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## A bottom-up perspective on leadership of collaborative innovation in the public sector

*The social construction of leadership for disadvantaged city districts in The City of Copenhagen*

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**A BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE ON  
LEADERSHIP OF COLLABORATIVE  
INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR**

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LEADERSHIP  
FOR DISADVANTAGED CITY DISTRICTS  
IN THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN

**BY  
JESPER ROHR HANSEN**

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED 2015



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## AUTHOR CV

Jesper Rohr Hansen has a background in sociology (cand.scient.soc) from Copenhagen University. Thematically, Jesper's research focus is on leadership, collaborative innovation, wicked problems, area based programs and disadvantaged neighbourhoods. His PhD was co-financed by Center for Bolig og Velfærd og Københavns Kommune, Teknik- og Miljøforvaltningen. Jesper's research was associated with a national research programme, 'CLIPS' that focused on collaborative innovation in the public sector. Jesper continues his work on urban planning and collaborative innovation through his current employment on the JPI-Urban Europe 'APRILab' project, which focuses on dilemmas of intervention, regulation and investment in urban-fringe development.





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# ENGLISH SUMMARY

In this thesis, I investigate how new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems in today's welfare societies through innovation. Accordingly, leadership for collaborative innovation in the public sector is the focus of this thesis. I pursue this objective by making two contributions, a theoretical and an empirical. Theoretically the thesis provides an answer to the following research question: How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems? The answer to this question is a model that displays a social constructive process approach to leadership, in which leadership emerges through social processes of recognition in collaborative innovation processes; leadership is recognised by utilising uncertainty to influence collaborators' sensemaking processes.

Empirically the thesis provide an answer to the following research question: How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

The answer to this question is that leadership acquires recognition by adapting its leadership; this adaptation is conditioned by collaborators' expectations, the profession-based leitmotifs of the innovation project as well as bottom-up leadership's ability to make sense of resistance to the innovation project. On the basis of this sensemaking, bottom-up leadership must make strategic choices concerning how to position itself in relation to specific leadership dilemmas.

Collaborative innovation in the public sector is an emerging research field concerned with how to understand and enhance collaborative innovation. Closed innovation methods do not provide adequate responses to today's complex challenges like climate change, aging societies, and financial crises. These challenges demand another quantity and quality of the innovation solution. These challenges are often ill defined, sometimes even wicked. The character of the challenges requires the involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders. In relation to leadership, collaborative innovation focuses attention on the potential of innovation through relations of cooperation that penetrate the boundaries of the lead organisation.

By means of literature reviews and an abductive, 'engaged scholar' research approach, I pursue a theory building strategy in order to detect and develop new forms of leadership for collaborative innovation. One of the conclusions inferred from this theory-building strategy is that network governance inspired leadership conceptions are dominant within the field of collaborative innovation leadership. In order to overcome this lack of differentiation concerning leadership conceptions, the

thesis juxtaposes existing leadership approaches and identifies four discussion points, which lead me to the following recommendations for theory building of collaborative innovation leadership conceptions:

- Conceptualising leadership as a process phenomenon
- Developing a new conception of influence and power
- Paying attention to initial conditions of leadership positions in terms of identifying how novelty is intimately related to position of power
- Conceptualising leadership approaches that can explicitly take into account the type of problem to be dealt with (lame/ill-defined/wicked)

Consequently, the outcome of the theory-building strategy adopted in the thesis results in a creative re-interpretation of a bottom-up perspective of collaborative innovation leadership. I adapt this bottom-up leadership to an empirical condition of a bureaucratic bottom-up position conceptualised within the theory of innovation and wicked problem-uncertainty. Making and giving sense are central aspects of the type of influence that this type of leadership can exercise. The crucial issue for a leader in this context is being recognised as a leader by collaborators as well as decision-makers in the bottom-up leadership's own organisation. Accordingly, leadership has to be made and exercised at the same time, having as its legitimate outset a profession-based, entrepreneurial platform. This recognition is dependent on the way in which the bottom-up leadership is able to introduce new organisational concepts and themes that direct the sense-making of collaborators. Accordingly, in order to enable an analysis in which it is possible to differentiate among emergent organisational phenomena that often occur simultaneously and iteratively, I develop a causal understanding of bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation, which is defined as follows:

1) An intentional process aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas in a specific context 2) initiated at the bottom of a public-sector organisation requiring that the 3) lead unit responsible is able to gain influence through leadership recognition, which is conditioned by 4) utilisation of wicked-problem uncertainty as well as innovation uncertainty through skills of public entrepreneurship and making and giving sense.

This causality is depicted in an analytical model. This analytical model as well as the above definition is the answer to the first, theoretical research question.

The thesis empirically investigates how bottom-up leadership can be recognised by collaborators through processes of social construction. In order to do so, the thesis investigates issues of bottom-up leadership through a single-case study. The

empirical context for the case study is the City of Copenhagen. In one of the seven central administrations, the Technical and Environmental Administration (TEA), a newly established office sets in motion an organisational innovation process aimed at increased coordination across administrations. This happened in 2008. The office is called *Neighbourhood Development*, and is responsible for managing area-based programmes in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood Development is successful in influencing its collaborators: its own administration and mayor, the other administrations, as well as the powerful social housing sector. In 2012, when the case study finished, the endeavours of the office and its collaborators had resulted in developments of a larger scale than the office had expected in 2008: A powerful cross-administrative set-up was developed, involving all seven mayors, level-2 directors and professionals from each administration; a partnership forum has been established between municipality and the social housing sector; and finally, an ambitious area-based policy was approved unanimously among local politicians and mayors, the *Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen*. This case can be considered a case of collaborative innovation since administrations and social housing sector organisations are collaborating with the bottom-up leadership and TEA. The process can be considered an innovation in that the City of Copenhagen in this process develops a new way of dealing with wicked problems. The case is a case of bottom-up leadership since the innovation project is being driven by an office with an urban planning profession, located at the bottom of a municipal central administration.

In the innovation ‘journey’ studied, contentious issues of organisational identities, scope of the innovation project and doubts of the collaborative value of the innovative solution dominates. This requires the bottom-up leadership to redefine leadership and the innovation project on a running basis. Adaptation, flexibility and making and giving sense in this chaos is what stabilises the collaborative innovation process. Accordingly, novelty is created in terms of a solution to a wicked problem - in spite of an inferior leadership position, in spite of a collaborative configuration and in spite a highly specialised, sector-defined outset. Arguably, such knowledge of novelty creation in spite of constraints is relevant for both research and (bottom-up) leaders in the public sector. So, bottom-up leadership is a highly flexible leadership approach. The analyses in this thesis demonstrate that for the people involved, this type of leadership requires a constant willingness to make sense of their identity, and constantly be able to adapt both leadership and project in order to keep up with the speed and turbulence related to collaborative innovation processes.

With regard to research contributions the thesis theoretically contributes by introducing an analytical model for bottom-up leadership. This model may inspire other researchers of collaborative innovation leadership in that it draws on other theoretical legacies than those at present dominating the academic discourse concerning collaborative innovation leadership. Further, the analytical model can be

used by other researchers to investigate specific causalities related to how a professional unit is transformed into an informal leadership; how specific acts of entrepreneurship enable the emergence of this type of bottom-up leadership; how specific wicked-problem uncertainties and innovation uncertainties develop a demand for a bottom-up leadership, related to the structural components of these wicked problems; how such a leadership exercises influence by making and giving sense to collaborators; and what happens when an informal bottom-up driven innovation project is being implemented and mainstreamed into the formal bureaucracies in political public organisations. By doing so, the thesis answers the first research question which is how to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems?

The thesis further contributes with empirical knowledge that explains the challenges for bottom-up leadership that want to address a wicked problem by means of innovation in a collaborative setting. This knowledge about leadership challenges is relevant to other collaborative innovation initiatives in the public sector that seek to address wicked problems, not only the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

# DANSK RESUME

I denne afhandling undersøger jeg hvordan nye former for offentlig ledelse kan bidrage til at løse komplekse problemer i nutidens velfærdssamfund gennem innovation. Lederskab for samarbejdsdrevne innovation i den offentlige sektor er derfor fokus for afhandlingen.

Dette gør jeg ved at svare på følgende to forskningsspørgsmål:

Hvordan teoretisere en bottom-up type af lederskab for de samarbejdsdrevne innovationer i den offentlige sektor der har til formål at adressere 'wicked problems'? Hvordan bliver bottom-up ledelse socialt konstrueret gennem anerkendelses-processer i en samarbejdsdrevne innovationsproces i den offentlige sektor der retter sig mod et wicked problem?

Det *første* bidrag er teoretisk i og med at jeg har et behov for at udvikle en teoretisk ramme. Svaret på dette spørgsmål er en social konstruktion af lederskab, en tilgang der er tilpasset en bottom-up bureaukratisk position, begrebsliggjort ved at trække på teori om innovationsusikkerhed og 'wicked problems'-usikkerhed. I dette forskningsmæssige perspektiv er usikkerheden til at skabe og give mening helt centrale forudsætninger for at et lederskab kan opstå. Den helt centrale udfordring for en leder i denne særlige kontekst er at blive anerkendt som leder undervejs i den samarbejdsdrevne innovation proces. Anerkendelse er betinget af måden, hvorpå denne vordende leder er i stand til at introducere nye begreber der kan dirigere samarbejdsparternes meningsdannelse. Afhandlingen giver os dermed viden om hvordan man bedre kan forstå bottom-up lederes særlige udfordringer, nogle udfordringer der er relateret til at have en ambition om at adressere en særlig kompleks og vedvarende samfundsproblematik (et 'wicked problem') via innovation. Denne viden om lederskab er potentielt set relevant for andre samarbejdsdrevne innovationsinitiativer i den offentlige sektor der har til formål at adressere 'wicked problems', dvs. ikke kun det 'wicked problem' som udsatte by-og boligområder udgør.

I afhandlingen er lederskab operationaliseret som en subjekt position der konstrueres gennem diskursiv handlen rettet mod at vinde de inter-organisatoriske mikro-kampe om mening. Lederskab tilegnes ved at opnå samarbejdsdrevne anerkendelse via anvendelsen af professions-relateret entreprenørskab for at introducere nye diskursive begreber; og ved at forsøge at styre samarbejds-relaterede meningsdannelser som indflydelsesstrategi. Ved at gøre dette udnytter denne type af lederskab den organisatoriske usikkerhed, som generelt skabes i

innovationsprocesser, for dermed at skabe fælles retning på tværs af organisatoriske grænsedragninger. Denne usikkerhed forstærkes når man forsøger at innovere et 'wicked problem'.

Denne teoretiske ramme konceptualiseres kausalt i en analytisk model for bottom-up samarbejdsdrevne innovationsledelse ('BUCIL'). Modellen er deskriptiv og forklarende, ikke handlingsanvisende, og tillader os at se hvilke betingelser der skal til for at lederskab kan opstå; lederskab her forstået som en forklaring på, hvordan professions-baserede ideer til at håndtere en præstations-brist i service-forsyningen til et bestemt politik-område genererer succes eller fiasko, betinget af evnen til at udøve indflydelse gennem uformelle kanaler. At udøve indflydelse gennem disse uformelle kanaler kræver at den vordende leder bliver anerkendt *som* en leder, og at transformere sin professionelle identitet til en sådan lederskabsposition.

Med henblik på at muliggøre en analyse, hvor det er muligt at skelne mellem emergente, organisatoriske fænomener, som ofte foregår samtidigt og iterativt, filtrer jeg disse komplekse årsagskæder ud ved at formulere en kausalforståelse af bottom-up ledelse af samarbejdsdrevne innovation, der er defineret som følger:

1) En intentionel proces med henblik på skabelse og implementering af nye ideer i en specifik kontekst 2), påbegyndt i bunden af en offentlig organisation, hvilket kræver, at den 3) lederskabsheden er i stand til at få indflydelse gennem lederskabsanerkendelse, som er betinget af 4) en udnyttelse af de usikkerheder, der akkompagnerer wicked-problem usikkerhed samt innovationsusikkerhed ved at benytte færdigheder der knytter sig til offentligt entreprenørskab samt sensemaking og sense giving.

Denne kausalitet er i afhandlingen afbildet i en analytisk model. Hermed har jeg besvaret det første forskningsspørgsmål.

Det *andet* bidrag er empirisk. Jeg anvender den analytiske ramme gennem et omfattende kvalitativt casestudie i Københavns Kommune. Jeg besvarer forskningsspørgsmålet: Hvordan bliver bottom-up ledelse socialt konstrueret gennem anerkendelses-processer i en samarbejdsdrevne innovationsproces i den offentlige sektor der retter sig mod et wicked problem?

I denne afhandling fokuserer jeg på bottom-up lederskab via et single-case studie. Den empiriske kontekst for casestudiet er Københavns Kommune. I en af de syv central-forvaltninger, Teknik- og Miljø Forvaltningen, påbegynder et nyligt dannet



kontor en organisatorisk innovationsproces, med det formål at øge koordineringen på tværs af administrationer. Dette sker i 2008. Kontoret bliver efterfølgende kaldt 'Kvarterudvikling', og har som ansvarsområde områdebaserede indsatser i udsatte boligområder. Kvarterudvikling har succes med at påvirke sine samarbejdsparter: sin egen forvaltning og den tilhørende borgmester, de andre forvaltninger, samt den magtfulde almene boligsektor. I 2012, hvor casestudiet slutter, har kontoret og dets samarbejdsparters bestræbelser resulteret i forandringer af en større skala end hvad der oprindeligt var forventningen i 2008: en magtfuld tværgående forvaltningsstruktur er blevet udviklet, involverende alle syv borgmestre, niveau 2-direktører, samt embedsmænd fra samtlige forvaltninger; et partnerskabsforum er blevet etableret mellem kommune og den almene boligsektor; og endelig er en ambitiøs område-baseret politik blevet enstemmigt vedtaget i Borgerrepræsentationen og blandt borgmestre, 'Politik for Udsatte Byområder i København'.

Jeg analyserer denne proces med henblik på at afdække, hvordan et sådant professionsbaseret byplanlægningskontor udvikler sit lederskab igennem denne proces, og hvad det er, der driver udviklingen af lederskab fremad. Jeg fokuserer på to faser i det kvalitative single-case studie: udviklingen af et tvær-administrativt evaluerings-værktøj samt den tvær-administrative politik-formuleringsproces. Jeg bruger dermed BUCIL-modellen to gange for at kunne analysere hvordan handlingstyperne entreprenørskab og meningsdannelse er relateret til bevægelser i den diskursive positionering af ledelse over tid; og for at kunne forklare, hvordan både lederskabs-handlinger og lederskabspositionering fører til subjektive fortolkninger af legitimitet, konflikt og modstand hos både samarbejdsparter og Kvarterudvikling. På denne basis opsummerer jeg udviklingen af lederskabspositionering vha. nogle fundamentale lederskabsdilemmaer. Disse lederskabsdilemmaer er af en generel karakter. Karakteren gør at de kan bruges til at blive sammenlignet med andre lignende, fremtidige cases af bottom-up samarbejdsdrevne innovationsledelse. Af datakilder bruger jeg kvalitative interviews gennemført i 2010, 2011, og 2012, policy dokumenter, optagelser af politik-møder, mødereferater, observationer og felt-noter.

Ved at svare på de to ovenstående spørgsmål giver afhandlingen et samlet svar på det overordnede forskningsspørgsmål og bidrager til forskningsfeltet der omhandler ledelse af samarbejdsdrevne innovation i den offentlige sektor. Dette gør afhandlingen ved at understrege at det hierarkiske udgangspunkt for ide-generering har konsekvenser for evnen til at lede de samarbejdsdrevne innovationsprocesser der er rettet mod 'wicked problems'. Jeg understreger også i afhandlingen at lederskab bedst kan blive begrebsliggjort som socialt konstrueret, i og med at bottom-up lederskab er tvunget til at udvikle sig som leder. På denne vis bidrager afhandlingen teoretisk set med en differentiering af lederskabskoncepter. Hvad angår det empiriske så fremhæver afhandlingen nødvendigheden af at den

vordende leder adresserer lederskabsdilemmaer gennem den samarbejdsdrevne innovationsproces, og dermed konstant giver meningsfulde svar på sin egen lederskabsrolle og sit innovationsprojekt. Dette er særligt presserende i innovationsprocesser, i og med at innovationer ofte er præget af uforudsigelige kontekst-udviklinger samt revisioner af innovationsprojektet. Bottom-up lederskabets mulighedsbetingelse og strategiske fordel er, at når en samarbejdsdrevne innovationsproces mobiliseres på baggrund af en professionsrelateret, specialiseret basis, så bliver usikkerhed angående omfanget af innovationsprocessen en kilde til lederskabsdannelse, i og med at der bliver en efterspørgsel på svar. Denne lederskabsdannelse er afhængig af offentlig, professionsbaseret entreprenørskab og evnen til meningsfuldt at svare på 'hvem er vi, og hvad er det egentlig vi laver?' i den usikre situation for hermed at kunne dirigere samarbejdspartners meningsdannelse.

Derfor bidrager afhandlingen med værdifuld viden for praksis i og med at den tilbundsgående analyserer hvordan ledelse rent faktisk udøves i en kommunes daglige liv. Afhandlingen påviser hvilke konflikter et sådant lederskab møder samt hvilke legitimitets-kilder som der kan trækkes på. Afhandlingen understreger især hvordan lederskabets *fortolkninger* af sin egen rolle, af konflikter, og af strategiske udviklingsmuligheder er helt fundamentalt for at kunne påvirke og manipulere den organisatoriske omverden. Hermed skabes der en helt ny organisatorisk virkelighed, hvor et wicked problem *opstår* som et problem, og dermed kalder på samarbejde på tværs af centrale interesser.

Afhandlingen opsummerer denne ledelses-ankendelse ved at konstruere nogle fundamentale lederskabs-dilemmaer som kan bruges til sammenligning med andre forsøg på bottom-up, samarbejdsdrevne innovationsledelse. Dermed bidrager afhandlingen slutteligt i et større perspektiv til diskussionen om hvordan der kan udvikles offentlig sektor-lederskabsdesigns der bedre kan adressere samfundsmæssige 'wicked problems' ved hjælp af samarbejdsdrevne innovation.

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*List of abbreviations and concepts from the empirical context*

CUT: 'Cross-municipal Team' (my abbreviation). In Danish: Tværkommunalt Team, level 3 in the Intra municipal governance structure

Intra-Municipal Governance: the municipal part of the Cooperation Forum (Mayor Forum, The Cross-Municipal Steering Committee, and Cross-Municipal Team)

ND: Neighbourhood Development, Urban Design Department, The Technical and Environmental Administration.

FA: The Finance Administration

CLA: The Culture and Leisure Administration

CYA: The Children and Youth Administration

HCA: The Health and Care Administration

SSA: The Social Services Administration

TEA: The Technical and Environmental Administration

EIA: The Employment and Integration Administration

SHO: The Social Housing Organisations

*List of theoretical abbreviations*

BUCIL: analytical model for 'Bottom-up Collaborative Innovation Leadership'



# CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter	Title	Content
1	Introduction	<p>Research questions are motivated and contextualised.</p> <p>Contributions and claim of thesis are stated</p>
2	Theory: Bottom-up leadership for collaborative innovation in the public sector	<p>The objective of the chapter is to answer the theoretical research question.</p> <p>Focus is on reviewing literature of collaborative innovation in order to identify conceptual challenges.</p> <p>Afterwards, leadership approaches are explained and discussed. As an implication, a list of theoretical design demands is produced that a new leadership conception for collaborative innovation should adhere to.</p> <p>On the basis of a critical assessment of Sandford Borins' research, bottom-up leadership is theorised in a way that satisfies design demands.</p> <p>The following concepts are explained and discussed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-leadership emergence as recognition and relational leadership</li> <li>-public entrepreneurship</li> <li>-making sense and giving sense</li> <li>-wicked problem uncertainty</li> <li>-innovation journey uncertainty</li> </ul>

		<p>-leadership distribution</p> <p>An analytical model ('BUCIL') is introduced and discussed.</p>
3	<p>Analytical approach Chapter 3. Analytical approach</p>	<p>The objective of the chapter is to explain and discuss the analytical approach deployed.</p> <p>Choice of analytical approach is motivated and a certain variant of discourse analysis is explained.</p> <p>The deployment of discourse analysis in terms of a synthesis with the BUCIL framework is discussed.</p> <p>The analytical concepts are operationalized.</p>
4	<p>Methods</p>	<p>The objective of the chapter is to explain the specific use of single-case study design.</p> <p>Single-case study design is explained.</p> <p>The selection of case is motivated.</p> <p>The process of data collection is explained, and method and data in relation to a qualitative case-study is described.</p> <p>It is described how data is analysed by means of Nvivo Software.</p>
5	<p>Context of bottom-up leadership case: Area-based programs and disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the City of Copenhagen</p>	<p>The objective of the chapter is to explain the empirical context to the reader and to outline the profession underpinning bottom-up leadership.</p> <p>The mixed experience with area based programs in Denmark is briefly introduced. Program types are explained to the reader.</p> <p>Central concepts of neighbourhood governance scholars (Archon Fung, Carmen Sirianni) are</p>

		<p>explained and deployed heuristically in order to frame the main empirical challenges in The City of Copenhagen.</p> <p>A phase figure is introduced, explaining what value-contribution the collaborative innovation seemingly have resulted in, in terms of a process of institutionalization in the City of Copenhagen.</p> <p>The organisational context is described in terms of municipal governance form.</p> <p>An organisational diagram of Neighbourhood Development, TEA, is introduced.</p>
6	Analysis A: The Evaluation Case	<p>The objective of the chapter is to provide first part of the answer to the empirical research question.</p> <p>In this the first embedded case, the concepts of the operationalized BUCIL model are being used to analyse how leadership is being recognised.</p> <p>The chapter sums up the leadership dilemmas driving the positional development of Neighbourhood Development.</p>
7	Analysis B: The policy formulation case	<p>The objective of the chapter is to provide second part of the answer to the empirical research question.</p> <p>In this the second embedded case, all BUCIL model concepts are being used a second time in order to analyse how leadership is being recognised and challenged, and how this change relates to the previous embedded case.</p> <p>The chapter sums up the leadership dilemmas driving the positional development of</p>

		Neighbourhood Development across both cases.
8	Discussion	A discussion of empirical findings is made, focusing on limitations of the study, the generalizability of findings, the implications for practice and future research agendas.
9	Conclusion	The thesis is concluded, summarising the theoretical and empirical contributions.  It is explained how the thesis has answered the research question.

# CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

## *Research area*

This thesis focuses on collaborative innovation in the public sector with an emphasis on leadership. The outset of collaborative innovation is that it facilitates creative problem-solving which would otherwise not be possible for a single actor (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Due to the increasing complexity of societal problems, leadership becomes crucial, but also the more challenging, when collaborative innovation is being targeted at wicked problems. Wicked problems demand collaborative solution-making in a context of overlapping uncertainties. These uncertainties need to be managed by a network type of leadership with no capacity to enforce decision-making (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Often this type of collaborations result in collaborative inertia, especially if leadership is not exercised (Huxham & Vangen, 2005).

Innovation only emphasises the importance of leadership. Innovation processes have their own dynamic of uncertainty, one that is tied up to an essentially unknown endpoint in a process of ‘becoming’ (Van de Ven, 1999). Consequently, people participating in innovation are forced to take risks (S. P. Osborne & Brown, 2011). In environments of uncertainty, people need something that can provide them with direction – leadership emergence is one of the ways in which this direction can come about (Griffin, 2002).

Despite the societal importance of this agenda in current times of austerity, leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation in the public sector are undifferentiated. As Bommert (Bommert, 2010) notes, the main managerial approach to leadership in collaborative innovation is networked government. Sørensen & Torfing (2011) conceptualise this approach as a facilitative approach, providing the approach with the conceptual and empirical advantage of drawing on the vast and distinctive research traditions of network governance (Torfing, 2013).

## *The theoretical and empirical problem*

Empirical studies of public sector innovation demonstrate that a large part of innovation processes are initiated at the bottom of public sector organisations by civil servants and middle managers, often on the basis of professional insight into complicated welfare issues (Borins, 2002). However, even though bottom-up leadership for public sector innovation often addresses problems in a holistic fashion, Sandford Borins’ empirical descriptions of bottom-up leadership are neither

explicitly adapted to a collaborative innovation context nor are wicked problems mentioned in these descriptions. Further, Borins' notion of bottom-up leadership is not theoretically developed.

So, if research is to contribute to the development of an innovative public sector, the suggestion pursued in this thesis is that (i) theoretical frameworks for leadership are needed that enables a differentiation of leadership conceptions, and (ii) that the concept of bottom-up leadership is a source of inspiration for such a theoretical development, insofar (iii) as the bottom-up approach is explicitly adapted to a context of collaborative innovation that seeks to address wicked problems.

### *An important problem*

In this thesis, I argue that the theoretical problem related to leadership of collaborative innovation is important to address, because it implies a lack of detailed knowledge concerning how bottom-up leadership is made and exercised. I argue that this lack of a developed theoretical approach to how to analyse a bottom-up leadership makes it difficult to understand what the challenges of this type leadership are, in what circumstances bottom-up leadership is called for, and how such a leadership comes into being in the first place. A lack of theoretical development also makes this type of leadership unconnected to previous research on how to lead collaborations and innovation under uncertain conditions. As a result, it is difficult for researchers and professionals to forecast what possible conflicts a leadership might provoke, what resources that a leadership could mobilise, how a leadership exercises influence, what the long-term institutional implications are for such a bottom-up leadership, and how the relationship is between bottom-up leadership and other forms of leaderships.

A further practical consequence of this problem is that this type of leadership is not noticed by students of strategic management, collaborative innovation and public sector leadership, as well as professionals and leaders enrolled in leadership training programmes. As a consequence, professionals engaged in bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation will most likely run the risk of going through the same laborious and confusing learning process again and again. The professionals will be highly dependent on chance, such as whether someone among the staff might have experienced something similar previously. Providing a language and empirical knowledge will alter the perspective which bottom-up leadership has on the difficulties and conflicts that professionals and their collaborators will encounter, as well as avoiding challenges or making these challenges easier to accept.

### *How the thesis contributes to problem solving*

In this thesis, I answer the following overall research question in order to contribute to addressing an empirical problem: How new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems in today's welfare societies through innovation.

First I solve part of this problem by answering the following theoretical question: How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems?

I do this by reviewing existing literature of collaborative innovation leadership. This serves the purpose of identifying theoretical design demands for collaborative innovation leadership. The review also helps identify discussion points that help clarify how bottom-up leadership should be theorised. Subsequently, I use Sandford Borins' (Borins, 2000; Borins, 2002) extensive empirical study related to innovation bottom-up leadership in the public sector as the main entry point for theory development. Motivated with Sandford Borins' empirical descriptions, I argue that the concepts of profession-based, public entrepreneurship, leadership emergence, sense-making and sense-giving are essential for describing and understanding bottom-up leadership. This descriptive framework is conceptually contextualised within the uncertainties of wicked problems and innovation, further introducing the fundamental hypothesis that uncertainty is the core issue that creates confusion and loss of meaning that will create a demand for leadership.

In accordance with this conceptualisation, I define bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership and develop an analytical model.

Finally, I operationalise the theoretical framework by means of a micro-oriented as well as a locally oriented, organisational discourse framework. This operationalisation provides the analytical model of bottom-up leadership with a well-defined theory of science position, as well as providing the theoretical framework with more rigour and plausibility concerning the hypothesised causalities concerning the social construction of leadership. Finally, this analytical approach to discourse also provides researchers with a further possibility of positioning their research findings not only within collaborative innovation leadership, but also within discourse analytical approaches to leadership, like the Relational Leadership Theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006) and social constructivist approaches to leadership (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010).

The second way in which this thesis contributes to problem-solving is that I apply the proposed theoretical framework, making an empirical contribution, answering the following question:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

In order to answer this question I conduct a single-case study of bottom-up leadership in the City of Copenhagen, Denmark, a city with a complex central-administrative structure. This is a well-chosen case because of an on-going change process among central-administrations dealing with the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in a new way. The bottom-up leadership in this case utilised their professional experience related to area-based programmes in disadvantaged neighbourhoods as a legitimate basis for initiating a change. The change was intended to bridge a performance gap in public service provision and public projects in these disadvantaged areas in Copenhagen. Public service provision and projects in these areas lacked coordination, which as a consequence led to fragmented welfare provision and a lack of strategic aim for these disadvantaged areas. Accordingly, a development project was launched with the aim of increasing the coordination in these disadvantaged areas by means of a central-administrative reform. When in 2009 I initiated the case study, efforts at operationalising and implementing the project elements had just begun. Because of this on-going process, the selection allowed direct participant-observation in a single case study of how leadership was constructed and applied.

This analysis is the bulk of the thesis as regards scope, in that I apply the full range of concepts proposed in the analytical model that I developed by answering the first research question. I analyse how leadership is socially constructed. I focus on two phases in the qualitative single-case study: the development of a cross-administrative evaluation tool and the cross-administrative policy formulation process. I thus use the bottom-up leadership model twice to analyse how actions of entrepreneurship, sense-making and sense-giving are related to a shift in leadership over time.

On the basis of this analysis, I summarise the positional development of leadership by means of some fundamental leadership dilemmas that I construct on the basis of the empirical findings. As data sources, I use qualitative interviews completed in 2010, 2011 and 2012, policy documents, policy-meeting recordings, minutes, observations and field notes.



### *Central claims of the thesis*

The central claim of the thesis is that bottom-up leadership first of all is a leadership that is socially constructed through processes of recognition as the innovation process unfolds, and that exercises influence by giving sense to collaborators. Leadership construction and application is made possible by a context of radical uncertainty. Accordingly, the proposed theoretical and analytical framework enables comparative studies of bottom-up leadership within and across wicked problem fields that hopefully can contribute with knowledge that will allow the public sector to create better conditions for collaborative innovation by developing organisational structures and resources that enable the utilisation of the important asset that specialised officials are.

I further claim that bottom-up leadership is a highly flexible leadership approach. The analyses in this thesis demonstrate that for the people involved, this type of leadership requires a constant willingness to make sense of their identity, and constantly be able to adapt both leadership and project in order to keep up with the speed and turbulence related to collaborative innovation processes.

This on-going dialectic between leadership and project is conditioned by the profession-related sense-making of substantial matters, thereby being forced to constantly keeping the project in alignment with aggregated profession-based experience of a public performance gap. For instance, in Analysis A of this thesis, the development of a central-administrative evaluation tool requires both to be aligned with the experience of working with area-based programmes, a profession which emphasises experiments and holistic solutions to neighbourhood problems; but the tool is also supposed to reflect the leadership identity through which the bottom-up leadership understands itself. Accordingly, when new substantial or leadership-related insights are achieved, leadership and innovation project are forced to adjust to each other.

Because both the innovation project *and* the leadership are in fact emerging, adaptability becomes crucial. Making sense of what is going on is what provides this adaptability. For instance, in Analysis B, Neighbourhood Development and representatives put much effort into making a policy for area-based programmes in disadvantaged areas, but are experiencing frustration and inertia. Reflecting on this, an employee in Neighbourhood Development makes the interpretation that the inertia is not a result of the diffuse character of the area-based programmes as a *tool*, but that the inertia results from the unclear political, strategic and substantive municipal approach to the *object* of the policy – the disadvantaged areas. This initiates a new process of entrepreneurial activities in Neighbourhood Development,

in which the possibilities of redefining the policy commission is pursued both in terms of substance and strategic support by decision-makers. Accordingly, when the innovation project is altered so must the individuals in Neighbourhood Development redefine its leadership.

In an organisational perspective, the thesis facilitates the perception of such bottom up leadership as an organisational function that enables constant sensitivity and adaptation to performance gaps. So, this type of leadership enables collaborative innovation to be imported into complex administrations. Here the constant construction and re-structuring of bottom-up leadership has the function of *flexibility* - providing the public sector with a highly flexible leadership that is able to absorb or avoid the blows of conflict, and consequently adapt the innovation project and leadership positioning to the conflictive structures in public political organisations. In this case, examples of these conflictive structures are role conflicts between administrations in terms of who has the right to define the major strategies of the municipality, but also to make it meaningful and strategically useful for municipal decision-makers to be part of a collaborative set-up.

#### *Contributions of the thesis*

This thesis contributes to the field of leadership of collaborative innovation in the public sector. The thesis theoretically contributes by introducing an analytical model for bottom-up leadership. This model may inspire other researchers of collaborative innovation leadership in that it draws on other theoretical legacies than what at present dominates the academic discussions of collaborative innovation leadership. Further, the analytical model can be used by other researchers to investigate specific causalities related to how a professional unit is transformed into an informal leadership; how specific acts of entrepreneurship enables the emergence of such a bottom-up leadership; how specific wicked–problem uncertainties as well as innovation uncertainties make a demand for a bottom-up leadership, related to the structural components of these wicked problems; how such a leadership exercises influence by making and giving sense to collaborators; and what happens when an informal bottom-up driven innovation project is being implemented and mainstreamed into the formal bureaucracies in political public organisations.

The thesis further contributes with empirical knowledge that explains the challenges for bottom-up leadership that wants to address a wicked problem by means of innovation in a collaborative setting. This knowledge about leadership challenges is relevant to other collaborative innovation initiatives in the public sector that seek to address wicked problems, not only the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. I analyse how actions of entrepreneurship and sense-making are

related to a shift in leadership over time. On the basis of this, I summarise how leadership is socially constructed by means of some fundamental leadership dilemmas. These leadership dilemmas may be of a general character that accordingly can be used to compare with other similar cases of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership. Hopefully, the insight into these bottom-up leadership dilemmas can qualify for future bottom-up leadership for dealing with the uncertainties of collaborative innovation when addressing wicked problems.

The thesis may also inspire practice in that it analyses in depth how a bottom-up leadership is actually enacted on a day-to-day basis of local government. It demonstrates what conflicts such leadership might encounter in a collaborative innovation process, and what sources of legitimacy can be drawn upon. For instance, how to create a new division of labour among collaborators in order to avoid defensive reactions? How to satisfy collaborative demands of clear leadership while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence? Through interviews with both leadership and collaborators on the same events and conflicts, professionals are given insight into each other's institutional rationality. For as the analyses demonstrate all reactions and conflicts are in fact perfectly rational. This makes conflicting viewpoints more understandable, which accordingly may help to reduce conflicts and meetings in which the same conflict points surface again and again.

Moreover, the thesis highlights that bottom-up leadership have choices to make when it comes to understanding and redefining its own leadership. Each of these choices has structural repercussions concerning the recognition of leadership by its collaborators. As the analyses in this thesis exemplify, when an innovation project is launched that focuses on central administrative coordination with implications for local working professionals, the leadership will meet resistance by advocates of the local working professionals, resulting in a clash between centralistic and localistic discourses. The point is not that these conflicts can be avoided, but that each choice of leadership positioning will have consequences in terms of what conflict points will be generated.



# CHAPTER 2. THEORY: BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP FOR COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

## *Introduction*

In this chapter, I develop my theoretical framework and in so doing I answer the first of two research questions. The question is: ***How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems?***

The function of this chapter in the thesis is two-fold. First of all the chapter demonstrates how the theory building demonstrated is an independent, theoretical contribution. Second, the function of this chapter is also to demonstrate how the theoretical framework that I develop can be deployed in an empirical analysis. This accordingly produces a basis for an analytical strategy and an explanation of the methods that I deploy in this thesis, i.e. steps that allow me to make two empirical analyses. Hence, throughout the chapter these two meta-tracks (theoretical contribution and deployment of the theoretical contribution in an empirical analysis) are commented on by way of theoretical explanations and discussions. Accordingly, some discussions contribute to clarify elements in the theoretical contribution, and some discussions contribute to clarify how the developed theoretical model (the 'BUCIL' model) can be deployed in subsequent analyses.

In the following sections, the intention is to identify what theoretical design qualities leadership for collaborative innovation should adhere to. This requires an understanding of collaborative innovation literature in general as well as a critical review of leadership approaches to collaborative innovation. As a consequence of this theory building strategy I argue that bottom-up leadership for collaborative innovations has to be theorised and defined.

This problem is important to address. First, studies of public sector innovation show that a large part of innovation processes are initiated at the bottom of public sector organisations by civil servants and middle managers, often on the basis of professional insight into complicated welfare issues (Borins, 2002). A significant number of these bottom-up innovation processes have a holistic focus, requiring collaboration across agencies and actors, potentially generating new collaborative

services. These observations are also highly relevant in a Danish context. Research demonstrates that when asking public sector leaders about what factors that initiates innovations, enthusiasts/employees are mentioned as the main factor with 85.2%. When asked about which groups are the source of innovation, employees likewise rank the highest with 73.5% (FTF, 2010).

If research is to contribute to the development of an innovative public sector capable of collaboratively utilise the expertise of civil servants, we need theoretical frameworks that provide us with knowledge on how to lead these processes. This might result in empowering politicians and decision-makers with profession-based political projects that address the wicked problems (Beinecke, 2009; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Weber & Khademian, 2008) of today's welfare societies.

In this chapter, I cover different strands of theory, touching on a number of concepts. In order to avoid confusion I start by establishing some core definitions which are explained elsewhere in the thesis.

I define **innovation** as an “intentional and proactive process that involves the generation and practical adoption and spread of new and creative ideas which aim to produce a qualitative change in a specific context” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, p. 849).

I define **collaboration** as “*organizations...that are working together*” (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, p. 1159).

I define a **wicked problem** as a phenomenon of uncertainty that “arises when parties are confronted with societal problems and do not know what the effects of their efforts to resolve them will be”. This uncertainty “in a network setting has three manifestations: substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainty” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 6).

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I introduce the research field of collaborative innovation. Subsequently, I review how existing scholars have conceptualised leadership of collaborative innovation. This is followed by a presentation of my argument for theorising a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation. I introduce an analytical model that supplements the existing leadership approaches to collaborative innovation in the public sector, and I discuss the applied concepts and the model in detail.

## 2.1 INTRODUCING COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION

This section introduces the research field of collaborative innovation and points to issues that future research needs to address. Accordingly, the section functions as a backdrop for a discussion of leadership issues in Section 1.

Collaborative innovation in the public sector is an emerging research field concerned with how to understand and enhance collaborative innovation (Hartley, 2005; Moore & Hartley, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Scholars agree that bureaucratic, closed innovation methods do not provide adequate responses to the challenges of community and policies (Bland, Bruk, Kim, & Lee, 2010; Bommert, 2010; Considine, Lewis, & Alexander, 2009). Today's complex challenges such as climate change, aging societies, and financial crises (Harris & Aldbury, 2009) demand a different quantity and quality of innovation (Bommert, 2010). These challenges are often ill defined, sometimes even wickedly, which requires the involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders (Hartley, 2005; Moore & Hartley, 2008; Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).

One of the claims of collaborative innovation is that it is a method of dealing with complex, ill-defined problems, such as education, health care, homeland security and environmental conservation (Nambisan, 2008). Accordingly, collaborative innovation in the public sector enables problem solving which is otherwise not possible for the individual actor; collaborative innovation focuses our attention on the potential of innovation through relations of cooperation that penetrate the boundaries of the lead organisation (ibid.). Sørensen & Torfing (2011) argue that there is a growing demand for this specific type of public innovation, due to the fact that citizens and private firms have rising expectations concerning the quality of public services; that professionals and elected politicians have growing ambitions as regards the solving of social, economic and environmental problems; and that we witness a growing number of wicked problems that are ill-defined, require specialised knowledge, involve a large number of stakeholders and carry a high potential for conflict. (Torfing, 2013) argues that *“the solution of the increasing numbers of ‘wicked problems’, which cannot be solved by standard solutions or by spending more money, calls for innovative solutions”* (p. 301).

Several other influential authors argue in much the same vein that collaborative strategies such as inter-organisational collaboration, network governance and new public government can be used to meet these demands in ways not possible for either hierarchy or market (Hartley, 2005; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; S. P. Osborne, 2010). A central aspect of this way of thinking is that the role of public managers is not to create the innovation by themselves. Hartley (2005) argues that we see a shift in management from New Public Management to network governance. (S. P. Osborne, 2010) argues that we are in fact witnessing the

rise of ‘New Public Governance’. (Torfing, 2013) explains the relation between New Public Governance and collaborative innovation by stating that New public governance is a new paradigm that “*will help to unleash the innovative potential of collaborative interaction*” (p. 303), because the paradigm focuses on the institutional conditions for collaboration and because it recognises the need to govern self-regulating systems of interaction (ibid.). What unites the authors is essentially that a networked type of governance is necessary in order to create innovation in the public sector. The challenge is to manage open and flexible, inter-organisational arenas (Sørensen and Torfing 2011) in which trust, relational capital and relational contracts are among the main governance mechanisms (S. Osborne, 2006), and where the networks are self-organising, functioning both with and without government (Rhodes 1997); where the public manager acts as a visionary ‘explorer’ that facilitates the creation of new networks (Hartley, 2005). Relating these considerations to traditional innovation research in the private sector, Moore & Hartley argue that what characterises much innovation in the public sector in general is ‘governance’ innovation, i.e. a radical change in the way in which a certain policy field or service is provided. Governance innovation thus “*changes the location and financing of social production, and the level and distribution of things that could reasonably be called social or public goods and services*” (Moore & Hartley, 2008).

Sørensen & Torfing (2011) describe the effect of collaborative innovation in terms of strengthening of innovation phases: idea generation is spurred when many stakeholders are involved; idea selection is improved in that ideas are tested critically among collaborators; implementation success is improved in that joint ownership is created; and dissemination is propelled by the collaborators involved (p. 852).

Several authors point to the shortcomings of existing research in collaborative innovation in the public sector (Bommert, 2010; Hartley, 2005; Moore & Hartley, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Hartley (Hartley, 2005) defines research agendas for public sector innovation in governance and public services. Hartley argues that more research is needed concerning the specific public sector contexts of public innovations. Concerning the innovation process, Hartley, quoting Borins (2002), argues that innovation is increasingly a “*bottom-up*” and “*sideways-in*” process (p. 32). Accordingly, Hartley asks what the ‘relative advantages and disadvantages’ of top-down, bottom-up and lateral innovation are for particular types of innovations, related to the ‘innovation journey’ through setbacks and barriers. Concerning governance innovation, there has been a tendency to focus on service innovations, not governance innovations, leading to questions such as in what ways is the shift an innovation, how does the innovation emerge and how is it sustained.

Concerning diffusion of innovation, there is much to be learned about how diffusion takes place, and how and why innovations are adapted to different contexts and



cultures. How, for instance, can innovation be recognised and described to others as distinctive? (p. 33). Concerning innovative capacity in organisations, why do some organisations appear to be more receptive to innovation than others? Concerning the link between innovation and improvement, one should examine change over time considering early performance losses, learning curves, improvements or further decline (p. 33). Concerning leadership and innovation, there is a need to step beyond traditional hierarchical models of innovation leadership to understand how innovation climates are nurtured; how policy-makers and managers can work together in distinctive roles of innovation, and how far innovation leadership is distributed within and across organisations (p. 33).

Bommert (Bommert, 2010) concludes that one of the conceptual shortcomings of collaborative innovation is that assumptions and conclusions about risks, issues and capacities are primarily based on theories of networked governance, whereas benefits are based on open innovation-literature (Bommert, 2010). As Bommert notes: *“this provokes the question whether collaborative innovation is simply a composition of the two, an “advanced” function of networked governance or whether it needs to be conceptualised in other terms?”* (ibid., p. 30).

(Moore & Hartley, 2008) explore how innovations in governance differ from traditional product or process innovations. The authors argue that governance and innovation have not been combined sufficiently. The inspiration from the private sector innovation research has led to studies of innovations that improve organisational performance through product and process innovations, *“rather than public sector innovations which seek to improve social performance through re-organisations of cross-sector decision-making, financing and production systems”* (p. 3). The authors also argue that the governance literature has focused on social coordination but has not drawn on innovation literature (p. 3). According to Moore & Hartley, these governance innovations involve networks of organisations, or the transformation of complex social production systems, being in general conceived and implemented above the organisational level (p. 4). These innovations focus both on concrete changes as well as the ways in which this productive activity is financed or resourced, as well as the processes used to decide what will be produced and the normative standards used to evaluate the performance of the social production system (p. 4). The authors points to a gap in the literature, because innovation literature does not work above the organisational level. Conversely, Governance literature focuses on analyses of broader social systems. Accordingly, this literature does not enable insight into how the precise ways *“in which the outputs and production processes of the (social) production system have been altered by a change in governance arrangements”* (p. 5). The governance literature lacks the detailed operational focus of the innovation literature (p. 5).

To sum up, I have in this section highlighted design demands for a theoretical conception of leadership for collaborative innovation, which are as follow:

- To consider drawing on other theories than network governance
- Investigate advantages/disadvantages of bottom-up, top-down and lateral innovations
- Relate these advantages/disadvantages to particular types of innovations, related to a process perspective of the ‘innovation journey’
- How governance innovations are innovative
- How an innovation emerges
- How it is sustained
- How it is diffused
- Innovation leadership needs to step beyond hierarchical models, in order to explain how to nurture innovation climates, how policy makers and managers can work together, and how far leadership is distributed within and across organisations

In the next section I explain and identify discussion points in order to produce further design recommendations for leadership theory building.

## **2.2 LEADERSHIP FOR COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A REVIEW**

Regarding leadership approaches to collaborative innovation, most scholars draw on some variant of network governance in order to conceptualise the aspect of collaboration. However, the conceptual depth, the leadership typologies and the understanding of how to exercise this networked type of collaborative leadership and other types of collaborative leaderships do vary within these collaborative innovation approaches. Below, I explain these approaches in more detail in order to identify discussion points relevant for theorising bottom-up leadership.

A number of scholars argue that networked types of governance are assessed to be a fruitful public sector management approach to collaborative innovation (Bland et al., 2010; Bommert, 2010; Eggers, Singh, Goldsmith, & Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, 2009; Hartley, 2005; Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2013) as they provide a focus on effective coordination across government organisations as well as the integration of actors across sectors.

Some scholars are inspired by open innovation. This transforms the implementation focus of network governance into an explicitly innovation approach, even though it remains an open question whether this combination actually leads to a new research

field or just a variant of networked government (Bommert, 2010). Collaborative innovation involves a diverse set of actors (Bommert, 2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011), thereby not only harnessing resources, but potentially enhancing all phases of the innovation cycle (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Power imbalances need to be levelled (Nambisan, 2008).

In contrast to network governance, some scholars propose analytical frameworks that position collaborative innovation as an explicitly multilevel concept, both empirically (i.e. at public agency level) and analytically: (Moore & Hartley, 2008) argue that 'governance innovations' need to integrate a more detailed view of the operations undertaken, a level of analysis that has so far been neglected in governance research but which holds a strong position in private sector innovation research. Sørensen and Torfing (2011) provide us with an analytical model, arguing that collaborative innovation occurs in institutional arenas of interaction which provide drivers and barriers that facilitate and hamper collaboration and innovation. An analysis of collaborative innovation should take into account the arenas of interaction embedded in an institutional framework, focusing on barriers and drivers at the levels of identity, as well as organisational, inter-organisational, institutional and cultural levels. Focus should also be on agency and individual level aspects of collaboration processes, such as empowered participation, mutual and transformative learning, and joint ownership.

(Nambisan, 2008) argues that network-based collaborative innovation can be defined as an external approach to innovation and problem-solving that "*relies on harnessing the resources and capabilities of external networks and communities to amplify or enhance innovation speed and innovation outcome*" (p. 6). Such an approach has four principles: a shared set of goals and objectives; a shared worldview or awareness; knowledge creation that emphasises new knowledge through interactions among network members; the architecture of participation that provides the governance mechanisms for the contributions of the participants to be coordinated, integrated and synchronised (ibid.).

Accordingly, Nambisan identifies four public leadership roles stratified according to two aspects of collaborative problem solving: the nature of the problem and the nature of the collaboration arrangement. Concerning the nature of the problem, this dimension relates to how well the problem is defined and how the innovative idea evolves. At one end of the continuum, the problem is defined by existing governance services or technologies; at the other end the problem space may be less well defined and more emergent in nature, which might require acquiring inputs from diverse stakeholders (p. 12). The second dimension relates to the organisation structure of the network, from centralised to de-centralised, i.e. whether the collaborative innovation is government-led or spread on various stakeholders. Accordingly, the four roles are innovation integrator, innovation seeker, innovation

champion and innovation catalyst. The innovation integrator works within a defined innovation space and is government led. The innovation seeker works within an undefined innovation space and is also government-led. With regard to the innovation champion, the government agency is perhaps not the primary innovation agent, but may take on a more facilitative and supportive role within an undefined innovation space. The innovation catalyst, by contrast, works within a defined and well-known problem space; the problem is defined but requires new collaborative solutions (Nambisan, 2008).

(Hartley, 2005) develops another kind of leadership typology than (Nambisan, 2008). This typology is related to innovation and improvement in the different regimes of governance and public management. These different roles are seen as related to a particular ideology and historical period, but may also co-exist and be in conflict. In 'traditional' public administration, the role of policy makers are commanders, and the role of public managers are as 'clerks and martyrs'. Within a New Public Management regime, the role of policy-makers is that of announcers/commissionaires, and the role of public managers is that of efficiency and market maximising. In a networked governance regime, the role of policy-makers is that of leaders and interpreters, whereas public managers take on the role of explorers (p. 29). According to Hartley, innovation under networked governance revitalises the leadership role of policy-makers: as enabler of innovation through large-scale legislation, but also by supporting innovation by providing resources for experiments and collaboration (p. 30). Public managers become explorers, commissioned by society to search for public value. Accordingly, managers are expected to use their initiative and imagination, but are also expected to be responsive to political guidance and feedback (p.30).

Sandford Borins (Borins, 2002) develops yet another typology of collaborative innovation leadership, this one developed around who initiates collaborative innovations. Borins makes a distinction between 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' led innovations in the public sector. This distinction, investigated through a large statistical and qualitative material, leads to three ideal types of innovation leadership: bottom-up innovation, policy-directed innovation in response to crisis, and organisational turnarounds by agency heads. In the USA, 50% of the innovations originate from middle managers or front-line staff, 25% from agency heads, 21% from politicians, 13% from interest groups, and 10% from individuals outside government. Borins' study further demonstrates that a huge part of these innovations are holistic (61% in the samples from 1990-1994 and 85% in the sample from 1995-1998). Holistic is here understood as providing multiple services to clients, coordinating organisations or taking a systems approach to problem (Borins, 2000).

Borins argue that bottom-up innovations “*require and create leadership*” (p. 469), given the fact that innovations require advocates and often become subject of discussion within an organisation. Innovations may also lead to new structures within an organisation, often involving interorganisational collaboration. The initiators of the innovation in question are likely to play a role in several of these aspects of the innovative process (p. 470). Borins note that “*because they are on the front lines or in middle management, they are creating an informal or alternative leadership structure*” (p. 470). The influence of such bottom-up innovations depends on the stance that the public sector’s top take toward these initiatives, such as negative, neutral, or highly supportive. Furthermore, bottom-up innovations may support already defined goals set by politicians and senior public servants, but they can also be the ones that produce initiatives that politicians are willing “*to embrace as their own*” (p. 471).

Politically-directed innovation statistically tended to occur when it was a response to a crisis, in that citizens expect politicians to lead the response (Borins, 2002). Borins argues that in each case politicians defined the problem and took responsibility for choosing the solution, and instructed the bureaucracy to inform their choices (ibid., p. 473). The organisational turnarounds by agency heads were a type of innovation leadership adopted in response to a public sector organisation that does not meet normal expectations for service delivery. Typically this involves the appointment of a new agency head by politicians.

(Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) argue that there is no “*commonly accepted theoretical framework*” for analysing collaborative innovation in the public sector (p. 858). Consequently, the authors introduce an analytical model, in which a specific governance role is defined. This managerial role is defined as “*meta-governance*” (p. 857), having as a fundamental characteristic the “*regulation of self-regulation*” (ibid.), which involves a combination of hands-on/hands-off tools. The authors argue that the facilitative network approach located in the collaborative innovation literature is exactly what metagovernance is about, in that metagovernance “*is a kind of facilitating network management that aims to provide a political, institutional, and discursive framework*” (p. 857). Proactive forms of governance are essential as management by shaping the institutional arenas of interaction, consequently having impact on the specific processes of collaborative innovation, including issues of empowered participation, mutual and transformative learning, and joint ownership. Accordingly, metagovernance can help to stabilise the institutional arenas of interaction, strengthen drivers and remove barriers while respecting the self-regulating character of collaborative innovation processes. Hands-off tools could be institutional design and network framing, and hands-on tools would involve process management and direct participation (p. 861).

(Torfing, 2013) argues that despite the great potential of collaborative interaction for enhancing innovation, attempts to facilitate and spur innovation might fail. Collaboration may be hampered by power asymmetries, mistrust, opportunistic behaviour, strategic and substantive uncertainty, conflicting frameworks and a lack of leadership and facilitation. Consequently, stakeholders need to exercise collaborative leadership and innovation management (p. 308). This can be acquired by trained facilitators or leaders connected with the involved stakeholders. Accordingly, this collaborative innovation management has to perform the different functions of steward, mediators and catalyst.

The steward convenes actors, sets the agenda, and frames and represents the collaborative process as a whole. Collaborative innovation management also has to take on the role of mediator in order to facilitate and drive the process. The aim is to clarify interdependencies, manage the process, build trust and construct common frameworks. The management thirdly has to generate innovation by acting as a catalyst by exercising entrepreneurial leadership such as enabling a re-framing of problems and encourage transformative learning.

Importantly, Torfing (Torfing, 2013) argues that the main analytical vantage point for studying collaborative innovation is provided by the theories of network governance. Torfing provides an overview of five different research approaches to network governance: rational choice institutionalism, normative institutionalism, interpretive governance theory, network management theory and governmentality theory (p. 310). This overview is important when dealing with the leadership of collaborative innovation, in that the different research traditions make possible different analyses of how leadership can be conceptualised. For instance, rational choice institutionalism produces an image of agents as calculating agents; normative institutionalism, conversely, allows analyses focusing on the role of identity, institutional rules and cultural norms, but may be hampered by its weak conception of agency in changing institutional structures; interpretive governance theory focuses on “*the social construction of practice through the ability of individuals to create and act on meaning*”(p. 311), and the approach allows a bottom-up approach (p. 311-312). Focus is on the individual actors and the meanings that they are constructing. Interpretive governance theory does, according to Torfing (p. 312), fail to provide a proper explanation of institutional and organisational conditions for action. Network management theory defines governance networks as interorganisational arenas for interest mediation “*between self-interested actors who interact because of the presence of a mutual resource dependency*” (p. 312). However, this approach has few reflections on the role of power in shaping identities, interactions and the institutional frameworks. Finally, governmentality theory does not focus on collaborative innovation, but enables a perspective on innovation as a part of a particular governmentality, shaped by discursive power strategies. However, the approach remains at a general and abstract level of analysis,

in that it does not make possible analyses of how and why actors are interacting, and what the conditions are for these actors to produce policies and regulations both continuous and discontinuous with the past (p. 313).

So, by assessing the leadership conceptions above I find that what inspires theory building in this research field is to strike a conceptual balance between stabilising the collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and de-stabilizing parts of the collaborative configuration, on the other hand, in order to utilise uncertainty. The solution for collaborative innovation has so far been to separate management and innovation: network governance is the approach taken as the management perspective, whereas open innovation is supposed to deliver the novelty (Bommert, 2010). However, scholars do this differently. (Nambisan, 2008) argues in favour of differentiation of leadership roles related to problem type. (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) seems to assume that the concept of meta-governance is suitable as an overall leadership approach, having a non-hierarchical, facilitative management approach, involving deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage and direct more or less self-regulating processes of collaborative interaction. The purpose of meta-governance is to stabilise the institutional arenas of interaction. Hands-off tools are institutional design and network framing; hands-on tools are process management and direct participation.

What the explanation of leadership conceptions furthermore reveals is a heavy reliance on networked governance approaches to collaborative innovation leadership. This undifferentiation of the theoretical conception of leadership arguably limits how leadership of collaborative innovation can be understood and investigated.

In the next section I identify discussion points that first of all demonstrate the undifferentiated conceptions of leadership. The discussion points also illustrate that another conceptual balance is possible between stabilisation and the utilisation of uncertainty, hence contributing to an increased differentiation of leadership conception.

### **2.2.1. DISCUSSION**

In the previous section, I introduced conceptions of collaborative innovation leadership. The main theoretical challenge of collaborative innovation is to be able to conceptualise how to strike a balance between stabilising the collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and de-stabilising parts of the collaborative configuration, on the other hand. Accordingly, the leadership conceptions reveal a number of assumptions concerning agency, social structure, power and theory-of-science position, all of which are related to the challenge of maintaining this balance between stabilisation and de-stabilisation. Accordingly, the previous introduction

and review contain a number of points relevant for discussing leadership approaches to collaborative innovation.

What the discussion points below contribute with is first of all clarifications of assumptions related to leadership of collaborative innovation in general. Second, the clarification of these assumptions is interpreted in the light of a bottom-up leadership perspective. Accordingly, the purpose of this discussion section is to open new research terrain for collaborative innovation leadership by displaying some theoretical design demands that new leadership conceptions should adhere to. I do this by juxtaposing differences between leadership conceptions, using Borins' notion of bottom-up leadership as an empirical source of inspiration, setting off from Bommert and Hartley's suggestions for conceptual shortcomings and unexplored research agendas.

Bommert suggests that researchers of collaborative innovation should reflect on conceptualisations of collaborative innovation, due to the fact that the research agenda is closely connected to research on network governance. Obviously, this comment is relevant for the leadership of collaborative innovation, especially for how to conceptualise bottom-up leadership, because Bommert's argument encourages a conceptualisation of leadership that is not based on network governance literature. Hartley likewise calls for more research in relation to governance innovation and public sector innovation in general. Research should to investigate advantages and disadvantages with bottom-up, top-down and lateral innovation, related to the particular types of innovations, related to a process perspective of an 'innovation journey'. Hartley also points to the fact that researchers need to demonstrate in what ways governance innovations are in fact innovative, how the innovation emerges, and how it is sustained. Hartley also points to research in innovation diffusion, in terms of innovative capacity, studying change over time taking into account initial conditions. Further, concerning leadership there is a need to step beyond hierarchical models, in order to explain how to nurture innovation climates, how policy-makers and managers can work together, and how far leadership is distributed within and across organisations. Moore & Hartley further argue that governance innovations, i.e. re-organisations of cross-sector decision-making, financing and production systems, have been neglected as a type of public sector innovation, and that existing governance literature does not provide insight into the precise ways in which outputs have been changed due to a change in governance arrangements.

When theoretically conceptualising leadership for collaborative innovation, the above remarks are important as they point to design standards of how to compose such theory. When reviewing leadership approaches for collaborative innovation,



the network governance approach is by far the theoretically most developed. The theoretical developments by (Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2013) are important steps forward for the collaborative innovation research agenda, including leadership approaches. First of all, the analytical framework introduced by (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) addresses a number of the weaknesses and shortcomings addressed by Bommert and Hartley. With regards to Bommert's critique, the analytical framework is still heavily influenced by network governance in terms of management, but also uses and synthesises key concepts related to planning and innovation research. This conceptualisation consequently enables a more developed synthesis of network governance and innovation. Further, this analytical framework also makes possible an analysis related to Hartley's remarks, in terms of a more detailed perspective on how outputs have been produced related to change in the governance system. Nambisan's more practically oriented framework contributes by stratifying leadership roles for collaborative innovation, also allowing for defining cases in which a public sector agency may not be in charge. Further, Nambisan's leadership concept is important in that it differentiates between ill-defined and well-defined societal problems, stressing the fact that the problem type to a high degree conditions leadership approaches. (Torfing, 2013)'s contribution is likewise important, because leadership roles of convener, mediator and catalyst are defined and conceptualised, by drawing on collaboration leadership literature. This is an important contribution since these roles are located closer to actual agency and action and less to managerial and governance functions. In this respect, Torfing's conception opens up for an analysis in which governance and leadership is perceived of as distinct types of action, and furthermore points to new research territory in which the interplay between leadership and governance can be dealt with. Second, Torfing's contribution is important by stressing the fact that analysis of collaborative innovation, governance and leadership to a high degree depends on what tradition of network governance research that a study deploys.

Finally, Borins' inductively generated distinctions of bottom-up/top down driven (holistic) innovations are important by providing categories that can be further theoretically conceptualised, and by providing categories that do not draw on assumptions on collaboration or network governance literature, but instead takes outset in less abstract, and easily identifiable, group of leaders.

Consequently, Borins' research of especially bottom-up leadership is relevant for the on-going debate of collaborative innovation leadership, because the empirical categories and the descriptions of leadership motivate to theory building that do not necessarily draw on public administration literature, such as network governance, or on collaboration literature. In the next section, I juxtapose the differences of leadership approaches, emphasising elements of Borins' bottom-up leadership.

### **2.2.1.1 Discussion point one: leadership as predefined vs. leadership as a process**

Key aspects of Borins' descriptions of bottom-up leadership are that they are based on front-line staff and immediate managers perception of a public sector problem; that leadership has to be made, since bottom-up leadership is not present in the beginning of the innovation process; and that this bottom-up leadership creates an alternative leadership structure, using informal channels of influence.

The first point that stimulates theory building in Borins' conception is that leadership has to be made. This statement is actually quite radical. It has the potential of enabling a radically different perspective on leadership, because in the leadership explanations reviewed above, leadership is understood as something which is defined to begin with, either by researchers or by professionals: someone 'convenes' or 'facilitates' the collaborative innovation to begin with, or someone acts as a 'catalyst', an 'explorer' etc. Despite the fact that these approaches suggests a flexible leadership approach, tailored to the different phases of collaborative innovations, the transformational aspect of leadership identity is not in itself taken into consideration as an independent research focus. Accordingly, an analytical perspective is generated in which the innovation process is the research object, i.e. the dependent variable, whereas leadership is kept fixed, i.e. the independent variable.

I argue that this is actually an assumption worth reconsidering, given the fact that process literature in innovation explicitly characterise such processes in terms that suggest subjective experience of an all-encompassing chaos and confusion. Take for instance some of the most acknowledged researchers of innovation, Andrew Van de Ven *et al.* (Van de Ven, 1999), and their description of innovation:

*"The journey is an exploration into the unknown process by which novelty emerges. The process is characterized as inherently uncertain and dynamic, and it seemingly follows a random process (...) To say that the process is open and dynamic implies that the timing and magnitude of events make the system of actions entrepreneurs take, outcomes they experience, and external context events that occur unpredictable, truly novel, and genuinely a "process of becoming".."(p. 3, my bold)*

Being part of such chaotic processes will have the implication that participants' identities and all of their organisational actions can actually be doubted upon: are we really on the right track here? Can we trust our own professional skills in terms of leadership, judgement and specialization? What will be the implications of the innovation for our jobs/position/department, given either success of failure?

Now, should we expect that this uncertainty, randomness, being part of something becoming and unknown that characterises *single*-organisational innovation would be reduced or amplified in a *collaborative* innovation context? The aggregated research of one of the most acknowledged researcher duo's in collaboration suggests the opposite. In several publications Chris Huxham & Siv Vangen have investigated an idea similar to collaborative innovation but under the heading of what the authors call 'collaborative advantage'. However, they have also developed the concept of 'collaborative inertia', which is a great danger in collaborative enterprises. The authors argue that even though concepts like 'strategic alliances', 'public service delivery partnerships' and other collaborative forms are surrounded by a strong rhetoric of something positive and rewarding, stories of actual success are hard to find. Actually the authors go as far as stating the following:

*"The overwhelming conclusion from our research is that seeking collaborative advantage is a seriously resource-consuming activity so is only to be considered when the stakes are really worth pursuing. Our message to practitioners and policy makers alike is don't do it unless you have to"* (Huxham & Vangen 2005, p.13).

Accordingly, given the fact that collaborations are often heavily marked by aspects of collaborative inertia, I assume that leadership making and related identity issues in a collaborative innovation process perspective would be an important independent research agenda to pursue *especially* in collaborative innovation processes, and most definitely in relation to bottom-up leadership. This is a research approach to leadership that is closer to what Torfing (2013) regards as interpretive governance theory, and less close to the rationalistic and structural approaches of network governance, because emphasis is on actors' interpretations, socially constructed meanings and identity issues.

What this discussion point suggests is that an independent research agenda of leadership making in collaborative innovation processes is called for. This is especially so for bottom-up leadership since such leadership not only have to exercise leadership in a collaborative innovation context that provokes a radical doubt of organisational identity and actions, but furthermore have to make its own leadership while simultaneously trying to exercise leadership. Accordingly, bottom-up leadership faces a dual challenge of identity transformation.

### 2.2.1.2 Discussion point two: position of power

Another aspect relevant to discuss in relation to leadership is the power position of a collaborative innovation leader. Nambisan differentiates leadership roles in accordance with whether the innovation is government led or not. In Borins' conception, the bottom-up leader has an inferior position, whereas in the other leadership conceptions reviewed the notion of power with regards to leadership is less defined, actually non-existent. Arguably, the amount and type of power available for a collaborative innovation leader to a high degree determines how to initiate and exercise such leadership. As a thought experiment, one could reflect on whether it would be possible for bottom-up leadership in a public agency to take on the role of what Nambisan calls an innovation integrator? Or whether it would be possible for bottom-up leadership to act as a convener or a variant of meta-governor? In Borins' descriptions of bottom-up leadership, this seems unlikely – such leadership develops 'alternative leadership structures', and is highly dependent on a receptive stance of decision-makers. We could ask this critical question: Is it possible to facilitate a collaborative innovation if you as a leader have no organisational mandate to do so? Although this may be possible, establishing collaborative relations to other organisations is arguably made easier if hierarchical support from one's own organisation is already achieved, thereby giving collaborators the impression that this project is worth the effort. Consequently, position of power is fundamental for the roles of leadership to exercise.

Borins' notion of bottom-up leadership explains how power and leadership role are closely interwoven. Reflecting on power and position of power also leads to a questioning of what the assumptions of governance network-related leadership conceptions are. Even though these leadership approaches are exactly adapted to a context of dispersed power and conflict, an assumption is that power is consolidated *within* the lead agency. On the basis of such a condition, it is possible for leadership to define what is supposed to be innovated, for instance a service, or what problem is supposed to be solved. On this basis, it is possible to facilitate spaces of more or less self-organised interaction.

The discussion above allows further discussion about what organisational mandates the different collaborative innovation leaderships have. It seems plausible that network governance based collaborative innovation leaderships assumes that an organisational mandate is provided by formal power structures at the beginning of the innovation journey, and that such a mandate will continue to be provided by organisational decision-makers (politicians, CEO's, mayor), until the collaborative innovation project is perceived of as a failure, as unfeasible, or has been implemented. Accordingly, since this is not the outset for bottom-up leadership, such bottom-up leadership presumably have more brittle and unsteady mandates, being highly dependent on whether they can influence decision-makers to perceive

the innovation project as their own. As a consequence, the juxtaposition between bottom-up leadership and network governance leaderships of collaborative innovation highlights that the leadership tools related to convener, catalyst, integrator, seeker, meta-governor are not necessarily available for bottom-up leadership. As a result, bottom-up leadership and its way of influencing and gaining power needs to be reconceptualised in a way that take into account the process perspective of strengthening the mandate for the innovation project.

This discussion of mandate, power position and related leadership tools also have consequences for how novelty is created within collaborative innovation.

### **2.2.1.3 Discussion point three: what generates novelty?**

In the governance network based leadership conceptions, collaborators and their interaction are supposed to create a sort of open innovation. Based on the discussion above on formal power and mandate, this open innovation approach to novelty is consistent, in that it is possibly for a meta-governor, an integrator etc., to exercise an agenda-setting power: what is to be innovated, who the relevant stakeholders are, and to remove barriers of the collaboration, such as levelling out power asymmetries. Accordingly, a defined arena of interaction is established, increasing the possibility of enhancing the quality of innovation phases. As a result, the relation between leadership and novelty is deliberately separated.

However, it is worth reflecting upon the strength and character of this separation between leadership and novelty. Nambisan's work is in this respect useful. As Nambisan's leadership roles describe, when the innovations are government led, the government defines what is supposed to be innovated – for instance, a service or a process. The government thereby also defines what the problem is that should be solved, ill-defined or not.

Consequently, what this discussion draws our attention to is that in most of the network–leadership-based approaches to collaborative innovation, some necessary restraints are imposed on collaborators to begin with. And even though these boundaries can be negotiated and generate conflicts of legitimacy, a defining framework is imposed to begin with. Obviously, such a framework is highly enabling and restraining for novelty creation, in that the chance of success of collaborative innovation is increased, but at the cost of radicality, in that a path-dependency is put on the collaborative innovation to begin with. So, with regard to novelty creation, it is definitely worth investigating what Hartley and Sørensen & Torfing calls the initial conditions: What the impact of the initial framing is, and whether this framing is based on political, administrative or professional insights, and what the consequences are for the long-term effects of the collaborative innovation.

For bottom-up leadership, the perspective is different. Interpreting Borins' description along this line of discussion, leadership and novelty creation are intimately and explicitly related: It is the bottom-up leader that generates a new idea for solving a problem, often in a holistic way; it is also the bottom-up leader that leads the collaborative innovation process. I assume that such bottom-up leadership may also have rather firm ideas on the size of the innovation, and most definitely have defined what the problem to be innovated is, given their professional insight. However, since bottom-up leadership is highly dependent on whether decision-makers embrace the innovation project as their own, and since they have a brittle, unsteady mandate at the outset of the innovation process, it is a plausible assumption that the administrative and political boundaries of the project are much more difficult to establish to begin with due to the brittle mandates of the innovation project. This also means that it is less clear 'what' is supposed to be innovated: is it a process, a product, a service, a policy or a systems innovation? For example, bottom-up leadership could have a project that calls for the need for a service-innovation; however, as the innovation unfolds and an increasing number of stakeholders are involved, the innovation project generates discussions, conflicts and makes possible strategic advantages in relation to the service-innovation. Accordingly, the project develops in an unexpected way that also involves a process innovation; implementing the innovation project makes it obvious that it is unclear who should actually deliver the service and what cross-organisational infrastructure that is capable of delivering such a service.

Consequently, what this discussion has made visible is that different conceptions of leadership impose different, but strong, enabling-constraining conditions on novelty creation, despite the fact that the network governance-related leadership conceptions seemingly separates the relation between novelty creation and leadership. Accordingly, this process link between the conception of the initial idea generation and its subsequently defined implementation is in itself a research agenda worth pursuing for collaborative innovation, and especially so for bottom-up leadership, because I suggest to perceive the path-dependency from initiation to ending of the innovation process as necessarily much more difficult to predict and sanction. These blurry and undefined boundaries, as well as the unpredictable status of the *type* of innovation that is being developed, are to a high degree what both enables and constraints bottom-up leadership. Bottom-up leadership has no power to sanction a path-dependency to begin with; instead, this path-dependency is created in the process, granting this type of leadership qualities of adaptability and flexibility, but at the cost of project stability.

#### 2.2.1.4 What types of problems are leadership conceptions adapted to?

This fourth and final discussion point deals with the link between problem type and leadership. Nambisan explicitly distinguishes between ill-defined, emergent problems and defined problems. In both cases, collaborative innovation can be applied, but requires different leadership roles. However, despite the ill-defined nature of the problem, it is still the lead agency that owns (Nambisan, 2008) the infrastructure for implementing the solution. This degree of governmental control over problem-definition and -solution clashes with research in wicked problems, for as Rittel and Webber (Rittel & Webber, 1973) argue, “*one of the most intractable problems is that of defining problems (of knowing what distinguishes an observed condition from a desired condition) and of locating problems (finding where in the complex causal networks the trouble really lies)*” (p. 159).

As a consequence, based as it is on private sector insights, Nambisan’s notion of ill-defined problems is definitely not on the same wickedness-level as wicked problems in Rittel & Webber’s understanding, given the fact that Nambisan seems to assume a consolidated government that despite the politicisation of problem issues is able to define goals and solutions. This assumption seems dubious. Sørensen & Torfing also recognise different types of innovations in their proposed analytical framework, from service to system innovation, but do not explicitly differentiate the leadership roles according to whether it is a defined problem or a wicked problem. In his conceptions of leadership, Borins does not differentiate between either tame or wicked problems, even though his notion of ‘holistic’ does qualify as examples of collaborative innovation.

So, what this discussion has clarified is that despite the fact that collaboration is often perceived as a necessary solution to wicked problems, seemingly collaborative innovation can be used to deal with both wicked and tame problems. Accordingly, the leadership conceptions reviewed do not conceptually tailor the leadership approaches to either of these problem types. What is the consequence of this deficit, and how can this deficit be remedied?

Considering the first question, the consequence is that the leadership conceptions of collaborative innovation risk operating with a vertical image of power structure and problem definition that is not useful when analysing wicked problems. Or put in another way, having Nambisan’s conception of an ill-defined problem in mind: the reviewed leadership conceptions are most suitable for deployment in that political or administrative phase in which powerful stakeholders have been able to detect *that* there is a wicked problem, and under *what* sector-based hierarchy the solution to such a problem should be placed. For instance, obesity is a public health problem that could be regarded differently from a sectorial perspective: As an educational

issue, or as a parental/family issue, as a consumer issue, or as a social class/lifestyle related issue, as a civil society issue, as a private issue, etc. Each of these sector-based perceptions and solutions will impose a certain institutional and discursive approach to the problem. As a consequence, if this sectorial and institutional framing of wicked problems is not explicitly conceptualised as part of the innovation process, leadership for collaborative innovation risks adopting a vertical image of power with the consequence of making wicked problems a less contentious issue than it is.

A possibility for remedying this conceptual weakness could be to import more insights of network governance and collaboration research that explicitly addresses wicked problems. (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) Koppenjan & Klijn's network management conceptual framework for wicked problems is used here as an illustration (2004). As Torfing (2013) assesses, this framework does not have many reflections on the role of power in shaping identities, interactions and institutional frameworks. However, I find that Koppenjan & Klijn's framework is highly useful in highlighting the power struggles between actors on the same power level, i.e. a *horizontal* collaborative configuration. The 'Zink Case' commented on throughout the book is very illustrative in highlighting this point: How knowledge claims are highly contentious when actors interact in a context in which no one has (yet) succeeded in establishing a legitimate framework of interaction. Conceptually, the authors describe the horizontal power struggles between collaborators as being conditioned by uncertainty: substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainty. These descriptive categories of uncertainties allow for theory building that draw on leadership concepts that is tailored to such a context of uncertainty and conflict, consequently allowing for less rationalistic, and more interpretive, approaches to how such leadership is exercised.

Importing Koppenjan & Klijn's concept of uncertainty would first of all contribute to leadership of collaborative innovation by allowing for an expansion of the phases of collaborative innovation processes. Not just leadership as something that enhances the innovation phases from idea generation to dissemination, but also as a specification of leadership enacted before the innovation phase takes place. When studying wicked problems, this initial phase is half of the innovation as this exercise of leadership is what allows an innovation process to be initiated to begin with, because in this phase, leadership will have located the wicked problem and defined a framework of how to solve it, a framework that will allow collaborators to interact in a way that is in alignment with claims of collaborative innovation.

### **2.2.2. SUMMING UP**

This section has discussed the emerging research field of leadership for collaborative innovation in the public sector. The purpose was to identify what



theoretical design qualities leadership for collaborative innovation should adhere to in order to differentiate leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation. Consequently, these discussion points qualify how I construct a theoretical model for a bottom-up approach to collaborative innovation leadership in the next section. First of all, conceptualisations of collaborative innovation are closely connected to research in network governance. I argue that this may hamper further theoretical development of leadership approaches, because:

- 1) leadership is assumed to be predefined when an innovation is initiated
- 2) the issue of power related to leadership position assumes a consolidated lead actor and a steady mandate throughout the innovation process
- 3) the relationship between novelty and leadership does not take explicitly take into account the enabling-constraining path-dependency that different leadership impose on the innovation type
- 4) Leadership conceptions are not explicitly tailored to specific problem types, consequently running the risk of rendering the innovation of wicked problems a less contentious issue than it is.

Accordingly, researchers should consider the following elements if they want to differentiate the theoretical leadership approaches to collaborative innovation:

- Conceptualising leadership as a process phenomenon, related to leadership making and related identity issues
- Develop elaborated conceptions of the relationship between influence and power
- Pay attention to initial conditions of leadership positions, due to the fact that leadership and the relationship to what it is that generates novelty is intimately related to position of power and the ability to exercise such power
- Conceptualising leadership approaches that can explicitly take into account the type of problem to be dealt with (lame/wicked), since the existing approaches not explicitly are tailored to a wicked problem setting, hence producing an image of power which is vertical in terms of the power to locate and define what the problem to be solved is.

## **2.3 THEORY DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP OF COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR**

In this section I interpret and theorise Sandford Borins' conception of 'bottom-up leadership' in a way that live up to many of the above listed design demands and recommendations. Next, I outline concepts that address weaknesses that I have found in Borins' conception. Thirdly, I theoretically outline a model for bottom-up leadership. Fourth, I explain and discuss concepts and model. Finally I conclude, summing up findings and my answer to my research question.

### **2.3.1. INTERPRETATION OF SANDFORD BORINS' 'BOTTOM-UP INNOVATION LEADERSHIP'**

(Borins, 2002) notes the following characteristics of bottom-up innovation leadership:

- The innovations require and create leadership
- They create an informal or alternative leadership structure
- Leadership are on the front lines or in middle management
- These innovations may support already defined goals, but they can also be new initiatives that politicians are willing to embrace as their own

Borins (Borins, 2002) further note that middle managers and front line staff (i.e. bottom-up innovation leadership) tended to "*initiate innovations that responded proactively*" to the internal problems of the organization or took advantage of opportunities created by new technology (p. 469). Further, bottom-up innovations are highly dependent on the supportive stance of politicians and senior managers, and are in general dependent on bureaucratic "*high-level support*" (p. 471).

Despite the many stimulating empirical observations, there are some unclear points in Borins' descriptions of bottom-up innovations. First of all, it is unclear how many of these descriptions are related to collaborative innovations, i.e. what Borins terms 'holistic innovation'. As a consequence, it is not evident that Borins' empirical descriptions cover the whole breadth of challenges related to leading collaborative innovations from the bottom of a public agency. Second, even though bottom-up innovation leadership may create new organisational structures and/or create an informal leadership structure, it is unclear what such informal leadership structures consist of, and how it comes into being. What is especially lacking is an explanation of how it is possible to conceptualize leadership which is both made and exercised simultaneously. Thirdly, it is unclear how the inferior power position and the related

brittle mandate-issue are dealt with by bottom-up leaders. Fourthly, it is unclear how leadership is actually made, a very relevant piece of knowledge, given the fact that collaborative innovations are highly conflictual processes, riddled with uncertainties, constantly in the risk of being caught up in 'collaborative inertia' (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). In relation to this, the conflicts associated with disturbing the local power structures of always specific organisations by seeking support for an innovation project are not part of Borins' concept either. This is due to the fact that Borins' study is focused on producing empirical knowledge by means of quantitative methods as well as comparative case analyses. Accordingly, Borins' findings are highly valuable for professionals as well as for highlighting the general differences between different types of leadership, but it is not a framework that allows for an analysis of the variety of ways of making and exercising bottom-up leadership.

Accordingly, I introduce an analytical model that builds on Borins' descriptions of bottom-up innovation leadership and that furthermore addresses the unclear points listed above. The analytical model likewise take into account the ideal design demands suggested by (Bommert, 2010; Hartley, 2005) listed above, including the recommendations that I have suggested as a consequence of the leadership discussion above.

### **2.3.2. DESCRIPTION OF CONCEPTS FOR AN ANALYTICAL MODEL OF BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP**

In the section above, I have listed ideal design demands for bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership conception. In this section 2.3.2, I sketch out the concepts of an analytical model by describing how these concepts live up to many of the above listed design demands. In section 2.3.3 I present and describe the analytical model. In section 2.4 I go more into detail with the proposed concepts explaining and discussing them. In section 2.5 I critically discuss the interrelatedness between the concepts by discussing the analytical model.

Six analytical key concepts are proposed that make up the profile of the analytical model for 'Bottom-Up Collaborative Innovation Leadership' ('BUCIL', for short):

- Process- and end-point uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999) and wicked problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)
- The social construction of leadership, conceptualized as leadership emergence through the concept of 'recognition' (Griffin, 2002)
- Public Entrepreneurship (Klein, 2010)
- Sensemaking (Weick, 1995)

- Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991)
- Leadership distribution

In the remainder of this theory chapter, these concepts will be further explained, discussed and related to each other. For now, the rationale behind the concepts, and the way that each concept addresses some of the design demands described above, will be outlined below.

*Uncertainty* is the most fundamental condition in my theory building strategy, for several reasons. First of all, theorising bottom-up leadership by means of a condition of uncertainties allows me to import core elements of both wicked-problem research and innovation research. Accordingly, my theory building is tailored to a wicked problem- and innovation context. Due to the fact that wicked problems by definition require collaboration, my theory building ensures that the collaborative aspect is maintained in the bottom-up leadership framework. Second of all, uncertainty satisfies the recommendations produced by my discussion above: that in order to differentiate leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation, conceptual relations between leadership, power position and novelty should be reconceptualised. Uncertainty as a theory building conception enables a theory building that take into account a process perspective on leadership (i.e. leadership recognition); that allows for an informal, yet strategic and intentional, process perspective on power of influence adapted to a context of wicked problem and uncertainty (i.e. giving sense); and that explains how the relation between novelty and leadership is reconceptualised, since uncertainty enables a theoretical explanation of novelty creation that emerges in a process through acts of construction and interpretation in radical change processes (i.e. sensemaking), as well as an increased power base (i.e. leadership distribution).

Uncertainty is conceptualised by means of two different aspects: a wicked problem uncertainty aspect and an innovation uncertainty aspect. In combination, these uncertainties of collaborative innovations provide the necessary assumption allowing bottom-up leadership to emerge in order to address a wicked problem through innovation: If uncertainty is not present, it will not be possible for bottom-up leadership to emerge by making and exercising their leadership, as described above.

(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)'s categories of 'network' uncertainty is tailored to a public problem type being 'wicked'. In this respect, adopting Koppenjan & Klijn's concept of substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties, the BUCIL model is tailored to a condition of a wicked problem. (Van de Ven, 1999)'s descriptions of the innovation journey do not in itself explicitly conceptualize the journey-

uncertainty as a specific type of uncertainty. Van de Ven *et al.* do describe, however, uncertainties that resembles bottom-up leadership uncertainty, in stating that proprietary entrepreneurs are “*exposed to high uncertainties and risks in not knowing what kinds of institutional regulations, technical standards, financing agreements, and specialized competences will emerge for the innovation*” (p. 170). According to Van de Ven *et al.* innovation uncertainty decreases over time “*as system functions that define technical and institutional parameters for the innovation emerge*” (p. 172). In my interpretation the metaphor of ‘journey’, Van de Ven *et al.*’s descriptions of becoming, and the authors’ descriptions of setbacks and iterative process do allow for a general conception of innovation uncertainty. This uncertainty I interpret as a process- and endpoint uncertainty: where are we in the process and what is actually our endpoint?

Adopting this condition of uncertainty ensures that a theoretical balance is maintained between collaboration and innovation in an analysis of bottom-up leadership. The concept also denotes that even though bottom-up leadership is successful in initiating an innovation project, the project will always be contested, and a basic uncertainty about the viability of the entire enterprise will always be present. This may be even more so in a public sector which do not have the same focus on technological innovation as Van de Ven *et al.*’s research (ibid. p. 170), hence presumably can be contested strategically or institutionally on a running basis. In this respect, even though it seems likely that bottom-up led innovations may be characterised by less uncertainty in the end of the innovation process, this is by no means given in a public sector, wicked problem context. Accordingly, this innovation uncertainty adopted into a framework of collaborative innovation uncertainty allows for an analysis that takes into account that innovation always entails a risk, the risk that the assumed value of the collaborative innovation will not be acquired.

