



## Conflict Theory

Møller, Bjørn

*Publication date:*  
2003

*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication from Aalborg University](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*  
Møller, B. (2003). *Conflict Theory*. Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold, Aalborg Universitet.

### General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal -

### Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at [vbn@aub.aau.dk](mailto:vbn@aub.aau.dk) providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

---

# **Conflict Theory**

**Bjørn Møller**

DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH SERIES  
RESEARCH CENTER ON DEVELOPMENT  
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (DIR)

WORKING PAPER NO. 122

---

© 2003 Bjørn Møller  
Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR)  
Aalborg University  
Denmark  
Development Research Series  
Working Paper No. 122

ISSN 0904-8154

*Published by*  
DIR & Institute for History, International and Social Studies  
Aalborg University

*Distribution*  
The University Bookshop  
Fibigerstræde 15,  
DK-9220 Aalborg East  
Phone + 45 96 35 80 71  
E-mail: [Info@centerboghandel.dk](mailto:Info@centerboghandel.dk)  
[www.centerboghandel.auc.dk](http://www.centerboghandel.auc.dk)

*Lay-out and wordprocessing*  
Britta Mailund

*Print*  
Centertrykkeriet, 2003

*The Secretariat*  
Research Center on Development and International Relations  
att: Secretary Marianne Hoegsbro  
Fibigerstraede 2  
Aalborg University  
DK-9220 Aalborg East  
Denmark

Tel. + 45 96 35 98 10  
Fax. + 45 98 15 32 98

E-mail: [hoegsbro@humsamf.auc.dk](mailto:hoegsbro@humsamf.auc.dk) or [jds@humsamf.auc.dk](mailto:jds@humsamf.auc.dk)  
Homepage: [www.humsamf.auc.dk/development](http://www.humsamf.auc.dk/development)

# Conflict Theory

Bjørn Møller\*

In this paper, a typology of conflicts is offered, followed by an account of the typical conflict cycle.<sup>1</sup> The following paper provides an overview of strategies, methods and instruments for conflict intervention, i.e. conflict prevention, management, mitigation and resolution.

## Levels of Conflict

Conflicts occur at various levels, ranging from the international level of wars to the inter-personal level of marital disputes—to which one might even add “intrapersonal conflicts” as most dramatically illustrated by schizophrenia.<sup>2</sup> (See Table 1). For our present purposes, however, a dichotomous distinction between conflicts within and between states seems adequate, albeit only with the addition of their combination in internationalised intra-state conflicts, here labelled “transnational conflicts”. It further makes sense to distinguish between violent and non-violent conflicts, and to acknowledge that neither the borders separating the various levels nor those between violent and non-violent conflicts are entirely clear or impermeable.

| Table 1: Taxonomy of Conflicts | International                            | Transnational   | Intra-state                                  | Inter-personal   |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| <b>Violent</b>                 | War<br>Other armed conflicts<br>Cold War | Military intervention<br>Support for armed insurgents | Civil wars<br>Armed insurgencies<br>Genocide | Wife battering<br>Child abuse<br>Murder<br>Violent crime |
| <b>Non-violent</b>             | Political disputes<br>Trade wars         | Sanctions<br>Diplomacy                                | Political struggle                           | Verbal disputes<br>Discrimination                        |

It would surely be tantamount to “reductionism” to assume conflicts to always follow the same pattern, regardless of the level,<sup>3</sup> i.e. to assume “isomorphism” across the divides between levels.<sup>4</sup> However, it makes perfect sense to make *heuristic* (and, of course, illustrative) use of accumulated knowledge about conflicts at one level for the analysis of conflicts at another. While one cannot assume that these will be structurally similar, it just might be the case. Also the commonly shared experience from conflicts at the interpersonal level may recommend such disputes for illustration (as opposed to explanation) of disputes at other levels, several steps removed from the daily experience.

---

\* Guest Professor, Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR), Aalborg University.

### *International Conflicts: Clausewitzian War and Beyond*


Conflicts between states occur over many different issues and come in many shapes. The issues of contention include such matters as territory, natural resources, power (entailing the ability to acquire all the rest, if need be by force) and prestige.<sup>5</sup>

Most such conflicts are, fortunately, peaceful and are fought out by means of diplomacy and other political instruments, often combined with economic means of persuasion or coercion. However, military means are often employed, either directly or indirectly, i.e. as means of deterrence or “compellence”, including “crisis management” as it is usually labelled in the post-Cold War jargon.<sup>6</sup> In other cases, of course, military force is actually used for fighting. Genuine wars used to be clearly identifiable by being preceded by a declaration of war, but this has become a distinct rarity,<sup>7</sup> calling for other criteria to distinguish “war” from “other armed conflicts”.

The most obvious solution to this is to reserve the label “war” for armed conflicts among states and to stipulate a quantitative threshold above which something should be called a war rather than a mere “incident”, e.g. in terms of battle-deaths per year.<sup>8</sup> This still leaves some definitional problems, e.g. whether to count wars between several states as one comprehensive or several dyadic wars, and whether to count a war intersected by periods of peace as one or several consecutive wars.

The traditional image of war is that of a rational endeavour of states opposing each other, each supposedly “representing” its respective people and being represented on the battlefield by its army, in its turn drawn from the people itself and thus somehow representative of it.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, it is possible to view the relationship between war and the state as almost a symbiosis, where the state is built on war, which in turn presupposes the state.<sup>10</sup> This form of war was aptly described by Clausewitz as “a continuation of politics by other means” i.e. as clearly subordinated to politics in an end-means relationship (see Fig. 1).<sup>11</sup>

**Fig. 1: Clausewitzian War**



This conception of war may have all along contained the seeds of its own obsolescence. First of all, in order for Clausewitzian war to serve as a means to political ends, it had to be orderly, i.e. regulated. This progressive regulation, *inter alia* by a legal application of the “just war” philosophy<sup>12</sup> has produced a steadily growing body of laws of war, the cumulative effect of which has been to outlaw war as a means to all other political ends than self-defence.<sup>13</sup> Henceforth war is thus only permissible as a response to an illicit use of military force by another state, i.e. only a suitable means to a very narrowly circumscribed span of political ends.

Secondly, for Clausewitzian war to be “rational” it had to be guided by science. Hence, the growing body of strategic thought, all aimed at transforming war into a genuinely rational, almost scientific endeavour.<sup>14</sup> However, the application of science to war also resulted (as intended) in a growing destructiveness of war, culminating in the two world wars and the development of nuclear weapons. Everybody soon had to realise the truth in Bernard Brodie’s concerns, voiced in 1946 in his *The Absolute Weapon*: “Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose”.<sup>15</sup>

The subsequent growth of the nuclear arsenals<sup>16</sup> promised (according to the “nuclear winter hypothesis” promulgated in the early 1980s) that a nuclear war would render the entire globe uninhabitable.<sup>17</sup> This level of destruction was obviously quite incompatible with any political aims, and all attempts at devising ways of using nuclear weapons for anything but the deterrence of nuclear attack have eventually been abandoned,<sup>18</sup> thus arguably rendering Clausewitzian war obsolete.<sup>19</sup>

Thirdly, the Clausewitzian paradigm of war presupposed a symbiotic unity of peoples, states and armies, which may also soon be a thing of the past. The unity between peoples and armies was manifested in the introduction of universal (male) conscription in most of Europe in the course of the century following the 1789 French Revolution—and it was usually accompanied by the granting of civil and political rights to the population, tantamount to the forging of a certain unity between peoples and states.<sup>20</sup>

Conscription, however, now seems to be on its way out, at least in the industrialised world,<sup>21</sup> where professional soldiers are the order of the day. We are even witnessing a progressive privatisation of war with the outsourcing of combat and other military tasks to private military companies (PMCs)<sup>22</sup>—a phenomenon which we shall also encounter in several African armed conflicts. One of the explanations may be that governments no longer feel entitled to jeopardise the lives of their citizens in war, i.e. that the world (or at least the developed part of it) have entered an era of “post-heroic warfare”.<sup>23</sup>

“War” in the traditional, i.e. Clausewitzian sense, may thus be approaching obsolescence.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, for the entire period from 1990 to 2001, only three (Iraq/Kuwait, India/Pakistan and Ethiopia/Eritrea) of a total of 57 major armed conflicts were between states, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project.<sup>25</sup> This may be an argument for labelling other forms of armed conflict “wars”, if only in order to save the term from oblivion and as a way of acknowledging the changing nature of armed conflict. Hence terms such as “new wars” (Mary Kaldor) or “uncivil wars” (Donald Snow), “post-trinitarian”, “post-modern” or “neo-archaic wars” (as suggested by the present author on different occasions).<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, it may be preferable to continue to reserve the label “war” to the increasingly rare phenomenon of large-scale armed conflict between states—just as one does not begin calling other animals “rhinos” merely because the rhinoceros has become an endangered species.

As this kind of war has all along been rare occurrence in post-independence Africa, I shall leave it at that.

### *Intra-State and Transnational Conflicts*

Most of today’s armed conflicts are intra-state,<sup>27</sup> i.e. they take place either between different groups within a society or between the state and an insurgent group. The contentious issues (“incompatibilities”) have by some analysts been lumped together under the headings “government” and “territory”, i.e. as having to do with either the type of political system or the incumbent government or with territorial issues such as secession or autonomy.<sup>28</sup>

As such conflicts are the predominant ones in Africa, most of the following account is devoted to such intra-state conflicts. There is, of course, also a wealth of conflicts at the intra-personal level, such as wife-battering, rape, child abuse or violent crime, but these have largely been omitted from the analysis.

A number of intra-state conflicts have become partly internationalised by the involvement of either other states or non-state contestants across an international border—for which phenomenon I have opted for the term “transnational conflicts”.<sup>29</sup> Arguably this transnationalisation of armed conflict is merely a reflection of the growing importance of transnational relations of all sorts<sup>30</sup>—and partly caused by globalisation.<sup>31</sup> The boundaries between “inside” and “outside” may simply be eroding, and the frontiers becoming increasingly blurred.<sup>32</sup> Conflicts which are, by their very nature, intra-state may become transnationalised in various ways, including the following:

- Through “humanitarian intervention”<sup>33</sup> by external powers, most often those of the global West or North, as happened in Somalia and to a limited (and rather perverted) sense in Rwanda with the French “*Operation Turquoise*”.
- In ethnic conflicts, one or several of the parties to the conflict may have ethnic kin in control of state power in neighbouring states. Especially if the latter base their legitimacy on ethnic nationalism they may feel compelled to come to the assistance of their beleaguered ethnic kin.
- The relationship between states and ethnic groups may also work the other way, as states may wage “proxy wars” against each other by supporting armed insurgents on each other’s territory who may or may not be ethnically related.
- Insurgents may operate out of bases across the border, thereby justifying cross-border raids, either in hot pursuit of fleeing insurgents (or terrorists) or, more radically, in the form of larger incursions or even invasions with the goal of destroying the bases—as was arguably the case of the Rwandan intervention in the DR Congo.

There are thus many ways in which what began as intra-state conflicts may become inter- or transnationalised, either deliberately or inadvertently. Once other states become involved they may well behave in a manner resembling what they would do in a genuine international conflict, which merely illustrates the blurred distinctions between the three levels of armed conflict.

### *The Regional Level*

Transnational conflicts mainly appear between adjacent states, i.e. at the regional level, which might be regarded as a special level bridging the divide between the international and the transnational one. However, not only has the

regional level generally been disregarded in the international relations (IR) literature, but also the definition and delimitation of regions remain controversial, both theoretically and politically.

What is clear is that a region is a subset of the global international system, but how to delimitate such a subset is debatable because several criteria might be applied, each yielding a different result—none of them, of course, being more correct than the others.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, for analytical (and sometimes also political) purposes it may be useful with a further subdivision to the level of sub regions or even smaller groupings. For instance, if one treats “Africa” as a region, then sub-Saharan Africa is automatically relegated to the status of a sub-region. The sum of the Great Lakes countries or those of Southern Africa would then, at most, qualify a “sub-sub-regions”, and we would need additional “sub-prefixes” to label any subset within them, such as parts of states (provinces, for instance) or “regions” which straddle state borders but comprise only parts of these states.

Among the possible criteria for delimitation the first that springs to mind is the simple geographical (or geopolitical) one of proximity, as a region is usually held to consist of contiguous states. For instance, one would never label the Commonwealth a region, simply because it comprises non-contiguous states. This contiguity criterion, however, begs the question of where to draw the outer limit, unless there happen to be clear natural boundaries. The African continent happens to be fairly clearly delimited, the only exceptions being the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula outside the continent and the Spanish exclaves in North Africa. However, it is far from obvious that countries like Egypt or the rest of the Maghreb really belong to Africa rather than to the Middle East—or even a Mediterranean region.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, in relations between peoples, societies and states, proximity is not merely a matter of physical distance, but also a function of topography, infrastructure, technology and economic factors. For instance, the fastest route of travel between several African capitals happens to be via Europe (*sic!*), simply because intra-African transport networks are so under-developed, partly as a legacy of colonialism.

Secondly, we have a variation on the geographical criterion, focusing on ecosystems, for instance defined by shared rivers and or other sources of water supplies.<sup>36</sup> In several cases, belonging to such an ecosystem creates a certain commonality, at least in the sense of mutual dependency and shared interests—as well as, alas, the basis for conflicts over how the proper division of “shared” natural resources. Arguably, the very term “Great Lakes Region” is based on such a criterion—even though the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) would then have to be excluded from it, and Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi included.

Thirdly, there is the criterion of cultural affinity—which happens to almost coincide with that of “civilisations” as used by Samuel Huntington, who predicts a clash between some of the world’s (alleged) nine great civilisations.<sup>37</sup> Apart from this unfortunate coincidence, the criterion may be unwieldy as cultural homogeneity is usually more pronounced when seen from the outside (where it is viewed as “otherness”) than from the inside.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, “culture” has many aspects (e.g. religious, ideological, and ethnic), which do not automatically yield the same delimitation. A variation on this theme is the notion of regions as “imagined communities”, in analogy with nations as understood by Benedict Anderson and other social constructivists. Like nations regions may be constituted as such by the members “imagining” themselves as belonging together, and the rest of the world acknowledging them as such, regardless of whether either has any “objective” foundation.<sup>39</sup>

Fourthly, the latter variation brings us into the sphere of politics, where a convenient political or legal criterion of delimitation might be membership of institutions or organisations defined as “regional”, e.g. by the United Nations.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, however, most African organisations (with the partial exceptions of ECOWAS and SADC) are so weak as to appear unsuitable for this purpose—and large parts of Africa are almost devoid of organisations, as is the case of the Great Lakes region. Moreover, there is considerable overlap between regions-defined-by-organisations (*vide infra*).

Fifthly, we have the “scientific” or empirical criterion of interaction, according to which regions may be identified as such by a greater-than-average intensity of interaction. Most analyses have focused on trade and other forms of economic interaction, but this would yield rather meagre results in all of Africa because of the low level of intra-African trade, at least as far as the formal economy is concerned. However, one might also look at phenomena such as labour migration and other cross-border human interaction, which might arguably also form the basis of regionalisation.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, as a variation of the above, we might define regions as having an above-average intensity of interaction and interdependence in the specific field of security. Barry Buzan has thus suggested the term “security complex” for “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”.<sup>42</sup> For all its merits, however, this concept seems to need some modification in order to be analytically useful when applied to Africa. First of all, its implications depend on how “security” is defined, more on which below. Secondly, the theory will have to allow for an overlap among security complexes, i.e. take into due account that some states may have to be reckoned

as parts of more than one security complex. While this may make the concept less neat, and the theory less parsimonious, it would surely make them both more useful tools for dealing with the real world.

However defined, the regional level seems useful as it allows for capturing both international and transnational conflict dynamics. Hence, the case studies on African countries have been grouped according to region and preceded by accounts of their respective regions—or rather sub regions. In order to avoid the inconvenience of cumbersome prefixes, whenever there has seemed to be no room for misunderstanding, the term “region” has been preferred also for what are rightly sub regions or even smaller sets.

### **The Roots of Conflict**

Conflicts have both structural (“root”) and proximate causes (“triggers”), the former referring to the underlying problems and the latter to the triggering factors. Fully-fledged conflicts never spring out into the open without a combination of the two, i.e. neither can a single event precipitate an open conflict unless there are structural reasons for it, nor can structural causes create a crisis in the absence of a triggering factor. This has implications for the handling of crises, e.g. for early warning and conflict prevention, which is often subdivided into “structural” and “operational” prevention, roughly corresponding to dealing with structural and proximate causes.<sup>43</sup>

The treatment of proximate causes has been relegated to the section on the conflict cycle, so we shall begin with a look at the potential structural causes of conflict. A useful point of departure is the commonplace distinction between conflicts of interests and conflicts of values and attitudes.<sup>44</sup>

#### *Conflicts of Interest*

Even though conflicts of interests are, by definition, “objective”, they are not immediately observable and their identification may, to a large extent, be a matter of ideology. One can arrive at the identification of objective interests from several different theoretical or ideological vantage points.

- Marxism thus argues that the ownership of the means of production (including land) leads to exploitation of the peasants and workers by the owners, which is tantamount to an irreconcilable and antagonistic conflict of interests, regardless of whether the two sides are aware of its presence.<sup>45</sup>
- The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung argues that “relative deprivation” constitutes “structural violence”, regardless of whether the parties realise this.<sup>46</sup> This deprivation is likely to produce aggression and, in due course, direct violence. This is especially likely to occur in the case of “rank disequilibria”, e.g. if groups of people rank high on one scale (e.g. of

education), but low on others such as influence.<sup>47</sup>

- Another peace researcher, John Burton, basically agree with this explanation whilst emphasising the paramount importance of “basic human needs” which are presumably inherent in human nature and universal, hence non-negotiable—the needs for identity, recognition, security and personal development which “will be pursued”, come what may.<sup>48</sup>

While all three theories posit an objective antagonism between the “haves” and the “have-nots”, it is important to stress that it is *not* absolute (material and other) poverty, which causes conflict behaviour. There is no strong correlation, if any, between violent behaviour and living standards. It is *relative* poverty or deprivation that causes grievances and conflict behaviour, i.e. a standard of living which is seen as unsatisfactory in comparison with something else—either with that which others (are seen to) enjoy, or with what the individual or group in question used to enjoy, or what s/he expected to enjoy in the future. Hence, deteriorating living conditions may cause conflicts, as may even a declining rate of growth, because it may frustrate overly optimistic expectations, thereby producing aggression and a propensity for direct violence, as implied by the famous “frustration-aggression hypothesis”.<sup>49</sup>

For all the merits of the above hypotheses, they are hard to operationalise. To the extent that “objective” conflicts of interests are not acknowledged by the parties (who may not even be conscious of their conflicting interests) the analyst has to resort to notions of “false consciousness”.<sup>50</sup> Thereby he makes himself an easy target for critics charging him with not being “scientific” because the postulates are inherently unfalsifiable.<sup>51</sup>

Indeed the analyst may even be charged with “cultural imperialism”, say if he (or, even more likely, she) claims that women are oppressed (i.e. suffer a relative deprivation of rights) and therefore have an objective interest in equal rights, if this claim is made in countries where gender stereotypes are so internalised in both sexes that women willingly accept a subordinate position in society—or even atrocities such as female circumcision (better labelled “genital mutilation”). However, such cases should not be taken as arguments against assuming objective interests, as it is surely not in the objective interest of babies to be mutilated. For all its possible merits, cultural relativism can surely be taken too far.

Even though a causal link between relative deprivation and violence may be difficult to demonstrate, there certainly seems to be a significant correlation between the two. First of all most major armed conflicts take place in the Third World—and not least in Africa as set out in Table 2.

|             | <b>Europe</b> | <b>Middle East</b> | <b>Asia</b> | <b>Americas</b> | <b>Africa</b> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <b>1989</b> | 2             | 4                  | 19          | 8               | <b>14</b>     |
| <b>1990</b> | 3             | 6                  | 18          | 5               | <b>17</b>     |
| <b>1991</b> | 6             | 7                  | 16          | 5               | <b>17</b>     |
| <b>1992</b> | 9             | 7                  | 20          | 4               | <b>15</b>     |
| <b>1993</b> | 10            | 7                  | 15          | 3               | <b>11</b>     |
| <b>1994</b> | 5             | 5                  | 15          | 4               | <b>13</b>     |
| <b>1995</b> | 5             | 4                  | 13          | 4               | <b>9</b>      |
| <b>1996</b> | 1             | 5                  | 14          | 2               | <b>14</b>     |
| <b>1997</b> | 0             | 3                  | 15          | 2               | <b>14</b>     |
| <b>1998</b> | 2             | 3                  | 15          | 2               | <b>15</b>     |
| <b>1999</b> | 3             | 2                  | 14          | 2               | <b>16</b>     |
| <b>2000</b> | 1             | 3                  | 14          | 1               | <b>14</b>     |

Secondly, the general picture of relative deprivation of most of the “Third World” is fairly clear and indisputable. It was aptly summed up in the opening words of the United Nations’ *2001 Report on the World Social Situation*: “Disparities in income and wealth are growing in many countries, and the distance between richer and poorer countries is also widening.”<sup>53</sup>

The annual reports of the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) present a very similar picture of a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots, both within and between countries and with regard to all indicators of “human development”. According to the 2002 issue of the *Human Development Report*, the richest five percent of the world’s people have incomes 114 times those of the poorest five percent,<sup>54</sup> and the average per capita income was US\$27,848 in the high-income OECD countries as compared to 1,690 in sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. sixteen times higher.

This inequality is not “merely” a question of income, but is also reflected in, for instance, life expectancy where that of the rich countries is 78.2 years, but that of Africa south of the Sahara is a mere 48.7.<sup>55</sup> Table 3 lists the “top twenty” and “bottom twenty” countries on the “human development index” (HDI) calculated by the UNDP, which also measures such factors as education (adult literacy and enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary education) in addition to GDP pc, i.e. gross domestic product per capita.

