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“The need and ability for expansion”: Conceptions of living space in the small-state geopolitics of Gudmund Hatt

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A B S T R A C T

Although they are often subjected to critical scrutiny, formal geopolitical practices have rarely been put on trial. One exception is the case of Gudmund Hatt (1884–1960), professor of human geography at Copenhagen University from 1929 to 1947, who was found guilty of “dishonorable national conduct” for his geopolitics during the German occupation. As a contribution to the critical history of geopolitical traditions, this article investigates Hatt as an example of a small-state geopolitician. Particular attention is given to his view of geopolitics as a practice and as an essentially material struggle for Livsrum (living space), and what this made him infer for the great powers and for small-state Denmark. Hatt’s geopolitical ideas had many parallels to those of his great-power contemporaries, but in important respects, his analyses also differed from traditional geopolitics. It is argued that, to a significant degree, this difference is related to the fact that Hatt narrated geographies of world politics from a small and exposed state with few territorial ambitions. This made him emphasize economic relations, efficiency rather than territorial size, and the geopolitical role of the Danish Folk (i.e., the nation). Hatt’s position as a peripheral observer to the geopolitical mainstream may also explain his understanding of geopolitics and living-space politics as practices pursued by all great powers.

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Introduction

In the evening of May 4th, 1945, the Danish streets erupted in jubilation following the announcement that the German occupation forces had surrendered. For Gudmund Hatt, professor of human geography at Copenhagen University, however, Liberation Day was far from jubilant. Rather, in his own words, he experienced “the worst hell.” On that day, the once respected professor was arrested by the resistance movement in the city of Vordingborg. In a letter written shortly after his arrest, he described how he and other suspected quislings were paraded “through a yelling and screaming and spitting mob of thousands” (Hatt to Bentzon, 15 May 1945, family papers, box 6). He was released after nine days, but was not relieved of the accusations that had caused his arrest, which were based on his extensive wartime activities as a geopolitical commentator. Hatt was neither a card-carrying Nazi nor a fellow traveler, nor was he attracted to political extremism in any other sense. Yet his geopolitical commentaries during the first years of his occupation were undeniably “pro-German,” and some of his statements came precariously close to signaling an affiliation with the Nazi ideology. For this reason, in the post-war purges, he was found guilty of “dishonorable national conduct” by a retroactive court for public servants. This cost him the chair at Copenhagen University and made Hatt “the most controversial professor Danish geography has fostered” (Buciek, 1999: 75).

The past two decades have witnessed the fruitful development of critical analyses of geopolitical reasoning, which, under the influential formulation of Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 192), approach geopolitics as “the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states.” Geopolitical reasoning is not confined to powerful states, however, and Hatt’s geopolitics is an intriguing example of this. His work revolved around many of the same themes found in other pre-war geopolitics, and behind a factual façade, it was as national as that of other traditional geopoliticians. Yet his geopolitics was conceived from the position of a small and geopolitically exposed state, and this had consequences for his analyses and for his eventual fate.

Born in humble but intellectually-charged circumstances as the oldest son of a village schoolteacher in West Jutland, the precociously gifted (Aage) Gudmund Hatt initially set his sights on ethnography, a field that caught his attention during a 1906 visit to the Cherokees in Oklahoma. This experience prompted him to study under Roland B. Dixon at Harvard in 1906–1907, working his way as a laboratory assistant. He may have considered emigrating,
but he returned to Denmark where geography and natural history were the entry to ethnography. It was in these fields that he received his graduate degree from Copenhagen University in 1911. Three years later, in 1914, he successfully defended his doctoral thesis. Following a research visit to North America, where he, among other things, studied with Franz Boas at Columbia, he was employed at the National Museum in Copenhagen. It was there that he developed a life-long passion for archeology. In addition to his work at the museum, in 1923, he was appointed associate professor of geography at Copenhagen University. During this period, he co-authored *Jorden og Menneskelivet* (The Earth and Human Life) with Martin Vahl, professor of physical geography at Copenhagen University. This four-volume study of world-spanning regional geography made Hatt’s name in Nordic geography, and it was at least partially due to this work that he left the National Museum in 1929 to become professor of human geography at Copenhagen University (Larsen, 2009a).

Hatt never left ethnography and archeology; indeed, these fields were his intellectual cushions when he was purged from geography for his geopolitics. He was thus a leading (if now archaic) figure in the development of Danish ethnography (Harris, 1986) and became an archaeological pioneer (Hansen, 1995). In this article, however, I investigate his career as a geopolicitian. In doing so, I contribute an element to the history of geopolitical traditions (e.g., Dodds & Atkinson, 2000; Kearns, 2009; Smith, 2003), knowledge that, for the simple fact of language, remains unknown to many. As Sidaway (2008: 44–45) points out, “work in and from other linguistic contexts remains marginalised in a revitalised Anglophone political geography.” Considering the very limited number of professional geographers at the time, to investigate the work of Hatt is also to narrate a history of geopolitics in Danish university geography before 1945. This was not lost on the self-confident professor. According to the post-war investigations, he was asked to contribute a paper on Danish geopoliticians to *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. He did not reply to this request, but if he had, Hatt would have answered that he “was the only Danish geopolicitian” (report, 6 Nov. 1945, T.225). Additionally, with a focus on Hatt’s view of geopolitical practices and of what he eventually described as *Livsrum* (livingspace), I also intend to explore an example of what could be termed “small-state geopolitics” – a situated perspective on both the small-state “self” and on the wider world. In this respect, my ambition is to contribute a historical case study to the existing literature. Tunander (2005) draws parallels between the work of Kjellén and post-war Swedish politics, for example, and Kearns (2009) investigates current reverberations of Mackinder’s geopolitics. In this paper, I will discuss the writings of the lesser-known Hatt and only allude to subsequent theoretical and practical developments.

### What is geopolitics?

In the autumn of 1939, a strongly pro-Soviet magazine published an interview with Hatt. In the somewhat lengthy introduction, the author complained that Hatt’s entry on the Soviet Union in *Jorden og Menneskelivet* was “idealistic history writing” in the sense that he viewed Western individualistic ideology as foundational and did not acknowledge the dominance of economic forces (Gregersen, 1939). Hatt, who later voiced strong warnings against Soviet expansionism, was certainly not molded according to Soviet specifications. Yet his geopolitics was if anything firmly materialistic, a sort of proto-political economy geopolitics, and this translated into an equally resolute small-state Realpolitik.

