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## Nationers Tegn

*Resumé af og et appendix til en doktorafhandling*

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**Ulf Hedetoft**

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## FORORD

Indeværende udgivelse omfatter to relaterede tekster:

1. Det obligate danske resumé af min doktorafhandling *Signs of Nations. Studies in the Political Semiotics of Self and Other in Contemporary European Nationalism*, som netop er udkommet på Dartmouth. Udgivelsen er støttet af Statens Humanistiske Forskningsråd. Afhandlingen er af Det humanistiske Fakultet ved Aalborg Universitet antaget til forsvar for den filosofiske doktorgrad. Forsvaret finder sted fredag d. 26. januar 1996 kl. 13.00, Auditorium B, Kroghstrædekomplekset, Aalborg Universitet.

2. Portrætter af 9 af de 50 respondenter, der indgik som en væsentlig del af afhandlingens empiriske datagrundlag. Disse 'nationale portrætter' var oprindeligt konciperet som en del af selve afhandlingen - derfor er de også skrevet på engelsk -, men jeg valgte af fremstillingsøkonomiske grunde at udelade dem. Ikke desto mindre kan de have interesse for særlige grupper af læsere, som på denne måde får adgang til materialet i appendix-form. Om den empiriske del af undersøgelsen i øvrigt, herunder respondenternes rolle, se især afhandlingens del II, kapitel I.

Ulf Hedetoft

20.11.95



## SAMMENFATTENDE REDEGØRELSE<sup>1</sup>

Denne redegørelse for afhandlingens væsentligste resultater vil falde i to dele: I. Form og metode; II. Substansen. Del I vil igen dele sig i fire afsnit: 1. Argumentets baggrund og sigte. 2. Argumentets form. 3. Argumentets empiri og litteratur. 4. Argumentets teori og metode. Del II falder i to afsnit: 1. Argumentets resultater, I. 2. Argumentets resultater, II. De første fire afsnit vil kort skitsere hvad der i afhandlingen især er koncentreret i Del I, Kapitel I, og Del II, Kapitel I, mens de to afsnit under del II i essensen er et forsøg på at udkrystallisere de mest substantielle momenter i Del II, Kapitlerne VII, respektive VIII.

### I. FORM OG METODE

#### 1. Argumentets baggrund og sigte

Fremstillingen tager udgangspunkt i fire afgørende forhold med relation til nationalisme i Europa, hvoraf ét er af makro-kontextuel og tre af teoretisk-metodisk karakter.

Det første forhold gælder de ændrede internationale, især EF/EU-europæiske, betingelser som nationalisme og nationalstat idag er konfronteret med i lyset af suverænitetsstab, integrationsbestrebelsers, funktionsforskydninger, transnationale bevægelser osv. Det var i den forbindelse en påtrængende opgave at forsøge at begrebsliggøre og empirisk at analysere konsekvenserne af sådanne processer for nationalisme i Europa idag, særligt med henblik på eventuelt ændrede former og konfigurationer for sammenhænge mellem nationale selvbilleder/selvforståelser og de dertil svarende fremmedbilleder. Hypotesen er, at den realhistoriske 'dekonstruktionsproces', som nationalismen herved undergår - og som stikordsagtigt kaldes 'euro-nationalisme' -, afsætter en række tegn, 'spor', såvel i politiske/officielle diskurser og ideale (fx medie-) konstruktioner af national identitet, som i den subjektive forestillingsverden - nationalidentiteter som levet proces og konkret billedliggørelse. På trods af en stigende forskningsinteresse for 'det nationale' skæbne i Europa og i den øvrige verden, er der kun få forsøg på systematisk og omfattende at nærme sig en forklaring på karakteren af igangværende transformationsprocesser og deres strukturelle aflejringer i dette område. Det hænger i sin tur sammen med de tre nævnte teoretisk-metodiske udgangsforudsætninger, der alle hviler på mangler og svagheder i den etablerede nationalismeforskning *per se*.

1. Det er en almindelig antagelse, at 'nationalisme' er et enhedsligt genstandsområde. Selv hvor det teoretisk erkendes, at antagelsen er problematisk, *behandles* nationalisme-spørgsmål ikke desto mindre hyppigt som relateret til ét begrebsligt felt - omend dette lige så ofte beskrives som vagt og vanskeligt at afgrænse. Heroverfor står denne afhandlings grundantagelse: at nationalisme kan begrebsliggøres og analyseres som en dualstruktur, bestående af 'objektivisk-ideal konstruktion' på den ene side (det "makroskopiske perspektiv") og 'subjektiv-konkret imagination' (det "mikroskopiske perspektiv") på den anden. Hvor den første udgår fra de nationale samfunds 'symbolske konstruktører' (politikere, medier, intelligentsia osv.) - altså 'oppefra' -, bæres sidstnævnte af modtagerne og (om)fortolkerne af de nationale billeder, den almindelige befolkning, nationerne i ordets egentlige betydning - 'nedefra'. Det er først her at konstruktionen 'nationalidentitet' bliver virkelig, dvs. som internaliserede billeder, følelser, selvforståelser, orienteringer og værdier: som levet "national allegori". De to delområder betinger hinanden i et komplekst interaktionsforhold, der umuliggør at de reduceres til hinanden, men ikke desto mindre knytter dem til hinanden som hinandens *alter ego*. De har hver deres interne strukturering, logik, betydningsrelationer og mening, men er samtidig henvist til hinanden som gensidig livsbetingelse. Alligevel er de ikke ligeværdige: nationalismens symbolkonstruktioner må anses for den uafhængigt variable, 'årsag', deres folkelige genfortællinger og tilegnelser som den afhængige, 'virkning'. Sikkert af den grund (og også fordi sidstnævnte er empirisk svært tilgængelig, især i tidligere perioder) er den overvejende del af nationalismeforskningen viet førstnævnte; selv når sidstnævnte er på tapetet, er de det normalt kun i form af deres ideelle repræsentationer *via* førstnævnte - vikariøst, inferentielt, ofte implicit; eller i bedste fald som statistik og meningsmålinger, i kvantificerede og praktisk anvendelige koordinatssystemer. Ikke mindst derfor har indeværende afhandling sat sig for, som primært mål, at afdække de "mikroskopiske", subjektive, imaginerede former for det der kaldes den 'nationale allegori' i de tre lande, som undersøgelsen omfatter: Danmark, Tyskland, og Storbritannien - så tæt på deres legemliggjorte form, borgerne - de levende tegn, bærerne af de nationale repræsentationer - som muligt, og under hensyntagen til deres egenrationalitet, autonome forestillingsformer og endogene udsigelseskraft. I denne konception bliver de ideelle konstruktioner primært til en forklarende og fortolkende 'interpretant' for disse subjektive 'tegnkonfigurationer' og 'signifikationer' snarere end et analytisk mål i sig selv. Men samtidig indebærer dette også, at de aktuelle sam- og modklangsformer mellem (euro-)nationalismens to ontologiske niveauer sættes på dagsordenen og må afklares. Dette kan konkret klargøres og perspektiveres af det næste hovedpunkt.

2. Som ikke mindst Gellner (især 1983) har påvist, er nationalismens ideal en konvergens mellem 'politik' og 'kultur', stat og nation, inden for et afgrænset territorium.

Omend denne afhandling (i Del I, Kapitel V) sætter et spørgsmålstejn ved anvendelsen af 'kulturel homogenitet' og problematiserer denne konvergens' kulturelle realitet i de fleste tilfælde, er der ingen tvivl om at dette korrekt - som Europas etnisk-nationale historiske model - afspejler tingenes *ideelle* tilstand, og også til den reelle, hvis 'kultur' vel at mærke erstattes af 'identitet' - ikke som metafysisk begreb, men som den forestillede form for borgernes politisk motiverede vilje til nationalt fællesskab, en(s)hed og mission. I afhandlingen forklares hvordan 'politisk identitet' skabes og i visse modulationer bliver til 'eksistentiel natur', altså bevidsthedsmæssigt afpolitiseres. Imidlertid er denne tingenes afpolitiserede tilstand en forskudt refleksion af netop konvergens mellem stat og nation, en tilstand der hviler på a) et nationsideal uden for og ved siden af staten, en slags national sakralitet der imaginært krænkes af sækulariteten og instrumentaliteten i det Politiske, men ikke desto mindre b) en relativt tilfredsstillende national sammenhæng og homogenitet (herunder en instrumentel sådan) mellem nation og stat. Med andre ord: nationalidentitet må antages at have et afgørende 'politisk' element, selvom det sjældent dukker op som sådan for den nationale forestilling - ofte tværtimod. Det er om noget denne politiske dimension der adskiller denne form for 'identitet' fra andre, mindre eksistentielle, mere foranderlige identitetsparametre (køn, alder, region, erhverv osv.). Denne politiske dimension (som må holdes afsondret fra national-politisk diskurs, åbenlys nationalistisk ideologi, og national-politiske bevægelser) er i den kritiske nationalismelitteratur på det nærmeste et uudforsket område. Denne afhandling sætter sig derfor som et vigtigt mål at undersøges formerne for nationalismens politiske semiotik, de tegn, billeder, meningssammenhænge og emotioner, der i skiftende konfigurationer konstruerer og dekonstruerer borgernes og deres nationalidentitets binding til det politiske domæne i dagens Europa - og primært betragtet gennem det centrale prisme, der udgøres af forskellige slags Selv-Andetheds relationer. Spørgsmålet her var da at udforske nærmere, hvilken indvirkning igangværende politisk-strukturelle deformationer og dislokationer mellem 'national' og 'international' (her: europæisk) kunne have for nationalisme i dennes (op)levede former, og hvordan dette ville påvirke den 'politiske dimension'. Gellners antagelse (1983) om at "nationalisme ikke normalt kan overleve uden sin politiske skal, staten", måtte efterprøves konkret.

3. Den tredje metodiske forudsætning har ligget indbygget i bemærkningerne ovenfor, uden at være blevet gjort eksplicit. Det gælder det synkrone overfor det diakrone perspektiv, strukturelle overfor historiske kausaliteter, tidssnittet overfor den processuelle linearitet. Den altovervejende del af forskningen i nationale spørgsmål - og uden tvivl den mest indflydelsesrige - applicerer en historisk optik, interesserer sig for nationalstatens og nationalismens tilblivelsesprocesser, overgangsfaser, mutationer - dens hypertrofier, atrofier og postmoderne kramper. Sådanne komponenter, nødvendige og

vigtige som de er, er også tilstede i afhandlingen, men har en klart underordnet status relativt til det synkrone perspektiv - afdækningen af nationalismens strukturelle og betydningsbærende former i et tidssnit koncentreret omkring år 1990. Dette er ikke kun motiveret af en substantiel interesse i den aktuelle situation i Europa, men metodisk endvidere af den antagelse, at historien *som forklaring* på nationale mentalitetsformer ikke tilbyder en tilfredsstillende, endsige den eneste, ramme. Nationalidentitet kan ikke reduceres til en historisk dynamik, snarere tilbyder det historiske perspektiv en besnærende ekstern 'logik', der kommer til kort over for en forklaring på nationalismens objektive såvel som subjektive rationale. Her er historien en forudsætning, en betingelse, men ikke en tilstrækkelig sådan, ejheller en egentlig grund. At nationalismen hele tiden trækker på og (re)konstruerer historien for sine egne formål er ikke et overbevisende modargument. Tværtimod: Historien kan som sådan ikke forklare, hvorfor nationalstatslige repræsentanter (politiske eller mere 'folkelige') restløst tilegner sig en ofte imaginær eller tilpasset historie, former historien i et bestemt billede, eller - lige så tit - lider af uhelbredelig amnæsi - netop for at opretholde og bekræfte en bestemt identitetsforestilling. Således er 'historicitet' snarere end 'historie' i brændpunktet for afhandlingen; som Anthony Giddens har udtrykt det (1985, p. 212), er det kun i den moderne vestlige verden, at historie på denne måde bliver til historicitet - den kontrollerede anvendelse af refleksionen på historien som et middel til at forandre den. Man kunne passende tilføje: og til at fastholde dens mere nutidige former, ideelle såvel som materielle. Interessen i og viljen til sådanne forestillinger må centralt søges i mere selv bærende strukturer, synkrone politisk-kulturelle processer og nationale identitetsformers betydningsbærende kraft. Her er der brug for en art etnografisk arkæologi i samklang med politisk-semiotisk mentalitetsanalyse. Dette skal på ingen måde forstås som en Lévi-Strauss'sk afvisning af historien, men som et forsøg på at indføre et komplementært og nødvendigt perspektiv til forståelsen af nationalismen som subjektiv-kollektiv identitetsdanner.

## 2. Argumentets form

Således er afhandlingens overordnede sigte at studere nationalismens politiske semiotik ved at opspore og undersøge en række forskellige 'nations-tegn' som indikatorer på nationalismens former, roller og funktioner i en europæisk integrationskontext inden for begge de ovennævnte to hovedmodi: nationalismen som politisk diskurs og symbolik, resp. som et folkeligt identifikationsraster for opfattelse, strukturering og normativisering af verden. Gennem en relativt statisk-synkron analyse er det da hensigten endeligt at give et begrundet bud på hvordan nationalidentitet ser ud nedefra/indefra, hvordan den påvirkes

af politisk-økonomisk 'integration', og hvor den for de to sidste århundreder så afgørende samfunds- og mentalitetsnexus - stat-nation - er på vej hen. I denne forstand forsøger fremstillingen i sidste instans at historicere og dynamisere det synkrone.

Hvad angår den form (ikke at forveksle med metode i strikte forstand, som vil blive behandlet i afsnit 4), som dette hovedargument antager, skal her fremhæves følgende komponenter: 1. den binære struktur/disposition; 2. Selv/Andetheds-figuren; 3. interkulturel komparation i to parametre: 'den gamle konfiguration' og landesammenligning; 4. forklaring og fortolkning - intertextualitet.

1. Den skitserede binaritet i selve genstandsområdet reflekteres i afhandlingens synoptiske struktur. Del I, 'Orders and Borders', behandler hvad jeg har valgt at kalde de makroskopiske perspektiver - de 'ovenfra' kommende, objektive, konsensuelle konstruktioner og diskursiveringer af nationalidentitet, resp. idealtypiske repræsentationer for og konfigurationer i den 'nationale allegori'. Her skabes ideelt en normativ kulturel og samfundsmæssig orden, baseret på klart optrukne grænser - nationalismens mentalgeografi. Med Kapitel V som det afgørende drejningspunkt indføres derefter i forskellige tempi slangen i paradiset: det inter- og supranationales praktiske dekonstruktion af de ideelle konvergenser, homogeniteterne i det Nationale, de konstruerede sammenfald af diskurs, interesser, billeder, mentaliteter og territorier. Kapitel VII om nationalidentitet og europæisk integration i tre lande repræsenterer her den væsentligste del af argumentet, og Kapitel VIII om suverænitets ændrede former afrunder Del I, der - som nævnt ovenfor - på én og samme tid fungerer som deduktiv interpretant for, 'årsag' til, og modpol for den langt mere induktive Del II, som er afhandlingens afgørende drejningspunkt.

Del II - 'Imagine Nations' - omhandler som undertitlen siger 'personaliserede kosmologier og interkulturelle billeder', nationalismens 'subjektive' modus i et mikroskopisk perspektiv - gennem en tæt, komparativ, intertextuel læsning af de tre nationers mentale tilegnelser af deres nationale tilhørsforhold: nationalismens mentalarkæologi i de tre lande (som tidligere: Danmark, Tyskland og Storbritannien). Fremstillingen bevæger sig fra en 'eksemplarisk' analyse af de tre identiteter i det spejl som 2. verdenskrig udgør, via en komparativt struktureret læsning af de tre mentale nationaluniverser taget for sig, til to interkulturelt opbyggede kapitler som analyserer den nationale Andetheds betydning for Selvbillederne langs to akser: interkulturelle billeder og vurderinger af de to andre lande i undersøgelsen (det specifikke, horisontale Andet); og sammenhænge mellem de nationale identiteter og 'Europa' som abstrakt, vertikal Andethed. Delen omfatter desuden et perspektiverende kapitel om USA som komplementær, extra-europæisk Andethed, samt to konkluderende kapitler: ét der primært syntetiserer resultaterne af Del II, og ét andet der i en mere inferentiel-deduktiv ånd sammenfatter den samlede fremstillings væsentligste indsigter. Disse to kapitler vil blive kort resumeret i del II nedenfor. I bred forstand

forfølger Del II samme fremstillingslogik som Del I, men inden for den 'subjektive modus': fra formel identitetsstabilitet til gradvis dekonstruktion via Andethedernes destabiliserende indvirkning. Her er der dog i højere grad tale om en formel argumentationslogik, idet det viste sig at denne indvirknings omfang og art var højest forskellig i de tre nationer, samt at destabiliseringer og fragmenteringer kunne spores allerede i den autonome undersøgelse af nationalidentiteternes empiriske repræsentationsformer (Kapitel III).

2. Som det således fremgår, har Selv/Andetheds-relationismen en fremtrædende plads i den formelle såvel som substantielle argumentation. Denne 'os-dem' figur er naturligvis en efterhånden gammelkendt *topos* i nationalismeforskningen (især dens antropologisk-etnografiske manifestationer), men antager her nogle nye former og funktioner, substantielt pga det integrationistiske perspektiv, formelt pga en systematisk, fleksibel og interkulturel anvendelse af figuren. Grundlæggende skelnes mellem tre hovedmodaliteter: den eksklusive, den gradualistiske og den eksotiske, som hver især igen falder i forskellige varianter. En væsentlig del af vurderingen af nationalidentiteternes aktuelle 'tilstand' beror på denne relationisme-figur som en væsentlig lakmustest: i hvilke former, funktioner, billeder og normativiseringer forekommer forskellige typer Andethed - i et kontinuum fra den 'hjemlige' Andethed (de 'andre' landsmænd) til den mest 'fremmede'. Interessant er her, at den begrebsligt mest grundlæggende modalitet - den eksklusive, afgrænsende - viser sig at have vanskelige livsbetingelser i begge nationalismens hovedmodi, især fordi de nationale selvopfattelser - i deres endogene mentale strukturering, og ikke kun i deres diskursive former - er blevet mere eller mindre gennemgribende 'invaderet' af relativiserende Andetheds-former. Det Andet er nu ikke bare et 'ydre' fænomen, men også et 'indre'. Dette er ikke grundlæggende et 'multikulturalisme'-argument, men et spørgsmål om individers selvopfattelse og selvkonstruktion som nationale - deres identitetsforestilling. Og selv om Andetheden (i forskellige varianter) ofte 'kun' er tilstede som kognitiv selvrefleksion snarere end affektiv identitet, som Selv-relativering og (tit) -negering snarere end problemløs identitetsbekræftelse, er det alligevel legitimt at konkludere at 'absolutte' nationale mentaliteter er inde i en problematiseringsfase, en fase der ikke peger mod nationalidentiteternes afvikling, men deres hamskifte. En væsentlig baggrund for denne transmutation viste sig at være rolleforandringer for nationalismens politiske dimension (se videre nedenfor, del II).

3. Argumentationen drejer yderligere omkring to komparative - og med det forudgående umiddelbart sammenhængende - akser. Den ene er landekomparationen, som i overensstemmelse med den hidtil skitserede fremstillingslogik indføres gradvist i Del I, for derefter at blive fuldt udfoldet i Del II. Udover de kendte fordele ved en komparativ fremgangsmåde, nødvendiggøres den inden for projektets rammer af to forhold: af det EF/EU-europæiske sigte, afdækningen af interaktionsmønstre mellem nationalt og over-

/internationalt, som ikke på en rimelig måde kan forløbe i relation til et enkelt medlemsland; samt af det forhold, at Del II består af en 'kvalitativ analyse', der mest hensigtsmæssigt og med de største chancer for gyldige og repræsentative resultater gennemføres komparativt. Om validitet og repræsentativitet i øvrigt, se afsnit 4. Derudover sættes den allerede skitserede 'os-dem' figur i et afslørende lys gennem reelle omvendinger og 'sidebytter', hvor 'os' i én konfiguration bliver 'dem' i andre.

Den anden er på én gang en begrebslig og en historisk-betinget sammenligning, eller bedre: sammenholdning. Del I, Kapitel I argumenterer bl.a. for, at nationalismen som både diskursiv og mental identitetskonfiguration idealtypisk er en af- og udgrænsningstruktur, der centralt kan defineres og perspektiveres via fire hovedfigurer, *τοποι*, og deres forskellige interaktionsmønstre: 'krig', 'etnos', 'sport' og 'immigration'. Hvor denne 'gamle konfiguration' typisk er eksklusiv, svarende til nationale forestillings- og omgangsformer mellem ca. 1870 og 1945 (tilblivelsesfasen for 'nationale folk', nationaliseringen af 'masserne'), er udgangsantagelsen at den efter 2. verdenskrig i stigende omfang har måttet 'internationalisere' sig. Således udgør den løbende i fremstillingen et holde- og sammenholdningspunkt, en eks- eller implicit skærm som dens moderniserede former kastes op på - en skærm der som sagt er såvel af konceptuel som historisk art. Resultatet, i en kort formulering, er ikke at konfigurationen er overhalet, men at den relative meningsvægt som dens enkelte komponenter besidder for vesteuropæiske identitetskonstruktioner har skiftet: fra 'krig' og 'etnos' til deres hhv. symbolske repræsentation og potentielle modpol: 'sport' og 'immigration'. Det må understreges, at de fire figurer som benævnt her udgør symbolske kondenseringspunkter for fire betydningsklynger inden for den nationale mentalitetskonstituering (forklaret i Del I, Kapitel I og II), og ikke må forstås i ordenes dagligdags betydninger/konnotationer.