**Table 3: Human Development: Selected Indicators<sup>56</sup>**

| Rank Top 20 |               | Life Exp. | GDP pc | HDI   | Rank Bottom 20 |               | Life Exp. | GDP pc | HDI   |
|-------------|---------------|-----------|--------|-------|----------------|---------------|-----------|--------|-------|
| 1           | Norway        | 78.5      | 29,918 | 0.942 | 154            | Senegal       | 53.3      | 1,510  | 0.431 |
| 2           | Sweden        | 79.7      | 24,277 | 0.941 | 155            | DRC           | 51.3      | 765    | 0.431 |
| 3           | Canada        | 78.8      | 27,840 | 0.940 | 156            | Côte d'Ivoire | 47.8      | 1630   | 0.428 |
| 4           | Belgium       | 78.4      | 27,178 | 0.939 | 157            | Eritrea       | 52        | 837    | 0.421 |
| 5           | Australia     | 78.9      | 25,693 | 0.939 | 158            | Benin         | 53.8      | 990    | 0.420 |
| 6           | United States | 77.0      | 34,142 | 0.939 | 159            | Guinea        | 47.5      | 1982   | 0.414 |
| 7           | Iceland       | 79.2      | 29,581 | 0.936 | 160            | Gambia        | 46.2      | 1649   | 0.405 |
| 8           | Netherlands   | 78.1      | 25,657 | 0.935 | 161            | Angola        | 45.2      | 2,187  | 0.403 |
| 9           | Japan         | 81.0      | 26,755 | 0.933 | 162            | Rwanda        | 40.2      | 943    | 0.403 |
| 10          | Finland       | 77.6      | 24,996 | 0.930 | 163            | Malawi        | 40        | 615    | 0.400 |
| 11          | Switzerland   | 78.9      | 28,769 | 0.928 | 164            | Mali          | 51.5      | 797    | 0.386 |
| 12          | France        | 78.6      | 24,223 | 0.928 | 165            | CAS           | 44.3      | 1172   | 0.375 |
| 13          | UK            | 77.7      | 23,509 | 0.928 | 166            | Chad          | 45.7      | 871    | 0.365 |
| 14          | Denmark       | 76.2      | 27,627 | 0.926 | 167            | Guinea-Bissau | 44.8      | 755    | 0.349 |
| 15          | Austria       | 78.1      | 26,765 | 0.926 | 168            | Ethiopia      | 43.9      | 668    | 0.327 |
| 16          | Luxembourg    | 77.4      | 50,061 | 0.925 | 169            | Burkina Faso  | 46.7      | 976    | 0.325 |
| 17          | Germany       | 77.7      | 25,103 | 0.925 | 170            | Mozambique    | 39.3      | 854    | 0.322 |
| 18          | Ireland       | 76.6      | 29,866 | 0.925 | 171            | Burundi       | 40.6      | 591    | 0.313 |
| 19          | New Zealand   | 77.6      | 20,070 | 0.917 | 172            | Niger         | 45.2      | 746    | 0.277 |
| 20          | Italy         | 78.5      | 23,626 | 0.913 | 173            | Sierra Leone  | 38.9      | 490    | 0.275 |

Life in the Third World is thus indeed “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”,<sup>57</sup> but especially so for the unfortunate poor, whereas the wealthy part of the population tends to be quite well off, even by European standards.

Inequalities within developing countries are thus usually much more dramatic than in the typical OECD countries, as emerges clearly from Table 4. In countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, the richest ten percent of the population thus have more than eighty times as much wealth at their disposal as the poorest ten percent. In comparison, the distribution in the “egalitarian” Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) is much more even, the richest ten percent having only 5-6 times as much as the poorest ten percent—and even the much less egalitarian United States has a more even income distribution, especially when measured in “20/20” figures comparing the richest to the poorest twenty percent of the population.

| <b>Table 4: Inequalities within Countries<sup>58</sup></b> |                |             | <b>Share of Income or Consumption</b> |            |                |            | <b>Inequality</b>      |              |
|--|----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|------------|----------------|------------|------------------------|--------------|
| <b>HDI Rank</b>  | <b>Country</b> | <b>Year</b> | <b>Poorest</b>                        |            | <b>Richest</b> |            | <b>Richest/Poorest</b> |              |
|  |                |             | <b>10%</b>                            | <b>20%</b> | <b>20%</b>     | <b>10%</b> | <b>10:10</b>           | <b>20:20</b> |
| 154  | Senegal        | 1995        | 2.6                                   | 6.4        | 48.2           | 33.5       | 12.9                   | 7.5          |
| 156  | Côte d'Ivoire  | 1995        | 3.0                                   | 7.1        | 44.2           | 28.8       | 9.6                    | 6.2          |
| 159  | Guinea         | 1994        | 2.6                                   | 6.4        | 47.2           | 32.0       | 12.3                   | 7.4          |
| 160  | Gambia         | 1994        | 1.6                                   | 4.0        | 55.2           | 38.2       | 23.9                   | 13.8         |
| 162  | Rwanda         | 1983-85     | 4.2                                   | 9.7        | 39.1           | 24.2       | 5.8                    | 4.0          |
| 164  | Mali           | 1994        | 1.8                                   | 4.6        | 56.2           | 40.4       | 22.4                   | 12.2         |
| 165  | CAS            | 1993        | 0.7                                   | 2.0        | 65.0           | 47.7       | 68.1                   | 32.5         |
| 167  | Guinea-Bissau  | 1991        | 0.5                                   | 2.1        | 58.9           | 42.4       | 84.8                   | 28.0         |
| 168  | Ethiopia       | 1995        | 3.0                                   | 7.1        | 47.7           | 33.7       | 11.2                   | 6.7          |
| 169  | Burkina Faso   | 1998        | 2.0                                   | 4.6        | 60.4           | 46.8       | 23.4                   | 13.1         |
| 170  | Mozambique     | 1996-97     | 2.5                                   | 6.5        | 46.5           | 31.7       | 12.7                   | 7.2          |
| 171  | Burundi        | 1998        | 1.8                                   | 5.1        | 48.0           | 32.9       | 18.3                   | 9.4          |
| 172  | Niger          | 1995        | 0.8                                   | 2.6        | 53.3           | 35.4       | 44.3                   | 20.5         |
| 173  | Sierra Leone   | 1989        | 0.5                                   | 1.1        | 63.4           | 43.6       | 87.2                   | 57.6         |
| 1  | Norway         | 1995        | 4.1                                   | 9.7        | 35.8           | 21.8       | 5.3                    | 3.7          |
| 2  | Sweden         | 1992        | 3.7                                   | 9.6        | 34.5           | 20.1       | 5.4                    | 3.6          |
| 3  | Canada         | 1994        | 2.8                                   | 7.5        | 39.3           | 23.8       | 8.5                    | 5.2          |
| 4  | Belgium        | 1996        | 3.2                                   | 8.3        | 37.3           | 23.0       | 7.2                    | 4.5          |
| 5  | Australia      | 1994        | 2.0                                   | 5.9        | 41.3           | 25.4       | 12.7                   | 7.0          |
| 6  | United States  | 1997        | 1.8                                   | 5.2        | 46.4           | 30.5       | 16.9                   | 8.9          |
| 8  | Netherlands    | 1994        | 2.8                                   | 7.2        | 40.1           | 25.1       | 9.0                    | 5.6          |
| 9  | Japan          | 1993        | 4.8                                   | 10.6       | 35.6           | 21.7       | 4.5                    | 3.4          |
| 10   | Finland        | 1991        | 4.2                                   | 10.0       | 35.8           | 21.6       | 5.1                    | 3.6          |
| 11   | Switzerland    | 1992        | 2.6                                   | 6.9        | 40.3           | 25.2       | 9.7                    | 5.8          |
| 12   | France         | 1995        | 2.8                                   | 7.2        | 40.2           | 25.1       | 9.0                    | 5.6          |
| 13   | United Kingdom | 1995        | 2.2                                   | 6.1        | 43.2           | 27.7       | 12.6                   | 7.1          |
| 14   | Denmark        | 1992        | 3.6                                   | 9.6        | 34.5           | 20.5       | 5.7                    | 3.6          |
| 15   | Austria        | 1995        | 2.5                                   | 6.9        | 38.0           | 22.5       | 9.0                    | 5.5          |
| 16   | Luxembourg     | 1994        | 4.0                                   | 9.4        | 36.5           | 22.0       | 5.5                    | 3.9          |
| 17   | Germany        | 1994        | 3.3                                   | 8.2        | 38.5           | 23.7       | 7.2                    | 4.7          |
| 18   | Ireland        | 1987        | 2.5                                   | 6.7        | 42.9           | 27.4       | 11.0                   | 6.4          |
| 20   | Italy          | 1995        | 3.5                                   | 8.7        | 36.3           | 21.8       | 6.2                    | 4.2          |

Globalisation may further exacerbate these problems, not only because it tends to objectively widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots, within and between countries, but also because it makes the gap more obvious to the have-nots, inter alia because of the growing access of everybody to the media.<sup>59</sup> American soap operas portraying “the filthy rich” must appear even more absurd when viewed in a village in Mozambique by people struggling hard to stave off starvation than when watched by, say, Danish youngsters, who are both much better off and in a better position to know that the spectacle is not even representative of the United States.

### *Conflicts of Values*

Conflicts of values and attitudes relate to less tangible and material matters than those of interests, but they are, paradoxically, more immediately observable, simply because values, beliefs and attitudes are, by their very nature, held consciously.

While it is, in principle, possible to have conflicts over any value or issue,<sup>60</sup> certain factors are more likely to become rallying points in conflicts than others, first among which seem to be ethnicity (including race), nationalism and religion.

Ethnicity does, of course, often rest on “objective” features such as race or other physical or linguistic features, as highlighted by ethnicity analysts of the “objectivist” or “primordialist” persuasion, who see ethnicity as an objective fact.<sup>61</sup> In their view ethnic identification may be subdued (as it was in Eastern Europe under Soviet/Communist rule) but once the “lid” is off, it will spring out into the open, simply because it is “natural”. A more cultural, but still “objectivist” definition is that of Anthony Smith, who defines an ethnic group as “a named culture-community whose members have a myth of common origins, shared memories and cultural characteristics, a link with a homeland and a measure of solidarity.”<sup>62</sup>

Closer analysis, however, reveals ethnicity to be a social construction, as objective features sometimes, but not always, become points of identification. Moreover, for most objective yardsticks there are sliding scales and grey areas, e.g. between different dialects and separate languages. It is only when the feature in question becomes a matter of social identification (or discrimination) that the need for clear-cut definitions emerges.<sup>63</sup> A perverse example of this was the “pencil test” used by the security forces of the apartheid regime in South Africa. When there was doubt whether a person should classify as white (or Asian) or black, the police officers inserted a pencil into his/her hair. If it fell to the floor the person was accepted as white (with all the accompanying rights), but if it stuck in the hair s/he was relegated to the disenfranchised and discriminated group of blacks.

Ethnies are thus, just as nations, best conceived of as “imagined communities,” and social constructs—but none the less real for that, as socially constructed reality is a reality on par with physical reality, only of a different kind.<sup>64</sup> However, social construction also allows ethnicity to be instrumentalised and abused, usually in the form of xenophobia or overt racism, by political leaders in pursuit of private goals such as power or profits.<sup>65</sup> That the consequences thereof can be severe or even disastrous has recently been demonstrated in the former

Yugoslavia<sup>66</sup> as well as, even more dramatically, by the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

Religion also often plays a divisive role, either as a constituent element of ethnicity or as an independent issue of contention,<sup>67</sup> as illustrated by some of the conflicts in Nigeria.<sup>68</sup> A clash between Islam and the West, either in the form of state-versus-state encounters or of the “war” between the Al-Qaeda network and the United States, also illustrates the potential of religion to become a rallying point for conflict.<sup>69</sup> On the other hand, shared religious affiliations and/or strong ecumenical traditions can also be conducive to conflict prevention or resolution (as in South Africa).<sup>70</sup>


Non-religious ideologies may play the same divisive role.<sup>71</sup> Just as many political conflicts within countries are driven by ideology, the entire East-West conflict was arguably a conflict pitting proponents of one set of values (communism) against the advocates of capitalism (market economy) and democracy. Whether it is over with the end of the Cold War, as proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama, remains to be seen.<sup>72</sup>

### **The Political Sphere**

Political conflicts do not constitute a separate category of conflicts alongside those over interests and values. Rather, the political sphere is the arena where most conflicts are fought out, one way or the other, as this is where the “authoritative allocation of values for a society” takes place, as argued by David Easton<sup>73</sup>—be they material values as in conflicts of interests and immaterial ones, as in conflicts of values.

#### *Centrality of the State*

The main institution in the political system of today is the state. It may well be that this has not always been the case, but that other forms of political organisations have predominated at other times.<sup>74</sup> It may also well be the case that the state is a European invention which has subsequently been superimposed upon other forms of authority, e.g. in Africa.<sup>75</sup>



Quite a strong case can also be made to the effect that the state is far from an ideal instrument for allocating values for a society, especially not when this “society” is becoming increasingly globalised and partly borderless—hence the likely need for other forms of governance in the not so distant future.<sup>76</sup> As of today, however, the state is the cornerstone of politics, both within bordered societies and between such societies, as the international system remains predominantly a state system.<sup>77</sup>

This makes it all the more deplorable that many states in the Third World, and not least in Africa, are weak and deficient in several respects. A useful conceptualisation of the “dimensions” of statehood, capable of capturing both state strengths and weaknesses, is that developed by Barry Buzan and subsequently slightly amended by Kalevi Holsti.<sup>78</sup> They both distinguish between the idea, the physical basis and the institutions of the state, while acknowledging that the three are closely interlinked (see Fig. 2).


### *The Idea of the State*

The “idea” of the state signifies its purpose or *raison d’être*, for which role several sets of ideas may recommend themselves.

- The simplest is that of historical continuity, i.e. the notion that a state has been there since times immemorial, or at least for a long period. This provides it with a degree of legitimacy, even in such cases where a state has temporarily ceased to be (as has, for instance, been the case of Poland more than once). This idea of continuity may also be more specific, e.g. by being linked to dynastic succession or to borders. It is often underpinned by myths, e.g. about heroic battles such as the Serbian myth (containing grains of truth) about the heroic battle against the Turks at Kosovo Polje.

- With thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau (or even Hobbes) came notions about a social contract between rulers and subjects, i.e. the concept of popular sovereignty according to which the state should somehow represent the people<sup>79</sup>—either in the form of democracy or (in a more perverted form) through the rule by a “vanguard” of the people, as in Marxism-Leninism or National Socialism.
- The latter points to the possibility of ideologically defined states, such as the “Democratic Peoples Republic” of Korea (DPRK, i.e. North Korea), the very *raison d’être* of which is to be based on the socialist “*juche*” ideology, alleged to further the objective interests of the people.<sup>80</sup> In a similar vein, certain states have a religious foundation, as the Jewish state of Israel or the Islamic states of Pakistan or Iran.<sup>81</sup>
- The most common modern idea of the state is, however, that of constituting the political “superstructure” of a society, conceived of as a nation, which raises the question how state and nation may be combined.

It is certainly possible that the state may precede the nation and serve as its constitutive criterion, as in political “state-nations” such as France and the United States where the nation is conceived of as simply the sum of the citizens.<sup>82</sup> In other cases, however, the nation precedes the state, and the predominant norm is that the state should conform as closely to the nation as possible, i.e. that the entire nation should belong to the nation-state, which should further be homogenous in the sense of containing no other nations or parts thereof. This has been the typically German form of nationalism.<sup>83</sup>



The nation-state is, however, a rather rare exception to the general rule that the borders of nations and states do not match (See Fig. 3). Many states are thus multi-national in the sense of comprising several nations within the same state borders, and some are part-nation-states, containing only part of a nation, as was the case of the German states through most of their history, and which remains

the case of the two Koreas and other “divided states”.<sup>84</sup> As we shall see in chapter six, Somalia belongs in this category of divided states, whereas Ethiopia is an almost textbook example of a multinational empire. Finally, there are several possible combinations of the two (i.e. multinational part-nations), as in the former Yugoslavia, which comprised, among other “entrapped” nations, a sizable segment of the Albanian nation, in its turn scattered across Macedonia and other states as well as concentrated in Albania proper.<sup>85</sup>

### *The Physical Basis of the State*

Every state needs a physical basis, including a territory, a population and an economic foundation.

- **Territory.** However much one might speculate about future “virtual states”, actual states need a territory, defining the limits of their sovereign domain. To which extent there are perennial laws and regularities for the size and configuration of this territory is a matter for geopoliticians to theorise about.<sup>86</sup> Suffice it to say that it has to be “adequate” and manageable, but often is not—especially in the case of former colonies whose borders were drawn by external powers with little regard for the “facts on the ground”. As a consequence, many Third World states, not least in Africa, are endowed with awkward shapes as, for instance, Namibia (with the Caprivi Strip); or they include exclaves such as Cabinda, belonging to, but geographically separated from, Angola; or they are ungovernably large (as the DR Congo), while others are unsustainably small (as Lesotho or Swaziland); or landlocked without access to the sea, as are several African states. Moreover, borders between states frequently collide with the actual borders of the second element of the physical basis, i.e. the population.
- **Population.** Every state needs a population, but there are no rules as to its size, which varies, with several orders of magnitude, ranging from the Holy See (Vatican State) with a population of a mere 890 souls to China with nearly 1.3 billion inhabitants.<sup>87</sup> An important parameter is that of ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic homogeneity, as many (but not all) states with heterogeneous populations exhibit a lack of internal cohesion, often manifested in civil strife.<sup>88</sup> Often, but again not always, such conflicts give rise to claims for autonomy or even secession,<sup>89</sup> of which we shall encounter several instances in the following chapters.
- **Economic basis:** A state further needs an economic basis (which may, of course, be subsumed under population and territory). While Marxism is surely wrong in assuming that the state is merely a superstructure of the economy,<sup>90</sup> it is undoubtedly right in assuming that the economy matters, if only because a productive surplus is a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) precondition of running the state apparatus. Without such an economic surplus, and the capacity to extract it via taxation, the state is in dire straits.

### *The State Institutions*

This takes us the “the state as such”, i.e. the institutions of which it consists. Important parameters are the form of government and its legitimacy, the administrative capacity and the relationship between the armed forces and the state.

- **Form of government.** While dynastic succession was previously regarded as sufficient for what has been called the “procedural legitimacy” of a government, today’s standards call for democratic rule, i.e. for free and fair elections with the participation of multiple parties, a free press, etc. Unfortunately, a functioning and stable democracy is usually the product of a long period of trial-and-error. Lacking such long democratic traditions, most African and other Third World states are therefore far from the ideal of democracy, and more aptly labelled “democratising countries”.<sup>91</sup> Even when the form of government is formally democratic, the political system may still be patrimonial or neopatrimonial, implying that governance is based on personal ties and various forms of patron-client relations.<sup>92</sup> The leader receives the support from his subordinates and subjects in return for various “favours” (e.g. in the form of jobs or protection), a system which often works at all levels of political authority—with Mobuto’s Zaire as the most infamous example.<sup>93</sup> However, such (neo)patrimonial rule is vulnerable to any economic downturn which may jeopardise the “trickling down” of favours and resources through the system. The state should further conform to the Weberian view of a “rational-legal polity” (as opposed to a “traditional” or a “charismatic” one),<sup>94</sup> and it should enjoy a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force”<sup>95</sup> with a clear division of labour among the various state agencies, combined with a clear (hierarchical) distribution of powers and responsibilities—all of which are rare exceptions, rather than the rule, in Africa and the rest of the developing world.
- **Administrative capacity** may contribute (alongside neopatrimonialism) to providing even non-democratic governments with a degree of “performance legitimacy”, which may arguably serve as a partial substitute for a deficient or completely lacking procedural legitimacy.<sup>96</sup> If an incumbent government can ensure law and order, degrees of freedom and perhaps even perform various “welfare functions”, its claim to power may not actually be questioned by the majority of the population—especially in countries without any tradition of democracy. Unfortunately, however, most Third World states also score low with regard to performance, if only because their services are usually performed by a bureaucracy which is not at all imbued with a “Weberian” ethos of service, but rather infected by corruption.<sup>97</sup>
- **Civil-military relations.** Ideally the armed forces and the rest of the “security sector” should also conform to the Weberian ideal, accept civilian

supremacy and abstain from any interference in politics. “Objective control”, according to Samuel Huntington should ensure “that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officers corps”, and which would allow them to perform well as “the tool of the state”, where “a highly professional officers corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state”.<sup>98</sup> However, in many weak states around the Third World, the danger of “praetorianism” looms large,<sup>99</sup> as the armed forces seek to control the state as such, e.g. via actual or threatened military coups.<sup>100</sup> They may do so either in order to protect their specific institutional or even personal interests (as typically in Latin America or West Africa)<sup>101</sup> or in a (usually misguided) attempt at “saving the nation from itself”, as may be the case of, for instance, Turkey and Pakistan.<sup>102</sup> Proper labels might be “predatory” and “patriotic praetorians”, respectively. Alternatively, the state and the military may develop a malign form of symbiosis, where the entire state (or even society as a whole) becomes thoroughly militarised—as was the case of the former USSR and South Africa and remains the case of, e.g., Israel and China even today.<sup>103</sup>

### *Weak and Failed States*

The above elements of statehood are interrelated, which means that weakness in one respect can easily produce other weaknesses and generate vicious circles of conflict, further weakening the State. The weakness (or “softness”, as Gunnar Myrdal called it) of many states, mostly but not exclusively in the Third World, is due to several factors, including the colonial past and the very short period in which to build a state in comparison with the centuries available for European state-building.<sup>104</sup>

While state weakness is thus endemic to the Third World, and not least Africa, only some states have ended up in the category of “failed states”, also referred to as “collapsed” or “quasi-states”.<sup>105</sup> Examples of failed states are Somalia and Afghanistan, which have, for protracted periods, been stateless to all practical intents and purposes.<sup>106</sup> Others states are better labelled “quasi-states”,<sup>107</sup> as the state remains as an almost empty shell endowed with “formal sovereignty” (also known as “external” or “negative sovereignty”) which is, however, unaccompanied by any “empirical sovereignty”. Such a state is recognised by other states as sovereign, and thus protected by the norm of non-interference in internal affairs, but it has no actual control (“internal” or “positive sovereignty”) over what happens within its sovereign domain.<sup>108</sup> Most states have, however, managed to “muddle through” from crisis to crisis without any actual collapse.<sup>109</sup>

## **Security and Conflict**

Most of the conflicts in the political sphere as well as many others revolve around “security” in one sense or the other, i.e. they are driven by the security concerns of one actor, or both. Hence, a lasting resolution to any given conflict tends to presuppose that both or all sides to it are, or at least feel, secure.

