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Argument for the topic of the essay

Why write an essay, trying to analyse the relation regional integration - culture? Regional integration is increasingly popular, also outside Europe (eg. the African Union, the processes in South East Asia), understanding it is per se important. Culture itself, as an element in social science analysis, was ‘in’ in the 1940 and 1950s and ‘out’ until the beginning of the 1990s. And within the study of regional integration, it has remained out'. Thus this essay aims at looking at a rather unnoticed relation namely that of cultural familiarity as a possible condition for successful regional integration. This inclusion of culture as variable should be seen as a first step towards building a ‘general’ theory of regional integration.

This essay, which is the first of two, begins by shortly defining the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘regional integration’, to establish a preliminary frae of reference. It is followed by an overview of (some) approaches to the integration process with a special emphasise on their in- or exclusion of ‘culture’. In the following essay, the theoretical frame established here will be operationalised in the form of four case-studies.

A Few Core Concepts

Culture

After decades in the darkness, culture has been en vogue within the social sciences since the beginning of the 1990s. Perhaps that is no coincidence. During the Cold War the World was divided in a few blocks and interest spheres, which did not leave much room for variation within the individual blocks. After the Soviet Unions falling apart, and the US standing as the only hegemon of benevolent and democratic nature, culture diversity has had better changes than before; for better or worse.

But what is culture and does it actually matter? To start out Geert Hofstade makes a very simple but useful distinction concerning culture, when dividing it in ‘Culture one’ and ‘Culture two’ (cf. Gullestrup 2003/31). ‘Culture one’ is culture in the classical meaning of the word, that is education, refinement, art etc. ‘Culture two’ includes the activities in ‘Culture two’ but is broader – very broad -, including every days work and routines like to great, to eat, to love etc. Culture in this essay is concerned mainly with ‘Culture two’, but that needs further elaboration. Hans Gullestrup has made an elaborate definition of culture with the aim of analysing and understanding cultures, across cultures (2003/55, my translation):

1 Zetterholm (ed), 1994, is a rare exception, but the anthology is unfortunately rather heterogenous.
“Culture is the worldview and the values, rules, moral norms and actual conduct – as well as the material and immaterial products and symbols related thereto - as human beings (in a given context and over a given time span) take over from the previous ‘generation’; which they – eventually in a changed form) try to pass over to the next ‘generation’ and which in one or the other form differentiates them from human beings belonging to another culture”

Another definition, less elaborated, comes from Samuel Huntington, who begins by warning us, in his 2000 (p. xv) book, that ‘[…] if culture includes everything, it explains nothing”, before he goes on defining culture in subjective terms as (2000/ xv): “[…] the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society”, a definition Landes (2000/2) and Porter (2000/15) also use. Brian M. Fagan writes: ”A culture is a complex system, a set of interacting variables – tools, burial customs, ways of getting food, religious beliefs, social organisation, and so on – that function to maintain a community in a state of equilibrium with its environment” (cited in Gullestrup 2003/45). Fagan’s definition trespasses that of Gullestrup and Huntington in so fare as it insist on the normative function of keeping a culture in equilibrium with its environment. I would consider that a highly questionable claim; the relativistic note it has got allows for the existence of both KZ- and Gulag-camps without questioning such ‘phenomena’.

Returning to Gullestrup and Huntington, they both include two levels in their analysis of cultures, Huntington already in the definition, Gullestrup in his elaborated frame of analysis. Both agree, that there is an ‘upper’ more or less visible or manifest layer, as well as a ‘deeper’, core culture.

Gullestrup and Huntington has different aims with their respective works; Huntington’s book is (1997/13): “[…] meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War. It aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers”. Thus his aim is very specific, conducted at the macro level, and very practical oriented, one may say, very Anglo-Saxon. Gullestrup’s ambition is different. His aim is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the cultural likenesses and differences of human beings, and that may make it easier to work in intercultural relations (2003/14). For this purpose Gullestrup builds a theoretical approach to analyse cultures. Thus his aim is of a general, theoretical nature, one may say, belonging to a continental scientific tradition. Due to this, I have chosen Gullestrups approach as theoretical basis for this essay – the model it self will be presented later.