De to komparationsparametre som her skitseret hænger endvidere sammen på den måde, at de nuværende identitetsformer i de tre lande sættes afgørende i relief af den måde hvorpå de forholder sig til punkterne i den 'gamle konfiguration'. Om denne i dens rene, 'oprindelige' form, se i øvrigt Hedetoft, 1990b.

4. Endelig skal det som et på dette sted formelt snarere end metodisk punkt, dvs. ét der påvirker fremstillingsformen, fremhæves at argumentationen i samme grad - og nu og da i samme bevægelse - bestræber sig på at være forklarende (begrebsudviklende) og fortolkende (omend der nødvendigvis er mere af førstnævnte i Del I, og mere af sidstnævnte i Del II). Teoretisk-metodisk bliver denne binaritet og dens indre logik/dialektik udviklet i Del I, Kapitel I - i denne redegørelse kortfattet i afsnit 4. Rationalet ligger i selve fremstillingsstrukturen, som igen begrundes i genstandsområdets dualitet. Vigtigt at fremhæve på dette sted er, at i modsætning til mange andre fremstillinger - og hvad der måtte forekomme at være 'almindelig sund fornuft' - udvikles 'forklaringerne' ikke

i første omgang induktivt-inferentielt fra den empiriske, konkrete hermeneutik, de intertextuelle læsninger af data (Del II). Snarere er forfatteren i denne fremstilling 'jæger' først, og dernæst 'samler'. Dette er ganske vist kun en halv sandhed, men i det omfang det *er* en sandhed, er den begrundet ikke i mangel på sund sans, men i den rationalitet som er genstandsområdet iboende: Del I er forklaringsrammen, fordi genstanden dér er de nationale imagineringers første og sidste årsag. Som sådan udgør denne Del, som allerede påpeget, en nødvendig interpretant (Peirces begreb) for Del II, hvis langt mere hermeneutisk-intertextuelle karakter på den ene side nødvendiggøres af både data og genstand, men på den anden side fordrer Del I's forklaringspotentiale for ikke at ende i fortolkningernes cirkel, Ecos 'limits of interpretation' (1990), og for at data ikke risikerer at blive opfattet som et 'magisk høreapparat' (Michael Moermann, 1988), en endegyldig og uskyldsren vej til nationalidentitetens hemmelighed. Med denne tvedeling er imidlertid også sagt, at hverken er Del II slet og ret 'cases' til belysning af Del I's teoremer, ej heller er Del I uden egen-empiri (se næste afsnit). Således er forholdet mellem forklaring og fortolkning som her skitseret kun en angivelse af 'relativ vægt'. Det ville måske komme sagen nærmere at sige (i Kracauers (1971) og Ginzburgs (1993) ånd), at der hele tiden 'jagtes' og 'samles' på samme tid, men med forskellig intensitet og fokus. Endelig må ovenstående relativiseres på ét yderligere - og afgørende - punkt: For hvor Del I er forklaringsrammen, udvikles de forklarende konklusionsforsøg til den samlede fremstilling rent faktisk ved afslutningen af Del II, induktivt, data-afhængigt, og ikke aksiomatisk-deduktivt (selv om Kapitel VIII tillader sig nogle mere spekulative ekstrapolationer). På denne måde genindføres den sunde fornuft på rette plads, så alle kan være tilfredse.

### 3. Argumentets empiri og litteratur

Spørgsmålet her er da: Hvad er det der 'samles', hhv. 'jagtes'? I hvilken slags empirisk materiale har det været anset for rimeligt at finde manifestationer af nationalisme i de to modi, hvilken type tilgængelighed og indre sammenhæng besidder materialet, og på hvilken måde/på hvilke steder har jagten og indsamlingen foregået. Dette afsnit kunne indlysende blive meget langt, men vil ikke desto mindre blive holdt i det kortest mulige format. Mere metodiske spørgsmål, der umiddelbart knytter sig til empiri/data/litteratur, vil blive taget op i det følgende afsnit.

Den mest afgørende antagelse er følgende: Det ligger i selve nationalismens egenart - som et samfundsmæssigt 'masse'fænomen der i hvert fald præsumtivt overskrider diverse sociale, politiske, regionale, aldersbestemte osv. skel og forbinder alle samfundets grupper i ét 'horisontalt fællesskab' (Benedict Anderson, 1983) - at dens manifestationer må være

'allestedsnærværende', forskelligartede og ofte implicite - hvormed menes, at med undtagelse af direkte italesættelser og iscenesættelser af national identitet (som behandles i Del I), må udtryk for nationalidentitet ofte antages at forekomme som 'forskudte tegn', i betydningsmani-festationer hvor det nationale indhold ofte vil være u- eller kun halvbevidst for meningsproducenten. Således må indsamlingen/jagten ikke bare foregå over et omfattende terræn, men det indsamlede/jagtende subjekt må også se i øjnene at genstandene for hans aktivitet, de nationale tegn, kamæleonsagtigt ofte vil fremstå i ganske andre former. Dette vil være konsistent med én væsentlig begrebsliggørelse af nationalidentitet i denne afhandling, nemlig at der her er tale om en form for moderne, profan sakralitetsbevidsthed. Men det stiller samtidig forskeren over for et ikke ubetydeligt empiriproblem - især inden for rammerne af det mikroskopiske, subjektiverede perspektiv: Hvis 'nationalidentitet' er et bevidsthedsmæssigt epi- og dybdefænomen, hvordan kommer man da systematisk på sporet af dens former og indhold? Hvordan kan et tilfredsstillende datakorpus sammensættes? Og hvordan undgås spekulation og 'overfortolkninger'? Det sidste spørgsmål angår metode, og vil blive behandlet i næste afsnit. De øvrige spørgsmål vender jeg tilbage til. Først en bemærkning om Del I og dens empiri.

Her skal fire delpunkter kort nævnes: For det første, at empirien i overensstemmelse med hovedgenstanden for denne Del - nationalismens diskursive, symboliserede, idealtypiske former - væsentligst er hentet fra tekster (i bredeste definition) med stor offentlig udbredelse: journalistik, politiske taler, officielle publikationer, offentligt tilgængelige manifestationer af anden art (national-politisk symbolik), og også i vidt omfang hvad overskriften henviser til som 'litteratur': altså faglitteratur i forskellige varianter (herunder skrifter om nationalisme), som her får en dobbelt funktion: som referencer og pejlingspunkter for den kurs som argumentationen afstikker for sig selv - en slags akademisk søkort -, og som egentlig empiri, i sig selv 'tegn' på nationalisme. For det andet: at materialets indsamlingsterræn er blevet afgrænset i overensstemmelse med de metodiske antagelser om nationalidentitetens karakter, som gradvist bygges op, og som her er skitseret ovenfor: altså fx. i forhold til de fire hovedfigurer 'krig', 'etnos', 'sport', 'immigration'. For det tredje: At der ofte er tale om data som mere eller mindre direkte tematiserer det Nationale - resp. det overnationale, selv om det selvindlysende hyppigt sker i punktform eller i sammenhæng med mindre nationale diskurser. Og endelig for det fjerde, at sigtet for Del I indebærer, at empirien har en underordnet rolle i forhold til begrebsopbygning og teoriudvikling - der er tale om empiriske punktnedslag til illustration af væsentlige teoretiske pointer, i en fremstilling der tilstræber at opbygge en sammenhængende forståelseskontext for Del II.

Hvad angår Del II var det empiriske problem som nævnt større: på den ene side er der her tale om at komme på sporet af nationalidentitetens subjektiverede former; på den anden må genstanden antages at unddrage sig systematisk empiri på grund af den quasi-sakrale karakter og den forlegenhed, individer hyppigt opviser når deres nationale orienteringer og valoriseringer er på tapetet. Naturligvis kan man i forskellige typer af objektiverede 'tekster' finde eksempler på det nationale subjekts følte og kognitive tilhørsforhold til hans/hendes nationalstat, men problemet her er dobbelt: at man risikerer at slutte fra nationalidentitetens 'offentlige' til dens 'private' former, hvilket i øvrigt kunne duplikere nationalismens ontologi i dens makroskopisk-symboliserede former, idet selektionsfilteret for hvad der slipper igennem offentliggørelsens nåleøje må antages at være identisk eller overlappende; og at en sådan dataindsamling unddrager sig, eller i hvert fald vanskeliggør, systematik, ikke mindst i det komparative perspektiv.

Løsningen blev at ty til en metode, der også er behæftet med problemer, men problemer der vurderedes som mindre alvorlige, idet den sikrede sammenlignelighed, bredde og en mere umiddelbar adgang til borgerne som privatmennesker: nemlig at sammensætte tre nationale 'identitetstekster' på baggrund af data indsamlet via kvalitativt opbyggede spørgeskemaer, og opfølgende interviews med ca. 50 % af respondenterne. Svagheden ved en sådan fremgangsmåde er selvfølgelig, at deltagerne direkte konfronteres med emnet - deres nationale identitet - og at indsamlingsformen derfor umiddelbart aktiverer diverse kognitive rationaliseringer, og ikke emnets affektive aspekter; endvidere appellerer formen til en vis grad af interesse i emnet samt (selv)reflek, især på grund af det tidsforbrug som deltagelse krævede. Ikke desto mindre var det afgørende for valget af dataindsamling, at ikke kun var der ingen umiddelbar genvej til nationalidentiteternes i deres mentale strukturering og særpræg *uden om* den kognitive dimension, men desuden at denne dimension også repræsenterer en bevidsthedsmodus i hvilken den nationale identitet må antages at eksistere, og derfor måtte kunne fungere som en sikker vej til mere affektive orienteringer. Faren for selvkonstruktion og rationaliserende diskursiveringer måtte kunne neutraliseres via en bredspektret spørgeteknik der stimulerede respondenterne til at reagere på deres nationale værdisæt inden for forskellige forestillingsrammer, via de homogeniteter i reaktioner og vurderinger der måtte forekomme inden for de nationale grupper, og via det kontrastive spejl som de to andre grupper udgjorde. Det skal her som væsentlig forudsætning bemærkes, at formålet ikke var at identificere gruppespecifikke særpræg for nationalidentitet inden for hvert af de tre lande taget for sig, men at nærme sig en bestemmelse af de specifikt fælles/samlende karakteristika, i overensstemmelse med den teoretisk begrundede formodning om, at nationalidentitet kun fortjener denne betegnelse hvis den udviser a) et massepræg og b) repræsenterer en samlingsbevidsthed. Dette skal ikke forstås som en afvisning af gruppespecifikke særegenheder af kulturel art,

men som en metodisk og indholdsmæssig underordning af dem. Med andre ord: en 'national identitet' som splitter mere end den samler, er ingen sådan. Af samme grund antoges det endvidere, at gruppernes omfang - 50 i alt - ville være tilstrækkelig til at opspore nogle afgørende træk i de centrale subjektive 'nationalkonfigurationer', som afhandlingen konsekvent benævner disse socialt og politisk funderede mentalstrukturer. Spørgsmålenes indhold drejede om tre hovedakser: respondenternes vurderinger af deres 'egen' nationalidentitet; deres forestillinger om de to andre nationer i undersøgelsen; og deres vurderinger af den europæiske integrationsdimension. Desuden omfattede spørgeskemaerne en 'kategori 4', med tillægsspørgsmål vedrørende immigration, USA, arven fra 2. verdenskrig, samt to-tre landespecifikke spørgsmål (hvor resten af skemaet var identisk i de tre lande). Efter indsamlingen var afsluttet - den forløb fra sommer 1991 til sommer 1993 - blev spørgeskemabesvarelsene ordnet landevis, spørgsmål for spørgsmål, således at det var muligt umiddelbart at aflæse genkommende reaktions- og vurderingsmønstre inden for hvert land. I denne forstand bliver besvarelsene, i afhandlingen, benævnt 'nationale tekster'.

Detaljerne i forbindelse med dataindsamlingens form og indhold i øvrigt kan ikke nærmere beskrives her - læseren henvises til afhandlingens Del II, Kapitel I. Resultatet: ca. 600 siders spørgeskemabesvarelses og 40-45 timers interviewbånd (hvoraf ca. halvdelen blev transskriberet til ca. 300 siders tekst). Dette korpus har udgjort den centrale materialedel for Del II, hvoraf en anseelig mængde er forsøgt inkorporeret direkte i den analyserende tekst. Derudover inddrages som perspektivering løbende - men mere marginalet, mest i noteform - anden sammenlignelig empiri, såsom resultater af meningsmålinger, inferentielt baserede identitetsanalyser, og resultater af anden empiriindsamling og andre relevante analyser.

#### 4. Argumentets metode

De metodiske grundtræk af afhandlingen - hvoraf adskillige allerede er blevet berørt - kan hensigtsmæssigt opdeles i fire kategorier: Strukturens metode; den begrebslige metode ('forklaring'); den analyserende metode ('fortolkning'); og empiriens metode (fx. spørgsmål om repræsentativitet). Førstnævnte er i realiteten allerede blevet behandlet under afsnit 2, *Argumentets form*. Omridset af de tre øvrige vil her kort blive skitseret i tur og orden.

1. Med sit overordnede sigte placerer afhandlingen sig i et krydsfelt afgrænset af politisk analyse på den ene side og kulturanalyse på den anden. Dette er et område der løst har fået betegnelsen 'kulturstudier' ('Cultural Studies') hæftet på sig, et område for 'tværvideenskabelighed' og 'interdisciplinaritet' som i værste fald indebærer en relativ

mangel på metodisk stringens, i bedste en gensidig befrugtning af tematisk overlappende fagområder, -begreber og -traditioner, som hos fx. Bourdieu, Geertz og Raymond Williams. Generelt er det dog ikke forfjeldet at hævde, at dette interdisciplinære felt stadig alt for tit er præget af subjektivism og metodisk uafklarethed. Den begrebslige del af den metodiske problematik i afhandlingen har derfor som væsentligst formål at formulere en forklaringsramme og nogle begreber, der gør det muligt at sammenknytte politisk-sociale og kulturelt-mentalitetmæssige sider af nationalismen til en ramme for konkret mentalitetsanalyse - også selv om sådanne rammer eller modeller altid har en vis grad af heuristik som følgefænomen.

Som allerede afhandlingens titel indikerer, er det p.t. bedste og mest stringent formulerede begrebsapparat der egner sig til at samle sådanne diversificerede inspirationer og tematiske sammenfald efter denne forfatters opfattelse semiotikken, mere præcist en generel kultursemiotik - teorierne om kulturtegns sociale liv og interaktion, som formuleret fra Saussure og Peirce til Barthes, Eco, Greimas og Sebeok - også selv om semiotiske øvelser i adskillige varianter ofte har en overdrevent esoterisk karakter. Men semiotikken som central inspirationskilde muliggør afgørende og væsentlige symbioser mellem socialt og kulturelt, individuelt og kollektivt, det mikro-analyserende og det makro-inferentielle, struktur og proces, hermeneutik og explikation, emotioner og iscenesættelser, identiteter og deres konkrete manifestationer, os-hed og andet-hed. Afhandlingen forsøger, med dette som pejlepunkt, en begrebslig og analytisk sammentænkning af nationale tematikker som 'egentligt' henhører til hhv. politologi/politisk filosofi og kultur/textanalyse/etnografi, via en konceptualisering af nationalisme(r) som semiotiske systemer, principielt bevægende sig inden for den Gamle Konfigurations figurer og med en processuel dynamik mellem 'samfund' og 'individ' der forsøges beskrevet via akserne og transformationspunkterne i 'den Nationalistiske Firkant' (Del I, Kapitel I).

Denne model har to hovedformål: 1. via fire akser og tre væsentlige forvandlingsfaser at indfange nationalismen som både social og mental proces, men også som struktur, en struktur hvis forskellige komponenter kan aktiveres mere eller mindre kraftigt afhængigt af situation, konkret nationalstat, individ eller social status, og som alle kan generere forskellige typer nationale diskurser, tegn og 'meninger'. Væsentligst forsøger modellen at hjælpe til at begribe nogle centrale interaktioner mellem borger og stat og mellem nationalismens materielle, instrumentelle og ideelle aspekter - ikke som hinanden udelukkende, men som komplementære brikker i en samlet mosaik, hvor 'nationalt tilhørsforhold' bliver til 'nationalistisk identifikation' (borgernes fællesskab, 'Gesellschaft') som igen bliver til 'national identitet' (som affektivt parameter og en slags skæbnefællesskab hinsides instrumentelle eller praktiske formål - 'Gemeinschaft'). I afhandlingen opbygges denne forskel som én mellem 'nationen-som-stat' og 'staten-som-nation', hvorigennem

indføres den tidligere nævnte politiske dimension af nationalismen i to tempi og to varianter. Denne komplementære binarisme er et væsentligt forklaringsparameter i de afsluttende analyser og konklusioner i Del II.

2. Det andet primære formål med modellen (og jeg er hermed gået videre til den 'analyserende metode') er at lægge grunden til dens 'forvandling' til en semiotisk-interpretiv matrix for den nationale mentalitetsanalyse, en dobbelt-matrix som i fremstillingen får benævnelsen 'The National Mentality Grid', og har til hensigt at ordne og systematisere forståelsen af de nationale identitetskonfigurationer - og herigennem desuden lette og anskueliggøre den interkulturelle komparation. Der er primært tale om et instrument til at afdække og strukturelt/korrelerende indholdsbestemme betydningslagene i de tre nationers mentale ærkæologi. Modellen - bestående af hhv. en 'rationel' og en 'æstetisk' variant - strukturerer de nationale orienteringer i tre 'horisontale' taxonomiske betydningsordener, eller 'niveauer' (fænomenologisk, teleologisk, existentiel), svarende til tre indstillingsdispositioner (pragmatisk, kognitiv, affektiv) og igen 'vertikalt' opdelt i tre paradigmer omfattende hhv. 'orientering', 'modalitet' og 'struktur'. Modellen kan i sin helhed ses i Del I, Kapitel I. Hvor dens forskellige niveauer og paradigmer både teoretisk og praktisk-analytisk kan indgå i forskellige tegnforbindelser med hinanden - fx. agere som hhv. udtryk og indhold, signifiant og signifié, denotation og konnotation for hinanden -, kan lignende samspil gøre sig gældende mellem punkterne i de to del-matricer gensidigt, men her vil det i sagens natur oftest være sådan at billedelementerne fra den æstetiske matrix udgør de konnotative og associative betydningsdimensioner i relation til orienteringer inden for den fornuftsbetonede matrix. Det viste sig dog ofte, at de orienteringer og artikulationer af national mentalitet som respektive kunne forstås inden for de to matrixers rammer stod i et modsætningsforhold - eller et forhold præget af uafklarethed og spænding - til hinanden, hvorigennem de æstetiske orienteringer ofte talte deres eget sprog, på tværs af rationalitetens udsigelsesstrukturer. Dette var især fremherskende i de tilfælde hvor 'Niveau 2' (den teleologiske taxonomi) var dominerende inden for den rationelle matrix, og hvor formen, tonen, negationernes affekt eller de anvendte billeder mere eller mindre direkte modsagde det denotative indhold. Anderledes: Jo mere uproblematisk identitetsforestillingerne placerede sig inden for et felt afgrænset af balance mellem Niveau 1 og Niveau 3 i den rationelle matrix, jo mere tenderede billedtegnene fra den æstetiske til at være affirmative bærere, vehikler, for disse forestillinger (typisk for den danske konfiguration). Og jo mere der udviklede sig spændingsforhold mellem Niveau 2 og Niveau 3 i den rationelle matrix - ofte via negationer og forlegenhedsartikulationer - jo mere tenderede de to typer mental nationalitetsorientering mod at støde hinanden væk og blive til bærere af hvert deres 'budskab' (især typisk i den tyske text, men også i den britiske, omend de konkrete former viste sig at være yderst forskellige).

Disse mentale koordinatssystemer var af gode grunde specielt anvendelige i Del II (afhandlingens kerne) - hvor Kapitel II som eksemplarisk analyse udfolder deres udsigelsespotentiale på den del af data, der omhandler respondenternes identitetsforestilling i lyset af 2. verdenskrig - men finder også en vis anvendelse i Del I, hvis genstandsområde - nationalismens iscenesættelser - centralt placerer sig indenfor Niveau 2, og idealtypisk inden for dettes (mest strukturerede) C- og F-paradigmer, som egentlig 'allegori' - nationalismens konstruktion som betydningsystem.

Det skal understreges, at matricerne netop ikke udgør selve forståelsen, men er en overordentlig vigtig betydningsstrukturel forudsætning for de intertextuelt anlagte fortolkningsforsøg, som konstituerer Del II. Disse har deres store fordele, men også klare begrænsninger, som angår spørgsmål om 'fortolkningens grænser', den semiotiske osmoses principielle uendelighed, den eksterne (makro-)ordens status, og kausale forhold. Sådanne begrænsninger diskuteres i denne Dels Kapitel VII, som sammen med Kapitel VIII derfor 'genindfører' den explikatoriske ramme i form af den nationalistiske firkant, og sammenfatter de konklusioner der kan drages ved en sammentænkning af 'euro-nationalismen' inden for de to hovedmodi. Disse resultater vil blive tematiseret i næste afsnit. Først en kort bemærkning om det tredje metodiske perspektiv - empiriens.

