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6 The Nordic Model and the Educational Welfare State in a European Light

Social Problem Solving and Secular-Religious Ambitions When Modernizing Sweden and France

Mette Buchardt

Since the late 19th century, the state education systems across Europe have been central political tools in not only state crafting but also in the solving of social problems. This is not least the case with regard to the Nordic states, where an education system, allegedly “for all,” evolved alongside the modernization and consolidation of the currently five Nordic nation-states. Since the mid-20th century, these processes have included the development of what has often been labeled the Nordic welfare state model.

In the words of welfare state historian Mary Hilson, the Nordic model is, however, historically to be understood as a model with five exceptions, each of the states in question being an exception (Hilson, 2008). It can also be questioned to what degree the Nordic model of, for example, education is exceptional. In this same vein, there is also the question of to what degree the Nordic education reforms from the late 19th and the 20th centuries have either been following the same traces or have at least sought to develop answers to the same questions and challenges as in other parts of Europe.

This chapter will focus on the question concerning the exceptionality of the exceptional Nordic welfare state model of education. It puts to the fore an often overlooked but increasingly rediscovered element of the Nordic education systems as they have developed since, especially, the late 19th century, when the current systems started to acquire the basic forms that they have today. More specifically, the chapter will explore the way the systems of education throughout the Nordic states became the arena for renegotiating the relation between state and religion and how this connected to and was part of broader questions about social cohesion in society. I will argue that, in order to understand the becoming of this arena, we need to focus on exactly the late 19th and early 20th centuries,

before the naming and the heyday of the so-called Nordic—sometimes called Swedish—welfare state model from the middle of the 20th century onwards. We also need to take a broader look across Europe to compare these reform processes with similar efforts in other European states under modernization.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a groundbreaking period for education reforms across continental Europe, the so-called *social question* was such a cross-cutting challenge. Predominantly fueled by the political discovery of urban poverty and the troubles in the ever-growing cities following the Industrial Revolution, the political attention paid to the social question (*det sociale spørgsmål, die soziale Frage, la question sociale*)—that is, how to handle poverty and undesirable social behavior that has been associated with poverty while still retaining class society and differences in social status and income—was a key political question cutting across the (rising) nation-states and (declining) empires of Europe (e.g., Schick, 1970; Kouri, 1984; Horne, 2002; Hilson et al., 2012; Tröhler, 2016). The effort was also to find ways between a conservatism directed toward yesterday, including support for the declining governing models of absolutism that by many political actors had proven inadequate, and at the same time control the revolutionary forces represented especially by the workers' movements.

In these early efforts to modernize the state into a so-called “social state,” “culture state,” and “*Rechtsstaat*,” education politics, often overlapping with social politics, were seen as a main tool. However, the political efforts concerning the social question did not only address social differences but also, for example, religious differences, something that was increasingly seen as a cultural question: How should different confessional belongings, different denominational divides within the confessions, and different positions with regard to the role of institutionalized religion within and in relation to the state and its institutions be handled? How should such religious difference within the populations be handled? Was religion the opposite of culture, or was it rather part of the culture and, as such, part of the national culture of the state? Also, here, the education systems were considered a means of creating new social and cultural cohesion models which in different ways were aiming at shifting religion from a churchly matter into a cultural and social glue of the state.

Among the central, but often overlooked, allied and key state crafters on what we may name the meso-level (drawing on Luft, 2020) were young ambitious theologian university intellectuals, who were eager to modernize not only religion and the church but also to become useful for creating new modern ways of governing. Their reform ideas included new modes of industrial production, investing in history and psychology as state-crafting tools, and reforming education (Graf, 1984, 1989; Grane, 1987; Buchardt, 2017).

Across the Nordic states—the independent states of Sweden and Denmark as well as Finland and Norway on their way to becoming so— young, modern so-called cultural Protestant public intellectuals together with state crafters from the social democratic parties—democratic socialist parties that were gradually leaving class struggle and radical criticism of religion behind—became central actors in developing such new approaches and strategies implemented through education reform (Buchardt, 2013, 2017; Skogar, 1993a, 1993b, 1999). Not only did such efforts become crucial for the retooling of the state–religion nexus. They are also central to explore in order to understand the educational character of the social state project at large. The social state here means the models that, under different names, for example, “*Wohlfahrtsstaat*,” were branded in their particular, more than exceptional, Nordic forms throughout the 20th century (Edling, 2019; Petersen & Petersen, 2013).

