But Anyone Can Mix Their Labor: A Reply to Cheneval

Jakob Thrane Mainz

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2 Citationer (Scopus)
36 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Francis Cheneval has recently argued that people have property rights over personal data about themselves. Until now, the discussion on data ownership has primarily been a discussion among legal theorists and economists. Cheneval contribution to the discussion is a very welcome input from academic philosophy. Cheneval attempts to reach his conclusion through two distinct strategies. One strategy is to reach the conclusion through a Lockean inspired libertarian rights-based theory of property. The second strategy is to reach his conclusion through a Rawlsian account of distributive justice. According to Cheneval, his conclusion can be reached both ways. In this reply, I will focus exclusively on Cheneval argument that people have Lockean inspired libertarian property rights over personal data. I will offer an objection, which– if correct –demonstrates demonstrates how Cheneval Lockean argument runs into a dilemma.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Vol/bind24
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)276-285
Antal sider10
ISSN1369-8230
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 22 mar. 2021

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