‘voicing the colours’ (‘small print media actors’). Seek to obtain interviews within editor general’s office, a news section editor and a journalist working in a field related to the Eurosphere themes.

This means that there are relatively few respondents per organization, but that they represent different ranks within each. Although we have selected individual respondents with the aim of representing the views of the organization, qualitative studies of responses reveal rather large internal differences between respondents from each organization (for more on this, see chapter 3 and 4). It is also important to note that the guidelines for respondent selection could be seen as encouraging overrepresentation of women, or at least not neglecting them when contacting respondents.

This background has to be made clear to make sense of the quantitative characteristics of our sample, which has been designed to capture a presentation of European opinion-makers anno 2008/2009. The most basic element to note is that the sample overall contains 1/3 women, or 255 out of 764 respondents to be precise. While the project’s own definition of opinion-makers cf. selection criteria for respondents described above, does not match categorizations in Eurostat, it is possible to say something about how our sample compares with general statistics about gender distributions among elites within the EU.

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31 (Sicakkan 2008: 6).
32 This figure includes 18 respondents interviewed as members of transnational organizations.
33 Thanks are owed to Zuzana Cabicarová from the Czech Statistical Office in providing information.
Table 1: Gender distributions among elites within the EU, Eurosphere and Eurostat data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Eurosphere interview</th>
<th>Eurostat statistics 2008-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO/SMO</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: no Eurostat data for Political parties

*25% females among national MPs across EU27 in 2007. But the number of women who get elected to parliaments does not necessarily reflect the number of women within the political parties.

Which means that as concerns think tank respondents, our sample is similar to patterns seen in Eurostat data, whereas we have no direct reference frame for political parties. Women in SMOs and in media probably are underrepresented in our sample. But it should be noted that the available Eurostat statistics in the above table concerns the presence of women and men only in transnational NGOs/SMOs, meaning that this is not a direct match for our sample, which includes mainly national SMOs. Within media, we sampled only main TV channels and most important nation-wide dailies with special respect to news. Eurostat includes all journalistic professions in all media sectors. Therefore both these reference frames are not completely fitting. Among our four sites of data collection, there are proportionally clearly

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Information in table 1 is retrieved from the following sources: See also details in appendix 1, V0.22(b)

Media:

Think tanks:
more women who have been interviewed within the social movements, yet our sample probably under-represents their presence when comparing with Eurostat data, unless it is the case that transnational SMOs have many more female members among their leaders than nationally based SMOs – which does not seem a likely hypothesis.

Our data set allows us to identify respondents’ rank within organizations - which coupled with presence may indicate power. This is relevant in relation to the research question from the GAP about how women are positioned within the selected organizations. Due to the rather different types of work (and hence ranks) carried out within political parties/social movements on the one hand and think tanks/media on the other, the sites have been grouped for comparison in this manner. The gender distribution within each site is indicated in relation to the number of respectively women and men within each site. Hence the presentation of data shows whether women/men are comparatively favoured/disfavoured for certain positions.

Table 2: Rank and gender within political parties and social movements:

In this table the categories ‘Organizational leader’ are compared, ‘Opinion and Opposition leader’ have been collapsed and compared, and finally, the ‘Group leader’ category from the political party data is compared to the ‘Minority leader’ category among the SMOs, whereas the fourth set of columns indicate ‘other/unspecified’ positions, which in the case of SMOs also covers employees and members. Details in appendix 1, V0.22.
As pointed out above, the Eurosphere interview sample is probably not representative for the general gender distribution within the sectors under observation. Therefore we cannot generalize about positions of women within each site. However, the data cover as many women as necessary for comparative inter-gender analysis, which is our main aim in these tables. Therefore, based on sampling random effects, we would hypothesize from tables 2 & 3 that there are more women among the lower ranks in both political parties and social movements. The relative dispersal within the media and think tank sites is more even, irrespective of the much lower presence in terms of numbers of female respondents within these two sites. Especially within media, the section leader category stands out for its relatively high presence of women. But again, we cannot extrapolate from this sample to general conclusions about the position of women within the European media sector.

Although hesitating to conclude that women generally occupy lower ranks within our sample, it is the case that despite the fact that our interviewers were encouraged not to neglect women, they did not succeed in finding enough females at high ranking positions. We cannot estimate percentages of women with high ranking positions at all 4 sites precisely, but we can make some inferences, namely that at those positions women are clearly underrepresented in comparison with men. As a result of the fitting sample for inter-gender analysis, we can estimate percentages of women at high-ranking positions of think tanks as approximately 30% +/- 9% (out of 95 organizational and research leaders 26 are women, which converted to percentages represent confidence interval for p=.05 between 21% and 39 %). The ratio of

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36 In this table the categories ‘Organizational leader’ from think tank data are compared with ‘Editor General’s Office’ from media data. ‘Research leader’ and ‘News Section Editor’ are compared, and finally, ‘Researcher’ is compared to ‘Journalist’. Details in appendix 1, V0.22.
women to men at those high positions is therefore between 2:3 and 1:4, i.e. lower at any rate. The women constitute a minority, but a large minority (Dahlerup 1988).

One issue mentioned in the GAP is whether the women feel powerful or powerless. Towards answering this question it is possible to look at the quantitative descriptions of women’s rank, but we also have two related items from the questionnaire, namely ‘How do your views on these questions [about ethno-national diversity] correspond with the dominant public opinion in this country?’ and ‘Do you feel that your views on these issues face much support or resistance when you voice them publicly?’ (V2.7) (it should be noted, however, that the feeling of meeting resistance from the public is not the same as feeling powerless). As the tables in appendix 1, V2.7 and V2.7(b) indicate, there is no significant difference between the genders on this question, and neither does the respondent’s rank within the organization seem to make a difference. Based on contingency analysis, high or low-ranking positions, gender status, combination of gender and high-/low-positions and sites were not significantly differentiating between the occupants’ and/or men and women’s feeling of meeting support or resistance to viewpoints (significance of CHI² by far overpassed level .1 and also corresponding Cramer’s V was not significant). However, the interactions between ranks and gender may turn to be not significant as a consequence of very low frequency counts, too. In sum, we conclude that: feelings about public support/resistance to one’s views are not differentiated by gender and sites; we can only speculate about respondent’s and gender ranks within organization. This could also be an important result: it seems that feelings about public support of/resistance to one’s views are not differentiated by a)higher/lower positions in general, b)by women/men's higher/lower positions in special, and c)by sites in general. However, the low frequency counts disqualify any reliable findings but for sites and gender in general.

We can now summarize our description of the quantitative gender distribution within our sample by saying that overall, women constitute about a third of the respondents, however, with more within the social movements, and fewest among the think tanks and media. Although this is as expected in the GAP, comparisons with available Eurostat data informs us that our sample probably under-represents the presence of women in SMOs and especially media, and that the expectation of women’s under-representation within European media was not well founded. There is no observed gendered difference in whether respondents feel they meet support or resistance when voicing their opinions, and based on the probable lack of representativity for the gender distribution within the sample across the data collection sites, it is difficult to conclude about women’s presence and position (rank)
within the different types of organizations. However, we may hypothesize that the political parties show less gender balance across the ranks than the remaining types of organizations, and that the ratio of women to men in high ranking positions is generally lower across all sites.

2 Does gender matter?
This section will provide an overview of priorities and opinions among males and females within the data sample and look at how respondents articulate gender concerns and how gendering takes place within the interviews. We ask whether gender matters for how respondents answer our questions and also whether respondents belonging to the women’s organizations in the sample show a distinct pattern when compared to the remaining respondents. Although not being the intended outcome from the beginning, the ensuing analyses highlight the impact of our selection criteria especially for SMOs in the dataset concerning priorities and opinions on gender related issues in the questionnaire. Our strongest result is that the variance of opinion in some areas such as the future development of the EU polity and which groups’ rights should be granted/protected by the EU, could not be understood without applying gender aspects in the analyses.

We apply a dual strategy based on the assumption behind the entire workpackage, namely that gender matters for a number of the research questions of the Eurosphere project. The interview guide includes a series of questions related to attitudes to gender equality, gender sensitive approaches to various policy areas, and opportunities for respondents to consider issues from a gender perspective. At an early stage, the WP7 team identified and discussed which of the items in the questionnaire were likely to be of most use for our work. This resulted in a proto-list of most relevant variables37. In order to assess the priorities and opinions of respectively male and female respondents, we have analyzed responses to ten of these variables by dividing answers according to gender. This constitutes the first element in our dual strategy.

The second element consists of separate analyses of how the seven women’s movements in the social movement part of the data sample38 (making up a total of 29 respondents) may or may not have provided a specific perspective on the ten questions at

38 These are Ni Putes Ni Soumises from France, NaNe from Hungary, the Women’s Council Denmark, Women’s Alliance for Development from Bulgaria, and KAMER and Kader both from Turkey as well as the European Women’s Lobby.
We hypothesize that particularly respondents from these seven actors have a specific identity and belonging vis-à-vis the European Union, and one of the specific research questions from the GAP is what role gender groups play in the articulation of the European Public Spheres. We thus wish to investigate whether the women’s organizations can in fact be observed to hold different views from the rest of the social movements in the data set. This is the second element in our strategy.

Proceeding by order of appearance within the interview guide, the first thematic focus was on diversity in general, and within this, the first relevant question from a gender perspective was ‘which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society?’ (V1.1). This question probes respondents’ understanding of diversity on an empirical level, while it on the theoretical level relates to questions about ‘competing diversity models’ (Chap. 1) and whether gender equality has been overlooked as a relevant category (Okin 1999 and Squires 2007) in earlier theories about multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995).

Respondents were presented with a number of options, among these that gender groups could be one such relevant group. The category most often mentioned as relevant for defining diversity is ‘ethnic groups’. But when looking at gendered differences in replies, we observe that women more often than men tend to consider the following sources of diversity more relevant: disability, gender, generation, sexuality groups and multiple/mixed belongings. Men slightly more than women chose non-European migrants as a source of diversity. The intensity of all these relationships is very low. (Eta or Phi for the whole sample between .098 and .174 and after removal of respondents from the women’s organizations, we observe a slight decrease to the range between .078 and .161, though with other significantly differentiated variables of shifting belonging, transnational and language groups with V between .078 and .133). Therefore, the women’s organizations smoothe out such gender correlated differences as shifting belonging, transnational and language groups on the one hand, and sharpen such female related differences such as gender and sexuality groups, or disability, generation and multiple/mixed belonging on the other hand. Women tend to

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39 This chapter contains analyses of answers on 10 of the important gender related questions identified by the WP7 group during the early stages of our work. The qualitative analyses of women’s movement respondents referred to in chapter 4 below are slightly more comprehensive, and are based on answers to 13 different questions.

40 A methodological note: apart from the fact that all respondents before the start of the interview were shown the following tentative definition of ethno-national diversity: “We define ethno-national diversity as the living together of different ethnic groups and/or nations within one political system. This includes both the native ethno-national minorities in this country (i.e. groups who differ by language, ethnic origin and/or cultural traditions from the majority population) and immigrants from all around the world who reside legally in Europe”, interviewers were also instructed to ask follow-up questions mentioning the possibility of these categories. However, we do not know in how many interviews interviewers actually prompted reactions to the question of including gender as a relevant group. For more on this, see Mokre and Pristed Nielsen, 2010.

41 For an overview of results, see appendix 2 p.3, for detailed results see appendix 1 V1.1 and V1.1(b).
consider gender groups as relevant, and non-European immigrants as less relevant. At the same time, men tend to consider gender groups as less relevant and non-European immigrants as more relevant. (Canonical r=.174, and without women’s organizations r=.202). Therefore, the selected women’s organizations tend to harmonise gender discrepancies with respect to concern for transnational and language groups, whereas they - as expected - enhance difference in attention to gender and sexuality groups between women and men (the 29 respondents from the women’s organisations consist of 26 women and 3 men).

