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Between integration and freedom: School segregation in critical perspective

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ABSTRACT

In what sense is school segregation a problem and if so, what might its solution be? Based on a distinction between three critical approaches – immanent critic, integrative critical and defetishizing – this paper argues that the complex case of school segregation demands a combination of these approaches. In the light of immanent critic approach (1) segregation threatens the minimal preconditions for democracy. Integrated formal social settings are a precondition for the formation of networks between structurally different groups in society. Without such networks, the different social groups will not listen to the problems of the others. From an integrative critical approach (2), however, school segregation is not only a problem of integrating individuals and society as a whole, but also about integrating our different value-commitments. Even if segregation threatens democratic equality, we should, according to this approach, find ways to protect the value of freedom when we aim at equality. This paper suggests ways to promote integrated schools while respecting freedom. Integration might be possible even while allowing for alternatives to public schools if widespread ideas about how test scores reflect the true values of education are questioned. For this purpose, however, and immanent and integrative critique will thus require a defetishizing approach (3).

INTRODUCTION

With the growing influx of non-western immigrants and concerns about academic performance, school segregation has also affected the otherwise egalitarian Nordic countries (Blossing, Imsen & Moss 2014). In Denmark, white flight from lower-secondary public schools has become a growing tendency within the largest four cities as well as at least eight larger provincial towns since the 1980s, leading to the segregated schooling of natives and children with immigrant backgrounds (UVM 2011, 26, 34f). The 10.6% children with immigrant backgrounds attending Danish public schools are not represented at all at 50% of all public schools, whereas 40% of them attend the 1% of the schools with the highest concentration of children with immigrant backgrounds (Andersen et al. 2012).¹ Due to housing patterns and white flight, descendants of immigrants of non-Western origin generally attend schools located in areas with many immigrants. Since the local school often reflects residential patterns, school segregation also increases as immigrants tend to live together with low-income and low educated in residential areas for renters rather than homeowners (Damm, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranæs 2006, Rangvid 2010).

Private schools are often preferred even when their academic score effect is lacking (Andersen 2008). In 2014, 17% of schoolchildren in Denmark attended private schools, a trend that has been growing for years. In Copenhagen in 2011, 28% of children were attending private schools, but for children whose parents had university education background, it was 38% (UVM 2011, 16). Civic parent-initiatives (e.g. *Brug folkeskolen*) that try to convince parents to engage with their local public schools have a hard time countering these trends. By 2016, parents seeking to compare schools or locate a better school for their child can now obtain easy online-access to the number of pupils with immigrant backgrounds (immigrant and children of immigrants) as well as aggregated test scores at a given school. Once the percentage of children with immigrant background exceeds 25-35%, highly educated, ethnic Danish middleclass parents tend to move their children to different public schools or to private schools (which in Denmark are heavily state-subsidized). Though aspiring, middle-class immigrants follow the same pattern, their flight is less outspoken (Rangvid 2010). Additionally, in general well-off parents are now spending more money on education than poor families and their economic spending has increased in the last decade (Rysgaard 2010). Academic performance differences are constituted by these patterns. In Copenhagen, four schools score above average of the highest scoring PISA countries, while 14 schools score lower than the lowest average (Egelund et al. 2011, 22).

In the Danish case, school segregation is recognized as a crisis of society (Olsen 2005), but it is also a crisis in the deeper sense that central actors disagree about in what sense it is a crisis and what should be done about it (Benhabib 1986, 19). Some centre-right politicians argue that segregation is only an ethnic problem, abstain from progressive housing policies on ideological ground, or they may believe that school competition will enhance school quality (see Andersen and Serritzlew 2007). Social Liberal have argued that it is only a personal moral problem, while the Social Democrats had to face that the former and the present Party leaders ended up sending their children to private schools. This raises a general question: In what sense is school segregation a problem? What exactly is the crisis?

The Danish school segregation case is paradigmatic in the way it calls for a complex normative political interpretation. Based on the above sketched case, this paper contributes both to a discussion of how public debates and policies on school segregation should be framed and to the theoretical debates about different types of critique. Apart from motivating the research question *What is the crisis of school segregation?*, the case will help keeping the political theoretical analysis ‘many-sided’ and ‘complex’ (Flyvbjerg 2006, 238).

It is nothing new that political debates about public schools are conflict-ridden, as they invariably reflect normative ideals of equality and freedom, society-wide integration and respect for particular affiliations. The work of political theorists has been useful in specifying some fundamental normative stakes and dilemmas of school segregation. For instance, they have diagnosed a reoccurring tension between particular attachments and society-wide concerns on the basis of a particular understanding of freedom or equality (Reich 2002, Levinson 1999). Sometimes, however, they have framed the debates too narrowly. They sometimes neglect how different agents (such as the children, parents and the state) have potentially conflicting interests in how schools should be framed, and that schools prepare children for potentially conflicting ends such as democracy, life and labor. The aim of schools can be viewed both from an observer’s perspective where the democratic and labor marked competences of citizens as a mass would be in focus, or from the more particular views of the agents such as children and parents that may worry about the overall wellbeing and life prospects of one particular child. Reflecting this complexity, this paper is more dialectical in its structure than is normally the case by applying different critical approaches and perspectives. Building on three critical approaches with a specific focus on two normative theories that insist on seeing the integration of citizens from either the

perspective of equality or freedom, the gain from combining rather than separating critical approaches is revealed through the sensitivity of the analytical diagnosis: The analysis of dilemmas of school segregation reveals the delicate link between ideals of democratic integration and parental freedom as these appear both for social observers and individual participants. In combination, the critical approaches allow us to understand the intersubjective constitution of participant identities and may stimulate institutional reforms that could lessen the tension between participants overlapping identities.

In the first section, I distinguish the three different critique approaches as well as the observer's from the agent's perspective. Though the weight given to 'immanent' and 'integrative' critique in the paper suggests that I take these to be the most important ones, both our crisis diagnosis and possible cures will benefit from taking into account other forms. In the second and third sections, I discuss the problem of school segregation with a focus on the 'immanent' and then the 'integrative' critique. It teaches us the link between democracy and integration, and the reasons why integration and equal citizenship necessarily stumbles upon freedom. Finally, it teaches us not only to see the complex links between norms, social identities and institutional settings but also to think creatively about how to overcome these challenges without being blinded by socially constructed facts that try to steal our public attention. These sections are also in themselves contributions to the theoretical school segregation literature. In the case of immanent critique, my analysis of Elizabeth Anderson's position (section 2) brings out a new critique of her otherwise well-founded work. In the case of integrative critique, I show the strength of Hegel's theory of recognition for contemporary school debates (section 3).