*The social construction of leadership* is conceptualized by means of Griffin’s concept of ‘leadership emergence’ (Griffin, 2002), a concept which I have chosen to position within a ‘relational leadership’ research field (Uhl-Bien, 2006). Leadership emerges in conditions of uncertainty through social processes of ‘recognition’. As a result, leadership emergence as a concept firstly is a suggestion for a post-structural, relational, theoretical explanation of how Borins’ ‘leadership making’ is being made and exercised at the same time. Furthermore, the concept is a process conceptualisation of leadership tailored to the uncertainty of radical change and related identity issues, thereby addressing this design demand described in the discussion above. Thirdly, positioning the concept of recognition within a relational approach enables me to define bottom-up leadership in a demarcated, yet relational, way: As the group of persons belonging to the professional unit that produces the innovation project in focus. This definition also allows for immediate superiors to be included in the bottom-up leadership unit. All of these persons will in a collaborative

setting be perceived of as leaders by collaborators, even though they do not bureaucratically have this position. Accordingly, leadership is something that is spread out, but only in the profession-based unit that develops the innovative solution. Accordingly, my concept of bottom-up leadership operates with an identifiable organisational unit that is to be understood as the main unit of agency.

*Profession based, public entrepreneurship* is my conceptualisation of Borins' (2002) notion of 'bottom-up'. This concept is crucial in that it signifies both the point of departure of the innovation and the character of the innovation: Entrepreneurship is a type of action that bottom-up leadership will have to display in order to emerge as a leader. The emerging bottom-up leadership has the advantage of consisting of professionals and perhaps an immediate superior with specialised competences within a given service, program or policy field. These members of such a specialised unit know where there is a performance gap (Klein, 2010), and they have ideas about which creative organisational connections to make in order to span the boundaries (Williams, 2002) across sectors and professions.

As a result, conceptualising the bottom-up dimension by means of public entrepreneurship captures how bottom-up leadership through its specialized, professional insights is able to form the basis of how to initiate innovations that, in Borins' terms, 'proactively' addresses public problems. Public entrepreneurship furthermore maintains Jean Hartley's (Hartley, 2005) recommendation of investigating advantages/disadvantages of bottom-up innovation, by emphasizing that such bottom-up based innovations have a distinctive character, and consequently, a distinctive way of remedying internal public sector problems. Entrepreneurship furthermore is a type of action explicitly located in a context of uncertainty, sometimes even producing this uncertainty, making it plausible that this type of action is what enables bottom-up leadership to make and re-make novelty in uncertain innovation processes.

*Sensemaking* is a basic social condition in radical change processes (Weick, 1995) enabling the involved parties to address the uncertainties associated with a collaborative innovation project addressing a wicked problem. Accordingly, sensemaking is consistent with the design demand of investigating bottom-up innovation advantages/disadvantages through a process-/innovation journey-perspective on innovation, as recommended by Hartley (Hartley, 2005).

Furthermore, sensemaking is also a concept that draws on a theoretical approach not conceptualised in network governance approaches to collaborative innovation leadership. As a consequence, adopting a sensemaking perspective to bottom-up leadership provides the theoretical framework of this thesis with a perspective on collaborative innovation processes, in which both leadership and collaborators are caught up in emerging, unpredictable processes. As a result, this theoretical

construction is opening up for analyses of processes in which the relations between leadership, collaborators and innovation project are less clear-cut and defined than what network governance-inspired leadership approaches seem to suggest. Sensemaking consequently allows for analyses in which a collaborative innovation process may be highly strategic, but nevertheless a strategic process fundamentally *conditioned* by uncertainty and ambiguity, thus pointing to a conception of actors and their interests as being more fluent and malleable in nature.

*Giving sense* (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) is a concept that captures the strategic and intentional elements of sensemaking described above, i.e. that bottom-up leadership initiates a change process with a specific, intended purpose in mind. As a consequence, giving sense as a concept first of all addresses an unclear aspect of Borins' notion of 'informal' leadership structures. By adopting the concept of giving sense I make the assumption that when uncertainty engulfs all involved collaborators, forcing them to make sense of the innovation process, it will be possible for collaborators to influence each other's sensemaking. Consequently, giving sense illustrates how it is possible for bottom-up leadership to exercise influence by giving sense in order to acquire high-level support.

Further, the conceptual advantage of adopting a perspective of making sense/giving sense related to leadership and collaborative innovation is that the concepts allows for analyses in which influence is not defined by organisational boundaries. Making and giving sense is a sort of influence which is able to spread across organizations despite an inferior bureaucratic power position.

*Leadership distribution* is the final concept of the proposed bottom-up leadership analytical model. Leadership distribution is a concept that I have generated out of a need of emphasising a defined output in the otherwise iterative processes of leadership making: that the sole purpose of bottom-up leadership is to make decision makers embrace the innovation as their own, or otherwise make it apparent that the innovation project supports already existing strategies. As Borins note, bottom-up leadership is highly dependent on top-level support. Leadership distribution is a concept that captures this vertical support. Leadership distribution can, however, also have several outputs: it can be consolidated within one organisation, presumably bottom-up leadership's own organization, or it can be distributed, because also collaborators embrace the innovation project as their own. Each of these leadership distribution outputs enables an analysis of why a specifically exercised bottom-up leadership resulted in a certain sustainability and diffusion.

Accordingly, this concept addresses the design demands of diffusion of innovation as well as paying attention to the fact that initial leadership position conditions how novelty is developed and framed, a condition which most likely has impact on how stakeholders and collaborators assess and embrace the innovation project.


In conclusion, the concepts are iteratively interlinked. It is difficult to convince collaborators to recognise your leadership endeavours if you cannot display a properly prepared project. And vice versa: It is completely futile to introduce an innovative project without the proper support for implementing it, i.e. being recognised as a leader by collaborators. And it is highly unlikely that you will succeed in leading collaborators with the focus of supporting your innovation project, without constantly trying to make sense of what you and your collaborators are doing internally as well as externally, thus providing you and the entire collaborative configuration with outlined directions for further collaboration.

In the next section, I causally combine the concepts outlined above by means of an analytical model and I describe the central idea of the model.

### 2.3.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ‘BUCIL’ ANALYTICAL MODEL

The proposed model is displayed below in Figure 1 below.

**FIGURE 1: ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR BOTTOM-UP COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION LEADERSHIP (BUCIL)**



The BUCIL model is a hybrid, in that the left side of the model denotes *iterative* processes in a context of uncertainty, whereas the right-hand side in terms of leadership distribution is an *output*-category.



So, the BUCIL model is a model which hypothesizes that bottom-up leadership builds leadership in an iterative way. Bottom-up leadership introduces novelty by means of entrepreneurship, which requires of the professional unit to make its leadership and exercise leadership. When introducing a new project to collaborators and to its own organisation uncertainty is created: What will be the result of innovation project, and will it yield value (process- and endpoint-uncertainty)? For whom will it yield this value (strategic uncertainty)? How are collaborators supposed to cooperate and handle the innovative solution to a wicked problem (institutional uncertainty)? Do collaborators agree on the substantive content of the innovation project (substantive uncertainty)? Despite these uncertainties, collaborators are forced to somehow respond to, and make sense of, the innovation project, because the innovation project claims legitimacy by both identifying a public performance gap and by also producing a solution to how to deal with this performance-gap.

Accordingly, uncertainty is forced upon collaborators. This uncertainty is what enables bottom-up leadership to give sense to collaborators by drawing on its profession-based, entrepreneurially generated novel solution to how to deal with a wicked problem. Most likely, such attempts of giving sense will generate both resistance and accept, and will have to adapt to external events, such as new legislation, policies and strategies, or change in personnel, since external events in general are typical in lengthy innovation processes (Van de Ven, 1999). In both cases, bottom-up leadership has to make sense of what the implications are of resistance and accept, since in both cases, the organisational context of the innovation project will have changed: either an opportunity for the innovation project has disappeared due to resistance, or an accept of the solution provokes organisational change which will have intended and unintended implications. Making sense of these changes by bottom-up leadership will accordingly be a reservoir of meaning that will inform and push for new actions of entrepreneurship. As a result, these new actions of entrepreneurship will redefine, or redevelop, the innovation project (or elements of it).

This redefinition of the innovation project will accordingly also require of the leadership to make sense of its own leadership. We have to remember Borins' descriptions of such leadership: Bottom-up leadership only is leadership because of the innovation project. Accordingly, I assume that the innovation project is the only legitimate basis for bottom-up leadership for demanding change on a collaborative scale. In this respect, bottom-up leadership differs radically from many other types of leadership that acquire their leadership either through bureaucratic position or mandate.

As will be explained in section 2.4, I make the assumption that leadership 'recognition' explains how agency and structure are enacted simultaneously. Acts of

leadership (entrepreneurship, giving sense related to both the purpose of innovation project and leadership role) are at the same time trying to introduce a new social structure for collaborators to interact in relation to. So, the relationship between leadership and innovation project can be perceived of as post-structural at the micro-level between organisations. Because of this post-structural, almost symbiotic, relationship between leadership and innovation project, when the innovation project changes, the leadership has to make sense of whether to redefine its own identity according to this change. Further, the post-structural relationship entails in the BUCIL model that a change of leadership may also require of the innovation project to be adjusted. For instance, if bottom-up leadership somewhere in the innovation process begins to perceive of itself as a strategic and cross-organisational leadership, but has formulated a project that does not have these strategic and cross-organisational elements, the innovation project will have to be enhanced in accordance with these leadership ambitions.

The reason why the BUCIL model also has an output-element is that I want to emphasize that bottom-up leadership is a distinct leadership. It is a time-limited leadership with a single purpose: Formulate an innovation project that bridges an identified public sector performance gap in relation to a wicked problem and make decision makers embrace this innovation project as their own. Leadership distribution as an output category denotes this embracing.

As a result, a bottom-up led collaborative innovation process can have several outputs. The first logical output option is that the innovation unit ceases to be the main driver of change because leadership is distributed amongst collaborators. This is the most radical form of collaboration: Organisations share resources, and, in this respect, also demand that leadership is imposed on each organisation, because sharing resources involves major changes in the central operations of the organisations (Keast & Mandell, 2011). In such a scenario, the innovation project is embraced both vertically (up through the innovation units' own hierarchy) and horizontally (across organisational hierarchies). The second logical option is that leadership is consolidated within the organisation of the innovation unit; the project is embraced by powerful stakeholders higher up in the hierarchy, but not by collaborators. This scenario denotes another option of inter-organisational structures, namely that of 'coordination' (Keast & Mandell, 2011). Here, the main organisation is now the driver of change, coordinating the collaborators' activities. The collaborators only make changes at the margin of their respective organisations. Here it would be expected that the innovation unit would continue to play a vital role in the implementation of the project. Finally, the third logical option would be that the journey of influence could be terminated if neither collaborators nor powerful stakeholders embrace the innovation project as their own.

In we work ourselves backwards through the model this output is dependent on two conditions. First of all, does the innovation unit manage to deliver a collaborative leadership that collaborators will somehow accept, despite the fact that this leadership is leadership in the making? As hypothesised by the relational leadership approaches discussed in section 2.4 below, in order to fulfil the process of leadership-making, the leader must demonstrate a behaviour that allows the leader to be *recognised* as a leader - despite the fact that the leader's ability to exercise this required leadership is limited, due to the low formal power position within the innovation unit's organisation (Borins, 2000; Borins, 2002). This requires as a minimum the ability to act in conditions of uncertainty and provide direction for collaboration by means of giving sense. This influence channel could be criticised for being a very soft tool, but as O'Toole (1996) notes, the strategic complexity in networks generates an uncertainty that makes it impossible to play the game as hypothesised in rational choice literature. In my interpretation, this complexity creates an environment of uncertainty that bottom-up leadership can utilise, enable bottom-up leadership to act strategically while collaborators are engaged in making sense of the situation.

So, a key challenge for bottom-up leadership is to influence collaborators' processes of sensemaking in order to enable the collaboration partners to overcome the inertia inherent in the process of collaboration. This hypothesis is much in accordance with the research findings of (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), in which strategies of both collaborative 'ideology' and 'thuggery' are deployed by partnership coordinators in order to move the collaborative process forward. Thirdly, in cases of turf fights, which are typical of especially inter-agency collaborations, it is important to display a project that makes 'collaborative turf' visible (Bardach, 1996). I would argue that this sort of challenge is also relevant for bottom-up leadership, inter-agency or not.

Finally, entrepreneurship in BUCIL is the point of departure of the innovation journey. Through professional insight in a complex problem, the innovation unit is able to display an innovation project that connects new and existing resources in new ways, thus delivering a collaborative solution to how a wicked problem can be addressed in a way that bridges the existing performance gap. This professional criticism of the status quo and related public performance gap is what provides the innovation unit with a legitimate claim to take action to begin with. Accordingly, entrepreneurship is the generator of novelty. It is the 'back stage' (Goffman, 1990) in which bottom-up leadership can digest and ponder the process, thus providing the 'front stage' leaders or professionals with sufficient answers to continue their journey of influence by giving sense. This professional criticism of the status quo and its public performance gap is what provides the innovation unit with a legitimate claim to take action from the outset. This space for action has to be expanded, partly

by exercising and producing leadership, partly by constantly being able to make sense of the on-going innovation process through engagement with collaborators and important stakeholders. This will provide the innovation project with a space for re-interpretation, flexibility and new guidelines for future collaborative and intra-organisational action.

However, entrepreneurship is also the weakness of bottom-up leadership, in that, to some extent, it is always based on a *specific* type of professional insight (urban planning, teaching, environmental affairs, immigration, employment, health etc.). Persuading collaborators with different sectorial insights to take part in the project could prove a challenge in the long run, thus perhaps pulling the output option towards a consolidated leadership position. Much depends on whether the innovation unit is able to convince collaborators of the *collaborative* turf of the innovation project. As (Crosby & Bryson, 2010) note, ‘champions’ of a collaborative solution need to be ‘multilingual translators’ in order to be seen as legitimate across camps (p. 219).

The analytical model allows me to define bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership as follows:

I define bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership as an 1) intentional process aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas in a specific context 2) initiated at the bottom of a public sector organisation requiring that the 3) lead unit responsible is able to gain influence through leadership recognition, which is conditioned by 4) utilisation of uncertainty through skills of public entrepreneurship, sensemaking and giving sense.

Part one of the definitions is the innovation definition, consistent with other innovation definitions (Hartley, 2005; Poole & Van de Ven, 2004; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Van de Ven, 1999), in that innovation is defined as context-dependent and initiated with the intention of implementation. Part two describes the point of departure of a collaborative innovation process, part three outlines the influence strategy available, and part four the skills necessary for succeeding with the strategy.

This construction of bottom-up leadership makes it appropriate to analyse cases in which wicked problem and innovation uncertainty dominate, as is the case, I argue, in bottom-up collaborative innovations that seek to deal with wicked problems. Further, uncertainty increases the level of conflict, thus further inhibiting the emergence of leadership figure and making it very difficult to prescribe leadership action. The theoretical construction underscores that leadership-making is a very

context-dependent phenomenon, highly dependent on the construction of local meaning in the involved organisations, thus suitable for observing leadership construction.

Figure 2 below summarises the leadership profile that the BUCIL model enables analyses of.

**FIGURE 2: KEY ASPECTS OF BOTTOM-UP COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION LEADERSHIP**

Lead figure	Collaborative leadership in the making
Power tools	Leadership recognition Making sense of uncertainty
Collaborative mandate	Unsteady; negotiable scope; stop-and-go
Novelty generating mechanisms	Bottom-up, profession-based innovation: entrepreneurship sensemaking
Cooperation characteristic	'Hilly': bottom-up leadership is highly involved in all interactions, being dependent on the support of collaborators and own hierarchy
Conception of innovation	Entrepreneurial and profession-based solution to a wicked problem
The locus of power when initiating innovation	Bottom of lead agency, mustering hierarchical support and seeking collaborative influence through leadership recognition
Theoretical foundations	Collaborative innovation in the public sector Relational leadership theory Complex responsive processes theory Innovation process theory Making and giving sense Wicked problems
Dimension of analysis	Horizontal Multilevel

### 2.3.4.SUMMING UP

In section 2.2.2 I have summarised earlier findings of this theory building chapter. In section 2.6 I conclude on the entire theory chapter. Consequently, in this summary section I only recapitulate and outline the previous and future steps of my theory building strategy.

First, based on a literature review of the emerging research field of collaborative innovation, I have identified what I perceive of as *the* main conceptual challenge. The literature review also contributed to identify avenues of future research. Both of these findings have provided me with recommendations for how to develop new leadership forms. Second, my theory building strategy has been to review and discuss conceptions of leadership for collaborative innovation. The overall conclusion of this review is that the present leadership conceptions are undifferentiated. Accordingly, I thirdly produce some discussion points with the purpose of stimulating such a differentiation. The result of these discussions resulted in additional recommendations for how to develop new leadership forms. Fourthly, taking into account the above recommendations and guidelines for future research, I have argued that Sandford Borins' empirical descriptions of bottom-up leadership has four intriguing aspects that stimulate theory building. Fifth, I have theoretically interpreted Sandford Borins' descriptions and identified weaknesses in relation to the previous steps in my theory building strategy. Sixth, I have outlined six analytical concepts in accordance with the findings related to my theory building strategy which, accordingly, provide us with an elaborated theoretical account of how bottom-up leadership is made and exercised. Seventh, since this theoretical outline entails emergent phenomena that often occurs simultaneously and which can be causally related in different ways, I have introduced an analytical model that clarifies these causal relationships.

The next step in my theory building strategy is to do the following:

- further make plausible the interactions outlined in the BUCIL model
- to enhance the analytical focus of the BUCIL model
- To make the deployment of the BUCIL model more accessible to other researchers.

I do this by explaining and discussing in more detail the content of each concept in relation to the model, and by discussing what the implications of this theory building are in terms of how to deploy the BUCIL model in an analysis.

## 2.4 EXPLANATION AND DISCUSSION OF ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS

In the sections above I have outlined how bottom-up leadership for collaborative innovation can be conceptualized and causally modelled.

In this section I explain the proposed concepts in more detail. This will provide the details necessary for discussing each concept, as well as the interactions of the concepts according to the BUCIL model. Accordingly, in this section I discuss on two different levels. On the first level I discuss each of the proposed analytical concepts. On the second level, I make an overall assessment of the model (section 2.5), pointing to unclear issues across concepts.

I argue that the following discussion points reflect steps in a research process for those that want to deploy the BUCIL model in an empirical analysis. The discussion points furthermore clarify issues relevant for the theory development of this thesis. Accordingly, these discussion points are generated first of all by reflecting upon my own experience with operationalising the BUCIL model, second by abstract, theoretical considerations concerning the concepts and their interaction, thirdly by reflecting on critical questions that I have received during the writing of this thesis.

**FIGURE 3: OVERVIEW OF DISCUSSION POINTS IN RELATION TO THEORY BUILDING**

Uncertainty	<p>How is uncertainty generated?</p> <p>What is the interplay between different types of uncertainty, leadership and sensemaking attempts?</p>
Leadership emergence	<p>Does leadership emergence as processes of recognition satisfies the design demands listed in the above sections?</p> <p><i>Comparing RLT and leadership recognition</i></p> <p><i>Leadership recognition and collaboration</i></p>



Public entrepreneurship	<p>Why is entrepreneurship suggested as a bottom-up leadership platform for initiating an innovation project?</p> <p>What is the relationship between entrepreneurship and leadership?</p>
Making sense and giving sense	<p>What is the relationship between making sense and giving sense?</p> <p>Which actors should be focused on in an analysis when the concepts are applied?</p>
Leadership distribution	<p>Why is leadership distribution a relevant concept for theorising bottom-up leadership?</p>
Overall assessment of the BUCIL model	<p>Is the proposed model a prescriptive or descriptive model</p> <p>Does the model neglect a vital distinction between managerial and political leadership?</p> <p>Does the theory section neglect important strands of literature related to each of the concepts of the BUCIL model?</p> <p>What are the demands for an analytical approach compatible with the BUCIL model?</p>

### 2.4.1. UNCERTAINTY

The way that I define the function of uncertainty in relation to the BUCIL model is that it creates a demand for leadership. The second way that I define the function of uncertainty is that it allows an analysis of wicked problem-solving related to bottom-up leadership.

As I have explained in previous sections uncertainty plays a fundamental role in the BUCIL model: it is the context condition for entrepreneurship, leadership emergence and making and giving sense. As a consequence of previous findings related to my theory building strategy, each of the suggested analytical concepts has been selected because they theoretically are linked to uncertainty in some way or another. This implicates that without uncertainty, the explanatory power of the BUCIL model is severely reduced. For bottom-up leadership, the utilisation of uncertainty is the central means of exercising influence. Furthermore, the explicit application of uncertainty into the BUCIL framework is what distinguishes this leadership framework from other forms of collaborative innovation leadership as uncertainty brackets and disturbs all that is structured and taken for granted: Professional, strategic and political identities, effects of strategies and policies, knowledge of organisational environment, perceptions of problem fields and efficient resource-combinations and -interactions. As a result, uncertainty underscores fundamental characteristics in processes that involve collaborative innovation and wicked problems.

Despite this importance, uncertainty is conceptualised differently by the analytical concepts outlined above and discussed in the sections below. It is outside the objective of this thesis to make a thorough theoretical discussion of the various forms of uncertainties and the practical and epistemological foundations of these. This is an agenda for future research. I am, however, interested in outlining a pragmatic vocabulary for uncertainty in relation to the BUCIL elements in order to allow for an analysis in which different types, or combinations, of uncertainties can be linked to situations in which leadership is made, exercised or blocked.

Koppenjan & Klijn's work, "Managing uncertainties in networks" (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004), is relevant for this thesis in that it addresses uncertainty in relation to collaboration, management and wicked problems. Van de Ven *et al.* (Van de Ven, 1999) describe uncertainty in relation to innovation processes. Jointly these two types of uncertainty dimensions are plausible as dominating phenomena generated when bottom-up leadership initiates a collaborative innovation process with the aim of addressing a wicked problem.

### 2.4.1.1 The uncertainties of wicked problems

Koppenjan & Klijn argue that government, business and civil society are increasingly faced with controversies over complex societal problems, and that these problems are characterized by a high degree of wickedness. Consequently, parties not only disagree about the solution, but also the nature of the problem. A second feature of these problems is that *”they cut across the traditional jurisdictions of organizations and cross the traditional boundaries between the private and public sector. Governments, businesses and civil society are unable to tackle these issues by themselves”* (p. 1). According to Koppenjan & Klijn, the uncertainty of wicked problems has three manifestations: substantive, strategic and institutional (p.6). Substantive uncertainty is focused on the aspect of the ‘what’: what is the nature of the complex problem? (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) state that a major source of uncertainty has to do with determining the nature of the problem (p. 6). Often the necessary information is not available on time. Further, knowledge and information are frequently contested (p. 6). This problem arises both because of a lack of information, but also a lack of interpretation of information and the establishment of meaning (p. 19).

The second aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the strategic uncertainty. Due to the unique character of perceptions held by some actors, other actors may not acknowledge or be aware of these; and therefore, a large variety of strategies may develop around a complex issue, making it difficult to predict what strategies actors will choose, and how the interaction of these divergent strategies will influence the problem situation and problem solving process (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

The third aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the institutional. In some instances wicked problems cut across organisational boundaries as well as administrative levels and networks. This will often result in uncertainty about process handling and the development of interactions with other actors, since actors work from different institutional backgrounds. Accordingly, each actor will have its behaviour guided *“by the tasks, opinions, rules and language”* of its own organization, as well as own administrative level and network. This leads to uncertainty about how the process will be handled and uncertainty about how the interaction with other actors will develop (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004 , p. 7).

Koppenjan & Klijn argue that standard responses such as information collection and top-down measures are inadequate. According to the authors, given the three manifestations of uncertainty, solving a wicked problem is not only an intellectual design activity, but also a strategic and institutional challenge. This requires of the stakeholders to interact in order to coordinate their perceptions, activities and institutional arrangements (p. 9).

### 2.4.1.2 Innovation journey -uncertainty

Van de Ven *et al*'s study of innovation processes demonstrate, that these processes can be characterised as a journey characterised by uncertainty, novelty, an unknown endpoint and an unpredictable process (Van de Ven, 1999).

As a consequence, the authors develop key innovation journey-concepts. In their studies the authors discovered how innovative ideas proliferate into many ideas, with the result of invention and reinvention. Many people were involved, but only partially. Further, the authors note that networks of stakeholders involved was constantly revised; that multiple environments were enacted; that the innovation journey consisted of multiple tracks and spin-offs; that the final result was indeterminate and that assessments were multiple and in-process assessments; and that the identity of the innovation became blurred as the new innovation and old orders were integrated (p. 8-9). The authors also noted that the innovations did not develop through a simple linear sequence or predictable stages, but instead "*a much messier and more complex progression of events*" was observed (p. 23), involving numerous setbacks and criteria shift. What is particularly noteworthy is that many of these setbacks and errors went uncorrected because of four types of learning disabilities: It was difficult to separate substantive issues from noise; entrepreneurs escalated their commitments by ignoring "naysayers"; some innovation participants became hyper vigilant, calling prematurely for changes; process-criteria of innovation success shifted over time (p. 39).

In relation to leadership, Van de Ven *et al*. investigates why top-managers did not intervene more than they did, given the fact that the innovation teams were experiencing uncertainty related to learning by discovery and testing. The authors argue, drawing on Weick's concept on equivocality, that the problem managers and investors faced was one of multiple, conflicting meanings of their investment decisions ((Van de Ven, 1999). Equivocality is more a result of diverse interpretations, a product of "*the collective and pluralistic settings in which top managers participate*" (ibid. p. 95-96). The authors essentially argue that "*in uncertain and ambiguous situations, organizational learning and adaptability are enhanced when a balance is achieved between diverse, opposing, and conflicting, views among innovation leaders*" (p. 97). However, maintaining a balance among pluralistic leadership roles is essential, requiring a negotiational style of decision-making "*by objection and constructive conflict resolution processes*" (p. 97).

### 2.4.1.3 Discussing uncertainties

In the section above I have explained the uncertainties that I assume will be present when innovating a wicked problem through collaborative innovation. As a consequence, these types of uncertainty in isolation are not unique for bottom-up leadership. However, what makes uncertainty essential for bottom-up leadership in accordance with the BUCIL model is that I make the hypothesis that uncertainty is what *allows* leadership to be made and exercised at all. All of the proposed concepts in the BUCIL model are chosen because they acknowledge and address the relation between uncertainty and novelty. This selection criterion is in accordance with the main theoretical ambition of collaborative innovation: to be able to make conceptual frameworks that allows for an analysis of how different perspectives of uncertainty have implications for leadership, novelty creation and the consequences of the collaborative innovation process.

For instance, in the collaborative innovation leadership literature reviewed in the start of this theory section, the networked governance based concepts of leadership deals with uncertainty by making plausible boundaries around it. These concepts build on the assumption that in an empirical setting an identifiable, already defined leadership or management is present. This leadership/management defines a framework for collaborators, allowing for the self-management and self-organizing of uncertainty within this framework, using hands-off and hands-on tool to optimise the constructive use of uncertainty. The networked governance approach to the management of uncertainty optimises this framed uncertainty in several ways, for instance by levelling power differentials, empowering participants, etc.

As a consequence of the BUCIL framework, a new type of collaborative innovation leadership is made identifiable. If we compare the BUCIL framework with the existing leadership frameworks in relation to uncertainty, we find that this leadership is not 'there' yet as a recognised, organisational social object or identity that collaborators and decision makers can relate to as a leader. Accordingly, uncertainty for bottom-up leadership is not an organisational phenomenon already there to begin with, located and delineated. On the contrary, it is something that emerges, collapses, is being expanded, perhaps enacted strategically in the process, and is being utilised by bottom-up leadership.

Accordingly, given the inferior power position of bottom-up leadership, uncertainty cannot be dealt with by means of a steady mandate, since powerful stakeholders have not yet accepted the innovation project on a strategic level. The innovation project 'only' has status of a 'project'. As a result, the way that bottom-up leadership deals with uncertainty is to stabilize and frame the collaborative configuration on a running basis. Not by mandate and strategic negotiations, but instead by a piecemeal form of sensemaking, utilising uncertainties in numerous interactions to influence

stakeholders, slowly building up momentum and increasing the scope of the project on a running basis.

Given the important role of uncertainty for the BUCIL model, some analytical assumptions are worth discussing:

- How is uncertainty generated?
- What is the interplay between different types of uncertainty, leadership and sensemaking attempts?

By discussing these issues I approach the limit of what can be theoretically explored within the boundaries of this thesis.

### *How is uncertainty generated?*

Following the empirical descriptions of Borins, it seems most plausible that it is bottom-up leadership, perhaps in alliance with other stakeholders that initiates a process, in which uncertainty begins to surface. This conception of uncertainty is also made plausible by both Weick and Gioia (see section 2.4.5 below) who both argue that giving sense, or manipulating sense making, requires some sort of proactivity on behalf of the actor that wants to influence other stakeholders' sensemaking processes.

Applying the concept of entrepreneurship in the BUCIL model likewise puts proactivity in conditions of uncertainty at the centre of analysis when explaining innovation. Weick's conception furthermore points to the fundamental constructive elements of sensemaking: Something is *made* sensible, and this making sensible requires acts of construction, in which a specific environment is produced. In this respect, the BUCIL model points to the fact that it is bottom-up leadership that produces and strives to enact a certain perspective on reality. In this certain perspective, a wicked problem is constructed *as* a problem and is being made possible to observe and identify for collaborators: *as* a problem that requires collaboration, *as* a problem that illuminates a public sector performance gap, *as* a problem that is highly complex, *as* a solution that likewise requires a complex solution – an innovation.

However, even though it is bottom-up leadership that initiates an innovation process, and therefore generates uncertainty, this does not necessarily imply that it is extremely difficult to deal with this uncertainty, or that bottom-up leadership has to spend a lot of energy to mobilise support for an innovation agenda. In Borins' descriptions bottom-up leadership acts proactively, before a public issue turns into a

crisis. In this respect, we get the image that a murmur is present in the ‘system’ (the public sector, group of stakeholder organisations), a dissatisfaction. Bottom-up leadership must be able to bring this dissatisfaction to the fore and synthesise it into a consistent critique of the status quo.

Van de Ven *et al.*’s research supports this assumption. In Van de Ven *et al.*’s research on innovation, the ‘innovation journey’ is triggered by some sort of ‘shock’, either internal or external to the organisation (Van de Ven, 1999). However, the authors note that innovations are *not* initiated “*on the spur of the moment, by a single dramatic incident, or by a single entrepreneur*”. In fact, before the “shock” phase, there was “*an extended gestation period lasting several years in which seemingly coincidental events occurred that preceded and set the stage for the initiation of innovations*” (p. 23). These descriptions resembles a Complex Responsive Processes perspective on novelty creation (see section 2.4.2 below), in which novelty cannot be created by designed leadership interventions through a top-down mandate, but is something that emerges through micro-interactions on a daily basis, in which slowly, a new organisational theme is emerging as a consequence of numerous interactions within and across organisations. Accordingly, it seems most likely that *fragmented* dissatisfaction of public agencies or stakeholders with contact to a wicked problem field will provide the seedbed for bottom-up leadership from which to launch a *holistic* critique of status quo.

*What is the interplay between different types of uncertainty, leadership and sensemaking attempts?*

The application of uncertainties to the framework of BUCIL opens up for theoretical and analytical questions with regard to the combinatory implications of uncertainty in relation to leadership emergence and sensemaking attempts. In this discussion section, I will briefly explore some plausible answers to this discussion point.

First of all, one could critically ask whether BUCIL assumes that all four uncertainties should be present at the same time in order for leadership to emerge. Do all four types of uncertainties make a joint demand for leadership, or will specific combinations of uncertainty block or increase the demand for a bottom-up leadership?

The answer to the first question would be that one or several of the uncertainties that Koppenjan & Klijn mention in relation to wicked problems must be present in order to enable an emergent leadership to be recognised by collaborators. This is because these uncertainties are what makes *collaborative* innovation distinct from single-organizational innovation. If this collaborative dimension is removed, BUCIL might as well be applied to a single-organisational context. The wicked problem uncertainties are what underscore that the environment of bottom-up leadership is

highly strategic and politicised, even though bottom-up leadership may be successful in both constructing, enacting and utilising such uncertainty. Accordingly, this type of uncertainty is also what makes the BUCIL model relevant for a *public* sector context, in that these uncertainty categories are produced by Koppenjan & Klijn as a result of their research in how network management is possible for a public sector agency.

Furthermore, I assume that the interplay between a journey-uncertainty and wicked-problem uncertainty could result in either resistance to, or demand for, leadership. A journey-uncertainty underscores element of experiment, development, risk, the current change in objectives and assessments criteria, unknown boundaries of the innovation project and, hence, an endpoint uncertainty. This uncertainty could contribute to a demand for leadership in combination with a substantive uncertainty related to a wicked problem. Being a *profession based*, i.e. specialized, leadership I assume that bottom-up leadership will stand strong in coming up with a detailed, experience-based solution for how to deal with the substantive uncertainty of a wicked problem. I would also assume that a journey-uncertainty could block for the demand of leadership in combination with an institutional uncertainty, because people in other organisations would have difficulties relating to, for instance, the future institutional ramifications of the project, such as interorganisational management, political responsibility, resource provision, judicial aspects of joint public service delivery etc. Accordingly, it seems plausible that bottom-up leadership would have to take into account, and address, the substantive, institutional and strategic aspects of a collaborative innovation project.

So obviously, this explorative discussion has stimulated to reveal some limitations of the BUCIL model that also stem from the research field of collaborative innovation: that a more thorough discussion is required within the research field of collaborative innovation in the public sector concerning the different aspects of uncertainty. This explorative discussion also denotes that empirical research is needed in order to clarify combinatory implications of uncertainties.

#### **2.4.2. LEADERSHIP-MAKING IN A COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION CONTEXT**

In this section, I conceptualise leadership-making in a collaborative innovation context. I first explain two relational leadership approaches, each suitable for studying different aspects of leadership-making: Relational Leadership Theory ('RLT') and the theory of complex responsive processes ('CRP'). Next I discuss these two approaches.



Relational Leadership Theory (RLT) was introduced by Uhl-Bien (Uhl-Bien, 2006). An operational definition for relational leadership is that “(1) some social order is constructed; and (2) structurally differentiated groups emerge which proceed to perceive each other’s ‘qualifications’ within constructed realities that become operative through the relationships inherent in or constitutive of social order” (Dachler & Hosking, 1995), qf. (Uhl-Bien, 2006). Also, participants are leaders when they: “(1) consistently make effective contributions to social order, and (2) are both expected and perceived to do so by fellow participants” (Hosking, 1988), cf. (Uhl-Bien, 2006).

Uhl-Bien sums up the definition of relational leadership as *“the social influence process through which emergent coordination (i.e. evolving social order) and change ((i.e., new values, attitudes, approaches, behaviours, ideologies, etc.) are constructed and produced”* (Uhl-Bien, 2006) p. 668.) In this respect, leadership is an outcome.

In order to reach these definitions, Uhl-Bien describes leadership as something that is constituted by the social construction of a certain type of reality in social relations.

The opening quote in Uhl-Bien (p. 654) is revealing. It defines the radical range of RLT: Leadership as being close to a social process in which the location of leadership in terms of agency becomes less relevant, since leadership is embedded in a dynamic system:

“We consider the relational perspective and [the approaches within it]...to be at the forefront of emerging leadership thrusts...The relational focus is one that moves beyond unidirectional or even reciprocal leader/follower relationships to one that recognizes leadership wherever it occurs; it is not restricted to a single or even a small set of formal or informal leaders; and, in its strongest form, functions as a dynamic system embedding leadership, environmental, and organizational aspects” (Hunt & Dodge, 2000, p. 448 quoted from Uhl-Bien p. 654).

Uhl-Bien argues that two approaches to leadership and relations exist. A traditional entity approach that focuses on relationships from the standpoint of individuals as individual agency vs. a relational approach that view leadership as social constructions, starting not with persons but processes (p. 655).

In Uhl-Bien's conception, entity approaches are focused on individuals and their perceptions, intentions, personalities and expectations. Entity approaches view leadership as an influence relationship. In these relationships individuals align to accomplish mutual and organizational goals. These approaches assume a realist ontology. Moreover, the approaches focus on manager-subordinate exchanges under the condition that structures are already organized (p. 661).

In contrast to entity-approaches, relational leadership sees leadership as social-relational processes of organizational design and change (p. 661). A relational perspective changes the focus from the individual to the collective dynamic. In these social processes, leaders and with whom they interact are responsible for the relationships they construct together. Accordingly, relational perspectives view the multiple realities of self and other as constructed (p. 662).

Relational constructionism is the most prominent approach to relational perspectives of leadership (p. 662). This approach suggests to focus on processes, understood as “the influential acts of organizing that contribute to the structuring of interactions and relationships” (p. 662). This ‘relational ontology’ raises questions such as how the processes of leadership and management in organizations emerge, and how “realities of leadership are interpreted within the network of relations”. Further questions are how decisions and actions are embedded in collective sense-making processes (p. 662). So, the focus of relational constructionism is on processes of interaction, conversation, narrating, dialoguing and multiloguing (p. 663). In this perspective, meaning is constantly negotiated and renegotiated, deriving its meaning “within the context of its particular sociocultural location”. (p. 663).

Across relational perspectives leadership is viewed as the processes by which a social order is constructed and changed (p. 664). RLT is therefore a process theory of leadership (p. 666). RLT focuses on the relational processes “*by which leadership is produced and enabled*” (p. 667). RLT does not preclude manager-subordinate relationships, but is just recognized as one form of leadership. Accordingly, other types of leadership may be just as important. By using RLT as an approach to leadership it is possible to see other leadership relations than those built form hierarchy (p. 667). This focus is a break from the notion that position is necessarily a reflection of leadership (ibid.).

An important question to address when perceiving of leadership as process is to define what distinguishes such leadership processes from other relational processes? The processes studied should demonstrate that a new social order is constructed and that groups emerge who perceive of each other’s qualifications within constructed realities as a result of the process. In such processes, leadership identifies a relationship in which some people are able to persuade others (p. 667). In this respect, leadership in itself seen as an outcome.

Pursuing this research agenda, the focus is on investigating “*how leadership relations are produced by social interactions*” (p. 669). A specific research agenda identified by Uhl-Bien could adopt a constructionist perspective and examine relationship development focused on “skilful processes”. Here, leaders are those who make salient contributions and are recognized as such “*because participants construe their influence as compatible with the means by which they seek to satisfy*

*their own values and interests*” (p. 669). According to Uhl-Bien, this perspective views leadership as a political process, in which different participants seek to further different and sometimes conflicting values and interests. Much in accordance with the BUCIL model, such research could focus on sensemaking activities of participants. Uhl-Bien suggests to investigate acts which influence social constructions; those who are perceived to make the most significant and consistent contributions, and why they are perceived to do so (p. 669). Another research agenda would be to focus more on the emergence of a social order as a process of structuring (p. 670), in which leadership can result from everyday practices.

Having now explained relational leadership theory, I turn to the concept of leadership emergence as ‘recognition’, and how this concept builds on what I have interpreted as a specific instance of a relational leadership approach, that of the theory of complex responsive processes.

The theory of *complex responsive processes* (‘CRP’) (Fonseca, 2002; Griffin, 2002; Shaw & Stacey, 2006; Stacey, 2007) is chosen in this thesis as a certain type of relational leadership theory, and it is from CRP that the concept of ‘recognition’ is to be understood. CRP as a social theory understands the complexity of organisational life through the social theories of Herbert A. Mead and Norbert Elias. It delivers workable propositions regarding leadership-making in micro-interactive processes of uncertainty. The value of CRP in terms of leadership-making for collaborative innovation is the proposal of (i) a general management theory with a solution to the structure-agency dilemma of social theory and (ii) a theory which is focused on novelty and identity creation in processes of uncertainty, conflict and power. The first point is valuable by allowing for an explanation of how bottom-up leadership can be exercised and made at the same time. The second point is valuable by locating these structure-agency aspects of leadership within a framework of uncertainty and conflict, an aspect highly relevant for processes related to innovation and wicked problems. Below, I will explain these two elements in more detail.

The explanatory strength of CRP in relation to bottom-up leadership perspective is the process perspective on organisational development. This perspective is able to explain how novelty emerges in everyday life of organisations. CRP should be understood as a pure descriptive theory. Accordingly, Stacey concludes that CRP implies a new focus, a focus on the quality of participation, conversational life, anxiety and diversity, as well as on unpredictability and paradoxes (Stacey 2011, p. 475). This process focus is relevant for bottom-up leadership, in that bottom-up leadership due to its lack of formal power is forced to participate and interact in a process characterised by uncertainties in order to influence collaborators.

So, CRP's strong focus on interaction and participation is important in that it argues for an actual necessity of leadership interaction. In contrast to a system theory perspective on organisational development, CRP does not conceptualize an organisation as a 'whole' which you can describe and influence from the outside (p. 440). Managers need to interact in order to create development, and novelty happens as a consequence of numerous actions and interactions.

This perspective of leadership as participants in a development process leads to an understanding of such leadership related processes which to a high degree provides a conceptual bridge between sensemaking and leadership. Stacey stresses that we need to pay more attention to the quality of conversations, because it is through the engagement in these self-organising organisational conversations that choices and responses emerge:

*"in moving from the position of manager as objective observer of a system to that of manager as participant in emergent enquiry, attention is focused on the **unexpected an complex patterning of the responses of organisational members to managers intentions**. Intention and design are understood as **emergent and problematic processes** and attention is focused on the **interplay of intentions**. The emphasis shifts from the manager focusing on how to make a choice to focusing on the **quality of participation in self-organising conversations** from which such choices and the responses to them emerge. It becomes a personal matter of reflecting together on the quality of participation" (2007: 444, my bold,)*

This perspective is relevant as it forces bottom-up leadership to constantly communicate and adapt its ideas of change in communication with other organisational participants, and further to reflect on why processes become problematic and on why the interplay of intentions results in other participants supporting, challenging or opposing the innovation project.

Accordingly, Stacey & Griffin 2005 (Griffin & Stacey, 2005) note that the self-organising and emergent draw attention to the fact that agents interact on the basis of their own locally organising principles, and that it is through this interaction that coherence emerges, without a predefined program or plan. These generalisations of coherence take on the forms of power in terms of social objects and cult values (p. 8).

This agenda is valuable for a theoretical explanation of leadership-making suitable for innovation in particular since uncertainty and explanations of novelty creation

are the focus. Griffin (Griffin, 2002) narrows down CRP to focus explicitly on ways in which leadership emerges in communicative, everyday interactions in organisations. Leadership has to be involved in everyday communicative interactions in order to influence the creation of organisational themes and the creation of 'social objects'. The contradiction between individual and collective is preserved by arguing in favour of a self-contradictory approach, 'participative self-organisation' (Griffin, 2002): Both the collective and the individual form and are formed by each other in local interactions. Power is to be understood as ideological and functional. Leadership as power has to be negotiated in conflictual, local processes of interaction, i.e. the functional power, in order to have an effect on organisational life.

According to Griffin, that which leads to recognition as a leader is the improvement of a person's ability to articulate emergent 'themes' of sensemaking in an environment of insecurity, as well as the person's willingness to act in unfamiliar circumstances. 'Themes' is defined as relationally: "*relationships between people in a group can then be defined as continuously iterated patterns of intersubjective themes that organise the experience of being together...themes interact in many, many local situations in which patterns of relating continuously emerge both locally and across populations. These patterns are changes in the themes organising local interaction as group members seek to negotiate with, and respond to, each other in some way as members of community*" (Stacey 2011, p. 340).

Further propositions regarding factors that generate recognition are that leaders tend to be idealised; leaders can assume the attitude of the 'generalized other'; they display greater spontaneity, they take risks; and they interact creatively despite unknown circumstances (Griffin 2002). Griffin accentuates that the CRP conception of leadership as participation with others has some explicit normative consequences for effective leadership:

*"So, what is the practice of effective leadership from the perspective of complex responsive processes? The practice is that of participating skilfully in interaction with others in reflective and imaginative ways, aware of the potentially destructive processes one may be caught up in. It is in this practice that one is recognized as leader, as one who has the capacity to assist the group to continue ethically, creatively and courageously into the unknown. This is a very different way of understanding the role of leader to the mainstream perspective on which the leader stands outside the system, designing, manipulating variables and pulling levers in order to stay in control"* (ibid., p. 13)

Another central aspect is to act imaginatively, which requires reflexive capacities:

*"spontaneity then means the capacity to act in a wider range of ways, taking risks and often surprising oneself and others. Such a capacity must be particularly valuable when it comes to acting into the unknown" (Stacey & Griffin 2005, p. 11).*

Summing up, RLT and CRP provide us with a perspective on leadership that focuses not on individual traits, but on the ways in which collectives are moved in a certain direction through the social construction of leadership roles. These collectives are influenced by new organisational themes, i.e. patterns of micro-interaction, through conflict-ridden, even destructive, interactions between the people working in organisations. This enables a perspective of leadership in which leadership-making can be studied in social relations at all organisational levels and by all people involved. From CRP, we also have the proposition that it is possible to influence collaborators through the formulation of organisational themes, possibly resulting in 'strategizing' (Stacey, 2007), as well as to be recognised as a collaborative leader by taking action in circumstances of uncertainty. This approach to leadership highlights the way in which leadership can influence processes of sensemaking across organisations.

### **2.4.3. DISCUSSING LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE**

Below, I will discuss three points:

- Whether leadership emergence as processes of recognition satisfies the design demands listed in the above sections
- In what ways leadership recognition and RLT are similar and differs
- what the theoretical challenges are with transferring organisational development and leadership theory to a collaborative context

*Does leadership emergence as processes of recognition satisfies the design demands listed in the above sections?*

Leadership emergence satisfies the demands that I have listed throughout the above sections in this chapter. In relation to leadership of collaborative innovation in general the concept lives up to my reflection concerning whether a collaborative innovation research agenda should consider working with a process perspective in

relation to leadership as well as on the collaborative innovation. Leadership emergence stresses the fact that leadership is something that is made through social interactions in organisations.

The concept is also highly relevant for an innovation agenda in that it is based on theory that explains how novelty is created. CRP imports theoretical elements from many different research disciplines, but at the core of the theory is the ambition of producing an analytical framework that highlights complexity, engagement, paradox and unpredictability. In order to produce this framework, CRP imports element from Mead, Elias and complexity science. Mead and Elias in conjunction are of importance. Mead's research is being used by CRP to argue that in every day interactions among people in organisations, there is always the possibility that novelty can arise.

The concept is furthermore important for bottom-up leadership in that it is based on theory that can explain how new social orders emerge simultaneously with the emergence of leadership. CRP's import of Elias is of relevance by providing a theory of how human agency is always located within relations of power that both enables and constraints (Stacey & Griffin p.6). Consequently, CRP produces a sort of theory building within organisations that positions it closely to other sociological attempts to overcome the structure-agency dilemma of social science, such as Anthony Giddens well-known structuration theory, as well as other post-structural theories such as Michel Foucault's concepts of discourse, Niklas Luhmann's concept of social systems, and Pierre Bourdieu's framework of habitus and power struggles within fields. However, in contrast to many of these theories, the CRP focus narrowly takes outset in the actions and patterns of interactions of the micro-level in order to emphasise not to reify structures.

Consequently, CRP as a theoretical base is valuable for a conception of bottom-up leadership in that it is applicable to a context of uncertainty, novelty, conflict and power, and because it can explain how leadership is made through a dialectic with a new social order created when the bottom-up unit begins to formulate and communicate its innovation project.

Hence, this conception of leadership allows for a radical re-interpretation of the following question: What is leadership in relation to organizational development? According to Griffin, it is possible to conceptualise bottom-up leadership as the main leadership in change processes insofar as it lives up to the preconditions that I have highlighted above, in particular the ability to bear uncertainty, take risks, be reflective, spontaneous and involved in numerous interactions.

Griffin's notion of leadership emergence as something that happens through social processes of recognition is furthermore important for the collaborative innovation

context as I have hypothesized in the BUCIL model in that it addresses the relation between uncertainty and leadership: When uncertainty is present in an organisation, people are searching for answers. If leaders demonstrate the ability to act in these conditions of uncertainty, as well as being able to introduce new themes, people may accept these themes. This general explanation of how leadership is dependent on the ability to bear uncertainty as well as coming up with a new organisational theme is consistent with Borins' descriptions of how innovation and leadership are interlinked. And further, since bottom-up leadership does not have formal power, the informal leader is forced to interact in order to spread its novelty throughout the organization. Accordingly, a concept of recognition focuses attention to the fact that the construction of a leadership identity and a novel organisational theme can occur simultaneously. This is why bottom-up leadership and collaborative innovation processes are intertwined processes: They are agency and structure initiated simultaneously when bottom-up leadership begins communicating a critique of an existing performance gap and a perceived solution.

#### *Comparing RLT and leadership recognition*

Griffin's concept of recognition can be perceived of as a specific instance of a Relational Leadership Theory approach, in that it satisfies the assumptions of RLT that Uhl-Bien lists (p.668):

1. Leadership relationships are not restricted to hierarchical positions or roles, but occur throughout the organization
2. Leadership relationships are identified by "interactive dynamics that contribute to emergence or direction of social order and action" (ibid.)
3. Relational leadership at a collective level studies the whole process by which social systems change, including how the socially constructed roles and relationships can be labelled leadership
4. All relationships occur in a context, and this context is important to the study of relational dynamics

However, combining Griffin and Borins' notion of bottom-up leadership in the BUCIL model makes the leadership conception a more operationalized version of an RLT instance. In my conception of bottom-up leadership, leadership is not restricted to hierarchical positions or to formal bureaucratic power. This is in accordance with RLT. But leadership in an analysis of bottom-up leadership using the BUCIL model is per definition located a priori: The focus of analysis is a profession-based unit in a public sector agency that has developed an innovation project.



Second of all, in the BUCIL model, I have also defined the main legitimacy of such leadership, in that this legitimacy is acquired at the outset from the entrepreneurial ability to come up with a solution to a perceived performance gap as the central problem, in relation to a wicked problem. Accordingly, the solution has to be cross-sectorial in some ways. Furthermore, the power of influence is likewise defined: influence to give sense in conditions of uncertainty, preconditioned on gaining recognition, by the ability to bear uncertainty, take risks, be reflective, and spontaneous.

The implication is that even though my suggestion for leadership emergence allows for a process analysis of how leadership is socially constructed through relations of recognition with collaborators, it locates leadership a priori, accordingly emphasizes agency. By so doing I adopt another approach to some aspects of RLT which in its most radical form perceives leadership as embedded in a dynamic system.

In my perspective, leadership is not seen as a dynamic system, in which leadership is embedded – leadership is something which is tied to a bottom-up position and the actions taken, taking into consideration enabling and constraining elements in the environment, enacted by bottom-up leadership. So, my argument is that it is bottom-up leadership that interprets and constructs the ‘system’ in which collaborators should interact, not the other way around. Accordingly, my perspective of leadership is strongly related to Weick’s and Gioia’s conception of sense-making and giving sense as acts of construction in which a certain environment is made sensible, constructed and enacted.

Accordingly I work with the assumption that bottom-up leadership is the driver and leader, implicating that other actors are not considered as being part of the leadership – they are placed on the other side of the leader/non-leader distinction, being here conceptualised as champions, sponsors and collaborators.

Despite denoting a defined leadership the BUCIL model do have several elements of relational, social constructivist approaches to leadership. First of all, the entire BUCIL model assumes that leadership is something that is socially constructed; it explains how this construction comes about. But the content of this construction is left open for empirical investigations. Second, it is by no means fixed in the BUCIL model what the relation is between the proposed social order (i.e. the innovation project) and how bottom-up leadership defines its role in relation to this new proposed social order. It is furthermore not defined in the BUCIL model how emergent leadership and its critique of the status quo are interpreted and reacted to by collaborators and relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, it is not defined how bottom-up leadership mobilises support or how it reacts to the criticism and opposition of stakeholders. All of these issues are empirical and left open for an

analysis, allowing these social objects, relations and identities to be constructed in empirical investigations.

### *Leadership recognition and collaboration*

One could critically ask whether leadership emergence is suitable for a collaboration agenda, being not specifically developed within such a context. This is indeed a relevant critique since the reviewed CRP and RLT literature concerning leadership does not operate with a collaborative dimension. Accordingly this literature could be assuming a single-organisational context or not deeming this distinction relevant.

There are different ways to answer the above question. The first answer would be that the BUCIL model is actually based on the assumption that different types of collaborative leadership will be involved: bureaucratic and informal. This is clear in Borins' description of bottom-up leadership and the way that the sometimes holistic innovation projects are developed: the purpose is to get decision makers to embrace the project as their own; bottom-up leadership operates both in the shadow of hierarchy, by making informal, or entire new, leadership structures in a strategic way but also being forced to activate hierarchy in order to increase the scope of the innovation project. Consequently, it is an empirical question *when* formal leadership, i.e. decision makers, engage with the bottom-up driven innovation, and *how* they do it. For instance, one could imagine a scenario in which bottom-up leadership uses its network to create a demand in its own organisation and in some of the other would-be collaborating organisations for a policy or strategy related to a wicked problem. This could have the consequence that bottom-up leadership forcefully can deliver an argument to politicians or CEOs in its own organisation that the problem is perceived of by other stakeholders, and that a strategy/policy has to be developed. So, in this scenario formal, bureaucratic power would be involved rather late in the process, with the purpose of mainly sanctioning a project that bottom-up leadership through numerous interactions can display of as viable and possible. This is actually the case in the empirical analyses in this thesis.

However, numerous other scenarios are possible. For instance, one could also imagine a scenario in which bottom-up leadership first mobilises all available resources in order to influence its own managers and CEOs. This could have the consequence that these decision makers are involved early in the project, being involved in reflecting on how to proceed, what elements of the innovation project that should be removed or up-scaled, and how to establish contact with relevant stakeholders.

The second answer would be that whether such leadership can be recognised in a collaborative configuration is exactly part of bottom-up leadership's challenge. However, being recognised in a collaborative configuration will, I argue, be more difficult than the CRP literature sometimes seems to suggest. For instance, Griffin assumes that if a unit, manager, group of persons etc. are able to bear uncertainty and to introduce new themes, increasing the quality of participation and interaction, this leadership will be recognised. However, in a collaborative context, this is by no means certain. Despite displaying all these qualities, collaborators may reject an innovation project out of strategic, institutional or substantive reasons. This is especially so for wicked problems. Because even though these problems may appear wicked to bottom-up leadership, it may not have been made sensible to collaborators that it *is* in fact wicked. An often mentioned feature of wicked problems is exactly that it is very difficult to define the problem to begin with (Rittel & Webber, 1973). So, we may hypothesise that a major ground-breaking challenge for bottom-up leadership is to convince collaborators that a wicked problem actually exists to begin with, in Weick's words: to make it sensible. If bottom-up leadership succeeds with this, uncertainty may begin to surface in the collaborators' organisations, leading to a demand for answers, initiating iterative processes of leadership recognition. Accordingly, what is relevant for an empirical investigation of bottom-up leadership would be to pay attention to how bottom-up leadership is able to make a platform of interaction with collaborators.

#### **2.4.4.PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP: BRIDGING THE PERFORMANCE GAP THROUGH PROFESSION-BASED ACTIVITIES**

In the BUCIL model I assume that public entrepreneurship is what provides leadership with both a legitimate claim for change as well as the ability to create novelty. I suggest that the concept of public entrepreneurship captures these aspects of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership. Below I explain and discuss why.

Klein *et al.* provide a valuable adaption of entrepreneurship to a public sector context. The authors conceive public agents "*as nominal stewards of resources that are commonly or jointly owned by members of a community*" (p. 2). According to the authors public entrepreneurship encompasses a wide range of activities: changing the institutional environment, establishing new organizations, creating and managing public resources, and taking advantage of spillovers by private actors for the good of society (ibid.). The authors conceptualize entrepreneurship not as a specific individual or type of firm but as a function. Klein *et al.* argue that, despite their limitations, private and public entrepreneurs have a shared characteristic, namely that entrepreneurs are defined as "*decision-makers in the allocation of*

*scarce resources under uncertainty*”, focusing on bridging a perceived performance gap. Reviewing entrepreneurship conceptions held by Knight (1921), Kirzner (1973) and Schumpeter (1934), Klein *et al.* find that in the public sector, entrepreneurship is a function characterized by the following:

- Alertness to opportunities (Kirzner, 1973)
- Judgmental decision-making about investment under uncertainty (Knight, 1921)
- Product, process and market innovation (Schumpeter, 1934)

Kirzner’s relevance for public entrepreneurship is, according to (Klein, 2010), that both private and public entrepreneurs “*perceive gaps between actual and potential outcomes or performance, and look for resources to close the gap*” (p. 3). Public entrepreneurship accordingly seek to marshal resources for fulfilling public or social interests, deploying them for better performance on public objectives (p. 3). So, the application to public entrepreneurship is sensing shifts in public preferences, anticipating common problems, identifying out-of-date practices, agencies and other institutions and avoiding undesirable outcomes in the public interest (p. 6).

Knight’s relevance for public entrepreneurship is to focus on investments under uncertainty. Knight’s concept is in contrast to Kirzner’s, in that profit opportunities only exist in retrospective, i.e. after gains and losses are realized (Klein *et al.* p. 3). Klein *et al.* argue that Knight’s concept is important in that it stresses a focus on uncertainty-bearing: the greatest economic returns accrue to those who can bear market uncertainties. Accordingly, public entrepreneurship is required to make investments under uncertainty. Klein *et al.* argue that this may require establishment of public organizations, and may yield major returns, but entrepreneurship may also lead to failure (p. 3). So, the application to public entrepreneurship is investment of public resources to meet political objectives, evaluating the suitability of various policies for achieving particular outcomes, and identifying gamesmanship nominally in pursuit of public interests but truly in private interests (p. 6).

Schumpeter’s concept of entrepreneurship is, according to Klein *et al.*, a function that “*disturbs existing patterns of resource allocation through bold, creative action*” (p. 3). Accordingly, this function is what that enables the introduction of new political products and processes (p. 4).

In my perspective, Hagedoorn (Hagedoorn, 1996) provide a valuable elaboration on Schumpeter’s concept of the entrepreneur in relation to innovation. Schumpeter defined innovation as ‘new combinations’ (p. 887). The entrepreneur can be described as the only agent of economic change. As a result, the entrepreneur is “*the personification of innovation, i.e. the individual who carries out new combinations*” (p. 889). According to Hagedoorn, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is in the first

place characterised by proactive behaviour and “*not necessarily a strictly rational economically maximising subject*” (p. 890), that is, a both rational and irrational agent who “*seems to be never satisfied by results based on existing innovations, but who keeps searching for new opportunities*” (p. 890). Schumpeter defined in his late writings the entrepreneur as follows:

*“The entrepreneurial function need not be embodied in a physical person and in particular in a single physical person. Every social environment has its own ways of filling the entrepreneurial function...Again the entrepreneurial function may be and often is filled cooperatively” (Schumpeter, 1949, p. 71-72, quoted from Hagedoorn 1996, p. 891). “*

According to Klein *et al.* (p. 6), the application of Schumpeter’s concept of entrepreneurship to public entrepreneurship contribute by emphasising the introduction of new policy proposals, political positions or paradigms, new procedures, changing administrative or electoral procedures, lobbying and other forms of rent seeking.

Klein *et al.*’s valuable contribution related to bottom-up leadership and collaborative innovation is, in conclusion, to allow for an adaption of entrepreneurship concepts to a public sector context. Another valuable contribution is “*breaking the boundary*” (p. 11) between public and private action, that allows for collective or network based entrepreneurship.

In the description above, many parallels can be drawn between Borins’ notion of how bottom-up leadership acts proactively in order to come up with solutions of emergent public problems, and Klein *et al.* and Hagedoorn’s conceptions of entrepreneurship. What is especially relevant for bottom-up leadership in trying to solve a wicked problem is how entrepreneurship as an organizational function is adapted to an environment of uncertainty, enabling entrepreneurship to bear this uncertainty and perceive of performance gaps.

#### **2.4.4.1 Discussing public entrepreneurship**

In this section I discuss

- why entrepreneurship is suggested as a bottom-up leadership platform for initiating an innovation project
- what the relationship is between entrepreneurship and leadership

*Why is entrepreneurship suggested as a bottom-up leadership platform for initiating an innovation project?*

The short literature review above suggests that uncertainty, entrepreneurship and innovation are closely related. What is also relevant is that entrepreneurship as an organizational function is primarily focused on creating novelty, even though entrepreneurship in Klein *et al.*'s conception also may have a management and decision making aspect. In this respect, entrepreneurship is first of all suitable for an innovation agenda, in that it is this organizational function that can generate new ideas for how to deal with an emergent problem or a perceived performance gap. Entrepreneurship also has the advantage in the BUCIL model that it is possible to separate novelty creation from leadership and strategy. Entrepreneurship is, according to Hagedoorn's interpretation of Schumpeter, a person or function who is both rational and irrational, being constantly on the lookout for new opportunities. Consequently, adopting entrepreneurship as one element of bottom-up leadership also explains why a type of leadership needs to accompany entrepreneurship, simply because entrepreneurship in itself is not necessarily motivated to take on leadership.

In fact, entrepreneurship is, in Schumpeter's conception, partly irrational by constantly searching for new opportunities. So, what public entrepreneurship is essentially about is creating novelty in uncertain environments through proactive behaviour. This description fits Borin's notion of bottom-up leadership, in that these innovations typically are initiated before a crisis emerges. Accordingly, such bottom-up innovations require proactivity.

Furthermore, in the BUCIL model, I have explicitly assumed that different types of uncertainty are present when going through a bottom-up leadership innovation process targeting a wicked problem. As Klein *et al.*'s review of Kirzner, Knight and Schumpeter demonstrate, entrepreneurship is a skill, personal attribute or organizational function that is assumed to operate in, and perhaps even seeking out and enacting (Weick, 1995), an uncertain environment. These spaces of uncertainty make it possible for entrepreneurship to perceive of new combinations, to perceive of public performance gaps, and to take risks. Accordingly, adopting public entrepreneurship as a platform for bottom-up leadership allows for an explanation of why bottom-up leadership is able to create novelty. Adopting public entrepreneurship also allows for an explanation of how members of bottom-up leadership do this: they have an insight in a public performance gap, they are willing to address this performance gap by seeking out, even enacting, uncertain environments, and in this environment, they demonstrate proactive behaviour by formulating ideas of how to make better use of resources by making new combinations. In this way, public entrepreneurship in the BUCIL model explains how bottom-up leadership expands its platform of influence by gradually improving and developing the innovation project.

### *What is the relationship between entrepreneurship and leadership?*

Despite the fact that entrepreneurship is a necessary platform for addressing a wicked problem through a bottom-up position it is by no means sufficient. As Borins mention, leadership has to be made, influence has to be exercised. Public entrepreneurship in Klein *et al.*'s conception does allow for wide-ranging implications on different organizational levels, but entrepreneurship does not in itself address the link between idea generation and how leadership is made in relation to this idea generation. Accordingly, in the BUCIL model, I separate entrepreneurship and leadership, even though both of these relational, constructed aspects of a specific organizational behaviour are located within the same bottom-up unit. The intention with this separation is that it allows for a more detailed analysis of the various forms of interplay between entrepreneurship and leadership: How a specific innovation project, conceptualised within a certain professional insight, calls for different, compatible leadership identities that consequently will have their own paths of leadership recognition, conditioned as they are by both innovation project and leadership choices taken.

So, the relation between entrepreneurship and leadership is in no way clear cut. Accordingly, there are numerous ways that bottom-up leadership could interpret and create its own leadership, based on previous experience, staff and resources available, leadership training (if any), and the prevalence of different types of uncertainties.

Another issue that highlights the explanatory advantage of separating entrepreneurship from leadership making is that the relation between entrepreneurship and leadership is an iterative process. At a given point in time in a specific innovation process, bottom-up leadership and its collaborators will have a specific understanding of the innovation project and will accordingly have faced specific challenges in order to get the project and its bottom-up leadership recognised. However, what Van de Ven *et al.*'s research suggests, is that innovation is truly a process of 'becoming', presumably involving numerous setbacks, as well as change in objectives and assessments criteria during the process. Accordingly, even though entrepreneurship can deliver novelty, it does not guarantee that the novel idea is correct. As soon as the emergent leadership communicates the project, the innovation project will have to be modified to changes in the environment, to changing staff as well as to existing policies, legislation and strategies. So, even though entrepreneurship is a platform for bottom-up leadership, it is a platform that *moves* and *is forced to move* when new substantive, institutional or strategic uncertainties are faced, and when things in the innovation project do not work out as they were planned to. This moving platform makes both project and leadership

flexible, but it does not necessarily generate leadership recognition. When changes are made in the innovation project, or when unexpected challenges cannot be solved, leadership risks losing credibility and perhaps has to redefine the entire content of the project and also its leadership.

So, on the basis of the above discussions, I define entrepreneurship as a function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) acts proactively in environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already existing resources, 4) in order for them to be deployed for a perceived better performance on public objectives.

#### **2.4.5. MAKING SENSE AND GIVING SENSE**

In the sections above I have explained and discussed how to understand uncertainty, leadership and entrepreneurship. In this section I explain and discuss making and giving sense. These are important aspects of bottom-up leadership since these aspects are what enable bottom-up leadership to influence collaborators and decision makers.

Sensemaking is related to entrepreneurship because it is through processes of making sense and giving sense that bottom-up leadership gather experience and reflections that leads to re-interpretation of organisational reality. Accordingly, making and giving sense is the fuel for the entrepreneurial motor, in that it allows for bottom-up leadership to make new resource-combinations or abandon old ones.

In this thesis sensemaking is understood within the acknowledged framework of Karl E. Weick (Weick, 1995), whereas the strategic element of sensemaking, in terms of giving sense, is understood within the framework of (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Making and giving sense is in the BUCIL model what allows bottom-up leadership to influence collaborators and decision makers, in spite of inferior power position and constraints imposed by uncertainties. What research in sensemaking reveals is that sensemaking can be a possibility to exercise influence. In this respect, uncertainty in the BUCIL model changes character: From a restraining condition to an enabling condition of collaboration. Uncertainty is what makes collaborators and decision makers susceptible for new ideas and answers that can help them understand specific parts of their organisational environment in new ways.

So, in this explanation of making and giving sense, I emphasize how new realities are created and enacted, as a consequence of bottom-up leadership's strategic positioning of its own leadership in relation to collaborators and decision makers, and as consequence of the new organisational reality imitated by means entrepreneurship.



According to Weick, sensemaking literally means the making of sense, because “active agents construct sensible, sensible (...) events. They “structure the unknown” (...) How they construct what they construct, why, and with what effects are the central question for people interested in sensemaking” (p. 4). Weick argues that sensemaking is distinct from interpretation studies (p. 6). Interpretation is often used to focus on texts, whereas sensemaking address how the text is constructed as well as how it is read. Consequently, Weick argues that the element of construction and action is what distinguishes sensemaking from interpretation studies, since interpretation studies are unable to explain novelty and its transformation:

*“Porac et al.’s (1989) four assumptions about the nature of an interpretive study focus on attending to cues and interpreting, externalizing, and linking these cues. What is left unspecified are how the cues got there in the first place and how these particular cues were singled out from an ongoing flow of experience. Also unspecified are how the interpretations and meanings of these cues were then altered and made more explicit and sensible, as a result of “concrete activities”.” (ibid., p. 8)*

Drawing on Schön, Weick argues that problems do not present themselves to the practitioners as givens, but must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are “*puzzling, troubling, and uncertain*” (p. 9).

Weick sums up sensemaking in contrast to interpretation in the following quote:

*“The key distinction is that sensemaking is about the ways people generate what they interpret (...) authoring and interpretation are interwoven. The concept of sensemaking highlights the action, activity, and creating that lays down the traces that are interpreted and then reinterpreted” (p. 13).*

Accordingly, sensemaking is focused on activity or process, and is more about invention than discovery (p. 13).

In relation to the BUCIL model, sensemaking is valuable because it highlights “*the invention that precedes interpretation*”. (p. 14). Sensemaking is not a metaphor for interpretation, such as how individuals make sense of their situations. Sensemaking is about making something sensible.

Weick’s understanding of sensemaking is furthermore useful because it relates to identity issues, making it plausible that collaborators attempts of making something sensible will have consequences for identity developments. Accordingly, sensemaking is also linked to the emergence of the identity of bottom-up leadership.

Drawing on Ring and Van de Ven's (1989) studies of transactions as occasions for innovation, Weick argues that sensemaking is something that is triggered by a failure to confirm one's self, and that sensemaking is central for maintaining a consistent, positive self-confirmation. Thirdly, Weick argues that *"people learn about their identities by projecting them into an environment and observing the consequences"* (p. 23). Fourthly, people simultaneously try to shape and react to the environments they face, in that they *"take the cue for their identity from the conduct of others"* (p. 23), but also make an active effort to influence this conduct to begin with (p. 23). Fifth, Weick argues that sensemaking is self-referential, in that people make sense of what happens around them by asking what the implications of these events will have for who they will be (p. 24). These considerations of identity are highly relevant for the iterative relationship that exists between sensemaking and leadership emergence – bottom-up leadership learns about identity by projecting it into an environment.

In relation to issues of retrospection, Weick argues that sensemaking is an activity in which many possible meanings may need to be synthesized. The problem for the sensemaker is not too little information, but too much (p. 27):

*"Investigators who favour the metaphor of information processing (...) often view sensemaking, as they do most other problems, as a setting where people need more information. That is not what people need when they are overwhelmed by equivocality. Instead, they need values, priorities, and clarity about preferences to help them be clear about which projects matter. Clarity on values clarifies what is important in elapsed experience, which finally gives some sense of what that elapsed experience means"* (p. 28).

These considerations that Weick has concerning retrospection are relevant for wicked problems since these types of public problems arguably generate an overwhelming equivocality.

Concerning the aspect of action, Weick uses the concept of enactment, drawing a parallel between what managers and legislators do, in that they both construct reality through authoritative acts. In this respect, Weick emphasises that in organizational life people *"often produce part of the environment they face"* (p. 30).

Weick further discuss what the occasions for sensemaking are. Sensemaking is typically triggered by ambiguity, puzzles or problems, and when people reach a threshold of dissatisfaction with their situation. This creates a type of shock that requires the initiation of action. However, not all cues or dissatisfaction are transformed into sensemaking. As Weick notes, occasions for sensemaking are

themselves constructed, becoming a platform for further construction. Ambiguity and uncertainty are organizational occasions that often produce novelties (p. 83-86.). Further, interruptions and arousal are both occasions that will have an effect on sensemaking. These two types of ‘shocks’ differ. Ambiguity leads to sensemaking because people are confused by too many interpretations; the events are experienced as complex, unclear or paradoxical (p. 92). Ambiguity creates confusion as a result of multiple meanings (p. 95), and therefore calls for social construction and invention. In contrast, uncertainty stimulates sensemaking because people are ignorant of any interpretation. Uncertainty is a shock that is occasioned by the inability “*to extrapolate current action and to foresee their consequences*” (p. 99).

Accordingly, when relating these two occasions of sensemaking to the BUCIL model, I make the hypothesis that collaborators and bottom-up leadership are facing different challenges of sensemaking. It seems plausible that uncertainty as a shock is what generally engulfs collaborators, whereas the challenge for bottom-up leadership more is a challenge of ambiguity and of synthesising across situations of interaction.

Weick further addresses the aspect of manipulation. Weick argues that political actors and organizational actors choose and create some of their own constraints (p. 164). Environments can be manipulated. Weick notes that there is “*a basic entrepreneurial quality to manipulation (...) the ways in which entrepreneurs create sensible niches for themselves and others is a good place to start in comprehending sensemaking by manipulation*” (p. 166).

To sum up, interpreting Weick’s conception of sensemaking within the BUCIL model clarifies and supports the following assumptions:

- Sensemaking enables bottom-up leadership to construct a new perception of reality
- Wicked problems have to be constructed as problems from the materials of problematic situations
- Novelty creation and identity transformation are linked through iterative processes
- Sensemaking is a synthesising ability
- Sensemaking is what allows a leadership to create and enact an environment by means of entrepreneurship
- Bottom-up leadership faces challenges of ambiguity and synthesising, whereas collaborators face challenges of uncertainty

In terms of the manipulation of sensemaking, or in other words, the strategic aspects of it, (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991)'s research is relevant for this thesis in that the authors explore the relation between sensemaking and sensegiving within a strategic change initiation at a university. In this respect, this piece of research is relevant, in that the concept of sensegiving provides a vocabulary for understanding how bottom-up leadership exercises leadership in terms of influence.

The authors make a distinction between sensemaking and sensegiving. Sensemaking is related to meaning construction and reconstruction by the involved parties, as they tried to develop “a meaningful framework for understanding the nature of the intended strategic change”. (p. 442). In contrast, sensegiving is “concerned with the process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (ibid.). In terms of sensemaking this process both involved the President of the university and his subordinates in the initial phases of a strategic change process. Especially lower level members were trying to figure out “*the meaning of the proposed strategic change effort*” (p. 442). Sensegiving had another character, in that the President of the university provided a viable interpretation of a new reality, in this way trying to influence stakeholders. This sensegiving attempt again prompted sensemaking responses of the targets of this sensegiving (p. 443). The authors likewise note that sensemaking is to high extent related to understanding, whereas sensegiving is dominated by influence. Furthermore, the authors note that when such strategic change was initiated, it had a distinctive character, by “being fraught with uncertainty, ambiguity and emotionality”, mainly on the part of the organization members, because the President’s initial communications indicated an obscure, but apparently significant, change was about to be implemented (p. 444). The authors in their discussion note that the change was not precipitated by crisis, and that arguably, managing strategic change without crisis is more difficult to accomplish because the lack of a rationale for change (p. 445). Instead, the process studied had a character of “*ambiguity-by-design*”, a tactic that may be effective for leading stakeholders to question the current situation (p. 446).

#### **2.4.5.1 Discussing making sense and giving sense**

In the BUCIL model, both making sense and giving sense are core because they enable bottom-up leadership to exercise influence without having a strong bureaucratic position. Giving sense and making sense may often be in play simultaneously, but in the BUCIL model I give them separate causal functions. The discussion points below are as follows:

- What is the relationship between making sense and giving sense

- Which actors should be focused on in an analysis when the concepts are applied?

*What is the relationship between making sense and giving sense?*

Concerning the relation between giving sense and making sense, (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) suggests a rather simple logic: sense has to be made in order for it to be given. Accordingly, the authors argue for a phase model in which first sense has to be acquired by the leader and uncertainty generated; next, sense has to be given, influencing the sensemaking of stakeholders.

However, in the BUCIL model, even though I agree on the simple relation between making and giving sense, I would argue that making and giving sense could be in play simultaneously, as Weick suggests: that sensemaking is something that is triggered by a failure to confirm one's self, and that sensemaking is central for maintaining a consistent, positive self-confirmation. Thirdly, Weick argues that *"people learn about their identities by projecting them into an environment and observing the consequences"* (p. 23). This simultaneousness as a producer of new patterns of interaction and the creation of novelty is something that is also emphasized by Complex Responsive Processes theory, by drawing on Mead's notion, that in every interaction, there is a chance to deviate from presumed patterns of interaction.

An example of this could be when bottom-up leadership makes a presentation of an element of the project for a group of collaborators or decision makers, arguing why this project addresses an aspect of a wicked problem in a new and more efficient way (giving sense to collaborators, who are busy making sense of what the project is about, and what the consequences of it will be ) – but afterwards bottom-up leadership in a discussion becomes aware of resistance towards certain elements (forcing bottom-up leadership to make sense of the conflict, interpreting own role and innovation project in the light of this resistance). This simultaneousness is perhaps more dominant for bottom-up leadership than in Gioia & Chittipeddi's study of an explicit top-down leadership, because bottom-up leadership has no authority to command in the first place, and definitely not to collaborators. This consequently does not provide bottom-up leadership with the luxury to first make sense, and then give sense, in an orderly, designed fashion. Influence has to be exercised on a constant basis. This simultaneousness is also what allows new sense to be made during conflicts.

*Which actors should be focused on in an analysis when the concepts are applied?*

So, where to look when using these concepts in a BUCIL-related analysis? Drawing some implications on the discussion points above across sections, I argue that in the BUCIL model, giving sense is deployed by bottom-up leadership in order to create ownership to the project, influencing collaborators sensemaking processes. Making sense, accordingly, causally has three functions in the BUCIL model, related to different actors:

1. Collaborators: Sensemaking as something that happens when collaborators are trying to make sense of what the innovation project is about. This can lead to counter- or co-attempts of alternative interpretations and constructions of reality, but may also lead to an openness for attempts of giving sense, due to resource constraints, disinterest in the project or lack of attention to the possible implications of the project
2. Bottom-up leadership: Sensemaking as something that happens when bottom-up leadership meets resistance, unexpected approval and positive interpretations when giving sense. This creates ambiguity and the need to synthesise experience across situations further, which can lead to new actions of entrepreneurship, i.e. new combinations of resources, and, for that reason, a redefinition of project and bottom-up leadership
3. Collaborators and Bottom-up Leadership: sensemaking as something that transgresses the two above strategic aspects of sensemaking by allowing for an experience of uncertainty and conflict that both collaborators and bottom-up leadership cannot interpret, hence is forced to make things sensible, i.e. to construct new realities.

In the BUCIL model, I hypothesize a strong causal link between leadership emergence as recognition and the possibility of giving sense. Sensemaking in Weick's conception has clear connections with the concept of leadership recognition. Constantly giving answers to uncertainty concerning collaborators identity and leadership identity in relation to the innovation project is, I argue, necessary in order to both keep believing in the collective enterprise and at the same time to remain responsive to inputs and learning during the uncertain innovation 'journey'(Van de Ven, 1999). Thus, as explained by CRP, sensemaking is essential for both creativity and the ability to act in conditions of uncertainty. Sensemaking is

crucially linked to processes in organisations, creating meaning as a result of the process (Hernes & Maitlis, 2010). Accordingly, I assume that the ability to give sense is highly dependent on whether bottom-up leadership is recognised, i.e. *how* it positions itself in relation to the innovation project and collaborators, and whether this positioning is perceived of as legitimate by collaborators.

I also assume that somehow bottom-up leadership has to generate uncertainty among collaborators in order for them to acknowledge that change is needed and in order for them to acknowledge bottom-up leadership. As (O'Toole, 1996) suggests, the complexity of interorganisational arrangements generates an uncertainty, that managers can exploit, when other stakeholders are busy figuring out what to do, because the complexity of problems and the interorganisational context make rational calculation of what games actors play very difficult:

*“I explore the idea of modelling interorganizational implementation via a rational choice approach. The first conclusion is that serious limitations constrain what may be possible through the formal rational choice representation and analysis of such settings. The second conclusion, however, is that these limitations for theorists do not mean that practical implementation success is itself problematic. In fact, an exploration of the limitations of formal approaches actually reveals the ways that practicing managers may be able to induce success under challenging network conditions: the modelling problems themselves point systematically to the practical management possibilities. (p.242)”*

O'Toole further argues that:

*“For public actors managing programs through networks, looking for solutions means searching for options sufficiently cooperative to encourage or permit programs to work. This type of success is not necessarily reliant on predictive game theoretic solutions. Indeed, the multiple uncertainties that preclude game theoretic solutions are themselves potential objects of influence by network managers as they seek their own variety of “solution” (p. 250).*

Therefore I assume that bottom-up leadership has, due to its professional specialization and its entrepreneurship, a head start for influencing collaborator's sensemaking, in that bottom-up leadership's context has already been interpreted and made sensible and enacted by bottom-up leadership. This is in contrast to collaborators, in which the challenge of making sense of 'the game' may have just begun.

## **2.4.6.LEADERSHIP DISTRIBUTION**

My key argument for the importance of leadership distribution in relation to a research agenda for bottom-up leadership is that the aftermath of bottom-up leadership is crucial, and especially so when it comes to proposing new solutions to wicked problems, since arguably solutions to these wicked problems could be difficult to sustain. Further, leadership distribution is also a way of living up to some of the suggestions for research that I have found in previous sections (see section 1), which are as follows:

- Investigate advantages/disadvantages of bottom-up, top-down and lateral innovations
- Relate these advantages/disadvantages to particular types of innovations, related to a process perspective of the ‘innovation journey’
- How an innovation is sustained
- How an innovation is diffused

Accordingly, leadership distribution is a concept that I have generated out of a need to capture Sandford Borins’ observation concerning one of the main objectives for bottom-up leadership: That bottom-up leadership is forced to make decision makers embrace the innovation as their own, or otherwise make it apparent that the innovation project supports already existing strategies. The function in the BUCIL model of leadership distribution is first to enable an analysis of what the implications of a specific leadership recognition is, and second of all, to emphasize that bottom-up leadership is a distinct type of leadership which is identifiable exactly because it is forced to operate from an informal power position, and because the main purpose of bottom-up leadership is to establish alliances with ‘the top’ of its own organization, preferably also the collaborating organisations. In other words, leadership distribution draws our attention to the fact that bottom-up leadership is a type of leadership with a certain duration.

### **2.4.6.1 Why is leadership distribution a relevant concept for theorising bottom-up leadership?**

I exemplify several scenarios below in order to explore why leadership distribution is relevant to address in an analysis using the BUCIL model, scenarios which are directly linked to how bottom-up leadership manages to conceptualise the innovation project and to exercise influence.



1. Bottom-up leadership's innovation endeavours construct some sort of political or strategic consensus that 'something has to be done' about this wicked problem. This necessitates a re-invention process of the innovative solution that bottom-up leadership has already developed, resulting in a collaborative innovation process as conceptualised by (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011), in which a formalised, facilitating leadership takes over.
2. Bottom-up leadership's own decision makers do not approve of the specific solution when the innovation process is ended, implicating that the innovation project is taken over and modified by a collaborator
3. Bottom-up leadership manages to make alliances with decision makers in its own organisation, that accordingly are so eager to make the project their own, that bottom-up leadership is terminated and put to other tasks
4. Bottom-up leadership manages to make alliances with decision makers in its own organisation; decision makers accordingly embrace the initiative as their own. However, decision makers are unable to continue to drive the process onwards, due to the highly complex character of both wicked problem and the innovative solution. In this respect, bottom-up leadership would be required to continue driving the process, now with a steady mandate, having the difficult task of maintaining the sense already made, and consolidate and sanction this sensemaking in new interorganisational structures, as Borins suggests.

What these examples illustrate is that each of these innovation 'sustaining' and 'diffusion' scenarios presumably will be a path-dependent consequence of how bottom-up leadership and innovation project are perceived by collaborators, and to which degree bottom-up leadership has managed to display the collaborative value of the innovation project, hence distribute leadership. As (Bardach, 1996) mentions, there are many barriers to inter-agency collaborations, but a central challenge is to make visible the 'collaborative turf' of the project. Collaborative turf here meaning that collaborators can see a strategic advantage or career opportunity in relation to the project. So, an important research agenda related to the interplay between leadership recognition, giving sense and leadership distribution is to investigate how bottom-up driven innovations are distributed among the top-levels of public agencies and collaborators, and what the aftermath of this distribution is, concerning the long-term value-contributing output of the innovation.

## **2.5 DISCUSSION: AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE BUCIL MODEL**

Above I have explained and discussed each of the applied concepts of the BUCIL model, highlighting issues of theory building and issues related to how to understand the causal interactions constructed in order to enable an empirical analysis.

Before I conclude on the findings related to these discussions, I make a discussion in which I critically assess the BUCIL model in its entirety. This assessment further enhances the theory building concerning bottom-up leadership. This assessment also clarifies issues that are relevant for a deployment of the BUCIL model in an empirical analysis.