The groups given highest priority in responses to V1.1 are by descending order: ethnic, religious, national, gender, and sexuality groups. Four out of five of these are groups that are included in the EU’s official anti-discrimination policy. Those groups being chosen least often (apart from cultural and language groups, which have been added in the post coding process, and hence are not categories respondents have been directly asked about) are in ascending order: transnational, shifting and global belonging.

The second variable we have investigated for a possible gendered bias in replies, is the question of whether diversity is an advantage/disadvantage to society (V2.2). Focusing attention on replies relating to advantages of diversity, we observe that male and female respondents differ significantly on 4 of 16 items including ‘other’ within this battery. Thus, men significantly more often than women answer that diversity is NOT an advantage for society or that diversity makes it easier to achieve an economically more successful society. Women, on the contrary significantly more often than men name other advantages than the 13 predefined options in the interview guide.

One of the tick options was that diversity furthers/hinders women’s equality and participation. Here we observe that 9% of female and 6% of male respondents would consider that diversity makes it easier to achieve women’s rights and gender equality. Concerning the opposite possibility that respondents would consider diversity a disadvantage for furthering women’s rights and gender equality, only a small proportion of the sample considered the item as a relevant answer to the question.

If we remove representatives of women's organizations, gender pattern emerges as (a) more distinctive (value of Phi increases for "Diversity is not an advantage for society" to .111 ) and (b) less distinctive (value of Phi decreases to .116 for "Diversity makes it easy to achieve an economically more successful society"), and (c) for ,,other“ remains the same (Phi=.140 ) and (d) there comes an extra new genderised item "Diversity makes it easy to

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42 For site specific analyses, see appendix 2 page 4
43 For details of analyses, see appendix 1, V.2.2 and V2.2(b), for a more general overview see appendix 2 pages 5 and 6.
create a society with less rigid identity ascriptions" (Phi=.085). Hence, representatives of women’s organizations seem to believe more than other women that diversity is not an advantage for society. Therefore logically, the women’s organizations seem to emphasize less than other women diversity as a source of economic success and as a means of creating a society with less rigid identity ascriptions, where this last option was claimed significantly more often by women than men after removing the women’s organisations from the sample. This means that contrary to expectations, the representatives of women’s organisations are less supportive of societal diversity as compared to the remaining women within the sample, or rather: they see fewer advantages to it than other women.

If we look at differences in replies across the data collection sites, we observe that 5 out of 16 items in this battery differ significantly by site. Media rather than other sites tend to deliver more "other" suggestions. Think tanks rather than other sites tend to mention advantages of achieving a more dynamic society, to sustain a society better adapted to globalization, and to achieve a more mobile society. SMOs rather than other sites tend to see advantages in achieving women’s rights and gender equality - and this opinion seems to be strengthened by the absence of women’s organizations, which indicates that these respondents do not consider gender equality and women’s rights to be connected with ethnic equality and minority rights.

Women's organizations tend to believe less than other SMOs that diversity a) facilitates achievement of women’s rights and gender equality, b) makes it easy to achieve a more mobile and more dynamic society. On the other hand, the women’s organizations tend to think more often than other SMO respondents that diversity makes it easy to sustain a society better adapted to globalisation. The women’s organizations also suggest more "other" ideas to the topic of advantages of ethno-national diversity.

The next question has been given considerable media attention in several countries (see also chap 6). The question in itself does not necessarily include a gender perspective, but given examples often raised in the media, this was a perspective respondents might put on the question⁴⁴, which was ‘should the state intervene in minority cultural practices when they restrict individual liberty?’ (V2.6)⁴⁵. We observe no difference between sites in how respondents have answered this question. However, when looking for difference between the

⁴⁴ Indeed, the prompts supplied to interviewers for eliciting answers from respondents not understanding the question included the following examples: ‘genital mutilation, oppression of women, forced marriages, polygamy, individuals’ exercise of rights like (women’s) right to education, working, freedom of expression, etc’.

⁴⁵ This question is directly related to the theoretical debate between Okin (2005), Kymlicka (1999), Phillips (2007) and others. See Chap. 1.
genders, we observe that 3 out of 7 items are significantly different for gender. The relationship is not very close (approximately 2% of common variance, \( \Phi = \) between .107 and .152, including language \( \Phi = .107 \)). Men (52%) more often than women (41%) mention language adaptation requirements as relevant for immigrants. This apparently is the most important requirement of all for men, whereas, interestingly enough, for women (approximately 50%) it is political system. For women more often than for men there are other aspects of life and other legal and law circumstances, which immigrants should have to adapt to. Without Women's organizations these correlations tend to increase for other aspects of life and for other legal and law aspects (to \( \Phi \) between .157 and .159) and decrease for language (from \( \Phi = .107 \) down to \( \Phi = .092 \)). Women's organizations, unlike the rest of women, do not consider language, other aspects of life and legal/law aspects as important for the adaptation process. In the same sense, the discriminant function predicts fundamental divergence between men and women as concerns language and other aspects of the national way of life and certain institutions that immigrants have to adapt to. If women stress other aspects, men tend to stress language and vice versa. After removal of Women's organizations the discriminant function slightly dropped down in intensity (from canonical \( r = .181 \) to \( r = .092 \)).

A key question in terms of our research aim of assessing the possible role of gender groups and the articulation of gender-related concerns in the EPS, was the question ‘What further positive or negative developments do you expect with regard to the impact of European integration on gender equality?’ (V3.3). This question addresses respondents’ notion of the legitimacy and importance of the EU as an arena for (re)producing or changing gendered roles.

Answers to this question was originally entered only as text strings in the data registration interface, but reading through the content of data, we have devised the following typology according to which data has been recoded:

1. No answer: 32% among both females and males
2. Improvements: 37% among females and 32% among males
3. No or ambiguous effects: 14% among both females and males
4. No improvements: 9% among females and 4% among males
5. Don’t know: 8% among females and 17% among males

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46 See appendix 2 page 7 for overview of these results and appendix 1, V2.6 and V2.6(b) for details.
47 For more on these theoretical assumptions, see Chap 1.
48 See appendix 1, V.3.3re and V3.3re (2) for details.
The general pattern is clearly that there is much more optimism than pessimism about the future of gender equality within the EU. The most interesting result here, in terms of considering gendering of discourses, seems to be that so many male respondents profess not to know enough about gender equality and the EU to answer the question. Examples of responses from male respondents include "I don't know how to answer to that" (res. 271 UK), “To be honest I hadn’t thought about that, but I wouldn’t know what to say either. I don’t know what’s up with gender policies” (res. 395 Bulgaria), and “The truth is I’m not aware of the gender policies, I wouldn’t know what to say” (res. 450 Spain). And one respondent even explicitly declares that these sorts of questions should be asked of the women’s organizations rather than anybody else: “We do not really focus on gender, so I would not be able to give a precise answer, you should go to EWL to ask them” (res.2055, transnational interview). In general, we see a tendency for female respondents to have an opinion about the issue, in particular more women tend to consider that the EU will not lead to improvements for gender equality, and we see a lesser tendency for some women to also think that there will in fact be improvements.

The following table gives an overview of answers to V3.3, and also includes an analysis in which the women’s organizations are excluded from the data set. As will be observed, the women’s organizations contribute to a less distinct pattern of responses, as they tend to give evasive responses (either ‘don’t know’ or no answer) more often than the remaining respondents. See also appendix 2 page 9.
Table 4: ‘What further positive or negative developments do you expect with regard to the impact of European integration on gender equality?’ (V3.3), recoded answers in percentages.

The less distinct pattern is surprising, insofar as the women´s organizations were expected to consider the EU to provide improvements for gender equality, as found in Pristed Nielsen (2010)\textsuperscript{49}, but see also chapter 4. Based on issues raised in chapter 4, we would interpret results on V3.3 to be partly due to the different national contexts and profiles of the seven women´s organizations in question, meaning that the diversity among the organizations explain the divergence of answers on this question. Another hypothesis that could be made is that V3.3. is a future oriented question (it concerns future expectation to the EU), meaning that being women´s organizations, these actors may have high expectations or set the bar high for what they would consider to be improvements, and hence they are less confident that their high expectations will actually be met.

Interestingly, the dampening of expectations for improvements on gender equality caused by the inclusion of the seven women´s organizations in the sample runs counter to the analysis in appendix 2 page 8\textsuperscript{50}, which deals with the desired direction of the future development of the EU polity. Here results demonstrate how respondents from women´s

\textsuperscript{49} However, the general pattern remains that there is much more optimism than pessimism about the future of gender equality within the EU – also within the women´s organizations.

\textsuperscript{50} For further details of this analysis, see appendix 1, V3 and V3(2)
organisations seem to put a slight brake on other women’s euroskepticism, they are less skeptical about European integration in the sense that when removing the women’s organization respondents from the analysis, the percentage of women claiming more decentralization increases.

In extension of the debate about decentralization or not, we asked whether the EU should have the power to grant minority rights to groups which would not be revisable by member states (V3.5). 10 out of 17 items in this battery are differentiated significantly by gender. Interestingly, there is a very clear pattern here, whereby the men are differentiated from the women in replying that the EU should NOT have such powers, whereas the women are differentiated from the men in choosing 8 named groups + ‘others’ as meriting special protection by EU level legislation. Altogether, approximately 1 out of 3 respondents (32%) claim that the EU should NOT have the power to grant minority rights to any group, but among the men 35% think so, whereas this only goes for 25% of the women. Conversely, smaller percentages of respondents express their views on various minority groups, saying that the EU should have the power to grant these minority rights. Supporters of protective EU legislation on one or more dimensions of diversity sum up to 27% of respondents in total. Women more often than men are positive about EU interference as regards: socio-economic, disability, gender, generational, life-style, religious, territorial and transnational groups.

Since those mentioned are only relatively slight tendencies, no discriminant function was found to predict reliably enough differences between men’s and women's point of view. As a rule, after removal of women’s organization respondents, the pattern of opinion became slightly more blurred (Phi or Eta decreases from the range between .087 and .154 to the range between .079 and .118). This means that the interviewed members of the women’s organizations rather than other women tend to be more radical supporters of the EU’s role as a guarantor of minority rights, which is supported by the findings in the qualitative analyses in chapter 4 above. Paradoxically, this finding runs counter to the analysis of responses to question 3.3 above, where the women’s organization members were found to tend to give evasive responses (‘don’t know’, no answer) to the question about what further positive or negative developments to expect with regard to the impact of European integration on gender equality.

These contradictory results lead to the observation that women in general within our sample, and especially women organized in women’s organizations, are pro-European

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51 For an overview of results on this, see appendix 2 page 10, for further details see appendix 1 V3.5a
intervention when it comes to protection of the rights of groups to a higher degree than men. This concerns especially the rights of such groups as socio-economic, disability, gender, generational, territorial, life-style and religious groups. Nevertheless, despite a clear predominance of female respondents expecting future improvements for gender equality within the EU, we observe that the women’s organizations - which can be expected to have working knowledge of these questions - are less clear about their future expectations concerning enhancement of gender equality within the EU. As is to be expected, considering sampling directions for SMOs, we also observe that these organizations within the sample tend to promote a sizeable range of minority rights when compared to the other data collection sites.52

Rolandsen Agustín (2008; 2010) has written about how transnational advocacy networks (TANs) working for women’s rights and gender equality are especially apt at mobilizing and making claims at the EU level, among these the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), ‘The EU is often articulated by the organizations as the main space for gaining visibility and recognition at the transnational level’ (2010:77). Although the seven women’s organizations in our sample are not all members of EWL, it appears from our results that they to some extent endorse the EU level as an important place of claims-making, although perhaps not sure about their ability to make an impact. As Rolandsen Agustín also points out, this is by no means an uncomplicated position, ‘They [EU institutions] tend to prioritise organizations that express opinions and interests that are similar to their own official policy. This means that the EU institutions contribute to the definition of what women’s interests are’ (2008: 507). This schism may be part of the source of evasive answers found among women’s organization respondents on question 3.3. Rolandsen Agustín has recently (2011, unpublished), shown that there is an ongoing struggle about the definition of gender equality and women’s interests and a discursive space for influencing the dominant discourse on gender equality.