We thus need to devote some attention to the very concept “security”, which has indeed become the subject of numerous analyses over the last decade or so.<sup>110</sup> The general trend has been a move away from a rather narrow, state-centric and militarised conception (“national security”), via one focusing on national and other identities (“societal security”), to a much wider concept which includes concerns for human rights, development, gender issues, etc., labelled “human security”. The latter may, indeed, be much more relevant for Africa than the narrower conceptions.

### *Security and Securitisation*

In International Relations (IR), the term “security” was used, until recently, in a rather narrow sense, i.e. as almost synonymous with military power, and it was assumed that it was mainly a function of the distribution of this military power. The more favourable the military balance was to a state, the more secure it was assumed to be.

Surprisingly little was, however, written about the *concept* of security (as opposed to strategies for achieving it) by the IR theoreticians. In his seminal work on Realism, the grand old man of Realism, Hans Morgenthau, thus hardly bothered to define “security”.<sup>111</sup> Arnold Wolfers was thus almost alone in venturing a definition, which has gradually become standard: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”<sup>112</sup> However, even this definition begs a number of questions: Whose values might be threatened and which are they? Who or what might threaten them and how? Whose fears should count and how might one distinguish between sincere and faked ones? And should the “absence” of threats and/or fear be understood in absolute or relative terms?

In contrast to IR, peace researchers have for decades endeavoured to develop meaningful conceptions of security as well as (closely related) of peace and violence.<sup>113</sup> This preoccupation has also reflected their longstanding interest in development issues<sup>114</sup> and the generally shared wish to avoid the pitfalls of the ethnocentrism, which has arguably always characterised IR.<sup>115</sup> Both Johan Galtung’s term “positive peace” and Kenneth Boulding’s “stable peace” might thus, in retrospect, be seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded security

concept.<sup>116</sup> For “security” to be genuine and durable, it would have to be based on a positive or stable peace structure. This would entail considerably more than a mere “negative peace”, tantamount to an absence of war, in its turn representing merely one particular form of “direct violence”. Genuine peace and security would thus presuppose an elimination (or at least a reduction) of “structural violence”, i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world population (*vide supra*). Thus conceived, a “positive peace” was more or less synonymous with what is today referred to as “human security” (*vide infra*).

Since the 1990s many members of the IR community have accepted the challenge of developing broader conceptions of security.<sup>117</sup> Barry Buzan and his collaborators at the now disbanded Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI (sometimes referred to as the “Copenhagen School”) have belonged to the theoretical vanguard in this endeavour with their analyses of national as well as “societal” security (*vide infra*).<sup>118</sup> However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from the (now defunct) East-West conflict and military matters,<sup>119</sup> most members of the IR and “strategic studies” (now often re-labelled “security studies”) communities have continued to oppose what they regard as an inappropriate expansion of the concept.

Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain widening, disagreement persists about where to draw the line. To expand the notion of security excessively—say, to include the absence of all types of problems and conflicts at all levels—would not be practical, since it would merely create the need for an additional term for “traditional security”, now relegated to being merely one species of the genus “security”. Not to widen the concept at all, on the other hand, might relegate security studies to a very marginalized position, if (as seems likely) “traditional” security problems will be perceived as having a sharply diminishing saliency.

The quest for a “correct” definition of an “essentially contested concept”<sup>120</sup> such as “security” is probably futile. Rather, this is a matter of definitions which may be more or less useful or relevant, and which may both reflect and impact on power relations, but which can be neither right nor wrong. “Constructivists” are thus probably right in dismissing the quest for concepts that are “correct” in the sense of corresponding to a pre-existing reality, if only because this “reality” is itself socially constructed, *inter alia* by means of concepts such as “peace” and “security”.

Mindful of being part of the game himself all the analyst can do may be to analyse how concepts are used, and how the security discourse is thus evolving.<sup>121</sup> As argued by Ole Wæver and others the challenge is thus to analyse the security discourse as a complex set of “speech acts”, i.e. to explore the

evolving “securitisation” and “desecuritisation” of issues.<sup>122</sup> Among other advantages, this approach induces caution with regard to elevating too many problems to the exalted status of “security problems”, which inevitably has political implications, some of which may be undesirable.

First of all, in the political discourse to label something a security problem may be (ab)used by the powers that be for making certain issues “taboo” and for marginalising their ideological opponents. A matter with alleged (national) security implications is arguably “off limits”, i.e. not a totally legitimate subject for political or academic debate, but one where everybody has to show loyalty to the common cause. In order to prevent such a closure of important debates, a relevant political goal might be a “desecuritisation” of pertinent issues, which may allow for a more open and fruitful debate. For instance, Russia is no longer seen as a security problem for the West, which allows for a more constructive and unbiased weighing of alternative options for how to relate to it.

Secondly, certain strata in society may benefit from securitisation, e.g. because they are traditionally viewed (and view themselves) as responsible for “security”, however defined. To securitise various problems may thus provide the security services with a justification for their claim to national resources, which may not be desirable.<sup>123</sup> “Critical security studies” devote themselves, inter alia, to uncovering such interests and power games influencing the security discourse.<sup>124</sup>

On the other hand, what might speak in favour of proclaiming something a security problem is that this attaches a label of urgency to the issue. Hence the attraction of, for instance, securitising environmental problems, which is tantamount to imbuing them with “existential” importance. Unless solved without delay such a problem may destroy all other values, which warrants giving it absolute first priority. The same argument might be made about HIV/AIDS.<sup>125</sup>

Whether to expand the concept of security or not, and if so in which direction and to what extent, are thus matters both of political choice and analytical convenience. In the following I shall analyse how it might be expanded whilst paying some attention to both the positive and negative political implications thereof. In principle, expansion can take place along different “axes”, i.e. as answers to various questions, which may be subdivided according to how radically they depart from the prevailing orthodoxy (See Table 5).

| <b>Table 5: Expanded Concepts of “Security”</b> |                   |                            |                                      |                                   |
|---|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <b>Degree</b>                                   | <b>Label</b>      | <b>Referent Object</b>     | <b>Value at risk</b>                 | <b>Source(s) of threat</b>        |
| No expansion                                    | National Security | The state                  | Sovereignty<br>Territorial integrity | Other states<br>(Substate actors) |
| Incremental                                     | Societal security | Nations<br>Societal groups | National unity<br>Identity           | Migrants<br>Alien culture         |
| Radical   | Human security    | Individuals<br>Mankind     | Survival<br>Quality of life          | The State<br>Globalization        |

- Security of whom? This is the question of focus, i.e. of the appropriate “referent object” (in the terminology of Buzan & *al.*, whereas Bill McSweeney prefers the term “subject”).<sup>126</sup> Three types of entities immediately spring to mind which might be either secure or insecure: the state, other human collectives or the individual, more about which shortly.
- Security of what? Depending on what the referent object is, its security will be a matter of an absence of threats to different values, i.e. it may have completely different connotations.
- Security from whom or what? This is the question of the sources of threat. Different values may obviously be placed in jeopardy by different actors, in addition to which there may be numerous “structural” threats (global warming, for example) without any direct agents. These might, in principle, also be securitised even though they rarely are.

Depending on which values are supposed to be threatened by whom or what threats may, furthermore, appear in different dimensions (or “sectors”), such as the military domain, the environment, or the economy—a matter which I shall leave largely untouched.

#### *From National to Societal Security*

Most of the “traditional” security discourse continues to revolve around the state, but even here it makes sense to distinguish between orthodox security studies and “alternative security studies”. What characterized the traditional IR approach to “security”, especially during the era of almost unchallenged dominance of Realism and Neorealism,<sup>127</sup> was a focus on the state as the referent object. Even though the preferred term was “national” security, this was strictly speaking a misnomer, because nations are not the same as states, except in a score or so of genuine nation-states (Japan, for instance) where nation and state happen to be (almost) coterminous (*vide supra*).

While most “Realists” have placed the main emphasis on military threats from other states, hence also on military strength as the most reliable safeguard of “national security”, a few authors have held a somewhat broader view of

national security, e.g. by including the economic dimension of security—if only as a consequence of their acknowledgement that power is, among other things, determined by economic strength.<sup>128</sup>

National (i.e. state) security was, moreover, all too often equated with the security of the regime in power. Contrary to the Hobbesian view of the state, however, if controlled by an unscrupulous regime the state often ceases to be a protector of its citizens and becomes a security threat to them, as in the case of various African “vampire states”<sup>129</sup> or totalitarian regimes. However, the rules of the game of “Westphalia” privilege existing states, regardless of their nature, and proscribe interference into “domestic affairs”, i.e. everything taking place within the territorially defined exclusive domain of the sovereign states comprising the system.

The Copenhagen School mentioned above has advocated accepting human collectivities as possible “referent objects” of security alongside states. The particular form of security applicable to such collective, yet non-state, referent objects is labelled “societal security”, which in the seminal work on the topic was defined by Ole Wæver as

... the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats (...) the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.<sup>130</sup>

Societal security is thus a matter of “identity”, which has indeed become quite a fashionable topic in IR theory.<sup>131</sup> It resonates quite well with the re-discovery of the cultural aspects of international relations (as in the “clash of civilizations” debate),<sup>132</sup> just as it corresponds to the actual “securitisation” of such phenomena as migration or “cultural imperialism”.

Unfortunately, it also holds to potential of appealing to xenophobic political groupings on the extreme right with whom the authors surely do not want to join ranks. Combined with the aforementioned methodology of discourse analysis and the post-modern rejection of “objectivist ethics”,<sup>133</sup> one might fear that the theory (however inadvertently) may simply lead to “rubber-stamping” all assertions of threats to national (or ethnic) security as equally valid. If there are no objective yardsticks against which to measure such allegations, the analyst is confined to merely recording what is being securitised, perhaps by opportunistic leaders seeking power by playing the “nationalist card” in a manipulatory fashion.<sup>134</sup>

This was part of the critique raised by Bill McSweeney against the Copenhagen School. Another part of his critique was the continuing focus of the state, albeit

no longer as the sole referent object, but as the mechanism through which all securitisation attempts have to pass. Finally, the “school” (if so it is) was criticized for privileging some possible identities over others, namely national and ethnic ones. Rather than assuming *a priori* that these are always the most salient identities, the analyst should adopt a scientific approach, requiring actual sociological investigations into how people rank-order their various identities.<sup>135</sup>

Even though “societal security” as a concept supposedly applies to any human collective, it has almost exclusively focused on national and ethnic collectives (viz. McSweeney’s above-mentioned critique). Important though these certainly are, one might also envision cleavages among other societal groupings, which might eventually come to be securitised. A first step in this direction would surely be political organization. Most likely seem to be a possible (societal) securitisation of religion or gender.

Religion has already been extensively politicised, if only because of its close links to some forms of nationalism (*vide supra*).<sup>136</sup> A few nations are thus defined in religious terms, which entails the risk that “alien” religions may come to be viewed as threats to national cohesion, hence securitised. To the extent that nations or states are not defined in religious terms, but as secular, the politisation of any religion (even the “national” one) may likewise come to be seen as threat, even to national security—as in modern-day Turkey or India, or in certain Arab states where radical Islamist movements threaten already Muslim states.<sup>137</sup> Even in the case of stable and cohesive states such as those of the West we see this phenomenon, as in the growing securitisation of Islam by the West, not merely in the shape of allegations to the effect that Islamic states constitute a threat to peace, but also with a societal security twist, arguing that Islam (personified by migrants) is a threat to Western civilization.<sup>138</sup>

Gender might, in principle also be securitised, as indicated by various strains of “feminist IR studies”, the gist of which seems to be that the traditional focus on the state reflects male domination, and that the concurrent emphasis on military means corresponds to innate male aggression, hence that an empowerment of women would produce more genuine and lasting security.<sup>139</sup> Both these topics also have obvious human security aspects, if only because they are regulated in several human rights conventions.

### *Human Security*

Just as societal security may thus endanger individual security, the state-centred approach to security has been charged with neglecting the people, i.e. of jeopardising human security. This is basically a matter of human well-being and, in the last analysis, survival of people, regardless of their national or other affiliations.<sup>140</sup>

“Human security” has, indeed, become something of a buzzword, used both by UN agencies, national development aid agencies and international as well as national NGO. The UNDP has been in the forefront of the this debate, as illustrated by the following quotations:

The concept of security must change—from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (*Human Development Report 1993*)<sup>141</sup>

For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime—these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (..)

Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ—hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich nations—but these threats are real and growing. (...)

Most people instinctively understand what security means. It means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives—whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment (*Human Development Report 1994*).<sup>142</sup>

Thus conceived human security may indeed be placed in jeopardy by an unrestrained quest for national security, say if the latter should involve war. Hence, for instance, the uncomfortable dilemma whether to place the survival of the population at risk for the sake of such intangible values as sovereignty—or whether a developing state should invest heavily in the implements of state security (i.e. armed forces) at the inevitable expense of economic development?<sup>143</sup>

According to a “cosmopolitan” ethics,<sup>144</sup> what really matters is the survival and well being of the individuals or, as the utilitarians formulated it, “the greatest happiness principle”.<sup>145</sup> Such happiness is, of course, compatible with, but only rarely presupposes, the sovereignty of one’s state, or for that matter the cohesion of one’s nation or other societal group.

There are thus different forms of security, with “national” (i.e. state) security, societal and human security constituting the main categories, defined by the different referent objects (state, societal group, individual). As threats to the different values of the various referent objects (sovereignty, identity and survival) may appear in many different shapes, all three categories have different “dimensions” or “sectors” such as the military, economic, and environmental ones. While this may make for a neat analytical framework, the real world is less orderly, if only because the different forms of security impinge upon each other, and strategies to achieve one may jeopardise the others. Hence

the need for a comprehensive approach to security as an integral part of understanding conflict.

### **The Structure of Conflict**

Not only are conflicts “about” certain issues, which may be analytically disentangled as attempted above. They also exhibit specific structures, reflecting, among other things, the nature and goals of the conflicting parties and their interaction.

#### *The Number of Parties*

All conflicts pit actors against each other, even though the term “actor” may be a misnomer in the case of latent conflicts, in which the parties may not even be aware of their conflicting interests, much less act accordingly i.e. exhibiting no conflict behaviour.

It obviously matters for the structure and pattern of the conflict how many actors are involved

- Some conflicts are, by their very nature, dyadic as are the interpersonal disputes between husband and wife, the societal conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis in the Great Lakes Region, the international conflicts between two states over a piece of territory such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea war or the global bipolar conflict of the Cold War, which pitted two opposing alliances against each other, each led by a superpower. Dyadic conflicts tend to be easier to analyse, e.g. by means of game theory (*vide infra*) and often easier to solve (at least in the sense of devising solutions, if not of implementing them) than conflicts with several actors, simply because the “arithmetic” is less complex.
- Other conflicts involve several parties, but can nevertheless reasonably be analysed—at least for certain purposes—as dyadic or bipolar, because the pattern of alignment between the parties is fairly stable, as was the case with the East-West conflict where it was virtually inconceivable that states might change sides.<sup>146</sup> The further the analysis moved away from Europe, or the more it focused on the role of neutrals, however, the more misleading it became to view the conflict as bipolar, i.e. “quasi-dyadic”.<sup>147</sup>
- Still other conflicts are, by their very nature, non-dyadic, i.e. polyadic or multipolar. Alliances between the actors shift rapidly and almost randomly—as was, e.g. the case in the Lebanese conflict, the struggle between the Somali clans or those in Afghanistan.<sup>148</sup> In such cases the balance of power (a rather fuzzy notion to begin with) becomes difficult to determine and a stable one hard to devise and even harder to realise.<sup>149</sup>

The misleading term notwithstanding, “third parties” are not parties to a conflict as such, but merely get involved in it in various capacities or combinations thereof as set out in Table 9 below.

- As “mediators”, seeking to broker an agreement between the real parties to a conflict—a role traditionally assumed by states, but increasingly viewed as the responsibility of international organisations, and sometimes even attempted by NGOs. We shall revisit this topic in the following chapter on conflict management and resolution..
- As “balancers” seeking to either preserve a fragile balance of power between the contestants or help tipping it, e.g. in the attempt to bring about an end to the conflict through a victory for one side. As a means to both ends the sale or donation of arms is often used.<sup>150</sup>
- As “mitigators” who do not deal with the conflict as such, but merely with its consequences, e.g. by providing humanitarian relief to its victims or granting refuge or asylum to the people fleeing from the conflict—roles which tend to be shared between states, international organisations (e.g. UN branches such as the UNHCR) and NGOs such as *Médicins sans Frontières* or the Red Cross.

Finally, of course, third parties, in their passive capacity as innocent bystanders, quite often find themselves as victims of a conflict—as is indeed the case of the civilian population in most armed conflicts, be they international or intra-state.

*Dyadic Conflicts: Formal Theories*

Dyadic conflicts have exerted a particularly strong appeal to that “tribe” within conflict studies which seeks to apply formal theories at a very elevated level of abstraction to the study of conflict, treating them as games featuring actors “A” and “B” with a total (and deliberate) disregard for their defining features.

| <b>Table 6: Game Matrix</b> |                      | <b>B</b>               |                        |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
|                             |                      | <b>Alternative 1</b>   | <b>Alternative 2</b>   |
| <b>A</b>                    | <b>Alternative 1</b> | A's Payoff, B's Payoff | A's Payoff, B's Payoff |
|                             | <b>Alternative 2</b> | A's Payoff, B's Payoff | A's Payoff, B's Payoff |

“Game theory” is in actual fact not so much a theory as a specialised terminology, which is presumably suitable for describing and analysing strategic moves. It presupposes individual rationality on the part of the actors, and its level of analysis is thus not so much actual human decision-making as the behaviour of a *homo strategicus*, remarkably similar to the *homo economicus* of economic theory.<sup>151</sup> The matrix of a typical two-person game might look as in Table 6.

A common distinction is that between “games against nature” in which one player is passive and unresponsive, and “games of strategy” where the two players interact. A further distinction is that between zero-sum, mixed-motive and cooperative games.

During the Cold War, most attention was focused on two-person zero-sum games, which appeared as an adequate description of the bipolar and highly antagonistic set of international relations. Game theory was thus also a convenient language in which to formulate strategies for how to handle this confrontation, unfortunately mostly in confrontational ways. In zero-sum games the gains of one player equal the losses of the other, i.e. they are games of pure conflict where both sides have to focus on relative gains and losses. For instance, even though both might “lose” the arms race in the sense of expending resources without achieving a usable preponderance of strength, it might still make sense to “race”, if only the respective adversary would lose more than oneself, as this would be tantamount to a relative gain.<sup>152</sup>

The most extreme zero-sum game was labelled “Chicken” by nuclear strategists such as Herman Kahn, who wanted to justify their call for “escalation dominance”.<sup>153</sup> “Chicken” depicts two (male) youngsters eager to demonstrate their courage by driving head-on towards each other in their cars in order to impress spectators (mainly girls). Whoever turns first, i.e. “chickens out”, loses (value -1), whereas the one who holds his course wins (value +1). However, if neither one turns the two drivers inevitably collide head-on and both probably die (value -10), as set out in Table 7. This predictable outcome has been used by opponents of nuclear weapons to illustrate the possible consequences of nuclear arms racing and posturing.

| Table 7: “Chicken” |             | B     |             |
|--------------------|-------------|-------|-------------|
|                    |             | Turn  | Hold Course |
| A                  | Turn        | -1,-1 | -1,+1       |
|                    | Hold Course | +1,-1 | -10,-10     |

Game theory has, however, also been used to devise less suicidal strategies for such confrontational games as well as for the analysis of less confrontational games, i.e. cooperative and mixed-motive games.

“Prisoner's Dilemma” is a mixed-motive game and might in fact be seen as a formal version of the security dilemma described below. Two apprehended criminals (A and B for short) are stipulated to be interrogated by the police simultaneously, but separately and without being able to communicate with each other. Each of them is promised a lenient sentence in return for giving evidence against the respective other. It is understood that if neither testifies against the

other, both will have to be acquitted for lack of evidence. The expected payoffs for the two prisoners are as set out in Table 8, where an acquittal has been given the value +2, a light sentence the value -1 and a harsh one that of -2. “Cooperation” refers to the relationship between the two prisoners, i.e. implies keeping silent, whereas “defection” means confessing and testifying against the other. Since A has no way of knowing whether B will give evidence, he has to assume the worst, namely that the other will indeed testify, under which presumption he will be better off testifying himself. Since B faces the same alternatives, both (according to game theory) will end up testifying against each other and both will be convicted (value: -1), thus doing considerably worse than if they had cooperated (+2).

| Table 8: Prisoner's Dilemma |           | B         |        |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|
|                             |           | Cooperate | Defect |
| A                           | Cooperate | +2,+2     | -2,-1  |
|                             | Defect    | -1,-2     | -1,-1  |

It has been demonstrated that the prisoner’s dilemma has no “solution”, i.e. that both sides invariably end up with sub-optimal payoffs. The problem lies with the structure of the conflict (i.e. the “game”) itself rather than with the actors. Even though the likely outcome is clearly suboptimal for both sides (albeit not for society), they are likely to arrive at it, not because of irrationality, but precisely because they are assumed to act rationally—i.e. cautiously and selfishly—which is surely not an unreasonable assumption. The payoff structure is simply a recipe for continuing and escalating violent conflict. Hence, cooperation between partial adversaries may never be initiated, regardless of how mutually advantageous.