In order to identify relevant discussion points, I reflect on the structure of my theory building strategy as well as one the discussions above. First of all, in my theory building I have used concepts that obviously have divergent theory of science positions. This theory building strategy leaves open issues of the prescriptive/descriptive character of the model, the status of the concepts, as well as theory of science position. Second of all, I have in my theory building drawn on literature that is not explicitly developed within a public sector context. Thirdly, I have drawn on literature that is located within different research fields, having the rather obvious implication that it has been outside the boundaries of this thesis to describe a state of the art of all these research fields.

As a result of these theory building implications, I discuss four points:

1. Is the proposed model a prescriptive or descriptive model?
2. Does the model neglect a vital distinction between managerial and political leadership?
3. Does the theory section neglect important strands of state of the art literature related to each of the concepts of the BUCIL model?
4. What are the requirements for a theory of science position and a specific analytical approach, if these should be compatible with the interactions of the BUCIL model?

### 2.5.1. IS THE PROPOSED MODEL A PRESCRIPTIVE OR DESCRIPTIVE MODEL?

The outset of the BUCIL model is that assumptions of leadership position when initiating collaborative innovation is somewhat neglected in the literature. As a consequence, related issues, such as power (the power to influence, the power to frame a problem), and uncertainty (process uncertainty, collaborative uncertainty), only play an implicit role in the collaborative innovation literature reviewed.

This generates confusion about the epistemological status of the model that I propose, a confusion that I also detect when reading through frameworks produced by other scholars of collaborative innovation leadership (Hartley, 2005; Moore & Hartley, 2008; Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2013): are the models prescriptive, i.e. are the models ‘how-to-do-it’-leadership-models? Or is it descriptive perspectives describing what is really (supposed) to be happening in collaborative innovations, in order for those processes to be *regarded* as collaborative innovations? Are they both? This is not at all clear in the collaborative innovation literature. For instance, (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) call their article ‘Enhancing collaborative innovation in the public sector’. Accordingly, the authors argue that an ideal scenario and agenda is indeed possible for collaborative innovation in the public sector. This is a seminal, and valuable, contribution in itself in order to highlight how collaboration in a certain form really can generate innovation and enhancing all phases of the innovation. However, the authors also state that the framework developed is an analytical model. Torfing (2013) implicitly seems to suggest that the role of power, and the epistemological status of the model, is left for empirical researchers to define; for as Torfing suggests, applying different sorts of traditions within network governance as the epistemological backcloth will provide different answers to the leadership status of the meta-governor, hence also to how to think of issues proposed in the model proposed by Sørensen & Torfing (2011), concerning the interplay between, for instance, discourse and empowerment, as suggested by the authors.

So, this multitude of interpretive possibilities of existing leadership frameworks makes it somewhat confusing for empirical researchers whether to think of these models as (i) descriptive models of what actually happens in collaborative innovation (ii) prescriptive models of what should be happening in collaborative innovation in so far stakeholders want to enhance the value of all innovation phases, or (iii) defining models in so far as the concepts of the models define what empirical phenomena that should be regarded as collaborative innovations. As a result, the epistemological status of the concepts in these models is somewhat unclear.

In order to counter this potential confusion of also the BUCIL model I first of all define bottom-up leadership in a descriptive way, and I suggest in Chapter 3 an

analytical approach that clarifies the epistemological status of the elements in the model.

Accordingly, the BUCIL model is not in its outset intended as a ‘this is how to do it’-leadership model, but a model that only wants to *explain* how bottom-up leadership is constructed. I believe that this is fairly consistent with much of the theory underpinning the model, in that all theory adopted points to how leadership necessarily is constructed through struggles of meaning, conflict and power, and how the ideas, boundaries and framing of innovation project and leadership is a constant source of negotiation and strife. Accordingly the BUCIL model in its basic state does not suggest what bottom-up leadership should do in order to get recognised, it only provides a framework for *enabling* explanations of how leadership is recognised. How such a recognition comes about is knowledge that is intentionally located in a black box-territory left to be discovered only by empirical analysis.

However, this does not entail that the model cannot be used to produce knowledge of a prescriptive kind, because it is possible that empirical researchers may want to limit themselves to investigating only part of the model. This would require an explicit re-interpretation and accentuation of the prescriptive dimensions of the literature applied, for instance:

- literature about how public entrepreneurship should be mobilised in order to be most efficient in terms of skills, team composition, etc.
- what makes a manipulation of sense-making most efficient
- how wicked problem uncertainty is best overcome through certain facilitated processes or tactics

In this re-interpretation, researchers should keep in mind, however, the entire uncertainty-related, constructionist perspective of the model: That neither leadership, nor collaborators, are mastermind rational actors with full information. Rather, they are involved in an innovation process of truly becoming, in which social objects are made sensible in which leadership and collaborative identities are constructed in the process, within always specific and idiosyncratic organisations, accordingly defying any notion of master-mind manipulation. For it is exactly this process-ambivalence that enables, and forces, bottom-up leadership to walk the line between the extremes of uncertainty and stabilisation in a flexible manner.

### **2.5.2. DOES THE MODEL NEGLECT A VITAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANAGERIAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP?**

One could criticize the model for drawing too much on management theory, consequently not acknowledging political leadership.

The first response to this critique would be that I have adapted the theoretical framework to a political, public sector dimension by drawing on empirical and theoretical conceptions from studies of public sector innovation and network management. Accordingly, within the ‘collaborative innovation in the public sector’- leadership literature, I have detected some theoretical lacunae for development, in which I have argued that the analytical model has a strength.

Accordingly, the model guides our attention to other aspects of leadership than visible, already established leaderships, such as bureaucratic and political leadership. By doing so, the model of BUCIL can be used as a research tool for analysing how bottom-up leadership is influencing political leadership, and what the long term consequences are for innovation projects that has such a trajectory, including the interplay between these two kinds of leaderships. Obviously, such a research agenda is important due to the on-going debate, at least in Denmark, concerning the power balances and interactions between public sector administrations and political leadership. Hence, the BUCIL model can also be used critically in order to examine what happens when public sector officials are taking on the role as policy developers, how they try to influence politicians, and how politicians can critically engage with such attempts of bottom-up influence in terms of addressing a wicked problem.

Second, the theoretical framework is a framework that is based on Borins’ empirical descriptions of public sector leadership. Theorising these descriptions by means of managerial theory does not make the causal dynamics of the model implausible in a public sector context. In fact, the opposite is the case: the model exactly describes how public sector officials come up with new solutions to wicked problems before they become a political contentious issue. In this respect, bottom-up leadership is part of the political leadership ‘food-chain’, in that employees in public sector administrations usually are highly engaged in qualifying and stimulating policy by pointing to problems in the public service delivery. In this respect, the BUCIL model describes what is going on in public agencies when it comes to policy processes in the phase just *before* the political level is involved.

Thirdly, the model is not supposed to be an overarching research approach for public leadership of collaborative innovations in itself, such as (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) – the BUCIL model definitely is adapted to, and consciously limited to, a specific

type of collaborative innovation, in which leadership has to be built in order to allow for a profession based innovation project to reach a scope of collaborative dimensions. After this, the project has to acquire a more regular status, by being championed by powerful stakeholders, albeit possibly with still a driving responsibility of bottom-up leadership. Hence, I assume that after this phase of initiating and driving such a collaborative innovation process, other types of leadership will take over, either supplementing, terminating or simply colonising the project.

Consequently, an important future research agenda would be to investigate the *interactions* between different types of public leaderships: What happens when, for instance, bureaucratic leadership or network governance related leadership approaches or political leadership takes over, or when the project acquires a more regular character? How do these formal, more powerful, leaderships deal with bottom-up leadership and the bottom-up driven innovation project?

Altogether, what this discussion has revealed is that it is an open question *whether* decision makers are able to take over and champion such a project, *how* they do it, and *how* bottom-up leadership constructed can co-exist or converge with more bureaucratic leadership structures, since it presumably will generate some adjustments having both a formal leadership and an informal leadership within the same organisation.

In relation to this interplay between formal and informal leaderships and the relation to entrepreneurship, Borins notes in his article “Loose Cannons and Rule Breakers, or Enterprising Leaders? Some Evidence About Innovative Public Managers”(Borins, 2000), that sometimes public innovators are perceived of as being part of a New Public Management regime, accordingly by critical researchers perceived of as people “*prone to rule breaking, self-promotion, and unwarranted risk taking*” (p. 498). Arguably I assume that researchers’ criticism of public innovators points to potential *empirical* line of conflicts that are produced when someone gets success by using informal channels, as bottom-up leadership does. Presumably, these attempts of influence will meet resistance. So, it is of relevance to enable research into how such bottom-up projects are championed further on, and what the challenges are of such projects – whether the sector-based, narrow point of origin haunts bottom-up collaborative innovations continuously, or whether ownership can be distributed, and how politicians can respond and utilise such specialised projects.

The final answer to this discussion point is that the BUCIL model, by drawing on Koppenjan & Klijn’s (2004) concepts of uncertainty, also allows for an analysis of strategic conflicts; of how bottom-up leadership navigates in such a strategic and political landscape. As such, a political environment is actually assumed in the

model, as bottom-up leadership has to adapt the innovation project to existing policies, and to adapt the project to the political and strategic reality of the innovation process.

### **2.5.3. DOES THE THEORY SECTION NEGLECT IMPORTANT STRANDS OF LITERATURE RELATED TO EACH OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE BUCIL MODEL?**

The theory building strategy in this thesis has been to identify gaps in the literature of collaborative innovation leadership and address those weaknesses by producing an analytical framework for bottom-up leadership, a framework that may also stimulate alternative approaches for conceptualising collaborative innovation leadership. Accordingly, the objective has been to make a theoretical model in which the causal linkages are clear and plausible, and which is able to answer as many of the identified design demands and theoretical lacunae as possible, hence making it possible for myself and other researchers to deploy the model in an empirical investigation. This has been achieved.

Accordingly, it has not been the objective of this thesis to make a full literature review of all the theoretical fields mentioned here. The solution instead has been first of all to import highly acknowledged, seminal academic research as emblems for each theoretical concept. This theory building strategy does not make the causality of the BUCIL model fragile. Instead this seminal research will have elements that state-of-the-art literature will have to relate to and build on, accordingly providing the BUCIL model with a solid carcass that can be given more muscle and flesh in specific, empirical analyses.

Further, each of these concepts have been re-interpreted within the causality of the BUCIL model, which has been made possible since much of the applied, seminal literature touches on a number of the issues and causalities also addressed in the BUCIL model - but this literature does so in a way that is not tailored to a collaborative, innovative, process, in which leadership is placed at the centre of the stage. So, the BUCIL model selects and enhances some of the causal linkages. For instance, Weick's concept of sense making is an approach that has a keen eye for identity, the construction of social objects and ambiguity. However, the approach does not necessarily address an innovation context, or how leadership is made in uncertain environments, nor does it situate sensemaking within a collaborative context. Or another example: complex responsive processes theory does explain identity, leadership and uncertainty, but seems to presume a single-organisational environment, in which leadership accordingly is able facilitate organisational conversations of a higher quality, and, by implication, seems also to assume, that

leadership is located in *a* leader, accordingly not working on the level of how leadership in a collaborative configuration is always also an *actor*, that is, being perceived of, and positioned as, a part of an organisation that has to provide mandates for projects. Further, complex responsive processes theory does not work with a bottom-up leadership perspective. And a last example: Relational Leadership Theory approaches leadership in a social constructionist, emergent perspective, but does not situate and specify the approach within a collaborative context, and does not specify, what a context of radical change processes such as innovation has of implications for how a relational leadership emerges.

Accordingly, as my presentation and discussion of each analytical concept has illustrated, each concept is imported exactly because they explain a causal link between two concepts.

The causalities of the BUCIL model are furthermore made plausible by being based on a literature review that points to design demands (section 2.2). And further, BUCIL is based not only on logical deduction and discussions between different theories, but also on Borins' well-acknowledged, quantitative and qualitative analysis of more than hundred American, public sector innovation projects, a large part of those 'holistic'.

Second, importing seminal research allows for more detailed literature reviews when deploying the model in specific analyses. For instance, in the discussion sections above, I have exemplified for each analytical concept how specific elements of the model can be explored by just focusing on the linkage between two concepts. If, for instance, a piece of research would investigate what conditions of uncertainty that facilitates the most entrepreneurial activity in relation to wicked problems, one would have to go deeper into literature of entrepreneurship and uncertainty. This would be a valuable contribution to the study of bottom-up leadership in for instance municipalities, in that such a study would highlight how to spur as much bottom-up leadership as possible, providing CEOs and politicians with knowledge about how to provide organisational structures that spur innovative projects. Or the linkage between leadership recognition and the specific tools which bottom-up leadership deploys for giving sense could be investigated, requiring literature reviews that in more detail describe what rhetorical devices, means of communication, and analytical tools etc. that public officials use in order to identify, influence and interact with key stakeholders.

Finally, I have in this thesis deployed an engaged scholarship approach, which is abductive in the sense that my field work has informed my choice of theory. By having two embedded cases in my research design in a single case study, one of those a pilot case, I have ensured that the challenges of practice have informed choices concerning theory building. I explain these issues in Chapter 4. Methods.



#### **2.5.4. WHAT ARE THE DEMANDS FOR AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH COMPATIBLE WITH THE BUCIL MODEL?**

In the theoretical framework above I draw on literature that has different theory of science positions. A relevant critique to such an eclectic theory building approach is what theory of science position in which to locate the model, because this location influences how the research object should be conceptualised, hence what specific analytical approach to apply. For instance, is 'leadership recognition' an 'identity', as Weick would perceive it, or a position in a discourse, as Relational Leadership Theory perhaps would suggest? Or how to perceive of organisational and interorganisational, informal leadership structures – are they thematic 'patterns of interaction', as complex responsive processes suggests, or some sort of emerging, conflict-generating 'institutional logic' (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012)? And what exactly is profession based, public entrepreneurship – a kind of action? And on what level is that action to be located, and what is actually meant by such an action, i.e. is it to be regarded as communication, or interaction?

Obviously, there is no single answer to this question, since this to some degree is left open for empirical researchers. I do, however, suggest in Chapter 3 to deploy a discourse analytical approach that allows for strategic action on the micro level, and that also allows analyses of how such a collaborative innovation process can develop into processes of discourse embeddedness and institutionalization. I argue that this type of discourse analysis is suitable for analysing the phenomenon of leadership emergence understood as a legitimate basis for initiating and sustaining intentional sensemaking processes, with the aim of ensuring that the lead agency's entrepreneurial solution to a wicked problem is implemented and possibly institutionalized.

That being said, for other researchers much depends on:

- whether to use all the concepts of the BUCIL model in an analysis
- whether a researcher wants to focus on only a specific part of the model
- What part of the model to focus on

No matter what approach taken, it is important to keep an eye on the following characteristics of the BUCIL model. BUCIL draws attention to how a leadership unit can increase the scope of a change process. In this change process, leadership is constructed in conflictual, power-ridden interactions. The selection premises for an analytical approach and a theory of science approach must have a theoretical approach to the structure-agency dilemma. Based on the previous sections in this

chapter, I argue that the following list of recommendations for analytical approaches should be kept in mind:

- Agency: a lead actor is driving the change, expanding its power base, generating conflicts
- Interaction: a lead actor is engaged in numerous conversations at the micro-level and generates new meaning through conversations, texts, and alliances, thus introducing new ways of perceiving problems and solution
- Epistemology: an approach which is constructivist regarding epistemology, i.e. explains social reality as a feature constructed in social interactions
- Innovation diffusion: Allowing for an explanation of an altered institutional framework related to how a lead actor changes the framing conditions for working with a wicked problem.
- Strategy: an approach that deals with, or at least takes into account, intentional, strategic action in a political and strategic environment
- Increasing platform of influence: an approach which perceives influence processes to be originating from micro-interactions in a local setting

Following the conclusion in the next section I go more in depth with the analytical approach adopted in this thesis, an approach which takes into account the above recommendations.

## **2.6 CONCLUSION**

In this chapter I have contributed to the research field of leadership for collaborative innovation. I have done so by providing a theoretical answer to how new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems in today's welfare societies through innovation. I have done so by pursuing a theory building strategy that has had the dual objective of producing an independent theoretical contribution and to make clear how such a theoretical contribution can be clarified as much as possible in order to allow for empirical analyses.

The theory building strategy has enabled me to identify and answer the following theoretical question: How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems?

The theory building strategy has consisted of the following steps.

First, based on a literature review of the emerging research field of collaborative innovation, I argue that the main theoretical challenge that drives theory development in this field is: to be able to conceptualise how to strike a balance between stabilising the collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and destabilising parts of the collaborative configuration, on the other hand, in order to allow for an utilisation of uncertainty. Accordingly, conceptions of leadership have to pay attention to this fundamental, conceptual challenge. This literature review of collaborative innovation furthermore identified recommendations for future research, recommendations that new conceptualisations should pay attention to in order to contribute to the field of collaborative innovation.

Second, my theory building strategy has been to review and discuss conceptions of leadership for collaborative innovation. The overall conclusion of this review is that the present leadership conceptions are undifferentiated. In order to allow for leadership differentiation, I discuss four points that has allowed me to produce a set of recommendations guiding my theory building.

Next, I interpret Sandford Borins' notion of bottom-up innovation leadership, arguing that this notion has some intriguing aspects that stimulate a theory building that satisfies the theory building recommendations that I have found.

As a result of identified weaknesses in Borins' concept of leadership, I find that the following six analytical concepts can be used to analyse how bottom-up leadership is exercised in a collaborative configuration that seeks to deal with a wicked problem through innovation:

- Process- and end-point uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999) and wicked problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)
- The social construction of leadership, conceptualized as leadership emergence through the concept of 'recognition' (Griffin, 2002)
- Public Entrepreneurship (Klein, 2010)
- Sensemaking (Weick, 1995)
- Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991)
- Leadership distribution

The next step of theory building was to construct a rather simple analytical model that allows for the analysis of a very complex organisational phenomenon: bottom-up leadership, constructed in collaborative innovation processes, with the aim of developing a new way of dealing with a wicked problem, involving phenomena of uncertainty, emergence, conflict and making and giving sense. Since many of these organisational phenomena occurs simultaneously, I have found it relevant to disentangle these phenomena causally in order to allow myself and others to make an analysis in which each phenomenon can be causally put in relation to bottom-up

leadership and the innovation of a wicked problem through collaborative innovation. Hence, this causally disentanglement also allows for future analyses of bottom-up leadership in which narrow analyses can be made by focusing only on a single causality in the analytical model, that I call 'BUCIL' (an abbreviation of 'Bottom-Up Collaborative Innovation Leadership').

Based on the causality of the BUCIL model I define bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership as an 1) intentional process aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas in a specific context 2) initiated at the bottom of a public sector organisation requiring that the 3) lead unit responsible is able to gain influence through leadership recognition, which is conditioned by 4) utilisation of uncertainty through skills of public entrepreneurship, sensemaking and giving sense

The next step in theory building was to explain and discuss critically the proposed concepts as well as the model, thereby qualifying further aspects of theory building and the interaction of the concepts in relation to the BUCIL model. The previous steps in the theory building strategy enabled me to identify a number of discussion points useful for enhancing the theoretical framework. The discussion related to both concepts and the BUCIL model in its entirety produced several findings. Some of the most important are as follows.

Concerning *uncertainty*, the discussion revealed that uncertainty for bottom-up leadership is not an organisational phenomenon already there to begin with, but it is something that emerges, collapses, are being expanded, perhaps enacted strategically in the process, and is being sought managed and utilised by bottom-up leadership. Bottom-up leadership deals with uncertainty by a piecemeal form of sensemaking, utilising uncertainties in numerous interactions to influence stakeholders, thereby slowly building up momentum and increasing the scope of the project on a running basis. Hence, it is bottom-up leadership that produces and strives to enact a certain perspective on reality that enables a wicked problem to emerge *as* a wicked problem. It seems likely that fragmented dissatisfaction of public agencies or stakeholders with contact to a wicked problem field will provide the seedbed for bottom-up leadership from which to launch a holistic critique of status quo.

Concerning the *interplay of uncertainty*, the discussion revealed that one or more of the uncertainties that Koppenjan & Klijn mention in relation to wicked problems must be present in order to enable an emergent leadership to be recognised by collaborators. Further, this explorative discussion has stimulated to reveal some limitations of the BUCIL model that also stem from the research field of collaborative innovation: that a more thorough discussion is required within the research field of collaborative innovation in the public sector concerning the different aspects of uncertainty. Hence, the discussion identified an agenda for future

research in relation to bottom-up leadership but also to leadership of collaborative innovation in general.

Concerning *leadership emergence*, the complex responsive process theory perspective on leadership emergence ((Griffin, 2002; Stacey, 2007) in combination with Relational Leadership Theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006) provide us with a perspective on leadership that focuses not on individual traits, but on the ways in which collectives are moved in a certain direction through the social construction of leadership roles in a context of radical uncertainty related to organisational change. The discussion furthermore highlighted the relevance of the suggested theory in order to overcome a structure-agency dilemma generated when explaining how leadership in the making can exercise influence. Hence, bottom-up leadership and collaborative innovation processes are intertwined processes: They are agency and structure initiated simultaneously when bottom-up leadership begins communicating a critique of an existing performance gap and a perceived solution.

Furthermore, the BUCIL model emphasizes an identifiable agency in terms of a bottom-up unit, composed of professional, specialized individuals, that accordingly is forced all of them to transform their identity when emerging as a collaborative leadership. Accordingly, leadership is something which is tied to a bottom-up position and the actions taken: It is bottom-up leadership that interprets and constructs the 'system' in which collaborators should interact, not the other way around, as Relational Leadership Theory might seem to suggest.

Further, this discussion emphasized that despite the fact that the BUCIL model provides a leadership conception that both defines and narrows down leadership, it is deliberately left open what the relation is between the proposed social order (i.e. the innovation project) and how bottom-up leadership defines its role in *relation* to this new proposed social order.

Concerning *public entrepreneurship*, the discussion revealed several advantages by separating entrepreneurship and leadership, even though these aspects are located within the same bottom-up leadership. Adopting public entrepreneurship allows for an explanation of how bottom-up leadership do this: Leadership has insight in a public performance gap, is willing to address this performance gap by seeking out, even enacting, uncertain environments strategically, in order to generate the possibilities for strategic influence. BUCIL accordingly explains how bottom-up leadership expands its platform of influence by gradually improving and developing the innovation project. So, the relationship between entrepreneurship and leadership is necessary, but in no way clear cut. The intention with the separation of leadership and entrepreneurship is that it allows for a more detailed analysis of the various forms of interplay between entrepreneurship and leadership: How a specific innovation project, conceptualised within a certain professional insight, calls for

different, compatible leaderships, that consequently will have their own paths of leadership recognition, conditioned as they are by both innovation project and leadership choices taken.

Accordingly, entrepreneurship is a platform for bottom-up leadership that *moves* and *is forced to move* when new substantive, institutional or strategic uncertainties are faced, and when things in the innovation project do not work out as they were planned to. This moving platform makes both project and leadership flexible, but at a cost. When changes are made in the innovation project, or when unexpected challenges cannot be solved, the leadership risks losing credibility. So, on the basis of the above discussions, I define public, profession based entrepreneurship as a function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) acts proactively in environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already existing resources, 4) in order for them to be deployed for a perceived better performance on public objectives.

Concerning the relationship between making and giving sense I find that that making and giving sense could be in play simultaneously. This simultaneousness is perhaps more dominant in bottom-up leadership than in Gioia & Chittipeddi's study of an explicit top-down leadership, because bottom-up leadership has no authority to command in the first place, and definitely not to collaborators. This consequently does not provide bottom-up leadership with the luxury to first make sense, and then give sense, in an orderly, designed fashion. Influence has to be exercised on a constant basis. This simultaneousness is also what allows new sense to be made during conflicts. In relation to these discussion points I assume that bottom-up leadership has, due to its professional specialization and its entrepreneurship, a head start for influencing collaborator's sensemaking, in that bottom-up leadership's context has already been interpreted and made sensible and enacted by bottom-up leadership. This is in contrast to collaborators, in which the challenge of making sense of 'the game' may have just begun.

Concerning *leadership distribution* I exemplify that the importance of leadership distribution in relation to a research agenda for bottom-up leadership is that the aftermath of bottom-up leadership is crucial, and especially so when it comes to proposing new solutions to wicked problems, since arguably solutions to these wicked problems could be difficult to sustain. The function in the BUCIL model of leadership distribution is to enable an analysis of what the implications of a specific leadership recognition is, and to emphasize that bottom-up leadership is a distinct type of leadership which is identifiable exactly because it is forced to operate from an informal power position, and because the main purpose of bottom-up leadership is to establish alliances with 'the top' of its own organizations, preferably also the collaborating organisations. Leadership distribution draws our attention to the fact that bottom-up leadership is a leadership type with a certain duration. Concerning

the output-category status of leadership distribution, I exemplify the importance of the concept by illustrating some output scenarios that illustrate that each of these innovation ‘sustaining’ and ‘diffusion’ scenarios will be a path-dependent consequence of how bottom-up leadership and innovation project are perceived by collaborators, and to which degree bottom-up leadership has managed to display the collaborative value of the innovation project, hence distribute leadership.

As a consequence of my theory building strategy, I identify four discussion points, based on the fact that my theory building have used concepts which have divergent theory of science positions, leaving open issues of the prescriptive/descriptive character of the model as well as theory of science position. Second, I have in my theory building drawn on literature that is not explicitly developed within a public sector context and I have drawn on literature that are located within different research fields, having the implication that it has been outside the boundaries of this thesis to make a state-of-the-art literature review of all these research fields.

My discussion of these points reveals that the BUCIL model is a descriptive model, thereby clarifying an unclear epistemological status which I find also surrounds existing concepts of leadership for collaborative innovation. This descriptive status is consistent with much of the theory underpinning the model. The BUCIL model in its basic state does not suggest what bottom-up leadership should do in order to get recognised, it only provides a framework for *enabling* explanations of how leadership is recognised.

My overall discussion also reveals that the BUCIL model does not neglect a vital distinction between managerial and political leadership, since (i) the theoretical framework is actually adapted to a political, public sector dimension by drawing on empirical and theoretical conceptions from studies of public sector innovation and network management, (ii) the theoretical framework is a framework that is based on Borins’ empirical descriptions of public sector leadership, (iii) the model is explicitly limited to a specific type of collaborative innovation, in which leadership has to be built in order to allow for a profession based innovation project to reach a scope of collaborative dimensions. After this, the project has to acquire a more regular status, by being championed by powerful stakeholders, albeit possibly with still a driving responsibility of bottom-up leadership. So, this discussion point furthermore points to the attention of a research agenda concerning how bottom-up leadership interacts with other public sector leaderships: What this discussion has revealed is that it is an open question *whether* decision makers are able to take over and champion such a project, *how* they do it, and *how* bottom-up leadership constructed can co-exist or converge with more bureaucratic leadership structures, since it presumably will generate some adjustments having both a formal leadership and an informal leadership within the same organisation. So, it is of relevance to enable research into how such bottom-up projects are championed further on, and

what the challenges are of such projects – whether the sector-based, narrow point of origin haunts bottom-up collaborative innovations continuously, or whether ownership can be distributed, and how politicians can respond and utilise such specialised projects.

In conclusion, I contribute to the differentiation of leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation by first of all theorising a new type of leadership, and second, by highlighting the uncertainty-related aspects of collaborative innovation leadership not addressed in the literature so far, in terms of the social construction of leadership and the way that the conceptual balance between stabilisation and the utilisation of uncertainty is conceptualised in another way. For bottom-up leadership, stabilisation is ensured by making and giving sense to collaborators, thereby utilising uncertainty. Stabilisation is furthermore ensured by having a highly adaptive leadership that through iterative social constructions adapts to a collaborative, political, public sector context, in which uncertainty generates conflicts and demands for answers.



# CHAPTER 3.

## ANALYTICAL APPROACH

In this thesis, I investigate how new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems in today's welfare societies through innovation. In the chapter above I have pursued this agenda by means of a research strategy that has enabled me to identify and answer the research question of how to theorise bottom-up leadership addressing wicked problems by means of collaborative innovation. Accordingly, I have contributed theoretically to the research agenda of leadership for collaborative innovation by developing an analytical model that enables researchers to identify and investigate aspects of this new form of public leadership. I have furthermore in detail explained and discussed causal aspects of the leadership model that I have developed (the 'BUCIL' model) in order to enable an empirical research agenda for bottom-up leadership.

In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I further pursue the empirical agenda concerning how new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems. I do so by answering the following question:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

This question is a direct implication of the research framework developed above. In the theory chapter above I have argued that researchers can apply the BUCIL model in two different ways. The first option is to focus on selected elements of the model. The second option is to focus on the model in its entirety. In this thesis I pursue the second option.

First of all, as touched on in section 2.5.3, I have in this thesis explicitly an 'Engaged Scholarship'-approach (see section 4.6). This means that my analytical approach has been abductive in the sense that my theory building has been informed by my field work and vice versa. Consequently, the concepts of the BUCIL model have informed my data collection and my observations, which also means that I have data on most of the concepts. The only concept which I do not use as part of my analysis is leadership distribution. This is due to the fact that my case study for natural reasons had to come to an end after three years, with the consequence that I do not have sufficient data to make an analysis concerning the causality between bottom-up leadership and the long-term implications of leadership distribution.

The second reason is that since I argue for the necessity and relevance of a new analytical framework, testing the framework as much as possible seems to me appropriate in order to provide other researchers the possibilities to further criticize or develop the BUCIL model in light of the analyses of this thesis (Chapter 6 and 7).

In this chapter I first explain how I deploy analytical tools that are in alignment with the methodological implications of the BUCIL model. I do so by outlining a discourse analytical approach. Next, I operationalize the BUCIL model.

### **3.1 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY: DEPLOYMENT OF THE BUCIL MODEL BY MEANS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

In this section I explain the first step towards an operationalization of the BUCIL model. Arguably, the theory of science status of each concept in the BUCIL model will change according to which analytical approach to adopt.

Accordingly, in this section I argue that a discourse approach both defines the theory of science position of the BUCIL model, as well as provides me with tools for operationalising the BUCIL model. I do so by briefly outlining central aspects of the deployed discourse approach. Next, I synthesise discourse approach and BUCIL model.

#### **3.1.1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: ACTION, TEXTUAL PRODUCTION, INSTITUTIONALISATION**

The research of Cynthia Hardy and Nelson Phillips (Grant, 2004; Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 1998; Hardy, 2001; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Hardy & Thomas, 2012; Phillips & Hardy, 2002a; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004) is suited for conducting an organisational discourse analysis that allows for intentional, strategic action with the aim of exercising influence. In several publications, the authors discuss the relationship of the organisational ‘food chain’ between action, producing ‘text’ (symbolic products such as conversations and written material), discourse production and the linkages to institutionalisation (Phillips *et al.*, 2004). Altogether, the work of Cynthia Hardy and Nelson Phillips provide a framework for doing discourse analysis focused on the micro-levels of organisations and on the details in the local situational context, an approach endorsed and exemplified by Alvesson & Kärreman (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000).

First, a definition and delineation of the term discourse. I adopt the definition of discourse developed by Grant & Hardy, who define organisational discourse as “*the struggles for meaning that occur in organisations*” (Grant & Hardy, 2004: p. 5), understood as “*an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production,*

*dissemination and reception, that bring an object into being*" (Phillips & Hardy, 2002a).

I also use the categories developed by (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) in order to delineate the scope of my discourse analysis. The authors distinguish between two different approaches to discourse. Either as social text (the study of talk and written text in its 'social action context') vs. the study of social reality as discursively constructed. The former conception views discourse as a local achievement with no general content, whereas the latter sees discourse as having a more general content in which discourse is "*a general and prevalent system for the formation and articulation of ideas in a certain period*" (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). Alvesson & Karreman distinguish between micro-, meso-, grand- and mega-discourses, stratified horizontally across a determination-autonomy-spectrum. In grand/mega-discourses, discourse is assumed to have powerful constitutive powers, thus demonstrating a very deterministic view of agency as reduced to subject positions made available by discourse.

In this study, the focus is on the micro-level. Alvesson & Karreman's arguments concerning the degree of agency determination ascribed to discourse are therefore relevant. The authors argue that it is important to make clear the degree to which discourse determines meaning: Whether they are overlapping, coupled or uncoupled. The discourse perspective of Cynthia Hardy and Nelson Phillips is placed somewhere in the middle, in that the formation of discourse is applied in a strategic organisational context (Phillips *et al.*, 2004). Therefore, discourse formation will always be strategically contested and will consequently reduce the determinism of agency.

In this respect, this study is in line with Alvesson & Karreman's recommendations. As Alvesson & Karreman conclude, they have "*expressed some sympathy for reducing the range in the study of discourses, thus being more attentive to the local social context of language use in organisations...We thus want to highlight problems with the tendency to work with a too grandiose and too muscular view on discourse*" (p. 1145). Consequently when I use the term discourse, the range of the discourse is local, limited to the organisations involved in the collaborative innovation project.

Second, how can we deploy organisational discourse? (Phillips & Hardy, 2002a) have written a small handbook on the investigation of processes of social construction by means of discourse analysis. This handbook provides me with the main tools for conducting discourse analysis, supplemented with other publications that elaborate on this perspective (Hardy *et al.*, 1998; Hardy, 2001; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Hardy & Thomas, 2012; Phillips *et al.*, 2004). (Phillips & Hardy, 2002a) define discourse as "*an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their*

*production, dissemination and reception that brings an object into being*” (p. 3). Discourses are embodied and enacted in a variety of texts, and may take a variety of forms: written texts, spoken words, pictures, symbols, artefacts etc. Discourse analysis is interested in ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse in the study of texts; discourses are shared and social, emanating from interactions between social groups and complex societal structures (p. 4). Discursive activity always arises in a specific context. Thus, according to Phillips & Hardy, when conducting discourse analysis, we need to study the interplay between text, discourse, and context.


Discourse analysis is a methodology that explores how socially produced ideas and objects are created through the study of ways in which language constructs phenomena. According to Phillips & Hardy discourse analysis is constitutive of the social world. (p. 6). Discourse analysis thus commits itself to a strong social constructivist view. Discourse analysis is also a reflexive research practice, in that the processes of social construction also apply to the work of research. Consequently, discourse analysis is attuned to the co-construction of the theoretical categories applied in research.

In the next section I further elaborate on discourse analysis by synthesising the approach with the BUCIL model.

### **3.2 SYNTHESISING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND BUCIL**

Discourse analysis is deployed in several ways in the analyses in chapter 5 and 6. In each analysis, Figure 4 is used to guide the operationalization. The synthesis of key concepts in the BUCIL model and a discourse analytical approach implicates that each key concept is interpreted within a discourse analytical paradigm, but also the other way around: discourse is interpreted by means of BUCIL. Consequently, both analyses draw upon the specific social constructive perspective that discourse analysis constitutes. I will explain what I mean by this statement below.

**FIGURE 4: ANALYTICAL STRATEGY WHEN APPLYING THE BUCIL MODEL**



What the figure essentially describes is that entrepreneurship can be understood as a type of action that has the discursive function to make new combinations in order to produce discursive texts (presentations, talk, communication, minutes, strategy papers, etc.). This discursive text is what calls for, and allows, for a new subject position to be created, that of the collaborative innovation leader. This innovation leader has, in order to enable the introduced discourse to have organisational implications, to transform the discursive concepts and texts into social objects in the organisation (a new commission for a policy, a new strategy, new organisational structure, new service, new practice etc.). Leadership does so by making and giving sense in order to win the organisational struggles for meaning. If successful, these social objects result in a process in which the introduced discourse (the innovation project and its implementation results) is being embedded in the existing discourses in the organisations. In a long term perspective, this discursive embeddedness could result in a process of institutionalisation, as suggested by (Phillips *et al.*, 2004).

Remember that this analytical structure is an iterative, causal structure, *not* a linear structure: uncertainty, entrepreneurship, leadership construction and making and giving sense should be understood as organisational phenomena that are present simultaneously, go through iterative stages and presupposes each other. Obviously, such organisational phenomena are difficult to operationalize.

The strategy taken in this thesis is selecting two embedded cases that I analyse according to the following structure in the analyses:

- Analysis of uncertainty on four dimensions:
  1. Substantive uncertainty
  2. Institutional uncertainty
  3. Strategic uncertainty
  4. Innovation uncertainty
- Analysis of entrepreneurship
- Analysis of leadership:
  1. Leadership conflicts
  2. Sources of leadership legitimacy
  3. Leadership identity
- Analysis of making and giving sense

Hence, each embedded case is fixed in time, and is being analysed from the perspectives of each category.

Below, I display how the BUCIL model itself can be interpreted within the discourse analytical approach presented and how this interpretation can be regarded as a synthesis.

### *BUCIL and discourse analysis*

As I have explained and discussed in Chapter 2, the BUCIL model is tailored to study emergent phenomena in organisations: emergent social orders (i.e. innovations) and emergent identities (i.e. leadership). BUCIL further is focused on how new things are made sensible, i.e. acts of social construction, and how these processes of sensemaking are being used strategically to influence collaborators, i.e. giving sense. BUCIL is furthermore focused on action, focusing on how structure and agency are being produced and enacted simultaneously.

In section 3 above I have explained key elements in a specific type of organisational discourse analysis. This type of organisational discourse analysis emphasises several key issues that are central when applying this approach on empirical material. Concerning methodology, discourse analysis is focused on exploring how socially produced ideas and objects are created through the study of ways in which language constructs phenomena. This is in alignment with BUCIL. Further, the study of the

production of identity is central in discourse analysis (see below). This is also in alignment with BUCIL.

In addition, these social constructions in discourse analysis needs to be examined in order to relate them to the individual strategies of actors, an element which is in alignment with BUCIL, in that it is bottom-up leadership that acts strategically and intentionally. Furthermore, (Phillips *et al.*, 2004) combine the strategic agency with discourse, and explains how these micro-discursive actions can result in the embeddedness of a new discourse in the organisations, having institutional consequences. This aspect of 'from the-small-to-the-grand'-process of influence is fully in accordance with the perspective produced by BUCIL, in which bottom-up leadership seeks to distribute leadership by making decision makers embrace the innovation project as their own.

In conclusion, the discourse approach as explained above is compatible with the BUCIL model. But the discourse approach also enhances the explanatory power of BUCIL. First of all by demonstrating that the type of social order emergence as proposed by BUCIL is supported by organisational discourse approaches. Second of all by defining narrowly how to apply each of the BUCIL concepts on empirical material.

So, in my interpretation of Figure 4 we can reduce it to two elements:

1. a new social order, e.g. an organisational development process, strategy or project
2. An actor that exercises influence by introducing this new social order, making leadership a necessity.

I have suggested above that we understand this concept of leadership in terms of discourse: One or more actors introduce or coproduce a new discourse, by which a subject position as leader is expected and perceived.

Thus, a workable definition of leadership recognition is: leadership recognition in the context of collaboration is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and discourse cannot be ignored, but are reckoned with, perhaps appreciated, in the strategic power games within and between organisations.

Differences do, however, exist between the BUCIL model and the discourse analytical approach suggested. First of all, in (Phillips *et al.*, 2004), strategic action is emphasised on the expense of the emergent process perspective as proposed by BUCIL. The identity and subject position of the initiator of a micro-discourse is not in itself part of the analytical framework, neither do the model allow for more

iterative approaches to how the emergence of a micro-discourse has an iterative and re-defining character in a context of bottom-up led collaborative innovation,

As I have depicted in Figure 4, it is possible to understand entrepreneurship as a proactive kind of action that has as its discursive function to introduce new texts and concepts, being here informed by resistance to attempts of giving sense. The emergence of collaborative leadership is to be understood as an emerging subject position made possible by the new discourse introduced by entrepreneurship. Making and giving sense is to be understood as how bottom-up leadership seeks to transform concepts into social objects in the organisation, e.g. new organisational structures, strategy papers, policies, services, etc. Finally, the distribution of leadership is to be understood as the first step in the process towards how the social objects are elements in a process of institutionalization.

Below, I will discuss this synthesis in more depth. I do so by explaining each concept in the BUCIL model in relation to the function it takes in the synthesis with the proposed discourse approach.

#### *Discourse and uncertainty*

The synthesis of discourse analysis and uncertainty implies that uncertainty is interpreted as something that momentarily dissolves meaning. Consequently, the dominant struggles for meaning (i.e. the existing discourses) are being paused and re-interpreted, as people in organisations are forced to make sense of their environment. The implication is that it is possible for a new discourse to be introduced. A new discourse implies new power structures, new identities, new subject positions, and new social objects. The implication of this synthesis is that the operationalization of uncertainty focuses on demonstrating how uncertainty generates frustration and a search for answers for the people involved in the collaborative innovation processes.

#### *Discourse and entrepreneurship*

The synthesis of discourse analysis and entrepreneurship implies that public, profession based entrepreneurship is interpreted as a *specific* type of discursive action that could contribute to generating this new discourse in a condition of uncertainty. The work of (Phillips *et al.*, 2004) support this interpretation of discursive action related to sensemaking, stating that “*sensemaking is a linguistic process (...) that produce texts that leave traces. For example, innovators who*



*depart from prior practice intervene proactively in the organization to promulgate new explanations of social reality”* (p. 641). In my interpretation of entrepreneurship and discourse, the basis for being able to intervene proactively is having identified a performance gap, and providing a new solution to this performance gap by making new combinations between available organisational resources. By making new combinations, novel concepts are introduced. If these novel concepts produce a coherent text, one of the primary conditions for the production of a new discourse is fulfilled.

The implication of this synthesis for analysis is that my operationalization of entrepreneurship guides the analysis of collaborative innovation leadership by showing:

- a. how new combinations are produced by means of entrepreneurship
- b. how these new combinations make up a coherent text
- c. how this coherent text implies how specific leadership subject positions are produced
- d. how the inspiration for new combinations, or the refinement of an existing text, is a result of an on-going and iterative sensemaking process forced upon the emergent leadership unit, sometimes provoked by resistance and conflict towards the discourse and the leadership subject positioning.

I demonstrate this in the findings-tables in Figure 17 and Figure 22 by displaying what ‘key text’ that is introduced, what ‘social object’ that is constructed, and what ‘resistance’ or ‘acceptance’ this new text and leadership generates. I further demonstrate this in each analysis in the entrepreneurship section by making a table (Figure 18, Figure 23) that displays the textual combinations made by means of entrepreneurship.

In the analysis of entrepreneurship, I emphasize the element of discursive *action* by describing how bottom-up leadership acts proactively, carving out organisational niches of new sense, enacting a new organisational environment. The element of action is important to emphasize, since leadership emergence and the introduction of a new micro-discourse does not happen by chance or relies on structural, systemic necessities. Leadership and discourse is produced by the specific individuals who are part of the professional unit emerging as bottom-up leadership, and who has strategic intentions – they basically want their innovation project to be implemented in some version or the other. These individuals are acting and interacting on the basis of personal insights, qualifications, intentions and experience.

Proactivity is a further specific characteristic action element of entrepreneurship, allowing the leadership unit to navigate in a context of uncertainty, by utilising and creating windows of opportunities. As I demonstrate in especially analysis B, proactivity is used to reduce the resistance to the new collaborative innovation project (i.e. the discourse) by making alliances with powerful stakeholders and exploring the landscape of power, consequently adjusting the collaborative innovation project to the discursive context. As such, entrepreneurship interpreted by means of discourse analysis enables bottom-up leadership to produce a new discourse and contributes to embed the new micro-discourse in the existing fabric of organisational discourses.

### *Discourse and leadership*

The synthesis of leadership emergence and discourse analysis implies first of all a focus on conflicts, since these reflect struggles of power. When studying identity by means of discourse analysis, in this case leadership identity, research demonstrates that new identities can be developed in order to reconcile conflicts between identities related to different discourses (Phillips & Hardy, 2002b). These conflicts therefore have to be interpreted and made sense of by bottom-up leadership and collaborators. One response for bottom-up leadership could be to revise leadership identity in alignment with a new strategic positioning. Another response could be to alter elements in the micro-discourse that bottom-up leadership is trying to disseminate across organisations. Sometimes these two types of responses are connected. For instance, describing the main goal of a collaborative innovation project as ‘increased coordination’ (demonstrated in this thesis) in contrast to ‘facilitating cross-organisational service production’ (an example) would require another kind of leadership as well as another type of project. The first one would invoke a metaphor of someone trying to achieve a leadership position in which orchestrating the administrative actions of organisational partners is possible; whereas the second would invoke a metaphor of someone trying to achieve a leadership position in which nourishing and enhancing inter-organisational activity and interactions of de-central service-providers is possible. A third response could be to ignore conflicts, going around them by trying to influence more powerful stakeholders (also partially demonstrated in this thesis).

The synthesis of discourse and leadership also, however, implies an analytical attention towards legitimacy. As (Phillips *et al.*, 2004) note, actions that lead actors to gain legitimacy, maintain or repair legitimacy are likely to produce texts that leave trace. Gaining legitimacy for bottom-up leadership is vital, especially because this leadership bases its claim for change on a perceived performance-gap, i.e. an ‘organisational crisis’ (*ibid.*). If bottom-up leadership does

not succeed in gaining legitimacy for this agenda by means of presenting a convincing text, most likely the support for the project will be negligible. Analytical focus on legitimacy therefore contributes to explain what existing discursive building blocks that support the innovation project.

Another reason for why legitimacy is important for the analysis of bottom-up leadership and its struggle for recognition is to investigate whether or not the presence of uncertainty generates a demand for leadership. As the theory of complex responsive processes assumes (Griffin, 2002), when uncertainty is present, people are looking for something to provide a direction. Such a 'something' most likely will be leadership. This perspective on legitimacy, as something which organisational actors are actually willing to grant to someone who can produce a good-enough answer, supplements the discourse approach to legitimacy. It does by hypothesising that existing power structures will *demand* a new type of leadership in conditions of uncertainty, an uncertainty generated by both the innovation project and the wicked problem's impact on cross-organisational understandings of substantive, institutional and strategic issues. Accordingly, applying legitimacy to the analysis creates a balanced approach to leadership recognition in which not only conflicts drives the innovation project and leadership construction forward.

A final issue of the synthesis of discourse and leadership concerns identity. Related to my elaborations above concerning conflicts and sources of legitimacy, one could be given the impression that there exists a fairly obvious 1: 1 relationship between micro-discourse and leadership identity, and that, accordingly, it would be fairly obvious for bottom-up leadership to define its own position. That impression would be wrong. This thesis pursues a structure-agency relationship which is intimately related - but it is symbiotic in the sense that both social order (the innovation project) and subject position (bottom-up leadership) has its own dynamics and challenges. I have elaborated on this symbiotic relationship in section 2.4.4, arguing that the reason for separating entrepreneurship and leadership is to enable an analysis in which the profession-based, new combinations made by means of entrepreneurial action implicates challenges and possibilities for how bottom-up leadership interprets and makes sense of its leadership and consequently, how collaborators perceive of this leadership.

So, in the analyses in this thesis, conflicts and sources of legitimacy denote possible routes of navigation and positioning within a micro-discourse landscape that bottom-up leadership itself has generated. Because of this, different subject positions are available as options. The implication of this relationship is that a change in one of the discursive elements affects the other. For instance, if an unexpected event occurs, very plausible in innovations, the emergent leadership is forced to interpret this event, make sense of it, and perhaps revise its leadership position. I therefore hypothesize that a constant awareness concerning identity is paramount for bottom-

up leadership. Another example would be that bottom-up leadership repeatedly experience conflict and resistance. This inertia could likewise result in a reflection of own leadership role, perhaps leading to a redefinition of identity, and perhaps even a redefinition of the innovation project.

A multiple positioning landscape is also proposed in this thesis because bottom-up leadership is not an actor perceived of as an all-knowing and rational kind of leadership. Bottom-up leadership has to constantly interpret its surroundings and make sense of them. As such, interpretations could be wrong, for instance, about how willingly alliance partners are to defend the innovation project or its leadership. Furthermore, not all conflicts may even be detected by bottom-up leadership, vital information concerning important contemporary or future events could risk not be paid attention to by bottom-up leadership. Consequently, bottom-up leadership could risk aiming for a fatal leadership positioning or making fatal decisions concerning elements in the innovation project.

Finally, and related to the multiple positioning landscape, leadership identity and positioning options are not something which is easily obtained or easily abandoned. First of all, bottom-up leadership starts out the innovation process with not being a full-blown, collaborative innovation leadership. What this means is that the leadership perhaps haven't got sufficient resources (staff, training, equipment), a very likely problem given the fact that I hypothesize that the mandate for the innovation project is constantly up to negotiation (See theory chapter above). Consequently, bottom-up leadership may suddenly experience a huge organisational demand for answers and guidance, depleting its resources rapidly; or it may experience the opposite if the initial conditions generated by, or granted to, bottom-up leadership, were highly supportive of the innovation project. Second, bottom-up leadership may not have the experience of thinking of itself *as* a leadership. Remember that bottom-up leadership emerges on a basis of specialization, and, therefore perhaps accustomed to a single-organisational environment and/or uncontroversial operations. Being suddenly positioned centre stage in cross-organisational conflicts and communication may therefore be experienced as something of a shock and even a mystery, perhaps clouding the fact that what collaborators challenge are the leadership exercised and/or the way the innovation project is communicated.

#### *Discourse and making and giving sense*

The synthesis of discourse and sensemaking and sensegiving implies a focus on socially constructed objects. (Hardy & Phillips, 2004) define objects as follows:

*“Objects are part of the practical realm: they are partially ideal but have a material aspect. When a concept is used to make some aspect of material reality meaningful, an object is constituted” (ibid., p. 302)*

The way I deploy discourse analysis in relation to sensemaking and sensegiving is by demonstrating that sensemaking, understood as the specific part of a struggle for meaning, in which individuals are ascribing meaning to what is going on around them, and to what other actors are doing and thinking. Sensegiving, on the other hand, has an intentional aspect, in that a certain actor deliberately tries to convince others of a certain interpretation of organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Interpreted within discourse analysis, the aim is to construct objects in the organisation. Accordingly, in the analyses I track the introduced concepts, generated by means of entrepreneurship, to follow whether or not they have an impact in the organisation. This discursive impact I define as a socially constructed object. For each analysis, I list these ‘objects’ tracked in the right-hand side of the Findings-tables (Figure 17 and 22).

To recapitulate this section, BUCIL as understood in Hardy & Phillip’s concept of organisational discourse analysis is as follows, in my interpretation: Entrepreneurship is a type of action that produces ‘texts’ (all types of communication) by introducing new concepts. However, entrepreneurship does not in itself have a leadership dimension, understood here as the ability to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty in such a way that collaborators will accept these decisions. Entrepreneurship is characterized by the ability to find a new solution to a performance gap. As a consequence, a new subject position has to be established, i.e. that of the ‘collaborative innovation leader’. In order to be able to transform concepts into social objects, and thus to make ensure that the texts are embedded in the existing discourses of the organisation, the leader has to manipulate and guide the sensemaking of collaborators to win the struggles of meaning. The emergent leader is not outside of the innovation process, but is also conditioned by the uncertainties of the innovation journey; therefore the emerging collaborative innovation leadership is forced to make sense as well during the process, using this ability of sensemaking to further enhance capacities of entrepreneurship, thereby sharpening and adapting the introduced micro-discursive concepts further. The text-producing unit must finally be recognised as a leader in order to disseminate the ‘texts’, and thus give sense. Leadership recognition is achieved when the ‘collaborative innovation leader’ is counted among strategic key actors across the collaborating organisations. In the next section I operationalise Figure 4.

### 3.3 OPERATIONALIZATION

In the sections above, I have presented an analytical model; I have argued that the causal connections hypothesised between the key concepts in the BUCIL model are rendered plausible by applying a certain conception of discourse analysis. In this section, I operationalise the concepts by breaking them down into observable phenomena. After this section, I turn to the *Methods* chapter, in which I describe methods that allow me to observe these phenomena.

Below, I operationalise the concepts by breaking them down into listed phenomena that could be interpreted as signs of bottom-up leadership. I provide examples of interview questions from the interview guides.

Key concept: Leadership as social constructive processes of recognition.

*Definition:* Leadership recognition in the context of collaborative innovation is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and discourse cannot be ignored, but are reckoned with, perhaps appreciated, in the strategic power games within and between organisations.

Observable signs of the constructed key concepts:

- Power struggles over leadership, i.e. who is the follower and who is to be led
- A visible intention to take the lead in developing something new, to present a new way of doing things, despite uncertainty
- People questioning, discussing, appreciating and assessing the leadership and the project

Examples of interview questions and points of observation

Interview questions:

- Can you put some words on how to understand the managerial challenge of this development project?
- In your opinion, has this project called for special efforts by officials and managers?

- Where has the need for leadership arisen, do you think? Can you think of any critical points?
- Is it your impression that the administrations involved knew what they wanted in this project?

Observations:

- Where does conflict arise and around what issues?
- Are leadership and innovation perceived of as legitimate?
- Who has the power to define what the collaborators are actually doing?

Key concept: Making sense and giving sense

*Definition:* Sensemaking is a social condition in organisations which must be established in order to keep moving and navigating in an unpredictable process (Weick, 1995). Leaders have to provide direction by providing answers to who collaborators are and what they are doing (Griffin 2002).

Observable signs of the constructed key concepts:

- People are adopting the same world view by using the same concepts and rhetoric
- People display uncertainty or considerations concerning the change and its implications.
- An increasing range of actors is included in the interactions involved in the change project

Examples of interview questions and points of observation

Interview questions:

- How much leverage have you professionals had in the project?
- What are your and your management's roles in the future?
- How do you see leadership challenges in the future?
  - Who will lead?
  - How should such leadership be performed?
  - In the light of conflicts or surprises: what have they led to in terms of considerations on your part and that of your administration?

Observations:

- What generates frustration and uncertainty in meetings and during interviews?
- What are the key points of discussion?
- What is conditioning conversational inertia and progress?

Key concept: Leadership distribution

*Definition:* The extent to which decision makers in their own organisations are influenced by giving sense

Observable signs of the constructed key concepts:

- People higher up in the hierarchy embrace the strategy
- People in the other organisations:
  - Are able to see some relevance/strategic advantage of the project
  - Develop innovation spin-off strategies themselves, taking on the roles of maintaining and driving the process

Examples of interview questions and points of observation

Interview questions

- Who demonstrates leadership in such a project?
- What are you and your administration's future roles?
- What are the key leadership future challenges?

Observation points:

- Who breaks collaborative inertia and helps move the discussions forward?
- Who takes charge when the situation is uncertain and decision making is crucial?

Key concept: Public entrepreneurship

*Definition:* Entrepreneurship as a function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) act proactively in environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already



existing resources, 4) in order to deploy them for a perceived better performance on public objectives.

Observable signs of the constructed key concepts:

- Professionally founded perspective
- The entrepreneurs are able to improvise in conditions of uncertainty by being proactive
- The entrepreneurs are able to combine resources in new ways in order to improve performance

Examples of interview questions and points of observation:

- How much leverage have you professionals had in the project?
- What are the limitations?
- What parts of the project were established in advance?
- Do you perceive this project as an interdisciplinary, cross-sector product, or do you see the final product as sector-specific?

Observations:

- How are new concepts and conceptions developed?
- By whom and why?



# CHAPTER 4. METHODS

In this section, I describe the methods used for collecting data consistent with the operationalization outlined in the section above.

First, I motivate my selection of case.

Subsequently, I define and describe the case study as a method. I focus on issues of generalizability and quality criteria. I argue that the qualitative, field work based, single-case study is an appropriate method framework when studying emergent phenomena such as innovation processes in which leadership is socially constructed. I finish the case study section by applying the case study method categories and criteria to my own case study. I conclude the section by describing how the different data sources (documents, transcribed recordings, field notes) live up to the standards of data triangulation characteristic of case studies (Yin 2009); and how the methods mutually reinforce each other, e.g. when observations made are used to inform and qualify a subsequent qualitative interview.

Next, I present an overview of the data collection: the date of data collection, the amount of data, the type of qualitative data, and which parts of the innovation process I chose to focus on. I briefly describe the qualitative data methods used: qualitative interviews, direct observation, and participant observation (section 4.4). In section 4.5 I give examples of how data is analysed. In section 4.6 I describe and reflect on the theoretical and practical consequences of adopting an abductive, ‘engaged scholarship’-approach.

Finally, I sum up the chapter.

## 4.1 SELECTION OF CASES

First of all, this case is a case of what Sandford Borins (see Chapter 2) calls bottom-up innovation leadership with a holistic aim. As I elaborate on in Chapter 5, the case is bottom-up in the sense that it is an office located within a central-administration in a professional unit with strong professional relations to the local level that is the initiator and driver of the process. Accordingly, the innovation project is not initiated in a strategy- or policy-office with natural, institutional relations to CEOs or the political level. Instead, the emergent bottom-up leadership is inspired by professional insights in performance gaps related to lack of coordination on a vertical dimension (local neighbourhood-central administrations) and horizontal

(administration-to-administration and municipality-social housing sector) when running the area based programs in disadvantaged areas.

Another motivation for selecting this Copenhagen case was the ongoing character of the process. I had the opportunity to observe and participate in a collaborative development process that was under development. This ongoing, developing character is consistent with the theoretical and methodological foundations of the BUCIL model as this model is adapted to ongoing processes of social construction. As a result, having access to an on-going process was to be preferred instead of selecting a case in which the process had already ended.

A third motivation was the collaborative dimension of the process. The development project was to begin with defined in a municipal strategy paper, having the objective of improving coordination across a number of organisationally separated stakeholders (See Chapter 5 for further case context details). Furthermore, the development project had the character of exactly a project, in that a strategy report had been written when the project was initiated. Accordingly, relevant data for an analysis for bottom-up leadership was bound to occur, no matter whether the project would be terminated or not. In this respect, the development project was indeed a *development* project that can be characterised as an innovation, in that the project denoted a radical break with former practice of running area-based programs in the City of Copenhagen. That being said, neither the emergent bottom-up leadership (Neighbourhood Development) nor collaborators coined the project as an ‘innovation’ process. Likewise, no ‘innovation leadership tools’ were deployed formally. In this respect, the case is analytically consistent with the definition of innovation applied in this thesis (see the introduction in theory chapter). In this respect, the case is strong in describing a ‘natural’ bottom-up leadership process, in terms of what happens when a professional office sets in motion an innovation process with no prior knowledge of public sector innovation and no specific innovation-skills to do so, other than a modest level of standardised, regular leadership-training.

Yet a further motivation fully consistent with the BUCIL model is that the case can be regarded as leadership’s endeavour to deal with aspects of a wicked problem: disadvantaged areas. What was clear to begin with was the process was highly contentious out of substantive, strategic and institutional reasons. As Analysis A demonstrate the parties involved had different perspectives on knowledge relevance related to evaluating the area based programs operating in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and furthermore had difficulties with clarifying roles and agreeing on a shared agenda. In this respect the case is well-chosen, especially because bottom-up leadership, through its strong ties with their colleagues working in the disadvantaged areas in an area based approach, exemplify how front-line staff experience aggregated when working with a wicked problem with insufficient

means provides a push towards a coherent critique transformed into a development project.

## 4.2 SINGLE-CASE STUDY DESIGN: DEFINITION, GENERALIZABILITY AND QUALITY CRITERIA

In this section I explain my use of the qualitative case study as the main method for collecting and constructing data. In this thesis, these are approaches and definitions of case studies that are in accordance with (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Maaløe, 2002; Yin, 2009). For this study, (Yin, 2009) is valuable in providing us with acknowledged standards for conducting and assessing case studies; (Flyvbjerg, 2006) is valuable in providing us with a narrow focus on analytical generalizability in single-case studies. And (Maaløe, 2002) is valuable in underscoring the strengths of field work based case studies. First, I define and describe the case study. Next, I focus on types of case study designs. Third, I use Yin (2009) to set up criteria for judging the quality of case study research designs. Finally, I apply the categories described in the first three sections to my research design, and use Yin's 'quality tests' for my research design in order to summarise strengths and weaknesses of my design in relation to my analysis.

### *Definition of a case study*

(Maaløe, 2002) argues that what characterizes a case study is the acceptance of ambiguity, and that, in contrast to other methods, such as an experiment, a case study is characterized by being an in-depth investigation of how people interact and act within their own environments. According to Maaløe, one of the main strengths of a case study is that it enables us to see what people are actually doing, instead of only relying on interview data describing what people *say* they have been doing. And further, the people you investigate to some extent provide the framework for your research (p. 31). Yin (Yin, 2009) defines a case study (p. 18) as "*an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident*". Thus, case studies are suitable when the researcher has no control over external events, and when how- and why-questions are being posed (p. 2).

Yin further extends the above definition by adding technical characteristics: "The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical

propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (p. 18). This last definition I find important, in that it builds on explicit quality criteria for conducting case studies.

A further characteristic of case studies is that they can be quantitative or qualitative. And they can rely on field work and ethnological approaches, but can also rely solely on desktop research (Yin, 2009).

### *Case study designs and questions of generalization of findings*

Generally, (Yin, 2009) argues in favour of a multiple case study approach, and warns researchers against ‘single-case’ designs (p. 50). Choosing the single-case study approach may be well grounded, but the researcher will have to realise that this approach will have some consequences for the external validity, in that it will be difficult to argue that the findings in the single-case will be empirically generalizable.

In contrast, (Flyvbjerg, 2006) argues that five misunderstandings about case studies exist, and that these misunderstandings draw on the misunderstanding that a case study is characterized by the making of inferences from a small population to a larger population (from a couple of cases to all members of the population). Instead, case studies are suitable for making analytical generalizations, i.e. contributing to theoretical developments by testing hypotheses. Yin also sees the use of case studies as a necessary tool for making analytical generalisations (p. 15), but recommends that a multiple case study approach is optimal, in that it also enhances the empirical generalizations (p. 24).; whereas Flyvbjerg emphasizes that the major force of case studies is to develop theory through single-case studies, and therefore proposes single-case studies. Some disagreement does exist, however, between these two scholars in that Flyvbjerg further argues that even single-case-studies “are multiple in most research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways” (p. 225).

In this respect, Flyvbjerg advocates a position that is in alignment with Van de Ven’s ‘engaged scholarship’-position: you have to engage yourself in the complex life (of organisations) in order to develop theory (that is usable for both practice and academia) (See section 4.6 below).

Another contribution by (Flyvbjerg, 2006) is a typology of cases. Flyvbjerg argues that the selection of samples and cases depends on the purpose of the study. The first choice to make is whether to choose random sample selection or a sample that is representative; or whether to choose informed-oriented selection, i.e. where a specific type of case is selected because you are interested in maximum utilisation of

information from small samples. Here, Flyvbjerg mentions five case types (Flyvbjerg, 2006) (p. 230):

1. Extreme/deviant cases,
2. Maximum variation cases
3. Critical cases
4. Paradigmatic cases

(Yin, 2009) supplements Flyvbjerg by arguing that a fifth rationale for single-case designs is the longitudinal case, in which the same case is studied at two or more different points in time (p. 49).

Other authors also argue that this type of process study is appropriate to study change, in that it helps locate the mechanisms that drive the process. A process study can account for path dependencies and the role of critical events in change and innovation. As Poole & Van de Ven (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004, p. 317) argue:

*“Poole et al. (2000) noted several advantages of process theory: (1) it gives a deep understanding of how change comes about by describing the generative mechanism that drives the process; (2) it can account for path dependence and the role of critical events in change and innovation; and (3) it can incorporate the role of human agency in change without reducing it to causal terms.”*

Yin further discusses two types of single-case designs: holistic versus embedded, which signifies that the same case study may have different units of analysis. Holistic designs are appropriate if no logical subunit exists, or if the theory underlying the case study is holistic. However, there is a risk that holistic designs may not permit the researcher to observe a phenomenon in operational detail (p 50), which will result in a highly abstract study. Another problem is that the nature of the case study shifts, and that the researcher is not aware of this. Thus, the research evidence begins to support another research question. Yin argues that a way of increasing your sensitivity is to have a set of subunits, thus having an embedded case study design.

Embedded designs also have weaknesses, the most obvious being the risks that focus remains on the subunit level. This will cause interest to be focused on the original phenomenon as the context, not the target of the study.

In the section above, I have defined what a case study is, as well as how the sampling of cases/a case, determine the researcher's scientific contribution. In the next section, I turn to the method requirements of a case study.

#### Criteria for judging the quality of research designs

(Maaløe, 2002; Yin, 2008) both argue that the use of different data sources is a requirement for conducting case studies; otherwise they do not qualify as cases. A case study must use the different data sources in order to acquire an overview of dialectics, and in order for the researcher to be able to apply as many analytical and inference methods as possible (Maaløe 2002, p. 32). Sources may be already existing documentation, archives, interviews, direct observations, and physical effects.

Yin (Yin, 2009) argues in favour of five components of a research design (p. 27):

1. The research questions of the study
2. Its propositions, if any
3. Its unit(s) of analysis
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions; and
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings.

Yin argues that the 'why' and 'how' research questions are compatible with case study research. Second, Yin argues that even though the why and how questions guide you to conduct a case study, they do not guide you as regards what you should study. Only propositions will delineate your theoretical position. Next, the propositions will point towards areas to look for evidence of the proposition(s).

Concerning unit of analysis, this concerns defining the case, which is a classic problem for case study researchers. The unit of analysis is related to your definition of your research question, and your research question should cause you to choose a unit of analysis which ranks higher than others. This unit may be revisited later in the research process (Yin 2009, p. 29-30). The case, which is also the unit of analysis, should be a real-time phenomenon, not an abstraction such as a topic, argument or a hypothesis. Finally, each case study and unit of analysis should either be similar to those previously studied by others, or should innovate this unit of analysis in a clear, defined way. If this is accomplished, Yin argues, previous literature can become a guide for defining the unit of analysis.

Concerning point 4, this concerns the way in which to conduct a proper analysis: what types of data and analysis are needed in order to answer your research question.



Concerning point 5, Yin argues that it is important to identify and address rival explanations of your findings before conducting the actual case study, in order to establish criteria for interpreting the findings of a study.

Yin proposes four types of tests, which are well known in empirical social research and useful in case studies as well (p. 123 ff):

- Construct validity
- Internal validity
- External validity
- Reliability

In conclusion Yin provides valuable standards for researchers to assess their own case study findings (p. 160). External validity touches on how to generalize own findings, and is thus linked to Flyvbjerg's case typology above: whether or not the findings are applicable to other settings. Here, Yin and Flyvbjerg agree that case studies can lead to analytical generalizations that may be modified by other case-studies. External validity is ensured first of all theory in single-case studies. And next, by the use of replication logic if multiple-case studies are concerned.

Concerning reliability, this test is intended to ensure that in case another researcher was to conduct the same study, the researcher would arrive at the same findings and conclusion (p. 45). Yin proposes that case study protocols and a case study database are appropriate means for making the research procedure transparent to others. Having a case study protocol and developing a case study database are useful means to address problems of data collection. A case study database can consist of case study notes, case study documents, tabular materials and narratives.

#### **4.2.1. SUMMING UP RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDY TESTS**

My case study can be characterized as an embedded single-case study with two embedded cases: a pilot case and a main case. It is also a longitudinal case, in that the embedded cases are part of the same process. It is qualitative and field work based. It uses a mix of qualitative methods: direct observation and participant observation, qualitative interviews and group meetings. I have also made drafts of analyses, either in presentations or in a report, in order for key stakeholders to give feedback on preliminary findings and analytical approaches. Data sources are recordings of meetings and interviews, main organisational documents, policy drafts and field notes. This case study design thus supports the engaged scholarship-approach (see section 3.4), in that the embedded design has allowed for a adjusting of my propositions and research question in the research process, which has supported my goal of producing knowledge that is usable for both practice and

academia. My case study design also supports my view on discourse analysis, in that the design enables me to generate process sensitive data. In particular, this design provides me with detailed insight into the conflicts and sources of legitimacy that lead to shifts in leadership construction and leadership recognition.

Considering the above case descriptions, which type of case is The Copenhagen Case? First of all, the choice seems to narrow down to an average case, an extreme case or a paradigmatic case. In addition, we need to situate the case within the population of cases selected by the analytical framework of BUCIL. Thus, the case is first of all a case of collaborative innovation leadership in a specific context. What distinguishes this case from other cases is first of all the profession that forms the basis of the leadership construction process through the formulation of a collaborative innovation project. This profession is experienced in working with disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Disadvantaged neighbourhoods are, as also demonstrated in the case analysis, a wicked problem. BUCIL is attuned to this type of context, and thus, the presence of a wicked problem does not make the case extreme, but rather average. In a Danish context, the case is extreme, though, in that the bureaucratic context, (demonstrated in this thesis' analysis and described briefly in section 5.3), the bureaucratic context is so ambiguous. Some respondents denote this ambiguity by calling the City of Copenhagen 'the seven-headed beast', i.e. an organisation that consists of seven more or less autonomous administrations, each with its own political committee and mayor, with different political parties being part of each administration, making joint problem solving difficult. As the analyses demonstrate, this bureaucratic structure implies that the number of stakeholders is high, which makes it difficult to maintain alliances and momentum, in that a large number of other programs and policies are also fighting for bureaucratic and political attention. The exact opposite might also be suggested: complexity and ambiguity may in fact enhance the momentum in that the institutional uncertainty is high, thus allowing the lead unit in the case, Neighbourhood Development, to progress, while collaborators remain passive due to the massive uncertainty; but it may also impede institutionalisation, as exemplified in Analysis B, in that leadership risks being consolidated. To a global audience, the City of Copenhagen will in this thesis be assessed as an average case; several of the interviewees reflect on problems of working across organisational borders, and state that even though the bureaucratic structure of the City of Copenhagen may be very well known for its complexity in a Danish context, it may not be very different from other capital city governments around the world.

In conclusion, we might say that in a Danish context this is an extreme case with regard to the complex bureaucratic structure of the municipality. This means that the case is rich in information. For a global population of cases, this may still be an extreme case as compared to small municipalities, but average in regard to larger municipalities such as small- and medium-sized city governments.

In terms of *types of tests*, I have endeavoured in this study to comply with the general tests of case studies proposed by Yin (2009). Regarding *construct validity*, I have sought to operationalise my concepts to the largest extent possible in accordance with the applied theory. As I describe in this chapter, I have also used different methods and different data in order to follow the standard of data triangulation. The chain of evidence is also established in that it is possible to retrace findings. Further, key informants have been reviewing preliminary parts of the analysis, mainly through presentations and through feedback of the embedded case. With regard to *internal validity*, Yin proposes different analytical tools. However, none of these have matched my abductive aim of developing and applying a theoretical model, and none of them support the single-case application of my theoretical model. Instead, I have applied discourse analysis (Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Phillips et al., 2004), a case study approach more in align with (Flyvbjerg, 2006)'s approach to theory development. Both the BUCIL model of analysis and the discourse analytical approach establish theoretically informed causal connections, whose relevance I will demonstrate later on in my analyses.

Yin's typology of 'rival explanations' has been adhered to by using the BUCIL model, in that I have developed a synthesis of rival explanations. Despite the fact that this typology seems more relevant in terms of program evaluations, the typology is also useful for not overstating the discursive impact of the type of leadership studied in this thesis. With regard to *external validity*, I have used the theory to inform my case study; and I have characterized my case above in a way that delimits its empirical generalizability. With regard to *reliability*, I have endeavoured to make systematic field notes. Further, I have made drafts of the content of the final report throughout the whole PhD process in order to ensure that the case study was in constant connection with theoretical propositions and research questions.

### 4.3 DATA COLLECTION

The case study conducted ran from September 2009 to mid-2012, although with differing intensity concerning field work. Sometimes the purpose of the case study was to keep myself up to date regarding the course of the innovation process: was the process about to terminate, being implemented or being expanded? During the low intensity periods, I was specifically searching for the emergence of delineated parts of the process in which cross-administrative collaboration took place, i.e. processes in which the administrations had to develop initiatives together. During the entire period, field notes were made. The purpose of field notes is both to collect data, but also to record episodic events and conversations that would prompt my own memory as well as the memories of future interviewees.

Two delineated parts of the collaborative innovation process were selected. These processes can be characterized as ‘embedded cases’, i.e. sub-parts of a case on the basis of which it is possible to generalize ((Yin, 2008). These embedded cases are also located at different points in time. The purpose of the first embedded case was to conduct a pilot study which, in addition to the purpose of gathering data, was also meant to further develop and adjust my case study as well as adjust my theoretical conception.

### *Embedded Case 1*

The first embedded case concerns an evaluation tool development process in a cross-administrative setting. The evaluation tool should be applicable for evaluating area-based programs in the City of Copenhagen. These area-based programs were owned by the social housing sector, supervised and co-financed by the City of Copenhagen. This process included civil servants from only three administrations, since the process was running at the beginning of the innovation process from the autumn of 2009 to mid-2010. The process did not have a definitive ending, but faded out, with the result that the lead office ‘Neighbourhood Development’ decided to conduct its own evaluation as a yearly routine. This was due to the lack of participation in combination with conflicts and competing evaluation agendas. This embedded case also was intended as a pilot investigation: I conducted a preliminary analysis of the various potential themes that I had observed, and allowed the interviewees to give feedback on my observations. In this respect, the embedded case helped forming the focus of data collection later on, as well as sharpening my analytical approach. In the pilot phase I discovered the following points:

1. Issues of management were indeed one of the main reasons for conflict.
2. It was impossible to establish a non-adversarial, objective observation point of the process in my field work. I therefore came to realise that I could not register and mediate between all the competing interests in the City of Copenhagen. I therefore decided to adopt the management perspective of the lead office when conducting field work, knowing quite well that this would reduce my chances of conducting field work in the other administrations. In order to compensate, I conducted retrospective, representative rounds of interviews.
3. Leadership, rather than collaborative management or governance-structures on a systemic or inter-organisational level, was the appropriate unit of the case, in that the process was mainly promoted by Neighbourhood Development. And because the conflicts in the pilot project were mainly linked to leader/follower-relations, i.e.

Neighbourhood Development pushing the agenda onwards, the rest of the administrations remained either supportive or critical.

4. It was mainly the relations between administrations that were the main challenge, not the relations between municipality and the social housing sector.

### *Embedded case 2*

The second embedded case was a cross-administrative policy development process. This process included civil servants and special consultants from all central administrations. The process was running for over a year, and the Policy for Disadvantaged Areas was finally approved on 1 December 2011. I recorded four of the most intense meetings at the beginning of the process, and interviewed the participants a year later. The reason for the timespan between recordings and interviews was the high-profile nature of the process, in which I decided, after consulting ND staff, that interference in the on-going process would be unethical. During the field work, I also assisted ND with developing an interview guide in order to conduct a stakeholder analysis of relevant directors.

The reason for choosing this embedded case was that:

1. it included an observable collaborative aspect in that parties had to develop a policy together
2. It included a critical aspect typical of collaborative innovation, in that several parties had to develop a common understanding of a wicked problem.
3. It included a leadership dimension, in that the TEA held the final responsibility for producing the policy, but with the consent of the other administrations.
4. It was characterized by being potentially conflict ridden. A tension could arise, in that Neighbourhood Development had been the driving force in the past, thus demonstrating an informal bottom-up leadership position. However, the policy was supposed to be a shared one, to which all administrations had to take ownership. On the basis of The Evaluation Case, I expected a potential conflict to develop between path dependency ('has it already been decided what this policy should contain?') and the clean slate ('this is a shared policy, we have to

develop it together'). In this respect, my focus was to observe who would stand up and demonstrate leadership, and what conditions that would enable this leadership to 'emerge' ((Griffin, 2002)

In the next section I describe the methods that I have applied and the data that I have gathered in relation to the two embedded cases.

## 4.4 DESCRIPTION OF METHOD AND DATA

In Figure 5 below, type and quantity of data are displayed. All data types are qualitative.

**FIGURE 5: DISPLAY OF DATA**

Method	Function in the research design	Data type	Data quantity	Time
Field work (2009-2012)				
Direct observation and participant observation, taking field notes in the ND office	<p>Registration of key events</p> <p>To detect evolving collaborative processes relevant to study</p> <p>Memory prompts usable for analysis and interviews</p>	Handwritten notes of conversations and observations, transferred afterwards into a word document	45 field notes, ranging from ½-2 pages a piece	September 2009-September 2012
Embedded case 1: Evaluation tool development process (Sept 2009-Medio 2010)				
Field notes at meetings	Registration of conflicts and co-creational events			
Round 1: Semi-structured, in depth, single interviews.	<p>Registration of participants' experience with the collaboration, focusing on:</p> <p>Barriers of innovation concerning the substantive dimension of the innovation</p>	<p>Recordings; afterwards transcribed</p> <p>Interviewees:</p> <p>-1-2 civil servants from the participating administrations</p> <p>- Middle manager of The Technical and</p>	<p>7 interviews</p> <p>Length: 1-1.5 hours per Interview</p>	2010

	project	Environmental Administration		
Round 2: semi-structured interviews	Feedback on preliminary analyses regarding innovation processes, in which interview data from round 1 was included	Recordings; afterwards transcribed	2 Interviews Length: 1-1.5 hours per interview	2009-2011
Focus group interview	Feedback on preliminary analyses regarding innovation processes, in which interview data from round 1 was included	Recording; afterwards transcribed	1 Interview: Length: 1 hour per interview	2011
Embedded case 2: Policy formulation case (December 2010-February 2012)				
Recordings of policy formulation meeting	Registration of conflicts and co-creational events  Leadership positioning	Recordings; afterwards transcribed  Participants: 1-2 special consultants from all seven administrations	4 meetings. Length: 3-4 hours per interview	2010-2011
'Engaged' interviews with directors or managers	Access to decision makers in a tense climate during The Policy Formulation	Recordings; afterwards transcribed  Interviewees:  -Level 2 director from SSA  -Level 2 director from SUF  Participating	2 interviews. Length: 1 hour per interview	2010



		<p>interviewers:</p> <p>2 Special consultants</p> <p>From The Technical and Environmental Administration</p>		
Semi-structured, in depth, single interviews.	<p>Registration of participants' experience with the collaboration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the soundness of the policy</li> <li>- the management of the policy process</li> </ul>	<p>Recordings; afterwards transcribed.</p> <p>Interviewees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Key special consultants from all seven administrations</li> <li>-If possible, directors from all seven administrations involved in the steering committee;</li> <li>- Managers with other knowledge of leadership during policy innovation and the preceding process</li> </ul>	<p>15 interviews</p> <p>Length:</p> <p>½-1.5 hours</p>	2011
Document analysis	<p>To clarify the line of events during analysis</p> <p>To clarify unclear issues of mandate and task descriptions related to collaborators' involvement in the innovation process</p>	<p>Policy documents:</p> <p>Drafts of Policy for Disadvantaged Areas, commission approvals, strategy reports, minutes</p>	8-10 main documents	Used in the analysis

### *Field notes*

I made observations and field notes when I was during field work in the embedded cases, or when I was keeping myself up to date in the ND office, inspired by Yin's recommendations (Yin, 2009). In some instances, the field notes took on the character of working minutes of a conversation that I had conducted with ND staff. The purpose of this was mainly to document events and conversations, including issues dominating the process in this period of time. The purpose of my field notes was also to qualify the retrospective qualitative interviews, in that observations made could be used to dig deeper into experience of the informants. Finally, the purpose of the field notes was to observe the phenomena listed in the Operationalization section (2.5) above: what were the points of conflict, who took leadership in certain interactions, what triggered inertia and progress, etc. The structure of the notes was the following: First a detailed description of what was said during the observed conversations, next a record of my reflections concerning analytical points or issues relevant for theory building.

### *Semi-structured interviews*

The second type of data analysed is qualitative, semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 2007). Most interviews lasted around an hour, some 1.5; a couple of interviews lasted 45 minutes. The qualitative interviews focused (in the first embedded case) on innovation and management and how the respondents thought of the project. Concerning the second embedded case, the interviews focused on leadership and how the persons involved in the policy process (i.e. team members formulating the policy as well as the directors from the steering committee) of the characteristics of The Policy Formulation process: its subsequent approval, the cross-administrative, organisational set-up of the policy, as well as future challenges for ND/The Technical and Environmental Administration leadership and policy. Thus, this type of data has a retrospective character, accommodating both further details concerning the policy process, but also an interpretative element in the data, such as when the interviewee presents a matter-of-fact, coherent story as a result of post-rationalization. The interview guides can be found in the appendix, although not all versions: The interview guides were tailored to the informant as part of the ND staff or not; it was also considered whether the interviewee was a formal leader or a civil servant, in that a formal position may be reflected in the interviewee's engagement in the process.

### *Coding*

The qualitative material was coded by means of the qualitative software tool Nvivo 9. For each code that proved relevant I described and condensed the content. I also worked with my operationalization, and combined these observations into three categories that I found relevant for understanding how the lead unit of ND is positioned as a collaborative innovation leader: Conflicts, Sources of legitimacy, and Leadership Dilemmas.

### *Reflections concerning the translation of quotes*

Translating qualitative data from Danish to English has been a greater challenge than I had expected. Especially the interview quotes presented in the analyses display my inability to translate Danish metaphors and phrases into meaningful English statements. As an unfortunate consequence of this fact, the interviewees may sometimes make statements that seems clumsy and inexact. This is in contrast to the intelligence and motivation which were demonstrated by these interviewees during the interviews. I have tried to the best of my abilities to make up for this by describing what is being stated.

## **4.5 DATA ANALYSIS**

As I have described in section 4.4 the data collected has different functions in relation to an analysis based on the BUCIL model. Accordingly, in the specific analyses, the data hierarchy is as follows:

- Qualitative interviews and recordings of feedback and policy formulation meetings
- Key policy and administrative documents
- ‘Engaged’ interviews
- Field notes

So, the main data source is transcriptions of qualitative interviews and recordings, since these data sources first of all most explicitly allow the participants in the collaborative innovation project to describe with their own words how they perceive of leadership, the innovation project and related challenges. These data sources are also of the highest ethical value, in that the interviewees and researcher agree on the

conditions of how the interview data is to be used. This issue is especially pertinent in an occurring process in a highly politicized, hierarchical and collaborative environment, in which civil servants, managers and directors operate. Accordingly, field notes and 'engaged' interviews have also informed my analytical focus points, in that these process data have been vital in order to detect when shifts in innovation project, sense making and leadership occurred, consequently providing the analyses with more credibility. This was highly important, in that informants 6-12 months later would already have naturalised these shifts.

The recorded qualitative material has mainly been used to address the analytical categories of uncertainty, entrepreneurship, leadership recognition and making and giving sense. The already written material available, such as policy drafts, minutes from inter-administrative meetings, and strategy reports, has mainly been used to first of all document how the endeavours of Neighbourhood Development and their collaborators have resulted in specific impacts, i.e. social objects, such as new organisational structures or a policy. This written material has also been used to document how entrepreneurship makes new conceptual combinations.

For each analysis I have used the codes displayed in Figure 6 below. These codes, produced in the qualitative software program Nvivo, are in alignment with the operationalization of theory in section 3.3. Some of these codes were easy to define, for instance in terms of entrepreneurship. Here the concepts were very well-defined in the literature that I have applied, and were easily imported as codes. In the synthesis of the BUCIL concepts and my discourse analytical approach, the function in an analysis was furthermore defined, in that entrepreneurship is what provides the conceptual material for a micro-discourse, enabling the emergence of leadership.

However, leadership recognition was more difficult to code. A challenge that surfaced when doing the analysis was to reconcile elements of Relational Leadership Theory, Complex Responsive Process Theory, sense making and discourse analysis. What makes it rather difficult to reconcile these theories in order to allow for a data analysis is that the approaches first of all allows for both the use of the terminology of subject position and identity. This also goes for the discourse analysis. To begin with in the analysis I approached the subject position as mainly a phenomenon which I had to construct by placing the statements of collaborators and emergent leadership on the same, interorganisational level. This would satisfy a discourse approach to a subject position, in which this position is only a position insofar as it is perceived of as legitimate by collaborators.

