Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Manfred J. Holler; Peter Skott

doi:10.1007/s11127-005-3417-4

Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Manfred J. Holler^*, Peter Skott

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.

Original language	English
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	125
Issue number	1-2
Pages (from-to)	215-228
Number of pages	14
ISSN	0048-5829
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-3417-4
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2005

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AB - Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.

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Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Abstract

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