

**Johannes Andersen**  
**THE POLITICS OF DAILY LIFE**  
**- on Modernity, Political Culture and**  
**the Culture of Everydaylife**

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Johannes Andersen

## THE POLITICS OF DAILY LIFE

- on Modernity, Political Culture and the Culture of Everydaylife

On meeting a young, skilled worker that says he is against privatization, that he votes conservative and that apart from that he hasn't got much time for politicians: all this is not particularly surprising. Nor on meeting a young woman with a top position in a large legal firm who says that she is in favour of trimming the welfare state and that she votes for a left wing party. As a reason for these points of view it is often argued that they are based on different forms of experience of daily life..and you accept that, too. You get close to the point where it would *really* surprise you to meet a young skilled worker that says he votes labour and claims that he'll continue doing so because he's part of the movement and because democratic socialism is an important goal for society if the oppressed are to have just a slightly better life.

That this last view is, immediately, the most surprising is, in part, due to the fact that today, and even more in the future, we can expect to meet many different forms and combinations of social status and political attitudes. We can already meet many political viewpoints that are a complete hotchpotch of attitudes, plucked from different places, whereas it is increasingly seldom that we find the *classic combination* of social status and political attitudes. And this situation makes an attempt to theoretize the relationship between political attitudes and a particular social point of departure increasingly difficult.

Within this mixture of different political attitudes, it is still possible to delimit political conflicts. But where such conflicts, previously, had to do with basic attitudes as to what kind of society was desirable - at a more fundamental level such attitudes had an emancipatory perspective - today one of the most signal cleavages is between, on the one hand, the *active elite* who personally intervene on many political issues - with opinions, demands and criticisms - and, on the other hand, the *spectator* who basi-

cally has a pretty passive attitude to political life. The role of spectator can be played in many different ways. There is the *interested* spectator who consciously relishes the spectator role and argues that democracy works best when the elected leaders perform their roles as decision makers and leaders and who only participates when a decision affects her personally. Another role is that of the *passive spectator* who, basically alienated from the whole political process, takes a back seat or simply awaits what happens.

In this pattern we can see the contours of a new political culture whose key feature is that trends and combinations of political attitudes are more likely to spring from experience of everyday life than from social status<sup>1</sup>. This shift is linked to certain fundamental societal changes which I will examine more closely in what follows. Here I will also attempt to delimit the contours, consequences and background to the cleavage mentioned above between *the spectator* and *the active*.

## **Modernity and Democratization**

Characteristic of modernity is the growth within a whole range of social, economic and political institutions of less personal, more functional, reflective and high tech systems of management and surveillance which, together with a process of globalization results in debilitation of the societal institutions that are crucial for the social structure and for the population's social and political orientation. This is tantamount to an increasing degree of individualization in which people are cut loose from their social communities and traditions. One result of this is an increasing degree of reflexivity in which each individual is constantly forced to reflect about what kind of community he or she belongs to, about the problems of reproducing close relationships to others, about the many choices he or she faces and the options for self-realization (Giddens 1990).

Each individual has more and more opportunities for their own life since new choices are constantly being created. In brief, the social division of labour and high productivity provide a number of possibilities both for mobility and for differentiation which, in turn, means that for the individual it is possible to design a *personal strategy* for his/her own life. But for this to happen, individuals have to make choices.

Such choices are made in a society in which the individual societal

institutions - speaking broadly, the organs of the state, trade unions, professional and political organizations etc. - are no longer the foundation stones of social and political life, with fixed places and positions as was, for example, the case with the labour movement. If you were a worker you were part of the labour movement and, as such, supported their general view as to what would be a positive social change: a view which the movement formulated. In brief, you were part of the movement and you could just lean back and let the institutions of the movement decide for you: both as to matters of attitudes and in finding a role in the community. In addition, this was a community that had an emancipatory perspective. A similar account could be written about the peasant movement, e.g. the array of institutions of the Venstre (agrarian liberal) political party that emerged in nineteenth century Denmark, linked to the cooperative movement and the Folk High schools.

For a whole variety of reasons, these institutions no longer have the same significance. They are no longer the bearers of opinions. Hence individuals have to make choices *themselves*. The individual has to develop his own opinions on a host of matters. This occurs in a process in which institutions attempt to bind to them different groups in the social and political game, for shorter or longer periods, by agreements and expectations of future gains.

The point, in essence, is that less and less can be taken for granted. And this is true both for institutions and for individuals. This entails that the individual is left to his own devices, to a greater and greater degree of reflexivity and strategic thinking as more and more choices of action open up. One is forced to understand the world around one by reflexive thought and to find a place in society as a result of personal choice. One has to make life meaningful oneself. On the other hand, this process also means that it becomes increasingly difficult to make such choices, precisely because one is not a member of an institutionalized community with particular traditions and opinions: so it is difficult to discover what is a "good" choice. One is caught in a dilemma in which, on the one hand the number of options grow but, on the other hand, one is not really capable of choosing between them all and, as a result, one's attitude to these choices is, to say the least, ambivalent (Ziehe 1989).

This development mirrors a trend in political life away from a classic, emancipatory politics based on a given vision of an emancipatory social change to a politics of everyday life or life style politics in which it

is up to each individual to develop his/her own political strategy, the goal of which is to realize the good to be found in each individual (Giddens 1991). This focus on self-realization is linked to the fragmentation of modern society, conceived as a split between the outer (the evil, the threatening) and the inner (the good) in which one must, minimally, defend oneself against the outer threat (Craib 1992).

Finding a place and a meaning in society is not, for the individual, a consequence of a particular way, based on traditions, of relating to a number of institutions and modes of thought, if one is to survive and act in society. Furthermore, such institutions as trade unions no longer *require* of us the kinds of commitment that they required in the past. For example, historically, in order both to formulate a rational belief about the future and to behave as a reasonable person, one simply had to be engaged in a specific institutional context. It's simply not that way anymore. The ever weaker and weaker position of the labour movement is an example of this trend. With the growing individualization of modernity, it is increasingly up to individuals to establish his/her social and political opinions: just as it is up to the individual to develop his/her strategy for a better life.

Summa summarum, one of the theoretical points about this trend is that the process by which individuals acquire their opinions is of increasing significance. Where previously, perhaps, political culture was to a large degree the result of given collective relationships and institutionally rooted traditions, opinions and attitudes have to be developed and reproduced in a sphere that is increasingly affected by individuals' reflections and choices. And this development gives rise to a number of exciting theoretical issues concerning the political culture. First and foremost, as to whether it actually is the case that it is the individual's particular form of daily life, and not his social status, that is decisive for developments in the political culture.

In this connection it is natural to test an hypothesis as to whether new conflicts are developing in the political culture as a result of increasing reflexivity. As to whether the development of a *spectator democracy* on the one hand is a response to this and, on the other hand, exacerbates this trend. It is these two issues that are to be examined more closely in this paper. I have chosen to look more closely at two crucial issues concerning the change in the political culture of Denmark:

1. Whether one can identify strata in the Danish population in which the political culture originates and develops by means of an empha-



sis on immediate individual interests in a process whereby these strata feel less and less linked to current political institutions and movements and in which one can register political opinions and attitudes which, on a number of issues, are increasingly at odds with the way in which one, traditionally, identified political problems and possible solutions i.e. whether one can identify an individualistic *spectator culture* with very limited engagement in politics.

2. Whether one can identify strata in the Danish population in which the political culture emerges and develops in a reflexive milieu and in which one can register opinions and values that emphasize participation and engagement. That is, a culture which, to a greater or lesser degree, is critical of, and on the offensive towards the more traditional, institutional ways of identifying problems and solutions. One can assume that a critical distancing from traditional political institutions, combined with a desire for a greater degree of influence for the individual plays a crucial role here: this can, *inter alia*, be part of the fundament of, and dynamic underlying, social movements. So there exist strata of the population which, due to the priority which modernity confers on each individual and his/her perspective on life politics which more than for other strata, realize the individual's democratic potential within the framework of spectator democracy. This political culture can be identified as the *activist culture* of spectator democracy.

Unfortunately, however, the actual treatment of these issues can only be limited since the empirical data that can be used is, in this context, very incomplete. Hence the answers to the questions raised are primarily illustrative and of a tentative nature.

This discussion does, however, raise issues of a more fundamentally theoretical nature about the background to the development of political opinions and values. Here I will attempt to confront assumptions about modernity's reflexivity with the more classical view that emphasizes the relationship between social status and political values. In other words, the question is whether, given the sparse and limited empirical material, there is some indication of evidence as to the basic theoretical points of the relationship between political culture, modernity, socio-economic class relationships, typologies of the culture of everyday life: and these relationships are to be explored in what follows. It is, not least, this last factor - the typologies of everyday life - that occupies a key role.