Unlike his geopolitical predecessors Ratzel and Kjellén, Hatt did not aim to establish an explicit system of law-like generalizations, and he generally avoided scholarly debates on the nature of geopolitics. In part, this was related to the audience he sought to reach. Most of Hatt’s geopolitical analyses were published in accessible books, pamphlets and articles for newspapers and popular journals, and, more often than not, these publications were based on the many lectures he was commissioned to give on the Danish State Radio (for a bibliography, see Larsen, 2009b). Thus, in a sense, Hatt shared Kjellén’s (1916: 35) ambition of “stirring public opinion … for more immediate service also to practical politics.” Considering that there was only one Danish radio channel and that his popular articles were published in leading national newspapers, his impact as a public intellectual was substantial. In the terminology of Ó Tuathail (1996), Hatt came to embody the tension between “formal,” “popular” and, as we will see, “practical” geopolitics. Hatt’s general avoidance of formal theorizing may also relate to his empirical view of geography; characteristically, Vahl and Hatt (1922: 1) wrote that “the actual description of geographical facts is the bedrock on which the geographical science builds.” Somewhat in this vein, in his lectures on political geography, Hatt noted that the German *Geopolitik* could be seen as “a sort of applied science” (lecture notes, private papers, box 23). When asked if geopolitics more generally could be considered a science, he told the post-war court that he viewed geopolitics as science applied to contemporary problems (court records, 8 April 1947, T.225).

Hatt may have harbored some of the anti-theoretical sentiments that have always thrived in parts of geography. Yet, in an essay first published in March of 1940, he offered an explicit discussion of geopolitics as a subject and practice. Tellingly titled “Hvad er Geopolitik?” (What is Geopolitics?), the essay formed the backbone of Hatt’s statement to the post-war court. Initially, Hatt did not stray from the path of figures like Ratzel and Kjellén, in that he found geopolitics to be about:

the origin, growth and decline of states, and seeks to account for the causes of these events and to elucidate the forces and conflicting interests on which the fate of contemporary [nuulevende, ‘now-living’] states depend (Hatt, 1940: 177).

This demonstrates that Hatt’s geopolitics included a clear element of state-centrism. Indeed, in his lectures on political geography, which appear to have been given during the 1930s and early 1940s, he identified political geography as an engagement with states that went beyond using state territories as a convenient ordering framework for regional analyses. Ratzel was a key figure in this respect: “Ratzel founded political geography as a science… Before Ratzel, scientific geography had won almost all its victories in the natural-scientific field” (lecture notes, private papers, box 23). With clear lineages to Ratzel and Kjellén, Hatt’s conception of geopolitics also involved a measure of organismism: “It is the union of land and people,” he wrote, “which forms the organic whole we call the state” (Hatt, 1940: 174). Organicism was not typical of his geopolitics, however. In fact, he recognized that the notion of the “organic state” was an analogy that could easily be exaggerated: “In German,” he cautioned, “Ratzel’s successors have written far too much on the state as a ‘space-organism’” (Hatt, 1940: 174). His lectures further criticized Otto Müll’s notion of the state as a “space organism”:

This philosophical abstraction … in Müll’s work opens the door for ominous misinterpretations and fallacies. When the actual being of the state is space, it follows with tragic necessity that ominous misinterpretations and fallacies.

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As we will see, this position also prompted him to advance a qualitative understanding of the state and a partly non-statist notion of small-state Livsrum.

Also in his view of geopolitics as a practice, Hatt was at the outset fairly conventional. Yet his understanding shows some significant insights that may also relate to his position as a small-state observer of the great-power mainstream. It is in this respect unsurprising (and most likely a statement of his commitment to detached and factual analysis) that he wrote:

Geopolitics is a critical analysis and appraisal of political forces on the basis of extensive and in-depth geographical, historical and economic knowledge (Hatt, 1940: 178).

In part, this is probably also the reason why Hatt, in his post-war statement, wrote that he had always sought to dissuade young geographers from trying their hand at geopolitics: “geopolitics is not for beginners, only for researchers who have acquired the necessary insight into the fundamental subjects” (statement, 10 Dec. 1945, T.225). Yet Hatt’s understanding went further than simply fixing geopolitical practices to comprehensive and mature knowledge. For him, the “life” of states was a topic that had not merely captivated “some scientific minds,” rather, “[o]utstanding statesmen have always conducted practical geopolitics” (Hatt, 1940: 178). In other words, he acknowledged that geopolitics could be “formal” as well as “practical” (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). Thus, he stated that:

Geopolitics as a science is particularly pursued in Germany. But in practice, British statesmen have been the world’s most perceptive geopoliticians, long before Ratzel and Kjellén began writing books (Hatt, 1940: 174).

He therefore believed that the British had practiced rather than theorized geopolitics. Moreover, Hatt (1940: 179) pointedly observed that, for instance, Bowman was “an outstanding geopolitician, even if he does not use the term.” Given these statements, it can be argued that Hatt preemptively disrupted the attempts to dissociate geopolitics from the “scientific” (political) geography that was soon underway in North America (Bowman, 1942; Gottmann, 1942). In fact, his use of “geopolitics” seems somewhat faddish. In the 1930s, he described his work as “political geography,” and, after the war, he prudently (if somewhat inconsistently) reverted to that label.

Interestingly, and seemingly in contrast to Haushofer (Bassin, 1987a: 120), Hatt recognized that geopolitics is not reasoned from an objective nowhere but from a subjective somewhere. Yet, although recognizing that geopolitics originates from national standpoints, he found that useful information could still be gleaned from geopolitical treatises. In a review essay on the mounting great-power conflict, for example, he cautioned that “the Anglo-Saxons are parties to the affair” and that it “would be unfair to demand neutrality of them.” (Hatt, 1939a: 428). Still, their accounts were particularly interesting “because the dangers of the Empire have sharpened the observers’ senses, and because the word is still free in the Anglo-Saxon world” (Hatt, 1939a: 428). He similarly found that German geopolitics was “distinctly nationalistic” and “all too often involved in the political struggle.” Yet, because “the German geopoliticians’ propaganda is so obvious and unmistakable that the cautious reader can hardly be misled,” he found that some of their work contained “valuable knowledge and many perceptive investigations of the natural and human forces on which the fate of the state depends” (Hatt, 1940: 177). The important thing was to remember “the personal equation, i.e., the error included because of the individual’s particular position” (quoted in Jerrild, 1939: 173).

Hatt’s strong materialism may partially explain this position; it is as if he saw ideology as a superstructure that could be separated from a material basis. In his lectures, his main criticism of Ratzel and many subsequent political geographers was thus their unsatisfactory attention to economic factors:

The relationship between people and land is primarily expressed in economic life. … [A] thorough insight into economic-geographical circumstances is a necessary foundation for political geography (lecture notes, private papers, box 23).