I conclude that policy reforms to the advancement of democratic ideals should take into account how solidarity rests on exposure to others, and that this exposure can be in accordance with freedom, if particular commitments and personal satisfaction is a recognized end of integrating public institutions. As it turns out, application of the three critique approaches to the Danish school segregation case reveals some strengths and limitations of all the three critical approaches, while supporting the development of new perspectives and possible conclusions (Flyvbjerg 2006, 233).

Critical approaches

What are the relevant critical approaches to diagnose social crises? The question is a continuant theme in philosophy and sociology (Walzer 1997, Boltanski 2011). Building primarily on distinctions developed by Benhabib (1986), I construct a typology of critiques:

1) immanent critique, 2) integrative critique, and 3) defetishizing critique. All three critical approaches point towards ‘internal inconsistencies and contradictoriness’ in the social order in comparison to the order’s own standards (Benhabib 1986, 9).² In all cases, the critique is not merely negative, but also constructive, offering ways of seeing solutions to the problems.

Philosophers tend to focus on how the norms are revealed and affirmed from the observer’s perspective, whereas sociologists tend to focus on how agents experience crisis (Bourdieu 1999). Inspired by critical theory, in the following I want to blur this distinction (Benhabib 1986, Honneth 2009, Jaeggi 2014). Staying true to their Left-Hegelian and Marxist heritage, critical theorists look for ways in which social contradictions can be diagnosed from the premises of the social order itself, with the intention of explaining why social pathologies can be reproduced by the agents (Honneth 2009). Apart from observers and agents, I will see agents as also inter-subjects, who continuously seek affirmation and a sense of meaning through communication with others. However, each perspective can become ones-sided. Observers can fail to understand what makes sense for agents. Agents and inter-subjects can be parochial and partial in their evaluations of valuable ends. In the worst case, this means that subjects have a tendency to group thinking that is activated through unfavorable social circumstances (such as segregation). Immanent critique, integrative, and defetishizing critique offer psychologically and sociologically complex explanations as to why the facts and values fail to fit.

Immanent critique points out contradictions between expressed values and actual behavior. It then adds a more long-term perspective, asking whether and why existing practices fail to provide the resources needed for the social system’s normative reproduction.³ In the case of immanent critique, a negative feedback loop can be described whereby negative social reactions are allowed to flourish in an unhealthy institutional setup. The immanent critique specifies that this negative circle can only be broken at the institutional level. In *integrative critique*, we are asked to run an additional test before institutional solutions to negative feedback loops are tested. Integrative critique asks whether any central values are being suppressed in our diagnosis and cure. Finally, *defetishizing critique* seeks to question whether any apparent facts in our diagnosis are given a status that a closer analysis could reveal as ‘fetishist’. It investigates whether any facts have been given a more central or irreplaceable role than they ought to, since their constructed and arbitrary character has been overlooked.

Though immanent critique can provide its own answers, it needs ‘nourishment’ from

alternative approaches. First, in the integrative critique, contradictions and the crisis of normative reproduction are diagnosed as a failure to integrate central values. Rather than repressing one set of values to favor the other, as ordinary immanent critique would, integrative critique asks how different value commitments of society can be integrated given our knowledge of the actors as individuals as well as inter-subjects. In the Danish case, this approach will reveal that the commitments to both equality and freedom contradict each other, and the question becomes how to integrate the two without suppressing either freedom nor equality.

Finally, asking why agents stick to the practices that tend to undermine societies' normative commitments, the approach of the defetishizing critique is to seek out tendencies in the social order that might reify or fetishize certain empirical facts and understandings to such an extent that the historical and constructed dimensions of these 'facts' are neglected, thus allowing them to appear as salient focal points for social practices. In the conclusion, I discuss how test scores may be fetishized in society in ways that the other forms of critique fail to bring out. Neither immanent and integrative critique may be able to achieve their ends alone. The fetish character of test scores must also be confronted.

Immanent critique of school segregation

Elizabeth Anderson's *The Imperative of Integration* (2010) is an exemplary application of immanent critique. In a refreshing combination of empirically based political science and political philosophy, Anderson demonstrates how segregation threatens democratic norms. Anderson argues that democratic values are threatened by school segregation to such an extent that the social patterns of segregation 'call into question our claim to be a fully democratic society of equal citizens' (Anderson 2010, 3). I consider her approach to be an example of an immanent critique, since her conclusion – that salient facts contradict important social values – involves an intersubjective perspective in light of which a negative socio-psychological feedback loop is reproduced through changes in the actor's perception of each other.

As an overall approach, Anderson proposes that we follow Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous strategy of seeking 'legitimate principles of government, taking people "as they are and laws as they might be"' (Anderson 2010, 3). For Anderson, Rousseau's idea entails a 'need to tailor our principles to the motivational and cognitive capacities of human beings [...] with all our limitations and flaws' (Anderson 2010, 3f). Anderson argues that we need to diagnose what kind of institutional settings lead to specific motivational and cognitive

biases. In a second step,

just institutions must be designed to block, work around, or cancel out our motivational and cognitive deficiencies, to harness our nonmoral motives to moral ends [...] To craft such designs, we must analyze our motivational and cognitive biases, diagnose how they lead people to mistreat others, and how institutions may redirect them to better conduct (Anderson 2010, 4).

Before we can move to genuine institutional reform, the immanent critical analysis must undertake a sociologically informed analysis of how certain facts under certain institutional circumstances threaten society's norms. Even if Anderson's sociological explanation is true, however, one may question her description of the society immanent values. Is Anderson smuggling in controversial norms of democracy in order to make segregation look worse than it is? I do not think so. We do not have to agree on one of the many conflictual models of democracy (Held 2006) to agree that certain practices may pose a threat to our values. Moreover, it is hard to disagree that within democracies, political institutions should in principle be equally responsive and equally accountable to the interests and concerns all citizens (Anderson 2010, 2). As Anderson herself puts it, 'the primary demand of democratic institutions [is] to treat all citizens as equals' (2010, 131). The question then becomes what kind of response is needed and how this responsiveness to all citizens as equals can be secured.