## Daily life as typology

In focusing on *everyday culture*, the objective is, first and foremost, to develop a theoretical conceptual apparatus - in the form of a *typology* - that should serve as an analytical tool with a view to achieve a greater sensitivity vis-à-vis actual political processes and actual political experience from everyday life.

The goal of a typology of everyday culture is, in other words, to identify certain typical varieties of opinions and reactions which, on the one hand, may have considerable significance for topical and current political processes and which, on the other hand, depending on their extent, can be expected to be of significance for the reproduction of the fundamental democratic political culture.

Both the advertising business and the major media deploy well-developed and statistically very complex typologies. These typologies make it possible to advance reasonable predictions as to how a given target group will react to a certain offer or product. For example, they help one, via advertising, to reach a specific target group and advise as to how such a target group should be stimulated.

What these typologies have in common is, however, that they are based, first and foremost, on empirical circumstances and they are, to a great degree, the result of the computer's capacity to classify data into a variety of clusters. What we have here are not *theoretically based* typologies and, for an investigation in the social sciences, this is a very serious limitation. To put this another way, what we must demand of a typology is that it does have a theoretical basis so that the typology doesn't just change with the first and best change in fashions or media habits. In other words, the typology has to be used as the point of departure for a closer theoretical explanation and discussion of a given phenomenon: and this is a minimal requirement.

One of the theoretically based typologies is the theory of life mode analysis (Højrup 1983). The concept of life mode is an attempt to identify the interaction between, on the one hand, *daily activities and chores* and, on the other hand, how such activities are *regarded*. The point of departure for the determination of daily activities and tasks is the marxist concept of the mode of production as formulated, inter alia, by Althusser i.e. a concept of the mode of production that insists on a relation between the level of the economy on the one hand and the level of ideology on the other

hand. But, in the same process, the relation assigns these levels a relative autonomy. This is certainly not a definition that claims that the logic of the economy works through directly to the level of ideology. Rather, the concept of mode of production is related to a structural determinism whereby, in the last instance, the economic level determines the boundaries for ideological connections of, for example, economic tasks (Althusser 1969).

From such a concept of the mode of production, two basic forms for activities and tasks in daily life and hence two different life modes can be determined. In simple commodity production, the key activity is linked to the production and reproduction of an independent business. In this mode of production the life mode is defined as the *independent life mode* and what is crucial here is a permanent interplay between work and rest in daily life. One does one's daily tasks. This work occurs in the same unit of production and consists of many different activities e.g. feeding animals, cultivating the fields, checking the crops etc. Often with the help of members of the family.

The dominant self conception in this life mode has, as its objective, to keep the independent business and the means of realizing this goal is also the business. The dominant values accentuate that one is free and independent. One is proud of a good day's work, trusts in one's own strength and believes that any crisis can be solved by a bit more work. Hence personal responsibility is highly valued.

In the capitalist mode of production, the central activity is wage labour in which the individual is forced to sell his labour for a shorter or longer period of time in order to ensure his and her family's reproduction. This life mode is defined as the *wage labour life mode* and its key characteristic is a separation of work and leisure time. Work is determined and programmed by others and, in this sense, involves coercion. The working situation is characterized by conflicts between workers ("us", "the working class", "employees") and those that employ labour and assign work ("them", "the capitalists" "the employers"). But work is necessary in order to realize the goals of leisure time which, to a certain degree, is decided by the individual himself. That's precisely why it is free time.

The self conception of this life mode is fundamentally constructed around the separation of work and leisure. Work is the means to achieve the goal of free time where each can realize him/her self. Here the dominant values are those that emphasize individual self-expression e.g. in

the form of consumption or leisure activities.

As a variant of the wage labour life mode, a *career oriented life mode* can be defined, one that is becoming more widespread as industrial society moves increasingly in the direction of post-industrial society, one in which service activities predominate both in the welfare state and in the private sector. But this is a variant: that is to say, the separation of work and leisure is crucial here too.

However, in the career-oriented life mode, work is demanding, creative and organized personally: that is, work is not just coercion but is also experienced as a personal challenge, as a chance for self-realization. Leisure can also be used for this purpose in that work can be expanded in order to cover part of one's leisure time e.g. in the form of overtime or by taking work home. But without forgetting the recreative purpose of leisure time.

The self conception of this life mode is based on a perspective which puts personal creativity and growth at the center. Work is both the goal and the means to achieve the goal: supplemented by a free time of complete relaxation. The life mode is based on the premise that each individual realizes her/herself opportunities, and we can see this in the values that are characteristic of this life mode.

This life mode is a theoretically clear illustration that the concept of the life mode is fundamentally rooted in the mode of production and that societal change, also at the level of everyday life, is related to the structures of the mode of production.

The last life mode that should be mentioned here is the *bourgeois life mode*. That is the traditional counterpart of the wage labour life mode in the capitalist mode of production. Here one administers capital, both in working time and in leisure time. The perspective and the objective is to ensure the reproduction and the growth of capital. The values cultivated in this mode show that one is different from the rest of the population e.g. in the form of status symbols. This life mode can only be found to a limited extent since its functions in relation to production are increasingly overtaken by representatives of the career oriented life form.

In Højrup's anthropological, qualitatively based analysis of, inter alia, fishermen in Salling (a fishing port in Jutland) he finds the life forms that are theoretically identified: not tout court but in different variations. Hence Højrup insists that an important theoretical modification of these definitions is the concept of *neo-culturation* that indicates that a life form

can well reproduce certain crucial features of self perception despite changes in the work situation. So that, for example, the independent life mode can well be reproduced on a small farm even when wage labour off-farm has gained a footing. The precondition for this is, meanwhile, that the small farmer can continue to reproduce some of the basic practical tasks of the independent life form (Højrup 1983).

The strength of the concept of the life mode consists clearly in the theoretically stringent rooting of the life forms in the concept of the mode of production. Hence it is a very impressive theoretical apparatus that Højrup has constructed and, undoubtedly, it captures many central patterns and structures of daily life which is precisely the target of a typology of this kind. On the other hand, it is precisely this theoretical insistence that the concept of the mode of production is basically that which structures everyday life which is also its weakness: in the sense that it is not capable of incorporating the changes that have occurred in society in the course of the last 20 - 30 years. Changes which, not least, are of significance for the everyday life of the individual: at the structural level, at the level of self perception and of the values the individual deploys when the many activities of everyday life have to be made meaningful.

Undoubtedly, the changes are to a great extent based on changes in the economy and therefore the economy continues to have crucial structural effects on everyday life: a circumstance that, for example, many theories of *post-fordism* have tried to identify. So there is no reason to undertake a make a fundamental assault on theories that have as their theme the structuring effects of the economy on, for example, forms of dominance, political institutions and processes (Hirsch et al. 1986). On the other hand, one of the obvious consequences of the societal changes that have occurred, as discussed earlier, is precisely a *liberation* expressed partly in increasing individualization and partly in the diminishing importance of key social movements. A liberation that enables the individual to act in a much larger space and, potentially, with many more choices than was previously the case. This is a development which, as has been mentioned, has as its theme the increasing significance of reflexivity.

There are indications that the individual's increasing focus on him/herself has more and more significance for society: for example, the determination of the career oriented life mode's perspective on self realization. But this perspective sticks to the framework of work and production which in effect means that the analysis is not capable of tracing a large

number of processes in daily life e.g. the development of culturally conditioned forms of behavior.

Inter alia, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has been aware of this and has attempted to determine the *social space* through a combination of production structures and differences in life style. Bourdieu's point of departure is a class problematic that focusses on the distribution of societal resources. Bourdieu focusses on four different resources that he calls *types of capital*. These consist of economic, social, cultural and symbolic resources of which the last two are crucial. The cultural resources account for knowledge and competence while symbolic resources involve different degrees of prestige. Control of these resources, or lack of such, assigns the individual power positions in the struggle to achieve positions in *social space*. This analysis departs from the individual and Bourdieu's point is that those that have the same positions in social space develop the same forms of behavior and disposition. And it is in this way that classes are constituted (Bourdieu 1984, Crompton 1993).

Classes are constantly undergoing change since, among other reasons, a strengthening of one form of resources, e.i. more education, can lead to a higher profile for classes at one point while a strengthening of others can change power relations. At a general level, Bourdieu focusses on processes of social differentiation which appear concretely in different forms of culture and taste. In other words, Bourdieu is very conscious of societies changing contradictions and on the significance of culture but does not fully manage to grasp the problematics that are a consequence of the process of modernization (Kaare Nielsen 1993).

