**Abstract**: Post-cinema has expanded the forms of cinema and audiovisual culture in general with the introduction of new image and media technologies. No longer contingent on profilmic reality or continuity editing, post-cinema allows for a new image of time beyond that of indirect and direct images of time, q.v. Gilles Deleuze’s work on cinema. This article investigates how post-cinema thinks about contemporary audiovisual culture through new forms, arguing that the new media machines of post-cinema produce other thoughts than articulated in Jean Epstein’s *The Intelligence of a Machine*. Three forms are detailed—animacies, capture and flows—showing how digital workflows revise earlier versions of cinema, producing new insights into how our world is organized, suggesting that post-cinematic media are accelerated soundimages that induce new sensations of life and control. The fourth form, plastic temporalities, challenges classic cinematic time as reaching beyond continuity through contiguity, suggesting instead that time has become increasingly flexible to adapt to a new spatiotemporal organization. In other words, time has become a resource and a technique of control.

**Keywords**: animation, morphing, post-cinema, time.

Running Head Right-hand: The Morph-Image

Running Head Left-hand: Steen Ledet Christiansen

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The Morph-Image

Four Forms of Post-Cinema

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Post-cinema has expanded the forms of cinema and audiovisual culture in general with the introduction of new image production and media technologies. No longer contingent on profilmic reality or continuity editing, post-cinema allows for a new image of time beyond that of indirect and direct images of time, the two images proposed by Gilles Deleuze in his two volumes on cinema, respectively termed the movement-image and the time-image.[[1]](#endnote-1) This article investigates how post-cinema thinks about contemporary audiovisual culture through new forms. Three forms are detailed—animacies, capture and flows—showing how digital workflows revise earlier versions of cinema, producing new insights into how our world is organized. The fourth form—plastic temporalities—challenges classic cinematic time as reaching beyond continuity through contiguity, suggesting instead that the concept and experience of time have become increasingly flexible to adapt to a new spatiotemporal organization.

In *Detention* (Joseph Kahn, 2011) we find a stunning example of a new image of time that goes beyond the movement-image and the time-image. In a continuous shot, the camera circles a group of students held in detention while simultaneously moving back in time. Although the editing joins are evident, morphing software is used to smooth out these joins and produce a synthetic long take. As the shot skips back in time, snippets of hit songs from the corresponding decade play as the soundtrack and the students’ fashion changes as well. As a time travel film, this sequence is not a flashback. Nor is the shot a meditation on the nature of the past and its relation to the present. What we come up against is the question of how cinema expresses duration, the key question for Deleuze’s work on cinema. Deleuze’s interest in duration comes from his larger interest in Henri Bergson’s philosophy of time.[[2]](#endnote-2) Bergson distinguishes between clock time and real, lived time, which he refers to as duration.[[3]](#endnote-3) Duration, for Bergson and for Deleuze, is indivisible and continuous.[[4]](#endnote-4) Part of this article complicates this notion of continuous, indivisible duration by adding multiple layers to that duration.

David Rodowick laments the shift to digital video because digital video cannot express lived duration, sliced, as it is, into ones and zeros.[[5]](#endnote-5) Following Bergson’s philosophy, this is a loss for Rodowick. Rodowick is concerned about the spatialization of the image, which he rightly identifies as continuous due to the lack of cuts in digital cinema that we traditionally find in analog cinema. However, in *Detention* time takes on another, far more interesting, characteristic: time becomes plastic. This shot is emblematic of a change in cinema that views time as a resource, something to be outright manipulated.

We live today in a time of simultaneity and juxtaposition;[[6]](#endnote-6) our current spatiotemporal world is one of flow, flux, acceleration and above all a demand for flexibility. The image for our time and of our time is what I will call the morph-image; an image of quick-change, metamorphoses and performativity (as in doing). We find the morph-image in what is currently called post-cinema, understood as the new media ecology after cinema’s dominance,[[7]](#endnote-7) the transmutation of time as internal flux[[8]](#endnote-8) and post-photographic cinema.[[9]](#endnote-9) Post-cinema names how new audiovisual media technologies enhance, reverse, retrieve and obsolesce cinema, all at the same time, as part of the same process, to use Marshall McLuhan’s conception of media tetrads.[[10]](#endnote-10) As such, it is imperative to understand how new audiovisual forms connect, disrupt, invert and perpetuate contemporary life, to use Marie-Luise Angerer’s idea of how technology and affect connect and express time.[[11]](#endnote-11)