3. Med 'empiriens metodik' forstår jeg her to ting, som skal læses i supplement til bemærkningerne om empiriens karakter, indsamling osv. i afsnit 2: dels fremstillingens anvendelse af 'texterne'; dels datas repræsentativitet og gyldighed.

Hvad det første angår, er materialet blevet tematisk kategoriseret og analytisk nærlæst med henblik på opsporing af nationaltypiske mønstre og 'tendenser', konfigureret i relation til matricerne, og sammenholdt med de andre tekster. Hvor interne divergenser eller mindre éntydige tendenser forefandtes, er dette nævnt, og om muligt konsekvensbestemt. Analyserne hviler ikke i nogen afgørende udstrækning på nøjagtige kvantitative opgørelser af 'besvarelsesprocenter' el.lign. - dette var for det første ikke muligt på grund af besvarelsernes 'åbne' karakter, for det andet på grund af respondentgruppernes størrelse. Der er tale om 'kvalitative analyser' hvilende på en gruppesammensætning foretaget på et 'non-probability' grundlag, eller som jeg vælger at kalde det: struktureret arbitraritet (afsnit 2). Texternes fragmenterede overfladekarakter er blevet gennemløbet i jagten på samlende vurderings- og normativitetsmønstre - i en slags utraditionel semiotisk textanalyse. Samtidig er forfattervurderingernes grundlag i stor udstrækning blevet direkte repræsenteret i den kritiske diskurs i form af omfattende textuddrag, med det formål at påvise de fremanalyserede mønstre, men også for at bringe de forskellige respondenter - de 'empiriske subjekter', de præsumtive tegn på nationerne - til at 'snakke med' - og nu og da mod - hinanden, lade mønstrene udfolde og udkrystallisere sig i en intertextuel diskurs, hvor forfatteren fører pennen og billedligt talt indtager den alvidende, synoptiske

forfatterrolle. På denne måde er argumentationen i formentlig usædvanlig høj grad indlejret - 'embedded' - i selve den kritiske diskurs, udfolder sig tematisk og narrativt i én bevægelse.

Hvad det andet delpunkt - repræsentativitet - angår, skal det først fremhæves at fremstillingen sandelig postulerer at indfange nogle repræsentative identitetsstrukturer, men at disse ikke må ligesættes med den type repræsentativitet (og dermed gyldighed) som stort anlagte meningsmålinger eller undersøgelser funderet i 'random probability sampling' kan tilskrives. Der er tale om to forskellige repræsentationsparadigmer, ét der primært er rettet mod relativt overfladiske og labile meningsfluktuationer, indfanget i statistiske kategorier og med en makro-social rationalitet: vejvisere for politiske eller økonomiske beslutningsprocesser. Og et andet der sigter mod afdækningen i dybden af bærende identitetsformer i deres betydnings- og meningsorienterede forstand, en slags etnografisk fortolknings- og forståelsesøvelse til begribelsen af nationale identiteter i deres kerneform. Der kan naturligvis være sammenfald mellem de to, men der behøver ikke være det (med en tilstrækkeligt omfattende population og et tilstrækkeligt stort forskerteam/ressourcegrundlag kan forskellene naturligvis minimeres: kvantitative og kvalitative analyser ville kunne udføres på samme materiale, meningsbærende enshedsstrukturer og opinionens politiske divergencer kunne diagnosticeres i deres sammenhænge, og analysen ville tjene begge formål/sigter på én gang). Dermed være ikke sagt, at en analyse af indeværende karakter kan gøre krav på at være udtømmende, heller ikke inden for sit eget idealsigte: der kan både pga populationens størrelse og selve undersøgelsens selv-reflexive krav være komponenter som er under- eller overrepræsenteret - eller muligvis slet ikke. Højest sandsynligt er nationalidentiteternes internationalt-tolerante former således 'overrepræsenteret' i de foreliggende tekster. Ikke desto mindre er der tale om et korpus der viser tre distinkt forskellige nationale mentaliteter, med hver deres nationaltypiske konfiguration(er). I denne forstand, og med Raymond Williams' begreber: undersøgelsen kan gøre krav på at afdække 'dominerende' og i stor udstrækning 'opdukkende' ("emergent") identitetsformer, men ikke nødvendigvis 'residuale'. Den ville også - selv om dette inden for kultursociologien og etnografien er langt vanskeligere end inden for eksakte videnskaber - hævde at være reproducerbar, gentagelig, og på den måde verificerbar. En sådan 'gentagelse' ville i øvrigt være ønskelig på et tidspunkt i fremtiden, for at indbygge det lineære moment i en bedre forankret form. Inden for afhandlingens rammer har reproduktion af 'eksperimentet' af indlysende grunde ikke været muligt - her må selve empiriens metodik, i samklang med fremstillingens øvrige dimensioner, bære overbevisningens og repræsentativitetens kraft i sig selv.

## II. SUBSTANSEN

Som nævnt indledningsvist vil denne Del bestå af to afsnit, som hver især ret lapidarisk sammenfatter de væsentligste substantielle resultater som omfattet af afhandlingens Del II, Kapitel VII (den 'mikroskopiske' analyse), henholdsvis Kapitel VIII (sammenholdningen af de to hoveddele).

### 1. Argumentets resultater, I

#### *Distinktive mønstre*

Studiet af nationalismens subjektive konfigurationer i de tre lande afdækkede tre klart distinkte identitetsformer, 'imaginerede fællesskaber' (Benedict Anderson) karakteriseret af forskellige betydnings'væv', and hyppigt af yderst disparate samspil mellem 'Selv' og 'Andet', pragmatik og symbolik, selv-bevidsthed og selv-fornægtelse, sikkerhed og forlegenhed, eksistentialisme og instrumentalisme, konjunktive og indikative indstillingsdispositioner, denotation og konnotation. Onomatopoetisk, selvbærende danskhed; traumatisk tyskhed i gang med at forvandle sig til en næsten naturstridig, oxymoronisk national selvsikkerhed, der i lige grad trækker næring fra legitim skamfuldhed og national styrke; og en britiskhed præget af selvformægtelsens og forlegenhedens deklasserede ikoner, i tydelig konflikt med nedarvede, følelsesbundne rester af en moralisme og en selvsikkerhed i erosion, imploderende spor efter magt: Tre forskellige nationale allegorier, der bestemmer de nationale ontologier i forhold til forskellige strukturelle konfigurationer mellem 'bevidsthed', 'vilje' og 'natur', mellem 'Jeg', 'Vi' og 'Nation', og mellem fortid, nutid og fremtid.

Et af de bemærkelsesværdige karakteristika i alt dette er *negationernes* funktion. Hvor de er relativt sjældne i den danske text, gennemsyrrer de begge de to andre texter. Rent faktisk er negationerne af national selv-identitet her de mest prægnante tegn på netop det der nægtes, fordi den konnotative signifikations dialekt, en fornægtet nationalismes konjunktive affekt, og de dramatiske, ofte lyriske betydningsmodulationer og -tætheder der ledsager den, taler deres eget tydelige sprog. Her viser Danmark - vognens tredje hjul - sig at have en interessant og tydeliggørende rolle. Positive, romantiserende tyske Danmarks-billeder, sammenholdt med den tyske identitets overvejende negative konfigurationer, bærer forskudt vidne om at tyskhedens dramatiske traumer tenderer mod en mere lyrisk nationalisme inden for den tredje betydningsorden. Hvorimod britiskhedens relative ligegyldighed over for Danmark - her er 'høfligt positive' forestillinger begrænset

til DK som i bedste fald et politisk og socialt korrektiv, men ingenlunde et nationalistisk - indikerer både at britisk selv-fornægtelse er mindre traumatisk (ikke at forstå som mindre omfattende) end tysk, og også at denne form for 'feminin', lyrisk og centripetal national ontologi er britiskheden - i det mindste i dennes engelske modulationer - relativt fremmed; dette er en national identitet hvor symboler trækker primær næring fra en kollektivistisk nationalismes 'imperative' betydningslager (Niveau 2), og hvor emotioner altid forsøger at antage form af en 'sund fornuft' (Niveau 1) begrundet i specifikke situationer.

I både Tyskland og Storbritannien er negationerne udtryk for en gennemgribende følelse af national hjemløshed, men netop derfor også for en følelsesbundet national hjemvé, en længsel efter uproblematiske identiteter. Imidlertid ser nogle af de tyske 'sår' ud til at være i gang med at heles, og tyskhed således at være i gang med at beslaglægge en mere positiv identitet - mindre diskursiveret og teleologisk end hidtil. De britiske problemer, omvendt, forekommer at være inde i en forværringsfase, hvor britiskhedens centrifugale kræfter, efter at have tabt en væsentlig del af sit historiske og kulturelle underlag, er ved at forvise denne identitetsform til en regelret erosionskrise (kun modvirket af den britiske kosmopolitiske arv), *eller* alternativt en mere insisterende, forkrampet og 'neurotisk' 'Little Englandism'.

På denne måde kan særlige negationsformer være lige så tydelige identitetsmarkører som for eksempel den gnidningsløse interaktion mellem pragmatisme og symbolisme, mellem fænomenologi og eksistentialisme, eller mellem det indikative 'Jeg' og den konjunktive 'Nation', som præger den danske konfiguration. På den anden side bevidner data lige så klart, at 'nationalisme' kun er kognitivt acceptabel i dennes affirmative former, altså når og hvor den kan tilskrives positive billeder og betydninger. Dette skal ikke forstås i den banale betydning, at respondenterne/folk i almindelighed normalt selvfølgelig ikke sympatiserer med det man kan kalde 'aggressiv' nationalisme, men (i) at negationer i form af forlegenhed eller skamfuldhed over ens egen nationalidentitet altid tenderer mod at frembringe en generel *benægtelse* af nationale følelser for så vidt angår én selv, og (ii) mest hyppigt tillige mod en almen afvisning af nationalismens værdi og/eller eksistens idag - afvisninger der lige så hyppigt negeres gennem opsporingen af sådanne kvaliteter i én og anden indenlandsk eller fremmed 'Andethed'. Som eksempel: Hvor den tyske tekst er negativ, forsigtig eller afvisende for så vidt angår en accept af tyskheden som national identitet - og inden for denne ramme klart tenderer mod at fordømme nationalisme som både farlig og overhalet -, er den næsten begejstret eksotisk i sin vurdering af dansk nationalisme, og også relativt beundrende over for hvad den ser som britiskhedens gådefuldt stabile og eccentricke egenskaber. Briterne, som i nogen omfang identificerer sig nostalgisk med fortidens former (omend i en forlegen modus), afviser ikke desto mindre en nutidig, dysfunktionel nationalisme, som de både finder adskillige spor efter

i deres landsmænd og - meget værre - i Tyskland. Og selv den danske text kopierer dette mønster, omend på en bagvendt måde: Hvor de danske respondenter homogent er glade for, tilfredse med og også stolte over deres nationale identitet, afviser de nationalismens former i (især) Storbritannien, men også i Tyskland. Der er dog en betydningsfuld forskel. For hvor de negationer som de tyske og britiske texter drejer omkring tenderer mod en universalistisk afvisning af nationalisme, gælder dette ikke den danske text, som på basis af sin egen lyriske homogenitet accepterer nationalisme *som sådan* men altså afviser dens *særlige* tyske og britiske manifestationer, og endog kan tillade sig den luksus at rette en mild kritik mod den 'indenlandske Andethed' - ikke som i Storbritannien for at være for nationalistisk, men ikke at være nationalistisk nok, hvilket vil sige: for egoistisk, materialistisk og 'krævende'.

Også mellem Tyskland og Storbritannien er der imidlertid en væsentlig forskel. Den tyske konfiguration vandrer som katten om den varme grød pga nationalismens nedarvede illegitimitet, og indoptager derfor begge ekstremer: en totalafvisning af nationalisme i dennes abstrakthed - baseret på en rationalistisk, post-national, europæiseret tankeform - og en altomfattende længsel efter en utopi bestående af en ikke-aggressiv, venligtsindet og uskyldsren nationalisme; inden for denne dikotomis rammer anerkendes en positiv tyskhed *de facto*, men enten vikariøst (via Danmark) eller som 'international' og 'historisk-kulturel' identitet adskilt fra 'nationalidentitet' og 'patriotisme' - altså kun i indirekte former hvor nationalismens politiske dimension kan borttænkes.

Heroverfor står det britiske mønster, som fordi denne texts orienteringer er styret af det pinlige ved nationens nedtur snarere end af den historiske forbrydelses illegitimitet, er mere centripetal, omend denne centripetalitet er yderst ambivalent. Idet den britiske variant søger efter en middelvej mellem afvisning og accept af nationalismen, mellem fornægtelse af Selv og nedgøring af det Andet, mellem fordømmelse af den hjemlige Andethed i den 'objektivistiske modus' (hvor respondenterne er betragtere og informanter) og ikke desto mindre en (noget forlegen) tilegnelse af dennes centrale egenskaber i den 'subjektivistiske' (hvor de er nationale repræsentationer, 'tegn'), famler den britiske text efter en moderniseret form i hvilken britiskhed kan bibeholde sine 'internationale' træk uden koloniale overlegenhedsstræk - og da den ikke finder en sådan (eller kun vagt og idealistisk i 'Europa') tager retning mod en form for exileret, hjemløs identitetsløsning, hvor den enkelte pragmatisk frigør sig fra tvetydighederne ved 'britisk identitet', men lader muligheden for helhjertet at vende tilbage til den på et senere tidspunkt stå åben.

### *Selv/Andet-konfigurationer*

De 'mikroskopiske' studier drejer centralt om den dualistiske akse, som Selv/Andet-relationerne udgør, en akse der drejer i adskillige og højst forskelligartede hastigheder, og med klare forskelle i intensitet: Andetheden som indskrevet i Selv-perceptioner, som en indre determinant; som vehikel for implicit Selv-anerkendelse; som en international model til ideel efterfølgelse; som historisk dommer og revser; eller som et kontrastivt sammenlignings-parameter. Den Anden antager således en lang række former inden for et kontinuum mellem 'fjendtlig' og 'eksotisk', i forestillingsformer med relation til forskellige 'niveauer' og 'paradigmer' inden for den nationale mentalitetsmatrix, og manifest ordnet inden for Del II's strukturelle disposition: den hjemlige Andethed, den specifikke internationale Andethed, EF-Europa som almen inter- og supranational Andethed, USA som 'betydningsfuld' Andethed. En fleksibel matrix hvor forskelle ('distinktioner' med Bourdieus term) antager forskellige betydningsnuancer, nuancer der i hvert fald til del afhænger af hvilke permutationer inden for kultur-identitetsnexusen (Del I, Kapitel V) der konkret aktiveres, men som altid i sidste instans vender tilbage til arten og omfanget af national Selv-tillid som den styrende variabel.

Andethedens specifikke form inden for hver respondents mentale strukturering og inden for - og mellem - de tre nationale konfigurationer som helhed kan forekomme tilfældig, men der er mening i galskaben: Selv og Andet forbinder sig ikke med hinanden på en vag, ubestemt måde, men meget præcist i overensstemmelse med kriterier som fx mental proximitet eller distance, graden og omfanget af affekt, relativ eller absolut valoriseringstendens, overordnet betydningsimplikation osv., kriterier der i sin tur er styret af subjektiv og/eller legitim Selv-vurdering, dvs. af grunde, betingelser, retfærdiggørelser, og ønsker for så vidt angår national stolthed, forlegenhed eller tillid. De teoretiske idealmodulationer, som diskuteres i Del I, Kapitel II, III og VI, viser sig i Del II at leve et praktisk egetliv, og at være distinkt forskellige i de tre nationer.

Hvad danskhed angår, er der tale om en højst selvsikker identitetsform, som p.t. befinder sig på et mellemstadium mellem dens traditionelt indadskuende tendens og en nyere, mere internationaliseret version. Ikke i nogen variant - heller ikke den eksklusive, kontrastive modus (fx. reflekteret i indstillinger til muslimsk immigration) - er denne nationalidentitet centralt afhængig af den internationale Andethed til bestemmelse af sig selv som identitet. Skønt tyskhedens mentale nærhed for danskheden er ubestridelig, er det lige så tydeligt at det hermed forbundne fjendebillede er inde i en svækkelsesfase, idet (negativ) symbolsk affekt konkurrerer med en mere pragmatisk tendens til at 'tilgive og glemme'. Og EF/EU er kun funktionel inden for pragmatismens indikative betydningsorden, og affektivt kun mhp de negative konsekvenser, integrationen i Europa måtte

medføre. Generelt fungerer den internationale Andethed for danskhedens former som et ret vagt, bekræftende spejl til Selv-ankendelse. Den eneste betydende Andethed er den hjemlige, som spiller en dobbeltrolle: subjektivistisk homogeniserende, objektivistisk fragmenterende. Danskhedens centripetale, onomatopoetiske hvilen-i-sig-selv overflødig-gør internaliseringen af den fremmede Andethed og muliggør 'intern' kritik og også distinktionen mellem danskhed som 'identitet' (positiv) og 'karakter' (mindre positiv).

Omvendt indoptager tyskheden den fremmede Andethed direkte i sin identitets-konstituering, på forskellige måder ganske vist, men alle centralt baseret på en positiv tysk identitets historiske svaghed hhv. illegitimitet. Her er det overordentlig vigtigt at skelne mellem Andetheden som en potentiel rollemodel til skabelsen af en ny identitet (resp. en faktor der holder den historiske skam i live), og som en overgangskatalysator for den mere selvsikre konfiguration, der nu kan anes. Begge disse varianter findes i den tyske text, men med en processuel tendens, der formentlig er i sidstnævntes favør. Svagheden i 'tysk identitet' i efterkrigstiden har muliggjort indoptagelsen af en række rationelt 'postnationale' eller 'civic' fortolkninger af identitet, men har tydeligvis ikke kunnet eliminere deres 'etnisk-nationalistiske' underlag. De 'eksotiske' vurderinger af dansk nationalisme i data er en forskudt refleksion af dette, men også af at en sådan 'ikke-aggressiv uskyld' ikke kan købes for nogen pris i Tyskland. Her grænser 'identitetsnormalisering' til at være en oxymoron. På en måde er normalitet altid medbestemt af det anormale, uanset hvor stærkt tysk nationalitet forsøger at gøre sig respektabel. Jo mere dens mentale former forsøger at iklæde sig indikativt-fænomenologiske betydninger, jo mere er sådanne forsøg belastet af de forestillede farer ved en positiv kosmologi forvandlet til sund fornuft og selvfølgelig identifikation - farer der ikke mindst holdes i live af netop Andetheden i såvel dens reale som dens mentalt-indoptagede former. Racisme i Tyskland er aldrig det samme som racisme i Danmark og Storbritannien, eller for den sags skyld næsten hvorsomhelst. Derfor er tyskheden udspændt mellem eskatologiens traume og en forløsning/tilgivelse baseret på (nok) udsoning og anger. Cæsuren i den tyske text mellem kosmologisk negation og kognitiv identitetsbekræftelse modsvarer direkte arten og omfanget af Andethedens indskrivning i Selv-billederne, samt af denne Andetheds forskellige materialiseringer. Det er derfor ganske logisk, at jo mere den tyske konfiguration tager sigte mod en positiv re-evaluering af national Selv-identitet på et etnisk-organicistisk betydnings-niveau, jo mere tenderer den mod at udsondre den fremmede Andethed som 'streng opdrager' eller som en stedfortrædende legemliggørelse af Selv. Dette var tydeligt i den tyske text: de respondenter der viste sig at have den største nationale selvtilid, var også dem der var mest kritiske over Danmark, Storbritannien, EF/EU og USA, og mest afvisende over for den fremmede Andetheds harpen på gamle nationale synder.

Endelig opviser den britiske konfiguration forsøg på at balancere mellem afvisning og accept af den egne nationale identitet, mellem pinlige og positivt affektive følelser, mellem lede ved hjemmet og hjemve på samme tid. Derfor er Andetheden en skønsom blanding bestående af fx: respektfuld afsky over for Tyskland, en afsky der stadig er dybt forankret i krigens fjendebilleder - forlegne internaliseringer af de ringeagtende holdninger som det Andet/de Andre forestilles at nære over for Storbritannien - rollemodelsholdninger til den almene EF-Andethed, begrundet i den helbredende funktion EF/EU ideelt kunne tænkes at have for restitueringen af den britiske syge - men mærkeligt nok også ganske mange forestillinger om, at britiskhed stadig er afholdt og respekteret internationalt. Hertil skal lægges, at omend argumenterne til fordel for Andetheden som positiv rollemodel er udbredte i den britiske text, er der så godt som ingen i den britiske gruppe der mener at sådanne forhåbninger har en realistisk basis, og de allerfleste respondenter er yderst kritiske/skeptiske over for EFs/EUs øjeblikkelige indvirkning på Storbritannien. Disse mangfoldige og tilsyneladende modstridende billeder af Andethedens former i den britiske text er tegn på en korroderende og eroderende identitetsformation, hvis bærepiller er ved at smuldre væk, men uden at dette faktum endnu har resulteret i et kvalitativt spring til konstruktionen af en mere moderniseret identitet, eller til en alvorlig instrumentalisering af den internationale Andethed hinsides de traditionelt fjendtlige, kontrastive billeder som anglo-britisk identitet indbefatter. Derfor sætter den britiske konfiguration sig mellem to stole, mellem accept og afvisning af det Andet, mellem mentalt 'going into Europe' og anvendelsen af den europæiske Andethed som negatorisk identitetsraster, mellem idealet om at ortodoks britisk kosmopolisme kunne forvandle sig til en ny form for europæisk internationalisme (her kontrasteret med den klart mere negativt valoriserede amerikanske Andethed) og en sådan udsigts tilsyneladende futilitet. Alt dette hænger igen sammen med spørgsmålet om forestillet kausalitet, altså ud- og fordelingen af skyld og ansvar for Storbritanniens og britiskhedens sørgelige tilstand idag, som på en tvetydig måde deles mellem britiske politikere og den fremmede Andethed.