One of the fields in which cultural dimensions have been especially deployed can be found in analyses of a variety of forms of youth culture that emerged in the course of the seventies and eighties. These youth cultures were regarded as, not least, the attempt by subcultures to attain an autonomy in society, be it in the vacuum of large cities, the temples of new religions or on the stands of the football grounds. The Birmingham school has, inter alia, tried to use a marxist inspired typology of youth cultures as *subcultures* i.e. a typology based on an emphasis on the relations of conflict between the subculture on the one hand and, on the other hand, the hegemonic culture (Hall et al. 1976, Gudmundsson 1992). We find here a typology which, although it has overestimated the significance of relations of contradiction, which its own theoreticians have acknowledged, but which nevertheless has, to some extent, opened up for precisely the in-

creasing significance of reflexivity - and thus, in practice, also for aesthetics - for the younger population groups in their attempts to establish their autonomy and independent forms of style and space. In brief, this school is a theoretical opening towards the dynamic and variety of the individual's choice of a life praxis.

That the material basis for this dynamic and variety is present has been underscored by a number of theories and analyses such as, inter alia, Inglehart's theory of the change from material to post-material values in modern industrial society (Inglehart 1990). The point here is that increasing welfare has enabled the individuals to concentrate more on themselves and their own development and career instead of being preoccupied with such more basic human needs as a stable income. But this is not the case for all. The level of welfare in times of economic growth is decisive for whether one cultivates material or post-material values. This leads to a relatively clear theme involving certain fundamental *generational differences* as between that part of the population that grew up in economically hard times - and which therefore has no other choice than to submit to the demands of their economic conditions and, on the other hand, those who have taken welfare for granted and hence could, helped by a higher and higher education, concentrate on choosing between a variety of options. While the first group rely on material values, the latter group cultivates the so called post-material values.

Here too it can be seen that the increasing *reflexivity*, not least among the younger generation, is a central theme in the determination of the values and attitudes in society. This is an important theme of T. Ziehe who has, in particular, concentrated on the dual character of reflexivity. On the one hand, there is the possibility of choosing what one wants and daily practice is precisely a permanent thematic on the options each individual, in principle, has. On the other hand it is, generally, difficult to decide what to choose. The traditional, institutional emphasis on certain particular options and values has broken down and, in their place, new options open up. But this also opens up for *ambivalence*. It can be difficult to choose, and particularly difficult to commit oneself to the option one has chosen. Since, among other things, one can, in principle, make a different choice each time (Ziehe 1989).

This duality, that is particularly widespread among the younger generation for whom the many options lead to a high degree of ambivalence, leads to a focus on precisely the options, for example of fashion, as a

way of *signaling a difference* and hence, in reality, to a focus on the aesthetics of daily life. Daily life has become *culturalized* in the sense that aesthetic values acquire increasing significance for creating meaning and signaling difference. This culturalization has occurred at the expense of the norms and values which, over a long period of time, have been imbedded and reproduced in societal institutions (Kaare Nielsen 1993).

Summa summarum, a contemporary typology of daily life must be capable of incorporating the crucial processes that are effects of *modernity*. This is particularly true of individualization, culturalization and increasing reflexivity. To examine some of these effects is my intention in what follows.

## Everyday Cultures

One of the crucial attempts to develop, theoretically, a concept for the typologies of everyday life, one that is capable of incorporating the tendencies we have mentioned, has been developed by the German cultural sociologist G. Schulze who, at the most general level, defines contemporary society as a *society of personal experience* (Schulze 1993) i.e. a society that is increasingly affected by an aestheticism of daily life and the increasing importance of reflexivity.

In the first instance, the roots of the society of personal discovery are to be found in the construction of the industrially based welfare state in the fifties and sixties. This brought about the material welfare that makes it possible to orient oneself after more creative and personality-developing needs rather than the economic semantics of the society of scarcity. From the middle of the sixties and into the seventies, society was increasingly affected by cultural conflicts based precisely on the desire to achieve personal satisfaction. This takes, not least, the form of generational conflicts in which the young, through a revolt against authority and the cultural conventional wisdoms of the past, find their own space and identity within the framework of the newly achieved welfare. The young become teenagers, develop their own music etc. and, in this way, strengthen the culturalization process in society. And this tendency becomes dominant in the society of personal experience whose characteristic tendency to the aestheticism of daily life and emphasis on reflexivity becomes clearer and clearer throughout the eighties.



*Culturalization* contributes to realize some fundamental cultural assessments, patterns or routines. Schulze refers to these as *everyday aesthetic schema* and the historical roots of many of these go back to the establishment of industrial society. The realization of these aesthetics means essentially that these roots have only limited significance. For what we are talking about is precisely the aestheticism of daily routines in contemporary society and not the reproduction of the social and cultural communities of the past such as were cultivated by, for example, the traditional bourgeoisie.

**Figure 1. Summary of everyday aesthetic schema**

every day aesthetic routines/patterns	typical characteristics 3 examples	Significance		
		Enjoyment	Difference/distinction	Life philosophy
<b>Highbrow culture</b>	classical music museum visits reads 'good' literature	thoughtfulness	anti-barbarian	perfection
<b>Trivial culture</b>	hitparade music tv-quiz reads romances	conviviality	anti-eccentric	harmony
<b>Culture of excitement</b>	rock music goes on town (pubs, cafés, movies, sport etc.) reads thrillers	action	anti-conventional	narcissism

These everyday aesthetic schema are regulated in such a way that the individual assigns significance to daily activities. A given phenomenon can be assigned different kinds of significance according to the schema. The phenomenon can give rise to *pleasure* or to something qualitatively important. This can be part of an attempt to *define oneself* in relation to others: part of the kinds of distinctions all cultures must have to develop their own identity. And such a given phenomenon confirms the *overall philosophy*, that is the basic values that underlie the particular everyday aesthetic schema.

Fundamentally, Schulze refers to three different schema, each with their own history and tradition. The "highbrow culture" scheme and the "trivial culture" scheme have roots back to industrial society while the "excitement" scheme can be located at the start of the welfare state when, inter alia, the mass media established a new cultural scheme. In the society of personal discovery, by virtue of the general culturalization, the schema are no longer linked to their historical roots and are therefore available to all, whatever their social origins. As such they are a crucial part of the actual reflexivity in society. The important features of the three schema are presented in figure 1 and will be incorporated in the following theoretical determination of a typology of everyday culture: although the *ideal typical definitions* should be self explanatory (Schulze 1993 page 163).

**Figure 2. Characteristic experience orientation in the different everyday aesthetic schemes**

	strive for rank and status	strive for conformity	strive for security	strive for self-realization	strive for stimulance
<b>Highbrow culture</b>	+	+	-	+	-
<b>Trivial culture</b>	-	+	+	-	-
<b>Culture of excitement</b>	-	-	-	+	+

+ indicates a dimension close to the culture, while - indicates a dimension that one tries to reject

When the individual reflects on him/herself and society, different forms of the culture of everyday life develop. It is these everyday cultures that assign meaning to phenomena and are the motivation for the way one acts. The individual finds his bearings, so to speak, according to different positions in society that are basically inscribed in the aesthetic schema of everyday life. In brief, people act within a *dimension of experience* that assigns certain positions they endeavor to achieve, or that they endeavor to avoid: as a goal in life, as a way of solving problems or as a general view as to what is the good society. For example, it is characteristic of highbrow culture to strive after rank and status and to think that a society functions best if such ambitions become widespread. By contrast, the other two cultures reject this form of ambition. Here, for example, one strives for security or stimulance. The different forms of *aspirations* should not be considered as fundamental human qualities but rather as social patterns and traits that give meaning to how society is experienced. The different

positions in the experience orientation are indicated in figure 2 (Schulze 1993 p. 165).

By combining the determination of the significance that different cultures assign different phenomena with that culture's experiential dimensions, one can, in theory, specify the content in the tendency to culturalization that, to an increasing degree, affects different groups in society. In other words, one can locate some of the values that are current in society where aesthetical assessment becomes increasingly widespread at the cost of traditional socio-economic values. Hence this is an important dimension in the theoretical determination of a typology of everyday culture that *consciously* attempts to incorporate the culturalization processes discussed above. Specifically, the combination should indicate, firstly, how one basically defines and identifies problems in one's life (existential problem definition) and, secondly, what societal perspective and points of orientation one supports.

In identifying problems connected to the strive for rank and status, the fundamental societal perspective that provides the point of orientation is rooted in *hierarchy*. If one views one's problems as a strive for conformity, then the point of orientation is *social expectations*. If the problems are based on a strive for security, then the point of orientation is *threats*. Whatever the case, the point of orientation is rooted in the external world which delimits the alternatives and the limitations each individual faces.

In identifying the problems connected to a strive for self-realization, the societal perspective is rooted in the *inner core*: that is, the positive potential for self development that the individual has. And, finally, there are problems connected to a strive for stimulation rooted in a perspective that prioritizes *need and pleasure*. The point of departure for these last two dimensions is that the "I" (the ego) makes demands on its environment. The first perspective one could label the perspective *based on the external world* while the second is *ego based*.