Angerer’s notions of connection, disruption, inversion and perpetuation are all forms of relations, ways in which forms interact with each other. In this way, even a disruption functions as a relation, because the negation of a relation is in itself a relation.[[12]](#endnote-12) We cannot separate sounds and images from our lives; audiovisual media participate in, produce and organize everyday life, rather than only reflect or represent it. I will argue that this participation, production and organization amount to a form of thinking of and about the world.

Thinking about our culture in terms of its dominant image was established by Gilles Deleuze in his two books on cinema. The movement-image is classical narrative cinema, where one event follows another in a logical, causal sequence. Time is experienced indirectly through actions and consequences.[[13]](#endnote-13) The time-image liberates cinema from clichéd, causal narrative unfolding and allows us to engage with the very question of time itself. This is what is often called modernist or experimental cinema. The time-image also marks a rupture in cultural organization after World War II, where fragmentation, dislocation and disjointedness reigned.[[14]](#endnote-14) Deleuze finished his study of cinema by pointing out that a third image was emerging, but never defined it.[[15]](#endnote-15) Proposals for this new image have been plentiful, including the neuro-image, the desiring-image, the life-image, the non-time-image, the space-image and the rhythm-image.[[16]](#endnote-16) While all these different image proposals are insightful, none of them successfully integrate or explain the new spatiotemporal world we live in and that new image technologies are part of. Each proposed image limits itself entirely too much by dealing with only one aspect of contemporary image production, whether it is the shift to neuroculture (Pisters’ neuro-image), the queering of cinema (Davis’ desiring-image), the biopolitics of (post-)cinema (Casarino’s life-image), the digital nature of current cinema (Sanchez’s non-time-image), the spatialization of time in videogames (Galloway’s space-time) and the interactions of sound and image, particularly in music videos (Shaviro’s rhythm-image). Contemporary image production is involved in *all* of these aspects at the same time, and prioritizing one over the other is insufficient. We urgently need an image-form that encapsulates all these aspects of contemporary culture, and to do so, we need a new vocabulary for how soundimages work.[[17]](#endnote-17)

On the other hand, that images think is axiomatic for film-philosophy. Exactly how much agency can be ascribed to cinematic images has been the subject of much debate in film-philosophy. In this debate, I side with what is referred to as the “*bold thesis*” by Paisley Livingston—that film has exclusive capacities for making significant contributions for philosophy.[[18]](#endnote-18) Livingston himself rejects this notion, arguing that the bold thesis is caught in a dilemma, that of paraphrase, where if film does philosophy through audiovisual means it cannot be paraphrased in language and is meaningless for us, while if film’s philosophy can be paraphrased, we are better off sticking with language anyway.[[19]](#endnote-19) Aaron Smuts takes issue with Livingston’s rejection based on this first horn of the dilemma, pointing out that film can make contributions to philosophy by presenting thought experiments.[[20]](#endnote-20) These thought experiments need not necessarily be expressible linguistically, and rather than paraphrase we should consider their articulation in language as translation. *Detention*’s synthetic long take can be stated linguistically but will lose its force as a thought experiment. My description of the scene in the beginning of this article is not the same experience as watching the shot and does not adequately reproduce the notion that time may run backwards. Film does philosophy through projecting “its own world with its own rules,” a world that is “less a reproduction of reality than a *new* reality.”[[21]](#endnote-21) Such a new world and new reality is evident in the scene from *Detention* I opened this article with. The film allows us to think time differently.