However, it has also been shown that iterated prisoner’s dilemma games may lend themselves more easily to cooperation. Fortunately, this notion of long (sometimes of indefinite duration) series of encounters between the parties may be a better way of conceptualising most conflicts of the real world, where the same parties (be they individuals, ethnic groups or countries) tend to find themselves up against each other over and over again.<sup>154</sup>

*The Security Dilemma*

Considering that, as argued above, security concerns are a salient issue in most political (and some other) conflicts, it is surely important whether the quest for security is viewed in zero-sum or variable-sum terms. Unfortunately the former tends to be the case at all levels of analysis, where we encounter various varieties of the so-called “security dilemma”.

- The national security dilemma is most elaborately described in IR literature.<sup>155</sup> At the international level, states face the dilemma of not knowing whether their neighbours have aggressive or peaceful and defensive intentions. Hence, they have to assume the worst and prepare themselves to be able to defend against an attack, either by an arms build-up, by entering an alliance or even by striking pre-emptively. These preparations will confirm the suspicions of neighbouring states about aggressive intentions, and these states are likely to feel the need for countervailing action, thereby confirming the suspicions of the first state, etc. The dilemma resides in the choice between either preparing for a possible attack, but thereby risking bringing it about, or not preparing for it, thereby accepting vulnerability and possible extinction if an attack should occur.
- The “societal security dilemma” is a new invention or discovery.<sup>156</sup> The IR discipline’s “capital R” realists tend to simply transpose the theory of the security dilemma from the state to ethnic groups, conceived of as “proto-states”—as some of them may well be, while others certainly are not. Those which are do, indeed, face a security dilemma very similar to that of states, i.e. they can only defend themselves against the respective other by means which will appear as threats to the other, thereby eliciting a response which diminishes the security of both sides.
- The “human security dilemma” has in fact been described at length for centuries, albeit not labelled as such. Hobbes thus described society in the state of nature as a perpetual *bellum omnium contra omnes*. This permanent “state of warre”, according to Hobbes, stemmed from the basic equality of man in terms of abilities as well as of needs, which made every man the natural contender of his fellow human beings for the scarce available resources—hence: *homo homini lupus*. The only escape from the resultant dilemma between “anticipation” (i.e. attack) and extinction was the establishment of the state (the “Leviathan”),<sup>157</sup> endowed with a monopoly, or at least an overwhelming preponderance of power.

However, if a state’s administrative capacities degenerate, including its ability to ensure personal safety of its citizens, it may well find itself on the path towards a “privatisation of security” as has happened to several states, not least in Africa.<sup>158</sup> If the police and other security services are unreliable, citizens and companies tend to resort to self-help, e.g. by soliciting the services of private security companies, but thereby only hastening the decline of the state’s “monopoly on the legitimate use of force”.<sup>159</sup>

### **Conflict Parties**

In the real world, of course, actors or conflict parties come in many shapes and sizes, few of which resemble the actors known from game theory or other formal theories.

### *Nature of the Actors*

The nature of the actors, for obvious reasons, differs from level to level as illustrated in Table 9, which merely lists dyadic conflicts, i.e. conflicts between two parties, albeit with the involvement of “third parties”.

| <b>Table 9: Parties to Dyadic Conflicts (examples)</b> |  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
| <b>Actors</b>  | <b>Main Actor 1</b>  | <b>Main Actor 2</b>   | <b>“Third Parties”</b>   |
| <b>Conflict Level</b>                                  |  |   |  |
| <b>International</b>                                   | State  | State   | Various actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States.</li> <li>• International Organisations (regional and global)</li> <li>• NGOs</li> <li>• Individuals</li> </ul> In roles as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mediators</li> <li>• Balancers</li> <li>• Mitigators</li> <li>• Victims</li> </ul> |
| <b>Transnational</b>                                   | State  | Guerillas<br>Terrorists<br>NGOs<br>Refugees/IDPs  |  |
| <b>Intrastate</b>                                      | State<br>Political party<br>Militias, Guerillas<br>Warlords,<br>Terrorists | Opposition parties<br>Religious groups<br>Trade unions<br>Militias, Guerillas<br>Warlords<br>Terrorists |  |
| <b>Interpersonal</b>                                   | Person   | Person  |  |

As far as the actual parties to a conflict are concerned, a number of parameters are significant:

- Do the actors exhibit such internal cohesion that they can reasonably be analysed as unitary actors, or do they exhibit such internal divisions that they must be treated as plural. While some analysts, particularly of the “realist” persuasion such as Kenneth Waltz insist on treating states as unitary actors, others view state policies as “outputs” produced by the “inputs” from various subnational actors struggling among themselves.<sup>160</sup> As far as non-state, but still collective, actors are concerned, they tend to be (correctly) viewed and analysed as comprising different groups with different agendas. For instance, while one would often refer to “Israel” as a unitary actor, few serious analysts would treat “the Palestinian resistance” as one.<sup>161</sup>
- To which categories do the actors belong? Some may be states, which may or may not be treated as unitary actors, while others are societal groupings of various kinds, institutions or even individuals.
- Is the conflict “symmetrical”, pitting like units against each other, or asymmetrical in the sense of taking place between actors belonging to different categories? Traditional wars were, by definition, conflicts between “like units” (differing in size, location etc, but not in terms of nature).<sup>162</sup> Most other conflicts, however, are asymmetrical. Either they pit the state as

an institution, or the incumbent regime, against rebels of various sorts or transnational foes such as terrorist networks;<sup>163</sup> or they pit groups or persons against each other, which may or may not belong to the same “species” or “genus”, e.g. religious fanatics against people who want to keep politics and religion separate.

- What resources do the actors have at their disposal, are these of the same kind and, if so, what is the balance of power between the actors, if indeed one can be determined? This may not be the case when the conflicting parties are strong in different dimensions as was, for instance, the case in the long struggle between the communist regime in Poland and the Catholic Church. Whereas the former was stronger in material terms, the latter’s strength was “symbolic”.
- What are the goals and strategies of the actors? The following section is devoted to this question.

### *Conflict Goals*

Irrespectively of the issue of contention, the conflicting parties may have different objectives and act upon these in different ways, in both cases with a significant impact on the structure of the conflict as such as well as on the opportunities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution. The aims may be arranged along a continuum of moderation and radicalism, as in Table 10.

**Table 10: Conflict Goals**

|                    |   |                      |
|--------------------|---|----------------------|
| <b>Moderate</b>    | ←—————→   | <b>Radical</b>       |
| <b>Recognition</b> | <b>Rights    Equality    Privilege    Domination    Expulsion</b> | <b>Extermination</b> |

- *Recognition*: The most moderate aims is to be recognised as a party to the conflict, which is not always self-evident. Just think of the struggle of the Palestinians to be recognised as a nation (as opposed to being mere a segment of a larger Arab nation) and that of the PLO to be acknowledged as their legitimate representative.<sup>164</sup>
- *Rights*: Next comes the achievement of some specified entitlements, be that in terms of human rights or of material goods.<sup>165</sup>
- *Equality*: Still moderate are claims for “equality” in the same respects—something which is often less “fair” and equitable that it might appear at first glance, especially when applied to groups (e.g. in the form of equality between a majority and a minority). Nevertheless, it has the advantage that it can, by its very definition, be enjoyed by both sides simultaneously.
- *Privilege*, on the other hand, is something which one side enjoys over the other and thus usually at the other’s expense.
- *Domination* is an even more radical objective, if only because it can only be enjoyed by one side to a conflict at the expense of the other. Only one can be

“king of the hill”. However, it does not automatically rule out the granting of specific rights to the dominated party.

- *Expulsion* is a very radical objective, tantamount to striving to be “alone on the hill” by means of ethnic (or other) “cleansing”, as happened in the former Yugoslavia. Its appeal tends to be strongest in protracted conflicts characterised by widespread violence (or even genocide), when two groups have developed such an intense mistrust of each other that co-habitation seems intolerable to one or, indeed, both sides. Radical though it is, even this objective may allow for compromise, e.g. in the form of secession-*cum*-relocation.<sup>166</sup>
- *Extermination* is the most radical objective that any conflict party can pursue, namely to get rid of the other side once and for all. On the interpersonal level, it simply means killing the other party, while at the collective (i.e. societal) level it is tantamount to killing the members of the opposing group—as the Nazi party attempted with regard to the Jews and the extreme Hutus in Rwanda with regard to the Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) in 1994. For obvious reasons such an objective does not lend really itself to compromise at all.

### *Conflict Behaviour*

Not all conflicting sides to all conflicts behave in the same way. Behaviour differs not merely because of different objectives, but also as a function of the means at the disposal of each side. It thus makes sense to make distinctions with regard to the means employed by the competing sides. They may be arranged according to the degree of violence, ranging from the peaceful voicing of grievances to fully-fledged genocide.

- *Dialogue* is obviously the most pacific way of dealing with conflicts and one for which democracies are renowned.<sup>167</sup> In many cases, however, the very setting for dialogue is highly controversial, and cultural divides may hamper mutual understanding, even within countries.<sup>168</sup>
- *Non-violent means of coercion*. There are numerous ways of “fighting out” a conflict by non-violent means, including elections, demonstrations, strikes, etc.<sup>169</sup> Some are, as opposed to dialogue, openly confrontational, even though they do not employ physical violence.
- *Sporadic violence* sometimes occurs spontaneously, e.g. by individual members of opposing groups acting on their own behalf. Unfortunately, this may generate an escalatory momentum, by providing the “victimised” party with motives for “getting even”, etc. Beyond a certain point, the use of violence may come to be seen as justified and “normal”.
- *Massive and systematic violence* may either occur as a result of things thus getting out of control, or it may be used as a deliberate strategy by one side, e.g. for intimidation and coercion—as may well have been the rationale for

atrocities committed by the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) against civilians, including its infamous use of amputations.

- *Genocide* represents the most radical and violent form of conflict behaviour,<sup>170</sup> one party seeking the violent extermination of the respective other, as was the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

### *The Psychological Dimension*

Part of the explanation why conflicts may escalate to such extremes as genocide is to be found within the minds of the conflicting sides.

The most simplistic answer to the puzzle of motivation can be fairly easily dismissed, namely that human beings are inherently aggressive. There are, of course, various biological and psychological theories, which argue along these lines, but also ample evidence to the contrary.<sup>171</sup> Rather than killing instinctively, man seems (as many other species) to “suffer” from an instinctive aversion to killing members of his own species, which must (and can) be overcome through training.<sup>172</sup> Psychopaths and sociopaths do, of course, exist, but they are (fortunately) far too rare to provide any satisfactory explanation for the frequent occurrence of atrocities in conflicts.

Social (as opposed to individual) psychology may provide better clues to understanding what makes people in special social contexts behave aggressively—i.e. how they are socialised to accept and even to personally perpetrate violence.<sup>173</sup> In the realm of individual as well as social psychology we find a number of theories about how people perceive their environment, which may go some way towards explaining their behaviour. Human perception and cognition simply exhibit certain patterns, which may help understand the propensity for aggression.

For instance, in order to better grasp and cope with their environment people almost automatically strive to avoid “cognitive dissonance”, i.e. they seek to interpret their observations in such a way as to reduce seeming inconsistencies, such as a friend behaving wrongfully or a foe acting benevolently.<sup>174</sup> Furthermore, there is an almost inescapable tendency to apply different standards to one’s own behaviour and that of an adversary—simply because one can ascertain one’s own motives directly through introspection, whereas one has to deduce those of others from their actions. Such actions always lend themselves to several different interpretations and the selection process is likely to be influenced by the quest for cognitive consonance. Even seemingly benign acts by an actor categorised as malevolent may be construed as tactical moves intended to make oneself less alert to the next (and presumably malignant) move. Conversely, the apparently malignant actions on the part of oneself or friends can easily be construed as enforced, i.e. as reactions to the actual or

anticipated moves by the malevolent adversary.

From such misperceptions and misinterpretations may develop “enemy images”, which are almost impervious to refutation. They add venom to any conflict, as the enemy is seen as not merely pursuing conflicting interests, but as being malevolent or even evil—as in U.S. President Bush’s labelling the U.S. adversaries an “axis of evil”.<sup>175</sup> Such labelling may easily set in motion an interactive cycle that could lead to violent confrontation.<sup>176</sup>

A field of special attention for psychologists preoccupied with conflict (or for political scientists and conflict analysts interested in psychology) has been cases where small groups of individuals, because of their special position in society, may take decisions of potentially nationwide or even universal significance. This was the case when the leaders of the two superpowers contemplated their behaviour vis-à-vis each other—most dramatically and well documented in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis which could have triggered a nuclear war and thereby global conflagration.<sup>177</sup> In such settings, decisions are presumably heavily influenced by perceptual factors and various social psychological mechanisms which may well produce irrational behaviour, caused by combinations of stress and “group-think”. The latter mechanism, well documented from psychological experiments, makes a group of individuals think increasingly along similar lines, thereby removing alternative options from consideration. While this may be conducive to such concerted action as is required in an intense crisis, it can also produce decisions with disastrous implications.<sup>178</sup>

Entire nations or cultures may arguably develop such “group-think” in the sense of enemy images or permissive attitudes to violence which are shared by all members of the community due to socialisation. This phenomenon has long been described by anthropologists who have identified both “cultures of violence” and profoundly peaceful and non-violent societies.<sup>179</sup> More recently the phenomena of ideas and culture have also been taken up by IR scholars.<sup>180</sup> This phenomenon is closely related to that of (national or group) “identity”, as human collectives tend to identify themselves through culture, but typically also by being different from “the Other”—which often leads to hostility towards this Other and arguably sometimes even presupposes violence, which confirms “otherness” and thus also one’s own identity.<sup>181</sup> One way of analysing these patterns of identification and “otherisation” is through discourse analysis, which can also uncover hidden patterns of attribution and framing in the language used.<sup>182</sup> Discourse analysis has also been applied to explaining the behaviour of states, e.g. in arms races,<sup>183</sup> and to understanding terrorist acts against states as a form of communication.<sup>184</sup>

One particular field of discourse is, of course, the mass media, which exhibit all of the above features such as group-think and enemy images—and which have the potential of almost causing war and at least of creating permissive attitudes towards the use of violence in the general public.<sup>185</sup> A particularly nasty example of this was the “hate radio” in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 genocide.<sup>186</sup> However, also advanced states have deliberately used the media as part of their war efforts.


### **Conflict Patterns**

Regardless of their causes and the parties involved, conflicts tend to exhibit certain patterns of evolution, i.e. to follow certain paths. To identify these paths is often a precondition for understanding them and, even more so, of managing and even resolve them.

#### *Causal Paths*

Monocausality is rare, as conflicts often have several, mutually reinforcing, structural (or “root”) causes which interact, thereby creating a path of conflict. It is thus often possible to trace (at least retrospectively) the path of a conflict from its latent stage to that of open and violent strife. Fig. 1.4 illustrates merely one such possible conflict path, the root cause of which is stipulated to be a scarcity of natural resources, as is a far too common situation, not least in Africa.<sup>187</sup>

At the root of the conflict may thus be a simple fact of nature such as a mismatch between population growth and the available (constant or only slowly expanding) pool of resources, producing what might be called a “Malthusian squeeze”.<sup>188</sup> The inhabitants may seek to squeeze more out of the finite resource pool available to them, but this will, at best, provide some temporary relief and the resources will be exhausted even faster. Alternatively, they may leave the country (as voluntary emigrants or as refugees) in search of better living conditions elsewhere—or they may stay put but suffer growing hardships as a consequence. In the latter case, a conflict over the distribution of available resources and jobs (a “cake-sharing dispute”) is likely to ensue which may well become intense or even violent.




If the population in question contains easily distinguishable ethnic or other groups and strata, these distinctions are also likely to be played upon by leaders claiming privileges for their respective groups—or opposing what they see as the privileges enjoyed by other groups. Even though the roots of the conflict may be economic, it may thus become “ethnicized”—something which may also come about in neighbouring countries as a result of the aforementioned migration and refugee flows. This may happen either directly or via the struggle over scarce resources, which is likely to become more fierce when “aliens” also have to be fed and housed. In its turn, the violent conflict may well produce additional refugees and internally displaced persons, thereby exacerbating both the economic and the ethnic conflict. In the light of the growing food shortage in Southern Africa by 2002<sup>189</sup> this is, alas, not an unlikely forecast for the region for the years to come.

The conflict may also become internationalised (*vide supra*), e.g. via its ethnification which may draw in the “ethnic kin” abroad of one or all of the opposing ethnic groups, via attempts at solving the problem of scarce resources through conquest,<sup>190</sup> or via cross-border refugee flows. In its turn, the involvement of external actors in the conflict is just as likely to exacerbate it as to help solving it.

### *The Conflict Cycle*

Provided that structural causes of conflict exist and that the latent conflict is sufficiently severe, virtually any event may serve as the proximate cause or trigger of an open conflict. In many cases it is an unpopular political decision which is seen as “the last straw”, but overt conflicts may also be set in motion by, e.g., acts of oppression such as the police cracking down on a demonstration, closing an oppositional newspaper or the like.

Even after having been set in motion, conflicts do not usually escalate in a linear fashion, as there are usually “thresholds” which must be crossed along the way. Just where these thresholds are situated depends very much on context and history, as it is usually a matter of perceptions and social constructions. In some countries police clubbing or tear-gassing demonstrators may, for instance, be seen as normal, whereas in others it may suffice for crossing a threshold. Taking this notion of thresholds as the point of departure, it makes sense to depict the “typical” evolution of a conflict as a “conflict cycle” as set out in Fig. 5 below.<sup>191</sup>



- First comes the **latent phase** where a conflict is dormant and barely expressed by the conflicting sides who may not even be conscious of their conflicting interests or values. Several indicators of impending conflicts can be identified, such as growing poverty, inequality, frustrated expectation and a growing tendency to view problems in “us versus them” terms, etc., as we shall see in the following chapter under the heading of early warning.
- Next comes the **manifest phase** where the conflicting parties express their demands and grievances openly, but only by legal political means. At this stage it is easier to identify both problems and contestants as conflicting sides tend to exhibit conflict behaviour and regroup themselves into opposing camps, often (but not always) defined in ethnic terms.
- In the **violent phase** the spilling of blood produces additional motives for

continuing the struggle, if only to “get even” or in order to escape retribution for atrocities already committed. Moreover, in this phase leadership is often usurped by people pursuing their various private agendas and often personally profiting from the continuing struggle.

- Fourth comes the **escalation phase** where violence breeds further violence, producing an escalatory momentum. Moreover, the longer the struggle has lasted, and the more destructive it has been, the more do the warring parties (and especially their leaders) have to lose by laying down their arms. Only victory can justify the preceding bloodshed and other “sunk costs”, hence the proclivity to struggle on as long as there is even a slight hope of prevailing, thereby attaining the power to set the terms..
- Eventually, however, the escalation comes to a halt, either because one side prevails or because both sides have temporarily exhausted their supply of weaponry. In the latter case, the conflict enters its **contained phase**. The struggle continues, but its intensity tends to decline.
- The conflict may thus evolve into its **abated phase**, where the basic causes of conflict remain in place, but where conflict behaviour has been significantly altered—with less violence and more political mobilisation and negotiation. At this stage, the prospects of post-conflict recovery begin to loom large in the minds of political leaders on opposing sides, and external actors may thus gain new leverage, e.g. as potential (but not unconditional) providers of aid.
- The **resolution phase** is arguably the most critical of them all, as success or failure of “post-conflict peace-building” will determine whether the conflict will flare up again. Such success presupposes that both the underlying causes of the conflict and its immediate consequences are addressed. If not, the conflict cycle is likely to enter a new round.

## Summary

We have thus seen that conflicts are, indeed, complex phenomena. On the other hand, quite a lot is, in fact known about their various causes, underlying motives, structures and dynamics as well as their typical evolution.

## Notes

---

<sup>1</sup> Good overviews of both conflict theory as such and of conflict management are Rapoport, Anatol: *The Origins of Violence. Approaches to the Study of Conflict* (New York: Paragon House, 1989); Kriesberg, Louis: *Constructive Conflicts. From Escalation to Resolution* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Wallensteen, Peter: *Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System* (London: Sage, 2002); Lipsey, Roderick K. von (ed.): *Breaking the Cycle. A Framework for Conflict Intervention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tom Woodhouse: *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Rupesinghe, Kumar: *Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An Introduction to Conflict Resolution* (London: Pluto Press, 1998); Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampton & Pamela Aall (eds.): *Managing Global Chaos. Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); idem, idem & idem (eds.): *Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001); Reuchler, Luc & Thania Paffenholz (eds.): *Peacebuilding. A Field Guide* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Jeong, Ho-Won (ed.): *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Sandole, Dennis J.D. & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.): *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Vasquez, John, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe & Linda Stamato (eds.): *Beyond Confrontation. Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Göran Lindgren, Kjell-Åke Nordquist & Peter Wallensteen (eds.): *Experiences from Conflict Resolution in the Third World* (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1993).

<sup>2</sup> An anthology seeking to map the entire field is Turpin, Jennifer & Lester R. Kurtz (eds.): *The Web of Violence. From Interpersonal to Global* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> This is Kenneth Waltz's main argument against what he calls "1<sup>st</sup> image" and "2<sup>nd</sup> image" analyses (based on human nature and the nature of the state, respectively) of the international system, it its turn residing at the 3<sup>rd</sup> level. See his *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); and idem: *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> An example of this is Galtung, Johan: "A Structural Theory of Aggression", in idem: *Peace and Social Structure. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. III (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1978), pp. 105-132; idem: "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations: A Study in Isomorphism", in idem: *Peace and World Structure. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. IV (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1980), pp. 27-53; idem: "International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach", *ibid.*, pp. 316-351; idem: *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 37-39. For a critique see Lawler, Peter: *A Question of Values. Johan Galtung's Peace Research* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 60-62.