Anderson first argues that responsiveness involves a minimalist democratic commitment to produce 'political stability by discouraging autocracy on the part of public officials and rebellion on the part of the citizens' (Talisie 2016, 139). Anderson then asks what it is that threatens this democratic minimalism. Her answer is simple and compelling. Without knowledge of how the problems of society are viewed from segregated groups, the perspective of the power elite remains unchallenged (Anderson 2004b, 106f).

What is more, even if reports were written, and knowledge about facts was diffused throughout the society, this would not be enough to motivate the elite to take these facts seriously. As Dewey (1993, 76) explains, our conduct reflects 'class-codes, class-standards, class-approvals – with codes which recommend the practices and habits already current in a given circle, set, calling, profession, trade, industry, club or gang.' In contrast to Dewey, Anderson defends the need for detailed empirical investigation of the causes and consequences of segregation (2010, 4). Building on relational theories of the causes of systematic group inequality in the works of Weber, Tilly, Granovetter, Coleman, and Putnam, and having consulted 'numerous independent lines of evidence, using different

methods, samples and measurement techniques, including Cutler/Glaeser's work on ghettos (Anderson 2010, 51), Anderson concludes that segregation leads to categorical inequality that stimulates negative group stereotyping between in- groups and out-groups. Building particularly on the perspectives of Granovetter, Coleman and Putnam, Anderson finds that segregation leads to categorical inequality, supporting group stigmatization through stereotyping of out-groups and unconsciously held heuristics supporting new biases between in-groups and out-groups (Anderson 2010, 51).

Anderson relates these potential long-term consequences of segregation on citizens' attitudes to her democratic theory of equal responsiveness. Segregation, she argues, 'enables officeholders to make decisions that disadvantage segregated communities without being accountable to them' (Anderson 2010, 2; compare Anderson 2002, 1205) as it 'blocks the mechanisms needed to hold officeholders democratically accountable to all the people (Anderson 2010, 111). Segregation thus 'impedes the formation of intergroup political coalitions [and] facilitates divisive political appeals' (Anderson 2010, 2). Citizens who are segregated 'are likely to entertain prejudices about each other, grow distrustful and perhaps contemptuous' (Anderson 2004b, 107); Anderson 2009, 220).

More formally put, 'If two groups of citizens, A and B, are effectively segregated from one another' (Anderson 2004b, 106), and 'the structure of opportunities is such that group A enjoys an overwhelming advantage in gaining access to public office and private positions of responsibility' (the equality concern), then 'members of group A will exercise their power in ignorance of or even disdain for the perspectives of members of B' (Anderson 2004b, 107).

Following from the minimalist democratic demands of equal responsiveness and treatment of citizens, Anderson argues that *society-wide communication* is a precondition for democracy. Democratic institutions need 'intergroup communication [...] to gather and use widely dispersed information about problems and policies of public interest' (Anderson 2010, 111). Furthermore, segregation 'undermines the competence of officeholders by limiting their knowledge of and responsiveness to the impacts of their decisions on the interests of all' (Anderson 2010, 2; compare Anderson 2002, 1205). Anderson's point here is that structurally disadvantaged *individuals* represent the perspectives of specific disadvantaged *groups*, and their views are needed if we are to tackle society's current problems. The disadvantaged and marginalized 'have different life circumstances and interests' from those of the elites (Anderson 2002, 1205, compare Dewey 1993, 60, 187). Since those in the social elite are likely also to become public decision-makers, segregation

means that decision-makers are less likely to stay alert to the needs, interests and perspectives and life conditions of groups of citizens who share different perspectives and interests to themselves. They lack ‘epistemic diversity’ (Anderson 2010, 134).

Following from the threats of social deafness, *elite accountability* relates *not* to the plurality of group-interaction, but specifically to the relation between the problem-solving elites and groups on the margins of society. Whereas society-wide communication stimulates the democratic dispositions of all by preventing citizens from becoming contemptuous towards out-groups, elite accountability relates specifically to whether the elite feels it has to be accountable to non-elite groups for the legitimacy of their decisions (Dewey 1993, 121). For the representative system to be legitimate, the problem-solvers should not be ‘insular, clubby, ignorant, unaccountable, and irresponsible’, which is exactly what is likely to happen if they take part in ‘demeaning’ group relations (Anderson 2010, 111).

Thus, departing from a minimalist democratic theory of avoiding autocracy, Anderson can now argue that the ideal of equal citizenship entails ‘the free cooperation and communication of citizens from all walks of life on terms of equality in civil society’ (ibid.). In particular, society should avoid group inequality on the lines of segregation by race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or citizenship; that is groups that come in paired social categories such as black-white, citizen-stranger (ibid., 7). The minimalist understanding of democracy is undermined if society reproduces ‘troubling patterns of intergroup interaction’ (ibid., 3) by which some groups are relatively disadvantaged in terms of ‘socioeconomic opportunity, public recognition, and democratic politics’ (ibid., 134).

Having diagnosed the problem, Anderson turns to possible solutions. She argues that ‘To achieve such responsiveness requires a robust civil society, in which people from different walks of life exchange their views about the problems they face, their interests, values, conflicts, hopes and fears’ (Anderson 2004a, 20; compare Anderson 2002, 1204, Anderson 2010, 124). Building on the work of Granovetter, Coleman and Putnam, Anderson adds that democracy ‘requires comprehensive integration of significant social groups in civil society and the state’ (Anderson 2010, 111). To explain what ‘comprehensive integration’ means, Anderson distinguishes several types of integration, such as role, status, spatial and informal integration (2010, 9, 116ff). In the formal settings of schools and military institutions, people have ‘sustained opportunities to practice interaction on terms of equality, and thereby acquire competence and ease in intergroup interaction’ (2010, 124). Especially schools, through ‘cooperative interaction’, can serve

these functions (134). Underlying the preconditions for her ideal that I distinguish in the following lies a concern that ‘[c]itizens can adjust their sense of the common purpose to others’ interests only through discussion and cooperative engagement with other citizens from all walks of life on terms of equal regard’ (Anderson 2010, 94, 123ff; Anderson 2002, 1204; Anderson 2004b, 106). Enforcing integrated institutions seems to be the solution:

[T]he task before us is to move [...] to a sustained culture of integration, in which [...] all institutions of civil society, including elite offices, will be integrated, and in which their interactions are governed by shared norms of equal respect forged together (Anderson 2010, 111).