But first one question has to be answered, does culture matter? Looking back at the place of culture in social sciences, the answer in the 70s and 80s would have been negative. But as already mentioned has culture as important variable had its comeback since the 1990s2. In his contribution to an anthology on economic development and democracy (Huntington and Harrison 2000) David Lands answers the question affirmative (p. 2): “If we can learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost al the difference” but also “On the other hand, culture does not stand alone.”. And Ronald Inglehart forcefully argues the same case (2000/80): “Distinctive cultural zones exist and they have major social and political consequences, helping shape important phenomena from fertility rates to economic and […] democratic institutions”. And Huntington argued in 1997: “In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economical. They are cultural. […]

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People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest level, civilizations.3

Thus there seem to be an argument for looking at the relation culture–regional integration (in the following RI or integration), especially as it—to my knowledge—is fairly underrated. Thus the next step is to define “integration”.

**Regional Integration**

‘Regional integration’ includes two concepts ‘regional’ and ‘integration’; we will look at them both, with an emphasise on the latter.

First of all the question arises, does one think of a sub-national region like a Danish or British county or does one think of supra-national regions, something larger that a state? In this context we look at supra-national regions. The concept ‘supranational-region’ is ambivalent, and hard to operationalize as one sees it, in Buzan 1991(chapter 5). Michael Haas’ basic definition is: “any subset of the international system” (1970), but this is much too broad. As outset I use Thompson’s classical definition from 1973 as it, to my mind includes the essence of the concept ‘region’ as well as being operational: “[the] necessary and sufficient conditions for a regional subsystem [I consider a region = a regional subsystem] includes: regularity and intensity of interactions so that a change in one part affects other parts; general proximity of actors; internal and external recognition of the subsystem as distinctive; and provisions of at least two, and probably more, actors in the subsystem”. I will leave it at this, for the time being.

The choice of definition ‘integration’ stands between a broad and a narrow definition. A broad definition would be to understand integration as the process leading to the establishment as well as the working of regimes4, which eventually may turn into states. It would be ‘overstretching’ the regime definition if one claimed that a state was a regime (and vice-versa). But a regime may be the beginning of a state formation. Krasner’s famous definition of regimes is very usable:

“[…] Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations”

This definition, and the addition of regimes at starting points of states, neither excludes the ambitious goal of establishing a federation, nor the less ambitious goal of a free trade area. Thus it is acknowledged that integration may have economic as well as political aspects.

Karl W. Deutsch’s understanding of integration is comparably narrow. He defines it as consisting of four elements (1968/192): “[…] 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity” is narrow, excluding processes aiming at less than close cooperation or state-building.

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3 Richard Shweder is very critical towards the emphasise on cultures importance (2000)
4 The term ‘regime’ may sound a bit outdated after Keohane has down-graded it to a sub-category of international institutions. But I find Stephan Krasners definition usefull, as it is broad and avoids the connotations often linked to the term “institutions” as being the same as an organisation. For a discussion of regime-theory, see Dosenrode 1992 pp 31-49.
Both of these definitions contain a more or less explicitly stated cultural element, compared to most other definitions as e.g. William Wallace’s “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units” (1999 / 9). Walter Mattli defines integration as [...] the process of internalising externalities that cross borders within a group of countries” (1999 / 190). This definition assumes that integration begins, when important groups, primarily economical, face problems in the cross-border transfer of e.g. goods and services. Thus it implicitly sees integration as an economic process, although not ruling out political courses completely. The definition allows for regional regimes of both economic (e.g. EFTA, ECSC) and political character (e.g. WEU, Council of Europe).

As the aim of this essay is to analyse the role of culture in integration processes, I will opt for Deutsch’s definition, focussing explicitly at ambitious integration projects aiming at close cooperation or even state-formation.

**Preconditions for integration, and the role of culture in integration theories**

Integration does not ‘just start’ spontaneously, most scholars agree about that, but there are divergences about the preconditions for regional integration. In this section three (or four?) approaches to integration will be analysed.

**Federalism**

If we begin with the federal-realist approach, a federation (which is the result of an integration process) has to be founded, two conditions must be met (Riker 1964 / 12 f):

"1. A desire on the part of the politicians who offer the bargain in order to expand their territorial control by peaceful means, either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for diplomatic aggrandizement. [...]"

2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so, because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. [...] And furthermore the desire for either protection or participation outweighs any desire they may have for independence. [...]."