The chapter will examine the late 19th- and early 20th-century education reforms in Sweden as a prominent example of the Nordic states, but this is done in comparison to reform efforts from other parts of Europe, most significantly the Third Republic in France. First, the chapter will introduce its methodology, that is, comparing answers to the social question in the two states. Then the chapter will use the French case as a basis for turning our glances back to the Swedish case as an example of the Nordic model. The chapter will then, as its main output, deal with how we can understand the demands put on and the role of the welfare state education systems as educators of welfare state mentalities and as a cornerstone in schooling the population into citizenship. This then includes how welfare state education also aims at educating the population into and thus simultaneously co-producing social imaginaries (drawing on Taylor, 2007) of religious, cultural, and social difference and cohesion in present-day Europe. On this basis, the chapter will address the question of whether and, if so, how to define an exceptional Nordic model for educating citizens in a democratic and allegedly secular society.

A Global History Methodology: Comparing Answers to the Social Question

In the past decades, the welfare state models have increasingly been the object of transnational studies. Thus, the whole issue of the Nordic-ness of the so-called Nordic model has been questioned. Where political science research, in particular, has promoted model-oriented typologizations (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 2005), historical research has rather sought to complicate the picture. That is the case with regard to the question of similarities within the Nordic states, especially with Mary Hilson’s previously mentioned description of the “internal” differences and variations within the Nordic states as a prominent example (2008). In addition, transnational history methodologies and conceptual histories have contributed to

understandings of welfare state crafting as transnationally produced (e.g., Kettunen & Petersen, 2011; Petersen & Petersen, 2013). Paraphrasing welfare state historian Pauli Kettunen, the welfare state should be understood as a transnationally produced body of knowledge and strategies that became answers to national questions and challenges (Kettunen, 2011a).

Drawing on trans-Nordic historical research about, for example, the impact of Lutheranism on the Nordic welfare states (e.g., Markkola, 2000, 2011), this chapter takes a comparative and partly transconfessional move and compares the relation between welfare state development and the crafting of secularization models in the Lutheran-dominated Nordic states and in Catholic and partly Protestant-dominated France. Where Cady and Hurd (2010) are comparing radical separation models with regard to institutional state–religion divisions across denominations, such as the secularization models in Turkey and France (e.g., Baubérrot, 2010), this chapter compares a separation model, namely the French *Laïcité* model, with the state–religion integration model that seems to be the pattern across the Nordic states.

In doing so, the chapter, however, also focuses on mutual challenges across the European secularization models in the states under modernization, comparing how different solutions were chosen in different political and geographical spaces as answers to the same questions, more specifically the social question. Thus, the chapter draws on a global history approach rather than a transnational one as its point of departure and is inspired by work that understands phenomena such as *enlightenment* and *secularization* as different and contextual reactions to similar circumstances such as local mobilizations in relation to global conditions (e.g., Conrad, 2012, 2018; Sorkin, 2008; Buchardt & Fox, 2020; Buchardt, 2021). When secularizing education reform processes within and across Europe are explored, looking at different national political reactions to the social question and the relation between religious differences and social differences serves as the methodological framework. In continuation, the concrete focus is on the role of meso-level actors in political reform with larger macro-political and social consequences. The main focal points in the chapter will hence be, on the one hand, the reforms passed in education politics as part of the social politics of the states of France and Sweden under modernization. On the other hand, the chapter will show how public intellectual religious modernists as meso-level state crafters engaged in solving the social question through educating efforts (Luft, 2020; Buchardt, 2013).

Late 19th to Early 20th Century: Religious and Secular Reformers Educate Montmartre

In 1913, the Lycée Jules-Ferry for girls opened on Boulevard de Clichy at the foot of the Montmartre hill. The lycée was named after the Third Republic Minister of Education and later Prime Minister Jules Ferry

(1832–1893), also known as the “father” of secularization and hygiene. The new institution connoted the spread of secular enlightenment in the neighborhood, which had been the target of extensive social reform interventions starting in the mid-19th century.