We also asked whether respondents would consider gender inequality a non-/anti-European practice (V3.6). This question was part of a battery consisting of 29 items (see appendix 2 page 12), among which gender inequality was the most often chosen option after ‘other’. There is no significant difference between male and female respondents in how many would choose to include gender inequality as a non/anti-European practice or value, only one

52 For an overview of results on this, see appendix 2 page 11, for further details see appendix 1 V3.5a (2)
53 Kader and Ni Putes Ni Soumises are unaffiliated.
54 Further details to be found in appendix 1, V3.6 and V3.6(2)
percentage point divides these two groups (34% of women and 33% of men would consider gender inequality non/anti-European).

According to sites there is a lot of difference, although on the level of 2-8% of the total sample, since only a minority of respondents were able to formulate their respective opinion. Especially the SMOs rather than other sites tend to consider as non/anti-European practice such values/ideologies as: Catholicism, free migration, neoliberalism, market globalization, secularization, and self-defense. Women’s organizations tend to be more radical partisans of those views than other women (Cramer’s V between .167 and .215 after removal of WO drops down to range between .160 and .195). Thus, the women’s organization respondents tend to identify anti-/non-European ideologies, practices and values slightly more often than other respondents, especially men.

In relation to respondents’ priorities of which immigrants should be let into the respondents’ own country, one possible answer was to prioritize spouses and family members of resident immigrants (V4.7). Respondents’ opinion about groups of immigrants that should be let into the country is slightly differentiated by gender on 3 items out of 17. In all those 3 cases, women are less restrictive than men. After removal of women's organization respondents, this pattern survives and even turns to be more distinctive. (The initial values of Eta between .131 and .136 increased to the range between .134 and .139 + one new item of .076- “highly educated/qualified people”). Conversely in this case, men (30%) after removal of women’s organization respondents would welcome highly qualified immigrants more often than women (23%). Therefore, the women's organization respondents seem to be strongly inclined to accept the idea of letting in the highly qualified immigrants. Discrimination analysis confirmed the crucial role of attitudes to spouses and family members of resident immigrants, highly educated people and to „Universal immigration rules should be applied for all people“. If women emphasize extended family relationships, they at the same time tend to prefer highly educated immigrants less than men, and they less than men decline claim of universal immigration rules for everybody. Conversely, the less women prefer extended family notions to be brought into practice, the more they orient themselves to highly educated immigrants. At the same time, those women prefer „universal immigration rules for everybody“ less often than other women. For men: the more they prefer highly educated immigrants, the less they take into account extended families of resident migrants and universal immigration rules for everybody. Women's organization respondents account for

55 For an overview of results, see appendix 2 page 13 and 14, further details can be found in appendix 1 V4.7 and V4.7(2)
stronger relationships (canonical r=.178, after removal of women organization respondents .139) between prioritizing either extended families or highly educated immigrants. The claim of universal immigration rules for everybody tends to be a locus of difference between women and men, since it remains as central even after removal of women’s organization respondents. Yet, the women’s organizations substantially contribute to the site differences as regards tolerance of immigration as such, and labour immigrants in special. The site differences can largely be summed up as SMOs being more in favour of no restrictions on immigration, whereas think tank and political party respondents tend to prioritize labour migrants. But these site differences disappear when removing the women’s organization respondents from the analyses.

We also asked a series of questions in relation to European Union enlargement, among these whether the latest enlargement rounds had been good or bad for some groups, among them gender groups (V4.13). As stated in chap. 1 ‘The development of the EU polity, including the recent EU enlargement, has increased migration and diversity within the EU. It has been followed by a "turn to diversity", which has provided new conditions for giving voice and influence to diverse and marginalised social groups’. The development has had contradictory implications within and outside the EU: It has made it easier for EU-nationals to move across borders. It has also put policies to address discrimination according to gender, race/ethnicity, sexuality, age and handicap on the EU public agenda. And it has made it more difficult for 3rd country nationals to enter the EU.

There were 13 items in the battery of questions about whether the latest enlargement rounds had been good or bad for some groups (V4.13)\(^56\). Out of 13 items only 2 are significantly differentiated by gender (\(\Phi\) between .129 and .153, and without the women’s organization respondents, it is not significant). Women more often than men evaluated the impact of the EU’s enlargement to the East as good for gender or sexuality groups, thanks to the attitude of the women’s organizations respondents. However, the frequency counts for other than ‘don’t know’ categories were not reliably high. Hence, European enlargement is not considered a topic highly relevant from a gender perspective, despite the fact that the theories presented in the state of the art above do point to enlargement as being relevant for ‘the turn to diversity’ within the EU. When we explicitly ask for its relevance from a gender perspective, it is the female respondents who elicit an answer\(^57\).

\(^{56}\) See appendix 2 page 15 for overview and appendix 1 V4.13b, V4.13b (2) and V4.13a for further details.

\(^{57}\) We do recognize the methodological danger that gendering was a process primarily occurring in interview situations with female respondents, perhaps especially with female respondents interviewed in their capacity as members of women’s organizations.
Further in relation to the European Union’s impact on gender equality, we asked about attitudes to EU policies on gender and ethnic equality issues. ‘Do you think that laws on gender/ethnic equality should be decided nationally, supranationally, or on a sub-national level (local, regional)?’ (V.4.10) Neither when controlling for difference among women and men nor among the sites, do we find any significant differences on these questions\(^{58}\). This despite the findings from analyses of responses to V3.5 about whether the EU should have the power to grant minority rights not revisable by member states, where we found a clearly gendered pattern, with more women endorsing this option, and especially the respondents from the women’s organizations doing so.

The final question we have analyzed for this report is central in regards to public sphere participation, namely ‘if there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?’ (V5.2). 5 out of 11 items in this battery are differentiated significantly by gender\(^{59}\). Women rather than men tend to think that the European communication space is a male dominated public sphere excluding women or excluding uneducated people. Apart from the list of asked exclusions, women tend to suggest other additional forms of exclusion more often than men. Men rather than women tend to claim that this public sphere excludes smaller EU member states or possible participants due to language diversity. However, most respondents do not mention the aforementioned exclusions, it is a question of up to 5% of the sample. After removal of women’s organisation respondents, the intensity of most of the relationships increases from the range between Phi=.133 and .150 to the range between Phi=.138 and .151. The only exception is the claim about the public sphere as being a male dominated one excluding women (decrease from Phi=.123 to .103): hence, this attitude tends to be assumed by the women’s organizations more often than by other women or men. The women’s organization respondents more often than other women and men also tend to suggest a) more extra-list other exclusions, b) exclusions of smaller EU member states. Conversely, exclusion due to language diversity is suggested by other women more often than by the women’s organisations. Women not interviewed in their capacity as organized in women’s organisations tend to name exclusion of uneducated people more often than women’s organisation respondents or men.

Discriminant analysis of this variable brought about some new aspects. If women consider the public sphere as exclusive of uneducated people and women, they are at the same time less likely to consider this sphere as that of firms and corporations and of larger EU

\(^{58}\) See appendix 1 V4.10d and V4.10(2) for details.
\(^{59}\) See appendix 2 page 16 for overview of results and appendix 1 V5.2 for further details
members. Conversely, if men consider the public sphere as excluding of smaller EU member states and employees and workers, they are less likely to see the public sphere as exclusive of women and uneducated people. The women's organizations tend to contribute to this gender polarization in opinion, since canonical $r = 0.231$ decreases after removal of women's organizations to $r = 0.220$.

Turning to site-specific rather than gender-specific variance in replies to question 5.2, we observe significant variation only on one item, namely that SMOs rather than other sites tend to consider the European public sphere as dominated by the richer ones, excluding socially disadvantaged people. After removal of women's organizations, Cramer's V slightly increases from 0.140 to 0.144 and one more items turns to be significantly differentiated: A public sphere of firms and corporations, excluding employees and workers. Hence, the women's organizations do not seem to be as radical in their social views as the other SMOs in the sample, which would also be consistent with some of the results presented in chapter 4. The women's organisations consider less often than other SMOs the European public sphere as dominated by the richer ones, excluding socially disadvantaged people and as dominated by firms and corporations, excluding employees and workers. No discriminant function was found to be significant.

Looking at other results about perceptions of male domination of the public sphere, the following result from a Eurobarometer report on ‘Women and European Parliamentary Elections’ is interesting.

‘**Perceptions of the current political scene as being male dominated**’ A large majority of the electorate (71% of men and 77% of women) agree that men dominate the political scene and that more women in politics could lead to a different style of political decision-making’. (Eurobarometer 2009: 5)

Although this obviously operates with a more narrow conception of the ‘political scene’ (as opposed to Eurosphere’s broad conception of public sphere which also includes media, think tanks and SMOs), it is interesting to note the apparent high consensus among both males and females about the gendered nature of the political scene in EU27. However, it should be noted that the above Eurobarometer result is based on one direct question about whether the political scene is considered male dominated. The Eurosphere results on V5.2 pertain to a more complex question about in/exclusion in the public sphere, in which several types of possible in/exclusions were presented to respondents.

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60 See appendix 2 page 17 for an overview of results and appendix 1 V5.2(2) for further details
Based on the above, we conclude that on many of the questions checked here, we do observe a tendency for gendered answers to questions pertaining to the position, rights and participation of women in the European Union. Reviewing the various main results from the above series of analyses of gendering processes within our interview data set, we see a number of tendencies. These relate to the two different dimensions of our analyses, firstly the question of whether women tend to differ from men in their attitudes to the interview questions, and secondly, whether the inclusion of women’s organisation respondents in our sample contributes with a specific angle on the same questions.

Regarding the observed differences between male and female respondents, we see the following tendencies: 1) first of all, women - compared to men - tend to consider gender groups as relevant, and non-European immigrants as less relevant for defining diversity. 2) Secondly, men significantly more often than women answer that diversity is NOT an advantage for society or that diversity makes it easier to achieve an economically more successful society. 3) Thirdly, the general pattern is clearly that there is much more optimism than pessimism about the future of gender equality within the EU. The most interesting result here, in terms of considering gendering of discourses, seems to be that so many male respondents profess not to know enough about gender equality and the EU to answer the question. 4) Fourthly, the men are differentiated from the women in replying that the EU should NOT have the power to legislate about minority protection over and above the member states, whereas the women are differentiated from the men in choosing 8 named groups + ‘others’ as meriting special protection by EU level legislation. 5) Fifthly, the claim of universal immigration rules for everybody tends to be a locus of difference between women and men, since it remains as central even after removal of women’s organization respondents. 6) Sixth, while European enlargement is not considered a topic highly relevant from a gender perspective, 7) we observe how women rather than men tend to think that the European communication space is a male dominated public sphere excluding women or excluding uneducated people.