The minimalist democratic ideal thus ends by coming close to the more ambitious Deweyan model (Dewey 1993), where democracy is ‘a state of social life [...] where there is free circulation of experiences and ideas, making for a wide recognition of common interests and purposes’ (122). For our purposes, however, the central point is that this approach authorizes the state to combat school segregation. Aligned with her moral psychological and institutional theory, Anderson claims that formal social institutions have the power to cancel our democratic biases. Though aware of the mixed empirical results (Anderson 2010, 125f), Anderson claims that specifically formal settings such as schools provide the preconditions needed for the ideal of democratic equality (ibid., 123).

Anderson mentions the Scandinavian countries as places that ‘demonstrate that egalitarian social democratic policies can dramatically limit class heritability and prevent class inequality from becoming categorical’ (ibid., 7) (compare Rothstein & Stille, 2003). Truly, many dimensions of Anderson’s arguments will resonate in the generally egalitarian Nordic countries. Given the fact of growing segregation in the Nordic countries, Anderson’s suggestion that schools should be seen as vehicles for democratic change (Anderson 2010, 122, 189), is likely to meet wide agreement in the Nordic countries. In contrast to Britain or Germany, Denmark’s primary and lower secondary schools have been widely *common* in the sense of undivided and socio-economically mixed through the 20th century. Combining different class-interests, leading Danish politicians agreed late in the 19th century to bring together children from different social backgrounds (Wiborg 2009). Since 1958, Danish primary schools have been undivided from the first to the ninth grade (lately, the preschool year has become obligatory, thus making 10 years of primary schooling mandatory). Within schools as well, they were generally undivided, with ‘[m]ixed ability classes throughout the entire nine/ten-year comprehensive school’ (ibid., 7). Additionally, private schools (although state subsidized and therefore inexpensive) have not appealed to

large segments of society in Denmark until the 1980s (Wiborg 2009). Historically, only one private school was elitist while most private schools have promoted themselves in terms of their alternative values and teaching pedagogies. If the public school were to erode, it would undermine widespread beliefs that integrated schools are a precondition for a workable democracy. Though controversial, efforts to integrate and equalize opportunities for immigrants have led some municipalities to institute bussing of children with poor language skills to schools in upper middle class residential areas (compare Anderson 2010, 126f).

Likewise, the democratic ideals expressed by Anderson are well grounded in the Danish context. The internationally recognized Alf Ross, in his *Why Democracy?*, defended an inclusive democratic ideal that depends on social equality as well as communicative egalitarianism (p. 139, 143, 146). From the school law of 1975 to the present day, a central objective of the school has been that of preparing children for democracy. The pedagogical strategies have also been deeply influenced by Dewey's democratic strategies for cooperative learning (Thestrup 1978, 26).

Challenges to immanent critique

Though generally favorable to Anderson's diagnosis and reform proposals, people in the Nordic countries might think that Anderson's diagnosis neglects important aspects. They are likely to find it surprising that Anderson makes little reference to freedom in her book on segregation, nor does she discuss autonomy, which is seen neither as an in-school value related to forming citizens' central virtues nor as the principle behind parental rights concerning their children's formative years (Reich 2002). The book does not confront the obvious conflict between democracy and parental freedom, which is surprising since in political philosophy, school segregation is often considered to be closely linked to a clash between respect for individual's personal attachments and freedom, on the one hand, and societal concerns about justice, citizen integration, solidarity, the reproduction of values, norms and citizenship identities and democratic equality, on the other (Gutmann 1987; Halstead & Haydon 2007; Levinson 1997). Rather, Anderson (2010) expresses a disdainful approach to freedom of choice. Describing the choices made by the middle class, she notes that they 'may choose neighborhoods on the basis of considerations of personal advantage, as well as ethnocentrism – feelings of affiliation and loyalty to groups with which they identify' (ibid., 70, 72, 73). The disdainful description suggests the legitimacy of neglecting reasons to promote freedom of association and freedom of choice. Clearly, she admits that a 'just and democratic society must secure not only the equality of its members, but also their liberties, including their freedom of [...] association' (2010, 19). Nevertheless, I find

her description of the 'right to freedom of association' derisive, and she seems only wholeheartedly to endorse the neo-republican view of freedom as the absence of domination (i.e. not being 'subject to the arbitrary will of another') (2010, 103, 106).

Anderson's approach runs the risk of giving a distorted perspective on the fact that Danish parents have a wide range of choices for selecting schools for their children, particularly due to the high level of financial subsidies for private school tuition as well as easy exit and entrance in public schools (UVM 2011, 29f, 44)⁴ She would disdain how 71% state financing (which makes them substantially cheaper than private schools in other countries), makes private schools too attractive an alternative to public schools (Rangvid 2010). The fact that private schools have a right to refuse pupils who may have learning or behavioural problems, whereas the public schools do not have such a right unless their classrooms are filled, gives private schools an advantage in creating a more homogenous, more effective learning environment.⁵

Being rooted in the liberal and egalitarian character of Danish school-policies, private schools receive a 71% state subsidy per pupil, independent of parents' income. Since the 1880s, Denmark has had a thriving civil society where engaged parents or educators could open schools based on a variety of pedagogical or ideological philosophies. What values might lie behind the long-lasting state support for private schools, and how do they balanced with democratic concerns? Anderson's approach reveals a problem and a solution from the observer's perspective, but it fails to take seriously the agents' perspectives (compare Nagel 1995, 8, 17, 30).

Though I share Anderson's skepticism towards the predominant choice approach to school segregation (Brighouse and Swift 2009), the point is that a critical theory that aims at making sense in this context has to confront the dilemma between democracy and freedom. Such a critical theory requires a more inclusive analytical frame than Anderson's.