This “film as philosophizing” becomes particularly evident and salient with the integration of new media and imaging technologies into cinematic production.[[22]](#endnote-22) While film has always employed special effects and trick shots, the rise of digital workflows has expanded the forms that film can take, the worlds film can produce and the new realities that film can show. Without going too far into the debate, the fact that digital cinema produces, rather than necessarily captures or records, reality removes Livingston’s “second horn of the dilemma” of cinema being dependent on objects in front of cameras.[[23]](#endnote-23) Plenty of films today, including *Detention*, are produced without solely depending on a camera. Digital animation along with unusual imaging techniques produce images that do not have a profilmic instance. In such cases, the plasmatic nature of images allows for an entirely different way of experiencing the world. This is not to say that all digitally recorded films will employ these potentialities, yet they remain a virtual force of the soundimages. Even films like *Waking Life* (Richard Linklater, 2001), which famously discusses existentialism in its dialog, may be considered as doing philosophy through the rotoscopic animation that overlays profilmic reality with an animated layer, thus allowing for smoother transitions between dream and diegetic reality.

Images think through forms, and so new forms are new thoughts; these new thoughts are necessarily thoughts about and of the new spatiotemporal world that we live in. Understanding these new film forms also allows us to understand the shape of the world we live in, which is one of the purposes of philosophy. Post-cinema does not imitate the world we live in but produces new experiences, new ways of being in the world, new embodied sensations that did not previously exist in the same manner. Post-cinematic images—morph-images—thus give shape to the world we live in by providing new experiences. By understanding how these images work, we understand the contemporary spatiotemporal regime better. Here, I will outline three forms: animacies, capture and flow, before concluding with a fourth form: the plasticity of time. These four theses can only be the starting point for how post-cinema thinks our spatiotemporal moment but are suggestive of how the post-cinematic image ecology differs from earlier eras.

Animacies

Post-cinematic works are increasingly animated moving images rather than recorded images. There is a long-standing debate on how film and cinema have become a subset of animation. Lev Manovich is the strongest voice from digital culture studies, while Alan Cholodenko has made the same argument for much longer in animation studies.[[24]](#endnote-24) In either case, post-cinema no longer relies solely on cameras to produce images; other imaging technologies are used as well. These new imaging technologies allow for new ways of producing images, new image behaviors and radically different workflows.

In Tony Scott’s time-travel action-thriller *Deja Vu* (2006), part of the plot hinges on a machine that can see the past unfold. This time window, as the technology is called, has a surreal, dreamlike quality to its images. Part of that quality comes from the fact that scenes were shot with a LIDAR device—a digital device that records distance rather than image through the use of laser light. These distances are then converted into images, but this process is an animation process, since there is no inherent connection between the distances recorded and the resulting images. While *Deja Vu* aims for resemblance, the LIDAR process of acquiring images allows for a much greater flexibility in how the images are finally rendered. In the film, the images of the past are grainy and static-y and produce ghostly trails of the characters moving around, producing a unique texture that renders the discrepancy in diegetic temporalities sensible for the viewer. The body of Claire Kuchever (Paula Patton) stretches and dissipates across the room in uncanny movements; her body takes on a degree of “plasmaticity” similar to what Eisenstein identified decades ago in Disney cartoons.[[25]](#endnote-25) Much like with Disney’s hand-drawn animations, Claire’s body is rendered plasmatic through the introduction of non-conventional imaging technologies and is subsequently animated.

Animation, then, increasingly becomes part of cinema, although the perceptual realism of digital animation obscures this very fact.[[26]](#endnote-26) These new digital images are attractions in both Tom Gunning’s and Angela Ndalianis’ senses, but they are also attractors in Aylish Wood’s sense—something that “exerts a particular influence over how a viewer engages with a text.”[[27]](#endnote-27) The special effects afforded by digital imaging and animation exert a force over the viewer, attracting attention and interest. This force is an animating force—an animacy—that gives life not just to the images on screen but also to viewers.

These digital animations *innervate* our nervous systems by integrating new image and media technologies into their forms of expression.[[28]](#endnote-28) These new technologies are animating technologies, themselves forms of movement and force. Innervation suggests integration with these new technologies to make us more lively, but also indicates a lack of distinction between human and nonhuman bodies.[[29]](#endnote-29) Post-cinematic animacies blur the agencies between images and viewers, because images are now able to take on new forms and expressions. In Angerer’s schema, then, animated images connect our bodies to the screen in new ways, because of the new technological affordances. This connection expresses itself through innervation, new energies that were not possible before.

