ECONOMY, EMOTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES – EUROSCEPTICISM ACROSS EUROPE

An examination of how individual characteristics and political parties shape public Euroscepticism.

Abstract

In recent years the people of Europe have gained a more sceptic view on further European integration. This is also known as a growth in public Euroscepticism. Not only have they become more sceptic, but it is argued that their reasoning for the scepticism has changed. Previously it was economic considerations driving public opposition, now it is argue to be a matter of emotions related to nationalism and anti-immigration. Concurrently with this development, a rise of Eurosceptical right-wing political parties has taken place around Europe and these parties' battle cry against further European integration is centred on the same emotions argued to drive public Euroscepticism. This lead to the following research question:

- *Why are people across Europe becoming more Eurosceptic and how do Eurosceptical right-wing political parties influence this development?*

In order to answer the research question, quantitative material from 10 European countries are examined in the years of 2008 and 2014. The quantitative material consists of public opinion surveys, which are combined with expert surveys on national political parties ideological and EU positioning. Due to the duality of the research question, the analysis is structured in two parts. The first, holding national parties neutral, is guided by four theoretically deduced expectations and examines the individual characteristics and how they have changed between 2008 and 2014. The second, loosening the assumption of neutral national political parties, is guided by two theoretically deduced expectations and examines how these Eurosceptical right-wing political parties influence public Euroscepticsm.

It is found that anti-immigration attitudes are crucial in explaining public Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the link between these has only gained strength between 2008 and 2014, why is concluded that this factor is the main reason for why people have become more Eurosceptic between 2008 and 2014. Thus, the emotions of anti-immigration are better predictors of public Euroscepticism than economic calculations. The analysis of the effects from Eurosceptical right-wing political parties on public Euroscepticism is hampered by the quality of the data available. Therefore, it was not possible to establish how these political parties influence the development in public Euroscepticism.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"Our European Union is, at least in part, in an existential crisis".

Those were the words spoken by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker on the 14th of September 2016 in his State of the Union speech (European Commission, 2016a) and it followed what can only be remembered as a number of crucial years in the history of the European Union (EU).

In 2009, one of the biggest bankruptcies even seen in modern history took place with the economic failure of the American bank Lehman Brothers. This acted as a catalyst for what came to be known as the European debt crisis in the following years (European Commission, 2016b). In 2015, as the waves of the debt crisis were easing out[1], a migrant crisis hit the EU, as thousands of migrants came to the European external borders to seek for asylum. Not alone was the European cooperation not geared to handle so many asylum seekers, it became a political battleground. These years of debt and migrant crisis were marked by the so far low of the European cooperation, when the United Kingdom – following a referendum held June 23rd 2016 – decided to withdraw the British membership[2] of The European Union (EU). The *existential crisis* is indeed evident. A fact also illustrated in how the people of Europe look at the European cooperation.

Looking at graph 1.1 below, the public opinion on the European cooperation has turned in a negative direction in nearly all countries from 2004 to 2014, with an overall drop of 0.40. And recent polls show that this tendency is also evident in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2016). The skepticism towards the EU is growing; a phenomenon often described as growing Euroscepticism.

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[1] Within 2014 Ireland, Spain and Portugal had concluded their financial assistance programs (See e.g. European Commission, 2016b)
[2] The decision to withdrawn from the EU is often described as *Brexit.*

Graph 1.1 Development of Euroscepticism across Europe

 Source: Own creation on the basis of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2004 to 2014. Question: *Should the European unification go further or has it already gone too far?* Scale: 0 (Unification gone too far) to 10 (Unification should go further).

However, this is not to say that public Euroscepticism originates from the debt- and refugee crisis. Usherwood & Startin (2013) argue that up until the mid-1980's there was a somewhat consistent consensus about the economic advantages related to further European integration. This changed in the years after signing the Single European Act in 1986, where especially the troubles surrounding the Maastricht Treaty marked a clear sign of the simmering Euroscepticism around Europe (Mudde, 2011; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013; Leconte, 2015;). Hooghe & Marks describe the political environment period prior to 1991, as:

"(…) *years of permissive consensus,* [years] *of deals cut by insulated elites. The period since 1991 might be described, by contrast, as one of constraining dissensus. Elites, that is, party leaders in positions of authority, must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues. What they see does not reassure them*" (Hooghe & Marks, 2009:5).

The people of Europe no longer tacitly accept the deals struck by European political elites, but have gained a far more critical approach towards these since the early 1990's (Ibid). Thus, Euroscepticsm among the people of Europe is not a new notion. However, its strength and the repercussions potentially following from it – illustrated by Brexit – is.

As public Euroscepticism has gained in both political and academic attention since the 1990's, several attempts to explain the individual level factors affecting it has been provided. These explanations have often centered on two arguments. An *utilitarian* one, where an individual's level of Euroscepticism is determined by his/hers cost-benefit analysis, and an *Identity* one, where it in essence is a matter of how threatening an individual sees 'outsiders' for his/hers social group that determines the individual's level of Euroscepticism. The academic battleground has often been centered on which of the two explanations provide the most explanatory power and as European integration has changed character, so has the explanatory power for these individual level factors. Where in the earlier years it was argued that the *utilitarian* approach was most influential, it has been argued that the *Identity* approach has held this role in recent years. (McLaren, 2006; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011; Hobolt & Vries, 2016).

A change in perspective on the explanatory force of individual level factors has been accompanied by a parallel development focusing on how these individual level factors link with intermediating factors between the EU and the public. This linkage has often been known as the *elite-mass* linkage and centers on the connection between media, elites and the political parties vis-à-vis public Euroscepticsm (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). And especially the latter has undergone an interesting development in recent years.

Simultaneously with an overall growing public Euroscepticsm across Europe as illustrated in graph 1.1, it has been argued that across Europe there is a:" (…) *rise of far-right political parties".* (Mudde, 2007:1). Some of the most prominent of these are *Front National* in France, *UK*

Independence party in the United Kingdom and *Party for Freedom* in the Netherlands. Although these political parties consist of a range of diverse characteristics they are known to be very Eurosceptical. E.g. Gómez-Reino & Llamazares, (2013:793) argue that that this party family: "(…) *is the most Eurosceptical party family (…)* and Hooghe et al. (2004:133) find that these (…) *radical right parties are without exception, highly Eurosceptical."* Their Euroscepticism can be described according to a common baseline along the lines of "(…) *nationalism, xenophobia* and *exclusive identity politics"* (Gómez-Reino & Llamazares, 2013: 792). In short, they are (…) *a specific form of nationalism."* (Mudde, 2007:30). Several studies have highlighted a strong linkage between these parties and public Euroscepticism (de Vries & Edwards, 2009; Werts et al., 2012; Gomez-Reino & Llamazares, 2013) and Ronald Inglehart has in a recent paper argued that the British *right-wing Eurosceptical political party* 'UKIP' acted as an important *catalyst* in Brexit (Inglehart & Norris , 2016:3).

Thus, we are faced with several developments; *a rise in public Euroscepticism,* where the explanatory factors are *changing perspective* concurrently with *a rise of far-right Eurosceptical political parties*. These developments beg numerous questions. Why are people across Europe becoming more and more Eurosceptic? Do people have certain characteristics that are decisive for Euroscepticism? And if so, which characteristics influence the opinion formation the most? Have the rise of Eurosceptical right-wing political parties been a factor in facilitating a rise in Euroscepticism? And if so, how is the linkage between individual characteristics and these Eurosceptical right-wing parties constructed?

These inquiries lead me to my overall research question:

- *Why are people across Europe becoming more Eurosceptic and how do Eurosceptical right-wing political parties influence this development?*

Chapter 2: Methodology

In this chapter the research design and the methods used to answer the research question will be described. Firstly, to give the reader an overview of the structure of this thesis, a research design is provided below. The research design describes the content of each chapter of the thesis, thus exploring how each chapter contributes to the answer of the research question. As implied in the last chapter, this thesis is structured accordingly to two main themes; firstly, the individual level factors of public Euroscepticism – known as antecedents – and secondly the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties' effect on public Euroscepticism. An illustration of the research design is found in figure 2.1.

The research design reveals some inherited challenges in the way I am going to answer the main research question of this thesis and these challenges need to be addressed. This will be done in the sections following the presentation of the research design. Firstly, I will present a short introduction to quantitative vis-à-vis qualitative methods, which is followed by three sections dealing with issues related to the choice of using quantitative methods.

In the last two sections, a presentation of the datasets used in this thesis will be given. The datasets consist of two types. The first is from the European Social Survey (ESS), which is the data that the public opinion relies on. These datasets will be used in the examination of *the first part* of the thesis. The second is from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which is the data that provides insight about the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties. These datasets will be used in the examination of *the second part* of the thesis in combination with the data from the European Social Survey.

2.1: Research design

In chapter one – *Introduction* – the development and the change in the nature of public Euroscepticism were described. Furthermore, a description of the contemporary rise of *Eurosceptical right-wing political parties* was provided. These developments formed the foundation for the main research question.

In chapter two – *Methodology* – I will address the research design and how it is structured accordingly to the two themes described above. Thus, the first theme is *the antecedents of public*

Euroscepticism and the second is *Eurosceptical right-wing political party effect on public Euroscepticism*.

The following sections of this thesis are to a large part constructed after this divide. This means e.g. that chapter three will be structured around the two themes; the first dealing with the literature on antecedents for public Euroscepticism and the second with the literature on Eurosceptical right-wing political parties' effect on public Euroscepticism. However, it should be underlined that this works mostly as structural guidance, as the two themes are interrelated and will be combined as will be evident in chapter THEORY. Following the research design, a more thorough examination of issues related to the choice of method will follow. In here, the issue of *measurement error* and the problem of *omitted variable bias* will be addressed, as these two challenges are particularly relevant in this thesis' utilization of quantitative methods. Following this, a section dealing explicitly with the problem of *endogeneity* related to the second theme of this thesis will be explored.

Hereafter, descriptions of the data sources used in this thesis are given in section 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. They consist of datasets covering 10 European countries in 2008 and 2014, which are collected through a comparative cross-sectional design. These datasets are remarkable as the empirical foundation in this thesis, as, firstly, they cover a troublesome period of the European cooperation and, secondly, they have not been utilized in the literature on public Euroscepticism so far. In other words, these datasets can help shed new empirical evidence on the development of public Euroscepticism within a troublesome period of European integration.

In chapter three – *Theoretical framework* – I will firstly describe how Euroscepticism is defined in this thesis. Thereafter section 3.2 and section 3.3 follows; the division into these two sections is a result of the research design, as described above. In section 3.2 I will explore two different – albeit interrelated – strands of literature dealing with individual level characteristics as antecedents of public Euroscepticism. This leads me to form expectations of which antecedents drive public Euroscepticism.

In section 3.3, the role of Eurosceptical right-wing political parties is described and it is theorized how these have an effect on public Euroscepticism. The methodological concerns of this relationship will be addressed in section 2.2.3. In section 3.3, three characteristics are identified and together they determine the *Intensity of the Eurosceptic cue*. This leads me to form

expectations of how the *Intensity of the Eurosceptic cue* has an effect on public Euroscepticism. Furthermore, an expectation formulated on the grounds of how the *Intensity of the Eurosceptic cue* and *antecedents* interact will be described. This is one of the main strengths of this thesis, as this combination of the two strands of theory will enable me to test and shed light on public Euroscepticism in ways that have never been tried before.

Chapter four – *Operationalization* – will start with the examination of the dependent variable. As only one variable is identified as being a reliable measure of public Euroscepticsm, a thorough inspection of the variable is needed. It is also in this section that the statistical methods used to perform the analysis are described. Hereafter, the operationalization of the expectations articulated in chapter three will begin. Firstly, I will start with operationalizing the expectations derived from section 3.2, followed by an operationalization of the expectations derived from section 3.3. In this last section, it is described how Eurosceptical right-wing political parties are identified within each nation in the EU.

In chapter five – *Analysis* – the analysis is presented. This section is divided into two parts, where the first deals with the expectations related to the antecedents of public Euroscepticism, whereas the second is related to the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties' effect on public Euroscepticism. This means that I in the first section of the analysis assume that the political parties are neutral (i.e. not having an effect on public opinion), whereas I in the second step loosen this assumption. As one of the main trajectories of this thesis is the development in public Euroscepticism, models for both step one and step two are provided for both 2008 and 2014.

In chapter six – *Conclusion* – I will conclude on the findings in the thesis and provide an answer to the research question formulated in the previous chapter.

Below an illustration of the research design is provided

Figure 2.1 Illustration of the research design

Following from the above description, it is described how I rely on quantitative methods to answer the research question. Therefore, I will give a short introduction to the overall use of quantitative methods and relate it to qualitative methods.

2.2: Quantitative method

To answer the research question of this thesis, I will use quantitative survey data. Without going into a deeper clarification of the ontological and epistemological considerations often following from using quantitative survey data (see e.g. Bryman, 2012; Ingemann, 2013), quantitative methods have both weaknesses and strengths vis-à-vis qualitative methods.

A critique often raised when using quantitative methods in social science is that it "(…) *possesses*

an artificial and spurious sense of precision and accuracy."(Bryman, 2012:178). It is argued that the social world is too complex and nuanced to be quantified and objectified into e.g. survey data. Using quantitative methods to explore Euroscepticism may result in e.g. lack of rich data including contextual meaning of people. However, it is, among other things, also one of the positive features of quantitative methods. As the data collection method is standardized it has been argued to add a high level of consistency to the collected data. Therefore, it has frequently been used in the social sciences as it provides the opportunity to be in a better position to argue for causality, enhance the generalizability of the results and to make better comparisons across contexts. (Ibid: 405-407). Put in reference to this thesis, using repeated cross-sectional survey data from multiple countries provides a strong foundation for the external validity. Thus, by doing my research as described above, I argue that I enjoy the strengths of being able to generalize across Europe. Hence, seen in relation to this thesis main objective – the examination of public Euroscepticism at an individual level across countries and time – the strengths of quantitative methods outweigh its limitations.

However, one must also be aware of the limitations of these strengths. This is what I in more detail will do below in the three following sections. Firstly, I will look into the concepts of *measurement error and omitted variable bias*, which are limitations related to the entire thesis. Secondly, the section of *endogeneity* is dealing especially with step two of the thesis' research design, as the second step possess some particular challenges for this thesis. Lastly, a description of the used datasets and their *reliability* will be given.

2.2.1: Measurement error

Measurement error is described by Gabel &Scheve (2007) as "(…) *poor measurement of the theoretical concepts* (…)" and is in essence a question of whether the indicators measure what I claim they measure. To answer this question, I will look at two related subjects. Firstly, how can I infer that answers on survey question capture the 'right opinion' of the respondents and second what pitfalls is evident when these answers are operationalized to cover the measures that I use to perform my investigation.

When using quantitative survey material the standardization of questions and answers always present a challenge, because of the (…) *inherent difficulty of mapping ones preexisting opinions onto the unavoidably vague language of survey questions*." (Zaller, 1992:31). Thus, the mapping of

Eurosceptic attitudes is at risk of being done to simplistic, because: *"A subject may say ''strongly agree'' one time and "agree" the next, simply because (…) he is uncertain how strong is "strongly*." (Achen, 1975: 1220). In other words, when examining a multifaceted concept like Euroscepticism through a standardized survey question, there is potentially room for measurement error. To put this in reference to the operationalization of public Euroscepticism and the expectations driving the analysis, if Euroscepticism or an expectation are to be operationalized according to only one variable, the conclusions drawn on the basis hereof depend on the quality of this variable. One way to compensate for this issue is to use multiple measures of the same concept. (Bryman, 2012:173).

However, this has not been possible in relation to the dependent variable. As becomes evident in chapter three, the concept of Euroscepticism has several facets. These several facets some authors have tried to capture by making an index of two variables (Gabel, 1998) or three variables (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). However, as several other scholars working within the literature of Euroscepticism, I am constrained by the data available[3]. I must therefore rely on a single variable to measure Euroscepticism. As this variable is of particular importance, a further examination of this variable will be done in section 4.3.

2.2.2: Omitted variable problem

As described, I rely on comparative cross-sectional survey data covering a period from 2008 to 2014. As the data used is collected through a cross-sectional design, the data is collected at one point in time and the timing of the collection of data can potentially influence the answers given. Christopher Achen puts it rather bluntly, as he argues that: *"People do not have a single preference in most decision situations* [but instead relies on the] *most preferred point from the distribution around his central preferred point*." (Achen, 1975:1220). In other words, events that transpired at the time of the data collection not possible to take into consideration can have played a significant impact on people's responses to the survey questions. This should also been seen in relation to the examination of the impact of the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties. In short, the proposed relationship between public Euroscepticism and Eurosceptical right-wing political parties may be influenced by several others developments, which I am not able to take into consideration.

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[3] As I use second hand data, I do not have the opportunity to influence the design of the used surveys.

Problems with omitted variables are always a challenge when working with survey data in the social world and an aspect one should keep in mind, when the final conclusions are drawn.