Således forsøger alle tre nationale indstillingsdispositioner - med eller mod vidende og vilje - at tilegne sig det Andet i former der er instrumentelt tilpasset identitetsformernes specifikke strukturer og udviklingsbaner, noget der afstedkommer en lang række unikke sam- og modklange mellem teleologisk rationalisme og kosmologisk sakralitet. Det betyder ikke nødvendigvis, at det Andet altid er den afhængige variabel, skønt dette *er* den idealtypiske modulation. Imidlertid repræsenterer 'det tyske tilfælde' en variant, som for tiden ser ud til at være i gang med at udskille det Andet som en afhængig faktor - men samtidig er ved at skabe nogle alvorlige *indre* Andetheds-billeder: Østtyskere og tyske politikere i særdeleshed, men også asylsøgere, immigranter og andre 'etniske minoriteter' -

konsistent med en øget mental samføring mellem kriterierne for statsborgerskab i Tyskland ('*ius sanguinis*') og borgernes selv-definitioner som og billeder af at 'være tyske'.

Alt i alt er dette område præget af Selv/Andetheds-relationernes variable geometri, en plasticitet og liminalitet der får deres mest prægnante udtryk i den kakofone multiperspektivisme der er resultatet af Del II, Kapitel IV's arkæologiske gravearbejde i de tre nationers tosidede, specifikke, interkulturelle mentalitetsformer.

### *Er nationalidentitet situationel?*

I litteraturen om nationalidentitet støder man ofte og i stigende omfang på det argument, at denne form for identitet og bevidsthed må anskues som primært situationel. Et af de klare resultater af afhandlingen er, at dette ikke kan underbygges empirisk - resp. at der her er tale om et optisk bedrag. Anderledes udtrykt: Jo mere 'nationalitet' (Niveau 1) forvandles til Niveau 3's eksistentielle identitetsformer, jo mere frigør den sig fra det situationelles vilkårlighed. Ikke sådan at forstå, at situationsbestemte 'substanser' (signifianter) ikke længere er ønskede eller nødvendige som identitetens konkrete udtryk, men at den vedvarende, dybereliggende styrke som en given nationalidentitet besidder netop reducerer det situationelle aspekt til én af mangfoldige vehikler for (viljen til) identitet, og dermed til en afhængig variabel. Det giver også teoretisk mening: Hvis det faktisk er meningsfyldt at forstå nationalidentiteter som grundlæggende tenderende mod 'kosmologiske essenser', så er det også konsistent, at det er disse essenser der bestemmer former, styrke og hyppighed for dens manifestationer. Dette er grundlæggende det argument der udvikles omkring kultur-identitetsnexusen i Del I, Kapitel V, og som her specifikt viser sin applikationsværdi på situationalismen. De tre nationale former dokumenterer denne tese på hver deres måde.

Som den mest selv bærende og centripetale identitetskonfiguration, den der er mindst karakteriseret af intern fragmentering, er danskheden tydeligvis ikke *afhængig* af situationer - uanset at den danske text problemløst fremmaner en lang række forskelligartede situationer, som disse danske mentaliteter associerer med dansk identitet. Det er netop fordi danskhed repræsenterer et homogent, onomatopoetisk, tæt vævet og 'permanent' univers, at dens bærere er i stand til restløst at forestille sig et nærmest grænseløst og varieret antal situationer som signifianter. Overfloden af situationer i den danske text udtrykker således det vigtige faktum, at dansk identitet er for enslig og for central til lade sig begrænse, endsige diktere, af situationelle former - i stedet invaderer den smertefrit alle de situationer, der er nødvendige til at udtrykke dens betydning og næsten allestedsnærværende karakter.

I en bestemt henseende gælder dette, overraskende nok, også det 'tyske tilfælde', men på en ganske anden måde - nemlig som en ambivalent ambition for tysk identitet, begrundet i den tyske politiske kulturs stabilitet i efterkrigstiden (i hvert fald til 1990), og klemmt inde mellem positiv, rationel identifikation med tyskhed (Niveau 2) og dens mestendels negative kosmologisk-affektive former (Niveau 3). Det er på den ene side sandt, at det fåtal af manifesterede situationer som den tyske tekst direkte og problemløst maner frem (fx. sport), er udtryk for 'tysk identitet' som næsten en oxymoron i Tyskland, en identitetsform hvor situationer overvejende bærer ved til *negationer* af identitet. På den anden side er det lige så sandt, at den spirende nationalbevidsthed som teksten bærer vidnesbyrd om netop er baseret på ikke-situationelle dimensioner i den tyske makro-kontext (økonomiske succeser, det politiske system, håndteringen af de historiske traumer i Vesttyskland, social- og miljøsikring osv.), som her bliver de primære bærere af en tysk ambition henimod positivt at gentillegne sig en ikke-forbigående, samlende, moderniseret nationalkosmologi. Således er den næsten totalt fraværende situationisme i den tyske tekst ikke kun udtryk for et nedarvet identitetstraume og en forståelig forsigtighed over for det Nationale som følelsesbundet og 'irrationelt', men også for eksistensen af (tysk) identitet som uafhængig af specifikke situationer.

Det modsvarende og tilsyneladende parallelle billede i den britiske tekst er kun overfladisk udtryk for samme slags problematik. Snarere reflekterer de britiske respondenter vanskeligheder ved at forestille sig situationer og kontekster for national stolthed en eroderende, imploderende identitetsform; de relativt få situationelle spor af magt og stolthed der ikke desto mindre forefindes ledsages systematisk af forlegenhedsudtryk, hyppigt af et ønske om at sådanne situationer og andre substanser måtte blive elimineret. Med andre ord, i den britiske tekst er mangelen på manifesterede situationer ikke som i Tyskland udtryk for et potentiale for en dybereliggende, ikke-situationsafhængig identitetsformation, men for at en sådan mere positiv national kosmologi ikke forefindes - delvist fordi den 'gamle' identitetsstrukturering ikke længere er 'anvendelig', delvist fordi Niveau 3's essentialisme altid har været fremmed for anglo-britisk nationalisme, der føler sig mest hjemme i den 'sunde fornufts' manifestationsformer (Niveau 1).

Således står vi her over for et interessant eksempel på en faktisk mere og mere situationelt baseret, fragmenteret identitetskonfiguration, som netop fordi 'situationisme' *eo ipso* udtrykker fragmentering og manglende permanens, viger tilbage fra at liste de aktiverende situationer, og tenderer mod tavshedens 'nul-signifiant' (Lévi-Strauss; Derrida). Situationisme, som uafhængig variabel, adskilt fra sit grundlag, er således en negativ faktor, udtryk for en identitetslakune.

Ergo, nationalidentitetens situationelle dimension tiltager i betydning omvendt proportionalt med dens selvsikkerhed, stabilitet og universalistiske karakter. Men som

sådan er situationismen i bedste fald en smertefuld bærer af en identitet der var engang, men kan ikke selv fungere som både signifiant og signifié. Omvendt vil stærke nationalismer tendere mod at forekomme situationelle, men paradoksalt fordi de hviler på en ikke-situationel basis.

Sådanne konklusioner er også relevante for spørgsmålet om 'europæisk identitet' (Del II, Kapitel V), som er aldeles situationel. Sammenlignet med det britiske tilfælde står vi imidlertid ikke her med sporene efter en imploderende identitetsform, men én der muligvis er i færd med at blive dannet - skønt dette scenarie givetvis vil forekomme de fleste ret uvirkeligt i den nuværende situation i Europa. Ikke desto mindre antager situationisme og kulturelle substanser her en noget forskelligartet rolle (Del I, Kapitel V, Model 11): Skønt de også her er afhængige variable, er de også det stof som identiteter oprindeligt skabes af, det 'kit' uden hvilket egentlige identitetsstrukturer ikke kan bygges. Om de bliver bygget er på den anden side ganske uafhængigt af sådanne materielle forudsætninger.

### *Kan centret holde?*

Hovedspørgsmålet her er i hvilket omfang de tre nationalidentiteter, som manifesteret gennem de tre tekster, besidder den nødvendige centripetale kraft til at modstå den centrifugalitet, der ubestrideligt findes i de nationale og internationale miljøer, og som sætter tydelige spor i respondenternes nationalmentaliteter. Hvordan forholder homogeniserende og heterogeniserende faktorer, identiteternes centreringer og decentreringer sig til hinanden, hvad kan meningsfuldt udledes angående de nationale fællesskabers, de 'horizontale broderskabers' styrke? Kan centret holde? Alternativt: hvor *er* centret?

På det mest overordnede niveau er sådanne spørgsmål ret lette at besvare. Undersøgelsen dokumenterer, at omend de tre identiteter utvivlsomt er inde i en fase karakteriseret af forandring og fluktuation, og endskønt to af dem indeholder en anelig mængde selv-problematisering, er de ikke desto mindre intakte, centrene er synlige, og der kan ikke spores nogen overbevisende vilje - ejheller en underliggende tendens - til at erstatte nationale følelser og loyaliteter med eksempelvis en europæisk identitet. De er ikke alle tre lige egnede til overlevelse i den Ny Verdensorden, og et betragteligt antal respondenter i både den tyske og den britiske gruppe negerer eller undskylder for deres nationalitet, deres fortid eller deres landsmænd, men både betydningsmønstrenes uniformitet og de nationale følelsers næsten illegitime styrke er garanter for denne sekulære religiøsitetens videre eksistens, til trods for - eller ofte på grund af - de fragmentationer og

usikkerheder der skaber kaos både i den eksterne makro-kontext og i respondenternes forestillingsverden.

Dette centrale resultat bør imidlertid ikke gøre os blinde over for et antal paradokser, udviklinger og modgående faktorer, som er tilstede i teksterne. Her skal to sådanne faktorer omtales: 1. konstruktionen af rationelle, apolitiske, men samtidig romantiserende identitetsformer; og 2. identiteternes udvidede mentalgeografi.

1. I alle tre tekster findes i forskelligt omfang en tendens til at afkaste nationalidentitetens politiske, statscentrerede komponent til fordel for konstruktionen af en kulturidentitets-nexus funderet i 'umiddelbarhedens rum': personlige omgivelser, lokaliteter, regioner, familie- og vennenetværk, arbejdspladser osv. - nærhedsrum som grundlæggende drejer om en akse hvor 'small is beautiful'. Denne tendens til indsnævrede identitetsrum hænger sammen med den tendens til dislokering af politiske loyaliteter, der vil blive behandlet under næste overskrift, og er synlig i den udbredte tendens til at prioritere 'kulturel suverænitet' højere end 'politisk'. Implikationen er på den ene side en tendens til (national) kulturromantisering inden for umiddelbarhedens rum. Men på den anden også en mere rationel holdning til én selv som borger i en given nation, mere distanceret (selv)-refleksion, mere rum for kritik, mere orienteringsrelativisme - dimensioner der ubestrideligt findes i alle tre tekster, omend det er svært at bestemme den *grad* hvori dette måtte være medbestemt af selve undersøgelsens indbyggede stimulus til refleksion. Derfor er den inferentielle konklusion mere éntydig, at tendensen til en indsnævring af identitetens rum er et resultat af netop de politisk-økonomiske internationaliseringsprocesser i Europa, som øver pres på de nationale rum og nationalismens etablerede funktionalitet. Med andre ord: Alle tre konfigurationer leder efter en stabil identitetskerne, og kun den danske lykkes med at lokalisere denne problemløst i 'dansk identitet', hvorimod de to andre disaggregerer på hver deres måde og derfor tenderer mod en kognitiv - og ofte også en affektivt-romantiserende - lokalisering af 'home' eller 'Heimat' i det Kendtes mindre - og mindre politiserede - cirkler. Undersøgelsen gør det på den måde sandsynligt, at makro-kontextens fragmentation og centrifugalitet er i færd med at reducere nationalismen til et spørgsmål om dennes psykologiske funktionalitet - en slags beskyttende stødpude - hvilket, hvor dette ikke lykkes, medfører en relokering af subjektivitetens identitetsprioriteringer til en Umiddelbarhed der forekommer mere sikker (eller, som i den britiske text, til en personaliseret form for national exilering, der ikke nødvendigvis er af fysisk art). Dette vil ikke eliminere den nationale identitet, men vil alvorligt påvirke dens indre sammenhæng og 'hegemoni', tenderer altså mod at gøre den til et mere 'relativt' og 'rationelt' fænomen. (Se videre næste afsnit.)

2. Overfladisk betragtet er det andet punkt det førstes diametrale modsætning, og overfladisk også mere i overensstemmelse med forestillinger om skabelsen af mere

globaliserende, expansive identitetsformer. I alle tre tekster kan man finde umiskendelige (omend ikke éntydige) tegn på en redefinition og ekspansion/udtynding af nationalidentitetens mentalgeografi, af nationalismens territoriale dimension som sammenfaldende med suverænitetens traditionelle statsgrænser. I den tyske text: den symbolske 'frigørelses' betydning af åbningen af europæiske grænser og den ubesværet hvormed tyskerne forestiller sig et muligt liv andetsteds end i Tyskland. I den britiske: de mangfoldige varianter over temaet 'expatriate existence' og litanierne til 'kosmopolitisk kultur'. I den danske: den udadvendte 'aggressivitet' og dens ambivalente pendlen mellem symbolsk nationalisme og pragmatisk internationalisme. Alt dette antyder en forandring i mentaliteternes indre geografi, en slags territorial identitetsfluiditet.

Så sandt dette er, skal det i samme åndedrag understreges hvad undersøgelsen løbende konkluderer: at denne fluiditet ikke i nogen forstand ses at modsige de nationale identiteter, men manifesterer dem i bestemte modaliteter og afarter (resp. vildskud). Disse former er nye, i den forstand at de er moderniserede reformuleringer og tilpasninger af nationale mentaliteter, men på ingen måde neutraliserer de dem, skønt de i nogle tilfælde udgør en desillusioneret reaktion på formerne for og resultaterne og funktionaliteten af 'hjemmet' for respondenternes håb, loyalitet og identifikationer. Dette sidste gælder kun i ringe udstrækning i Danmark, men i de to andre tekster er udvidelsen af mentalt territorium, snarere end tegn på dannelsen af internationale identitetsformer, et udtryk for national hjemløshed, dvs. for den negation som den ovenfor nævnte 'indsnævrende' tendens er en 'positiv' omend indirekte reaktion på. Hyppigt fremsatte hypoteser om at 'tribalisme' og 'globalisme' er parallelle og sammenlignelige 'trusler' mod den nationale identitet - at nationalismen er under tryk fra begge sider, i et skruestik mellem højere og lavere identitetsformer på én gang - finder ingen bekræftelse i data. Der er ingen sporbar tendens henimod dannelsen af en 'suprational' identitet, ej heller nogen vilje til en sådan, heller ikke blandt disse relativt veluddannede og udadvendte respondentgrupper. Deres internationalisme er, i almene termer, en vag, skuffet refleksion af andre processer i makro-konteksten, hvortil hører paradoksalt deres politiske centres aftagende autoritet og legitimitet og politikens internationalisering. Og lokalisme-tendensen, som rent faktisk er synlig i data, er en kulturel-psykologisk reaktion mod nationernes og nationalismens stigende ustabilitet og usikkerhedsmomenter, mod devalueringen af den politiske sfære, og i Tyskland specifikt mod national idealismes stadigt lave legitimitet samt de forringede materielle *output*-forventninger (især i ex-DDR). Imidlertid baserer disse tendenser mod en forstærkelse af det Umiddelbare og Kendtes betydning for identitetsdannelsen, i modsætning til den diffuse og bredt sagt negative dannelse af de 'internationale' mentalgeografier, sig i det mindste på kulturelle signifikanter af affirmativ art.

## *Nationalidentitet og politiske repræsentationskriser*

Ovenfor (Del I) omtaltes på et alment niveau den politiske dimensions ambivalente betydning for national identitet, en mentalitetsform der i sine 'essentialistiske' modulationer ser ud til at være upåvirket af sådanne profane faktorer, men som ikke desto mindre centralt afhænger af den forskudte tilstedeværelse af en 'statskomponent' - forskudt i betydningen 'benægtet', 'ubevidst' eller 'afpolitiseret'. Dette viser sig ikke mindst i situationer, der sammenlignet med det fredelige ideal for nationalstatslig normalitet repræsenterer anomalier: krigssituationer; når nationer (endnu) ikke har opnået deres egen stat, eller er igang med at opbygge den; eller som i de tilfælde, der er mest relevant i denne sammenhæng, hvor statens/de nationale politikeres mentale legitimitet som folkets repræsentanter drages i tvivl eller regelret eroderer.

I sådanne tilfælde optræder der en 'cleavage' - spaltning - inden for den ideale mentalitetsprocess der repræsenterer den nationale identitets konstruktion - i den Nationalistiske Firkants B-C permutation (se afhandlingen, Del I, Kapitel I), dvs. langs den linje hvor individuelle eller gruppe-interesser politiseres og staten primært opfattes i instrumentelle termer (nationen-som-stat). Og uanset at den afgørende pointe vedr. national *identitet* er at den delvist afkaster denne instrumentelle forudsætning ved at forvandle sig til moralisme, u-interesseret identifikation, afkaldsbevidsthed osv. (staten-som-nation), ændrer det ikke ved det faktum at en vedvarende stabilitetsforudsætning er at den teleologiske dimension ved stat-borger relationen opretholdes, og at interaktionen mellem idealistisk og instrumentel indstilling til staten løbende er en reel mulighed for nationens medlemmer.

Således vil staten som nationens praktiske syntese på den ene side altid blive bedømt - rationelt og/eller emotivt - i forhold til dens gerninger i relation til borgernes egeninteresser. På den anden side fører dannelsen af staten-som-nation til sin helt egen, '3. ordens'-instrumentalitetstænkning, i den forstand at staten og dens aktører *også* bedømmes i forhold til om deres handlinger, diskurser, resultater og karismatiske egenskaber kan imødekomme nationalidentitetens krav om stolthed og ære. Dette kriterium er vigtigt inden for internationalismens os-dem relationer, hvorimod det første tenderer mod primær fundering i nationalstatens 'interne suverænitet'. På den måde bliver staten altid bedømt på to forskellige dimensioner inden for nationens instrumentelle teleologi: en materiel ('tilfredshedskriteriet') og en ideel ('stolthedskriteriet').

Det er i den forbindelse slående, at en sammenholdning mellem de tre 'subjektive' konfigurationer viser en direkte korrelation mellem (u)stabiliteten og (dis)harmonien i den givne nationale identitet og tegnene på 'politiske repræsentationskriser'. Den 'onomatopoetiske' danskhed modsvares af stor tillid til dansk politik og danske politikere; her er der

kun svage tegn på mistillid, og ingen antydning af en legitimitetskrise - på trods af det faktum, at data spænder over fx. Maastrichtdebatteerne i Danmark og en anelig række politiske 'skandaler' (fx. Tamilsagen).

Den tyske text skelner klart og entydigt mellem 'politisk system' (positivt) og 'politiske aktører' (ringe), hvilket implicerer en mere dybtgående utilfredshedsmentalitet, grænsende til men ikke identisk med en egentlig legitimitetskrise. Den ringeagt, teksten udviser over de politiske aktører, modvirkes i nogen grad af tillid til systemets institutioner og processer, af håb om en mere positiv synergi mellem politikerstyrke og politikerkarisma i fremtiden, og af bevidstheden om tysk international styrke uanset politikernes kvalitet. Imidlertid dokumenterer data klart, at hvad angår 'vesttyskerne' har Genforening, økonomisk recession, og en atmosfære præget af usikkerhed overfor værdier i den vesttyske politiske og sociale kultur påvirket den instrumentelle, 'output'-relaterede sammenkædning af stat og borger, og dermed det politiske lag i en spirende (vest)tysk, præ-Genforenings-identitet - ikke mindst fordi enhver tilnærmelse til en positivt konciperet nationalidentitet i det tidligere BRD i udstrakt omfang byggede på den teleologiske betydningsordens (Niveau 2's) kognitive, 'civic' identifikationsorienteringer. Og med hensyn til 'østtyskerne' er det lige så klart, at eksplosionen af deres utopiske forestillinger om lykken ved at forenes med Vesten afsætter spor af en tilsvarende politisk mistillid og kaster denne mentalitetskonfiguration tilbage til en slags omvendt glorificering af en 'østtysk' identitets sociale og kulturelle komponenter. Dette er på sæt og vis et mere alvorligt problem. For 'østtyskerne' forventede sig af det vestlige Tyskland ikke mindst leveringen af en 'ægte' politisk identitetsdimension (materiel tilfredsstillelse, der igen bar kimen til en varig, snarere end abstrakt-utopisk, national idealisme) - for kun at få denne forventning afsløret som en umulig drøm. Derfor nærmer den 'østtyske' problematik sig mere en egentlig legitimitetskrise end vest-borgernes frustration og skuffelse. Fælles for begge del-grupper er dog, at sporene af en tillids- og repræsentationskrise er dybe og gennemgående, og modvirker - snarere end neutraliserer eller eliminerer - den i øvrigt tiltagende identitetssikkerhed, som den tyske text manifesterer. Her er der tale om én af de i øvrigt adskillige dikotomier, der præger tyskhedens mentalitetsstrukturering: hvor nationens repræsentanter betragtes og vurderes yderst nedsættende, gælder dette ikke nationens repræsentationer i form af forfatning, institutioner, virkemåde og resultater.