Regarding the question of how the selected women’s organizations contribute to our data sample, we see that they 1) tend to harmonise gender discrepancies with respect to concern for transnational and language groups, whereas they - as expected - enhance difference in attention to gender and sexuality groups between women and men. 2) Representatives of the women’s organizations seem to believe more than other women that diversity is not an advantage for society, which means that contrary to expectations, the representatives of women’s organisations are less supportive of societal diversity as compared
to the remaining women within the sample, or rather: they see fewer advantages to it than other women. 3) The women’s organizations contribute to a less distinct pattern of responses about future expectation for gender equality within the EU, as they tend to give evasive responses (either ‘don’t know’ or no answer) more often than the remaining respondents. This is surprising, insofar as the women’s organizations were expected to consider the EU to provide improvements for gender equality, as found in Pristed Nielsen (2010)\(^{61}\), but see also chapter 4. It also runs counter to the analysis of responses to the question about the desired direction of the future development of the EU politics. Here results demonstrate how respondents from women’s organisations seem to put a slight brake on other women’s euroskepticism. 4) The interviewed members of the women’s organizations rather than other women tend to be more radical supporters of the EU’s role as a guarantor of minority rights. These contradictory results lead to the observation that women in general within our sample, and especially women organized in women’s organizations, are pro-European intervention when it comes to protection of the rights of groups to a higher degree than men. But despite a clear predominance of female respondents expecting future improvements for gender equality within the EU, we observe that the women’s organizations - which can be expected to have working knowledge of these questions - are less clear about their future expectations concerning enhancement of gender equality within the EU. 5) The women's organization respondents seem to be strongly inclined to accept the idea of letting in the highly qualified immigrants, also to a higher extent than women in general within the sample. 6) In general, the women’s organizations do not seem to be as radical in their social views as the other SMOs in the sample, which would also be consistent with some of the results presented in chapter 4. This can be exemplified by the fact that the women’s organisations consider less often than other SMOs the European public sphere as dominated by the richer ones, excluding socially disadvantaged people and as dominated by firms and corporations, excluding employees and workers, and the fact that they more than other women would tend to prioritise access for highly educated immigrants rather than spouses and extended families to their own countries of citizenship. In general, we observe how the women’s organisations in the sample tend to pull in both political directions, both left and right, and also tend to give answers resonating with both pro- and anti-diversity attitudes. The one issue on which they agree is on supporting the EU’s role as a guarantor of minority rights.

\(^{61}\) However, the general pattern remains that there is much more optimism than pessimism about the future of gender equality within the EU – also within the women’s organizations.
3 Conclusions

Our strongest result from this chapter in our report is that the variance of opinion in some areas such as the future development of the EU policy and which groups’ rights should be granted/protected by the EU could not be understood without applying gender aspects in the analyses. This means that respondents’ gender is to some extent indicative of preferences and opinions regarding gender related questions and attention to gender perspectives on some of the diversity and EU policy questions we raise. In this sense, gender sometimes matters. Women constitute approximately 1/3 of the respondents for the project, but based on comparison with available Eurostat data, our sample is probably not representative for women within the four sites among which data has been collected. We find no observed gendered difference in whether respondents feel they meet support or resistance when voicing their opinions, and based on the probable lack of representativeness for the gender distribution within the sample across the data collection sites, it is difficult to conclude about women’s presence and position (rank) within the different types of organizations. But we do see a tendency for their general underrepresentation, both within the organizations in general, and within the higher ranks of the organizations in specific. We hypothesize that the political parties show less gender balance across the ranks than the remaining types of organizations, and that the ratio of women to men in high ranking positions is generally lower across all site, although it seems women make up a ‘large minority’ (Dahlerup 1988) in these contexts.

A second main observation based on the above, but also highlighted by the qualitative analyses of chapter 4, is the lack of consensus among the seven women’s organisations, who are diverging in terms of how conservative/liberal they are, and hence most often do not make a unidirectional impact on patterns in replies between women and men. We find it interesting to note how these seven women’s organisations are on the one hand less EU-skeptical than the women in general within our sample, and favour more direct EU level legislation for the protection of minority rights, yet do not necessarily connect minority rights with gender equality legislation, and are generally more sceptical about the EU’s ability to further women’s rights and gender equality than women in general within the sample. Hence, we propose that the most meaningful further research agenda based on results above would be to look at how political party affiliation and other aspects of respondents’ identities and belonging may intersect with respondents’ gender, creating a more intersectional approach to answering how gender-related concerns are present/absent in the articulation of the European public sphere. This would require a qualitative approach to our data, and would also entail looking at whole interviews and assess consistency within them, to approach an
understanding of the identities and belongings of the actors. This has been done for the respondents within the women’s organizations within the sample, as presented within chapter 4, but could also be expanded to cover other actors within our data sample in the future.

In conclusion, women within our data set generally hold opinions differing from the men on several items within the questionnaire. And at the same time, the respondents from the women’s organizations, being mostly women, often hold views that differ from the remainder of the respondents, often serving to highlight or contradict gendered patterns in replies, and demonstrating a distinct endorsement of EU-level regulation of gender and minority equality issues, yet coupled with some skepticism about the positive effects of such regulation, and a less inclusive conception of diversity and which immigrants should be let into the EU compared to the women in general within the sample. Hence, as also demonstrated in chapter 4, the women’s organizations within the sample display great heterogeneity and hence impact diversely on gendered patterns in replies to several items in the questionnaire.
PART 6
Where are the Women and What is a Gender Issue?

Quantitative Analyses of the EUROSPHERE Media Data Set Supplemented by a Small Exploratory Analysis

Tabitta Flyger

This chapter in our report is meant to provide an overview of some quantitative characteristics of the EurospHERE media data set, with a specific focus on the first two elements of the gender action plan, namely the questions “where are the women?” and “gendering as a process” which will be approached under the headings; “Where are the women – a view on female sources.”, “Gender as a theme” and “Attitude of female sources”. Prior to the three sections, some methodological and explanatory remarks on the media data will be made, in order to clarify the concepts, possibilities and limitation in the dataset. The analysis of the media material will be concluded under the heading “where were the women and what was gender themes?” in order to highlight and tie together the findings.

1 Methodological reflections on the EurospHERE media data set
The content of the media-dataset which is the foundation of the following analysis is a collection of data gathered in sixteen European countries, with the purpose of doing content analysis, which has further been quantified and made comparable as a large-N dataset, with a total of 20213 records. In all sixteen countries, data was collected from three national dailies every weekday, as well as two broadcast television news shows pr. country pr. weekday. The nineteen-week period of data collection was divided into two: the first period stretching from 10th of May 2008 until 31st of July 2008 and the second period from 1st of September 2008

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62 With the assistance of Lyng Gregersen and Tine Fuglsang.
63 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom.
64 16783 newspaper items and 3430 broadcast news items.
until 10th of October 2008. The selection criteria during this period had both a content dimension and a time dimension. The time dimension was that only the items appearing on the weekdays were included whereas the content dimension is the “European dimension”.

More specifically, this means that country teams were instructed to include A) Stories covering EU-institutions affairs, or B) Stories covering issues related to one or more foreign European states. Hence gender as a topic was not a selection criterion for the articles themselves, which potentially creates a strong bias in the following analyses of the representation of women and gender issues in the material. This relates to the fact that the overarching purpose of the Eurosphere project is to create innovative perspectives on the European public spheres and to identify the conditions that enable or undermine the articulation of inclusive democratic European Public Spheres. Hence, selection criteria A and B above are precisely designed to capture the possible existence and content of a European public sphere rather than 16 individual national public spheres. Thus, the fact that the overarching selection criteria were related to the EU, means that the representation of women and gendering of issues may be underrepresented in relation to the more general appearance of women and gender issues in the media. Nevertheless, this sampling procedure and subsequent analysis looking for the presence of gender in the material is appropriate, insofar as asking questions about the representation of women and gender issues in the material exactly contributes to assessing the content and level of inclusivity of the European public sphere, here understood as being represented by the three newspapers from each country in the analysis. Hence, ‘gender and gender policy’ was only one out of nine sub-topics defined in the data collection procedure, functioning as a way of ordering the collected material. As gender was thus not a primary data selection criteria but a topic in combination with the “European dimension” the media data is not representative of gender issues as such, but is rather taken to be representative of the media discussion of gender issues in direct relation to the EU and the European public sphere in the period of data collection.

Large parts of discussions below refer to the concept of “sources”. The way ”sources” are used in the Eurosphere media data set needs explanation for two reasons. Firstly it is a key

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65 Any period of data collection, is affected by minor or major events and developments that affect the content of the media landscape. When analysing i.e. the relative importance of themes in the Eurosphere data set this must thus be taken into consideration. One general “event” and development that might affect the content of the media items in 2008 is the global economic crisis which is pointed to in the Eurobarometer rapport as an important element in the perception of the EU and of the EU citizens’ daily lives and problems. (Eurobarometer report, 2)

66 See www.eurospheres.org

67 The nine topics are EU institutions; European committees; Reform treaty; Enlargement; Minorities or minority policies; Immigration or migration policy; Free movement or mobility; Gender and gender policy; Constructing Europe and the EU. The printed and the broadcast news stories must relate either implicitly or explicitly to one of the themes to have been included in the media dataset and the nine topics can therefore be viewed as secondary selection criteria.
variable in the analysis at hand, and secondly it is important to stress that source refers to the sources appearing in the news items and is not the same as the news item itself. Hence, sources are the persons actually making statements in the selected newspaper or broadcast news items. This means that there are very many selection processes involved in who eventually end up in our sample as sources. It depends both on which sources as selected by the media themselves (men and women with different statuses and relationships to societal institutions), which sources are named within the media (as opposed to appearing anonymously or being referred to in a generic sense) and which sources are included in the articles selected via our sampling procedure. This all means that the descriptive characterisations of the material below is not to be taken as representative of the appearance of women and gender issues within the 16 countries as a whole, but only as indication of the presence of women and gender issues when specifically discussing EU institutions or affairs and/or stories related to one or more foreign EU countries. This importantly excludes all nationally oriented debates about women, gender and gender policy, which may in fact represent the majority of media coverage of these issues.

Another point that needs mentioning in regards to “source” is the position of the sources that are identified within news items selected on the basis of the EU-related criteria. The fact that the sources appear in news items selected on basis of the specific set of EU related criteria could be an indication of a certain type of source, a type which may not be representative of sources in general on the media site. By this we mean that the selection criteria favour sources knowledgeable about or having an opinion about either the EU or the internal affairs of one or more foreign EU countries. However, the relevance of this methodological reservation may be somewhat offset by the consideration that our sample includes different types of media actors, ranging from yellow press to more conservative media actors, which would theoretically mean a spread in the voices of actors. The question remains whether the mere ability to have “voice” on the media site is indicative of the sources being elite sources and thereby not being illustrative of a general trend. Attempts to answer this question are outside the range of this chapter, but the question of generalisability is still relevant to bear in mind when reflecting on findings related to “source”.

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68 When the news item itself is the source this is coded by using the value “NI”. NI is applicable to all categories of news items as the general trend of an article will be contained within the NI-label. This becomes especially relevant in the case of framing, as the general framing of an article will be coded using the value NI.