Exploring the relationship between antecedents and Euroscepticism in certain circumstances gives me the ability to argue for the direction of the correlation[4]. However, when loosening the assumption that political parties are neutral in part two of the analysis, I experience the problem of endogeneity. Therefore, a theoretical explanation of how to understand the correlation between political parties and public Euroscepticism must be made.

2.2.3: The problem of endogeneity

A bulk of literature has investigated the correlation between public opinion and political party positioning on European integration. The main discussion has evolved around whether the correlation is bottom-up (i.e. public opinion guides the positioning of political parties), top-down (i.e. political parties and elites cue the public opinion) or both. Or as Steenbergen et al. (2007) is asking: *who is cuing whom*?

Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the notion of *permissive consensus* was – as previously described – an often used expression when dealing with how the people of Europe formed opinions on European integration. In other words, the causal arrow went from political elites to public opinion. However, as there has been argued to be a shift from *permissive consensus* to *constraining dissensus* (Hooghe & Marks, 2009), the notion of the top-down process[5] has been challenged by some scholars (E.g. Carrubba, 2001).

The contested premise of the top-down process is in essence an argument derived from the literature on strategic positioning of political parties. It describes how the public cue political elites with information about their preferences to which the political elites respond. The central idea within this line of thinking is that political parties consist of mainly rational people, whose central goal is to win an election. In other words, political party success is a matter of electoral success and the political parties must place themselves in a position, where they can maximize their votes (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004).

Carrubba – using sophisticated statistical methods that are argued to overcome the problem of

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[4] E.g. if gender is found to be correlated with Euroscepticism, I argue that the correlation runs from gender to Euroscepticism and not the other way around.
[5] In section 3.3.2.1 the theoretical arguments for how the top-down process works will be described in more detail.

potential reverse causation or endogeneity[6] – finds evidence "(…) *that the more pro-EU the electorate is, the more pro-EU national parties tend to be'*. (Carrubba, 2001:18). He finds evidence that a causational direction flowing from voter to party has the most explanatory power.

What is especially interesting about his findings is that he finds support for a bottom-up effect prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, as his dataset cover the period from 1977 – 1992. Seemingly political parties have been responding to the public opinion on European issues for years before the permissive consensus shifted into constraining dissensus.

However, this bottom-up effect has been contested in the literature and some of the most notable contributions come from Ray (2003), Gabel & Scheve (2007) and Steenbergen et al. (2007). These authors use the same statistical methods as Carrubba (2001), but on different datasets, finding most support for the top-down process.

Ray (2003) and Gabel & Scheve (2007) argue that the instrumental variables deployed by Carrubba (2001) are not thoroughly investigated. Gabel & Scheve (2007:1016) argue that: "*The analysis does not, however, present a valid test of whether the instrument* [i.e. instrumental variable] *is correlated with the endogenous regressor (…)*". In other words, as Carrubba uses instrumental economic self-interest variables (e.g. education, income level etc.) to predict individuals party identification, he makes the assumption that the individual shapes the positioning of the party independent from the instrumental economic self-interest views of the individual. Carrubba himself also acknowledges the problem as he writes: "*An important limitation of this instrumentation is that it does not control for the possibility that an individual's demographic characteristics determine one's party identification and one's party determines what policy positions one holds.*" (Carrubba, 2001:149). Ray (2003:979) argues somewhat similarly that: (…) "*Carrubba's nonrecursive model predicting party positions did not rule out the possibility that parties influence their own supporters (…)*".

Put bluntly, his study – albeit sophisticated – theoretically heightens the effect of the bottom-up effect.

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[6] Carrubba (2001) uses a statistical method often used in economics, where he uses instrumental variables to predict the independent variables, where after the predicted independent variables are regressed onto the dependent variable overcoming the reverse causation issues. It is especially because of this approach that Carrubba's results have being inspiring and influential for the research on the party-voter link regarding European integration (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007).

Turning to authors finding support for the top-down effect on the same methodological basis as Carrubba (2001), Ray (2003), Gabel & Scheve (2007) and Steenbergen et al. (2007) find evidence that elites do cue public opinion. E.g. Gabel & Scheve argue that (2007: 1013) *"(...) more negative elite messages about European integration do indeed decrease public support for Europe."* Similar conclusions are made by Ray (2003) and Steenbergen et al. (2007) and especially the latter provide these findings with an eye for the contextual factors influencing the party-voter linkage. Even though Ray (2003:986) takes into account the role of national context, Steenbergen et al. (2007:27) do so in a more nuanced manor as they control for *electoral system, election year* and *referendum provision* and still find evidence that the causation is top-down. Although what the article has in nuanced control variables it lacks in the treatment of the dependent variable, as it investigates only opinion from political party members; it has been argued that a strong partisanship increases the likelihood of a top-down process (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011:20), why it potentially overestimates the effect of the political parties.

Furthermore, looking at other contributions not based on the statistical methods discussed above, there seems to be evidence that the process is mostly one of top-down. E.g. Steenbergen & Jones (2002) find that public opinion is affected by political elites in a non-uniform way, as the effect is relying on the nature of the elite cue and Llamazares & Gramacho (2013) find that – among what they call the traditionally 'Euro-enthusiastic' countries of Spain, Portugal and Greece – the political party cue has the potential to influence public opinion.

Loveless & Rohrschneider (2011:18) put it bluntly: *"Yes, on the whole, popular attitudes regarding the EU are typically considered to be mediated or even manufactured through the attitudes of national and EU elites (...)".*

Therefore, I make the assumption that the opinion formation process is elite driven. I.e. in the theoretical divide between top-down vis-à-vis bottom-up, I choose to look at the relationship as a result of the former.

However, I do not assume that the linkage is a uniform one, but is instead mediated by societal-level factors. The link between these and Eurosceptical right-wing political parties is one I will return to in section 3.3.

As the methodological concerns related to this thesis have been addressed above, I will now describe the datasets used to perform the analysis. Firstly, the datasets from the European Social Survey, which form the empirical basis for examining public Euroscepticism, will be described. Thereafter, a description of the Chapel Hill expert survey, which in combination with the datasets from the European Social Survey, will form the empirical basis when I examine the linkage between public Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic right-wing political parties.

2.2.4: European Social survey

Usually when research on Euroscepticism has been conducted, it has been done on the basis of Eurobarometer data, which consists of survey material collected by the European Commission (see e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Sørensen, 2007; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Serricchio et al., 2013). But recent research has found that "(…) *the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys were initially fashioned by and for European Commission officials. The unofficial aim of the creation of the EB was to prove the existence of a European public opinion, to which the Commission could refer in order to legitimize its initiatives in the eyes of domestic governments. As a result, the methodology used in these surveys, as well as their results, should be considered with appropriate caution".* (Leconte, 2015: 253).

Therefore, I instead rely on the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2008 and 2014, which has released datasets not yet utilized to explore public Euroscepticism.

The European Social Survey is a cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since 2001. The data consists of face-to-face interviews with randomly selected individuals. The data collection process takes place every two years and aims to measure the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of the populations of Europe (European Social Survey, 2016a). The survey has received the title of European Research Infrastructure, which among other things means that it "(…) *offers unique research services to users (…)* " and that these research services are (…) *used by the scientific community to conduct top-level research* (…)" (European Commission, 2016c) Furthermore, the European Social Survey subscribes to the Declaration on Professional Ethics of the International Statistical Institute. To ensure the countries included in the ESS live up to these standard, the survey data is being supervised and reviewed according to the ESS paper on *project specifications.* Furthermore, this also gives the data a strong comparative dimension, as the data collection process has been optimized: "*In order to achieve 'optimal comparability'*(…) (European

Social Survey, 2016b). The European Social Survey is financially supported by all the participating countries, why it is public available.

2.2.5: Chapel Hill expert survey

The second part of my data is used when examining the effect from Eurosceptical right-wing political parties on public Euroscepticism and relies on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The Chapel Hill expert surveys estimate party positioning on European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European countries. The first survey was conducted in 1999, with waves following in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014; it is the latter two waves that are of particular interest to this thesis. Again the data is second hand, why an assessment of its credibility has been necessary.

The data consists of surveys answered by political scientist, who were identified using The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Handbook of political scientist in Europe. The individuals were chosen on the basis of their nationality and because they specialized in either the domestic political system of their nation or European politics. E.g. in the case of Denmark, 11 experts, whom both held Danish nationality and were considered to be experts accordingly to the ECPR Handbook, were interviewed. Furthermore, to ensure a reasonable number of responses from each nation, political scientists with an expertise on a given nation of which they were not themselves a citizen were identified; again, this was done by the use of the ECPR Handbook (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2016).

This thesis' analysis is confined to 10 countries as these are all included in both waves of the ESS and the CHES. The 10 different nations are described in table 2.2 below, as well as the number of parties and the number of expert evaluations conducted for each country.

Table 2.2 Overview of the 10 European Countries

Country	Number of expert evaluations		Number of parties evaluated	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
Belgium	16	6	14	13
Denmark	11	11	9	9
France	9	14	9	13
Netherlands	14	11	10	11
United Kingdom	16	7	8	7
Sweden	15	22	10	10
Czech Republic	20	15	7	9
Hungary	17	14	7	6
Poland	15	17	8	8
Slovenia	13	14	8	9

Source: Own creation on the basis of Bakker et al. (2015) and Polk et al. (2016).

It is evident that the group of countries above in table2.2 is located in the northern, middle or eastern part of Europe. Ideally, the southern countries would also be represented, as this would heighten my ability to argue for generalizability of any findings across all of Europe. Thus, the limitations in the available data lower the representativeness of any findings, which must be kept in mind, when the final conclusions are drawn.

Looking at the case of Belgium and United Kingdom, a drop from respectively 16 to 6 and 16 to 7 expert evaluations happened between 2010 and 2014. A concrete reason for this drop is not provided in the background paper (Polk et al., 2016). However, when relying on expert judgments based on surveys – and some with only few answers – certain problematic aspect are needed to be taken into consideration.

Mudde (2011:19) argues that the CHES data:" (…) *have both its strength and weakness. Its strength, and the key reasons for its popularity, is that the data set is longitudinal, quantitative, and easily accessible. Its weakness is the source of the data, i.e. the so-called „experts" that fill out the surveys."* The data from these experts are among other things in risk of becoming biased as

they use their subjective judgment, which may be influenced by: "*Informational asymmetry, temporal constraints* [and the] *conflation of preferences and behavior."* (Marks et al., 2006:26). Instead, one could have relied on political manifesto data[7] to explore national party positioning on European issues, which would be done: "(…) *predominantly on the basis of official party literature, most notably election and party programs* (…)". (Ibid: 26). However, the strength of relying on expert surveys is that they provide a measure of political party positioning which is not volatile to strategic positioning in relation to e.g. elections. Or as Bakker et al (2014:5) argues: "(…) *For scholars interested in* (…) *durability, for example, the rhetorical positioning of political parties as presented in election manifestos may be of less value than other measures of party positioning that incorporate a party's words and deeds."* Instead of relying on the parties' rhetorical stance, I chose to rely on a combination of this and their actual actions. One thing is what is being *said* while under influence of e.g. national strategic concerns, another is was is being *said* and *done*. Furthermore, a study made in 2006 comparing four datasets on political party positioning – including the Chapel Hill expert survey – found that (…)"*none of the four sources of data we examine has a monopoly of truth* [but] *the expert dataset is the most valid among those at our disposal".* (Marks et al., 2006:33-34). Likewise, a cross validation of both the 2010 and the 2014 survey with data sources such as the Comparative Manifesto Project found a high degree of alignment between them (Bakker et al., 2014; Bakker et al., 2015).

Therefore, I rely on the Chapel Hill expert survey from 2010 and 2014 to be able to give me valid information about political party positioning. This means that the ESS dataset from 2014 will be combined with the CHES from 2014, and the ESS dataset from 2008 will be combined with the CHES from 2010. Ideally I would use the ESS dataset from 2010, but because it is missing key variables, this is not an option. Furthermore, this approach is deemed most appropriate, as the field work for the CHES was done in the spring of 2010 (Bakker et al., 2015) and the fieldwork for the ESS from 2008 in the countries used for the analysis was done mainly in the spring of 2009(European Social Survey, 2016c). This is not optimal, but this is some of the limitations one encounter, when using second hand data.

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[7] Such data sources could be from the Comparative Manifesto Project or the Euro manifesto study.

2.3: Finishing remarks

In this chapter, I have outlined my research design, my methodological choice and any problematic aspects of these and lastly described the datasets I use for my analysis. Albeit this thesis experiences difficulties in some areas – some of which must be kept in mind when the final conclusions are drawn – the main trajectory for the further paper has now been described. Next follows a theoretical chapter, which will introduce the theoretical backbone for this thesis and present the expectations that are to guide the analysis.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I will present the theoretical foundation for this thesis. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will describe how *Euroscepticism* has been defined in the literature previously, which leads to how it is defined in this thesis. Thereafter, in part two, the individual level characteristics – or what is known as the *antecedents* – for public Euroscepticism will be described. It has been argued that it is possible to divide this literature into the two main theoretical strands of *Instrumental self-interest* and *Social identity.* Within the two strands several dimensions exist. These dimensions will be explored, which will result in the description of four expectations derived from the literature concerning how the antecedents explain public Euroscepticism. In part three the theoretical foundation linked to the second part of the analysis will be described. This part deals with how it is theoretically argued that Eurosceptical right-wing political parties can have an opinion formation effect on public Euroscepticism. Following from this part, two expectations concerning the linkage between public Euroscepticism and Eurosceptical right-wing political parties are deduced. All six expectations are summed up in table 3.3 at the end of this chapter, where any finishing remarks are also provided.

3.1: Defining Euroscepticism

A highly influential definition of Euroscepticism is provided by Paul Taggart (1998), with his comparative study on European political parties, as he distinguishes between *hard* and *soft* Euroscepticism. He describes Euroscepticism as a 'touchstone of dissent' within the established political parties and argues that Euroscepticism is mostly limited to minor parties in the periphery of national party system. This argument has both found support (e.g. de Vries & Edwards, 2009) and opposition (e.g. Gomez-Reino & Llamazares, 2013), but the concepts of *hard* and *soft* Euroscepticism have had a substantial influence on the definition of Euroscepticism and have often been applied outside this initial starting point (see e.g. Sørensen, 2007; Skinner, 2013; Usherwood & Startin, 2013). This is especially true after the concepts were redefined by Taggart & Szczerbiak (2002; 2003) after critique from Kopecky & Mudde (2002) (see also Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2016). Taking Kopecky & Mudde's (2002) critique into account, Taggart & Szczerbiak define *hard Euroscepticism* as "*the principled opposition to the project of European integration*",

whereas *soft Euroscepticism* is defined as "*the absence of a principled objection to EU European integration, but an opposition to the Union's current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that it was planning to make."* (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003:22). However, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) made their own definition of Euroscepticism, which also gained ground in the literature. Instead of defining Euroscepticism on a one-dimensional spectrum from hard to soft, they argue that it is possible to look at both the opposition/support towards *the principle* and opposition/support towards *further integration* in the EU.[8] The contributions by both Taggart & Szczerbiak (2002; 2003) and Kopecky & Mudde (2002) intend to capture different *degrees*[9] of political party opposition towards EU, but the introduction of the divisions between opposition/support towards *the principle* and opposition/support towards *further integration* by Kopecky & Mudde was an important step in the development of the conceptualization of Euroscepticism. This differentiation has been influential in the literature and has been adopted by among others Wessels (2007), Krouwel & Abts (2007), Serricchio et al. (2013)[10].

The former three studies all have in common that – apart from adopting the Euroscepticism definition by either Taggart & Szczerbiak (2002;2003) or Kopecky & Mudde (2003) – they also built further on top of the concept of political support developed by David Easton (Easton, 1975). In short, Easton differentiates between three object levels – Authorities, Regime or Community – and two modes of orientation – specific or diffuse. Used within the Euroscepticism literature the opposition towards 'the objects' can be understood as: "'*Opposition to the authorities' refers to negative attitudes towards public officials and institutional actors that exercise EU governance. 'Opposition to the regime' refers to negative attitudes towards the political values, norms and structures of the EU. 'Opposition to the community' refers to negative attitudes towards other citizens understood as fellow members of the European collective*" (Wessels, 2007: 289). 'Orientation' in this context can be understood as: "'*Diffuse opposition' is opposition towards the idea of European integration, while 'specific opposition' is opposition towards the EU as the current*

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[8] This can be described as the differentiation between *the idea* of the EU and the *development* of the EU. (see. e.g. Sørensen, 2007: 59-60). Flood & Usherwood (2005:4) labels the differentiation as a matter of ideology vs. strategy in national political parties.

[9] Or the *intensity* of opposition, as argued by Sørensen (2007:60-62).

[10] Other authors inspired by Taggart & Szczerbiak (2002; 2003) and Kopecky & Mudde (2002) not included in this section due to limitations in the available number of pages of this thesis, includes Flood & Usherwood (2005), (Vasilopoulou, 2009), Sørensen (2007;2008) Leconte (2010), Skinner (2013) Stöckel (2013) and de Vries & Steenbergen (2013)

embodiment of that idea" (Serricchio et al., 2013:52).