However, I quickly discovered that ignoring the element of identity made it difficult to explain why leadership of Neighbourhood Development developed. Obviously, Neighbourhood Development makes sense of their own identity as well and makes interpretations of how people react to Neighbourhood Development's projection of

identity upon collaborators, and accordingly has to make choices of how to position itself. So, in order not to re-introduce a structural explanation of how ND emerged as leadership (i.e. collaborators' expectations and assessments), I imported elements of identity in the coding, which allows the analysis to explain how ND makes strategic choices of positioning, but within a discursive field, in which many different positionings are possible, and in which the discursive field is established in a collaborative fashion.

What furthermore makes the issue of identity highly relevant in an organisational analysis is the collaborative dimension. Both ND and their collaborators are in each and every instance both acting as professionals and individuals, but are also bearers of an organisational identity and mandate. Accordingly, subject positions in collaborative, organisational configurations are not as flexible as one could presume when adopting the discourse term 'positioning'. This term brings out post-modern connotations of flexibility and an easily-dispensable past in order to generate strategic or status-related value to the individual.

The contrary relationship seems to be more relevant to assume when studying bottom-up leadership in collaborative configurations – that a running transformation of positioning in organisational sites of interaction is indeed possible and required, but may imply severe and painstaking transaction costs to individuals. This may be why the discourse scholars explained in Chapter 3 maintain the use of identity, despite the fact that identity as a concept entails connotations more related to modern theory building in terms of stability and essentialism, in contrast to postmodern and post structural theory building, that to a higher degree favour fluent, fragmented and adaptive perspectives on 'selves'.

In this thesis, as a result, maintaining both identity and subject position in the analyses thus capture both a steady and a flexible element of leadership making: Identity is the emergent leaders self-perception, which has to be in accordance with organisational mandates and qualifications, whereas the concept of subject position captures the flexible and dynamic elements related to the fact that it is the emergent leadership that introduces a new discourse (an innovation project) with several possible positionings available. Each new choice concerning positioning requires the recognition of this position from collaborators, and furthermore requires a change in the professional and organisational identity in order to actually being able to perform in accordance with this position.

Accordingly, in the analyses, this is also why the positional development of ND is composed of two concepts, such as 'value-based implementer', in that these concepts display the tension between leadership identity and its aspirations, on the one hand, and a collaboratively negotiated subject position, on the other hand. This tension is first resolved when the aspirations of the emergent leadership is fully in

alignment with the expectations of collaborators (or the other way around), as displayed in Chapter 7, when the position of 'Strategic implementer' is adopted as suitable for both leadership and collaborators.

In the figure below, I have listed the codes used in the Nvivo Software, codes that are consistent with the operationalization of BUCIL concepts.

**FIGURE 6: CODING TREE**

Name
<p>Entrepreneurship:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to see system improvements</li> <li>• combining new or already existing resources</li> <li>• proactive_improvise_exploiting uncertainty</li> <li>• professionally founded perspective</li> </ul>
<p>Leadership recognition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different roles and identities is created and negotiated</li> <li>• Leadership display success/failure to influence</li> <li>• Leaders deals with uncertainty</li> <li>• Acts perceived of as legitimate</li> <li>• people question/appreciate/judge leadership and/or project</li> <li>• Power struggles over leadership_leader_follower</li> <li>• Attempts of taking the lead</li> </ul>
<p>Making and giving sense:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adoption of worldview</li> <li>• More people are included in_affected by the change</li> <li>• people use the same rhetoric</li> <li>• Uncertainty_People try to explain difficulties/ conflicts/ insecurity</li> <li>• What are we doing?_people show uncertainty concerning implications</li> <li>• Who are we?_people demonstrate anxiety concerning their perceptions and roles</li> </ul>

Leadership recognition was furthermore more complex to analyse as I had to let the data help me to construct a new subject position, innovation leadership, which on top of this also developed over time, in accordance with a project leadership itself has launched. This is also one of (Phillips & Hardy, 2002a) approaches to discourse analysis: Despite the fact that a discourse approach is a highly theoretical approach, such an analysis has to allow for something new to be constructed out of the data. Accordingly, BUCIL is mainly focused on leadership, and so leadership was this ‘something’ that should be produced when analysing data.


As can be seen in an excerpt of a mind-map below, in the analytical process I have taken the content from each of the codes. Subsequently, I have pointed to overall issues that these codes relate to, in terms of collaborators perspectives on the innovation project and the leadership. Accordingly, I subsumed these perspectives on leadership recognition in terms of conflicts and sources of legitimacy, since discourse analysis and CRP theory argue that new themes, or discourses, emerge through conflicts. However, Griffin also points to the fact that in uncertain environments, people may be receptive to being influenced as this helps them to make sense of what they are doing, and who they are. Accordingly, in the analyses I assume that there also are sources of legitimacy that ND as leadership can draw upon, in order to improve chances of influencing collaborators. In this respect, discourse analysis is represented by the synthesis with the BUCIL concepts, as I have described and discussed in section 3.2.

Discourse analysis is also present when interpreting the overall findings, as displayed in the findings table of each analysis. Here, I display how the interactions hypothesized in the BUCIL model results in a positional development of NDs leadership.

Given the large amount of qualitative material, for each empirical theme discovered I have selected one or two key quotes that exemplify the content of the theme the best. This may create an impression of uniformity within each code. However, the contentious and conflictive nature of the embedded cases is maintained by explicitly addressing the conflict points in each analysis.



**FIGURE 7: MIND-MAP OF HOW TO CONNECT CONTENT OF ANALYTICAL CODES**



In the next section I explain how engaged scholarship as an approach provided me with some guidelines for developing theory usable for both academia and practice.

#### **4.6 ENGAGED SCHOLARSHIP: CONDUCTING RESEARCH USABLE FOR BOTH ACADEMIA AND PRACTICE REQUIRES ABDUCTIVE APPROACHES TO THEORY BUILDING**

One of the aims of the thesis is that people in the practice field can recognise their professional challenges in the knowledge production part of the thesis. Thus, the thesis should reflect research that is usable for both academia and practice. This decision was inspired by four main conditions. First of all, this thesis is co-financed by two external parties: Neighbourhood Development, City of Copenhagen and The Danish Center for Urban Regeneration and Community Development (in Danish: Center for Boligsocial Udvikling). These parties have co-financed the project with the intention that knowledge which is relevant to them is produced.

Second, I was throughout the PhD process associated to the ‘CLIPS’-research project. CLIPS is focused on contributing to the practice of doing collaborative innovation in the public sector by means of an interaction approach<sup>1</sup>.

The third condition is theoretical: a preliminary literature study of public sector innovation as well as a literature study of collaborative approaches to innovation will point in the direction of a need for further theory building.

The third condition was interlinked with the fourth condition: my field work. I experienced difficulties in reconciling insights from my early preliminary literature study with observations made in my field work, which forced me to engage in some theoretical development.

I will elaborate on condition three and four below. Next, I will conclude this section by describing my solution to being engaged with the combined fields of practice and academia. This approach is Van de Ven’s ‘Engaged Scholarship’ approach (Van de Ven, 2007). His main inspiration for this book was the claim that when engaged in producing knowledge usable for both academia and practice, you have to accept that reality is complex, and that in order to address this complexity, you are forced to combine different strands of theory. This general perspective provided an answer to the question why I could not reconcile my field work observations with existing research, and provided me with a possible solution to my research problem, i.e. when building theory, drawing on strands of research from different disciplines is required.

Public sector innovation is an emerging research field (Hartley, 2005). On the basis of a literature study of public sector innovation in relation to the research project PUBLIN, Røste argues that public sector innovation is an “*amalgam of other theories*”, and does not consist of independent theories (Røste, 2005). Røste's

solution to this 'amalgam'-quality of public sector innovation is that the 'amalgam' reflects the complexity of the public sector itself, not a lack of synthesis. I would argue that this is not only a problem in *public* sector innovation, but in innovation research in general. This argument is also supported by scholars of innovation, such as (Shavinina & ScienceDirect (Online service), 2003; Shavinina, 2003), who state that innovation consists of multidimensional and multidisciplinary research approaches.

I find this polyphonic approach to the phenomenon of innovation unsurprising and uncontroversial. Definitions of innovation, such as that of (Albury, 2005; Eggers *et al.*, 2009; Van de Ven, 1999), describe rather lengthy processes of innovation, from idea generation to implementation to dissemination. Obviously, for each of these phases, numerous disciplines can be applied: learning theory, implementation research, governance research, change management research, institutional research etc. Innovation has thus been exposed to multiple research approaches.

To sum up, *one* out of many possible research agendas, following Röstle and the PUBLIN-researchers and innovation researchers in general, is that when studying public sector innovation, there may be a need to combine different theories in order to be able to explain the complex phenomena. If this only applies to public sector innovation, I would argue that adding the dimension of 'collaboration' will amplify the need to combine previously separate research disciplines. This poses some challenges to innovation research: which combination of theories is appropriate for the integration and development of a specific theoretical position?

This challenge can be narrowed down to two interlinked questions. One question concerns theory building, the other concerns an abductive approach.

1. *Theory building*: how can we conceptualize uncertainty within a collaborative, organisational setting suitable for public innovation sector research concerning leadership?
2. *Defining an abductive approach*: what methodological approach should be taken to meet the challenge of complexity in a world of practice in order to ensure that this will contribute to the worlds of both practice and academia?

I provide a theoretical answer to the first question by means of the BUCIL model (Chapter 2). And I answer it by using the methods suitable for an abductive approach: case studies, a feedback session on the pilot case, observations, field studies and semi-structured interviews (see Chapter 5 and previous sections in present chapter).

The second question can be answered by the 'engaged scholarship' approach (Van de Ven 2007). Below, I explain the elements I have found useful in Van de Ven's approach to organisational and social research, engaged scholarship.

Van de Ven argues that there is a theory-practice gap, and that this gap is partly caused by a knowledge production problem (p. 4). This knowledge production problem arises when the researcher recognises that the different perspectives and types of knowledge are 'partial, incomplete and involving [an] inherent bias with respect to any complex problem' (ibid.). This problem can be solved by means of knowledge co-production among scholars and practitioners. Engaged scholarship thus proposes a position in which the engaged scholar perceives of herself as a participant, thus learning and understanding a subject by engaging in conversations with stakeholders (p. 14). This is a pluralistic approach to knowledge, which requires a pluralistic methodology (p. 15). An engaged scholarship approach thus proposes that it is necessary to operate with different theoretical perspectives in order to understand a complex phenomenon (p. 15). A pluralistic methodology proposes to compare different explanations to the same problem (p. 21).

One of the main strengths of Van de Ven's engaged scholarship is that in academia it legitimizes theory building that first of all draws on different strands of explanations to a problem. This theory building requires "*intimate familiarity*" with the problem domain (p. 100). Thus, one of the ways in which to build theory through an engaged scholarship approach is to discuss different explanations with stakeholders; and to look for the development of a theory by looking for anomalies, i.e. defining the phenomena that a certain theory cannot explain. Thus, the search for anomalies can be used to test hypotheses. Overall, this is what Van de Ven means by abduction: engaging with stakeholders, using and testing different hypothesis in order to define issues that cannot be explained, thus bringing in new types of explanations in order to build a theory that will explain the phenomenon under study.

In the short description above, I have stated the main points that I have found inspiring to guide my interaction with practice.

First of all, I would argue that leadership of collaborative innovation in the public sector is a complex phenomenon. Literature concerning innovation, public innovation and leading and managing collaborations supports this claim.

I have had the aim to make knowledge coproduced during my PhD process. I have mainly accomplished this by being present in the ND offices and the embedded cases, acting as a discussion partner and participant, carrying out minor analytical tasks, as well as taking notes in order not to forget my observations and thus

recording the complexity in terms of the changes that both the practitioners and I were subject to. I also gave three presentations on my preliminary findings.

Another precondition according to van de Ven is familiarity with the problem domain. I have fulfilled this condition, in that I was familiar with the professional field connected to area-based programs through short employment in Neighbourhood Development during the period preceding my PhD fellowship. I had also become familiar with the issue by specializing, through my BA-assignment and Master thesis in urban development and the social problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, as well as area-based programs. During this process, I had participated in a course in order to develop an area-based project together with four other students. And finally, by having been part of the process of formulating a strategy report "*The "Horisontal Pillar". A Strategic Development Perspective for the Coordination of Area-Based Interventions in the City of Copenhagen*" (Engberg, 2008) which is a central component of the innovation project driven forward by Neighbourhood Development. My role in this process was as student help for the associate professor who wrote the report.

Another element of engaged scholarship is the dialogue between research and practice. I established this in my pilot-study and the subsequent feedback sessions, in which I described different theoretical approaches and preliminary analyses possible, and urged the interviewees to give their opinion about my preliminary analyses and also to state the areas of research they were most interested in. This interaction was one of the main reasons for my choice to focus on leadership. Another example concerned collaborative innovation and novelty. I was engaged in this in my field work, for instance, in that one hypothesis of collaborative innovation is that novelty is created in collaborative arenas. However, I discovered that this was not so – novelty was created between TEA and EIA, written down in *The Horisontal Pillar*, and developed and adapted through the almost three-year long case study process.

And finally, I have been searching for anomalies; spending time on defining the shortcomings and strengths of innovation, collaboration and leadership research, combining these insights by means of the BUCIL model. This is a plural methodology in which I regularly compare and adapt different explanations to the same phenomenon.

The examples above demonstrate how I have defined my engagement with practice as an abductive methodology. My overall evaluation of this approach is that to some extent it requires experienced researchers to conduct intensive exchange of knowledge between practice and academia. Despite having the ambition of being engaged, I became less engaged than I had expected in interaction with practice that contributed both to my practice and research processes. Thus, by means of Van de

Ven's typology, I have adopted the engaged scholar-position as 'informed basic research'. Van de Ven describes this position as one in which the research question is focused on describing and explaining, but the researcher takes advice from stakeholders and inside informants on research activities concerning theory building, problem formulation, problem solution etc. This is a position in which the researcher directs and controls all research activities, including the final report (p. 271). Thus, this position is more detached than the positions of collaborative research, design/evaluation research or action/intervention research (p. 271-2).

## **4.7 SUMMING UP**

In this chapter I have motivated my choice of case, emphasising the qualities of the case in terms of its on-going character, the strong bottom-up leadership element of the development project, the collaborative dimensions and the wicked problem that the development project aims to address and the uncertainties that the case unleashes. These are all aspects that make the case a strong case for an analysis of bottom-up leadership consistent with the BUCIL model. I have furthermore explained how I understand and apply a qualitative single-case study design with two embedded cases, and I demonstrate how the research design meets the standards of such a case study. The data collection has been described in terms of elaborated descriptions of the two embedded cases, and method and data has been described in relation to the function of these in the research design, as well as time of data collection and amount of data. Further, the analysis of data has been described, especially how Nvivo Software has been deployed. Finally, Van de Ven's (Van de Ven, 2007) concept of engaged scholarship has been explained and the application of it elaborated on, based on explorative literature reviews of public innovation that justifies a pluralistic methodology.

In the next chapter, I describe the empirical context of the bottom-up leadership case.

# **CHAPTER 5.**

## **CONTEXT OF BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP CASE: AREA-BASED PROGRAMS AND DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBOURHOODS IN THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN**

The research focus in this thesis investigates issues of leadership through a single-case study approach. The empirical context for the case study is The City of Copenhagen. In one of the seven central administrations, The Technical and Environmental Administration ('TEA'), a newly established office sets in motion an organisational innovation process aimed at increased coordination across administrations. This happens in 2008. The office is called 'Neighbourhood Development', and is responsible for managing area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood Development is successful in influencing its collaborators: its own administration and mayor, the other administrations, as well as the powerful social housing sector.

In 2012, when my case study ends, the endeavours of the office and its collaborators have resulted in developments of a larger scale than the office had expected in 2008: A powerful cross-administrative set-up has been developed, involving all seven mayors, directors and professionals from each administration; a Partnership Forum has been established between municipality and the social housing sector; and finally, an ambitious area-based policy has been approved unanimously among local politicians and mayors, the 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen'. In this chapter, I describe this development process and the context of this in more detail.

Now, before going more in depth with the specific elements developed as a consequence of the innovation process, I provide in section 5.1 the reader with guidance for understanding what kind of institutional development that has been going on since 1998-2012 in The City of Copenhagen. I do this by means of explaining the prescriptive theories of two well-acknowledged scholars within governance literature that addresses the institutional and strategic design challenges related to disadvantaged areas.

In section 5.2 I provide a brief overview of the Danish experience with using area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods from 1998 to 2008; this overview is important, in that it provides the reader with an understanding of the function of the programs in dealing with the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and how this function entails the citizen-related ‘bottom-up’ design principles explained in section 5. This understanding will allow the reader to understand, how the involved administrations (TEA, EIA) interpreted this experience critically in order to establish a legitimate claim for change.

In section 5.3 I provide a brief description of the complex and silo-divided way in which The City of Copenhagen is organized. This organisational overview will allow the reader to understand why working across administrative boundaries is a leadership challenge. In section 5.4 I also provide an organisational diagram describing the organisational position of Neighbourhood Development.

In section 5.5 I describe the innovation process year by year. Despite its length, this process description is important, in that it will allow the reader to understand how the leadership exercised by Neighbourhood Development resulted in specific outcomes. These specific outcomes will also be described.

In section 5.6 I combine the descriptions from the previous sections in order to assess the institutional change that the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen has generated. I do so by deploying neighbourhood governance concepts explained in section 5 to the context description of the case, producing a phase model that explains how the innovation process in the City of Copenhagen has created value in terms of enhancing the institutional design related to deal with disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

Finally, I sum up, relating the findings of this context-chapter to research question.

## **5.1 THE POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN: PROMOTING AREA BASED GOVERNANCE BY FACILITATING LOCAL-CENTRAL COLLABORATION**

In this section, I outline key literature that deals with area based governance in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Sirianni, 2009)(Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003). The purpose of the literature is to allow the reader to understand, what the overall purpose of the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen is, and what contribution bottom-up leadership makes to promote more efficient neighbourhood governance. Consequently, I only use the literature in order to create a heuristic



framework that demonstrates what the contributions and challenges related to this innovation are.

Interpreting the context of this thesis within the governance frameworks explained below, the innovation that I study can be regarded as an emergent development of a new institutional framework in local government. The challenge is to make efficient linkages between central administrations, between administrations and social housing organisations, and between central administrations and local stakeholders at the neighbourhood level, mainly street level bureaucrats and front-line staff. Coordination is crucial here, so is central-administrative reform strategies. The thesis exemplifies this institutional development by focusing on how area based programs both have informed this development and, in the end, is transformed by it.

Accordingly, the Copenhagen case of collaborative innovation leadership can be understood as a process demonstrating in detail the emerging of specific institutional design principles.

As will be explained further down below, Fung and Sirianni both argues that if citizen involvement in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is to be exploited to the fullest, a certain institutional set-up is required. This institutional set-up requires that different principles are applied. One of these institutional design principles required is that a strategic, coordinating central administration is established that is flexible enough to deal with the complex, differentiated and interrelated set of problems these neighbourhoods are dealing with. The Copenhagen case is such a case: an inter-organizational development project initiated at the central level has been evolving since 2007, aiming at coordination across administrations and through a partnership with the social housing sector. A cross-administrative policy and organization for socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods have been developed and approved of. Large-scale development plans for disadvantaged city areas have been approved of.

The thesis therefore demonstrates a trajectory concerning the development of a certain municipal program: how working with area based programs in socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods for more than a decade has been a vital discursive underpinning of a central-administrative reform in The City of Copenhagen. Since the late 90s, municipalities in Denmark have been using the 'area based program'-approach as one of the main tools to address some of the extraordinary needs of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The programs are organized as projects, working with the neighbourhood characteristics and local stakeholders, co-financed by central and local government, involving the different administrations and local stakeholders in an ad hoc fashion, in accordance with each program's objectives. However, the innovation process in the City of Copenhagen raises the question of whether this program level approach has been sufficient. The case points to an

alternative development path for the area based approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods, a path in which the programs are being assigned a more fixed institutional function, and in which the area based approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods is moved from program-level to policy-level.

The thesis thereby demonstrates a local governmental innovation that can be explained in the following way: Welfare provision at the neighbourhood level in socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods can be more efficient and innovative insofar a central-administrative reform is implemented that coordinates the sector-divided municipal activities through a city district planning level; the central-administrative reform is to be stabilized by means of a cross-administrative and political partnership-structure that allows for a continuous management of political, administrative and strategic conflicts between the involved stakeholders.

In the section below, I outline key literature that is specific enough to contextualise the institutional features of the Copenhagen innovation.

### **5.1.1. ARCHON FUNG & ERIC OLIN WRIGHT: OVERCOMING THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN CENTRALISATION AND LOCALISATION**

(Fung & Wright, 2003) argue that empowered participatory governance can be summarized along three principles:

- Practical orientation
- Bottom-up participation
- Deliberative solution

In practice, this ideal is advanced in practice by three design properties:

- Devolution
- Centralized supervision and coordination
- State-centered, not voluntaristic, reforms, i.e. the purpose is to remake official institutions along the principles listed above

The application of principles and design properties will result in 'accountable autonomy'. Fung (Fung, 2004) points out that it is very much a form of "bottom-up innovation" which is the driver of accountable autonomy:

*"While new public management strategies claim to invite citizen participation...(...)they depend predominantly on the resourceful action of professionals at the street, school, and headquarter levels (...)Much more than new managerial strategies...accountable autonomy encourages the incorporation of local values and knowledge into public decisions" (ibid. p. 13).*

The role of central government is thus to facilitate local action by making focused assessments, develop new institutional cultures, ensure cross-functional coordination, and ensure trust-building between participants. In a democracy perspective, this will enable an empowered participation.

Fung's normative foundation rests on a dual argument: that 'Empowered participation' is better than existing forms of citizen participation in public governance, so far that citizen participation 1) is more responsive, and 2) provide a better distribution of resources. At the same time this citizen participation must result in 3) innovation, and 4) efficiency. As such, citizen participation is not an end in itself. This is evidenced by the following quote:

*"Even if some version of participatory democracy is feasible, it might not be very desirable as a path of reform. The core argument of this book is that troubled public agencies such as urban police departments and school systems can become more responsive, fair, innovative and effective by incorporating empowered participation and deliberation into their governance structures" (Fung 2004: 3)*

Fung argues that in some cases it makes more quality for public action if the programs are decentralised, in that decentralization permits public action to tailor measures to suit local stakeholders' needs or preferences (p. 4). 'Devolution' also allow local stakeholders (residents, teachers, police, etc.) to create new ideas and implement them as innovations (p. 5). Third, local knowledge is used to improve the effectiveness of public actions already under way in the area, such as better patrolling and knowledge of the crime. Fourth, committed citizens are provided resources and expertise in order to take action.

However, local solutions are sometimes borne by the local parties themselves. This can lead to bias and favouritism as a result of local power struggle and an exclusion of certain groups (p. 6).

Accountable autonomy denotes an apparent contradiction, in that the term describes a circumscribed local autonomy since this autonomy is being monitored, supported and evaluated centrally. Autonomy locally lies in the understanding of independence

from the central power in order to build up capacity of local actors in order for them to pursue their own objectives (p. 6).

Fung states through two case studies that apparently it requires certain prerequisites before the actions of empowered participation can be successful:

1. External support, in the form of ad hoc assistance from various government agencies or external funding
2. That there must be an incentive for local stakeholders to work together in a common cause. A blocking factor may include infighting among the resident (p. 7)

In relation to the second prerequisite centralized authority in the form of external assessments can help to reduce local power struggles.

The role of central authorities in order to support the local developments is:

1. providing various forms of support to local groups
2. Hold these groups accountable that their autonomy is being used to generate efficiency and democracy (p. 8).

Of particular interest is the fact that Fung refers to the ‘central-local dichotomy’, stating that this dichotomy is dominant in our understanding of political structure and organizational design (p. 69). Each model has its advantages and disadvantages, and Fung argues therefore that it is necessary to have a hybrid model where the central level supports and monitors the locals, and where the locals engage civil society and innovate:

*“the dichotomy between centralization and decentralization dominates our notions of political structure and organizational design. This chapter nevertheless argues that a hybrid design, in which local autonomy requires centralized support and accountability and in which accomplishing broader aims requires street-level innovation and civic engagement, is more promising than either simple centralization or decentralization” (ibid., p. 70).*

Fung gives an example in which the central city government was especially confused about who should take initiatives and leadership in relationships with schools, and points out that although there is still a central power, it has been reconfigured to support, rather than control. Central support is needed in order to create local autonomy (p. 70):

*”Surveying the range of these mechanisms underscores the importance of robust, albeit reconfigured, centralized power for the sake of local deliberative autonomy and illuminates the variety of design challenges whose answers require rejecting the dichotomy between centralization and devolution. The political conflicts between proponents of local control and central authority highlight the practical difficulties of overcoming this dichotomy and establishing a stable hybrid form” (p. 70)*

Fung summarizes the dilemmas of participatory decentralization and argue that a hybrid design is to cope with the following challenges (p. 70-71):

- Difficulties in mobilizing citizens and disseminate information on the participants' opportunities and benefits
- To ensure that participants have the properties and the knowledge necessary to conduct a consultation ('deliberation') and solve public problems effectively
- To ensure that participants have commitment and decision-making power to implement their choice
- Domination and exclusion of certain groups as a result of power inequalities between the groups, or between groups and professional
- The high variability of quality across urban areas which occur as a result of decentralization
- Provincialism and consequent inefficiency in problem solving
- Local actors' dependence on resources and organizations outside their own control range

So, Fung’s framework is relevant for this thesis in that it highlights that problems at the neighbourhood level can only be solved by building institutional frameworks that combine the advantages of central-administrative governance with the advantages of involving citizens and stakeholder knowledge at the local level.

### **5.1.2.CARMEN SIRIANNI: POLICY DESIGN FOR INCREASED CITIZEN SELF-GOVERNMENT**

In this section I outline Sirianni’s approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods. I do so by explaining the eight design principles for collaborative governance that she proposes, and by describing the institutional challenges that her study of Seattle’s

neighbourhood empowerment and planning practice demonstrates. By doing so, I illustrate the difficulties that may also be a context factor in the Copenhagen case.

Carmen Sirianni (Sirianni, 2009) approaches local problems by using concepts of complexity as well as a multi-level approach to 'collaborative governance'. Sirianni's outset is that the complexity of public problems is a core challenge of governance.

Sirianni's contribution is to couple the increasing complexity of public problems with the fact that democracy is waning. Sirianni notes that the 'self-governance' of ordinary citizens is becoming more and more expensive due to complexity: "*various general factors drive the cost side of civic problem solving and collaborative governance. Among the most important are the increasing complexity of public problems, the growing diversity of publics, and the rising expectations of citizens for voice and inclusion.*" (p. 13). Put in another way: government is inclined to become more and more expensive if citizens are not involved in governance in new ways.

Of empirical relevance to this dissertation is Sirianni's analysis of neighbourhood empowerment and planning in Seattle, the State of Washington. Sirianni's analysis describes in detail how Seattle during two decades developed its neighbourhood system. The city developed a Neighbourhood Matching Fund Program, and consolidated its neighbourhood service centers in a Department of Neighbourhoods, giving the directors of this department training, a training which allowed the Department to train neighbourhood groups (p. 68). This setup, enforced by thirteen district councils, and supported by staff through the coordinators of the neighbourhood service centers, is to a high degree a decentralized way of involving citizens and local stakeholder, which the neighbourhood service centers facilitate interaction at the local level and see it as their role to develop local leadership (p. 79). Sirianni's analysis also describes how neighbourhood plans were developed by citizens, and was supported in their implementation by the fact that the mayor in 1998 decentralized various city departments into six sectors, so that local departmental units could collaborate with the neighbourhood plans (p. 100). And the mayor urged departments to align their budget with the priorities of neighbourhood plans. In all, this led to a cultural change in planning, in which planners felt obliged to take into account the work done by the citizens (p. 102).

Sirianni concludes that the design principles of policy developed piecemeal faces important challenges if to remain robust in a dynamic economic, demographic and political environment. First of all, budget cuts accelerated during a mayor with a centralist leadership style has eroded much of the civic infrastructure, reducing the muscles of Department of Neighbourhoods by removing key staff, the so-called neighbourhood development managers. As such, there is a tendency to revert to bureaucratic silos (p. 109); the trust between neighbourhood leaders and

departments erodes quickly when new staff did not receive the proper training and disenchantment arose among experienced neighbourhood leaders.

What the study in my opinion thus demonstrates in terms of the enhancement of collaborative innovation and governance, is how much of the stability of the institutional design that is dependent on central support, especially the support of decision makers – and how quickly the pendulum can move once again towards centralization and bureaucratic silos. The study also demonstrates, according to Sirianni, that despite major challenges with the design of both neighbourhood empowerment and the leadership style of central decision makers, a collaborative governance culture seem to have emerged in Seattle and its surrounding region, both in terms of stakeholder mind-set as well as in the city's new strategies (p. 116).

Sirianni argues that the fiscal and democratic challenges can be dealt with insofar as collaborative governance and policy to some degree apply eight design principles. The first five principles are directed towards the local level, whereas the remaining three are directed towards the collaborative level (p. 42):

- Coproduce public goods: public goods are increasingly complex, and thus require that citizens are coproducers.
- Mobilize community assets: The line of reasoning here being that even the poorest communities have resources that can be mobilized
- Share professional expertise: All professionals engaged with policy should use their expertise to empower citizens. Conversely, citizens have local knowledge about the environment, crime, pollution etc. that can inform professional practice. This principle thus advocates that a mix of knowledge types gives the most efficient solutions.
- Enable public deliberation: policy should promote public deliberation among citizens. The value here being that deliberation can produce insights otherwise unavailable to elected representatives or public administrators; deliberation also make citizens appreciate varied perspectives and thus gives higher legitimacy to decisions.
- Promote sustainable partnerships: policy should encourage collaboration amongst relevant stakeholders.
- Build fields and governance networks strategically: this principle of a network form of governance ensures that complex public problems are dealt with in a sustainable manner, thus combining all relevant governance components together in the best possible way.
- Transform institutional cultures: this principle requires that government institutions support the principles above.
- Ensure reciprocal accountability: when engaging in collaboration, and thus sharing power, influence, expertise, resources and knowledge, accountability becomes complicated and crucial.

So, for Sirianni, innovation is on a governance level, i.e. when a public sector authority (agency, state, local government) alters its way of governing in a way that applies as many as the above design principles in so far as the problem at hand requires it. Like Fung, this broad framework has numerous outputs, the overarching aim for Sirianni being an increased capability of citizens to self-govern.

### 5.1.3.DISCUSSING AND SUMMING UP FUNG AND SIRIANNI

The authors both agree that in order to deal with the complex problems in welfare societies, stakeholders and especially citizens have to be involved in coproducing solutions. It is the adaption to this principle that is supposed to create more efficient governance, i.e. a governance whose solutions are cheaper, that are more sustainable because they are adapted to local circumstances, and innovative, i.e. that generates as much value as possible in that solutions are coproduced by a set of diverse stakeholders.

**FIGURE 8: OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CARMEN SIRIANNI AND ARCHON FUNG & ERIC OLIN WRIGHTS**

	The problem	The solution	Principles and design properties	The outcome
Fung, Fung & Wright	Overcoming the local-central dichotomy	Empowered participatory governance:  Accountable Autonomy as institutional design	I. Practical orientation II. Bottom-up participation III. Deliberative solution IV. Devolution V. Centralized supervision and coordination VI. State-centered, not voluntaristic, i.e. a purpose is to remake official institutions along	- Governance innovations  -fairness  -Increased efficiency  -local innovations



			the principles	
Sirianni	‘an erosion of the activities and capacities of citizenship’ (p. 1)  ‘Self-governance is increasingly expensive’	government as a critical enabler of productive engagement and collaborative problem solving by engaging citizens and relevant stakeholders in collaborative governance	I. coproduce public goods II. mobilize community assets III. share professional expertise IV. enable public deliberation V. promote sustainable partnerships; VI. build fields and governance networks strategically VII. transform institutional cultures VIII. Ensure reciprocal accountability	More efficient governance  A revitalized democracy

As can be seen in Figure 8 above, there are many similarities between design principles, whether the principles are for institutional design or policy design. Fung’s principles I-III is very similar to Sirianni’s principles I-V. Sirianni operates with a horizontal governance design principle (VI), whereas Fung conceptualizes his conception of governance more narrowly in terms of supervision and coordination. Fung’s principle VI is also quite similar to Sirianni’s no. VII. and Sirianni’s no. VIII is similar to Fung’s principle VI.

A guiding metaphor for my understanding of the above frameworks consists of the concepts vertical, horizontal and integrative. Fung provides the clue for this metaphor when he states that we have to overcome the dichotomy of ‘local-central’. This metaphor thus invokes a top, i.e. the central-administrative, strategic power level that has the ability to take strategic decisions on devolution and coordination; and a bottom, i.e. citizens, street level bureaucrats, local professional service providers. These two entities have to be integrated in order to create synergy. Sirianni invokes the same metaphor in her design principles, and adds a horizontal dimension, that of partnership building and networked governance. Also here we

find a horizontal integration in that actors have to be linked to each other in a non-hierarchical manner.

The authors differ in their insistence on how to apply the design principles. Sirianni (Sirianni, 2009) seems to argue for a flexible list of principles, arguing that not all principles will be relevant in every instance, even though her case studies apply most, if not all, of these principles. In this respect, it is the exact *combination* of applied principles that ultimately is the mechanism for producing knowledge analytical framework. (Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003) distinguishes between deduced *principles* and empirical applications of these principles as a *design*. Thus, in contrast to Sirianni, Fung & Wright's principles are the a priori assumptions drawn from democratic theory, whereas the design principles are to be applied in practice.

The frameworks of the authors, though much alike, do have some differences. Fung/Fung & Wright have a keen eye for principles relevant for the vertical dimension, i.e. the specific training and involvement of citizens. The consequence is here that even though design principles do address the central governance dimension, we do not receive many pieces of advice concerning *how* to strategically involve stakeholders in a horizontal exercise. The cases described by Fung/Fung & Wright remain in its understanding in vertical silos (school, policing), in which the strategic involvement is only addressed at the local level, and centralized power struggles are conceptualized more pragmatic as coordination. Accordingly, the wicked problem dimension in terms of cross-sectorial solutions seems not to be fully approached by the developed principles.

Sirianni's framework makes up for these weaknesses, since the principles of partnership and the strategic building of fields and governance networks address the central power dimensions; in Sirianni's case-study in Seattle, we are being given more insight into power struggles at the central level. This is also demonstrated in the somewhat gloomy conclusion of Sirianni's case-study, as with a new mayor, the whole decentralized organisational design concerning neighbourhood involvement in development work, built up during two decades, seems to quickly erode when a centralist new mayor is appointed.

As a result of the above exploration of governance frameworks addressing disadvantaged neighbourhoods, in this thesis I deploy in section 5.6 Fung and Sirianni's design principles in order to make a simple presentation of how the development process in the City of Copenhagen has developed the institutional framework for working with disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In order to do so, some background information concerning area-based programs in Denmark has to be conveyed.

## 5.2 AREA-BASED PROGRAMS IN DENMARK: NATIONAL EXPERIENCE

First, I provide a brief overview of the Danish experience with using area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods from 1998 to 2008; this overview is important, in that it provides the reader with an understanding of the function of the programs in dealing with the public problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This allows the reader to understand, how the two involved administrations (TEA, EIA) interpreted the somewhat mixed national experience with area based programs critically in order to establish a legitimate claim for change of this type of program in 2008 when the innovation project began. Further, this elaboration explains how area based programs arguably can be perceived as having design qualities that to a high extent capture Fung and Sirianni's bottom-up principles.

'Area-based programs' is a term that covers many other program names in which the content of the program is more or less identical. Another name for area-based programs in research literature is 'comprehensive community initiatives'. In this thesis, area-based programs are defined broadly as programs that seek to "*...promote positive change in individual, family, and community circumstances in disadvantaged neighbourhoods by applying the principles of comprehensiveness and community building to improve physical, social, and economic conditions.*" ((Fulbright-Anderson & Auspos, 2004). 10). As discussed by several scholars in (Connell, 1995), area-based programs as program types are especially difficult to evaluate due to complexity of the problems that the programs intend to solve.

The role that this type of program has in a Danish context is to be perceived as an extraordinary welfare initiative in disadvantaged areas that is supposed to counter the negative development of these areas. However, as the brief description below will reveal, the experience at present with these types of programs are somewhat mixed. The mixed experience is somewhat in contradiction to the initial optimism that surrounded the high-profiled and strong state support of these programs in the end-90s. In a historical perspective, the programs demonstrated a radical break with the existing planning practice towards disadvantaged areas. The existing planning practices prior to the launching of area based programs in a Danish context were mainly physical and top-down. The area based programs were perceived of as a radical break, in that in 1996, Neighbourhood Lift was perceived of as distinctive by being defined by the National City Commission as (Skifter Andersen, Kielgast, & Norvig Larsen, 2003):

- Addressing a selected geographically defined district,

- Being holistic, i.e. integrating resources from several public sector areas
- Involving local stakeholders in the district

The holistic, cross-sectorial, geographically bounded aspect, combined with huge efforts in facilitating the interaction of local residents and stakeholders symbolised a new way of conceptualising the problems of the areas. However, the large-scale, area-strategic aim of Neighbourhood Lift was not pursued by subsequent governments, with the impact that the funding of the programs was considerably reduced.

I will describe in short the Danish types of programs in more detail below, in order to provide the reader with knowledge of what types of programs that are involved in the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen, and how these programs operate.

First of all, in the history of municipally operated area based programs, *Kvarterløft*/'Neighbourhood Lift' and its contemporary successor, *Områdefornyelsen*/'Area Renewal' are the most important. Second, there are at present social and physical types of area-based programs operated by the social housing sector, supervised and sometimes co-financed by the relevant municipality, in Danish called a '*Helhedsplan*', meaning an 'entirety plan', which I translate into 'Comprehensive Plan' – a physical Comprehensive Plan and a social Comprehensive Plans. The physical Comprehensive Plans are uncontroversial in the context of this collaborative innovation process, and will not be described further.

In 1998, new urban renewal legislation was passed, the so called 'Holistic Area Renewal', which paved the way for the area-based programs called 'Neighbourhood Lifts' (Andersen et al., 2009). These programs were, compared to the succeeding area based programs, far the most ambitious ones. These programs came in two waves: the first seven Neighbourhood Lifts were launched in 1997-2002, with a total budget of DKK 1. 3bn (approx. 174.4m Euro) (Jensen & Munk, 2007); and the second wave, composed of five Neighbourhood Lifts, was launched in 2002-2008, with a total budget of DKK (approx. 120m Euro).

The main part of the funding was spent on improving housing conditions, between 80-90% (Jensen & Munk, 2007)<sup>51</sup>; (Andersen et al., 2009). The programs were funded nationally by the state, to which the City Council applies for funding. As the Danish evaluation reports show, the programs were relatively successful ((Jensen & Munk, 2007)<sup>54</sup>), despite the fact that effects sometimes are impossible to document (Skifter Andersen et al., 2003). On the basis of aggregated experience with evaluating the effects of area based programs, (Andersen, 2002) argues that both

purpose and effects of the area-based programs in Denmark and in Europe in general are unclear, due to the inadequate understanding of the nature of these deprived urban areas in which the programs operate.

In terms of organisation, the largest cities, such as Copenhagen, have had local secretariats in all area lifts, operated by a handful of municipal employees (Jensen & Munk, 2007)<sup>31</sup>), whereas in smaller municipalities, the secretariat is located closer to the Town Hall. Some advantages of local secretariats are easy access to local community ties, creation of local social capital and resident empowerment, enhancement of the holistic perspective due to increased local knowledge, sustaining of project momentum, and providing a voice to the local area. However, disadvantages of the local organisation of secretariats might be local isolation, lack of municipal ties, later on hampering the anchoring of the program; the risk of developing projects that counteract general municipal policy; the risk of enforcing the perception of the area as stigmatized, because it needs special area-based program-attention; and finally there may be conflicting issues of loyalty (municipal vs. the local area) for local working professionals in the secretariat. A main conclusion is that the area-based programs and their projects must be located closer to the municipality in order to ensure ownership of the projects (*ibid.*, p. 31).

Further, research demonstrates that Neighbourhood Lift often has the disadvantage that the programs are being targeted towards goals defined by the funding ministry, which may not be in alignment with residential experience of the problems (Mazanti, 2002).

Problems are also often mentioned in relation to the area-based approach in Denmark concerning the issue of shared ownership of the area-based programs across administrative units. In evaluations of area renewals, only the administration with technical planning expertise is typically involved in the programs, the other administrations contributing somewhat reluctantly (Engberg, Hansen, & Norvig Larsen, 2008); the programs face the barrier that despite their holistic perspective, the programs are perceived of as being within the resort of the technical and planning administrations. Some municipalities suggest that this can be overcome by distributing the funding centrally in the municipality, instead of only to the technical administration (*ibid.*).

So, despite the relative success of Kvarterløft/Neighbourhood Lift, these large-scale programs were not continued. The area-based programs still operating in Denmark are called 'Områdefornyelse' (Area Renewal), and are nationally funded. This funding frame is considerably smaller than that of Neighbourhood Lift: around DKK 60 m a year<sup>ii</sup>, plus an annual frame of DKK 40 m for additional building renovations in the areas where Area Renewal is operating. The municipality is expected to co-finance the double amount.

The City of Copenhagen describes ‘Area Lift/Area Renewal’ in much the same way as Neighbourhood Lift, in that it (TEA 2012: 7<sup>iii</sup>):

- Aims to initiate positive development of the chosen areas
- Has a well-defined geographical boundary
- Is comprehensive and all-embracing
- Takes its starting point in the policies and strategies of the City of Copenhagen
- Is based on citizen participation and local involvement
- Is limited to a six-year period
- Is generally financed by public funds but is co-financed by foundations, residents and businesses
- Consists of three phases: a district plan phase, an implementation phase and an anchoring phase

Now we turn to the social area-based program operated by the social housing sector. As part of the governmental Housing Agreement in 2005 and 2006, the National Building Fund generated by the social housing sector was commissioned to launch both social and massive physically Comprehensive Plans: From 2007-10, DKK 2.4bn /Year for physical renovations, and 400 Mio. DKK 400m /Year (approx. 295, 2m Euro) (Boligaftalen 2006), and from 2011-2016, DKK 18bn for physical renovations, and DKK 440m/year, a total of DKK 2.64bn , for social Comprehensive Plans (Boligaftalen 2010).

Differences and similarities exist between area renewal and social Comprehensive Plans. Area Renewal operates on a city district level. The Comprehensive Plans also have an area-based focus, but this is limited to the social housing block of flats and its tenants as the working unit. The largest Comprehensive Plans also have a local secretariat operated by employees from the social housing sector. As these social housing areas are the main problem areas in Denmark, two different types of area-based programs could in practice be operating in the same neighbourhoods, but with different project owners (local governments vis á vis social housing organisations), and on the basis of different neighbourhood plans.

So, to sum up the national experience with area based programs when the collaborative innovation in The City Copenhagen in 2007-2008 is put into motion, it is fair to say that the programs were relative successful, but did not in itself provide a ‘solution’ to the wicked problem of disadvantaged areas. The effects of the programs were somewhat unclear; evaluation of the programs draws attention to challenges of the municipal sector-based administrations in terms of cooperating

with each other in a way that mirrored the ‘holistic’ ambitions of the area based programs.

Despite these mixed experiences and a lack of future agenda for these area-based programs, no other extraordinary program solution to disadvantaged areas has been put in its place, and governments has since the downscaling of the state-funded programs made legislation that de facto defines the problems as a social housing sector problem, by enforcing the Central Distribution Fund of the Danish social housing organisations to fund social and physical Comprehensive Plan. Furthermore, these types of programs do, despite their limitations mark a radical break with prior physical, top-down planning procedures, emphasizing citizen-and stakeholder involvement in the formulation of a holistic neighbourhood solution.

So, the situation in 2007 is that two types of area based programs, both with a social focus and both having the possibility of being enhanced by funding for physical renovations and city renewal funding, are operating simultaneously in some disadvantaged areas, both having the ambition of providing a holistic solution to complex neighbourhood problems.

Having now described area based programs, I will turn to the organisational context of the City of Copenhagen.

### **5.3 THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT: THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN AND THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT**

In the empirical analyses below some of the civil-servants refer to the municipality as ‘the seven headed beast’, pointing to the fact that the municipality is divided in seven sector-based administrations, each having its own political committee and its own mayor. Accordingly, a strong background-narrative when doing my fieldwork and interviews is that working within this political and administrative structure is highly difficult and kaleidoscopic. In this section I briefly outline some explanations for this professional experience.

Sector-divided municipal administrations in general seem to place some restraints on holistic types of programs such as area-based programs in types of ownership (see section 5.2). The administration structure in The City of Copenhagen seems to impose even heavier constraints on area-based programs. (Engberg & Larsen, 2010) have made an analysis of the early parts of the development process that I also analyse in this thesis, arguing that the coordination of place-based politics and programs suffers from problems due to the complex governance structure of the city administration (p. 555). According to (Engberg & Larsen, 2010), the consequence of the municipal governance system is that the mayors do not have the ruling authority

in their own committees or the ruling majority in the city council. The mayors negotiate all issues on a case by case basis. As a consequence, the administrative governance is divided between the seven mayors and the managing directors. Thus, each administration is subject to the authority of both mayor and standing committee. (Engberg & Larsen, 2010) argue that this governance system generates tensions and conflicts within administrations and between administrations, hampering cross-administrative coordination and integration.

That the municipal governance structure in the City of Copenhagen is rather complex, difficult to navigate in and heavily politicised is further demonstrated by research (Berg, 2004) and by the fact that in 2006 the Financial Committee in the City of Copenhagen established a commission with the purpose of qualifying a political basis for assessing the need and wishes of a change of the municipal governance reform in Copenhagen (Københavns Kommune, 2007); the political process of a future change in the municipal governance structure was running concurrently with the collaborative innovation process that I studied. This process was met with resistance at the national governmental level, in which one of the governmental parties with relations to municipal politicians in the City of Copenhagen openly rejected the option of legislation concerning a reform of this type of municipal governance structure in the four biggest cities in Denmark<sup>iv</sup>. This political process came to a final halt in 2013, in which the government decided to abandon this reform project altogether<sup>v</sup>.

The motivation for The City of Copenhagen to establish a commission looking critically at the rule of government is, according to the commission, that “*in order to ensure a modern and dynamic municipal organisation*” ((Københavns Kommune, 2007), including comprehensiveness and coherence in the municipal service to citizens and business, the City of Copenhagen is in need of an organisation that supports the possibilities of holistic thinking and a coherent municipal strategy across municipal administrations (ibid. p. 6).

Rikke Berg (Berg, 2004) provides explanations to why actors in the municipal organisation in The City of Copenhagen as well as nationally have an experience of sector-divided stove-pipes and lack of strategic possibilities across administrations. Berg assesses Danish municipal governance forms, comparing these with international examples. According to Berg’s typology, the governance in Copenhagen can be regarded as an instance of a ‘government by committees’ (in Danish: udvalgsstyre). In this type of municipal government, the municipal council is the superior body of decisions. The chair of the council meetings is being managed by a mayor, who has the responsibility for the political agenda, but otherwise does not have more formal power than the rest of the council. The administration is taken care of by a number of standing committees. The committees are composed according to a principle of proportion that guarantees a broad



representation of political parties. Each committee is being led by a committee chairman, elected by a majority in the committee. A defining characteristic of this type of government is that all politicians are both defining the principles for each administration and are also taking part in the executive functions in the municipal organisation. Copenhagen is a specific instance of this municipal governance form, a so-called 'intermediated form' (in Danish: mellemformsstyre) in which the committee chairs is selected by another method of selection, and are full-time employed. The administrative management is furthermore divided between the mayor and the committee chairs. These committee chairs are like the mayor automatic members of the finance committee (p. 14-15).


According to Berg, the committee-model promotes different considerations. First of all the inclusion of layman, since all elected politicians are taking part in the executive functions. This consideration furthermore ensures a distribution of power, because much of the power ascribed to the executive power is distributed among mayors, financial committee, standing committees and the municipal council. The power is also distributed amongst politicians and civil servants. The third consideration that this type of government promotes is consensus, since the committees are expected to reach agreement concerning the use of public means. The fourth consideration is stability, related to the consensus aspects of this government model.

However, according to Berg, such a government by committees also restrains other considerations (Berg, 2004). Firstly, since power is distributed it can be difficult to assign responsibility to decisions made. Second, because all politicians share responsibility there is no incentive for politicians to demonstrate a powerful political leadership. Accordingly, a weak political leadership actually promotes stability. Thirdly, the consideration of democratic control is also restrained by the fact that lay politicians are involved not just in terms of formulating political principles, but also in the executive affairs of government. This makes it difficult for politicians to control the administration. Accordingly, the political level is closely interwoven with the administrative level, an aspect that hinders the governability in the municipal organisation. According to Berg, the commission working with a given remit will identify with it, hence being advocates of spending instead of minimizing budgets. Through the work of the standing commissions high ranking civil servants have easy access to make alliances with the political level. These conditions both increase the level of spending within the specific sector, but also restrain the overall and cross-sectorial coordination.

## 5.4 ORGANISATIONAL DIAGRAM OF NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT


Through four figures below I have depicted the organisational framework of the studied collaborative innovation. The first figure, Figure 9, is adopted from Berg's general model for 'Government by Committees' (Berg, 2004), by simply stating the names of committees and administrations. This is the overall organisational framework.

FIGURE 9: MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN



In the subsequent Figure 10 I have depicted the administration (The Technical- and Environmental Administration, ‘TEA’ for short) in which the organisational unit in the focus of analysis, Neighbourhood Development, is located. As can be seen in the figure, TEA consists of an administrative management: a board of directors, a department for resources and a Town Hall secretary. Below this administrative management is ten Departments, (or centres), among which is Department for Urban Design, having a couple of hundred employees.


**FIGURE 10: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION**



**IN THE SUBSEQUENT FIGURE,**

Figure 11: Dept. for Urban Design, I have depicted Department for Urban Design. This department has its own director and secretariat and is divided in six sub-departments, in which Neighbourhood Development is one of those sub-departments.


**FIGURE 11: DEPT. FOR URBAN DESIGN**



In the final Figure 12 below, I have depicted Neighbourhood Development. The office consists on the central-administrative level by a middle manager and staff, approximately two secretaries and about ten full-time employed civil servants at the central level. It is the central-administrative part of Neighbourhood Development which is the bottom-up leadership unit studied.

Locally, at neighbourhood level, this central-administrative office supports the running of around four to six Area-Renewal programs on a running basis, in which two new area based programs are launched every year, all operated by full-time employed staff, each Area-Renewal Program having a local manager and around five employees. Furthermore, Neighbourhood Development facilitates, monitors and evaluates the social housing sector's social Comprehensive Plans. The total number of employees has been increased during the case-study. In 2012 Neighbourhood Development has in total 65 employees, 20 employed centrally.

**FIGURE 12: ORGANISATIONAL DIAGRAM OF NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT**



## **5.5 THE CASE STUDY: A DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN**

Figure 13 below displays the major events for each year, from 2007-2012. The outputs marked with an asterisk denote parts of the process that I have chosen as suitable ‘embedded’ cases (Yin, 2009) for my study of how collaborative innovation leadership is constructed and exercised by Neighbourhood Development. The first embedded case concerns the attempts of Neighbourhood Development to establish a cross-administrative evaluation practice in 2009. The second embedded case concerns the attempts of Neighbourhood Development and its allies to establish a cross-administrative policy (2010-2011). I use the term ‘embedded case’ in order

to emphasise that I have chosen to focus on specific parts of the process in the case study; arguably, these will provide us with general knowledge of leadership in this specific part of the development process. These cases were chosen because they exposed the leadership challenges of Neighbourhood Development at two different points in time, thus providing us with knowledge of how this leadership changes over time in order to match the most pressing challenges.

**FIGURE 13: EVENTS AND OUTPUT IN THE COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION PROCESS (2007-2012)**

Year and headline	Description of output
2007: Initiation of strategy process	Support is acquired for initiating a strategy process concerning the increasing number of area-based programs
2008: Approval of strategy report	Approval of strategy report <sup>vi</sup> ;  Merging of area-based offices  New name and leader for the newly established office - Neighbourhood Development
2009: Implementation of strategy report recommendations	*Cross-administrative qualitative evaluation practice of the social housing sectors 'Comprehensive Plans'*  Cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: 'The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map' <sup>vii</sup>  Consolidation of the area-based remit in TEA/Neighbourhood Development
2010: New cross-administrative organisation, partnership, and commission for policy	New Intra-Municipal Governance structure implemented  New Partnership Forum Created between municipality and social housing sector  Terms of reference acquired for a cross-administrative policy

	<p>*Initiating policy formulation process*</p> <p>New demands for municipal approval of the social housing sector's 'Comprehensive Plans'<sup>viii</sup></p>
2011: Policy Approval	<p>*Policy formulation process continued*</p> <p>A change in commission</p> <p>*"Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen" is approved of<sup>ix</sup>*</p>
2012: Policy Implementation	<p>Three out of six 'Development Plans' are approved of in the 2012-budget negotiations in The City of Copenhagen<sup>x</sup></p>

*2007: Initiation of strategy process*

In 2007 a strategy process was initiated in close cooperation between TEA and the Employment and Integration Administration (EIA), concerning area-based programs. A researcher from Danish Building Research Institute was running the process and was responsible for producing an analysis and a set of recommendations to improve the area-based practice. The City of Copenhagen, The National Association of Local Governments, The Ministry of Welfare and the Danish Building Research Institute jointly financed this development project. The project was completed with a project report entitled 'The Horizontal Pillar: a strategic development perspective concerning the coordination of area-based programs in The City of Copenhagen' (Engberg, 2008).

This happened in a context in which two offices in TEA's planning department 'Urban Design Department' were experiencing increasing problems of cooperation and coordination of their programs operating in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the city. One of the offices, 'Area Lift', was managing the area-based programs conducted by the City of Copenhagen itself. The other office, 'The Comprehensive Plan Team', part of the 'Social Housing' office was managing area-based programs run by the social housing sector, co-financed and approved of by the City of Copenhagen. In TEA, the Comprehensive Plan Team was experiencing problems with the very rapid increase in the number of Comprehensive Plans, going from 22 to an estimated number of 34. The Team was experiencing that the other administrations were lacking in goals for these initiatives as the Comprehensive Plans were considered as belonging to TEA's turf. This hampered the provision of municipal resources to co-finance the Comprehensive Plans (Engberg, 2008).

Not just TEA, but also the Integration and Employment Administration were operating policies and programs that addressed extraordinary welfare problems in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. At this point in time, EIA was operating six area-based initiatives area-based, such as crime preventive Hot Spot initiatives, Job Patrols targeting citizens on social benefits, a Job Bus, outreach efforts targeting youth, a voluntary centre constituting part of an Area Lift, a Task Force aimed at counselling on integration and employment issues. Finally, EIA was involved in the area-based programs in general. These EIA initiatives were supporting EIAs emigration policy, in which a goal was to stop the trend towards more disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Engberg, 2008).

*2008: Approval of strategy report: "The "Horizontal Pillar". A Strategic Development Perspective for the Coordination of Area-Based Interventions in the City of Copenhagen'*

The report was finally approved in ultimo 2008. The report presented six recommendations, based on interviews with middle managers, special consultants and civil servants mainly from TEA and EIA, and the recommendations were aiming at increased coordination. The report defined its strategic development perspective to be one that "contains an idea of a collective response to the coordination challenge. In this response there is both a common understanding of the problem, some practical, operational tools and an offer of coordinated and systematic management practices. Under the heading of *The Horizontal Pillar*, a concrete suggestion for a development perspective for better coordination of area-based interventions in Copenhagen is presented" (Engberg, 2008). The report identifies several governance challenges. First of all, there is need for better area-based governance, professionalization of the area-based programs, and an evaluation practice of the programs. Second, a horizontal challenge exists, in that the practices of the administrations are not coordinated. Third, there is a vertical challenge, in that



the local activities and central-administrative practices are poorly integrated (p. 49). The report further describes an institutional shortcoming, in that the area-based-programs require a horizontal administrative practice in order to be successful; the horizontal practice is hampered by the silo-divided administrations. Further, the report describes that the area-based programs and the established municipal activities are difficult to integrate, due to their different perceptions of goals and types of means to reach these goals: typically, area-based programs are of a temporal character and logically focused on development, whereas already established municipal activities are of a permanent character, focused on steady operation (p. 50). The report further states, that party-political disagreements lead to difficulties with prioritizing and working across areas of responsibility; that the size of the administrations makes it difficult to establish an overview of the many activities taking place in the disadvantaged areas; that it is unclear what the effect of the programs is, which makes it difficult to further improve the area-based program as a program, and which makes it difficult to argue that this type of program is the best program for dealing with the disadvantaged areas; and that the strategic level of the area-based-programs is insufficient, leading to a lack of shared goals across administrations. All of these conditions lead to a lack of coordination of the municipal activities (p. 51).



The recommendations for addressing the problems described above, in order to generally coordinate a shared improvement of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, are as follows:

- A shared agreement and strategy running across the seven administrations in the City of Copenhagen
- An enhancement of the city area level as a planning framework for area-based programs
- A unified governance structure for area-based programs between EIA and TEA
- A shared negotiation and collaboration procedure between local and central parties of area-based programs in a new organisational structure.
- A tool for evaluating and monitoring area-based programs
- A socio-economic map of the city in order to coordinate and qualify the selection criteria for area-based programs (Engberg 2008: 18, my translation)

As a result of the strategy report, two offices in TEA have merged: one team from the office that manages the increasing number of the social housing sector's 'Comprehensive Plans', and one office that manages 'Area Renewal' programs. A new leader has become appointed from the Comprehensive Plan team, and later on a new name has been given to the office: 'Neighbourhood Development'.

#### *2009: Implementation of strategy report recommendations*

In 2009, the implementation of some of the recommendations from 'The Horizontal Pillar' began. The two offices have merged into one, called 'Neighbourhood Development' (in Danish, 'Kvarterudvikling'). The central ND office consists of about five full time employed civil servants and their middle manager, previously a project manager at the office of the 'Comprehensive Plan Team'; the local office comprises around 40 civil servants employed in Area Renewals. The implementation of the evaluation tool and the appliance of the socioeconomic map began. External events influenced the implementation process. In end-2009, new legislation was passed concerning the social housing sector, the so-called 'Governance Dialogue' (in Danish, 'Styringsdialogen'), in which the supervision of the social housing sector was moved from state to local government level (Socialministeriet, 2010; Velfærdsministeriet, 2008). The governmental purpose of

this move was, among others, to force local governments and the social housing sector to cooperate more closely on issues such as urban planning and housing policies. This influenced how the implementation of The Horizontal Pillar-project was carried out, in that both 'Governance Dialogue' and 'The Horizontal Pillar' emphasised closer cooperation and coordination among municipality and the social housing sector.

The following recommendations from the strategy report were implemented in 2009:

- A cross-administrative qualitative evaluation practice of the social housing sectors 'Comprehensive Plans'
- A cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: 'The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map'<sup>xi</sup>
- Consolidation of the area-based resort in TEA/Neighbourhood Development

*The evaluation practice* was commissioned by an administrative intra-municipal steering committee, and was supposed to seek inspiration in 'The Horizontal Pillar'. The evaluation practice was one of the recommended tools in 'The Horizontal Pillar' that was supposed to ensure increased quality in the area-based programs in general. The parties participating in the team responsible for implementing the evaluation template were TEA, EIA and SSA (The Social Services Administration).

*The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map* was developed as a side-project parallel with 'The Horizontal Pillar'-process. The digital socio-economic map was supposed to support the ways in which different areas of the city were supposed to be politically and administratively prioritized due to their problem characteristics. In order to be used as an analytical tool suitable for detecting areas with complex problems, data sources across the municipal administrations are supposed to be integrated in the Map. Likewise, the map can perform quantitative track changes in the areas targeted by area-based programs, and thus functions also as an evaluation tool.

*Consolidation of the area-based remit* in TEA was implemented by reducing the number of central steering committees for the different area-based programs, and by defining Neighbourhood Development as the body responsible for area-based programs.


*2010: New cross-administrative organisation, partnership and commission for a policy*

As a consequence of the new legislation, the ‘Governance Dialogue’, The City of Copenhagen and the social housing sector was in need of a formalized partnership in which the activities and strategies of the actors could be formally coordinated and conflicts could be dealt with. This process began already in 2008, and gained momentum in 2009. As this coordination need had much in common with the coordination aim of The Horizontal Pillar, these two policy streams were merged in ultimo 2009.

The implementation of The Horizontal Pillar-project was thus prolonged and to some extent re-invented. New working groups were established that were to redefine their functions within the new inter-organisational set-up across all seven administration units, involving a partnership with the social housing sector and a powerful top of decision makers, consisting of a ‘Mayor Forum’. Before this external event interfered, ND had so far been successful and was about to gather political consent concerning a political steering committee.

In June 2010, the new organisational structure was approved of<sup>xii</sup>. Consequently, in 2010, The Technical and Environmental Administration suggested (April 2010) that besides coordinating activities with the social housing sector, the organisation should also have a policy to guide its future collaborative action. The Technical and Environmental Administration was commissioned by The Board of Mayors and The Intra-Municipal Steering Committee to run a cross-administrative policy formulation process, initially having the same aim as stated in ‘The Horizontal Pillar’: to produce a policy for area -based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In September 2010, the Board of Mayors decided that a ‘policy for area-based-programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ should be outlined, with TEA as the coordinative administration, delegating the responsibility of this task to ND.

The director of the Urban Design Department in The Technical and Environmental Administration, ranking above ND and their middle manager, had the idea that the policy should be a ‘toolbox’ policy. The policy should contain all the feasible instruments (methods, activities) that the administrations had applied successfully in the disadvantaged areas so far. The logic behind this was that when discovering a new disadvantaged neighbourhood or city area, the directors in the steering committee as well as the mayors could easily acquire an overview as regards the instruments to be used in the exact city area.



Organisational diagram, showing an organisation at three levels; from left to right, the internal governance in Copenhagen City (green boxes), the joint Partnership Forum between Copenhagen and representatives from the social housing organisations (Blue boxes), levels of agreement (white boxes), and levels of decision making (grey circles). The model is my translated version of the organisational diagram in (Københavns Kommune, 2010)

Thus, the following outputs were created in 2010:

-The new 'Intra Municipal Governance' structure was implemented as part of a new internal organisation in The City of Copenhagen. The new organisation was to satisfy the demands for a better intra-municipal overview, a new way of organising the cooperation with the social housing sector, and the political anchoring of both relations to the housing sector and the area-based programs<sup>xiii</sup>:

- At level 1 the Intra-Municipal Governance and a Mayors Forum.
- At Level 2 an administrative, cross-administrative Steering committee comprised by level 2 directors,
- At level 3 theme groups. Level three is comprised by civil servants, including a 'Cross-administrative Team' ('CUT').

The purpose of the Mayors Forum is to ensure a political anchoring of agreements and strategies; political focus on development of the social housing areas; a proposal for political prioritization of goals for area-based programs and the development of the social housing areas in general (ibid.: 5).

-The New Partnership Forum was created between municipality and the social housing sector. The purpose of Partnership Forum is to provide 'one shared entrance' for the social housing sector to the municipality and vice versa; and to enable political prioritization of goals across municipal and housing organisational interests regarding area-based programs and the social housing areas in general (ibid.: 6). Here, mayors and seven representatives from the housing organisations' National Association's first circle are to cooperate.

-Commission acquired for a cross-administrative policy. In April 2010, a commission was applied for<sup>xiv</sup>. Here it was stated that the newly established Mayors Forum was supposed to initiate a 'shared municipal policy for working with the area-based programs' (ibid.3).

-Finally, Neighbourhood Development developed (on the basis of its new evaluation practice) new demands for municipal approval of the social housing sector's 'Comprehensive Plans'<sup>xv</sup>. These demands were supposed to increase the quality of the plans and ensure that the plans were coordinated with the municipal activities in the area. They emphasized that in the future, the City of Copenhagen will demand that the Comprehensive Plans are more extensive, thus making them less vulnerable to shifts in personnel; that the Comprehensive Plans should assess the implications of the plans more critically, and also be more thorough to ensure that initiatives are not launched in competition with municipal activities; that the plans should be regarded as development plans, but with the focus of developing and supporting already existing social housing and municipal activities; and that there should be an increased focus on the anchoring of developments as well as cooperation with municipal actors<sup>xvi</sup>.

#### *2011: Approval of policy*

Half way through The Policy Formulation process (March 1, 2011), the director for the Urban Design Department got a new job in another municipality. The municipal election in November 2009 had resulted in the election of a new mayor of The Technical and Environmental Administration. The mayor left the position after 18 months, and a new mayor was appointed in May 2011. For a period, ND experienced a leadership vacuum. This gave ND access to a higher ranking level-2director in TEA. Jointly, this alliance allowed for ND to suggest a change in the commission for the policy, from a focus on area-based programs, to a focus of a greater scope – disadvantaged city districts.

In September-November 2011, the Policy was approved in all seven committees. December 1, 2011, the 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas' was finally approved in the City Council (in Danish, 'Borgerrepræsentationen').

Preface  
 – joint responsibility, joint effort



With the policy for disadvantaged areas of Copenhagen we will focus our efforts on creating green growth and improving quality of life in disadvantaged parts of the city and on increasing the number of job opportunities which involve local players.

There are six disadvantaged areas in Copenhagen, parts of which are encompassed by a number of local areas of responsibility. The areas are: Nordhavn, Havnørst, Sønder Boulevard, Vesterbro/Sydhavn, Havnørst/Teglstrup and Vesterbro/Vestager.



**Higher population – greater differences**  
 In 2009, Copenhagen was voted the world's best city and its population is expected to increase by 100,000 people by 2025. Since it is today. For this reason and others, many new attractive areas of the city have been developed over recent decades, and more new areas are on their way.

At the same time, problems have accumulated in certain parts of the city. Among other things this is due to continued housing abandonment of public housing. This has led to a concentration of people with low income, low education and poor health levels. As a result, the gap between well-functioning and disadvantaged parts of the city has grown and this threatens the cohesion of the city.

We will fulfil these goals through building partnerships with everyone involved, preferential treatment of disadvantaged areas and increased focus on what works – instead of on operations.  
 We hope you will welcome the new policy for the city's disadvantaged areas.


**Focus on what works**  
 In the policy for disadvantaged areas of Copenhagen we have formulated a general vision for these areas: that the residents of disadvantaged areas will be able to find employment and education by 2020. Our goal is to ensure that the residents of disadvantaged areas use public schools, day-care facilities, after-school institutions and leisure and sports clubs to the same extent as the residents of other parts of the city. Our goal is to improve employment levels in the Copenhagen average, while a target is to ensure that disadvantaged areas are put as safe to live in and visit as other parts of the city.

Double page from Policy for Disadvantaged Areas of Copenhagen, symbolically showing all seven mayors sitting side by side

Besides the very important change in policy commission, the main outcome in 2011 was the approval of Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen. The overall goals in the Policy were that the areas should be ‘lifted to a general Copenhagen level’ by 2020, focusing first of all on generating employment and education for all



residents. Each of the seven administrations has its own goals, such as satisfaction with culture and leisure activities, youth education for 95% of the youth, a varied resident composition etc. The core means to reach these goals are preferential treatment of the areas requiring development of the core operations in the areas; such development should be shared jointly amongst all seven administrations, in a partnership with the social housing sector. The overall tool is the so called ‘Development Plans’: one Development Plan for each of the six disadvantaged city districts, identified by means of The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map, as displayed at one of the pages in ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’:



*Page from Policy for Disadvantaged Areas, demonstrating how The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map was being put into use to identify disadvantaged areas*

The development plans are supposed to be formulated and implemented in ‘two waves’: the first three to be drawn up in 2012, the final three in 2013. The Development Plans are described as ‘a prioritisation tool for customized solutions’ (p. 28), and thus share a number of the holistic, context-sensitive characteristics with area-based programs, with the exception that the plans are developed by municipal professionals, not involving the lay residents. Each of the development plans is thus tailored to the city area, focusing on the municipal initiatives that should be prioritized in order to reach the 2020 policy goals. The policy includes no economy. The volume of the development plans, i.e. to which degree the administrations are willing to boost their core operations, is an issue in the annual budget negotiations.

*2012: Policy implementation*

In 2012, three out of six ‘Development Plans’ were approved in the 2012 budget negotiations in The City of Copenhagen<sup>xvii</sup>.

## **5.6 DEPLOYING NEIGHBOURHOOD GOVERNANCE CONCEPTS TO THE CASE**

In the sections above I have outlined insight into disadvantaged neighbourhoods provided by two scholars relevant for neighbourhood governance. I have also briefly explained national experience with area based programs, the organisational context for the innovation project as well as describing the process outputs of this innovation process in some detail.

In this final context section I combine these different insights in an assessment of the institutional development with regards to the area-based approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods. I have in Figure 14 further down below depicted how the institutional setting has changed during the innovation process. Here I use the concepts developed by Archon Fung and Carmen Sirianni (Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003; Sirianni, 2009) in a heuristic fashion. Fung and Sirianni’s concepts are useful descriptors since they are developed on the basis of the conceptual challenges of linking ‘the local’ with ‘the central’: How central institutions can work better together with local stakeholders in order to produce more innovative and efficient solutions at the local level. The concepts allow us to understand the process in The City of Copenhagen as happening in three overall phases.

The first phase in Figure 14 preceded the innovation process initiated in 2008, the second phase was from 2008-2010, and the last phase was in 2010-2012. For each phase I have listed the institutional changes made in the row below the organisational images. Further, on the vertical dimension the model is split up on three levels: the central-administrative level, the local service level, and civil society; the first two levels thus denote the municipal activities.

**FIGURE 14: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA-BASED APPROACH TO DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBOURHOODS**

level	Phase 1: Experience with area-based programs (1998-2007)	Phase 2: Emergence of area-based leadership, coordination and strategic field (2008-2010)	Phase 3: Policy for Disadvantaged Areas and Development Plans (2010-2012)
Central-Administrative			
Local service			
Civil society			
Design principles Applied	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>coproduce public goods</li> <li>Mobilize community assets</li> <li>share professional expertise</li> <li>Public deliberation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Centralized supervision and coordination</li> <li>Build fields and governance networks strategically</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remake official institutions</li> </ul>

### *Phase 1: Fragmented instances of area based approaches*

In the first phase, I have depicted an image of fragmented instances of the area-based approach up to the development of the strategy report, The Horizontal Pillar. It is this fragmentation and lack of coordination that are addressed in the report. Here we see that three main actors, TEA (The Technical and Environmental Administration), EIA (The Employment and Integration Administration) and The Social Housing Organisations (SHO) each operate their own area-based programs for dealing with problems in the same disadvantaged neighbourhoods:

In this phase, we also see that the area-based solutions span across both local service and civil society levels, thus focusing mainly on the local level. And we see how the area-based solution has some institutional capacities that are solely focused on the local level, in that they seek to empower local stakeholders and coproduce public goods at the local level through the cooperation between civil society and the local government.

### *Phase 2: Developing central-administrative institutional design principles*

In Phase 2, we see the implementation results of The Horizontal Pillar–project and the leadership endeavours and entrepreneurship demonstrated by Neighbourhood Development (ND). We see the emergence of a strategic field consisting of (i) an Intra-Municipal Governance structure across all seven administrations (ii) a Cooperation Forum between municipality and the social housing organisations. We also see how the cross-administrative Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map, an evaluation practice and resort consolidation have been implemented, and how ND emerges as an example of area-based leadership that focuses on increasing the coordination of area-based resources at a neighbourhood level through centralized means.

### *Phase 3: Consolidating the development of central-administrative institutions through Policy*

In phase 3, we see the core elements of the institutional design as it appeared when I completed my case study in 2012. The strategic field now has an approved, cross-administrative Policy for Disadvantaged Areas to guide its actions towards 2020, and the Policy is being implemented by means of an area-based solution, but now at city district rather than neighbourhood level. We also see how, in this way, the Policy integrates the municipal activities, integrating the central-administrative level

and the local level. It appears that the area-based programs now have to relate to the Policy and Development Plans, not the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, in that the ‘problem’ with, and solution for, the neighbourhoods has in this way been defined by means of the policy. We find that an institutional change has come about, in that the administrations and the social housing organisations are now working together in a fashion that is in align with the horizontal and coordinative ambition described in the report, The Horizontal Pillar. We also see how the Development Plans and the Policy remain within the municipal sphere. This also implies that the contact to civil society still is a function to be maintained within the area-based programs. And finally, we see that leadership is consolidated within TEA, in that the other administrations perceive of the innovation project as an initiative that needs to be managed by TEA and ND.

## **5.7 SUMMING UP**

In this chapter I have described the context for the case of bottom-up leadership in the City of Copenhagen. The function in the research design is to illustrate how the City of Copenhagen has dealt with the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods prior to the innovation process studied. The function is furthermore to enable the reader to understand the profession that has informed bottom-up leadership: how this profession perceives of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and how the professional development when working with area based programs has enabled a critical reflection concerning area based programs, providing the foundation for putting into words the municipal performance gap in this welfare area.

The research question that is to be answered in this chapter and the chapters below is:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

This chapter have contributed to answering this research question by:

- Demonstrating what aspects of the development process that are in fact innovative when related to the wicked problem field
- Describing what context bottom-up leadership navigates in
- Describing what the profession underpinning bottom-up leadership is

- Describing what aggregated experience that has been available for this profession
- How this professional experience has been interpreted critically in order to launch an innovation project that addresses a municipal performance gap when governing disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

I have done so by explaining how two key scholars within neighbourhood governance suggest developing institutional frameworks in order to enhance the governance of these neighbourhoods with the objective to produce increased value for citizens at the local level. I have briefly outlined the national experience with area based programs and described these program types. This outline firstly serves the purpose of making the reader familiar with context rhetoric and the profession that underpin bottom-up leadership. This outline also provides the necessary basis for making an assessment of how the Copenhagen Case can be considered as an innovation that has contributed with value. The deployment of neighbourhood governance concepts to the Copenhagen case demonstrates that prior to 2007, area based programs as an approach for dealing with the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods had some institutional strengths and weaknesses. Area based programs has many of the strengths argued for by scholars of neighbourhood governance in terms of cross-sectorial solutions to a wicked problem as well as the involvement of citizens and local knowledge in problem solving. However, a weakness of this area based approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods has been the lack of central-administrative solutions and the lack of a strategic field and an institutionalized solution for how to deal with this wicked problem. The deployment demonstrates that as a consequence of the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen, the area based programs have inspired a process that provides the City of Copenhagen with a new institutional framework that is both able to operate on the local level in an context-specific way, incorporating knowledge and perspectives of citizens and local stakeholders; the institutional framework has been able to enhance this area based approach to disadvantaged areas by providing a central-administrative framework that focuses on coordination, the establishment of a strategic field consisting of administrative and political decision makers across municipal and social housing administrations, tied to a cross-administrative policy, implemented through a city-district planning level solution, the so-called 'Development Plans'.

In this respect, the 'dichotomy', as Archon Fung coins it, between the local and the central has been overcome, even though it remains an open question whether this solution is possible to stabilize.

This section has furthermore provided the reader with an insight into the rather complex organisational reality that Neighbourhood Development is located within. Finally, the section has produced a timeline and description of events concerning the

collaborative innovation process. This description provides the reader with guidance to understand the events and context related to the analyses below.





# CHAPTER 6.

## ANALYSIS A: THE EVALUATION CASE

In this and the following chapter I analyse two embedded cases: The Evaluation Case and The Policy Formulation Case. For each case I make a brief introduction in which I describe and depict major events occurring at this point in time in The City of Copenhagen. Despite this introduction, the reader should consider reading Chapter 5, especially section 5.5, since the analyses below assumes the familiarity with events, names and intentions introduced in those sections.

I analyse the qualitative data gathered in the period October 2009-February 2010 by means of the BUCIL model. These data were gathered in order to shed light on some conflicts in a team responsible for the evaluation work package in the innovation project 'The Horizontal Pillar' (the Pillar, for short).

Below, I first describe the process conditioning The Evaluation Case – both external events and substantive issues discussed in the cross-administrative Evaluation Team. Next, I recapitulate analytical strategy. Next, I display my findings. I conduct my analysis in the following sequence: uncertainty, entrepreneurship, leadership recognition, making and giving sense. I conclude by condensing the analytical findings into abstract leadership dilemmas that I found dominant in this embedded case; these leadership dilemmas ultimately explain how leadership is constructed and transformed. The purpose of introducing the leadership dilemmas is to enable the knowledge generated by BUCIL model to be compared with, or inspire, other future studies of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership in the public sector.

### 6.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION: THE EVALUATION CASE

In this section I describe in brief the key events in the innovation process studied. These key events influence the task of The Evaluation Team. In this description, findings from the analysis are used to inform this description. In this respect, the description should not be regarded as a neutral description, but as a description that is implicated by the previous chapters of this thesis.

As marked with bold in Figure 15 below, the evaluation case starts in 2009, and is part of a phase in which the strategy report recommendations from The Horizontal

Pillar is supposed to be implemented. So, in parallel with this case, a cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice is being launched, the area-based remit is being consolidated in TEA, and in 2010, the work packages related to The Horizontal Pillar is being merged with the process of establishing an organisational framework for implementing the new legislation related to The Governance Dialogue.

**FIGURE 15: TIMELINE – THE EVALUATION CASE**

Year and headline	Description of output
2007: Initiation of strategy process	Support is acquired for initiating a strategy process concerning the increasing number of area-based programs
2008: Approval of strategy report	Approval of strategy report <sup>xviii</sup> ;  Merging of area-based offices  New name and leader for the newly established office - Neighbourhood Development
2009: Implementation of strategy report recommendations	*Cross-administrative qualitative evaluation practice of the social housing sectors ‘Comprehensive Plans’  Cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: ‘The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’ <sup>xix</sup>  Consolidation of the area-based remit in TEA/Neighbourhood Development
2010: New legislation: The Governance Dialogue.  New cross-administrative organisation, partnership, and commission for policy	New Intra-Municipal Governance structure implemented  New Partnership Forum Created between municipality and social housing sector  Terms of reference acquired for a cross-administrative policy  *Initiating policy formulation process

	New demands for municipal approval of the social housing sector's 'Comprehensive Plans' <sup>xx</sup>
2011: Policy Approval	*Policy formulation process continued  A change in commission  *“Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen” is approved of <sup>xxi</sup>
2012: Policy Implementation	Three out of six 'Development Plans' are approved of in the 2012-budget negotiations in The City of Copenhagen <sup>xxii</sup>

In 2008/2009, the implementation of the recommendations from 'The Horizontal Pillar' report began. The evaluation tool and the socioeconomic map were implemented. External events influenced the implementation process. At the end of 2009, new legislation was passed concerning the social housing sector, the so-called 'Governance Dialogue' (in Danish, 'Styringsdialogen'), in which the supervision of the social housing sector was transferred from state to local government level. The government's purpose of this move was, among others, to force local governments and the social housing sector to cooperate closer on issues such as urban planning and housing policies.

This influenced the outcome of The Horizontal Pillar-project. The City of Copenhagen and the social housing sector were in need of a partnership in which the activities and strategies of the actors could be formally coordinated and conflicts could be dealt with. Since this coordination need had much in common with the coordination aim of The Horizontal Pillar, these two policy streams were merged. The implementation of The Horizontal Pillar-project was thus prolonged and to some extent re-invented. New working groups were established that were to redefine their function within the new inter-organisational structure, involving a partnership with the social housing sector and a powerful top of decision makers, consisting of a

‘Mayor Forum’. Before this external event interfered, ND had been successful and was about to gather political consent concerning a political steering committee.

Another external event in 2009 also affected the project, but mainly the team responsible for implementing the qualitative evaluation practice in The Evaluation Team. The government decided that the increasing number of ‘Comprehensive Plans’ in the social housing sector were in need of a national evaluation program, with a special emphasis on evaluating some of the complex effects of this type of area-based program. This decision influenced the team working on adjusting and developing a shared evaluation tool of exactly these types of programs; the team was based on an agreement between TEA, EIA and SSA. As a consequence, the troublesome task of measuring the effects of area-based programs was abolished, leaving this difficult task to the organisations which were supposed to conduct the national evaluation.

The task for The Evaluation Team was to make a shared evaluation tool, called the ‘Strategy Template’ (in Danish, ‘strategiskabelonen’) inspired by the recommendations from ‘The Horizontal Pillar’. It was now proposed to adopt the evaluation approach developed by (Fulbright-Anderson, 1995). This adopts a theory of change evaluation approach to a neighbourhood community context. The purpose of the Strategy Template was to define the political or strategic goal of an area-based initiative, and define as precisely as possible intermediate mile stones in order to reach that goal. The Template was also supposed to define the activities on either of the levels of neighbourhood, organisation, network, family and individual. The theory of change behind a given activity can both be made more plausible, and its effects can be documented quantitatively and qualitatively on the proper level.

The Strategy Template is supposed to enhance coordination in that it is a working document shared by all engaged actors, enabling them to adjust and discuss expectations. And further, it is applicable for the conveyance of complex information in an easily accessible format (Engberg, 2008). The Strategy Template is displayed below (empty template for the strategy report, The Horizontal Pillar, p. 65, my translation). On the horizontal dimension, it has steps from 1 to 5; on the vertical dimension, it defines the level of the activity.

Figure 16: Strategy template

	[Year 0]	[Year 2]	[Year 3]	[Year 4]	Political/ Strategic objectives
	Themes, activities and projects	Short term: Milestones and success criteria	Medium- term: Milestones and success criteria	Long term: Milestones and success criteria	
	Step 5	Step 4	Step 3	Step 2	Step 1
Neighbourhood					
Organisational issues					
Network and family					
Individual					

(Source: Engberg 2008)

Making a cross-administrative evaluation tool is no easy task, however, and for two reasons. As demonstrated in the lengthy analysis below, conflicts regarding leadership and uncertainty about, and resistance to, the content of the innovation project increases the level of conflicts in the team, and makes it difficult for the team to reach consensus about the desired purpose of the evaluation tool.

But there are also tricky substantive discussions which are primarily centred on different administrative knowledge needs and mandates which reflect each administration's sectorial focus and position taken in the innovation process. These

knowledge needs and related mandates become clearer as the team gathers experience while working with the template. In 2011 the negative experience gathered in the Evaluation Case made a positive contribution to The Policy For Disadvantaged Areas (See Analysis B), by informing the so-called ‘Mercedes Sign’, an illustration that symbolises the division of labour as well as administrative identity in relation to working cross-sartorially in disadvantaged areas (see section 7.7.3, The acceptance of the introduced concepts, ‘The Mercedes Sign’).

As a series of administrative documents from this period (autumn 2009) demonstrate, we see a specific development. The team set out in the autumn 2008/spring 2009 with an assumption that, when using the evaluation template, the Comprehensive Plans could provide both numbers on the effect and at the same time produce more consistent change theories for their activities. Here, TEA/ND puts much effort into visiting the Comprehensive Plans, explaining about the logic behind the new evaluation tool, and helping the projects fill out the template.

However, when the templates were assessed afterwards in The Evaluation Team, the experience was mixed: it became clear that the evaluation template was not useful for quantitative monitoring, since the plans did not include the quantitative documentation to measure effects, and also did not use the template in the same way.<sup>xxiii</sup> It was also clear that the template generated frustration for the social housing professionals employed in Comprehensive Plans, as the format of the template was difficult to work with, and the logic behind the template was somewhat abstract. The projects and involved administrations experienced conceptual difficulties when distinguishing between for instance success criteria and milestones<sup>xxiv</sup>.