In reality, the fundamental distinction between the ego-based and the external base is an attempt to incorporate changes in the material and economic background for the growth of different cultures. This perspective is, for example, close to the basic generationally specific socialization that Inglehart's distinction between material and post-material values signals. Essentially, the point here is that the older generation relate to values rooted in material conditions because they have been socialized in an era in which economic resources were limited and in which they were preoccu-

pied with achieving precisely these material conditions. By contrast, the young are oriented to values that can be characterized as post-material i.e. values that put the individual's development at the center because they were socialized in an era where there was no material hardship and where, instead, they could concentrate on themselves and their own development, supported by a higher level of education. Inglehart roots these positions in economic change but they could just as well be referred to as dimensions of experience (Inglehart 1990).

In the case of the older generation, the essence of the relationship between the 'Ego' and the 'External world' is that one starts with the external world and determines the ego in relation to this: in the sense that, for example, one attempts to live up to the employer's demands, to live up to the expectations of neighbours, that one will ensure one's economic livelihood by working overtime etc. In brief, one is prepared to subordinate oneself to the demands of one's environment, expectations and possibilities. In the case of the younger generation, the relations are more affected by starting with the ego and therefore the external world is considered as subordinate to the needs of the ego.

These two basically different conceptions of the relationship to the external world correspond to two basically different ways of identifying and formulating solutions to different problems which, in turn, can be defined in different ways dependent on which specific perspective and solutions to which one is rooted. In the former conception, for example, such virtues as hard work, traditional virtues, reticence are possibly positive features while, in the latter, the development of a personal strategy for a decent life - i.e. prioritizing housing, education etc. - can be positive features.

The combination of *firstly* the relationship between the ego and the external world, *secondly* the societal perspective and point of orientation and *thirdly* the variations as to how one identifies existential problems form the theoretical basis for Schulze's typology of everyday cultures. This combination is indicated in figure 3.

But everyday cultures do not merely assign values. They also contain a definition of a basic dimension of knowledge and a basic dimension of action. As to knowledge, Schulze works with a dimension of, on the one hand, simplicity and, on the other hand, complexity. And here it is obvious that, the better educated a person is, the better that person is capable of thinking on complex and abstract lines.

**Figure 3. Theoretical identification of everyday culture**

Cognition dimensions			Everyday Cultures
Experience of relationship between 'I' and the 'external world'	The societal perspective and point of orientation	Identification of solutions to existential problems	
external world based relationship	hierarchy (in the external world)	strive for rank and status	level culture
	social expectations (from the external world)	strive for conformity	culture of integration
	threats (from the external world)	strive for security	culture of harmony
I-based relationship	self development and inner/depth experiences	strive for self-realization	culture of selfrealization
	immediate need and pleasure	strive for stimulance	culture of entertainment

As to action, Schulze operates with a dimension somewhere between spontaneity on the one hand and order and rational control on the other. The older one is, the more order one requires while, when young, one requires more freedom of action and hence is more oriented towards spontaneity. Working with these two dimensions one can determine the *fundamental semantic* of everyday cultures, that is, the way they have significance for daily life (Schulze 1993 page 254). This combination is indicated in figure 4.

**Figure 4. The fundamental semantic**

		Thought	
		simplicity	complexity
Action	spontaneity	<b>culture of entertainment</b>	<b>culture of selfrealization</b>
	order	<b>culture of harmony</b>	<b>(culture of integration) level of culture</b>

Everyday cultures are determined in relation to culturalization: that is, in relation to a dimension of experience and hence not on the basis of socio-economic dimensions. As a consequence, there is no real hierarchy as between cultures. On the other hand, each has its own characteristic counter cultures which they, so to speak reflect in the sense that they

consciously reject them. These contrasting positions in everyday cultures are indicated in figure 5.

One can, of course, criticize the lack in Schulze of an anchor for everyday culture in socio-economic conditions since, first and foremost, it is a limitation that the importance of economic and material conditions for the creation of opinions in everyday life is not included. Whether a person is unemployed or lacks economic resources unavoidably affects the identification of problems and suggested solutions. On the other hand, these problematics can also be incorporated in the typology of everyday culture viz. a harmony culture focusses on threats from the surrounding world and sees the strive for security as a possible solution to these problems.

**Figure 5. Everyday Cultural Conflicts**

<b>Direction of Conflict</b>	<b>Enemy Images</b>	<b>Content of Conflicts</b>
Cultural level contra the culture of entertainment	"primitive"	Order and complexity are in conflict with spontaneity and simplicity
Culture of entertainment contra cultural level	"conceited"	
Culture of self-realization contra culture of harmony	"philistine"	Spontaneity and complexity in conflict with order and simplicity
Culture of harmony contra culture of self-realization	"agitator" "parasite"	

By way of illustration, one could say that the cultural level corresponds to the traditional bourgeois culture that, historically, occurred in the upper reaches of society. The integration culture corresponds to the culture of the well-adjusted functionary while the harmony culture corresponds to the culture that, for example, is widespread in the labour movement and among traditional farmers. Crudely speaking, the culture of self-realization corresponds to that of the 1968 generation and its fellowtravellers while the entertainment culture corresponds to the culture widespread among young without education.

However the real point of the typology has been to start from the *culturalization tendencies* in modern society which none of the typologies

whose point of departure are socio-economic dimensions could incorporate. Hence everyday cultures cannot be identified by socio-economic groups but serve as possible opinion-giving positions in contemporary life in which we, as individuals, have to think about choice upon choice. On the other hand, it is probably also the case that attempts to combine both cultural and socio-cultural dimensions cause some fundamental problems, among other things, that a theoretical clarity on one dimension can cause a lack of clarity on another dimension. On the other hand, it is probably also the case that an attempt to combine the cultural and the economic dimensions can lead to some fundamental problems, *ceteris paribus* a theoretical clarity which, for example, Bourdieu exemplifies (Bourdieu 1984).

## **Everyday Culture and Political Culture**

The subsequent theoretical question is whether there is a relationship between everyday culture and political culture. As a first step, it could be interesting to investigate whether everyday culture is of significance for political attitudes. Whether it is the case that one can identify central combinations of different political attitudes which can, in a significant way, be interpreted in relation to different everyday cultural typologies. As a second step, it would be interesting to discuss, at a more general level, whether structural features of everyday culture can be identified in the political culture and what results this can have for changes in the political culture in the future. And, with such a discussion, I in reality come to a discussion of spectator democracy and of the two theses I put up at the beginning of this article.

So, in what follows, I will examine more closely possible relationships between everyday culture and political culture. The data available to me does not enable a definitive answer to the questions in the Danish context. But, at the least, they allow a provisional investigation in which one can attempt to see what is at stake.

I will take my point of departure for this provisional investigation in Schulze's summary analysis of different forms of everyday culture. With the theoretical determinations of everyday cultures referred to above as an analytical framework, Schulze has carried out an extensive empirical investigation in order to identify the specific contents of these cultures more closely. The point of departure is data, collected in Nuremberg in

1985, that contains information on attitudes, social characteristics and the pattern of everyday aesthetics in the form, for example, of information on interior design, cultural consumption etc. This study shows that the classification on the one hand confirms the above assumptions on generational differences and, on the other hand, that the focus of particular everyday cultures is particularly dependent on education. Starting from these two dimensions, age and education, Schulze has synthesized a sociological pattern in which the fulcrum of the different everyday cultures is identified. The main features of these are shown in figure six. It should not be forgotten that culturalization has made these cultures available to all and that we can only identify certain pivotal features. For example, the pivotal features of the culture of self-realization are located among the group of well-educated between 20 and 44 years old. The well-educated can also relate to other everyday cultures just as people above 45 or people without education can relate to the culture of self-realization (Schulze 1993, page 382).

The values here discussed constitute the basis for the establishment and reproduction of life style and everyday culture: that is, for different, more or less clearly defined, group formations. The values serve as a number of options that can relieve the "free" individual who is constantly meeting situations where he/she is forced to reflect. *The various everyday cultures are hence a form of options for recognition, problem identification and problem solution to the modern liberated individual*: options one takes up to a greater or lesser degree (Kaare Nielsen 1993 page 142).

Methodologically, the key question is of course to what extent one can use a classification based on Germany on Danish conditions. On the one hand, Germany and Denmark are, in a number of fields, different. Doubtless, for example, *level culture* has had better opportunities to develop in Germany than it has in Denmark since, inter alia, the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy have, traditionally, been more prominent in Germany. The effects of the Second World war are also quite different in the two countries. Germany has had experience with authoritarian systems based on fascism while Denmark has experienced a democratic system. On the other hand, there are many similarities, not least as to the actual culturalization of society. Specifically, this finds expression in the growth of a political culture in which, for example, grass root movements have had considerable significance, especially for the well-educated; although this has occurred in quite different political contexts (Kaare Nielsen 1991).



So there are good reasons for being inspired by Schulze's typology in connection with analyses of Danish conditions. And one reason is that since processes of modernization are more advanced in Germany than they are in Denmark, so that the tendencies in Germany can be considered a projection of tendencies that are still occurring in Denmark (Kaare Nielsen 1993, page 139).