Table 3.1 Orientations towards political objects

		Political objects	
Modes of orientation	Authorities	Regime	Community
Specific	X		
Diffuse	X	X	X

Source: Wessels (2007:289)

Wessels (2007) gives an illustration of the arguments above in table 3.1 and on the basis of this empirically identifies three different types of skeptical EU citizens: *Critical Europeans, Eurosceptics and Adamant Eurosceptics* (Ibid: 303). Krouwel & Abts (2007:258) use Easton's assumptions described above and introduce the dimensions *negativism* and *reflexivity*. However, their contribution is mostly theoretical inspiring work, as they propose it is possible to identify 40 types of Euroscepticism (Krouwel & Abts, 2007:261).

Thus, following from the arguments presented above, a definition of Euroscepticism in this thesis must take into consideration some measure of *degree,* whether the scepticism is *diffuse* or *specific* and what *objects* this scepticism is directed towards. Therefore, the definition of Euroscepticism in this thesis is as follows:

Public Euroscepticism ranges from soft to hard scepticism and denotes the citizens diffuse opposition towards further European integration.

Using the above definition of Euroscepticism, the central theoretical elements of what the dependent variable is intended to capture has been presented. How these elements become operationalized is presented in section 4.3. As will be seen in this section, it is not possible, because of limitations in the available data, to measure diffuse opposition towards authorities and to make a distinction between the object levels of regime or community. Therefore, Euroscepticism captured in this thesis denotes *negative attitudes* towards both *the political values, norms and structures of the EU*(Regime) and towards *other citizens understood as fellow members of the European collective*(Community).

With a definition of how to understand Euroscepticism in this thesis, I will now turn to the next central theoretical section of this thesis. This section will investigate the literature that deals with how antecedents explain public Euroscepticism.

3.2: Antecedents for Euroscepticism

The literature on public Euroscepticism has found a number of different individual characteristics that have explanatory power vis-à-vis Euroscepticism. However, there seems to be some consensus on two main themes that have shown great power in explaining public opinion on Euroscepticism. The two are to a large part conflicting each other, as the fundamental theoretical tenets differ. The first, *the instrumental self-interest explanations*, build on *the economic man*, whereas the second, *the social identity explanations*, build on *the sociological man.* The theoretical tenets as well as different dimensions within each strand will be further outlined in the sections below, starting with *instrumental self-interest.*

3.2.1: Instrumental self-interest

As EU initially was based predominantly on economic cooperation, the support for further integration has often been understood in economic terms. Even though this strand consists of several different explanations, it is possible to denote a common basic logic underlying them:*" Essentially, these explanations rest on the notion that support for EU membership comes from the implicit cost/benefit analysis of (…) likely economic benefit gained from integration*." (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011:9).

Within this literature, a differentiation between two categories has often been made. One is the 'socio-tropic explanation', the other is the 'ego-centric explanation' (see. e.g. McLaren, 2006; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011; Serricchio et al., 2013; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). However, following Hooghe & Marks (2005), it is possible to denote another dimension in this line of theory; this dimension is called 'objective evaluation' vis-à-vis 'subjective evaluation'. An illustration of these dimensions is made below in figure 3.2 and constitutes the main categories of dimensions under the Instrumental self-interest strand this thesis is dealing with.

Figure 3.2 Instrumental self-interest explanations for public Euroscepticism

Source: Slightly adjusted figure created on the basis of Hooghe & Marks (2005: 422).

When salience of public Euroscepticism rose during the 1990's, the objective and subjective socio-tropic explanations were the most prominent areas of investigations (i.e. boxes II and IV). Contributions within socio-tropic objective line of thinking, characterized the support for further integration as a matter of national economic performance measured by growth rate, inflation and unemployment (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996) and country net benefits from the EU membership using EU trade and budget returns as independent variables (Anderson & Reichert, 1995). The basic understanding was that an individual was able to make a cost/benefit analysis based on his/hers country's actual economic utility of being a member of the EU (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011:9).

However, this assumption was challenged and it was argued that one should concentrate on how national economic performance was *perceived* by the general public; the logic was that assuming individuals to make these objective cost/benefit evaluations were to idealistic.

In their 1993 study Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) include both the perceived national economic benefits as well as the objective national economic benefit, finding most explanatory power for the subjective socio-tropic evaluations. Likewise Gabel & Whitten (1997: 91) argue: "(…) *our results show that national economic assessments are* (…) *powerful predictors of support (…)*". Therefore, the question was not only whether one's country performed well economically, but also very much a question of how the public perceived their country to perform economically. And

the fact that the subjective evaluation (i.e. *the perceived performance)* played an even greater role than initially thought became increasingly clear in the literature.

However, where studies presented by Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) and Gabel & Whitten (1997) argued for the centrality of *socio-tropic perceived performance* (cell IV) and even that this category explained Euroscepticism better than the *socio-tropic objective* ones (cell II), newer contributions focus on the *ego-centric perceived benefits.* Loveless & Rohrschneider (2011:9) for instance argue that "(…) *these socio-tropic approaches gradually gave way to a more specific process of egocentric utilitarianism.*" Gabel (1998a) actually refuted the socio-tropic objective explanations, as he finds that declining unemployment and rising GDP were correlated with less support for integration. Similar conclusion is made in Gabel (1998b), where he concludes that :"(…) *citizens' support for integration is positively related to the level of economic benefits they expect to derive from European integration."* (Gabel, 1998b: 351). In other words, he argues that it is the *ego-centric perceived benefit* (Cell III) that explains Euroscepticism most accurately. Hooghe and Marks (2005) sum up the argument and they highlight the importance of the categories with *subjective* evaluations: "*European integration is perceived by most citizens to shape their economic welfare in a general sense. Citizens who feel confident about the economic future – personally* [i.e. cell III] *and for their country* [i.e. cell IV] *– are likely to regard European integration in a positive light, whereas those who are fearful will lean towards Euro-skepticism."* (Hooghe & Marks, 2005:422).

What is similarly interesting is that Gabel also found that individual level objective characteristics (i.e. cell I) such as class partisanship, gender, proximity to borders etc. were of greater explanatory force than socio-tropic ones (Gabel, 1998b). This meant that measures for macro-factors (such as GDP, inflation, unemployment etc.) were now being supplemented and tested against both perceived economic benefit, but also against variables intended to measure *social location* or *socio-economic* status of individuals (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011:10; Serricchio et al., 2013: 53). In sum, the underlying logic was "(…) *that individuals in different socio-economic locations experience integration differently, some as winners and some as losers."* (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011:10). Basically, the distributional consequences of further integration were measured and it was found that "(…) *the winners (the most well of, educated and skilled individuals) are much more likely to support integration than the losers."*(Serricchio et al., 2013:

53). "The winners" are simply better positioned in society to take advantage of further integration than "the losers". Several socio-economic characteristics have been argued to be influential in determining individuals' ability to take advantage of further integration.

Hooghe et al. (2007) for instance examine how occupation is related to Euroscepticism, but because of the complex measure of occupation, these authors find mixed results, as the occupational effect is dependent on the measurement and the operationalization of 'occupation'. A way to nuance this perspective would be by making predictions of what degree a respondent's occupational category is influenced by a countries import/export[11]; however, this is outside of the scope of this thesis.

Moreover, McLaren (2006:41-45) finds that age and income are related to Euroscepticism. In short, the older you are and the less income you have, the more Eurosceptic you tend to be. The general logic described above is applied here as well; the younger you are and the better your financial status is, the more further European integration appeals to you, because you are deemed to be better suited to take advantage of the enhanced market liberalization that follows. Nelson and Gurth (2000) find that women are more Eurosceptic than men, because they are – or at least perceived themselves to be –more economically vulnerable to economic integration; they are simply the likely 'losers' from market liberalization because of their position in the labor market. Gabel (1998b) finds that political ideology has an effect, as the individuals voting for the extreme left- or extreme right-wing political parties are more Eurosceptic. De Vries & Edwards (2009: 8) describe this as the 'inverted U-curve'. The effects of political ideology were measured as the traditional understanding of left/right, but arguments put forward by Hooghe & Marks (2009:16-17) suggest that this division is too simplistic. However, newer examinations still argue that it has explanatory power vis-à-vis Euroscepticism (E.g. Serricchio et al., 2013). As this thesis is explicitly dealing with right-wing political parties, it is especially this part of the political spectrum, which will undergo further examination. The reasoning for people with right-wing attitudes to resist further European integration is that they view further integration as a threat to both their cultural and national sovereignty. De Vries & Edwards (2009:9) argue that people with these far *right-wing attitude* connect European integration with "(…) *a clear anti-immigration sentiment*".

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[11] For a study doing this on trade liberalization in general see (Mayda & Rodrik, 2005)

Looking more closely into the aspect of education, it is important to mention that the interest in this factor is not entirely a new mechanism to explain opinion formation about European integration, but had been put forward with Ronald Ingleharts seminal publication on post-materialism in 1970 (Inglehart, 1970). The main assumption relevant to this theoretical section is that as post-materialism and education were closely connected – and post-materialism was connected with both higher levels of political sophistication and political awareness – a higher degree of education would eventually lead to more positive attitudes towards the EU. Individuals would simply gain the cognitive mobilization to understand and appreciate the abstract nature of the EU. The post materialistic approach was later argued to have profoundly less impact than originally expected (see e.g. Gabel, 1998b), but the notion that *education* was significant in determining opinion on European integration lived on[12]. The causal effects from education on Euroscepticism are contested. Education is argued to have both an effect as it enhances cognitive mobilization (e.g. Wessels, 2007:12-14) but also enhances an individual's competitiveness through a greater level of skills, thus enabling an individual to do better in a more integrated Europe, with a higher level of competition (McLaren, 2006:32-38) Moreover, a recent study (Hakhverdian et al., 2013) examining the effects of education on Euroscepticism from 1973 to 2010 in 12 countries across Europe found a negative correlation; the higher educated individuals are, the less Eurosceptic they tend to be.

In sum, the four different categories for public Euroscepticism described and illustrated in figure 3.2 constitute the foundation of the theoretical strand of instrumental self-interest. What is evident from the section above is that the explanations belonging under cell I and cell III (i.e. the egocentric objective and subjective evaluation) and cell IV (the socio-tropic subjective evaluation) are the ones described in the literature to possess the most explanatory power in relation to Euroscepticism[13]. On the basis hereof, I have deduced some expectations about which antecedents impact public Euroscepticism.

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[12] The effects of these socio-economic explanations are not only confined to examining public opinion on European integration, but also play an important role, when explaining public opinion on trade liberalization in general. (See e.g. Kaltenthaler et al., 2004; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005.)

[13] Furthermore, due to limitations in available amount of space and time, objective evaluations of further European integration of socio-tropic character (i.e. cell II or also understood as actual measures of a country's economy) will be excluded.

3.2.1.1: Expectations

The first expectation is related to the subjective evaluation of further European integration of either egocentric of socio-tropic character. I expect that when looking at public Euroscepticism, *negative subjective evaluations of either egocentric of socio-tropic character are correlated with public Euroscepticism.* In other words, if an individual perceives his/hers own or his/hers country to fare economically bad in the future, this individual is also more likely to evaluate further European integration in a negative light.

The second expectation is related to the objective egocentric evaluations. Following from the sections above, I expect that age, income, gender, political ideology and education are correlated with Euroscepticism. Therefore, I expect that *individuals with higher age, lower income, lower education, far right-wing political standpoint, and women are more Eurosceptic.*

These expectations are to be operationalized in section 4.5.1 and further tested in chapter five.

The four different explanations described above and illustrated in figure 3.2, all have in common that attitudes towards European integration are formed by individuals' utilitarian calculations. However, this line of theory stands in contrast to the second strand of theory used to describe public Euroscepticism in the literature, which instead is centered on *social identity* considerations by individuals. It is this strand of theory, I turn to now.

3.2.2: Social Identity

The concern of *Social identity* – some authors have argued – came to the forefront of examinations of public opinion on European integration in the end of the 90's as the EU gained more competences in non-economic areas, thus changing the nature from primarily an economic project into a political one[14] (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). Hobolt & de Vries (2016:420) pus it clearly as they argue that as Europe has moved towards a political community it has become about the " (…) *pooling of sovereignty that potentially erodes national self-determination and blur boundaries between distinct national communities"*. This has had the consequence that the social identity characteristics of the European citizens have gained more influence in explaining opposition towards European integration and has even been argued to

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[14] Serricchio et al. (2013: 53) explicitly points towards the deployment of the EMU as an important event that decreased public support and shifted the academic focus from the instrumental self-interest explanations towards the social identity explanations.

provide more explanatory power than economical ones (Hooghe & Marks, 2009: 10-12). In their 2005 article, Hooghe & Marks argue that economic explanations are only valid, when certain circumstances are present. They argue that: *"The economic approach to public opinion is likely to be most valid when economic consequences are perceived with some accuracy, when they are large enough to matter, and when the choice a person makes actually affects the outcome."* (Hooghe & Marks, 2005:422).

One of the main contributors within the social identity line of thinking has been Lauren McLaren and especially her 2002 article has been influential, as it is somewhat a replication of Gabel (1998b) with many of the same Instrumental self-interest variables. She instead finds social identity characteristics to provide better explanations for Euroscepticism, than the Instrumental self-interest explanations (McLaren, 2002). In her 2006 book, McLaren (2006) gives a more detailed outline of her approach and she presents the line of theoretical thinking labeled *Group Conflict Theory*. *Group conflict theory* is a highly studied sociological concept and is a feature that is common to essentially all aspects of social organization. Applied to Euroscepticism, the main reason for resisting foreigners is simply because they are a threat to *the respondents group* or their groups' social identity. Thus, McLaren argues that what makes people resist European integration is the fact that people do not have self-interest guided opinions at all times, but instead many opinions are determined by what is best for the group an individual is related to, which has often been be regarded as ones country (McLaren, 2006:50-51). McLaren (2006:71) argues: "*The thousands of experiments underlying social identity theory have consistently shown that individuals identify with the in-group, support group norms and derogate out-group members along stereotypical lines, even when there is no individual gain at stake."* Tillman (2013) puts the argument bluntly, as he argues: "*One holds positive attachments to an in-group (…) and some amount of hostility towards members of the out-groups"* (Tillman, 2013:568). The in-/out-group formation could be seen as a way for individuals to boost self-esteem or as cognitive structures used to make order of a confusing world (McLaren, 2006:72). Neither way, what she finds in her 2006 book – as well as in her 2002 article – is that the individuals' perceived fear of 'losing' national identity is closely related to how threatened they are by other cultures, which to a large part determines Euroscepticism. She concludes that "*The analysis here indicates that attitudes*

toward the European Union tend to be based in great part on a general hostility toward other cultures."(McLaren, 2002: 564).

This hostility towards other cultures is to a large part dependent on the strength of the individuals' national identity; when individuals identify strongly with their nation, they are essentially more likely to feel threatened by other cultures. However, the underlying logic – European and National identity as competitors in a zero-sum game (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011:13) – has been contested by other scholars. Hooghe & Marks (2005) refine the argument as they argue that individuals can both strongly identify with their nation and Europe at the same time; thus, the matter is not one of strong national identity, but rather one of 'exclusive national identity' vs. 'cumulative national identity'.

However, Hooghe & Marks' (2005) operationalization of national and European identity rests on two rather simple measures found in Eurobarometer data and Bruter (2003:1154-1155) argues that "(…) *Eurobarometer, provide scholars with extremely poor and inadequate instruments to measure European identity; they have clear validity problems.".* He instead proposes to look at the European identity as consisting of the two components 'civic' and 'cultural'. What is central, according to Bruter (2003), is that when measuring identity through survey data without paying attention to the different components, the measure often becomes too simplistic. Wessels (2007:287-290) takes on a similar argument saying that it should be recognized that social identity should be measured more detailed and not rely on one single survey question.

Taking a step closer into how outsiders are perceived to threaten national identity and influence Euroscepticism, de Vresse & Boomgarden (2005) argue that people – following the logic of the group conflict theory presented earlier – who tend to label immigrants according to the in/out-group dimension: (…) *are also more likely to categorize others into out-groups in general and also to show hostility towards these."* (de Vresse & Boomgarden, 2005:64). Therefore, as one of the effects of further European integration is the bringing together of people from different countries, regions and cultures, it is argued that people holding negative attitudes towards immigrants are more skeptic for further European integration. In sum, *"It is not in-group favoritism but rather a negative out-group bias, indicated by hostility towards immigrants that matters in understanding support for the EU.* (de Vresse & Boomgarden, 2005:64). McLaren (2006:54-68) finds evidence that

migrants are blamed for both rising unemployment and a (perceived) drop in quality in the education systems across Europe, but de Vresse & Boomgarden (2005:72-74) takes the argument further and find anti-immigration attitudes as the most influential explanation of attitudes towards European integration. Likewise Azrout et al. (2012) find evidence – using similar theoretical foundation – that when news are framed in a way that present immigrants in a negative light, individuals are more likely to oppose further European integration; this is especially true regarding people, who carry strong anti-immigration attitudes before exposed to the negative media stories.