Since 1860, when the northern outskirts of Paris including Montmartre were annexed into the 18th arrondissement of the city of Paris, the French state, the city of Paris, and its city planners had aimed at educating and taming the people of Montmartre, an uncontrolled land populated by politically excitable peasants and workers. During the Franco-Prussian War from July 1870 to January 1871, units of the army and the National Guard inhabited the area, and following the war, Montmartre became a very active site for *La Commune de Paris*, the Parisian attempt at a revolution that mobilized socialists and anarchists as well as secularists and radical republicans. The so-called Communard revolt, which lasted from March to May 1871, was even set off in Montmartre. Further up Boulevard de Clichy, at Place Blanche, where the later iconic temple of pleasure the Moulin Rouge was to open in 1889, a barricade was placed which, according to graphics that form part of the collections at the Musée de Montmartre, was guarded by female Communards (e.g., Hewitt, 2017).

Following the defeat of the insurrection, the construction of La Basilique du Sacré-Cœur de Montmartre became part of the efforts to punish, tame, and educate the Montmartre population due to their central role in the Commune. The planning of the building had started after the defeat in the war, and the politically contested plans became part of the ambition of a national and religious renewal in order to restore morality and govern a new moral order (Harvey, 1979). On a propaganda poster, also stored at the Musée de Montmartre, the basilica was pictured as, so to say, placed upon the heads of the disobedient Montmartre population, spreading its neo-Byzantine-Roman functionalist light over them. The basilica was placed in the cityscape so that a direct line from it to the Pantheon was drawn through Baron Haussmann’s streamlined boulevard city. This streamlined cityscape was the result of the 1850s’ and 1860s’ politics of urban planning that had served to make the city healthy through clear-cut lines and also to prevent insurrections (Pinkney, 1955; Harvey, 1979; Rabinow, 1989).

The Pantheon was originally built as a church, and it functioned as one on and off. More than anything, however, it became a civil religious shrine over the remains of distinguished French citizens. In the urban geography of Paris during the Third Republic, the nation and its moral restoration hence connected a restoring as well as reforming functionalist Catholicism to the republic. The colonization of Montmartre had other educational features as well: From 1894 to 1904, for instance, the Saint-Jean de Montmartre Church was constructed on the Rue des Abbesses in the middle of the hill between Boulevard de Clichy and the basilica on the hilltop. This church had a form that connoted a factory in its industrial

design. It combined rationalist and progressivist ideas with an Orientalist decor, recalling the colonial sphere of the French empire. The church conveyed military as well as labor imagery and thus signaled crucial key disciplines of French modernity in the educating landscape of the area to be tamed.

Educational institutions in the conventional sense also started to populate the heights of Montmartre as they did across Paris and France following the Education Act of 1882 under Jules Ferry. Education was now “for all” and therefore also secular, thus bringing up the population by means of civic and moral education. One of these was the Lycée Jules-Ferry, which, as already noted, was named after the icon of educational secular morality. In the attempts to act on the social question through urban planning, functionalized Christianity as well as educational secularization, both contributed to—in the wording of the Danish historian Karin Lützen on similar efforts in the Nordic states—“taming the city” (Lützen, 1998) and both projects formed part of the combined religious, secular educational efforts of social problem solving.

Secularization Reform Through the Education System: France, 1880s to 1900s

It is relatively well known that the complete separation of religion and state was passed in France in 1905 under the so-called *Laïcité* Act. However, other separation laws had already been passed before this, not least the Education Acts of 1881 and 1882 under Minister of Education Jules Ferry, laws that separated religion and school. This went hand in hand with making French education increasingly compulsory and free of charge. The latter was passed with the Law of Free Primary Education, June 16, 1881, whereas the Act of March 28, 1882 made education compulsory and secular. The 1882 act made the topic of religion not only non-confessional but also dissolved it as an independent school subject. Instead, a course in moral and civic education became part of the curriculum. Religion as a historical and cultural phenomenon became a subtopic in history and civic education, where biblical texts stood side by side with other “historical texts” from the history of civilization (Singer, 1975; Mayeur, 2004; Mayeur & Rebérioux, 1987; Baubérot, 2010).