In this spirit, Hatt’s geopolitical writings were often sketchy on geo-strategy and military matters but detailed on production and trade statistics. This does not imply that “ideology” played no role, but it was decidedly a secondary role. In his post-war statement, he was thus at pains to emphasize that “the political geographer studies impersonal forces.” For him, it was the political geographer’s task “to explain the power-politics of states according to the given geographical conditions.” Accordingly, despite noting that “national-socialism and other authoritarian state-forms have always seemed highly unpleasant to me,” he characteristically stated that “I have always considered that the importance of ideologies can be easily overstated.” Further, in what could be read as parallel to Spykman’s (1938: 236) dictum that “geography does not argue” but “simply is,” Hatt added for good measure that “ideologies pass away, while countries and peoples remain” (statement, 10 Dec. 1945, T.225). This statement was not designed to please the court or post-war sentiments, but was a sincere reflection of his perspective.

The need and ability for expansion

The concept of Livsrum, which Hatt began to use around 1940, was fundamentally a political–economic worldview. Livsrum is related to his conception of “culture,” an essentially materialist concept that he developed in his ethnography (Buciek, 1999; Høiris, 1986). In his geopolitics, the originally Western European “industrial culture” was of central importance:

The industrial culture is expansive; its nature is the exchange of commodities between countries, the processing of domestic and foreign raw materials with an eye on the world market. A people cannot possess a well-developed industrial culture without markets for raw materials and sales; and industrial development can be furthered to a great extent by colonization and emigration, which creates or secures such markets (Hatt, 1926a: 230).

From this, he drew the Ratzelian conclusion that “any vital people possesses the need and ability for expansion” (Hatt, 1928a: 163; cf. Murphy, 1994: 179). However, in linking colonialism to industrialism rather than relations between states, he was arguably closer to the analysis of Hobson than to geopoliticians like Mackinder (cf. Kearns, 2009: 159).

At the outset, however, Hatt’s early geopolitics took the form of “colonial anthropogeography” (Larsen, 2009a: 25–28). The intersections between geography and colonialism are widely recognized (e.g., Godlewksa & Smith, 1994), and the development of Danish geography (and related fields) was closely connected to fieldwork in Greenland, Denmark’s only remaining colony in the interwar years. Unsurprisingly, this connection had political implications. Hatt and other geographers were outspoken proponents of Danish sovereignty over the island (e.g., Hatt, 1940: 227–228; Vahl & Hatt, 1924), and it appears that Hatt assisted the government in the 1933 Hague settlement of the Danish–Norwegian dispute over Northeast Greenland (Munch to Hatt, 21 April 1933, private papers, box 5). In this and other ways, Hatt was a political engaged.

Like others at the time, Hatt reckoned that industrial states would increasingly have to rely on resources from the tropics. This led him to consider the question of the tropics as a destination for
European migration (Hatt, 1928a, 1928b). It is with regard to this topic, we find Hatt’s most blatant lapses into environmental determinism on the then widely debated topic of human acclimatization (Livingstone, 1987). With reference to Europeans’ purported inability to perform physical labor in the tropics, he initially rejected the idea of significant migration to the tropics, and it was similarly on the basis of climates that he construed colonial typologies (e.g., Hatt, 1929a). For example, his distinction between “white man’s countries” and “plantation countries” (Fig. 1) was related to acclimatization. (Probably because many of them were based on radio talks, there are surprisingly few maps in Hatt’s geopolitical writings.) Strands of environmental determinism survived in his work, but his arguments increasingly shifted away from the climate and toward an amalgam of race and class. In 1928, he recognized that “the struggle between white and black” in South Africa had not ended with the European conquest:

By making the natives a working underclass, the Europeans have given the racial struggle a social character and at the same time blocked the way for large-scale European immigration (Hatt, 1928a: 218).

Further, by 1940, it appears that he had reached the conclusion that European migration was blocked by the availability of cheap indigenous labor:

Europeans, even of Nordic race, can live and work and thrive in a hot and humid tropical climate when they are secured good conditions, particularly in the respect that any form of competition with other races’ cheaper labor is blocked (Hatt, 1940: 97; cf. Smith, 2003: 189ff).

In reaching such conclusions, Hatt often resorted to stereotyping and, from a contemporary vantage point, racism. Yet, with the notable exception of Danish colonialism in Greenland (Hatt, 1929a), he had a clear eye for the violent and exploitative nature of colonialism, and he scorned its hypocrisy. Significantly, he also recognized that colonialism was not only related to resources and markets; it equally concerned labor, a system in which a small European “upper class” exploited the labor of an indigenous “underclass.” The “native labor force” was thus “Africa’s greatest asset,” and this involved a “proletarianization of the natives” (Hatt, 1938a: 42, 81). This brought him close to what Kearns (2003: 178) recognizes as the Marxist reading of imperial geopolitics as a system that “offered national capitals cheaper raw materials, new markets and super-exploitable workers.” Yet he did not offer his analysis as a critique; in spite of specific reservations, he accepted colonialism as an unavoidable reality of industrial culture.

In this manner, Hatt shared what Bassin (1987b: 476) in his analysis of Ratzel identifies as “the ubiquitous conviction that the healthy development of an advanced state in the modern world rested fundamentally on the acquisition of colonies.” Yet his notion of Livsrum also departed from Ratzel’s Lebensraum. Ratzel’s worldview was essentially agrarian, and Lebensraum was accordingly related to the acquisition of territory for the agrarian settlement of migrants from what he saw as an overpopulated Germany (Smith, 1980). Hatt also considered Europe as overpopulated, but in the midst of the global depression, he saw this expressed in unemployment that had to be solved through increased industrial production and trade (Hatt, 1928b, 1938b). Thus he argued that European states needed access to overseas resources and markets. Considering that he was based in a country that was still highly dependent on agriculture, albeit in an industrialized and export-oriented form, his worldview was noticeably industrial. This perception, as well as his view of small states like Denmark as fundamentally dependent on the structures of large states, explains why Hatt departed from the Ratzelian emphasis on territorial possession. In the late 1930s, with the prospect of war looming ever

Fig. 1. Pacific Ocean problems. Pink: “White man’s countries”; blue: “Independent East Asia”; lilac: “Plantation countries”; faint pink: “Mestizo countries” (Hatt, 1936). (Map courtesy of The Royal Danish Geographical Society).
larger, he developed this view in his analysis of Europe’s “happy age” and of the period that followed.

The end of Europe’s “happy age”

Like many of his contemporaries, Hatt’s analysis of world politics was founded on what Kearns (1984) aptly terms “closed-space thinking,” which was set against his reading of the nineteenth century as the “happy age” – for Europeans and those of European descent. At that time, colonialist powers could expand overseas; the world was “open” in a territorial sense. But through the liberal politics of Britain, the world was also “open” to other industrial states in an economic sense. “The 19th century was the great age of liberalist politics,” Hatt (1941a: 5) argued, and its “ideals were British.” This made him conclude:

[T]he free-trade idea prevailed in England's economic politics by the mid-19th century, and from this followed a more free colonial policy that opened England's colonies for trade and navigation by non-British nations... Humankind has never been closer to a coherent world-economy... It was the century of world trade and international division of labor (Hatt, 1941a: 6-7).

