Abstract
Francis Cheneval has recently argued that people have property rights over personal data about themselves. Until now, the discussion on data ownership has primarily been a discussion among legal theorists and economists. Cheneval contribution to the discussion is a very welcome input from academic philosophy. Cheneval attempts to reach his conclusion through two distinct strategies. One strategy is to reach the conclusion through a Lockean inspired libertarian rights-based theory of property. The second strategy is to reach his conclusion through a Rawlsian account of distributive justice. According to Cheneval, his conclusion can be reached both ways. In this reply, I will focus exclusively on Cheneval argument that people have Lockean inspired libertarian property rights over personal data. I will offer an objection, which– if correct –demonstrates demonstrates how Cheneval Lockean argument runs into a dilemma.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy |
Vol/bind | 24 |
Udgave nummer | 2 |
Sider (fra-til) | 276-285 |
Antal sider | 10 |
ISSN | 1369-8230 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 22 mar. 2021 |