Behind these school secularization reforms was, as shown by, for example, church historian Patrick Cabanel, a considerable liberal and social Protestant influence (Cabanel, 2016; Borello, 2017). In 1878, Ferry made the philosophy- and literature-educated Ferdinand Buisson the director of primary education. Buisson had authored, for example, *Le Christianisme Liberal* (1865)—a liberal and social Protestant manifest. In this post, he became a main force in developing the secularization laws for the school. Also in 1878, Buisson published the *Dictionnaire de Pédagogie et d'Instruction Primaire*—later considered what is often described as “the

bible” of secular education. In 1905, after having served as a professor of education at the Sorbonne, he chaired the parliamentary committee to implement the complete separation of church and state.

As was the case with other Christian modernist public intellectuals, Buisson’s areas of social and political involvement were broad: The question of war and peace, the question of women (women’s suffrage and women’s education), the question of education, the question of Jews, and the question of religion were all overlapping questions which were also all sub-questions of the social question. Fueled by the challenge of how to handle poverty, especially urban poverty in the cities among the working classes, questions on how to bridge social difference and create social cohesion across social classes became the point of departure for handling other differences. The solutions were to develop a third way between conservatism, absolutism, and church traditionalism on the one hand and the radical socialism and atheism of the international workers’ movement and liberalist atheism on the other. The secularization laws were in that sense also a defense of the churches against themselves. The laws were a way to create social cohesion through making a frame for difference in which difference did not pose a threat: maintaining class society in a decent way, defending society by creating it—and making the state the creator.

What Buisson and Ferry did in education, and what the city planners did in Montmartre, was thus similar to what the social Protestant economist Charles Gide and his fellow Protestant and modernist Catholic colleagues accomplished in what was most likely the world’s first think tank: the Musée Sociale. The Musée Sociale was a cradle for the social Christian labor union movement in France, where the question of education, the question of women, and the question of the treatment of Jews also attracted political attention (Horne, 2002; Offen, 2018). These efforts were all leading up to the definition of France as a secular and social state. Similar efforts developed in other parts of Europe. For instance, Christian social ideas of a so-called *Wohlfahrtsstaat* developed in Berlin and in Vienna—just in a more social conservative rather than social democratic form.

In Prussia, the movements of welfare state-aiming social Christians were fronted by, for example, the political anti-Semitic economist Adolf Wagner (Schick, 1970; vom Bruch, 1985; Hübinger, 1994; Stoetzler, 2008; Petersen & Petersen, 2013). In Vienna during the late Austrian Empire, they were spearheaded by cultural Catholic public intellectuals involved in the Vienna Mayor Karl Lueger’s *Christlichsoziale Partei* (1893–1934) and in the cultural Catholic *Leo-Gesellschaft* (e.g., Boyer, 1995; Weiss, 2014). This public intellectual society for cultural and social renewal was named after “the workers’ pope,” Leo XIII, who was sympathetic to workers’ social rights and opposing unlimited capitalism—as well as opposing Marxism.

The movements toward the Nordic welfare state models in all their variations started out simultaneously with similar efforts in the Calvinist/Reformed and Catholic-influenced French- and German-speaking states and were considerably inspired by these. What was called the Nordic model during the 20th century was thus crucially inspired by ideas and strategies that developed in other parts of continental Europe.

The Social Question and the Nordic Welfare State Model

Often described—from the inside as well as from the outside—as a third way between the state socialism and planned economy of the Eastern Bloc and the market economy of the Western Bloc, the Nordic model may be characterized as a combination of a state-controlled sector with the support and facilitation of a market economy with the aim to distribute resources across social classes without dissolving class society and with the retention of the division of labor (Hilson, 2008; Kettunen & Petersen, 2011). A certain Nordic model of education has also been identified research-wise and proclaimed politically. This model of educating the population can be described as an ideology across and a collection of historical and contemporary similarities between the systems in the five states in question: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland. As an ideological and strategic program, the model may be said to serve two purposes: to distribute welfare through an education system mainly free of charge and to educate the population into welfare state mentalities, celebrating equality and enhancing social cohesion and societal solidarity through labor and thus also by means of retaining a division of labor through compromises between classes. What became named as the Nordic model, a model that became especially apparent in the heyday of the Nordic welfare state under Social Democrat leadership during the Cold War, actually had its historical roots in late 19th-century state modernizations (Buchardt et al., 2013).

