Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions

Patrick Leoni, Frederik Lundtofte*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review


We explore the link between informativeness of signals, stochastic dominance and equilibrium bids in a multi-unit auction with risk averse bidders. We show that for a particular class of signal distributions, informativeness is related to conditional first-order stochastic dominance, so that a higher degree of informativeness in the signal-fundamental distribution induces higher bids and therefore higher revenues. Our framework is relevant for discussing total revenues and informativeness in US Treasury auctions.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Letters
Pages (from-to)80-82
Number of pages3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2017
Externally publishedYes


  • Common value auctions
  • Informativeness
  • Stochastic dominance


Dive into the research topics of 'Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: The case of Treasury auctions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this