<sup>5</sup> A good overview is Ringmar, Erik: "Book Review Essay: On the Causes of War", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 223-230. See also Brown, Seyom: *The Causes and Prevention of War*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Vasquez, John A.: *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Evera, Stephen Van: *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of International Conflict* (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1999); Suganami, Hidemi: "Bringing Order to the Causes of War Debates",

---

*Millennium*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1990), pp. 19-35.

<sup>6</sup> The term “compellence” comes from Schelling, Thomas: *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 195-203; idem: *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-91. On crisis management see Blechman, Barry M. & Steven S. Kaplan: *Force Without War. U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978); Kaplan, Steven S.: *Diplomacy of Power. Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981); Booth, Ken: “Warships and Political Influence”, in Michael McCwire & James McDonnell (eds.): *Soviet Naval Influence. Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 459-482; Cable, James: *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

<sup>7</sup> Hallett, Brien: *The Lost Art of Declaring War* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998).

<sup>8</sup> The various quantitative projects use different definitions. On the “Correlates of War” project, see Singer, J. David: “Correlates of War”, in Lester Kurtz (ed.): *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1999), vol. 1, pp. 463-471; Daniel S. Geller & idem: *Nations at War. A Scientific Study of International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gleditsch, Nils Petter & al.: “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 5 (2002), pp. 615-637. On the Uppsala project see Wallensteen, Peter & Margareta Sollenberg: “Armed Conflict, 1989-2000”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 5 (September 2001), pp. 629-644. For an annual update see the *SIPRI Yearbooks* and for a continuous update the website [www.pcr.uu.se/data.htm](http://www.pcr.uu.se/data.htm). On the Hamburg project (*Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung*) see, e.g. Gantzel, Klaus Jürgen & Torsten Schwinghammer: *Warfare since the Second World War* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); and the annual data with updates at [www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/Ipw/Akuf/home.html](http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/Ipw/Akuf/home.html). On the general problems see Bremer, Stuart A: “Advancing the Scientific Study of War”, in idem & Thomas Cusack (eds.): *The Process of War. Advancing the Scientific Study of War* (Luxemburg: Gordon & Breach Publishers, 1995), pp. 1-34; Isard, Walter: *Understanding Conflict and the Science of War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 107-126; Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): *Handbook of War Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 1993); idem (ed.): *Handbook of War Studies II* (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 2000). A comparison of the various projects and their definitions is Seybolt, Taylor B.: “Measuring Violence: An Introduction to Conflict Data Sets”, *SIPRI Yearbook 2002. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 81-96.

<sup>9</sup> Creveld, Martin Van: *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 33-42.

<sup>10</sup> On the role of war in state-building see Krippendorff, Ekkehardt: *Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984); Tilly, Charles: “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds.): *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191; idem: *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Mann, Michael: *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. I: *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); idem: *ibid.*, vol. II: *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); idem: *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1988); Giddens, Anthony: *The Nation-State and Violence* (Oxford:

---

Polity Press, 1995); Holsti, Kalevi J.: *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Creveld, Martin Van: *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Porter, Bruce: *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: The Free Press, 1994); Spruyt, Hendrik: *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Black, Jeremy: "A Military Revolution", in Clifford Rogers (ed.): *The Military Revolution Debate. Reading on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 95-114; Rogers, Clifford J.: "'As if a New Sun had Arisen': England's Fourteenth-Century RMA", in McGregor Knox & Williamson Murray (eds.): *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 15-34.

<sup>11</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von: *Vom Kriege* (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein Verlag, 1980), p. 34 (Book I, chapter 1.24): "Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln. So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführung desselben mit anderen Mitteln".

<sup>12</sup> Hallett, Brien: "Just War Criteria", in Kurtz (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 8), vol. 2, pp. 283-293. On the ethical foundations of just war theory see, e.g., Walzer, Michael: *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977); Johnson, James Turner: *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. A Moral and Political Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); idem: *The Quest for Peace. Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); idem: *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1999); Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.): *Just War Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Nardin, Terry (ed.): *The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Smock, David R. (ed.): *Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1992).

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, Baratta, Joseph Preston: "The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War", in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 695-705; Best, Geoffrey: *Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts* (London: Methuen, 1980); Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopolous & Mark R. Schulman (eds.): *The Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1994); Murphy, John F.: "Force and Arms", in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): *United Nations Legal Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 247-318; De Lupis, Ingrid Detter: *The Law of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Green, L.C.: *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: *International Law and Armed Conflict* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992).

<sup>14</sup> See, for instance, Gat, Azar: *The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Earle, Edward Mead (ed.): *Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (New York: Atheneum, 1970); Paret, Peter (ed.): *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Chaliand, Gérard (ed.): *The Art of War in World History. From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). See also Gray, Colin: *Strategic Studies. A Critical Assessment* (London: Aldwych Press, 1982); idem: *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>15</sup> Brodie, Bernard (ed.): *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76.

---

<sup>16</sup> On the United States see Rosenberg, David Allen: idem: “‘A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’. Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-1955”, *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 3-38; “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960”, *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71; Ball, Desmond: “The Development of SIOP, 1960-1983”, in idem & Jeffrey Richelson (eds.): *Strategic Nuclear Targeting* (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 57-83. On the Soviet Union see Catudal, Honoré M.: *Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev. A Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1988); Garthoff, Raymond L.: *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990).

<sup>17</sup> Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy & Walter Orr Roberts: *The Cold and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984). For a critique see Wohlstetter, Albert: “Between an Unfree World and None”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985), pp. 962-994.

<sup>18</sup> See, for instance, Keeny, Spurgeon M. & Wolfgang Panovsky: “MAD versus NUTS”, in William P. Bundy (ed.): *The Nuclear Controversy. A Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York: New American Library, 1985), pp. 3-20; Gray, Colin S.: “Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory”, in Steven E. Miller (ed.): *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence. An International Security Reader* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 23-56; idem & Keith Payne: “Victory is Possible”, in Philip Bobbit, Lawrence Freedman & Gregory Trevorton (eds.): *U.S. Nuclear Strategy. A Reader* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 466-476; Clark, Ian: *Limited Nuclear War. Political Theory and War Conventions* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); Mlyn, Eric: *The State, Society, and Limited Nuclear War* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995); Iklé, Fred C., Albert Wohlstetter & al.: *Discriminate Deterrence. Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988).

<sup>19</sup> Green, Philip: *Deadly Logic. The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Rapoport, Anatoli: “Critique of Strategic Thinking”, in Naomi Rosenbaum (ed.): *Readings on the International Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 201-227.

<sup>20</sup> Posen, Barry R.: “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”, *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124; Lynn, John A.: *The Bayonets of the Republic. Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-1974* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984); Knox, Macgregor: “Mass Politics and Nationalism as Military Revolution: The French Revolution and After”, in idem & Murray (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 10), pp. 57-73; Mjøset, Lars & Stephen Van Holde: “Killing for the State, Dying for the Nation: An Introductory Essay on the Life Cycle of Conscription in Europe’s Armed Forces”, in idem & idem (eds.): *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002), pp. 3-94; Forrest, Alan: “Conscription as Ideology: Revolutionary France and the Nation in Arms”, *ibid.*, pp. 95-116; Kestnbaum, Meyer: “Citizen-Soldiers, National Service and the Mass Army: The Birth of Conscription in Revolutionary Europe and North America”, *ibid.*, pp. 117-144. On Prussia see Schnitter, Helmut: “Die überlieferte Defensionspflicht. Vorformen der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in Deutschland”, in Roland G. Foerster (ed.): *Die Wehrpflicht. Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), pp. 29-37; Stübig, Heinz: “Die Wehrverfassung Preußens in der Reformzeit. Wehrpflicht im Spannungsfeld von Restauration und Revolution 1815-1860”, *ibid.*, pp. 39-53; Förster, Stig: “Militär und staatsbürgerliche Partizipation. Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Deutschen

---

Kaiserreich 1871-1914”, *ibid.*, pp. 55-70; Best, Geoffrey: *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770-1870* (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1998), pp. 150-167, 207-214; Paret, Peter: “Nationalism and the Sense of Military Obligation”, in idem: *Understanding War. Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 39-52; idem: “Conscription and the End of the Ancien Régime in France and Prussia”, *ibid.*, pp. 53-74.

<sup>21</sup> Rödiger, Frank S.: “Wehrstruktur und Rekrutierungssysteme weltweit”, in Eckhardt Opitz & idem (eds.): *All-gemeine Wehrpflicht. Geschichte, Probleme, Perspektiven* (Bremen: Edition Trennen, 1994), pp. 195-206; Dertouzos, James N. & Joseph E. Nation: “Manpower Policies in the U.S. and NATO”, in Trevor N. Dupuy (ed.): *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), 1993), vol. 4, pp. 1630-1640; Haltiner, Karl W.: “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 7-36; idem & Andreas Kühner (eds.): *Wehrpflicht und Miliz - Ende einer Epoche. Der europäische Streitkräftewandel und die Schweizer Miliz* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999)

<sup>22</sup> Shearer, David: “Private Armies and Military Intervention”, *Adelphi Papers*, no. 316 (1998); Isenberg, David: “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms”, *Center for Defense Information Monograph*, November 1997, at [www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/report.html](http://www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/report.html); Nossal, Kim Richard: “Roland Goes Corporate: Mercenaries and Transnational Security Corporations in the Post-Cold War Era”, *Civil Wars*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 16-35; Musah, Abdel-Fatau & J. ‘Kayode Fayemi (eds.): *Mercenaries. An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Cilliers, Jakkie & Peggy Mason (ed.): *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies* (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); Mandel, Robert: *Armies without States. The Privatization of Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

<sup>23</sup> Luttwak, Edward N.: “Post-Heroic Warfare”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 109-122; idem: “A Post-Heroic Military Policy”, *ibid.*, vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44; idem: “The Crisis of Classic Military Power and the Possible Remedy of ‘Post-Heroic’ Intelligence-Based Warfare”, in Ryan Henry & C. Edward Peartree (eds.): *The Information Revolution and International Security* (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 1998). See also Gentry, John A.: “Military Force in an Age of National Cowardice”, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 179-191; Moskos, Charles C. & James Burk: “The Postmodern Military”, in James Burk (ed.): *The Military in New Times. Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 141-162; Rosenau, James N.: “Armed Force and Armed Forces in a Turbulent World”, *ibid.*, pp. 25-61

<sup>24</sup> Mueller, John.: *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

<sup>25</sup> Eriksson, Mikael, Margareta Sollenberg & Peter Wallensteen: “Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2001”, *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, pp. 63-76; Wallensteen & Sollenberg: *loc. cit.* (note 8).

<sup>26</sup> Snow, Donald M. *UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Kaldor, Mary: *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999); Gray, Chris Hables: *Postmodern War. The New Politics of Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1997); Creveld: *op. cit.* (note 9); Møller, Bjørn: “The Faces of War”, in Håkan Wiberg & Christian P. Scherrer (eds.): *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 15-34; idem: “The Role of Military Power in the Third Millennium”, in Young Seek Choue, ed.: *Will World Peace Be Achievable in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?* (Seoul: Institute of International Peace

---

Studies, Kyung Hee University, 1999), pp. 91-126.

<sup>27</sup> Wallensteen & Sollenberg: *loc. cit.* (note 8).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (London: Routledge, 1992); Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild (eds.): *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Brown, Michael E. (ed.): *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carment, David & Patrick James (eds.): *Wars in the Midst of Peace. The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict* (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1997).

<sup>30</sup> See, for instance, Rosenau, James N.: *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Rosecrance, Richard: *The Rise of the Virtual State. Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

<sup>31</sup> Scholte, Jaan Art: *Globalisation: A Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1999); Falk, Richard: *Predatory Globalization. A Critique* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999); Robertson, Roland: *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992); Hirst, Paul & Grahame Thompson: *Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); Waters, Malcolm: *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995); Robertson, Roland: *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992); Clark, Ian: *Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Keith, Nelson W.: *Reframing International Development. Globalism, Postmodernity, and Difference* (London: Sage, 1997); Mittelman, Jammes H.: "The Dynamics of Globalization" in idem (ed.): *Globalization. Critical Reflections* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 1-20; Cox, Robert: "A Perspective of Globalization", *ibid.*, pp. 21-30; McGrew, Anthony G.: "Conceptualizing Global Politics", in idem & Paul G. Lewis et al.: *Global Politics. Globalization and the Nation State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 1-30; idem: "World Order and Political Space", in James Anderson, Chris Brook & Allan Cochrane (eds.): *A Global World? Reordering Political Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 11-64; Kofman, Eleonore & Gillian Youngs (eds.): *Globalization. Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1996); Palan, Ronen & Barry Gills (eds.): *Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

<sup>32</sup> On the conceptual dichotomy see Walker, R.B.J.: *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>33</sup> On humanitarian interventions see, for instance, Moore, Jonathan (ed.): *Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Rodley, Nigel (ed.): *To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Dorman, Andrew M. & Thomas G. Otte (eds.): *Military Intervention. From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); Lyons, Gene M. & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): *Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore, ML: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Roberts, Adam: "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; Phillips, Robert L. & Duane L. Cady: *Humanitarian Intervention. Just War Versus Pacifism* (Lanham, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Hippel, Karin von: *Democracy by Force. US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also *The Responsibility to Protect*. Report of the International

---

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001); and *The Responsibility to Protect. Research, Bibliography, Background* (same publishers).

<sup>34</sup> Recent studies include Fawcett, Louise & Andrew Hurrell (eds.): *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *passim*; Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde: *The New Security Studies: A Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 9-20, 42-45 & *passim*; Lake, David A. & Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Wriggins, Howard (ed.): *Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Daase, Christopher, Susanne Feske, Bernhard Moltmann & Claudia Schmid (eds.): *Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik. Tendenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993); Tow, William T.: *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Adler, Emmanuel & Michael Barnett (eds.): *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Keating, Michael & John Loughlin (eds.): *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

<sup>35</sup> Calleya, Stephen C.: *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World. Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996). On the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions see Møller, Bjørn : “Introduction: Regional Security from Conflict Formation to Security Community”, in idem (ed.): *Oil and Water. Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 1-54. On regionalism in Asia see idem: “Introduction: Defence Restructuring in Asia”, in idem (ed.): *Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 1-38. On the Nordic (sub)region see idem: “The ‘Nordic Model of Regionalism’”, in Stephen C. Calleya (ed.): *Regionalism in the Post-Cold War World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 45-70.

<sup>36</sup> Boulding, Elise: “States, Boundaries and Environmental Security”, in Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.): *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 194-208. See also the chapter on the Nile Basin in Elhance, Arun P.: *Hydropolitics in the 3<sup>rd</sup> World. Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 53-84.

<sup>37</sup> Huntington, Samuel: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 26-27 & *passim*. The nine civilizations are the Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese. An earlier version of the “cultural approach” was Wallerstein, Immanuel: *Geopolitics and Geoculture. Essays on the Changing World-System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 139-237.

<sup>38</sup> Neumann, Iver B.: “Self and Other in International Relations”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 139-175. See also Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwill (eds.): *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

<sup>39</sup> Anderson, Benedict: *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Adler, Emanuel: “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations”, *Millennium*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1997), pp. 249-278; idem & Barnett (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 34), *passim*.

<sup>40</sup> On the role of regional organizations within the UN, see Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe & Rogert A. Coate (eds.): *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*

---

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 33-36.

<sup>41</sup> See, for instance, Bach, Daniel C.: “Regionalism versus Regional Integration: The Emergence of a New Paradigm in Africa”, in Jean Grugel & Will Hout (eds.): *Regionalism across the North-South Divide. State Strategies and Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 152-166.

<sup>42</sup> Buzan, Barry: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 186-229 (quotation from p. 190). The delimitation of security complexes is illustrated by the map on p. 210. For an update see idem, Wæver & de Wilde: *op. cit.* (note 34), pp. 15-19 & *passim*.

<sup>43</sup> See, for instance, the report of the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly on *Prevention of Armed Conflict* (7 June 2001), UN document no. A/55/985-S/2001/574; or the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: *Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Corporation, 1997).

<sup>44</sup> Kriesberg: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 7-11.

<sup>45</sup> See, for instance, Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels: “Manifest der kommunistischen Partei”, in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, vol. 4 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), pp. 459-493, especially pp. 462-474; Marx, Karl: “Lohnarbeit und Kapital”, *ibid.*, vol. 6 (1975), pp. 397-423, especially p. 414; idem: *Das Kapital. Erster Band*, *ibid.*, vol. 23 (1972), especially pp. 531-541.

<sup>46</sup> Galtung, Johan: “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, in idem: *Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. I (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen Forlag, 1975), pp. 109-134. On the source of inspiration for this concept, colonial Rhodesia, see idem: “Twenty Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and some Responses”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1985), pp. 141-158. For a similar analysis see Kriesberg: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 68-73. See also Midlarsky, Manus I.: *The Evolution of Inequality. War, State Survival, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 231-247.

<sup>47</sup> Galtung, Johan: “A Structural Theory of Aggression” (*loc. cit.*, note 4), pp. 105-132; idem: “Rank and Social Integration. A Multidimensional Approach”, in idem: *Peace and Social Structure* (*op. cit.*, note 4), pp., pp. 133-181; idem: “The Dynamics of Rank Conflict: An Essay on Single vs. Multiple Social Systems”, *ibid.*, pp. 182-196. See also Lawler: *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 136-144. On rank disequilibria as an explanation for international wars see Paul, Thaza Varkey: *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>48</sup> Burton, John W.: *Conflict: Basic Human Needs* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); idem: *Violence Explained. The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 32-40. See also the special issue of *International Journal of Peace Studies*, devoted to John Burton (vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 2001), especially Rubenstein, Richard E.: “Basic Human Needs: The Next Step in Theory Development”, pp. 51-58.

<sup>49</sup> The classical work on the “frustration-aggression” hypothesis is Dollard, J. & al.: *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939); and the most elaborate application of it remains Gurr, Ted Robert: *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). See also Rapoport: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 33-38.

<sup>50</sup> Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels: “Die deutsche Ideologie”, *Marx-Engels-Werke* (*op. cit.*, note 45), vol. 3 (1969), pp. 11-530, especially pp. 46-50.

<sup>51</sup> The main proponent of this criterion is Popper, Karl R.: *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959); idem: *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

- 
- <sup>52</sup> Wallensteen & Sollenberg: *loc. cit.* (note 8), p. 32.
- <sup>53</sup> At [www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/Introduction.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/Introduction.pdf), p. 1. See also Dieter, Heribert: "World Economy—Structures and Trends", in Paul Kennedy, Dirk Messner & Frank Nuscheler (eds.): *Global Trends and Global Governance* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 65-96.
- <sup>54</sup> UNDP: *Human Development Report 2002* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 10.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.
- <sup>56</sup> Figures are taken from *ibid.*, pp.149-152.
- <sup>57</sup> Quote from Hobbes, Thomas: *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 186.
- <sup>58</sup> UNDP: *op. cit.* (note 54), pp.194-197
- <sup>59</sup> Falk: *op. cit.* (note 30). See also Barber, Benjamin R: *Jihad vs. McWorld. Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001).
- <sup>60</sup> Grant, Peter R.: "Cognitive Theories Applied to Intergroup Conflict", in Ronald J. Fisher: *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution* (New York: Springer Verlag, 1990), pp. 39-57; Kruglansky, Arie W., Daniel Bar-Tal & Yechiel Klar: "A Social Cognitive Theory of Conflict", in Knud S. Larsen (ed.): *The Social Psychology of Conflict* (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 45-56; Moore, Michael: "Mirroring and Misperceptions", *ibid.*, pp. 71-80; Rabbie, Jacob M.: "A Behavioral Interaction Model", *ibid.*, pp. 85-108; Fisher, Ronald J.: "Toward a Social-Psychological Model of Intergroup Conflict", *ibid.*, pp. 109-122.
- <sup>61</sup> On the various "schools" in the study of ethnicity and nationalism see Hutchinson, John & Anthony D. Smith (eds.): *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and idem & idem (eds.): *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Periwal, Sukumar (ed.): *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995); Brass, Paul: *Nations and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison* (London: Sage, 1991); Kellas, James G.: *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1991); Kupchan, Charles (ed.): *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
- <sup>62</sup> Smith, Anthony D.: "The Formation of National Identity", in Henry Harris (ed.): *Identity. Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 129-153, quote from p. 133.
- <sup>63</sup> Wæver, Ole: "Identities", in Judit Balázs & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): *Peace Research for the 1990s* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993), pp. 135-150; Lindholm, Helena: "Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion", in idem (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflict in the 1990s* (Göteborg: Nordnes, 1993), pp. 1-39; Keithly, David: "Security and Ersatz Identity", *European Security*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 80-96; Kowert, Paul A.: "National Identity: Inside and Out", *Security Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 1-34; Neumann, Iver B.: "Identity and the Outbreak of War", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 7-22; Williams, Michael E.: "Identity and the Politics of Security", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 204-225.
- <sup>64</sup> Anderson: *op. cit.* (note 39).
- <sup>65</sup> Gellner, Ernst: *Nations and Nationalism* (London: Basil Blackwill, 1983). See also Lemarchand, René: "Ethnicity as Myth: The View from the Central Africa", *Occasional Paper* (Copenhagen: Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, May 1999).
- <sup>66</sup> See, for instance, Ramet, Sabrina P.: *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992); idem: *Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Mojzes, Paul: *Yugoslav Inferno. Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans* (New York: Continuum Press, 1994); Gordy, Eric D.: *The Culture of Power in Serbia*.

---

*Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Thomas, Robert: *Serbia under Milosevic. Politics in the 1990s* (London: Hurst, 1999).

<sup>67</sup> Kastfelt, Niels (ed.): *Religion and African Civil Wars* (London: Hurst & Co., 2002); Hansen, Holger Bernt & Michael Twaddle (eds.): *Religion and Politics in East Africa* (London: James Currey, 1995); Duran, Khalid: "Afrikanische Konflikte. Der Faktor Religion", in *Afrikanische Perspektiven. Friedensbericht 1998. Theorie und Praxis ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung in Osteuropa* (Chur/Zürich: Verlag Rüegger, 1998), pp. 191-202.

