Abstract
We propose a simple theoretical model for how a company with both private and state shareholders decides on its optimal tax policy. The model predicts that even in the absence of state shareholding, a company will not always pick a tax policy that minimizes taxes. Conversely, majority state ownership will generally not result in zero tax avoidance. Using panel regressions on the entire population of state-owned as well as publicly listed Swedish companies from 2000–2019, we find that a one standard deviation increase in state ownership increases corporate tax payments by around 14%.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 110063 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 208 |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021 The Author(s)
Keywords
- Ownership structure
- State ownership
- Tax avoidance