Pay as You Speed, ISA with incentive for not speeding: Results and interpretation of speed data

Harry Lahrmann, Niels Agerholm, Nerius Tradisauskas, Kasper Klitgaard Berthelsen, Lisbeth Harms

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

To simulate a market introduction of Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) and to study the effect of a Pay as You Speed (PAYS) concept, a field trial with 153 drivers was conducted during 2007–2009. The participants drove under PAYS conditions for a shorter or a longer period. The PAYS concept consisted of informative ISA linked with economic incentive for not speeding, measured through automatic count of penalty points whenever the speed limit was exceeded. The full incentive was set to 30% of a participant's insurance premium. The participants were exposed to different treatments, with and without incentive crossed with informative ISA present or absent. The results showed that ISA is an efficient tool for reducing speeding particularly on rural roads. The analysis of speed data demonstrated that the proportion of distance driven above the speed where the ISA equipment responded (PDA) was a sensitive measure for reflecting the effect of ISA, whereas mean free flow speed and the 85th percentile speed, were less sensitive to ISA effects. The PDA increased a little over time but still remained at a low level; however, when ISA was turned off, the participants’ speeding relapsed to the baseline level. Both informative ISA and incentive ISA reduced the PDA, but there was no statistically significant interaction. Informative reduced it more than the incentive.
Original languageEnglish
JournalAccident Analysis & Prevention
Volume48
Issue numberSeptember
Pages (from-to)17-28
ISSN0001-4575
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Cite this

Lahrmann, Harry ; Agerholm, Niels ; Tradisauskas, Nerius ; Berthelsen, Kasper Klitgaard ; Harms, Lisbeth. / Pay as You Speed, ISA with incentive for not speeding : Results and interpretation of speed data. In: Accident Analysis & Prevention. 2012 ; Vol. 48, No. September. pp. 17-28.
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Pay as You Speed, ISA with incentive for not speeding : Results and interpretation of speed data. / Lahrmann, Harry; Agerholm, Niels; Tradisauskas, Nerius; Berthelsen, Kasper Klitgaard; Harms, Lisbeth.

In: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 48, No. September, 2012, p. 17-28.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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