Further, the administrative representatives in The Evaluation Team also realised that the activities in the Comprehensive Plans were less specific when describing their activities than expected; and the professionals in the Comprehensive Plans applied and filled out the template in an uneven fashion. Also, some Comprehensive Plans welcomed the new tool, in that it qualified project management and the quality of the activities in accordance with the original intent of the template.

This experience became a point of discussion in the autumn 2009 for the team, in that SSA and EIA had expected that their need to document effects of their engagement in specific Comprehensive Plans would be met. Conversely, TEA/ND was mainly concerned with the progress and the coordination of the overall Comprehensive Plans, having a good dialogue with the plans; the aim for TEA was to improve these area-based plans by making present and future Comprehensive Plans more tight and goal specific, using the change theory approach to effect the plans in order to make the plans more specific and realistic concerning the causal logic and effect of the programs. Altogether, in October 2009, TEA positioned itself

as a unit mainly focused on coordination and organisational development of the municipal system; as a result, TEA mainly used the template as an indicator tool to identify where the Comprehensive Plans and the municipality needed to improve their way of cooperating.

This altered purpose of the evaluation template was new to SSA and EIA, and TEA was required to be more explicit about what they wanted from the evaluation, given the TEA/ND representatives' new coordinative role.<sup>xxv</sup>

As a consequence, a new vocabulary inside the team was launched, in which the 'evaluation [was] suggested to walk on three legs'<sup>xxvi</sup>. The team thus abandoned a holistic tool-approach; instead, the evaluation template was considered to satisfy only the knowledge needs of TEA, whereas SSA and EIA needed knowledge that focused on effect and on evaluating activities in order to inspire new methods usable for their respective administrations<sup>xxvii</sup>.

Much effort was put into revising the ways in which the template was supposed to be used, revising the Template - and writing a consensus document to the Steering Board about the experience with the Template<sup>xxviii</sup>. As a consequence of these numerous and painstaking discussions and attempts to improve the evaluation practice, the team began to perceive of each other as operating on different levels and with different interests: TEA's representative perceived of ND's role as focused narrowly on coordination and organisational development, whereas EIA and SSA had a more activity-specific focus; they took a keen interest in documenting the effect of their engagement in the area-based programs and also in qualifying their future activities and methods for working in the disadvantaged areas<sup>xxix</sup>.

In the end, SSA and EIA abandoned their evaluation activities completely, and TEA ended up continuing the evaluation practice themselves. The theory of change approach towards area-based programs was used from then on to monitor the progress of the Comprehensive Plans. Further, the concept of the theory of change was also used by ND in order to organize the different policies across administrations: in The Policy Formulation Case two years later, we see how ND was again mobilizing this way of thinking (Policy for Disadvantaged Areas, p. 32-3)<sup>xxx</sup>. Applying this way of thinking provided the cross-administrative policy with the ability to integrate a consistent and strategic area-based approach that would underpin The Policy for Disadvantaged Areas.

As the analysis below demonstrates, these substantive discussions also mirror the organisational identities and social constructed positioning of the involved organisations in this process: TEA moved from an activity-based organisation to a coordinative and organisational development-position, whereas EIA and SSA perceived of themselves as delivering specific services to individuals at the local

level. And as the evaluation experience demonstrated, gathering quantitative knowledge of ‘what works’ in the disadvantaged areas was so complex and contextual that this ambition was abandoned by the municipality. The team focused instead on qualifying the consistency of the local work of the area-based program by attaching the programs to existing policies and qualifying future methods and activities.

## **6.2 RECAPITULATION OF ANALYTICAL STRATEGY**


The analysis answers the research question:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

The focus of my analysis is how the specific leadership challenge in the situation forces ND to develop its leadership by dealing with central leadership dilemmas. The situation is conditioned both by the empirical context, but first and foremost by the ND’s own entrepreneurship. ND’s entrepreneurship allows it to enhance its leadership by introducing concepts, establishing new combinations between already existing resources; in this respect, entrepreneurship allows ND to decide and alter the context of the collaborative innovation process.

According to the operationalised version of the BUCIL model, there is a one-way causal connection between entrepreneurship and leadership construction: the innovative project introduces a novel combination of discourse concepts; in order make this package of concepts influential, leadership has to be established.





In more simple words, a hypothesis of BUCIL is that a specific innovation project also requires that the bottom-up unit transforms into a specific, yet not structurally defined, type of collaborative leadership. The innovation project thus both paves the way for a new subject position of the ‘collaborative innovation leader’ and is dependent on it. This specific type of leadership must be successful in creating certain social objects by means of giving sense – otherwise leadership will not be recognised, the concepts will not be accepted, and the innovation project will have to be either redeveloped or simply put to an end. As a consequence, I assume in this analysis that mobilizing support for a cross-administrative coordination practice involves shifts in ND’s leadership.

The first part is an analysis of uncertainty. Second, I analyse how entrepreneurship introduces certain discursive concepts that condition the positional development necessary in order for ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader. I do this by operationalizing entrepreneurship as the capacities of making new combinations and acting proactively in conditions of uncertainty. I first investigate who acts proactively, and secondly how combinations of concepts generate a specific context; such context conditions future lines of conflict and sources of legitimacy of leadership.

The third part of my analysis looks into leadership recognition; in this section I want to demonstrate how the specific context shaped by means of entrepreneurship generates a requirement for developing a new leadership position. I do this by operationalizing leadership recognition as a feature that develops through both conflicts and sources of legitimacy. In order to emphasize a focus on action, I further

operationalise leadership recognition as leadership related reflections on identity. Whereas conflict and legitimacy are generated collaboratively when new discursive concepts are introduced, the perception of leadership identity is an actor-specific phenomenon in which the lead unit makes reflections and choices that will affect the way in which it perceives of its possibilities to lead.

The fourth part of my analysis is concerned with making and giving sense; in this section I want to demonstrate how the specific combination of entrepreneurship and leadership recognition conditions ND's ability to influence collaborators. I do this by operationalizing making and giving sense on the basis of the concepts introduced by entrepreneurship that are turned into social objects, and thus collaboratively accepted. I also take into account the introduced concepts that are met with resistance.

Finally, I conclude. I do this by describing the positional development of ND. I do this by re-interpreting the analysis, abstracting the findings into the most fundamental leadership dilemmas that condition the positional development of ND as the collaborative innovation leader.

Having now elaborated on the task of The Evaluation Team, on some of the substantive discussions reflecting the administrations' different knowledge needs, mandates and interests, and having recapitulated analytical strategy, I now turn to how ND in this period was emerging as a leader of a collaborative innovation project that emphasized increased coordination.

### **6.3 FINDINGS**

The Findings-table below (Figure 17) is an answer to the research question, which is:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

I start by presenting the findings from each column, from left to right. Next, I conclude the chapter by relating the content of the findings table to the positional development by summing up the leadership dilemmas.

Concerning entrepreneurship, I find that this type of behaviour is mainly located within ND, which has the expertise in area-based programs, and the best overview of how the innovation project will affect the area-based programs. What is also remarkable is how valuable the strategy report 'The Horizontal Pillar' is in providing ND with meaningful concepts. The rhetoric of optimization of the municipal system, and the insistence that the neighbourhood should be the proper unit for coordination of the municipal activities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods stand strong in this part of the innovation process. Likewise, ND is insisting strongly on another powerful image: that two layers of municipal activities are operating in the neighbourhoods, and that these layers are not connected. Lastly, ND emphasizes that the coordination problems cannot be solved locally, only centrally, by means of setting up political goals for the area-based programs.

Concerning ND's leadership and its recognition, the analysis demonstrates that ND's subject position as leader begins with the contested leadership position of a value-based implementer. ND is firmly convinced that its project will make a difference for the area-based programs and the citizens living there, a conviction acquired through much experience with the running of area-based programs. During the innovation process, however, ND met resistance against this position, and was instead beginning to perceive of its leadership as having a coordinative, not profession-based, responsibility in the innovation process, leaving substantive and professional issues up to the collaborating administrations. Further, ND also met resistance regarding the implementation-related part of the leadership position, in that collaborators demanded more influence. Therefore, ND's behaviour developed towards a position not of an implementer of an already finished product, but as that of a developer involved in more iterative processes of organisational development. As I have described in the Findings-table, this positioning of ND was a consequence of the fact that ND was in need of providing answers to certain leadership dilemmas, which were socially constructed as a result of specific resistance to their innovation project.

Therefore, the leadership dilemmas were created when ND tried to direct the sensemaking of its collaborators. ND met both acceptance and resistance. Resistance in that by some, especially representatives for the Social Service Administration, their innovation project was considered an extra-layer organisation, generating too much coordination through an abstract and obscure mega plan, impeding the self-management of professionals working at the local level. And accepted and welcomed by other professionals and decision-makers since the novel concepts introduced by ND was used to heavily influence the nature of the Cooperation Forum with the social housing sector; the responsibilities and role of the intra-municipal, cross-administrative set-up; and the need for a policy for area-based programs.

Figure 17: Findings - The Evaluation Case

<p><b>Entrepreneurship:</b></p> <p>The production of ‘texts’, introducing novel concepts</p>	<p><b>Leadership recognition: The social construction of the subject position of collaborative innovation leader</b></p>	<p><b>Making and Giving sense: Transforming concepts into social objects</b></p>
<p>Entrepreneurship as an in-house, profession-based activity</p> <p><b>Key text introduced:</b> ‘The Horizontal Pillar’.</p> <p><b>Genre:</b> administrative</p> <p><b>Profession:</b> area-based planning</p> <p>Concepts introduced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- optimization of the municipal ‘system’ for dealing with disadvantaged neighbourhoods requires coordination across administrations</li> <li>- The city area is the proper unit of coordination and planning</li> <li>- The project activities and the day-to-day activities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are unconnected</li> <li>- There is a lack of political goals concerning how to improve the disadvantaged neighbourhoods</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Positional development (2008-2010):</u></b> From ‘value-and-profession-based implementer’ to ‘developing coordinator’</p> <p>Leadership Dilemmas:</p> <p>How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical organisational structures?</p> <p>How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development work still remains?</p> <p>How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence?</p> <p>How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?</p>	<p><b>Resistance:</b></p> <p>‘Micro-plan vs. Mega-plan’</p> <p>‘too much coordination vs. screaming need for coordination’</p> <p>‘self-management vs. coordinative management’</p> <p><b>Solution:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- division of labour</li> <li>- Constructing a learning-by-doing-approach to the collaboration process</li> </ul> <p><b>Acceptance:</b></p> <p>Cooperation Forum;</p> <p>Intra-Municipal Governance</p> <p>Commission for a policy</p> <p>Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map</p>

In the next section, I start out with an analysis of uncertainty in order to justify my hypothesis that uncertainty in collaborative innovation processes generates a demand for meaning and leadership. Next, I analyse entrepreneurship, leadership recognition and making and giving sense before finally discussing and concluding this part of the analysis.

## **6.4 UNCERTAINTY AS THE CONDITION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND SENSEMAKING**

In this section, I exemplify how uncertainties dominate in this part of the collaborative innovation process. In the BUCIL model, my assumption is that the three types of uncertainties invoked when trying to solve a wicked problem (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) through collaboration interfere with the uncertainty of innovation journeys (Van de Ven, 1999). Overall, I argue that we have four types of uncertainties: substantive, institutional, strategic and journey-related.

The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how these uncertainties jointly generate a demand for bottom-up leadership, in terms of profession-based entrepreneurship, leadership and making and giving sense.

### **6.4.1.SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY**

Substantive uncertainty is focused on the aspect of the ‘what’: what is the nature of the problem? (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) state that a major source of uncertainty has to do with determining the nature of the problem. This problem arises both because of a lack of information, but also a lack of interpretation of information and the establishment of meaning (p. 19).

In the quote below, a member of The Evaluation Team states the following concerning the process:

*”what also makes it [The Horizontal Pillar Project] difficult is the whole area-based, around...that about the effects. That is, what...that is, I...Heck, I am very much in doubt about whether there is a municipal understanding of what it is...We need more time to discuss, well, days, just to ...what is it that the area-based is? (EIA, civil servant, 19)*

The quote demonstrates that the area-based approach as a type of initiative is difficult to handle in a cross-administrative framework. And that members of The Evaluation Team and people involved in The Pillar Project have a need for developing a shared understanding of what the initiative 'is'.

The quote below from an ND civil servant demonstrates that this substantive uncertainty is also part of the talk in the ND office:

*"...something that we [Neighbourhood Development] are practicing right now is talking about, for instance, what is our working unit at all? It is something we call 'area-based programs' and what is that exactly? Because it...what we are about to be doing in our office is sitting and writing policies, so what is our working unit?" (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, Focus Group Feedback, 11)*

This quote demonstrates that ND in 2010 is facing the task of formulating a policy. Therefore, the ND office needs to be very specific as to what the working unit is. The way I interpret the quote is that this is to some extent difficult, in that the area-based approach is a flexible approach as regards the solving neighbourhood problems – the content of the programs may be many things. Second, ND has itself initiated a development process in which their focus is on coordinating central-administrative processes in order to create synergy in the neighbourhoods. Therefore, the working unit cannot be defined unless ND's leadership position is also defined – is it an office that operates area-based programs, an office that is focusing on disadvantaged neighbourhoods, or an office that wants to facilitate a certain change in the way the municipal administrations are cooperating? Consequently, this transition of the ND office towards a leadership position demands sensemaking processes.

#### **6.4.2. INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY**

Another aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the institutional. In some instances wicked problems cut across organisational boundaries as well as administrative levels and networks. This will often result in uncertainty about process handling and the development of interactions with other actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 7).

In the quote below, in the group feedback session on my pilot study, one person in ND responds to the concept of innovation by giving a picture of how to navigate within an inter-organisational framework:

*"I still think about that capacity building... If we are to act as old municipal officials in such a system I at least need to get a more detailed definition of what the framework is and how big the margin is and how do you get such dynamics to function in some departments where they might not have had the discussion [that we have had] " (Neighbourhood Development, Focus Group Feedback Civil servant, I10)*

What seems to be a major challenge in this way of collaborating is the huge amount of talk and disagreements and the lack of action. Thus, the quote presents a dilemma: on the one hand, more action is needed in order to move forward; on the other hand, some sort of 'capacity-building' process is also required, which will again require much discussion and conversation. In this respect, there is a clash between entrepreneurship as a professional type of action focused on change, and the process of making sense of the project to others.

The quote below is from a civil servant in EIA who has been engaged in both The Evaluation Team and a group that has produced recommendations on policy formulation and transversal collaboration. In the quote, the process is characterized by being extremely difficult and uncertain:

*"so as a starting point, it is ... It is insanely difficult. .. but also incredibly exciting ... people have been incredibly professionally engaged in it... That is the driving force ... because I will say that the system around makes it hard ... what the area-based is and what the area-based objective is and what the various administrations want out of it is extremely uncertain. So therefore you as an official end up in a place where your framing conditions and the objectives of the collaboration and the outcome that must come out of such a process of collaboration, are extremely diffuse. (EIA, Civil servant, I9)"*

This quote tells us is that bottom-up innovation creates institutional uncertainty, in that the organisational decision makers do not know what the end goal is or should be. Thus, the division of labour is not determined, the roles of the actors not defined, but have to be negotiated. This also creates uncertainty, in that the point of departure of the innovation process is the area-based program type which all administrations are involved in, but whose purpose, or intended purpose, they are unsure about. All in all, the impression from the quote is an atmosphere of how to make an overview of this very complex and exciting process. And what the quote displays is an

understanding of a collaborative process in which it is up to the professionals to make sense of what is going on. In this respect, despite both the vertical and horizontal constraints described by this civil servant, bottom-up innovation actually places a lot of responsibility and a lot of possibility of influence on the civil servants.

### 6.4.3. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTIES

The third aspect of wicked problem uncertainty are the strategic uncertainties.

The quote below is from an ND employee responding to my pilot study:

*"You might also want to have a few pages concerning some infighting in TEA .. One thing is historic, another thing is present. We have neighbouring centres which think that area coordination... that it is some of the worst ever created... and that's an interesting barrier... that one cannot even agree and feel the support of one's own, how to say, own administration .. In order to go to war with the other... to engage in dialogue etc., right?" (Neighbourhood Development, Focus Group Feedback, Special consultant, 110)*

This civil servant introduces a type of uncertainty that is based not on collaborative strategic uncertainty, but actually on *internal* strategic uncertainty as to whether decision makers in the TEA-organisation are willing to support the project. This is an important finding concerning bottom-up innovation, in that it demonstrates that bottom-up innovation projects are characterized by power struggles, both internally and externally.

In the quote below, another civil servant relates to the uncertainty connected to conflictive organisational perspectives on the same phenomenon:

*"Basically we still live in the time of the seven-headed beast. That is, the interpretation of the common task is all the time an interpretation based on the individual administrations. So I think that's a challenge, and that is what we are hoping now that.....on the mayor and director levels, there has not been a ... I mean there are many interpretations going on down through the ranks – "what do they mean up there?" These very broad signals that "now something must be done",*



*these signals crystallize down through the hierarchies, and offer some very different interpretations; to be able to short-circuit this process backwards and say, "Well, is this what you want?" - this generates difficulties. I am sure that the people I've worked with, to the best of their ability, have tried to interpret what signals they got from outside, but of course by their own self-understanding – well, this is what you do." ((Neighbourhood Development, civil servant, 14))*

In the quote the popular perspective on the City of Copenhagen as a 'Seven-Headed Beast' is invoked, with each administrative head fighting the others or not knowing what they are doing, pulling in different directions. In the quote, the ND employee refers to the emerging new organisation across administrations. In this innovation process, what is clear is that there is no shared vision of what the area-based programs should do in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As a result of this lack of political consensus, ND and the collaborating professionals placed at the bottom of the bureaucracies have to spend a lot of energy on figuring out what 'the top' of the hierarchy actually wants, interpreting this from the perspective of each administration, producing conflicts in working groups.

#### **6.4.4. INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY**

Finally, the fourth aspect is the risk-taking end-point uncertainty, i.e. Van de Ven's uncertainty of the journey (Van de Ven, 1999). Will it work? What is this 'it', i.e. where will the journey take us? Are we on the right track, or are we really on a detour?

The Evaluation Case was a pilot project in this PhD study, and ND employees responded to some of my early considerations concerning innovation. I was interested in whether they could identify themselves with the perspective of innovation uncertainty. One person notes:

*"we get a lot of experience along the way...we are now running the project, and now we have come to understand on what kind of road we are driving...before, it was just planned...and that will perhaps dominate some of this discussion about The Horizontal Pillar...in this type of work, you change course and you change your goal as you go along, but that can easily become history (...)" (Neighbourhood Development, special consultant, 110)*

What this person is suggesting out of courtesy is that it is of less use to Neighbourhood Development to think in terms of innovation uncertainty than in leadership. However, the interviewee also acknowledges the fact that the type of process he is involved in is a process characterized by increasing understanding and change of course as the project is being implemented.

Another ND employee responds that "what we can use it [my pilot presentation] for perhaps relates to what you write and what we are saying, that is: Enhancement of the cross-organisational collaboration. Yeah that is mighty fine, but what is it really?" (Neighbourhood Development, civil servant, Focus Group Feedback I10).

Similarly to the quote above concerning the institutional uncertainty related to the working unit, the purpose of the enhanced collaboration structure is still unclear.

In the quote below, a civil servant makes reference to the Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map, and how the cross-administrative team managed to develop the map:

*"We tried to get an understanding of what we could do with this [map] .... the original formulations were very broad. It was something about how area-based interventions should be put more on the agenda. There was also a desire that it had to be an important tool that could appear in the overall municipal planning paper [Kommuneplan]. And it should still primarily be used for the selection of area renewals, but ... it has been very wide ... "we want this, but it must also be able to accomplish this." So it has been very diffuse, and the steering committee has not really demonstrated what they wanted to do with it. "'(ND, civil servant, I6)*

What this quote demonstrates is that once a mandate had been acquired for developing and implementing the map, uncertainty was dominating regarding the purpose of the map, i.e. what was the map actually supposed to do. The process was still a journey in which the destination had to be figured out. What the quote also demonstrates at the end is that the civil servants actually had much liberty to develop the map as they wanted, since the steering committee did not actually know what to use the map for. This quote thus demonstrates another important finding, supported by other quotes below, that the lack of hierarchical leadership creates a void in which the Neighbourhood Development unit actually has very wide degrees of freedom to fill this void. What this quote demonstrates is the opposite of popular visions of public sector innovation, which is perceived as being very restrictive. Bottom-up innovators' strengths are to introduce an innovative project that produces uncertainty that actually seems to paralyze hierarchical leadership, giving room for much manoeuvring.

#### **6.4.5.SUMMING UP**

The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how these uncertainties jointly generate a demand for bottom-up leadership, in terms of profession-based entrepreneurship, leadership and making and giving sense.

I found that the innovation project generated substantive uncertainty concerning what the area-based program is. This uncertainty was also linked to ND's leadership position, in that the innovation project concerning area-based programs both redefined the programs and forced ND to position themselves as a leader amongst central-administrative actors. Therefore, the working unit of ND could not be defined unless the leadership position of ND was also narrowed down.

The innovation project generated institutional uncertainty, in that conflicts concerning action and sensemaking conversations arose. Further, the innovation project triggered institutional uncertainty, in that the administrations did not know how to relate to area-based programs; it was therefore difficult to attain a division of labour. The institutional uncertainty left it up to the civil servants to make sense of the innovation project and what was going on in general. This institutional uncertainty thus seemed to place a lot of responsibility and the possibility of exercising influence by civil servants.

Concerning strategic uncertainties, one major strategic uncertainty arose from tensions within ND's own administration, in that not everybody agreed that using the area as a unit for cross-administrative coordination was appropriate. Further, due to the institutional uncertainty, the civil servants across administrations interpreted the signals from decision makers in the light of their own administration's interests, making conflicts rather tense at the level of civil servants.

Finally, concerning innovation uncertainty, the lack of involved hierarchical leadership left it very much up to the civil servants to figure out how elements from The Horizontal Pillar were supposed to be implemented; this caused questions of leadership concerning how to navigate in the development process to arise in ND.

## **6.5 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW CONCEPTS AIMED AT INCREASING COORDINATION OF AREA-BASED APPROACHES**

In the section above I have described how uncertainties are influencing the process around the development of a shared evaluation tool across three administrations. These are conditions that the participants have to somehow manage in order to come up with answers that make sense, thus creating direction for collaborators. In this section, I analyse entrepreneurship as the motor that produces and introduces concepts; such concepts may be accepted or resisted as making sense by collaborators. The function in the analysis is to show first of all that a profession-based entrepreneurship is able to both generate, and partly break, the deadlock of uncertainties characteristic of collaborative innovations by introducing concepts that generate a direction for collaborators. And second, how these discursive concepts condition the emergence of a specific subject position, enabling ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader.

I first analyse the professional basis for entrepreneurship in the case; the type of entrepreneurship explains why certain types of novel concepts are being produced. I then analyse the way in which proactivity is exercised.

Figure 18 below displays the combinations made by means of entrepreneurship. The figure also displays how the combinations produce a certain situation for the collaborative innovation process, generating leadership dilemmas. The entrepreneurial combinations can be understood as connections made between socially constructed objects, connections that introduces a certain micro-discourse. As the section will demonstrate, these combinations produce dilemmas that require a change of leadership, in that central decisions have to be made in ND. To give an example the first leadership dilemma is invoked in that the combinations described in The Horizontal Pillar report formulate recommendations for the ways in which vertical and horizontal administrative structures can be better combined. As this section, and the leadership recognition section below will explain in more detail, when ND starts to implement the recommendations, the ND office has to discover how to strike a balance between a) enabling coordination horizontally by means of the novel coordinative unit – the city area, and b) allowing the rest of the administrations to engage in vertically specialised work. In this section, I analyse these combinations, and I demonstrate how certain of the combination challenges are dealt with by means of entrepreneurship and the direction of sensemaking. I demonstrate how certain combinations produce a micro-discourse in which more fundamental change in leadership identity is required in order to adopt the subject position of a collaborative innovation leader.

**FIGURE 18: PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP - COMBINATIONS AND LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS IN THE EVALUATION CASE**

Combinations are made between the socially constructed objects of....		Leadership dilemmas produced
Vertically separated administrations	Horizontal structure	There is also a legitimate rationality claim for working in silos. How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical structures?
Central administrations	Local city area as planning framework	
The administrations' evaluation demand	A shared evaluation practice	How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence?
The local work in disadvantaged neighbourhoods	A system change perspective on the local governmental organisation	How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?
Day-to-day operations in disadvantaged neighbourhoods	Project work in disadvantaged neighbourhoods	There is a danger of integrating development work too much in the day-to-day operations. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development work still remains?

### 6.5.1. THE PROFESSION GUIDING HOW NEW COMBINATIONS AND CONCEPTS ARE GENERATED: THE AREA-BASED PLANNING APPROACH

The profession underpinning entrepreneurship in the Copenhagen case is a planning profession that has the 'neighbourhood' as its working unit. As I described in Chapter 5, area-based programs have a certain profile, entailing a certain profession. The focus of the area-based profession is spatial, and it combines physical and social resources. It develops projects in close cooperation with local stakeholders, especially citizens, and thinks of itself as focused on, and giving voice to, the locals. It is a profession that has to introduce new solutions to existing problems, often by means of working across organisational and professional boundaries. It is also a profession that is in need of other professions and contributions from other stakeholders to fulfil its ambition of delivering holistic solutions to complex problems. In the City of Copenhagen, as in most municipalities in Denmark, this profession is placed in The Technical and Environmental Administration.

The innovation process that I studied in The City of Copenhagen was a means of expanding the elements of the professional perspective described above. Not just to encompass the local level, but also the central administrative level. This is most clearly formulated in the Pillar report. Here it is emphasized, that even though the area-based programs have some local advantages, the potentials of the programs are not utilised to the fullest, in that the 1) cross-administrative way of working within an 2) area-based working unit in 3) close contact with citizens requires 4) adjustments at the *central* level in order to 5) create coordinative and integrative synergy at the local level:

*"Area-based programs can provide synergies at different levels: at the local level the programs typically build on a concrete problem - and resource analysis of the local context. Existing resources, qualities and preferences in an area are identified and incorporated in a new, coherent change strategy and utilised better. The municipal initiatives at the local level are mutually supportive when incorporated in a common strategic framework. At the municipal level, better coordination of area-based programs strengthen the administration's respective policy areas because the problems are addressed in close relation to citizens. Thus, there is a reason to consider how the pillars of the municipal organisation better coordinate and in some cases integrate their activities"* (Engberg 2008, p. 10, my translation).

'The Horizontal Pillar' can thus be seen as both a creative and logical continuation of some core lead motifs in the area-based approach and its profession: the

horizontal holistic combinations of resources across stakeholders, tailored and adapted to specific instances of 'the local'.

**FIGURE 19: FRONT PAGE OF THE STRATEGY REPORT 'THE HORIZONTAL PILLAR' (ENGBERG 2008)**



The middle manager of Neighbourhood Development understands the project as essentially a project that has to strengthen the cross-administrative cooperation by applying the holistic understanding of problems in disadvantaged neighbourhoods; but also as a project that makes the area-based profession much more clear:

*"It makes professionalism stand out much clearer. It tells you something about what the area-based interventions are and what they can do. I think sometimes it's been a bit like 'let the thousand flowers bloom' and 'hey there' [Halløjsa]- it sometimes becomes a 'funny walk' [gakket gangart] that you can pull out of your hat on festive occasions. This is where I think that the report nicely shows what kind of professionalism is embedded in this project (...) Part of that professionalism is also*

*about moving beyond this project-making and make it contribute to developing the ordinary activities - both in the municipality, but also in housing organisations etc.” (Neighbourhood Development, middle manager, I7).*

In the dense quote above, it is clear that the Pillar Project is a radical break with the existing professional practice, and a break that is perceived of as a project with wide-ranging consequences for the way in which the municipality deals with disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

A very influential value laden distinction is introduced here between 'project-makerism' and 'day-to-day operations' – a distinction that draws upon, and affects, discourse to such a degree that 'projects' in general, including area-based programs, have a very bad standing amongst local politicians later when the municipal administrations are in the process of formulating a policy for area based programs and disadvantaged areas. Accordingly, the former local, experimental practice of introducing new solutions through projects is in this quote counterposed to the ordinary operations of the municipality. The Pillar Project and the profession that underpins it do not favour any of these positions, but rather a third mediating position.

As the quote below demonstrates, the project is about combining the work in disadvantaged neighbourhoods with an organisational perspective in a new way that entails a change of identity in the ND office. It is also about creating combinations between the social housing sector and the local governmental programs running in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods:

*"My involvement has perhaps been, or my efforts have been on the level that we became more aware of our role in this Neighbourhood Development in relation to not just all sorts of different facets of the work in disadvantaged neighbourhoods; but we tended to look more into what could be done about organisation and collaboration in a very broad sense...basically there is a close correlation between tasks in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and in the social housing sector. It's not an absolute intersection [fællesmængde], but there is a large intersection." (Neighbourhood Development, civil servant, I4)*

The quote below is from a civil servant from The Evaluation Team, in which another combination is introduced: that between area-based instances of cross-professionalism and increased ability to solve complex problems:



*“But this is also why it is so good that we know, and we know this for a fact - that there is a field in the social Comprehensive Plans in which methods are developed and experience is gained. Basically this is perhaps also what has been in need of being elevated to a higher and broader academic discussion and awareness, and this I am quite sure about, that there is an extreme amount of hidden expertise in the social Comprehensive Plans” (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4)*

What is being proposed here is seeing the evaluation practice as a combination of central administrative professional practice and the locally tailored way of working, a combination which could lead to much needed knowledge in the central administrations, and could also lead to much more efficiency and synergy.

The quote below demonstrates another combination, that between different types of work: day-to-day operations and project work:

*“There are many facets to it, as it also is about finding out what the relationship is between project-work and operational work. The area-based programs in general distinguish themselves greatly by to some extent being people and initiatives that are to a considerable extent disconnected from everyday life in the areas where they are being implemented. They become projects, project staff and project content which from their point of origin are not aligned with neither the professionalism being exercised in the areas or general [municipal] activities in the disadvantaged areas ... (...) exactly that dimension is what we need to work on, and it must be much more integrated into the municipal operation, so that people have a stake in it.” (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4)*

What is being explained in the quote is that these two types of work operate in parallel and disconnected manners; the area-based programs viewed in this organisational perspective is too uncoupled and not part of the work infrastructure already there in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In this respect, the combination is not antagonistic, but reconciling, coined in the concept of 'integration'. However, the same civil servant continues thinking about these uncoupled ways of working: that the synergy combination also preconditions that the two types of work, development and the day-to-day operations, are not integrated into one. In this respect, a leadership dilemma is generated here: how to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that the development work still remains:

*Finding the interface [snitfladen] ... if you integrate development work closely into operational work, it becomes difficult to find the interface between municipal operations and municipal development, and I have no solution to that right now, but I have some ideas about how to fix it, but conversely it must be said that the local network of employees from day-care centres, schools, you name it - that is the largest public human resource also in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. "(Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, 14)*

This quote demonstrates that there is a tension in the micro-discourse when implementing The Horizontal Pillar: that the holistic lead motif in the area-based profession could be conflicting, i.e. conceptually uncoupled, with its ambition of conducting local experimental work.

### **6.5.2.SUMMING UP**

The objective of the analysis was to show first of all that a profession-based entrepreneurship is able to both generate, and partly break, the deadlock of uncertainties characteristic of collaborative innovation, by introducing concepts that generate a direction for collaborators. And second, how these discursive concepts condition the emergence of a specific subject position, enabling ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader.

In Figure 18 above, I have summarised the combinations made by means of the entrepreneurship based on the profession of the area-based approach. These combinations are both present in The Horizontal Pillar, as well as invoked in conversations afterwards. 'The Horizontal Pillar' can thus be seen as both a creative and a logical organisational continuation of some core lead motifs in the area-based approach and its profession: the horizontal holistic combinations of resources across stakeholders, tailored and adapted to specific instances of 'the local'. However, the analysis also demonstrates that in the process of implementing some of the recommendations, a possible discursive tension exists between two core motifs in the area-based approach: the horizontal-holistic and the experimental. If too much focus is placed on horizontal coordination of the day-to-day operations of the municipality, development work needs to be redefined.

What I also find, however, is that the concepts introduced form a micro-discourse in which the subject position of the collaborative innovation leader needs to be further defined. In the situation of The Evaluation Case, ND's discourse forces its members to relate to certain leadership dilemmas:

1. There is a legitimate rationality claim for working in silos. How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical structures?
2. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying the demands of co-creation and influence?
3. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?
4. There is a danger of integrating development work too much in the day-to-day operations. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development work still remains?

The choice of how to address these leadership dilemmas will define how ND's leadership will be developed in order to be recognised. As the 'Leadership Recognition' section further down below exemplifies, ND do in this phase of the project makes sense of how to exercise leadership differently: Perhaps communicate a more closed set-up to collaborators; perhaps define a division of labour among administrations more clearly. So obviously, the introduction of new concepts provides ND with some strategic choices to make, with regard to how much to expand the innovation project, and how this expansion or stabilization of project should come about, in terms of communicating to collaborators more closed or open processes. Each of these possibilities will have different impacts concerning implementation success, and concerning what it is that is supposed to be implemented.

### **6.5.3. PROACTIVITY: BASED ON THE AREA-BASED PROFESSION AND SPECIALIZATION**

In this section I will describe how, to some extent, the proactive type of bottom-up leadership action enables the innovation project to move forward, despite the uncertainties mentioned above.

Some of the interviewees give explanations of proactivity and the ability to navigate in an environment of uncertainty. In the quote below, a civil servant from ND mentions the bureaucratic position and way of working as being essential for the ability to identify development possibilities:

*“This office is one year old, i.e., it has also had to find its own role, which has not been defined in advance, and it's a little easier to be innovative when you have to build something than when you have to limit yourself or tearing down something. ... The way we work we have relatively much contact with the local level, as we sit in*

*the control groups and are mingling with these people .... So we have an approach that makes it different for us in contrast to how the other administrations are structured: in a vertical column. This means that their staff and development functions are located to a relatively high extent in the central administrations" (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4)*

In this quote, the respondent understands the ND as a sort of hybrid office, being both local and central at the same time, and having network ties to many different professions. Another explanation given is that the ND office is very new, providing much room for developing the objectives and identity of the office. The quote demonstrates that the profession and proactivity in combination function as a reservoir for inspiration.

The quote below shows features of proactive action at the time when the merging between The Horizontal Pillar and the Governance Dialogue began. Having already been working hard on implementing 'The Pillar', the ND office and its allies were able to see the Governance Dialogue as being interconnected. In fact, in the Pillar report, this event was actually taken into account, thus giving ND a head start for influencing the process:

*"I do not think they could have figured it out by themselves ... it's been obvious ... that the residential social work [boligsociale arbejde] in the neighbourhoods and the social problems are also highly visible in the social housing sector. Therefore it has been obvious from the start that all the efforts in residential social work in the public sector also played a very important part [in the process] and were very, very high on the agenda ... it [was] also obvious that we had been in that sandbox already since we had tried and experienced with the interdisciplinary work in relation to the Comprehensive Plans ....so, when it began to unfold, it made sense to see it as a cross-cutting way of collaborating." (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4).*

In describing this as being both an act that requires entrepreneurship, leadership recognition and making and giving sense, the quote demonstrates how the 'Pillar' as a profession-based development plan provides ND with possibilities for acting when the more or less unforeseen consequences of the 'Governance Dialogue' emerged.

The quote below shows how the report The Horizontal Pillar is being used and slowly begins to function as a concrete tool for action:

*"The whole myth of Copenhagen City's inability to work together across administrations was also something that I was influenced by to begin with. I was really pleased that The Horizontal Pillar has articulated that issue and set an agenda for moving forward. That is a major reason for why I think it's fun to be here. That is the agenda, and an agenda that we in Neighbourhood Development, by our one-year birthday, can see ourselves having a role in, and which makes more and more sense. Day by day it is becoming an increasingly workable and concrete professional to-do list for us. And an agenda which is also gaining increasing [momentum] ... there is a very positive dialogue around it ... you have a greater sense of the content of what the other colleagues are doing, and each project respects the other project .... "* (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4)

The quote demonstrates a dual function of The Horizontal Pillar report: it reduces much uncertainty concerning collaboration across administrative boundaries and gives ND a head start in the direction of sensemaking. The quote also shows how the civil servant notices that the concepts introduced are beginning to become accepted by others.

#### **6.5.4.SUMMING UP**

In this section, I have analysed how proactivity as a type of action to some extent enables the members to move forward, despite the uncertainties mentioned above.

In the analysis I find that the area-based profession and ND's specialization in this profession function as a reservoir for proactivity. First of all, in that ND is a hybrid office with contacts to both the central and local levels. Further, the office is new, which ensures much space for developing objectives and identity of the office in conditions of uncertainty. Also, The Horizontal Pillar functions as a very important type of to-do-list for the office, enabling the employees to address the many uncertainties - not much doubt about the soundness of the project is shown in the interviews. It also allows ND to utilise unforeseen influence possibilities, such as the Governance Dialogue, in that ND already has developed concepts that can help themselves and municipal partners to make sense of this legislative demand for change.

The overall entrepreneurship findings suggest that by introducing concepts, profession-based entrepreneurship to a large extent shuts down further processes of collaborative idea generation, helping to avoid some of the 'collaborative inertia'

often observed in collaboration literature (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The concepts and perspectives of the 'Pillar' also helped ND to make a head start when other municipal processes were initiated, such as the Governance Dialogue, acting as a reservoir for making sense of unforeseen situations. As the main driver of this innovation process, ND is the actor that both produces and utilises the *collaborative* uncertainty. The office members are the main drivers of the project and have the responsibility for running the project; ND is also the actor that is best able to take advantage of the collaborative uncertainty: as the Pillar-project is very specialised, we get the image of a bureaucratic leadership that is to some extent paralyzed, or perhaps intentionally unengaged, which implies that the civil servants and the ND manager have to figure out how to make sense of the process themselves.

## **6.6 LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION: DEALING WITH LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS**

In the previous sections, I demonstrated how profession-based entrepreneurship can be used to introduce a micro-discourse, composed by a specific configuration of concepts. I also demonstrated how the introduction of this micro-discourse in some instances generates unexpected leadership dilemmas. Solving these leadership dilemmas requires types of actions that are more fundamental as regards consequence than proactivity: they require identity shifts and a strategic discursive positioning despite the fact that the consequences of these actions are to some extent unknown.

In this section, I focus on how the attempt to introduce this micro-discourse generates a leadership positioning landscape in which ND needs to perceive and adjust to points of leadership conflicts and sources of legitimacy in order to provide collaborators with direction, thus acquiring recognition as a collaborative innovation leader. Both conflicts and sources of legitimacy potentially lead to changes in ND's leadership, in that they point out specific trajectories that ND could take in order to address what I call leadership dilemmas.

I will first describe how people struggle with leadership and the collaborative innovation project. Second, I will analyse the sources of leadership legitimacy. Third, I will describe how ND staff and manager involved in The Evaluation Case process relate to their own leadership.

### **6.6.1. LEADERSHIP CONFLICTS: DOUBT ABOUT COLLABORATIVE VALUE AND ILLEGITIMATE LEADERSHIP**

In The Evaluation Case, only three administrations were involved. EIA and TEA had a shared understanding of the Pillar-project, in that only these two administrations were willing to engage themselves in the project. Therefore, EIA and TEA were alliance partners. SSA had a wish to participate, but did not share coordinative ambitions of the Pillar-project. Therefore, when conflicts arose, this was mainly between representatives from TEA/ND and representatives from SSA, and mainly at civil-servant level. As the conflicts below display, the main line of conflicts circled around the value of the Pillar-project, and of the Evaluation practice; but they also concerned leadership. It was not the task given to The Evaluation Team that generated conflict, even though professional disagreements did arise. Instead, The Evaluation Team is a catalyst for more fundamental innovation project- and leadership-conflicts.

First, I will analyse the arguments against the value contribution of the Pillar Project; next I will analyse conflicts concerning leadership. Finally I summarise the section.

#### **6.6.1.1 Doubt about collaborative value**

*Unclear purpose*

In the quote below, an SSA interviewee responds to my question:

*“I: If we're about to say something about the process of cooperation ... what would some words then be if you had to characterize this process since March 2009?”*

*R: Well yes, it will be ... it will be two words, it will be contentious and it will be unclear.” (SSA, civil servant, I8)*

Concerning ‘unclear’, the interviewee gives the following explanation of ‘practical preconditions’:

*“Something that I also reflected on was: have we even looked at organizing....are even the most basic psychological and common linguistic frameworks in place so that we can make innovation together? If we do not understand the same thing by the words we use, and if we do not agree on what we are talking about and what it means when we talk about it, is it then even possible for us to develop things together?” (SSA, civil servant, I8)*

What the quote demonstrates is that the conflicts have provoked a series of post-conflict-reflections concerning ways in which to develop initiatives across administrations, as also demonstrated in other interviews. Not just in SSA, but also in EIA and TEA members of The Evaluation Team reflect on how to initiate such processes better, considering if it would have been better to create a new team which people from the collaborating administrations would be a part of in the development phase, thus enabling a shared understanding.

Another aspect that is also unclear is The Horizontal Pillar-report itself:



*“When I read The Horizontal Pillar for the first time, the first thing that came to my mind was: Damn it's hard to understand! Wow! And I still feel that way every time I read it. I just have to say: Wow, there is a communicative task here that I believe has still not been completed.” (SSA, Civil servant, I5)*

That the report is not easy to grasp is supported by an interview with the former director for TEA's Urban Design Department, interviewed almost two years later, explaining that he did not himself fully understand what the report was about. When I presented him with my impression that collaborators had a hard time understanding the report and the project, the now former director answered:

*“Well, that's absolutely correct. We were running into a problem concerning the way in which the project was developed - it was impossible to communicate. It was completely like that, and I think that I still feel the same way - I have read it three times without understanding it. But, we and the National Association of Local Governments made a sort of a translation which I think was very good ... which just got it down to earth. And then, as we have now made the project into something more tangible, like saying 'The Horizontal Pillar', that was actually a very good metaphor. It indicates that we are a municipality which is divided in such and such a fashion, so we need to work together on the other dimension and be in it all together.” (TEA, former director, I29)*

What the above two quotes demonstrate is that the Pillar-report as a profession-related, specialised report may have been very useful for ND as a leader, in that it reduced ND's uncertainty (see above). It may also have been very ingenious in terms of actually presenting a new, consistent solution to a way in which to make progress in dealing with a wicked problem. However, it is also almost impossible to understand for outsiders. The report has functioned at a leadership level as a public strategy report with a reservoir for giving sense, causing the strategy to be inaccessible to others, thus in fact non-public. This public/non-public function of the strategy report is a leadership advantage in terms of giving sense, but at the cost of provoking misunderstandings and problems in communicating the nature of the problem.

In the lengthy quote below, the EIA member of The Evaluation Team puts into words this ambivalent status of the Pillar report and the project:

*“R:It's concerning the power to define, and where the hell is it? - it's so blurry.*

*I: The power of definition of what is innovative or what do you mean exactly?*

*R: First, what is innovative, but also what needs to be innovated and why it must be innovated. This is usually the crisis question you ask about your project, right? Where are the external needs and internal needs then? Now if you took The Horizontal Pillar and made such a [...] project model in which you ask the question of what the need is, everything seems to be concerned with an internal need for TEA because it is simply the condition for doing what they can to solve the task they have been given. Therefore, they are also the people who are running around seeing the idea behind it all, which might be harder for us – do we get something out of it? How is it that we get something out of it? Will our citizens get more quality and will my job become easier or?” (EIA, Civil servant, I2)*

What the quote demonstrates is that the Pillar Project enabled ND/TEA to see what the meaning of the project was, and to develop the project; however, collaborators had difficulties in seeing themselves as part of the project.

This conflict demonstrated that at this point in time, what ND gained in momentum, they seemed to lose at the same time with regard to collaborative ownership of the project.

*Expanding, blurry boundaries of the project threatened sound professional work*

Another conflict that especially SSA displayed was the blurry scope of the innovation project. Different examples are given in which ND's entrepreneurship, combining municipal resources in new ways, is perceived as a threat. TEA is considered as an actor that just cannot gain enough turf and tries to take control of professional areas in which they have no professional insight. In the quote below, this 'turf fight', which I described in my Pilot study, is corrected by a SSA civil servant in a feedback session:

*"R: The turf struggle was like this in my perspective: It was not that this remit had to switch to TEA because I think everyone here, from high to low, all agree that there was no interest in SSA in having Comprehensive Plans or area renewals [as part of our remit]. ... What the dispute was about, and is about, is: what is area-based? Which of the residential social work [det boligsociale] must be in align with a more*

*general interdisciplinarity? And what's just our business like it used to be? (SSA, Civil servant, I3)*

The fear of the SSA-employee is how much of SSA's social work is going to be included in the 'Pillar'-project. The boundaries of the project are blurry and are disturbing existing professional practice:

*"... My experience is simply that there are some forces in TEA that will simply swallow everything raw, and they simply cannot get enough ... and that makes me feel a bit like: "you stick to what you know about and in fact have a professional insight into, and let us do our social work" (SSA, Civil servant, I3)*

This quote demonstrates that when ND introduces a new coordinative centre, that of the city area, they start to interfere with the professional boundaries of the other administrations, for instance what the objective of state-level, Social Reserve Fund-means should be; should these project resources support SSA objectives or city-area objectives? The conflict is increased as for this SSA employee it is very unclear what the boundaries of the project are: a division of labour has not yet manifested itself at this point in time.

*Too much coordination: symptoms of a 'mega-plan'*

Another central conflict concerns the concept of coordination, demonstrated in the quote below:

*"I strongly believe in... that those who need to communicate with each other, they are the people who must perform a task together .. And all that about making extra layers of organisation, well, I just do not believe in it... we are killing ourselves by attending meeting after meeting... we must act, not attend meetings " (SSA, Civil servant, I3)*

The quote demonstrates a point that is to some extent similar to 'the blurry boundaries'-conflict above, since ND's project is interfering with existing practice. However, the quote foreshadows a more radical critique, as ND is perceived of as an actor that simply generates negative value in terms of an 'additional-layer organisation' at the central level. Furthermore, the quote may also reflect the sector-based way the municipal organisation is organised, making coordination through numerous meetings a requirement when initiating strategies that cut across the sector-defined, organisational boundaries.

In the SSA-quote below, this critique is developed further:

*“I think there are great many people engaged in management who are thinking in 'mega plans' – “Now we need to have a form and some measuring and then we'll get everything under control” .. No you won't. No one in this country or other countries will ever get everything under control; this is not how the world works... You asked me, 'does it [the crosscutting collaboration] work well enough?' By no means, and it doesn't work in our own administration. But I believe that we should try to get this to work, this 'small-and-specific' to work. I just do not believe in mega master plans at all, but it may well turn out that I am wrong. But what I do believe in is, on the other hand, that you end up making a great many people incredibly tired of their work because they lose control, because they feel that there are others who turn up and express the viewpoint that they [i.e. the others] are smarter than they are” (SSA, Civil servant, I3)*

In the quote, we see that the coordination critique is a critique of master-plan coordination. We see a resistance to ND's giving sense in that ND and their core mission of increasing coordination centrally is positioned as a centralistic, extra-layer organisation that makes professional life difficult for professionals working at the local level. And ND as a coordinator who interferes in an playful and unserious manner: ” *“It's really, really, really important when you're doing something here that you do not think that uh, that all of a sudden you implement your extra-layer organisation in all sorts of places where you yourself think it might be fun. (SSA, Civil servant, I8) ”*

The quest for coordination (Jennings Jr & Krane, 1994) is actually thought of by collaborators as legitimate; however, the Pillar Project should be implemented and adapted to the local level, in micro-relations, not in a master plan, as a ND-led implementation exercise, as demonstrated in the quote below:

*“It just has to be the right parties, we cannot have people sitting and coordinating us who have no idea what [our initiatives is about]. It is a professional distinction I make, so the logic of The Horizontal Pillar can be applied to a huge number of our initiatives, but we must be very precise about whom the relevant stakeholders are and who are the natural stakeholders and not least the natural process managers, right. And it must of course in no way be an administration with no professional share in it” (SSA, Civil servant, I8)*

We see a conflict between TEA and SSA, in that ND argues that there is a screaming need for coordination, whereas SSA argues that ND's project is actually producing too much coordination, in that another cross-administrative strategy, the

Lord Mayor's Finance Administration's Safe City Strategy and ND are trying to coordinate what SSA is doing, as described also in another interview (I8).

### *Phase conflict*

Another major conflict in The Evaluation Case was whether the report was one of implementation or development. SSA presented their view of the conflict as one of development, whereas the TEA considered it one of implementation. As the quote from SSA below exemplifies, SSA saw the Pillar-report as an opportunity for further development in order to create a shared understanding of the report.

*"I: So you would actually have liked to have had a process where you had discussed content to a higher extent?"*

*R: That we had made it our own. That in a very, very practical way we had said: Now we have this amazing presentation to inspire us and to find out how we will manage this area together in our municipality. Now we sit down and we write what is our problem – and with all this knowledge, what is our solution? .... There was no doubt ... that there was another agenda in TEA, and it was like, "Well the answer is here and that is what we will continue to aim at." "*(SSA, Civil servant, I8)

The quote demonstrates that ND is perceived of as a leader which already has the answer and just wants to implement, whereas SSA-employees argue in favour of the reinterpretation of the Pillar recommendations.

As the ND quote further down shows, reflecting on my pilot study, however, there is an element of inconsistency in this argument:

*"R: But I think that there is another concept too ... When I read about phase confusion [in the pilot study] which I strongly agree with... Then I thought ... I think there is something you can explain with phase [confusion], but I also felt there is something that is about not taking responsibility and not being honest... SSA may at any time, if we now take them as an example, say: "Oh, we did not know" .. The steering committee had actually made a decision that now we were moving into the phase of plain operation [drift]. " "*(ND, middle manager, I7)

The quote demonstrates that there is an atmosphere of distrust between SSA and TEA, and that in ND's point of view SSA are resisting leadership attempts to implement the solution, despite the fact that, according to TEA, the steering committee demonstrated formal decision-making as a way of breaking the collaborative inertia in The Evaluation Team.

### 6.6.1.2 Illegitimate leadership

In the collaborative value creation section above, issues related to the process and the substance of the project were analysed. In this section, I will go more into another theme occurring in the interviews when I was asking about the project, the process and how it was managed: Leadership. Two different, but interrelated, types of leadership were referred to in the interviews: how the TEA/ND managed the process and the absence of formal, hierarchical leadership in the previous period. Both types of leadership are linked directly to the level of conflict. Here, I will analyse the way in which the collaborators perceive of ND's leadership. As the data material demonstrates, a key conflict point was the unclear roles of the participants involved. The level of conflict was highest in The Evaluation Team, whereas the team developing the 'Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map' ('The Map Team', for short) was less conflict-ridden, even though the question of roles was also present here.

*Resistance: Coordinator, not leader*

The first quote from an EIA civil servant explains why the civil servants experience themselves as having a vulnerable position in the collaboration:

*“Well it's a very vulnerable position to be in, because you are actually responsible for negotiations and the clarification of expectations on behalf of an entire administration. Here you may quite often be in doubt about what your own administration wants.” (EIA, civil servant, I9)*

Mostly, the individual administration does not know what it wants to do with the innovation project. The mandate that the individuals have is therefore highly uncertain, meaning that they cannot make decisions straight away in the teams in which they are involved. This absence of hierarchical leadership makes the individual's own position very difficult to manage, increasing the level of conflict, since much depends on the individual civil servant in this part of the process.

The second quote from a SSA civil servant addresses the lack of leadership, both from the TEA and the executive board in general, in relation to the high level of conflict:

*“To me this is not about people being stupid. But there are some quite trivial dynamics in organisations and between people, and we are all here to do the best for the organisation we come from, and we have some interests that we try to defend and if we get into a too vague space... Well, then any idiot will know that it will*

*generate... I have a sort of internal frustration in that I have been talking about this with my management several times, and I know that if I were sitting in that chair, I would have taken it up to the Executive Board a long time ago. That they haven't done so, that's so frustrating, and I think it's even more frustrating that TEA has not done so because they are the project managers." (SSA, Civil servant, I8)*

The quote demonstrates that SSA representatives perceive of the problem of conflict as related to the fact that an undefined space of interaction exists for the people involved in The Evaluation Team, in that they are left to fight amongst themselves, due to lack of both hierarchical leadership and to ND's failed process management. Thus, another conflict is that ND is simply inadequate as a process manager, as the quote below demonstrates:

*"in the same way, the project leader has to be able to accept that the participants are angry and complain, and deal with it. .... And you have to take responsibility for moving forward, so I think that they have a special responsibility" ((SSA, Civil servant, I5),*

TEA is seen as the 'project leader' and is therefore expected to establish an overall management framework for the collaboration. And this management requires that the project leader has to accept that the participants are complaining, and move the process forward: the leader has to be able to address conflicts, and reduce them –ND has not been able to do so.

Another aspect of illegitimate leadership is that ND is perceived of as a collaborative leader that pretends to be inclusive, but actually knows all the answers in advance:

*"The reason why it has been a weird process is that it has been like: "we do this together, but in-reality-we-are-in-charge (...) you point towards a huge problem throughout the process that we have never actually articulated: "who are you, who are we, what can you expect from us, what can we expect of each other across administrations". It has constantly been running in an ad hoc kind of way" (SSA, Civil servant, I5)*

The quote also demonstrates that the role-confusion amongst administrations creates disappointment, in that the administrative representatives do not know what to expect of each other. The SSA interviewee later in the interview refers to a meeting in which she is supposed to just accept what has already been developed by others, despite the fact that she was invited in the first place to actually make decisions on the behalf of her administrations. This shows that representatives from SSA do not

recognise ND as their leader: they refuse to be followers. And they feel that they are wasting their time:

*"I think we spend a lot of energy on those clarifications, both in The Evaluation track and in fact also in the Socio-Economic Map track. A great many meetings have also been spent on asking: what is actually negotiable in this working group because, well, there is no reason for us to provide all sorts of ideas that you are not interested in anyway – then we just don't want to waste our time [on thinking of new ideas]"(I5)*

What the quote thus demonstrates is a critique of ND for not defining the space for negotiation. ND is perceived of as both a leader that wants other administrations to participate, all on an equal basis – and at the same time as a leader that already knows the answers, thus in reality not leaving any room for negotiation.

In the quote below, we see how two different leader roles clash and co-exist at the same time, creating much ambivalence: the 'project manager' and the 'facilitator':

*"I cannot tell you clearly what it is that goes wrong [in the cooperation] but ... but my experience is that we do not agree on whether we are equal in the cooperation. That is where I find that [the ND representatives] perceive of themselves more as project leaders than as coordinators .... I actually think we should be equals, and then there should be a coordinating administration, but because we represent different administrations, we must be equal when cooperating, but I think that I feel that TEA experience that it is their process. So we do not agree on what the facilitator function [tovholderfunktion] is " (SSA, Civil servant, I5).*

The quote demonstrates that SSA had expected a facilitator type of leadership, in which parties are treated as equals; but what they experienced was a 'project manager' type of leadership, in which the project manager ranked above the others. This resulted in open disagreement concerning how the process should be managed. It appears that ND's leadership is not perceived of as legitimate.

ND's ambivalent leadership position is also assessed by an EIA-interviewee, who points our attention towards a leadership dilemma:

*"You can easily sit in a meeting and say, well, complain about not being properly included, while also...TEA should exercise greater control, right? And it gets extremely difficult for the facilitator/project manager [tovholder] to handle that complexity in relation to what is being expected of them. So we can say that we all seem to agree that we need to work across boundaries in a sort of matrix*



*organisation in which there is opportunity for everyone to affect this project, everyone should have ownership. But at the same time, there is also a need for someone to take the lead. And you might say that from the outset, two opposing rationales are at stake.” (EIA, Civil servant, I9)*

The quote demonstrates the ambivalence in the situation: ND is both expected to lead and take charge – but it is also expected to manage a process in which the other administrations can have as much influence as they want. This is a leadership dilemma, especially visible in The Evaluation Case: How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands for co-creation and influence?

A final leadership dilemma is seen in this last SSA-quote; here ND’s leadership is criticized first of all for creating a direction, and holding on to it – and next, to some extent, for acknowledging SSA’s critique of the evaluation template in The Horizontal Pillar-report, changing direction:

*“TEA has changed their position as I see it and that is basically fine - besides that it was super frustrating to have spent six months, and then, because they get a new employee ... then we suddenly start all over again. That made me a little annoyed: now we have spent so many months talking about this, and then suddenly you [TEA] all of a sudden completely change course and then we have to start all over again” (SSA, Civil servant, I5)*

The quote demonstrates that for a leader to change position during a process, without the consent of collaborators, is perceived of as illegitimate when it happens, even though this may be approved of later on. The critique is actually a critique of the volatility, the inconsistency, and the brittleness of the leadership, in that a new employee can suddenly change the entire direction of The Evaluation Team. Consequently, this critique invokes another leadership dilemma: How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?

## 6.6.2.SUMMING UP

Conflicts to a high extent dominate The Evaluation Case. One major conflict concerns the fact that especially SSA has found it difficult to identify the purpose of the innovation project. Critique has also been raised regarding the fact that the three participating administrations do not have the practical preconditions for conducting this type of development work. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for the administrative representatives to develop a shared understanding.

The unclear purpose is amplified by the profession-related, specialised strategy report of The Horizontal Pillar, which is very difficult to understand for especially SSA, but also for EIA. This also makes it difficult for collaborators to see themselves as part of the project, and to see what they gain from contributing to it.

Another major conflict is the expanding, blurry boundaries of the project; ND uses their concepts and emergent leadership position to gain access to new areas of responsibility. This provokes fear in especially SSA, in that the scope of ND's project is seemingly without borders.

A third major conflict is a resistance towards ND's mission of increasing coordination. According to SSA, ND's project actually provokes a situation in which there is too much coordination. The consequence of this resistance is that ND can be positioned as a centralistic leader that generates negative value in terms of overburdening their collaborators with a superfluous extra-layer organisation. Instead of ND's 'mega-plan', the SSA-representatives favour a micro-plan in which the local parties themselves are the natural leaders, and ought to coordinate where they deem this to be appropriate.

A further distinction is invoked here, that of 'top-down' vs. 'bottom-up'. We may see this distinction as a battle between TEA and SSA concerning who has the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the 'front line, local working staff'. A further distinction is invoked in the quotes: 'action vs. meeting'. SSA wants to act, not participate in meeting after meeting, stealing valuable time from client work. Finally, the conflicts also present us with an image of ND as a 'know-all developer' vs. the hard-working civil servant (the collaborating administrations); TEA runs the risk of making people tired by talking down to them, instructing them how to work.

The fourth conflict concerns a definition of phases. SSA-representatives argue that they perceived of the evaluation process, and The Horizontal Pillar-project in general, as a report for inspiration, i.e. SSA argues in favour of an idea-generation phase. In contrast, ND argues that the recommendations from the report were supposed to have been more or less implemented, since both SSA and EIA have

formally accepted the report. This conflict produces an atmosphere of distrust and hostility, generating inertia in the team.

In an overall perspective, this inertia may be seen as a struggle for power as ND will gain momentum from a straightforward implementation, whereas SSA will gain influence if the report recommendations are renegotiated.

So how does the above analysis of conflict points contribute to answering the research question: How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

First of all, we see how the conflicts above relate to four, rather abstract, leadership dilemmas discovered in the entrepreneurship-section:

- How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical organisational structures?
- How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development work still remains?
- How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands for co-creation and influence?
- How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?

Thus, the conflicts give flesh and blood to the concept of leadership recognition for an innovation unit placed at the bottom of a collaborative setting. The conflict points display issues that ND has to relate to in order to define and develop their subject position of a 'leader' in a micro-discourse that they themselves, in alliance with EIA, have introduced: are we to position ourselves as implementers or facilitators? How far can we stretch our legitimacy claim for coordination without provoking aggressive defence reactions from our collaborators? How to gather support for our solution? How to enable collaborators to see the value of the project, when the entire project may be regarded as a leap of sector-related, profession-based faith? The analysis also provides detailed descriptions of reasons why conflicts may escalate in situations generated by such an emerging leadership: that to a large extent decision-makers are unengaged in, and unable to, set a direction; instead, due to a specialised solution to a wicked problem, the actual leaders are mainly specialised civil servants who are fighting to win the struggles for meaning across organisations.

The Evaluation Case is riddled with conflicts. Therefore, the points of conflict are many, and the sources of leadership legitimacy few. In the section below, I will describe these sources.

### **6.6.3. SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP LEGITIMACY: PROJECT MANAGEMENT, LOCAL COORDINATION AND SHARED PROCESS UNDERSTANDING**

In the section above I displayed the issues of conflict in the leadership positioning landscape. In this section I will focus on leadership legitimacy. As I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, the concept of recognition (Griffin, 2002) is useful in two ways: first of all, it focuses on conflict and power: how meaning is generated through conflicts. But the concept of recognition also enables a focus on the fact that existing patterns of power not only generate opposition and resistance to new discourses or themes, but that these patterns of power are also sometimes susceptible for influence and actually demands to be influenced. This susceptibility to be influenced I conceptualize as legitimacy: it is an element in the micro-discourse that people find makes sense to them when trying to reduce the uncertainty they experience; it also enables them to see how these elements might generate value to them.

In the quote below, I ask an ND employee about the implementation of the Pillar, once the project was approved of in ultimo 2008. Did the fact that only EIA contributed to begin with reduce the ownership of the project in the steering committee, in which managers from the remaining administrations were represented?

*"No, but that could very well have been the result. But I really don't think that was the case. To some extent I believe they seemed a little relieved that we knew very well what we wanted. But at the same time they would also like to modify and qualify the [project-]design, etc. " (ND, Special consultant, I10)*

The quote thus demonstrates that leadership showing direction is actually appreciated by managers from the other administrations; but that they also want to influence the way in which it is supposed to be implemented. This type of leadership displayed by ND is in some respect ambivalent.

#### *Project management*

In the first quote below, a civil servant from SSA talks positively about a change of management:

*"What she really is capable of, and that I sometimes missed here [in relation to The Pillar project/the Evaluation Case], is that banal understanding of the fact that project management is also about making sure that everyone is happy. I have experienced a different kind of trample style, and I am just very happy to be greeted that [other] way. And I think it's really, really important when you think of cooperating in flat structures, the flatter structure you want, the more aware you have to be that everyone want their demands fulfilled. The less you do that, the less people bother to play along, play with a flat structure. So it is just strategically very sensible to try and create inclusion." (SSA, Civil servant, I8)*

The background of the interview statement is that the 'Governance Dialogue' has implied that the ND office and their 'Pillar'-project are to be redefined within a larger project. This project is also a development project, but in contrast to the 'Pillar'-project, the 'Governance Dialogue' is founded on legislation. As a consequence, a neighbouring office to ND, 'Social Housing', now has the responsibility for running the cross-administrative process of involving the administrations. 'Social Housing' runs a standardized process management model, which is approved of in this interview as the proper way of doing things when working across administrative boundaries. The quote raises another question: is the present smoother-running collaboration process a result of better process management or as a result of The Governance Dialogue process having much more political and administrative attention, enabling it to define the role of the administrations much more clearly? The Governance Dialogue may actually, despite its cross-administrative nature, reflect that things are now 'business as usual' – bureaucratic, formal leadership is once again involved.

In the SSA quote below, it is also perceived as a source of leadership legitimacy that ND/TEA is now doing much more of the work themselves; and they are perceived of as being much more professional:

*"it [the leadership] is different. I think that TEA is taking more ownership. They have also got a completely different organisation to base their work upon, both in terms of expertise and the number of resources. And in that process it certainly seems as if TEA is going to be more inclusive than it sometimes has been.*

*They're doing more of the work themselves and that seems fair. I think we in the beginning stood up to a lot. I think you need to write something about the fact that TEA was expected to perform one task at a time when they had only three employees [centrally] – it very quickly became huge. Therefore they did not know anything*

*about evaluation or .. so I just mention this to say that they've to a much higher extent joined the struggle [kommet ind i kampen]" (SSA, Civil servant, I3)*

Furthermore, a more clever way of using collaborative resources is also approved of. In the section above, the waste of resources in meetings that produce much discussion but no progress was highly criticized. However, as a result of observed professionalization in ND, and the TEA in general, the TEA now does a lot of the work themselves, and run the process much more professionally. In response to the Pilot Study Paper which I presented to the informant, the informant mentions that to begin with, the ND office had no capacity to run the type of process they did: too little manpower and experience. But at this point in time (November 2010) they are perceived of as being much more professional, resourceful and competent.

#### *Demonstrating the value of the project to other professionals*

In the sections above, I have described how the lack of direct hierarchical involvement leads to conflicts and negotiations amongst the civil servants themselves. A crucial element for bottom-up leadership is demonstrating the collaborative value of the project. As the TEA quote below exemplifies, a tool like the socioeconomic Copenhagen map can be used as a means to exercise influence:

*"I: So if I understand you correctly then, in order to get the other administrations more engaged you have created a form of cooperation based on trade? If they could see some more benefits of being part of it, they would also engage in it?"*

*R: Yes, that has clearly been my goal. Also because I was informed that TEA might provide DKK 500,000 for the development of the Map in 2010: "Perhaps you would like to run it and develop it?" So it was also a little like a sales [talk] The Culture and Leisure Administration has always been saying: "We are not area-based. "But anyways I really think that the representative thought it was very interesting: "How exciting it must be for you to be able to go in and see where the sports facilities are located. If you can see that there are many children in this part of town, aren't you then interested in seeing how many sports facilities are located in the area? So the representative has actually been modestly engaged in it". (ND, Civil servant, I6)*

The quote demonstrates that it is important that the other administrations get something specific out of the collaboration, such as a tool that allows them to present progress to their own decision makers. And furthermore, the map acts as a tool for influencing the civil servants, in that it is a part of the pillar-logic: viewing the problem of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods as a *spatial* problem entails that it makes sense to create maps that allow for spatial interpretation of how problems in these neighbourhoods can be solved. Thus, the map produces a certain kind of knowledge, in full accordance with the discursive elements of the Pillar Project.

The second TEA quote also demonstrates that it is important that the locally working civil servants buy in on the vision of the Pillar Project:

*“It [the project] needs to be much more integrated into the daily municipal operations, so that you have a task in it. I think that as soon as you see yourself as having a task to perform in relation to the project and also perceive it as having a potential, that if across all these external and extraordinary project grants you can see an opportunity to develop your own talent as a part of it – the interest will be much bigger. ... There is a need for the reflection of The Horizontal Pillar concerning crosscutting collaboration to be implemented in every library and every nursery there is. That’s necessary. Not least in times of recession where you feel that you are being squeezed from the one side, and then there is someone across the road running around and playing amusement park”. (ND, Civil servant, I4)*

The locally working civil servants have to be able to make sense of the project, i.e. experience that it creates value in their daily work, otherwise the project has failed. What the quote also displays is that, if not improved in some way, the area-based programs are at risk of being positioned as a ‘all fun and games’ in which numerous activities are initiated without contributing to a higher goal. For ND, it is important to do something about this image.

*Shared process understanding: ‘Learning by doing’ as the legitimizer of interest-based conflicts*

In the quote below, a civil servant from EIA reflects upon some of the dominating discussions across administrations in the wake of collaboration experience so far. What the quote shows is that this particular process has been very conflictive at the civil servant level, leading to reflections about how to improve collaboration in the future. The civil servants, especially from SSA and EIA, feel very exposed, in that they feel they have to negotiate by themselves on behalf of a whole administration. What the quote demonstrates is that the collaborating parties at this level deal with the conflicts by constructing a shared understanding of what has been going on. This shared understanding is a way of de-personalizing the conflicts, thus objectifying it

to simply a rational matter of interests and mandate. This shared understanding thus shares some of the entrepreneurial elements described above. I interpret this finding as a way of both being able to continue collaborating at a lower emotional cost, and as a way of ‘making peace’, thus re-establishing the subject position of ‘the professional’:

*“[when] we have to make some terms of reference we should at least remember to make it [the cross-administrative working relation] a recurring theme. So we constantly confront those conflicts, and above all, use them in a positive way. To develop things instead of it being a hindrance. Like when criticism is raised from the SSA about the lack of something, well, then you have to ... instead of saying "Arhg!!", or .. or feel offended at heart, so simply say, "well it's not me, Brian, sitting as a representative from EIA saying [while he is knocking impatiently on the table]: "I must have some impact measurements because I must! " (EIA, Civil servant, I9)”*

In the quote above, a civil servant from EIA explains how the experience concerning the massive conflicts gathered in this collaborative process can help others in the future. Also, when interviewed in round two, giving feedback to my pilot-study, both SSA-informants replied something in style with the following when describing the process experience, that ‘*this is how it is in these types of processes.*’ In other words, the civil servant from EIA and civil servants from SSA even mentioned a desire to make a handbook for working across administrations. The quote exemplifies that a process perspective on what the administrations have been experiencing has to some extent produced a more relaxed atmosphere.

#### **6.6.4.SUMMING UP**

In terms of sources of leadership legitimacy, we find that as an administration TEA gains more recognition when the now merged processes of The Horizontal Pillar and The Governance Dialogue are managed by another TEA office. This office is doing professional ‘by-the-book’ project management, and is doing a lot of the work themselves. This type of cross-administrative leadership is highly approved of by SSA. Further, another source of legitimacy seems to be simply a professional and experienced staff in ND, which in number matches the task. We see that if the bottom-up leader is perceived of as too vulnerable or too inexperienced; if they do not have the sufficient manpower to take on as much of the hard work as expected, support from sceptical collaborators is harder to acquire. Further, what also seems to provide the emergent leader with recognition is the fact that the civil servants from the other administrations need to take some ‘value’ with them back home – either an



event for their mayor to demonstrate results or a tool like the socio-economic map that may prove of value in their own internal evaluations or professional work.

In the next section, I turn to the way in which ND-staff have decided to position themselves as leaders across these leadership dilemmas, conflicts and sources of legitimacy.

#### **6.6.5. LEADERSHIP IDENTITY: MOVING TOWARDS A COORDINATIVE ROLE**

In the sections above I have explained how a specific type of profession-based entrepreneurship has formed the basis for leadership emergence. I have also analysed how people constantly judge and negotiate the project and the leadership position. Finally, I have analysed how ND/TEA has navigated in power struggles by dealing with the resistance to both leadership and project and by being engaged in discussions and achieving legitimacy by demonstrating value for the other administrative professionals. Thus, a visible leadership is easily identifiable in the case of ND/TEA, despite the fact that not all agree that TEA should be the leader, or has the legitimacy or the necessary skills to be a leader. A question is still unanswered:

- How does ND understand its own leadership and its development so far?

This is an important dimension of leadership emergence. Even though in this project I conceptualize leadership as socially constructed, emerging through conflicts with *collaborating* parties, leadership emergence hinges both on the entrepreneurial project, but also on the way in which the lead unit takes action in order to transform itself from a unit with a strong entrepreneurial and conceptual basis to a unit recognised for its leadership. This is inevitably an identity transformation which emergent leaders have to fulfil by themselves, by defining their own roles, reflecting on sources of legitimacy and points of conflict. As Griffin (2002) notes, leadership hinges on providing direction by answering the question: who are we, and what are we doing?

In the quote, I have asked the manager from ND why decision making was so difficult to obtain in The Evaluation Team, and report how the manager explained my observations - that decisions were difficult to sanction, resulting in inertia:

*"Perhaps it's TEA's and thus also my own levels of ambition that have been too high, as I have always insisted that the cross-administrative and the interdisciplinary ways of collaborating were possible .... I thought it would be easier. I thought most definitely that we had a common cause which would have supported the process in one way or another. This I also expected in relation to the Children and Youth Administration, and those people we have never managed to include, despite the fact that the one thing which dominates the Comprehensive Plans and the area renewals are exactly activities for children and youth " (ND, middle manager, I7)*

In the response, we see an interesting experience in leadership making: that the outset for the innovation project and the leadership position was value based – that the wish to do something for the disadvantaged neighbourhoods was expected to be enough in order to acquire legitimacy for the project, and thus allowing the members of The Evaluation Team to come up with a joint solution. However, as the conflict with SSA shows, the means to acquire this goal are contested, perceived of as an extra-layer activity, actually being counterproductive.

In the quote, I ask what ND has learned from The Evaluation Case:

*“R: I think that we will try to draw some other lines concerning for instance the Copenhagen Map, where we say: this is TEA, which has received half a million to develop the map.*

*I: So you set up a frame, and then invite people in?*

*R: Yes as long as they want to participate.” (ND, middle manager, I7)*

The response signals that more direct leadership will be used in the development of The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map. So, as a response to the conflicts in The Evaluation Team, a less flat leadership structure will be the way forward. Later in the interview, the manager refers to an episode of success in which ND uses the distinction between 'project-layer/day-to-day municipal activities' to influence a funding process for new projects. For ND, this type of funded projects is exactly what is to be coordinated by using an area-based perspective:

*“I also think we have moved very, very far on cross-government collaboration in Copenhagen while I've been here, and I think this has been because we have dared to articulate our really high ambition concerning this agenda (...) I think also that you can look at some of the new things that we are experiencing now. There is now a different understanding that if we make a Social Reserve Fund application [Satspuljeansøgning], then it should actually contribute to what we're doing already – so there is an organisational structure that to a higher extent refers it [such an application] to an area-based level” (ND, I7, middle manager)*

This quote demonstrates the powerfulness of a new micro-discourse as an influence tool, in that it allows ND to try to forcefully address the insufficient way in which the municipality deals with disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The quote also demonstrates that the micro-discourse enables ND to influence processes of which they have not so far been a legitimate part. In other words, ND is expanding its sphere of influence by means of the discourse.

As hypothesised by the BUCIL model, leadership has to be engaged in discussions and conversations in order to gain an influence and in order to compensate for the lack of hierarchical power. As the sections above have displayed, many discussions arise all the time: in The Evaluation Team, The Map Team, as well as in discussions with other administrations concerning funding processes etc. In the TEA quote, the civil servant tries to put some words on issues of the numerous discussions, negotiations and conflicts in relation to the lack of decision making:

*“R: For example, if you take SSA, their line manager is very remote concerning our work. But at the same time, this manager has at least 4-5 officials who cooperate to an incredible extent with us. And for us it is, then, extremely difficult to get decisions taken because we always negotiate with various officials and on very, very few occasions get to speak to her. And when we do reach her, then she's always far from the concrete tasks, because she, well, I just think that it [The Horizontal Pillar project] is a small part [of her work]*

*I: So she cannot be part of the dialogue in an active and specific professional way?*

*R: No, she will say, "I'll bring this or that official of mine". So we haven't really...., it's very, very rare that .... The way things are running here is not like it could be in other places in which the bosses sit down and say – "where are we going"? And then decide for specific tasks to be performed.” (ND, special consultant, I10)*

What this civil servant points to, also later in the interview, is the fact that the middle manager in SSA is not very much engaged in the Pillar Project due to its 'nice-to-do' status as a development project, and due to the fact that the manager in SSA does not have much knowledge of the project. As a consequence, negotiations

are conducted with the civil servants of SSA instead. What ND is trying in this part of the innovation process is to cope with a key challenge of bottom-up innovation: how to mobilize hierarchy in order to acquire support. However, this influence strategy is blocked by the civil servants of the other administrations, in that the SSA manager is assisted by the manager's own civil servants.

In the quotes from TEA below, several understandings of ND's own leadership are presented. In the first quote, the middle manager from TEA explains how they have become more aware of their own role as people who are capable of handling issues concerned with 'organizing and level of collaboration':

*"This has been an exercise which is also about shutting things down - what we should **not** do. As regards the Safe City strategy and The Social Reserve Fund's applications [Satspuljemidlerne] we have the same academic reflections which are: what can we do here, how far we can go, what is our role? We can help in some of the preventive work, we can work at the area-based level, we can try to coordinate, and we have some viewpoints concerning the organisational set-up - These are some of our strengths, and then there is a lot which is more relevant for social professionalism and which concerns citizens at the individual level, which is not our part. I think this might also be a relief for some of the other administrations - the fear of whether we would spread all over the place and have an opinion about everything. Here we say, "No, this is your field of responsibility - this is what you do best ". I definitely think that some of our professionalism lies in being capable at the organisation and collaboration levels." (ND, middle manager, 17)*

What is introduced here is a powerful division of labour distinction which reappears later in the 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen', a distinction between 'Area/individual'. This distinction is basically a way of making sense of the central-administrative world, in that it helps reduce the conflicts between the administrations which are perceived as having an individual focus (such as SSA, CLA, EIA) and administrations which are perceived as having a spatial focus, such as TEA. According to my field work, this distinction was not present to begin with in TEA or among SSA and EIA. Just like the introduction of the 'learning-by-doing-process'-concept (see 'sources of legitimacy' above) as a 'shared third' that allows the administrations to cooperate, the 'Area/individual' helps facilitate a division of labour in which the other administrations can relax: TEA does not wish to coordinate everything (such as The Social Reserved Funds), a fear that I described in the section above. What is also relevant in the quote is how ND defines itself as the player of a more coordinative role, rather than as a value-based implementer.

In the quote, the identity of the coordinator is elaborated by a civil servant from ND:

*"Well but that's the system. The responsibility to improve the situation in disadvantaged neighbourhoods becomes a joint responsibility for developing the municipality as well, including the administrations. It is not just a responsibility to optimize some client-oriented problem-solving efforts ...That's what really matters. Because The Horizontal Pillar simply deals with the system's ability to handle these problems. That is what it deals with. "* (ND, civil servant, I4)

ND perceives of its role as working at a system level: enabling the municipality to work across administrative boundaries. This is also a coordinative role, but on a meta-level, in that ND perceives of the municipality in general as an organisation with a system failure. ND is representing the entire municipality and its capability (or lack of) to work together as one efficient unit. Thus, ND takes on a self-critical role, being aware of its own system's limitations, and having as its professional expertise a systems development role. This is in contrast to its former professional role, which was limited to neighbourhood development at a local level, making as efficient an area-based program as possible.

In the next quote, a civil servant from the 'map'-team interestingly notes that she was actually unaware of the nature of ND's role in relation to the Map-team:

*"I: And your role is to lead or to be the coordinator? How do you understand your own role?"*

*R: That has been little unclear. It has been a bit 'guess a task'- like, as there really hasn't been someone who has said what they wanted - other than the Map needed to be developed... so we spent quite a lot of time on also reaching a common understanding of what this is, and what can do with it? Why is it that this does not work?"* (ND, civil servant, I6)

Two things are important to note in this quote concerning leadership identity. In this team they more or less figured out the purpose by themselves, since there wasn't an agenda from the outset. The example demonstrates that some elements of the Pillar Project are seemingly more tightly connected to questions of leadership identity than others. For instance, in the Map-team, the civil servant had no knowledge as to what the overall purpose of the Pillar Project was. In fact, the civil servant explains later in the interview that she needed the assistance of another ND civil servant in order to 'frame' the purpose of the Map for the Map-team. Thus, in contrast to The Evaluation Team, we see a civil servant with no explicit mission to lead the development of the Map based on identity issues. In this part of the Pillar Project, more room for negotiation existed, which gave less conflict, and thus less need to negotiate identities. This finding is important to reflect on, in that it suggests why certain parts of the Pillar Project spurred more conflicts than others. It also reflects

how all civil servants in ND are undergoing an identity change, in that all ND-employees are expected by others to lead.

In the quote below what is also clear is the reflection in ND that the ND manager and some of the ND employees thought that they would have an easily implementable report after the Pillar formulation process had been completed at the end of 2008:

*"After I was made manager, and the report itself had been completed and we took over and had to implement it, I became the project owner of it, so it is anchored in my department - the implementation of it: how much are we going to implement, and how to go about it.... I think they [the report recommendations] were and are really good, and I also think that they really made a lot of sense to our professional field. I also think some of the recommendations appeared very complete. When we had completed the Pillar report, it was like: "well, now we are ready to get started," but when we dug into it, I think that we spent nine months on taking another turn with it. We were sitting with this report at the beginning, thinking that 'now we should really get going and implement it', but it was actually really difficult. The report seemed very concrete, but there was a huge distance between the level that was in the report and then going out and implementing it in a municipal reality. " (ND, middle manager, I7)*

However, when the implementation process began, problems appeared with regard to actually implementing the recommendations. This also explains why SSA experienced shifts in strategy: an entrepreneurial and sensemaking process in the ND happened 'backstage', while on the front stage, ND maintained that the recommendations from the Pillar report, such as the Evaluation Tool, were the right ones to use. This is an important finding, in that it shows us something about the difficulty of running a narrow collaborative innovation process from the bottom and up, at least when the journey was initiated by making a thorough analytical report with a set of recommendations; as soon as the 'innovation journey' (Van de Ven 1998) changes course, due to trial-and-error learning, there is only the leader to blame, which makes it very expensive in terms of leadership recognition. This cost is also amplified when the change of course is accompanied by a leadership identity change from implementer to coordinator.

In the ND-quote below, we see how the identity of coordinator is also linked to being a development office:

*"I have not regretted it [the evaluation work], because then I would revise my strategy. I still believe that it can help us to move closer to the Comprehensive Plans and that we can pick something up and capture something along the way that is important to capture. We can live out our role as coordinator ... but there is no*

*doubt that it is a big mouthful. I also think that one of the good things about it was that it has helped to sharpen the understanding of people in the department - that our office is a development office... I also think that we are beginning to build up a team which is actually capable of handling it and thrive on it and think that it actually is a fantastic and cool working day to have when speaking professionally as it offers so many different tasks. I also think that the other administrations are beginning to figure out how we go about it, and that we also go out and deliver what we promise. "(ND Manager, 17)*

Two things are important to note in this quote. First, that ND sees its work as development work on a continual basis, for instance by using the evaluation practice as a tool for constantly refining and informing their role as coordinator for the area-based programs, such as the Comprehensive Plans. Second, that the ambition of being a development office has required a change in the staff in a way, which has allowed the ND office to actually manage development work. This description denotes an identity change from an operations office to a development office; I interpret this change as being the result of some of the conflicts that I have demonstrated throughout this part of the process, by means of my analysis of The Evaluation Case. As a consequence of this identity change, according to the manager, ND is beginning to develop a leadership profile that the other administrations can relate to: a stable provider of a certain product with a delineated field of responsibility.

#### **6.6.6. SUMMING UP LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION**

The understanding of leadership emergence in the BUCIL model is that it is socially constructed. What is of interest here is how the emergent leader becomes recognised by others, i.e. seen as a force to be reckoned with. The point of recognition is reached through processes of conflict, in that conflicts provoke identity development in the lead unit.

As presented above, we see that the emergent leader's (ND) initial self-image was one that I call a 'value-based implementer'. This positional label does not sum up bottom-up leadership's total self-understanding; in fact, ND also thought of itself as a development organisation to begin with. However, the image of a development organisation was not accepted by SSA or others, presumably because when ND was moving from observable talk to action, for various reasons it handled the task as one of implementation.

In the period from end-2008-2009, conflicts over leadership position occurred, in which the position of ND was not accepted by others. A discrepancy existed

between self-image and the collaborators' perception of the leadership. Accordingly, 'value-based implementer' is a social-constructive leadership label in the sense that it both captures collaborators main perception of leadership and ND's own leadership outset in terms of identity.

In the process that I construct as 'The Evaluation Case', i.e. mid-2009 to start 2010, ND's has become better defined. Rather than in a role as value-based implementer, we find that the legitimate basis of influence lies in a much more defined and also recognizable role in the City of Copenhagen: As a coordinator that still develops, but also 'facilitates', interaction by accepting and working with the different 'interests' and 'cultures' in the other administrations.