Thus, according to Hatt (1938b: 4), the “Europeanization” of the world during the nineteenth century was, to a large extent, an “Anglicization.” To his credit, Hatt (1940: 176) acknowledged that this was accompanied by “much human extermination and much bloody oppression” of peoples of non-European descent, and he ridiculed attempts to portray colonialism as altruism. Yet, in contrast to the conservatism of Kjellén (Holdar, 1992), he was favorably inclined toward liberalism in both its economic and political guises:

Liberalism is today derided. Yet it should not be forgotten that liberalism was the precondition for the free development of the capacities and vigor of nations and individuals, which made 19th century Europe strong, wealthy and happy (Hatt, 1938b: 4).

But however appealing, not least to his small and trade-dependent Denmark, liberalism was an ideology that, in Hatt’s analysis, did not withstand the material realities. “Liberal principles could only hold sway as long as possibilities for expansion were practically limitless,” Hatt (1941a: 93) argued, but by the early twentieth century “it became apparent that the world was already taken into possession, the Earth was divided between its conquerors” (Hatt, 1940: 176). In his analysis, the British system faltered largely because “economic liberalism did not bring equal economic progress to all states” (Hatt, 1938b: 5), and because in the face of crisis, British free-trade “internationalism” gave way to Imperial “nationalism” (Hatt, 1941a: 10). In short, “the economic exploitation of overseas countries was no longer open for all European nations. Thus ended Europe’s happy age” (Hatt, 1940: 176). World War I was accordingly at heart a conflict over colonial policy, Hatt (1929a) concluded, and broadly the same material logic applied to the next war:

[What] is happening in the world today is a tremendous struggle, not over ideologies but over real assets... the struggle concerns such realities as colonies, markets and resources (Quoted in Jerrild, 1939: 174).

Considering that Hatt was soon to be marked as “pro-German,” it is noteworthy that, at this historical juncture, he clearly voiced his ideological inclination toward the democratic powers. True to his materialist outlook, however, he strongly urged Denmark not to stray off the prudent course of small-state Realpolitik, which, for him, meant neutrality:

As a democrat, I have a natural sympathy with the democratic great powers, which I would not like to see vanquished by the Central Powers; but I consider it a greater tragedy if Denmark should be laid to waste in a struggle over who should command the world markets (Jerrild, 1939: 174).

From the territorial and political-economic closure of the world, Hatt saw the emergence of two antagonistic groups of increasingly autarkic great powers, the “satisfied” (mattiye) and the “hungry” (sultne), or, as he also put it in English, the “haves and have-nots.” While the former – particularly Britain, Russia and the United States – wanted to maintain the territorial status quo, the latter – Germany, Japan and Italy – wanted border revisions in their favor “because they lack raw materials, markets, land for settlers, and generally fields of action for their national energies” (Hatt, 1938a: 72). More specifically, to use the terminology of Agnew and Corbridge (1995), he recognized that world politics from around the turn of the century had moved from a “British geopolitical order” to a “geopolitical order of inter-imperial rivalry.” In an interview published in December 1940, Hatt summarized his argument this way:

The free-trade dream of a coherent and harmonious world has cracked. Each country can no longer rely on nurturing its own specialties, and the reason for this is that the Anglo-Saxon world did not bring equal advantage to all. Therefore, the world seems to be divided into a few areas or blocks with a leading industrial great power at the center of each (Quoted in Jerrild, 1940: 4).

Living-space politics

In analyzing the new geopolitical order, Hatt tapped into debates on Großraumwirtschaft, or large-space economy. Understood as “an expansionist grand design based on an explicitly geographic component,” Walter argues that Großraum thinking pervaded all great powers, although the most daring conceptions “came from the powers which would finally end up among the losers in history” (Walter, 2002: 65, 68). Hatt would have agreed with this. He would have disagreed, however, with Walter’s conclusion that Großraum thinking mostly failed to materialize. The phenomena he began to explicitly discuss as Livsrum in around 1940 were in several cases already existing facts, he argued, and drives toward autarkic “economic–geographical blocks” were the results of a pervasive Livsrumspolitik (living-space politics). Like his conception of geopolitics, he did not tie this concept to a particular national context:

The division of the world into economic–geographical great-spaces [Storrum] proceeds with the relentlessness of a natural law. Living-space politics is often perceived as a German invention. But that is utterly wrong. Living-space politics did not originate in mainland Europe – it actually arrived in Europe last. The division of the world into large economic blocks, which is now being finalized, began a long time ago (Hatt, 1941b: 13).

Practice mattered more than words; in fact, he saw the Monroe Doctrine as the first step in the creation of geopolitical blocks (Hatt, 1941a: 89). He wrote:

When it is often portrayed that the National Socialists invented living-space politics, it is probably because the necessity and practical implementation of the formation of blocks has been most thoroughly discussed by the German side in recent years – whilst other large-nations [Stornation] have contented themselves with engaging in practical living-space politics without producing a literature on its theory (Hatt, 1941b: 14).
This line of reasoning was most systematically pursued in his 1941 work entitled *Hvem kæmper om Kladen* (Who is Fighting over the Globe), which was based on a series of radio lectures with the more telling title “Jordens Økonomikredse” (The Economic Spheres of the Earth).

The British Empire was an early and successful example of practical living-space politics, Hatt argued, but the expansion into North Asia and North America by Russia and the United States, respectively, were also forms of colonialism and expressions of living-space politics. Significantly, he also viewed Livsrum in terms of political and particularly economic domination that went beyond direct territorial control. As a post-mortem swipe at Bowman, who loathed being called “the American Haushofer,” Smith (2003: 319) argues that he envisioned an “American economic Lebensraum.” In a parallel analysis, Hatt found that the United States since the late nineteenth century had primarily engaged in “economic expansion” and in “efforts to make the western hemisphere an economic large-space [Storrum] under U.S. leadership.” To this end, Pan-Americanism had been seized as “a unifying ideology, which was to be utilized politically and economically by the strongest power in the western hemisphere, the USA” (Hatt, 1941a: 34–40). He applied a similar logic to the power of Britain. In part, this power was based on the far-reaching territorial Empire, but he also recognized “capital power” as “one of the Britons’ most important assets” (Hatt, 1939b: 200). This was particularly the case in South America (Hatt, 1939c). However, he concluded that “the British Livsrum is large and wealthy, even if it is limited to the Empire” (Hatt, 1941a: 17).