Later did Riker accept the comment of A. H. Birch, who insisted, that the perceived threat also could be caused by factors inside the state (Riker 1975 / 114). In the same vain, one may add, that there is nothing in Riker's model suggesting, that one cannot expand the threat to a broader field than the military and diplomatic fields. The main concern must be that the threat is serious. In such a case the threat could also be of economic, social or political nature (McKay 1999 / 29 & 32). The important point in the political consideration is that the statesman believes that the threat he perceives can be countered by joining or founding a federation. And also implies that a unitary state may be turned into a federation, to save it from total disintegration, as was the case of Belgium and several former British colonies. Federalisation has been a devise to handle cultural diversity threatening, ‘unity in diversity’. But the cases, federations, analysed by Riker all had a common

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5 This section mainly focuses on the integration theories / approaches which see a state formation of some kind as the end of the integration process, thus e.g. functionalism and intergovernmentalism is not included.
core culture what may explain that he did not look at culture explicitly (and that is the same case for McKay only looking at the EU).

K. C. Wheare (1963) is a representative of the federal-liberal tradition, and he lists a number of conditions for integration (1963/35 pp):

1) "To begin with, the communities or states concerned must desire to be under a single independent government for some purpose at any rate" […]
2) "They must desire at the same time to retain or to establish independent regional governments in some matters at least." […] "They must desire to be united, but not to be unitary" […]
3) "Federal government is not appropriate unless the communities concerned have the capacity as well as the desire to form an independent general government and to form independent regional governments"

Wheare then lists a number of preconditions to answer the question what leads states to desire integration, that is federation, and at the same time want to keep a certain independence including regional governments (1963/37):

"Communities [nation states / SD] have been led to desire union from a variety of reasons. But in the modern federation some factors seem always to have been present
- A sense of military insecurity and the consequent need for common defence.
- a desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realization that only through union could independence be secured.
- a hope of economic advantage from union.
- some political association of the community concerned prior to their federal union either in a loose confederation […] or as parts of the same Empire, […]
- geographical neighbourhood,
- and similarity of political institutions."

Concerning culture Wheare is ‘woolly’; on the one hand, he states, that (1963/38): "It is interesting to notice that some factors are unexpectedly absent. Thus community of language, of race, of religion, of nationality have not been listed as likely essential prerequisites of the desire for union", and (p. 39). "It is clear that, strong as these forces of language, race, religion and nationality are in producing a desire for union […] it has proven possible none the less to produce a desire for union among peoples who differ in all these important particulars". On the other hand he later mentions divergence of nationality, differences of language, race and religion (1963/ 41) as factors running contrary to integration, and in the above list of preconditions he lists ‘similarity of political institutions’.

Thus the federal traditions seem to share an agreement on the quest for security and independence, in a broad sense as important conditions for integration, whereas the cultural variable may play some kind of undefined but not essential role. The reason could be conceptual, a lack of definition of ‘culture’, as especially Wheare includes elements of ‘our’ definition.

**Neo-Functionalism**

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6 The reason for this mistake could be that Whearer considers the protestant and catholic denominations as ‘different’ religions, whereas they in fact share the same core culture (cf. Dosenrode 1998).
If any, the neo-functionalist approach has been synonymous with the European integration process. This close link has been its strength in the formative years of the EC, and its weakness since the mid-1960s. The founding father of the approach was Ernst Haas, who wrote his seminal work ‘The Uniting of Europe’ from 1958, and who continued to publish important contributions the next decade and a half. Other important contributions came from Leon Lindberg (1963), and Philippe Schmitter (1969, 1971). Haas’ starting-point was a criticism of David Mittrany’s functionalism from the 1940s. He combined functionalism with inspiration from Jean Monnet’s pragmatic approach to European integration. Contrary to the functionalists, Haas and his followers looked at regional integration, not universal, and they understood the integration process as political, not merely functional or technocratic.

Haas’ original background conditions for regional integration were that the entities should possess pluralistic social structures, be substantially economic & industrial developed, and there should be a common ideological patterns among participating units. In other words Haas’ approach was limited to explaining integration in pluralistic democracies. But one has to remember, that integration has taken place, on a voluntary basis, among others in the North German Tax-Union and the United Dutch Provinces.

In his cooperation with Philippe Schmitter, Haas tried to loosen the close binding to the European integration-project and give neo-functionalism a general applicability (1964). Their result was a model with background conditions (size of unit, rate of transactions, degree of pluralism, elite complementarity); conditions at the time of economic union (governmental purpose, powers and functions of the new institutions), and the process conditions (style of decision making, growth rate of transactions, actors adaptability).