And yet, we should temper that enthusiasm for new media affordances with the recognition that much of this new innervation is in fact a retrieval of what cinema used to be—the early cinema of attractions that Gunning has analyzed so elaborately was itself a version of new innervations and blurring of images and bodies. The techniques that are used in *Deja Vu* are tied to digital technologies, but the practice that they generate—the animacies that are produced—are not new. Cinema has always been interested in the plasmatic movement of images.

And yet again, what is new in *Deja Vu* and a host of other films that incorporate LIDAR devices or other non-camera recorders is the obsolescence of the camera. While early cinema was born among a plethora of visual technologies, slowly these alternate forms fell to the wayside, and visual culture solidified around the camera as the predominant image producer. No more is this the case; we see a host of imaging technologies emerge that do not require a camera, or where the image recording device is so far removed from the classical film camera that it may as well not be considered a camera. Devices such as motion capture and performance capture technologies are really not cameras, even though they are often referred to as such. Instead, these devices record movement for images to be mapped onto later. The camera with its required profilmic reality is slowly becoming a residual technology and a residual practice.

Post-cinema is more plasmatic than traditional cinema, and its morphing form expresses a deep relation between humans and technology, a relation that can no longer be regarded as prosthetic[[30]](#endnote-30) but instead must be regarded as an interrelation or a transductive relation.[[31]](#endnote-31) Although such an argument—that post-cinema reveals the transductive relationship between human being and technologies—may appear to be a radical claim, such an argument has a long tradition in film-philosophy, formulated by Jean Epstein, who recognized that cinema produced an “upheaval in the hierarchy of things.”[[32]](#endnote-32) Cinematic reproduction—and for that matter post-cinematic production—is precisely the mechanism through which this realization becomes more acute. For Epstein, these mechanisms came through accelerating or slowing down time, but today’s forms are broader and more varied. All special effects broaden our perception and so broaden our agency.

Capture and Disruption

The flip side of animacies is that we are *captured* by soundimages; whether this is a matter of entrainment, corporealization or modulation, post-cinematic works sometimes articulate our capacities to feel, to act and to think through their intensities. While we are animated by the new forms of post-cinema, these forms may also realize our bodies and attentions in ways that connect to biopower. When images are regarded as attractors, they not only produce new affective and attentive states but also limit and modulate what we experience. The animacies of post-cinematic images *entrain* us, where entrainment is “the coordinating of the timing of our behaviors and the synchronizing of our attentional resources.”[[33]](#endnote-33) Particularly rhythmic patterns align our bodily features with these same patterns; our bodies synchronize to the movement of the moving images. In this way, post-cinematic works function as what Nikolas Rose has termed technologies of power.[[34]](#endnote-34) Post-cinematic works do so by the way they animate new experiences in us.

*Requiem for a Dream* (Darren Aronofsky, 2000) stands as one of the clearest examples of post-cinematic technologies of power. The movie uses a full range of different cinematic techniques and technologies to produce its intense sequences, including sequences shot with video cameras, rapid MTV-style editing, Snorri-cam shots, time-lapse sequences and split screens, as well as the juxtaposition of extreme close-ups and extreme long shots. This arsenal is indicative of the expanded type of filmmaking that has become typical in post-cinema: any kind of camera, any kind of cinematic practice, may be used, as long as it generates new experiences and new forms.

As for the characters, they are all caught in nightmarish scenarios of addiction and control, constantly trying to get out of their circumstances but never able to succeed. The movie immediately suggests the technologies of “healthism,” the link between the social body and individual well-being,[[35]](#endnote-35) as well as responsibilization, turning unemployment, illness and poverty into an individual issue of self-care.[[36]](#endnote-36) Clearly, none of the characters are capable of self-care, and the film shows how even TV and sugar are addictions that modulate behavior. There is a constant tension between the characters’ goals and ambitions and what they are able to achieve.

However, *Requiem for a Dream* actually disrupts the technologies of healthism and self-care by producing empathy for the characters and the estranging and shocking drug sequences. Instead, we would do better to think of the entwined notions of “cruel optimism” and “slow death” put forth by Lauren Berlant.[[37]](#endnote-37) The only option that the characters in *Requiem for a Dream* have is to survive in a time of “struggling, drowning, holding on to the ledge, treading water, not-stopping.”[[38]](#endnote-38) The stark, delirious images produce the same sensation of corporealization: forced into conditions beyond one’s control, constantly spiraling out of control. There is agency here but only the lateral agency of choosing *how* to die.