<sup>68</sup> Fifty percent of Nigeria's population are Muslims, forty percent Christians and ten percent adherents of various indigenous beliefs, according to [www.geohive.com/global/religion.php](http://www.geohive.com/global/religion.php). For a more detailed breakdown see [www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh\\_245.html](http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_245.html) and [-246.html](http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_246.html). On the intertwined ethnic and religious conflicts see also Suberu, Rotimi T.: *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria* (Washington., DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 4-5, 135-37 & *passim*; Maier, Karl: *This House Has Fallen. Nigeria in Crisis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2000), pp. 143-192.

<sup>69</sup> Huntington: *op. cit.* (note 37); Fuller, Graham E & Lessler, Ian O.: *A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995); Halliday, Fred: *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Hunter, Shireen T: *The Future of Islam and the West. Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1988). On non-state actors see Juergensmeyer, Mark: *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Benjamin, Daniel & Steven Simon: *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Williams, Paul L: *Al Qaeda. Brotherhood of Terror* (No address: Alpha, 2002).; Kelly, Robert J.: "Armed Prophets and Extremists: Islamic Fundamentalism", in Harvey W. Kushner (ed.): *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium* (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 21-32

<sup>70</sup> On the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) see Asmal, Kader, Louise Asmal & Ronald Suresh Roberts: *Reconciliation through Truth. A Reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). Its report is available at [www.mg.co.za/mg/projects/trc](http://www.mg.co.za/mg/projects/trc).

<sup>71</sup> Carlton, Eric: *War and Ideology* (London: Routledge, 1990); Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus & Frank Salter (eds.): *Indoctrinability, Warfare and Ideology* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).

<sup>72</sup> Fukuyama, Francis: *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). On the Soviet view see Kubalkova, V. & A.A. Cruckshank: *Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International Relations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990); Bialer, Seweryn: *The Soviet Paradox. External Expansion, Internal Decline* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), pp. 191-212; Jahn, Egbert: „Der Einfluss der Ideologie auf die sowjetische Aussen- und Rüstungspolitik“, I-III, *Osteuropa*, vol. 36, nos. 5-7 (1986), pp. 356-374, 447-461, 509-521.

<sup>73</sup> Easton, David: *The Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 130.

<sup>74</sup> See, for instance, Spruyt: *op. cit.* (note 10).

<sup>75</sup> On pre-colonial forms of political organisation see Mair, Lucy: *African Kingdoms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Vanisa, Jan: *Kingdoms of the Savanna* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); Davidson, Basil: *Africa in History* (London: Phoenix Press, 2001), pp. 61-71, 147-151 & *passim*; Reader, John: *Africa. A Biography of the Continent* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 200-203 & *passim*; Davidson, Basil: *The Black Man's Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (London: James Currey, 1992); Herbst, Jeffrey:

---

*States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also UNESCO's *General History of Africa*. Abridged Edition, e.g. vol. VI: Aoiayi, J. Fade (ed.): *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s* (Oxford: James Curry, 1998), pp. 7-8, 39-50 & *passim*; and vol. VII: Boahen, M., & A. Adu (eds.): *Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1990), pp. 25-32, 240-249 & *passim*. On the consequences see Thomson, Alex: *An Introduction to African Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 7-29; Schraeder, Peter J.: *African Politics and Society. A Mosaic in Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 98-104. On the general phenomenon see Ayoob, Mohammed: *The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

<sup>76</sup> See, for instance, Lyons & Mastanduno (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 33); Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild & I. William Zartman: *Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996); *Our Global Neighbourhood*. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Falk, Richard: *Explorations at the Edge of Time. The Prospects for World Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); *idem: On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1995); Simai, Mihaly: *The Future of Global Governance* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (eds.): *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (London: Edward Elgar, 1992).

<sup>77</sup> Bull, Hedley: *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1995), *passim*; Watson, Adam: *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 182-213. See also Fowler, Michael Ross & Julie Marie Bunck: *Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Krasner, Stephen D.: "Westphalia and All That", in Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane (eds.): *Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutional, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235-264; *idem: Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

<sup>78</sup> Based, with some modifications, on Buzan: *op. cit.* (note 42), pp. 57-111; Holsti: *op. cit.* (note 10), pp. 82-98, and especially the figure on p. 98.

<sup>79</sup> Rousseau, Jean Jacques: *Du Contrat Social* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966); Hobbes: *op. cit.* (note 57); Locke, John: *Two Treatises on Government* (London: Everyman's Library, 1974).

<sup>80</sup> Park, Han S. (ed.): *North Korea. Ideology, Politics, Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); Kim, Samuel (ed.): *North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Simons, Geoff: *Korea. The Search for Sovereignty* (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1995).

<sup>81</sup> On Israel see Sandler, Shmuel: *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel. The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993); Evron, Boas: *Jewish State or Israeli Nation?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). On Iran see Gieling, Saskia: *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); Kazemi, Farhad: "Review Article: Models of Iranian Politics, the Road to the Islamic Revolution, and the Challenge of Civil Society", *World Politics*, vol. 47, no. 4 (July 1995), pp. 555-574. On Pakistan see Ganguly, Sumit: *The Origins of War in South Asia. Indo-*

---

*Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Groves, Denise: “India and Pakistan: A Clash of Civilizations?”, *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 17-20; Hyman, Anthony: “Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State”, in Peter Janke (ed.): *Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. Europe and Asia* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 169-202. On the “creeping Hinduisation” of India see Chatterjee, Partha: “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism”, in Vashuda Dalmia & Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.): *Representing Hinduism. The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity* (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), pp. 103-128. On the general problem see Juergensmeyer, Mark: *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>82</sup> On France see Ulla Holm: “The Struggle between the Political Nation and the Cultural Nation”, in J. Peter Burgess (ed.), *Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Post-Modern Europe* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), pp. 395-414. On the USA see Smith, Rogers: *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Jacobsen, David: *Peace and Belonging in America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

<sup>83</sup> On the philosophical origins see Herder, Johann Gottfried: “Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit”, in idem: *Schriften* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1968), pp. 140-208; idem: *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1966), pp. 104-112; Longerich, Peter (ed.): “Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?” *Dokumente zur Frage der deutschen Einheit 1800-1990* (München: Piper, 1990); Weidenfeld, Werner (ed.): *Die Identität der Deutschen* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1983); idem (ed.): *Nachdenken über Deutschland. Materialien zur politischen Kultur der Deutschen Frage* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985).

<sup>84</sup> I have elaborated on this topic in Møller, Bjørn: “Unification of Divided States in East Asia”, in idem (ed.): *Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 161-201.

<sup>85</sup> Kofos, Evangelos: “The Two-Headed “Albanian Question”: Reflections on the Kosovo Dispute and the Albanians from FYROM”, in Thanos Veremis & idem (eds.): *Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998), pp. 43-98; Pichl, Elmar F.: “Die ‘albanische Frage’ in Mazedonien”, in Joseph Marko (ed.): *Gordischer Knoten Kosvo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), pp. 57-73. On the background see Malcolm, Noel: *Kosovo. A Short History* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

<sup>86</sup> A good selection of the “classics” of geopolitics is Tuathail, Geraóid, Simon Dalby & Paul Routledge (eds.): *The Geopolitics Reader* (London: Routledge, 1998). See also Tuathail, Gearóid Ó.: *Critical Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 1996); Agnew, John: *Geopolitics. Re-visioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998); Parker, Geoffrey: *Geopolitics. Past, Present and Future* (London: Pinter, 1998).

<sup>87</sup> CIA: *The World Factbook 2001*, at [www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html](http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html).

<sup>88</sup> See, for instance, Gurr, Ted Robert: *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); idem: *Peoples versus States. Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).

<sup>89</sup> On secession see Bartkus, Viva Ona: *The Dynamics of Secession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On various less drastic measures see Lapidot, Ruth: *Autonomy. Flexible Solutions to Intrastate Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

<sup>90</sup> Engels, Friedrich: “Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats”, *Marx-*

---

*Engels-Werke* (*op. cit.*, note 45), vol. 21, pp. 25-173.

<sup>91</sup> A good overview is Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle: *Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Joseph, Richard (ed.): *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Villalón, Leonardo A. & Phillip A. Huxtable (eds.): *The African State at a Critical Juncture. Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998): Thomson: *op. cit.* (note 75). See also Huntington, Samuel: *The Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1968); *idem*: *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

<sup>92</sup> On traditional patrimonialism see Weber, Max: "Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism", in *idem*: *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), vol. 2, pp. 1006-1069. On neopatrimonialism see Lemarchand, René: "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems", in Daniel Rothchild & Naomi Chazan (eds.): *The Precarious Balance. State and Society in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 149-170; Bratton & de Walle: *op. cit.* (note 91), pp. 61-96; *idem* & *idem*: "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa", *World Politics*, vol. 46, no. 4 (1994), pp. 453-489; Conteh-Morgan, Earl: *Democratization in Africa. The Theory and Dynamics of Political Transitions* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), pp. 60-63; Thomson: *op. cit.* (note 75), pp. 107-112; Clapham, Christopher: *Private Patronage and Public Power* (London: Pinter, 1982).

<sup>93</sup> Young, Crawford & Thomas Turner: *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Wrong, Michela: *In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz* (London: Fourth Estate, 2001), 189-209 & *passim*; Bayart, Jean-François, Stephen Ellis & Béatrice Hibou: *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

<sup>94</sup> Weber, Max: *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 328.

<sup>95</sup> Weber, Max: "Politics as Vocation", in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.): *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), pp. 77-128, quote from p. 78.

<sup>96</sup> On the phenomenon and its inherent problems see Huntington: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 91), pp. 46-58. See also Chan, Steve: "Regime Transition in the Asia/Pacific Region: Democratization as a Double-Edged Sword", in Desmond Ball (ed.): *The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 52-67, especially p. 58.

<sup>97</sup> The NGO Transparency International publishes an annual *Corruption Index*, where 10 is the ideal score (no corruption) and scores of less than 5 signify serious problems. In the 2001 index (at [www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html](http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html)), Finland and Denmark scored best (9.9 and 9.5, respectively), while Nigeria and Bangladesh were at the bottom with scores of 1.0 and 0.4, respectively).

<sup>98</sup> Huntington, Samuel P.: *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957), pp. 80-85. See also Janowitz, Morris: *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960); Welch, Claude E., Jr.: "Civil-Military Relations", in Dupuy (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 21), vol. 2, pp. 507-511; Desch, Michael E.: *Civilian Control of the Military. The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999); Lovell, John P. & David E. Albright (eds.): *To Sheathe the Sword. Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997); Kemp, Kenneth W. & Charles Hudlin: "Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Fall 1992), pp. 7-26; Schiff, Rebecca L.: "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of

---

Concordance”, *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 7-24; Feaver, Peter D.: “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control”, *ibid.*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 149-178; Bland, Douglas L.: “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations”, *ibid.*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 7-26; Cox, Thomas S.: *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone. A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Cawthra, Gavin & Robin Luckham (eds.): *Governing Insecurity. Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books, 2003).

<sup>99</sup> On the concept see Huntington: *op. cit.* 1968 (note 98), p. 196; *idem*: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 91), pp. 231-251. See also Finer, Samuel E.: *The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976); Pearlmutter, Amos: *The Military and Politics and Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>100</sup> On Africa see Welch, Claude E., Jr. (ed.): *Soldier and State in Africa. A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), *passim*; Bienen, Henry: “Populist Military Regimes in West Africa”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Spring 1985), pp. 357-377; Gershoni, Yekutiel: “The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in Sub-Saharan Africa”, *ibid.*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 235-248; Thomson: *op. cit.* (note 75), pp. 121-140; Schraeder: *op. cit.* (note 75), pp. 244-266.

<sup>101</sup> On Latin America see Millett, Richard L. & Michael Gold-Bliss (eds.): *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Bowman, Kirk S.: “Taming the Tiger: Militarization and Democracy in Latin America”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 3 (August 1996), pp. 289-308; Norden, Deborah L.: “Redefining Political-Military Relations in Latin America: Issues of the New Democratic Era”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 441-468; Sethi, Manpreet: “Changing Role of Military in Latin America: Some Approaches and Interpretations”, *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 21, no. 10 (Delhi: IDSA, 1998), pp. 1547-1560..

<sup>102</sup> On Turkey see Hale, William: *Turkish Policies and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994); Birand, Mehmet Ali: *Shirts of Steel. An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991); Heper, Metin & Aylin Güney: “The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 635-657. On Pakistan see Shafquat, Saeed: *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Rizvi, Hasan-Askari: “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan”, *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 96-113.

<sup>103</sup> On the USSR see Nichols, Thomas M.: *The Sacred Cause. Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). On South Africa under PW Botha’s “total strategy” see Cock, Jacklyn & Laurie Nathan (eds.): *War and Society. The Militarisation of South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Cawthra, Gavin: *Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine* (London: International Defence & Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986). On Israel see Barnett, Michael N.: *Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 153-209, 225-243; Etzioni-Halevy, Eva: “Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites’ Connection in Israel”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 401-418; Ben-Eliezer, Uri: *The Making of Israeli Militarism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 19-144, *passim*. On China see Shambough, David: “China’s Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection”, *The China Quarterly*, no. 146 (June

---

1996) pp. 265-298; Lin, Chong-Pin: "Limits to Professionalism: The Extramilitary Role of the People's Liberation Army in Modernization", *Security Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 1992), pp. 659-689; Ji, You: *The Armed Forces of China* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), *passim*.

<sup>104</sup> Ayoob: *op. cit.* (note 75). See also Myrdal, Gunnar: *Asian Drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968). "Softness" mainly referred to inadequate ability to implement policies.

<sup>105</sup> On failed states see Zartmann, William I. (ed.): *Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Herbst, Jeffrey: "Responding to State Failure in Africa", *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 120-144; Joseph, Richard & Jeffrey Herbst: "Correspondence: Responding to State Failure in Africa", *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 175-184; Mazrui, Ali A.: "The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa", in Olara A. Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle (eds.): *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 233-244. On Liberia see Sawyer, Amos: *The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia. Tragedy and Challenge* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Huband, Mark: *The Liberian Civil War* (London: Frank Cass, 1998). On Sierra Leone see Zark-Williams, Alfred B.: "Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 143-162. On Congo/Zaire see Wrong: *op. cit.* (note 93).

<sup>106</sup> On Somalia see Ahmed, Ismail I. & Reginald Herbold Green: "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 113-128; Compagnon, Daniel: "Somali Armed Units. The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based Factions", in Christopher Clapham (ed.): *African Guerillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 73-90; Laitin, David D.: "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention", in Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder (red.): *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 146-180; Lyons, Terrence & Ahmed I. Samatar: *Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Simons, Anna: "Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma", in Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild (eds.): *Africa in the New World Order* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 71-84. On Afghanistan see Kaplan, Robert D.: *Soldiers of Good. With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Vintage Departures, 2001); Urban, Mark: *War in Afghanistan*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); Borer: *Superpowers Defeated*, pp. 173-186; Rubin, Barnett R.: *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. From Buffer State to Failed State* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1995); Harpviken, Kristian Berg: "Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 34, no. 3 (August 1997), pp. 271-287; Kartha, Tara: "The Weaponisation of Afghanistan", *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 19, no. 10-11 (New Delhi: IDSA, 1997), pp. 1389-1422; Mendelson, Sarah E.: "Internal Battles and External Wars. Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan", *World Politics*, vol. 45, no. 3 (April 1993), pp. 327-360; Mishra, Pankaj: "The Making of Afghanistan", in Robert S. Silvers & Barbara Epstein (eds.): *Striking Terror. America's New War* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002), pp. 69-90; idem: "The Afghan Tragedy", *ibid.*, pp. 203-244; Judah Tim: "War in the Dark", *ibid.*, pp. 111-168.

<sup>107</sup> The term is that of Jackson, Robert H.: *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>108</sup> On the concept of sovereignty see Fowler & Bunck: *op. cit.* (note 77); Krasner: *op. cit.* 1999 (note 77). On the distinction between "formal" (or external) and "empirical" (or

---

internal) sovereignty see Kratochwill, Friedrich: “Sovereignty as *Dominium*: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Lyons & Mastanduno (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 33), pp.21-42; Rosenau, James N.: “Sovereignty in a Turbulent World”, *ibid.*, pp. 191-227; idem: *op. cit.* (note 30), pp. 217-236.

<sup>109</sup> See, e.g. Thomson: *op. cit.* (note 75), passim; Schraeder: *op. cit.* (note 75), pp. 217-290.

<sup>110</sup> The following account is largely based on the author’s: “National, Societal And Human Security—A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans”, in *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century* (Paris: UNESCO, 2001), pp. 36-57.

<sup>111</sup> The closest he came to a definition was: “National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions”, in Morgenthau, Hans J.: *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 562. In another connection, he added “culture” to the list, emphasising that the “survival of a political unit in its identity” (i.e. “security”) constitutes “the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units”. See “The Problem of the National Interest” (1952), in idem: *Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 204-237 (quote from p. 219).

<sup>112</sup> Wolfers, Arnold: “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in idem: *Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 147-165 (quote from p. 150).

<sup>113</sup> See, for instance, Krell, Gert: “The Development of the Concept of Security”, in Egbert Jahn & Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.): *Elements of World Instability: Armaments, Communication, Food, International Division of Labour* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1981), pp. 238-254; Jahn, Egbert: “From International Peace Research to National Security Research”, in Jaap Nobel (ed.): *The Coming of Age of Peace Research. Studies in the Development of a Discipline* (Groningen: Styx, 1991), pp. 57-75; Frei, Daniel: “Was ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu verstehen?”, in Wolfgang Heisenberg & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers. Frieden und Sicherheit. Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in Osteuropa* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 41-49; Stephenson, Carolyn: “New Conceptions of Security and Their Implications for Means and Methods”, in Katharine and Majid Tehranian (eds.): *Restructuring for World Peace. On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992), pp. 47-61; Fischer, Dietrich: *Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR, 1993).

<sup>114</sup> See, for instance, Galtung, Johan: “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1971), pp. 81-118; idem: “A Structural Theory of Imperialism—Ten Years Later”, *Millennium*, vol. 9, no. 3 (1980), pp. 183-196; idem: *The True Worlds. A Transnational Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1980); Lawler. *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 70-79.

<sup>115</sup> Neuman, Stephanie (ed.): *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). On the US dominance of the discipline see also Wæver, Ole: “The Development of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations”, in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner (eds.): *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). pp. 687-727.

<sup>116</sup> Galtung, Johan: “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research” (*loc. cit.* note 46); idem: “Peace Research”, in idem: *op. cit.* (note 46), pp. 150-166; idem: “What is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s”, in idem: *Transarmament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988), pp. 61-71. On “stable peace”, see Boulding, Kenneth: *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

---

<sup>117</sup> A good illustration of the development is the two consecutive versions of a textbook on security studies: Shultz, Richard, Ray Godson & Ted Greenwood (eds.): *Security Studies for the 1990s* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993); and Shultz, Richard H., Jr., Roy Godson & George H. Quester (eds.): *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brassey's, 1997). A precursor of the present debate was Ullman, Richard: "Redefining Security", *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-177. Good overviews are Nye, Joseph E. & Sean M. Lynn-Jones: "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field", *International Security*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; Lynn-Jones, Sean: "The Future of International Security Studies", in Desmond Ball & David Horner (eds.): *Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1992), pp. 71-107. See also Mangold, Peter: *National Security and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1990); Booth, Ken: "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice", *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), pp. 527-545; idem (ed.): *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991); Clarke, Michael (ed.): *New Perspectives on Security* (London: Brassey's, 1993); Terriff, Terry, Stuart Croft, Lucy James & Patrick M. Morgan: *Security Studies Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). A useful collection of central writings on security is Sheehan, Michael (ed.): *National and International Security* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2000)

<sup>118</sup> Buzan: *op. cit.* (note 42); idem, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole Wæver & al.: *The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990); Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre: *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); idem & al.: *op. cit.* (note 34).

<sup>119</sup> Good examples of "expanded strategic studies" are Brown, Neville: *The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Souchon, Lennart: *Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik* (Herford: Mittler Verlag, 1990).

<sup>120</sup> Gallie, W.B.: "Essentially Contested Concepts", in Max Black (ed.): *The Importance of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Praeger, 1962), pp. 121-146.

<sup>121</sup> A basic work on social constructivism is Berger, Peter L. & Thomas Luckman: *The Social Construction of Reality* (London: Allan Lane, 1967). On this and various "postmodern" approaches to IR theory see George, Jim: *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Vasquez, John A.: "The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory after Enlightenment's Fall", in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.): *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 217-240; Ruggie, John Gerard: "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", in Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 115), pp. 215-246; Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a critique see Østerrud, Øyvind: "Antinomies of Postmodernism in International Studies", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 4 (November 1996), pp. 385-390.

<sup>122</sup> Wæver, Ole: "Securitization and Desecuritization", in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.): *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86; Buzan et al.: *op. cit.* (note 34). Recent works of a related constructivist or post-structuralist orientation include Campbell, David: *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Fierke, K.M.: *Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Huysmans, Jef: "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 226-255; Hansen, Lene: "A

---

Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 369-397; Constantinou, Costas M.: “Poetics of Security”, *Alternatives*, vol. 25, no. 3 (July-Sept. 2000), pp. 287-306. For a critique of the “Copenhagen School” (Buzan, Wæver and others) for not being consistently constructivist see McSweeney, Bill: “Security and Identity: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1996), pp. 81-93; idem: *Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>123</sup> For an argument along these lines about South Africa see Harris, Geoff: “The Irrationality of South Africa’s Military Expenditures”, *African Security Review*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2002), pp. 75-84. See also Zacarias, Agostinho: *Security and the State in Southern Africa* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999).

<sup>124</sup> See, e.g., Krause, Keith & Michael C. Williams (ed.): *Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997); Jones, Richard Wyn: *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Fierke: *op. cit.* (note 122).

<sup>125</sup> A good example of this is the recent writings of Gwyn Prins, who has argued in favour of a reorientation of security studies to the environment. See, e.g., idem: “Politics and the Environment”, *International Affairs*, vol. 66, no. 4 (1990), pp. 711-730; idem: “The Four-Stroke Cycle in Security Studies”, *ibid.*, vol. 74, no. 4 (October 1998), pp. 781-808; idem: “A New Focus for Security Studies”, in Ball & Horner (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 117), pp. 178-222; idem: “Global Security and Military Intervention”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 7-16; idem: “Security Challenges for the 21st century”, *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 1 (Jan. 1997), pp. 27-30.