A central concept was ‘spill-over’, the nearly deterministic claim, that agreement on integration in one economic area would over time course other economic policy-areas to integrate, too, in order to secure the full benefit of the integration in the first policy-area. Over time, the integration would turn political. But, according to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991/5) Haas, recognised, that a political kick in the right direction might be necessary, and that a high authority, looking after the integration projects common interest – not the individual member states – would be needed. The motives, the driving forces would be the pursuit of the politicians’ interests.

The transfer of loyalty towards the new ‘unit’ was another key-question.

French president de Gaulle’s partly successful attempt to ‘renationalise’ the EC, put a stop to the hypothesis of automatic spill-over, and neo-functionalism was criticised severely. But the criticisms lead to refinement of the approach (e.g. Joseph Nye1971).

Schmitter sums Haas’ approach up in the following way (2005/257):

“He [Haas / SD] hypothesized that, with the help of an active and resourceful secretariat and support from the organized interests affected by such externalities, national governments might (fitfully) learn and (reluctantly) agree to change their original positions. According to this approach, integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressure and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and developing more authority to the regional organizations they have created.
Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will ‘spill-over’ into political integration”

The spill-over could happen if certain changes occurred (again Schmitter: 2005/258):
- increased interdependence between member-states
- a crisis of a certain size
- development of a powerful regional bureaucracy
- development of independent, regional interest organisations capable of acting in the region

Apart from Schmitter’s earlier works, is his article from 2005, very fruitful. In this article he reviews neo-functionalism as well as some of its critics. His main argument for neo-functionalism is, that it was given up, too soon, and that it offers good explanations to the European integration-process during the 1980s and 1990s. But he also recognises shortcomings and emphasises which were put wrong (2005/ 261-62).

Haas and Schmitter did mainly worked with European integration and the EC / EU has for some decades had a very high degree of integration, where as e.g. EFTA did not posses that. Schmitter interpretation of neo-functionalisms most distinctive maxims is paradigmatic, and he is a central contributor from the ‘4th generation’ (2005 / 258 – 260):

1. “States are not exclusive and may no longer be the predominant actors in the regional/international system”
2. “Interests, rather than common ideals or identity, are the driving force behind the integration process,” [but actors may learn and develop common ideals and identities]
3. “Decisions about integration are normally taken with very imperfect knowledge of their consequences and frequently under the pressure of deadlines or impending crisis”
4. “Functions or issue areas provide the usual foci for the integration process (at least in Western Europe), beginning with those that are initially considered the least controversial and, hence, easiest to deal with.”
5. “Since actors in the integration process cannot be confined to existing national states or their interest groups and social movements […], a theory of it should explicitly include a role for supranational persons, secretariats, and associations whose careers, resources and expectations become increasingly dependent upon the further expansion of integrative tasks”.
6. “[Actors] Strategies with regard to integration are convergent, not identical”
7. “Outcomes of international integration are neither fixed in advance by the founding treaty, nor are they likely to be expressed exclusively through subsequent formal agreements”

Schmitter analyses the strengths and weaknesses of neo-functionalism, and lists 6 points (2005/266-67):

- “There were, indeed, underlying interdependencies that may have taken some time to mature, but they did serve to compel actors into reaching agreements that were not initially intended. […] It is less clear, however, that the roles assigned to Eurocrats in the EC/EU

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7 This list is a resume of Schmitter’s list leaving out details. Schmitter himself draws on Haas 1964 and 1958.
secretariat and to the Euro-associations headquarters in Brussels in this process were so significant in this process of task expansion”

- The growth in EC / EU activities meet has raised the frequency of meetings between the national representatives as well as between the national representatives and the EU civil servants. “This seems to have induced important learning effects […] and even to have resulted in shifts in conceptions of national interests which may have been more important than the upward shift to regional interest politics predicted by neofunctionalists.”
- “[…], the policy expansion […] has made it not only easier but even imperative to reach complex ‘log-rolls’ and ‘package-deals’ sufficient to extend further Community compétences and to buy out even the most recalcitrant of opponents. The process may even have crossed ‘the threshold of irreversibility’ […]”
- “[…] much of what has happened since the mid-1970s can better be attributed to external trends and shocks than to purely internal processes and functional engrenage.” [The capacity of the European nation states, to control external economic trends fell], but it is doubtful that this would have had such an impact [on the integration process] were it not for the generalized perception that Europe as a whole was declining relatively to other competing regions of the world.”
- “In their singular concentration interdependencies rooted in production and exchange and, hence, the roles played by representatives of classes and sectors, the neofunctionalists tended to overlook very significant extensions of scope and, especially, the level of Community authority that were going on right under their noses – namely, as a result of the deliberations and decisions of the European Court of Justice.”
- “Finally, neofunctionalists failed to recognize (or, at least, to ‘problematize’) the significance of the enlargement of the EEC / EC to include new members”