Pushing the notion of corporealization further, we also see how post-cinema renders certain feelings and sensations as more successful than others, which is what we can call *modulation*. Modulation is not the production of specific feelings or sensations but rather what Deleuze calls a “sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another.”[[39]](#endnote-39) If we exhibit the proper feelings and sensations, we are allowed to pass through the sieve uncontested, but if not, we are blocked, questioned and antagonized.

These rhythms are converted into what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have termed affective labor.[[40]](#endnote-40) Where Siegfried Kracauer’s salaried masses would be compensated in the form of distraction, the compensation of the multitude is to work even during their compensation.[[41]](#endnote-41) Entrained by the post-cinema’s flow of images, an abundance of affect is created, which demands us to participate in the attention economy. Sensory overload was always the strategy for giving people the busy-ness they wanted after a full day of unfulfilling work, but for post-cinema, we can trace a move towards an overload of affect that puts us in a state of flow, fully subsuming our attention so that we do not even notice that we are working. The flow of images is the capture of time and attention.

Capture, then, becomes one of the dominant forms of control in our contemporary era. As such, the entrainment that new image forms elicit follows Angerer’s perpetuation of contemporary life—the articulation of our bodies and sensations through audiovisual rhythms is just such a perpetuation. But while our attention may be attracted and captured, some films also disrupt perpetuation by eliciting feelings that are incongruent with dominant moods. *Requiem for a Dream*’s fragmented audiovisual style ends up disrupting the technologies of power that currently structure contemporary life. We can consider this disruption a form of reversal, according to McLuhan’s schema. The intensities of audiovisual entrainment are reversed so that what is often captured instead becomes disruption. Rhythmic patterns become disjointed, and the form of Aronofsky’s film is precisely what allows us to recognize the survival time of the characters.

Flows

A different form of capture, although closely related, is the state of *flow*: a state that feels exhilarating but is also that moment when our attention is fully captured. This capture of attention is often done through intense audiovisual sequences that propel our experience into new territories. Again, morphing techniques are crucial for such attention capture so that images can reach the proper flow of intensity. A very literal version of this flow is played out in *Gravity* (Alfonso Cuarón, 2013), where Dr. Ryan Stone (Sandra Bullock) is stranded in space and has to get back to Earth or die. Here, animation technologies allow for sublime sequences—most famously the opening 13 minutes—of floating, the camera seemingly moving uninhibited by gravity itself. In fact, these shots are not continuous or weightless. Instead, several shots are morphed together into one apparently continuous shot.

This sensation of flow is produced in two primary ways: *elastic shots* and *morph cuts*. An elastic shot is Yvonne Spielmann’s term for shots that create alternative understandings of space other than perspectival space, through special effects.[[42]](#endnote-42) Spielmann notes that most special effects in cinema could legitimately be called “spatial effects” because they almost always depend on bending space in new ways. In *Gravity* these *spatials* are produced by having the camera move in highly unconventional ways that sever us from a stable point of view. Instead, our point of view changes unexpectedly as objects that leave frame right flow back in frame left. This spatial unmooring is spectacular because we are so unused to this kind of cinematography that it produces a renewal of perception.

Part of this unmooring comes from the morph cuts, an animation technique where shots that end and begin with almost the same composition can be morphed seamlessly together to present a continuous shot. Morph cuts are distinctive in that they are invisible if done well and so produce a literal version of Bordwell’s concept of “intensified continuity.”[[43]](#endnote-43) In *Gravity* the continuity of shots is intensified through morphing and so produces space and time as a continuous unfolding relation. This unfolding is another example of the logic of intensity, where new articulations of space help generate and attract attention.