Furthermore, Hobolt et al. (2011) also carry out an investigation related to the Turkish membership finding evidence that not only is anti-immigration attitudes important, but they are also closely connected to anti-religious attitudes. In their case, especially Islam has a strong explanatory force in explain resistance against the unification between Turkey and EU. The argument is that (…) *cultural differences have become increasingly politicized in Europe and, since 9/11, debates on multiculturalism have become mixed up with debates on the 'threat of Islam'"*. Thus, anti-religious attitudes or *religious intolerance* is "(…) *a negative evaluation of a group of individuals owing to their religious affiliation (or lack thereof)* (…)", which justifies a view and certain treatment of this group. Put bluntly, it is again the *group conflict theory* that is influencing how people evaluate European integration; a division of people in in/out-groups accordingly to e.g. nationality is also happening accordingly to religion, which in turn explains Euroscepticism.

In a recent study Tillman (2013) argues that what is central from all these three different characteristics of the social identity strand of Euroscepticism literature – national identity, cultural threat and religious threat – is that they are all endogenous to the concept of *Authoritarianism.* In other words, the concept of authoritarianism is a predisposition that can explain the social identity characteristics described above. Whether one prescribes to the idea that authoritarianism can be considered causally prior to political attitudes (Tillman, 2013:571) is debatable. Nevertheless, Tillman finds that his measure of authoritarianism is correlated with the social identity explanations and opposition for European integration. Furthermore, he finds that when testing all three social identity explanations simultaneously, anti-immigrations attitudes are by far the measure with most explanatory force across all models (Tillman, 2013:582-584). This is remarkable, as it includes the aspect of national identity in the same model, which previously had

been argued to be key in the understanding of how in/out-group perceptions influence public Euroscepticism.

In sum, what are often argued to matter within the social identity line of theoretical thinking are the aspects of 'exclusive national identity' vs. 'cumulative national identity' and in/out group perceptions within the aspects of culture and religion. The contribution by Tillman (2013) and the aspect of *authoritarianism* is relevant, but I argue it to be endogenous to national identity, cultural and religious threat. Therefore, it is taken into account through the other explanations[15]. This provides the following expectations about the correlation between the social identity explanations and public Euroscepticism.

3.2.2.1: Expectations

Firstly, *it is expected that if an individual holds an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, he or she is more likely to be Eurosceptic.*

Secondly, as a growing literature end of the 1990's has highlighted the role of *Social identity* explanations over the *Self-instrumental* ones, *I expect that the Social Identity explanations have more explanatory power than the Self-instrumental ones*.

These expectations are to be operationalized in section 4.5.1 and further tested in chapter five.

3.2.3: Finishing remarks

In the section above, I have described the two most prominent lines of theory of antecedents for public Euroscepticism – *instrumental self-interest* and *social identity* – and on the basis of these descriptions, deduced four expectations. In the following section, I will describe the theoretical foundation for the second part of the analysis. In this part, I will look into how the political parties in general have been theorized to have an impact on public Euroscepticism. This will be put into relation of both my main aim of examining right-wing political parties' impact on public Euroscepticism and into the context of the previous deduced expectations. All expectations are summed up in table 3.3.

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[15] This should also be seen in the light of this thesis main objective, which is not to test how the different dimensions of social identity are correlated to one another.

3.3: Role of intermediaries

The *Social identity* and *Instrumental self-interest* explanations presented above have to a large degree been perceived as each other's opposites, when looking at what characterizes a Eurosceptic individual (See e.g. McLaren, 2002; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016).

However, there has also been a great deal of literature investigating the *Intermediaries* between the EU and the public opinion of it. These intermediaries consist of elites, media[16] and political parties[17] (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). In this section, I will firstly describe how the intermediaries – in this case the political parties – are theorized to have an effect on public opinion formation within the area of Euroscepticism. As explained earlier in chapter one and two, this thesis will look into a particular group of political parties all of which are found on the right-wing of the political specter. These have often been argued to be highly skeptical towards the EU and it is the *political cue* they put forward that is of central interest. However, the cueing effects from these political parties are constrained by two societal-level variables: already existing considerations in the public and the intensity of the political message. In this thesis, I will look specifically at the intensity of the political cue from the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties and not go into a detailed analysis of already existing considerations[18]. In section 3.3.2.2 it is argued that the intensity of the political cue can be measured by three elements – salience, intra- and interparty dissent – which combined provide me with a measure of the *Intensity of the Eurosceptical cue*. This forms the basis on which I form two expectations, which will be presented in section 3.3.3.

3.3.1: The cueing effect from political parties

Hobolt & de Vries describe the core argument for why political cues have an effect on public Euroscepticism:

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[16] Due to limitation in space and time, I have to delimit myself from taking media effects into account. However, studies made by e.g. Carey and Burton (2004), de Vreese & Boomgaarden (2006) and Azrout et al. (2012) find a framing effect by the media.

[17] In this thesis, a distinction between the elite and political parties will not be made, which is a similar approach as Hobolt & de Vries (2016).

[18] To do so would require a more detailed analysis of *the content* of Eurosceptic cues put forward by Eurosceptical right-wing political parties to be able with certainty to claim, whether their cue is in line with already existing considerations in the public. I will instead rely on the assumption that Eurosceptical right-wing political parties resist further European integration on the basis of their high level of nationalism, xenophobia, fear of immigration etc. A more detailed description of why Eurosceptical right-wing political parties resist further European integration are given in chapter one and section 3.3.2.1.

*"The core argument is that European integration is too complex and remote from the daily lives of most citizens for them to have sufficient interest, awareness, or emotional attachment to base their attitudes on an evaluation of the implications of the integration process. **Instead, citizens rely on proxies or cues to overcome their information shortfalls."** Such information shortcuts may take various forms, but given that citizens **generally pay more attention to the national political arena** than to European politics, it makes sense that they **employ domestic cues** to form opinions about European integration*. (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016:421, emphasis added)[19].

A central line of theoretical thinking behind the cueing effect is a rather pessimistic view on individuals. It is argued that they find it hard to formulate an informed and independent view on European integration because they lack the cognitive skills to understand the highly complex issues concerning European integration.

Steenbergen et al. (2007:17) writes that: "(…) *it may be difficult to make utilitarian calculations about the impact of European integration, because it is unclear how the EU affects a person's life (…) citizens may look for elite cues, including those from parties they tend to support, and may adjust their view accordingly, either through information or persuasion."* . The notion of *persuasion* is to a large degree inherited in the concept of *permissive consensus*. Another, slightly more optimistic view, is that the citizens have the ability to understand the complex nature of the EU, but simply does not pay enough attention, as the proximity to the EU project is too far away from the day-to-day lives of ordinary citizens (Wessels, 1995). Lastly, Steenbergen et al. (2007:17) argue that the cues may also represent "(…) *a division of labor between citizens and elites, whereby citizens expect elites to provide them with information that can form their opinions*. Nevertheless, the premise is that cues presented by political parties "(…) *provides citizens with cognitive shortcuts that help them decide what is in their interest"* (De Vries & Edwards, 2009:8). Whether public opinion on European integration is formed by persuasion or information from elites is contested, which especially holds true for the circumstances concerning the influence of individual level characteristics, when exposed to persuasion/information (See e.g. Zaller, 1992). However, it is argued that: "*It is well established that political elites shape public support for the European Union."* (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016:422).

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[19] What is implicitly stated in this quote is the fact that public opinion to a large part is determined by the cues provided by these intermediaries; in other words, a top-down approach to opinion formation is taken.

3.3.2: Societal-level variables

As described in section 2.2.3, this thesis assumes that the effect from the political parties is top-down oriented, where national political parties – as described above – cue people. However, to say that the political parties exert an effect in a straightforward way or by mere presence in the political system of each nation would be simplistic (For an example of this, see Netjes & Edwards, 2005). In 1992, John R. Zaller wrote his seminal book on the nature and origins of mass opinion. He assumes – like several of the scholars investigating European integration described in section 2.2.3 – that public opinion is mostly elite driven[20] (Zaller, 1992). However, Zaller does not argue that this happens in a uniform way, but is – among other things – dependent on society-level variables (Zaller, 1992; 40-52). Following the argument by Zaller (1992), especially two societal-level variables come into play. The first, *the existing considerations among the public,* centers on: *"The greater their* [i.e. the public] *concern and initial knowledge, the more likely they are to notice and comprehend additional information that comes their way"* (Zaller 1992:154). The second, *the intensity of the political message,* is concerned with "(…) *that some messages have greater capacity than others to transfuse a public that is differentially attentive to politics."* (Zaller 1992: 151-152).

Put bluntly, Zaller (1992) argues that the intensity of a political message and existing considerations concerning the content of the message in the public influence peoples' opinion on the matter. Put in relation to this thesis, the influence on the public's opinion on further European integration is determined by the intensity of the Eurosceptic message put forward by right-wing political parties and how this message align with already existing consideration already present in the public.

3.3.2.1: Existing considerations

The first societal-level variable – already existing considerations – is to a large part concerned with what *the content* of the Eurosceptical cue is. As previously stated, this is not the central objective of analysis in this thesis. However, this has already implicitly been dealt with in section 3.2.2, where I introduced the social identity explanations. The explanations for public resistance towards further European integration within the social identity explanations are to a large part argued to

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[20] It is important to mention that by elite driven he does not mean political parties exclusively, but also includes (…) *higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many kind experts and policy specialists."* (Zaller, 1992:6). However, due to necessary limitations in scope, this thesis will only look upon the political parties.

be some of the same core elements articulated by Eurosceptical right-wing parties against further European integration. Although there are a large variance in the political parties within this group, Mudde (2007: 11-32) argues that *nationalism* acts as the core element binding these parties together and Gómez-Reino & Llamazares (2013:792) argue that: "*Their extreme nationalism is directly connected to their xenophobia, their anti-immigration attitudes and their welfare chauvinism.*" These are all characteristics[21] that have been argued to be closely related to Euroscepticism and Euroscepticism has in recent years been argued to be an integrated part of these parties ideational and political foundation (See e.g. Mudde, 2007; 2011; de Vries & Edwards, 2009). Furthermore, de Vries and Edwards (2009) – examining the content of the cue from among other Eurosceptical right-wing parties – find that: "*On the extreme right, the battle cry is defence of national sovereignty, as parties successfully mobilize national identity considerations against the EU.*" (de Vries & Edwards, 2009: 22).

Put bluntly, if considerations regarding nationalism, xenophobia, anti-immigration attitudes etc. are already present among the public or parts of it, then people holding these attitudes will be more likely to notice and comprehend the cue coming from Eurosceptical right-wing parties given that these parties send out cues regarding nationalism, xenophobia, anti-immigration etc.; the cues would then simply be in line with parts of the public's mindset. Therefore, I expect individuals with opinions closely related to the core elements of the Eurosceptical right-wing parties to be more Eurosceptic when exposed to cues from Eurosceptical right-wing political parties than the ones not holding nationalistic, xenophobic or anti-immigration attitudes. This I will address further in section 3.3.3.

3.3.2.2: Intensity of political message

The second societal-level variable, which is described as *the intensity of the political message* or – as I label it – *the intensity of the Eurosceptical political party cue* has been examined by other scholars concerned with Euroscepticism. However, they rely mainly on examining the differences in intensity of Eurosceptic cues between nations and do not attempt to examine the effect on public opinion when faced with different and changing intensity of the cue across nations. This seems remarkable, as: " *Changes in the relative intensity of* (…) *communications on an issue will produce changes in the kinds of considerations people form, which will in turn produce changes in*

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[21] Similar arguments were presented in the introduction to this thesis.

the opinion statements they make." (Zaller, 1992:52).

However, in this thesis I will attempt to bridge the two strands of literature in order to examine how Eurosceptical right-wing political parties have an effect on public opinion formation. To do so, I will start by examining how to determine the intensity of a Eurosceptical cue.

How to determine the intensity of a Eurosceptical political party cue

The intensity of a Eurosceptical cue, has been examined by several other scholars working within the area of political party influence on public opinion towards European integration.(See e.g. Steenbergen & Jones, 2002; Ray, 2003; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Steenbergen et al., (2007) and Gabel & Scheve,2007). Following the work of these authors, it is described how it is possible to identify three attributes which are determining for the intensity of cues provided by political parties regarding European integration. The *intensity of the political cue* varies accordingly to three characteristics. It can be (…) *"attributed to the **salience** of the issue of integration, to **internal party divisions**, and/or to a pro integration **elite consensus**."* (Ray, 2003:980: emphasis added). Firstly, I will address the aspect of *salience,* then the aspect of *intra-party dissent* and lastly the aspect of *inter-party dissent.*

Salience

The aspect of salience is driven from *salience theory*. The essence of the theory is one of party competition in which it is presumed that parties strategically manipulate issues' salience to accomplish certain goals; parties can either shift their position on a given issue in order to meet whatever goals they have or they can compete over the issues come on the political agenda in an effort to heighten the relevance of their specific issue (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004). "*Thus party competition involves the definition of the political space – i.e. what is salient and what is not.*" (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004: 166). Issue salience will vary across parties and when an issue – such as European integration – is highly salient to a political party it has been argued to influence public opinion (see e.g. Zaller, 1992). "*If an issue is salient to a party, one can expect the party to vocalize its positions clearly and frequently. Such a strong signal means that even those who pay relatively little attention to politics are likely to be exposed to the party position.*" (Steenbergen et al.,2007: 20). To put it bluntly, it is argued that the more salient European integration is to a party, the more like the party is to influence public opinion; the intensity of the cue is thus greater.

What is an important aspect to be aware of is the fact that this connection is most influential upon

voters for the given party; i.e. a political party with a high issue salience of European integration is more likely to affect – or cue – the voters of the party. In other words, voting for a Eurosceptical right-wing political party means that an individual is more likely to be influenced by the party's cue (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007).

More concretely: "*the influence a party's position on the issue of European integration will have upon voter's opinions increases as the importance of the issue of European integration to the party increases.*" (Ray, 2003: 980).

Intra-party division

The second aspect is the one of *intra-party* division. The underlying logic is that if there is an intra-party division on European integration, the political cue provided by the party is not as coherent as if there were less or no intra-party division. Ray (2003:981) argues that: *The presentation of contradictory messages by various party leaders will muddle the cues sent by the party* (…)". And a muddled cue leads to a potentially weakened political message, which has less influence on public opinion. Furthermore – following the argument of Steenbergen & Scott (2004) and Steenbergen et al., (2007) – intra-party division on European integration may also reduce a party's incentive to publicly discussing the issue; when a party cannot agree on a coherent political message, the party is less likely to try to put the issue on the political agenda and discuss it in public.

Thus, a high intra-party division on European integration provides both conflicting messages and lower incentive for a party to discuss the issue, albeit it being of high salience to the party. Ray (2003:981) argues that: "*Disagreement within parties about the correct position to take on European integration can be expected to weaken the ability of a party to influence the opinions of its electorate.*" and Steenbergen et al. further argue that: "*More unified parties should exert greater influence over party supporters than more divided parties do.*" (Steenbergen et al., 2007:20).

Inter-party division

The last aspect – which has been closely related to the concept of *permissive consensus* (see e.g. Ray, 2003) – suggest than when there is an elite consensus regarding an issue the politicization of the subject is suppressed. This has been argued to have been the case up until the end of the 1980's, where an elite consensus regarding further European integration existed among the

(mainstream) political parties[22], which lead to the public not opposing this. Inter-party division interruptions this connection and has been argued to transform "(…) *the 'permissive consensus' that predominated during the EU's first three decades into a 'constraining dissensus."* (Hooghe & Marks, 2005:425-426). The logic behind the argument is described very accurately by Steenbergen et al., (2007:20): "*The more consensus on European integration there is among political parties, the less political parties will benefit from stressing the issue. As a result, cues from party elites to their supporters will tend to be subdued (…)*. Thereby meaning, when the inter-party division on European integration is low, then the intensity of the political message is likewise theorized to be low. On the contrary, when inter-party division on European integration is high, the intensity of the political message is likewise argued to be high (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007).

Next, I will address how the theoretical descriptions of these societal-level variables are expected to influence public opinion.

3.3.3: Expectations

Following from the descriptions of the two societal-level variables above, it is possible to formulate two expectations.

First of all, I expect that when the *intensity of the Eurosceptical cue is high within a nation, so is its impact on public opinion.* Therefore, I expect that *the intensity of the Eurosceptical cue is correlated with public Euroscepticism regardless of the Social identity and Self-instrumental characteristics of the public.*

Secondly, I expect to see a correlation between the nation specific *Eurosceptical right-wing cue* and the *Social identity* driven explanations, because of the convergence of the basic theoretical tenets between these two factors[23]. That means that *the correlation between the intensity of the Eurosceptical cue and Euroscepticism is stronger, when individuals' hold a higher level of exclusive national identity and/or feelings of cultural or religious threat by foreigners.*

Furthermore, as described in section 2.2.3 and section 3.3, sympathy with or partisanship of a political party has been argued to influence the effect from political cues. If one sympathizes with

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[22] This is somewhat still the case depending – of course – on how one classifies a mainstream political party. See e.g. Ray (2007) for a newer analysis of Euroscepticism among mainstream political parties.

