TY - JOUR
T1 - An Event-Driven Resilient Control Strategy for DC Microgrids
AU - Sahoo, Subham
AU - Dragicevic, Tomislav
AU - Blaabjerg, Frede
PY - 2020/12
Y1 - 2020/12
N2 - Though recent advancements in dc microgrids are largely based on distributed control strategies to enhance reliability, their susceptibility to cyber attacks still remains a challenging issue. Additionally in converter-dominated dc microgrids, mitigation of cyber attacks upon detection in a timely manner is the need of the hour to prevent the system from immediate shutdown. Since most of the existing research is primarily focused on the detection of cyber attacks in dc microgrids without giving prior attention to comprehensive steps of mitigation, this article classifies cyber attacks as events and introduces an event-driven cyber attack resilient strategy for dc microgrids, which immediately replaces the attacked signal with a trusted event-driven signal constructed using True transmitted measurements. This mechanism not only disengages the attack element from the control system, but also replaces it with an event-triggered estimated value to encompass normal consensus operation during both steady state as well as transient conditions even in the presence of attacks. Finally, the event detection criteria and its sensitivity are theoretically verified and validated using simulation and experimental conditions in the presence of both stealth voltage and current attacks.
AB - Though recent advancements in dc microgrids are largely based on distributed control strategies to enhance reliability, their susceptibility to cyber attacks still remains a challenging issue. Additionally in converter-dominated dc microgrids, mitigation of cyber attacks upon detection in a timely manner is the need of the hour to prevent the system from immediate shutdown. Since most of the existing research is primarily focused on the detection of cyber attacks in dc microgrids without giving prior attention to comprehensive steps of mitigation, this article classifies cyber attacks as events and introduces an event-driven cyber attack resilient strategy for dc microgrids, which immediately replaces the attacked signal with a trusted event-driven signal constructed using True transmitted measurements. This mechanism not only disengages the attack element from the control system, but also replaces it with an event-triggered estimated value to encompass normal consensus operation during both steady state as well as transient conditions even in the presence of attacks. Finally, the event detection criteria and its sensitivity are theoretically verified and validated using simulation and experimental conditions in the presence of both stealth voltage and current attacks.
KW - DC Microgrid
KW - Distributed Control
KW - Cyber-Physical Systems
KW - Cyber Attacks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089681843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TPEL.2020.2995584
DO - 10.1109/TPEL.2020.2995584
M3 - Journal article
SN - 0885-8993
VL - 35
SP - 13714
EP - 13724
JO - I E E E Transactions on Power Electronics
JF - I E E E Transactions on Power Electronics
IS - 12
M1 - 9095427
ER -