In other words, Schmitter recognises the importance of the national politicians as well as the environment, thus accommodation to frequent raise criticism. But is culture a variable here? Could it be that Schmitter, like Haas, implicitly only looks at integration in ‘cultural homogenous regions”? Neither Haas nor Schmitter uses the concept explicitly, but cultural elements occure e.g. in Haas original model as background variables (pluralist social structures, common ideological patterns). Elements which are included in the Haas-Schmitter model. On the other hand, Schmitter considers ‘common ideals and identity’ as the result of integration, not a course for it.

**Transactionalism**

Karl W. Deutsch’s (1912 – 1992) name is close of synonymous with ‘transactionalism’ as approach to integration as he was the leader of its main contribution ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area’ from 1957.

As already mentioned does he isolate four main tasks of integration (1968/192): “[…] 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity”.

These tasks are then, in the best behaviouristic tradition spelled out (cf. Deutsch 1968/192). Peace is – quantitatively – measured by the absence of war as well as the lack of preparation of such.

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8 Could be right, but the European Roundtable of Industrials as well as Jacques Delors were important actors when launching the ESA. The later developments may be more doubtful.
Multipurpose capabilities is indicated by the total GNP, its per capita GNP and the variety of undertakings. Specific tasks can be found by identifying common institutions, functions, resources etc., and a common role identity ill be indicated by the use of common symbols, the creation of new ones, by the support and behaviour of elite and mass (1968/192): “including popular acceptance of unrequited transfers of wealth or other benefits within the community, and of some degree of sharing benefits and burdens within it”

Then Deutsch goes on listing the background conditions for a successful integration process (1968 / 1992 p.): “The conditions of integration can again be stated under four headings: (1) mutual relevance of the units to one another; (2) compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards; (3) mutual responsiveness; and (4) some degree of generalized common identity or loyalty.”

Whereas conditions 1 to 3 are fairly clear and *grosso modo* in accordance with e.g. the federalist and neo-functionalist approaches number 4 deserves a few words. According to Deutsch a common generalized loyalty can be measured by (1968/193):

“[… ] the frequency and saliency of perceptions of joint interests, both in terms of distributions of attention and of parallel expectations of reward, as shown by survey data and by the content analysis of mass media and government communications. Another indication would be the objective compatibility or consonance of the major values of the participating populations, permitting cooperation among them to be perceived as legitimate. This could be supplemented by indications of common subjective feelings of the legitimacy of the integrated community, making loyalty to it also a matter of internalized psychic compulsion.”

Deutsch attaches importance to factors which belong to cultural aspects, according to my previous (short) conceptualisation. This becomes evident, when he goes on to define ‘identification’ as the (1968/193): “[… ] the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties, and “we”-feelings.” The cultural variable’s importance becomes even clearer, when Deutsch discusses the ‘Essential background conditions’ for an amalgamated security community.

In their 1957 book, Deutsch et al. analyses ‘security communities’ to see how zones of peace may develop. Their empirical material builds on about 36 historic case studies. They understand integration and ‘amalgamation’ as different but partly overlapping. They defined integration as (1957/5): “[… ] the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population”. And (1957/6) “By amalgamation we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal.” Using these two concepts as axis Deutsch et al. constructs a matrix:

(Figur s. 7)

The one interesting in our case is the amalgamated security community (ASC), as it is the most ambitious project, which may take on state form as a result of integration; whereas the ‘pluralist security community’ at the most is comparable to a confederation. On the basis of their casestudies Deutsch et al. identifies five ‘essential requirements’ for the establishment of ASCs (1957/46-69):
“1. *Values and Expectations.* […] in regard to values, we found in all our cases a compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units. Sometimes this was supplemented by a tacit agreement to deprive of political significance any incompatible values that might remain. […] Values were most effective politically when they were not held merely in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values to be acted on in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachment to them. This connection […] we call a “way of life”, and it turned out to be crucial”. […] In regard to expectations, we found that in all our cases amalgamation was preceded by widespread expectations of joint rewards for the participating units, through strong economic ties or gains envisaged for the future” […]