Since parental freedom needs some level of recognition, I see a need to confront the problem of school segregation and dilemma of promoting both individual freedom and democratic citizenship from additional viewpoints than Anderson offers. Anderson is too dependent on a distinction between the social observer's perspective and the agent's perspective. From the social observer's perspective, the interests of all citizens should be taken into consideration, whereas at the agent level, their interests may be dismissed or derided if they contradict the social preconditions for the social system. The idea that the philosophical task was to reveal how contradicting perspectives and ideals could be combined at both the level of the agent and for the social observer has primarily been

developed by Hegel. A discussion of Hegel's political philosophy could show us a way out of our dilemma.

The integrative critique of school segregation

Integrative critique is an attempt to integrate apparent value conflicts, taking into account the moral psychological as well as the institutional preconditions for the production and reproduction of values (Benhabib 1986, 44, 71f). Following the approach of integrative critique, the integrative critique seeks to point out ways in which current value conflicts can be *integrated* through a complex *crisis diagnosis* that considers not only the different values but also the causes of the social crisis (Benhabib 1986, 108). Such a strategy can be found in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* (1821), where he attempts to integrate the apparently conflicting ideals of freedom and community into a theory of modern society that brings forth the potentials for realizing and reproducing the central norms while also resolving the contradictions that threaten to undermine this potential (Benhabib 1986, 95ff).

For Anderson, individual freedom merely undermines democratic citizenship. In contrast, Hegel's integrationist strategy insists on finding a place for individual freedom (Honneth 2014). As he puts it, freedom is 'the pivotal and focal point in the difference between antiquity and the modern age' (Hegel 1991, §124).

Taking his point of departure in the immanent problem of combining individual preferences with the reproduction of social life, Hegel argues that an immanently critique will have to also integrate conflicting values. In the modern world, citizens have come to identify with three different forms of freedom that stand in a state of tension with each other and require some sort of integration (Neuhouser 2000). The three forms, to be discussed below, are the freedom of *persons*, *subjects* and *members*.

How will this integration take place? Institutions can be formed to help the integration at the individual level. To Hegel, rather than facing an abstract 'ought', individuals are led through the social makeup and, in particular, through the forms of recognition that institutions and members offer each other to experience both the frustrations of disintegration and the goods and promises of social integration (Wood 1990). Hence, citizens become motivated to choose actions that reproduce a good society from the perspective of both individuals and observer (Neuhouser 2000).

Hegel's model combines an observer and an agent perspective through an intersubjective perspective. Hegel explains how the modern world can combine individual and systemic observer perspectives through the intersubjective phenomenon of recognition.

Whereas the individual perspective concerns social actors' lived experience, the systemic perspective represents the observer-thinker's holistic view of how institutional practices relate to each other from the perspective of an external observer (Benhabib 1986, 31).⁶

Modern citizens are legitimately recognized in three fundamental ways: as *persons*, *subjects* and *members*. Having sketched their central logics, I turn to a discussion of how they may be combined, whereupon I then discuss how the approach sheds new light on how to approach the social problems and dilemmas of school segregation. A solution would not only involve working around our biases, as Anderson suggested, but also seeing institutional recognition as a way of positively motivating citizens and forming their identities and aspirations. If this project succeeded, tensions between the three forms of recognition could be eased.

According to Benhabib, it is Hegel's strategy to map out 'social institutions and practices' while insisting on not seeing them 'in isolation' from how they all contribute to reproduce a normative social structure (Benhabib 1986, 76). As she sees it, this holistic approach should allow us to review the 'plurality of norms' present in society and to 'judge all relevant norms of human action' (Benhabib 1986, 78). It is this complex idea I want to explore as a potential solution to the dilemmas of school segregation. As I see it, Hegel's approach supplements rather than contrasts Anderson's view that integration is a legitimate principle of government and that humans are formed by the institutionalized relations in which they live.

A. THREE FORMS OF RECOGNITION

RECOGNITION OF PERSONHOOD: THE IDEA OF SELF-OWNERSHIP

The recognition of personhood involves respect for the individual's self-ownership of his or her body and conscience. Respect takes the legal form of respecting civil and political rights, such as the rights of physical movement and ownership (of property), freedom of thought (conscience, beliefs) and association (ethical and social association, religious) (Hegel 1991, §66). Hegel stresses that although this recognition comes with a certain expectation ('be a person and respect others as persons' (Hegel 1991, §36)), and though 'the training of my body in various skills, like the education of my spirit, is, likewise, a more or less complete penetration and taking possession thereof' (Hegel 1991, §52), no matter what persons do in terms of caring for their rights or enslaving themselves physically and mentally, '*for others*, I am essentially a free entity within my body' (Hegel 1991, §48, §49, §66, §209).

The mere *'possibility'* that one could possess one's body and mind as a free will sets claims on others to recognize the person's negative right (i.e. 'not to violate personality and what ensues from personality') (Hegel 1991, §38). Hegel calls the 'goods' that 'constitute' the person's 'personality' 'inalienable' and the person's 'right to them' 'imprescriptible' (Hegel 1991, §66). As persons, we have an inalienable right to our 'personality in general', to our 'universal freedom of will' as well as what Hegel calls 'Ethical Life, and religion' (Hegel 1991, §66). Following this form of recognition, citizens may see their children as a kind of property and may believe that the state should not interfere with the institutionalized ways or the ethical ideals according to which they wish to raise their children.

II. RECOGNITION OF SUBJECTIVITY: RESPECT FOR WELL-BEING INTERESTS

Hegel contrasts the recognition of being a person with the recognition of being a *subject* (Hegel 1991, §37, 38, 43). As subjects, we are recognized as having 'particular interests' (in the form of individual 'advantage or welfare') (Hegel 1991, §37). To recognize citizens' 'subjective freedom', states have to make sure that central institutions protect 'the right of the subject to find its satisfaction in the action' (Hegel 1991, §121), which to Hegel, 'is the pivotal and focal point in the difference between antiquity and the modern age' (Hegel 1991, §124). As subjects, individuals are recognized as having interests of their own, both short term or in the form of overall welfare and happiness (Hegel 1991, §123, §150). It is 'the right of the subject's particularity to find satisfaction (Hegel 1991, §124)', respect that 'the subject is determined in its differentiation and so counts as something particular' (Hegel 1991, §123). Parents may interpret this recognition as a right to choose a school that reflects their concerns for their child's well-being in both the short and the long run. Also, they may see it as a right to have aspirations that deviate from those of others and even to have interests that may appear antisocial, such as the desire to get ahead of others.