This type of leadership defines its own role more narrowly as one with no responsibility and professional insight in the expertise of other administrations, but only operating on an organisational and collaborative level; this definition of leadership also defines the scope of the innovation project, making collaborators relax, in that the blurry boundaries are defined much more clearly. A division of labour has been established, and the administrative roles have been defined. This causes uncertainty to become greatly reduced.

ND and its collaborators begin to construct and share an understanding of the 'process' as a *development* process which is slow, due to bureaucracy and collaborative discussions; but also marked by uncertain surroundings, requiring a perspective of 'learning', 'transformation' etc. in order to address and lead the process.

Further, ND still perceives of itself as a true development office, now also capable of actually fulfilling this role, in that ND staff is beginning to get accustomed to this identity. I call this leadership position 'developing coordinator'.





## 6.7 MAKING AND GIVING SENSE

In the sections above, I have demonstrated that different types of certainty dominate The Evaluation case process and its environment. I have demonstrated how entrepreneurship deals with some of these uncertainties by making new combinations, introducing novel concepts. And I have demonstrated, how introducing these new concepts produce a landscape of possible leadership positioning that provokes identity changes in ND, pushing them towards a more delineated leadership identity in terms of coordination, facilitation and continual development. And I have argued that ND has acquired recognition by moving from being a value-based implementer to becoming a developing coordinator, which entails a more defined role distribution across administrations. I have also demonstrated how trying to introduce certain concepts in The Evaluation Team met severe resistance; but also that novel distinctions and concepts are powerful tools for expanding a bottom-up leader's sphere of influence.

In this section of the analysis, I focus on elaborating on the causal link of the BUCIL model between the social construction of leadership recognition and the ability to give sense.

To summarise my hypothesis concerning making and giving sense: In the BUCIL model, I hypothesize that leadership initiated at the bottom of one of the collaborating organisations has sensemaking as its primary power tool. This concept originates from Weick. However, in contrast to Weick's conception, I give the concept a more strategic twist by connecting it causally with leadership emergence. According to the BUCIL model, *directing* how collaborators make sense of the collaborative innovation process is conditioned on whether or not the leadership is recognised. Leadership recognition is defined as follows: *Leadership recognition in the context of collaboration is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and innovation project cannot be ignored, but has to be reckoned with in the strategic power games within and between organisations.* The main logic of the BUCIL model is conditioned by uncertainty – the uncertainty that collaboration and innovation generates. As soon as this discursive process is initiated, collaborators are forced to relate to the project and the emergent leader – either by doing nothing, by being hesitant about the project or the strategic goals of the leader, being supportive to some extent, or by trying to stop the project or discredit the leadership etc. However, no matter what action is taken by collaborators, the collaborators are forced to make sense of the project. And the bottom-up innovators' influence tool is to direct this sensemaking.

In the remaining part of the section, I mainly give a systematic summary of what I have already discovered in the analytical sections above. In this section I take the liberty to adopt a more analytical story-telling style, and only introduce new quotes if I have to make a point not already contained in the sections above.

In the sub-analyses above, I have demonstrated that uncertainty prevails. We see this in the many explanations people try to come up with concerning leadership, conflicts in relation to The Evaluation Case etc. People ask themselves: what is going on, who are we, and what are we doing? People are confused and puzzled about what they are actually doing, who they are, what the innovation project is about, in what phase they are, whether or not the merging of The Horizontal Pillar and Governance Dialogue will push the project further, whether this merger will actually manifest itself as a new project, whether a sort of political consensus concerning the policy-to-come will be helpful, why there are so many conflicts, etc. All in all, these considerations justify the use of the term sensemaking – people are making sense of the turbulence they already experienced, what they are experiencing now, and what they will come to experience in the future. All of these considerations are essential for the interviewees in order to discover how to act, i.e. how to position themselves in relation to the innovation process.

So, what is the relation between leadership recognition and giving sense? ND has been able to direct this sensemaking in some collaborative interactions manifesting themselves in the period 2009-2010, but not in others. What sites of interaction have I described in the above sections? We have the following sites mentioned by the interviewees:

- The Evaluation Team
- The Map Team
- Steering committee
- Governance Dialogue process
- General discussion concerning The Horizontal Pillar
- The Social Reserve funds

It is only possible to analyse The Evaluation Team in some depth, since this is the only site of interaction in which I have collected data from all involved team members. However, in order to make sense, the respondents often relate to the other sites of interaction for comparison, and they describe and explain these sites of interaction in very different ways, either comparing or contrasting these sites of interaction with The Evaluation Case, focusing on a certain issue, such as leadership legitimacy, confusion about the innovation project or the maze-like governance structure of the municipality. It is worth considering why sensemaking was possible in some sites of interaction and not in others.

Below, I therefore first describe and analyse the sites of interaction, with a special emphasis of The Evaluation Case. Second, I discuss the conditions for giving sense by comparing sites of interaction with the Evaluation Case.

### *The Evaluation Team*

If we take The Evaluation Team, making and giving sense was not possible. To be sure, a lot (!) of sensemaking was going on, and new collaborative sense was created (the ‘learning by doing’-construction as well as the division of labour distinction of ‘individuals vs. areas’, embodying also wide identity distinctions between administrations with legislative responsibilities for citizens/clients vs. administrations with physical/coordinative/strategic responsibilities ). But ND did not manage to persuade SSA of the value of the project. In fact, collaborative sense was created as an emergency response to an unbearable situation for the professionals: the conflicts were becoming too personal, so collaborative sense had to be made in order to be able to continue working together. This is evident in that respondents in the interviews regularly describe the collaboration in ambivalent ways: the behaviour of the other administration is not appropriate (antagonism), BUT this-is-how-it-is-given-the-conditions-of-the-collaborative-interaction (reconciliation). These two explanations co-exist, the antagonistic being mainly emotional and the reconciliation rhetoric mainly dominated by a casual rational/professional attitude.

The collaborative sensemaking was in fact a type of sensemaking that did not create a shared platform in terms of a ‘we’ that is doing something. This is first of all very apparent when comparing the interview transcripts related to The Evaluation Team with the response of the single interviewee in The Map Team: in both instances, ‘we’ is used quite often. The difference is that in The Evaluation Team ‘we’ does not refer to the team, but to each respondent’s own administration (we the TEA, we the SSA); whereas in The Map Team, ‘we’ is not this ‘mandate’-we, but the ‘team’-we. So in The Evaluation Team, the efforts of ND to give sense created sensemaking characterized by opposition. This does not mean that the team disagreed on everything. As the interviews and my field notes document, the team agreed that the original evaluation tool was inadequate, and that the ‘theory of change’ evaluation approach introduced in The Horizontal Pillar report provided valuable insights into how the ‘Comprehensive Plans’ works – that the plans often have a weak strategic approach across activities.

This oppositional sensemaking takes on different expressions. First of all, as my field notes document, and as explained by the respondents from EIA and SSA, in the end The Evaluation Team decided to split up the evaluation practice. Thus, we see a change from a shared evaluation practice to a split evaluation practice. As the informant from SSA states in an interview, ‘the evaluation is now walking on three

legs' (One leg for SSA, one for EIA, and one for TEA). Thus, the conflicts created a division of labour, resulting in a situation in which the people involved were not forced to interact. And eventually TEA ended up conducting their own evaluation process, whereas EIA and SSA abandoned their evaluation practices altogether. Both respondents from SSA and TEA stated almost in unison as a consequence of their interaction in The Evaluation Team and other sites: 'We have discovered what we are NOT'. Thus, we see a movement from collaboration to a traditional division of labour in which no shared practice is present. Consequently, The Evaluation Team moved from a situation of what we might in (Keast & Mandell, 2011; Sowa, 2008)'s collaboration-spectrum call potential 'collaboration' (i.e. sharing resources) to coordination to ad hoc cooperation.

Another expression of the oppositional sensemaking in The Evaluation Team that I have touched on in the analysis sections above circles around the main discursive positions invoked by the 'pillar' and ND: Coordination, leadership, the advantage for the frontline staff working locally in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As an example: ND/TEA justify their innovation project by what an interviewee calls a 'screaming need' [in Danish: 'skrigende behov'] for coordination in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, a 'need' revealed by the complaints often heard of the 'local professionals', in which they criticize the Seven Headed Beast of the Municipality. This is an act of legitimization in which an implicit argument is that people 'close' to the 'problem' are the most superior assessors of strategic relevance, as they feel the immediate deficiencies of the municipal 'system'. This act of legitimization is countered by the civil servants from SSA. They see themselves as 'defenders' of the 'locally working professionals' who are being overrun by an extra-layer organisation, also a deficiency of the system. Another example: The leadership position of ND is being challenged. ND argues that the 'area' is an appropriate object of coordination and planning, making it obvious that ND is supposed to coordinate some of the activities of the other administrations. SSA argues that no master-plan leadership is needed and definitely not any master plan that invokes area-based activities such as a local coordinative secretary. In fact, the administrations are coping by themselves, people are in no need of a master-plan leader, but in need of 'micro-tools' of 'self-management': the Horizontal Pillar points to important issues, but it has to be implemented by the professionals, the 'natural' leaders, where they think that it is relevant – and not by TEA.

### *The Map Team*

In The Map Team, the opposite picture seemed to apply, compared to The Evaluation Team. Instead of a sense-overwritten slate, 'the empty slate' seemed to be the problem, according to the TEA interviewee. Here, there was actually a need of someone giving sense. Thus, a 'sense maker' from TEA who had been part of the Pillar process to begin with was pulled in to frame the context of the map. The roles

of the collaborators were much more equal, everybody being confused as to how to further develop the Map. A collaborative 'we' dominates the narrative of the civil servant explaining issues of collaboration. Again, in this case sensemaking is not to be found in discussions about the nature of the tool— according to the interviewee, somebody just suggested that 'each administration should be allowed to contribute with three statistical indicators to the map'. The Map do has some sensemaking qualities mentioned by the interviewee. The administration of Culture and Leisure ('CLA') is repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees as an ally of SSA and EIA, but not of TEA. CLA is perceived of as being quite sceptical about the area-based approach. In relation to the Map, CLA is also mentioned as a unit which is not interested in participating. However, the interviewee mentions that the participator from CLA saw some 'exciting' possibilities in the spatial display of CLAs activities, as the quote below demonstrates. So, what is of importance here is that the power of making and giving sense was to a high degree conditioned by whether or not the professionals find the new perspective interesting. Professionalism and the development of professional engagement are what make the direction of sensemaking possible. The Map story also points to the fact that the *Map*-tool is part of the exercise of making and giving sense: the other administrations are beginning to think in spatial terms and are considering how spatial elements relate to each other. Furthermore, the other administrations are in need of various data to demonstrate the effects of their initiatives, a need which the Map can fulfil.

#### *The steering committee*

The steering committee is not well described in the interviews. Because of the explorative purpose of the pilot study concerning The Evaluation Team, I was also not focused on the committee, since it was not very often mentioned in the ND office as a site of conflict. What we did hear about the steering committee and the middle managers was that they were unengaged, due to the developmental 'nice-to-do' character of the Pillar Project. We also heard that the steering committee as a group knew very little about area-based programs, which made it difficult for these middle managers to make profession-based, qualified decisions. All in all, this committee is spoken of in very uncontroversial terms, its main function being to oversee that the Pillar Project is implemented – not to set a direction. This is, in other words, not a site of interaction in which making and giving sense is a problem because of oppositional sensemaking as in The Evaluation Team. What is difficult for ND is that sensemaking generally requires access to powerful fora and time to influence these decision makers.

### *The Governance Dialogue*

The Governance Dialogue is spoken of in very positive terms by ND – we get the impression that the Governance Dialogue is to some degree an unequivocal hallmark of ND’s ability to give sense. The Governance Dialogue was already anticipated in ‘The Horizontal Pillar’. Thus, many of the thoughts already developed in the process of making The Horizontal Pillar report, as well as in the attempts of implementing the report, are carried over in the Governance Dialogue process. Several civil servants mention that the Governance Dialogue could not have been run so smoothly without the involvement of ND. ‘Suddenly’ things run smoothly, with no resistance, since the Governance Dialogue is a piece of legislation, and since the top of hierarchical leadership (mayors) is involved – there seems to be a demand for answers. This mobilizes the entire bureaucracy, creating steady mandates throughout the municipality. The combination of sense already made and stable bureaucratic structures make the Governance Dialogue a pleasant process for everyone, including SSA. As I have described above, we also see that another TEA office runs the Governance Dialogue process in a very skilful, by-the-book project management style, which to some extent restarts the process, giving ND a more withdrawn role to play.

### *The Horizontal Pillar*

‘The Horizontal Pillar’ as a report has played a very important role in sensemaking – a symbolic role. In the entrepreneurship section I have already explained how the report internally functions as a safeguard against uncertainty, acting as a solid roadmap that just needs to be implemented. It thus removes the uncertainty in ND. It also has an unapproachable air about it. Throughout the interviews, newcomers (both TEA and SSA and EIA), have difficulties in understanding what is being described in the report, and some collaborators have not even had the time to read the report. The report also has strong sensemaking qualities. As the middle manager of ND notes in the interview, people throughout the municipality talk about ‘The Pillar’ as a symbol of working across boundaries, although only few have actually read the complicated report (I7).

As also stated in my field notes, The Horizontal Pillar is used repeatedly in interactions when people from other administrations are confused about the nature of the innovation project. ND civil servants refer to the report as an answer, along with a statement like: ‘NDs role is to strengthen the cross-administrative cooperation in the municipality. ‘The Pillar’ shows that...’. The Pillar thus begins to take on a structuring role due to its complex, unapproachable and thoroughly analytical status. In the eyes of others, the Pillar is complex and highly specialised. We see this when people from SSA refer to it. Thus, the Pillar is used for reference purposes in interactions as an objective source of knowledge, an analysis which gains legitimacy

from the fact that coproducers of the report recommendations are civil servants from the municipality. Being complex, specialised and difficult to grasp, the Pillar is difficult to challenge in the daily interactions. Thus, ND uses the pillar to direct the sensemaking in specific interactions. It is no coincidence that one of the most involved civil servants from ND has often made comments like this: “The Pillar has been our bible. I often return to it, the analytical points are brilliant.” In the very confusing process, the Pillar report generates sense to ND, it acts as a storage and repertoire of meaning which is otherwise difficult to remember and navigate in on a daily basis.

The sensemaking advantage in interactive settings is indicated in the quote below:

*“we are now working to get an organized municipality in the horizontal pillar (...) basically there is a high correlation between tasks in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and in the social housing sector. (...) And the nature of the task is to look at cross-cutting and interdisciplinary efforts.” (ND, civil servant, I4)”*

Here we see how an ND civil servant clearly couples the Governance Dialogue and the Pillar, using the rhetoric of the Pillar to understand and conceptualize to others what the governance dialogue should be about.

Another ND representative involved in the Governance Dialogue explains the connection between the pillar and the Governance Dialogue like this:

*“R: Because we had to implement ‘the Pillar’, we had these project meetings where the steering committee discussed how many resources they had. And we ended up having four meetings in the project (...) We have tried to create an organisational framework. This makes it possible to reuse the thoughts from The Horizontal Pillar-report. And now that we are moving into the larger organisational structure, it becomes an even greater challenge to ensure that the intellectual baggage does not disappear more and more. It is clear that we would probably still, at the very end, be able to see the main lines, but it could end up being nothing but guidelines. Because, after all, many thoughts have been made.*

*I: Is it a challenge do you think? That you have learned a lot and you have struggled a lot with implementation and how to then get the package transferred to the new design?*

*R: Yes. And it is especially a great challenge if changes occur in the entries in the working group, project, etc. Because you cannot really remember the arguments for the various proposals. And before you know of it, you may soon become convinced that some of the other models might be just as good and so there is a risk of losing the common thread.” (ND, Special consultant, I10)*



Here we see that in an interaction setting, only four meetings are permitted by the steering committee to implement part of the Pillar in the Governance Dialogue. What the quote says is that ND is highly involved in making a coherent story about what the project is about, influencing the processes, so that the Pillar thoughts are used to influence the much bigger Governance Dialogue process, especially concerning the organisational form of the Governance Dialogue. Here, ND is fighting for an enlarged horizontal 'Pillar', running across all seven administrations at three levels. The quote also illustrates the fragility of sensemaking: when new people become involved, the influence disappears. Thus, new people need to be introduced to the thoughts of the Pillar again and again, and representatives from ND who know the arguments in detail need to be present constantly in order to exercise influence.

### *The Social Reserve funds*

The example with The Social Reserve Funds has already been explained above. From the data we know very little of this site of interaction. Here we see how forceful the giving sense is: a new perspective on The Funds is taken, in which funds produce isolated layers of project activities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, which actually breeds fragmentation instead of coordination. In order to create coordination, funds need to support what is already going on in the neighbourhoods. However, this attempt of making and giving sense was not accepted. As the SSA interviewee mentions, this perspective was seen as an act of turf imperialism and as 'extra-layer'-disturbance. Despite this, ND used this site of interaction to connect with the more powerful Finance Administration (FA), thus trying to influence FA's 'Safe City'-strategy.

## **6.7.1.WHY ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN THE ABILITY TO GIVE SENSE?**

When comparing the different sites of interaction in terms of why making and giving sense was possible, we will come up with a joint answer to the leadership conditions for making and giving sense.

In Figure 20 below I have summed up what we know about the ability to give sense in relation to different sites of interaction occurring in this phase of innovation project, i.e. 2008-2010. On the vertical dimension, I have put in generic key categories that I have discovered in the analytical sections above. One can criticise the categories for being somewhat self-referring and overlapping. However, I have found that the summarising strengths of the categories make up for their generic character. First of all, is bureaucratic leadership dominant in the setting in order to guide the interaction of participants? Second, is the emergent leader redefining its role in parallel with an on-going activity? Third, is the scope of the innovation

project defined? Fourth, are identity issues dominant? We know by now that a combination of these factors has led to such severe cooperation conflicts that people were almost unable to cooperate. And that these cooperation conflicts thus were blocking the way for making and giving sense. On the horizontal dimension, the sites of interaction are listed. However, as the 'X's signify, some sites of interaction is too poorly referred to in field notes and interviews to be used for comparison. This goes for The Social Reserve funds, general discussions concerning the 'Pillar', and the steering committee.

**FIGURE 20: ABILITY TO GIVE SENSE ACROSS SITES OF INTERACTION**

	The Evaluation Team	The Map Team	The Social Reserve funds	The Governance Dialogue process	General discussions concerning The Horizontal Pillar	Steering Committee
Bureaucratic leadership dominant	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Emergent leader redefining his/her role through/in parallel with the activity related to the site of interaction	Yes	No	Yes	No	X	X
Defined scope of innovation project	No	No	No	Yes	X	X

Identity issues dominant	Yes	No	Yes	No	X	X
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We can compare The Evaluation Team as a site of interaction with the remaining two sites of interaction mentioned by the interviewees. So, in the evaluation site of interaction, ND and its collaborators are up against a brick wall. Hardly any progress is made in the team. The Steering Committee is mobilized by ND in order to command progress, but with no effect. The factor combination seems to be that first of all, hierarchical leadership is absent, AND the emergent leader is redefining his/her role through the activity level, AND the scope of innovation is not yet defined, AND identity issues are dominant.

Hierarchical leadership is absent, in that the steering committee is unable to provide guidance for the civil servants. Instead, the civil servants have to make sense of the evaluation themselves: *“We were happy lions, that’s what I prefer to call us, not hungry, but happy, lions, forced to fight amongst ourselves”*, as a frustrated SSA-interviewee states (SSA, civil servant, I8). Making and giving sense is complicated by the fact that ND and EIA change team members; new people are brought in that re-interpret the situation. What we see from the analysis of the empirical material is that first, ND takes the position as a leader who firmly believes that the recommendations from the Pillar-report are implementable in a straight-forward manner. However, when implementation is started, things turned out differently, the evaluation tool did not deliver as hypothesised, new people were brought in to provide more power to the ND office, context factors conditioned the purpose of the evaluation tool, since other actors were also engaged in a larger, national evaluation of the ‘Comprehensive Plans’.

Thus, the original purpose of the evaluation tool is no longer feasible, and an ND employee is being sent on an evaluation course, with the implication that instead ND starts to see its own role as that of a ‘co-evaluator’ of both the Comprehensive Plans of the social housing organisations, but also the municipal role and its ‘systems ability’ to collaborate across administrative boundaries. Thus, as an emergent leader, and by means of entrepreneurship and sensemaking, ND adapts and redefines its role and its identity through the evaluation activity. This is experienced by SSA as a mysterious turn-around, propelling issues of identity issues: Who is in charge, what is the role of ND, and who decides what the purpose of The Evaluation Team is? Finally, in the eyes of collaborators the scope of the innovation project is still a mystery: what is the purpose of the Pillar, will it provide us with value, and who will ultimately gain from the innovation project? Well, obviously TEA, but how about the citizens and the participating administrations? In this respect, the members of

The Evaluation Team are interpreting their activity in the light of the overall purpose of the 'Pillar'-project.

Now we turn to The Map Team for comparison. The difference here is that as an emergent leader, ND does not redefine its role through the further development of the Map, and identity issues are not perceived of as dominant. Yes, much talk and sensemaking regarding the purpose of the map are found, but overall, there is a shared 'we' in the group, and there are no battles around a fixed tool. Thus, despite the absence of hierarchical leadership, progress is being made. What seems to further propel the progress of The Map Team is that ND has learnt something from the inertia of The Evaluation Team. As a consequence of the absent hierarchical leadership, in the future ND will take a more firm leadership position, backed up by a development grant from its own organisation. In conclusion, no explicit attempt of making and giving sense is made here by ND, in that the ND civil servant involved is not really aware of the overall nature of the 'Pillar' project. As a consequence, the Map as a director of sensemaking is much more subtle, in that it takes on the character of an easy 'win-win' for the involved administrations, while simultaneously underpinning the spatial discourse of the Pillar.

Finally, we have the Governance Dialogue process. Here, ND is successful in heavily influencing sensemaking. ND's 'sister'-office, 'The office of Social Housing' are formally running the process. Bureaucratic leadership is heavily present due to the legislative commissioning of the process. At this point, ND does not redefine its role through the activity, since much of the past process can be re-used. The scope of the project is also well-defined, in that the Governance Dialogue requires close cooperation between the social housing organisations and the Municipality, requiring a powerful organisational set-up. Finally, identity issues do not seem to dominate. The office of Social Housing is praised for its skills in exemplary process management, both by ND and SSA. It is also clear that this is a process run by TEA, since the supervision of social housing standards etc. clearly falls within TEA turf.

The comparison shows that between The Evaluation Case and the Governance Dialogue, large contrasts exist. In the Governance Dialogue interaction, questions of roles are never brought up by the interviewees. Turf-fights are not displayed by EIA and SSA concerning the blurry boundaries of the innovation project. We also see ND in a more withdrawn role, leaving the process management to The office of Social Housing. And finally, the process of the Governance Dialogue receives bureaucratic attention, making bureaucratic leadership dominant and engaged.

In between these two sites we have The Map Team. The ND civil servant engaged does not at the outset have a clear agenda concerning the way in which to develop the Map. In contrast to The Evaluation Team, no attempts were made here to give

sense, only to have people involved. In this site ND does not redefine its role through the activity to make a change in direction. Thus, the conclusion concerning the ability to give sense from the bottom and up seems, at this point in the analysis, to be that the decisive factors are whether or not the appointed leader redefines his/her role through/in parallel with the activity, while at the same time trying to influence sensemaking from the leadership position of a value-based implementer.

### **6.7.2.SUMMING UP**

At the beginning of this section, I assumed that a causal relation exists between leadership recognition and the ability to give sense. The main logic behind this was that when an entrepreneurial unit initiates a change process within the conception of its own narrow profession, uncertainty will dominate, and a bureaucratic leadership void will arise, with the implication that the bottom-up unit will have an unsteady mandate.

In order to acquire a more powerful and steady mandate, the bottom-up unit is forced to direct the sensemaking of collaborators. In order to do so, the bottom-up unit has to fill out the bureaucratic leadership void by building up a leadership position itself. This assumption is to some extent confirmed: when the Governance Dialogue is initiated, innovation and collaborative uncertainty disappear, bureaucratic leadership is dominant, and the process is running smoothly, compared to The Evaluation Case. As one of the ND interviewees states: “we are about to be part of mainstream”, i.e. the normal strategic life of the organisation.

At the end of February 2010, in alliance with The office of Social Housing, ND was about to be recognised as a leader, in that the offices had initiated a strategy process for initiating the Governance Dialogue, which in the end was going to have political implications for all administrations. However, at this point, the process was still only in its infancy. The Governance Dialogue stands in stark contrast to The Evaluation Team. ND’s leadership is not accepted, a fight between TEA and SSA is initiated, concerning whether the innovation project of the Pillar is still being developed, and thus possibly redefined, or whether the project is indeed ready to be implemented. In this respect, I would argue that ND is still not recognised as a leader, i.e. ND is not seen as a sufficiently powerful actor to fill out the bureaucratic leadership void, and is thus incapable of making and giving sense in this site of interaction.

This leads to conflicting sensemaking attempts, which renders the innovation project doubtful and the leadership illegitimate. Being successful in making and giving sense in other sites, however, enables ND to acquire recognition. Thus, this section concerning the direction of sensemaking makes an important contribution to the

research question, in that it tells us about the mutual interplay between leadership position and making and direction of sensemaking.

The character of this interplay is vital for being recognised as a leader, thus enabling the direction of sensemaking. An important general finding is, as seen in this case, that profession-based, collaborative innovation focused, informal leadership cannot entirely substitute the formal, bureaucratic leadership. Recognition is further acquired when the informal leadership is connected to formal leadership.

Another important finding that provokes resistance is that ND is redefining its leadership position through the activities it is performing, provoking uncertainty concerning the direction of the innovation journey. Also, an important finding is that, due to its innovative character, the blurry and undefined boundaries of ND's project provoke resistance and uncertainty.

## **6.8 DISCUSSION**

In this section, I relate the empirical findings to my own expectations, and to the way in which they answer the research question. In the discussion section in Chapter 8, I make a more elaborate discussion concerning how the findings across Analysis A and B can be interpreted and situated within existing research.

My own expectations regarding conflict points when exercising bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership were to some extent met in the analysis of The Evaluation Case. This was particularly so concerning conflicts around whether the project is really a value-contributing innovation, and whether the solution is the most appropriate one. I believe that these are fundamental challenges for most innovations. And the findings are in alignment with single-organisational comparative studies (Van de Ven, 1999).

My own expectations concerning the emergence of leadership were somewhat more abstract, due to the fact that I have not found other studies with the same approach as in this thesis. I would have expected conflict concerning who should be in charge, and I had also expected that to some extent the lead unit would have been more confused about what they themselves were doing. Concerning the first issue, these conflicts appear to a high extent in The Evaluation Case. What was somewhat of a surprise was how ambivalent the exercise of bottom-up innovation leadership was, in that in my interpretation and presentation of rationalities, the criticism from collaborators was highly rational and understandable.

I find that the descriptive approach of a discourse analytical approach is highly relevant in such a setting. The discourse approach enables us to understand how the recognition of ND's innovation project and their leadership is acquired by different means. These means are both strategic and power related. But leadership is also acquired through actual struggles of meaning, in which it is by no means possible as researcher to have an objective point of assessment to judge to what extent and in what ways the involved actors are 'right' concerning their approach to ND and their innovation project. In this respect, my answer to the research question fully counters the possible favourable bias towards ND and the ambitions that could have been a consequence of my methodological choices of focusing narrowly on ND's leadership construction.

Concerning the second issue, I would have expected ND to be more in doubt or confused about their own project, due to the fact that they themselves would fall victims to the mounting uncertainties stemming from both wicked problems and innovation processes. What this analysis demonstrates is that despite its obscurity and unapproachableness in the eyes of collaborators, the biblical status of the research report 'The Horizontal Pillar' has provided ND with a firm belief that the recommendations were natural implications of the development of their own development. So, despite the fact that ND is indeed also a victim of uncertainty, this is mainly concerned with their own identity development, not with doubting whether or not their project is sound.

This firm belief is a key factor for enabling ND to break the typical collaborative inertia (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). What was somewhat surprising in this analysis was thus that to a high extent ND's sensemaking circled around an interpretation of themselves and their own role in the inter-organisational landscape. In a sense, we have the metaphoric image of the innovation project 'The Horizontal Pillar' being pushed forward by ND, while ND as a small office to some extent have difficulties redefining its identity soon enough to keep up with the speed of the process. We see here, and this is important, how difficult it is for a small, newly established office to both exercise and make leadership at the same time. This match between the introduced micro-discourse and the subject position is earned through harsh conflicts in which ND perceives of itself as a development focused leader *and* is being recognised as such a leader.

If we now turn to issues of ownership of the innovation project, I would have expected that bureaucratic management would have played a more dominant role in settling disputes and showing direction. What is surprising in this analysis is how distanced management is, and how much space for manoeuvring ND and their collaborators have. This may have been a deliberate management decision made by the steering committee, but it is quite striking that such a leadership vacuum exists between the administrations. This is an important finding, in that on the one hand it

provides ND with space for developing a leadership position, but on the other hand it also amplifies conflicts.

Finally, concerning the direction of sensemaking, I would have expected that the somewhat complex strategy report of ‘The Horizontal Pillar’ would have generated resistance. This was also the case, but what was an important finding was how influential the novel concepts written down in the report actually was in such change processes. In this respect, ND acquired influence, not by necessarily translating concepts into a shared frame of reference, but rather by explaining the concepts and the purpose of the innovation project again and again in a way that proposes a profession-based, highly specialised perspective on a new way in which to handle the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

In the next section, I conclude on Analysis A.

## **6.9 CONCLUSION: POSITIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

In this section I summarise and conclude on the findings in the analysis above. I do this by presenting leadership dilemmas and the actions (not) taken by ND. I answer the research question:

*How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?*

Leadership is recognised in The Evaluation Case first of all by making and giving sense. The direction of sensemaking requires the production of ‘texts’, in this embedded case, the ‘Pillar’-report; but also concepts made in the process. These texts are produced by means of entrepreneurship. The analysis of The Evaluation Case shows that some elements of the texts function as sources of legitimacy for the emergent leader, allowing ND to give sense.

ND positions itself as a unit which responds to the needs of the ‘locals’. ND knows of these needs inform its close contact with local stakeholders through its professional work. Another source of legitimacy derives from presenting a project which has as its focus the promotion of collaboration across the administrative units. Furthermore, standardized project management which assumes ownership by doing most of the development work itself is another source of leadership legitimacy, which moves ND closer to attaining the status of a recognised leader. And finally, merging the Pillar and the Governance Dialogue is a major source of legitimacy, in



that bureaucratic leadership, including political leadership, provides formal leadership legitimacy to ND's innovation project.

Another aspect of making and giving sense is to make sense in an environment of uncertainty. ND firmly believes that its innovation project is a natural implication of its own profession. For this reason, ND's sensemaking activities are to a high extent not focused on their own role in relation to collaborators. This identity turbulence also makes the boundaries of the innovation project more blurry, and is thus perceived of as a threat by some collaborators. In this case there is intense dialectic between the resistance to ND's attempts to give sense and ND's reflection on its own identity. There is a mismatch between ND's perception of itself as a development unit and being recognised as such a unit.

So despite the sources of legitimacy present in the case, the combination of the sources allows for discursive resistance. The innovation project is by some positioned as a mega-plan with a confusing content in which the value for the locals is highly dubious, and with blurry boundaries. TEA is positioned as turf 'greedy'. The link between the sources of legitimacy and ND's emergent leadership is basically questioned, causing both project and leadership to be illegitimate. ND is positioned as a unit which acts as a leader, but should only coordinate. And even this coordinative role is questioned, in that too much coordination actually exists; perhaps the local working professionals would fare better if they managed the transversal way of working themselves in their current micro-organisations.

Furthermore, ND is perceived of as an unprofessional process manager, who says something but suddenly changes its course when new people are employed, and when new insights are acquired. All points of conflict contribute to pointing out discursive subject positions of leadership recognition: they reflect collaborative expectations, though sometimes inconsistently, to how such leadership ought to act. As a consequence ND is undergoing a positional development from 'value-based implementer' to 'developing coordinator'.

The leadership dilemmas are:

1. How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical structures?

This dilemma presents itself repeatedly through the interviews. The vertical chain of command produces politically defined professional boundaries and turf that are clashing with horizontal concepts introduced in the Pillar report and by ND in the process. This is leading to the question: what is to be coordinated, and how? The response is a division of labour between TEA and the administrations with a focus on clients. This distinction reduces conflict. In the process, a distinction is socially produced that develops administrative identities. TEA has as working unit the 'city

area', whereas SSA and EIA have the 'individual', i.e. the citizen. This distinction involves much more than just a definition of working unit, it also defines roles and identity. TEA/ND are focusing on organisational, coordinative aspects of the 'area', attained by means of facilitation, and therefore have no responsibility for the individuals in a professional sense. In contrast, SSA defines itself as a non-area administration with individuals as their responsibility, attained by means of a deeply specialised professionalism. Thus, this dilemma pushes towards an area-based coordinator.

As I will demonstrate in the analysis of the 'Policy Formulation' case, this distinction becomes part of the policy, at least in some of the early drafts, called the 'Mercedes-sign', in that it symbolizes three different administrative types of work in the disadvantaged areas: individually focused development activities, area focused development activities, and the daily operations activities. The 'Mercedes-sign' merges two logics: the division of labour-distinction and the perception introduced by ND: that two different, sometimes conflicting, layers exist in the disadvantaged neighbourhood: project layers and the daily operations activities of the municipality.

2. How to satisfy collaborative demands for a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?

This dilemma manifests itself firmly in The Evaluation Team. AS a new, young office, ND starts out with an idea that the "Pillar"-report has easily implementable recommendations. However, when testing the recommendations in real life, things turn out differently. This generates the impression of a somewhat rigid leadership-figure that holds on to the report recommendations until a new, more experienced employee is brought in, which leads to redevelopment of the evaluation tool. This change of leadership course generates much frustration amongst SSA participants. This experience makes ND realise what it means to be a development unit: that it is a 'learning-by-doing'-process in which everything cannot be planned in advance. This experience of conflict in The Evaluation Team leads first of all to a 'shared third' conception of the way of working together – that the collaborators are part of a 'learning'-process in which phase-position cannot be known in advance, only in retrospect. The experience, which is also reflected in other of the work packages of the 'Pillar'-report, alters ND's positioning of itself. It no longer positions itself as an implementer (of the Pillar), but as a developer (in which a space of something 'unplanned' exists between strategy and realization of the strategy).

3. How to satisfy collaborative demands of clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence?

This dilemma shares some features with the dilemma above. This dilemma manifests itself for ND as a kind of illogical collaborative demand: “we want you to take charge and to make our own clear structure so that we don’t become confused – but we want to influence the way of taking charge, and we want to co-construct the structure we are about to build”. This is the most delicate dilemma seen in the analysis of The Evaluation Case, and it remains unresolved. The dilemma is rooted in the fact that the informal leadership of ND cannot totally substitute bureaucratic leadership. The dilemma disappears for a moment when ND merges its Pillar Project with the Governance Dialogue, but it re-enters the stage later on, as displayed by the analysis of the ‘Policy Formulation process’. ND as a sensemaker fills out the bureaucratic leadership void by making and giving sense: convincing people of the coordination problems in the disadvantaged areas, using sources of legitimacy as discursive positions to convince collaborators and would-be stakeholders, such as the social housing organisations. However, the leadership is not enough to fill out the void, conflicts emerge because the leadership can always be perceived as illegitimate, in that the direction of sensemaking provokes resistance, invoking re-interpretation of both innovation project and leadership.

Instead, ND manages the dilemma by trying different tactical moves in order to circumvent the dilemma when it emerges. Hardy & Phillips argue that when thinking of the relationship of discourse and power from an agent perspective, agents can mobilize resources as a type of action that influences struggles for meaning. They call this mobilization of resources ‘episodic power’.<sup>1</sup>

ND’s management of this dilemma can be seen as a way of using episodic power. First of all, some work packages of the Pillar are successfully implemented, moving the implementation process forward, despite stalemate in The Evaluation Team. Presumably, acquiring recognition in some sites of interaction pushes the process forwards, making critique more and more risky.

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<sup>1</sup> Hardy & Phillips (2004) define this type of power as: ‘the use of the formal power and authority, the manipulation of scarce resources, coalition, co-optation, and even physical coercion that are part and parcel of everyday life” (p. 306).

Second, ND holds on to the overall wisdom of the Pillar, ‘patience-ing’ people out by means of entrepreneurship, re-interpreting the evaluation solution, suggesting new options for improvement.

Thirdly, as seen in the future events in The Map Team, ND tries to position itself as a less inclusive, setting up a more firm frame for collaboration. Fourth, ND uses its ally EIA to demonstrate the willingness to demonstrate that not only TEA is in favour of the change. Thus, in some instances EIA and TEA agree that some proposals should be delivered by EIA, even though TEA has also shared in their production. And fifth, as seen in the Governance Dialogue, ND uses bureaucratic leadership as a way of legitimizing the implementation of some of their own ideas; by heavily making and giving sense in the Governance Dialogue, ND is able to create successful proposals for a new, powerful, cross-administrative structure, commissioned at the highest level (mayor-level). This is a structure in which the design is in line with The Horizontal Pillar-recommendations, albeit at a much higher level than anticipated. The approval of this cross-administrative structure leads to the next step, in which ND and its allies in the TEA suggest that the new structure should also have its own policy, a ‘Policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods’.

4. There is a risk of integrating development work too much in the day-to-day operations. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development work still remains?

This dilemma has not yet manifested itself very clearly, and it is only mentioned directly by one ND civil servant. However, the dilemma becomes crucial to address when the Policy for Disadvantaged Areas is formulated.

The dilemma is rooted in the fact that ND is trying to maintain a middle position. One extreme in this position is maintaining a vital element of their profession: Area-based programs as an experimental profession, i.e. the ability to introduce new solutions for dealing with local problems in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. At the other extreme is the image and rhetoric introduced by ND itself: that a problem with the municipal way of governing the disadvantaged neighbourhoods has been a too heavy reliance on externally funded activities, producing a split in layers between daily operations activities and project activities. The ‘Pillar’ proposes to merge these layers by moving the project activities closer to the governance logic of the day-to-day operations in the municipality. This could create more efficiency, in that the projects are adapted to already existing policies and strategies, thus contributing to these goals. However, are the projects still supposed to suggest new solutions, and what to do with these new solutions? We

begin to see the contours of a split in the area-based approach: one actor still operating as before, running area-based programs at the local level; and a central-administrative, organisational restructuring process focused on enhancing horizontal and holistic municipal administrative processes around the city area. At this point, these two actors of the area-based approach are not related to each other in that the central-administrative restructuring has not been completed. At this point, the dilemma remains unsolved.



# **CHAPTER 7.**

## **ANALYSIS B: THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE**

In this section I analyse how ND and collaborators managed to formulate a cross-administrative policy. I will demonstrate in the analysis below how vulnerable The Policy Formulation process was for ND as an office that wanted to give sense in a collaborative innovation context conditioned by uncertainty, both in terms of making progress and in terms of maintaining a mandate for the policy. And I will explain how the overcoming of this challenge of leadership can be explained by using the BUCIL model.

The analysis answers the research question:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

The analysis is structured as follows: First I describe the process of The Policy Formulation. The purpose is to provide the reader with a line of events. Second, I present my findings in the Findings-table (Figure 21). I use this table to structure the analysis.

The first part of the analysis is concerned with entrepreneurship; in this section I want to describe how entrepreneurship exercised by bottom-up leadership introduces certain discursive concepts that condition the positional development required for ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader. I first analyse the type of uncertainty in question; second, who is acting proactively? Third, how do combinations of concepts generate a specific context for The Policy Formulation process, a context that conditions future lines of conflict and sources of legitimacy of leadership?

The second part of the analysis relates to leadership recognition; in this section I want to demonstrate how the specific context generated by entrepreneurship generates a requirement for developing a new leadership position.

The third part of the analysis deals with making and giving sense; in this section I take the liberty to draw on the analytical points already made. I do this by analysing which of the discursive concepts, introduced by bottom-up leadership, are turned into social objects, i.e. becoming collaboratively accepted, and which of the introduced concepts meet resistance.

Finally, I conclude by describing the positional development of ND. I do this by re-interpreting the analysis, abstracting the findings into the most fundamental leadership dilemmas that condition the positional development of ND as the collaborative innovation leader.

## 7.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

In this section I give a short description of the key events in the policy process studied.

As marked with bold in Figure 21 below the Policy formulation process began in 2010 and was finally approved of in December 2011.

**FIGURE 21: TIMELINE - THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE**

Year and headline	Description of output
2007: Initiation of strategy process	Support is acquired for initiating a strategy process concerning the increasing number of area-based programs
2008: Approval of strategy report	Approval of strategy report <sup>xxx1</sup> ; Merging of area-based offices New name and leader for the newly established office - Neighbourhood Development
2009: Implementation of strategy report recommendations	*Cross-administrative qualitative evaluation practice of the social housing sectors 'Comprehensive Plans' Cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: 'The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map' <sup>xxxii</sup> Consolidation of the area-based remit in



	TEA/Neighbourhood Development
2010: New legislation: The Governance Dialogue.  New cross-administrative organisation, partnership, and commission for policy	New Intra-Municipal Governance structure implemented  New Partnership Forum Created between municipality and social housing sector  Terms of reference acquired for a cross-administrative policy  *Initiating policy formulation process  New demands for municipal approval of the social housing sector's 'Comprehensive Plans' <sup>xxxiii</sup>
2011: Policy Approval	*Policy formulation process continued  A change in commission  *“Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen” is approved of <sup>xxxiv</sup>
2012: Policy Implementation	Three out of six 'Development Plans' are approved of in the 2012-budget negotiations in The City of Copenhagen <sup>xxxv</sup>

In the analysis of The Evaluation Case, I described how ND influenced the cross-administrative process of implementing the Governance Dialogue. Part of this influence was to give sense in such a way that the organisational structure for the Governance Dialogue was in accordance with the concepts and recommendations introduced in 'The Horizontal Pillar'. I also described how ND, in a front-stage fashion, altered its leadership position, exemplified by ND's constant re-interpretation of the knowledge that should be generated in the evaluation in order to match its emerging leadership position as an organisational developer and coordinator.

In June 2010, this new organisational structure was approved of ('Udkast til Kommisorium for Borgmesterforum'; 'baggrund for politik for udsatte byområder'). In September 2010, the Board of Mayors decided that a 'policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods' should be made with The Technical and Environmental Administration as the coordinator. In September-November 2011, the Policy was approved of in all seven committees. December 1, 2011, the 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas' was finally approved of in the City Council (in Danish, 'Borgerrepræsentationen'). A change had been made in the title, signifying a change in policy scope: from area-based programs to disadvantaged (city) areas. A vital part of my analysis is to describe how this change came about due to the leadership-related activities of Neighbourhood Development and its allies.

So, in April 2010, The Technical and Environmental Administration suggested that, besides coordinating activities with the social housing sector, the new intra-municipal organisation should also have a policy to guide its future collaborative action. The Technical and Environmental Administration was commissioned by The Board of Mayors and The Intra-Municipal Steering Committee to run a cross-administrative policy formulation process with the same initial aim as stated in 'The Horizontal Pillar': to produce a policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

The director of the Urban Design Department in The Technical and Environmental Administration, ranking above ND and their middle manager, had the idea that the policy should be a 'toolbox' policy. The policy should contain all the feasible area-based instruments (methods, activities) that had been successfully applied in the disadvantaged areas. This would enable the directors in the steering committee as well as mayors to acquire an overview concerning instruments to use in a specific city area, when a new disadvantaged neighbourhood or city area were documented.

Things turned out differently, however. In the middle of The Policy Formulation process (March 1, 2011), this director got a new job in another municipality. In the municipal election in November 2009 a new mayor had been elected for The Technical and Environmental Administration. This new mayor did not demonstrate any great interest in the policy. The mayor left the position within 1.5 years, and a new mayor was appointed in May 2011.

Thus, in the spring 2011, ND experienced a leadership vacuum and a new political leadership: their immediate superior had left, and the appointed mayor had been substituted. As a consequence, in this period ND gained access to the Level-2 director in the Technical and Environmental Administration, who supported the Policy.

As a consequence of The Policy Formulation process, ND had the growing ambition that the policy should not just be a tool-box policy for area-based programs, but a policy for disadvantaged city districts. This idea was embraced and developed by the level-2 manager in The Technical and Environmental Administration, as well as by the newly appointed mayor, whom ND also made contact to.

Another unforeseen event was the right-wing governmental Ghetto-plan that was launched in October 2010<sup>xxxvi</sup>. This plan identified 10 ghettos in Copenhagen, and created a demand for a counter-response from the leftist-led City of Copenhagen in terms of a strategy for disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This provided ND/TEA with a political momentum for formulating a new policy related to disadvantaged city districts.

As a result of the strong vertical alliance between The Technical and Environmental Direction, ND, and the mayor, ND proposed that the terms of reference for the policy were altered, making the policy much more ambitious. This also made the policy much more controversial, as it was potentially conflicting with the strategic aims of the Lord Mayor's Finance Administration, such as the initiative launched jointly by the mayors, the 'Safe City Program<sup>xxxvii</sup>' and 'Focused City Development'. The Safe City Program was initially seen by representatives from the Finance Administration as a potential rival of the Lord Mayor's 'Safe City Program', in that this program was primarily targeting some of the same areas as Policy For Disadvantaged Areas, and because it was also a cross-administrative initiative. The 'Focused City Development' initiative is part of the Municipal Plan ('Kommuneplanen'), the overarching planning tool for municipal development. TEA's policy is seen as a potential rival, in that it covers a large part of the city, but other districts than Focused City Development, which focuses on developing growth areas. Thus, as representatives from the Finance Administration note in a policy formulation meeting, introducing TEA's policy could result in a city development which is actually *unfocused*.

At the end of the process, the 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas of Copenhagen<sup>xxxviii</sup>' was approved of. The overall goals were that the areas should be 'lifted to a general Copenhagen level' by 2020, focusing primarily on generating employment and education for all residents. Prior to the approval, ND had been gathering policies from each administration in order to find sector-specific policy aims to guide the goal development of Policy For Disadvantaged Areas.

So, in the final policy, each of the seven administrations have its political objectives, such as satisfaction with culture and leisure activities in the area, education for 95% of the youth, a varied resident composition etc. The means to reach these objectives

are preferential treatment of the areas, requiring the development of the core operations in the areas, shared jointly amongst all seven administrations in a partnership with the social housing sector. The overall tool is the so called 'Development Plans': one Development Plan for each of the six disadvantaged areas, formulated and implemented in 'two waves': the first three to be drawn up in 2012, the final three in 2013. The Development Plans were described as 'a prioritisation tool for customized solutions' (ibid., p. 28), and thus share a number of the holistic, context -sensitive characteristics with area-based programs, with the exception that the plans are developed by municipal professionals, not involving the lay residents. In the policy there is no economy. The volume of the development plans is an issue in the annual budget negotiations.

## **7.2 FINDINGS**

The Findings-table (Figure 22) is an answer to the research question:

How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

I start by presenting the findings from each column, from left to right. Next, I complete this 'findings'-section by relating the content of these categories to the positional development related to leadership dilemmas.

FIGURE 22: FINDINGS - THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE

<p><b>Entrepreneurship:</b></p> <p>The production of ‘texts’, introducing novel concepts</p>	<p><b>Leadership recognition: The social construction of the subject position of collaborative innovation leader</b></p>	<p><b>Making and giving sense: Transforming concepts into social objects</b></p>
<p>Entrepreneurship as shared and leadership-related proactivity: navigating in environments of institutional and substantive uncertainty</p> <p><b>Key text:</b> ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen’</p> <p><b>Genre:</b> political</p> <p><b>Profession:</b> Area-based planning</p> <p><b>Uncertainty:</b> institutional and substantive uncertainty</p> <p><b>Concepts:</b></p> <p>Preferential treatment for the disadvantaged areas</p> <p>Strengthening of the core operations, less of projects</p> <p>City district as planning level</p> <p>Consolidation of local networks and local steering committees</p> <p>The Yellow Clouds</p> <p>Individual/area-based distinction</p>	<p><b><u>Positional development (2010-2012):</u></b> From ‘developing coordinator’ to ‘strategic implementer’.</p> <p><b>Leadership dilemmas:</b></p> <p>How to maintain both ‘innovation’ and the strengthening of ‘core operations’ as key policy concepts?</p> <p>How to avoid that both policy and leadership are positioned as ‘remote centralists’?</p> <p>How to avoid being positioned as an unstable, inconsistent leader?</p>	<p><b>Resistance:</b></p> <p>No local decision making authority</p> <p>A minimal focus on innovation</p> <p><b>Acceptance:</b></p> <p>Change of terms of reference for the policy</p> <p>Development Plans</p> <p>The approval of the policy as cross-administrative ‘meta-policy’</p> <p>Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods</p> <p>‘Mercedes sign’</p>

### **7.3 UNCERTAINTY AS THE CONDITION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND SENSEMAKING**

In this section, I analyse the uncertainties that dominate The Policy Formulation process. My assumption is that the three types of uncertainties invoked when trying to solve a wicked problem through collaboration (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) interferes with the uncertainty of innovation journeys (Van de Ven, 1999). Overall, we have four types of uncertainties: substantive, institutional, strategic and journey-related uncertainties.

The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how these uncertainties jointly generate a demand for bottom-up leadership.

#### **7.4.1.SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY**

The substantive uncertainty is focused on the nature of the problem. This problem arises both because of a lack of information, but also due to the interpretation of information and the establishment of meaning (p. 19).

This substantive uncertainty is most clearly present at the beginning of The Policy Formulation process, especially at The Policy Formulation meetings. Different layers of discussions are present simultaneously in the meetings: the meeting agenda, mandate and terms of reference-discussions, discussions concerning the problem, as well as discussions concerning the scope of the policy, and what the political aim should be.

The most visible layer is a 'meeting agenda'-structure. An ND special consultant structured the process by relying on project management approaches, such as formulating a vision and setting goals. However, the immediate output of vision-exercises and establishing a goal-hierarchy from vision down to activities was disappointing, cumbersome and to some extent frustrating for some of the participants. It did not provide the participants with an opening for how to formulate a policy. As noted by the ND Consultant at one of the first meetings, the results from the members' brain-storm are surprisingly vague and very general, like "having a green neighbourhood", with "safe environments" and "healthy citizens". The consultant reflected openly about this fact in the team:

*"I really expect that when we finish this work, we've got ten recommendations which say that: 'if you have to make an effort in such an area in which there are problems, then it may be most profitable to work with better education and health for kids', ... (...) I was a little surprised that we actually ended up with such an abstract focus. I had truly believed that each of us had come up with many more [statements], such as 'there should be less unemployment in my area' or .... that each one of us really had contributed with more of our administrative preferences [in Danish: baggage] "(Policy formulation meeting, 2011, part 3)*

The quote demonstrates first of all that the administrative members are having difficulties in relating to the problem with their own administrative strategies, in that the problem to be solved is not defined. This produces inertia in the group, as none of the proposed goals and visions provide the team with any guidance for future direction.

The ND consultant facilitating the meeting sessions says the following with regard to the problem:

*"What I miss is a problem formulation (...) I miss that we agree on why it is, in fact, that we are sitting here? Why do we have area-based interventions? (...) We'll have to be able to explain to people why it is essential. It is because we think there are some fundamental problems that need to be solved. We cannot yet explain that to others in words. And if we cannot do that, we cannot persuade anybody to provide us with a big bag of money (...) The question is that perhaps we should be careful not to indicate to them [decision makers] that we are about to make a huge analysis of these city districts, because we have no time for that in four meetings. I am aware that it is easier to do what you suggest, just to jump straight on to the policy level. But we should at least agree ...*

*Team member: no, but that was not what I said.*

*TEA: no, no, then it was maybe just what I heard. But ... next time we are going to have to agree on what types of problems we can solve with the area-based interventions. And the problem is that we can almost everything. This is, of course, the next problem. (11, part 3 – 147) "*

The quote illustrates several things going on in the team, related to the substantive uncertainty. First of all, that it is difficult for the team members to come up with a consensual agreement on what the problem is as regards the disadvantaged areas. Second, the team has difficulties in establishing an approach as to how to unlock this problem: some propose that it is necessary to conduct more in-depth analyses of city districts, some propose to focus only at political objectives.

The reasons for this vagueness is further demonstrated by discussions in which more fundamental types of uncertainties other than just the substantive come to the fore. Especially the combination of the substantive and institutional uncertainties in combination is difficult to handle. Here the representatives in The Policy Formulation Team are confused about disadvantaged areas and the supposed relation to the holistic character of the policy, due to the use of area-based programs. In the discussion below from one of the meetings, the holistic approach of the area-based programs is to some extent too vague and with no narrow goal definition; therefore, making the policy subordinate to existing administrative strategies will not solve the problems either:

*“Representative CYA: “we must have a look at the strategies that we already have. And so we’ve actually also some individual policies that cut across sectors. We have a Children & Youth policy, which is in need of a revision here in 2011, but after all, it is still a policy which has been approved of by The City Council [Borgerrepræsentation]. And it has some statements in relation to what we are really thinking about, for instance that there should be decent bike paths to school ... and all those things. There are quite a number of things. But we also have a large number of other things in the individual administrations that point towards the types of wishes and hopes we have for each of our areas. So I think we really could use what we already have to inform this work here (...)*

*Rep. Finance Administration: I think we should really be aware of not making a policy for the whole of Copenhagen. Because if we screen all of our administrations and strategies then yes, there must be green trees everywhere, yes there must be bike paths throughout the city, etc.. I also think that our last brainstorm was characterized by the fact that we do not yet have the answer to what types of problems we want to solve here (...)But otherwise the efficient goals are absent. I think you know that we must be able to say, uh ..the politicians should be able to go out there and say that ‘when I have worked in an area and put an area-based effort into my work, when I am leaving there are no more criminals, everyone can read, everybody should be able to sleep safely at night and everyone has a job. I know that it is unrealistic, but there must be some concrete things’ ... (11, part 3)*

The dialogue above demonstrates that the dustbin strategy for moving The Policy Formulation work forward is not the solution in order to formulate a policy, in that this will just turn the policy into a policy for everything. The general substantive uncertainty paralyzes the group, making it difficult for the participants to start formulating the policy. This uncertainty is also demonstrated rather late in The



Policy Formulation process, when after several meetings the ND special consultant again presents the issue of what the ‘problem’ to be solved is. The quote below demonstrates the difficulty expressed by a Finance Administration member of The Policy Formulation Team in an interview later on as regards the pinning down of the problem; this provoked discussion after discussion. And now, even when the policy has been approved of, it still seems to be a rather vague problem that lacks further clarification:

*“Well I thought how striking it was that at this advanced stage in the process we still could not agree on what the problem was (...)I think many colleagues were really frustrated at times that we chatted and chatted around things. And this part about, well, what's the problem? (...)And I think, in fact, still so. ... (...) Well so now we have formulated a problem which is that some areas are lagging behind on a number of socio-economic parameters (...) But we might still ask why this is a problem?(...) Perhaps it is really a question of where one stands politically or as a human being.”*

*(I20, member of The Policy Formulation Team)*

What the quote tells us is that defining the ‘problem’ of a wicked problem is essentially the challenge of agreeing and accepting a consensual solution, despite the fact that this solution is essentially a leap of faith. So, even when the problem has been defined, it may still be questioned whether or not the framing of the problem is correct. For this reason, support for solutions to a wicked problem can easily wither away.

#### **7.4.2.INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY**

Another aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the institutional aspect. Wicked problems cut across organisational boundaries, as well as administrative levels and networks. This will often result in uncertainty about process handling and the development of interactions with other actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004 , p. 7).

At the beginning of The Policy Formulation process, the institutional uncertainty has less to do with the strategic uncertainties of collaboration; rather, it is a question of the mandate given as well as the implications. Many discussions focus on the wishes of decision makers (The Lord Mayor, Intra-Municipal Steering Committee, the director of Urban Design Department) and on what is expected of the team:

*“Heck I do not know what they want, specifically not with regards to this neighbourhood. But I do know what my politicians want, and how it should be presented to them, and if it is to progress further through the system, it must be*

*digestible [spiseligt]. And it will not do any good if we then choose a solution that transcends the policies and strategies we already have” (group interview 11, part 3)*

The quote demonstrates that The Policy Formulation process of such a wicked problem prompts uncertainty about mandate and what part to play in the policy process.

In the quote below, the members are also discussing the division of labour concerning the fact that it is special consultants who develops the policy:

*“R. (a): I think that the policy should begin by having a pool [of propositions], which might require some changes..... if nothing else, the Director could easily, of course, just remove those kinds of things. “..(group interview 11, part 3)*

The quote reflects that the cross-administrative policy formulation challenges existing institutional structures, making it unclear what role the stakeholders in the policy process have. This is essentially an institutional uncertainty about division of labour and roles: what are the roles of The Policy Formulation Team members in this process vis á vis decision makers such as politicians and steering committee? The quote demonstrates institutional uncertainty about scope: how ambitious can the policy be?

### **7.4.3. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY**

The third aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the strategic uncertainty. Due to the unique character of perceptions held by some actors, other actors may not acknowledge or be aware of these; and therefore, a large variety of strategies may develop around a complex issue, making it difficult to predict what strategies actors will choose (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

This type of uncertainty is present in the entire process, but becomes visible to all at the end of The Policy Formulation process. To be sure, collaborative, strategic problems are also present at the beginning of The Policy Formulation process. This strategic uncertainty is a conflict regarding the nature of the coordinative unit: should already existing, cross-administrative policies be enhanced, or should the policy be further developed (see 7.6 for elaboration of this point of conflict).

A second reason why strategic uncertainty is also generated is that ND mobilizes hierarchical support in its own administration to change the terms of reference for the policy, as I described in the introduction to The Policy Formulation case. This makes the policy potentially much more powerful, but also more vulnerable to

strategic considerations. For instance, the former director of Urban Design Department mentioned that it was essential that all the mayors in the Forum of Mayors felt that the present, now more powerful, policy was relevant to them, which required hard work on the parts of ND and the Centre:

*“Where there might be a little scepticism... someone asked: Haven’t we created a huge complicated organisational structure here, which is almost larger than what we had before? And we had used the argument that we needed to clean up the organisational proliferation. So we insisted, ‘no, we believe this structure is transparent and therefore usable’. I remember when we were having the first meeting [in the municipality] ... If it had seemed meaningless to the actors involved in some of these sessions, we would have lost it, and there were signs of this. For example, a Children and Youth mayor saying “why am I sitting here?”. And the Mayor of Culture was perhaps also present. In this case we then made a speedy decision and opted for a culture theme the next time. So, if people could not see that this was very important, we wouldn’t have been able to move up [to that level]. So it was really, really important that the meetings were prepared in detail, and that there was some substance in it” (...) (TEA, director, I29)*

What the quote shows is how vulnerable the policy process is in terms of maintaining and sanctioning support at top decision makers’ level, because of ND’ bottom-up leadership position. What the quote also demonstrates is the challenge of stabilising the mandate for the policy throughout the process. The quote further reflects the fundamental ambivalence of the project in terms of potential inconsistency: the purpose is to increase coordination by merging some of the unstructured organisations concerning the area-based programs – and at the same time, the means to do this is a very huge internal administrative structure which is perceived by some stakeholders to be just as incomprehensible as the previous ones. And the quote demonstrates the workload that is required to give sense when the number of collaborators is increasing. This strategic uncertainty is reflected throughout the process, also at the end of The Policy Formulation process, as the quote below exemplifies:

*“It was about to go wrong at the end. I think the fact is that almost a week before it was being discussed politically, Frank Jensen [The Lord Mayor] after he had read it through once and had no comments, then - well, I don’t know, actually, why he got the policy again- but he did - and said he did not agree with the vision. And it’s called something including green growth & quality of life. And that he will not allow... He doesn’t want it to be called green growth, he just wants it to be called Growth & quality of life. And we have a mayor who puts green growth really, really high on the agenda. So he will not yield, and our Board of Directors will not yield, our CEO will not give up. And then it’s running like that for 10 days, where we simply do not know whether we can get it landed. And my consultant and I we’re*

*ready to do almost anything. Because if it is not being approved of jointly, then all of it ... would have been for nothing, right? And then it succeeded because we found a compromise which was Green, Healthy and Creative Growth. (ND, middle manager," 115)*

In the quote an episode is mentioned in the approval process, in which there is a disagreement with the lord mayor and his administration, in that Policy For Disadvantaged Areas used the words green growth, which the lord mayor felt was at odds with the Municipal Plan – even though the policy was to focus on ‘green growth’. What the quote tells us is that a conflict is provoked in that the two most powerful administrations, TEA and The Finance Administration, both want to promote themselves as having ‘green’ political aims, and that a conflict in this minor part of the policy is potentially jeopardizing the entire policy enterprise. This strategic uncertainty and conflict also reflects the fact that the policy has reached a level close to FA-turf, since it is FA that has the remit of strategic urban planning.

#### **7.4.4.INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY**

Finally, the fourth aspect is the risk-taking end-point uncertainty, i.e. Van de Ven’s uncertainty of the journey (Van de Ven, 1999). Will it work? What is this ‘it’, i.e. where will the journey take us? Are we on the right track, or are we really on a detour?

This is keenly discussed in The Policy Formulation Team:

*"And so I think maybe we should have a discussion on what it is then ... What are we doing here? Is it a policy? Or is it to dig further down and provide them with something else, which in fact are, perhaps, recommendations for something? But a policy is something that is located higher up and not at the level of a real plan for action." (policy formulation meeting, 111, part 3)*

Several interviewees mention this uncertainty of the journey during the interviews. One consultant argues that the process was ‘very unclear’ from the beginning (I25). Also, an ND consultant argues that in fact there were very wide boundaries for the policy process, with no direction to begin with, which generated much uncertainty:

*"I: Did you experience periods or critical situations when you really had to make an extra effort to perform some type of leadership, or when some precarious situations arose where there were doubts about the direction in which to go?"*

*R: there were many. There was the whole start-up phase [of the policy], when I was thinking "now we have these sessions, now we almost have to, you know, guess what our task was, right?" And we were fidgeting a bit, thinking we should try to start the group up in a good way and get them... build some social relationships and so on, with Christmas cards. With Christmas cards and mulled wine and so on.(...)So it was about putting the train on the right track and then there was this uncertainty: what type of task should we get started with, concerning resources and all that? There might have been many directions to take. And also because, well, it is quite clear that none of us had said in advance "this is where we're going, ya'll.[In Danish: Hvor skal vi hen, du]" Exactly.*

*I: I'm actually a little unsure about how much liberty you had in the group?*

*R: a very great deal" (ND, Special consultant, I19)*

What the quote tells us is that the direction of the policy was very uncertain to begin with, which is linked to the wicked problem uncertainty, in that decision makers themselves have no very fixed idea of the purpose of the policy. The team ends in a leadership vacuum, much like in The Evaluation Case, in which it is up to the team themselves to decide how ambitious the policy is supposed to be, and what the purpose of this should be.

Another interviewee mentions that the existing solution may only be temporary, and in fact is a transition model, in that the Intra-Municipal Governance structure is too heavy (see section 7.5.1.2). A third interviewee speculates whether the Intra-Municipal Governance set-up is proposed with the intention of paving the way for a different administrative structure with only one mayor, a so-called unity-administration as a solution to cross-administrative collaboration problems:

*"R: It is about the issue of the seven mayors and this underlying silence all the way through – is it in fact an exercise of paving the way for a unity-administration in the long run?. This issue is also present...*

*I: you mean that it is a sort of proto-type or a model or what are you thinking?*

*R: I don't know if it's something like that, but it is definitely something down that road ...Whether it has been said out loud so explicitly in some places at any time, I will not be able to say. But if you look generally at what is going to happen, then this process fits in very well as a guinea pig in relation to... well yes just all the hurdles that you were faced with when so many administrations must work together. But at the same time also, what is it that we get out of it?" (CYA, civil servant, I24)*

What the quotes tell us is that it is very difficult for collaborators, ND included, to figure out what the result of the process will be, and whether the project has actually been completed or is a precursor of something else. This also makes it difficult for some collaborators to make up their minds concerning whether or not to support the innovation project. As a consequence, the combination of the institutional and journey-related uncertainties allows ND to continue developing and running their innovation project, with the hesitant consent of collaborators.

#### **7.4.5.SUMMING UP**

Wicked problem uncertainty in a collaborative innovation context calls for answers that make sense to collaborators. In order to produce these sensemaking answers, a recognised leader is required who is able to produce and introduce new concepts. Four different types of uncertainty have been applied to map out a trajectory of uncertainties.

The analysis above contributes to answering the research question in several ways. First of all, the analysis demonstrates that the combined uncertainties of the substantive and institutional aspects at the beginning of The Policy Formulation process have a paralyzing effect on the participants. The participants are in need of producing answers that make sense; however, the ND facilitated framework does not in itself enable the participants to move forward. In fact, the participants are making such slow progress that the political support for the policy is about to wither away. This paralysis calls for leadership that is able to generate a direction for collaborators.

Second, the analysis demonstrates that as a consequence of ND and the efforts of allies to alter the terms of reference for the policy, strategic uncertainty dominates the conclusion of The Policy Formulation process, in that the more ambitious policy is potentially in conflict with already established plans and strategies of the Financial Administration. This is an important finding, in that this change of uncertainty context calls for more strategic types of leadership and action.

And third, at the conclusion of The Policy Formulation process, when the policy was approved, the uncertainty of the journey characteristic of innovations was dominant: collaborators try to figure out where they are in the process; is Policy For Disadvantaged Areas and Cross-Municipal Governance the final solution, or is this solution only a temporary model, already in transition? What this finding tells us is

that the leadership displayed by ND in The Policy Formulation process generates the need for new collaborative answers in a highly strategic environment.

There are several steps in this trajectory of uncertainties: first a phase of substantive & institutional uncertainty within a defined terms of reference and ownership; second, a strategic and journey-related uncertainty in which a solution has been defined, but in which the future is uncertain, and in which the policy is perceived of as a strategy that is competing with other strategies. All in all, the combination of the substantive and institutional uncertainties impact the team's ability to make visions and goals, and thus the kind of product that should be produced. Should this be a product which is non-controversial, in that the product has already been defined as being focused on 'what works', and therefore is non-ambitious and already settled? Or should the product be more ambitious, leaving it up to the steering committee and other political bodies to remove unwanted parts of the policy?

#### **7.4 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS SHARED AND LEADERSHIP-RELATED PROACTIVITY: NAVIGATING IN ENVIRONMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL AND SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY**

In this section, I analyse how entrepreneurship exercised by bottom-up leadership produces and introduces discursive concepts, which may be accepted or resisted as making sense by collaborators. More specifically, I analyse how a specific constellation of entrepreneurship leads to the introduction of specific concepts. The function in the analysis is to show that entrepreneurship is able to introduce concepts that generate direction for collaborators, despite uncertainty. I also study how these discursive concepts condition and call for the emergence of a specific subject position which will cause ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader.

I first analyse the type of entrepreneurship present in the case, focusing on why certain types of novel concepts are being produced. I next describe how the production and introduction of concepts produce a discursive text that defines the lines of conflict and sources of legitimacy for leadership.

Figure 23 below displays the combinations made by entrepreneurship. The table also displays how the combinations produce a certain context for the collaborative innovation process which appears to be a challenge for the collaborators. The table further displays the type of action applied to address the challenges created when altering the context. And finally, the table describes how this type of action contributes to producing a discursive concept in some instances. In the summing-up

section, I explain which of the context challenges are addressed by means of profession-based entrepreneurship, and which of these challenges can only be addressed by means of leadership. These challenges are thus socially constructed leadership dilemmas that require of ND to alter its leadership. In this respect, the table also allows us to see more clearly the differences between the two action types of entrepreneurship (as conceptual development) and leadership (as positional development).

The analysis is structured by the two types of entrepreneurial action that I find dominant in The Policy Formulation case: shared proactivity and leadership-related proactivity. Each of these types of proactivity addresses some context challenges which are producing leadership dilemmas and concepts.

**FIGURE 23: PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP - COMBINATIONS AND LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS IN THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE**

Combinations are made between the socially constructed objects of....		Process context produced	Type of action addressing the context challenge	Concept introduced
Policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods	Intra-Municipal Governance	How to create a horizontal infrastructure that can deal with a cross-administrative policy?	Shared proactivity	'CUT'  The 'Mercedes' sign



Yellow clouds	The persistence of the problems in disadvantaged neighbourhoods	So far, the area-based programs have been too insufficient and too uncoordinated. How to make a more powerful area-based solution?  How to avoid a situation in which the politicians see nothing but new types of 'plans' in all policy proposals?	Shared proactivity  Leadership-related proactivity	Development Plans  Core operation  Enhanced central-administrative set-up
Policy of Safe City (FA)	Policy for Vulnerable City Areas	How to avoid a direct conflict between two seemingly identical policies?	Leadership-related proactivity	
Investments in 'Focused City Development' (FA)	Investments in 'Development Plans' (The Technical and Environmental Administration)	How to avoid the picture of an unfocused municipality with 'focused' development plans in the entire city?	Shared proactivity  Leadership-related proactivity	Preferential Treatment
Policy for Vulnerable City Areas	'The Copenhagen Tale'	How is the improvement of physical and social distress linked to economic growth	Shared proactivity	Social cohesion

		and quality of life?		
'The municipal core operations (in Danish: 'kernedriften')	The solution of 'the problem' (Policy for Disadvantaged Areas)	How to display the value of this solution?  How to maintain both local innovation and system-optimization in the policy?	Leadership dilemma	Innovating intra-municipal governance
Governmental ghetto-policy	Policy response	How to produce an alternative response to the governmental 'ghetto policy'	Shared proactivity  Leadership-Related proactivity	Policy for Disadvantaged Areas
Yellow Clouds	The fear of too much coordination	How to avoid being positioned as remote centralists, overburdening locally working professionals with competing layers of coordination?	Leadership dilemma  Shared proactivity  Leadership-related proactivity	Local decision making competence

### **7.5.1. PROACTIVITY: SHARED AND LEADERSHIP RELATED PROACTIVITY**

In this proactivity section, I describe how this type of action to some extent enables the members to move forward, despite the uncertainties mentioned above.

I find that two types of proactivity are present in the process formulation case. I call these 'shared proactivity' and the 'leadership related proactivity' of ND and FA.

The shared proactivity is formally delineated by mandate, and denotes that all members in The Policy Formulation Team are active in making suggestions of how to make a policy. The members are participating actively in order to reduce uncertainty and make progress, both when the policy is written and also a year after when the policy is approved of and becoming an organisational reality. Thus, the members do what they think is expected of them, which is a difficult exercise, since parts of bureaucratic and political leadership in the respective administrations find it difficult to relate to Intra-Municipal Governance (i.e. the institutional uncertainty).

ND and FA's proactivity, on the other hand, is much more subtle and strategic: ND actually manages to alter the terms of reference for the policy, altering the target unit of the policy: from a focus on area-based programs to a focus on disadvantaged areas, as is seen in the approved policy<sup>xxxix</sup>. And ND and FA manage to avoid some conflicts between the two administrations, especially by developing a division of labour with the Safe City strategy. I call this type of proactive leadership related proactivity, in that this type of proactivity is closely connected to ND's leadership position as policy responsible.


### **7.5.2.SHARED PROACTIVITY**

The shared proactivity of The Policy Formulation Team members has two aspects. First of all, members in The Policy Formulation meetings are making huge efforts to make substantive links between policy propositions and the strategic and political landscape of their own administrations and the municipality in general, in order to ensure that the policy produced actually contributes to horizontal and vertical coordination, and not to more fragmentation. Second, the members, most of them also part of the Intra-Municipal Governance team, 'Cross-Municipal Team' ('CUT') (in Danish: Tværgående Team) are facing challenges with regard to establishing the infrastructure necessary in their own administration. The infrastructure is part of a municipal organisational change process, which is necessary in order to manage the now formalized, inter-organisational relations, generated both by the policy and the partnership with the housing administrations.

I could have avoided categorizing this behaviour as a type of proactivity, since these members seem to be doing only what is expected of them. However, this description would be incomplete. As the section below will demonstrate, supported by the leadership emergence analysis, the members do to some extent become advocates of the policy and the cross-administrative vision for the municipality; and they do actually handle uncertainties in a very skilful way, being able to see many development opportunities. In this respect, to a considerable extent they have an eye for what (Bardach, 1996) calls 'collaborative turf', i.e. are able to see the collaborative advantages (professional, strategic, career-related) of being part of the collaborative innovation project.

In The Policy Formulation meetings, most members contribute to moving the process forwards, mainly by delineating the task by tying the policy up to already existing policies. For instance, some suggest that they construct the policy in such a way that it contributes to the newly appointed Lord Mayor's 'The Copenhagen Tale'<sup>xi</sup>, a vision for the entire city of Copenhagen that focuses on solving the paradox that Copenhagen is one of the most attractive cities to live in, concerning quality of life, but is lagging behind when it comes to economic growth<sup>xii</sup>. Here, the members consider positioning the policy as one which improves the 'social cohesion' in the City, so that the city does not fall apart. Other suggestions are to position the policy as a special type of investment strategy, much similar to The Finance Administration's growth-focused 'Focused City Development'; or to relate it to the new policy of CYA, since many problems in the disadvantaged areas have to do with adolescents making the streets unsafe and lagging behind in terms of education. Connecting The Policy Formulation task to existing policies and visions is a way of providing the policy with a certain amount of probability for success and legitimacy, since the policy under development in this respect contributes to something that is already approved of by politicians. Accordingly, an aspect of the shared proactivity is to make linkages to other policies in order to have a starting point for positioning the policy in the policy landscape of the municipality, partly by adopting concepts.


In parallel with The Policy Formulation meetings, ND also seeks to push the agenda forward, basically by taking on more of the cumbersome job of writing and modifying the policy. ND also gathers policies from the other administrations in order to enable each administration to see its own political goals and strategies represented in the Policy. ND has also made a breakthrough as regards reducing the substantive uncertainty of The Policy Formulation Team by using the formerly developed data tool, 'The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map', to conduct an area-based data analysis of the disadvantaged areas of the city. ND presents the surprising results of the analysis to the team, especially the finding that even though specific neighbourhoods of the city have been the focus of many projects and area-based programs, the problems remain within the same city district. ND calls these six areas 'The Yellow Clouds' of the city, which reflects the conclusion that the problem of the city area will remain if targeted at a neighbourhood level (see image below).



*Source: Policy for Disadvantaged Areas*

Programs need to be launched at a larger scale in the city area. This analysis thus supports ND's sensemaking efforts, in which the lack of 'coordination' and the unconnected layers of 'operations/project work' result in nothing but shifting the problems round within the same city area.

In order to highlight this distinction between different types of municipal activities in disadvantaged areas, the team also introduces a figure labelled 'the Mercedes sign' (see below). The sign is a direct consequence of the conflict with The Social Administration, as I have demonstrated in my analysis of The Evaluation Case. Introducing the Mercedes sign enables the different administrations to see themselves in the joint policy, despite the differences in their working units. As I described in The Evaluation Case, most of the other administrations work at an individual level when making extraordinary activities in the disadvantaged areas, whereas ND's administration focuses mainly on the areas. And finally, some of the activities in the areas are not extraordinary but are part of the municipal operations. As we saw in The Evaluation Case, combining and coordinating these different layers of initiatives are vital in order to acquire more effective problem solving.



## Unified efforts

– operational, individual-oriented  
and area-based initiatives

*Source: Policy for Disadvantaged Areas*

The Mercedes sign enables all of the administrations to perceive of their efforts as contributing to the same objective – preferential treatment of disadvantaged city districts.

Introducing The Yellow Clouds, preferential treatment of the ‘yellow cloud areas’ and the Mercedes sign is a breakthrough in the Policy Formulation Team, in that it gives the team an idea of what the problem to be solved by the policy should be, especially concerning the size of the problem. However, this also poses a potential problem for the team. Could the finding lead the politicians to stop all extraordinary activities in the disadvantaged areas, since the last 10 years of project efforts have seemingly been in vain? Jointly, the members support the argument, which draws on ND’s sensemaking, in that the uncoordinated problem solving at the local level has been insufficient, and that an enhanced, cross-administrative set-up is needed if the problems are to be dealt with. What this observation tells us is how much of the knowledge attained by ND in the work with The Horizontal Pillar can be used in order to produce a sophisticated argument.

‘The Yellow Clouds’ becomes one of the shared concepts in the groups, and the identification has implications later on when the policy is finally formulated and implemented, in that each ‘cloud’ is to be addressed by a city area ‘Development

Plan', indicating that six Development Plans should be financed by the municipal administrations.

I identify another aspect of the shared entrepreneurship in the retrospective interviews a year later as having the character of *lobbyism, developing an intra-administrative infrastructure at civil servant level, as well as dealing with conflicting mandates.*

It is important to note that many of the permanent members of The Policy Formulation Team are well-known cooperation partners with ND, some also being part of the Pillar Project (ND, special consultant, I19). Second, as part of Intra-Municipal Governance at three levels (mayor, director- and civil servant levels), the permanent members of The Policy Formulation Team are also part of the new organisation, meeting monthly in the 'Cross-municipal Team' ('CUT'). The interviewees are thus part of both The Policy Formulation and Cross municipal Team. As the interview session demonstrates, the task of making the Policy for Disadvantaged City Areas and the new organisation meaningful rests with these civil servants/special consultants. Despite variations in position, the civil servants display a very autonomous behaviour, which is very similar to that of the special consultants: they plan much of their work themselves, having their immediate superior's confidence that they are doing their jobs, and they have few routine tasks. As one respondent phrases it, "*Most of us in the team decide for ourselves what to do with our time. Of course if we don't produce anything, we have a problem, but otherwise...*" (I20, member of Policy Formulation Team).

What this quote tells us is that much of the cross-administrative work and its success or failure depends on how these consultants/civil servants manage this interaction, both in relation to the representatives from the other administrations and in their own administrations.

One civil servant from the Health and Care Administration sees the Cross-municipal Team as both a channel for lobbyism and a facilitator of enhancement of elements in her own administration's Health Policy:

*"I believe that the reason why I am allowed to do this is because it is stated in the Health Policy that if you work with health, then you should deal with this task across administrations. And this [policy for vulnerable urban areas] is in particular a task to work on across administrations. And you might say the work that I do, wherever I participate, is of course always lobbying. It is about constantly ' nudging ' and constantly getting people to think about the health dimension"* (HCA, Civil servant, I17)

In the quote, we see how CUT is not only a one-way influence channel for ND – it also works the other way round, providing the members of the team with a platform from which to influence the other administrations. In this respect, I find that the members participating in The Policy Formulation Team display proactivity, in that they are constantly forced to figure out how the emerging policy can support their own administration's agenda. In the quote, The Policy Formulation Team and 'CUT' become an arena for influencing the other administrations.

This respondent is the only one out of the seven members from CUT being interviewed who speaks in such positive terms about the entrepreneurial possibilities in this new political and organisational set-up. The other interviewees give different assessments of the policy and the team and the effects of it. For instance, one special consultant mentions in a laid-back manner that: *"This is, of course, what this policy is in fact trying to look at. That we'll have to take the long tough haul. We will have to simply upgrade the level, and thus upgrade the people there, in order to avoid getting these problems. And that is really, really, really good. And it is in fact very visionary"* (I25). A second consultant comments in relation to the policy that *"everything collides right here ... I've never been inside something that makes so much sense in one way or another if we could just make it work - and that at the same time collides with so many other things that it's almost impossible to stay afloat [in Danish 'træde vande']"*. (I24) And a third says that *"I think there are many perspectives in this ... positive perspectives ... in many respects we in Copenhagen are the lead dog [in the sense: leader of the pack] in relation to the rest of the country ...it's sort of a development laboratory, right"* (I23).

What the diversity in the quotes displays is that the use and adaptation of the policy varies across administrations, highly dependent on the perspective of the individual consultant/civil servant and how they are establishing connections between the new policy and already existing policies and strategies. The involved officials are able to make sense of the project and what they are doing, and to some extent are able to see some future perspectives in it.

To give an example of the entrepreneurship displayed by the administrative representatives, a special consultant mentions a telling episode in which her administration, The Children and Youth Administration, is invited to a meeting in The Technical and Environmental Administration. The purpose of the meeting is to agree on what the Children and Youth Administration can provide for the Development Plans in the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods. In the quote, the description of the event demonstrates how the new cross-administrative set-up generates an ambivalent assessment for collaborators, in that it conflicts with the traditional structures that people meet at different levels. But it also makes a lot of sense. And further, in the final part of the lengthy quote, we see that the CUT



members have a very difficult key role in communicating centrally across administrations:

*"So we go to them [ND, TEA] ... We say that we can contribute with the analytical part (...) and then it stops there. (...) We cannot start launching new initiatives before we know what our chosen Mayor wants to do (...) And **that** understanding ... they do not have that in the other [administrations] ... that when I, in fact, go over there and when I am utterly hopeless – this is because I **must** be hopeless."(Consultant, CYA)*

This quote demonstrates that the innovation project is starting to make sense to collaborators. But it also demonstrates that some of the administrative challenges of initiating a cross-administrative process are simply to learn to accept the organisational reality of their collaborators and not to react emotionally when collaborators are unable, for various reasons, to contribute with as much as you might have wanted. In this learning process, administrative representatives are fully aware of the fact that their collaborators perceive of them as 'hopeless', in that they cannot contribute with as many resources as ND wants. Overall, this is obviously a frustrating experience for some CUT-members, in that they are being squeezed from both sides: having an ambiguous position both in relation to collaborators and their own administration. Dealing with this ambiguous position requires proactive behaviour.

Members of The Policy Formulation process team and CUT describe the consequences of the new set-up and the related ambiguities. Some of them describe how the structure has demanded the *development of an intra-administrative infrastructure* in their own administration. The descriptions reveal that the future policy influence depends on the abilities of these individuals to bridge the gap between Policy for Disadvantaged Areas and the objectives of the respective administrations. In the quote below, a special consultant reflects on the perspectives in making cross-administrative policies. The overall conclusion of the reflection is that most often, even though the wording of a policy is cross-administrative, it is perceived by the other administrations as sector-bound. Two openings exist to bridge the gap between cross-administrative boundaries: the annual budget negotiations, and the work of the civil servants at the bottom of the organisation:

*"Cross-cutting policies do get approved in The City Council, but (...)It is really difficult to get them to play (...), in essence we consider each other's policies sectorial policies. Even though they are formulated as transversal policies. (...) So one thing is the nice words from above. The crunch of the matter is this: how will this policy be translated into budget proposals (...) Further down [the hierarchy] a lot of officials are trying to coordinate. And there it makes sense. There you can do a lot. You can adjust some screws and handles and get the cooperation to work and produce some synergies and interfaces and some working relations. There I think*

*that it has significance. But it depends, of course, enormously on [the CUT MEMBER] (...); that she can see that what we are doing is being strengthened by cooperating in this and that way, where she can spot the possibilities for doing so.” (Special consultant, HCA)*

This quote shows that making an infrastructure depends on the single civil servant/special consultant being able to bridge the gap and see the possibilities, as displayed by the HCA civil servant. But it also demonstrates that despite working cross-administrative ‘on paper’, cross-administrative policies in the City of Copenhagen are traditionally located in one sector-administration, reducing ownership to policies in general.

