Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols.

Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian Mödersheim, Achim D. Brucker, Anders Schlichtkrull

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceedingArticle in proceedingResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Number of pages16
PublisherIEEE
Publication date2021
Pages1-16
ISBN (Print)978-1-7281-7608-6
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-7281-7607-9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Event 2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) -
Duration: 21 Jun 202125 Jun 2021

Conference

Conference 2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Period21/06/202125/06/2021
SeriesProceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
ISSN1940-1434

Cite this