A Case of Greenlandic Fisheries Co-Politics: Power and Participation in Total Allowable Catch Policy-Making

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Greenlandic governance institutions have been criticised for their colonial heritage of centralisation and lack of democratic participation. In the same manner, Greenlandic fisheries management is notorious in the academic literature for its centralised and locally illegitimate character. While recognising the lack of localised co-management fisheries governance institutions in Greenland, we argue that something has yet to be said about power and user participation in the centralised institutions that have developed. From a symbolic interactionist perspective we dissect the centralised institutions in terms of a differentiated cast of actors and their interaction and argue that participation and power come in many institutional guises as the complex cast of actors within the centralised system represent themselves and others. If we are to understand power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance, we need to understand the creation of alliances of the subject-positions that seek control of the self-rule fisheries governance decision-making.
Original languageEnglish
JournalHuman Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)175-184
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2012

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