III. RECOGNITION OF MEMBERSHIP IDENTITIES

In the recognition of *membership identities*, Hegel draws our attention to the self-image of 'being what one is in the *other*' and claims that this self-image also 'attains its right' in the modern world (Hegel 1991, §167). In Hegel's story, this form of recognition finds institutional form in the family (marriage, childrearing), as well as in relations of work and in the institutions of citizenship of the well-ordered state itself. Hegel underscores that in the modern world, we are both recognized as legal *persons*, *moral subjects*, *family-members*, *citizens* (in the sense of *bourgeois*), and *human beings* (Hegel 1991, §190). Through such forms of membership, individuals can achieve an 'affirmative awareness of self in an other self' (Hegel 1971, §436). Though this form of recognition may inspire the

idea that our social freedom is found in close family relations or local communities of choice, Hegel argues that citizens also need to find social freedom in public institutions and the state at large. Regardless of whether parents interpret this third form of freedom as a right to home-schooling, religious- or public schooling, in all cases, the institutional form of schooling will need to allow every individual to see his or her own aspirations and identity as reflected in the institutional form. Furthermore, the institution will need to support citizens in developing a sense of being dependent on the state for their own freedom and well-being. The state needs its citizens to understand that it is through the state's central institutions that their personhood and subjectivity is respected, developed and allowed to flourish.

[O]therwise, the state must hang in the air. It is the self-awareness of individuals which constitutes the actuality of the state, and its stability consists in the identity of the two aspects in question [i.e. individual and society-wide ends, SLJ]. It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends are not satisfied, and if they do not find that the state as such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself stands on an insecure footing (Hegel 1991, §265Z).

Combined with the points made above, this kind of well-being I take to mean as not being alienated from the central institutions in which they lead their lives (family, work, state institutions). Citizens may find that their recognized status and identity ('Selbstgefühl') is intimately tied to these institutions and to the relations they entail (Hegel 1991, §147).

B. COMBINING THE THREE FORMS OF RECOGNITION

Integrative critique begins by pointing out salient social values, and the question then becomes how to combine those values. In our case, can respect for a parent's right to choose a segregated school be combined with the reproduction of these three commitments over time? Hegel's model offers two enhancements to Anderson's. Apart from offering a way of framing the problem as one of combining different values over time, Hegel shows us the intersubjective mechanisms through which a possible integration may take place. Whereas Anderson aimed at society-wide communication, Hegel worries about whether all individuals will be able to find themselves at home in the state. In fact, Hegel does not merely conduct his integrative approach from the social observer's perspective, aiming only at 'coordinating social action through the functional interconnection of action consequences' (Benhabib 1986, 230). His position includes what Benhabib calls the

‘intersubjective perspective’, which is important for diagnosing lived crises (1986,12) where social integration can be sought relying on the ‘coordination of action through the harmonizing of action orientations’ (ibid., 230).

In a good society, citizens may discover, through struggles and periods of alienation and choice that their ‘particular satisfaction, activity, and mode of conduct’ have a social and institutional basis (Hegel 1991, §258). Here the individual may find ‘that its own dignity and the whole continued existence of its particular ends are based upon and actualized within this universal’ (Hegel 1991, §152).

Hegel believed that citizens would gain deeper satisfaction with greater permanence (Hegel 1991 §185) if they were recognized not merely as having a right to their personal possessions, or to their subjective desires, but also recognized as having an identity as a member of society as a whole. This recognition would entail a recognition that the citizen, as member of society at large, ‘has an interest in, and endeavors to promote, the less selfish end of this whole’ (Hegel 1991, §253). But how might he approach someone who was not yet at her right spot in society? How might he approach the agent from the agent’s own perspective? From the observer’s perspective, the integrative problem is how to reproduce a democratic society where citizens have their identity in the state, while the rights of personhood and freedom of all are respected. From the intersubjective perspective, the question is how the appropriate forms of recognition can be reproduced institutionally. From the subject’s perspective, I will suggest that the question is really one of how to avoid alienation. Citizens should not feel *alienated* as a result of the very social practices through which one is commanded to fulfil the obligations necessary for the overall realization of equal and free citizenship. Since members of society are also persons and subjects, and since they should not feel *alienated* in their membership-roles, they should remain ‘present in this identity as a person, i.e. as atomistic individuality’ (Hegel 1991, §167). Hence, the potential *force* of institutions has to be repeatedly approved of by all individuals (compare Hegel 1971, §436 and Neuhauser 2000).

I. ALIENATION AS CRITERION FOR EXIT RIGHTS?

In critique as crisis integration, functionalist logics and lived experiences as well as social and moral identities of social actors have to be mediated (Benhabib 1986, 78, 141). This can be achieved through a translation of the ‘the functional language of crisis into the experiential language of suffering, humiliation, oppression, struggle, and resistance’ (i.e. the lived experience of social actors) (p. 142). Applied to the debate over the legitimacy of school segregation, I see a potential in appealing to parents’ sense that choosing a private

school without considering its social consequences is neither ideal for society nor for them and their children's development. Appealing to parents' judgement on this issue must confront the lived experiences of social actors with the functional language of crisis.

Related to the question of school segregation, we may think of a situation in which schools are common and well-functioning and where only those citizens who are severely alienated due to deeply held beliefs or out of serious concerns with short and long-term well-being are offered exit options, and this in a situation where coercive measures would not be applied. In such cases, 'The right of individuals to their particularity is, likewise, contained in ethical substantiality, for particularity is the mode of outward appearance in which the ethical exists' (Hegel 1991, §154).

Apart from whether market identities and -structures already have too strong a hold on middle-class citizens, the legitimacy of a limited exit right depends on a distinction between deeply held moral convictions and broader concerns for one's children's well-being. Though this distinction may appear illegitimate from the perspective of persons and subjects, the default option could be envisioned where 'parents' can at least be asked to think of themselves as living up to their 'special duties of care' to 'care for the other's well-being in light of his or her individual needs' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 139).