69 In the selection of news papers and broadcast media, the research groups were asked to select media actors representing variation from tabloid to conservative media actors.
Further methodological considerations in relation to the Eurosphere media dataset that need mentioning, are both general problems relating to the interpretation involved in the quantification of qualitative material and problems particularly related to the Eurosphere project. What could be perceived as general problems are the ways in which the coders interpret the news item – a problem articulated in relation to i.e. the framing content where it becomes a question of assessing which is the strongest priority in news items. This potentially allows the subjectivity of the coder to play a significant role. To point to an example where this challenge of quantifying qualitative data becomes challenging in a different way, attention can be directed towards the instructions in the codebook to categorize stories referring to headscarf as gender topics. This a priori definition of categorizations of a topic rests on the assumption that headscarves are problems related to gender as opposed to headscarves being problems related to constructions of identity. When taking a closer look at the news items dealing with headscarves in the dataset, it becomes clear that most items are referring to the ruling of the Turkish constitutional court in June 2008, which re-introduced a ban on headscarves in Turkish universities. Reviewing seventeen articles selected on the basis of two criteria

- “Gender - first or second most important theme” and
- The mentioning of either of the two words “Muslim” or “headscarf” in the coders notes.

reveals that nine of the seventeen news items do not discuss headscarves as a gender issue but rather as a problem of national identity relating to secularism and religiosity. Summing up on the methodological challenges, both the possible bias introduced by the subjectivity of the coder as well as the a priori definition of categorizations of topics can be problematic. Both challenges being due to the diverging contexts that can be expected to affect the problematization of topics.

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70 In regards to coding of the media material in the Eurosphere project, Pernille Rødkær Bundgaard, member of the Danish team, furthermore points to the fact that there are variations between the paper coding sheet and the electronic codingsheet which i.e. makes it impossible to tick more than one box in the variables V16, V17, V21, V22, V23 and V24 – an option which had otherwise been put to use on the paper coding sheet.

71 Media codebook page 1.

72 Which could have equalled a categorization as “constructing Europe and the EU”. Media codebook page 1 lists “national identity” and “national/local cultures and traditions” under this category.

73 See appendix 1 for an overview of the articles and a short content description.

74 With problematization is meant the not taken for granted existence and character of “problems”. See Bacchi, 2009. In regards to headscarves this means that headscarves are not a problem but becomes problems in different ways in different contexts, which might influence the person coding the news items.
2 Where are the women? – a view on female sources.

In combination with the “gender-of-source” variable, the variables of interest to the question “where are the women?” are country of publication, space prominence of the news item, prominence in the paper, item type and source type.

The main findings from the analysis of these variables are firstly the uneven distribution of male and female sources in the dataset. Across countries there is an overweight of men in the dataset, as 41.3 % of the identified sources in the dataset, across countries, are men, and 9.6 % are women which results in an average difference between male and female sources of 31.7 percentage points. Two conclusions can be drawn from this finding: first of all, that the articles often do not explicitly identify the gender of the source being quoted (in 49.1% of cases they do not), and secondly, that when sources are identifiable as either male or female, we see that it is overwhelmingly men who are the sources in these articles covering A) EU- institutions affairs or B) issues related to one or more foreign European states. This skewed distribution of female and male sources, within the media site, has a potential effect on the voicing of claims, interests, attitudes and values within the European public sphere if claims, interests, attitudes and values diverge between the two gender groups.

A pattern which can further be identified with regards to the gender of the sources identifiable in the media data set, is that the majority of countries follow this trend of male sources in more than 40% of the articles/broadcast items and less than 11 % female sources.

Based on the above, we so far conclude that while the gender of sources quoted in newspaper articles or appearing on broadcast news is identified in only 50.9 % of the cases, it is the case that when the gender of the source is identifiable, it is overwhelmingly male sources.

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75 This has been tested by using a chi-square test which shows a p-value of 0.000 for this variable which makes it highly significant and hence very unlikely that the results have come about by coincidence. Appendix 3 crosstab A.

76 It should be noted, however, that the news items very often do not identify either the name or the gender of the source. This is problematic for interpreting our results, insofar as we do not now whether women or men are more or less likely to be identified when they are sources, nor can we control for differences in national journalistic practice for naming/not naming sources, as we do not now what these differences are or whether they are systematic in any way.

77 Less skewed are Estonia, Bulgaria and Denmark. Denmark is characterized by the identification of 15.5 % female sources and 40.8 % male sources in the data set which makes a difference of 25.3 percentage point between the male and female sources present in the media. This tendency to a smaller gap between the male and female sources represented in the media is even clearer in the cases of Estonia and Bulgaria where the source is identified as female in 15.7 % and male in 29.5 % of the cases from the Bulgarian media site. In the case of Estonia the divergence from the general pattern lies in the percentual difference between female and male sources i.e. there are only 9.0 % female sources but also only 31.4 % male sources which adds up to a difference of 22.4 % in the case of Estonia. Appendix 3 crosstab A.

Other examples of exceptions to the general pattern are Finland and Belgium. They are characterised by large percentual differences between the male and female sources. In the case of Finland there are 71.6 % male sources and 27.6 % female sources which is a difference of 44.0 percentage point. Regarding the points raised in note 24 above, this suggests a national difference in tradition for naming sources, as this means that the sources are actually identified in 99.2% of the cases from Finland. So either Finnish journalists always tell specifically who they sources are, or we have a systematic coding error. In the case of Belgium the male sources add up to 59.9 %, while the female sources add up to 9.1 % which equals a difference of 50.8 percentage point between female and male sources.
However, to this we added the observation that Bulgaria, Finland, and Denmark represent a pattern differing from the general one, as these three countries have comparatively more female sources being quoted in the media, although men still make up the majority, also in these countries. The observation that Bulgaria, Denmark and Finland diverge from the general pattern with regards to the gender of the source can be complemented with a view to the distribution of sources within the NA and missing categories in an attempt to provide a possible explanation for this divergence. Of the sixteen countries, Bulgaria has the lowest percentage within the category “missing”, followed by Finland. Bulgaria and Finland also stand out in regards to the percentage within the NA category, as Bulgaria has the highest percentage of all the countries in the category “NA” and Finland the lowest percentage. Taking this into consideration there might be reason not to put too much emphasis on these extraordinary cases, which leaves only Denmark as a case diverging from the general pattern.

A second main finding is related to the crossing between source type and gender of the source, and this becomes interesting in the light of the question “where are the women?” in that it renders information about the agency of the women present on the media site.

It appears that “politics” is the most frequent category for both male and female sources, which most likely has to do with how news items were selected, namely looking for items covering A) EU- institutions affairs or B) issues related to one or more foreign European states. Persons/citizens groups is the second most frequent source type for both male and female, in the case of female sources followed by NGOs and social movements. NGOs and social movements are also the category where the most notable difference between the male and female sources can be detected, as 3.2 % of the male sources are categorized as “NGO/social movement” and the corresponding figure for female sources is 6.5 %. The fact that the pattern of male and female sources types does not diverge in relation to the two most frequent categories and the fact that the most notable percentual difference is to be found within the category “NGO/social movement” indicates that female voices are relatively most prominent as “NGO/social movement” - actor types.

Including the space prominence variable gives an indication of the length of the articles with male and female sources which can be taken as a quantitative indicator of

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78 The categories “NA” and “missing” thus holding 14.5% and 34.6% of N’s(Appendix 3, Cross tab A). The categorisation “NA” used when it has not been possible to identify e.g. the belonging of a source and “NA” does thus not equate the category “missing” which is a category appearing in the data processing of the news material.
79 Source type refers to the type of source in the news stories. Among the tick options are “politics” and “pressure groups”. This variable gives insight into the types of actors present in the media-arena. Appendix 3 crosstab B
80 Appendix 3 crosstab B
81 Appendix 3 crosstab C
“where are the women?” in terms of the presence of female sources in the media. The tendency is that in respect to space prominence, both male and female sources increase the space prominence from 1/7 of a page\textsuperscript{82} to 1/4-1/2 page\textsuperscript{83}. In comparison, the largest percentual difference between male and female sources in regards to space prominence, is to be found in the ½-1 page category, where 20.3% of the female sources are registered as opposed to 16.5% of the male sources. This means that the longer the newspaper articles are, the more likely the journalist is to identify the sources in a way that also allows for identification of the gender of the source. Further, it also means that women are relatively (compared to the men) more likely to appear as identifiable sources the longer the articles are. In other words, the longer an article is, the more likely it is to include not only identifiably male sources.

This focus on “prominence” through the length of the article can be further elaborated by analysing the gender of the source and “prominence” understood in terms of where in the paper the news item is placed\textsuperscript{84}. The crossing of these two variables shows a similar tendency across gender of the source, as the frequency increases when the prominence decreases, with the largest percentage of articles that include information about the gender of the source are placed on page 5 and onwards (excluding the back cover). This result is consistent with the pattern identified above.

Crossing the gender of the source with the type of item\textsuperscript{85} in the newspaper reveals similar patterns for the appearance of male and female sources within the “news piece” category, which is the largest category among the types of items (64% with a male source and 67.3% with a female source within the two gender groups). We find the clearest difference between the two gender groups in the category “editorial”, where 9.8% of sources are registered as female and 5.9% as male. What is particular about “editorial” other than female sources being more frequent in this category, is that the editorial is the leading article that gives the newspapers’ opinion rather than simply reporting information\textsuperscript{86}. Female sources being more frequent in this category can thus be perceived of as giving the female sources a prominent position qua the prominence of the editorial in the newspapers\textsuperscript{87}.

\textsuperscript{82} 16% for male sources and 15% for female sources (% within gender group). Appendix 3 crosstab C
\textsuperscript{83} 30.3% for male sources and 27.8% for female sources, with the female sources peaking within the category 1/7-1/4 of a page (28.8% of the female sources being in news items of this length). Appendix 3 crosstab C
\textsuperscript{84} Appendix 3 crosstab D
\textsuperscript{85} Six categories are available to the coder. News piece, opinion piece, editorial, feature, letter to editorial and news analysis. Appendix 3 crosstab E
\textsuperscript{86} Longman. Dictionary of English language and culture, 1992, 407
\textsuperscript{87} Performing a Chi-Square test on these findings shows a high degree of statistical significance (P-value of .000). Appendix 3 crosstab E.
This outline of the “prominence” and “types” of female sources can be summed up by arguing that prominence, in terms of the location and the length of articles are relevant to the strength of the “voices” of female actors and the strength of what is being voiced.

3 Gender as a theme?
Despite the relatively strong presence of female sources within editorials, gender as a theme does not hold a particularly prominent position within the category “editorial”. This is perfectly explicable by the selection criteria, but nevertheless leads us to conclude that it could indicate that the news papers do not assign attention to the gender-related aspects of EU institutions and affairs. To this observation that the presence of women is not the same as the presence of gender as a theme, must be added that gender of the source did in general appear to have an effect on the frequency of gender as a “first most important theme”, as gender is the least frequent “first most important theme” where the source is male and a more frequent “first most important theme” where the source is female.

A second question relating to gender as a theme, is the question of the types of actors that articulate gender as a most important theme. With an overweight of sources placed within the category “politics” it is to be expected that the gender theme is to be relatively more frequent within this category, which is confirmed. The fact that gender as an important theme is as frequent when the type of source is registered under the category “religion” as under the category “NGO/social movement” is, however, surprising, as there will be social movements and NGO’s that have specific gender profiles, while this is not the case with religious communities. In fact, gender is the most frequent important topic when the source is categorized as “religion”, followed by “migration policy” -this pattern is identical with the pattern in the category “NGO/social movement”.