In what follows, I will try to take up this challenge and, starting with Schulze's general sociological classification, based on age and education, I will see whether I can discover the same typical patterns among Danish groups, similar to those that are found in Schulze's everyday culture. But, as has been mentioned above, I will focus on the political culture rather than the general everyday culture which has been Schulze's perspective. This presupposes a clearer theoretical precision of features of the political culture, corresponding to different everyday cultures which I will attempt in what follows.

The first issue raised in the introduction concerns to what degree one can locate a tendency for the political culture to emerge and develop through an emphasis on narrow individual interest in a process in which the individual only to a very limited degree feels tied to existing political traditions and movements. An obvious place to examine this is to look at *the culture of entertainment* since here, the individual is center stage and the motive is to be stimulated - to avoid, among other things, a basic problem, boredom. A precondition for this focus on stimulation is that the basic necessities are available. For a large part of this group, the provision of these basic necessities takes place via the welfare state.

As to reflexivity, the key to this culture is simplicity and spontaneity as to action. In this particular culture it is not necessary to commit oneself to a cause. But forms of commitment often permit single issue politics to dominate the political agenda in this culture. For example, the mass media, here widespread, and the tabloid press knows this well in the way they constantly focus on single, dramatic events.

Since stimulation is the daily food of this culture there are reasons for assuming that such persons are more concerned with what the state can offer them than with formulating demands and ideas about what should occur in political life. Hence the hypothesis that, within the democratic framework, such people are more concerned with the *output* of policies than as citizens who are engaged in policy *inputs*. This asymmetry can reveal itself in different ways: such as interest about politics, capacity to

keep up with political debate and about attitudes to politicians and political parties. This culture is assumed to be not very interested in politics as such and, as a corollary, one would assume that such a culture has a strong feeling of powerlessness in relation to political life.

**Figure 6. Typologies of Everyday Cultures**

education	age	
	20-44 years	45-70 years
studentereksamen (high school diploma), further education from a university	<b>Selfrealization culture</b> <i>Primary perspective:</i> The inner state and self-contemplation <i>Crucial problem definition:</i> Strive for self-realization <i>Basic cognition frame:</i> Complexity and spontaneity <i>Experiential dimension:</i> Art and creativity rock	<b>Level culture</b> <i>Primary perspective:</i> Hierarchy <i>Crucial problem definition:</i> Strive for status <i>Basic cognition frame:</i> Complexity and order <i>Experiential dimension:</i> walks/ highbrow culture/museums
Studentereksamen and brief or medium long further education		<b>Integration culture</b> <i>Primary perspective:</i> Social expectations <i>Crucial problem definition:</i> strive for conformity <i>Basic cognition frame:</i> Limited complexity & order <i>Experiential dimension:</i> take a nice walk
Studentereksamen and technical training	<b>Entertainment Culture</b> <i>Primary perspective:</i> The basic necessities <i>Crucial problem definition:</i> Strive for stimulation <i>Basic cognition frame:</i> Simplicity and spontaneity <i>Experiential dimension:</i> Talk shows rock	<b>Harmony culture</b> <i>Primary perspective:</i> risk <i>Crucial problem definition:</i> strive for security <i>Basic cognition frame:</i> simplicity and order <i>Experiential dimension:</i> game shows
Secondary school and brief or medium long further education		
Secondary school and technical training		
Secondary school and no further training		

In the Danish political culture, attitudes to the welfare state play a very crucial role. Many political issues are decided on the basis of attitudes

to the welfare state. Given the above comments, there are reasons for assuming that the welfare state -as a provider of different kinds of services, payments and stimulation - plays a key role in the culture of entertainment. But one can hardly expect major engagement in providing inputs to the development of the welfare state: neither at the level of institutions nor, at the more general level, to the welfare state as a whole. In sum, there are grounds to expect that the entertainment culture represents a very one-sided trend in the political culture, one that focusses on the role of *spontaneous spectator*, which in many ways fits in well with the trend towards the growth of a spectator democracy.

The second question that was raised in the introduction concerns whether one can trace a political culture which, as a natural consequence of increasing reflexivity in society, focusses on the individual's political engagement and participation. Such a tendency should, presumably, be primarily localized in the *culture of self-realization*. Here too, the point of departure is that, as to political action, one puts the individual at the center but the goal here is self absorption or self realization. Problems here are identified as to whether given phenomena or institutions impede self-expression and thus the individual's personal freedom.

This occurs in a context of a high degree of reflexivity, based on a capacity to generalize and to grasp complex issues, just as it is natural here that the individual is directly and personally engaged in a given issue. And such circumstances motivate for activity in a number of fields, including political activity. Given this, there are reasons for assuming that such people are very interested in politics but, on the other hand, highly critical of traditional politics e.g. political parties and politicians. First and foremost, because such people are really interested in taking part in the political process and there is no great tradition for this in the established system. So there is a kind of opposition in this critical distancing from traditional political life, a critique that can well take the form of an interest in direct political participation.

A key question is whether this emphasis on individual commitment and participation also leads to a demand for a weakening of the welfare state in order to strengthen the individual's arena of freedom and sense of personal responsibility or whether this emphasis rather leads to a positive view of the welfare state on the basis of a conception that the welfare state constitutes a foundation on which to develop a personal strategy for one's own pursuits. There are obvious reasons for assuming the latter since, inter

alia, everyday culture is extremely affected by the results of the development of the welfare state in the last thirty years. On the other hand, there are certainly those who hold the opposite view, not least among the youngest section of this culture because, among other reasons, they were raised in the shadow of the dominance of an older generation, and their positive view on the welfare state.

In sum, there are grounds for expecting that the culture of self-realization corresponds to a political culture that puts a high value on personal political engagement in its most direct and activist form. So it is here that the *committed individualist* is to be found: one who actively seeks support for his/her own life style and everyday culture, both as to material consumption and everyday culture and who would like to support the growth of new forms of democratic participation in order to create further space for direct engagement in politics. All this fit quite well with the basic structure of spectator democracy. For it is here one finds a reflective and meditative approach to politics, on the basis of one's own situation. In this culture, people are not afraid of taking the role of *soloist* on the political stage.

As to the political culture of *level culture*, there are grounds for assuming that it too is influenced by a great interest in politics. Here one reads about and discusses politics and communicates with the authorities. But here there is not the same degree of interest in taking part. In full accord with its focus on the crucial importance for society of hierarchy, this culture accepts the existence of a political elite with which one communicates by means of such traditional institutions as political parties and elections. One is committed as part of a greater totality where the interests of the community have preference. Here the interest in new forms of political participation is low. In sum, the level culture corresponds to a political culture which constitutes a positive foundation for elite democracy i.e. *the committed spectator*.

The political culture of the *culture of integration* does have a certain interest in politics but the level of engagement is generally lower than in the level culture. A crucial feature of this culture is, presumably, a willingness to accept the existence of a political elite and to subordinate oneself to the decisions that that elite takes, certainly those taken by political authorities whose roots are in traditional political institutions, such as political parties but who are hardly prepared to take an active part in the political process themselves. In sum, such a political culture is that of the *tradi-*

*tional spectator* .

*The culture of harmony* corresponds to a political culture with a lack of interest in and high degree of alienation from politics. This culture has a long tradition for subordination to political elites, be their parties or trade unions. So direct political participation is not promoted here. The political orientation is primarily to parties rooted in traditional ideologies: in a Danish context, the Agrarian Liberals and the Social Democrats. In sum, this culture represents the *passive spectator*.

If one compares these theses on the relationship between everyday culture and political culture one can trace a difference between, on the one hand, different forms of passive, spectator culture and on the other hand, cultures that emphasize political activity, whether of the spontaneous single issue format or more systematic forms of political activity. This distinction can be linked to a basic theoretical thesis as to a general dislocation of political perspectives that relates to the process of modernization: a movement from a *traditional emancipatory politics* to a more modern *life politics*. The perspective of traditional emancipatory politics is that the collective potential of society, for example of the working class, must be liberated and that, by economic democracy, they must achieve control of production.

The three forms of political culture referred to above correspond in a number of ways to this form of politics. Here political leadership is given priority, be it that of the authorities (level culture) or that of the collectively elected leader (culture of harmony). By contrast, the view of life politics is that it is the individual's own (inner) potential that has to be fully realized. This political perspective corresponds in different ways to the forms of political culture that are related to the culture of self realization and the culture of entertainment and, for that matter, also the conditions for the political life, discussed several times above, and which could be called a spectator democracy (Andersen et al. 1993).

The theoretical determination of the political cultures that correspond to different everyday cultures are shown in figure seven. I will now see whether I can locate these forms of political culture in a sociological classification, based on *age and education*, to get a feel for whether Schulze's everyday cultures are of any relevance for an analysis of political culture in Denmark. This investigation, will, as has been mentioned, be a preliminary step in investigating the relationship between modernity and political culture in Denmark.

