Why ‘Swampman’ would not even get as far as thinking it was Davidson: On the spatio-temporal basis of Davidson’s conjuring trick.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

In this article, we analyse one of the most famous recent thought-experiments in philosophy, namely Donald Davidson's Swampman. Engaging recent commentators on Davidson's Swampman as well as analysing the spatio-temporal conditions of the thought-experiment, we will show how the ‘experiment’ inevitably fails. For it doesn't take seriously some of its own defining characteristics: crucially, Swampman's creation of a sudden in a place distinct from Davidson's. Instead of denigrating philosophical thought-experiments per se, our analysis points towards considering thought-experiments in a different sense: imaginary scenarios helpfully self-deconstructing rather than constituting substantive philosophical resources.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftPhilosophical Investigations
Vol/bind42
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)350-366
Antal sider17
ISSN0190-0536
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2019

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Why ‘Swampman’ would not even get as far as thinking it was Davidson: On the spatio-temporal basis of Davidson’s conjuring trick. / Christensen, Bo Allesøe; Read, Rupert.

I: Philosophical Investigations, Bind 42, Nr. 4, 2019, s. 350-366.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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