**Brazil’s South Atlantic Strategy**

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**Introduction**

*…Brazil has strong ties with the ocean, both in political and economic aspects, which leads it to exercise a natural influence over the South Atlantic.* (Brazilian government, 2012: 17)

This paper analyzes Brazil’s South Atlantic strategy as part of its overall strategy of insertion in the international political and economic system. The paper focuses on Brazil’s South Atlantic security strategy and how it relates to the country’s economic strategy. As noted in the citation above from Brazil’s White Book on National Defense from 2012, Brazil is interested in exercising its influence in the South Atlantic space and finds this would be natural given its geographical location with an extensive South Atlantic coast line from São Roque in Northeastern Brazil to its Southern border with Uruguay.

It is argued that Brazil aims at creating a sphere of interest encompassing South America, the South Atlantic and Western Africa through a policy of cooperation and strengthening of economic and political ties in this region with which Brazil seeks to promote its economic and political interests as well as greater regional autonomy under the leadership of Brazil that is the strongest power in this geographical space. This has potential geopolitical implications at the level of the Western Hemisphere as well as on the global level.

The intended contribution of the paper is to provide a characterization and interpretation of Brazil’s South Atlantic strategy. In seeking an understanding of this strategy the analysis draws on Ruy Mauro Marini’s theory of Brazil as a “sub-imperialist state” (Marini, 1965 and 1974) and Amado Luiz Cervo’s theory of Brazil as a “logistical state” (Cervo, 2008, 2010 and 2012), since a discussion of the main issue in the light of these two theories is fruitful in terms of both understanding and characterizing Brazil’s South Atlantic strategy.

**Brazil’s South Atlantic Strategy in the Context of the 21st Century**

Brazil’s South Atlantic Strategy is best understood in the broader context of Brazil’s “rise” in the global power hierarchy along with a number of other ”emerging powers” in the 21st Century. This process started before the international financial crisis that broke out in the United States in September 2008, but the financial crisis has further contributed to changing global power balances particularly to the benefit of emerging powers. During the last decade Brazil has experienced considerable economic growth coupled with broad improvements in living standards of its population. At the same time, Brazil has gained an increasingly significant role in international politics as part of the BRICS coalition (Christensen, 2013) and through its strong engagement with South America as well as its growing emphasis on its relations with Africa (Christensen, 2012). This is part of an overall international political strategy of giving growing emphasis to its relationships and cooperation with countries in the global South (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007; Christensen, 2012). The strategy relates to the understanding of the international system of the governments led by the Workers’ Party (PT) since 2003. The Brazilian governments’ understanding of the international system, developments within the system and Brazil’s position in it from the outset of the Lula government in 2003 has been described well by Samuel Pinheiro Guimerães, the Secretary General of foreign policy of the Lula governments (2003-2010). He emphasizes the centralization of global power through “hegemonic structures” dominated by the highly developed countries and led by the United States. Brazil’s integration in the system was seen as somewhat problematic due to its external vulnerability. Therefore, it was essential for Brazil to reduce its external vulnerability and increase its autonomy (Guimarães, 2003). On this basis Brazil should pursue the construction of a multipolar world through collaboration with other great peripheral states and thereby promote its own sovereign insertion in the global order in a non-subordinated manner (Guimarães, 2005: 157). According to his vision, Brazil should furthermore seek to build a South American pole of power through South American integration since Brazil was seen as not being sufficiently strong on its own to become a pole in a multipolar world system.