By the end of the 19th century, absolutism as a form of governance had been replaced by democratically oriented models on the road to parliamentarism in the Danish and Swedish realms and Finland and Norway were on their way to becoming independent states. Simultaneously, social and religious differences and contradictions affected the states in question. The church as institution was challenged by, on the one hand, anti-religious and anti-clerical liberal as well as socialist agitation, while on the other hand, not least revivalist movements—the second wave of Pietism—challenged the monopoly of the state church. In general, the role of Christianity in relation to what was increasingly in Nordic and German language debates called the culture was up for discussion (Schjørring, 1980; Grane, 1987; Buchardt, 2013, 2015; Foss, 1990). Also, the growth of the deaconess movement, philanthropic associations, and so-called Social Christianity, the latter inspired by the Christian social political

movement in, for instance, Prussia and the English Settlement House movement, meant that neo-Protestant ideas about social cohesion in the worldly sphere became part of the modernization of the Nordic states. Protestant ideas—including Lutheran ideas about all spheres of society as holy—started to influence state politics in new ways (Schjørring, 1980; Markkola, 2011; Markkola & Naumann, 2014; Borioni, 2014; Buchardt, 2015). Likewise, the idea of People's Churches instead of state churches started to develop in, among others, Sweden (Hammar, 1972). All of these efforts draw on, for instance, Prussian social Christian ideas of the social state—as not least formulated by the earlier-mentioned social economist and proponent of Christian state socialism Adolf Wagner, whose ideas influenced, for example, the idea of Sweden as "*folkhemmet*"—"the people's home" (Naumann, 2014).

At the theologian faculties in the North, especially in Copenhagen, Uppsala, Lund, and Kristiania/Oslo (while to a lesser degree in Helsingfors/Helsinki), inspiration from German liberal theology and biblical criticism meant that younger modern theologians started to challenge and reinterpret the relation between state and church and to revisit Luther and Lutheranism.¹ A personal and historical study of the texts was supposed to pave the way back to religion for the modern human being and bridge the growing divide between religion and culture. This led to a Nordic version of cultural Protestantism that influenced the Nordic societies long after liberal theology had been critiqued and left behind. The imprint left by cultural Protestantism was not least that it contributed to the transformation of Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity into the "national culture" and thus to its preservation as part of state crafting in the Nordic countries from the 20th century onwards (Buchardt, 2017).

The school became a central arena for this transformation process. Secularization strategies—efforts to divide state and church institutionally—thus became part of the big comprehensive school reforms that intended to build a comprehensive education system free of charge. This cornerstone was making it possible to—in principle—provide access for the whole population at all levels of the education system, starting with the *Folkeskole*—the People's school—which covered primary and lower secondary school and which should thus develop as a school for all classes under the same school roof. This would become significant for what is today often referred to as the Nordic model of education (Buchardt, 2013, 2015).

On the one hand, this model can be said to provide social equity, not by dissolving class society but by making circulation between social classes possible through free education: *Standscirkulation*—literally "estate circulation"—as the Social Democrat teacher, later head of the Danish teachers' in-service institution, Vilhelm Rasmussen called it (Rasmussen, 1910). On the other hand, the welfare state school can be said to spread the values of equality and class compromise and democracy through education

(Buchardt et al., 2013). Educating to the nation and about the people thus became synonymous with educating social cohesion into welfare state mentalities. The recontextualization of historical studies of Bible Scriptures into the school curriculum and of knowledge from the new university discipline, which was later named comparative religion, into a curricular area and topic in the school are examples of this process.

