TY - JOUR
T1 - Sottostima dei costi dei progetti di opere repubblich
T2 - errore casuale o intenzionale?
AU - Flyvbjerg, Bent
AU - Holm, Mette Skamris
AU - Buhl, Søren Ladegaard
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - This article presents results from the first
statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth $90 billion (U.S.), it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether important infrastructure should be built are highly and systematically misleading. The result is continuous cost escalation of billions of dollars. The sample used in
the study is the largest of its kind, allowing for the first time statistically valid conclusions regarding questions of cost underestimation and escalation for different project types, different geographical regions, and different
historical periods. Four kinds of explanation of cost underestimation are examined: technical, economic, psychological, and political. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic
misrepresentation, i.e., lying. The policy implications are clear: In debates and decision making on whether important transportation infrastructure should be built, those legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust the cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts. Independent estimates and analyses are needed as are institutional checks and balances to curb deception.
AB - This article presents results from the first
statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth $90 billion (U.S.), it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether important infrastructure should be built are highly and systematically misleading. The result is continuous cost escalation of billions of dollars. The sample used in
the study is the largest of its kind, allowing for the first time statistically valid conclusions regarding questions of cost underestimation and escalation for different project types, different geographical regions, and different
historical periods. Four kinds of explanation of cost underestimation are examined: technical, economic, psychological, and political. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic
misrepresentation, i.e., lying. The policy implications are clear: In debates and decision making on whether important transportation infrastructure should be built, those legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust the cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts. Independent estimates and analyses are needed as are institutional checks and balances to curb deception.
KW - cost overrun
KW - cost escalation
KW - transportation
KW - infrastructure
KW - cost-benefit analysis
KW - accountability
KW - lying
M3 - Tidsskriftartikel
SN - 0004-0177
SP - 87
EP - 114
JO - Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali
JF - Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali
IS - 82
ER -