Another challenge is to make managers aware that there is a need to make this infrastructure. These are acts of proactivity. The quote below demonstrates the highly complex landscape in which these CUT-members are navigating. The civil servant described how this happened in an ‘ad-hoc fashion’, finally triggered by a sort of coincidence. For a period, the formation of the new Intra-Municipal Governance structure was overshadowed by the fact that new mayors were elected, perhaps making the cross-administrative set-up politically uninteresting at that point:

*"And this is where I start ... We have in fact formed the Mayor's Forum, but in reality there was no awareness in this administration, besides perhaps in our Mayor, about what it really should be used for, it was a little unclear (...)you might say that this in fact is turning out perhaps to be an advantage ... because it enables it to live a life without too much attention (...) and then all of a sudden we get a new Director. And he literally stumbles over the policy, and he thinks to himself "Whoops! We are at risk here" and then starts to show an interest. And this is where we begin to develop a whole set-up here [in this administration]" (Member, CUT, CYA)*

The quote shows how difficult it is for collaborators and their directors to predict the consequence and the meaning of the new set-up. The quote thus demonstrates how the institutional and the journey-related uncertainties converge - it is impossible to know how the project will develop. Collaborators may be able to be part of the innovation journey in terms of the shared proactivity, but they do not have the ability to influence where the project is taking them, that is, they have little insight in the course of the journey. The quote thus supports O’Toole’s (O’Toole, 1996) hypothesis: that collaborative configurations to some extent paralyze collaborators’ ability to figure out the purpose of the strategic game they are participating in; and it supports my assumption that this paralysation creates the opportunity to influence collaborators by giving sense. The quote also demonstrates that an infrastructure in the administrations is highly needed in order to synchronize the newly approved of Policy for Disadvantaged Areas with other transversal strategies, such as FA’s Safe

City. And this synchronization of policies is a highly complex matter, requiring much proactivity in order to couple all these different policies, programs and projects.

Implementing this infrastructure is not necessarily a one-time event. Another civil servant also explains that the vertical hierarchy clashes with the new horizontal hierarchy. The clash is provoked when one order is given by the new, cross-administrative steering committee, and another order is given by the civil servant's immediate superior. In the example provided in the quote, the civil servant is asked about the leadership challenge of making cross-administrative collaborations. The civil servant describes that suddenly he serves two masters, each with a legitimate claim to make decisions, although the legitimacy of the cross-administrative hierarchy is not always recognised:

*"... with CUT [Intermunicipal Team] a team similar to a steering group has been formed. So the managerial level is of course represented. (...) But at the same time, of course, you as civil servant have as your immediate superior a manager who is **not** represented in the Steering Group. And the orders you are given from one place and the other place do not always harmonize in relation to your work tasks (...) CUT's legitimacy obviously must be retrieved from the Steering Group and of course, at the top, the Mayor Forum. And if other managers do not believe that this [Intra-Municipal Governance structure] is legitimate, then you have a problem."* (CLA, member of The Policy Formulation Team, I25)

The quote shows that the new Intra-Municipal Governance structure challenges vertical management structures, creating conflicts between two types of leadership structures, vertical and horizontal.

### **7.5.3.SUMMING UP**

The analysis of profession-based entrepreneurship contributes to answering the research question in several ways. First, in the analysis I find that proactivity is shared amongst collaborators, in contrast to the finding in The Evaluation Case. The way in which they share proactivity helps to address some of the challenges generated when new combinations are made, as described above. Some of the challenges concern creating a horizontal infrastructure, as well as coming up with responses to how the policy can contribute to the Lord Mayor's 'Copenhagen Tale'; but also in general to reflect on how a Copenhagen response to the governmental

‘ghetto policy’ can be formulated. Thus, the shared proactivity mainly addresses the institutional uncertainties.

Second, I find that the actual concepts and arguments are still mainly produced by ND, in order to address the substantive uncertainty – but with the consent of collaborators. It is ND that introduces the concepts of the ‘Yellow Clouds’ as well as re-uses the rhetoric from ‘The Horizontal Pillar’ in terms of introducing the concept of ‘Development Plans’ and by re-introducing the notion of improving ‘the municipal core operations’. Thus, the main generator for producing concepts is still profession-based entrepreneurship, focused on optimization of the area-based approach for solving complex problems through a holistic approach.

Overall, this analysis thus demonstrates that a heavy need remains for a profession-based entrepreneurship in order to address the substantive uncertainty in a collaborative innovation process. This implicates that ND still is forced to produce and introduce concepts in order to maintain and develop its leadership. The analysis also demonstrates that the collaborative efforts in producing an intra-administrative policy creates institutional challenges for collaborators that must be dealt with; otherwise frustration and potential resistance will emerge.

#### **7.5.4. LEADERSHIP RELATED PROACTIVITY**

In the section above I have analysed the implications of shared proactivity – how this element of entrepreneurship enables The Policy Formulation Team to respond to the uncertainties related to their task.

In this section I will focus on what I call leadership related proactivity, which is tightly connected to ND and the strategic network alliances that are identified and established parallel to The Policy Formulation process.

In The Policy Formulation meetings that I observed, leadership related proactivity was not present. Two members from ND participated, and they took on the role of sensemaker and facilitator in the team, but otherwise they participated in the discussions on par with the rest of the participants without having the answers at hand for formulating the policy from the beginning.

ND mainly acted proactively in between the meetings. As an example, when conducting my field work, I was asked by the ND consultant running the meetings, if I wanted to be part of a series of interview sessions with the directors from The Cross-Municipal Steering Committee with the argument that “you are a PhD and all”. My task was to make an interview guide and carry out the interviews. The responsible ND consultant had a main agenda with the interview sessions: to gain direct access to the directors, asking what they thought the policy should be, and

also to inspire The Policy Formulation Team. It was important that the interview sessions appeared 'neutral', i.e. that a researcher carried out the interviews (field note 2011-01-25); it was also a way for the ND consultant to question the directors about the possible paths the policy might take, which was demonstrated during an interview with an SSA director (I32). Overall, this was a way of reducing the uncertainty of The Policy Formulation Team and clarifying what was expected of them; and it was a way of finding out how to create a "burning platform" by making visible the strategic layers across and within administrations through the interviews. There was a need to establish a burning platform; as the ND consultant mentioned, it is *"obvious that we need to change gears; but some members of the team are already in doubt whether the policy will be a change of gears at all"* (field note 2011-01-25). Overall, this example of leadership related proactivity illustrates the fluent, brittle and strategic position of the policy: the consultant desperately needs an overview of the strategic landscape of the policy, and what the top management wants, while keeping both the top management and the civil servants engaged in the process.

The process of the interview sessions was quite telling. Two ND representatives and I carried out two interviews, and a third appointment was cancelled. When I asked about the remaining four interview sessions, the ND consultant replied that he had already met with the relevant directors face to face. This process illustrates the changing interfaces between the formal exercise of formulating a policy in the team and the informal, more network related, exercises of navigating quickly and with sufficient speed in a strategic landscape. The interview episode perhaps also demonstrates that discrete bilateral meetings were more useful for the consultant than the formalized interview set-up. Furthermore, it mirrors the fact that at this point, in the spring of 2011, ND increasingly took on the task of formulating the policy to speed up the process, so the policy could be approved by each of the seven political committees of each administration sooner. Thus, a movement from a formal policy formulation process to a more informal, network based process of strategic negotiations played out in numerous discrete, bilateral meetings between special consultants from the involved administrations as well as in meetings with directors. Additionally, another example of ND's proactive behaviour is the way in which they seek to influence the terms of reference for the policy by forming alliances with a director from The Technical and Environmental Administration in February and March 2011 (I15), and later on with the newly appointed mayor (I19).

The ND consultant describes examples of this leadership related proactivity in an interview. The consultant states that while alliances with the top management are important, strong alliances with the project team are even more so. In fact, the low level of conflict was a result of ND having handpicked the team members: *"we had asked most of them to join the team (...)because they are our regular cooperation partners"* (ND, special consultant, I19). Handpicking members with some

knowledge of urban planning for The Policy Formulation Team is an important influence tool: the members have a prior understanding of an innovation project; and conflicts are reduced because they already are attuned to thinking in area-based concepts.

Also, the numerous bilateral meetings with the team member from The Finance Administration were also important in order to ensure that this administration would approve the negotiated policy content:

*"We had many bilateral meetings (...) So I could be sure that she would not cause a deadlock when I proposed something (...) And ever since, she has proved to be an enormously good alliance partner" (ND, special consultant, I19).*

The ND is highly dependent on alliance partners in The Finance Administration, in that a consequence of changes in the terms of reference is that Policy For Disadvantaged Areas has a scope and content that is perceived of by The Finance Administration as a possible competitor to the administration's existing strategies. Bilateral meetings between these two administrations help establish a division of labour, creating synergy, as the quote below demonstrates. The Finance Administration's Safe City professionals discover that Policy For Disadvantaged Areas could play a preventive role, whereas Safe City could focus on short term initiatives:

*"Another very important alliance partner I have had all the way is Safe City [from FA]. (...) They perceive this as contributing 100% to their agenda (...) We have not worked so closely together, but we have had a great alliance and they have been pushing a lot through in their administration, arguing that it [the policy] was important work and that the thoughts behind it were proper ones etc. (...) Because they can see that we are talking about the same area, and that they mainly work on the short course. But they can also see that we are working with the prevention of the crime, which they struggle with in their everyday life" (ND, special consultant, I19).*

What the quote shows is that leadership related proactivity is vital in order to figure out how to avoid conflict and create synergy. When The Finance Administration can see the value of the emerging policy, the support for the policy enhances. In this respect, the quote illustrates a formalized power distribution in The City of Copenhagen, in that ND's administration needs the approval of the more powerful Finance Administration when formulating an ambitious policy.

Furthermore, the core of this type of proactive action is to be able to relate to sensemaking, understood as making sense of what ND and its collaborators are doing. During The Policy Formulation process, an ND employee reflects on the

terms of reference for the policy and the confusing relation between area-based programs and disadvantaged areas and suddenly realises that the terms of reference perhaps should be different:

*"It was a time of transition, when all of a sudden Sam begins to talk about, well, shouldn't we rather call it something else, because what we are really talking about is those areas, but are constantly saying that we are looking at the initiatives. So why not call it what it was supposed to be called? And that, I must admit, no one else has questioned. So again it is, in a way, plainly to take leadership upon yourself" (ND, special consultant, I19).*

The quote shows that ND does not have the answers of how to solve the tensions within the initial policy framework; instead, they are dependent upon their own ability to make sense of what they are doing in the process, the numerous discussions with collaborators, and then come up with new solutions and concepts. The solution for the tension is to remove the focus from area-based programs, and instead focus on the problem: the disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

An ND middle manager further comments on how the Director of the Urban Design Department obtained a new position in another organisation, creating a leadership vacuum. This meant that ND had contact to a level 2 director in The Technical and Environmental Administration. The ND manager and the director jointly decided that the policy could be much more than a 'whatever works toolbox' of area-based programs, a mandate which was dictated by the now absent director. The level 2 director had stronger visions for the policy and used her bureaucratic influence to change the mandate of the policy:

*"during the process, a space for leadership emerges (...) I will say that Nettie [the director] and I pushed it through (...) If she had not done so, we had not been able to continue (...) So what she saw was a clear opportunity (...) that this here, this is a new kind of lodestar [in Danish: 'ledestjerne] for Copenhagen as a metropolis(...). She could see that 'well, this is the answer to the Government's 'Ghetto Strategy' and that we will not be a part of" (ND, middle manager, I15)*

The quote thus demonstrates that this proactive behaviour is about utilizing windows of opportunities; both in terms of using the government's 'ghetto plan' as a positional lever for a new, ambitious policy in contrast to the governmental strategy, but also for redefining the mandate for the policy, actually changing the policy radically. Redefining the terms of reference, however, requires new alliance partners. With reference to Keast & Mandell's (Keast & Mandell, 2011) typology of coordination-cooperation-collaboration, the alteration of the mandate moves focus of the policy away from coordination of extraordinary activities to actual collaboration around a shared type of program. Finally, the quote demonstrates the

limits of the power of the social construction of bottom-up leadership. Despite its informal nature in terms of sensemaking and entrepreneurship, it is a type of leadership bound to a subordinate hierarchical position, making it possible for superiors to both limit and expand the range of influence considerably, being highly dependent on stabilising the innovation project by having alliances with directors at the top. As the ND consultant states: *“Benny [the former director] he is a very bright guy, he definitely is, but I guess he would have insisted that the task was to make a policy for those six Area Renewals and the 34 Comprehensive Plans (...) He wouldn’t have bought it, he definitely had intercepted that one, if he had still been here – that about that the policy all of a sudden was a policy for disadvantaged areas”* (ND, special consultant, I19).

Thus, the immediate superiors of bottom-up innovations play a crucial part in defining the scope of innovation processes from bottom-up leadership. Bottom-up leadership is highly sensitive both to change in higher ranking management as well as of the objectives of this management. In this case, we would have witnessed a less radical public sector innovation in so far as the line manager would have remained in his position.

### **7.5.5.SUMMING UP**

The analysis of profession-based entrepreneurship contributes to answer the research question in several ways.

First, in my analysis I find that in order to counter institutional and strategic uncertainty, ND and its FA-ally demonstrate a *leadership related proactivity* that remove potential conflicts while the policy is being formulated. ND does this by making contacts with directors and the FA administration, in order to figure out what is possible, and thus producing a division of labour and a shared understanding of each other’s strategies.

Second, in my analysis I find that this type of proactivity is necessary, in that the policy is vulnerable as regards changes in political support. Leadership related proactivity is a way of interpreting and adapting to the signals from decision makers in a political organisation.

Thirdly, I find that this type of proactivity is necessary in order to act on sensemaking during the process. This is most evident when ND decides to alter the mandate of the policy, partly based on the numerous discussions in The Policy Formulation Team, in which the discussions constantly circles around the disadvantaged areas, not the area-based programs.



Leadership related proactivity thus helps ND to navigate between institutional, substantive and strategic uncertainties, in terms of combinations made and introduced that will have the biggest chance of success.

Fourthly, I find that leadership related proactivity also generates new leadership dilemmas that cannot be handled by this type of action alone. These dilemmas relate to the overall project and the overall leadership positioning of ND: how might they display the future value of the policy proposition, maintain both innovation and system optimization in the same discursive 'text', figure out the future connection between the different types of area-based plans and programs, and avoid being positioned as a remote centralist that overburdens local working professionals with competing layers of coordination.

These leadership dilemmas thus require more fundamental changes in the types of action for the bottom-up leader in order to gain recognition. The next section focuses on constructing these leadership dilemmas.

## **7.5 LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION: DEALING WITH LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS**

In the previous sections, I have concluded that different forms of uncertainty create a demand for answers. ND's profession-based entrepreneurship as well as overall shared proactivity enables the production and introduction of novel concepts in a highly uncertain context with an unstable mandate. Entrepreneurship further enables a production of concepts that are not on direct collision course with existing major strategies in the City of Copenhagen.

This section has another focus. The implications of introducing these novel concepts are the emergence of a new micro-discourse, in which certain leadership positionings are possible to take and develop. In this section, I focus on how the attempt to introduce this micro-discourse generates a leadership positioning landscape, in which ND needs to perceive and adjust to points of leadership conflicts and sources of legitimacy in this landscape in order to provide collaborators with direction, and thus acquiring recognition as a collaborative innovation leader. Conflicts and sources of legitimacy may lead to change in bottom-up leadership, depending on the actions that the lead agency takes in relation to address leadership dilemmas.

I list these leadership dilemmas in the conclusion of the analysis. In this section, I analyse the conflicts and sources of legitimacy that construct these leadership dilemmas.

I first describe how people struggle with leadership and the collaborative innovation project, in this case, the Policy for Disadvantaged Areas. Secondly, I analyse the sources of leadership legitimacy. Thirdly, I will describe how ND staff and managers involved in The Policy Formulation process relate to their own leadership, and how they deal with the leadership dilemmas by reflecting on their identity.

#### **7.6.1.POINTS OF LEADERSHIP CONFLICTS: THE COORDINATIVE CENTRE, INTRA-MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION**

In this section, I will focus on conflicts: how these are related to issues of recognition in terms of making a leadership position legitimate. As I described in the theory section, entrepreneurship is needed in order to find an innovative solution in a uncertain environment, introducing a new micro-discourse; whereas the social construction of leadership is necessary in order to be able to adapt to the changing demands of both the innovation journey as well as collaborators expectations of such leadership, expectations that to some extent are generated by the micro-discourse. Conflicts are important to analyse, in that they first of all describe potential sites of power struggles in terms of resistance to the micro-discourse and the related leadership position. Conflicts thus make visible certain leadership dilemmas that need to be handled by ND, otherwise collaborators' support for both leadership and project may wane. Secondly, conflicts are also conversations where discourse is negotiated and sense made.

I have found three main conflicts in my data. These concern the coordinative centre, Intra-Municipal Governance and the contested role of innovation. I will describe these conflicts in the section below and reflection how these conflicts provide further answers to how leadership is recognised.

##### **7.5.1.1 Fighting over the coordinative centre: horizontal and vertical struggles**

*The vertical struggle: the fear of too much coordination of the local working professionals*

A conflict point similar to the critique in The Evaluation Case is a fear of too much local coordination as a consequence of the policy. In the first quote, a participant in The Policy Formulation Team raises a critique of the policy as being centralistic and burdensome:

*"I'm just not entirely sure I agree that all projects in an area necessarily must be coordinated, so ... I simply foresee an extreme kind of bureaucratization of the system ahead of us" (13, part 1).*

The quote demonstrates that there is a vertical struggle regarding the position of the coordinative centre: at the local or the central level. Here, ND's project is in danger of being positioned as centralistic and bureaucratic. This critique is a similar to one raised in The Evaluation Case.

ND tries to counter this positioning by arguing that more bureaucracy is not the answer. In fact, the purpose of the focus on increased coordination is to reduce the amount of bureaucracy by devolving power to the natural stakeholders in the 'yellow cloud' areas:

*"No, but that is not at all how it is conceptualized. For example, I find it obvious that it should be a local, social centre manager who should be a part of a steering group in such a yellow cloud- city district. And he sits and discusses what the problems are in this city area here, what projects we have, and whether we should in fact be helping to manage the projects, perhaps more than the municipal operation. These local managers have to ensure that the projects underpin the day-to-day operation in such a way that we all are working together in a joint direction. Well, doesn't that make sense? So it's not just all chaos?" (13, part 1).*

As the quote demonstrates, ND intends to establish a local organisation with decision making power in each 'yellow cloud', thus giving the coordinative responsibility for each city areas to the local manager with most activities in the area. This idea seems to be in alignment with ND's 'lessons learned' from the Pillar Project, in which ND only wants to coordinate, leaving the 'how' up to the local parties. And this solution also mirrors the context-sensitive focus that area-based programs have, in which all relevant stakeholders are involved in order to address the major problems identified in each individual neighbourhood. Here, this logic is applied to the city district level of the 'yellow clouds'.

In another interview, a civil servant fears that when all decisions concerning the policy goals are made centrally, there is no flexibility on the local level to address the problems. Thus, this civil servant fears that the Intra-Municipal Governance structure and the policy might be too rigid, and thus blocking for solid professional work (I27). This conflict makes visible one of the most persisting leadership dilemmas for ND's leadership and project: how to avoid that ND's innovation project and leadership are being positioned as detached and centralistic?

*The horizontal coordination struggle: the new policy or the existing policies?*

In the policy meetings, two administrations try to influence the policy by arguing that it ought to support already existing strategies. One administration representative suggests that the policy ought to support greening strategies, and the other representative suggests that the policy ought to support the Children & Youth Policy:

*"We must have a look at the strategies that we already have. We actually also have some individual policies that cut across regions. We have the Children & Youth Policy, which is in need of a revision here in 2011, but after all, it is still a policy which has been approved of by the City Council [Borgerrepræsentation]. And it comprises statements in relation to what we really think about, among other things, that there should be decent bike paths to school ... and all those things. There are quite a number of things. But we also have a great deal of other things in the individual administrations that point towards the kinds of wishes and hopes we have for each of our resort. So I think we must use what we already have" (CYA representative 11, part 3)*

Instead of developing an entire new policy, the representative argues that the policy might as well support the existing policies. However, this is defied by a representative from the Financial Administration in the policy formulation meeting, since there is a risk that the boundaries of the policy will be difficult to delineate, exactly because it is area-based. Consequently, many municipal activities could be regarded as area-based.

There is a key conflict that circles around the status of the policy: is the policy to be perceived as something that will improve transversal coordination by being a helping hand to already existing policies – i.e. a subordinate position; or is it to be perceived as similar to the existing policies, that is, just another policy, pulling in its own direction, actually increasing the uncoordinated mess of the City of Copenhagen? The Finance Administration pulls in the direction of an independent policy, whereas the two critical administrations, The Culture and Leisure Administration and The Children and Youth Administration pull in another direction. The dispute was not settled at this meeting. This conflict demonstrates that each member tries to pull the policy in a direction to favour their own interests: FA and ND want to develop something new, a new centre of coordination. CLA and CYO want the policy to contribute to coordination, by supporting existing policies and making these policies the centres of coordination.

As I noted in my field work, a director from the Finance Administration had considerations of whether the policy should be a part of the FA strategies concerning 'Focused City Development' (Field work note 2011-09-15). Again, this observation demonstrates that if there are too many coordinative, cross-administrative city development plans, the city ends up having no strategic focus at all. Furthermore, the new policy risks threatening already existing strategies, especially the FA strategies which are cross-administrative, strategic and large-scale in nature.

### **7.5.1.2 Intra-Municipal Governance: cumbersome and politically illegitimate**

*Intra-Municipal Governance is cumbersome*

Another point of conflict is that the Intra-Municipal Governance structure is perceived of by some actors as too heavy first of all. One director notes that there is too much information for the directors in The Cross-Municipal Steering Committee at the meetings, some of it even irrelevant. This leads this director to wonder whether the future structure is going to change - or whether it is solid enough in the long run. In fact, the director sees it is as a 'colossus with feet of clay' (EIA, director, I18): "*In that in the past, you had no Intra-Municipal Governance structure or policy; and now you have a governance structure with all mayors involved, including a policy. In this huge structure, there is a risk that the ordinary politicians on the Board of the Social Housing National Organisation, and a member of the Cooperation Forum, to some extent do not believe that they have been involved enough, and if this is the case, the entire support for the policy could fail*" (I18). There is a tension between making the necessary progress through alliances while at the same time a risk of excluding certain stakeholders. In the quote below, the director responds to my question of what the central points of conflict has been on the journey from The Horizontal Pillar to the upcoming approval of the policy:

*"It is a very huge structure that we have been building. It is a **very** huge structure. And now we are sort of only beginning to test how it works in relation to the local actors, right. Because now we are beginning to work on the Development Plans. Now we have overtaken this strategy and now we...now a lot of people have gathered, right? And then I saw the template for it, and I just thought; Oh no, now they are **not** going to launch all sorts of new empowerment movements or bottom-up processes, not in all these [policy] areas that we now on a general level, through budgets and other things, have made closure on, right, and which have already been politically approved " (EIA, director, I18),*

The statement above is a director's reaction to the initial work of the Development Plans for Policy For Disadvantaged Areas. Here, the key balance and point of conflict is the cutting edge between top-down and bottom-up. Seemingly, given the huge governance structure with representatives from the social housing sector, disagreement concerning the centralistic top-down approach might arise. Furthermore, the quote also demonstrates that it is challenging to work in a collaborative governance structure with many stakeholders and cross-sector issues. Finally, the quote also reflects that the municipal system has difficulties in maintaining the logic developed in the innovation process: that even though the governance structure is perceived of as huge and top-down, it is a response to earlier days, in which the initiatives in the disadvantaged areas were characterized by fragmentation and bottom-up driven projects. The speculations of this director reflect that key stakeholders are considering whether the balance struck between bottom-up and top-down in the policy is the right one.

The Intra-Municipal Governance structure also has the deficit that it is part of a centralistic set-up. The consequence is that it is important that what is being fed into the new structure from the locals is in alignment with the centrally made decisions. This is the point of conflict for ND, in that the leadership exercised has excluded some actors, who somehow may need to be made part of the innovation project. As a consequence ND risks being positioned as a centralistic leader.

Similarly, another director argues that the cross-administrative structure is only temporary, in that it is too heavy and too abstract. However, the structure is also perceived as necessary, since the disadvantaged neighbourhoods mainly are located in areas owned by the social housing organisations, a condition which has made the inter-organisational structure the way it is:

*"...But conversely, I think that it is right and necessary, or at least something in the style here is right and necessary, because of course we cannot do anything in the exposed urban areas (...) So we [the municipality and general housing sector] have a shared destiny here (...) it gets too heavy. And of course, it is also something you need to think through whether it should be here in the long-term, but it does serve as a sort of temporary transition structure [in Danish: overgangskonstruktion] to get the right agenda set" (SSA, Director, I18).*

The quote demonstrates several points. First of all, the fluency and brittleness of the collaborative innovation process: the new policy has just been approved and not even been put to work, and already key stakeholders are beginning to reconsider whether its administrative basis is good enough. The quote thus points to the massive pressure that ND and TEA are under in order to keep up with the speed of the process and the way that people are beginning to make sense of what they are doing. The quote also points to fact that the cross-administrative structure is

perceived of as highly ambivalent, in that it is both necessary but also unmanageable in the long run. In that case solutions for wicked problems seem to require constant vigilance from the lead actor, otherwise support for the collaborative solution seems to disappear. Finally, the quote reflects some stabilizing factors in terms of the partnership with the social housing sector – that this partnership needs an intra-municipal governance structure.

A third leader points to this stabilization: That in order to keep people engaged, you need to make it relevant for people to be in The Cross-Municipal Steering Committee. One way to do this is to provide scope for influence for directors and mayors, so that they do not feel that they are wasting their time:

*"So from my perspective, there is only one way forward and that is to get the leaders to want to take responsibility. They (ND/TEA) must continue to make it sufficiently interesting to sit in the forums. And to encourage people to actually show up, because when people show up they are indeed committed.*

*In: How can they continue to make it interesting?*

*R: That's a good question ... professionalism should definitely be included in this 'equation. And that implies, of course, that management and monitoring [in Danish: opfølgning] are in order, but I don't think that's sufficient. It is vital that people experience that important decisions are being made.."(EIA, Manager, 122)*

The quote demonstrates that the new governance structure and policy seemingly do not have enough scope for influence, especially for keeping the administration directors engaged. In my interpretation, TEA needs to create true collaborative turf by making the decisions of a key TEA resort open for other administrations, enabling them to interlink these decisions with their own strategies. The interviewed leader contrasts the TEA project with FA projects, in which all relevant stakeholders show up because of the fact that FA to some extent can provide this scope for influence.

#### *Bottom-up leadership as short circuiting vertical management*

In the interviews, it seems that the type of bottom-up leadership that ND is exercising to some extent short circuits vertical leadership. As the quote below demonstrates, ND to some extent had a standing disagreement with the director of the Urban Design Department. ND wanted a more engaged director. As I have also described elsewhere, this director wanted a policy that focused on 'what works'. The disagreement was solved when the director found a new job in another municipality. Thus, for a period, the Urban Design Department, which ND is part of, had a

constituted director, the level-2 director. This director plays a crucial role for pushing ND's agenda forwards, changing the terms of reference for the policy:

*"You don't get someone like her, or a Board or directors in general, to join to start with. Our former director for Urban Design Department was of course also with us throughout the process (...) And I think he thought 'well, okay' (...) but it [the directors engagement] wasn't something that seriously moved anything (...) for him it was another kind of story, because it [the innovation project] was one among a lot of other cases and steering groups he was part of." (ND, Middle manager, I15)*

The quote demonstrates that the formal immediate superior for bottom-up leadership is crucial as a gateway in granting access to higher ranking directors. And if this level of management is overburdened, the innovation project does not get the attention it requires in order to become radical.

The quote below demonstrates that when running a process from the bottom and up, with a steering committee at the administrative top of the new inter-organisational set-up, the civil servants' immediate superior to some extent has no control over his or her employees, in that the civil servant is given orders from higher ranking directors:

*"... with CUT [Intermunicipal Team] a team similar to a steering group has been formed. So the managerial level is of course represented. (...) But at the same time, of course, you as civil servant have as your immediate superior a manager who is **not** represented in the Steering Group (...) CUT's legitimacy obviously must be retrieved from the Steering Group and of course, at the top, the Mayor Forum. And if other managers do not believe that this [Intra-Municipal Governance structure] is legitimate, then you have a problem." (CLA, member of The Policy Formulation Team, I25)*

In my interpretation, the quote demonstrates that two simultaneous types of leadership create conflicting legitimacies, vertical and horizontal, which are left to the civil servants to handle.

In only two administrations is this bypassing of intermediate leaders mentioned as a problem. However, in an interview with the ND middle manager (I15), the matter of conflict is exactly giving the CUT members/policy formulation members resources enough to make the Intra-Municipal Governance structure effective. So, what the quotes above suggest is that a profession-based development project such as the Pillar, leading to alliances with the top management, poses a challenge for the intermediate management level, in that they have no control of their employees, to some extent. This could be a potential barrier if these directors are not included in



some way, and if the ambitions of the professionals (here the ND office as well as members of 'CUT') are not matched by their immediate superior.

*The collaborative governance structure is in conflict with the nature of politics*

A critique raised of the ND leadership is the way that the office gained influence through its alliance with both top directors and politicians. This critique to some extent resembles the critique of the conflicting leadership legitimacy. In the quote below, a director explains how another part of the municipal bureaucracy, the politicians, to some extent has been pacified and a victim of the new Intra-Municipal Governance structure. The critique is also a critique of the new cross-administrative structure and policy: that these two organisational aspects, to some extent, rank higher than even mayors. Thus, the administrative structure has become too extensive, destroying the conflictive and voluntary nature of politics by forcing people to work within the new structure:

*In the Committee and ultimately in the City Council, you have a system for how to reach agreement. In the end you vote, and the majority wins. And politicians are good at this and it is a set-up that we are familiar with. And sometimes you barter and negotiate, and compromises will be made, and that is how it is. [BUT] When you put seven mayors into a room and say: "now you have to agree". That is not the nature of politics. And it's not natural for mayors to agree on something and then go out as a joint Executive Board. (...)So in this way, I think that somebody have been trying to get everyone to agree, not only administrative but also political; and these mayors have been placed in a strange forum, where they can't really act, while at the same time the formal system is running parallel. (Manager, I26)*

The quote demonstrates several things. First of all, it reflects a critique of the division of labour between administrative and political decision making. Seemingly, TEA's project is here perceived as an administrative reform strategy which has expanded into the field of politics, requiring all mayors to agree on specific issues. This quote thus also reflects future challenges for bottom-up leadership of wicked problems, for example the almost impossible task of stabilizing horizontal collaborations by means of cross-organisational strategies. This entails, among other things, that politically appointed leaders to some extent in a given a policy field agree that a particular solution is the only right one. Seemingly, this strategic move from ND and TEA is perceived of as even more illegitimate because the solution has been developed in the administration.

*Innovation: a policy is not a profession-related playground*

Another dispute concerns the concept of 'innovation' in the policy. As described in the analysis of The Evaluation Case, experimentation and development are part of the Pillar Project as well as the ND profession and leadership position. The concept of innovation, especially on the local level, is emphasized in some of the early policy drafts. However, it is rejected by The Finance Administration member since the 'innovation'-agenda was not part of the mandate given. Instead, the focus of the policy should be 'what we know, the well documented', it should not give the politicians the impression that the professionals just want a playground:

*There was one issue I was hesitant about. It is that in this paper there is a lot of focus on innovation and developing new things and I think we've got a clear order that we should focus on what we already have: what we know, what is well documented (...) I think we must be very careful to get it described in a proper manner, so that the Steering Group and our mayors do not get the impression that 'now we would just like to have a playground to do new and exciting things.' " (I14, part3)*

At this point in time, the ND's ambitions are at odds with the mandate given to them. The quote also reflects that ND as the leader of a policy is supposed to find answers, not point out more areas for development.

*When demands of effect assessment clashes with the necessity for developing new collaborative work forms*

Another conflict presented in the interviews is that parts of the municipal organisation have difficulties in handling the cross-administrative way of collaborating. As the statement from The Finance Administration below demonstrates, there is a strong focus on 'effect' in the municipality: what will the effect of the policy and the new organisational set-up be? A main challenge for this special consultant has been to construct the argument that it will only be possible to increase the effect of the municipal efforts by collaborating in a new way – even though it remains uncertain what specifically will happen. In this way, the insight from 'The Yellow Clouds' is also used by The Finance Administration member to defend what is happening in The Policy Formulation Team, thus making and giving sense. The quote also demonstrates how difficult it is to initiate collaborative innovations across administrative boundaries, in that the administrations, especially

the Lord Mayor's most powerful administration, have difficulties dealing with the unpredictable end-point of innovation:

*My primary role has been to keep the FA involved in the collaboration. Because at a very early stage there was great scepticism concerning whether to make this policy, and what type of monster we are creating, right? And is it really budget-maximizing, and are we going to use a lot of resources to meet and talk about a lot of things.(...) and also a concern about, well, what will it lead to in terms of concrete outputs, right, will we get some effect out of it? So it [my role] has been to insist that if we want an increased effect, we have to go through this period where we find out how to collaborate in a new and more co-ordinated way. (...)This is the burning platform, right? And this has also been my role - to clarify the burning platform and tell the story that 'now we will do it in a new way and it will have an enhanced effect, but exactly what we are doing I cannot say yet' (FA, I20)*

Most importantly, the quote demonstrates the difficulties that parts of the organisation of The City of Copenhagen have in dealing with cross-administrative innovation projects targeting wicked problems. Nevertheless the rhetoric of innovation shared in The Policy Formulation Team is heavily mobilized and applied by this special consultant with the intention of keeping FA involved in the collaboration.

### **7.6.2.SUMMING UP**

In this section, I have demonstrated that three points of conflicts dominate The Policy Formulation process: the coordinative centre, Intra-Municipal Governance and the contested role of innovation.

The conflict of coordination comprises a vertical and horizontal struggle of coordination. The vertical struggle concerns some collaborators' fear that increased coordination demands of the central level will make it more difficult and bureaucratic to work at the local level. The horizontal struggle is also a fight over the coordinative centre: whether the policy should be a new coordinative centre, or support existing coordinative functions, such as existing policies and strategies in the respective administrations.

The conflict concerning the Intra-Municipal Governance structure is that ND's bottom-up type of leadership, making allies with top politicians and top directors, short-circuits the vertical chain of command in the administrations. This is efficient in acquiring power, but at the expense of generating reluctance at the intermediate leadership levels, rendering the horizontal Intra-Municipal Governance structure illegitimate. A related critique concerns the nature of politics: that the governance structure pacifies mayors, who are forced to work within a consensus structure. This

intra-municipal structure is at odds with the voluntary and conflictive nature of politics. A related conflict is that despite the fact that ND and the administrations have managed to make a cross-administrative, horizontal structure, some of the directors perceive the structure to be too big and cumbersome to work within, and the Intra-Municipal Steering Committee feels overburdened. Throughout the interviews, this structure is regarded as ambivalent: it places heavy demands on the staff members involved, but at the same time it is also seen as necessary because of the Governance Dialogue and the need for a partnership with the social housing organisations.

The conflict concerning maintaining an element of innovation in the policy clashes with collaborative demands of effect assessment. Especially the Lord Mayor's strategic Finance Administration is sceptical as to whether the Intra-Municipal Governance structure and the policy will produce any results, and to some extent FA is not willing to accept the fact that no answers as regards the consequences of the innovation project can be given in advance.

ND is perceived as responsible for running The Policy Formulation process. Despite the cross-administrative elements, it is clear from the assessment of ND and The Technical and Environmental Administration's leadership that the final responsibility for the collaborative innovation project rests on the shoulders of ND and The Technical and Environmental Administration. In the BUCIL model, I assume that the innovation project and leadership are intimately related. This also means that criticism of the project is an implicit critique of ND's leadership. Accordingly, some parts of ND's leadership are clearly being perceived of as illegitimate by some collaborators, although the strength of the criticism varies considerably, and with few people uttering the critique directly. ND's leadership and the conflicts concerning their innovation project can be seen as counter-discursive positions of critique that may or may not be forceful enough to generate resistance across collaborators. Thus, despite that the criticism varies and does not represent the full picture of ND and their project, the criticism is presented here because it points out dilemmas that may have an impact on ND's leadership.

The criticism is also described here in order to compare the discursive resistance to other studies of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership. ND is criticized for inconsistency, or perceived as being inconsistent:

- ND wants to increase coordination, but they actually risk doing the opposite when launching a new project that aims to be a new centre of coordination.

- ND wants to focus on the ‘core operations’, only allowing new projects when these contribute to the goals of the ‘core operations’, but they also want to be innovative at the local level (at least in the early phases of The Policy Formulation).
- ND is criticized for seeking influence through a collaborative governance structure which is in conflict with the autonomy of politicians, and which forces people to collaborate.
- ND is perceived of by the Finance Administration as a ‘disturber of the peace’ by not adhering to the demands of effect assessment.
- ND is perceived of as launching a type of ambivalent coordination that has a character of a necessary burden: it risks wasting people’s time, while at the same being necessary as a consequence of the Governance Dialogue; and the type of coordination is perceived of as potentially centralist in nature, a centralism which both short-circuits traditional line management as well as possibly interfering with the work of local professionals.

### **7.6.3.SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP LEGITIMACY: SAME DIRECTION, CONSOLIDATED MACHINE, NO TURNING BACK, INNOVATING GOVERNANCE**

In the previous section, I described the points of conflict in the leadership positioning landscape. These conflicts are one aspect of the leadership dilemmas.

In this section, I will focus on the other aspect - leadership legitimacy. When collaborators from the administrations assess ND and TEAs leadership and the collaborative innovation project, I find two main themes as a result of these questions. The most important theme concerns the collaborative project. The second theme concerns the present and future leadership of ND and TEA.

#### **7.5.4.1 Assessments of the collaborative innovation project**

In the following sections, I will describe the sources of legitimacy that collaborators suggest. These are *walking in the same direction, a consolidated machine, no turning back now* and *innovating governance*.

*'Walking in the same direction'*

Across administrations and positions, an overall agreement exists that both the policy and the Intra-Municipal Governance structure make sense. One of the respondents mentions at a policy meeting that *"the municipality has 56 different strategies, depending on what administration and maybe even what department you're in. But the point is I guess, well at one time or another, and this is true not just concerning the area-based approach, but in general, that the City of Copenhagen at some time must begin to walk in the same direction"* (member, policy meeting, 2011, part 3).

ND's ambition of enhancing cross-administrative collaboration is by almost all interviewed participants in The Policy Formulation process regarded as legitimate, not only in the area-based field, but as a guiding principle for local governance.

Another interviewee sees the policy as an attempt to address a main challenge in the municipality: how to make cross-administrative policies that makes a substantive, collaborative contribution, and not just a symbolic collaboration:

*R: "Our health policy ... I did not agree with the way it was designed, if I may say so, because we tried to keep the political-strategic level to ourselves for a long time, as a HCA development, while at the same time saying it was cross-sectorial. So we kept the development strand of the policy in our own office for a very long time. And we involved the others in a more particular way [...]."*

*I: (a): Hm-m. So do you think that this policy has involved the other administrations more in relation to the policy area?*

*R: Yeah, I think so, in a way. It is, of course, also dependent on whether the individual administrations actually pick up the initiatives from TEA, how much they have been involved, I assume"* (HCA, I16, special consultant)

The quote demonstrates that 'true' collaboration is what makes a difference – but many cross-municipal policies only have symbolic value. One explanation is that policy development is mainly done in-house, and the other administrations are only included when the policy has been made. In a sense, the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods is assessed as being broader and more inclusive; but it remains to be seen whether or not the administrations will acknowledge the policy objectives as their own goals, and not only the goals related to their own sector. The quote also demonstrates that this type of policy partly depends on whether the administrations are able to make sense of the policy in relation to their own strategies and sector-specific policies. This point is elaborated in the quote below:

*“I just thought that the policy here is such a policy ... our health care policy perhaps could have been such a comprehensive policy.*

*I.a: so you think this [policy] is broader than your own, in one way or another?*

*R. a: Yes, I think so, because it attempts to embrace all the policies for all administrations under one umbrella. It is, after all, very much a shared platform, you might say..... But in relation to both CYA and TEA, they have many other goals. ... It may well be that I'm overly optimistic, now when I sit here and talk about it. But that's just because I think it's a super important area. And that I see an opportunity to work with the health dimension in relation to, well, it will not be something fragmented. Now it [the health dimension] will be part of something” (HCA, Civil servant, I17)*

In the quote we see how the cross-administrative element in Policy For Disadvantaged Areas is perceived of as contributing to sector-specific goals such as health; this cross-policy creates a structure for combining various strategies to other sector-strategies that require collaboration in order to address wicked problems. Thus, Policy for Disadvantaged Areas is also an opportunity for other administrations to coordinate their own activities better. The policy is perceived of as an overarching policy, which can help improve the efficiency of other administrations.

*A consolidated machine: moving initiatives/projects towards the core operations*

A related theme to the one above is the metaphor of a machine which can be optimized. We saw the precursor for this image also in the ‘Pillar’-project in which the word ‘coordination’ was dominant. Here, the machine is the municipal ‘core operations’. We see this when interviewees use words such as the ‘system’ or the ‘core operation’, as in the quote below:

*“I think it's [a] wise move which has made good sense throughout [the process]. The move that TEA, or that the new policy is making, by saying 'this is about to get aligned the projects towards the municipal core operation' – to consider development work as being close to the day-to-day operation, and to make sure that we don't initiate development projects and such things which are outside the day-to-day operation. Because we know from experience that those things will die. So I guess all the way around, including our CEO, is supportive of thinking in that way. So in that way there is a resonance here, I think, also in the system, that this is the way we must think about it” (HCA, special consultant, I16)*

In the quote we see a stark contrast to the oppositional image of projects and earlier generations of area-based programs as being unfocused and too experimental, as we saw in the analysis of The Evaluation Case. As the quote above demonstrates, the body of the municipal 'core operation' has joints, and projects are limbs too far away from the joints. So they have a tendency to wither away and die. This quote is not representative for all interviewees concerning the dramatic vein. But it does say something about how strong the antagonistic relationship between the 'projects' and the 'core operation' can become when using this discourse. And why one informant mentioned that the focus on 'core operations' has almost become so dominant in the municipality that it is too much: suddenly it is almost forbidden to undertake 'projects' (I27).

The second quote demonstrates the overall professional ambition behind the antagonism: that it is the core welfare services that are able to solve the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods:

*"R: Yes, because if you see it from my perspective it can't be the Area Lift that makes the biggest difference. It can't possibly be four employees out there [in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods]. And it can't possibly be the Social Comprehensive Plan, no matter how great they are. It can't be DKK 5 million per year in the area of Mjølnerparken [disadvantaged social housing area] which really makes the difference. What make a difference are the primary schools out there, it's the day-care institutions, and it is about whether the library actually manages to attract some people.*

*I: And that is what it [the Policy] says? With its focus on core the operations?*

*R: Yes, it is, and in this way they have seen quite right: to avoid doing it project based. That is the big mantra in the City of Copenhagen at the moment because we might have had a tendency in the past sometimes to believe in quick fixes, so it's the right focus" (EIA, manager, I22)*

In this respect, the quote also explains that the antagonism underpinning the 'project/core operation' is also a symbol for the new political leadership as a way of marking a radical break with the former decision makers' practice. Because of this it is perceived of as legitimate by ND to utilise this antagonism.

However, as several directors note, despite the fact that the policy and Intra-Municipal Governance structure are to some extent accepted in the central administrative and political systems, and indeed also demonstrate a big leap forward in being able to solve the problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the vocabulary of 'coordination', 'core operations' and 'central strategies' is perhaps not something that locally focused people can see themselves in. Perhaps what the residents in the



socially disadvantaged areas remember the most is actually the frivolous experiments such as 'going to the fun park "BonBon-Land"', and not the strategies (I28). ND's project aims at centralized plans and decision making, suggesting fixed goals to be achieved. But (local) politicians have no use for machine 'images': they want something that evokes feelings. As a result the image of administrative optimization (the machine image) generates resistance.

In the quote below, a director describes some of the weaknesses of the policy. One possible weakness is that locally focused stakeholders such as residents and local politicians have no ownership of the policy. In order for the policy to become relevant, it has to become more concrete. One way of doing this would be to make a show-case, enabling the rest of the policy to be implemented. A show case could be targeting only problems related to youth, fear and crime, or business related investments in the areas. This may create ownership of the policy, which is now lacking:

*"I think we generally have a challenge in this field of the exposed urban areas with respect to our objectives. They are not, how can I put in, they are not [articulated] in sufficiently simple political language. I think there are a lot of actors related to this who cannot figure out what the ultimate goal really is, what is that we want .... I don't think it comes by itself. I think that there's going to be produced a great many useful things and I also believe there will be a perspective in it. But I don't think there will, in any case if we were to take your headline called 'innovation leadership', arise more radical changes from that level.... it may well happen that the proposals will be coming forward, but they will not be given priority in such a political process, because who is it **really**, who is it **really** that kind of owns these cases? You probably know the way that things are being managed in a budget prioritization process in the City of Copenhagen - therefore, there must be some politicians who own this here, so that they can be given priority"* (Director, SSA, I28, my bold)

In my interpretation the quote demonstrates, that sensemaking is constantly happening in the City of Copenhagen concerning "the monster" (I20) that has been created. The quote also reflects that it is of vital importance for maintaining legitimacy that the strong administrative vein in the policy is transformed into specific political projects to which politicians can have an ownership.

Another consequence of the image of the consolidated machine is the future role of area-based programs. As a civil servant (I24) and a director state (I18), it is unclear what the role of the area-based programs are in the future, since 'projects' now have to be tied to core operations. Consequently, the area-based programs are in a vulnerable position, in that they have a status of 'projects', and in this respect must be able to show that they can contribute to the goals of the policy. This perspective

is interesting from bottom-up leadership perspective, in that ND has used their critical insights of the area-based programs in order to inspire a policy making program focused on coordination. However, this exercise has to some extent partly left their point of professional origin in a limbo. Consequently it is important to highlight that such bottom-up leadership may require a redefinition of that profession and its operations.

So, concerning leadership legitimacy, the image of the machine being optimized through an antagonistic relationship between 'core running' and 'projects' is closely linked to the cross-administrative set-up, in terms of centralization and formalisation of decision making. For centrally focused stakeholders, this discursive element in the policy and the cross-administrative organisation are legitimate. However, locally focused politicians and residents may not find this positioning legitimate, and the ownership of the policy is mainly to be found amongst the involved stakeholders at the central level.

#### *No turning back now*

Another aspect that relates to the 'same direction' theme is that cross-administrative collaboration is a necessity. A number of interviewees explain the necessity of working cross-administratively by referring to past developments: There was quite plainly a need for improved coordination and leadership concerning the area-based resort in TEA, because they overtook this turf from FA, consequently needed to define how the administration would administer these area-based programs, especially because of the explosion in The Social Comprehensive Plans:

*"I will say, it was the whole experience, both for social housing organisations, administrations and for politicians that there was not sufficient coherence and coordination in what was happening. And neither were there any broad outlines for what kind of landmarks there was present in this type of program. (...) There was a lack of an overall set-up, right? And then TEA decided to establish that working group, initiating the project [The Horizontal Pillar]. (Director, I18, EIA)"*

The quote demonstrates that an aspect that has legitimized the leadership of ND and TEA is an actual demand from the municipal system to create some order and structure in this administrative field.

The quote below points to another source of legitimacy:

*"It is right and necessary, or at least something in that style here is right and necessary, because of course we cannot do anything out in the disadvantaged areas."*

*It is indeed thought-provoking that the vulnerable urban areas, it's social housing urban areas that we are talking about here, it is not a private rental sector, investing in some large area, which has ended in disaster. So we have a shared destiny here which is special (SSA, director, I28)".*

The reason why ND and TEA's project is granted legitimacy in relation to the cross-administrative set-up is that both the municipality and social housing organisations have a need for being able to talk to each other as unified actors; this need to some extent contributes to legitimize the policy and the new governance structure. However, as we saw in the conflict section (7.6) above, this cross-administrative set-up is highly ambivalent for stakeholders to relate to.

Another necessity mentioned is the fear of riots as happened in London 2011. As the interviewee argues, working across administrations is necessary in order for the city 'not to break in two'. And further, that the cross-administrative practice is a clean break with the existing practice six to seven years before (I18). What this comment illustrates is that the policy and the new governance structure are perceived of as legitimate by some involved stakeholders in that the municipality are doing things on a much more qualified capacity level than before.

#### *Innovating governance*

Another aspect of cross-administrative cooperation in relation to legitimacy is that it is perceived of by several respondents as *innovative*: as the capitol, the City of Copenhagen has a duty to be first-mover in finding solutions to the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The development of new ways of collaborating is innovative. This cross-administrative development also improves the professional capacity of the civil servants involved, in that they gain knowledge of how isolated phenomena are actually interlinked in the disadvantaged areas. This is also assessed in a positive manner. Professional drive and development are issues that the civil servants in the interviews often mention; likewise, these are considered factors that legitimize both the project and leadership (I20, I23).

#### **7.5.4.2 Summing up**

In this section, I have found four positive assessments of the collaborative innovation project run by ND and its collaborators. These are *walking in the same*

*direction, a consolidated machine, no turning back now, innovating governance and the disadvantaged areas approach.*

Collaborators find it highly relevant to work across administrative boundaries and collaborate with the social housing sector. In this respect, ND's project has become a shared object, in the sense that most respondents agree that collaboration is necessary, and that the governance structure in the City of Copenhagen has problems when it comes to true collaboration, in that most policies continue to be perceived of as sector-bound, despite their cross-administrative intention. And not only in the field of disadvantaged neighbourhoods is this agenda relevant, but also in general, when addressing complex problems such as health and employment. Furthermore, some perceive of the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods as a meta-policy, on which employment and health can be hinged, thus using the policy as a cross-administrative infrastructure.

The image of the municipal governance as a multi-layered initiative machine that is in need of consolidation is also present in some of the interviews: the number of projects needs to be reduced and instead moved closer to the 'limbs' of the core operations. Otherwise municipal governance will remain unfocused, and the project limbs will wither away and die. Projects must be connected to, and clearly demonstrate, how they enhance the core operations of the municipality. This image is what underpins the 'Mercedes sign' in the final policy, as I have described in the Entrepreneurship section. However, collaborators also reflect on the possible consequences of using what I call the 'consolidated machine', rhetoric of 'coordination', 'core operations', and 'central strategies'. The rhetoric might cause difficulties for local politicians and citizens in them taking ownership of the policy because it does not generate emotions.

Collaborators also find that in the field of disadvantaged areas and neighbourhoods, there is no turning back. The municipality has a shared destiny with the social housing sector, in that most of the disadvantaged areas consist of social housing dwellings. Thus, Intra-Municipal Governance and the policy are necessary in order to define the future role for this shared destiny. If the municipality and the social housing sector do not succeed in making progress in the disadvantaged areas, the problems is in risk of escalating, with unforeseen consequences.

Finally, some respondents perceive the collaborative endeavours positively and as a sign of innovation: that the municipality is innovating its way of collaborating between administrations; and that the municipality is actually 'a first mover' in dealing with the complex problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

### 7.5.4.3 Leadership assessments: ND and TEA as the driving force

In the section above, I have analysed what sources of legitimacy that conditions the way that stakeholders relate themselves to TEA's innovation project. In this section, I will turn to how ND/TEA's leadership is assessed. An assumption of the BUCIL model is that bottom-up leadership may lead to either that leadership may be distributed, or a consolidated leadership in the lead organisation in which the entrepreneurial unit is located. In this section, I will explore who is perceived of as leader, and the sources of legitimacy that supports this leadership.

#### *ND as the driving force*

It is strikingly clear all interviewees perceive ND and TEA as the driving forces of the process. This is reflected in the quote below:

*"I: If such a policy is to be successful in the long run, should TEA maintain pressure on all levels, or?"*

*R. a.: Yes, there is no doubt about it. There is no doubt about it. They are the only ones who can do it. A policy such as this one here will not result in anything without a ferocious information pressure.*

*I. a: Constantly and all the time?*

*R. a: Constantly and all the time. I am absolutely sure about that (HCA, special consultant, I16)*

What the quote demonstrates is that the policy, despite being cross-administrative, is perceived of as being the responsibility of TEA. This is also reflected below:

*"This is a large bureaucracy, and it can result in something good ...But there is a need for creating momentum ... so they [TEA] must for God's sake not breathe a sigh of relief over there, from my perspective. It is okay to take a breathing pause, but it is now they must ensure that it keeps going, ... and here I speak from my own experience with this system about how difficult it can be to keep the pot boiling – exactly to get the small things made up in such a way that people can do things a little bit differently, to get the necessary partial agreements made, to supplement small bits to budgets that enables you to make a difference ...to nurse those stakeholders that now believe that they've been heard, but who now are beginning to think that nothing is changing" (EIA, manager, I22)*

In this quote it is perceived of as a sole responsibility of ND and TEA to keep the other administrations engaged. The quote also illustrates that this engagement requires much labour from TEA and that this task is not perceived of as a collaborative task.

Obviously, the expectation that TEA and ND are supposed to lead grants the leadership in TEA some legitimacy, in that the project now is a part of the usual business in the City of Copenhagen. However, the transversal and cross-bar element of the policy has not resulted in a distribution of leadership, nor did any interviewees mention an ambition to take on some of the leadership. Accordingly ND and TEA are isolated as the driving force of the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods.

*Avoiding conflicts by using a by-the-book leadership style: servicing, advocating, acknowledging, facilitating and creating a shared identity*

Another aspect that grants ND legitimacy is a by-the-book leadership style. During the four meetings that I participated in, I was able to see leadership enacted. ND took on the role of the by-the-book leader, making several positional moves that reduced the level of conflict. First of all, the ND consultant took on the role of providing service to the other administrations, making things as easy as possible for them. As I demonstrated in my description of the meetings, if criticism of The Technical and Environmental Administration or the project was voiced, the ND consultant would take on the position as the responsible party. If something was unclear, especially concerning mandate, the ND consultant provided the group with strategic knowledge and repeated the formal mandate to group members; the ND consultant also invited the project owner, the director of the Centre for City Design, to make a presentation about how he viewed the policy, and how he would suggest that the group could relate the policy to The Copenhagen Tale or the Governance Dialogue. The ND consultant also urged The Finance Administration member to give a presentation of the results from the Cross-Municipal Steering Committee meeting recently held, providing the group with information about what the '7 director' wants; and he gave The Finance Administration member the task of presenting 'The Copenhagen Tale'. The ND consultant also brought in skilled, locally working people in area-based programs, boosting the members' knowledge concerning problems in the neighbourhoods and shortcomings of existing practice. The ND consultant was also very clear about acknowledging the other members' expertise, for example saying "we [in TEA] have to be better when making area boundaries, so that the Children and Youth Administration has their viewpoints represented beforehand" (policy meeting, I11 part 1). Additionally, the ND

consultant and the FA alliance took on advocacy for members present, such as “we have to make sure that with respect to SSA your needs have been met”(policy meeting, I13, part 1). Another type of leadership behaviour was to facilitate interaction and knowledge by making a Christmas card exercise, in which each member wrote his/hers vision of a good neighbourhood. Finally, the ND consultant also took actions providing direction for the group by creating a shared identity, for example stating “we’re in this mess together, we have to make the policy” or “we have to give the steering committee the numbers they want” or introducing a them/us division of labour: “it is not up to us to make the decisions; that is up to the politicians”. This ‘we’ and ‘us’ positioning is in contrast to some group members, who consider ‘we’ to refer to the administration they represent.

ND was not alone in exercising leadership. The Finance Administration member, representing the most powerful administration of the Lord Mayor, also took on a supportive leadership role, especially concerning advocacy for SSA, as well as providing valuable strategic knowledge, for example on the ‘talk’ of the Lord Mayor, and concerning The Finance Administration’s strategies that might be in conflict with the policy that the team were developing. The FA member also discussed whether the term ‘Development Plan’ for targeting the ‘Yellow Clouds’ was an appropriate term, in that city development and master-planning is considered The Finance Administration’s turf, and stated that it might confuse and tire politicians, if yet another type of ‘plan’ was to be made. Furthermore, when a ND representative, (very keen on the idea of local innovation) presented a policy draft full of innovation paragraphs, The Finance Administration member acknowledged the draft, but also remarked that *‘the Lord Mayor is very tired of new funny projects, he has made that very clear’*. This knowledge gave the group direction and helped them to develop the policy.

In overall, the leadership of ND is unchallenged and accepted, ND positioning itself not as a hierarchical leader, nor a substantive leader of an already defined project, as was the case in The Evaluation Team.

### *Broader and more inclusive*

Another aspect that serves to legitimize the policy and the new organisation is that both process and output is perceived as broad and inclusive (I16, I25, I17) - even though a respondent also categorizes it as ‘top-down’ and having been ‘altered in the 11th hour’, i.e. a subtle critique that ND altered substantive parts of the policy at the end of the process. Despite this, some ownership across administrations is demonstrated in the interviews. This relates to the leadership position of ND, but it also relates to the policy as a product. Both contributing to the substance of the

policy, being heard, as well as ND's boldness to, late in the process, involve members of The Policy Formulation Team once again asking what 'problem' needs to be solved. These are all aspects that legitimise the project and the leadership.

#### **7.5.4.4 Summing up**

I would have expected from the interviews that some respondents would state that different actors would or should take leadership, or at least participate in running the process. Surprisingly unanimous, however, all respondents state that ND and The Technical and Environmental Administration are the main driving force for the process in the future. This is also a surprise when considering the fact that the analysis above has shown that some interviewees find ND and The Technical and Environmental Administration's political project legitimate. To some extent, this finding reflects that collaborators in this case may approve of the project, and even may see some strategic advantages in it, but it is not their task to run the project. This is an important finding in this section, because it gives us an idea of the challenges that other BUCIL processes might come across despite.

Another important finding is the respondents' difficulties in actually describing and assessing the leadership – they have few directly critical remarks concerning leadership abilities. Furthermore, the interviewees actually have no vocabulary for describing the type of leadership. The leadership of ND and The Technical and Environmental Administration was overall assessed as uncontroversial. The few conflicts concerning ND's project and their leadership behaviour have been analysed in the 'Conflict' section. This uncontroversial nature is in stark contrast to their collaborative innovation project. And it is also in stark contrast to The Evaluation Case. No matter whether the interviewees are being strategically polite or not, or whether the interviewees are unfamiliar with assessing (this type of) leadership, what this tells us is that ND's leadership at this point has been recognised *as* a regular leadership in this specific context.

In The Policy Formulation meetings, most conflicts are actually avoided by a by-the-book leadership style. Here, ND has a leadership style that is effective in avoiding collaborative conflicts. ND and the ND consultant position themselves as leaders with a keen eye for the needs of the group, by servicing the members, advocating for members, acknowledging the members' need and professionalism, facilitating interaction and attempting to create a shared identity amongst members.



## 7.6.5.LEADERSHIP IDENTITY

In the previous sections I have analysed what kind of a landscape that ND as a leader is conditioned by in its attempts to introduce new concepts, exercising influence in terms of making and giving sense. Points of conflicts and sources of legitimacy point to possibilities for leadership positioning, as well as what the possible future consequences these positioning possibilities will have for the future trajectory of the innovation process.

As the above sections have demonstrated, many positionings are possible in the landscape of conflict points and sources of legitimacy. These positionings depend on the choices taken by ND. So how does ND make sense of what is going on, and who they are?

The following markers of identity stand strong in the interviews:

- Moving from development unit to strategy unit
- Creating and utilizing windows of opportunity
- The will to lead on the basis of professional insight
- A differentiation of leadership roles
- A bottom-up approach

### 7.5.5.1 Moving from development unit to strategy unit

In the interviews with key people from the ND office, I asked the interviewees to reflect on how they perceived of their own office's leadership, both in relation to The Policy Formulation process and in general, and whether they could express how they perceived their own leadership.

In terms of the general development that the ND office has undergone, perhaps the most striking development is from being an office focused on operations to being a strategic office. In my field work, I noted that the middle manager casually mentioned the following: "*We have developed from being an operation office to a strategy office...I have my secretary, Mary, monitoring all the other political committees...no surprises*". I found this distinction between an operations office and a strategic office central in order to describe the positional development before the Pillar to the office's leadership position at the time of interview (2008-2012). And probing into this, I asked the middle manager to reflect on this earlier statement. The response given was that this development has altered the status of ND from being a central service facility for area-based programs to being an office that develops strategies for disadvantaged areas, which has required a new role in relation to the

area-based programs. Now, the main objective is not the neighbourhood plans of the Area Lifts, but 'Policy For Disadvantaged Areas', to which the programs have to adjust:

*"It [that identity change] is very significant indeed, I must say. Concretely, you could say that it is something our own projects, that is, the area renewals, really have difficulties in understanding. Because ... and that may say little about the development, that in the past, this office has been an office which supported, serviced, enhanced concrete projects. Firstly, area renewal and subsequently also the Comprehensive Plans. So what we are doing today is much more policy and strategy development. And today, we would not be seen as an office for area-based interventions, we would be seen as an office for disadvantaged areas, right?"*

*(...)Our mission is to continue having a point of departure in the specific area based projects, but being able to use them for something more. So today we're still there when a neighbourhood plan in an area renewal is created. But then we will constantly hinge it on the nine goals in the Policy. (...) Today, I know much more about the strategies, policies, politicians, and when something comes up in a committee, e.g. what would they be interested in, or what we can use the Think Tank for Integration for, etc. (I15)*

As a consequence, the roles of ND has changed in relation to the area-based programs of 'Area Lift' and the Comprehensive Plans, and the roles of the area-based programs have changed, in that before, the success criteria was an approved Neighbourhood Plan for an Area Lift program. Now, the programs have to see themselves as supporters of a policy with fixed goals. In terms of the development in leadership, the focus is not to support citizen involvement or bottom-up processes in the neighbourhoods. Instead, the policy is a central means for improving the work locally. As such, we also see that instead of a self-perception of a development unit, in the future, strategic skills and a stable, visible, collaborative profile is necessary in order to make the policy valuable at the local level. In order to do so, ND has to have a stable and reliable actor profile. The image of 'products on the shelves' [in Danish: 'varer på hylderne] stands strong in this narrative: what is it that collaborators can expect of ND? This needs to be very clear. As the middle manager notes: *"I do not see the policy as something involving citizens (...) It's the opposite. As something that is about first of all 'now we have to figure out how we cooperate well together', and second, how is it that we, I mean, what are the exact products on our shelves? (I15)"*

Furthermore, the middle manager also reflects on the future shift in roles, because until then, ND had been a development unit. If the future challenge is less development and more steady deliverables, then it may be a challenge for the ND

office and the leadership involved because the ND employees enjoy being a development unit (I15).

A further characteristic of ND's leadership is that the main leadership still is to be found in ND and in their mayor – this alliance has to keep pushing forward their agenda, especially at the political level. Supportive factors are the new organisation, in which the social housing sector has a major interest in maintaining the political dialogue with the City of Copenhagen (I15).

A final overall challenge for ND's leadership is the constant uncertainty concerning resources. ND has been asked several times how many man hours it will take to make the so called 'Development Plans', the key instrument in Policy for Disadvantaged Areas. An explanation for this inability to accept uncertainty is given by the middle manager in ND: *"the less people understand of the change project you are doing, the higher the formal demands"* (I15). Instead, the Development Plan is supposed to be a facilitated process, in which the different administrations can provide feedback concerning the needs of specific areas. So, ND constantly has to reply that the content of the Development Plans is up to the locally working professionals and managers; ND mainly provides the frame for the process. Being able to handle these formal demands can be a challenge for a development unit. Thus, what we see here is a continuation of the facilitative, coordinative role, coupled with an understanding of the project as a development project. However, in terms of the focus on the strategic dimension, we also see a greater awareness of the need for closure regarding development identification, and more focus on implementing and utilizing what has already been produced.

Another aspect of leadership in the ND office is, according to the middle manager, establishing channels for communication between the middle manager in ND and other stakeholders. A precondition is to trust the work of the employees in the office, and 'sometimes give them room for failing' (middle manager, ND). Thus, the role is to translate the 'considerations' made at the professional level, in such a way that people higher up the hierarchical ladder, including the politicians, are able to see its necessity. As the middle manager figuratively describes it, *'the product has had to be sold several times in the process, despite the fact that we didn't have the product on our shelves. But I have trusted that they would in time make the product, so (I15)...*' A part of this translation process of a leader is also to be able to explain the necessity of the project, why it needs to be developed, and why it was not there beforehand. This is necessary in order for The Technical and Environmental Administration directors to convince the board of directors of the other administrations to make room for development amongst their own civil servants; also to encourage politicians to see that the project is 'a winning case' for them. All of these different layers of leadership and stakeholders have to be coupled by the middle manager in ND:

*“So there are at least a whole lot of levels which will be connected, I think, when I look back at the process, through my course of leadership. And my leadership has also been about that I have been able to sell the case to my management board, in such a way that they have given me enough leadership space to work with it” (middle manager, ND, I15).*

The image of the policy as something that couples different municipal resources stands strong.

A precondition for exercising this leadership is also the personal intention to develop a professional area, and having visions for it. The middle manager describes a distinction between her type of leadership and a less developed leadership style: *‘whether you are focused on managing your resort and the working procedures, doing what you must, or whether you also push an agenda forward, taking the lead. And my aim has very specifically been saying, ‘well, we are the biggest municipality with the most areas on that famous ghetto list, and we...we have many administrations and a lot of money and a lot of other different stuff, so we must, you know, be an example, right?’*

What this quote also tells us is that an important part of the ND identity has been the identity of a developer and a first mover in a national context.

Another identity mark of the ND leadership is what I will call the will to lead. At the time, there was a great awareness amongst the three interviewed ND members that ND is a leading unit. This identification stands stronger than in The Evaluation Case. The leader also acknowledges that she has been of the driving forces; otherwise the project would not have been pushed forward at all. In order to do so, a genuine desire to develop this professional area must be present.

In relation to running the process, the resource demands of the employees have been huge. The mission in the office has been to carry everything through themselves, avoiding giving ultimatums:

*“Well, the process has been fuelled by the fact that people have been dedicated to it, you might say. And that has also included weekends and evenings and at-odd times. And it has also demanded an incredible willingness from my staff and myself to say, well, we personally take care [in Danish: ‘håndbærer’] of everything that is in need of making its way through the municipal system (...) It would have been dropped with a bang, if we were to have sat down and said: ‘You have a deadline on Tuesday. If you do not stick to that, well, bam, bam, bam’. So instead it’s been like everything from to jumping on a bike and going off to another local actor and saying ‘just listen and see, and we could do such and such and such’ to going to a*

*director meeting and saying: 'Listen to this here, it's damn important and' ... So we have simply been sending tracks in all directions almost at the same time" (I15 ).*

In order to be bottom-up leader, different tools of power must be applied, which to a high extent is giving sense to others by making numerous contacts, especially to the local level in order to acquire legitimacy.

Despite having come this far, many challenges lie ahead in terms of strategic decisions. Especially concerning whether or not the other administrations will support the policy aims financially in the future budget negotiations.

And also, whether ND can maintain support from the top management and top politicians. This seems to be a vital support in order to keep running the process from the bottom of The Technical and Environmental Administration. In the example given, the new director for the Urban Design Department was not fond of the idea in the policy concerning 'preferential treatment', and wanted this element to disappear from the policy. However, having just talked to two mayors about it, including The Technical and Environmental Administration's own, the ND manager succeeded in maintaining the 'preferential treatment' ambition in the policy. This, and other examples, demonstrates the importance of constant alliances with the top management in order to maintain support for the policy, and the vulnerability of the policy project. As the middle manager from ND noted, hard work and luck are also involved to maintain this support, due to the high number of policies in ND's own administration: *"It is also about luck ... The Technical and Environmental Administration has... [a great number of policies and strategies]. So you really have to fight in order to keep, you know, attention...."*

What the quote demonstrates is how much bottom-up leadership is dependent upon the constant making of alliances and influencing collaborators; otherwise this bottom-up leadership is vulnerable to turnarounds and new strategies in the hierarchical leadership.

#### **7.5.5.2 Creating and utilizing windows of opportunity**

In the interviews with key people in ND and the former director of the Urban Design Department, I asked about critical events during the innovation journey. There is agreement concerning these critical events:

- The importance of the former director leaving his position, allowing ND to get in contact with the two highest ranking directors in the administration

- The importance of using the alliance, especially with one of the directors, to alter the scope of the policy
- The importance of making the first meetings in the board of mayors meaningful to the mayors
- The importance of making a successful alliance with the Finance Administration

Taking action in these events, combined with the ability of making and giving sense around these events, has allowed ND/TEA to evolve from a coordinator of a 'toolbox of what works' policy to being a coordinator of a full-blown meta-policy. This meta-policy potentially involves being a meaningful framework for how welfare service delivery and sector policies for a third of the population of the City of Copenhagen are supposed to transform disadvantaged neighbourhoods into areas which on certain scores is on average with the rest of the city. As I described elsewhere, this is one of ND's cross-roads of leadership: whether the policy should be a subordinate policy supporting already existing policies; or whether the policy should be a superior policy that is a cross-sectorial framework for other sector-related policies. This is a cross-road concerning leadership recognition, meaning that opting for a less ambitious policy would not have required ND to acquire another type of recognition, because the role of the developing coordinator in the phase of The Evaluation Case would have suited a subordinate policy, whose main focus would remain the area-based programs. However, as we have seen above, making powerful alliances with top management enabled ND to make a much more ambitious meta-policy, but it has also required ND to alter their identity in order to acquire recognition, which their manager terms 'strategic'.

#### *The will to lead on the basis of professional insight*

The interviewees in ND give different descriptions concerning their leadership. But a red thread in explaining how they made it this far is the combination of two elements: a will to lead and to develop a solid professional foundation. One of the interviewees refers to one of the director interviews made in parallel with policy formulation meetings. This interview has been an inspiration in terms of understanding the power available in the municipality - the agenda setting power:

*“R: I think, kind of like he said [the director] when we went there to interview him, that there is not much available power in the structure here in this municipality and someone must take responsibility and emphasize substantive matters. And that if you show leadership, then you will also to a high extent get support (...) intuitively, we*

*were well aware that this here was network-based management, and network management is about everyone having the right of veto in this structure. Everyone has the right of veto, but people only participate in this as long as they can see there is something in it for them, and what we then have done is that we have allied ourselves greatly with the top management (I19). “*

Both the statement concerning ND's role and the reference to the conversation are important, in that they demonstrate that the awareness of ND's own position also rests on the many conversations and conflicts with stakeholders and people involved. Thus, the relationship is not only ND giving sense, but also ND being part of a collaborative sensemaking process, in which ND picks up pieces of meaning as they move forward – especially concerning their own role. We also see this when an ND member reflected on the conversations in the policy group, and subsequently decided to try to alter the scope of the policy in a way that matched the direction of the collaborative conversations. The quote further demonstrates an important finding: that abstract concepts, in this case ‘networked leadership’, provided to the interviewee in a leadership training program, is essential for ND as an office to making sense of their own project – similarly to The Evaluation Case, in which abstract concepts such as a ‘systemic’ perspective on evaluation and the ‘strategy template’ provided ND members with new ways of understanding the municipality and ND's project. Finally, the quote demonstrates that the agenda setting power in terms of demonstrating leadership can provide momentum for an emergent leader. This is an interesting finding, especially in a complex organized municipality as the City of Copenhagen, in that it to some extent challenges the image of public sector bureaucracies as factors that themselves inhibit the creation of new solutions. What the quote reflects is that the agenda setting power, or what I call the direction of sensemaking by means of the BUCIL model, is the type of power that can influence stakeholders, despite bureaucratic constraints. The quote thus also points to the fact that demonstrating leadership is indeed in itself a positional act that can generate recognition under specific circumstances.

In describing the alteration of the policy mandate from a small to a large mandate, an interviewee explains that:

*“it was a time of change. Sam [ND civil servant] suddenly started talking about whether we shouldn't give the policy another name, because we always ended up talking about the [city] areas [when discussing the policy](...) so we simply postulated this professional necessity (...) we produced a PowerPoint for the board of mayors, and no one questioned the change.... Again, it is about taking leadership” (I19).*

What the quote tells us is that when this ND employee describes how it was possible to exercise this profession-based leadership, a relation is made between sensemaking, network based alliances and the direction of sensemaking, justified by a professional claim. In terms of leadership, the decision to make this move was an act of leadership.

What is also present in the ND perceptions of their own leadership is the conception of it as bottom-up leadership. Despite that leadership is exercised on many different levels, the project is something that ND has been developing, and has *'pushed through the system and created support for and made alliances around (...)* Leadership happens on many different levels (...) *But I see this project as leadership from the bottom and up (...)* it's the same kind of network management that I have always talked about "(ND consultant, I19).

Another reflection in ND in the quote below is that they have an ability to describe their role in a leadership context – that it is leadership from the 'middle' that is the driving force of development:

*"It is the administrative officer level, the level of CUT, it is, in fact here that the driving force is. And they are the ones who create organisational development up and down and they also have relationships to the projects. So it's really in there that it's going on. So it can be said from the managerial point of view that it is us who influence our leaders ... But it is not something that comes from the Heavens ... because they [the area-based programs] have had that character... It is the area-based interventions and Comprehensive Plans (...) It is, after all, down in that engine room that things have been formulated and posted up and down in the system". (ND, civil servant, I21)*

In the quote, we see again that the inspiration from the area-based programs has worked as a platform for initiating change, and that has influenced the leaders in the municipality. Despite the fact that ND's identity is moving towards being more strategic, there still is a strong identity in the office concerning development, as the quote below demonstrates:

*"It is such that when the Policy [for Disadvantaged Areas] is formulated, it is half-solved. It should of course generate the natural 'what's next'. And that is what we have achieved... to get that. And so you might say that we do not know the answer to that yet.(...)But it is also a huge advantage – exactly that a direction and a point of view are created, but that no final solutions are created." (I21).*



This quote is important for several reasons. First of all, we see an ND member reflect on some of the point of conflicts that the existing governance and policy set-up has produced concerning the collaborative governance structure and its hugeness, as well as the problem with the lack of ownership due to the administrative centralistic top-down character in the policy (see above). Quite important in the quote is that the collaborative difficulties of grasping what the innovation project is about can also be perceived of as an advantage, in that the uncertain horizon of the journey and the institutional uncertainty create a demand for more answers, which may allow ND to continue the project and thus produce these answers. The ambivalent consequences of this way of exercising influence become clear in that an increasing number of actors are demanding answers, but if these are not met quickly, strategic support may wither away. Moreover the quote reflects that the bottom-up leader in this case is in need of an increasing number of staff to satisfy the demands of the collaborators by giving sense and explaining the purpose of collaborative enterprise to them.

#### *A differentiation of leadership roles*

An important finding is an explicit *internal division of labour concerning leadership aspects*. The three interviewees were also the people who were mostly engaged and visible in running and defining the process at the ND office throughout the period from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. But in contrast to The Evaluation Case, they now seem to have their own leadership role to play almost without overlap.

The special consultant running the process formulation meetings did so more or less alone, deciding who to make alliances with in parallel to The Policy Formulation process, etc. The role of this special consultant has thus been mainly pro-active in a leadership related way, building networks strategically. The area in which this leadership is exercised is in The Policy Formulation Team; but equally important also in informal, bilateral settings, such as meeting face-to-face with important stakeholders (CEO's and special consultants), negotiating the wordings and goals in the policy. This special consultant is in contact with the area-based professionals at the ND office. The consultant is having routine tasks as well, playing here an informal leadership role in the office, but from the perspective of what is strategically and politically achievable.

The middle manager has moved away from the profession-based, entrepreneurial substance, and consequently has a more formal leadership role, exercising leadership in formal settings, while having an overview of all ND activities and employees. In relation to the policy, she has an explicit formal position comprising tasks such as making presentations in steering committees and for the social housing organisations, approaching the new mayor and a director from The Technical and Environmental Administration, and making the tough decisions on which way to go

concerning how to manage leadership dilemmas. Therefore she fills out the leadership vacuum of the former director of the Urban Design Department, and has a 'championing role' (Van de Ven, 1999). This director functions as a channel for the work produced by her employees, and has the final responsibility of handling the fundamental leadership dilemmas. Finally, this leader also defines the leadership position of the ND office to a great extent, for instance when reiterating the ND identity as a 'strategy' office.

The civil servant also engaged as a member, and not as a project leader, in The Evaluation Team and in The Policy Formulation Team describes his own leadership as a 'narrative' type of leadership:

*"R: I have had a tremendous influence and very little responsibility. (laughing)*

*In: Well that sounds nice*

*R: I am good at having an overview and I get good ideas, coupling them to traditional ideas in a transversal way. So it has very much been my role to draw lessons from elsewhere and illuminate them using storytelling and it has largely been...*

*I: is that a leadership role?*

*R: it's more of a.. There is some professional development and professional leadership in it, but at all times I work relatively consciously at not sitting at the head of the table very often. I do so in periods but I withdraw whenever possible - partly because young people have a career where they'd like to go out and show leadership and responsibility, and partly because my skills are to float on top of systems and connect things together and draw attention to potentials."(I21)*

This civil servant is very much engaged in sensemaking, the direction of sensemaking, entrepreneurial activities, and he often gives presentations in professional settings such as visiting other professionals in Sweden (Field notes 2010-09-06) and telling about the project (Field notes 2010-09-06). He reflected mostly on The Policy Formulation process, thus fostering the idea that maybe the policy should not be focused on the area-based programs, but on the city districts themselves. He also plays an informal leadership role in the ND office, especially concerning explaining substance of the innovation project to new employees, and what to expect in the future (I21).

So, another important finding is the specialised development of leadership in all three key persons at the ND office. The middle manager moves towards a more formalized, strategic and professional leadership role, exercising leadership in

formal arenas, leading all activities at the ND office, and making the tough decisions, such as deciding when to finish The Policy Formulation process. She is largely supported by both the strategically networking consultant and the entrepreneurial sensemaking civil servant. The special consultant defines his role by means of concepts attained in a leadership training program, the main word being 'network management' and 'change management'. The civil servant with keen skills in entrepreneurship and sensemaking defines his role as a 'narrative' leadership, contributing to keeping the growing ND office together by explaining what the project, and the last three to four, has been about. This development is not only an individual related specialization, it is also an *actor* related specialization. The ND office now formally has the responsibility for a policy process and its implementation. For this reason each member of the office is perceived of as a leader in all engagements with other actors, and is required to take the lead in each and every instance.

### 7.5.5.3 Summing up

With regard to ND's perception of their own leadership, I have demonstrated three types of findings. The first important finding is an explicit *internal division of labour concerning leadership aspects*, which was not present in The Evaluation Case. The three interviewees were also the people who were mostly engaged and visible in running and defining the process at the ND office throughout the period from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. But in contrast to The Evaluation Case, they each had their own leadership role to play almost without overlap. Thus, another important finding is the specialised development of leadership in all three key persons in the ND office. The middle manager moves towards a more formalized, strategic and professional leadership role, exercising leadership in formal arenas, leading all activities at the ND office, and making the tough decisions, such as deciding when to finish The Policy Formulation process. She is largely supported by both the strategically networking consultant and the entrepreneurial sensemaking civil servant. The special consultant defines his role by means of concepts attained in a leadership training program, the main word being 'network management' and 'change management'. The civil servant with keen skills in entrepreneurship and sensemaking defines his role as a 'narrative' leadership, contributing to keeping the growing ND office together by explaining what the project, and the last three to four years, has been about. This development is not only an individual related specialization, it is also an *actor* related specialization. The ND office now formally has the responsibility for a policy process and its implementation. Consequently each member of the office is perceived of as a leader in all engagements with other actors, and is required to take the lead in each and every instance. A change in leadership can be detected when ND begins to realise that the policy could be a meta-policy. Entrepreneurship is displayed in terms of utilizing 'windows of opportunities', combined with the ability to give sense, produces crucial key events,

such as the importance of the former director leaving his position; using an alliance with one of the directors to alter the scope of the policy; making the first meetings in the Forum of Mayors meaningful; making a successful alliance with the Finance Administration

Thus, this leadership related type of proactivity denotes an important shift in how concepts are produced: the concepts are still based on professional insights, as in The Evaluation Case, but are to a greater extent modified and negotiated in bilateral meetings with ND's powerful allies, such as ND's directors and The Finance Administration.

The second important finding is that ND perceives the motivation behind their leadership to be the will to lead and develop on a professional basis. The interviewees describe their type of leadership as bottom-up leadership, in which it has been important to allow development of ND staff, and in which ND staff are running the process. ND perceives their leadership as having the agenda setting power, based on demonstrating the will to take the lead in the professional field. This is an understanding produced in conversations with a director, who emphasized the fact that ND does not only give sense, they are also forced to make sense of what they are doing, and picking up pieces of meaningful statements while running process.

In terms of leadership positioning, a third important finding is that ND perceives itself as having developed from an operations office, servicing the Area Lift programs, to a strategy and policy office. In relation to this new role, we also see that instead of a self-perception of a development unit, in the future, strategic skills and a stable, visible, collaborative profile is necessary in order to make the policy valuable at the local level. In order to do so, ND has to have a stable and reliable actor profile, in which ND needs recognizable products on its shelves. Furthermore, a vital ND understanding of itself and its leadership is that they, backed up by the Pillar-report, always have been sure of which direction to go, while not having all the answers on how to get there. They have thus managed to have half of the answers, thereby creating a collaborative need for more answers. Thus, a more diverse self-perception of leadership is visible in ND. They are strategic in order to maintain support for the policy and acquire resources for the Development Plans in the future budget negotiations, and they constantly maintain alliances by means of networking. The facilitative role is necessary when trying both developing and implementing the policy at the local level, while involving local managers in qualifying the Development Plans.

## **7.6 MAKING AND GIVING SENSE**

In the sections above, I have demonstrated that different types of uncertainty dominate The Policy Formulation process. I have demonstrated how entrepreneurship deals with some of these uncertainties by making new combinations and introducing novel concepts. Also, I have demonstrated that introducing these new concepts produce a landscape of possible leadership positioning that provoke identity changes in ND.

In the BUCIL model, I assume that uncertainty creates the possibility for influencing collaborators by giving sense. In this section, I will demonstrate this directing of sensemaking in terms of describing the reception of the concepts introduced.

In the extensive analysis above, sensemaking has already been described in terms of entrepreneurship, in which ND breaks the substantive uncertainty by introducing certain concepts; and also in terms of the sources of leadership legitimacy. These points will be only briefly mentioned in this final part of the analysis where I will analyse the approved policy paper and document the influence of ND. Secondly, I will exemplify the resistance to the influence that ND tries to exercise through its leadership; and I will exemplify how ND exercises this giving sense through numerous conversations with stakeholders. In this section, I will also analyse and reflect across the analytical sections above in order to demonstrate the direction of sensemaking.

### **7.7.1.RESISTANCE TO SENSEMAKING: BYSTANDER EFFECTS, LESS INNOVATION, NO LOCAL DECISION MAKING**

#### **7.6.1.1 The extent of making and giving sense: advocacy and bystander effects**

The interviewees from The Policy Formulation Team and CUT are the most positive towards the policy. They can see the value of the project, they find it exciting and professionally relevant, also for their own administrations, and they seem to be proud of it. Managers and directors from administrations other than The Technical and Environmental Administration usually use a more modest vocabulary, describing the project along the storyline of ‘something that had to be done’; ‘let’s see what we can do with it’; ‘it is cumbersome work to some extent’; ‘the future challenges are many’; ‘perhaps the project is too big’ etc. This difference is perhaps not surprising: the professionals focus on professional issues and development possibilities, while the managers and directors focus on the strategic challenges that lie ahead. In this respect, the limitations to the extent of exercising influence by

means of sensemaking is that the project may be based on the right premises, but it is still uncertain whether it will produce value - this remains to be demonstrated. The project needs a stable leadership, and it is still uncertain whether the other the administrations will continue to support the policy in the budget negotiations – this is one of the most important signs of whether or not the project is accepted and approved. Also, the project needs to be more specific. In this respect, the members of The Policy Formulation Team and CUT in some instances take on the role of advocacy, whereas this is more limited in the interviews with managers and directors from other administrations – they rather take on the role of the bystander. They find the project necessary, but they do not champion the project, at least not in the interviews. In general, two of the directors who were willing to participate in the interviews see the project as part of an overall capacity building project in the City of Copenhagen ; as a test and a development of the ability to cooperate across silos. In this respect, the cross-administrative part of the project is widely accepted across most interviews, as demonstrated in section 7.6.3.