A non-territorial economic Livsrum was not a feature of the third “satisfied” great power, the Soviet Union. Its foreign trade was negligible. Hatt noted, partly because the Bolshevik revolution had been directed at the liberal economy and had severed the Soviet Union from the world economy: “The main enemy of the revolution was international capital.” Despite this, production had made giant strides since the revolution, a feat that had “immense costs in human suffering and misfortune,” and that “would not have been possible under more free economic conditions.” For this reason, and due to its vast natural resources, the Soviet Union had approached “complete economic self-sufficiency” more closely than any other great power (Hatt, 1941a: 50–60). Still, he found that, for two reasons, the Soviet Union was less “satisfied” than the United States and Britain: First, it lacked tropical lands. Second, and critically for his anti-Soviet stance, it also lacked access to the oceans.

Suggestively, Hatt (1941a) addressed the “satisfied” great powers in individual chapters, whereas the major “hungry” powers—Japan and Germany—were discussed in chapters on “East Asia” and “Continental Europe.” Hatt saw a potentially great future for China, but it was Japan that first assumed geopolitical significance in East Asia (Hatt, 1936, 1938a, 1941a). Blocked from mass-migration through immigration restrictions and an abundance of cheap indigenous labor, Japan had to intensify its domestic economy. “Like any other industrial state,” Hatt (1936: 45) argued, “Japan must have raw materials and markets; from this arises Japan’s China politics.” Therefore:

It is not to replace Chinese peasants with Japanese that Japan has fought in China for nearly four years. For Japan as an industrial state, the question is to secure itself the leadership of the East Asian Livsrum (Hatt, 1941a: 78; also Hatt, 1936: 37–8).

A Japanese Livsrum in East Asia would still lack some vital resources, however, notably rubber and oil, and he found that the sphere of interest Japan sought to acquire “in reality encompasses the entire western side of the Pacific region, just like the USA’s Monroe Doctrine encompasses the eastern side of the Pacific” (Hatt, 1941a: 81).

Hatt was more guarded in relation to Europe and the living-space politics of (Nazi) Germany, partly, it seems, because he followed the line of informal but government-encouraged self-censorship by the mainstream media when it came to the powerful southern neighbor. (With the occupation on April 9th, 1940, censorship was formalized, nominally under Danish control until the resignation of the government on August 29th, 1943.) Both before and during the occupation, much was consequently implied “between the lines” (by Hatt as well as others). Still, he provided an analysis that essentially followed the materialist logic he applied to Japan and, indeed, the “satisfied” powers.

West of the Soviet Union, which Hatt saw as the boundary of Europe, Germany had the largest number of industrial workers but lacked resources compared to Britain and France, both of which could be supplied by the colonies. For Germany, he reasoned, this made securing natural resources particularly important (Hatt, 1938b). In an essay first published in January of 1939, he found that Germany’s “economic and political penetration” of the Danube-countries and the Balkan Peninsula had greatly improved its resource basis. This would strengthen Germany in a war with Britain. However, he argued, “Germany needs overseas markets;” and there was no reason to believe that it would “relinquish its demand for overseas political expansion, that is, a recovery of the colonies” (Hatt, 1940: 15). Germany was still a “hungry” power. The question of colonies seems to have faded somewhat with the outbreak of war in Europe. First and foremost, Hatt (1941a: 96) now argued that the German Livsrum idea aimed at “organizing the economy of the European continent in a way that would make Europe blockade-resistant” (Hatt, 1941a: 101). Yet, at a time when a German victory still seemed likely, he predicted a more long-term aim:

Germany’s plans for the organization of the European Livsrum reach far beyond the current war... The political-economic reorganization of Europe will continue, and its chief aim will be to secure the independence of the European Livsrum from the rest of the world (Hatt, 1941a: 101).

In this scenario, the individual countries of continental Europe would have to adapt their production according to the common interest. As he put it, “a certain division of labor must necessarily take place within the European Livsrum” (Hatt, 1941a: 103). This raised a number of concerns for Denmark. For continental Europe as a whole, he seemed uncertain as to whether it would be possible to reconcile national divisions; with a question that would come to haunt later generations, he asked: “Will Europe’s peoples be able to feel themselves as Europeans?” The answer rested on Germany; Hatt (1941a: 105) found that “the problem Germany will have to face after a victorious war” would be “to unite Europe’s strong nations in a common will — the greatest task in Europe’s history. On the solution of this task rests Europe’s fate.”

In this and other ways, Hatt’s view of existing and emerging Livsrum was essentially founded on long-term economic considerations. It is not a coincidence that he co-authored a wall-map and an accompanying booklet on the worldwide distribution of resources nor that this is the theme of the map appendices of his 1941 book on Livsrum. Although he acknowledged that the distribution of markets and labor played an important role, his geopolitics were often deterministic with respect to the geographical location of natural resources. Geographical materialism was also a feature in the writings of contemporaneous German geopoliticians (Natter, 2003), and he was undoubtedly (if rarely explicitly) inspired by their work. However, because he reasoned from a small state with no possibility of engaging in the wider world but through economic relations at the mercy of stronger states, geo-materialism was arguably pushed to the fore in Hatt’s geopolitics. More conventional questions of geo-strategy certainly played a part, not
least after the outbreak of war in Europe. But with the notable exception of Soviet geopolitics, he generally — if often inconsistently — subsumed such issues to the greater world drama of geographical-economical blocks.

**Small-state Livsrum**

Most of Hatt’s geopolitics addressed the great canvases of the looming and soon unfolding great-power conflicts. But with the outbreak of war in Europe, Denmark assumed a more visible position in his writings. It was particularly in a text written for a never-realized German book with the working title “Dänemark im neuen Europa” (Lund, in press), which was published in several Danish versions, that he developed his understanding of Danish Livsrum. Danish quests for wider territorial expansion had come to a close in the Middle Ages, he argued, and the state had instead sought to secure and, to a degree, expand its home basis in relation to neighboring Sweden and Germany. This ended with the 1864 loss of Schleswig–Holstein, which sealed Denmark’s status as a small state. For a man who saw geographical expansion as the hallmark of a vital people, this could hardly be the end of the story. In place of territorial aggrandizement, however, it was through seamanship and “trade instinct” that Denmark, or rather, the Danish people (Folk), had expanded:

In this way, the Danish people’s expansive capacity has mostly not unfolded through state expansion. But through private enterprise and frequently under foreign flag, the Danish expansive force has asserted itself all over the globe... The mounting intensity of Danish economic life has thus gone hand-in-hand with — and partly depends on — a kind of expansion, an increasing adjustment to and entanglement in the world economy (Hatt, 1942: 6–7).

As we have seen in relation to the United States, in this manner, Hatt’s notion of small-state Livsrum involved a measure of relationality. Absolute spaces of mappable territories were important, but Livsrum was also about commandeering the networked spaces of the world economy. Because he saw Denmark as highly adjusted to what later generations would term “globalization,” it should not be surprising that he looked favorably on the liberal order, “Europe’s happy age,” nor that he worried about the consequences of its demise.