Secularization Reform Through the Education System in the Nordic States: Sweden, 1880s to 1910s

In Sweden, theologians of liberal orientation such as Frederik Fehr and Samuel S. Fries had, especially since the 1890s, argued that the Catechism in school instruction should be replaced by, for instance, extended reading of biblical texts which should be treated as history. In addition, the young liberal theologian and pioneer of comparative religion Nathan Söderblom took part in this effort (Söderblom, 1895; Skogar, 1993a, 1993b). Söderblom was involved in the young churchmen movement and the student association Heimdal and thus was in this sense leaning towards a nationally engaged modern Conservatism. However, he also engaged in Christian socialist attempts to collaborate with the workers' movement (e.g., Söderblom, 1892). In 1903, he took part in publishing the work of the Prussian social liberal and cultural Protestant politician and pastor Friedrich Naumann, a key figure in the *Evangelisch-Sozialer Kongress*, the central organization in the German-language Christian social movement (Naumann, 1903).

In the late 1910s, Söderblom, who had become the Archbishop of Sweden in 1914, was a central figure in the solution to the question concerning the status of the Catechism in educational policy and school legislation in co-operation with the Social Democrat Minister of Education Värner Rydén. Sweden thus became one of the first countries in which an early version of the history of religions formed part of the school curriculum for religious education (Salqvist, 1947; Moberger, 1961, 1962; Tegborg, 1969; Buchardt, 2013, 2015). However, the secularization elements of the Swedish educational political battles were not unambiguous.

A closer look at the ideas behind the reform efforts, for instance the reform ideas of Söderblom, reveals that the ambition was by no means to dissolve Lutheran Christianity as a central element in state upbringing through schooling. Rather, the history of religion was a way to bring to the fore historical figures such as Luther as a central means of instruction in the upbringing of future citizens. The fact that figures such as Zarathustra were also considered useful in this respect was, in the view of Söderblom—along with his comparative religion scholar colleague and fellow liberal theologian and collaborator, the Danish-Swedish Edvard Lehmann, who was a professor in Lund from 1913—based on the idea that Christianity would prove its strength no matter what. Christianity's

special status and the fact that Luther, for instance, should have the status of being considered as historical source material only emphasized this (e.g., Lehmann, 1918; Söderblom, 1912, 1915).

Similar ideas were also mirrored in the understanding of the state and the status of Christianity of the two co-operating theologians. Lehmann, who was inspired by and fascinated with, for instance, Fascist Italy, even described the state as the new church (Lehmann, 1928). At the same time, Söderblom described Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity more moderately as a

living religious organism . . . so interwoven with Swedish culture [*odlingen*] and the history of the realm [*rikets historia*] that only ignorance or infatuation can see anything arbitrary in the fact that it and nothing else possesses a special relationship with the governance of the realm [*rikstyrelsen*] and is used by the state for religious and other tasks.

(Söderblom, 1918, p. 5)

Both were, in other words, proponents and among the initiators of a culturally oriented neo-Protestantism that sought to make Christianity useful as culture for the state, the nation, and the people (Buchardt, 2013, 2015).

Neo-Protestant liberal university theologians—often, like Söderblom, young modern conservatives in a political sense—hence contributed to the compromise between, on the one hand, conservative church circles and revivalist circles who wanted to preserve the Catechism, and on the other hand, liberal and socialist criticism of religion striving to remove the Catechism from the school of the state. Here especially, the Social Democrat parties—the new state-bearing socialist parties in the Nordic states—became central partners of alliances (Moberger, 1961, 1962; Tergel, 1969; Buchardt, 2013, 2015): in Sweden with the 1919 reform and in, for example, Denmark during the 1930s (Buchardt, 2020). The compromise meant further separation between the state church institution and the state school institution. However, it also meant that Lutheran Christianity was reactualized as culture (and actually also as tradition) and thus as a formative as well as living history of and for the state. A state cultural Protestantism that was to become powerful during the 20th-century history of the Nordic states and up until the present had been consolidated institutionally and was to become part of the layers of Nordic *welfare state mentality* (Kettunen & Petersen, 2011). To the extent that it makes sense to define a distinctive Nordic model for secularization—understood as a separation between church and state—it might make just as much sense to define a distinctive Nordic way of resacralizing the state based on transformed and preserved Lutheranism with the school and the transformed teaching of religion as a central site of production.