Another aspect of flow and elastic images comes in the form of temporal elasticity, what I will call *temporals*. Temporals are instances of time moving at different speeds, whether faster or slower. The iconic example of a temporal effect is the bullet-time effect in *The Matrix* (The Wachowskis, 1999). The Wachowski sisters’ movie innovated a new image of time, which spatialized time by morphing multiple shots together to one seamless tracking shot that in fact does not move. One hundred twenty cameras were used in this time-slice sequence, before digital composting and animation morphed these still images together to a moving image. Once again, while time is indeed spatialized (since the non-camera appears to rotate while characters do not move), it is more useful to think of the plasticity of time, the way that time may move without duration, in a sense. Time moving without duration is precisely what Rodowick objects to about digital cinema, since it contradicts a key Bergsonian idea: that movement and duration are the same. Rodowick borrows Deleuze’s logic of becoming when he (Rodowick) argues that “the electronic image is never wholly present in either space or time.”[[44]](#endnote-44) What Rodowick does not grapple with and which is what is at stake here is the distinction between quantitative and qualitative differences. This distinction is developed by Bergson in *The Creative Mind* and commented on by Deleuze in his book on Bergson. For both Bergson and Deleuze, qualitative differences are about repetitions that are not the same, an intensity of variation.[[45]](#endnote-45)

Temporals exist outside of quantitative difference, outside linear, clock time, but they also exist not “wholly present” in real time, that of lived duration, since the experience of plastic time goes beyond human perception. We experience something we cannot experience. Static images turn into moving images, but they do so only through a spatial change, a spatial re-orientation. This plastic time connects quantity (more than 12,000 frames per second) to quality (the intensity of the sequence) and produces change (shift in camera perspective) without change (strings of code). Time moves without duration, and multiple scales of time are introduced as the qualitative multiplicities of different temporalities: the temporality of the viewer, the temporality of the bullet-time setup, the temporality of the morphing animation and so forth.

The bullet-time effect has since become standard issue for action movies and has been further intensified. So far, the effect has culminated in *Dredd* (Pete Travis, 2012), where the experience of time is slowed down by a drug called “Slo-Mo.” People under the influence of Slo-Mo provide the spectacular superslow-motion temporals. As the results of a drug, the slowing down of time no longer solely expresses power but instead becomes control. When Judge Dredd attacks criminals under the influence of Slo-Mo, he is able to act much faster than the criminals. We are placed in a position of awe as Dredd metes out justice. The superslowing down of time is an example of how this new kind of image is intensified to present time as an awe-inspiring resource: time becomes a technology of control. Master villain Ma-Ma is punished by falling to her death under the influence of Slo-Mo, an act of justice in itself. Time becomes a technology of power, and being subjected to the slowing down of time is in itself a punishment in *Dredd*. This kind of temporal suggests a very different relationship to time, as time suddenly becomes part of the narrative plane of the film, rather than being solely a matter of viewer experience. Time becomes, in a sense, tactile, something that characters feel and are aware of experiencing.

Time, then, is not expressed indirectly through the actions of characters, as in Deleuze’s movement-image, nor is it a direct image of time passing, as in Deleuze’s time-image. Rather, time has become plastic, something that can be changed and manipulated, more like a resource than something outside of human experience. In other words, our relation to time has changed into something palpable. Time flows, but no longer is this flow unilateral or at the same speed. While time ramping has always been part of cinema, making time part of the diegetic makeup of the film indicates a shift in temporality. Cinematic time is enhanced, made more intense in the new forms of spatials and temporals whose flows capture viewer attention.

Flow, then, becomes a state that perpetuates contemporary life in Angerer’s schema, because viewer attention is swallowed up by these morph shots that produce new impressions of space-time. For McLuhan, these new intensities of space and time would indicate cinema’s enhancement into something more, something that goes beyond older technological limits. The digital workflows of post-cinema allow for new articulations of space and time and as a result produce new experiences and new ways of thinking space and time. Such new articulations are most evident in the plastic temporalities produced by post-cinema.

Plastic Temporalities

Time has special traction in post-cinema and in our current spatiotemporal world. Animacies, capture and flow are all forms of modulating time. We can state this positively: time becomes emancipated; or we can state it negatively: time becomes a resource to be managed. As I have tried to show, neither is more correct than the other, but they are instead two modalities that individual movies articulate and make sensible. Cinema, or rather post-cinema, thus modulates our reception of time, in what I suspect John Mullarkey would call a refraction of the becoming-of-time.[[46]](#endnote-46) Time is constantly constituted anew in cinema, as time is increasingly manipulated.

