Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the interactive conflicts between business and governmental authorities in the regulatory process of an emerging business model: sharing economy. Focusing on bike sharing system, the study also investigates the conflict-handling strategy of bike sharing companies and government regulation. Design/methodology/approach: An evolutionary game model is introduced to illustrate the interactive conflict between bike sharing companies and government regulation, combined with system dynamics (SD) to simulate the evolutionary conflict-handling strategies between the two players. Findings: The dynamic strategies of the two players are observed, and under five conditions the conflict outcomes are evolutionary stable states. Simulations show that each party sacrifices part of its interest and adjust its strategy according to that of the other, indicating the conflict-handling strategy as a compromising mode. Furthermore, the strategies of bike sharing companies are sensitive to additional operation and maintenance costs for producing low-quality bicycles and costs of positive regulation, which provides theoretical guidance for regulatory authorities. Originality/value: The station-less bike sharing come up in China recently, and it is an important research field of entrepreneurship. Owing to the uniqueness and novelty of the phenomenon, conflicts and challenges exist during the regulation process. Thus, the study practically contributes to the conflict-handling strategies of businesses and government under the context of sharing economy. Methodologically, as a novel issue with less available data to carry out empirical research, this study combines evolutionary game theory with SD to shed light on the complex interactions between businesses and government. The research method can be applied to other entrepreneurial studies.