Secondly, the soul-searching deliberative practices needed to test the level of the parents' frustrations can take a liberal form that is already common in school settings.⁷ Whether such limitations to freedom of exit are legitimate may depend on the distinction between personal and subjective freedom. We should acknowledge the slippery slope here once the right to opt out of the public system is recognized publicly and legally: citizens may interpret this right as a form of *freedom* to focus solely on how to advance the welfare of their child. Rather than seeing the recognized choice as the possibility to opt out on grounds of conflicts with deeply held moral convictions, parents may see it as a right to advance their private interests in the same manner that private interests are served when people pursue 'freedom of choice' in market settings. Allowing exit-right only on the basis of deliberation could be perceived as a personal loss of moral freedom once moral choices become indistinguishable from market choices. However, depending on the details of policy-designs, limiting exit-rights need not be a serious moral limitation.

As a consequence, we might find that a majority of citizens who were in the default public school setting would have frustrations and conflicts but somewhat limited rights of exit. Hegel wants us to think of the citizens' surrendering of merely personal aims, what he calls 'immediate exclusive individuality', in similar ways as what goes on in types of

relationships where through the individual may become ‘conscious of itself in the *other*’ (Hegel 1991, §167). School institutions should be so designed that members would have this experience. Important would here be democratic practices and means of influence where the value commitments and personal aspirations on behalf of their children can be honored.

II. NON-ALIENATION AS CRITERION FOR INSTITUTION BUILDING

Apart from the question of legitimacy of default public schools, there is the problem of motivation of the participants. Why would those citizens with particular personal aspirations listen to the defenders of crisis integration? One strategy for state actors could be to make the public choice as attractive as possible. By making schools a ‘substantial ethical institution’, parents who experienced frustrations and conflict of a minor kind would eventually realize their deeper affiliation and freedom in and through those institutions. To reach this level of ethical awareness, the frustrated parents may have to realize that giving up their choice of private school is a small price to pay, that they still have options for voice and making their interests heard, and that what they are denied in terms of school choice, they gain more fully as part of a public, democratic project.

In the market sphere, we are already allowed to indulge in subjective desires to such an extent that ‘In the end, it is no longer need but opinion which has to be satisfied’ (Hegel 1991, §190Z). The public contrast to the private is needed, since ‘civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both’ (Hegel 1991, §185) just as marketization leads to ‘discontent and moral irritation’ (Hegel 1991, §189) in as much as market leads to ‘an equally infinite increase in dependence and want’ (Hegel 1991, §194).

The point is not that we should fully give up on parental choice. Systematically denying citizens their rights as *persons* ends up alienating them and thereby denies them membership freedom. The central point of Hegel's proposal, therefore, is to search for an institutional mix that allows citizens to realize the freedoms of persons, subjects and members.

III. DISCUSSION OF THE ALIENATION APPROACH

The idea that the alienation felt by parents who choose to send their children to private schools could support policies that disfavored private schools faces a severe problem precisely when it comes to the question of schools. The Hegelian motivational model works, as I believe it does, in the version Hegel envisioned, because individual frustrations are overcome by struggles and efforts by the very same individuals. However, the parent-child

relationship introduces a gap between the individuals' suffering and struggling (cf. Swift 2003). Since persons are separate, this may not be a legitimate move (Rawls, 1971). Parents may experience the suffering of a consumer identity and lack of greater social integration if they choose private schools, but they may be willing to suffer if they find that they thereby relieve their children from suffering in the short- and the long-term. The public school may be a place of conflict and alienation for the child in the short-term, and it may be a place that parents' think will lead to the child's lower academic performance in the long-term. The parents may refuse to let their children participate in the struggle for society-wide integration if the struggle seems arbitrary and unrelated to the crisis as the child experiences it (unresolved minor conflicts here and now in school). In relation to the long-term perspective (academic performance and labor market potentials), parents are likely to want to promote their children's' well-being rather than use them as instruments in a social struggle for system integration that they – from a game theoretical perspective – do not trust that others are supporting.

There are good reasons why parents have this motivation: they have particular attachments to their children, they want their children to love them later in life, once they realize what they did to promote their well-being, and hardworking parents in dual-earner families may feel guilty about leaving children in the hands of institutions for large parts of their childhood.

Notice that this challenge is only fully harmful to an approach that operates exclusively from the perspective of individuals' motivations and lived experience. Hegel did not want to characterize membership and the freedom that accompanies it as a mere phenomenological experience of existential connectedness to other persons or to their lack of alienation. Having seen to what length Hegel is concerned with the subjective experiences of citizens and their motivational structures, and having seen the problems that a free choice strategy can generate, we may now acknowledge that strengthening a default public school institution founded upon membership identities is an important and non-totalitarian consequence of applying Hegel's approach to crisis integration. Schools are central social institutions that satisfy parents' need for support in the upbringing of their children, while supporting the children's need for a sense of membership and stimulation of their desire to grow and develop. Hegel's concern that rich and poor citizens could develop identities of non-membership if they did not feel that the state provides for their happiness (§244) also speak to the need for non-segregated, non-alienating schools.

CONCLUSIONS

Issues of school segregation pose unsettling questions about identity and morality that easily lead to antagonistic blame games in public discourse. If we allow market-like choices to govern the school system fully, democracy risks being undermined. This paper has shown that the application of different critical approaches can help our public self-interpretation, bringing out norms and dilemmas that we might otherwise fail to confront by public reasoning.

Anderson brings out the democratic dimensions of school segregation. She confronts us with the demand that democracy requires social integration. Democracy ‘requires the full inclusion and participation as equals of members of all races in all social domains, especially in the main institutions of society that define its opportunities for recognition’ (2010, 112f). Given this focus on the equal democratic status of citizens, Anderson’s social democracy is an attractive form of expressive egalitarianism (2010, 14).

Though Hegel’s 1821 text lacks the democratic dimension and thus the dimension of society-wide communication central to Anderson’s argument, it allows us to take into account a more complex list of values, providing resources for describing the functional importance of public schools at the systemic and individual level in light of its theory of the motivational capacities of individuals. The task now becomes that of finding ways to overcome lived crises and systemic problems at the same time. This becomes inherently tricky once we add in the factor of the complexity of the parent-child relation.

