Abstract
Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new vulnerability which we call teleportation. An attacker (e.g., a malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g., exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the use cases considered in this paper.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Titel | Proceedings - 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) |
Antal sider | 16 |
Forlag | IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) |
Publikationsdato | 28 jun. 2017 |
Sider | 563-578 |
Artikelnummer | 7962003 |
ISBN (Elektronisk) | 9781509057610 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 28 jun. 2017 |
Begivenhed | 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS and P 2017 - Paris, Frankrig Varighed: 26 apr. 2017 → 28 apr. 2017 |
Konference
Konference | 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS and P 2017 |
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Land/Område | Frankrig |
By | Paris |
Periode | 26/04/2017 → 28/04/2017 |
Sponsor | IEEE France Section, Technical Committee on Security and Privacy (TC) |