In the following, attention is directed towards gender as an important theme within different contexts. The way of approaching this has been to define different clusters of countries that share important features. The countries are grouped in the following way:

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88 The 8 themes are: Constructing Europe and the EU; EU institutions; Reform treaty; Enlargement; Minorities or minority policies; Immigration or migration policy; Free movement or mobility; Gender and gender policy;
89 When crossing 1st and 2nd most important themes with type of news item, 8.2% of the news items are editorials. Within the category editorials 20.4% deal with topics of EU institutions, 11.2% with enlargement, 10.9% with mobility and 2.8% with gender. Appendix 3 crosstab F
90 Gender as a first most important theme has a frequency of 8.2% within “first most important theme” when looking at the female-source group only and correspondingly 2.7% within the male- source group. Appendix 3 crosstab K.
91 Included in this category is both first and second most important theme. V 6.1 and V 6.2. Appendix 3 crosstab G
92 Appendix 3 crosstab G
93 It is debatable how to group the European countries in clusters because it often will depend on different issues, for example welfare, migration/citizenship and gender. The following analysis is based upon a preliminary grouping of different countries – primarily according to geographical criteria with the inspiration from welfare state research. We are aware that Estonia
- A Northern European cluster: Norway, Denmark and Finland.
- An Eastern European/post-communist cluster of countries: Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria.
- A Southern European cluster of countries: Spain and Italy
- A cluster of central European countries: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria; UK and France

A general trend when focusing on the importance of gender relative to other themes, within the clusters, is that gender accounts for between 4.1% and 5.9% of the items within each of the four clusters. This makes gender amongst the four least frequent most important themes in all four clusters of countries. Furthermore, a variation of 1.8 percentage points between the clusters in regards to gender as an important theme makes gender the most “stable” category, in the sense that between the clusters of countries, gender as a most important theme accounts for the least variation. In comparison, the enlargement theme represents the most significant variation across clusters. Like the conclusion drawn on the basis of the content analysis of the editorials above, this observation suggests that the importance of gender as a theme in relation to the European dimension on the media site is not as significant as other themes. This is of course explicable in light of the sampling criteria for selecting articles (EU affairs and EU institutions), but nevertheless, it is worth remembering that these selection criteria also included ‘stories covering issues related to one or more foreign European states’. The European media does not appear to undergird the existence of a common European public sphere for discussions about gender and gender policy.

When combining the fact that there are 267 items across sixteen countries where gender is the first and second most important themes with the introductory commentaries on the actual content of selected items coded as “gender first and second most important theme” it becomes a question how many of the items coded as gender first most important theme can be accounted for by references to events like the re-introduction of ban on headscarves in Turkey.

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94 Appendix 3 crosstab H
95 Appendix 3 crosstab I
To investigate what the content of the items coded as “gender – first and second most important theme” was, the coders notes were reviewed, and this showed a varied picture of what constitutes gender issues in the different countries. If the nine themes, included as tick options in the category “first most important theme”, are divided into two clusters, where one is EU-construction themes and the other is diversity-themes, this can be used to identify a possible pattern of female and male sources. Taking these two clusters as the basis, the female sources have the highest frequency within the EU-construction cluster as the themes “enlargement” has a frequency of 22.9% within the female

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96 Appendix 2
97 The tick options in V6.1 are; Constructing Europe and the EU; EU institutions; Reform treaty; Enlargement; Minorities and minority policies; Immigration or migration policy; Free movement or mobility and Gender policy
98 Constructing Europe and the EU, EU- institutions and Enlargement.
99 Diversity-themes are Minorities/minority policy, Migration policy and Gender
gender group, “EU institutions” a frequency of 19.7% and “minorities/minority policy” a frequency of 16.2%. For the male-source group, the most frequent first most important themes are “minorities/minority policy” (21.2%), “enlargement” (18.5%) and “migration policy” (18.1%)\textsuperscript{100}.

This does not give any clear indication of a correlation between gender and any one of the two thematic clusters. The two most frequent themes within the female-source group do however fall within the EU-construction cluster of themes, while this is only the case for the second most frequent “first most important theme” where the source is male. In other words, it is so that female sources are proportionally more likely to appear in stories covering EU-construction themes than in stories covering diversity themes. We observe that identifiably male sources appear relatively more often in the news items covering diversity themes which, however, is not a suggestion of the existence of a causal relationship between gender of source and specific themes\textsuperscript{101}.

\textsuperscript{100} Appendix 3 crosstab L

\textsuperscript{101} The relationship between gender and specific themes might be affected by various other variables such as type of source or type of news item.
In the Eurosphere media data set is also included a variable that deals with the framing of themes. The variable “Framing content” registers the concrete thematic content of framing, meaning that gender can be framed from the perspective of human rights or gender equality, and thus be justified or understood within different frames. In the graphic illustration below it is clear that the dominant frame of gender as the first most important theme is gender equality followed by human rights. This prominence of an “equality” and “rights” frame around gender as an important theme could be an indication of gender issues being present on the media site as something that functions within a universal rights frame, rather than something that is presented as embedded in national identity.

4 Attitudes of female sources
In the following the question “where are the women?” is approached by focusing on the attitudes of female sources to diversity and the EU. When directing attention to the attitude towards EU and gender of the source, a marginal gender gap can be identified, as the male sources appear to be slightly more anti-EU and slightly less pro-EU than female sources. Hence 31.5% of males are recorded as being pro-EU and 7% as anti-EU, whereas respectively 32.6% are pro-EU and 4.5% anti-EU among the female sources. This finding is remarkable when comparing it to the findings in “Eurobarometer standard 69”. However, apart from the fact that “Eurobarometer standard 69” draws on data collected in the spring of 2008 - and the Eurosphere media data is collected between May and October 2008 – there is very little comparability between the two data sets. The results of the Eurobarometer report, which is based on the attitudes of a random sample of European citizens, show that there is a gender gap in the attitude towards EU membership as 57% of the male EU citizens find their

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102 The variable “framing content” maps what a source or a news item presents as something to be promoted or protected. Under V23 there are 24 tick options with “gender equality” being one of them.
103 See appendix 3 crosstab M
104 Appendix 3 crosstab J.1
106 The question posed in the Eurobarometer survey is: “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...?” and the tick options given are 1. A good thing 2. A bad thing 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Don’t Know
country’s membership of the EU to be “a good thing” as opposed to 47% of the women. Despite the lack of methodological comparability between the sampling procedures, these opposite trends leads us to the reflection “can the female sources that are sources in news item complying with the EU related selection criteria, be taken to represent a category of women that diverge from the average female EU citizen and how?”. This remains an open question that serves as a reminder of the important interplay between selection criteria, findings and conclusions.

This tendency of the female sources in our sample to be slightly more pro-EU and slightly less anti-EU than male sources can also be identified when focusing on pro- and anti-diversity, which is illustrated in the figure below. Identified female sources in our sample are pro-diversity and pro-EU to a higher degree than are the identified male sources.

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When testing the relationship, between gender and attitude towards diversity, Chi-square testing render a value of .000, meaning that the relationship is statistically significant (appendix 3 crosstab K).
5 Where were the women and processes of gendering on the media site

The findings from the analysis of the Eurosphere media dataset has been presented under the three headings “Where are the women – a view on female sources”, “Gender as a theme” and “Attitudes of female sources”. In this concluding part of the report, the main findings will be summed up and tied together in order to let the data material provide perspectives on the two first elements of the gender action plan.

In relation to “where are the women?” the main observation was the overweight of male sources in the sample. This tendency was identified in all sixteen countries. The general pattern to have male sources in more than 40% of the articles/broadcast items and less than 11% female sources was broken by Bulgaria, Finland and Denmark, where exceptions to this pattern could be identified in that female sources were less infrequent.

Another finding relating to “where are the women?” was the observation that female sources were more frequent within the category “gender as a first most important theme” than the male sources. However, this trend varied across different types of news items, which suggests that there is no direct causal relationship between female sources and gender as a first most important theme.

Furthermore, gender is registered as an important theme most frequently when the source is categorized under “politics” followed by “religion/church” and “NGO/social movement”. The surprising element in this, is the fact that gender is as frequently registered as an important theme where the source type is coded as “religion/church” as where the source type is coded as “NGO/social movement”. The surprise being that a number of NGOs and social movements will have gender profiles, while it would be the exception for religion and church to have explicit gender profiles, and thus appear as sources in news items coded as “gender first or second most important theme”. A question arising on this background, but being outside the range of this paper, is to what extent the content of gender themes and issues vary between different source types.

A general trend, when focusing on the importance of gender relative to other themes within the clusters of countries, was that gender accounts for between 4.1% and 5.9% of the items within each of the five clusters, which makes gender amongst the four least frequent most important themes in all five clusters of countries. A variation of 1.8 percentage points between the clusters in regards to gender as an important theme also makes gender the most “stable” category, in the sense that between the clusters of countries, gender as a most important theme accounted for the least variation.
The introduction to this chapter spoke about how the second element of the gender action plan was “gendering as a process”. By including two very limited qualitative analyses, it became evident that different countries have different gender issues, which supported the argument that gender and gender issues are not “naturally” occurring categories with a pre-defined content and form, but rather situated social and political constructions. On the basis of a small exploration of the actual content of news items registered under “gender-first or second most important theme” it was also questioned whether certain issues like headscarf-issues can automatically be understood as gender issues. The discussion arising on the basis of this observation from the Eurosphere data set could consequently be, whether debates over headscarves are debates that revolve around questions of gender equality that have been bent\textsuperscript{108} so much that headscarves are debated, banned or permitted in order to achieve goals that are distant from the goal of gender equality, or whether headscarf debates are in fact questions of national identity constructions that are being stretched\textsuperscript{109} to being questions of gender equality. The difference between the two might seem minor, but is in fact major, and is essentially a matter of who defines the headscarf as a “problem” and why. Analyzing the actual process of gendering of the headscarf debates in the different national context is, however, out of the reach of this report and must remain an open question.

To sum up: The media data indicate that discussions about gender and gender policy do not seem to be one of the priority issues on the European public agenda, which could be one of the pre-conditions for the formation of a European public sphere. The following chapter will explore this issue by comparing whether gender-related concerns are present/absent in the articulation of the domestic and/or EPS and if so what are these concerns?

\textsuperscript{108} The use of the expression "bending" is inspired by the discussion of "bending", "shrinking" and "stretching" by Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo in "the discursive politics of gender equality" from 2009. Bending is defined as "A process that shapes meaning at the expense of the goal of gender equality. Bending occurs when the concept of gender equality is adjusted to make it fit some other goal than the achievement of gender equality itself"(Lombardo et al, 2009, 5)

\textsuperscript{109} "Stretching" refers to the broadening of a concept "by developing a larger meaning that expands on its previous understanding in a given context"(Lombardo et al, 2009, 5)
PART 7

Preliminary Conclusion: Reflections about Theory and Research

Birte Siim

1 Introduction: Gender, Diversity and the Public Sphere

The general objective of the gender report has been to analyze women’s inclusion/exclusion in the European Public Sphere (EPS). The specific aim has been to explore the potential for a European public space pertaining to gender and diversity, confronting theoretical approaches and concepts about the diversity and European Public Sphere with empirical research. The empirical focus is on the views of the European political elites, which include some of the most important civil society actors in the EPS. This concluding section aims to give a brief overview of the most significant research results in the gender report; to reflect on the theoretical approaches, concepts and models on the basis the empirical findings, and to identify questions, issues and themes, which we plan to explore by further research.

The report has presented the state of the art, methodological reflections and design (chapter 1 and 2). The state of the art was divided in two parts: 1) Rethinking the Public Sphere (PS) from the Perspective of Gender and Diversity; 2) Gender and Diversity in the European Public Sphere (EPS). The report has employed a well-known analytical PS model to explore the patterns of in/exclusion of gender and diversity within the EPS. This model has four dimensions: who participates, what is the form and content of their contribution, how do they communicate, what are the desired outcomes (see ch.1). The empirical emphasis has been on the first two dimensions, and the intersection of gender with diversity has been integrated as a transversal concern across these dimensions.