A way out of this dilemma involves taking on board the moral psychological corrections of Anderson’s systemic strategies entailed by the recognition approach. According to the theory of recognition, the given motivations of citizens should not be taken fully at face value. Our motivations tend to change with the institutionalized patterns of recognition we experience. If politicians follow the face value of majority middle-class voters, they are likely to be reluctant to take on (off-putting) radical solutions and they may instead propose moderate (but ineffective) solutions. Our strategy, therefore, should not be merely to work around motivational biases and deficits, but to think creatively about how to balance off institutions that provide us with different forms of recognition. If we ‘are what we are as recognized’, it matters how we recognize each other. Latently, this apparently banal observation has radical implications if we can envision creative ways of combining the individual and the observer perspectives (Benhabib 1986, p. 80, 93f & Wood 1988, 110).

The two models also serve as warnings against the political temptation to satisfy the

immediate interests of middle class voters. Likewise, the theories may serve as warnings against the negative circles of interest adaptation and identity formation that can result when central membership institutions are formed in accordance with a simple model of preference-satisfaction.⁸

A combination of the two models is particularly helpful for forming a positive circle for the reproduction of liberal and democratic norms. In particular, the recognition approach could be helpful for investigating the micro-dimensions of a school setting, as it would allow us to combine and develop the three kinds of freedoms (cf. Davis 2007). This strategy would also introduce Anderson's democratic focus. Having a say is likely to enhance the sense of participation. Of relevance here is Anderson's discussion of how authorities such as teachers may 'function as norm entrepreneurs in making public their support for integration and supply incentives to induce subordinates to follow norms of civility in intergroup relations' (Anderson 2010, 210,124). Given such expressive authorities, a pluralistic school environment may stimulate both democracy incentives and autonomy (Levinson 1999, Warren 2001, 107, 153f; cf. Anderson 2010, 120). Greater awareness of the values, problems and dilemmas tied to school choice and segregation might make it easier for citizens, teachers, and politicians to become norm entrepreneurs. This awareness may all help stimulate a positive circle, where expressive commitment to shared schools and its democratically attractive functions by the public and politicians (Levinson 2007, 635ff) would again stimulate public commitment to membership institutions. Such a public commitment should be of importance to any democratic society.

To initiate this positive circle, however, it is not enough to call for responsible choices of parents on the basis of quantified data about aggregated test scores and the number of immigrants, a strategy promoted by the Danish Liberal and Social Liberal parties. Reports show that *bussing* leads to the flight of resourceful middle-class parents towards private schools; *redrawing of school districts* leads to instant pressure on local politicians from citizens who can always opt out of the public school system (Saietz 2008); and injecting extra resources for schools in areas with many immigrants (*magnet schools*) does not attract middle-class parents.

The problem might be that when it comes to the individual development of schoolchildren, parents and policymakers have more faith in academic test results than democratic learning (Gutmann 1987, 3ff). This view reflects not only the way OECD rankings have been interpreted in Denmark (UVM 2013, 1), but also the sense that the welfare state needs to redefine itself as a 'competition state' in order to survive global

competition (Pedersen 2011). The immanent and integrative approaches may thus remain impotent unless combined with a defetishizing critique of the growing obsession with aggregate test scores of schoolchildren and the strong beliefs that these scores can measure the success of lower secondary schooling (Nielsen 2013). To make the social practitioners see the democratic and freedom-enabling potentials of public schooling, the tendency to see school test scores as the primary indicator of school performance needs to be confronted as a kind of ideology. The critic would thus need to advance a ‘defetishizing critique’: to show ‘that what appears as a given is in fact not a natural fact but a historically and socially formed reality’ (Benhabib 1986, 21). The term *fetish* may seem peculiar here, and this is not a blanket argument against statistical facts as such. However, there are moments when statistics *can* take on a fetish form, performing as facts of a higher order that somehow trump or suppress further debate about what the problem is and how it might get solved. Calling test scores a fetish suggests that the obsession with numbers and rankings may suppress the discussion of more deeply held values. The fetishized object is taken to be a natural fact that our moral norms and pragmatic thinking have to work around, but not challenge. As apparently neutral measures, academic test scores colonize traditional democratic and humanistic ends of school life, replacing part for the whole (Nussbaum 2010; Brighthouse et.al. 2016 4f). As the socially constructed test scores achieve the status of an obstacle around which everything else naturally has to move, immanent and integrative critique can achieve its ends only when combined with a *defetishizing* critique.

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NOTES

¹ In 2007, there were 36 schools where more than 50% pupils had immigrant backgrounds.

² These will often be practical contradictions (Benhabib 1986, 106; cf. Jaeggi 2014, 288ff).

³ This is a reformulation of a distinction made by Jaeggi (2014), pp. 286ff.

⁴ Even the most exclusive private schools – with two or three elite exceptions for children of diplomats, etc. - cost the parents only about USD 150-250 per month per child, with scholarships available.

⁵ The 2001-2011 Government extended the free choice of schools, promoted national standards and tests, and made rankings of school test scores publicly known. The law of 2005 giving parents extended free choice of public schools means that public schools must accept any child wishing to enrol if space is available (given a quota set by local politicians for each school); formerly, school choice was also free, but principals could object for pedagogical reasons (UVM 2007).

⁶ Benhabib (1986, 142) argues that the critic needs to diagnose and integrate at both levels; that is, diagnose and integrate crisis as seen from both the individual and the systemic perspectives. She claims that Hegel fails in doing so (99). In contrast, I intend to demonstrate that Hegel's idea of freedom is not a mere systemic observer theory of how functions and consequences related to central values can be coordinated by an administrative elite. Hegel brings out the importance of the lived experience and action orientations of individuals for social integration, and his approach allows us to do the same to a greater degree than does Anderson. The key lived experience is the phenomenon of recognition according to which recognitional practices supported by institutions are constitutive of our self, our reasoning capacities and our very freedom as human beings (Benhabib 1986, 81, 83).

⁷ In order for a child to be permitted to opt out of the compulsory religion classes in Danish schools, parents need to confer with a teacher about the content of the teaching in order to ensure that they know what it is they are rejecting.

⁸ Clearly, a full strategy would involve public discussions on issues besides middle class fears; this would include issues such as social and housing policies (Anderson 2010, ix, 5; UVM 2011, 18), affirmative action, nation-building strategies, and racial issues as well as numerous other issues related both to conditions external to the school (such as questions of 'residential segregation') as well as within the school environment itself (i.e. formal and social integration) (Anderson 2010, 126).