In the Brazilian government’s White Book of National Defense (2012: 27), it notes the ongoing transition in the 21st Century towards a multipolar order characterized by the coexistence of traditional powers and emerging powers and highlights the importance of Brazil’s defense policy in an overall strategy of “affirmative and sovereign insertion” in the international system that should promote Brazil’s vision of “cooperative multipolarity” (2012: 29). Former Brazilian Foreign minister Antônio Patriota has used the concepts of “cooperative and inclusive multipolarity” and “benign multipolarity” (BRICS Policy Center, 2011: 2) to describe the same thing, namely a multipolar order that is at the same time cooperative by including emerging powers and socially inclusive by promoting anti-poverty aims. It is in this context that Brazil’s strategy of creating a sphere of influence in South America and in the South Atlantic should be understood. Creating such an area of influence should further several Brazilian goals such as a “competitive insertion” in the global economy, strengthening Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat in a reformed United Nations Security Council and, finally, contributing to a more socially balanced and inclusive global order, and, as a consequence, also the creation of a more stable and peaceful situation of the world system (Brazilian government, 2012: 27-51). This description of Brazil’s aims and practice of foreign policy corresponds to Cervo’s view of Brazil as a “logistical state” that defends the principle of “reciprocity multilateralism” of results that describes a situation where all countries gain from multilateralism thereby paving the road for a more inclusive global order (Cervo, 2010). The theory of Brazil as a “sub-imperial state” has a far less benign view of Brazil’s intentions as well as the results of Brazil’s foreign policy actions. According to this theory, Brazil pursues a kind of “neo-mercantilist” economic policy towards South America and Africa that corresponds to the interests of Brazilian economic elites. Brazil is thus seen as participating in a “new scramble” for natural resources in Africa in which the traditional developed countries as well as the “emerging countries” take part, with the participation of governments, big private businesses as well as state companies (Fiori, 2013: 43). This new scramble is seen as exploitative and as going against the interests of the broad popular masses. The logistical state theory is in agreement with the view that the Brazilian state promotes the expansion of Brazilian capitalism through its support of the internationalization of Brazilian businesses, but disagrees with the argument that the outcome is necessarily exploitation and negative social outcomes for the broad popular masses. Instead it depicts the motivations behind Brazilian engagement as not only defending Brazilian businesses and Brazilian socio-economic development but also as defending the socially inclusive potential of “reciprocity multilateralism”. This corresponds to the official government view that Brazil promotes “benign multipolarity” or “cooperative and inclusive multipolarity”.

Regardless of the theoretical perspective one believes best explains the motivations and policies of Brazilian foreign policy, it is widely agreed amongst Brazil-oriented scholars that the PT governments from the outset emphasized South America as the prioritized region for Brazilian foreign policy, since the region was seen as essential to Brazilian interests. This focus has later been widened to include Western Africa and the South Atlantic as Brazil’s significant regional “strategic environment” in the 21st Century (Fiori, 2013: 44).

The new emphasis on the Southern Atlantic Ocean can be related to the discovery of vast reserves of oil and natural gas, in the so-called “Pré-sal” in the Brazilian waters from 2007 as well as discoveries of oil and gas in the African parts of the South Atlantic. However, the Brazilian interest in the South Atlantic precedes the big oil and gas discoveries of 2007 and later. In 2004 the concept of “Blue Amazon” was promoted by the Brazilian Marine forces in order to call attention to the importance of Brazil’s ocean resources by comparing Brazilian territorial waters with the Amazon, or “Green Amazon”, that has traditionally been considered of key importance for a variety of reasons including both the existence of significant natural resources (Wiesebron, 2013: 108) and the importance of having effective sovereignty over this vast space. The “Blue Amazon” corresponds to Brazil’s jurisdictional waters including, not only the waters within the 200 sea mile limit set by the regime of the seas, UNCLOS, in 1982, but also waters corresponding to Brazil’s continental platform taking into consideration Brazilian islands far removed from the coast. Thus, approximately 3,6 million square kilometers are recognized as Brazilian waters while another approximately 900.000 square kilometers are claimed by Brazil (Brazilian government, 2012: 17 and 44), an area that is similar in size to the Brazilian Amazon.

**Brazil’s Security Strategy in the South Atlantic**

 ”*In its relations with other countries, Brazil emphasizes its immediate geopolitical surroundings constituted by South America, the South Atlantic and the Western coast of Africa”* (Brazilian government, 2012: 12. Author’s translation from Portuguese)

