A Geometry-Based Game Theoretical Model of Blind and Reactive Underwater Jamming

Security is a critical consideration in Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs) due to the importance of the applications in which these types of networks are often employed, from military applications to marine natural disaster prevention. Furthermore, even simple Denial of Service (DoS) attacks such as jamming can be very effective in disrupting the communication, with significant negative consequences for these critical applications. While jamming has been widely studied in the context of terrestrial networks, the peculiarities of propagation in UANs, such as the low propagation speed, the multipath, and the high delay spread, need to be considered: the relative positions of the jammer, transmitter, and receiver can have a huge impact on the feasibility and impact of reactive jamming, opening the way for the exploitation of other jamming models. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of a reactive and a blind jammer through a game theoretical framework, comparing them for different geometries of the scenario. We assess the impact of the different jammers, employing different active and evasive strategies, where the first type of countermeasure implies the use of additional energy to protect the communication, while the second tries to avoid the jamming signals by randomizing the transmission pattern.