#### **7.6.1.2 No local decision making**

In general ND's sensemaking has not, as I have argued elsewhere, resulted in a leadership distribution. Across all interviews, the conclusion is that ND and TEA are those who should lead and run the process. Hence the remaining administrations, at least in terms of the strategic layers of directors, take on the role of the bystander. This could be perceived as a limitation of the direction of sensemaking by ND. Another limitation to sensemaking was ND's ambition concerning how the Development Plans for The Yellow Clouds should be managed. ND had the idea that the natural official stakeholders and leaders in the area should have decision making authority themselves. For as demonstrated in section 7.6 concerning leadership conflicts, the fear of too much coordination at the level of locally working officials has been a persistent critique all the way from the phase of The Evaluation Case and throughout the phase of policy formulation. As we also saw in that section, ND's ambition to make the natural leaders the decision makers would have made their leadership more consistent in terms of countering the critique of generating extra layer of organisations. And it would perhaps also have struck a better balance between bottom-up and top-down, allowing some layers of politicians and other stakeholders to be involved in the policy by proposing specific projects. However, things turned out differently. As we saw in one of the interviews with one of the directors from EIA, the micro-discourse that ND has been mobilizing could not align the image of the consolidated machine with more bottom-up processes (see section 7.5.1.2).

In the quote below, I asked the ND consultant about the outcome of the Development Plans:

*“R: Hm hm, why did it turn out that way? It was, of course, because ...I think it makes the most sense if there are some overarching objectives. If you are going to make a policy for such an urban area, then it's natural that it is a political priority of what we'd like to do with those areas. In other words, it gives the sense that there are some overarching objectives that politicians can nod to and which they think they can make theirs. When you're talking about why the local management network didn't get more influence on the process itself, and perhaps involved in the project, then it was because that the ones in the executive boards didn't want anymore, they would prefer not to disturb the hierarchical structure. So it was vetoed to give them power locally” (I19).*

The quote reflects that the main ambition of ND's project from The Horizontal Pillar was to have the political level more engaged. On the other hand, as I mentioned above, it also made sense to give the local management networks the decision making power. In between these two choices, the cross-municipal steering committee, i.e. the directors, decided that the goals should be political and centrally fixed. The quote illustrates the leadership dilemmas that ND is facing during the innovation process in a clear way. It becomes impossible to produce an innovation project which can contain both a bottom-up and top-down position at the same time.

### **7.6.1.3 A reduced focus on innovation**

Similar to the local decision making, another element that did not become as powerful as ND hoped was the local innovation part. As I have already demonstrated ND met resistance concerning the strong focus on local innovation at the beginning of The Policy Formulation process.

As it turned out, innovation is not mentioned anywhere in the final policy. Instead the rhetoric of the 'municipal operations', 'coordination' and 'synergy' stands strong (p. 11). This is in contrast with some of the earlier drafts of the policy (edition 2011-02-13). Here, one of the main headlines of the policy content is 'Innovation, testing and development' (p. 7). My interpretation of this draft demonstrates that the innovation angle, much in alignment with the contextualised, area-based approach, was part of the original ND intentions. However, the outcome of the innovation angle in the policy was similar to that of the local decision making power: it could not be contained within the micro-discourse introduced by ND, as this was at odds with the governance structure developed and sanctioned by the steering committee.

### **7.7.2.SUMMING UP**

As discovered during my fieldwork, ND did not succeed with some vital types of discursive actions. Especially two are worth noting, since these also have consequences for the future of ND's collaborative innovation project based on the area-based approach as well for the recognition of their leadership.

First of all, ND's attempt to make 'local innovation' part of the policy did not win the discursive conflict against the social constructed object of 'the municipal core operation'. The latter discourse draws on the discourse of 'system optimization' and 'coordination', two main facets of the Pillar Project.

As demonstrated in The Evaluation Case, this conflict was actually perceived by one of the ND civil servants as producing a leadership dilemma. To some extent, this is ironic, in that ND was very successful in mobilizing support for this system optimization discourse.

Secondly, ND also sought to distribute leadership amongst administrations by arguing that the management and development of the Development Plans should rest on the local managers with most stakes in the specific city area. Most likely, this would have had the consequence that the locally working professionals and directors from the other administrations would be left to develop the Development Plans, and the local parties would have to develop on their own, while at the same time having to contribute to the overall goals of the policy. In that case the fear and oppositional sensemaking displayed in both embedded cases of 'extra layer organisation', 'mega plan' and 'too many coordinators' would to some extent have been acknowledged. However, this attempt was also unsuccessful.

All in all, success and failure in specific areas provide the policy and the total innovation project with some specific strengths and weaknesses.

### **7.7.3.THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE INTRODUCED CONCEPTS**

ND has to a great extent been able to give sense in The Policy Formulation process. One way to demonstrate this is to backtrack from the final policy to The Policy Formulation process nearly a year earlier. Both in terms of the discursive content of the policy and how the policy is supposed to be implemented. If we look at the final product of the policy, "Politik for Udsatte Byområder"<sup>xliii</sup>, or the English version "Policy for Disadvantaged Areas of Copenhagen"<sup>xliiii</sup>, key terms for problem-solving are (p. 5):



- “Binding partnerships with everyone involved”
- “Preferential treatment of disadvantaged areas”
- “Increased focus on what works: unified core operations”

The first quote reflects the Governance Dialogue set-up. The second that these areas will receive preferential treatment, which was one of the main efforts of the ND office, who had the idea that the services provided in the disadvantaged areas were of lower quality than in other parts of the city. Likewise, the focus on ‘*unified* core operations’ (my emphasis) reflects first of all the ‘strengthening of the transversal cooperation’ identity marker of the ND office, as demonstrated in The Evaluation Case. Secondly, ‘unified *core operations*’ (my emphasis) reflects the ‘system optimization/coordination’ discourse promoted by ‘The Horizontal Pillar’ project.

This is not to say that the ND office has made all of this discourse-related sense all by themselves. The ‘showdown of the project making’ (in Danish: ‘Projektmanageriet’), which is a part of the ‘core operation’ rhetoric obviously had a resonance with the Lord Mayor and his administration, as displayed in the ‘Shared proactivity section’ above. Where this discourse came from, my data material cannot explain, though one manager mentions that this change of rhetoric concerning ‘projects’ is related the current Lord Mayor’s attempt to make a political edge to his predecessor. But what my analysis does explain is that the ND office used this discourse to make a direction for the policy, and that this discourse had strong connections with the ‘Pillar’ project.

Furthermore, another marker of the ND office in the policy is the ‘customized solutions’ in the disadvantaged areas, taking the form of ‘Development Plans’. This is in direct connection with the profession underlying this collaborative innovation project, that of the ‘area-based program’. Furthermore, the proposal for implementation of the policy in terms of ‘Development Plans’ is a heritage from the ‘Pillar’ report, where it is stated that a strengthening of the city area level to a planning level is recommended, in that *‘a shared prioritization of areas or city parts is created, linking them to the municipal plan process. The most disadvantaged neighbourhoods and city areas of Copenhagen are to be objects for a unified effort with the participation of all administrations’* (Engberg 2008, p. 56, my translation). And on page 16, it is stated that ‘it is obvious that development plans for the prioritized city areas are made’ (ibid.).

As demonstrated in the proactivity section, uncertainty dominated the team, in particular the substantive uncertainty. All in all, the team were seeking answers, and making room for a co-creation of sensemaking. As demonstrated in the entrepreneurship section, most members in the team displayed entrepreneurship in

coming up with answers for how to solve their problem of making a policy. This co-creation of sensemaking was most dominant when they tried to tie the policy to already existing strategies, such as the 'Safe City' policy, the Green Growth Strategy, The Copenhagen Tale etc. However, in the substantive discussions, little progress is made, as demonstrated in previous sections.

As the team undertook meeting after meeting, weariness began to show, and the participants seemed somewhat disillusioned. On this background of uncertainty and inertia, ND was able to deliver answers, for example:

- Introducing the 'yellow clouds'
- Introducing the concept of 'preferential treatment' or 'affirmative action' (in Danish: positiv særbehandling)
- Introducing the concept of 'core operation'
- Introducing the concept of 'transversal cooperation'
- Introducing the 'Mercedes sign': a division of labour

Some of these elements have already been introduced and commented on in this analysis; therefore I will merely summarise these instances of making and giving sense roughly.

#### *Introducing the concept of 'yellow clouds'*

As described in the proactivity section, ND was able to introduce the concept of 'yellow clouds', identifying six disadvantaged areas in the city. ND did so by applying the tool already developed during the implementation of the Pillar Project, that is, the Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map. Backtracking the map analysis, ND was able, on a professional basis, to argue, that the municipal actions taken thus far had remained on a project level, and therefore only pushed the problem from neighbourhood to neighbourhood within the areas. The disadvantaged areas persisted. Thus, the 'yellow clouds' as a concept is an argument for moving the policy to another level, arguing that large-scale plans will match the area-based challenges. Also, this would result in more focus on the core operations. The Yellow Cloud-analysis thus laid the foundation for the later Development Plans, in that each cloud is supposed to have its own Development Plan.

*Introducing the concept of 'preferential treatment'/'affirmative action' (in Danish: positiv særbehandling)*

Preferential treatment was a concept also championed by ND in order to give the policy political content. As already described elsewhere, The Policy Formulation Team had vast problems in defining what the problem was. Introducing this concept both helped to establish the problem and the solution. The problem was that the city was 'breaking in two', meaning that some parts of the city were 'lagging behind' in the positive development that the city was witnessing. Preferential treatment could be the answer in order for this not to happen.

In the first policy formulation meeting, the group discussed to which areas a policy should apply, and on which criteria the areas should be selected: those with problems or those in which there was a synergy between programs?

As the quote below demonstrates, an ND civil servant uses area-based insights to argue that the most well-off areas of the city also have the best quality of core operations. Thus, in order to counter the poor quality of welfare services and to upgrade the disadvantaged areas to a level equal to the rest of the city, preferential treatment is in fact necessary:

*"According to the best of my knowledge, you cannot make a forward-looking policy which relates to what we must fight against it. You will need to make a policy based on a vision and a tale of Copenhagen, which has a forward-looking element in it. (...) Equality is indeed positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged areas. It is a positive way to say it." (policy formulation meeting, I11 part 3)*

The quote further demonstrates that the discourse drawn upon here concerning preferential treatment relates to a geographic approach to exclusion mechanisms of society, in which the welfare state needs to make up for equalities structurally by means of preferential treatment to certain groups of citizens.

In the fourth Policy Formulation Meeting (I14, part 2), the concept of preferential treatment started making sense in a key argumentation promoted by ND in relation to the Development Plans. In the argument the area-based approach is linked to preferential treatment. This argument is linked to coordination, to non-extra layer organisations, to being in control in which funding resources to use, making these serve the core operations, and giving the City of Copenhagen an argument for deciding which projects to approve. This is an argument in which the local government, not the national government, knows best. The ND consultant summed up the argument of the policy because the other administrative participants were unsure of what the formulation team had decided, and what the policy was about. This episode demonstrates several things. First of all, prior to the explanation,

people were still confused about what they had agreed on and on what they should focus on in the remaining part of The Policy Formulation process. Therefore the ND consultant provides direction and directs sensemaking by summing up what the policy is about. What the episode also demonstrates is that the consultant did so by drawing on concepts from The Horizontal Pillar, as well as rhetoric that was influential in the municipality in that point in time, such as the antagonistic relationship between projects/operations, and the extra layer organisations/increased, consolidated coordination.

#### *Introducing the concept of 'core operation'*

The introduction of the concept of 'core operation' was a direct consequence of the rhetoric of the Pillar report, and of the increased demand for coordination. Whether or not this discourse was mobilized by ND or whether it was part of a more cross-administrative, direct showdown with the former way of governing the City of Copenhagen (as suggested in one of the interviews), focusing on the core running was at that point highly influential. And using this concept helped ND to identify the 'problem' as to why the disadvantaged areas continued to be disadvantaged: too many projects, too little emphasis on core operations, and too little coordination in the top management.

#### *Introducing the concept of 'transversal cooperation'*

Similar to 'core operation', the concept of 'transversal cooperation' was also introduced by ND, and it pointed out another deficiency in the former approach to disadvantaged areas: a lack of coordination. This positioning was also evident in The Evaluation Case, in which a conflict arose around whose task it was to ensure coordination: the 'centralists' (The Technical and Environmental Administration) or the localists (SSA).

#### *Introducing the 'Mercedes sign'*

The 'Mercedes sign', as it was named by The Policy Formulation Team, is part of the final policy (p. 22). Here, the conflict on division of labour with the Social Administration made it necessary to depict the different roles of each administration.

As the former director of the Urban Design Department commented in an interview (I29), The Technical and Environmental Administration did not to begin with, i.e. in the early Pillar days, know enough on how the other administrations worked.

The Mercedes sign helped to create a division of labour which allowed The Technical and Environmental Administration to have the coordinative role and the area-based programs as resort, whereas SSA could focus more narrowly on the individuals and families. Furthermore, the Mercedes sign also had a third element, that is, the 'core operations'. Thus, as a consequence of the conflicts with SSA especially, the Mercedes sign helped to create a distinction between two types of extraordinary project activities hitherto applied in the efforts to improve the disadvantaged areas: individual and area-based projects. And the Mercedes sign visualized the distinction between projects and core operations, as described in The Evaluation Case. This sign thus reduced the level of conflict, in that the fear of the turf-greedy Technical and Environmental Administration was dampened.

#### **7.6.4.1 Summing up**

In this analysis, we have seen how ND and The Technical and Environmental Administration have managed to acquire substantive influence: a new inter-organisational set-up; an ambitious policy across all seven administrations, which were approved by all mayors and all politicians in the City Council. The BUCIL model builds on the hypothesis that the uncertainty produced when trying to find an innovative solution to a wicked problem by means of collaboration undergirds both the need for leadership emergence as well as making collaborators open to ways of making sense of what is happening around them; in general, making collaborators open to a profession-based, entrepreneurial project. Overall, I find that this hypothesis is supported by my analysis.

The ability to give sense is of course dependent on many factors. Plain luck is mentioned as a factor in some of the interviews, also ND interviews: that the Lord Mayor decided to accept the policy; that the director of The Urban Design Department applied for a new job; that the right-wing government when launching its 'ghetto plan' provoked the left-wing political leaders in the City of Copenhagen, and thus created a burning platform for an independent Copenhagen answer for how to address the neighbourhoods on the governmental 'ghetto list'; and that the policy was launched immediately after a municipal election, which meant that politicians and mayors were open to new projects and ideas.

The analysis has also demonstrated that there are severe limitations to how far an emerging leader can go in terms of distributing leadership. The conclusion is that

everyone expect The Technical and Environmental Administration and ND to continue running the process; giving sense in the City of Copenhagen did not create actual leadership distribution, but rather a consolidated, vertical leadership in ND's administration. As we have seen, both the mayor and directors of The Technical and Environmental Administration have embraced and heavily championed the collaborative innovation project. The conclusion seems to be that, in this process analysed by means of BUCIL, someone had to stand up as the leader – and remain the leader. In the final discussion in this thesis, I will reflect on this finding and on the distribution of leadership in more detail.

## 7.7 DISCUSSION

In relation to my own expectations in the theory section, it is evident that with regard to the innovation solution proposed by ND, the main challenge in this part of the collaborative innovation process is not as much *if* there is need for a novel solution to wicked problems, but more whether the proposed solution will solve the problems. To some extent, collaborators accept that collaboration is necessary, and that the solution is legitimate. Seemingly, collaborators also go along on the journey, although hesitantly, as long as their uncertainties are moderated by ND's new answers. The main conflict lines are whether the solution actually will work, and whether the project is worth the risk. Thus, to a great extent, ND's leadership is recognised, but it is also criticised for being inconsistent.

My expectations that there would be translation problems concerning enabling collaborators to make sense of the project are also met. In the BUCIL model it is an open question whether leadership will be distributed or consolidated. As my analysis documents, disputes arise among TEA and FA concerned the ownership of the policy, and who should be in charge. As a result, ND and TEA are being perceived of as main leadership. This 'obviousness' of ownership in one administration relates to the fact that in this case, despite the fact that the governance system in the City of Copenhagen enhances sector-divided pillars, the administrations have a shared infrastructure and shared systems of division of labour, which to some extent block for a formally distribution of leadership.

The findings also support Sandford Borins' (Borins, 2002) research findings concerning bottom-up innovation, in which leadership is made and enacted along the way. The findings also support Huxham & Vangen's research of collaborative leadership, in which leadership often uses all kinds of formal and informal means, including collaborative 'tuggery', in order to move the collaborative agenda forward. This was evident in this process, in which The Policy Formulation case clearly was an ordered and well-facilitated front stage, while, in parallel, ND made

great efforts in forging alliances, gathering strategic information, and thus in fact actually striking the difficult balance between ‘collaborative ideology’ and ‘collaborative thuggery’ well (Huxham & Vangen, 2000) in order to satisfy collaborative demands of progress.

This study, using another type of rhetoric and concepts than Huxham & Vangen, allows us to see that thuggery is actually called for and expected by collaborators, and that there actually is a demand in the municipal system in general for progress, and to a high degree also an acceptance of this collaborative thuggery – it is, to a great extent, perceived of as ‘the way to go about the task’.

Concerning the field of collaborative innovation, the study of The Policy Formulation case to some extent supports the hypothesis of Sørensen & Torfing’s research model (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011), since ND is given a mandate that allows it to facilitate interaction. However, my analysis based on the BUCIL model generates some other perspectives on this case. First, findings related to the preconditions for such leadership, and second, findings regarding the future consequences of such application of facilitation.

Sørensen and Torfing’s hypothesis is that a meta-governor type of leadership is able to create novel solutions in a collaborative innovation setting by facilitating collaborative involvement. Actually, The Policy Formulation Team, and the facilitative approach deployed by ND, is emblematic of this type of leadership; the ND consultant exactly applies network leadership tools learned on a leadership course. However, what my study demonstrates is that in a wicked problem setting, the stacking uncertainties of wicked problems and innovation journey uncertainty in fact paralyze The Policy Formulation Team, with the implication that support for the policy is about to wither away. Accordingly, my study demonstrates that a vital history of leadership emergence and sense making in the context of wicked problems actually precedes the rise of the meta-governor as a leadership figure. And that it is this vital history that actually manages to break the deadlock of uncertainty – in this case by drawing on lead motifs of a sector-specific, but holistic and cross-disciplinary profession.

Second of all, concerning the future consequences of bottom-up leadership applying a facilitative leadership may have some repercussions that deviates some from concepts of network governance based leadership for collaborative innovation. As I demonstrated in the theory section, bottom-up leadership driven innovations may be challenged after its immediate implementation (see section 2.4.1): the innovation project could be difficult to create ownership to; or bottom-up leadership may be a necessary companion for formal management since bottom-up leadership (as these analyses demonstrate) is what functions as a container for all the sense made during the collaborative innovation process. Accordingly, since the novelty-power relation

is different for bottom-up leadership (see section 1), the innovation process before and after the application of facilitated leadership differs from network governance approaches to collaborative innovation. Hence it remains a question for future investigations whether these two different research approaches can be combined in a research design, as each analytical model may point to different ‘motors of change’ (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004) in different parts of the process, and on different levels.

In a broader perspective, concerning the micro-oriented, action-related perspective on discursive action and institutionalisation (Phillips *et al.*, 2004), this study can be perceived of as testing this framework. However, the study in this thesis supplements the framework by further incorporating the innovation perspective of uncertainty and the iterative character of how to make and give sense at the same time when exercising leadership. This is somewhat in contrast with Phillips *et al.*’s model that has a linear approach, rendering discursive action for change a highly rational and deliberate type of change and management.

The results also may point to the challenges emergent leadership (Griffin, 2002) has in maintaining and expanding the organisational conversations across organisations in order to maintain the new ‘theme’ that is being introduced as the innovation project is expanding. Similarly, in The Policy Formulation case, ND faces considerable challenges in both maintaining focus on the central and local level, requiring of them to continue to explain to new stakeholders who they are and what they are doing.

The findings further provide a perspective on how to perceive of this leadership, and the study provides a perspective to management in municipalities concerning how to understand profession-based leadership and innovation. The study is also relevant to studies of area-based programs, and how these programs can be used to inspire bureaucratic reform strategies for striking a better balance between bottom-up and top-down, and what type of dilemmas emerging leaders may encounter during this innovation journey. In this respect, the findings are relevant to the discussion raised by Fung and Sirianni (Fung, 2004; Sirianni, 2009) concerning how to enable a better connection between bottom-up and top-down dynamics. This study demonstrates that leadership should be considered as a crucial variable in developing more efficient and innovative institutional designs.



## 7.8 SUMMARY OF THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE: POSITIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP

In this section, I will summarise and conclude on the findings from the analysis. I do so by means of presenting leadership dilemmas. The description of the leadership dilemmas is an answer to the research question which is: *How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?*

The answer is that ND's leadership is recognised when ND consolidates its leadership in a way that is consistent with the innovation project and in a way that makes sense to collaborators. Every time ND uses its abilities of entrepreneurship to create situations which enables choices, for instance concerning the level of coordination, collaborators' expectations change, and new leadership dilemmas are created that require ND to find new answers in order to give sense.

Accordingly, ND is constantly forced to reflect on its identity in relation to the choices that have to be made in relation to the dilemmas. Therefore ND transforms its identity on the basis of an interpretation of collaborators' expectations, but in alignment with the content of the innovation project. The innovation project perceived of as a micro-discourse requires a consistency in terms of the novel concepts introduced; otherwise the direction of sensemaking is not perceived of as creating collaborative direction, and the leadership is brought into doubt. For instance, in the long run it is impossible to maintain both bottom-up and top-down discursive distinctions in the same innovation project, such as 'local decision making *and* political and administrative centralization', and 'local innovation *and* a consolidated machine'. Accordingly, ND's leadership has to change towards a more strategic identity, which is supposed to deliver concrete value and answers to a greater extent, and to a lesser extent create new territory for development.

This entire social construction of leadership and its recognition is conditioned on ND's ability to expand the range of entrepreneurship: collaborators are to some degree forced to go along and to develop bureaucratic structures that are in alignment with the cross-administrative infrastructure suggested by ND.

That implies that actions of shared entrepreneurship, able to address the institutional uncertainty, are required. This shared entrepreneurship is generated by means of a by-the-book facilitative leadership in which collaborators feel included and in which there is room for discussion. The weariness and massive uncertainty that come from

these policy formulation discussions provide an opportunity for ND to give sense, breaking the deadlock of the substantive uncertainty and innovation uncertainty.

The social construction of leadership is also conditioned by ND's ability to perform a leadership related proactivity, which has as its core function to explore and depict the strategic administrative landscape in the municipality. This has the implications of improving the development process of a policy, thereby reducing the strategic uncertainty of collaborators.

Finally, being able to make sense of what ND and collaborators are doing is a vital condition for opening up new paths of development, and thus to give sense. Making sense throughout the innovation process is related to the professional leitmotifs providing the basis for the entire innovation project, in this case the holistic, cross-disciplinary, geographical and contextual leitmotifs of 'the area-based programs' profession.

So what have the main leadership dilemmas been during The Policy Formulation process? To begin with, some discursive struggles both mobilized by ND, but also conditioning ND's behaviour, are present in the case.

The first dilemma relates to the discursive clashes between innovation and coordination. The distinctions underpinning this clash are:

- project vs. core operation
- development vs. system optimization

The dilemma is: how to integrate innovation and coordination?

The ND answer to this is to maintain a middle position: that development is necessary in order to optimize. And that innovation consequently is the improved ability to collaborate across administrative boundaries and in partnership with the social housing sector. This middle-position manifests itself as a social construct in form of 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas', being a meta-policy for other sector related policies and aims. This position further manifests itself in the Development Plans; these plans exemplify a combination of fixed political objectives and a possibility for local professionals and managers to adopt the plans to the specific city districts. The position manifests itself as one of the most legitimate leadership sources, according to collaborators in the municipality: an improved ability to walk in the same direction; the position manifests itself as a 'fact' in the interviews that the municipality necessarily must be able to solve this problem in another way than previously.

The second leadership dilemma relates to the discursive clashes between centralists and localists. The distinctions underpinning this clash are:

- top-down vs. bottom-up
- too much vs. too little coordination

The dilemma is: how can it be avoided that ND's innovation project and leadership are positioned as remote and centralistic?

The ND answer is that top-down enforced coordination is necessary in order to improve the quality of local work. The social object constructed to assure the answer is the Development Plans, in which local professionals are involved in formulation processes, consequently both making room for influence as well as the ability to see that the plans generate value. The second solution is to create less coordinative forums by merging already existing professional networks in the areas.

A third dilemma is: how can ND avoid being positioned as an inconsistent leader? As we saw in collaborators' perception of leadership, several of the leadership challenges relate this critique:

- How can a new coordinative centre be considered improved coordination, when in fact too many attempts at coordination are present in the central administrations?
- How can ND both be a leader and still have no answers to direction of the process?

The ND answer is first of all a differentiation and specialization of leadership functions in ND, enabling ND to maintain several leadership positions at the same time, but in different sites of interaction:

- facilitation and narrative leadership for the local working professionals as well as The Policy Formulation Team
- strategic mobilization, network management and a clear strategic profile at the central level
- minimizing the development ambition

We see this in the minimization of the innovation angle in Policy for Disadvantaged Areas. We see the manifestation of this in The Policy Formulation Team, in which a by-the-book collaborative leadership is visible. We see this in that ND does not develop their identity in a visible way through their activities as they did in The Evaluation Case. Accordingly there is much better correlation between ND's self-perception of identity and collaborators' expectations of this leadership in The Policy Formulation case, which in the end also grants less resistance and more leadership recognition.





# CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION

## 8.1 GENERALIZABILITY OF FINDINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP

Given the scope of the empirical study I will limit myself to discuss the generalizability of findings concerning the most important aspect of the BUCIL model: how leadership is socially constructed through processes of recognition. I do this by discussing each of the leadership dilemmas that I have constructed by means of the analyses.

An overall finding is that regarding leadership development we see a positional development that has a general character: **establishing – influencing – mainstreaming**. This positional development is made visible by having two cases, each located in a different phase of positional development. First the leadership has to be established, then influence can be increasingly exercised. Subsequently, the space of further development has to be delimited and finally shut down; this enables the innovation project to be mainstreamed in the strategic-political organisational context.

So, the certain dilemmas, revealed by the analysis, are of a character that other bottom-up leaderships should keep in mind as they display a range of choices that the emergent leadership has, concerning the interplay of innovation project re-development and options of leadership positioning.

Related to this finding of a positional landscape for bottom-up leadership, the study demonstrates the intimate relation between stabilisation and uncertainty: stabilisation of the collaborative configuration may come at the cost of further utilisation of uncertainty. Consequently, risk-taking and tactical choices are crucial for bottom-up leadership.

In this respect, the study demonstrates that Neighbourhood Development has opted for the maximum scope of the project through a certain response to each of the leadership dilemmas. For instance, by positioning ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’ as a cross-administrative *meta*-policy, the Policy takes on the administrative function of a new coordinative centre. This is risky approach that results in a lack of leadership distribution horizontally. Neighbourhood Development at the end of the case study becomes aware of a demand for a closure of further developments. Collaborators do not want more development perspectives but want value out of their efforts. Accordingly, opting for maximum scope has the implication of a

discursive positioning of innovation project and leadership as centralistic, administrative and huge.

This positioning comes at the cost of a bureaucratic leadership and local politicians that have not been included hence perceive of the project as abstract and unspecific; it is difficult for these stakeholders to make sense of the project in terms of how the innovation project can generate collaborative advantage in terms of specific projects. As several interviewees reflect on openly in the Policy Formulation case, there are speculations of *what value* the entire enterprise has generated.

Accordingly, bottom-up leadership may run the risk of ‘skating the thin ice’ for too long, stretching the utilisation of uncertainty too much, with the possibility of generating great project scope; but bottom-up leadership in this way runs the risk of expanding the scope of the project to such a volume that the innovation project remains trapped too long in a development phase, making the collaborative system exhausted and impatient before the project enters the value-generating phase of implementation and dissemination.

Another important finding worth discussing in relation to dilemmas and bottom-up leadership is the organisational function of bottom-up leadership. On the basis of the detailed analyses above, I interpret bottom-up leadership as a flexible form of leadership. Bottom-up leadership navigates in a very agile way by tailoring a profession-based innovative idea to a collaborative, political-strategic context. Bottom-up leadership does so by making sense of its organisational environment and creating sensible niches by giving sense, enabling bottom-up leadership to make alliances, mobilising and utilising already existing organisational discourses.

The on-going social constructionist nature of the leadership is what delivers this flexibility: Bottom-up leadership adapts its own leadership as well as its project through an iterative process between making sense, giving sense, experiencing resistance, and uses this sensemaking to inform new actions of entrepreneurship, combining organisational resources in new ways, within the evolving interpretation of its own profession. These interpretations of its own leadership are what make Neighbourhood Development develop from a value-based implementer, over a developing coordinator, towards a strategic implementer, adjusting its leadership to the specific challenges of the collaborative innovation process.

Accordingly, another important finding of this study is more detailed knowledge about what distinguishes this leadership from other collaborative innovation leaderships in terms of flexibility. Flexibility is made *strategic* by being anchored in aggregated profession-based insights; these insights are maintained throughout the entire innovation process, providing a reservoir for making sense of the collaborative environment, consequently enabling bottom-up leadership to make



sense of the collaborative environment. As a result, the aggregated profession-based insight functions as a safe-guard against the risk of being paralyzed by uncertainty.

This is clearly demonstrated in this study, in which the cross-disciplinary element of the area-based program-profession is used as a platform for arguing that administrative structures should be aligned with the local insights that this profession has of the complex character of disadvantaged areas. This insight in a wicked problem is made sense of, carving out niches in the political-strategic environment and adapting leadership and innovation project to these niches. Accordingly, a related finding is that the sense made is contained by bottom-up leadership throughout the entire collaborative innovation process. What the implication of this flexibility is in a long-term, institutional perspective is an empirical question: Is it possible to embed all the sense made by bottom-up leadership in the discursive fabric of the collaborative configuration? Is this type of embeddedness tactically desirable for the bottom-up driven innovation project in terms of diffusion and leadership distribution?

Below, I discuss the findings related to leadership dilemmas, focusing on generalizability.

*Dilemma one: How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical organisational structures?*

This dilemma demonstrates that the necessarily undefined, blurry boundaries of the innovation project will be regarded as a potential threat by collaborating parties, because it is uncertain, how many resources the new cross-organisational solution will require. It is important to remember that bottom-up leadership is characterised by working with an unsteady, stop-and-go mandate for the innovation project, a mandate which is constantly up to negotiation.

This study demonstrates that this dilemma is particularly dominant in collaboration between public agencies or administrations, since public resources are limited and consequently, a collaborative innovation project causes a collaborative zero-sum game. Consequently, the sooner the interface between cross-organisational issues and vertical, intra-organisational issues can be defined, the sooner well-known and productive working relations can be established.

*Dilemma two: How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development still remains as part of the profession underpinning bottom-up leadership?*

One way to perceive of this dilemma is to interpret it as something specifically related to the area-based program profession that is the professional platform of the studied innovation project. Accordingly, this dilemma mirrors that the area-based profession at its core thinks of itself as an experimental profession. Not all bottom-up leadership professions need to have this self-perception in order to initiate bottom-up leadership collaborative innovation processes, not even all urban-planning professions. In this interpretation, the explanatory power of this dilemma for other bottom-up leaderships is somewhat limited.

However, another, interpretation is also possible. What the above analyses demonstrates is that the *informal* boundary spanning activities (Williams, 2002) of the area based program-profession is being used as an inspiration for designing the features of a central-administrative reform. As a consequence, the *informal* boundary spanning activities that has so far been deployed in order to making the program type holistic are being *formalised* in administrative structures. The implication of this administrative formalisation is that the profession has to redefine itself, but now in accordance with a self-imposed, strategic-administrative, political agenda, and with less informal room of manoeuvring. This implication is demonstrated in this study because the professionals working in the area-based programs now have to adjust their programs in accordance with a new institutional role. As such, bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation have more or less unintended consequences for the profession that initiated the innovation journey.

*Dilemma three: How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence?*

This dilemma demonstrates ambivalent collaborative requirements: A clear leadership-position and fixed project on one side, on the other side live up to demands of co-creation, inclusion and unforeseen adjustments. This dilemma will be a constant challenge for bottom-up leaderships. As the analyses demonstrate collaborators will remain vigilant as to whether bottom-up leadership can deal with the leadership challenges, and will also have an interest in affecting the project, as a consequence of the increasing impact of the innovation project.

This dilemma was mainly dominant in the initial phase of the innovation project, in which the struggles of leadership were most intense, and in which bureaucratic leadership was most absent. Accordingly, the struggle of meaning concerning the *framing* of the innovation project in terms of giving sense and issues of resistance to these attempts are strongly related to collaborators' demands of co-creation and influence. As was seen in the second analysis, when bureaucratic leadership was re-entering the stage, the framing was much less contentious. Accordingly, it seems plausible that this type of dilemma will dominate in the beginning of a collaborative innovation process.

However, much depends on how consistent the concepts are that form the core of the micro-discourse. In this study, the core was very consistent, given the fact that a detailed report was made to begin with in 2008. This provided bottom-up leadership with a sense-making advantage, providing bottom-up leadership with a 'bible' to consult when the process became confusing and challenged. This, however, also hampered the inclusion of new perspectives. Attempts were made to begin with to include representatives from the other administrations in the initial phase (2007) of the project, but not until 2008 did all seven administrations agree to be involved in the project.

So, this dilemma is at its core truly contentious as it reflects several complex interplays: Small-scale projects, initiated by bottom-up leaderships, located within a sector-specific approach, have difficulties communicating in a 'multi-lingual' way (Crosby & Bryson, 2010) in order to display 'collaborative turf' (Bardach, 1996). However, bottom-up leadership of these small-scale projects also has to accept the ambivalent fact that despite efforts of inclusion and co-creation and multi-lingual efforts, recognition is intimately related to the scope of, and power behind, the innovation project. Consequently, collaborators will not pay attention to the innovation project until it reaches a certain scope. As a result, collaborators are necessarily entering the process rather late. As a result, bottom-up leadership has to prepare tactics for how to deal with demands of project re-invention and co-creation in a way that does not result in collaborative inertia (Huxham & Vangen, 2005).

*Dilemma four: How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?*

This dilemma has some overlap with Dilemma Three above. However, this dilemma differs as it accentuates collaborators' expectation to what a 'leadership' is, whereas dilemma three above is mainly related to the innovation project. This dilemma is located in the first, initial phase of bottom-up leadership in which leadership is

adapting to the first leadership ‘shock’, triggered when bottom-up leadership for the first time positions itself in a collaborative configuration; bottom-up leadership will accordingly experience collaborative demands to leadership. In this study the impact of this shock is that ND is abandoning its position of a value-based implementer to a position of developing coordinator.

The main challenge is making sense of discrepancy between collaborative and bureaucratic expectations and bottom-up leadership identity. Remember that in this face the leadership is in its formative phase, having barely managed to gather consent to initiate a project. In a collaborative innovation process, in which bottom-up leadership is both development unit *and* leader, an obvious clash exists between these two elements of bottom-up leadership’s profile in an organisational perspective: An entrepreneurial function and a leadership function. These functions perceived within a discourse analytical perspective denotes both an emergent discourse and a related, yet not fully determined, subject position. The relation between these elements is up to the emergent leadership to develop, define and choose. Bottom-up leadership has to realise that it navigates in a landscape of tactics and strategic options for leadership positioning.

As seen in The Evaluation case, the leadership sets out on the entrepreneurial, profession based platform, and it is this platform that dominates part of the first phase. What is dominating the sense-making activities of bottom-up leadership in this case is the project, with capital letters. Accordingly, *strategic* and *institutional* uncertainties are by Neighbourhood Development being made sense of, and handled, by means of *substantive* means. However, the substantive uncertainty is only part of the puzzle. Accordingly, when bottom-up leadership insists on the merit of the innovation project for dealing with disadvantaged neighbourhoods (the leadership position of ‘value-based implementator’), but suddenly alters the project as a consequence of a necessary adjustment to the structuring elements of the micro-discourse introduced (the leadership position of ‘developing coordinator’), leadership in the eyes of collaborators appears fragile and inconsistent. This increases the potential for conflict.

#### *Dilemma five: how to integrate innovation and coordination?*

This dilemma reflects a discursive struggle that emerges when ND by means of entrepreneurship strives to combine a discourse of ‘core operations’ with the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’. ND argues for the important role of local governance networks for each disadvantaged area. This self-organizing element in the Policy design would first of all make the Policy seem less centralist, and would accordingly minimize the critique that the project imposes centralistic coordination on the local

civil servants; second of all, the local governance networks could enhance the development of local innovation. However, as the analysis of the Policy Formulation Process demonstrates, the collaborating administrations simply cannot opt for such a devolvement of power, both out of historical reasons, but also because demands of stabilisation are strong in the municipal system, especially among directors.

Interpreting this dilemma I find that the dilemma nicely captures what Archon Fung terms ‘the dichotomy’ between top-down and bottom-up in urban governance. Accordingly, the dilemma reflects an institutional design challenge. In this case-study, the dilemma is resolved by minimizing local governance networks and, accordingly, enables local innovation as an element of the ‘Development Plans’. The result therefore is an increased coordination of municipal resources through the formulation of Development Plans, Development Plans whose objectives are defined by the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’. In this way, an institutional arrangement is made that enhances the local coordination of municipal resources in the disadvantaged areas through central-administratively and -politically defined objectives.

So, in a broader perspective, this dilemma opens up for a relevant discussion concerning institutional arrangements that defies the distinction between top-down and bottom-up. As Fung notes, stabilisation seems to be central in these arrangements. As both Fung and Sirianni’s analyses demonstrate, this stabilisation is difficult to attain. What the Copenhagen case demonstrates is a process of institutionalization. As I have depicted in Figure 14 (p. 198), in the two first phases we see an institutional development concerning first developing bottom-up-elements; next we see ND’s leadership emphasis on developing complementary top-down elements, and in the third a synthesis is generated, having both a central element (a policy) and a local element (development plans, supported by area based programs). The Copenhagen collaborative innovation process accordingly has left institutional marks, but these marks are not time-resistant. However, the process do demonstrate a development in which the municipal organisation actually develops in a way towards an institutional arrangement that is able to deal with both bottom-up and top-down dynamics related to the challenges of disadvantaged areas in one institutional framework. As such, the collaborative innovation has succeeded in coming up with support for a solution for a wicked problem, in this way overcoming substantive, institutional and strategic uncertainties. In comparison with Fung and Sirianni’s frameworks, this study demonstrates that leadership efforts of giving sense on an iterative basis are crucial for attaining stability. Accordingly, Fung and Sirianni’s suggestions for stabilisation by means of ‘cultural’ and ‘institutional’ arrangements draw on a bed-rock assumption – that stability of complex institutional arrangements can be ensured if novel organisational arrangements embedded ‘deep’ enough in urban governments. What this thesis demonstrate concerning the

development of such organisational arrangements is that these strategies need to be supplemented by design principles that emphasize leadership.

*Dilemma six: How to avoid that both policy and leadership are positioned as 'remote centralist'?*

Bottom-up leadership in my conception is a group or team of professionals, and possibly their immediate manager, that are part of a big, public central administration or an agency. Accordingly, some of these professionals have well-established relations with front-line staff, i.e. relations to where service is actually provided to citizens. Consequently, bottom-up leadership must be aware that as soon as the innovation project is initiated, this collaborative innovation process has some central-administrative repercussions that will be perceived by front-line staff as centralistic and remote. A standing challenge for bottom-up leadership is to communicate the value of the necessity of the central-administrative change. For as I hypothesize, and as the study demonstrates, the main source of legitimacy when initiating a collaborative innovation project is to speak on behalf of 'the locals', i.e. those who have contacts 'with the reality'. If this bond to 'the real world' is cut, bottom-up leadership will lose its legitimate claim for change.

*Dilemma seven: How to avoid being positioned as an unstable, inconsistent leader, who both wants to operate a meta-policy and at the same time develop new initiatives?*

The seventh dilemma is arguably also a general challenge for bottom-up leadership: to position one's own leadership as both strategic and at the same time focused on development. This dilemma manifests itself in the end of the process. The dilemma demonstrates in my interpretation that there is a limit to how long a collaborative configuration can endure being in a development phase. But the dilemma does, in accordance with the complex responsive processes theory underpinning the concept of leadership recognition, also point to a limit for how many relations to stakeholders that bottom-up leadership can maintain in order to keep winning the organisational battles for meaning. In continuation of this point, the dilemma points to a limit of giving sense: As the process unfolds, the history of the process grows, and so there is an increasingly complex story to be told to collaborators, concerning 'who we are, and what we are doing'. The collaborative push towards mainstreaming and formalisation of the innovation project solves this problem by sanctioning making and giving sense with formalised bureaucratic power.

So, at some point collaborators will demand (i) a value-demonstrating realization of the innovation project, in this case a value that can be exchanged to political or

administrative capital, as well as (ii) an administrative, managerial stabilisation, mainstreaming and specification of the project. Ultimately, this dilemma signifies the ruptures that arise when the innovation project is initiating its delivery from an informal bottom-up type of leadership to a bureaucratic type of leadership.

## **8.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

I have produced this thesis using the following key elements, which are tightly and consistently connected:

- the objective of making both a theoretical and empirical contribution concerning an emergent perspective on bottom-up leadership
- a unique opportunity to study an ongoing development process

This ambition of developing theory abductively while at the same time doing an empirical investigation in a fast-moving, highly dynamic process within an emerging research field (i.e. collaborative innovation in the public sector) has affected my choice of methods, having consequences for access to informants and my choice of how to do my fieldwork. The access to informants, especially decision makers across administrations, was made difficult related to the policy formulation process due to the fact that the policy formulation process was highly contentious.

Out of ethical reasons I decided not to intervene in this process by starting asking questions of leadership and innovation in the middle of this highly unsteady process, but instead wait for the process to finish. However, a limitation of the cross-administrative interviews made afterwards was that the CEO-level and the political level had decided to support the Policy, having the consequence that the interviewees did not utter much critique about the Policy or about ND's leadership. As a demonstration of this, an interviewee asked whether I could turn off my recorder at the beginning of the interview, in order for the interviewee to 'speak freely' about how the informant assessed the high-profiled policy formulation process related to 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas'.

What this incident demonstrates is in my interpretation that more conflict points could have been discovered if other methods or research strategies had been deployed. What this limitation of the study points to is first of all the trade-off of studying on-going processes vs. doing retrospective studies, and second of all the limitation of doing research in highly political organisations. The access to in-process meetings, participant observations and field notes are means to counter the

closure of conflicts that may arise when a collaborative innovation process is finished. Accordingly, future process studies should consider upgrading these ethnographic methods, enabling these ethnographic methods rank higher in the data collection strategy.

Furthermore, the fact that the thesis was co-financed by Neighbourhood Development could also have affected informants' perception concerning my role in the process and my credibility as a researcher. However, even though future studies should avoid this financial problem if possible, it remains a challenge to appear unbiased in the eyes of collaborators when studying bottom-up leadership, since researchers most likely will have to spend a considerable amount of time in the company of the bottom-up leadership professionals, unless other methods are applied that require less fieldwork.

### **8.3 FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS**

In this section, I identify three research agendas.

Theoretically, I have in this thesis identified several future research agendas. Concerning bottom-up leadership, Chapter 2 describes discrete steps in my theory building strategy. Hence, it is possible to look at these steps and make other interpretations concerning theory building. For instance, Sandford Borins' research could be interpreted in other ways; or other concepts could be deployed for a theoretical interpretation. More specifically, I have in Chapter 2 emphasized that the relationship between utilisation of uncertainty and stabilisation is the main conceptual challenge for leadership concepts of collaborative innovation. I have argued that the concept of uncertainty warrants further theoretical developments given a context of collaborative innovation. This could inspire future leadership conceptions. Another research agenda concerning collaborative innovation leadership in general is to focus more on the aspect of the social construction of leadership.

Empirically, it is necessary with more research concerning bottom-up leadership deploying the BUCIL model. First of all, other analytical approaches can be applied, such as narrative analyses. This could further contribute to a discussion of whether the BUCIL framework is appropriate for cross-case comparisons, or whether other causal relations or variables should be applied. Future studies should also consider deploying the BUCIL model more narrowly, such as mainly focusing on a single causal relationship of the model, enhancing the literature studies concerning the chosen causality.



Another research agenda is to deploy the BUCIL model in other contexts and/or related to other wicked problems. A relevant research agenda is to test the BUCIL model in a setting in which the central conflicts were located outside a public authority context, for instance, if bottom-up leadership in a public agency or municipality engaged with civil society and/or private sector stakeholders. Would this different context trigger other leadership dilemmas? It would also be highly relevant to deploy the BUCIL model in a setting in which another wicked problem was the objective of the collaborative innovation project. Would another wicked problem require other institutional design 'dichotomies' to be overcome than the 'central-local dichotomy' (Fung, 2004) identified in this thesis?

Finally, concerning future research agendas in a broader perspective, BUCIL studies can benefit from being located within other research fields besides collaborative innovation leadership. Starting from the level of practice and to the abstract level, this study can benefit from being more thoroughly compared to other types of leadership conceptions of area-based programs, for instance area-based leadership (Hambleton & Howard, 2010). This study can also be compared to leadership of other types of wicked problems (Beinecke, 2009). And furthermore, the study can contribute to, and benefit from, being localised within coordination studies (Jennings Jr & Krane, 1994; Jennings Jr & Ewalt, 1998; Peters, 1998; Reff Pedersen, Sehested, & Sørensen, 2011), especially concerning how coordination can be achieved across organisations by means of certain leadership designs, and to engage in the debate of how we should perceive value-contributing coordination efforts. For as this study shows, doubts of the collaborative value are in fact not only an a priori, theoretically constructed process characteristic concerning how to navigate in innovation processes; it is also related to the entire innovation project launched in The City of Copenhagen that argues that a specific collaborative framework will result in value in terms of increased coordination among sector-specific programs and policies.

That implies that the study can contribute with empirical results concerning the value of coordination efforts, and whether to perceive these merely as instances of moments in which collaborative decision making is possible (Reff Pedersen *et al.*, 2011), or whether inter-organisational coordination is an end-state that can be achieved (Peters, 1998). Further studies of collaborative innovation leadership may also focus more narrowly on the institutional consequences, given either the bottom-up or top-down origin of collaborative innovation journeys. Further, this study demonstrates how some institutional design properties, focused on more effectively integrating the local and the central level of governance (Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003; Sirianni, 2009) are actually constructed through struggles of meaning across organisations.

Now, concerning the more theoretical discussions of bottom-up leadership for collaborative innovations, it would be fruitful to conduct literature studies of

different theoretical bottom-up approaches to managing change across organisations and the institutional ramifications. Other approaches have the 'from the small to the grand' metaphorical causality as explored in this study, as demonstrated by the discourse approach taken in this thesis (Phillips *et al.*, 2004). This is also true of an approach such as institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). Finally, I believe this study and the results can contribute further to the theoretical approaches to the on-going discussion of the social construction of leadership (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010), especially because both collaborative innovation and wicked problems are context factors that actually create a demand for a construction of such a leadership.

# CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

This thesis opened with a puzzle: How can new forms of public leadership contribute to solving complex problems in today's welfare societies through innovation? Empirically I have studied a central-administrative, ongoing development process in The City of Copenhagen from 2009-2012. The aim of the development process was to increase the coordination of area-based municipal activities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods through collaboration across administrations and across municipal and social housing organisations. The main challenge related to this 'wicked problem' of disadvantaged city districts is to overcome the 'local-central dichotomy' (Fung, 2004) between neighbourhoods and sector-divided municipal administrations. Accordingly, my objective has been to produce theoretical and empirical research knowledge of how leadership displayed in the case study can be conceptualized and analysed within the research agenda of collaborative innovation in the public sector (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).

I pursue this objective by making two contributions, a theoretical and an empirical. Theoretically the thesis provides an answer to the following research question: How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems? Empirically the thesis provide an answer to the following research question: How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems?

## *Theoretical problems of collaborative innovation: Undifferentiated leadership conceptions*

The main theoretical challenge that drives theory development in the research field of collaborative innovation is the following: to conceptualise a balance between stabilising a collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and de-stabilising parts of the collaborative configuration, on the other hand, in order to utilise uncertainty. Conceptions of leadership have to pay attention to this fundamental, conceptual challenge and to explore it creatively.

New conceptions of leadership should pay attention to some specific design demands that can be used as an inspiration for such a conceptual exploration. First of all, to consider drawing on other theories than network governance. Further, to investigate both advantages and disadvantages of bottom-up, top-down and lateral innovations. These advantages should be related to different types of innovation, adopting a process perspective of the innovation journey. New conceptions of

leadership should also pay attention to both initial conditions as well as the outcome of these various innovation conditions, in terms of explaining how an innovation emerges, how innovation is sustained and diffused. Finally leadership conceptions need to conceptualise the distinctive *collaborative* dimension of related to innovation that penetrates the boundaries of involved organisations. Accordingly, novel leadership conceptions need to step beyond hierarchical models; this enables these novel leadership conceptions to explain how to nurture innovation climates, to explain how policy makers and managers can work together, and to explain how far leadership is distributed within and across organisations.

The present leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation in the public sector are undifferentiated. These conceptions are mainly tied to leadership of networked governance. Network governance as a leadership approach has the objective of stabilizing arenas of interaction through facilitation. This conception is indeed highly relevant and consistent; network governance as a foundation for conceptualising a balance between stabilisation and de-stabilisation in a context of collaborative innovation provides researchers with the advantage of drawing on a vast amount of research, related to a number of different, well-defined schools related to network governance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Torfing, 2013).

However, the network governance based conceptions are most suitable for analysing collaborative innovation leadership in empirical settings where powerful decision makers within their own organisations take on leadership. In order to open up for the theoretical production of new leadership conceptions that do not fit this empirical setting, I discuss the differences that do exist among the leadership conceptions. I do so by emphasising a juxtaposition of Sandford Borins' (Borins, 2002) empirical descriptions of 'bottom-up innovation leadership' with the network governance based leadership conceptions.

The reason for the choice of this juxtaposition is first of all the above mentioned research recommendations; among other issues, Sandford Borins' empirical descriptions stimulates a theory building that allows conceptions not drawing on network governance, that display advantages and disadvantages of bottom-up innovations, and that relates innovation to a process perspective. Second, Sandford Borins' notion of bottom-up innovation leadership has intriguing aspects that stimulate a theory building. These intriguing aspects are that bottom-up driven innovations require and create leadership, and in so doing bottom-up leadership creates an informal or alternative leadership structure. What characterises such leadership is that it has close ties to, or is located on, the front lines or in middle management. Further, the aim of these innovations is to either support already defined goals, or to generate new initiatives that politicians are willing to embrace as their own. Third, Borins' descriptions explains the observations that I made of the

development process in the City of Copenhagen better than the current, network governance based conceptions of leadership. In the studied process the innovation is initiated at the bottom of a central organisation in a profession-based office with no prior experience of initiating cross-organisational, political and strategic development processes.

The juxtaposition of Borins' leadership descriptions and current leadership conceptions implicates the identification of four discussion points. These discussion points are of a general character that can guide the theory building of new leadership forms.

The first discussion point that such juxtaposition reveals is whether leadership should be predefined or whether leadership should be perceived of as a process achievement. All leadership conceptions of collaborative innovation with the exception of Borins' assume that a formally appointed leadership is present to begin with when initiating an innovation, and that such leadership perceives of itself *as* leadership and is perceived as such *by* collaborators. However, these assumptions should be questioned. In fact, collaboration, innovation and wicked problems are all context factors that I suggest calls for the exact opposite image of leadership. What in my interpretation *defines* all of these context factors is uncertainty: Uncertainty of roles, of identities, of strategic aims, of whether the innovation generates value, of organisational boundaries, of the character of relations between organisations. Uncertainty as a condition enables another perspective than what currently dominates collaborative innovation in which uncertainty at the outset is framed and delimited. Uncertainty has the ability of enabling a questioning of everything that is taken for granted in organisations. The uncertainties that I identify as crucial in relation to collaborative innovation is wicked-problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and innovation uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999). These uncertainties have potentially the force to momentarily question the taken-for-granted organisational environment of collaborators and leadership, forcing everyone to iteratively answer some radical questions: "who are we, and what are we in fact doing"? As a result, if we assume that leadership is *not* defined to begin with, this discussion point opens up for a process concept of leadership, since such a process can take into consideration issues of uncertainty, an uncertainty that encompasses both innovation project and the identity of leadership.

The second discussion point concerns the position of power. This discussion point reveals that leadership and power are closely interwoven, and that the leadership position of current collaborative innovation leadership conceptions implicitly provides leadership with a steady mandate throughout all innovation phases, hence also provides such leadership access to a specific range of leadership tools to deploy. However, bottom-up leadership has not access to such a steady, top down mandate. On the contrary, bottom-up leadership initiates a collaborative innovation

journey with only an unsteady, brittle, stop-and-go mandate. Consequently, the game of power is always open for bottom-up leadership and therefore much more all-encompassing, since a mandate has to be acquired, sustained and defended throughout all innovation phases. Accordingly, bottom-up leadership has not access to steady-mandate leadership tools. As a result, the tools for influence for bottom-up leadership have to be theorised in another way, albeit still being able to strike a balance between stability and de-stability in order to utilise uncertainty.

The third discussion point is: What generates novelty? In network governance based conceptions of collaborative innovation leadership, leadership and novelty is seemingly separated. It is assumed that collaborators through their interaction generate novelty. However, this scenario is only possible because leadership power is deployed in a way that establishes a defining framework for the collaboration. This condition thereby ensures that a steady mandate of collaborative interaction is present. Accordingly, leadership and novelty is actually not separated, but the leadership-novelty relation is made and enacted *before* the innovation cycle is initiated; this enactment is what defines the scope and the sectorial and institutional framing of the collaborative novelty-generating exercise.

By contrast, for bottom-up leadership, I have shown that leadership and novelty is intimately interwoven in a different way: bottom-up leadership generates a new idea, but since the power position is weak, the framing ability for bottom-up leadership is not possible; hence, the boundaries of such an innovation project is much more blurry, since the type of innovation and its level of implementation is emerging in the innovation process. This is both a valuable source of further novelty creation and development, but also a source of collaborative instability and doubt about bottom-up leadership's dependability.

The fourth discussion concerns what types of problems that leadership conceptions are adapted to? I find that although the literature mentions wicked problems, ill-defined problems and tame problems, the leadership frameworks do not distinguish between these problem types. Network governance conceptions generate the image that leadership owns and controls crucial parts of inter-organisational infrastructure. In other words, current leadership conceptions seem to suggest that leadership has the power to define meaningful frameworks for solving wicked problems. This degree of governmental control over problem-definition and -solution clashes with research in wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) and is a highly dubious assumption.

The consequence of not tailoring leadership conceptions to specific problem types has the consequence that the leadership challenge towards wicked problems are conceptualised as less contentious than these problems are. Leadership conceptions of collaborative innovation risk operating with a vertical image of power structure

and problem definition that is not useful when analysing wicked problems. Current leadership conceptions are most suitable for deployment in that political or administrative phase in which powerful stakeholders have already detected that there is a wicked problem, and under what sector-based hierarchy the solution to such a problem should be placed.

On the basis of this discussion, I find that the following crucial elements should guide theory building in order to contribute to leadership differentiations related to collaborative innovation: To conceptualise leadership as a process phenomenon, related to leadership making and related identity issues; to develop a new conception of influence and power for bottom-up leadership, tailored to conditions of inferior hierarchical power position, taking into account the condition of an unsteady mandate; to pay attention to initial conditions of leadership positions - leadership and the relationship to what it is that generates novelty is intimately related to position of power and the ability to exercise such power; to conceptualise a leadership approach that can explicitly take into account a wicked problem type.

Interpreting Sandford Borins' concept of bottom-up leadership critically inspires a theoretical re-interpretation of how bottom-up leadership can be analysed within an explicit collaborative innovation research agenda in which the aim is to address a wicked problem. Is such an exercise even possible for bottom-up leadership? Inspired by the development process in the City of Copenhagen the answer to this question is definitely affirmative, since bottom-up leadership in that case managed to muster collaborative support for dealing with the wicked problem of disadvantaged city districts, despite lack of training in collaborative innovation leadership, and despite an inferior power position and an unsteady mandate.

Inspired by this development process, I find that the following six analytical concepts can be consistently combined in order to enable researchers to analyse how bottom-up leadership is exercised in a collaborative configuration that seeks to deal with a wicked problem through innovation:

- Process- and end-point uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999) and wicked problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)
- The social construction of leadership, conceptualized as leadership emergence through the concept of 'recognition' (Griffin, 2002)
- Public Entrepreneurship (Klein, 2010)
- Sensemaking (Weick, 1995)
- Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991)
- Leadership distribution

*Uncertainty* is fundamental in the theory building of this thesis. Theorising bottom-up leadership by means of uncertainty enables import of core elements of wicked-problem research and innovation research. Wicked problems by definition require collaboration, so my theory building ensures that a collaborative aspect is maintained in theory development. Uncertainty further satisfies conceptual design demands described above. In order to differentiate leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation, causal relations between leadership, power position and novelty should be reworked. Uncertainty is consistent with a process perspective on leadership as it allows for an informal, yet strategic and intentional, process perspective on power of influence. Uncertainty explains how the relation between novelty and leadership is reconceptualised: Uncertainty enables a theoretical explanation of novelty creation that emerges in a process through acts of construction and interpretation in radical change processes, as well as an increased power base.

*The social construction of leadership* is conceptualized by means of Griffin's concept of leadership emergence (Griffin, 2002). Leadership emerges in conditions of uncertainty through social processes of recognition. Leadership emergence is a suggestion for a post-structural, relational, theoretical explanation of bottom-up leadership: how leadership is being made and exercised at the same time. Furthermore, my positioning of leadership recognition as a relational leadership theory approach (Uhl-Bien, 2006) enables me to define bottom-up leadership in a demarcated, yet relational, way: As the group of persons belonging to the professional unit that produces the innovation project in focus. This definition also allows for immediate superiors to be included in the bottom-up leadership unit, insofar as they contribute to leadership and innovation project development on the basis of a profession-based insight. Leadership is something that is spread out, but only in the profession-based unit that develops the innovative solution. In this thesis, I interpret and define leadership recognition within a micro- and action based approach to discourse analysis (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). Consequently, I define leadership recognition as follows: Leadership recognition in the context of collaborative innovation is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and discourse cannot be ignored, but are reckoned with, perhaps appreciated, in the strategic power games within and between organisations.

*Profession based, public entrepreneurship* is my conceptualisation of Borins' (2002) notion of 'bottom-up'. This concept is crucial: It signifies both the point of departure of the innovation and it defines the character of the innovation: Entrepreneurship is a type of action that bottom-up leadership will have to display in order to emerge as a leader. The emerging bottom-up leadership has the advantage of consisting of



professionals and perhaps an immediate superior with specialised competences within a given service, program or policy field. These members of such a specialised unit know where there is a performance gap (Klein, 2010) and have ideas about which creative organisational connections to make in order to deal with a wicked problem. In order to allow for a detailed analysis between novelty generation and leadership emergence I separate leadership and entrepreneurship. Hence, I define entrepreneurship as a function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) acts proactively in environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already existing resources, 4) in order for them to be deployed for a perceived better performance on public objectives.

*Sensemaking* is a basic social condition in radical change processes (Weick, 1995). Sensemaking enables the involved parties to address the uncertainties associated with a collaborative innovation project addressing a wicked problem. Sensemaking as concept draws on a theoretical approach not conceptualised in network governance approaches. Consequently, adopting a sensemaking perspective to bottom-up leadership provides the theoretical framework with a perspective on collaborative innovation processes, in which both leadership and collaborators are caught up in emerging, unpredictable processes. Sensemaking opens up for analyses of processes in which the relations between leadership, collaborators and innovation project are less clear-cut and defined than what network governance-inspired leadership approaches suggest. Collaborative innovation processes are highly strategic, but they are strategic processes conditioned by uncertainty and ambiguity. Accordingly, actors and their interests are in such an analysis perceived of as being fluent and malleable.

*Giving sense* (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) captures the strategic and intentional elements bottom-up leadership. Giving sense addresses an unclear aspect of Borins' notion of 'informal' leadership structures. When uncertainty engulfs all involved collaborators it is possible for collaborators to influence each other's sensemaking. Giving sense illustrates how it is possible for bottom-up leadership to actually exercise influence by directing the sensemaking processes of collaborators in order to acquire high-level support. Making and giving sense is a sort of influence which is able to spread across organizations despite an inferior bureaucratic power position.

*Leadership distribution* as a concept is generated out of a need of emphasising a defined output in the otherwise iterative processes of leadership making. The sole purpose of bottom-up leadership is to make decision makers embrace the innovation as their own. Leadership distribution captures this vertical support. Leadership distribution can have several outputs: it can be consolidated within one organisation, or it can be distributed, because also collaborators embrace the innovation project as their own. Each of these outputs enables analysis of why a specifically exercised

bottom-up leadership results in distinct innovation sustainability and innovation diffusion.

Many of the above mentioned organisational phenomena occur simultaneously and in an iterative fashion. Accordingly, I disentangle these phenomena causally in order to allow analyses in which each phenomenon can be causally put in relation to bottom-up leadership and the innovation of a wicked problem through collaborative innovation. I do this by means of an analytical model called 'BUCIL' (an abbreviation of 'Bottom-Up Collaborative Innovation Leadership'). Modelling iterative causalities facilitates future analyses of bottom-up leadership in which narrow analyses can be made by focusing only on a single causality in the analytical model.

Accordingly, in order to enhance the analytical focus of the BUCIL model, each of the proposed analytical concepts as well as the model in itself are discussed critically, qualifying further aspects of theory building and the interaction of the concepts in relation to the BUCIL model. What is especially important in these discussions is clarifying causally how leadership is related to public entrepreneurship and making and giving sense, and how the presence of wicked problem uncertainty and innovation journey uncertainty provides an opportunity for leadership to emerge and exercise its influence simultaneously.

This discussion underpinning the concepts in the analytical model and the interactions of the model allows me to define Bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership ('BUCIL') as follows:

I define bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation as 1) an intentional process aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas in a specific context 2) initiated at the bottom of a public sector organisation requiring that the 3) lead unit responsible is able to gain influence through leadership recognition, which is conditioned by 4) utilisation of uncertainty through skills of public entrepreneurship, sensemaking and giving sense.

The BUCIL model is adapted to a collaborative innovation context, as it recognises the uncertainty that essentially characterizes innovative solutions to wicked problems by means of collaborative resources. The key concepts of the analytical model are selected because they are theoretically based on an assumption of change in uncertain environments. Having the innovation uncertainty and the wicked-problem uncertainty as a guide for theory building it is ensured the analytical model can be used to analyse collaborative innovation processes in a way that acknowledges how conditions of uncertainty enable and restraint bottom-up leadership.

To sum up my theoretical contribution: I contribute to the differentiation of leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation. I first of all theorise a new type of leadership. I find that specific uncertainty-related aspects of collaborative innovation leadership have not been addressed in the literature so far: The social construction of leadership related to the way that the conceptual balance between stabilisation and the utilisation of uncertainty is conceptualised. For bottom-up leadership, stabilisation is ensured by making and giving sense to collaborators, thereby utilising uncertainty. Stabilisation is also ensured by the fact that bottom-up leadership is flexible leadership that through iterative social constructions adapts to a collaborative, political, public sector context, in which uncertainty generates conflicts and demands for answers.

*Leadership construction for disadvantaged city districts in The City of Copenhagen: Overcoming the local-central dichotomy by means of cross-administrative coordination*

The analytical model produced in this thesis enables me to make an empirical contribution to the research field of collaborative innovation. I do so by answering the question: *How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of collaborative recognition in an innovation process in the public sector that deals with wicked problems?*

The bottom-up leadership of Neighbourhood Development in the first embedded case has been going through a development from a position as ‘value-based implementer’ in 2008 to a position of a ‘developing coordinator’ in 2010. I summarise this positional development by means of four abstract leadership dilemmas:

1. How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical organisational structures?
2. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that development work still remains?
3. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence?
4. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation?

In the second analysis (2010-2012) of the social construction of leadership, I focused on how ND was given responsibility for formulating a cross-administrative policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged areas. In this phase, ND moved towards a new leadership position in 2012: from a 'developing coordinator' to 'strategic implementer'.

In this analysis, I found that the following three leadership dilemmas have been the driving force of the positioning of ND's leadership, from developing coordinator to strategic implementer:

5. How to integrate innovation and coordination?
6. How can it be avoided that ND's innovation project and leadership are positioned as remote and centralistic?
7. How to avoid being positioned as an unstable, inconsistent leader, who both wants to operate a meta-policy and at the same time develop new initiatives?

These findings concerning leadership dilemmas reveal that we see a positional development that has a specific character for bottom-up leadership studied, in terms of establishing–influencing–mainstreaming. This positional development is made visible by having two cases, each located in a different phase of positional development. First the leadership has to be established, then influence can be increasingly exercised. Subsequently, the space of further development has to be delimited and finally shut down; this enables the innovation project to be mainstreamed in the strategic-political organisational context.

These certain dilemmas, revealed by the analysis, are of a character that other bottom-up leaderships should keep in mind as they display a range of choices that the emergent leadership has, concerning the interplay of innovation project re-development and options of leadership positioning.

What bottom-up leadership should pay attention to is that the dilemmas truly are dilemmas in the sense that each choice has its disadvantages. In this respect, the study demonstrates the close relation between stabilisation and uncertainty: stabilisation of the collaborative configuration may come at the cost of further utilisation of uncertainty and vice versa. Risk-taking and tactical choices, informed by sensemaking of own leadership identity, are crucial aspects for bottom-up leadership in terms of leadership positioning. The study demonstrates that Neighbourhood Development has opted for the maximum scope of the project

through a certain response to each of the leadership dilemmas. As the analysis of a policy formulation process demonstrate, Neighbourhood Development has some choices in terms of positioning 'Policy for Disadvantaged Areas': should it be a cross-administrative *meta*-policy, or a more modest policy, that enhances existing policies that also seek to enhance cross-sectorial problem solving? As a consequence of ND's alliances and tactical choices, the Policy takes on the administrative function of a new coordinative centre. This is risky approach that results in a lack of leadership distribution horizontally. Neighbourhood Development at the end of the case study becomes aware of a collaborative demand for a closure of further developments. Accordingly, opting for maximum scope has the implication of a discursive positioning of innovation project and leadership as centralistic, administrative and huge. Accordingly, ND as leadership has to adapt to this consequence in order not to be perceived of as inconsistent.

The study demonstrates that bottom-up leadership may perceive it as worth the risk of expanding the range of sense giving activities, since it provides bottom-up leadership with the possibility of generating great value; but this possibility may run the risk of expanding the scope of the project to such a volume, that the ownership to the project is being reduced. This is because the innovation project remains trapped too long in a development phase, making the collaborative system exhausted and impatient before the project enters the value-generating phase of implementation and dissemination.

Another important finding in relation to dilemmas and bottom-up leadership is that the study has provided an enhanced understanding of bottom-up leadership's organisational function in a collaborative innovation context. On the basis of the analyses in this theses, bottom-up leadership is a flexible form of leadership, that in a very agile way navigates and tailors a profession-based innovative idea to a collaborative, political-strategic context, by making alliances and mobilising and utilising already existing organisational discourses. The on-going social constructionist nature of the leadership enables this flexibility. Bottom-up leadership adapts its own identity as well as its project in iterative processes between making sense, giving sense, experiencing resistance. Bottom-up leadership uses these iterative processes of leadership construction to inform new actions of entrepreneurship, combining organisational resources in new ways, within the evolving interpretation of its own profession.

Accordingly, another important finding of this study is more detailed knowledge about what distinguishes this leadership from other collaborative innovation leaderships in terms of flexibility. Flexibility is founded on the fact that an aggregated profession-based insight is maintained throughout the entire innovation process, providing a reservoir for making sense of the collaborative environment, consequently enabling bottom-up leadership to make sense of the collaborative

environment in a consistent way. This reservoir for sensemaking is what provides bottom-up leadership with a flexibility that is also *strategic*: the aggregated profession-based insight functions as a safe-guard against the risk of being paralyzed by uncertainty and ensures consistency in sensemaking processes. This is clearly demonstrated in this study, in which the cross-disciplinary element of the area-based program-profession is used as a platform for arguing that administrative structures should be aligned with the local insights that this profession has of the complex character of disadvantaged areas. This insight in a wicked problem is made sense of, carving out niches in the political-strategic environment and adapting leadership and innovation project to these niches.

Accordingly, a related finding is that the sense made is contained by bottom-up leadership throughout the entire collaborative innovation process. What the implication of this flexibility is in a long-term, institutional perspective is an empirical question: Is it possible to embed all the sense made by bottom-up leadership in the discursive fabric of the collaborative configuration? Is this type of embeddedness even tactically *desirable* for the bottom-up driven innovation project in terms of diffusion and leadership distribution?

What the leadership dilemmas also reflect is that a progressing dialectical relationship exists between two crucial aspects of the bottom-up leadership's profile in an organisational perspective: an entrepreneurial function and a leadership function. These functions perceived within a discourse analytical perspective denotes both an emergent discourse and a related subject position. The relation between these elements is up to the emergent leadership to develop, define and choose. Accordingly, in a discourse perspective, bottom-up leadership has a high degree of control concerning the *continual expansion* of the leitmotifs of the profession based innovation project. However, the more bottom-up leadership continues to expand and develop the organisational discourse (by means of entrepreneurship), the more collaborators are growing impatient, since this continual development blocks for the collaborative adoption and mainstreaming of the innovation project. Bottom-up leadership should carefully consider the balance of these functions, since collaborators assumably grow weary of new developments before bottom-up leadership does. This balance is, of course, dependent on the character of leadership distribution; a high degree of leadership distribution could allow for further expansion of discourse, if collaborators can make sense of this expansion as something that produces 'collaborative turf' (Bardach, 1996).

The two analyses compared contribute with knowledge concerning the iterative relationship between entrepreneurship, leadership position, sensemaking and discursive influence.

As seen in the first embedded case, the leadership sets out on the entrepreneurial, profession based platform, and it is this platform that dominates part of the first phase. However, this platform moves with new insights and when the innovation project faces resistance. Accordingly, when bottom-up leadership insist on the merit of the innovation project, but suddenly alters the project as a consequence of a necessary adjustment of leadership and trial-and-error feedback related to the innovation project, leadership appears fragile and inconsistent. This increases the potential for conflict. Accordingly, bottom-up leadership has to accept that it faces a radical identity transformation and leadership maturation in the beginning of an innovation journey, in which the leadership moves from a profession-based unit to being a full-blown, collaborative leadership unit. This transformation involves all members of the unit, since these professionals suddenly change status from having an intra-organisational identity within a defined, sector-based remit to an inter-organisational leadership identity, in which they are carriers of an unfinished innovation project that requires of them to defend, explain and disseminate the project in inter-organisational interactions. This could be experienced as something of a shock for the emergent leadership.

In the second embedded case, the overall positional development towards mainstreaming demonstrates in my interpretation that there is a limit to how long a collaborative configuration can tolerate being in a development phase. But the dilemma does also point to a limit for how many chains of interactions bottom-up leadership can maintain in order to keep winning the organisational battles for meaning. In continuation of this point, the leadership dilemmas do also point to a limit of how complex chains of making and giving sense that can be communicated: as the process unfolds, the history of the process grows, and so there is an increasingly complex story to be told to collaborators, concerning ‘who we are, and what we are doing’.

Further, as the second embedded case demonstrates, network relations have to be sustained at different levels of interaction, both at the central-administrative level and at the local level. According to collaborators, vital stakeholders want to be included more in the innovation project; accordingly, network relations have to be further expanded. This is why the analysis demonstrates an enhanced leadership differentiation *within* the Neighbourhood Development office. So, in the middle of this huge web of interactions, the bottom-up leadership faces the challenges of collaborative demands for answers; of leadership expectations; of bureaucratic dissatisfaction from intermediate levels of the organisation as well as local politicians not included in the innovation; of difficulties of maintaining support for the innovation project – in the middle of all these interactions we find the bottom-up leadership.

This image that the analyses of the social construction of leadership conjure is that of a construction constantly tinkered with, built by bottom-up leadership, having a constant need for being glued together by means of giving sense and providing answers and maintaining alliances to decisionmakers. Accordingly, this image demonstrates yet a further important finding concerning the organisational function of bottom-up leadership in collaborative innovation: To perform as a container of all the sense made during the contentious and confusing innovation process. The collaborative push towards mainstreaming and formalisation of the innovation project seemingly solves this network-problem functionally by substituting the need for making and giving sense with formalised bureaucratic power.

So, at some point, bottom-up leadership has to make a decision concerning whether to continue outlining new development terrain or whether instead enhance its leadership in terms of generating value that collaborators can rely on. At some point collaborators will demand a value-demonstrating realization of the innovation project. This is why Neighbourhood Development moves towards a strategic leadership position, 'strategic' symbolising a closure of development and an enhancement of predictable elements of leadership profile. In this case value for collaborators is specific projects within the meta-political framework, projects that can be exchanged to political or administrative capital, as well as an administrative, managerial stabilisation. Ultimately, the positional development trajectory towards a 'strategic implementer' position signifies the fractures that arise when the innovation project leader is initiating the delivery of the innovation project from an informal bottom-up leadership position to a formal bureaucratic leadership.

#### *Future research agendas*

I identify three research agendas. Theoretically the relationship between utilisation of uncertainty and stabilisation is the main conceptual challenge for leadership concepts of collaborative innovation. The concept of uncertainty warrants further theoretical developments given a context of collaborative innovation. Future research should focus more on the aspect of the social construction of leadership. Empirically, it is necessary with more research concerning bottom-up leadership deploying the BUCIL model. Other analytical approaches than discourse theory can be applied. Future studies should also consider deploying the BUCIL model more narrowly, focusing on a single causal relationship of the model, enhancing the literature studies concerning the chosen causality. What this study especially calls for is the aftermath of bottom-up leadership innovations: what happens when such an innovation project is being mainstreamed and when all the contained sense is substituted with formal arrangements? Can empowered bottom-up leadership co-



exist with bureaucratic power structures? Further, the BUCIL model should also be deployed in other contexts and/or related to other wicked problems.

Finally, concerning future research agendas in a broader perspective, BUCIL studies can benefit from being located within other research fields besides collaborative innovation leadership, such as being compared to other types of leadership for wicked problems; or bottom-up leadership can contribute to coordination studies concerning how coordination can be achieved across organisations by means of certain leadership designs. As this study shows, doubts of the collaborative value are related to the entire innovation project that assumes that value will be gained in terms of increased coordination among sector-specific programs and policies. Accordingly, bottom-up leadership studies in a wicked problem context can contribute with empirical results concerning the long-term value of coordination efforts: whether to perceive these merely as instances of moments in which collaborative decision making is possible (Reff Pedersen *et al.*, 2011), or whether inter-organisational coordination is an end-state (Peters, 1998) that can actually be achieved and sustained.

It would also be fruitful to conduct literature studies of different theoretical bottom-up approaches to managing change across organisations and the institutional ramifications. Other approaches have the 'from the small to the grand' causality, such as institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana *et al.*, 2009). Finally, I believe this study and the results can contribute further to the theoretical approaches to the ongoing discussion of the social construction of leadership (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010), since both collaborative innovation and wicked problems are context factors that create a demand for such a leadership.



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## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>i</sup> See the following webpage for a project description in English: [http://www.ruc.dk/fileadmin/assets/isg/02\\_samarbejde/CLIPS%20-%20publikationer/Project\\_description.pdf](http://www.ruc.dk/fileadmin/assets/isg/02_samarbejde/CLIPS%20-%20publikationer/Project_description.pdf), accessed May 2013
- <sup>ii</sup> <http://mbbl.dk/by/byfornyelse/omraadefornyelse>, accessed May 14th 2013
- <sup>iii</sup> Download the description of TEA's 'Integrated Urban Renewal 2012' in English at the following website: [http://kk.sites.itera.dk/apps/kk\\_pub2/pdf/870\\_hHal1d53AJZ.pdf](http://kk.sites.itera.dk/apps/kk_pub2/pdf/870_hHal1d53AJZ.pdf)
- <sup>iv</sup> <http://www.kl.dk/menu/SF-siger-nej-til-enhedsforvaltning-id103786/>. Accessed March 2014
- <sup>v</sup> <http://www.kl.dk/menu/Opgiver-reform-af-styreformen-i-de-store-byer-id126823/?n=1->. Accessed March 2014
- <sup>vi</sup> See the following website for the strategy reportpaper (only in Danish): <http://www.sbi.dk/byudvikling/byforvaltning/den-horisontalehorizontale-sojle/den-horisontalehorizontale-sojle>. See the following website for a short version of the strategy reportpaper (only in Danish): [http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id\\_39070/scope\\_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx](http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id_39070/scope_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx)
- <sup>vii</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://kbhkort.kk.dk/?profile=sociokort>
- <sup>viii</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=804>
- <sup>ix</sup> See the following website to view the Policy in English: <http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=869>
- <sup>x</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/om-kommunen/indsatsomraader-og-politikker/byplanlaegning-og-anlaeg/udsatte-byomraader>
- <sup>xi</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://kbhkort.kk.dk/?profile=sociokort>
- <sup>xii</sup> 'Udkast til Kommisorium for Borgmesterforum'; 'baggrund for politik for udsatte byområder'
- <sup>xiii</sup> document nr. 2010-203266: Bilag 1 til indstilling om ny organisering: 3
- <sup>xiv</sup> document nr. 2010-250827: Bilag 2 til Indstilling – Ny styringsmodel vedrørende den almene boligsektor og de områdebaserede indsætter
- <sup>xv</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=804>

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<sup>xvi</sup> 'Krav og anbefalinger til ny runde helhedsplaner'

<sup>xvii</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/om-kommunen/indsatsomraader-og-politikker/byplanlaegning-og-anlaeg/udsatte-byomraader>

<sup>xviii</sup> See the following website for the strategy report (only in Danish): <http://www.sbi.dk/byudvikling/byforvaltning/den-horisontalehorizontale-sojle/den-horisontalehorizontale-sojle>. See the following website for a short version of the strategy report (only in Danish):

[http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id\\_39070/scope\\_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx](http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id_39070/scope_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx)

<sup>xix</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://kbhkort.kk.dk/?profile=sociokort>

<sup>xx</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=804>

<sup>xxi</sup> See the following website to view the Policy in English: <http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=869>

<sup>xxii</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/om-kommunen/indsatsomraader-og-politikker/byplanlaegning-og-anlaeg/udsatte-byomraader>

<sup>xxiii</sup> Doc: 2009-434053: Forslag til revideret strategiskabelon til efteråret 2010 (September 1 2009).

<sup>xxiv</sup> DOK4: Evaluering af boligsociale helhedsplaner i København (September 16 2009)

<sup>xxv</sup> Referat d. 9. oktober 2009 (October 19 2009)

<sup>xxvi</sup> Agenda for meeting in the team September 1 2009 (Email-correspondance the 31 of August 2009); Doc: 2009-439623: Evaluering af helhedsplaner 2010 – SOF's forslag til evalueringsdesign

<sup>xxvii</sup> Doc: 2009-364920: Skitse til fremtidig evalueringskoncept for helhedsplanerne (September 1 2009)

<sup>xxviii</sup> DOK4: Evaluering af boligsociale helhedsplaner i København (September 16 2009)

<sup>xxix</sup> DOK4: Evaluering af boligsociale helhedsplaner i København (September 16 2009)

<sup>xxx</sup> Dok. Nr. 2010-608443 (September 15 2010)

<sup>xxxi</sup> See the following website for the strategy reportpaper (only in Danish): <http://www.sbi.dk/byudvikling/byforvaltning/den-horisontalehorizontale-sojle/den-horisontalehorizontale-sojle>. See the following website for a short version of the

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strategy reportpaper (only in Danish):  
[http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id\\_39070/scope\\_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx](http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id_39070/scope_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx)

<sup>xxxii</sup> See the following website (only in Danish):  
<http://kbhkort.kk.dk/?profile=sociokort>

<sup>xxxiii</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=804>

<sup>xxxiv</sup> See the following website to view the Policy in English:  
<http://www.kk.dk/da/Om-kommunen/Indsatsomraader-og-politikker/Publikationer.aspx?mode=detalje&id=869>

<sup>xxxv</sup> See the following website (only in Danish): <http://www.kk.dk/da/om-kommunen/indsatsomraader-og-politikker/byplanlaegning-og-anlaeg/udsatte-byomraader>

<sup>xxxvi</sup> (<http://www.sm.dk/Nyheder/Sider/Vis%20Nyhed.aspx?NewsItem=526>).

<sup>xxxvii</sup> <https://subsite.kk.dk/sitecore/content/Subsites/SikkerBy/SubsiteFrontpage.aspx>

<sup>xxxviii</sup> The policy can be downloaded in English atfrom the following website:  
<https://subsite.kk.dk/Borger/BoligOgByggeri/~media/6BEC9FBD981E4035849347BEE92BA9F2.ashx>

<sup>xxxix</sup> The policy can be downloaded in English atfrom the following website:  
<https://subsite.kk.dk/Borger/BoligOgByggeri/~media/6BEC9FBD981E4035849347BEE92BA9F2.ashx>

<sup>xl</sup> [https://bibliotek.kk.dk/files/file\\_attachments/2011-08-29\\_1401/koebenhavvnerfortaellingen\\_2.0.pdf](https://bibliotek.kk.dk/files/file_attachments/2011-08-29_1401/koebenhavvnerfortaellingen_2.0.pdf)

<sup>xli</sup> <http://www.kl.dk/Kommunalpolitik1/Vakst-er-ogsa-et-kommunalpolitisk-ansvar-id85812/>

<sup>xlii</sup> [http://kk.sites.itera.dk/apps/kk\\_pub2/pdf/871\\_2Oh6MqcOSn.pdf](http://kk.sites.itera.dk/apps/kk_pub2/pdf/871_2Oh6MqcOSn.pdf), homepage visited 27th of February, 2013

<sup>xliii</sup> [http://kk.sites.itera.dk/apps/kk\\_pub2/pdf/869\\_yNq8vh4bJF.pdf](http://kk.sites.itera.dk/apps/kk_pub2/pdf/869_yNq8vh4bJF.pdf), homepage visited 27th of February, 2013

## SUMMARY

The thesis investigates how new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems in today's welfare societies through innovation. A bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation addressing wicked problems is theorised, displaying a social constructive process approach to leadership; a theoretical model emphasises that leadership emerges through social processes of recognition. Leadership is recognised by utilising the uncertainty of a wicked problem and innovation to influence collaborators' sensemaking processes. The empirical setting is the City of Copenhagen in which a strategy- and policy-making process is launched by a handful of professionals and a middle-manager with an in-depth knowledge of area-based planning programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The objective is increased coordination across municipal administrations and social housing organizations. A crucial condition for success is iterative leadership adaptation. In conclusion, the thesis finds that specialized professionals are indeed able to develop politically viable, innovative and collaborative solutions to wicked problems; and that such professionals are able to transform themselves into an actual, yet temporary, leadership, fully able to navigate the uncertainties and conflicts that characterise large political organisations.