The concepts of ”security” and ”defense” are sometimes used as synonyms, but they don’t always cover the same. In 2002, Ronaldo Pierre Cavalcanti Lundgren published the results of the project of delineating a Brazilian Security Strategy in a research project conducted at the U.S. Army War College. In this document that counted with Colonel Josph R. Nuñez as a Project Advisor, Lundgren highlights how Brazilian democratic governments had tried to avoid the use of the term “national security”, because they found that the concept had been misused by the authoritarian governments in Brazil between 1964 and 1985 giving it a meaning that allowed to pursue “*political persecution and violation of human rights*” (Lundgren, 2002: 1) as part of its national security doctrine of suppressing the perceived internal enemies in Brazilian society. Lundgren’s aim is to reintroduce the concept of national security due to its importance for the Brazilian nation. He argues that: “*National security is an integral part of individual and communal needs. Without it, there is a lack of those conditions necessary for societal development*” (Lundgren, 2002: 1). Therefore it is important to develop a Brazilian security strategy is his argument. In order to do so it is necessary to distinguish between the concept of “security” and the concept of “defense” he argues citing the Minister of Defense at the time of his writing, Geraldo Quintão, for saying that “…*it is necessary that every national state clearly defines its perception of concepts of security and defense*”. He further cites Quintão for specifying his understanding of the two concepts: “*Security is an ideal state, a condition; defense is a real side, directly linked to a specific kind of characterized and measured threat.*” Based on this understanding that opens up for seeing security as a dynamic concept of how a society understands the condition of security at a given point in time Lundgren introduces his own and new concept of national security: “*National security is a responsibility of both the state and the people respectively, represented by government institutions and private organizations, in relation to external and/or internal vulnerabilities, that threaten to, or have the potential to, weaken state structures and/or reduce human development*.” (Lundgren, 2002: 2).

Since Lundgren developed his suggestion for a Brazilian security strategy based on his conceptualization of national security just cited Brazil has been ruled by a government coalition with the Workers’ Party (PT) as the presidential party. During the presidencies of Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003-2006 and 2007-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014) Brazil has moved towards attaching great emphasis to matters of “national defense”. An important outcome of this has been three documents (Ministry of Defense, 2005, 2008; Brazilian government, 2012) promulgated by the Ministry of Defense that was first created in 1999, as defense matters were the turf of the military before this. The 2008 document entitled “National Strategy of Defense” with the subtitle “Peace and Security for Brazil” was the first of its kind in Brazilian history. It particularly aimed at making defense issues an area of interest on the national agenda. This meant that society should be engaged in debating defense issues that were seen as important for both state interests and the interests of society at large as argued in the introductory statements of Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, the Minister Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency (Ministry of Defense, 2008: 5-6). Another issue stressed from the outset in the document was the desirability of developing a systematic formulation of a strategy of national defense linked directly to a strategy of national development. These two should be linked, it was argued, because “*The national strategy of defense is inseparable from the national strategy of development. The latter drives the former. The former provides shielding to the latter*.” (Ministry of Defense 2008: 8). Lastly, ministers Jobim and Unger stressed that Brazil’s new prominent position in the international scenario that had been gained through political and economic stability made it necessary to develop a new posture in defense matters (Ministry of Defense, 2008: 5). In the 2012 document, the Brazilian “White Book of National Defense”, it is similarly stressed that Brazil should take active part in the construction of the new nascent international order underway, In this new order Brazil needed to take a posture on the international scene that was at the same time affirmative and cooperative. Also, it was seen as necessary to coordinate the Brazilian external agenda closely between the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) with the Ministry of Defense in order to promote the consolidation of broadly representative structures of global governance that should reflect the new distribution of world power (Brazilian government, 2012: 27). In this context of the rise of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the international system Brazil should promote a multipolar order that was cooperative, in conceptual terms “cooperative multipolarity” (Brazilian government, 2012: 28 and 30). At the same time this cooperative multipolar order should be inclusive in social terms thereby contributing to a fairer social model for the world and to world peace. It is argued that security and development are intimately connected and that these two aims should be promoted internationally through multilateral institutions (Brazilian government, 2012: 31). We could thus conceptually speak of Brazil promoting a world order characterized as “cooperative and inclusive multipolarity” through mechanisms of “reciprocity multilateralism” of results as in Cervo’s conceptualization (2010).