Conclusion: The Social Question and European Educational Secularization Reform Around 1900

If we now turn our glance back to the French *Laïcité* reforms in education that—not to forget—predated and paved the way for the major secularization reform that radically divided religion and state and changed civil law about marriage, divorce, the church’s right to property, organization, etc., and compare this with the Nordic model of secularization, the differences are of course obvious. In France, a radical division model was chosen, whereas in the Nordic states an integration model was implemented in the period where the state church of the monarch was changed into state-controlled so-called People’s Churches—*Folkekirker*. On the one hand, there was certain independence granted to these churches, and on the other hand, they were under parliamentary control and tied to democracy, “the people,” and the nation. Where France divided religion and state, the Nordic states integrated and transformed religion into a national and cultural matter that worked toward “welfare nation-state” cohesion—to phrase it with a concept developed by political historian Pauli Kettunen (Kettunen, 2011b; see also Tröhler, 2020; Buchardt, 2020). Yet, in both cases the social and the religious questions were intersecting in education reform.

If, instead of comparing church–state relations, we take it the other way around and look at how secularization reform in education was part of the answer to the social question, the picture changes and becomes surprisingly more similar. In the Swedish and the French secularization reforms implemented through the education systems in question, the education systems were considered a means of creating social and cultural cohesion that, in different ways, aimed at shifting religion from a church to a cultural matter and into the social glue of the state. Both in the Swedish version of a Nordic model and in the French model, the social and the religious questions were intersecting in education reform. Furthermore, in both the relevant states, these transformations of religion through the education systems took place in the context of the broader political ambition of creating a school “for the whole population” free of charge. The economic and secularizing elements of education reform thus worked interconnectedly in the political project of creating new social cohesion imaginaries and citizenship demands. From this, we may question to what degree the Nordic model of, for example, education is exceptional and conclude that, in several senses, important Nordic education reforms from the late 19th century and the early 20th century followed the same traces and sought to develop answers to the same questions and challenges as in other parts of Europe.

In order to understand education reform as part of state crafting and how the social question framed the conditions for the modern European states and thus the historical conditions for the welfare state models of

not least education, we need to look at social politics, education politics, and secularization politics as neighboring and overlapping areas of political strategy. We also need to understand that secularization in the meaning of church–state institutional divisions is only one side of the coin where resacralization of the state, not least through educational efforts, is the other. Last but not least, we need to understand that educational political efforts were not only pursued through the crafting and reforming of the education system, and thus through “education policy,” but that the entire character of the modern state aiming at solving the social question by becoming a social or welfare state is at its core educational.

In summary, in the late 19th- and early 20th-century education reforms in the Parliamentarism-governed monarchy of Sweden and in the French Third Republic, the social question was answered with educational efforts addressed through schools as well as through city planning in order to make the social body “healthy.” Some of these efforts combined the separation and reintegration of religion and state while aiming at creating a new culture for society across difference. In addition, the Swedish state, as is the case with other Nordic states, did not only educate through the educational system. Rather, educationality can be said to be a feature that has cut across education politics, as well as housing policy, co-operative movements, politics of religion, urban planning, and language policy, just to mention a few. Moreover, the political efforts of education can—as read from their onset in the late 19th century—be said to be social politics at the core. Education politics were to some extent identical with social politics in the quest to find new strategies for solving the key political challenge of the time: how to peacefully bridge the gap between social and cultural difference—including religious difference and class society—without removing them.

These strategies of educational social politics contributed to the national secular social-state of France as well as the nation welfare states of the Nordic states not only becoming sites for transforming religion into a social glue by transforming it into a cultural matter, but also to giving—though not alone—the secular social state as well as the culturally Lutheran welfare state their educating character. This educational social and welfare nation form of state was actually what was instrumentalized when cleaning up and taming Montmartre and when making Luther and Zarathustra historical heroes for upbringing in the secular-religious Nordic welfare state school.

Note

1. In Kristiania, this resulted in a division of the faculty of theology in the beginning of the 20th century.

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