## Political opinions and activities

As has been discussed above, the political culture can be categorized in a number of key fields that affect political life. They affect, inter alia, the general political debate, views on the welfare state and views on a number of current political issues (Andersen 1993). Figure 7 reproduces some hypotheses on the subject, divided into five groups. These groups are classified by age and education. *Group 1* are the well educated under 45 in which all, minimally, have studentereksamen (Advanced levels). *Group 2* consists of people under 45 with relatively short technical training or no education at all. *Group 3* are the well educated over 45, who both have studerentereksamen and further education. *Group 4* are over forties with technical training or with a brief further education. And, finally, *Group 5* consists of over forty fives with technical training or no education. As has been mentioned, the classification has been drawn up in a way similar to that of Schulze with the idea of investigating whether Schulze's classification is a useful tool for the study of political culture in Denmark<sup>2</sup>.

The activities and attitudes for these five groups are based on the calculation of averages in relation to an index. This means that several questions on the same theme are collated after which average values have been calculated for the individual groups on a scale of 0 to 1 (GLM-method see Andersen et al. 1993). As table 1 makes clear, it contains questions that cover political attitudes in relation to politics in general, in relation to the welfare state and in relation to more topical issues<sup>3</sup>.

As can be seen from the table, the group of people under 45 with brief or no education (Group 1) shows a number of interesting features that support the thesis put forward in figure 7. Firstly, this group is not particularly interested in politics, have little confidence in politicians and experience the highest level of political powerlessness. This compares to a low level of political participation, of membership of political parties and of communication with authorities. All this indicates that this group is not very active in political life nor feel comfortable with the political universe. Despite this general distancing from politics, this group is part of the population that generally supports the welfare state. But it does so with a signal critical eye. They tend to think that the welfare state is misused and that public employees are not very effective.

**Figure 7. Everyday Culture and Political Culture**

Education	age	
	20-44 years	45-70 years
studentereksamen and long further education at a university	<p><b>Selfrealization Culture</b>                      Very interested in politics                      Relates reflexively to all aspects of political life.                      Positively inclined towards the welfare state.                      High level of political participation.                      Critical of traditional forms of politics and interested in new forms of participation.</p> <p><i>The engaged individualist</i></p>	<p><b>Level culture</b>                      Very interested in politics.                      Reservations about the welfare state.                      Takes active part in e.g. political parties.                      Critical support for the political elite                      Not interested in new forms of participation</p> <p><i>The committed spectator</i></p>
studentereksamen and short or medium long further education		<p><b>Integration Culture</b>                      Some interest in politics                      Reservations about the welfare state.                      Aktiv deltager i f.eks. politiske partier                      Positiv større til den politiske elite.                      Ikke for direkte deltagelse.</p> <p><i>The traditional spectator</i></p>
studentereksamen and technical training		
secondary school and brief or medium long further education	<p><b>Entertainment Culture</b>                      Not interested in politics                      Relates to political life primarily as a consumer.                      Politically alienated.                      Positively inclined to the welfare state                      Low participation                      Can get involved in single issues and also in social movements.</p> <p><i>The spontaneous spectator</i></p>	
Secondary school and technical training		
Secondary school and no training		

Relating this low level of political interest with the critical support to the welfare state gives a picture of a political culture which is considerably affected by a *user/client* attitude to politics generally and to the welfare state

in particular. This user/client attitude to the welfare state reveals itself, inter alia, in critical attitudes when the state does not live up the client's expectations while the same people do very little about it.

**Table 1. Political attitudes and activities**

	Group				
	1	2	3	4	5
Interest in politics	0.63	0.42	0.7	0.59	0.4
Support for the welfare state	0.56	0.52	0.41	0.43	0.46
Agrees that the welfare state is misused	0.39	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.52
Trust in politicians	0.35	0.31	0.49	0.51	0.37
Political powerlessness	0.21	0.54	0.13	0.22	0.51
Agrees that public employees work ineffectively	0.2	0.19	0.2	0.12	0.14
Consider strangers a threat to Danish culture	0.2	0.42	0.21	0.28	0.54
Interested in establishing local councils	0.72	0.62	0.49	0.52	0.38
Won't be bound to party policies - so not a member	0.65	50.5	0.62	0.52	0.45
Communicates with authorities	0.27	0.16	0.37	0.28	0.12
Takes part in demonstrations	0.46	0.21	0.29	0.21	0.1
Member of a party	0.08	0.07	0.17	0.15	0.13
Average participation (average of 23 activities)	7.49	6.06	8.01	7.5	5

Group 1: Well educated over 45s, all have at least stundereksamen

Group 2: Over 45s with brief technical or no education

Group 3: Over 45s with median or long higher education

Group 4: Over 45s with technical or brief further education

Group 5: Over 45s with technical or no further education

Given a political culture in which the one pole is rooted in mistrust to politics and the other pole in a kind of consumer perspective to the welfare state, one could assume that engagement in specific political issues can rapidly take the form of mistrust in politicians. On the other hand, such engagement can quite rapidly dissipate. For in this political culture there is little basis for attempting to explain issues or deploying arguments from other basic views when new issues appear. A direct, brief and intense engagement is thought sufficient. This attitude is particularly evident in the group's views about immigrants, of whom they are very afraid and who are thus



considered a very important societal issue (Andersen 1993b).

	1	2	3	4	5
Union membership	0.8	0.84	0.96	0.89	0.8
Very interested in union work	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.14	0.07
Level of affinity with labour movement	0.44	0.49	0.34	0.41	0.48

Group 1: Well educated over 45s. all have at least studentereksamen

Group 2: Over 45s with brief technical or no education

Group 3: Over 45s with median or long higher education

Group 4: Over 45s with technical or brief further education

Group 5: Over 45s with technical or no further education

Given this background there are grounds for expecting that the engagement in the trade union movement of this group will be low: taking the form of a low percentage of union and other membership, little interest in union activities and little affinity to the labour movement in general. However, as table 2 shows, this is not the case. The percentage with union membership is not different from other groups whereas interest for union activities is relatively low. Surprisingly the level of affinity to the labour movement is the highest of any group.

Historically, collective membership (e.g. union membership), constituted the basic framework for the social critique of the weakest in society and helped give this critique direction and perspective. Given this, what has just been discussed could indicate that this tradition has not completely disappeared. Further, that this group occupies an ambivalent position. On the one hand, they relate to the welfare state primarily as clients/users - that is, a form of life politics perspective. On the other hand, they support those political traditions in whose political strategy the welfare state is an integral part i.e. a form of emancipatory politics. Hence they can be, simultaneously, both critical and positive to the welfare state. So what we have here is a group whose political attitudes are ambivalent, stretching from the most modern to the more traditional positions.

In many aspects, the group of well educated under 45s, Group 1, occupies a contradictory position to that of group 2. They are among the most interested in politics, have a high level of communication with the political


public and are, generally, very politically active with, among other things, the highest level of participation in demonstrations. In addition, this group is not very politically alienated. This picture might well be explained by the previous assumptions of this group's high degree of culturalization and reflexivity.

An illustration of this can be provided by examining how this group relates to the traditional right-left divide. Figure 8 shows how the different groups place themselves on a right-left scale. As the figure shows, group 1 has the clearest profile, with the fewest placed in the middle and the most on the wings, with the center of gravity on the left wing. By contrast, group 2 has the least profile, with about 10% "don't knows" and a very heavy concentration around the middle. With group 3 (well-educated over 45s), the profile is just as pronounced as with group 1 but in the opposite direction in that the political center of gravity is on the right end. And, finally, there is an evident common feature linking group 5 (over 45s with little or no education) and group 2 in that group 5 is also centered around the middle.

It is interesting to note that in group 1, trust in politicians is at the same level as in group 2. It is worth giving some consideration as to the

background for the lack of political trust of these two groups. In the case of group 2, this is presumably closely connected to, for example, the experience of alienation and doubts about the efficacy of the welfare state so one could assume that, for group 1, this mistrust is closely linked to a genuine political disagreement and difference. So such people have a critical attitude to leading politicians because they have a number of ideas as to how politics ought to be conducted. In brief, they feel badly represented in the political decision-making processes. Further evidence of this can be garnered from the left-

Figure 8. Right-left scale



right orientation in which group 1, at the time the data was collected when the country was lead by a conservative prime minister, Paul Schlüter, were oriented to the left. So mistrust in politicians can be grounded, inter alia, in both opposition and in alienation (Goul Andersen 1992, Jensen 1993) and this is roughly true of each group.