The 2008 document stressed amongst other things the importance for Brazil of strengthening the military capacity of the country and that this should be achieved in part by means of developing the country’s defense industry and to develop technological mastering in the military field as a way to promote a sovereign presence in the world and reduce the country’s dependence on imported technology, not the least in strategic sectors, such as space and nuclear technology (Ministry of Defense, 2008: 32-36). Furthermore, the army should be repositioned. It was centered in the South Eastern part of the country, which is also the economic and industrial heartland of the country, but should expand towards the North, West and South Atlantic regions as these were seen as the areas of greatest concern regarding threats to the country (Ministry of Defence, 2008: 13), which were characterized as diffuse. However, it was stressed that two particularly central perceptions of threat was the threat of far superior force in the Amazon and the threat of armed conflict in the South Atlantic region (Ministry of Defense, 2008: 48).

Brazil’s national defense strategy has not always been received well nor understood well outside the country. The prestigious “The Economist” for instance brought an article on September 9th  2010 with the title “What is Brazil’s army for?” In this text The Economist criticizes and even ridicules the Brazilian defense strategy. The journal particularly emphasizes that it makes no sense for Brazil to expand its military presence in the Amazon given that the country is at peace with its neighboring countries, and it also stresses that it is surprising that the Brazilian government would support the military’s plans of developing nuclear propelled sub-marines to defend the “blue” Amazon (The Economist, 2010). However, from a Brazilian perspective, both in terms of the military and the government, this makes good sense as Brazil sees a need in being able to protect their territory and key resources that can contribute to national socio-economic development. This makes sense in a geopolitical context where oil and gas as well as other natural resources are becoming scarce and valuable and it makes sense from the perspective of Brazil wanting an enhanced stature on the international political scene, although Brazil’s actual military capacity is far inferior to that of important NATO powers such as the United States and Great Britain that are significant actors in the South Atlantic. The White Book of National Defense stresses that although new themes or threats such as piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking and environmental degradation are relevant threats that must be dealt with through defense measures and policies the main players in the international system are still national states and the most important potential external threats also come from foreign states (Brazilian government, 2012: 28).

Thus, from a Brazilian perspective armed conflict in the South Atlantic is one of the greatest potential threats facing Brazil. This threat is related to potential and actual conflicts regarding energy resources in the South Atlantic. The Falkland Islands that are located outside the coast of Argentina while belonging to Great Britain are at the center of actual non-violent conflicts that are being processed diplomatically at the United Nations. In the recent Montevideo Declaration, the member states of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) claimed that Great Britain was developing illegitimate hydrocarbon activities in areas around the Falkland Islands as well as other British islands in the region while reinforcing their military presence in the area (ZOPACAS, 2013). This claim was denied by the British at a UN General Assembly meeting on May 17 in 2013 (UN, GA/11374, 2013). The issue of energy resources, however, is broader and involves the South Atlantic as a whole, but particularly the Brazilian Pré-Sal oil and gas fields as well as all and gas fields particularly of Nigeria and Angola in the Gulf of Guinea outside the African coast. Other natural resources including different minerals and fish, as well as the issue of maritime sea routes relevant for international trade are also important. However, the interest surrounding the South Atlantic both on the part of the countries in this region and countries from outside this region with interest in it has grown considerably after the huge oil and gas finds that have created this need to underline the claim of states in the region to their sovereignty of territorial waters and desire to block potential initiatives from outside the region to militarize the region (Pereira, 2013: 34).

ZOPACAS was initially instated in 1986 on the initiative of Brazil with the aim of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the region (Amorim, 2013: 11-12). In the 1970s, the Brazilian government and private business actors, particularly exporters in the manufacturing sector, had developed great interest in Africa in large part due to a high level of mutual trade between Brazil and Western African countries as well as investments by Petrobrás in the oil and gas sectors (Marini, 1974). Brazil had not pursued an independent security strategy in the region, however, as the government saw cooperation under US leadership as necessary in the Cold War context it chose not to take on a leadership role in the region abstaining from a more active independent military role (Pereira, 2013: 40). Mutual trade had fallen drastically in the 1990s and a number of Brazilian embassies had been closed in Africa indicating a reduced emphasis on relations with the African continent (Amorim, 2013: 15). Similarly, ZOPACAS was not strongly emphasized in this period as can be evidenced in the very few meetings held by the organization. This meant that Brazil was not trying to gain the initiative in the region. However, a renewed emphasis on Africa and new embassy openings in Africa was the tendency after the installment of the Lula government in 2003 (Fiori, 2013).