[23] E.g. *nationalism, xenophobic, exclusive identity etc.*

a political party, one is more likely to follow the political cue. This thesis wants to explore opinion formation in a broader perspective and not just delimit itself to sympathizers of a given Eurosceptical right-wing political party. Therefore, it is anticipated that people voting for Eurosceptical right-wing parties have a higher level of Euroscepticism compared to those who do not. However, the variable serves mainly as a control variable, but if any significant results are found, these will be analyzed upon.

These expectations are to be operationalized in section 4.5.2 and further tested in chapter five.

3.3.4: Finishing remarks

In the section above it was presented how the cueing effects from political parties are to be understood in this thesis. It is understood as a top-down oriented approach, where the public is cued by political parties. Following this, as the cueing effect is not a uniform one, two societal-level variables were described. The first – existing considerations – are not the main objective of this thesis due to limitations in time and scope. However, I rely on the assumption that people who share the same values as those values theorized to be presented by Eurosceptical right-wing political parties are more likely to have a higher level of Euroscepticism than the people, who do not. The second – Intensity of Eurosceptic cue – is examined more in depth, where it is determined that the intensity of the Eurosceptical cue can be measured according to three characteristics; salience, intra- and interparty dissent. On the basis of these two societal-level variables, two expectations were formulated.

To give the reader an overview of the expectations formulated in this chapter, table 4.3 is made below. This table also guides the next chapter. In here the operationalization of each of the variables used to test the expectations will be presented along with the more practical statistical way of making these tests.

Table 3.3 Overview of the expectations

Self-instrumental	Expectation number 1:	Individuals with negative subjective evaluations of either egocentric of socio-tropic characters are more Eurosceptic
	Expectation number 2:	Individuals with higher age, lower income, lower education, far right-wing political standpoint, and women are more Eurosceptic.
Identity	Expectation number 3:	Individuals that hold an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, are more Eurosceptic
	Expectation number 4:	Individuals that hold an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, are more Eurosceptic regardless of their *Self-instrumental* characteristics.
Eurosceptical radical right-wing parties	Expectation number 5:	The intensity of the Eurosceptical cue is correlated with public Euroscepticism regardless of the *Social identity* and *Self-instrumental* characteristics of the public.
	Expectation number 6:	The correlation between the intensity of the Eurosceptical cue and Euroscepticism is stronger, when individuals' hold a higher level of exclusive national identity and/or feelings of cultural or religious threat by foreigners.

Chapter 4: Operationalization

In this section I will present how the expectations derived in the last chapter are operationalized and how they are to be analyzed. Firstly, I will introduce the statistical approach, with which I am going to analyze my data. I will be using linear regression in a multi-level model, as a way to analyze the data taking into account the different level of Eurosceptical cue between each nation. All tests and analyzes will be carried out in SPSS Statistics version 24.

Secondly, I will present a thorough examination of the dependent variable, which is to measure public Euroscepticism. As the variable is measured according to a linear scale certain characteristics of the variable need to be tested to see if the variable is suited for linear regression analysis. This will be done for both variables in both the 2008 and the 2014 survey.

After this, an operationalization of the expectations derived from chapter three will follow in two sections. Section 4.5.1 will provide an operationalization of the expectations of section 3.2 (i.e. antecedents), whereas section 4.5.2 will provide an operationalization of the expectations of section 3.3 (i.e. Eurosceptical right-wing political parties). The results of these two sections are summed up in table 4.2.

4.1: Multi-level models using linear regression

In my analysis I have chosen to use a multi-level model, because of the hierarchical structure of the data, where answers from respondents are nested within specific levels (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009:522-524). As I argue for differences in the intensity of Eurosceptical cue between countries, I assume that the data contains more than one level; thus, units at one level (i.e. individuals) are nested and exposed to a certain constant contextual measure (i.e. Eurosceptic right-wing party cue) within units of another level (i.e. countries). Therefore, using standard modeling techniques such as a linear regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) without taking into account the multi-level nature of the data would imply that the observations are independent and so is the residuals; this would violate the requirement of absence of autocorrelation. (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009; Lolle, 2003) The consequence of autocorrelation is that :"(…) *estimates of standard errors are reduced, which increases the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when accepting the null is more appropriate."* (De Vries & Edwards, 2009:24). Put bluntly, if there is autocorrelation in

the groups (i.e. correlation between the residuals of the dependent variable in each country) the standard errors become smaller, which enhances the risk of potentially overestimating the P-values. (Lolle, 2003; Stubager & Sønderskov, 2011).

A formal way of statistically checking whether the data is suited for multi-level analysis is to calculate the *intra-class coefficient* (ICC) of the dependent variable to check the relationship between the variance at both levels. If the variance of the answers on the dependent variable within nations varies from the overall variance of the entire dataset, the ICC would be higher than zero[24]. An 'Empty Model' is made using the multi-level function in SPSS for both 2008 and 2014, where the variance of the dependent variable is calculated for both the individual level and the country level. When these two measures have been found, the calculation of the ICC is done in the same way as illustrated in Lolle (2003).

For 2008 – as can be seen in Appendix A – the variance at the individual level is 6,282566 and the variance at the country level is 0,335949. Thus, this gives an ICC at:

$$\frac{0,335949}{(6,282566 + 0,335949)} = 0,050759$$

For 2014 – as can be seen in Appendix A – the variance at the individual level is 6,926374 and the variance at the country level is 0,348542. Thus, this gives an ICC at:

$$\frac{0,348542}{(6,926374 + 0,348542)} = 0,047910$$

In other words, looking at the initial empty models, the country level explains roughly 5.0 % in 2008 and 4.7 % in 2014 of the variance of the dependent variable. Furthermore, the country level

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[24] Lolle (2003) argues that it is not the *size* of the ICC that determines whether the data is suited for multi-level analysis, as the distribution of the dependent variable could be skewed at an individual level. A hypothetical example illustrates the problem: We assume 1) that Euroscepticism and age are positively correlated and 2) that Euroscepticism and education are negatively correlated; when you get older, you get more Eurosceptic and when you get higher educated, you get less Eurosceptic. If one were to compare variances at individual- and country level, but were faced with 10 nations, where 5 consisted of almost only elderly people with high education and another 5 consisted of almost only younger people with low education, then the ICC would potentially be low because of the limited difference in variance; the individual level effects would counteract each other. However, introducing an independent variable such as education in to the equation could potentially make the ICC larger, because the variance of the dependent variable would be calculated accordingly to a fixed value of education.

variance is statistically different from zero; the difference in Euroscepticism between countries is not just a result of random fluctuations (Appendix A).

However, one comment should be made about the low number of countries used in this analysis. As I have only data from ESS and CHES for 10 countries for both years, I can potentially experience problems with the significance level for the independent country level variable (i.e. Eurosceptic political party cue)[25]. Lolle (2003) argues that one should have 20-30 cases (i.e. countries) or above to ensure a large enough number of cases to trust the results from the country level parameter. As I have no more than 10 countries, any significant results from the analysis of the country level variables should be analyzed tentatively. This should furthermore be taken into consideration, when the final conclusions are drawn.

Accordingly to Lolle (2003) it is possible to identify two main types of multi-level models. One is called *Random intercepts model* and the other *Random slopes model*. In the random *intercept* model, it is the intercept of the linear line that fluctuates accordingly to context; it assumes that the slope of the line is fixed among countries and only the intercept vary. In the random slopes model, the assumption of a fixed slope is loosened and is allowed to fluctuate accordingly to the context. The difference between the models[26] essentially is a matter of explained variance of the dependent variable. Both models provide estimates for the average line, but the random intercepts model provides only variance estimates for the intercept; put bluntly, when the optimal position of the intercept on the Y-axis for the linear line has been found, how much variance is explained by it. The random slopes model also provides estimates for the variance explained by any independent variable one might want to investigate. If hypothetically age is differently correlated with Euroscepticism within each of the 10 nations I am investigating, a random slopes model would allow me to get calculations of how much of the overall variance *age* could explain of the dependent variable (i.e. Euroscepticism).

However, the calculations of the coefficients in a random intercepts model are not sensitive to the values of the dependent variable, as is the case of a random slopes model. Usually, in a random

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[25] This is restricted to the country level variables, as the individual level variables used have at least above 1200 respondents in all nations.
[26] It is important to stress that I look at this from an analytical point of view and not a mathematical one. See e.g. Lolle (2016).

slopes model one would center the independent variables around their mean, as this gives the most accurate calculation of the variance between the variables (See e.g. Lolle, 2004). Furthermore, as my theoretical foundation is built on the notion that I do not expect country level difference on the micro-level variables (i.e. I assume the same effect from e.g. age across all countries), I have chosen to do a random intercepts model. This implicitly means that I have chosen to reduce complexity at the cost of detail.

However, as my expectation number six theoretically presupposes an interaction between the country level variable (i.e. Intensity of Eurosceptic Cue) and an individual level variable (i.e. Social Index), I will introduce a *Cross-level Interaction term.* (Lolle, 2003; Lolle, 2004) Therefore, I will introduce a term in the analysis that takes into account how the values of the Social identity index and the Intensity of the Eurosceptic Cue are related; I theoretically argued that when people have different scores on the Social identity index, the effects of the Eurosceptic Cue are correlated differently with Euroscepticsm. Consequently, I assume that when scoring higher on the Social identity Index, the effect of the Eurosceptic Cue is stronger, thus resulting in a higher score of Euroscepticism; the *Cross-level Interaction term* should in other words be both positive and significant, if this is the case.

Summing up, my choice of statistical analysis is a multi-level random intercepts model with a cross-level interaction term. However, due to the cross national nature of the datasets, several characteristics of both the context of the respondents and the sampling methods are not similar. Therefore, weights are applied to the datasets.

4.2: Weights
When using cross-national data and aiming at generalizing any findings across countries, issues concerning the context of the respondents and the sampling design become evident. Simply put, when comparing countries of different size, which have different sampling methods for the surveys, the weight of and the possibility of choosing a random individual are different. Therefore, I apply two different weights to the datasets.

Firstly, I apply a *design weight*. This weight is applied to correct for the fact that in some countries respondents have different probabilities of being a part of the conducted survey due to the sampling design used in each country. Therefore, the design weight differs within countries.

Applying this gives me more accurate measures for all the individuals within a certain country; thus, the estimates are not affected by a possible sample selection bias.

Secondly, I apply a *population size weight.* This weight corrects possible errors that lie in the difference in population sizes, but similarity in sample size. Put simple, when the proportion between countries sizes and sampling sizes are not the same, some countries get over-represented at the expense of others; usually the smaller countries get over-represented at the expense of larger ones. Therefore, the design weight is the same within countries, but differs between them. The population size weight ensures that each country is represented in proportion to its population size.

In order to combine these two weights, they are multiplied by each other (Appendix BB). This ensures that my datasets, firstly, is representative within countries as all individuals have the same probability of being sampled and, secondly, their representativeness in the datasets resembles the country size (European Social Survey, 2016d).

As described earlier, the nature of the dependent variable is linear, which mean I will be using linear regression in my multi-level model. However, to do so, a thorough examination of the dependent variable is needed.

4.3: The dependent variable

In order to capture all nuances of Euroscepticism as defined earlier, one would ideally create an index consisting of two or more variables (See e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2005). However, this has not been possible, as only one question has been deemed appropriate to measure Euroscepticism accordingly to the definition applied in this thesis (see section 3.1.1). Former investigations on public Euroscepticism have often used a dependent variable, where analysis has been done on the basis of binary categories: Either ones country's membership of the EU is good or bad.[27] I argue that such a dichotomy between good or bad is too simplistic to measure Euroscepticism. Simply put, a respondent may think that one's country's membership of the European Union is good, but think that European integration has gone too far. Is the respondent then Eurosceptic or not? I

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[27] An often used survey question – or questions similar – is the following: "Generally speaking do you think (your country's) membership is: 1) a good thing, 2) a bad thing 3) neither good nor bad, 4) do not know". (Serricchio et al., 2013:55) and often category 2 and 4 are excluded. Moreover, this good/bad dichotomy has been dismissed in the European Commission's Eurobarometer investigation since the fall of 2011 (European Commission, 2016d).

argued that the respondent is. Put bluntly, you may not want to dismiss the whole European Union, but this does not mean that you cannot be skeptic of its development.

Therefore, the wording of the dependent variable relies on the following question in both the 2008 and the 2014 edition of the European Social Survey:

Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?

The variable ranges from (0) *Unification has already gone too far* to (10) *Unification should go further,* but have been re-coded in order to make the interpretation as intuitive as possible. Therefore, the variable ranges from (0) *Unification should go further to* (10) *Unification has already gone too far*

As can be seen from above, the dependent variable is measured according to a linear scale, thus making it suitable for linear regression using OLS. However, four assumptions need to be addressed to ensure that the used variables are within the formal statistical requirements to make linear regression. (Lolle, 2003; Aggresti & Finlay, 2009; Stubager & Sønderskov, 2011). Firstly, the surveys should be collected randomly. As argued in section 2.2.4, I must rely of the European Social Survey to be so. Secondly, the distribution of each Y value is normal for each X value; this is also known as *normally distributed error terms*. Thirdly, the conditional standard deviation is identical for each value on the dependent variable; this is also known as the requirement of *homoscedacity*. Fourthly, the relationship between X and the mean of Y is linear. The method is somewhat robust regarding deviations from these formal requirements (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009: 276-278), but a thorough examination follows below for both each year and both country- and individual level. To do so, the final model with all the independent variables have been built in both years, as this allows me to get SPSS to calculate the predicted values for both individual and country level, as well as residuals for the individual level (See Appendix C & CC). These outputs from SPSS are used below.

4.3.1: Normally distributed error terms
The first of these requirements I will address is the need to have normally distributed error terms. This means that the residuals (i.e. the distance from each observation to the regression line) are

somewhat normally distributed. To check whether this is the case, I have produced the residuals for each respondent and each country, which are then standardized (Appendix CC). The results of this are displayed in appendix C where it is evident that the error terms are somewhat normally distributed for the models at individual level in both 2008 and in 2014. Luckily, as the number of respondents is very high at a total of above 10.000, small violations is within the formal requirements (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009).

When looking at the country level, the situation is different. As illustrated in appendix C the low number of countries leaves me with the problem of a distribution of variance at country level that is not normally distributed in neither 2008 nor 2014. In the 2014 dataset, no countries can be characterized as extreme outliers, although in the case of Sweden and UK, the residual is above 1.5 and is clearly distant from the others. However, in the 2008 dataset, especially the case of Poland – which is the outlier with a residual of over -2.5 – can have critical influence on the analysis. Ideally, one would exclude a case such as Poland. However, due to the already low number of cases, Poland will not be excluded; instead, this will be taken into consideration, when the final conclusions are drawn.

4.3.2: Homoscedacity

The second of the requirements is homoscedacity. When we have homoscedacity, the predicted answers from respondents on the dependent variable at both individual- and country level should be distributed somewhat uniformly with a horizontal belt around zero. (Lolle, 2003; Aggresti & Finlay, 2009) Put simply, no matter how each respondent's (or country's) score on the dependent variable is predicted accordingly to the final model, the residual should not be too far away from zero. If the residual is too large, it could potentially disrupt the analysis; I am simply looking for influential outliers. As illustrated in Appendix C, at the individual level, the graphs for both the 2008 and 2014 datasets display homoscedacity; we see that some observations are more than three standard deviations in absolute numbers from zero, but by far the majority of the observations are within two standard deviations in absolute numbers from zero.

When looking at the case of the country level, the picture is very different. Again, the low number of countries influences the graphs. The 'usual suspects' of United Kingdom and Sweden in the 2014 dataset display comparatively large standardized residuals at the country level, but they are

not characterized as extreme outliers. In the 2008 dataset, Poland show a – compared to the other countries – large standardized residual below - 2.0. To keep an as high amount of countries as possible in the analysis, Poland is kept in the analysis. However, if better data were available, one could consider removing Poland from the 2008 dataset. Instead, these are issues, which are taken into consideration, when the final conclusions are drawn.

4.3.3: Test of linear requirement between variables

To test the requirement of linearity, test at both level individual level and country level is needed. Put bluntly, the mean of my dependent variable (i.e. Euroscepticism) should be linearly related to each independent variable controlling for the other independent variables[28]. Aggresti & Finlay argue that the question of linearity is of central concern: "*If the model assumes a linear effect, but the effect is actually strongly nonlinear, the conclusions will be faulty.*" (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009: 450).

Firstly, when looking at the relationship between the variables at an individual level in the partial regression plots in Appendix C[29], I expect to see a linear relationship between the linear scaled variables and Euroscepticism in both datasets. The relationship is actually only of clear linear character for the *Social identity index* in both years, whereas the other variables do not display a clear linear correlation with Euroscepticism. However, as stated in the quote above by Aggresti & Finlay, the question is centered on mostly the bivariate relationship and whether or not this does not violate the requirement of linearity; thus, what matters the most is that the data do not show a clear non–linear correlation, such as an U-sharped one. When looking at the partial plots for both datasets, I argue that none of the used independent individual level variables severely violate the requirement of linearity.

