Why democrats can tolerate a systematic pattern of low and unequal turnout: Electoral turnout, political equality, and the case for compulsory voting

Beskrivelse

This paper attacks the democratic argument in favor of compulsory voting. Taking its starting point in the empirical evidence that electoral turnout decreases inequality in who votes increases, and that inequality in turnout leads to unequal political influence, the democratic argument asserts that low and unequal turnout violates political equality, and that compulsory voting is therefore justified in order to protect political equality. This paper argues that the democratic argument neglects to distinguish between inequality in the political influence of groups and inequality in the political influence of individuals, and that it fails when such a distinction is made. While it is true that unequal turnout leads to inequality in the political influence of groups, it does not lead to any inequality in the political influence of individuals, but only inequality in the political influence of individuals violate political equality. Thus, unequal turnout does not violate political equality, and the democratic argument fails.

Periode	25 jun. 2018
Begivenhedstitel	Political Philosophy Workshop
Begivenhedstype	Workshop
Placering	Roskilde, DanmarkVis på kort
Grad af anerkendelse	National