As to the welfare state, group one's support is at the same level as group 2 and the level of support of these two groups is significantly higher than that of the other groups. However, here too the forms of support are different and we can illustrate this by the fact that group 1 does not have the same experience of abuse of the welfare state that the other cultures have. On the other hand, group 1 agrees with group 2 that public employees do not work effectively. Somewhat simplistically, in their attitudes to the welfare state, group one's political engagement does have an effect in that they consider the welfare state as an institution that ought to be a service and a safety net for everybody. That this group is, at the same time, a bit critical of the level of efficiency of public employees, could be linked, inter alia, to the fact that an important part of this group are employed in the private sector and that, in relation to the public debate in Denmark in the eighties on the modernization of the public sector, they are of the opinion that the task could be conducted more efficiently. So it is not simply as a consumer that the public relate to the welfare state, but one can also relate to it as a politically engaged person, as an active citizen and as someone in private sector employment: full of prejudice about the public sector as such.

At a more general level, we can assume that the well educated over 45 to a greater degree than group 2 relate to the whole spectrum of political processes: both concerning the formulation of demands (and to relate critically to politics) *and* when it concerns assessing the activities and services of the welfare state). It is also noticeable that they do not relate to politics via the more traditional institutions such as political parties. On the contrary, such people are very active in, for example, demonstrations, a political activity that tends to be linked to a more individual and personal commitment to politics. And this form of commitment finds expression in a great interest in the creation of local councils.

In several fields, group 3 and to a certain extent group 4, share a political culture with group 4 similar to that of group 1. All are interested in politics and politically active. There are attitudinal disagreements, inter alia as to their views on the welfare state but they are on a par as to the question of whether immigrants constitute a threat to Danish culture. The decisive

cleavages are to be found on the issues of political parties and political participation. People in group 3 generally have confidence in politicians, the highest level of organizational membership but are not particularly active just as they are not particularly active in demonstration, nor are they especially interested in the creation of local councils. So groups 3 and 4 show the same interest for politics as group 1 but these cultures are part of a more general pattern of the political culture which puts priority on supporting the political elite or the authorities and not on personal participation or direct engagement.

The political culture of group 5 (the little educated over 45s) has features that are reminiscent of group two's (the little educated under 45) but there also signal differences. There are similarities to group two: not interested in politics, feel politically alienated and don't have much trust in politicians. On the other hand, they're not real backers of the welfare state, despite a high degree of affinity with the labour movement, an important political difference. And, further, a very low level of interest in union activities.

Perhaps one can discern, in these conflicting opinions, the contours of a political culture that is more reserved than group two's but which continues, though passively, to be rooted in some of the basic political traditions. They are certainly not interested in local councils, nor are they interested in an active communication with the political public. Generally speaking, it is in this group that we find the lowest rate of political participation.

If these data are compared with the overview of the political culture of everyday life one can see a *similarity* in many fields. One can clearly see the contours of an *committed individualist* in the group of well-educated over 45s. It consists, to a high degree, of people that are interested in being a part of political life and relate to a broad spectrum of political issues. We can also clearly see the contours of a *spontaneous spectator* who is politically alienated, passive and quite one-sided (consumer oriented) in their general view of politics. Their politics span, on the one hand, a consciousness of historical traditions and, on the other hand, a tendency to more spontaneous engagement signaled, for example, in an interest in local councils. It is obvious that the two groups occupy important roles in spectator democracy. The one wants, at times, the role of the soloist, while the other is more withdrawn and only to a limited extent appears on stage. But what they have in common is that they assume the roles of spectators in that the point of departure for their focus on political life is themselves, or more broadly speaking, a life politics perspective.

And here we can see the contours of an *engaged spectator*, a *traditional spectator* and a *passive spectator*. That is to say, forms of a political culture that fit into spectator democracy but which continue to have roots that go down to a more traditional form of politics in which the emancipatory perspective, and hence a more general and binding engagement play a crucial role. And given this, we can conclude that there is a source of theoretical inspiration in Schulze's typology and this will be further pursued in what follows.

The overall picture of the political culture that begins to emerge spans not just a conflict between a life politics perspective on the one hand and an emancipatory perspective on the other hand. Within the life politics perspective too, one can discern different spectator roles, stretching from the engaged individualist to the spontaneous spectator. This circumstance reveals a conflict between, on the one side, the committed individualist and other forms of political culture on the other, where the conflict emerges is on the issue of whether to be *active* in political life. There are also different forms of passivity, stretching from the engaged to the spontaneous and the passive spectator, an important qualification of the conflict between active and passive that seems to have had a decisive impact on political life in Denmark.

### **Political cultures and citizenship**


The considerations raised in the introduction were not just about whether one could identify a conflict between the active and the passive. They were also about whether or not a political culture of a hyperactive avant-garde was developing: that is, a culture that has *personal political engagement as a norm*. One which relates critically and passively to the political life which has no such norm, and which, from their perspective, they consider part of the traditional political process. In certain fields, the answer to this question is Yes. It is quite clear that it is particularly group 1, together with group 3, that do affect political life and hence on the issues and matters raised there. It would hardly be misleading to use the concept *dominance* of this role (Andersen et al. 1993 page 128).

An illustrative example of this kind of commitment can be an interest in the creation of local councils. As table 1 shows, group one's interest in local councils is considerably greater than that of all other groups and this indicates a great desire to engage directly in the political process. But, as has

been mentioned above, group 2 also shows a considerable interest in such councils. In this perspective, the issue of local councils does not just illustrate a broad interest in personal engagement and in reflexivity in group 1 but also illustrates the *general* individual and spontaneous perspective on action as was put forward in the typology of everyday culture and in the treatment of the life politics perspective.

At a more general level, this situation can be illustrated by the distinction materialism and post-materialism (Inglehart 1990). In this survey, the distinction is based on responses to four statements in which respondents were asked to indicate which values they considered most important, next most important etc. Those prioritizing "*the maintenance of law and order*" and "*fighting price increases*" as most important and next most important

were classified as materialists since they prioritize material goods, societal order and stability. Those that prioritize "*Giving people more say in important political decisions*" and "*Protecting freedom of speech*" were classified as post-materialists since they are more concerned with individual freedom, creativity and participation. Those that mix different statements from the two groups of values were classified as a mixed category and among these a classification has been undertaken, depending on which statement has been regarded as the most important (Gundelach et al. 1993). The results are shown in figure 9.<sup>4</sup>



As the figure shows, the post-materialist attitudes are, as expected, dominant in group 1 whilst the materialist attitudes dominate in group 2. This, to some degree, matches the expectations as to an 'avantgarde'

indicate other dimensions in this classification of central values.

The highest share of post-materialists are hence to be found in group 3. This is quite interesting given that this group also prioritizes traditional political institutions, for example, political parties. On the other hand, we can assume that the move of this group towards some of the values held by group 3 is in part due to their education. Perhaps they have moved more in attitude than they have in practice, as their relatively negative attitude to political demonstration and the creation of local councils would indicate.

It is also noticeable that the share of the materialist-oriented in group 2 is relatively high and this would seem to indicate that the 'I'-centered nature of this group is channeled in the direction of consumption and stimulance. They belong to a political culture that, to a greater or lesser degree, have had these material needs covered by the welfare state and are therefore concerned as to whether the welfare state will continue to be able to do so or whether, for example, politicians, misuse, inefficiency or immigrants can prevent this from happening.

The result as to the extent of material and post-material values illustrates the different ways in which the younger groups put the 'I' in the center. Whereas group one's prioritizing of the individual's own development permits reflexivity and extrovert engagement, group two's desire for stimulance corresponds to a narrower and self-centered political engagement in which one can well step forward and be active, but where the starting point is narrow and materially-based interests.

As to citizenship, it might well be that the political culture of group one is most able to take on board a "willed", radical-democratic concept of citizenship (Andersen et al. 1993, page 13 ff). This group's previous engagement in social movements could give evidence of a certain will to more collective engagement. There is also some indication that this group is not so inclined to support a "willed" politics where one consciously relates to the problems of the whole community: this group's political culture is seemingly too centered on a personal and more consumer-oriented stimulation strategy. Traditionally, it has been the collective forms of organization (such as trade unions) that have managed to bring those who are weak in resources onto the political arena: both as strategy and as power factor. The reasons for such collective organization have been *necessity*, justified by material security. Such thinking can clearly be found in group 5 which, generally, is even less aware of political life than group 2 but group 5 has precisely strong traditions for collective organizing and for leaving it to

the elected leadership to make its mark in political processes. Today this *necessity* for collective organization is no longer imperative as a consequence, inter alia, of the ensurement of a minimum of welfare needs provided by the state. And this makes it possible for group 2 to be more concerned with individual stimulation.

Seen in this light, it is possible to consider group one as a form of political 'avant garde' which, more or less consciously, actively seeks to promote a radical-democratic citizenship, whose roots in the other cultures is more dubious. But, on the other hand, we should not forget that a new kind of *necessity* is emerging. Namely the need to defend democracy in a process whereby power factors (capital, business organizations, trade unions etc.), media processes (the transformation of politics into entertainment) - the media and the processes of internationalization (the European Union, multinational companies etc.) all tend to erode the democratic process and the public sphere and make them more and more peripheral in relation to, on the one hand, people's social daily life and, on the other hand, the real political processes. Unless - as a result of the fact contemporary society makes it possible to fulfill private strategies - one can accept the democratic decay and the growth of a *spectator democracy* then there is a *moral necessity* to react.