<sup>126</sup> Wæver, Ole: “Self-referential Concepts of Security as an Instrument for Reconstruction of an Open-ended Realism in IR”, in idem: *Concepts of Security* (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1997), pp. 347-373; Buzan & al. 1998: *op. cit.* (note 34), pp. 35-42. McSweeney: *op. cit.* (note 122), p. 87.

<sup>127</sup> For a historical account of “Realism”, see e.g. Smith, Michael Joseph: *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). See also Frankel, Benjamin (ed.): *Roots of Realism* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); idem (ed.): *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (London: Frank Cass, 1996). For a critique see Vasquez, John: *The Power of Power Politics. From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), *passim*.

<sup>128</sup> An example of this is Gilpin, Robert G.: *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); idem: “The Economic Dimension of International Security”, in Henry Bienen (ed.): *Power, Economics, and Security. The United States and Japan in Focus* (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 51-68; Knorr, Klaus: “The Determinants of Military Power”, *ibid.*, pp. 69-133; idem: *The War Potential of Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956). Kenneth Waltz also included economic factors in his “aggregate capabilities”, e.g. in *op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 129-131. For a recent attempt at measuring such aggregate strength see Tellis, Ashley J., Janice Bially, Christopher Layne & Melissa McPherson: *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000).

<sup>129</sup> The term stems from Ayittey, George B.N.: *Africa in Chaos* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

<sup>130</sup> Wæver, Ole: “Societal Security: the Concept”, in idem et al.: *op. cit.* (note 118), pp. 17-40 (quote from p. 23). See also Buzan, Barry: “Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization”, *ibid.*, pp. 41-58.

---

<sup>131</sup> Wæver, Ole: “Identities”, in Judit Balázs & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): *Peace Research for the 1990s* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993), pp. 135-150; Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwill: “Revisiting the ‘National’: Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism”, in idem & idem (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 38), pp.105-126; Keithly, David: “Security and Ersatz Identity”, *European Security*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 80-96; Kowert, Paul A.: “National Identity: Inside and Out”, *Security Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 1-34; Neumann: *loc. cit.* (note 63); Williams: *loc. cit.* (note 63).

<sup>132</sup> Huntington: *op. cit.* (note 37). For a critique see Chan, Stephen: “Too Neat and Underthought a World Order: Huntington and Civilizations”, *Millennium*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1997), pp. 137-140; Welch, David A.: “The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon”, *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 197-216; Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal & Michaelene Cox: “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no. 5 (September 2000), pp. 583-608.

<sup>133</sup> See, e.g., Featherston, Mike: “In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction”, *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 5, nos. 2-3 (June 1988), pp. 195-215; Heller, Agnes & Ferenc Fehér: *The Postmodern Political Condition* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988). On (the lack of) postmodern ethics see Saurette, Paul: “‘I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them’: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory”, *Millennium*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-28. For an attempted rebuttal of the charges against postmodernism see George, Jim: “Realist ‘Ethics’: International Relations and Post-modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic”, *ibid.*, vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 195-223.

<sup>134</sup> Hall, John A.: “Nationalisms, Classified and Explained”, in Sukumar Periwál (ed.): *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 8-33; Haas, Ernst B.: “Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction”, *Millennium*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1993), pp. 505-545; Pearton, Maurice: “Notions in Nationalism”, *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1996), pp. 1-15.

<sup>135</sup> McSweeney: *op. cit.* (note 122), pp. 68-78.

<sup>136</sup> Gellner, Ernest: *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992); Reychler, Luc: “Religion and Conflict”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 19-38; Peter Janke (ed.): *Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. Europe and Asia* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); Watson, Helen: “War and Religion: An Unholy Alliance?”, in Robert A. Hinde & ida (eds.): *War: A Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutionalized Violence* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 165-182.

<sup>137</sup> On Turkey see Heper, Metin, Öncü, Ayshe & Heinz Kramer (eds.): *Turkey and the West. Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Kramer, Heinz: *A Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Mastiny, Wojzech & R. Craig Nation (eds.): *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). On India see Chatterjee, Partha: “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism”, in Vashuda Dalmia & Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.): *Representing Hinduism. The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity* (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), pp. 103-128. On the Islamist threat to the Arab states see Guazzone, Laura (ed.): *The Islamist Dilemma. The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995).

<sup>138</sup> Rich, Paul: “European Identity and the Myth of Islam”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 3 (July 1999), pp. 435-452. See also Fuller & Lessler: *op. cit.* (note 69), Halliday: *op. cit.* (note 69); Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar: “US Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29, no. 4 (December 1998), pp. 449-462; Jawad, Haifaa A.: “Islam and the Threat: How Fundamental Is the Threat?”, *The RUSI*

---

*Journal*, vol. 140, no. 4 (August 1995), pp. 34-38; Hunter: *op. cit.* (note 69); Huband, Mark: *Warriors of the Prophet. The Struggle for Islam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Hoveyda, Fereydoun: *The Broken Crescent. The "Threat" of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism* (Westport, Ct.: Praeger Press, 1998); Hibbard, Scott W. & David Little: *Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

<sup>139</sup> Hansen, Lene: "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School", *Millennium*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2000), pp. 285-306. In feminist circles the notion of male aggression seems to be fairly widespread. See, for instance, Gould, Benina Berger: "Gender Psychology and Issues of War and Peace", in Knud S. Larsen (ed.): *The Social Psychology of Conflict* (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 241-249; Jabri, Vivienne: *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Galtung, Johan: *Peace by Peaceful Means (op. cit. note 4)*, pp. 40-48. On genderised security studies in general see also Terriff & al.: *op. cit.* (note 117), pp. 82-98; Elshtain, Jean Bethke: "Feminist Inquiry and International Relations", in Michael W. Doyle & G. John Ikenberry (eds.): *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), pp. 77-91; Tickner, J. Ann: "Feminist Perspectives on Security in a Global Environment", in Caroline Thomas & Peter Wilkin (eds.): *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 41-58. For a male perspective on the particular woman's view of the world see Booth, Ken: "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist", in Krause & Williams: *op. cit.* (note 124), pp. 83-120, especially pp. 99-101.

<sup>140</sup> On human security as a concept see Commission on Human Security: *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003); Suhrke, Astri: "Human Security and the Interests of States", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 265-276; MacLean, George: "The Changing Perception of Human Security: Coordinating National and Multilateral Responses. The United Nations and the New Security Agenda", at [www.unac.org/canada/security/maclean.html](http://www.unac.org/canada/security/maclean.html); Tow, William T. & Russell Trood: "Linkages between Traditional Security and Human Security", in William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur & In-Taek Hyun (eds.): *Asia's Emerging Regional Order. Reconciling Traditional and Human Security* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 13-32; Kim, Woosang & In-Taek Hyum: "Toward a News Concept of Security: Human Security in World Politics", *ibid.*, pp. 33-46; Wilkin, Peter: "Human Security and Class in a Global Economy", in Thomas & idem (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 139), pp. 23-40; Thomas, Caroline: "Furthering the Debate on Human Security", *ibid.*, pp. 179-183; Zacarias: *op. cit.* (note 123), pp. 139-160; McSweeney: *op. cit.* (note 122), pp. 152-172; Renner, Michael: *Fighting for Survival. Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity* (London: Earthscan, 1997), pp. 135-153 & *passim*; Booth, Ken: "Security and Emancipation", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4 (1991), pp. 313-326; idem: "Human Wrongs and International Relations", *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 103-126.

<sup>141</sup> *Human Development Report 1993* at [www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm](http://www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm).

<sup>142</sup> *Human Development Report 1994* at [www.undp.org/hdro/e94over.htm](http://www.undp.org/hdro/e94over.htm).

<sup>143</sup> On the general relationship between military spending and development see Ball, Nicole: *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Brauer, Jurgen & J. Paul Dunne (eds.): *Arming the South. The Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms Production and Arms Trade in Developing Countries* (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2002). See also Cheatham, Marcus: "War, Military Spending, and Food Security in Africa", in Norman A. Graham (ed.): *Seeking Security and Development. The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 229-253; Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena: "Do African Governments Favor Defense in Budgeting?",

---

*Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 191-206; Dunne, J. Paul & Nadir A.L. Mohammed: "Military Spending in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Evidence for 1967-85", *ibid.*, vol. 32, no. 3 (August 1995), pp. 331-343; Muepu, K.: "Defence Expenditures Reduction and the Re-Allocation of Resources in Southern Africa with Specific Reference to South Africa", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, vol. 20, no. 1 (May 1998), pp. 58-90.

<sup>144</sup> For an analysis of the communitarian/cosmopolitan dichotomy, see Brown, Chris: *International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).

<sup>145</sup> Mill, John Stuart: "Utilitarianism", in Max Lerner (ed.): *Essential Works of John Stuart Mill* (New York: Bantam Books, 1963), pp. 189-248. See also Ellis, Anthony: "Utilitarianism and International Ethics", in Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel (eds.): *Traditions in International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 158-179.

<sup>146</sup> On the terminology see Kaplan, Morton A.: *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1957); or idem "Some Problems of International Systems Research", excerpted in John Vasquez (ed.): *Classics of International Relations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), pp. 297-302. On European bipolarity see Buzan & al.: *op. cit.* 1990 (note 118), pp. 15-16, 36-41.

<sup>147</sup> On the European neutrals and non-aligned states see, e.g. Sundelius, Bengt (ed.): *The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987); Kruzal, Joseph & Michael H. Haltzel (eds.): *Between the Blocs. Problems and Prospects for Europe's Neutrals and Non-Aligned States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Hakovirta, Harto: *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Carton, Alain: *Les neutres, la neutralité et l'Europe* (Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1991). On the Third World during the Cold War see Allison, Roy & Phil Williams (eds.): *Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rodman, Peter W.: *More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Hopf, Ted: *Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Thomas, Scott: "Africa and the End of the Cold War: an Overview of Impacts", in Sola Akinrinade & Amadu Sesay (eds.): *Africa in the Post-Cold War International System* (London: Pinter, 1998), pp. 5-27.

<sup>148</sup> On Lebanon see Khazen, Farid El.: *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Sirriyeh, Hussein: "Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict", *Adelphi Papers*, no. 243 (1989); Atlas, Pierre M. & Roy Licklider: "Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 35-54; Norton, Augustus Richard: "Lebanon's Malaise", *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2 (Winter 2000-01), pp. 35-50.. On Somalia see the case study below. On Afghanistan see note 106 above.

<sup>149</sup> On the concept of balance of power see Sheehan, Michael: *The Balance of Power. History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996); Gulick, Edward Vose: *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967), *passim*; Wolfers, Arnold: "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice", in idem: *op. cit.* (note 112), pp. 117-131; Haas, Ernst B.: "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.): *Politics and the International System*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Co., 1972), pp. 452-480. For a devastating critique see Vasquez: *op. cit.* (note 127), *passim*. On the (in)stability of multipolarity see Davis, Christopher Mark: "War and Peace in a Multipolar World: A Critique of Quincy Wright's Institutionalist Analysis of the Interwar International System", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 31-73; Huber, Reiner

---

K. & Rudolf Avenhaus (eds.): *International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993); Kegley, Charles W. & Gregory A. Raymond: *A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the 21st Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 67-120; Schweller, Randall: *Deadly Imbalances. Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)

<sup>150</sup> For a comparative study of the effects of arms transfers see Brzoska, Michael & Frederic S. Pearson: *Arms and Warfare. Escalation, De-escalation and Negotiation* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

<sup>151</sup> Game theory was developed by John Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern and others in *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944). See also Nicholson, Michael E.: *Formal Theories in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); idem: *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 63-103; Rapoport: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 286-309; Schelling: *op. cit.* 1960 (note 6), *passim*; Brams, Steven & D. Marc Kilgour: *Game Theory and National Security* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 1-15. Both the *Journal of Peace Research* and the *Journal of Conflict Studies* publish numerous articles from this category..

<sup>152</sup> On the general problem of absolute v. relative gains see Snidal, Duncan: "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation", in David Baldwin (ed.): *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 170-208; Powell, Robert: "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp. 209-233.

<sup>153</sup> Kahn, Herman: *On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios* (London: Pall Mall, 1965), p. 11. See also idem: *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); idem *Thinking the Unthinkable* (New York: Horizon Press, 1962); idem: *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984). On the intellectual setting in which such ideas were hatched see Kaplan, Fred: *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

<sup>154</sup> On the prisoner's dilemma in general see Rapoport, Anatoli: *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974); idem (ed.): *Game Theory as Theory of Conflict Resolution* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970); idem & Albert M. Chammah: *Prisoner's Dilemma. A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press., 1970). On its possible resolution see Axelrod, Robert: *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); idem: *The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Stein, Arthur A.: *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). On the general problem of "cooperation among adversaries" see Stein, Arthur: "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", in Baldwin (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 152), pp. 29-59; idem: *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Milner, Helen: "Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496.

<sup>155</sup> Herz, John M.: *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), *passim*; idem: "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; idem: "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2

---

(1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 42), pp. 294-327; Glaser, Charles L.: “The Security Dilemma Revisited”, *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Schweller, Randall L.: “Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?”, in Frankel (ed.): *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (*op. cit.*, note 127), pp. 90-121. The most elaborate study of the security dilemma is Collins, Alan: *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (Edinburg: Keele University Press, 1997). On the implication of security dilemma considerations for military strategy see Møller, Bjørn: *Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1991); idem: *Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); idem: *Dictionary of Alternative Defense* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

<sup>156</sup> Posen, Barry R.: “The Security Dilemma of Ethnic Conflict”, *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47; Rose, William: “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, *Security Studies*, vol. 9, no. 4 (Summer 2000), pp.1-51; Walter & Snyder (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 106), *passim*; Roe, Paul: “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as Tragedy”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 2 (March 1999), pp. 183-202.

<sup>157</sup> Hobbes: *op. cit.* (note 57), pp. 183-188, 223-228 & *passim*; idem: “De Corpore Politica”, excerpted in idem: *Body, Man and Citizen*. Selections from Thomas Hobbes (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 277-281.

<sup>158</sup> Mills, Greg & John Stremlau (eds.): *The Privatisation of Security in Africa* (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999); Cilliers & Mason (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 22); Duffield, Mark: “Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection”, *Civil Wars*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998) pp 65-102.

<sup>159</sup> Weber: *loc. cit.* (note 95) p. 78.

<sup>160</sup> Waltz: *op. cit.* (note 3). On various forms of pluralism see Halperin, Morton H.: *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Allison, Graham T.: *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1971). See also Carlsnaes, Walter: “Foreign Policy,” in idem, Thomas Risse og Beth Simmons (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 331-349.

<sup>161</sup> Sayigh, Yezid: *Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Robinson, Glenn E.: *Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Parker, Christopher: *Resignation or Revolt? Socio-Political Development and the Challenges of Peace in Palestine* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); Usher, Graham: *Palestine in Crisis*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1997), pp. 61-83; idem: *Dispatches from Palestine. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).

<sup>162</sup> Waltz: *op. cit.* (note 3).

<sup>163</sup> On “asymmetrical war” see, for instance, Arreguín-Toft, Ivan: “How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”, *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93-128; Hoffman, Bruce: “Responding to Terrorism across the Technological Spectrum”, in John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt (eds.): *In Athena's Camp. Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), pp. 339-368.

<sup>164</sup> See, for instance, Sayigh: *op. cit.* (note 161); Khalidi, Rashid: *Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

<sup>165</sup> On the international human rights regime see, for instance, *The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1995* (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995);

---

Newman, Frank C. & David Weisbrodt: *International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1996).

<sup>166</sup> Kaufmann, Chaim D.: “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”, *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; idem: “When All Else Fails”, in Walter & Snyder (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 106), pp. 221-260.

<sup>167</sup> See, for instance, Newman, Saul: *Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies. Mostly Ballots. Rarely Bullets* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996); Gowa, Joanne: *Ballots and Bullets. The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

<sup>168</sup> Avruch, Kevin: *Culture and Conflict Resolution* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998). See also Cohen, Raymond: *Negotiating Across Cultures. International Communication in an Interdependent World*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

<sup>169</sup> The most elaborate account of these methods is Sharp, Gene: *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*, vols. 1-3 (Boston: Porter & Sargent, 1973).

<sup>170</sup> Staub, Ervin: *The Roots of Evil. The Origins of Genocide and other Group Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Charny, Israel W. (ed): *The Widening Circle of Genocide* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Förster, Stig & Gerhard Hirschfeld: *Genozid in der modernen Geschichte* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1999); Gibbons, Harry Scott: *The Genocide Files* (London: Charles Bravos, Publishers, 1997); Schabas, William A.: *Genocide in International Law. The Crimes of Crimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>171</sup> See the internet book by David Adams: *The Aggression Systems*, published at [www.culture-of-peace.info/aggression-intro.html](http://www.culture-of-peace.info/aggression-intro.html) On the role of biology see Berkowitz, Leonard: “Biological Roots: Are Humans Inherently Violent?”, in Betty Glad (ed.): *Psychological Dimensions of War* (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 24-40; Rapoport: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 3-32; Brown: *op. cit.* (note 5), pp. 8-10. On the alleged deep psychological roots of aggression, the classic is Freud, Sigmund: “Das Unbehagen in der Kultur”, in idem: *Abriß der Psychoanalyse/Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (Frankfurt: Fischer Bücherei, 1965), pp. 63-129; and idem: *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (Vaduz: Verlagsanstalt Kultur und Politik, 1940); idem: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (New York: Bantam Books, 1959). See also Fromm, Erich: *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973); Ehrenreich, Barbara: *Blood Rites. Origins and History of the Passions of War* (London: Virago Press, 1997).

<sup>172</sup> The classical work on the difficulties involved with making soldiers kill each other is Marshall, S.L.A.: *Men against Fire. The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000). Even though the author’s use of the evidence has been criticised, the findings are supported by a more recent work: Grossman, Dave: *On Killing. The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1996). See also Bourke, Joanna: *An Intimate History of Killing. Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Sapolsky, Harvey M. “War without Killing”, in Sam C. Sarkesian & John Mead Flanigan (eds.): *U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas. Into the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 27-40; Watson, Peter: *War on the Mind. The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Goldstein, Frank & Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (eds.). *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*. (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996).

<sup>173</sup> Good introductions to the social psychology of conflict are Fiscer: *op. cit.* (note 60), *passim*; Larsen (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 60). On its workings under war conditions see LeShan,

---

Lawrence: *The Psychology of War. Comprehending its Mystique and its Madness* (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992). See also Steinweg, Reiner (ed.): *Faszination der Gewalt. Politische Strategie und Alltagserfahrung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983); idem & Christian Wellmann (eds.): *Die vergessene Dimension internationaler Konflikte: Subjektivität* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), especially Nicklas, Hans: “Wie wir den Krieg herstellen. Die Institution des Krieges als gesellschaftliches und psychisches Konstrukt”, pp. 62-92.

<sup>174</sup> The classical work on this phenomenon is Festinger, Leon: *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).

<sup>175</sup> The formulation was “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” *State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002, at [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html).

<sup>176</sup> On enemy images see, for instance, Fiebig-von-Hase, Ragnhild & Ursula Lehmkuhl (eds.): *Enemy Images in American History* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997); Shimko, Keith L.: *Images and Arms Control. Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Hermann, Richard K. & Michael P. Fischerkeller: “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War”, *International Organization*, vol. 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 415-450.

<sup>177</sup> Allison: *op. cit.* (note 160); Kennedy, Robert F.: *Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Signet Books, 1969); “White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 164-203; Bundy, McGeorge (transcriber) & Blight, James G. (ed.): “October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm”, *ibid.*, vol. 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 30-92.

<sup>178</sup> Janis, Irving: *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). See also Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody & Robert C. North: “The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations”, in Dean G. Pruitt & Richard C. Snyder (eds.): *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 62-79; Lebow, Richard Ned: *Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); idem: “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?”, *Political Psychology*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1983), pp. 333-354; Geva, Nehemia & Alex Mintz (eds.): *Decision-Making on War and Peace. The Cognitive-Rational Debate* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997). On misperception among states see also Jervis, Robert: *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); idem: *op. cit.* (note 155); Kim, Woosang & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: “How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War”, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 39, no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 51-66.

<sup>179</sup> Gellner, Ernst: “An Anthropological View of War and Violence”, in Hinde, Robert A. (ed.): *The Institution of War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 62-80; Sponsel, Leslie E. & Thomas A. Gregor (eds.): *The Anthropology of Peace and Violence* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), *passim*; Monga, Célestin: *The Anthropology of Anger. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 163-189 & *passim*.

<sup>180</sup> Goldstein, Judith & Robert O. Keohane (eds.): *Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutional, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.): *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Lapid & Kratochwill (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 38); Berger, Thomas U.: *Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jandoral, John W.: “War and Culture: A Neglected Relation”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 25, no. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 541-556; Henderson, Errol Anthony: “The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820-

---

1989”, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 42, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 461-484.

<sup>181</sup> Campbell: *op. cit.* (note 122); Neumann: *loc. cit.* (note 38); idem: *loc. cit.* (note 63); Williams: *loc. cit.* (note 63). Analyses of African conflicts along similar lines are Deng, Francis M.: *War of Visions. Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); and Lemarchand, René: “Ethnicity as Myth: The View from the Central Africa”, *Occasional Paper* (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 1999); idem: “Exclusion, Marginalization and Political Mobilization: The Road to Hell in the Great Lakes”, *ibid.* (2001). On the role of “representation” in the West’s attitude to the war in Bosnia see Hansen, Lene: *Western Villains or Balkan Barbarism? Representations and Responsibility in the Debate over Bosnia* (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1998).

