Security aspects in underwater wireless networks have not been widely investigated so far, despite the critical importance of the scenarios in which these networks can be employed. For example, an attack to a military underwater network for enemy targeting or identification can lead to serious consequences. Similarly, environmental monitoring applications, such as tsunami prevention, are also critical from a public safety point of view. In this article, we assess a scenario in which a malicious node tries to perform a jamming attack, degrading the communication quality of battery-powered underwater nodes. The legitimate transmitter may use packet-level coding to increase the chances of correctly delivering packets. Because of the energy limitation of the nodes, the jammer's objective is twofold: 1) disrupting the communication and 2) reducing the lifetime of the victim by making it send more redundancy. We model the jammer and the transmitter as players in a multistage game, deriving the optimal strategies. We evaluate the performance both in a model-based scenario and using real experimental data, and perform a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the performance of the strategies if the real channel model is different from the one they use.
|Tidsskrift||IEEE Internet of Things Journal|
|Status||Udgivet - okt. 2020|
Bibliografisk noteFunding Information:
Manuscript received February 29, 2020; accepted March 5, 2020. Date of publication March 23, 2020; date of current version October 9, 2020. This work was supported in part by the Bundeswehr Technical Center for Ships and Naval Weapons, Maritime Technology and Research (WTD 71), Kiel, Germany. This article is an extension of a previous work, presented at ACM WUWNet’19 with the title “Jamming the Underwater: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Energy-Depleting Jamming Attacks” . (Corresponding author: Alberto Signori.) Alberto Signori, Filippo Campagnaro, and Michele Zorzi are with the Department of Information Engineering, University of Padova, 35131 Padua, Italy (e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org).
© 2014 IEEE.