### **Everyday culture contra social groups**

The above comments on the relationship between modernity, aesthetics, individualization and political culture have been based on the basic theoretical premise that, concerning political attitudes etc., the process of culturalization increasingly plays a central role at the cost of such social variables as membership of a specific social class or group. This premise was indicated in the concluding discussion on the background for political participation in the study *Medborgerskab. Demokrati og politiske deltagelse* (Citizenship. Democracy and Political Participation) (Andersen et al 1993, page 219). It was shown here, inter alia, that political interest is a very crucial explanatory factor for differences in political participation.

So, as it is laid out in the introduction to this article, the theoretical point is that aesthetic strategies play a steadily increasing role in the political culture than do socially conditioned strategies. The brief exposition of the different groups' political culture has, at least, shown that we really can



demarcate signal differences between the different cultures and that these cultures can well be related to a typology of everyday cultures. So there are reasons for arguing that there are differences that relate to the more fundamental value orientation of these everyday cultures. And it should not be forgotten that there are, of course, quite clear social distinctions in the typology of everyday cultures presented above. Differences in educational level alone are tantamount to differences in the resources one controls. But the central point in the typology deployed is that one can identify different patterns of values and horizons that correspond to actual processes of culturalization. Given this, it would be interesting to confront the typology of everyday cultures - based on a classification by age and education - with the classification of social groups that was used in connection with the analysis of political participation (Andersen 1994a page 36ff, Andersen et al. 1993, page 113ff). This has been carried out in table 3.

The table present the F-values that emerge from a GLM-test of different models. The F-value for a given model shows the correlation between the explanatory and the non-explanatory variable. If the F-value is less than 1 then the model has not explained anything since the non explanatory variance is greater than the explanatory. If the F-value is greater than 1, the explanatory variance is greater than the non-explanatory. For example, in the case of interest in politics, the greater the difference one finds between the different groups' interest - compared with the median variation in the total model, the higher F-values you will get. So the point is that the greater the F-value the greater the variation is explained by the variable that is incorporated in the model.

With these comments in mind and starting with table 3 we can conclude that both the classification by social group and the typology of everyday cultures are of use in the analysis of political culture. As table 3 shows, the classification by social group is crucial for the explanation of variations in political participation and communication with public authorities in general. So in other words, political participation generally follows a class specific pattern as has been explained in *Medborgerskab* (Citizenship)(Andersen et al. 1993). But an important exception is participation in demonstrations and interest in local councils where the classification by everyday culture is more important. This suggests an hypothesis that participation in demonstrations and local councils is more value-laden and culturally conditioned that, for example, membership of a political party and voting. Hence one can, generally, assume that

demonstrations and local participation are part of a more aesthetically conditioned political culture than a number of more traditionally-rooted forms of participation.

	Social Groups	Everyday Culture
Interest in politics	5.41	*12.49
Support for the Welfare State	*12.36	2.4
Political powerlessness	8.32	*14.05
Communicate with public authorities	*12.43	7.15
Participate in demonstrations	3.86	*17.85
Immigrants constitute a threat	3.98	*12.99
Interest for local councils	4.53	*10.78
Political participation in general	*16.57	*9.09

\* indicates the highest figure

When it concerns interest in politics, the typology of everyday cultures has the higher explanatory power. This could, inter alia, be related to the fact that the political agenda, increasingly reflects matters that have emerged from the aesthetic universe of the media. The daily media presentation of political issues can be assumed to play a major role in capturing the interest of the public.

On the other hand, there is the issue of political powerlessness. This dimension is also best explained by the typology of everyday cultures. In other words, the intensive media presentation of a political issue can be assumed to raise emotions and a feeling of insecurity and incapacity to comprehend the political processes. This can be related to the mass of information that appears on given political issues with an intense personal drama that so often dominates political reportage and the more abstract reference to "institutional" or "necessary" balances in relation to society e.g. the relationship of the balance of payments to unemployment (Andersen 1990, Negt 1992).

On the issue of support for the welfare state we can see that the classification by social groups has the greater explanatory power which is perhaps not surprising in that support for the welfare state can presumably follow both political traditions, based on the classical class conflicts and in actual social inequality which is also encapsulated in the classification of social groups.

On the other hand, attitudes to immigrants can best be explained on the basis of the classification of everyday cultures. And this too need not be surprising since precisely the issue of immigration raises emotional and individual considerations.

These two issues - attitudes to the welfare state and views on immigration - constitute extremes on the scale of crucial political issues. The one is based on classic political strategies while the other is more linked to everyday life, the media and the more emotional aspects of political life. In this way, their F-values as to explanatory level can underscore the significance of the fact that people are both conscious of classic, class-based political cultures while also seeking to be more open vis-à-vis the actual culturalization tendencies and perhaps even more so to the future significance of these for the political culture.

These circumstances make it quite evident that there can be no clear conclusion as to the relative explanatory power of the *classification by social groups* contra *the typology of everyday cultures*. But I think there is a certain tendency for the classification by social groups to provide the better explanation concerning variables rooted in more traditional and perhaps more institutional factors. Whereas the typology of everyday cultures has better explanatory power as to more contemporary and isolated political attitudes, just as the typology is useful in explaining phenomena in which the subjective experiential dimension plays a central role. And, for that matter, this is in complete accord with the basic determinations of the typology of everyday cultures and, not least, matches the underscoring of the increasing significance of culturalization.

### **The attempt to construct a new typology**

To a very high degree, curiosity as to whether there are some eruptions on their way in the political culture coupled to a desire to attempt something new has been the motivating force behind the preparation of this contribu-

tion. The result has been a very preliminary attempt, partly to make a theoretical determination of a typology which could be used in Danish conditions. Not least the indication that there are certain signal differences emerging in Danish political culture: differences between, on the one hand, a form of "avant-garde" culture which is in great contrast to a number of different spectator cultures which, to a greater or lesser degree, close off from or simply passively relate to the political process. However, as has been discussed above, there are reasons for certain reservations about the typology.

Both the theoretical determination of the typology and the analysis of its use in relation to Danish political culture is very provisional. But, hopefully, it can serve as a source of inspiration for continued attempts to identify differences in the Danish political culture. And its my hope, that my analysis could be used in other *reflexive* societies as well. For, without doubt, something new is on its way. There is quite some uncertainty about exactly what is on its way. What to do about this situation is quite unclear. But work on these issues is crucial if democracy is to have a chance to grow.

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## Notes

1. Political culture can be defined as *a more or less coherent pattern of values, norms, opinions, knowledge and modes of behavior which, on the one hand, serve to integrate citizens and institutions in a democratic, public sphere and which, on the other hand, have an effect on the analysis, formulation, agreement on, legitimization and elaboration of public policies* (Andersen 1993a, p.22). This definition emphasizes, in the first instance, the key values, opinions and acts which comprise the political culture. The second part of the definition emphasizes the integration of citizens and citizens in the public sphere where a variety of values, norms, attitudes etc. contribute to a conceptualization of politics and political problems. This is an integration which contains and develops by means of contradictions and conflicts in which there is, nonetheless, a process of integration. Were this not the case, it would be absurd to refer to a political culture at all.

2. The classification gives the following groups:

Well-educated between 20 and 44 years	15% of population
Brief or no training, between 20 and 44 years	29% of population
Well-educated over 45 years	7% of population
Average education over 45 years	8% of population
Brief or no education over 45 years	41% of population

3. The formulation of questions for the different indices is presented in what follows. The index for political interest covers both an indication whether the person is interested in politics and whether politics are discussed in the family. The index as to a positive assessment of the welfare state is compiled from three questions. Firstly whether one agrees that the social reforms should be retained to at least their present extent. Secondly, whether one agrees that differences in income should be leveled out and, thirdly, whether one agrees that the private sector should be controlled and regulated by the state.

The abuse index is collated from the following attitudes: whether too many people who receive unemployment benefit should try to find a job; that many using the National Health Service are not sick and too many of those on public assistance get money to which they are not entitled. The index as to trust in politicians consists of an assessment of whether trust in council members and members of parliament is quite great or very great. The index of political powerlessness consists of a single question as to whether one agree that politics is usually so complicated that one can't understand what is going on. Views as to parties, public employees, foreigners, local councils, and party members are all based on single questions. Whereas the indication of communication with authorities is based on three dimensions: whether one has spoken up at a public meeting, written letters to the newspapers etc. and has approached public authorities.

4. There can, in all, be three different mixes of statements in the construction of an index of materialism and post-materialism. This has been done in several calculations. Only the first of these, the most widely accepted, has been used here (see Gundelach et al. 1993).