For Hatt, migration was also a kind of expansion and a sign of vitality, a point he applied to Denmark as well as Norway and Sweden (Hatt, 1940: 329–331). The population of a productive people would increase and manifest itself in migration. Yet, pointing to the example of the United States, he found that Scandinavian migrants tended to integrate into the host population within a generation. They were therefore a loss to the home country — and a cheap gain for the host country. He argued that a truly vital people should absorb overpopulation through increased productivity at home, and he did not doubt the Danish ability to accomplish this:

[The nation’s vitality Livskraft is great enough to sustain a population pressure, a surplus of strength, which is necessary for any people that have to make an effort for the development of the world (Hatt, 1943a: 12)].

Access to a wider geography of resources and markets was also vital for small states, but Hatt did not see this as necessarily linked to territorial possessions. This illustrates his distinct discomfort with the Ratzelian emphasis on territorial size as the measure of state vitality. Reflecting elements of what Hartshorne (1950) later termed “centrifugal” and “centripetal” forces within states, he wrote:

One should guard oneself against counting so strongly on quantity that one forgets quality. Small states can be strong, well organized, full of life and leading in cultural development. Large states can be unorganized, hopelessly full of contradictions, weak and disposed to falling apart (Hatt, 1940: 174).

This was clearly a product of Hatt’s position as a small-state geopolitical. In fact, in a previous articulation of this criticism, he found that “[t]his philosophy can perhaps seem a little depressing for members of small nations.” Yet, he added reassuringly, one should not be too gloomy about the quantitative view: it “is only philosophy” (Hatt, 1934: 92).

Hatt’s discussion of Danish Livsrum covered only a fraction of his geopolitical oeuvre. This element is significant, however, because while Hatt clearly drew on wider ideas of the “need” for geographical expansion, he adapted such notions to the particular context of small states, primarily Denmark. Portuguese geopoliticians could engage in “the art of not being a small-state” through overseas empire (Sidaway & Power, 2005: 536), but this was not an option in Hatt’s small-state geopolitics. Instead of territorial possession, he emphasized spatial efficiency and reach; and rather than the military power of the state, he stressed the entrepreneurial energy of the nation. In this respect, it is notable that he did not marshal the space of Greenland (or other North Atlantic dominions) in his discussion of Danish Livsrum. Arguably, Hatt may thus have articulated a Danish variant of a wider figure of thought in small-state geopolitics. For example, Schough (2008: 17) suggests that Swedish geopolitical imaginaries involved notions of “expansion without military support.”

**Scavenius’ geographer**

The first years of the German occupation remain the most contested period in modern Danish history (Dethlefsen, 1990). From the occupation on April 9th, 1940, to the resignation of the government on August 29th, 1943, Denmark was formally a sovereign and neutral state under German “protection.” Within the (often tacit) limits set by the occupation power, Denmark retained considerable autonomy during this period of “collaboration.” All branches of the state continued to function, including the democratically elected parliament and its government, and German–Danish relations were officially maintained through the respective foreign offices. Hatt ceased his geopolitical activities with the resignation of the government in August of 1943, and it is in the context of the politics of “collaboration” that his work should be viewed. This politics marked the culmination of a particular strand of small-state Realpolitik. Spearheaded by the Social-Liberal Party, but eventually also adopted by the Social Democrats, it was argued that Denmark could not be defended militarily. Denmark should be firmly neutral and balance its foreign policy between the great powers, but should particularly not provoke neighboring Germany. Rather than defend the state as a territorial unit, the strategy was to protect the nation as a politically democratic and socioeconomically viable entity, even through a period of foreign occupation (Korsgaard, 2008; Lidegaard, 2009). Faced with the reality of occupation, this small-state survival strategy was (sometimes grudgingly) adopted by most of the political establishment, but Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius became its controversial figurehead. Hatt maintained contact with Scavenius during (and after) the occupation, and the foreign ministry facilitated several of his wartime activities (Larsen, 2005a). Moreover, he was an unwavering supporter of the foreign minister’s unsentimental small-state Realpolitik. In his post-war statement, when Scavenius had become the vilified icon of “collaboration,” Hatt had the courage to declare that he wrote and acted as he did because he was...
“convinced that the policy of Foreign Minister Scavenius was the only right one under the given circumstances” (statement, 10 Dec. 1945, T.225). If Bowman was “Roosevelt’s geographer” (Smith, 2003), Hatt can well be described as Scavenius’ geographer.

Set within this broader smaller-state Realpolitik, one can distinguish three, often intertwining “survival” arguments in Hatt’s geopolitical writings during the occupation. These arguments were interlaced with his longstanding view of existing or emerging great-power blocks and were related to his view of Danish Livsrum. In the increasingly charged context of foreign occupation, however, and facilitated by his manifest lack of self-serving prudence, they were unequivocally “pro-German.”

First, and least controversially, Hatt’s wartime geopolitics contained arguments for economic survival guided by the particularities of the war and his view of a “closing” world. During the first years of the occupation, when Germany still seemed likely to dominate a “New European Order,” the elites worked hard to protect the Danish economy in the anticipated reordering (Lund, 2004). Considering that Hatt saw Denmark as heavily involved in international commerce, it is hardly surprising that he added his voice to this concern. Like others, he was particularly worried that the emerging industrialization should be curtailed by Denmark being reduced to a provider of agricultural produce:

In Europe’s agrarian countries there may be some fear that Germany and Italy could use their position of power to halt the industrialization of the agrarian countries to secure the European market for their own industries. However, this fear will hopefully and probably turn out to be groundless (Hatt, 1941a: 102–103).

Yet he had long seen Denmark in a wider European context, and his eventual “pro-German” position had precedence in his “pro-European” orientation. Hatt (1934) thus dismissed ideas of a Nordic tariff union (also Hatt, 1938c). Emotions should not obscure material realities, and in a closing world economy, Denmark belonged in a wider European economy. Hatt (1929b) also viewed Coudenhove-Kalergi’s visions for a “Pan-Europe” as having merit.

Second, one can, in Hatt’s wartime geopolitics, distinguish an argument for national-political survival. In a generous reading, it was to this end that he occasionally praised Hitler:

If the new Europe is to succeed, its individual nations must feel themselves to be active partners in the venture... Germany’s Fuehrer knows that the nations are realities. The struggle against Soviet-Russia has made Hitler the hope of Europe’s repressed peoples. If the banner of national self-determination continues to fly over the politics of the German Reich, it could be possible to create the great European community that will secure a future for our part of the world (Hatt, 1941b: 24–25).

