A rational-voter explanation of the cost of ruling

Martin Paldam; Peter Skott

doi:10.1007/BF01047690

A rational-voter explanation of the cost of ruling

Martin Paldam^*, Peter Skott

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Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

46 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

It is well known that the average government loses votes - the so-called cost of ruling. We show that the loss can be explained as a perfectly rational demand for change in a median voter model, once the model is amended to let the two parties be visibly different.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Public Choice
Vol/bind	83
Udgave nummer	1-2
Sider (fra-til)	159-172
Antal sider	14
ISSN	0048-5829
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047690
Status	Udgivet - 1 apr. 1995

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A rational-voter explanation of the cost of ruling

Abstract

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