Dette kan næppe siges at karakterisere den britiske text, som udviser en identitet/politik-nexus i hastig erosion, især på grund af en gennemgribende vurdering af statslig dysfunktionalisme på begge de instrumentelle niveauer omtalt ovenfor ('tilfredshed' og 'stolthed'), og gående på såvel politikens aktører som dens objektiverede former. Således inkorporerer de britiske data både en repræsentationskrise og en egentlig legitimitetskrise, og den forlegenhed, apologi og nationale selv-fornægtelse, der præger

den overalt, korrelerer med disse krisetegn som årsag hhv. virkning. Inden for begge instrumentalitetsparametre er tilstandene p.t., betragtet gennem respondenternes briller, nedslående, og transponeres i teksten som en gennemgribende stigmatisering af både den 'politiske klasse' og det 'politiske system'. Britiskhedens 'diffuse opbakning' bag dens politiske strukturer spejles i respondenternes vage og almene utilfredshed med den politiske sfære samt i den udstrækning kritik mod firsernes thatcherisme er moralsk begrundet. Ikke desto mindre er nationalidentitetens politiske element her mere synlig end normalt, fordi dens dysfunktionaliteter truer denne dimensions ellers implicite, aksiomatiske natur. Således bliver den centrifugale tendens i den britiske text - dens tegn på identitetserosion - ikke kun et symptom på den tosidede kendsgerning, at både stat-borger relationen og Storbritanniens internationale position er blevet alvorligt - og samtidigt - svækket, men bliver også til en *specifik* eksemplificering af en betydningsfuld *almen* pointe, nemlig at der i hjertet af europæiske identiteter sidder en 'statsræson', hvis bevidste tilstedeværelse for borgerne aftager ligefrem proportionalt med dens funktionalitet for deres nationalidentitet.

Således viser disse studier som helhed, hvad Robert Musil indså allerede i 1921, nemlig at "under alle nationens ideologiske beklædningsstykker er det dog staten der er den mest lebedige. Man fristes næsten til at sige: den er dens krop; men i virkeligheden er den endnu mere, for desværre er den næsten også dens sjæl" (Musil, 1978, p. 1066). I 1990erne, 70 år senere, er denne 'statslige dimension' ikke bare forvandlet fra "ideologi" til identitet, men langthen også fra et positivt værditerræn til en slagmark fyldt med ambivalente negationer. Spaltninger mellem stat og folk, politiske og kulturelle repræsentationskriser, oversættes til nationale identitetskonfigurationer som diverse former for det Pinlige, indsnævrede loyalitetsrum og affektiv hjemløshed.

## 2. Argumentets resultater, II

I. Det er passende her at starte med 'konvergensteorien', som i afhandlingen udgør hovedunderlaget for Del I, Kapitel V. Teorien sætter, at nationalismens væsentligste egenskab - og det der adskiller den fra tidligere produktions- og mentalitetsformer - er sammenfaldet af politik og kultur/identitet, stat og nation, understøttet af fælles forestillinger om national exceptionalisme og eksklusivistiske billeder af den internationale Andethed. Uanset teoriens gyldighed hvad angår programmatik og nationalitetens romantiske ideal (samt muligvis tidligere historiske faser), er det ikke desto mindre ret afgørende at undersøge i hvilken udstrækning, respektive hvordan, teoriens står sig i relation til nationalismens virkelighed idag. Kan den forklare nationalidentiteten i dens øjeblikkelige

konfigurationer? Er det, som en historisk filosof har udtrykt det (Jonathan Rée), snarere sådan, at nationsformen er et "bedrag (...) som foregøgler os at de stater, som definerer de nationale grænser, er udtryk for en forudgående folkelig vilje. (...) Den narrer os til at deltage i et globalt antagonisme-system, og siger til os at vi kun udtrykker os selv når vi gør det" (Rée, 1991)? Eller er den 'postnationale' fortolkning rigtigere, ifølge hvilken et sådant 'bedrag', omend tidligere en magtfuld faktor, nu er blevet enten gennemskuet eller overhalet af historien - som Wallerstein har udtrykt det i ironiens form, "netop i det øjeblik nationale kulturer er blevet skabt, den ene forskellig fra den anden, er disse [internationale økonomiske] 'flows' begyndt at nedbryde de nationale distinktioner" (citeret fra Hall, 1992)?

På basis af disse studiers duale strukturering - svarende til de to sider af nationalismens ideelle medalje - forekommer en fjerde mulighed at give os et mere tilfredsstillende, omend kognitivt og strukturelt mindre strømlinet svar, hvor konfigurationer af Selv og Andet, lokationer og dis-lokationer, 'naturlig loyalitet' og 'rationelle holdninger', er i gang med at frembringe en ny type nationalmodalitet, omfattende en ny type afspaltning mellem stat og nation, men uden at dette - i hvert fald i det korte løb - truer den identitet der hviler på nationale følelser. Idet jeg vælger at anvende den organicistiske diskurs, hvori nationalismen gennemgribende italesættes, er den konkluderende påstand, at nationalismen - som et totaliserende og magtfuldt socialt fænomen - snarere end at sygne hen er i gang med at gå ind i en modenhedsfase, som genopfinder og rekonstruerer nation/stat-nexus'en, den Gamle Konfigurations *topoi*, permutationerne indeholdt i den Nationalistiske Firkant, og sammenhængene mellem de nationale betydningsstrukturers subtekster, kontekster og prætekster (Del I, Kapitel III) - og gør det begrundet i en tilpasningsproces til nye eksterne overlevelsesbetingelser og under indoptagelse af resultaterne af bestemte historiske erfaringer. Skønt der hverken er fuldstændig overensstemmelse eller total heterogenitet i sammenhængen mellem den nationale arkæologiske strukturs to hovedlag, peger en korrelation af parallelle væsenstræk og ekstrapolationer af kausale interaktioner mod et strukturelt og lineært mønster som forekommer relativt nyt - og som manifesterer sig i tre distinkte varianter i de tre lande. Dette mønster kan konceptualiseres som en nationalismens 'romantiske agnosticisme', en ny 'habitus' der udspringer af en relativ desaggregering mellem stat og nation, mellem politik og identitet, i en atmosfære præget af politisk apati og desillusion.

Nationalismen tilpasser sig ny forudsætninger ved at undergå en omdefinering selv langs den afgørende stat/nation-konvergensakse, gennem en delvis indoptagelse af kognitiv og emotiv dissonans, opblødningen af både positive Selv-billeder og negative Andet-billeder, og gennem integrationen af negationer og fravær. På en måde ser vi her aktivering af den semiotiske antropologis 'nul-signifiant', den fraværende tilstede-

værelse, centret som en decentrerende struktur (og proces), men ikke som en definitiv bevægelse mod centrifugalitet, snarere mod nationalidentitetens politiske udtømming og den imaginære skabelse af ny sammenhænge, nye centre og nye betydningsrum for det Nationale. Denne nationalismens modningsproces i den yderste ende af det 20. århundrede indbefatter en vis moderering af nationalismen (både som 'mentalitet' og som 'interesse'), men samtidig dannelsen af en ny slags nationalromantik og dyrkelsen af 'organiske' loyaliteter *qua* 'rødder', 'identitet' og 'skæbne' i nye former. Lad os se nærmere på et par af denne nye konfigurations hovedkomponenter.

II. Nationalismens symbolske konstruktører - politikere, økonomiske aktører, medier og intellektuelle - står idag over for betingelser for handling, diskurs og organisering som, med eller mod deres vilje, tenderer mod at afsondre dem fra deres nationale grundlag (fx. Cerny, 1990). Skønt de utvivlsomt stadig sætter stor pris på politisk opbakning fra deres befolkninger og de traditionelt dybe nationalfølelser den bundet i; og skønt de utvivlsomt stadig (med transnational business som mulig undtagelse) forfølger nationale interesser i den ene eller anden form, og således ser sig selv som nationale repræsentanter; ikke desto mindre strider de økonomiske, teknologiske og strukturelle forhold under hvilke de gør dette i hvert fald delvist mod opretholdelsen af en tæt, 'organisk' forbindelse med den nationale interesses underliggende basis i dens form som forestillet folkeligt fællesskab. Nationen-som-stat, dvs. top-down forbindelsen mellem folk og stat baseret på instrumentalitet og interesse - og samtidig grundlaget for nationalidentitetens politiske dimension - svækkes og udvandes, både pga erosionen af den velfærdsstatslige nexus, fordi nationale politikere ofte foretrækker at forfølge den 'strukturelle' (her internationale) snarere end 'politiske' (her nationale) fortolkning af den nationale interesse (jvf. Moravcsik, 1989), og fordi forudsætningerne såvel som behovene for en eksklusiv nationaldiskurs og -ideologi kun er tilstede i en moderat eller fragmenteret forstand. Sådanne kontekst-afhængige ændringer i interaktionen mellem nationalstaten og dennes internationale dimension indebærer at staten - stadig national, men igang med at ekspandere sin interesse- og handlingsradius hinsides nationale grænser - både er mindre og mere interesseret i folkets nationale identitet end hidtil.

Den er mindre interesseret pga grænsernes stadigt mere udflydende karakter, udvidelsen af dens (og økonomiens) handlingsfelt, og det svindende behov for pro-aktivt og kontinuerligt at skulle mobilisere det nationale samfund i dets *helhed* bag den nationale interesse. Både politik og økonomi er således ved at gøre sig semi-autonome i relation til nationale demarkationer, og deres fremgang og success - strukturelt og instrumentelt - er mindre afhængige af 'deres' folks helhjertede opbakning. Nationale politiske aktører kan på et voluntaristisk niveau meget vel føle sig bundet og forpligtet over for deres respektive befolkninger, men deres deterministiske behov for det - totalt og eksklusivt - er mindre

absolut. Dette eliminerer ikke interessen hos den nationale konstruktions agenter for agenterne for det forestillede fællesskab - men det omformer denne interesse, og i en bestemt forstand, paradoksalt, forøger det den også.

For så længe de politiske rum forbliver nationale - hvor udtyndet denne nationale kontekst end måtte være - må den nationale stats og den traditionelle suverænitets aktører nødvendigvis dyrke 'nationen' som deres magts afgørende bærepille - og dermed også de følelser af loyalitet og ambition der når alt kommer til alt definerer nationen som en sådan. Jo mere økonomiernes og politikernes reelle aktionsradius overskrider nationalstatslige grænser, jo mere nationalstaten dis-lokeres - jo mere presserende er på en måde behovet for konstant at symbolsk bekræfte og rekonstruere denne den nationale magts *centrale* situering. Der er selvfølgelig et materielt rationale bag dette: nationerne er stadig meget vigtige både som økonomisk faktor (men næppe længere i sin totalitet, jvf. Reich, 1992), som kilden til og legitimationen af politisk magt, og som den politiske kommunikations primære objekt. Samtidig skjuler den tiltagende politiske symbolisering og semiotisering af den nationalstatslige magt-nexus - nationen-som-stat som en top-down *rekonstruktion* - også fortvivlelsen over potentialt tab uden reelt håb om extra-national kompensation, en klyngen-sig til afprøvede magtafgrænsninger, og den 'negative' interesse i politisk inddæmning af og kontrol med sociale fragmentationstendenser som langthen ikke mindst skyldes den gradvise nedbrydning af sammenhængen mellem nation og stat. I den forbindelse kan 'identitet' - appeller til national solidaritet og opofrelse, (ny)fortolkninger af den nationale 'etnicitet', (ny)ordningen af den nationale hukommelse osv. - ikke afskrives som et intentionelt middel for de symbolske konstruktører til *reaktiv* håndtering af samfundsmæssige opbrudstendenser; i dette område, som i andre, gør den faktiske erosion af nationen-som-stat dens symbolske konstruktion så meget mere påtrængende. 'Affekt' for nationen-som-stat må opretholdes under forhold hvor 'interesse' i staten (som en positiv formidler af sikkerhed, lighed og solidaritet) er for nedadgående. Dette peger mod en forvandling af 'nationalidentitet' inden for Niveau 2's officielle teleologi - fra en positiv, materielt baseret programmatik til en negativ, symbolsk og defensiv imakologi; og, for så vidt angår de nationale borgere, fra at være objekter for mobiliserende Selv/Andet-diskurser til nu *også* at befinde sig i en selvmodsigende rolle som modtagere og forbrugere af præ-fabrikerede identiteter der har løsgjort sig fra det meste af deres samfundsmæssigt-kulturelle betydninger og implikationer.

III. Hvis vi vender spejlet, hvordan påvirker dette den nationale forestillings bærere, deres opfattelser og følelser? Indebærer den gradvise erosion af nationen-som-stat nødvendigvis en parallel erosion af staten-som-nation, af nationale værdier, affekt og kosmologier? Kan de "statsborgerskabets vaner", som Robert Reich taler om (Reich, 1992), vedblivende forvandle sig til Tocqueville's "hjertets vaner", som en mentalitet

omfattende borgerligt-kollektivt afkald, i en historisk situation hvor sådanne mentale orienteringers instrumentalitet og intentionalitet er under alvorlig beskydning?

De mikroskopiske studier af de tre identiteter bevidner først og fremmest, at nationalisme som følelsesmæssigt værdisæt på den ene side rent faktisk afspejler et desengagement i stat og politik og en svækkelse af nationen-som-stat (forstået som mentalt paradigme); men på den anden side også, at den forsøger at gendanne sig selv netop i en reaktionsproces mod det Politiske, i en slags agnostisk afkastning af den politiske dimensions skin(d). Denne proces (som nu og da omfatter en kognitiv benægtelse af eksistensen af patriotisme) resulterer ofte i skabelsen af ny nations-romantik, i og med at der reageres på den internationale instrumentalisering af den nationale interesse på tre distinkte måder: 1. ved at lokalisere identitet i det Kendtes Rum (jvf. ovenfor); 2. ved at genbekræfte det nationale båndes ideelle solidaritet - altså en tilbagevending til nationen-som-stat i romantisk-imaginære former; 3. ved at forsøge at rodfæste den nationale følelses organicisme (Del I, Kapitel II) inden for det symmetrisk organiserede internationale univers' gradualisme og inden for den kognitive rationalitets grænser ('kulturelle ligheder' osv.). Men samtidig er der tegn på to yderligere - og mindre lovende - processer, skønt de inden for disse respondentgrupper er mindre kraftigt repræsenteret: 4. en individualiseret, apatisk, ikke-kollektiv genovertagelse af (dele af) den nationale identitet - en slags nationalismens Anden Sækulariseringsbølge (nr. 1 er nationalismen som verdslig 'afløser' for religiøse trossystemer); og 5. en etnisk-racial, desillusioneret genopfindelse af nationalismen i dens 'gamle' form, omfattende indvandrerfjendtlighed og formuleringen/udnyttelsen af konservative politikker med det formål - og med en dertil svarende diskurs - at modgå erosionen af det Nationale ortodokse arkæologi.

De tre første komponenter forsøger på forskellige måder at erstatte den eftertragtede kognitive, instrumentelle sammenkædning mellem nationen-som-stat og staten-som-nation, ved enten at 'rationalisere' nationalidentitet, idealisere den svækkede politikkomponent, eller gendanne staten-som-nation inden for konvergensen mellem kulturens reelt apolitiske Kendthed (for danskerne stort set identisk med grænserne for det Nationale) og identitetens affektive værdisæt. Alle tre løsninger (i forskellige kombinationer) 'invaderer' Niveau 2, dvs. sigter mod at fylde hullet som den svækkede (men så meget mere bevidstgjorte) politiske dimension har efterladt inden for nationalidentitetens mentale strukturering og semiotiske indebyrd, samtidig med at de funderer sig på en grundlæggende accept af de forhold der i sidste ende er ansvarlige for dilemmaet: statens 'europæisering'. Den fjerde mulighed repræsenterer en apatisk, desillusioneret, 'protestantisk' reaktion på omstændigheder hinsides egen kontrol, mens den sidste og femte tendens uden omsvøb vil geninstallere staten-som-nation som et efterstræbelsesværdigt sted for centripetal,

naturlig loyalitet, og derfor søger at tilbageføre traditionel funktionalitet og spatialitet til det nationale politiske rum.

IV. Afgørende i alt dette er at svækkelsen af det Politiske (henholdsvis af politikken nationale diskurser) som en signifikant, men hidtil relativt 'usynlig' dimension i nationale identitetskonfigurationer, potentielt fjerner den eneste stabile, 'nødvendige' faktor i kultur/identitets-nexusen. Herigennem frigøres på sæt og vis det Nationale som imaginær konstruktion, og kulturelle faktorer indtager nye uafhængige positioner i forskellige gendannelser af nationalidentitet. Således konfronteres 'udvidelsen' af det Politiske - dets europæisering og globalisering - reaktivt med en subjektivisk, konjunktivisk blanding af 'fordybning', 'indskrænkning', 'rationalisering' og 'kulturalisering' hos udviklingernes og den nationale konstruktions afhængige variable. Den tendentielle svækkelse af nationen-som-stat (ikke identisk med en svækkelse af staten) indebærer med andre ord ikke nødvendigvis en svækkelse af staten-som-nation: den idealisme og kosmologiske affekt som sidstnævnte omfatter kan og vil føre et selvstændigt imaginært liv. Det prætextuelle Tegn (Del I, Kapitel III), den nationale forestillingsverdens mentale repræsentationer, gør sig relativt uafhængige af deres logiske Interpretant, politikken *signifié*. Dette muliggør både den agnostiske og negativt indlejrede desillusion hos den skuffede troende (tendens: en borgerlig ('civic') rationalisering af det nationale tilhørsforhold), og den romantiske, positivt rodfæstede dyrkelse af nye sammenfald mellem identitet og kultur (tendens: en 'etnisk' væsensbestemmelse af identitet) - eller for den sags skyld begge på samme tid i forskellige individuelle kombinationer.

Disse udviklinger indbefatter en omdefinering af relationer mellem 'tilfredshed' og 'stolthed', 'effekt' og 'affekt' inden for den subjektive nationalismes mentalitetsparameter. Inden for traditionelle strukturer medfører nationen-som-stat (Niveau 2) ideelt tilfredshed med ens borgerstatus i et givet land på grund af Politikken instrumentalitet, mens staten-som-nation (Niveau 3) fører til stolthed og positiv affekt. Omgrupperingen af sammenkædningen mellem Nationalstat og det Internationale som hidtil defineret repræsenterer et brud af mere end tilfældig og forbigående karakter i denne pænt ordnede sekvens. Tilfredshed elimineres ikke, men tenderer mod at rette sig mindre åbent og affirmativt mod centret for national politik, mod dets 'output' og den opbakning det måtte kunne tiltrække på den basis. Istedet bliver tilfredshed (i det omfang den er tilstede) mere diffust lokaliseret i fx. individuelle muligheder, personligt initiativ, held, eller muligvis i nationen, men da i en abstrakt, uspecificeret og relativt apolitisk forstand. Og den exceptionalistiske stolthed som nationalitet ideelt afstedkommer; som staten kan forøge ved at handle succesrigt på den internationale arena (hvis den vel at mærke gør det inden for rammerne af ortodoks suverænitet); og hvis højeste udtryk er viljen til at dø for sit land - dæmpes, dis-lokeres (fx. til sportspladsen), semiotiseres mere totalt, omvendes (fx. til

skamfuldhed eller dyrkelse af det Andet), eller erstattes af andre tegn, andre prætextuelle identitets-signifianter der smager mindre af den nationale politiks -isme (fx. sprog, litteratur, landskabet, økonomiske landvindinger osv.), ja på en måde mindre af det Nationale.