2. *Capabilities and Communication Processes.* […] The most important of these conditions was an increase in the political and administrative capabilities of the main political units to be amalgamated. […] Another essential condition for amalgamation, closely related to the increase in capabilities, is the presence of markedly superior economic growth, […] Another essential requirement for successful amalgamation was the presence of unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned, and between the politically relevant strata within them. […]

3. *Mobility of persons.* Another condition present in all our cases of successful amalgamation was the mobility of persons among the main units, at least in the politically relevant strata. […]

4. *Multiplicity and Balance of Transactions.* […] it appeared that successfully amalgamated security-communities require a fairly wide range of different common functions and services, together with different institutions and organizations to carry them out. […]

5. *Mutual Predictability of Behaviour.* A final condition that may be essential for the success of amalgamation may be some minimum amount of mutual predictability of behaviour. […] we found in a number of our cases that mutual predictability of behaviour was eventually established upon a firm basis. This firm basis was the acquisition of a certain amount of common culture or of common group character or “national character”.

Not surprisingly Deutsch et al also identified a number of factors which would either prevent or slowdown the integration respective amalgamation process, or break up an ASC (1957/59-65):

1) Extensive military burdens have had an disintegrating effect.
2) The participation of large amounts of citizens, which had not previously participated in politics, has strained the political system, especially if their participation has increased ethnic or linguistic differentiation.
3) Economic decline, over a longer period, has tended to weaken the capability of the government and the political elite.
4) The political elites would have to be open to new members, and to be able to adjust to new circumstances, otherwise a counter-elite would be formed eventually with disintegration as the result.
5) Unfulfilled expectations in social, economic, or political reforms could also lead to disintegration.

To Deutsch (1968/198-99) the integration process begins when three situations occur and old habits are broken:
1) Expectations of a new, common and better life must be present; expectations which create some kind of, latent, feeling of unity.

2) The feeling of unity will be created by an external challenge which demands a united response

3) A new generation of politicians has to arrive on the political scene, as younger people are less bound by past experiences and habits.

Deutsch et al. wrote in a time, where, according to Huntington (2000/ xiii) culture was accepted in political science as a “crucial element in understanding societies, analyzing differences among them, and explaining their economic and political development”. Thus Deutsch’s emphasise on institutions and culture is in no way ‘suspect’, it lays in the then present tradition. But this element has been played down in most, if not all the following classical works on integration. Relating Deutsch et al’s work with the short discussion of ‘culture’ above is one of the aims of this essay. What makes Deutsch et al’s contribution so valuable is its broad empirical basis, but that it also its weakness, as some of the cases is very old and hardly helps us today (e.g. the uniting of Wales and England and the gathering of the Habsburg Empire with violence). Also the emphasise on the breaking of habits especially the expectation of a new and better life, united, is questionable – and as Deutsch generalizes the statement somewhat in the 1968 book compared to his 1957 book, he may have been aware of this. Only in an abstract way did the population of the 13 American colonies find a new “distinct way of life” (1957/85) from the beginning. But they did break political habits in so fare as they seized self-determination, taking responsibility of their own lives. In this sense it is reasonable. To Deutsch culture played an important role.

Summing up

Culture is, as described above, diffuse and hard to come to grips with. We also know that ‘culture’ was an acceptable variable to include in ones analysis at the time Haas, Riker, Whearer and Deutsch wrote their contributions to integration-theory yet only Deutsch specifically treated the issue, and Wheare was unclear about it, but did admit its importance. Riker and Haas did not mention it at all, although especially Haas (and to a lesser degree Schmitter) included cultural elements in their work. One reason that Riker and Haas did not mention ‘culture’ as an important variable, could be that their cases (Rikers federations and Haas’ ECSC) were basically culturally homogenous, and thus this variable was not important. Whatever the reason was, today realists like Samuel Huntington considers culture an important variable, as does the ‘liberals’. Thus the working hypothesis of this essay will be the claim, that cultural homogeneity as an important precondition for supranational integration⁹. The next step, in a planed paper, is to look at the role of culture in four concrete cases.

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⁹ It would blow the frame of this essay, but a comparison of the above approaches to integration begs for several other aspects to be analysed empirically: the importance of crisis, of a secretariat general, of economic gains, of interdependence / globalisation …
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