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[28] Further below these variables will be described in more detail

[29] In each partial plot, the correlation between one independent variable (X-axis) is graphed against the dependent variable (Y-axis) controlled for the other independent variables. The value has been standardized, which is why both scales are both negative and positive. Furthermore, when making all the partial plots, I have included the non-linear scaled variables (e.g. gender, far right-wing political placement etc.) in order to control for their effect. However, as I am not arguing for linearity or using the partial plots from these variables otherwise, they have not been included in Appendix C.

Secondly, I address the country level variables by graphing the relationship between the *fixed predicted* value and the *predicted values*[30] (See e.g. Lolle, 2003; Lolle, 2004) in Appendix C. Looking at the graph for both 2008 and 2014 it is evident that relationship is somewhat linear, although one should interpret the graph with caution; the low level of countries can potentially influence the relationship. However, it seems safe to argue that at the country level, a linear relationship is found in both datasets, thus making the dataset suited for linear regression.

4.4: Finishing remarks

Judging from the examinations of the ICC and the dependent variable above, I argue that it is justified to use a multi-level linear regression model with a random intercept and the dependent variable proposed above. However, as noted above, the low number of countries affects both the requirement of homoscedacity and the normal distribution of error terms on the higher level (i.e. country level). Especially the case of Poland for the 2008 dataset can be characterized as an outlier. However, due to the low number of countries in the analysis, I have argued not to delimit myself from more countries and instead interpret and conclude on the results with caution. As I have now described the overall statistical method and made a thorough examination of the dependent variable used for the analysis, I will now look closely upon the independent variables used.

4.5: The independent variables

In this section I will present the variables I will use to investigate my expectations. All the variables are described with the full range of values they are able to take in the analysis. To see the more specific statistical procedures (e.g. recoding's of variables, missing values etc.) see the appendix's described in each section below.

The section is divided into two parts. The first part will deal with the independent variables related to the first part of the analysis; i.e. it will deal with expectation 1, 2, 3 and 4. The second part will deal with the independent variables related to the second part; i.e. it will deal with expectation 5 and 6.

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[30] Put bluntly, the *fixed predicted values* do not take into consideration the country level variable (i.e. Intensity of Eurosceptic Cue), put the *predicted values* do. Thereby, when you map those two against each other, you can see whether the effect from the country level variable is in fact related to the dependent variable in a linear way. However, when doing so, the graph is at risk at becoming nearly perfectly linear *if* the country level variable has no noteworthy effect on the dependent variable; the *fixed predicted values* and the *predicted values*, would simply not differ greatly from each other.

4.5.1: Operationalization of part 1

Expectation 1:

- *Individuals with negative subjective evaluations of either egocentric of socio-tropic characters are more Eurosceptic*

This expectation has two different components of analysis. The first – *the subjective egocentric evaluation* – unfortunately does not have any useful measures in the asked surveys, why it has to be left out of the analysis.

In order to investigate the subjective *socio-tropic aspect* of the expectation, I use the question:

On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?

The answers range from '0' (Extremely dissatisfied) to '10' (Extremely satisfied). In order to make the interpretation more intuitive the scale has been recoded, so '0' now represents *Extremely satisfied* and '10' represents *Extremely dissatisfied*. (Appendix B & BB)

Expectation 2:

- *Individuals with higher age, lower income, lower education, far right-wing political standpoint, and women are more Eurosceptic.*

This expectation has several different components of analysis.

Firstly, *age* will be measured using the question: "*In what year were you born?*" The answers given here have been subtracted by the interview year by ESS, which provide answers ranging from '18' to '97'.

Secondly, *income* will be measured using the question: "*Using this card, please tell me which number describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.*" The answers range from '1' (1st decile) to '10' (10th decile).

Thirdly, *education* will be measured using the question: "*What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?*" The answers ranges from '1' (less than lower secondary) to '7' (higher tertiary education), but have been re-coded in order to make the interpretation as intuitive as possible. Therefore, it ranges from '1' (higher tertiary education) to '7' (less than lower secondary).

Fourthly, *far right-wing political standpoint* will be measure using the question: "*In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*"
The answers range from '00' (left) to '10' (right), but will be recoded into a dummy variable, where the answers at the extremes on the right-wing (i.e. '9/10') will be coded as '1' and the other answers coded as '0'.

Fifthly, *women* will be measured using the question: "*Are you male/female?*" with answers rangering from '0' (Male) to '1' (Female).

For all details on recording see appendix BB. To see an overview of all the variables see appendix B.

Expectation 3 and 4

- *Individuals that hold an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, are more Eurosceptic.*
- *Individuals that hold an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, are more Eurosceptic regardless of their Self-instrumental characteristics.*

Firstly, the issues of exclusive identity and religious threat are unfortunately not possible to examine for both 2008 and 2014, as no useful questions were asked. However, the second component of the expectations is measurable on three different questions[31]. They are:

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[31] It is problematic that two out of three concepts lack a measurement. However, as can be argued on the basis of Tillman (2013) the aspect of anti-immigration attitudes is the most important one. Furthermore, as this concept is measured by several variables, I argue that its ability to cover several aspects of anti-immigration attitudes is high. For a critique of a single variable measure for national identity see e.g. Bruter (2003), Wessels (2007) and section 3.2.2.

- *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?*
- *And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?*
- *Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?*

All the questions range from '0' (Bad for the economy/ Cultural life undermined/Worse place to live) to '10' (Good for the economy, cultural life enriched, better place to live), but have been reversed in order to make the interpretation most intuitive vis-à-vis the dependent variable.

These questions cover nearly the same theoretical concept, why they are argued to be useful in a reflective index. When the data allows one to make a reflexive index, several advantages follow with this. Among other things, it enhances the validity (i.e. three measures capture a complex concept more precisely than a single measure) and it makes the analysis more simple (Hellevik, 1995).

One could make a factor analysis, thus letting SPSS 'cluster' the variables together in order to identify different dimensions (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009). However, as there are only three variables, a reliability analysis is deemed appropriate, as these three variables are theoretically argued to fit together; thus, the index is initially based on a theoretical foundation and not a statistical one. When performing the reliability analysis using Cronbach's Alpha it is clear that these variables are all suited to be combined together and used in an index. As can be seen in Appendix D, Cronbach's Alpha[32] is 0.847 for the 2008 dataset and 0.860 for the 2014 dataset, which is well above the minimum requirement of 0.7 (Aggresti & Finlay, 2009). Furthermore, a removal of one of the items does not heighten Cronbach's Alpha. Similarly, the inter-correlation matrixes show large correlations in bivariate situations with a minimum of 0.614 in 2008 and 0.642 in 2014. Therefore, I argue that the variables are highly suited to be combined in a reflective index.

Thus, an index which measures respondents' view on foreigners' impact on the nation's economy, impact on the nation's culture and impact on the general state of the country are created and will be analyzed upon as a measure intended to capture the different aspects of the *Social identity*

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[32] See appendix DD for the SPSS syntax

explanations. The index is made by adding the values for each respondent together, which are then divided by three to find the mean value (Appendix BB). To view the descriptive statistics of the index, see Appendix B.

4.5.2: Operationalization of part 2

Expectation 5 and 6

- *The intensity of the Eurosceptical cue is correlated with public Euroscepticism regardless of the Social identity and Self-instrumental characteristics of the public.*
- *The correlation between the intensity of the Eurosceptical cue and Euroscepticism is stronger, when individuals' hold a higher level of exclusive national identity or/and feelings of cultural or religious threat by foreigners.*

In order to investigate these expectations, I need to identify the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties in the nations. To do so, I relate party stances on both ideological positioning and the political parties EU-stance to the mean of each nation's parties.

The wordings of the questions are the following:

- What was the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in YEAR ranging from '1' (Strongly opposed) to '7' (Strongly in favor)
- What was the position of the party in YEAR in terms of its overall ideological stance? '0' (Extreme left) to '10' (Extreme right).

Therefore, a party is characterized as Eurosceptic, when its EU position is at least one standard deviation below the mean EU position of the nation's parties. Likewise, in order to identify right wing parties in each country, when a political party is at least one standard deviation above the mean left/right position of the nation's parties, it is considered right-wing.

Measuring each party's standard deviation from the national mean on, firstly, its EU positioning and, secondly, its ideological stand, gives me two new variables. When these variables are cross-tabulated, the political parties that are both one standard deviation above the mean national ideological stand and one standard deviation below the mean national EU positioning will become

evident[33]. Furthermore, only parties with at least 3.0 percent of the vote in the last election are included, as a way of acknowledging that the parties most noticeable to people (i.e. those they vote for) are the most influential ones.[34] For all the statistical measures, see Appendix E & EE. Further below, in table 4.1, I have described the parties within each nation.

After the identification of the relevant parties, the intensity of their Eurosceptic Cue has to be determined. To do so, three useful variables have been identified.

The first question, measuring *intra-party dissent*, reads:

- "*What was the degree of dissent on European integration in YEAR?* Answers range from '0' (Party was completely united) to '10' (Party was extremely divided).

The second question, measuring the *salience* of European integration, reads:

- *What was the relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance in YEAR?* Answers range from '0' (European integration is of no importance, never mentioned) to '10' (European integration is the most important issue).

The first measure, *intra-party dissent*, has been recoded, so it matches the theoretical argument behind; the more united, the stronger the Eurosceptic message. Then *intra-party dissent* and *salience* have been added together and then divided by two in order to find the mean value; i.e. the strength of the *salience* and the *intra-party dissent* on further European integration of each Eurosceptical right-wing political party in each nation has been calculated. In case there are more than one Eurosceptical right wing party in a nation (like the case of e.g. Czech Republic in 2014), I weigh the parties by vote share to determine an overall Eurosceptic cue for each country.[35](For all measures and calculations, see Appendix EE).

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[33] This process is similar to the one presented by De Vries and Edwards (2009).

[34] It should be mentioned that in the 2014 dataset in the case of Poland, KNP falls below the threshold of 3.0 % of the popular vote (they receive 1.1 %). Furthermore, in the case of Denmark and Slovenia, the Eurosceptic parties – in Denmark 'DF' and in Slovenia 'NSI' – is only accordingly 0.76 and 0.94 standard deviations above the mean right/left position in the nation. These parties have, however, been included to heighten the number of countries in the dataset. Furthermore, in the 2010 dataset the countries mentioned all have parties that live up to the requirements.

[35] A hypothetical example illustrates this procedure. A country has two Eurosceptical right-wing parties, A and B, which all in all have received 10 percent of the popular vote. Party A, who has received 7.5 percent, has a larger portion of the vote share than party B, which has only 2.5 percent. In this case, party A would be weight by a factor of

The third question, measuring the *inter-party dissent*, reads:

- *What was the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in YEAR*? Answers range from 1 (Strongly opposed) to 7 (Strongly in favor).

A standard deviation has been calculated for each nation as an expression of how large the variation of political consensus among the parties regarding EU were in each country; following from section 3.3 it is expected that larger variations among parties (i.e. less consensus) would imply a stronger Eurosceptic cue.

The measure described above (i.e. the one capturing the *salience* and *intra-party dissent*) and the one capturing the *inter-party* dissent forms the basis of the measurement of the intensity of the Eurosceptical Cue of the right wing political parties in each nation. In order to take all three measures into consideration as one, a combined score has been made by multiplying the mean salience and intra-party dissent score this with the inter-party dissent score. These are displayed in table 4.1 below.

0.75 and party B by a factor of 0.25, where after it is possible to determine an overall Eurosceptical cue for the given nation.

Table 4.1 Eurosceptical political parties in 2010 and 2014

Country	Political party		Combined Salience and intra-party dissent (Scale from 0 to 10)		Inter-party dissent (The variation of each countries' political parties' EU positioning)		Salience, Division and Inter-party dissent - combined measure		Difference 2010 - 2014
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	
Belgium	VB	VB	5,78	6,55	1,67	1,54	9,64	10,07	+ 0,43
Denmark	DF	DF	7,88	8,09	2,14	2,13	16,90	17,24	+ 0,34
France	FN	FN	8,04	8,69	2,24	2,11	18,03	18,35	+ 0,32
Nether-lands	PVV	PVV	8,64	8,74	1,69	1,86	14,57	16,24	+ 1,67
United Kingdom	UKIP	UKIP	9,53	9,21	1,96	2,01	18,65	18,48	- 0,17
Sweden	SD	SD	7,12	7,59	2,00	1,85	14,23	14,08	- 0,15
Czech Republic	ODS	ODS & USVIT	5,63	6,18	1,64	2,14	9,23	13,23	+4,0
Hungary	JOBBIRK	Fiddesz & JOBBIRK	6,16	7,19	1,52	2,29	9,40	16,43	+7,03
Poland	PiS	KNP	7,24	8,38	2,04	2,03	14,79	17,02	+2,23
Slovenia	SNS	NSI	6,15	7,43	1,22	,88	7,50	6,56	- 0,94

Source: Own creation

In the column at the far right the difference in *Intensity of the Eurosceptic Cue* between 2010 and 2014 for each country is calculated. Albeit with *Slovenia* as the best example of a less *Intensive Eurosceptic Cue*, the overall tendency is that the *Intensity of the Eurosceptic Cue* has been rising, which is especially the case in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. It is interesting that from 2010

to 2014, an overall Intensity in the Eurosceptic Cue has occurred, while in the period from 2008 to 2014 there has been an average rise in public Euroscepticism.

It is important to hold in mind that I do not limit my investigation of the political party effects to party supports (as described in section 3.2). Therefore, a dummy-variable is introduced, where people having voted for the parties mentioned in colon one above in each year are compared to those who have not voted for them[36].

The question used reads:

What party did you vote for in the last national election?

Answers have been recoded to 1 (Voted for the Eurosceptical right-wing parties mentioned in table 4.1) and 0 (Did not vote for the Eurosceptical right-wing parties mentioned in table 4.1) (Appendix B & BB).

4.6: Finishing remarks

The second part of this chapter have dealt with the operationalization of the independent variables. Firstly, the individual level variables where addressed, then the country level variable. In order to give the reader the best possible overview of the variables and the operationalization's of the expectations described in this chapter, table 4.2 is illustrated below. The next chapter will address the analysis.

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[36] For the 2008 ESS dataset, the variable does not included the voters for the political parties in Hungary, United Kingdom and Sweden, as it could not be constructed.

Table 4.2 Operationalization of expectations

	Operationalization of expectorations	Question wording	Variables as they are used in the analysis
Euroscepticism		Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?	Scale: 0 (Unification should go further) to 10 (Unification has already gone too far).
Expectation 1	Socio-tropic subjective evaluations	On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?	Scale 0 (satisfied) to 10 (dissatisfied)
Expectation 2	Egocentric objective evaluations 1. Age 2. Income 3. Education 4. Political standpoint 5. Gender	1. Year of birth? 2. Which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? 3. What is your highest level of education? 4. In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself? 5. What is your gender?	1. Scale 18 (low) to 97 (high) 2. Scale 1 (1st decile) to 10 (10th decile) 3. Scale 1 (higher tertiary education) to 7 (less than lower secondary). 4. Scale: 0 (other) to 1 (far right-wing) 5. Scale: 0 (male) to 1 (female)
Expectation 3 and expectation 4	Social identity index	1. Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? 2. Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? 3. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?	1. Scale: 0 (Cultural life enriched) to 10 (Cultural life undermined) 2. Scale: 0 (Better place to live) to 10 (Worse place to live) 3. Scale: 0 (Good for the economy) to 10 (Bad for the economy).
		Part 2	
Expectation 5 and expectation 6	Eurosceptical Cue	1. What is the relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance in YEAR? 2. What is degree of dissention European integration in YEAR? 3. What was the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in YEAR?	1. Scale: 0 (European Integration is of no importance, never mentioned) to 10 (European Integration is the most important issue) 2. Scale: 0 (Party was extremely divided) to 10 (Party was completely united) 3. Scale: 1 (Strongly opposed) to 7 (Strongly in favor). *Combined they provide the Intensity of the Eurosceptic Cue*
	Control variable: Vote for Eurosceptical right-wing party	Which party did you vote for in the last national election?	Scale: 0 (Voted for other) to 1 (Voted for Eurosceptical party)

Chapter 5: Analysis

In this chapter, I will present the analysis. As described earlier in section 2.1, my analysis is structured into two parts. The first assumes that political parties are neutral, why only the antecedents will be analyzed upon. Therefore, in the first part, two tables will be displayed; one covering 2008 and another covering 2014. Each table will consist of three models. Firstly, an *empty model* will be presented. It has previously been used in the calculation of the ICC and is simply an illustration of the average level of Euroscepticism and the variance between individuals and countries. In model 1, I introduce the variables related to expectation 1 and 2 and in model 2 the variable related to expectation 3 and 4 is further introduced.

In the second part of the analysis, I loosen the assumption that the political parties are neutral. Therefore, the tables from the first part of the analysis are further expanded, as I introduce model 4 and model 5 for each year. In model 4, I introduce the variables relating to expectation 5 and in model 5 I introduce the Cross-level interaction term related to expectation 6.