Det må på ingen måde forstås sådan, at den slags apolitiske begrundelser for nationalidentitet er en nyhed. De tegnstrukturer og betydningsosmoser, som Del I, Kapitel II, III og IV behandler, argumenterer for det modsatte standpunkt. Pointen er her, at eftersom den nationale allegoris afgørende, omend implicite, Interpretant er inde i et hamskifte, vil nationale stolthedsfølelser tendere mod minimalisering, eller mod at blive indskrevet i enten nye sammenhænge eller i gamle tegnkonfigurationer med en mindre centripetal betydning. Sagt anderledes: Der er en ikke ubetydelig forskel på et essentialiseret Tegn der *repræsenterer* det Politiske i en afpolitiseret form, og et der *erstatte* det Politiske på grund af ændringer i dets manifeste eller forestillede betydning for nationalismens mentale strukturering. Paradokset i denne problematik er, at jo mere det Politiske er blevet bevidstgjort som på en eller anden måde væsentligt for den nationale identitet, jo mere falder dets anseelse, jo mere aflegitimiseres det, og jo mere forsøger nationale borgere tilsyneladende at minimere, bagatellisere og omstrukturere dets rolle. Dette fører ikke nødvendigvis til hverken kritik af eller manglende interesse i politiske emner - det afhænger af specifikke nationale og individuelle forhold - men, i det omfang der kan generaliseres, snarere til forsøg på at bortrationalisere staten som betydningskilde fra subjektive identitetsformationer og nationale følelsesstrukturer, og til enten at længes efter eller henvise til situationer af nationalidentitet uden for det statsligt-politiske rum. Denne form for desaggregering og den national-romantiske agnosticisme, den har som følgesvend - åbenbar i tegnene for både 'hjem' og 'hjemløshed' i Tyskland og Storbritannien - kan endog spores i Danmark, omend i en ånd af national bekræftelse og en næsten total sammensmeltning af kultur og identitet, der klart adskiller den fra de to andre lande.

V. Argumentet så langt rejser et par vigtige spørgsmål: Hvad er det der gør nationalidentitet national hvis den politiske dimension ikke længere er der ... hvis identitetspolitik er én ting, og politikens identitet noget ganske andet? Eller omvendt: Hvis national identitet stadig er national, politikken/centret stadig er vigtig, og interaktionen mellem 'regional' og 'national' ikke meget mere end den fluiditet der allerede afdækkes i Del I, Kapitel V (Model V-VIII), står vi da virkelig med en ny situation, eller er dette bare en ny variant af et gammelt fænomen, af et veletableret mønster hvor centrifugalitet og centripetalitet konstant vekselvirker?

Skønt det ikke ganske kan afvises som en fjern mulighed at de nuværende konfigurationer kunne være forbigående snarere end et overgangsfænomen, er

hovedindikationen ikke desto mindre at nationalismens strukturelle liminaliteter er forøget både i omfang og betydning sammenlignet med mere traditionelle fragmenteringer og dislokationer inden for triaden kultur-identitet-politik. Dette må ikke forstås som en påstand om, at det Politiske er ved at forsvinde fra denne korrelation, men som en tese om at dets internt homogeniserende og eksternt forstærkende effekt (for eksklusive Selv/Andet-konfigurationer) er svækket resp. mere tvetydig. Det er utvivlsomt sandt, at en samtidig og total eliminering af det Politiske som en mental betydningsaktør for det Nationale - og en assimilation til mindre eller muterende identitetsrum - ville resultere i ophævelsen af *national* identitet i enhver betydende forstand inden for nationalismens subjektive dimension. Men det beskriver ikke dækkende den nuværende situation, ejheller formentlig den retning den er ved at tage.

Det ville være mere dækkende at sige at den relative desaggregation af de to hovedlag inden for nationalismens totale arkæologi forlener Kultur og Lokalisme med en ny form for primat *som* bærere *af* det Nationale som mentalt identitetsraster. Dette forudsætter naturligvis den vedvarende betydning af 'nationalitet' som reservoir for betydningsfuld diskurs, værdi, affekt og selv-definition - omend ikke nødvendigvis som det eneste reservoir med den funktion; ikke nødvendigvis med samme hegemoniske indflydelse; og ikke nødvendigvis med de samme urørlige konnotationer af sakralitet og organicisme. Den Ny Nationalromantik, idet den forankrer sig i ny strukturer for inter-nationalt samkvem og perception, blander på agnostisk vis følelse og rationalitet, normativitet og værdirelativisme, etnisk og 'civic' orientering, på en måde der synes at favorisere mindre eksistentielle tilhørsforhold og en mere sækuler fortolkning af staten-som-nation.

Det er stadig helt igennem muligt at argumentere for, at dette kan fortolkes som en periode-specifik variant af samspillet mellem den Gamle Konfigurations hovedtopoi, af diverse klassiske Selv/Andet-modulationer, og af den altid tilstedeværende tendens for national-identiteten til at iklæde sig betydningsformer adskilt fra deres *signifié*. Hvis noget er ved at 'ske', er der sandsynligvis tale om gradbøjninger snarere end kvalitative ændringer, og knytter i hvert fald klart an til konfigurative identitetsformer der længe har været synlige. For eksempel: Danskhedens tiltrækning mod en folkeligt-kulturel dimension, der er relativt selv bærende, er som sådan ikke ny. Lokal-provinsialismen i tyske forestillinger om 'Heimat' er blevet grundigt afdækket som en historisk signifikant egenskab ved tyskhedens kulturelle dimension (men muligvis mindre som en egenskab ved og bærer af tysk nationalidentitet). Og englændernes forkærlighed for diverse former for 'mindre' identitetsformationer (knyttet primært til region, klasse, generation og senere subkultur) er også veldokumenteret - skønt det også her er sådan, at den vigtige pointe, at dette er en af de væsentligste former for tilegnelsen og udlevelsen af *national* identitet, ofte er blevet overset.

I denne forstand er de strukturelle konfigurationer, som afhandlingen afdækker, i overensstemmelse med historisk materiale der omfatter længere tidsspænd. Det gør det vel muligt at argumentere for, at i en vis forstand kan der i nogle af de her konkluderende resultater være en tendens til at skyde gråspurve med kanoner, og muligt at hævde at der ikke er noget signifikant nyt på horisonten: De afdækkede former er gamle fænomener med gamle betydninger! Ikke desto mindre er påstanden her, at der er mere på spil end en sådan traditionel position ville repræsentere - men lige så klart mindre end en postnational tilgang implicerer. Dokumentationen for, at vi her har at gøre med gamle fænomener med nye betydninger, ligger ikke så meget i indholdet af nationalismens to hoveddimensioner hver for sig, ikke i deres autonome indhold, men i deres strukturelle korrelation - i det billede af generel dislokation og forskudte konfigurationer, der aftegner sig gennem sammenholdningen af de 'objektiverede' former og de 'subjektiverede' forestillinger om national identitet. Og ikke i hver af de tre nationale 'cases' i isolation, men i deres parallelle semiotiske strukturer i en gensidig afvejning.

For uanset at de tre nationale konfigurationer er meget forskellige, og de specifikke interaktionsmønstre mellem Selv og Andet, strukturer og diskurser, kognition og affekt, affirmation og negation, top-down og bottom-up, er klart distinkte, bærer de alle ikke desto mindre vidnesbyrd om skævtrækningen (snarere end opløsningen) af de traditionelle struktureringer af nation og stat, identitet og kultur, Selv og Andet, og en agnostisk (ofte desillusioneret) refiguration af væsentlige elementer ved nationen som identitet, og ved nationernes distinkte identitetstræk. Der findes også andre, mere eksterne tegn på at 'noget er i gære': fx den nyopdukkede folkelige, mediemæssige og akademiske interesse i nationalisme (jvf. Del I, Kapitel I); postnationale drømmerier om at leve i en ikke-nationale tidsalder; og andre hyppigt forekommende afvisninger af eller afstandtagen fra nationalisme som et pinligt eller usmageligt fænomen - alle er de symptomer på strukturelle og substantielle ændringer i mentalitet og værdiorientering, skønt de i deres kognitivt-vurderende indhold ofte overdriver nationalismens atrofi og undervurderer dens sammenhængskraft.

I den forbindelse må det ikke overses, som afhandlingen detaljeret dokumenterer, at nutidige identiteters sækulære, negative og mangesidede sammensætning på den ene side *er* af romantisk art - dvs. indeholder deres egen slags nationale affirmation (tydelig inden for eksempelvis sport); og på den anden lige så klart *er* agnostisk, dvs. på en skeptisk, længselsfuld og distanceret facon negerer en identitetens centripetalitet og en tabt (resp. umulig) national orden. Herigennem skabes en lakune der forsøges udfyldt ikke af fuldgyltige erstatninger, men af substitutter, eller af 'nul-betydernes' meningsfylde. Det er i og på grund af nationens relative fravær som identitetskilde at den forekommer at være mere nærværende end før. Den er indfanget i en mentalitetsforskydning mellem på

den ene side en indikativ fænomenologisk negative tegn og på den anden en positiv omend konjunktivisk kosmologi, en dislokering som den (a)politiske identitetsdimension ikke længere kan holde tilfredsstillende sammen på for så vidt angår national affekt og sammenkædningen af Selv/Andet-permutationernes kontekster og prætekster. Alligevel forsøges dette gjort af nationalismens symbolske konstruktører, men halvhjertet, og inden for en selv-referentiel diskurs der i stigende grad isolerer sig fra mindre konstruerede, folkelige fortolkninger af national identitet. I sin tur bliver denne de politiske aktørers nationale selv-referentialitet en yderligere grund til politisk misfornøjelse blandt nationernes borgere, og forstærker det Nationale dilemma og de 'centripetalt-vertikale' repræsentationskriser.

VI. Dette er i kort form indholdet af nationalismens igangværende modningsproces - som således på ingen måde er unilineær, modsigelsesfri eller harmonisk. Samtidig er det nødvendigt at klargøre, at udtrykket 'nationalismens modning' som organisk metafor lagt fra er perfekt. Det har to væsentlige mangler. For det første forbindes med 'modning' og 'modenhed' sædvanligvis en overgang fra uskyld til erfaring, fra idealisme til realisme. For det andet associerer man ofte denne myndiggørelsesproces med fornuftens minimering af den smerte, som konflikterne mellem den ungdommelige uskylds idealer og samfundets kontante krav til individet afstedkommer.

Hvad angår europæisk nationalismes makro-stadier set i dette lys, holder disse analoge forudsætninger ikke ganske - på en måde vendes de endog om. I et lineært perspektiv var nationalismens tidlige stadier som vi ved langt fra uskyldige - dette ville kun kunne dække nationalismens romantiske idealer, fx. i Herder'sk form, men ikke dens politiske og sociale virkelighed. Omvendt, hvad nogen ser som en spirende mulighed idag - og én som disse studier delvist bekræfter - er at nationalisme rent faktisk kunne tilegne sig en sådan uskyldighed, virkeliggøre nogle af dens indbyggede idealer, eller i værste fald være en mindre destruktiv faktor end hidtil.

Denne omvendning af modningens antropomorfske proces - en bevægelse fra 'erfaring' til 'uskyld' snarere end omvendt - implicerer også, at den anden prædikation ikke kan opfyldes bogstaveligt. Snarere end at syntetisere de disparate elementer fra sin tilblivelsesfase og lære produktivt at anvende sine traumatiske erfaringer, producerer nationalismen i sin modningsfase nye polariteter, disharmonier og usikkerheder. Det kan ikke være anderledes, eftersom nationalismen ironisk nok netop (kun kan) modnes via en proces bestående af delvis desaggregering mellem dens to væsentligste konstituerende elementer, Stat og Nation. For at blive i metaforen, ville dette være at sammenligne mellem adskillelsen mellem forældre og børn, på det tidspunkt hvor sidstnævnte går inden i voksen-tilværelsen. Problemet er at nationalismen, som Gellner har udtrykt det, ikke 'normalt' kan overleve uden sin forældre-politiske 'skal', Staten, hvilket forudsigeligt peger

mod et langtrukket opgør mellem tilbagevendende udbrud af national recidivisme og forsøg på at forvandle en tilstand af (positivt vurderet) anomi til normalitetens permanens og stabilitet.

Skabelsen af uskyld fra erfaring, under samtidig bibeholdelse af historisk erfaring, er derfor en opgave der langt fra er sikker på succes. Ikke desto mindre er en sådan modnende nationalisme sandsynligvis et bedre alternativ end både regression til den Gamle Konfigurations rigide allegorier - fyldt med national hypertrofi - og også at foretrække for en decentreret, postnational kosmopolitanismes loyalitetsatrofier. Som Robert Reich rigtigt påpeger, vil kosmopolitter "være verdensborgere, men uden hverken at acceptere eller bare anerkende nogle af de forpligtelser som statsborgerskab i en nation normalt omfatter. (...) management-konsulenten vil sandsynligvis ikke føle noget særligt bånd til noget samfund" (1992, p. 309-310). Han konkluderer, at "(d)et er ikke indlysende at menneskeheden står sig klart bedre med en overflod af kloge kosmopolitter der føler ligegyldighed eller magtesløshed over for verdens dårligdomme end med en samling af skøre nationalister der er ude på at gøre netop deres samfund til Nummer Ét".

Hvis man skal kunne finde en middelvej mellem disse to yderpunkter, forudsætter det en genskabelse af sammenbindingen mellem stat og statsborgere på en måde, der genindfører en slags 'borgerligt ansvar' på begge sider som et teleologisk-instrumentelt kontraktforhold, mens organicismen og exceptionalismen i staten-som-nation - og dens eksistentielle dannelse af identitet - elimineres. Det skulle være muligt at fastholde en politikens identitet, uden nationalisme som et resultat af en diskursiveret og hegemoniserende identitetspolitik. Dette scenarie kan indbefatte en vis kulturelt forankret stolthed over stedets særpræg, men vil betydeligt reducere den nationale stoltheds sakralt-irrationelle rolle. Identitet ville skabes via kulturelle loyaliteter og faktuelle interessefællesskaber, snarere end omvendt: gennem det nationale afkalds anonymitet og de forestillede nationers abstrakthed. Den agnostiske nationsromantik, som afhandlingen afdækker - i stort omfang affødt af negationer, implosion og frustrationer - er ikke i sig selv en løsning. Der er flere forskellige udviklingsbaner potentielt indlejret i arten af de nuværende konfigurationer. I den 'værst tænkelige situation' kunne nationalismens modningsproces vise sig at afkaste yderst afskrækkende resultater. Imidlertid, i en overordnet afvejning giver dens nye konfigurative mønstre mellem Selv og Andet anledning til en vis from optimisme i en *fin-de-siècle* tidsånd som ellers præges af uvished og mismod.

## Note

1. Iflg. "Bekendtgørelse om erhvervelse af doktorgraden" pg. 9.

Om redegørelsen i øvrigt skal bemærkes følgende: I lyset af at afhandlingen er skrevet på engelsk, det mest udbredte og mest tilgængelige internationale forskningssprog, samt af at resultaterne af undersøgelsen løbende er sammenfattet i fremstillingens forløb, er indeværende danske sammenfatning holdt i et relativt kort format, og med emfase på ordet 'resultater' i kravet om at "(a)fhandlingen skal ved indleveringen være ledsaget af en sammenfattende redegørelse for de forskningsresultater, som forfatteren mener at have opnået" (Bekendtgørelsen pg. 9). Det indebærer, at metodiske problemstillinger i denne sammenfatning er blevet nedprioriteret til fordel for substantielle konklusioner. Den største del af sammenfatningen (2. del) udgøres af et sammendrag af Del II, Kapitlerne VII og VIII - de to kapitler som i selve afhandlingen uddrager essensen af den samlede fremstilling. Det er formentlig overflødigt at understrege, at pga denne sammenfatnings kursoriske karakter må en lang række forudsætninger af teoretisk, metodisk og indholdsmæssig art nødvendigvis udelades eller forkortes dramatisk. Det er derfor uundgåeligt at adskillige resultater her vil fremstå i deres nøgne, relativt forudsætningsløse form, uden 'mellemløse', og derfor i visse tilfælde kan forekomme at være postulater. For at fylde dette hul, må læseren ty til den egentlige tekst.

Litteraturhenvisninger (også forsøgt holdt på et minimum) vil som i hovedteksten antage form af forfatter + udgivelsesår, som igen refererer til referencelisten.

## UDVALGTE RESPONDENTPORTRÆTTER

NATIONAL PORTRAITS I

DK-25

FRG-4

UK-43

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: DK-25

### *"VALUABLE TO BE DANISH": EXISTENTIAL LYRICISM AND NATIONAL ESCHATOLOGY*

DK-25 is male, well-off, settled, occupies a leading position in a private company located in Copenhagen, an activity to which he devotes the larger part of his life and energy. He is, in a sense, as confidently 'Danish' as they come (in the sense in which Chapter III defines Danishness), whilst, nevertheless, embodying a particular, individual configuration, and having a wide-ranging international biography. He characterises his own background and worldview as follows:<sup>1</sup>

"Jeg er født i 1942. Jeg hæfter mig ved det, fordi jeg tror at hele den generation, der er født under krigen ... altså det har noget med det følelsesmæssige at gøre, specielt til selvfølgelig Tyskland. Jeg er vokset op nord for København. Min far var <...> i det firma, vi sidder i nu, jeg har haft en traditionel opvækst med dansk klaverspil og spejder, og har haft et normalt skoleforløb. (...) Jeg har arbejdet i <to europæiske byer> (...), og jeg har arbejdet for et amerikansk <firma> i København i en kortere periode. (...) I mit arbejde har jeg ikke haft berøring med Europa indtil for 5 år siden (...), så i de sidste 5 år har jeg også beskæftiget mig med Danmarks samhandel med England, og i de sidste par år har jeg beskæftiget mig med <handel inden for Europa> (...). Familiemæssigt har jeg haft en borgerlig opvækst, og jeg er nok født så tidligt, at jeg er lige før 68-generationen, så jeg har været ret konform hele vejen igennem, så jeg er ikke nogen rebel, og jeg er af borgerlig observans, og lever i et klassisk familiemønster med kone og to børn nord for København".<sup>2</sup>

A self-description thoroughly and confidently suffused with 'normality', 'traditionalism', 'conformity' - of a stable feeling of 'homeness', which, as will be seen, derives directly

from, and therefore completely matches, the national confidence of this respondent. Politically, the respondent specifies his "bourgeois orientation" as having continuously implied support for the Danish Conservatives, though in recent years he has sympathised with and voted for their erstwhile coalition partner in Government (until January, 1993), the Liberal Rightist Party ('Venstre'), though more for "personal" than "political" reasons - "the human element in politicians", as he calls it - finding the leader of the Liberal Rightists, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, to represent the emergent international confidence of Danishness which the respondent favours, better than the leadership of the Conservatives. Hence, DK-25 is a strong supporter of active Danish membership of international organisations like NATO, the EC, and the UN, and an outspoken critic of the mentality of 'the Law of Jante' as well as of the petty-minded, 'un-Danish' materialistic orientations that he finds in many of his countrymen, orientations that have, over the last 20-25 years, whittled away at the roots of 'genuine' Danishness - in which this 'non-rebellious' respondent's identity and emotions are totally, happily, and 'homogeneously' immersed - as already his description of his early piano lessons as "*Danish* piano playing" indicates (see above). DK-25 is not just "happy and proud" of his citizenship - and, in this sense, a self-confessed "nationalist" - but confidently and unashamedly so, in an almost lyrical mode, leaving no doubt of the near-existentialist depths of his nationalist emotions:

"Jeg er den type dansker, der ikke har spor imod regnvejr, så jeg trives egentlig fint under hjemlige himmelstrøg. Jeg er i den forstand nok meget dansk, altså jeg kunne overhovedet ikke tænke mig at emigrere. (...) Jeg holder meget af dansk klima, der er noget vand man kan kikke på, bøgeskove og sådan noget. Jeg er meget dansk. (...) jeg er glad for at være dansk og erkender, at det er her, jeg trives bedst, <og> så vil man jo gerne forsvare den platform. (..) Da det for mig er værdifuldt at være dansk, så er det ikke ligegyldigt, hvordan Danmarks anseelse er internationalt set. (...) Arbejds-mæssigt er jeg glad og stolt over, at jeg arbejder for et stort, anerkendt og velrenommeret dansk firma. (...) Vi <er> på mange måder et meget homogent land. (...) Jeg kan glæde mig over at en dansker kan gøre sig gældende <i international sport> (...) og det kan jeg gå og glæde mig over en hel dag. (...) Det nationale rummer det hele".<sup>3</sup>

Thus, this respondent's subjective Danishness unproblematically combines inward- and outward-looking dimensions: total identification with Denmark as a nation of "hjemme-

fødninge"<sup>4</sup> originating in the peasantry and in the "wounds following the defeat of 1864",<sup>5</sup> but also with a strongly felt desire to see Denmark well and honourably represented internationally ("we are also a seafaring nation, aren't we"?). He frequently refers to Danes or Danish companies that have managed to excel internationally - in spite of the Law of Jante -, to the "geniuses", those with "international class, almost too big for Denmark", the "special talents" who are put down in Denmark where "other countries would be proud", to Hans Christian Andersen, Kierkegaard, Victor Borge, or to LEGO, NOVO, A.P. Møller etc. This is also the measuring rod according to which individual politicians like Uffe Ellemann-Jensen are perceived to stand out positively on the background of the rather non-descript mass of parochial powers-that-be and others with "influence in society", who, according to this respondent, have not grasped that the best way to secure the survival of Denmark and Danishness - "for the next 1000 years" - is to strengthen its international dimension, to leave "our" mark on the rest of the world, even if this has to be bought at the expense of some of "our external sovereignty".