The revitalization of ZOPACAS took hold in 2007, the same year that Brazil or rather the Brazilian energy giant Petrobrás started making some of its new discoveries of oil and natural gas. The discoveries of oil and natural gas increased international interest in the South Atlantic region and can be seen as the main explanatory factor behind Brazil’s great interest in moving towards a situation in which extra-regional military vessels could be kept outside the South Atlantic allowing the region to gain control. As by far the greatest power in the region such a situation was very desirable as it was likely to make Brazil a leader in the region. Fiori points out (2013), however, that Brazil is militarily vulnerable in the South Atlantic area due to its weak military capacity when compared to that of NATO powers Great Britain and the United States. What we see Brazil doing, however, is to use positive diplomatic relations with states in the region as well as multilateral organizations such as ZOPACAS to gain influence through diplomacy carried out through key institutions of the existing world order such as the UN. Another aspect of this approach is Brazil’s focus on dialogue diplomacy and discursive means to develop understandings that support the argument that states in the South Atlantic region should have the right to control the region and to use the resources found there to develop the deprived and somewhat politically unstable region in socio-economic terms lifting living standards and reducing poverty and hunger. This strategy of using diplomacy, dialogue and discursive tools to spread support for the Brazilian position could potentially be efficient from the perspective of Brazilian interests, but it is still too early to say anything definite in this regard.

Brazil has been very active in promoting the South Atlantic as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation as well as the promotion of South America as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in this context. In both cases there is an aim of keeping extra-regional powers out of the region militarily. Former defense minister Nelson Jobim made this very explicit with a statement explaining the significance of the South American Defense Council that was established in 2008/2009 under UNASUR, the South American Union, as being a matter of securing that the “*defense of South America should only be undertaken by South America*.” (Nelson Jobim cited in Einaudi, 2011: 7). The activation of the USA’s Fourth Fleet in 2008 and a diplomatic conflict between Colombia and Ecuador over Colombia’s intrusion on Ecuadorian territory in a raid on a group of individuals belonging to the Colombian guerrilla/terrorist group FARC without prior permission may have been important triggers behind the creation of the South American Defense Council in the same year. The activation of the Fourth Fleet was strongly criticized by the Brazilian leadership that considered it to be an act of intimidation on the part of the United States in a context of huge oil and gas discoveries.

The White Paper on National Defense describes South America as a security community and as a block in military terms and that it is focused on maintenance of peace and dissuasion against intrusion by forces from outside the region (Brazilian government, 2012: 34). ZOPACAS has a similar meaning to Brazil regarding the South Atlantic although the collaboration can be seen as more nascent. Brazil’s aim is to assure that the region, i.e. the member states of ZOPACAS assure their control of the region in terms of defense issues and the ZOPACAS Treaty itself is an important element in reaching this aim as is the Brazilian focus on defense cooperation with countries in the region. A number of defense cooperation treaties have been signed after 2003 with most of them signed from 2009 (Aguilar, 2013). The ZOPACAS Treaty was established at the UN with Resolution 41/11 of the General Assembly in 1986 on the initiative of Brazil. Its focus was to assure that militarily powerful states from outside the South Atlantic region should not introduce nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the South Atlantic and that conflicts and rivalries foreign to the region should not be projected over the region by states located in other regions (Brazilian government, 2012: 34). There is a clear parallelism in what is going on in the South American region or sub-region and in the South Atlantic region or sub-region. However, at the outset of the PT government in 2003, Brazil’s strategic regional emphasis was on South America but has come to extend to Western Africa and the South Atlantic in the new understanding of Brazil’s strategic environment.