Statements like this appear naïve, and because Hatt recognized Nazi Germany as an aggressor against the smaller European states in other writings, his praise of Hitler as a defender of national self-determination is rather perplexing. But statements like this should probably be seen as contributions to the immediate tactics of maintaining a degree of political autonomy for the Danish people, which were pursued by the majority of the establishment in the early years of the occupation. Indeed, there is much to suggest that some of his writings were directed at the occupier rather than at the occupied. After the war, Hatt himself wrote:

I have maintained a neutral, objective form in my articles. When opportunities arose, I emphasized the small European nation’s vitality and unassailability, and the necessity to consider this in a possible reordering of Europe. This was, of course, particularly intended for possible German readers (Statement, 10 Dec. 1945, T.225).

Still, Hatt’s geopolitical writings included assertions that went well beyond what could be seen as prudent, if unheroic, small-state survival tactics. For his time, he was not an anti-Semite. In fact, before the war he had viewed “the harsh behavior against Germany’s Jews” as a possible argument against Germany reacquiring African colonies (Hatt, 1938a: 76–77). He also contributed to an anthology, which can be read as a subtle attack on Nazi race theory (Bak, 2004). In late 1942, however, the Axis Powers were suddenly united in “the fight against the British—American—Russian—Jewish world hegemony” (Hatt, 1943b: 49). With more than a whiff of Nazi propaganda, he here appears to have seen Jews as part of “the international circle” of economic and political command.

The eastern giant

While Hatt’s arguments concerning economic and national-political survival must to some extent be inferred, the third argument is straightforward. This essentially geo-strategic argument related to Denmark’s precarious position in what he saw as a conflict between great powers competing for Livsrum and centered on Soviet expansionism. Yet it derived from his reading of British balance-of-power politics. He argued that “[i]t is always the privileged social classes and nations that want balance,” and for two centuries, Britain had maintained the balance of power in Europe because a “strong and unified Europe... could threaten the British Empire’s very existence” (Hatt, 1939b: 198). In this respect, World War I had been a British success. Yet, in an argument reminiscent of Mackinder, whom he later mentioned as a source of inspiration, he found that the political center of gravity was moving eastward, toward the Soviet Union, and that “this move will accelerate if West and Central Europe destroy one another” (Hatt, 1939b: 211). He therefore issued the following warning:

To vanquish Germany with the help of Russia, from a British point of view, must be to exorcise the Devil by means of Beelzebub. Hitler’s fall could very well entail a German alliance with the Soviet Union. The European balance always pursued by England would then forever be eliminated (Hatt, 1939b: 209).

Possibly because of the purported British viewpoint, the first line of this quotation found its way to Hatt’s post-war statement and several private letters of explanation. But he did not see European geopolitics from a British point of view. His perspective was distinctly Danish, to some extent Nordic, and if connected to some broader region, it was with the smaller European states. And the long-term danger lay with what he saw as the expansionism of the “eastern giant state and its, to the Nordic way of thinking, disgusting social order” (Hatt, 1941c: 122). Despite such statements, he was not particularly marred by fears of Communism. His analysis was mainly founded on the notion that Russia had for three centuries expanded in the direction of least resistance, most recently toward the northwest. Reflecting his conclusion that the Soviet Union was the most “satisfied” great power, he did not view this as a quest for political-economic Livsrum but, rather, as a geo-strategic drive for access to the oceans. In this, he saw dire consequences for the Nordic countries:

The most important sea route of Northwest Russia must by necessity of nature pass through the Baltic Sea; and to command the sea lanes through the Baltic Sea, Russia must master the entrance to the Baltic Sea... Russia can only achieve such power by conquering the entire Scandinavian Peninsula and Zealand (Hatt, 1941d: 18).

The Nordic peoples’ chances of resisting this pressure would be few, Hatt found, had it not been for two other factors in the
geopolitical equation — Britain and Germany. However, in contrast to the Mediterranean, which was vital to the Empire, Britain had not established “a Baltic Gibraltar or Malta” (Hatt, 1941d: 7). Moreover, in a re-articulation of the classic geopolitical binary of sea versus land, he found that air power was vital in mastering the Baltic Sea, and air power was, for him, related to land. It was not least for this reason that he believed Germany would fare best in the Baltic balance-of-power equation “because Germany is a Baltic power and a land power, whereas England lies outside the area and is a sea power” (Hatt, 1941d: 26). The same logic applied to European geopolitics in general:

Germany is located in Europe’s center, England in Europe’s periphery. Germany’s fate is Europe’s fate. England, on the other hand, is the center of a global empire and more directly tied to that than to the European mainland... In this war, Germany is struggling against foreign, Europe-hostile forces. Germany’s defeat in this struggle will amount to a European catastrophe. Germany’s victory could be the entry to a new and rich blooming of Europe... If the new Europe is realized, it will happen because a large and vigorous people put its existence to the task (Hatt, 1941b: 20, 22, 26).

Britain was the key world power throughout much of Hatt’s geopolitics. As World War II developed, however, he increasingly addressed Britain and the US as one block that was united in maintaining “the Anglo-Saxon world order,” which Hatt (1939b: 199) considered to dominate “politically or at least economically half of the Earth and more than half of the Earth’s vital resources.” As the war wore on, Britain and apparently, if tacitly, Germany began to fade as key powers in his European geopolitics. Instead, he saw the contours of the coming cold war geopolitical order. In the closing lines of one of his last geopolitical works, he ruefully wrote:

If the Axis Powers fell, their defeat would most likely be celebrated by many as a victory for the European people’s right of national self-determination. But the joy would probably be short-lived. If there are not sufficiently strong unifying forces within our continent, Europe will fall under foreign rule, first American and Russian, later Russian alone (Hatt, 1943b: 55).

With a rather confounding roundabout logic, it was apparently particularly Britain’s reluctance to protect the smaller European states from more or less overt German aggression that drove Hatt to conclude the following:

What has happened in recent years to Czechoslovakia and “red Spain,” which I will term “liberal Spain,” should show us with sufficient clarity that the Western Powers are not concerned with the protection of these smaller, democratic states, but with the protection of their own interests (Quoted in Jerrild, 1939: 174).

He applied a similar analysis to the fate of Austria and Poland (e.g., Hatt, 1939a), and although Denmark and several other states were to fall victim to Nazi aggression, he continued to see Germany as the bulwark against Soviet expansionism. As he admitted after the war, the fate of Finland was instrumental in this respect:

Behind everything I have written or said lies a worry for the future of the European nations, particularly the small European nations. I have, as far as I could, avoided expressing feelings. I have not always succeeded in this, particularly when it came to Finland, whose heroic struggle made the deepest impression on me (Statement, 10 Dec. 1945, T.225).