As will be seen, in spite of his 'objectivistic' criticism of Danes, this respondent consistently couches his talk in the national "we" and in naturalist, onomatopoeic imagery. 'I' and 'we' merge. There is no significant distinction. He is a true, national believer, given to thinking in terms of the need for personal sacrifice and idealism in order to salvage that which "contains it all", the lyrical national framework, one of "the big existential questions" which, here, consistently triggers affective descriptions of the Danish landscape, of valuable Danish traditions, of Danish history, and of personal memories - like the time, in the mid-50s, when the respondent walked, as a boy scout, round a lake in Northern Copenhagen, carrying a torch in commemoration of Denmark's liberation from the German occupation, ten years earlier. And as is often the case with believers thinking in terms of salvation, eschatological notes of menace and perdition cannot quite be kept out of the text - visible already in the recurrent use of terms such as "salvation" ('frelse', 'redning') and "survival" ('overlevelse') - though this respondent makes his very best effort to smooth over these cracks in the onomatopoeic national edifice, by insisting that - rather than being at the mercy of international or historical forces - the future of Danishness and of Denmark is purely a matter of whether "we" want to make the right effort, or not (in which latter case we probably do not deserve to survive anyway), or whether we want to give our "special talents" power and recognition in proportion to their deserts - for it is, ultimately, they whom we need to "save" us and our reputation. However, intimations of outside factors ultimately constituting the threatening context cannot,

of course, be totally absent, and are not. They are principally of three kinds: oriented towards Danish-German history and Germany today; towards the EC; and towards extra-European immigration to Denmark.

As far as Germany is concerned, rational and affective inclinations both struggle with each other and intertwine in a number of ways in the identity configuration of this respondent. On the one hand, he repeatedly refers to the German impact on Danish history (including his own personal biography) - 1848, 1864, 1940-45, as well as the absolute economic dependence of Denmark on Germany today. On the other, he just as obstinately asserts that these facts have not been conducive to creating anti-German stereotypes in his mental set-up, that he "gets along very well with Germans", that he and most of his generation have overcome this historical legacy etc. Concurrently, however, he identifies a stable German national character, where automatism, work discipline, authoritarianism, and obedience are the main ingredients - the Germans are "the Japanese of Europe" - but does not recognise this image as stemming in any way from history; they derive, solely, from his own experiences with Germans, and, further, he does not regard Germany as a potential threat. Thus, this respondent's "first historical image of Danishness" - that of *Dybbøl Mølle*<sup>6</sup> in Southern Jutland, exemplifying, more than anything else in Danish historical mythology, the traumatic interaction of Denmark and Germany - combines with his memories and images of WW II - "it is was a small minority who saved us then" - and his present-day perceptions of Germans to somehow belie his rationalistic assertion, and wish, that the German threat is purely a thing of the past, and that his current perceptions are intended in an "affectionate" sense only. The mental curtain interspersed between past and present is also one between affectiveness and reason; as such, it is quite transparent, and also relatively unconvincing for a national identity as deeply cherished as this one: a functional deception believed in, but a deception nevertheless. At the very least, the two sides of the German coin grate quite uncomfortably against each other - though not within the awareness of this mental configuration itself, but rather seen through the analytical prism of the interpreter. This is confirmed by the respondent's description, elsewhere, of his orientation as "Anglo-Saxon" rather than German or French - though his attachment to English ways is mainly steeped in admiration for its internationalist dimension, where he is critical of its lack of modern "efficiency" - and of his being unable to think of any significant German contribution to contemporary culture.

Also the EC *could* be a threat, though this respondent strongly supports Danish membership. The menace would, in that case, hinge on a failure to maintain the

distinction between "external" and "internal" sovereignty, the respondent favouring sovereignty pooling as for the former (foreign policy matters), but not the latter: "There is something called Danishness, and I wish to keep that, and for that reason I believe that there have to be some domestic or internal things that we should determine in a sovereign way, as a sovereign nation-state". This also implies that an unlimited opening of the Danish borders, carrying the potential consequence that EC citizens would be able to come and settle in Denmark at their own decision and in unlimited numbers, constitutes a menace for this respondent, clarifying why he has an "ambivalent attitude" towards the EC. This immigration question is, however, seen as much more serious in the case of extra-European (Muslim) immigration. Here, this respondent becomes truly apocalyptic, imagining Denmark as "flooded" and "threatened", on two counts: numbers, and the alienness of the immigrants' culture(s) - immigrants who are seen to be unwilling to assimilate and therefore, logically, threaten the homogeneity of a Danishness within whose confines citizens "belong together", where there are "few social tensions in us", where "we still have mutual respect and understanding, and recognise each other without a problem". However, as this respondent sees things, that is precisely the quality that we have, vigorously and constantly, to defend, both against "our own fickleness" and "spoilt materialism", and against outside menaces.

So, "we must get a hold on ourselves", "not spend more than we earn", appreciate our Danishness even if it might involve a slight drop in our "material well-being" and our "gross national product". However, the nationalism of this respondent, though poised between immersion and affectionate criticism, salvation and possible perdition, the inward- and the outward-looking modes, ultimately has no existential problem in pivoting around its own confident axis. Its lyricism clearly wins out over its eschatological leanings, assured that it is not only "valuable to be Danish", but that Danishness will, come hell or high water, eventually weather the storm because of its own intrinsic virtues.

## Notes

1. In this as well as in all the other National Portraits, points that might indicate the identity of the respondent have been deleted or generalised. This will be denoted by the use of pointed brackets: <...>.
2. "I was born in 1942. I stress this, because I think that the entire generation born during the War ... you know, it has something to do with emotions, particularly vis-a-vis Germany. I grew up north of Copenhagen. My father was a <...> in the firm we are in

now, I had a traditional upbringing with Danish piano playing and boy scout activities, and had normal schooling. (...) I have worked in <two European cities> (...), and I have worked in an American <company> in Copenhagen for a short period of time. (...) In my work, I did not touch on European matters until 5 years ago (...), so for the past 5 years I have also taken an active interest in Denmark's trade with England, and for the last couple of years I have been engaged in <inter-European trade> (...). Family-wise, I had a bourgeois upbringing, and I was presumably born early enough to precede the '68 Generation, so I have always conformed, so I am no rebel, and my orientation is bourgeois, and I live in a traditional family pattern with a wife and two children north of Copenhagen".

3. "I am the sort of Dane who does not in the least mind rainy weather, so I am actually very comfortable at home. In that sense I am very Danish, I couldn't at all imagine emigrating. (...) I am very fond of the Danish climate, there's some water to look at, beech forests, and so on. I am very Danish. (...) I am happy to be Danish and admit to feeling most at my ease here, <and> then one would like to defend that platform. (...) Since, for me, it is valuable to be Danish, it is not a matter of indifference what Denmark's reputation is, internationally. (...) In terms of work, I am happy and proud to work for a big, recognised and well-reputed Danish company. (...) In many ways, we <are> a very homogeneous country. (...) I can have a sense of joy when a Dane makes a mark <in international sports> (...) and I can go around having pleasure from that for a whole day. (...) Nationality contains it all".
4. An almost intranslatable Danish term, meaning 'people born in and for the nation as home, and who could imagine living nowhere else'.
5. In the war against Prussia, which Denmark blundered into and humiliatingly lost, only to see 2/5 of its territory go to Prussia. It was after this defeat that Danish politics, culture, and identity started to take an inward-looking turn, setting in motion an international wariness which is still around today.
6. "The Mill at Dybbøl", in whose near vicinity important battles were fought and which was, as a consequence, laid in ruins both in the 1858-50 Danish-German showdown, and also in 1864. It is a time-honoured national symbol in Denmark.

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: FRG-4

### *"AUCH IN ANDEREN LÄNDERN!": YEARNING FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE NORMALISATION OF BEING GERMAN*

FRG-4 modestly states his occupation as "kaufmännischer Angestellter". Recently retired, he had always worked (and worked his way up) in private business, first as a sales assistant, later as a planner and researcher in marketing, and always in the southern part of Germany. This is also where he was born, in 1934, one year after the Nazis' assumption of power. His response to C4, Q7, asking for the meaning of WW II for Germany and Germanness today, is revealing in multiple ways: "Das sind keine Fragen für einen Fragebogen, sondern Kapitel in einem Memoirenband! Ich was 1939 fünf und 1945 elf Jahre alt, überlebte mehrere Bombenangriffe und hatte keine normale Ausbildung".<sup>1</sup>

The curtness of this reaction belies, as one might suspect, the depth and intensity of the respondent's emotions as far as this issue (as well as other questions directly pertaining to German history and identity) is concerned.<sup>2</sup> The same tendency to couch personally and emotively charged statements in the form of descriptive indicatives is, also elsewhere, in evidence: "My father had a small enterprise and lost it during the war. (...) I had to take over this small enterprise of my father's..." (Interview). Clearly, his opening statement in C1, Q1 - "(d)eutsch zu sein ist für mich eine wertfreie Eigenschaft" -<sup>3</sup> should be taken at less than face value. Nor does his ensuing remark - "deutsch zu sein ist für mich eine ganz natürliche Sache, ebenso wie es für mich natürlich ist, dass ich ein Mann bin, oder 183 cm gross" -<sup>4</sup> completely cover this respondent's national self-image, which on closer examination proves to be far less sanguine, a composite caught in a vice between cosmopolitan rationalism and national assertiveness, between historical trauma and a yearning for normality, between blunt directness and defensive evasiveness, between confident satisfaction and a less-than-legitimate national pride, between irritation at 'das Ausland' and admiration of 'Ausländer'. This is a deeply ambivalent personality, intent on relating

cognitively and argumentatively to his nationality as a 'value-free property', to himself as 'international', and to 'typical German characteristics' as nothing but an ill-founded, foreign-bred stereotype, but simultaneously one of the most affectively and assertively 'German' respondents, grappling with the paradoxes and peculiarities of German history. Witness the unresolved tension between the following two statements:

1. "Ich habe in meinem ganzen Leben noch keinen 'typischen Deutschen' kennengelernt, auch noch keinen typischen Franzosen oder Engländer. Ich glaube auch nicht, dass es solche überhaupt gibt" (C1, Q2).<sup>5</sup>

2. "It is a typical property of Germans, if I may generalise, that when we <!> have an idea, and we follow this idea consequently <i.e. consistently>, that this idea becomes more real than reality. One could say the same of the fears we have. (...) restricting immigration (...) is something which lies deep in the brains of the majority of the population ..." (Interview).

The subtext that ultimately links these two apparently contradictory observations - simultaneously explaining their contradictory nature - proves to be what the respondent sees as a flawed relationship between Germany and the international community, a relationship negatively shaped and persistently maintained by the latter, to the detriment of national 'normality' in Germany, and weighing on the "brains" of German in an unnatural way, with adverse consequences. The contextual meaning of the first statement above, therefore, is that 'das Ausland' is wrong to constantly presuppose some *negative* German character traits, and that these are as little in evidence in Germany as comparable characteristics in France or Britain. As he freely stated during the Interview: "I have never met a Frenchman who had a bad conscience about Algeria, and what happened there?! I have never met an Englishman who said something about the British role in Southern Africa ... (...) There are many things which are quite natural and normal and accepted in other countries, which are not natural and normal here in Germany, for we have the idea that we must be far out of reach of criticism, so that everybody will not tell us, 'you are still ex-Nazis or nationalists or racists', so we overreact". And it is this "overreaction" that also explains the second statement above, for this - according to the respondent - is the ultimate reason why restricting immigration lies so "deep in the brains of the majority of the population". Something which, *per se*, is "not typical for Germany", becomes

especially loaded because Germany is expected to act more morally, less selfishly than any other country. Between such wishes for normalisation and defensive reactions against the expectations and encroachments of 'das Ausland', it is apparent how Germanness is most uncontroversially described as a 'value-free property' which is both as natural and as inevitable as one's height or hair colour.

However, where expressions of explicit national allegiance and pride are still difficult for this respondent ("Der Begriff 'Patriotismus' - in anderen Ländern etwas ganz selbstverständliches und natürliches, ist hier jedoch stark negativ befrachtet, so dass ich den letzten Teil der Frage nicht beantworten kann"),<sup>6</sup> he is more than open about what he sees as responsible for this anomalous state of affairs, whilst repeatedly employing the national 'we' as his fixed point of reference and as the orientational vantage-point from which he speaks: "... this bad conscience is kept alive in a very penetrating and irritating way which many people do not understand and do not accept. (...) there are many black points in the history of many nations <!>, but when we come abroad, we are normally confronted with the issue, 'oh, you are a German, oh, you must be a monster'. (...) It is kept alive with such a lot of energy, especially in our neighbouring countries, and in the United States. It is really irritating. (...) What really makes me sick in my stomach is that we always run around saying, 'we are really saints now, we have been sinners, and now we are saints'". And he makes no bones about his conclusion, either: "...we should claim the same rights and the same standard of nationalism which is commonly accepted in other comparable countries" (all from Interview). The 'we' of shame must be transformed into a 'we' of normality.

In this light, it makes sense that FRG-4's questionnaire responses (in particular) are literally riddled with variations on the phrase included in the title of this Portrait: "Auch in anderen Ländern!". In a personal effort to counter the 'Sonder'-status that 'das Ausland' imposes on Germany, its negatively defined exceptionalism, this respondent lets hardly a question pass without remarking that conditions in Germany are not qualitatively different from other countries. Some examples of this argumentative figure have already been included in quotes above. The rest encompass *inter alia*: "Allerdings habe ich die gleichen persönlichen Erfahrungen auch in anderen Ländern gemacht" (C1, Q5);<sup>7</sup> "Ich hätte diese Erwartung auch in jedem anderen land" (C1, Q7);<sup>8</sup> "Für jedes Land gilt: ..." (C1, Q8);<sup>9</sup> "Das (...) ist sicher nicht verschieden von anderen europäischen Ländern" (C1, Q11).<sup>10</sup> Etc. In this way, the respondent negotiates between his desire for a normal - and

legitimate - national identity, his annoyance at 'das Ausland' as a generic (rather than specific) entity - see below -, and his international-intercultural self-image.

The primary catalyst for FRG-4's views and sentiments about the normalisation of Germany and German identity is, as will have been noted, the question of immigration, an area where the respondent, already in the questionnaire (1991), admits to having changed his attitudes over the last decade and where "(n)ow everybody says, 'we want to be in control of what happens in the line of immigration, but on the other hand, we do not dare to express it' (Interview; 1993). Also here, his argumentation defensively employs the international comparison: "I cannot imagine any country who would not react to such an uncontrolled immigration like that", whilst drawing a line according to "standards of behaviour", "looks", "numbers". Talking about Rumanian gypsies, he reflects that "they were kind of accepted as a more or less exotic and interesting looking people, who would sell carpets and travel from here to there, this was always a romantic thing, but what happens now is that they are coming by hundreds and thousands. (...) exotic minorities are very small <sic> to be integrated, everybody says 'well, we are not against asylum seekers', but if you ask him, 'would you share your house with one of them?', he would say, 'no, sorry'" (Interview). The respondent evidently shares this view. Conversely, he sees his own feelings of being a 'European' confirmed by the fact that "(a)ufgrund meines Auftretens und Aussehens hat man mich bereits in jedem Land für einen Einheimischen gehalten" (C3, Q10);<sup>11</sup> the follow-up to this observation in the Interview ("From what I look like, nobody can localise where I come from") added, once again, the traumatic twist of historical ambivalence, activating the respondent's anger at 'das Ausland': "So first contacts were really friendly. After some time, people heard that I come from Germany (...) and then I always felt that something was wrong. This was especially hard in the fifties and sixties, when I did a lot of business in the Netherlands. (...) I remember one case when I told this elderly gentleman that in 1945 I was a child, I have only little memory of this thing, I definitely do not feel any personal responsibility for it". This is a person who takes pride in his cultural Europeaness, and feels that he is unjustly hamstrung in this ambition by the prejudices of the international Other.

This Otherness is not the only agent responsible for the lack of normalcy, however. The other primary factor is established parties and politicians in Germany. Where, on the one hand, Germany is in many ways perceived as small, as innocent, and as victimised by 'das Ausland', the German nation is also seen to be at the mercy of its "political class", not just in the sense that politicians are seen to be relatively "incompetent", "untrustworthy",

and "corrupt" - "we are fed up with scandals"; "our democracy needs some leaders, someone who people can believe in"; but specifically in the sense that the established parties - the CDU/CSU and the SPD especially - have failed to honestly reflect the wishes of the people in the immigration issue, and have therefore left the field open for rightwing parties and their strategy for "criminalising" the newcomers. The powers-that-be are thus seen to lose "influence, by just neglecting what people really want". This respondent, in the 50s and 60s a sympathiser of the CDU, only later to turn to the SPD, sees this fact as one of the principal causes of German "Politikerverdrossenheit", unmistakably embodying it himself, among other things in his fervent denial that Helmut Kohl can in any way be seen to have been elected by the people; in his elevation of Willy Brandt to near-saintlike status: "He is kind of above <indicating a halo>. And Kohl is kind of a fate we have here in Germany" (Interview); and also in partially sympathising with that euphemism, "the smaller parties", for "sometimes they even say the right sort of thing".

On the other hand, like almost all the other German respondents, FRG-4 opines that Germany has the right kind of political system and even the right party landscape; the current *malaise* is on the shoulders of those who inhabit it, being both "weak" and even (too) "polite" guardians of the national interest. Asked, for instance, whether German politicians do enough to defend German interests in the EC (C3, Q6), this respondent firmly replies, "Nein. Sie tun sicher weitaus weniger als die Politiker in anderen EG-Ländern",<sup>12</sup> but immediately proceeds to add to this affective statement a cognitively informed international comparison - a safeguard against interpretive misuse, since he is, after all, speaking to a foreigner: "Die Leute in anderen Ländern sind in dieser Hinsicht wahrscheinlich auch unzufrieden mit ihren Politikern".<sup>13</sup> In other words: though our situation is bad, it is so in a 'normal', not abnormal, sense. As is consistently the case with this respondent, his national outlook is evenly compounded of 'Politikerverdrossenheit' and 'Auslandsverdrossenheit', and guided by the ambiguities of reason vs sentiment, internationalism vs nationalism that this mix necessarily entails.

By the same token of ambivalent reactions, FRG-4 thinks Germany's sovereignty should be strengthened - large parts of Germany, i.e. especially the GDR, having long been "regiert vom Ausland" - but is also a strong supporter of a united Europe that might act as "an economic and moral force" in international politics - to the extent that the respondent imagines himself to come into the hypothetical possession of "Europa-Staatsangehörigkeit" (C1, Q14).<sup>14</sup> Also here, however, his distrust of the powers-that-be is evident. Europe - a "label", an "undefined monster" - is currently developing along the

wrong track: "the top seems to be quite unable to understand what it is all about". The diversities of Europe are too large to be contained within a single formula, and any positive progress must happen slowly, organically, from below - as intercultural processes. Any imposition of artificial harmonisation should be counteracted: "Wenn z.B. deutsche Sozialpolitik in Brüssel für Griechen gemacht wird, oder sizilianische Einflüsse über eine Einheitswährung Inflation fördern" (C3, Q5),<sup>15</sup> then this a threat to German sovereignty. Thus, the respondent is vehemently opposed to "starke Konzentrations-tendenzen" (C3, Q7)<sup>16</sup> in the EC and, asked what he would vote in the hypothetical case of the Maastricht Treaty being put to a referendum in Germany, is in little doubt: "triple NO"!

In this perspective, 'das Ausland' takes on another meaning, when imagined in concrete terms. The Danish NO vote (June 1992) is seen to be "one of the few positive events in political life", and the reluctance of the British people is embraced as "convincing reasons" as well. Also in a broader context, this more positive slant on 'Ausländer' (clearly bolstered by the cultural internationalism of the respondent, and concretely by his being married to an 'Ausländer') and the *specific* national Other manifests itself. About England: "Ich fühle mich in England und bei den Engländern um so wohler, je mehr ich davon kenne" (C2, Q1);<sup>17</sup> "Ich finde das dortige politische System vorbildlich" (C2, Q3).<sup>18</sup> On several occasions, he further alludes to Winston Churchill as an admirable statesman. About Denmark: "Mein Bild hat sich sehr positiv entwickelt" (C2, Q7);<sup>19</sup> "Ich habe nie etwas Negatives darüber gehört <i.e. the Danish political system>" (C2, Q9);<sup>20</sup> "Small is beautiful" (C2, Q10). Only in the case of the USA is there direct correlation between his general and specific (negative) views.

Hence, it is not surprising that similar ambivalences between affirmation and negation, sentiment and reason, abstraction and concretion, are reflected in the respondent's perceptions of German Unification. On the one hand, it is a "complex" and partly "negative" thing, since, appearances to the contrary, "after reunification, we are not strong, we are much weaker than before"; cognitively, the respondent even avers that the two parts of Germany do not belong "naturally" together (Interview). On the other hand, he perceives East Germans as "Landsleute" (C4, Q5) and has, self-admittedly, played a part in inducing one of his children to change from a West to an East German university, because "I personally believe that the education system in Eastern Germany was, in some ways, better than ours <!>" (Interview). In the context of the entire data, it emerges that one of the positives of the new *Bundesländer* for this respondent is that they are heirs to

a culture which is less "materialistic" than the West German, a contemporary trend which is variously blamed for both political disenchantment (the decline of religiosity and belief; the "legitimacy" of corruption and greed); negative trends in German identity (C1, Q5); and, as here, the decline in national education.

