The pervasive interconnection of autonomous sensor devices has given birth to a broad class of exciting new applications. At the same time, however, the unattended nature and the limited resources of sensor nodes have created an equal number of vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit in order to gain access in the network and the information transferred within. While much work has been done on trying to defend these networks, little has been done on suggesting sophisticated tools for proving how vulnerable sensor networks are. This work demonstrates a tool that allows both passive monitoring of transactional data in sensor networks, such as message rate, mote frequency, message routing, etc., but also discharge of various attacks against them. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of an attack tool that can be used by an adversary to penetrate the confidentiality and functionality of a sensor network. Results show that our tool can be flexibly applied to different sensor network operating systems and protocol stacks giving an adversary privileges to which she is not entitled to. We hope that our tool will be used proactively, to study the weaknesses of new security protocols, and, hopefully, to enhance the level of security provided by these solutions even further.
|Titel||Blackhat Europe 2010, Digital Self Defense|
|Publikationsdato||12 apr. 2010|
|Status||Udgivet - 12 apr. 2010|
|Begivenhed||Black Hat ® Technical Security Conference: Europe 2010 - Barcelona, Spanien|
Varighed: 12 apr. 2011 → 15 apr. 2011
|Konference||Black Hat ® Technical Security Conference: Europe 2010|
|Periode||12/04/2011 → 15/04/2011|