All models are made from the results presented in Appendix A & AA.

Furthermore, I compare models to see whether e.g. model 2 explains more variance than model 1. Therefore, I display the variance of the dependent variable for both individual- and country level and furthermore calculate the R^2 for the entire model and for each level within the model. The latter provides me with the possibility of comparing explained variance between models and between levels. However, it does not tell me whether the models are statistically significantly different from each other. A formal statistical test is needed for this and since the models are nested[37] it is possible to perform a *likelihood ratio test* using the *Full Maximum likelihood method*[38]. (Lolle, 2004).

When using the Full Maximum likelihood method, SPSS provides me with the *–2x log likelihood* value for each model. The *–2x log likelihood* is Chi^2 distributed. Therefore, by using a simple Chi^2

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[37] For each more advanced model additional variables are added, but none is removed.
[38] When making multi-level analysis it is argued by Lolle (2003; 2004; 2016) that the estimations can be calculated by two methods: *Full Maximum likelihood* and *Restricted Maximum likelihood.* If one is to compare models, where in one model a micro-level variable is additionally added compared to the previous one, the Full Maximum likelihood must be used (Lolle, 2004:48).

test on the difference between the *–2x log likelihood* and the added degrees of freedom[39] of the models, it is possible to determine whether the newer model has statistically significantly more explanatory power than the previous one; e.g. does *model 1* fit the data better than *the empty model*, does *model 2* fit the data better than *model 1* and so forth. If the difference in *–2x log likelihood* is insignificant, one should always rely on the previous model (Lolle, 2003; 2016). The significance level of the Chi^2 test will be illustrated in the bottom of each model.

All calculations are presented in appendix F & FF.

At the end of this chapter, finishing remarks and an evaluation of the results found in relation to each expectation will be given.

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[39] E.g. when comparing *the empty model* with *model 1* in table 5.1, the difference in *–2x log likelihood* is 35963,2 and the degrees of freedom is 6, as I add six more variables in *model 1* compared to *the empty model.* These numbers are then used in a Chi^2 test to determine, whether they are statistically different. In appendix F & FF, the calculations are provided in more detail.

5.1: Antecedents and public Euroscepticism

5.1.1: 2008

Firstly, I will address the year of 2008. Looking at the empty model in table 5.1 below, the only fixed effect calculated is the Intercept[40], which provides information about the average Euroscepticism in the dataset. On a scale from 0-10, the approximately 17.000 surveyed scores a 4.70, which means that the average person within the 10 countries surveyed, are more pro-EU than against it. However, as argued in chapter one, this has changed over the last 6 years.

Table 5.1 Antecedents and public Euroscepticism, 2008

	Empty model	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	4.70***	2.59***	1.38***
Satisfaction with economy	–	0.21***	0.17***
Age	–	0.004**	0.001
Gender	–	0.20***	0.18***
Education	–	0.18***	0.08***
House income	–	0.006	- 0.004
Far right-wing	–	0.22**	0.01
Social Identity index	–	–	0.38***
Variance at individual-level	6.283***	5.524 ***	5.061 ***
Variance at nation-level	0.336**	0.134 *	0.111 *
R^2 Individual-level	–	0.12	0.19
R^2 Nation-level	–	0.60	0.67
R^2 Overall	–	0.15	0.22
-2 Log Likelihood	85012.7	49046.0***	46382.9***

* Significance level < 0.1, ** Significance level < 0.05, *** Significance level < 0.01.

Besides the intercept, the variance for both individual- and nation level is displayed. When taking the square root of the variance, which provides the standard deviation, it is possible to how much Euroscepticism varies between individuals and between countries. For the individual level, Euroscepticsm typically varies with 2.51[41] points from person to person. For the country level,

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[40] The intercept will only be addressed in the empty model. In the following models it illustrates the average level of Euroscepticism when all the introduced independent variables are set to have a value of zero, which makes the interpretation somewhat difficult. To make it more intuitive to analyze upon, one could center the independent variables on their mean (Lolle, 2003). However, do to limitations in time and available space, this will not be done.

[41] $\sqrt{6.283}$ = 2.51

Euroscepticsm typically varies with 0.58[42] point from country to country. What is furthermore interesting is the fact, that the variance at the country level is statistically significant. The difference in Euroscepticsm between countries are not just a coincidence; some countries are indeed more Eurosceptic than others.

Turning to model 1 and model 2, *satisfaction with the national economy* and *Euroscepticism* are related with a coefficient of 0.21 (P<0.01) in model 1 and 0.17 (P<0.01) in model 2. The results show that the more dissatisfied an individual is with the state of the national economy, the more Eurosceptic they tend to be; for each unit a person scores higher when measuring his/hers *satisfaction with the national economy[43],* he/she displays 0.20 and 0.17 points more Euroscepticism. Nearly similar results are found when looking at *Gender*, with a coefficient of 0.20 (P<0.01) in model 1 and 0.18 (P<0.01) in model 2. Women are more Eurosceptic than men. What is similarly interesting is that both the *satisfaction with economy* and *gender* are highly significant (P<0.01), when controlling for the other variables in model 1 and 2. The variable of *house income* does not show any significant coefficients in any of the models.

Furthermore, in model 1 highly significant effects (P<0.05) from *education* (0.18), *far right-wing political placement* (0.22) and *age* (0.004) are evident; the latter effect, albeit statistically significant, is very small. E.g. a 10 year leap in *age* would typically only mean an increase in 0.04 points of Euroscepticsm. However, a 7 unit difference in education[44] would typically mean a 1.26 point difference in Euroscepticism.

However, when introducing the *social identity index,* the educational effect drops to 0.08 (P<0.01), the effect from *far right-wing* political placement drops to 0.01 and becomes insignificant, the effect from *age* becomes insignificant and the effects from *satisfaction with the economy* and *gender* become lower as described above. It seems that some of the effects from the variables in model 1 are correlated with *Social identity*. The *Social identity index* is also by far the variable that displays the largest effect, with a coefficient of 0.38; a one unit increase on the *Social identity index* typically means a 0.38 point increase in *Euroscepticsm*.

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[42] $\sqrt{0.336} = 0.58$
[43] The scale goes from 0 (Satisfied) to 10 (Dissatisfied).
[44] I.e. going from one end of the scale to the other: 1 (higher tertiary education) to 7 (less than lower secondary). Going from more educated to less educated is a hypothetical scenario.

Looking at the two variables most influenced by the index in model 2 (i.e. *education* and *far right-wing* political placement), one could imagine that in relation to *education* that e.g. poorly educated people have a tendency to hold more anti-immigration attitudes, which then are correlated with Euroscepticism. This would imply that in model 1, the anti-immigration attitudes are overrepresented among the people with poor education, why the coefficient for *education* is larger than in model 2.

Similarly, when introducing the *social identity index*, the change in the effect from the *far right-wing* variable is rather remarkable. One could image that e.g. strong anti-immigration attitudes were found among people at the *far right-wing* and as these attitudes are held constant in model 2, the difference between the *far right-wing* and the rest is marginal. This appears as a clear indication of why people placing themselves at the *far right-wing* resist European integration. However, one should have in mind that the composition of the reference group (i.e. all those *not* placing themselves at the far right-wing), could influence this picture, as the reference group also holds people with far *left-wing* political placement.

Moreover, introducing the variables in model 1 explain around 60 % of the nation level variance. The standard deviation in difference in Euroscepticism between nations has gone from 0.58 in *the empty model* to 0.36 points in model 2 and the difference is significant at 0.1 level; thus, it is only possible to argue that the variance at country level is different from zero with 90 % certainty. Furthermore, the variables introduced explain 12 % of the individual variance, and 15 % of the overall variance; it appears that the expectations related to *Instrumental self-interest* provide good explanatory force of Euroscepticism. However, when introducing the *Social identity index* in model 2, not only do the other coefficients change – as described above – but so does the amount of explained variance. Introducing this one measure explains additionally 7 % of the individual, national and overall variance. The standard deviations further drop to 0.33 ($P<0.1$) between countries and 2.25 ($P<0.01$) between individuals. This is a clear indication of the centrality of this measure in explaining Euroscepticism.

Finally it should be mentioned that – 2x log likelihood test displays that the model 1 and model 2 are more precise and provides more explanatory strength than the previous one ($P<0.01$).

On an overall note, it can be seen that introducing the *Instrumental self-interest* and the *Social identity index*, explains 67 % of the national variation in Euroscepticism. Put in different terms, the variables in model 2 explains roughly two-thirds of the country level variation, which is 5% of the total variation[45]. Furthermore, 19 % of the individual and 22 % of the overall variance are explained in model 2 leaving the impression that the *Instrument self-interest* and *Social identity index* provide good explanations, as to why people are Eurosceptic. However, it leaves 33% variance at nation level, 81 % variance at individual level and 78 % variance at the overall-level still to be explained.

5.1.2: 2014

Secondly, I will turn to 2014. Initially looking at table 5.2[46] it becomes evident than on an overall average, Euroscepticsm has grown in Europe. Where the average score on the dependent variable in 2008 was 4.70 points, the average score is now 5.12; thus, the average person in the 10 countries would in 2014 typically be in the half that is against further integration. In 2008 it was the other way around. Not only has Euroscepticism risen on an average level, but also the variance at individual level has become greater. In 2008, the standard deviation between each person was 2.51 points, but has grown to 2.63 points in 2014. This could indicate that not only are people in general more skeptic, but they are also more divided on the question of further European integration. However, this division seems to be a phenomenon within nations, as the nation level variance has not changed remarkably. The standard deviation has only risen from 0.58 to 0.59.

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[45] See e.g. the calculations of the ICC in the previous chapter.
[46] Once again, it should be mentioned that – 2x log likelihood tests display that the model 1 and model 2 are more precise and provide more explanatory strength than the previous one (P<0.01).

Table 5.2 Antecedents and public Euroscepticism, 2014

	Empty model	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	5.12***	4.03***	2.75***
Satisfaction with economy	–	0.20***	0.09***
Age	–	0.003**	0.002
Gender	–	– 0.10**	– 0.15***
Education	–	0.14***	0.02
House income	–	0.01	0.003
Far right-wing	–	0.90***	0.48***
Social Identity index	–	–	0.42***
Variance at individual-level	6.926 ***	6.392 ***	5.719 ***
Variance at nation-level	0.349**	0.340*	0.303**
R^2 Individual-level	–	0.08	0.17
R^2 Nation-level	–	0.03	0.13
R^2 Overall	–	0.07	0.18
-2 Log Likelihood	85889.2	65364.5***	61851.9***

* Significance level < 0.1, ** Significance level < 0.05, *** Significance level < 0.01.

Looking at the *Instrumental self-interest* explanations in model 1 and model 2, similar results are found for *satisfaction with economy, education* and *age* in 2014 as in 2008. *Age* is significant (P<0.05) in model 1, but becomes insignificant in model 2. The effect is also poor, with a coefficient of only 0.003; a 10 year leap in *age*, would give a 0.03 point more Eurosceptic opinion. However, *satisfaction with economy* is highly significant with coefficients at 0.20 (P<0.01) in model 1 and 0.09 (P<0.01) in model 2. This explanation has been shown to be statistically significant in both 2008 and 2014, even when controlling for the *Social identity index*. This indicates that people's opinion formation about further European integration is correlated with how they view the status of their national economy; in this regard it would have be very interesting to have the ability to test, whether the perceived state of the national economy also resembles the reality (i.e. objective socio-tropic indicators).

Also the aspect of *education* is interesting in 2014. Where it – as in 2008 – is highly significant in model 1, it becomes insignificant in 2014, with a coefficient very close to zero. The introduction of the *Social identity index* has removed its explanatory power; the more poorly educated people are not more Eurosceptic, as found in 2008. Put bluntly, this could indicate that the growth of

Euroscepticism is happening among people regardless of their educational background. Once again, *house income* is insignificant across all models.

The *gender* explanation shows some noteworthy results, as it is in both models negatively correlated with Euroscepticsm; i.e. women are 0.10 points (P<0.05) *less* Eurosceptic compared to men in model 1 and 0.15 points (P>0.01) in model 2. Thus, an opposite *gender* effect of what was theoretically expected and found in 2008 is evident in 2014, where men are more Eurosceptic compared to women regardless of the other *Instrumental self-interest* and *Social identity* explanations. Furthermore, we see an opposite development when introducing the *Social identity index* between the two tables. In 2008 the coefficient – looking at it in absolute numbers – becomes smaller in model 2, in 2014 the coefficient becomes bigger in model 2; thus, controlling for anti-immigration attitudes only reveals a stronger and more significant difference between men and women. This is a clear indication that the nature of Euroscepticism has changed between 2008 and 2014 and perhaps now men feel more vulnerable than women to the heightened competition in a larger market following from further European integration. Nevertheless the theoretical reasoning, it is quite remarkable that the correlation has changed this way from 2008 to 2014.

Another remarkable result is the *far right-wing* political placement, which show a highly significant coefficient at 0.90 in model 1 (P<0.01) and 0.48 (P<0.01) in model 2. People placing themselves at the *far right-wing* are respectively 0.90 points and 0.48 points more Eurosceptic than the reference group, which is by far the largest coefficient presented by any of the dummy variables. In 2008, the effect from this variable became insignificant when controlling for the *Social identity index;* the reasoning was that people that placed themselves at the *far right-wing* were more Eurosceptic due to their anti-immigration attitudes It seems that same reasoning perhaps can be applied in 2014, as we see a slightly smaller coefficient between model 1 and model 2; people who places themselves at the *far right*-wing, may be holding a higher level of anti-immigration attitudes, which then influence the correlation with Euroscepticism. Thus, when controlling for the *Social identity index* a smaller correlation is detected, as the people who placed themselves closer to the far *right-wing* are more 'alike' the reference group.

However, what is of great importance is that it does not become insignificant in model 2. This is an

interesting find, as this indicates that *Euroscepticism* at the *far right-wing* is not only a question of a higher level of anti-immigration attitudes. And when compared to 2008, it looks as if a development has taken place over the last 6 years. Put bluntly, this could indicate that *Euroscepticism* has gained in strength on the political *far right-wing* throughout the last 6 years. [47]

Yet, it should still be stressed that the *Social identity index* is – as in the case of 2008 – the high scorer. In 2014 it has a coefficient of 0.42 (P<0.01) and introducing this measure in 2014, heightens the explained variance with approximately 10 % points at nation level (3 % to 13 %), individual level (8 % to 17%) and overall-level (7 % to 18 %). With a coefficient of 0.42, a 5 point leap would mean a 2.10 point leap in *Euroscepticism*. In other words, anti-immigration attitudes provide great explanatory force vis-à-vis *Euroscepticism* and even greater than the *Instrumental self-interest* explanations.

Comparing the variance in 2008 with 2014, it is in 2014 larger across all models and both levels. Looking firstly at the variance at the individual level in model 2, the standard deviation is 2.39 in 2014, whereas it is 2.25 in 2008. This larger degree of variance could be seen as a result of the enhanced politicization of the EU, as implicitly addressed in chapter one. Some people see EU as a part of the problem, whereas some see it as part of the solution, which could give reason for a larger spread in opinion.

Even though the variance level is higher, the explained variance at the individual level is nearly the same. In 2008 it was 19 %, in 2014 17 %. This means that one can ascribe 17 – 19 % percent of the individual variance to the *Instrument self-interest* and *Social identity* explanations in the years of 2008 and 2014.

However, with that being said the nation level variance is not as good explained in 2014 as in 2008. At the nation level, twenty times as much variance in 2008 in model 1 and five times as much in model 2 was explained compared to the models in 2014. The drop at nation level from 2008 to 2014 cannot be explained by a much large variance between countries, as it has only grown slightly (0.013 points). The level of *Euroscepticism* still differs between countries (P<0.1), but it seems as if the nation level differences in *Euroscepticism* are not a matter of the individual

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[47] It could also be interpreted as if the reference group has become *less* Eurosceptic. However, when there is an overall rise in Euroscepticsm, it seems contradictive to argue that a certain group experiences a lower level of Euroscepticism, without another group experiencing a higher level.

characteristics tested here.

Naturally as both the nation level and the individual level variance have lower R^2 in 2014 than in 2008, the explained variance at the overall-level is also lower in 2014 compared to 2008.

The decreased level of explained individual-, national- and overall-level variance in 2014 compared to 2008 indicates that the nature of *Euroscepticism* has changed between 2008 and 2014. The 'usual' antecedents have no longer as great explanatory power as previously. Perhaps other individual characteristics' are needed to be tested. Or perhaps the variance between countries could be explained by nation level characteristics, such as differences in *Intensity of Eurosceptic cue*. This is what I will turn to now.

5.2: Antecedents, Eurosceptical right-wing political parties and Euroscepticism

5.2.1: 2008

In Table 5.3 below, the analysis has been expanded with model 3 and model 4, where the individual level control variable *Voted for Eurosceptical parties,* the nation level variable *Eurosceptical Cue* and the interaction variable between *Social identity Index* and *Eurosceptical Cue* are introduced.

