TY - JOUR
T1 - The impact of board characteristics and CEO power on banks’ risk-taking
T2 - stable versus crisis periods
AU - Fernandes, Catarina
AU - Farinha, Jorge
AU - Martins, Francisco Vitorino
AU - Mateus, Cesario
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements This research has been financed by Portuguese public funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., in the framework of the project with reference UIDB/04105/2020.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - We examine the impact of board structure, CEO power and other bank-specific factors on bank risk-taking for a sample of 72 publicly listed European banks in both stable and crisis periods. Using a simultaneous equations approach, our main findings indicate that the proportion of independent directors, the board size, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power affected bank risk-taking negatively during the recent financial crisis. On the contrary, institutional shareholder ownership and the presence of an ex-CEO as Chairman influenced bank risk-taking positively. Additionally, we separately analyse stable and crisis periods and observe that in the pre-crisis period only board independence and institutional ownership keep the same impact on risk while CEO power has no influence and the existence of an ex-CEO as Chairman reduces risk-taking by banks. We conclude that different governance characteristics have different relevance for banks' risk-taking contingent on the economic environment being one of stability or crisis.
AB - We examine the impact of board structure, CEO power and other bank-specific factors on bank risk-taking for a sample of 72 publicly listed European banks in both stable and crisis periods. Using a simultaneous equations approach, our main findings indicate that the proportion of independent directors, the board size, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power affected bank risk-taking negatively during the recent financial crisis. On the contrary, institutional shareholder ownership and the presence of an ex-CEO as Chairman influenced bank risk-taking positively. Additionally, we separately analyse stable and crisis periods and observe that in the pre-crisis period only board independence and institutional ownership keep the same impact on risk while CEO power has no influence and the existence of an ex-CEO as Chairman reduces risk-taking by banks. We conclude that different governance characteristics have different relevance for banks' risk-taking contingent on the economic environment being one of stability or crisis.
KW - Banks
KW - Corporate governance
KW - Financial crisis
KW - Risk
KW - Simultaneous equations
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85103211589
U2 - 10.1057/s41261-021-00146-4
DO - 10.1057/s41261-021-00146-4
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85103211589
SN - 1745-6452
VL - 22
SP - 319
EP - 341
JO - Journal of Banking Regulation
JF - Journal of Banking Regulation
IS - 4
ER -