<sup>182</sup> Jabri: *op. cit.* (note 139), *passim*; Schäffner, Christina & Anita L. Wenden (eds.): *Language and Peace* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999); Crawford, Beverly & Ronnie D. Lipschutz: “Discourses of War: Security and the Case of Yugoslavia”, in Krause & Williams (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 124), pp. 149-185. On the use of discourse analysis in general see George: *op. cit.* (note 121). See also Dunn, Kevin C.: *Imagining the Congo. The International Relations of Identity* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

<sup>183</sup> Wengeler, Martin: *Die Sprache der Aufrüstung. Zur Geschichte der Rüstungsdiskussionen nach 1945*, (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1992); Chilton, Paul (ed.): *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); Lifton, Robert Jay & Richard Falk: *Indefensible Weapons. The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), pp. 100-110; Mutimer, David: “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”, in Michael Klare, & Daniel C. Thomas (eds.): *World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 187-221.

<sup>184</sup> Derian, James Der: “The Terrorist Discourse: Signs, States, and Systems of Global Political Violence”, *ibid.*, pp. 237-265.

<sup>185</sup> Hunt, W. Ben: *Getting to War. Predicting International Conflict with Mass Media Indicators* (Ann Arbor: MI University of Michigan Press, 1997); Rotberg, Robert I. & Thomas G. Weiss (eds.): *From Massacres to Genocide. The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996); Mermin, Jonathan: *Debating War and Peace. Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). For analyses of media treatment of the war against Iraq see Taylor, Philip M.: *War and the Media. Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Parasitil, Andrew T.: “Defeating the Vietnam Syndrome: The Military, the Media, and the Gulf War”, in Tareq Y. Ismael & Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.): *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations in the Middle East* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 242-262; Campbell, David: *Politics Without Principle. Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); idem: *op. cit.* (note 122); Baudrillard, Jean: *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Norris, Christopher: *Uncritical Theory. Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992); Manheim, Jarol B.: “The War of Images: Strategic Communication in the Gulf Conflict”, in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.): *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 155-171; Mueller, John: “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War”, *ibid.*, pp. 199-226. On the Vietnam War see Hammond, William M.: *Reporting Vietnam. Media and Military at War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998). On the

---

Kosovo war see Mertus, Julie A.: *Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

<sup>186</sup> On the infamous *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* see Melvern, Linda R.: *A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), pp. 70-73 & *passim*; Chalk, Frank: "Hate Radio in Rwanda", in Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke (eds.): *The Path of a Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. 93-107. The NGO Search for Common Ground has sought to use a radio station, Studio Jambo, to foster peaceful sentiments between Hutus and Tutsis in neighbouring Burundi. The author personally visited the station in June 2000. It is described on the organisation's website at [www.searchforcommonground.org/](http://www.searchforcommonground.org/).

<sup>187</sup> Inspired by, but differs from, Vasquez: *op. cit.* (note 5); idem: "Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from those that Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 40 (1996), pp. 531-558. See also Hauge, Wenche & Tanja Ellingsen: "Causal Pathways to Conflict", in Paul F. Diehl & Nils Petter Gleditsch (eds.): *Environmental Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), pp. 36-57; Tir, Jaroslav & Paul F. Diehl: "Demographic Pressure and Interstate Conflict", *ibid.*, pp. 58-83; Goldstone, Jack A.: "Demography, Environment, and Security", *ibid.*, pp. 84-108; Suliman, Mohamed: "The Rationality and Irrationality of Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa", in idem (ed.): *Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 1998), pp. 25-44; Bächler, Günther: "Environmental Degradation and Violent Conflict: Hypotheses, Research Agendas and Theory-building", *ibid.*, pp. 76-112; Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.: *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), *passim*; Midlarsky: *op. cit.* (note 46), *passim*.

<sup>188</sup> See Malthus, Thomas Robert: *An Essay on the Principle of Population or a View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness with an Inquiry into Our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils which it Occasions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), vols. 1-2.

<sup>189</sup> FAO: *Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in Subsaharan Africa*, Report no. 2 (August 2002). The report mentioned "food emergencies" in the following countries: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and estimated that thirteen million people would be in need of emergency supplies of food in Southern Africa alone.

<sup>190</sup> On the risk of international conflicts over water see Elhance: *op. cit.* (note 36); Morris, Mary E.: "Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle East", *The Emirates Occasional Papers*, no. 14 (1998); Klare, Michael: *Resource Wars. The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2001), pp. 138-189; Homer-Dixon: *op. cit.* (note 187), *passim*; Alao, Adiodun & 'Funni Olonisakin: "Economic Fragility and Political Fluidity: Explaining Natural Resources and Conflicts", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 2000), pp. 23-36; Azam, Jean-Paul: "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 4 (July 2001), pp. 429-444; Mott, William H. IV: *The Economic Bases of Peace. Linkages Between Economic Growth and International Conflicts* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997); Weede, Erich: *Economic Development, Social Order, and World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Collier, Paul: "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy" (unpublished World Bank Paper, 15 June 2000) quoted in Klare: *op. cit.*, p. 211; idem & Anke Hoeffler: "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2355 (Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, 2000).. See also Berdal,

---

Mats & David Keen: “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications”, *Millennium*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1997), pp. 795-818; Jean, Francois & Jean-Christophe Rufin (eds.): *Économie des guerres civiles* (Paris: Hachette, 1996); Berdal, Mats & David Malone (eds.): *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

<sup>191</sup> Inspired by, but differs from, Rupesinghe, Kumar: *Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An Introduction to Conflict Resolution* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), pp. 88; Lipsey, Roderick K. von: “The Intervention Cycle”, in idem (ed.): *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 3-49; Kriesberg: *op. cit.* (note 1), p. 25.

## DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH SERIES

### WORKING PAPERS:

- No. 1: *Olav Jull Sørensen*: Marketing Issues in Peasant Agricultural Development, 55 pp, 1983.
- No. 2: *Hans Gullestrup*: The Ecol-Humanistic Technology - the new Technology as Experiences from the Past, 33 pp, 1983.
- No. 3: *Georg Sørensen*: Transnationals and the Transfer of Technology to the Third World, 31 pp, 1984.
- No. 4: *Georg Sørensen*: International Bureaucracies and Aid: The Political Economic of the 'B-Share', 11 pp, 1984.
- No. 5: *Georg Sørensen*: Notes on Materialism and Boredom - Western Development Ideals, 12 pp, 1984.
- No. 6: *Olav Jull Sørensen*: Marketing Systems and Economic Development. An Institutional-Structural Approach, 41 pp, 1984.
- No. 7: *Georg Sørensen*: How much Poison is Another Man's Meat? - Notes on the Logic of World Systems Analysis, 29 pp, 1984.
- No. 8: *Georg Sørensen*: Peace and Development: Looking for the Right Track, 18 pp, 1984.
- No. 9: *Georg Sørensen*: The Twists and Turns of Development Theory - A Comment on "The European Experience" by Dieter Senghaas. 19 pp, 1984.
- No. 10: *Jacques Hersh & Ellen Brun*: Aspects of Soviet Participation in a Shifting World Economy. 45 pp, 1984.
- No. 11: *Olav Jull Sørensen*: Marketing System Development and Labour Migration: Analysis and Consequences. 41 pp, 1984.
- No. 12: *Georg Sørensen*: How Cold is the Second Cold War? - An Assessment of the Scope of 'the Great Contest'. 23 pp, 1984.
- No. 13: *John E. Kuada*: Agricultural Development in the Third World. 23 pp, 1984.
- No. 14: *Olav Jull Sørensen*: Profiles of Tanzanian Peasants and their Marketing Implications. 52 pp, 1984.
- No. 15: *Jørgen Kristiansen*: Urban Passenger Transport in Developing Countries - Socio-economic Impact and the Choice of Technology. 58 pp, 1985.
- No. 16: *John E. Kuada*: Marketing Systems in a Development Process. 35 pp, 1985.
- No. 17: *Georg Sørensen*: Some Contradictions in a Rich Concept on Development. 14 pp, 1985.
- No. 18: *Olav Jull Sørensen*: Marketing of Agricultural Inputs/Implements and Profiles of Farmers in Kenya: Project Preparations. 47 pp, 1986.
- No. 19: *Georg Sørensen*: Development Through the Eyes of a Child. 17 pp, 1986.
- No. 20: *Georg Sørensen*: International and External Intertwined: 5 Obstacles to Development in India. 20 pp, 1986.
- No. 21: *John E. Kuada*: Macro-Micro Integrated Framework for Market Opportunity Analysis and Project Selection. 14 pp, 1986.
- No. 22: *Olav Jull Sørensen*: Co-operatives: Movement-to-Movement Cooperation. Some Conceptual Views. 15 pp, 1986.
- No. 23: *John E. Kuada*: Financing Rural Food Marketing Systems in Ghana. 16 pp, 1986.
- No. 24: *Hans Gullestrup*: Culture, Cultural Analysis and Cultural Ethics - Or What Divides and What Unites Us? (Out of print) (in Danish). 84 pp, 1987.
- No. 24a: *Hans Gullestrup*: Culture, Cultural Analysis and Cultural Ethics - Or What Divides and What Unites Us? (Second revised edition) (Out of print) (in Danish). 92 pp, 1988.
- No. 25: *John E. Kuada*: Food Marketing in Ghana, the Role of Rural Food Traders. 53 pp, 1988.
- No. 26: *Henrik A. Nielsen*: Monitoring Rural Development in Bangladesh. 22 pp, 1989.
- No. 27: *Hans Gullestrup*: The Ethical Dilemma in the Intercultural Co-operation, or: The Development Aid Worker's Personal Problem (in Danish). 26 pp, 1991.
- No. 28: *Chaiwoot Chaipan*: Current Issues on Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia. 24 pp, 1991.
- No. 29: *Henrik Nielsen*: Databased Information on Danida-Projects 1962-91: Overview and Analysis of the Daniproj-Database. 55 pp, 1992.
- No. 30: *Hans Gullestrup*: Evaluating Social Consequences of Social Changes in the Third World Countries. 24 pp, 1993.
- No. 31: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: In The Shadow of the Pacific Century - Comparative Perspectives on Externalities Influence on Economic Policy-Making in Southeast Asian Would-be NICs. 106 pp, 1993.
- No. 32: *Henrik A. Nielsen*: Local Community Development Around the Bay of Bengal: Context, Crises and Perspectives. 27 pp, 1994.
- No. 33: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Southeast Asian State Responses to a Regionalized World Economy. 21 pp, 1994.
- No. 34: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Semi-autonomy in Economic Policy-making: The Case of Thailand. 28 pp, 1994.

- No. 35: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Increasing Exports in a Decreasing World Market: The Role of Developmental States in the ASEAN-4. 27 pp, 1994.
- No. 36: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: State Capacities and Bargaining Strategies in the Global Disorder. 14 pp, 1994.
- No. 37: *Samir Amin*: The Future of Global Polarization. 17 pp, 1994.
- No. 38: *Peter W. Cunningham*: The Re-affirmation of State Socialism. The South African Debate. 17 pp, 1995.
- No. 39: *Andre Gunder Frank*: Nothing New in the East: No New World Order. 28 pp, 1994.
- No. 40: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: State Intervention in Southeast Asia. Creating Growth without Welfare. 20 pp, 1994.
- No. 41: *Garry Rodan*: Ideological Convergences Across 'East' and 'West': The New Conservative Offensive. 24 pp, 1995.
- No. 42: *Jacques Hersh*: North Korea: Ideal-Type Anomaly. 18 pp, 1995.
- No. 43: *Research Centre for Development and International Relations (DIR), Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt et al. (eds.)*: Research Program 1995-1997. Globalization and Social Change - Structures, Systems and Unidisciplinary Research. 74 pp, 1995.
- No. 44: *Feiwel Kupferberg*: Ethno-nationalism, Liberal Democracy and the Psychology of the Post Cold War Era. 19 pp, 1995.
- No. 45: *Feiwel Kupferberg*: Uncertainty, Chaos and Learning: Prolegomenon to a Sociology of Creativity. 27 pp, 1995.
- No. 46: *Feiwel Kupferberg*: Strategic Learning: East Germany as a "Model Case" for Transformation Theory. 26 pp, 1995.
- No. 47: *Li Xing*: China and East Asia vs. The West: Controversies, Clashes and Challenges. 19 pp, 1995.
- No. 48: *Kwang-Yeong Shin*: Democratization and Class Politics in Korea, 1987 - 1993. 20 pp, 1995.
- No. 49: *Joachim Hirsch*: Regulation Theory and its Applicability to Studies on Globalization and Social Change. 12 pp, 1995.
- No. 50: *Ellen Brun*: The New Social Contract: Sustainability from below. 20 pp, 1995.
- No. 51: *Li Xing*: The Dynamics of East Asian Intra-Regional Economic Relations. 22 pp, 1995.
- No. 52: *Kwang-Yeong Shin*: Characteristics of the East Asian Economic System: Authoritarian Capitalism and The Developmental State. 33 pp, 1996.
- No. 53: *Li Xing*: Playing Democracy and Human Rights. The International System and the China-West Case. 17 pp, 1996.
- No. 54: *Jacques Hersh & Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Dirigisme or Laissez-Faire? - Catching-up Strategies in the Global System After the Demise of Soviet-Style Command Economies. 22 pp, 1996.
- No. 55: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt & Jacques Hersh*: Peace Convergence and Political Legitimacy in Israel and Palestine. 16 pp, 1997.
- No. 56: *David Harvey*: Globalization in Question. 22 pp, 1997.
- No. 57: *Amiya Kumar Bagchi*: In Praise of the Developmental State. 35 pp, 1997.
- No. 58: *Su-Hoon Lee*: The Rise of Environmentalism in South Korea. 31 pp, 1997.
- No. 59: *Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya*: The Politics of Regionalism: APEC and the EU in Comparative Perspective. 37 pp, 1997.
- No. 60: *Manfred Bienefeld*: The State and Civil Society: The Political Economy of the "New Social Policy". 35 pp, 1997.
- No. 61: *Duncan McCargo*: Problematising Democratisation: The Thai Case. 22 pp, 1997.
- No. 62: *Li Xing*: Conceptualizing the Crisis of Socialism: A Gramscian Approach. Some Reflections on the Chinese Socialist Experience. 41 pp, 1998.
- No. 63: *Henrik A. Nielsen*: Decentralising the Monitoring of Development Intervention: From Local Government Impact-Monitoring. 116 pp, 1998.
- No. 64: *Suresh Narayanan*: From Miracle to Realities: The Malaysian Economy in Crisis. 26 pp, 1998.
- No. 65: *Li Xing, Jacques Hersh & Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: The Rise and Fall of East Asian Capitalism: Back to the future? 30 pp, 1998.
- No. 66: *Jan Oberg*: Globalization and Responses by Civil Society to Humanitarian Emergencies. 44 pp, 1998.
- No. 67: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Development Theory and the Crisis of the State. 30 pp, 1998.
- No. 68: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Jacques Hersh and Li Xing (eds.) and members of DIR*: Research Program 1998-2000 Globalization and Social Change Interdisciplinary Critical Perspectives. 81 pp, 1998.
- No. 69: *Katarina Tomaševski*: Human Rights in International Development Co-operation: Between Politics and Policy. 69 pp, 1999.
- No. 70: *Mammo Muchie*: Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa's Renewal in the Era of Globalisation. 32 pp, 1999.

- No. 71: *Wolfgang Sachs*: Globalization and Sustainability. 38 pp, 1999.
- No. 72: *Xing Li*: The Market Approach to Industrialization: A Critique of China's Experiment. 37 pp, 1999.
- No. 73: *Bob Jessop*: The State and the Contradictions of the Knowledge-Driven Economy. 37 pp, 1999.
- No. 74: *Bob Jessop*: What follows Fordism? On the Periodization of Capitalism and its Regulation. 36 pp, 1999.
- No. 75: *Mammo Muchie*: Climbing the Value-Added Chain in Leather Manufacture: Lessons from the Indian Case to Enhance Value-Added Leather Processing in Ethiopia and Kenya. 26 pp, 2000.
- No. 76: *Stanislav Menshikov*: Macropolicies to Help Re-Start Economic Growth in Russia. 44 pp, 2000.
- No. 77: *Stanislav Menshikov*: Indicators and Trends of Economic Globalisation. 26 pp, 2000.
- No. 78: *Stanislav Menshikov*: The Role of International Capital Flows: How to Reduce the Vulnerability of the Global Economy. 23 pp, 2000.
- No. 79: *Mammo Muchie*: The Way Africa Entered The Millennium: Trousers and Skirts down or Head High: A Commentary. 19 pp, 2000.
- No. 80: *Manfred Bienefeld*: Globalisation and Social Change: Drowning in the Icy Waters of Commercial Calculation. 48 pp, 2000.
- No. 81: *Mammo Muchie*: From Protest to Sanitation: Critical Reflections on the UN's Discourse of Environmentally friendly Technologies. 24 pp, 2000.
- No. 82: *Jacques Hersh*: Globalization and Regionalization: Two Facets of One Process. 22 pp, 2000.
- No. 83: *Mammo Muchie*: Towards a Theory for Re-framing Pan-Africanism: An Idea Whose Time Has Come. 30 pp, 2000.
- No. 84: *Rajah Rasiah*: From Dragons to Dwarfs: Reexamining Neo-Liberal Explanations of the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis. 23 pp, 2000.
- No. 85: *Jacques Hersh*: The Constraints of World Capitalism in Catching up. 35 pp, 2000.
- No. 86: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Political Business as Usual-Comparing Public-Private Partnerships in East and Southeast Asia. 22 pp, 2000.
- No. 87: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Democratization and Social Welfare in Thailand. 23 pp, 2000.
- No. 88: *Mammo Muchie*: The Uptake of Environmentally Sensitive Innovation in Production in Sub-Saharan Africa. 19 pp, 2000.
- No. 89: *Mammo Muchie*: Imagining Ethiopia Beyond War and Poverty: The two-year war between two strategic allies in the Horn of Africa. 34 pp, 2000.
- No. 90: *Susanne Thorbek*: Beyond Equal Rights. 25 pp, 2000.
- No. 91: *Timothy M. Shaw*: Development Studies at the Start of the New Millennium in South and North. 18 pp, 2000.
- No. 92: *Jane L. Parpart*: Rethinking Participatory Empowerment, gender and development: The PRA Approach. 24 pp, 2000.
- No. 93: *Timothy M. Shaw*: Contemporary Conflicts in Africa: implications for development studies/policies. 36 pp, 2000.
- No. 94: *Andre Gunder Frank*: ReOrient Historiography and Social Theory. 41 pp, 2000
- No. 95: *Howard Stein*: The Development of the Developmental State in Africa: A Theoretical Inquiry. 30 pp, 2000.
- No. 96: *Li Xing and Jacques Hersh*: Understanding Capitalism: Crises and Passive Revolutions. 35 pp, 2001.
- No. 97: *Jiang Shixue*: Reflections from Comparative Studies Of the Development Models in Latin America and East Asia. 15 pp, 2001.
- No. 98: *Jiang Shixue*: Sino-Latin American Relations: Retrospect and Prospects. 21 pp, 2001.
- No. 99: *Peter Wad*: Social Development in East Asia: Warfare, Workfare, Welfare? 51 pp, 2001.
- No. 100: *Peadar Kirby*: Is the Irish state developmental? 28 pp, 2001.
- No. 101: *Elmar Altvater*: The Growth Obsession. 28 pp, 2001.
- No. 102: *Berhanu Gutema Balcha*: Food Insecurity in Ethiopia: the Impact of Socio-political Forces. 17 pp, 2001.
- No. 103: *Marianne H. Marchand*: Gendering Globalization in an Era of Transnational Capital: New Cross-border Alliances and Strategies of Resistance in a Post-NAFTA Mexico. 21 pp, 2001.
- No. 104: *Ravindra Kumar*: Gandhi: Non-violence and Indian Democracy. 9 pp, 2002.
- No. 105: *Mammo Muchie*: The New Partnership for African Development (Nepad): A False or a True Start for Shaping Africa's Decolonised Future? 10 pp, 2002.
- No. 106: *Vibeke Andersson*: Indigenous Authority and State Policy: Popular participation in two villages in rural Bolivia. 19 pp, 2002.
- No. 107: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Rethinking the Nexus between Development Theory and IR: From Old Divisions to New Encounters. (forthcoming).
- No. 108: *Louise Takeda*: The Emancipatory Potential of Ecological Economics: A Thermodynamic Perspective on Economics, Space and Sustainability. 95 pp, 2002.

- No. 109: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: No Middle Road Capitalism: The Impact of the Uniform Policy-regime in Eastern Europe and East Asia. (forthcoming).
- No. 110: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Confronting Globalization through Social Reform in East and Southeast Asia. (forthcoming).
- No. 111: *Johan Galtung*: A World in Economic Crisis. 33 pp, 2002.
- No. 112: *Kristen Nordhaug*: US Hegemony, Economic Integration and Monetary Regionalism in East Asia. 33 pp, 2002.
- No. 113: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia. (forthcoming).
- No. 114: *Rajah Rasiah*: The Competitive Impact of China on Southeast Asia's Labor Markets. 37 pp, 2002.
- No. 115: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Crisis Management in Thailand: The Ambivalence of "New" Keynesian Responce. 27 pp, 2003.
- No. 116: *Annette Kanstrup-Jensen*: Constraints on Capability Formation of Indigenous Communities: The Case of Human Development among Akha and Hmong Groups in South East Asia. 22 pp, 2003.
- No. 117: *Li Xing & Mammo Muchie*: Globalization and Social Well-being Alternative Approach to Well-being Attainment and Measurement. 22 pp, 2003.
- No. 118: *Bjørn Møller*: Raising armies in a rough neighbourhood. The Military and Militarism in Southern Africa. 45 pp, 2003.
- No. 119: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Making capitalism work: The dubious dichotomy between welfare and workfare. 24 pp, 2003.
- No. 120: *Bjørn Møller*: African conflicts: Background factors, motives and patterns. 92 pp, 2003.
- No. 121: *Li Xing & Jacques Hersh*: The Genesis of capitalism. 30 pp, 2003.
- No. 122: *Bjørn Møller*: Conflict theory. 68 pp, 2003.
- No. 123: *Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt*: Reflections on human rights and the new US world disorder. (forthcoming).
- No. 124: *Bjørn Møller*: Aid against terrorism. 19 pp, 2003.