One of the key issues has been to qualify and refine the concept of intersectionality as a transversal theoretical and methodological approach to study gender and diversity on the basis of the EUROSPHERE dataset. The report has explored the theoretical, analytical and normative tensions between inequalities according to gender and ethnicity, which is
something that need to be abolished, and diversity understood as a positive value, which refers to accommodation of differences, for example sexual, cultural or language differences. It has also explored the tensions between claims for accommodation of sexual and ethnic diversities and claims for pluralism, which refer to accommodation of differences in cultural and political attitudes. The emphasis of empirical part of the gender report has been mainly, but not exclusively, on intersections of gender with race/ethnicity. Due to methodological limitations the focus has been on intersectionality on the discursive and organizational level – and only indirectly on the structural or institutional levels.

The different chapters have given an overview of the EUROSPHERE findings pertaining to gender and diversity, which as mentioned earlier include collected EUROSPHERE data, institutional data from selected political organizations as well as elite interviews with social and political actors at the four different sites: Political parties, social movements, media and think tanks. They do address issues connected to women’s political agency, but due to methodological limitations the mayor emphasis is on processes and discourses. The main focus is thus on identifying gendered discourses about national and European belongings.

The chapters have presented a variety of analyses, which include both in depth comparative qualitative analyses and case studies of selected organizations (ch.3 and 4.) and descriptive quantitative and inter-gender analyses (chapter 5 and 6). They include a descriptive analysis of the relations between women’s social movements and the EU (ch.4), as well as an overview of some quantitative characteristics of the EUROSPHERE interview data (ch. 5). The analyses are primarily based upon the EUROSPHERE dataset but also include additional data, which enable a more detailed mapping of specific issues, for example of minority women’s inclusion in the European public sphere.

1.1 Gendered Discourses
One of the main dimensions for the inclusion/exclusion in the public sphere is participation and positions on different sites and within different organizations in the European political elites. On the theoretical level, the notion of women’s agency refers to power relations and analyses of who represents whom, and to women’s inclusion in the public sphere and the EPS, as well as to relations between various women’s organizations and between women’s SMOs and other SMOs, for example minority organizations. On the empirical level, women’s agency refers both to the position of individual women within various organizations as well as to the role of women’s SMOs.
One of the limitations of the sample is that the data collection of important social and political actors and key organizations in civil society is not representative. Women do form a large minority of about 30 percent of the sample and the overall results do not refute the hypothesis that there is a male dominance in the leading positions across the four different sites. This is especially true for political parties and SMOs. The dominant picture is, however, that gender interacts with other factors, which influence women’s positions across the sites and within the various organizations. The inter-gender analysis indicates that there are specific dynamics attached to women’s in/exclusion on the various sites and within different organizations, which is important for understanding potentials and barriers for women’s access to the public sphere.

The quantitative analyses of selected questions in chapter five show that there is a tendency for gendered answers to questions pertaining to the position, rights and participation of women in the European Union on many of the questions checked here. On of the strongest results from this chapter in our report is that the variance of opinion in specific areas such as ‘the future development of the EU polity’ and ‘which groups’ rights should be granted/protected by the EU’ could not be understood without applying a gender perspective in the analyses. At the same time we found that the selected women’s organisations in the sample tend to pull in opposite directions according to political families on the Left and Right; they also tend to give answers resonating with both pro- and anti-diversity attitudes.

The only exception to this is the organizations agreement on EU’s role as a guarantor of minority rights. This leads to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion: One the one hand, the selected women’s organisations are less EU-sceptic than women in general within our sample, and favour more direct EU level legislation for the protection of minority rights. On the other hand, they do not necessarily connect minority rights with gender equality legislation, and are generally more sceptical about the EU’s ability to further women’s rights and gender equality than women in general within the sample.

These quantitative results were explored in greater detail by the comparative analyses of the six national women’s organizations and the transnational umbrella organization, European Women’s Lobby (see Ch. 3 and 4). The following organizations were included in the EUROSPHERE sample: a) Women’s Alliance For Development, WAD (Bulgaria), b) WOMEN’S COUNCIL (Denmark); c) Ni Putes Ni Soumises, NPNS (France); d) Nők A Nőkért

Chapter five compared the gender distribution among elites within the EU, Eurosphere and Eurostat data. This showed that the distribution of think tank respondents in our sample is similar to patterns in the EUROSTAT. We also noticed that women in SMOs and in media are probably underrepresented in the EUROSPHERE sample (see p 79, table 1).
Együtt Az Erőszak Ellen, NANE (Hungary); e) Association to Support Women Candidates in Political Parties, KA-DER (Turkey); f) Women’s Centre, KAMER (Turkey), and g) the European Women’s Lobby (EWL).

The EUROSPHERE database indicates that women’s organizations are indeed included in the public sphere and to some extent also of the EPS. One indicator is their membership of The European Women’s Lobby (EWL), another is their dense networking activities on the European and international level. The analyses further illustrate that the organizations do not form one homogeneous unity but rather a diverse group, which has different views on key issues pertaining to gender equality, diversity and the EU. Although most of the analyzed women’s SMOs are members of the EWL, which is the strongest organization at the EU-level coordinating activities pertaining to gender issues, the analyses illustrate the diversity of priorities and claims of women SMOs at the national and transnational level. The findings illustrate that there are important discursive struggles going on between different women’s organizations about the representation of women, and women’s issues, at the transnational European level (see Ch.3).

At the European level the EWL has since its start in 1990 been the dominant gender equality actor but the qualitative case studies indicate that the organization is today challenged from two sides: from minority women’s organizations and from new (Conservative) women’s organizations. One of the implications is that arguments about pluralism and inclusiveness at the EU-level have acquired new meanings as they have become part of competing discourses. Pluralism is for example used as a claim for the inclusion of Conservative women’s organizations – for example as gender experts -; and it is no longer exclusively a claim to include diversity in terms of ethnic minority women organizations/actors (see ch.3).

In spite of the diverse framings of gender equality in political families on the Left and Right, which was to be expected, it is worth emphasizing that we also found an overall consensus among respondents across the six national women’s organizations/SMOs analyzed about two main issues: The positive linkage between European integration and gender equality, and the legitimacy to regulate gender equality and anti-discrimination at the EU-level. This is a strong finding, which tend to support the dominant discourse of the EU as a major generator of gender equality and women’s rights. There is thus a basis for both conflicts and alliances: On the one hand we have identified ongoing struggles about what the dominant gender discourse should be. On the other hand there is also a basis for alliances about further EU regulation of gender equality at transnational level.
This mix of struggles and potential areas of alliances among women’s SMOs should be explored in greater detail: One research area would be exploring potentials and barriers of EU’s multi-level institutional and discursive opportunity structure for claims from national women’s’ SMOs as well as from various transnational organizations’ analyzed in chapter 3. One question is in what way the national discursive and institutional opportunity structures influence civil society actor’s claims at the transnational EU level?

1.2 Gendering as a process
At the theoretical level, gendering as a process analyses what factors can contribute to explain the specific gender articulation or framing of gender issues. At the empirical level, it refers to how and to what extent gender is being framed in discourses within organizations, at the national and the EU level. The results generally confirmed previous research that gender equality as a political goal is both contested and contextual. Gendering takes specific forms in particular organizations, on particular sites influenced by the specific national contexts. The gender report has identified dominant discourses as well as counter discourses across and within the different sites, for example in SMO/NGOs and on the media site. Thus the focus on gender equality as an important issue to be regulated by the European political actors does not mean that respondents agree about what is the meaning of gender equality and what the most important issues for women are.

The studies of the European Parliament (EP) illustrate that there are new discursive struggles about the understanding of gender equality, women’s rights and gender issues on the EU level articulated by Conservative and Socialist women represented in the EP. However, they also illustrate that when EP women do manage to agree on key issues across political families on the Right and the Left, for example about the importance of EU funding for projects about violence against women, they did succeed in influencing EU politics (Ch. 3; Rolandsen Augustin 2011).

One important transversal research area is respondents’ articulation of intersecting equalities. Here, the findings confirmed that various framings and positions about intersectionality pertaining to gender and diversity exist on the discursive level. However, ethnic diversity is the most consistently relevant indicator among our respondents, and the specific articulation of these intersections varies according to organizations and national contexts. In spite of the gap between the level of sophistication by respondents in interviews and the level of theory in the present gender report, the qualitative analysis does confirm that references to intersections of gender with ethnicity/race are articulated in a number of ways,
especially by respondents within particular political parties and by antiracist organizations. The various framings and positions have tentatively been labeled exclusionary, inclusionary and ambiguous intersectionality.

One remarkable finding is that the coupling of gender and ethnicity/race is to a lesser extent articulated by respondents within the selected women’s organizations. This may be due to a selective bias in the sample. An additional case study of the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) based on the home page and written documents (after Sept. 2010) indicates an important shift pertaining to a greater sensitivity related to issues of ethnicity/race (Pristed 2011, forthc.). A future research theme would be to explore the differences between dominant and counter discourses at the national and transnational levels in greater details focusing on the various forms of intersections of gender with ethno-national diversity, for example through cluster analysis.

2 Diversity in the European Public Sphere

The overall results confirm that major national and European discourses are gendered and some of them also tend to exclude the unequal other within and outside the nation as well as in the EU. Counter discourses exist across Europe, but are often linked to opposite attitudes and positions towards EU/European democracy. They may include both euro-skepticism and contestation, which refers to visions about a more social and democratic Europe.

The findings indicate that at the supra-national European level, the broad consensus, which has till recently existed about a dominant gender discourse situated within the EP and the EWL to a certain extent articulated by the parliamentarian Left and women’s SMOs within the EWL, has come under pressure. Since the enlargement new struggles have been identified between Conservative (religious) forces and the Left in the EP, which has challenged the monopoly of the EWL at the EU-level (see Rolandsen Agustin 2011). The six women’s SMOs in the sample in many ways represent the diversity of European women’s SMOs, since they were selected according to a geographical European dimension, Northern, Southern and Central and Eastern Europe, but at the same time they also represent both old and new EU countries as well as candidate countries, like Turkey.

One future research theme would be to explore the struggles, negotiations and collaborations about the different meanings of gender equality and women’s issues in the national SMOs as well as their relations to the transnational EU-institutions, for example the European Commission and the European Parliament. Another theme would be to explore the possible links between the various national arena and Euro-spaces.
Concerning the European Public Sphere (EPS) the gender report points to a somewhat paradoxical result: On the one hand, most of the women’s SMOs do belong to a relatively strong transnational network, i.e. the EWL, and do have dense networks with other organizations within and outside the EU. On the other hand, the respondents also claim that no common public sphere exists (see chapter 4; 73). This is an illustration that the EPS is a complex and contested notion, but it could also be interpreted as an example of a gap between discourse and practice; that respondents’ practical collaborations in this case is ahead of the discursive understanding.

3 Reflections about theory and research
This final section aims to confront the theoretical approaches, models and concepts with the most important empirical findings. The objective is to debate whether and how the findings contribute to challenge established theories; what questions and issues do they raise, which should be pursued by cross-national in depth case studies and cluster analysis? And what kind of problems, issues/areas for future research has been identified at the EU-level?

The state of the art gave an overview of three major research themes, which have usually been analyzed within relative separate research areas:

- Gender and Diversity Models, which address mainly national and not transnational models
- Gendering the Public Sphere, which address in/exclusion of women in national models
- Gendering the European Public Sphere, which address in/exclusion in transnational models

3.1 Gender and Diversity Models
The theoretical overview concluded that the major academic approaches have not succeeded in overcoming the split between diversity models and gender models. In political theory ethno-national, cultural or religious diversity tend to be the primary categories, while in gender research gender has till recently been the primary category. Although scholars like Bauböck and Phillips have presented multidimensional models, which include more than one category, they have been criticized for presenting models where ‘one size fits them all’ (Verloo 2007), because they have not addressed the structural roots, institutional logics and dynamic interactions between different inequalities.
The empirical findings in this report confirmed that the notion of diversity is complex and contextual. Diversity refers both to positive and negative values as well as to different social categories. The results also confirmed the hypothesis that gender makes a difference for views on diversity and the public sphere with a number of qualifications. One of the strong findings is that contexts plays a crucial role for understanding of our key concepts; diversity and the PS; in most questions national and organizational context serve as a better indicator of expressed views than the respondent’s gender. This result confirms recent developments in intersectional gender theory, which distinguishes between gender on the level of position, organization and identity (Yuval Davis 2006). It also corresponds with findings about women’s political representation that there is no correspondence between the gender of the representative and the policies that the person supports (Celis, Childs, Kantola & Krook 2008).