When it comes to the issue of assuring regional control of the South Atlantic region, Brazil is an essential state due its superior power resources. However, José Luís Fiori stresses that Brazil is quite vulnerable in defense terms due to a military capacity including that of it its marine capacity that is strongly inferior to the power of the United States, Great Britain and NATO as a whole and he points out that it will take years and even decades to significantly strengthen Brazil’s capacity in this area. Similarly, he doubts that the states of the South Atlantic will be able to cooperate closely due to a lack of common interests (Fiori, 2013: 42). This last issue remains to be seen, however. One could consider the Montevideo Declaration from the last ZOPACAS summit in Montevideo, Uruguay, in January 2013 an indication that an element of common identity formation and interest convergence around the aims of the ZOPACAS Treaty may be developing in the region. This is clearly a Brazilian aim, as Brazil in its White Book of National Defense considers ZOPACAS to be significant for Brazilian defense (Brazilian government, 2012).

Brazil is clearly dedicated to developing defense oriented collaboration initiatives in the South Atlantic region. Similarly, it seeks to work towards mutual trust amongst states in the region as well as to exchange information on defense related issues. It has done so through a range of initiatives including a number of bilateral cooperation agreements, defense oriented initiatives in the trilateral IBSA Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil and South Africa that was created in 2003 and multilateral initiatives such as ZOPACAS. One IBSA initiative is IBSAMAR, a marine initiative that includes India that like Brazil has a relatively large fleet contrary to South Africa (Amorim, 2013) and other African states that tend to have weak military capacity. In Bilateral cooperation agreements in defense include Cap Verde, South Africa, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Angola and Equatorial Guinea (Aguilar, 2013: 57-58). Many of these agreements are from 2009 and 2010 reflecting the revitalization of ZOPACAS in 2007 and including significant oil producing countries. Technical cooperation is typically a significant aspect of these agreements. Brazilian development aid or its South-South cooperation often takes the form of technical cooperation rather than financial aid. However, in the case of Brazil’s technical cooperation with Namibia for instance, cooperation largely has had the form of assistance as Brazil initially financed the building of a Namibian fleet (Aguilar, 2013: 59-60). Brazil has similarly cooperated with Argentina on strategic nuclear related issues and has undertaken military exercises with both Argentina and Uruguay, the other two South American members of ZOPACAS that counts three South American countries and 21 African countries (Brazilian government, 2012).

**Brazil’s Economic Interests in the South Atlantic region**

Brazil has a strong interest in the vast energy resources in the South Atlantic as well as in mineral resources, fish and commercial sea routes. Most of Brazil’s international trade takes place by way of ocean transport from the South Atlantic to markets in the North Atlantic, the Pacific Ocean as well as the Indian Ocean as well as to other destinations in the South Atlantic area. They wish not to encounter any obstacles for this trade (Brazilian government, 2012). The energy resources are clearly strategically important and it is highlighted in the Government’s White Paper on National Defense (2012) as well as in the Montevideo Declaration of ZOPACAS (2013) that these resources are of great importance to the socioeconomic development of countries in the South Atlantic region and to the fight against poverty and hunger in the region, and thus the resources are important in the political stabilization of unstable countries in the region and therefore also for peace. Brazil’s emphasis on the theme of energy resources became stronger that previously with the new oil and gas finds from 2007 and ahead. Trade with African countries as well as other economic links received growing interest on the part of Brazil from 2003 with the new Lula government as part of its more general increased emphasis on South-South trade with its strategy of trade diversification. Between 2003 and 2009 Brazilian exports to Africa grew five-fold (Amorim, 2010), while Africa’s share in overall Brazilian exports grew more modestly from 3.91 % in 2003 to 4.72 % in 2011 (Shutte, 2012: 70). Brazilian trade patterns with Africa follow a North-South pattern with Brazil specializing in manufacturing exports to Africa while mostly importing natural resources. This pattern of trade is the same as the pattern in the 1970s when the military government had also attached much importance to its trade with Africa. In fact, the great importance attached to the African market was most likely a pragmatic reason why the Brazilian military government decided to establish relations with and recognize the left-wing national liberation movements that had gained power in Portuguese speaking Angola and Guinea Bissau. At that earlier time, Africa’s share in Brazilian exports was even greater than it has been in the 21st Century. However it was reduced significantly in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, a period in which the focus on Africa was weakened as evidenced also in several embassy closings by Brazil on the continent. Clearly, this pattern is in Brazil’s interest as it seeks to strengthen its manufacturing sector. This pattern of trade resembles Brazil’s trade patterns in most of South America (and much of the rest of Latin America) (Christensen, 2012a) with some partial exceptions in those countries that are the most industrially advanced in the region, particularly Argentina.