In a sense, Hatt was both too little a realist to fully gauge the power of the United States and too little an idealist to truly fathom the devastating impact of Nazi ideology. Privately, however, he was not completely blind to the dark sides of the Nazi regime. In a reply to a letter praising one of his radio talks, he wrote:

It is very possibly correct that Germany must necessarily become the leading state in the new Europe. But I will regret it if it is to happen under the current regime because, in that case, it would not become the cooperation among free nations that both you and I consider to be the goal (Hatt to Dam, 13 Dec. 1941, private papers, box 13).

**Geopolitics on trial**

Hatt’s prediction of a divided Europe was vindicated, and his fear of Soviet expansionism soon became mainstream thinking in the West. In fact, only a little into the Cold War, an American article on the Soviet Union and Northern Europe referenced his highly pro-German 1941 book on “Baltic Sea Problems” without qualification (Anderson, 1952). Privately, he also found his analysis proven correct, for instance, by the Soviet invasion of Hungary (Hatt to Åström, 12 Nov. 1956, private papers, box 16). One could argue that post-war events similarly supported his skepticism of the Nordic countries as a refuge in a world of political-economic blocks (Hatt, 1934, 1941b). Nordic feelings were running high during the war, and the possibility of a Nordic community continued to attract elements of the political establishment over the following decades. But Denmark soon sought military refuge in NATO, though under US rather than German tutelage, and the country eventually entered the EEC, which in many respects has come to resemble the European community, Hatt seems to have envisioned.

Just as Hatt’s colonial geopolitics, when disentangled from its many problematic elements, contains some astute observations about colonialism, so do his later writings, despite their frequently dubious appearance, point toward geopolitical dynamics that came to characterize post-war discourse and events. Early post-war sentiments had little room for nuance, however, including overt criticism of the Soviet Union. Hatt’s activities and writings during the occupation could not sustain a trial for treason but were instead submitted to the extraordinary disciplinary court for public servants, which was established as a part of the questionable retribution of the occupation (Tamm, 1998). Hatt’s trial has recently been analyzed in some detail (Lund, 2007; Larsen, 2000a), but, because this represents one of the few instances where geopolitical ideas have been subjected to a formal trial, we shall briefly consider some main points.

Throughout the proceedings, Hatt consistently maintained that he acted only when called upon and in line with the government’s policy. Moreover, he considered it his academic and national duty:

[When requested, I felt a duty to express myself on political-geographical questions — because political geography is part of my subject, and also because I had reason to believe that a cool, objective conception of the problems, expressed by a Dane who was not a Nazi, maybe could do a little good (Statement, 10 Dec. 1945, T.225).]

Hatt readily admitted that his statements might have occasionally come across as “pro-German,” but if that were the case, it was the result of an objective analysis and based on what he considered best for Denmark. The judges were not convinced. Although they recognized that his position broadly followed that of the government and much of the mainstream press, they found that government and press had acted out of necessity, whereas Hatt had acted by choice and beyond academic objectivity:

In the opinion of the court, the statements in the writings and speeches cited above can neither in form nor in content be seen as
an objective scientific account of geographical-political perspectives on the European situation [because] the mentioned statements contain both attacks on the British-American-Russian politics and a defense of the German-Japanese politics [that were] of a purely moral character (Ruling, 7 May 1947, T.225).

In a sense, although upholding a notion of scientific objectivity, the court recognized the political nature of scientific work. In the historical context, however, where the government and the press that had encouraged Hatt’s work were cleared, this was a highly problematic exercise. As a result, Hatt was found guilty of “uavredig national Optraeden” (dishonorable national conduct) and sentenced to be dismissed from his position. With the ambiguity that characterized the proceedings, however, he was dismissed with full pension.

The sentence was a devastating blow for the proud professor, and it marked Hatt’s complete withdrawal from the field of geography. Somewhat like Välino Auer, the geopolitician of Finnish Lebensraum who reinvented himself as a geologist (Paasi, 1990), he found refuge in archeology and ethnography. He published major treatises in both fields and was slowly re-admitted into the academic establishment in the final years of his life, but he never recovered from the injustice he felt had been committed against him (Larsen, 2009a).

“As a political geographer — and as a Dane”

In bringing the work of Gudmund Hatt out of the recesses of Danish geography and into the modern geographic literature, in this article, I have sought to add an under-investigated facet to the now well-established argument that geopolitics should be approached as “the politics of the geopolitical specification of politics” (Dalby, 1991: 274) embedded in particular historical—geographical contexts. In this respect, my key contention is that although the general formulation of this argument holds equally well for small-state and great-power geopoliticians, geopolitics take distinctive forms when narrated from the material and intellectual position of a small state. At least, this is a conclusion that can be inferred from Hatt’s geopolitics.

Like many of his better-known great-power peers, Hatt considered the geopolitics of spatial expansion through the establishment of Livsrum (living space) as vital to any industrial state. He similarly saw the formation of antagonistic economic—geographical blocks as the hallmark of his age. However, he argued that this Livsrumspolitik (living-space politics) was pursued by all great powers, and geopolitics was correspondingly a general practice that was exemplified by Germany but had also been practiced by other great powers for quite some time. He also recognized that geopolitical reasoning should be seen as embedded in national standpoint. This cautiously critical position to geopolitics as theory and practice may be related to Hatt’s position as a small-state observer of the great powers.

Hatt’s small-state geopolitics is arguably most evident in his more substantial ideas. Most distinctly, he was highly critical of territorial size as a measure of geopolitical vitality. While he acknowledged that territory played a role, in the longer run, geopolitics was particularly concerned with access to geographies of resources, markets and, to some extent, labor. This led him to view the power of the United States as based on a mainly economic Livsrum. However, a small state could also expand and demonstrate the vitality of its people through engagement in economic relations. Arguably, it was this emphasis on the people, which made him see Denmark in a wider European context from an early stage. From this, it was only a small step to the wartime strategy of protecting the Danish people rather than the territorial state.

Regarding Bowman, Smith (2003: 238) concludes that he “saw no necessary contradiction between scientific universalism and the specific national interest.” As we have seen, this is equally true of Hatt. Yet whereas great-power geopoliticians could “win” or “lose” with their respective states, Hatt, the small-state geopolitician, pursued national aims through a great power. Spurred by his excessive materialism, this tied him to Nazi Germany, the eventual loser — and national enemy. Still, he pursued this line of geopolitical thought for deeply national and, to his own mind, scientific reasons.

When Hitler offered the Scandinavian countries non-aggression treaties in 1939, Hatt wrote the prime minister an exposé of Denmark’s precarious geopolitical position. He did not fool himself that a treaty would make a major change to that position. However, he argued that “[n]o means that can hold back a hostile occupation ought to be left unused, for ideological reasons or for reasons of Nordic cooperation” (Hatt to Stauning, 10 May 1939, private papers, box 11). Typically, it was accordingly “as a political geographer — and as a Dane” that he urged the prime minister to conclude a treaty.

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