The country reports have identified competing diversity models in political debates, for example universalist adaptation, particularistic assimilation and mutual Integration. More detailed comparative analyses are needed of cross-national similarities and differences and especially how these diversity models relate to gender. The qualitative analyses of interactions of gender with diversity in selected organizations across the 16 European countries presented in the gender report indicate that respondents articulate framings of and positions towards diversity. They further illustrate that most respondents do acknowledge multiple inequalities, but they articulate various discursive framings, especially of the intersections of gender with ethnicity/race. Most respondents do not articulate any direct linkages between gender models and diversity models, for example respondents from the six national women’s movement organizations. This is a strong finding, which indicates that we need more detailed comparative analyses of how respondents in particular organizations, on specific sites and in different national contexts, understand and frame the different equality strands.

111 The universalist adoption model seems to be the dominant approach in many countries and has a universalist take on ethno-national diversity and a preference for individual rights and a rejection of group rights. The particularist assimilation approach is a minority discourse articulated primarily, but not only, by the Populist Right, and the mutual integration approach is a minority discourse articulated primarily, but not only, by the social movements SMOs (see for example the national Danish Country Report: http://eurospheres.org/files/2010/06/Denmark.pdf)
3.2 Gender and Diversity Models the European Public Sphere

The Public Sphere models address important questions about participation, communication, legitimation and accountability. The dominant approaches to gendering the public sphere, for example Young and Phillips, rest upon normative claims about women’s common interests, often based upon women’s political marginalization; or claims about alliances between women’s organizations and migrant/minority organizations; and they are often premised upon conceptions about a certain dualism between civil society organizations and national political systems.

Recently European feminist scholars have started to explore the contradictory effects of Europeanization for gender equality. One example is Liebert’s approach, which underlines EU as a provider of gender and minority rights, while Squires and Verloo have expressed more critical approaches to the focus on diversity and the EU new strategy for mainstreaming of multiple inequalities. Squires have presented an elaborate participative-democratic model for gender mainstreaming based upon an integrated approach to gender and diversity mainstreaming. She has argued for an intersectional model, which addresses power-differentials between and within social groups by asking who has the power to decide what mainstreaming is or should be.

The various chapters of the gender report illustrate that the theoretical presumption about alliances between different social movements/SMOs cannot be taken for granted. This may be due to different opportunity structures, which influence the dynamic between women’s SMO and minority organizations in Europe and the US. In the EU claims for gender equality have until recently had more institutional support than claims for race/ethnicity. Respondents are aware of and do address the issue of multiple inequalities, which is today on EU’s political agenda. Respondents organized within the EWL and in the anti-discrimination movements, for example organized in ENAR, do express rhetoric about recognition of multiple inequalities. However, the practical collaborations often lack behind, and European SMOs have only recently started to form communication networks or established alliances across different inequality strands.

One tentative conclusion could be that on the level of rhetoric, interactions between gender and ethnic diversity tend to be perceived as cumulative and not competing claims, but more detailed case-studies of the organizations is needed in order to conclude whether the claims and social practices of various organizations should be understood as competing, cumulative or combined/integrated.
The gender report has also challenged theoretical presumptions about an existing dualism between civil society organizations and nation states. The analyses of women’s SMOs indicate that SMOs tend to give uncritical support to their own national legislations, and they illustrate that the national SMOs tend to articulate relatively positive perceptions of the impact of the European integration/regulation of gender equality.

The report underlines that European majority women’s organizations/SMOs do articulate rhetoric about inclusion of minority women. The findings have identified several strategies for including minority groups on the European level there: One main strategy is to include minority women within majority originations, which has for example been used by the European Women’s Lobby (EWL). Another strategy is to include minority women’s issues within majority women’s organizations, for example in Women against Violence Europe (WAVE). A third strategy is the empowerment of minority women directly through the formation of their own organizations, for example Black European Women’s Council (BEWC).

3.3 Post-national and trans-national intersectionality
Feminist research has argued that the notion of intersectionality can be used as a theoretical and methodological approach to overcome the dualism between gender and diversity models. The gender report illustrates that the main classifications need to be contextualized and refined: For example Hancock’s distinction between a unitary, multiple and an intersectional approach to studies of race, gender and class, or Squires’ distinction between combined, or integrated model.

Firstly, the report has shown that key categories like gender and diversity are contested and contextual, and often have different meanings across Europe. Secondly, it confirms that ‘one form does not fit all’. It follows that the intersectionality approach needs to be refined in order to distinguish between different social categories, because the intersections of gender with ethnicity/race has different dynamics and framings than intersections of gender with class. Finally, and most importantly, the intersectionality approach needs to be refined in order to address the multilevel EU governance. We have argued that Yuval-Davis’ multilayered citizenship model, which explicitly addresses both relations between different inequality strands and relations between the national and transnational arenas, is a fruitful starting point for comparative transnational analyses. The report illuminates, however, that there is a strong contextual nation state bias in the conceptions of intersectionality, which needs to be addressed and integrated within a transnational approach.
The report has further argued that it is fruitful to distinguish between intersectionality in academic debates from intersectionality in political debates, policy documents and interviews. We have proposed that it is useful to differentiate between exclusionary and inclusionary intersectionality pertaining specifically to analyses of gender and ethnicity/race in political debates: Exclusionary intersectionality is defined as a discourse, which emphasizes one form of inequality (for example gender equality) while at the same time exacerbating other forms of inequalities among other categories (for example ethnic groups). Inclusionary intersectionality is defined as a discourse, which emphasizes the intersection between different inequality creating mechanisms and the potential negative implications for strengthening inequality (in diversity). In political debates, one dominant discourse, for example about how gender and race/ethnicity intersects, which exclude immigrant minorities, can make it difficult to articulate alternative understandings and counter discourses.

The report thus confirms previous research findings, which distinguish between interactions between different inequality strands, specifically between intersections of gender and ethnicity/race. Respondents within particular political parties do have conflicting framings of and positions concerning interactions between different inequality strands as well as about interactions between the nation state and the European polity, EPS. The analyses of different framings of interactions of gender and race/ethnicity often express interactions of majority and minorities. One position is the ‘excluder’, which articulates an intersection of gender with ethnicity/race/culture or religion, but this is used to emphasize the difference between them and us- they the minority oppress women whereas we the majority is gender equal. For example: ‘Young immigrant girls as bearers of integration’. This position is contrasted with the ‘includer’, which articulates a more dynamic interaction between gender equality, ethnicity and culture. We also found examples of framings, which articulate ambivalent interactions or no interaction between gender and ethnicity/race.

In terms of relations between the EPS and the nation state, the country reports have identified different models and visions for the public sphere. One strong finding to be explored by further research is that nationalist framings tend to be dominant across Europe and are articulated by respondents in most countries. These framings include a pragmatic pro-EU approach, a democratic-participatory approach and a nationalist anti-EU approach\textsuperscript{112}. In

\textsuperscript{112} The pragmatic-intermediate EU-approach, which is positioned between more autonomy to the member states and more EU-regulation/centralization, is the dominant approach in most countries, whereas the nationalist anti-EU approach is a minority approach situated mainly but not exclusively at the populist Right, and the democratic participatory approach is situated mainly, but not exclusively within the SMOs (see for example national Danish Country Report: http://eurospheres.org/files/2010/06/Denmark.pdf)
addition, the analyses pointed towards a remarkable contrast between political parties and media compared to SMOs: most respondents from political parties and the media tend to articulate arguments and concerns close to the pragmatic nationalist model, whereas many respondents from the selected social movement organizations articulate concerns that are more participatory transnational – in practice if not in rhetoric. This result is remarkable, although it may partly reflect a methodological bias in the selection process that included SMOs, which participate in trans-national European networks, for example EWL and ENAR.

4 Conclusions: In/exclusion of Gender and Diversity in the European Public Sphere

The empirical results allow for some conclusions with regard to the ex/inclusion of gender and diversity in the European Public Spheres (EPS). Concerning women’s ex/inclusion our results confirm that women political actors are not excluded from the EPS but neither are they included on equal footing with men. This general picture needs to be qualified in several ways. Firstly, although there still seems to be a male domination across the arenas, the EUROSPHERE data indicate that there may be developments in the gender distribution among the political elites within the EU: women political actors do form a relatively large minority of the major opinion makers in our sample both within the PS and EPS understood in the broadest sense, including SMOs, political parties, media and think tanks.

Secondly, the analysis has identified gender differences between respondents of these political elites on selected issues, and we noticed that gender/gender issues were one of the factors influencing the attitudes of women SMOs. It was also emphasised that other factors are often more important than gender explaining respondents’ attitudes towards key issues pertaining diversity and the European public sphere: Gender intersects with organizational affiliation, national contexts and political families. A future research area would be to compare whether there are significant differences between the attitudes of women in the political elite with the attitudes of ordinary women citizens.

Regarding the EPS we did find transnational debates on gender and diversity issues, but paradoxically they are mainly driven by civil society actors, i.e. by different SMOs/NGOs. These debates form discourses which evolve around common themes, which are often but not always contested. If the public sphere is understood as a space of contestation, collaboration and negotiation, all these findings point towards the possible
emergence of European Public Spheres dealing with issues of importance for the political present and future (see Brüll, Mokre & Siim 2011).

However, this positive evaluation raises many new questions. As the European public spheres we found are still relatively small and specific, their impact on citizenry at large as well as on the political system remains limited. The findings, which are supported by the Eurosphere reports, illustrate that for most political parties as well as media representatives, gender and diversity issues played a much less prominent role than for SMOs/NGOs. The reports further illustrate that the issues were not dealt with by think-tank-representatives, which arguably play an important role for policy making in many countries. And it was virtually invisible in the media content analysis. On this basis it seems probable that the average citizens will only get in touch with different debates and positions on gender and diversity, if s/he is already interested in the issue.

One interesting area for future research is interactions of women in the political elites and ordinary women citizens on the European level. For example to what extent women organized in SMOs and in general within the political elites can serve as the link between the citizenry at large and the European political institutions. Another question would be whether this form of an EPS can serve as a linkage between citizens and political institutions or will remain confined to a relatively small, although transnational, group of interested people and organizations.

This is a crucial question for evaluating whether the public sphere is able to fulfil its classical functions - namely inclusiveness and accountability. When public spheres do not provide links between citizens and the political institutions, issues of accountability and legitimacy are challenged. Inclusiveness means the possibility for everyone concerned to take part in the public sphere. In a representative democracy, this participation often takes place in an indirect way, namely via representative organizations. The political parties play a key role in the democratization of the Public Sphere both on the national and trans-national level. It is therefore a problem that ethnicity and gender seem to play a minor role for the political parties, which are main representative organizations of contemporary democracies.

In sum, we have found promising democratic elements within an emergent EPS from the perspective of gender and diversity in terms of both participation and discourse: The presence of women as opinion makers, the interactions of women’s SMOs and minorities’ organizations and the articulation of discourses on the intersections between ethnicity and gender can be interpreted as a sign of the emergence of broader European public spheres.
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