Underwater Jamming Attacks as Incomplete Information Games

Federico Chiariotti, Alberto Signori, Filippo Campagnaro, Michele Zorzi

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/conference proceedingArticle in proceedingResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) have several fundamental civilian and military applications, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against their communications are a serious threat. In this work, we analyze such an attack using game theory in an asymmetric scenario, in which the node under attack does not know the position of the jammer that blocks its signals. The jammer has a dual objective, namely, disrupting communications and forcing the legitimate transmitter to spend more energy protecting its own transmissions. Our model shows that, if both nodes act rationally, the transmitter is able to quickly reduce its disadvantage, estimating the location of the jammer and responding optimally to the attack.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication IEEE INFOCOM 2020 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)
Number of pages6
PublisherIEEE Communications Society
Publication dateJul 2020
Pages1033-1038
Article number9162758
ISBN (Electronic)9781728186955
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Jamming
  • Security in underwater networks
  • Underwater acoustic networks

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