Table 5.3 Antecedents, Eurosceptical right-wing political parties and public Euroscepticism, 2008

	Empty model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	4.70***	2.59***	1.38***	1.41**	1.55**
Satisfaction with economy	–	0.21***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
Age	–	0.004**	0.001	0.003	0.003
Gender	–	0.20***	0.18***	0.16**	0.16**
Education	–	0.18***	0.08***	0.06**	0.06**
House income	–	0.006	- 0.004	0.002	0.002
Far right-wing	–	0.22**	0.01	0.17	-0.18
Social Identity index	–	–	0.38***	0.36***	0.34***
Voted for Eurosceptical party	–	–	–	0.56***	0.56***
Eurosceptical cue	–	–	–	0.03	0.02
Social Identity index and Eurosceptical Cue	–	–	–	–	0.002
Variance at individual-level	6.283***	5.524***	5.061***	4.832***	4.832***
Variance at nation-level	0.336**	0.134*	0.111*	0.110*	0.110*
R^2 Individual-level	–	0.12	0.19	0.23	0.23
R^2 Nation-level	–	0.60	0.67	0.67	0.67
R^2 Overall	–	0.15	0.22	0.25	0.25
-2 Log Likelihood	85012.7	49046***	46382.9***	35435.4***	35435.2

* Significance level < 0.1, ** Significance level < 0.05, *** Significance level < 0.01.

And as becomes evident in model 3, the *Intensity of the Eurosceptical Cue* does not provide any explanatory force to the model. The coefficient plays at best a marginal role, as the effect is small (0.028) and insignificant (P>0.1). Furthermore, as the explained variance at the nation level drops marginally (0.001 point), the R^2 at the nation level is not impacted. The effect from the *Eurosceptic Cue* appears rather redundant in this model. However, what is interesting is the effect from those that voted for a Eurosceptical right-wing political party, as they are 0.56 points (P<0.01) more

Eurosceptic than those who did not. Moreover, the variable slightly affects the coefficients from nearly all the other independent variables in a negative direction; the variable is in other words a good predictor of *Euroscepticism*.

This is not surprising, as already described in section 3.3, affiliation with a political party or partisanship has been proven to be closely related to the political parties' key political view. Yet, it is interesting that the effect for the far *right-wing* variable became insignificant in model 2 *before* the *Voted for Eurosceptical party* variable was introduced. This could indicate that identifying yourself at the political *far right-wing* is not the same as voting for far right-wing Eurosceptical parties. Although these parties are identified to belong on the *far right-wing* and have *Euroscepticism* as an important part of their political foundation, people placing themselves at the *far right-wing* may find other parties to vote for.

Furthermore, the explained variance rises with 4 % points at the individual level and 3 % points at the overall-level from model 2 to model 3. It appears that the only explanatory power added in model 3, comes from the individual level variable. But even though the added explanatory force is modest, model 3 still has a better fit to the numbers compared to model 2 as illustrated by the significant Chi^2 of the difference in the – 2x Log likelihood.

Looking into the coefficients in model 4, an interaction term is introduced in order to examine how different strengths of a *Eurosceptic Cue* interact with different scores on the *Social identity index* which leads to different levels of *Euroscepticism.* However, as can be seen in model 4 the interaction term is insignificant and the coefficient is very small. Similarly the changes in the coefficients of the other independent variables are minimal. The *far right-wing* variable goes from a positive coefficient (0.17) to a negative one (-0.18), but this should be attributed to coincidence as the P-value is above 0.1. The *Social identity index* goes from 0.36 to 0.34, but is still highly significant (P<0.01). However, model 4 does not provide additional explanatory power, as the explained variance for individual-, nation- and overall level is not affected. Furthermore, the Chi^2 test is not significant at even P<0.1 level and - as explained in the introduction to this analysis – as model 4 is not significantly better than model 3, one must rely on the coefficients in model 3.

Overall, it appears that the *Intensity of the Eurosceptic cue* in itself and its interaction with the *Social identity index* does not add further explanatory power to the models in 2008. However, as

seen in table 4.1 in section 4.5.2, the average *Intensity of the Eurosceptic Cue* has risen in the same period that the average p*ublic Euroscepticism* has risen; whether it is possible to detect a correlation between these developments in 2014, will be examined below.

5.2.2: 2014

In model 3 and model 4, a somewhat similar pattern as in the 2008 models becomes evident. Introducing the *Eurosceptical Cue* does not add any explanatory force to the model. The coefficients for the *Eurosceptical Cue* are small at 0.05 (P>0.1) in model 3 and 0.02 (P>0.01) in model 4. Furthermore, they are both insignificant and neither the explained variance at individual-, nation or overall-level is affected. A small change in the variance does appear on nation level, but the change is so marginally small that it would be difficult to determine anything from this change. As was the case in 2008, it is hardly possible to ascribe any explanatory force at the nation level or overall level to this variable. Similar effects are evident for the interaction term between *Social identity* and the *Eurosceptical Cue;* the *Intensity of the Eurosceptic Cue* does not display any significant results across all models regardless of being an independent variable in itself or included in an interaction term.

Table 5.4 Antecedents, Eurosceptical right-wing political parties and public Euroscepticism, 2014

	Empty model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	5.12***	4.03***	2.75***	2.30**	2.79**
Satisfaction with economy	–	0.20***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
Age	–	0.003**	0.002	– 0.0003	– 0.0003
Gender	–	– 0.10**	– 0.15***	– 0.12**	– 0.12**
Education	–	0.14***	0.02	0.04**	0.04**
House income	–	0.01	0.004	0.004	0.004
Far right-wing	–	0.90***	0.48***	0.29**	0.29**
Social Identity index	–	–	0.42***	0.44***	0.34***
Voted for Eurosceptical party	–	–	–	0.63***	0.62***
Eurosceptical cue	–	–	–	0.05	0.02
Social Identity index and Eurosceptical Cue	–	–	–	–	0.006
Variance at individual-level	6.926 ***	6.392 ***	5.719 ***	4.999 ***	4.993 ***
Variance at nation-level	0.349**	0.340*	0.303**	0.304*	0.302*
R^2 Individual-level	–	0.08	0.17	0.28	0.28
R^2 Nation-level	–	0.03	0.13	0.13	0.13
R^2 Overall	–	0.07	0.18	0.27	0.27
-2 Log Likelihood	85889.2	65364.5***	61851.9***	46455.9***	46454.3

* Significance level < 0.1, ** Significance level < 0.05, *** Significance level < 0.01.

However, when looking at the variable *Voted for Eurosceptical Party*, we see the same results in 2008; it displays a strong and highly significant coefficient at 0.63 in model 3 (P<0.01). As model 4 is not significantly better than model 3, I rely on the measures from model 3. Although theoretically it is not a surprising find, put in relation to table 5.3 it becomes interesting. First of all, the coefficient is larger in 2014 than in 2008 indicating a stronger correlation. Furthermore, introducing the variable has heightened the R^2 at individual level with 11% and at the overall-level with 9%. Thus, the explanatory force of this variable is higher in 2014 than in 2008. Also, the development of the *far right-wing* variable is different across models compared to 2008. In 2008 the variable became insignificant in model 2, but in 2014 the variable is significant throughout all the models on a 0.05-level albeit with smaller coefficients in model 3 and 4. When comparing this with the results found in 2008, it indicates that even when controlling for voters for Eurosceptical right-wing political parties, people placing themselves at the *far right-wing* are more Eurosceptic than the ones, who are not. Thus, it underlines the argument presented earlier that it appears as if

Euroscepticism has grown at the far *right-wing*; these results are furthermore highlighted by the fact that the *Social identity index* is controlled for in the models. Thus, it does not appear that *vote* or *anti-immigration attitudes* can explain the *Euroscepticism* found at the *far right-wing*. This appears rather peculiar, when thinking of this thesis theoretical understanding of how the main point of contestation for further European integration found on the political far *right-wing* is based on anti-immigration attitudes.

Furthermore, it is also interesting that *education* is insignificant in model 2 in 2014, but becomes significant in model 3. Perhaps some people with higher educational background have voted for Eurosceptical right-wing parties or perhaps it is the other way around. Nevertheless, it appears that on an overall basis, the coefficient is generally smaller in 2014 compared to 2008. Thus, the found gap in Euroscepticism between the poorly and highly educated appears to have become smaller between 2008 and 2014.

The gap between men and women becomes a bit smaller in model 3, which could be taken as an indication that the voting patterns influence the *gender* effect. However, if this is the case, it appears that women are more likely to vote for Eurosceptical right-wing parties than men.

A final comment should be made about the *Social identity index*. It is the variable that displays the most explanatory power across all models in all years and is in all models significant at the 0.01 level. Interestingly, its coefficient has also grown between 2008 and 2014 from respectively 0.36 to 0.44 (model 3 coefficients). This means that going from one extreme (0) to the other (10) would lead to a 0.8 points higher score on Euroscepticism in 2014 than in 2008. As the two datasets are independent of each other, one should be careful with comparing the coefficients head to head. However, it appears as if the correlation between *anti-immigration attitudes* and *Euroscepticism* is greater in 2014 than in 2008.

Lastly, the development of the explained variance between 2008 and 2014 should be noted. In 2008, the maximum explained variance is 23 % (Individual level), 67 % (nation level) and 25 % (overall-level). In 2014 the maximum explained variance is 28 % (Individual level), 13 % (nation level) and 27 % (overall-level). Comparing these numbers, it becomes clear that even though the variance at both individual level and nation level were a bit higher in 2014, the individual level variance is better explained in 2014 compared to 2008. This is quite remarkable, as it appears to contradict the tendency found in table 5.1 and 5.2; thus, the *Voted for Eurosceptical party* variable

is important in explaining individually-level variance in 2014. The opposite is the case for the nation level variance, where the R^2 drops from 67% to 13% between 2008 and 2014. It appears as if other explanations should be investigated to explain the difference in Euroscepticism between nations.

5.3: Finishing remarks

Comparing the results above with the expecations presented in table 3.3, leads to the following finshing remarks of the analysis.

Table 3.3 Overview of the expectations

Self-instrumental	Expectation number 1:	Individuals with negative subjective evaluations of either egocentric of socio-tropic characters are more Eurosceptic
	Expectation number 2:	Individuals with higher age, lower income, lower education, far right-wing political standpoint, and women are more Eurosceptic.
Identity	Expectation number 3:	Individuals that hold an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, are more Eurosceptic
	Expectation number 4:	Individuals that hold an exclusive national identity, feels culturally and/or religiously threatened by foreigners, are more Eurosceptic regardless of their *Self-instrumental* characteristics.
Eurosceptical radical right-wing parties	Expectation number 5:	The intensity of the Eurosceptical cue is correlated with public Euroscepticism regardless of the *Social identity* and *Self-instrumental* characteristics of the public.
	Expectation number 6:	The correlation between the intensity of the Eurosceptical cue and Euroscepticism is stronger, when individuals' hold a higher level of exclusive national identity and/or feelings of cultural or religious threat by foreigners.

Support is found for expectation one. The more dissatisfied with the national economy individuals tend to be, the more Eurosceptic they tend to be. This tendency is both highly statistically significant ($P<0.01$) and is found across all models in both years albeit with a weaker correlation in 2014 than in 2008. It would have been interesting if the datasets had provided the possibility to test whether this correlation was also found in regards to the dissatisfaction with the personal

economy (i.e. subjective ego-centric). Therefore, it is important to notice that when claiming support for this expectation not all dimensions were investigated due to a lack of available data.

Both support for and evidence against expectation two was found. *Age* and *house income* do not provide good explanations of Euroscepticism, whereas *education* does. Although *education* had a small coefficient in all the models, it still proved to be statistically significant across all models except one. In comparison to the three aforementioned dimensions, *Gender* and *far right-wing* political self-placement are not as straightforward. For *gender* the correlation changes direction between 2008 and 2014. In 2008 women were more Eurosceptic than men. In 2014 men were more Eurosceptic than women. This development is highly surprising and perhaps is a result of men feeling more vulnerable to further European integration in 2014 than in 2008. Or perhaps other variables are needed to further test the correlation.

For the variable measuring *far right-wing* political self-placement it develops from being insignificant in 2008 to being significant in 2014. As this correlation also holds true even when controlling for the *Social identity index* indicates that it is not bound by anti-immigration attitudes. People placing themselves on the *far right-wing* simply have a higher level of *Euroscepticism* compared to those who do not in 2014.

Support is found for both expectation three and expectation four. The *Social identity index* has throughout all the models shown the strongest coefficients of all the variables with P-levels below 0.01 and when introduced in model 2 in both years it has heightened the R^2 substantially. Moreover, it displays a stronger correlation in 2014 than in 2008, whereas the coefficients for the *Instrumental self-interest* explanations – with the exception of self-placement on the *far right-wing* – on an overall basis become smaller. Although it – due to limitations in the datasets (see section 3.2.2) – has not been possible to perfectly measure the concept of *exclusive national identity* and *religious threat,* the issues of anti-immigration attitudes have displayed great explanatory force of *Euroscepticism* and it appears to have only gained more influence when comparing 2008 to 2014.

Evidence is found against expectation five and six. The *Intensity of the Eurosceptical Cue* does not show any significant correlation with Euroscepticism in any of the models and neither does the interaction term between the *Intensity of the Eurosceptical Cue* and the *Social identity index*.

Perhaps the *Intensity of the Eurosceptical Cue* has not been constructed in a sufficient manner or perhaps the isolation of one such nation specific characteristic leaves out too many other explanations that influence the linkage between political elites and the public. To put it bluntly, it can be difficult to isolate and empirically identify such a linkage, as many factors at both national and European level can disturb the correlation proposed in this thesis.

It could also be due to the greatest limitation of this thesis; the empirical foundation. Two main issues have been identified. The discrepancy between the ESS and CHES dataset used for the year of 2008 and the low number of countries in both years. Firstly, if any results were to be found in model 3 and model 4 in 2008, these should be analyzed upon with caution. Secondly, the individual level variables all had above 10.000 values for each variable, whereas the *Intensity of the Eurosceptical Cue* had only 10. This is below the usual minimum requirement when performing multi-level analysis, which can make it difficult to get significant results. Simply put, such a low number of cases raise the statistical uncertainty, which often results in a large P-value. However, it should be noted that those that *Voted for a Eurosceptical Party* also have a higher level of *Euroscepticism*. Even though it mainly served as a control variable, it displayed a strong highly significant coefficient throughout all the models and provides good explanatory power of *Euroscepticism*. This could be taken as an indication of the usability of the identification of Eurosceptical right-wing political parties across Europe and also be seen as evidence of the commonly argued fact that people vote for the political parties who share their political view.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Public Euroscepticism is on the rise across Europe. The nature of public Euroscepticism is changing. A rise of Eurosceptical right-wing political parties is taking place. Those are the three developments that essentially form the basis for this thesis, which resulted in the following research question:

- *Why are people across Europe becoming more Eurosceptic and how do Eurosceptical right-wing political parties influence this development?*

To answer the research question, quantitative material from nationwide surveys on public opinion in 10 European countries in 2008 and 2014 were used. Furthermore, these surveys on public opinion were combined with expert surveys that estimate party positioning on European integration in the same 10 European countries. This quantitative material has been analyzed by performing several multi-level linear regression models for each year. These models have been deployed as a way of examining six different theoretically deduced expectations based upon literature on public Euroscepticism and cuing effects from political parties.

It is found that public Euroscepticism in both years is linked to the perceived state of a nation's economy and education; the worse state people think their national economy is in and the lower educated they are, the more Eurosceptic they tend to be. The level of house income and age does not influence people's level of Euroscepticsm. It is also found that women are more Eurosceptic than men in 2008, but it is the other way around in 2014. Moreover, there is no difference in Euroscepticism between those who place themselves at the political far right-wing compared to those who do not in 2008, but in 2014 those at the far right-wing tend to be more Eurosceptic. However, the strongest predictor of Euroscepticsm in both years and across all models is anti-immigration attitudes. Rising fear of immigrants correlates with rising Euroscepticism. Concurrently, as the perceived state of a nation's economy, education, and gender loses some of their explanatory force between 2008 and 2014, the link between Euroscepticism and anti-immigration attitudes grows stronger.

The analysis of the effects from Eurosceptical right-wing political parties are hampered by the quality of the data available. They show poor results and no link was found between Euroscepticism and the Intensity of the political cue from Eurosceptical right-wing political parties. Similarly, no results were found for a link between the Intensity of the political cue, anti-immigration attitudes and Euroscepticsm. However, a vote for one of the Eurosceptical right-wing political parties analyzed upon revealed a link with Euroscepticism in 2008, but an even stronger one in 2014.

Altogether it is concluded that anti-immigration attitudes are the main explanation of Euroscepticism across Europe and that this factor is the main reason why people have become more Eurosceptic between 2008 and 2014. It is furthermore concluded that no results are found, when examining the influence of the political cue from Eurosceptical right-wing political parties. However, voting for a Eurosceptical right-wing political party and self-placement at the political far right-wing became stronger predictors of Euroscepticism in 2014 than in 2008. This indicates that further examinations are needed to fully understand the interactions and the development between these political parties and public Euroscepticsm.

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