Brazilian foreign direct investments in Africa have also grown significantly in recent years, particularly in the sector of energy and in the mining sector, sectors where Brazil has very strong big companies. Thus, the two biggest Brazilian investors in Africa are Petrobrás and Vale which respectively belong to the energy and the mining sector (Fiori, 2013: 45). This going out strategy has been supported by the government and by the public development bank, the BNDES through a new “national champions” policy of giving great priority in its credit giving to the internationalization of some of the biggest Brazilian businesses. According to Markus Kröger, this policy gained new impetus from 2008 (Króger, 2012: 887). In that same year Brazil’s “Integration with Africa” program was initiated with a focus of enhancing businesses and economic links (Fiori, 2013: 45). Businesses in other sectors are also interested in investing in Africa, these are sectors such as agriculture, bioenergy and engineering businesses in the infrastructural area, sectors where Brazil has strong companies. These same sectors are also the most significant areas of Brazilian business internationalization in South America as well as other parts of Latin America. In Latin America Brazil has been active in investments in the manufacturing sector as well, not the least in Argentina (Christensen, 2012a).

Apart from these ’hard’ aspects of Brazilian economic interests in the region more ’soft’ aspects are also relevant. These aspects involve Brazilian international cooperation policies, the so-called South-South cooperation (SSC) or South-South development cooperation (SSDC). Brazil has joined the ranks of other “emerging donors”, particularly donors or cooperation partners such as China and India which have introduced new conceptions of official international solidarity-oriented policies. These countries tend to avoid conditional lending that has been an important element in the cooperation policies from traditional donors belonging to the OECD countries trying to promoted democracy and “good governance” as they understand it. The emerging donors are less inclined to encroach on the ‘policy space’ of ‘recipients’. A central component in Brazil’s SSDC consists in technical cooperation agreements in a wide range of areas such as agriculture, health, defense, education, poverty reduction and eradication of hunger and a wide range of other areas (Schutte, 2012: 70). Apart from this, Brazil has also contributed to debt reduction agreements in Africa. Brazil’s SSDC is organized in a peculiar way as it is headed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, ABC that is part of the foreign ministry. The ABC collaborates with other organizations that specialize in different sectors and these organizations carry out the actual technical cooperation in the fields they specialize in, these being fields where Brazil has a considerable level of technical expertise. In some cases a triangular set-up is made when partners such as other states or international organizations collaborate with the Brazilian party and the recipient party such as in the area of the Zero Hunger program (Fraundorfer, 2013: 101-102) that has been praised internationally and which Brazil has engaged in internationalizing through different partnerships. Another area is agriculture where the Brazilian research organization EMBRAPA is the agent of ABC entering into technical cooperation projects with ‘recipients’ in for instance Africa and Latin America. Brazilian SSRD is typically seen as very different from the development cooperation of traditional donors, both because of the absence of conditionalities, but also because the widespread use of a demand-oriented approach to cooperation, i.e. that the recipient must itself want and ask for entering technical cooperation agreements and projects with the Brazilian counterparts. This aspect is received well both in Africa (Aguilar, 2013: 65) and in Latin America where Brazil develops technical cooperation projects as in Africa, Africa being the biggest recipient of Brazilian cooperation. Sandra Bry Husum shows in case study analyses the positive reception in Latin America by the Brazilian demand-oriented approach to technical cooperation, though she argues that there may currently be a tendency that Brazil is starting to be less selfless in its approach to technical cooperation that has so far been perceived as having a strong solidarity focus by focusing on what recipients want to achieve. She argues that the Dilma government seems to be introducing expectations of gains for Brazilian businesses in the context of technical cooperation (Bry, 2014 forthcoming). Technical cooperation agreements are not only celebrated with poor countries with low levels of technical capacities. It is also pursued amongst Brazil and other emerging powers, e.g. in the area of defense where Brazil collaborates with China in the satellite project CBERS, a project initiated in 1988 (Wiesebron). Brazil also has a strategic partnership with France in the defense sector where a key concern is the transfer of technology and know-how from French producers to Brazil. Brazil has two main aims with this arrangement. One is mainly strategic, namely to strengthen its domestic technological capacity and depend less on imports in the sector. The other aim is to develop defense sector industries that can substitute imports and contribute to growing Brazilian exports of technologically advanced production in the defense sector. In this way the defense sector would contribute to Brazilian development. This dual focus reflects the close relationship between defense and development highlighted in the 2008 Strategy of National Defense (Ministry of Defense, 2008). A number of the initiatives taken in the defense sector, not the least the Pro-Sub program (Wiesebron, 2013: 117), are very relevant in Brazil’s South Atlantic security strategy. The Pro-Sub program’s aim is to develop and produce nuclear propelled submarines to patrol in the South Atlantic thus participating in the control of the area and in the policy of dissuasion against intrusions by extra-regional powers. The government sees this as an important aspect in the defense of Brazilian energy resources under the bottom of the sea in the South Atlantic. Brazil’s demand-oriented technical cooperation with less developed countries can be seen as a demonstration that Brazil is indeed a humanistic country trying to assure inclusion of poor segments of populations in other developing countries. When Brazil is perceived in this way it will give it local good-will in receiving countries. If this is achieved, Brazilian “soft power” is strengthened. This would be desirable for Brazil for instance in the case of its collaboration with West African countries in the South Atlantic area as it may strengthen Brazil’s aim of creating an area of influence in this region and thereby also strengthen the potential for strengthening ZOPACAS and the idea of a South Atlantic controlled by states in the region. This would be relevant from a security perspective and could also strengthen Brazil’s bid for a permanent position in a reformed UN Security Council. Another benefit from positive African perceptions of Brazil could potentially also be reaped in the commercial area both in terms of growing mutual trade and in a positive view and treatment of Brazilian direct investments in Africa.