Epstein already called cinema a time-thinking machine, since we can see “the lengthening or shortening of time on screen.”[[47]](#endnote-47) Epstein makes a radical claim—that cinema has taught us “the unreality of continuity and discontinuity” through time compression and expansion and so “ushers us into the unreality of space-time.”[[48]](#endnote-48) For Epstein, then, cinema is a machine that thinks time differently through its technological makeup. As post-cinema expands the technological devices used to produce soundimages, it stands to reason that space-time is similarly expanded.

These spatiotemporal manipulations and distortions are part of a larger shift in contemporary culture, where notions of “non-places”[[49]](#endnote-49) and “timeless time”[[50]](#endnote-50) are necessary to understand the ways we live. The emerging forms of post-cinema are ways of grasping these changes, changes that increasingly revolve around the demand for flexibility. All the forms I have outlined here converge on the notion of plastic temporalities, which was where I opened with *Detention* and its new image of time. That film is not the only film that has developed a new way of engaging with time, an engagement beyond implicit or direct images of time. Instead, the image of time currently emerging is one of plasticity and morphing. The images we have encountered are all morphs, able to take on any shape necessary. Space and time become resources rather than constants, something for post-cinema to modulate and re-articulate in new plastic forms.

I employ the term “plastic” in the sense that Catherine Malabou has developed it across a range of books, most importantly *What Should We Do With Our Brain?*, where she also takes issue with the idea of submitting to capitalism’s demand for flexibility.[[51]](#endnote-51) Plastic temporalities, then, suggest a new kind of temporal organization, a revision of Mary Ann Doane’s “cinematic time”—no longer is the cut the predominant way of organizing post-cinematic time, the way editing did for cinematic time.[[52]](#endnote-52) Since so many cuts are in fact smoothed over and morphed together, as I have shown, duration is a malleable element in post-cinema. Time is increasingly viewed as reversible and fluid, in shots such as *Detention*’s tracking shot into the past, in reverse-narration films such as *Irréversible* (Gaspar Noé, 2002), in the temporal paradoxes created by films such as *Predestination* (The Spierig Brothers, 2014) and even in the time loops of *Edge of Tomorrow* (Doug Liman, 2014). Time’s emancipation and modulation show how post-cinema emerges as a new mode of thought. Deeply embedded in contemporary spatiotemporal organizations, post-cinema is indicative of and part of how time is rendered differently today. No longer is time a matter of contingency, organized around a paradoxical continuity of noncontinuous moments.[[53]](#endnote-53) Post-cinematic time takes several forms, only a few of which I have discussed here, but as should be evident, flexibility and changeability are predominant aspects. The inclusion of new image and media technologies into contemporary audiovisual culture has facilitated these changes and will continue to develop new forms. These forms are inherently centered around an expansion of duration into multi-temporalities, a thickening of time.

Notes

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4. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F.L. Pogson (Mineola, Dover Publications, 2001). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. David Rodowick, *The Virtual Life of Film* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 171. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Bergson also discusses simultaneity in *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics,* trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Dover, 1946). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
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12. Hegel deals at length with relations and their negation in his discussion of being, nothing and becoming, as well as his outline of Concept in *The Science of Logic*. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
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14. Ibid., 73ff. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
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17. I choose to compound “soundimages” into one word, rather than two words or a hyphenated term, since I believe it impossible to separate sound and images in film, except as an analytical category. We experience sound and image at the same time, hence soundimages. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
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19. Ibid., 12. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Aaron Smuts, “Film as Philosophy: in Defense of a Bold Thesis.” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 67, no. 4 (2009): 414. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Daniel Frampton, *Filmosophy: A Manifesto for a Radically New Way of Understanding Cinema* (London: Wallflower Press, 2006), 5. Emphasis in original. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Stephen Mulhall, *On Film*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge 2008), 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Livingston, “Theses on Cinema as Philosophy.” 12. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
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28. For more on innervation, see Miriam Bratu Hansen, *Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Angerer, *Ecology of Affect*, 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
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38. Lauren Berlant, “Nearly Utopian, Nearly Normal.” *Public Culture* 19, no. 2 (2007): 279. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
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