**Conclusion**

Enormous oil and gas discoveries in the South Atlantic, both in Brazilian territorial waters and in West African territorial waters have increased the interest of states from the region as well as extra-regional powers in the South Atlantic. It has also contributed to the revitalization of ZOPACAS and Brazilian technical cooperation with West African states in the area of defense. Brazil aims at rising in the international hierarchy of states and at gaining greater influence on world order. In this context, it is Brazil’s aim to develop a leadership position in the South Atlantic region and work towards a situation in which extra-regional powers are pushed out of the South Atlantic militarily. This would enhance Brazil’s political stance in the region and would make it increasingly influential on the world stage. In the economic domain such a development in the security area would enhance regional control of abundant and valuable natural resources, particularly energy resources, which can be utilized to advance socioeconomic development in Brazil as well as several West African states. This could potentially create a virtuous circle of economic development in the region which could contribute to political stabilization as well as to broad-based improvements in living standards in the region.

With an aim of improving its image in the region and promote regional support for Brazil’s wish to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security council, Brazil has engaged in technical cooperation with countries in the region. This cooperation can also be seen from a perspective that highlights aspects of solidarity and inclusive development as significant motivations behind Brazilian foreign policy. However, Brazilian technical cooperation in the region in e.g. the military area also aims at promoting the aim of an autonomous South Atlantic region controlling its own security affairs with Brazil being the leader and dominant power thereby contributing to Brazil’s rise and influence in the international system. Brazilian economic motivations are also relevant, as Brazil seeks to promote ever denser trade and investment relations with countries in the region. These relations follow a North-South pattern with Brazil in the role of the North exporting manufacturing products and investing in the region. This aim can be explained both from the theoretical lens of Brazil as a sub-imperial power basically joining the traditionally dominant industrial countries in a “scramble for Africa” and from the lens of Brazil as a “logistical state” that supports the interests of groups in Brazilian society including business interests and that at the same time promotes a new world order of “cooperative and inclusive multipolarity” through the principle of “reciprocity multilateralism of results”. In this last perspective Brazil would at the same time promoting its national economic interests and a world order with more cooperation between traditionally powers and emerging powers as well as a world order that is more socially inclusive and thus more efficient in promoting improved living standards in developing countries contributing thereby to world peace.

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