Ultimately, there is little doubt that FRG-4, on a significant level of subjective affectiveness, welcomes Unification as a necessary stepping-stone towards the normalisation of Germany that he is clearly yearning for and, on a personal level, as the patching process to a life that, from the start, was informed by macro-political events that affected it deeply. It is also on these issues that the pervasively rationalistic discourse of the respondent most often acquires a note of emotive involvement: 'Schicksals-gemeinschaft'. <Speaking of WWII and after:> "Our factories were bombed, our whole economy was down. The country was divided into two halves, part of it was amputated completely, and we had two possibilities: either to die or to get up from it" (Interview). For this respondent, Unification, however "complex" and contradictory, is a possibility to recoup this "we", and to put an end to the negative uniqueness of post-war Germany - if only 'the other countries' would let it happen. Hence, he can sympathise with the increased self-absorption of Germans: "when your house is burning, you are not interested in going to the opera" (Interview). This house is neither Europe nor the world - it is Germany. Though he ideally envisages the future world to become less and less determined by nations (C1, Q12), this respondent's coordinates of identity, value, and orientation are, partly despite himself, steeped in the fatefulness of being German.

## Notes

1. "Those are not questions for a questionnaire, but chapters in a volume of memoirs! In 1939, I was five years old, in 1945 eleven, survived several air-raids and had no normal education".
2. More clearly than in the case of many other respondents, the rational terseness of FRG-4's responses to the questionnaire contrasted with an increasingly affective behavioural pattern as the interview progressed.
3. "For me, being German is a value-free property".
4. "For me, being German is a very natural thing, as it is natural for me to be a man or to be 183 cm. tall".

5. "In my whole life I still have not come across a 'typical German', nor a typical Frenchman or Englishman. Nor do I believe that such people exist at all".
6. "The concept of 'patriotism' - in other countries something totally matter-of-course and natural, is here very negatively charged, so that I cannot answer the last part of the question" (C1, Q12).  
The respondent does state, however, uncharacterically of the German group as a whole and perhaps in a vein of provocation, that "Fahnen, Nationalhymnen und -Speisen sind für mich durchaus erträglich" ('Flags, national anthems, and national foods are for me completely acceptable').
7. "However, I have made similar personal experiences in other countries as well".
8. "I would have this expectation in every other country, too".
9. "For every country, the following applies: ...".
10. "Surely that (...) is not different from other European countries".
11. "Due to my behaviour and appearance, I have already been taken for a native in every country".
12. "No. They definitely do a lot less than politicians in other EC countries".
13. "In this respect, people in other countries are probably also dissatisfied with their politicians".
14. "European citizenship".
15. "When for instance German social policies are made for Greeks in Brussels, or Sicilian influences on a common currency produce inflation".
16. "Strong tendencies towards concentration".
17. "The more I know about it, the more comfortable I feel in England and among the English".
18. "I find their political system to be ideal".
19. "My image has developed very positively".
20. "I have never heard anything negative about it".

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: UK-43

### *"A SENSE OF HISTORY, A SENSE OF PLACE": MORAL BRITISHNESS UNDER SIEGE*

In the British group, UK-43 is clearly one out of two respondents in possession of a fairly confident national identity. She has a 'feel' for Britain, or, as she repeatedly phrases it herself, a "sense" of "belonging", of "place", of "history", and a commensensical rootedness in a Northern English kind of moral, class-bound Britishness, a rootedness not easily shaken. For her, contemplating any kind of 'exile' would be an alien notion. She is a strong supporter of the Monarchy: "It does not matter one iota that George III was mad and extremely unpopular, and it does not matter that Henry VII was an absolute bastard, what it actually does give us is 700 years of continuity, maybe 900 years of continuity". And she feels "part of a nation which at best is tolerant, ironic, brave and has a long cultural history".

However, as evidenced particularly by the statement about the monarchical tradition in Britain, her natural rootedness in British soil, her identification with British history and culture, are considerably tempered by a half-ironic, half-angry awareness of the cracks and crevices in the contemporary British identity kit: "The disadvantages are that I am part of a nation which is smug, conceited, jingoistic and lacking in style. (...) nationalism and deep-rooted conservatism (...). I don't like the image of Britain that much. (...) I feel that we are perceived by the rest of Europe to be pig-headed, and I think we are". So, she is "happy about but not always proud of being British", and though feeling that "being British is natural", particularly regrets the "general erosion of those services, set up in the mid-40s, which gave people decent health, education, housing. The erosion of this has made many (especially younger) people self-seeking and materialistic". It has also affected her own character: "I am more aggressive than I used to be because that is how we have become". All in all, therefore, though cherishing her Britishness in a moderately affective sense, she nevertheless cognitively "prefer<s> to see <her>self as a Northerner and/or a European".

Just turned 40, UK-43 is a Yorkshirewoman born and bred, having continuously lived in the same part of Northern England for her entire life, and is clearly, and self-admittedly, emotionally linked to this particular patch of England: "I do feel a Northerner, I do feel part of that more open and friendly, and slower society, than I have witnessed in the South East. (...) We have a greater working-class identity up here, and that is what makes us different. There are more working-class people who are likely to stay working class, and who are not upwardly mobile". This description does not completely fit the respondent herself, however. Professionally, by twists and turns, she has worked her way through a not-too-brilliant primary and secondary school spell, an initial journalistic career, an adult graduate course at a nearby university (graduating with a dual honours degree in an Arts subject and with sociology as her third), a first marriage, children, a subsequent divorce, a second marriage, and is now working in an administrative capacity at an institution of higher education in the vicinity.

She is a "card-carrying member of the Labour Party", but nevertheless finds politics "extremely boring", and, though she was indeed going to vote for Labour in the then upcoming General Election of 9 April 1992, "<she is> not happy with what the Labour Party are doing at the moment". She can spot no "great differences" from Conservative policies, and, by and large, conforms with her own description of the British electorate as "turned off by the way politics are run in this country. (...) The people of Britain could not care less about who is in power. (...) I also feel a certain sort of apathy".

No doubt these reservations about British politics and politicians - "(t)here are not that many politicians, I feel, that are not corrupted by the power that they have" - rub off on her sentiments about British autonomy: "the political needs of a country are very much related to a common culture and identity. (...) <However,> I feel fairly fairly ambiguous about Britain's sovereignty". This makes her a strong advocate of a continental-style system of proportional representation and of the introduction of a constitution. She also favours some sort of all-European constitution, but on the condition that it will not jeopardise the national constitutions, let alone the separate national identities and cultures: "...as close political cooperation as possible without losing a country's autonomy or national identity. I don't know what I think of a European federation...".

She generally finds that "(i)f <!!> we are going to be part of Europe, we have to join full-scale", and believes that in spite of "pockets of entrenched Britishness", "we are becoming more pro-Europe (...) the downfall of Mrs Thatcher actually shows how pro-Europe we have become". This assessment, however, is slightly belied by the respondent's

continued iteration of the fact that "we are an island, and that is why we are insular", of the alleged "nationalism", "aggression", and "pigheadedness" of the British, and of their behaviour when abroad - "I hate them reproducing Britain wherever they go. (...) We go for some shine and we ask for fish and chips. We are not prepared to take part (...). We go into Germany, we go to Spain for a holiday, we go to Greece, and we take rather than give". She epitomises these feelings about both people and politics in Britain when (in the questionnaire) she applies the prism of 'alterity', the imagined views of the Other. Somewhat embarrassed, though without relinquishing the 'we'-identifier, she comments that

"(w)e are not the power we were and I feel that many politicians work hard to restore that feeling of power instead of working for more 'societal' improvements. Britain could have a place as a distinct and idiosyncratic part of Europe with a reputation for a well-organised welfare state. But we are still too interested in power and I think our arrogance is sometimes considered pathetic by other nations".

This type of embarrassment, though occasionally hedged around with conditionals and other modifiers, also creates quite a visible mental problem for the respondent in terms of some of the vehicles of national pride that she has internalised, but which no longer seem particularly functional or appropriate. While the Gulf War "confirmed my view of my own nation as one which, at its worst, believes in the glory of war"; and while she attributes to only "those people who actually saw (...) the Second World War" a belief that Britain's skills as a "fighting nation" are "extremely important"; then, nevertheless, this negatively and objectivistically described national war infatuation is a sentiment that the respondent shares herself on a level of righteous morality: "We fought the Germans because they were wrong <in WW II>"; "I wouldn't describe myself as a nationalist, although WW II might have changed my ideas if I had been alive. (...) I would be ready to sacrifice a great deal to fight against any invasion"; "I feel that is a part of the common conception of being British. (...) I do feel it at a personal level, and I find it very hard to come to terms with. (...) It is something which is part of my culture that I have imbibed, but I find it very difficult...".

And though her emotions are still stirred by the residual trappings of state, pomp, and power - e.g. "royal ceremonies where the pageantry is stunning, e.g. funerals, weddings. Because they have a certain leel of dignity which is unsurpassed in other countries" -, as far as the glory of war is concerned, she would opt for a joint EC army, if for no other

reason, then because it "would go against that idea of what a British army means to people in a romantic sense. (...) let us get rid of the crap that makes us all feel nostalgic about it, so that we can actually see what it is about, and I would like to be rid of that too".

It is obvious from the data as a whole that this has, in no little way, to do with the gradual but sure decline of Britain since the morally defensible victory in WW II, with the fact that it has proved of scant avail to the victors, and that even the good points accruing from it - the construction of the post-war welfare state - have been slowly eroded from within. This has left British nationalism and "superiority" as an eccentric quirk, or, even worse, as a blotch on the image of the nation - a modern anachronism. But it has also left an indelible mark on the respondent's perception of both Americans and Germans: "I do feel a certain resentment towards Germany that their losing the war helped them rebuild with financial aid from the USA. (...) If we had had that level of subsidy in Britain from our own government or from America, when we were not doing too well after the Second World War, maybe our industrial base would be a little healthier now". Hence, the wartime camaraderie between Britain and America, let alone the Special Relationship, do not make any great impression on UK-43: "the animosity between America and Britain towards the end of the war was really quite enormous"; "our attitude towards them during the Second World War was, 'thank you for helping us, but we do not want you in Britain', was it not?"; "I'm not sure we ever liked Americans, historically"; "<they are> neurotic about socialism and communism, (...) it is some sort of dreaded enemy, when, in fact, *they* are the dreaded enemy"!

The last-mentioned, surprisingly acrimonious statement of hostility against the USA finds its partial explanation in the fact that "we are already dominated by America in Britain, <and> I do not want to become like America". This simultaneously catapults the respondent's sympathies towards EC cooperation - "I would rather be like Europe" - in turn paving the way for an extremely ambivalent attitude towards Germany. On the one hand, Germany was both a loser in WW II and a nation to have been financially aided towards economic reconstruction by the USA; in addition, "there is some sort of order in that country that drives me absolutely wild. (...) this idea of actually being part of an ordered society allows or takes in nationalism".

On the other hand, Germans deserve some respect because they have managed well since the War, have a democratic political system, and are, after all, Europeans. Having to choose between American and German domination is not something that the respondent fancies, but, should things come to the worst, there would be no doubt in her mind: "If we

all became Germany, I could actually fit into the lifestyle of Germany far more easily". Yet, though Germany is no longer a "military" threat to Britain, Germans *are* "nationalistic, assertive - sometimes to the point of aggression". It is obvious that - within the mental context of the enemy images of the USA and Germany - the respondent's national sentiments become more clearly projected than is otherwise the case, and her national embarrassment abates. This tendency is strengthened by that other important pillar of subjective identity for this respondent: the combination between regionalism and a 'working-class' identity. As for the Americans, "my husband's family are from a mining community, all miners or ex-miners, fairly bright, but very working-class, and they do not like America"; as for Germany, she finds comfort in the fact that "we <i.e. the common people> are less xenophobic"; and as for the domestic arena, one of the situations triggering the respondent's national sentiments are, as she puts it, "(p)eople's march for jobs. Where thousands gather together for a common cause".

The same class sentiment makes UK-43 regard Scottish nationalism as "slightly misguided", since, if successful, it would weaken Labour in Britain, and, even the social issue aside, "I think it is impossible for us, for English people, not to feel British ...". The Scots may withdraw from Union, "they <may> no longer <be> part of us", but still "it will be part of our consciousness that they are".

In this mental universe, Danes and Denmark are clearly and predictably marginal. The respondent's image is a vague and inconsistent composite of 'drink', 'sex', and 'repressiveness', as is obvious from this illuminating minuscule snippet from the interview:

Q: Some people we have talked to over here think of Denmark mainly as an agricultural country, would that fit your image as well?

A: I really do not know, but now that you have put the thought in my mind, yes. Wait a minute, I do know a Dane. I have an extremely good friend, who is married to a woman of Danish parentage, even though she was born here, so yes, I do know somebody of Danish descent. She has an extremely clean house <!> (...).

Q: But you do not hear much about Denmark, I suppose?

A: No.

Q: It is not a lot in the press or in the media?

Q: European Guardian this morning ... each week they have somebody from one country, living in another, and asking them what it is like. And this morning it is a

Pole living in Denmark. And he also says that they are very free with their love affairs.

A: I am not so sure that the reality actually matches up to that sort of image.

A: 'Easy-going', I think, is what he said".

In volatile image clusters such as these, 'beer brewing' unproblematically translates into 'problems with drink', and 'easy-going' into 'sexually uninhibited'. On a more serious note, Denmark for this respondent connotes her own desire to see every EC member-state "go on surviving with its own separate identity. (...) I do not think it is good for people's actual sense of self to become someone else" (this in spite of her earlier flirtation with the notion of becoming German). Denmark becomes the vehicle of her wish to see Britain retain its identity despite European integration: "We do not feel part of Europe politically. (...) there is <no> identity politically". In this, she is totally representative of the entire British group. Though she believes that, as far as Britain and her own national identity are concerned, "(m)y politics don't make *me* feel particularly British", she here nevertheless *indirectly* confirms the significance of a 'political' dimension as a necessary precondition of any genuine "sense" of nation - a point *directly* undercut by the fact that almost all the areas of national pride she can think of stem, in some way, from the field of state and politics, though they are, in her mind, circumscribed by a fair measure of embarrassment and apologetics, poised between internalisation and the occasional, more superficial donning of the outside prism of alterity.

This is a kind of national Britishness under siege, rooted in 'natural' notions of a typically British, class-based morality, a morality whose extraneous rationale is being pulled away from under it. On the other hand, this cannot ultimately erase the impression of this respondent as one of the only ones in the British group to retain a deep font of British affectiveness and sentimental attachment to nation and region - whilst still living in Britain.

NATIONAL PORTRAITS II

DK-7 A & B

FRG-20

UK-46

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: 7A & B<sup>1</sup>

### *"THE NATION AS 'MOTHER' TO IT ALL": THE LYRICAL PATHOS OF PATRIOTISM*

Here is a married couple who have 'seen it all'. Having lived through the greater part of the 20th century, they have both observed and experienced, "have been enraptured by the heights and depths of history" (7B). 79 and 86 years of age at the time of the interview, they had been retirees for a good many years in the northern part of Jutland, having seen an active life spanning various parts of Denmark, some other countries as well, two world wars, and the development of Denmark from a predominantly rural country to an industrial nation revolving around the modern welfare state. Both of them born in the heartland of the Jutland peninsula, DK-7A - the male part - studied theology in Copenhagen and went on to serve as a vicar in *Den danske Folkekirke* (the Church of Denmark) for the whole of his professional life, first in the Copenhagen area, then in North Jutland for a quarter of century. DK-7B, a qualified nurse, abandoned her profession when they married in the late 1930s, and assumed the duties of a vicar's wife. They went on to have several children, but also one miscarriage, in the early 40s, which they attribute to the psychological impact of the German occupation of Denmark, witnessed by them from their then residence in central Copenhagen. Politically, DK-7A has swerved between sympathies for the Conservatives, the Liberal Rightists ('Venstre'), the Social Democrats, and his current preference, the Christian People's Party, whereas his spouse has, quite unswervingly, loyally, and true to her roots in agricultural, rural Denmark, stuck by 'Venstre', the traditional party of large and medium-sized landowners, her entire life. Incidentally, they see the current political landscape as messy and wish for more determination and courage on the part of Danish politicians, who, in their view, are not exactly bad or ill-intentioned, but just weak and somewhat amateurish. They describe their respective family backgrounds as follows - and, as will be obvious, there are close similarities, politically, socially, and in religious terms:

7A: "Vi boede jo også i et sogn, en kommune, hvor indre mission var i flertal i kommunen, og mit hjem var et indremissionsk hjem, oprindeligt frikirkeorienteret oppe fra Thy med min mors forældre, min morfar var leder af <specific menighed>. Min far og mor i deres skolearbejde, distriktsarbejde, det var med indre missions møder i skolen, hvor skoledistriktets børns forældre kom og fyldte skolen, og med missionsuger, men med meget aktivt fra mine forældres side, og sognet var venstrefolk, det var også et landsogn, så min far var i sognerådet som medlem for Venstre ...".<sup>2</sup>

7B: "Ikke alene et bondesamfund, men et indremissionsk samfund af den gode og loyale slags, som ikke var sort og fordømmende udadtil, men som var et samfund, der fungerede godt, og havde eget hus, og lærerne og overlærerne var engageret i det, det var noget der var tiltalende og godt. Det var ikke mennesker, der havde flyvske politiske meninger, og det var meget besindigt".<sup>3</sup>

The natural, matter-of-course grounding in family, social structures, religion, and politics, the rooted stability of value and orientation that these extracts exude, is recognisable in the respondents' images of Denmark and Danes as well, but here with a clear admixture of feminine pathos and lyricism - "I cannot conceive of anything else (...). I love it all" (7A); "the nation contains it all, is almost as a 'Mother' to it all" (7B); based in territorial notions of what constitutes "Danish soil" - "I wish my country reached to the river Ejder" (7B);<sup>4</sup> hardened by the experience and memories of the wars they have lived through - "that is when you know where you belong" (7B); and feeling their identity to be justified by the belief that Denmark, as a "small, non-aggressive nation", is highly respected abroad. In spite of this insistence on smallness, however, and despite their notion of a 'typical Dane' as a 'peasant', "frugal and self-helped", this elderly couple, particularly the female part, will have no truck with the Law of Jante or with Danish humility in international matters - "all that overdone modesty" (7B). On this score, they are just as obvious carriers of the outward-bound, more internationalist mode of Danishness as a number of their younger fellow respondents. However, first a few observations on where they specifically stand out:

"Det er en naturlig ting for mig at være dansk. (...) min slægts, min barndoms hjem, mit eget hjem med Hustru og børn. Her havde jeg mit virke. Dansk er mit sprog, min

kultur. Danmarkshistorie er min historie. Når jeg tænker efter, elsker jeg det altsammen. Vi bor i et godt land" (7A); "Det at have et 'Fædreland' er et privilegium! endda ét man kan lære meget af! Jeg har været betaget af historiens højder og dybder, føler med de smertelige nederlag; min morfar var Soldat i 1864. (...) Der var herskere, som sløse landsdele væk for egen vinding, det gør mig harm! Det *danske* almuesind som tålte og adlød, og bar alle byrderne. At være dansk er selvfølgelig også forelskelse i en stump land, som Aakjær og Blicher udtrykker det. Jeg var som 7-årig med til min skoles Genforeningsfest <1920>, det er en lysende klar begivenhed for mig" (7B).<sup>5</sup>

DK-7B elsewhere expands on the theme of Unification by recalling her feelings for the people south of the former border "who had now rejoined the old country" ('nu var de kommet hjem til det gamle land'), and regrets that the result was not nearly good enough: Denmark should have claimed - "with more authority!" - all land down to the 'Ejder', if not in 1920, then certainly after WW II!.

The respondents' lyrical love of the Danish territory and their near-total identification with all things Danish are not just features denotatively present in this kind of 'talk', but are profoundly inscribed into its inflections of tone, syntactic structures, wording, and connotative meanings. There is a note of subjective and emotive pathos in such extracts which clearly transcends even the ordinary onomatopoeia of the 'average' Danish configuration, and makes it superfluous for these respondents to use the national 'we' to any large extent. The Empirical Subject has here embraced and appropriated this 'we' to a degree where 'I' and 'we' are identical, in the mode which has, elsewhere, been termed subjectivistic.

These are people whose lyrical nationalism has, paradoxically, been shaped by, and hammered out on, the anvil of war and conflict, repeatedly pitted against a German foe, most emphatically in WW II: "Well, the wars, if they have done no other good, then at least they have aroused people and made us think about developing a national frame of mind <et nationalt sindelag>" (7B). The resultant enemy images of Germans and Germany are not "flattering to contemplate, but it is a difficult lesson to learn to love one's enemies" (7B). The shock of War was apparently severe - though they tried to cushion their children from them as best they could - and is imagined in concrete, elaborate, and detailed forms, e.g. as follows:

"Når man sådan går sorgløs igennem, og så oplever man en niende april, hvor jeg gik og ventede barn om en måneds tid, og hvor tyskerne pludselig gik udenfor vores vinduer med deres stabler af maskingeværer, så får man det ind på huden. (...) Denne her fjendskabsfølelse der voksede op mod Tyskland, det var noget helt nyt, og vi kunne ikke gøre andet, vi måtte jo blive klar over, at det var fjender. (...) Vi har da tit sagt til hinanden, 'nå ja, men det kostede os jo ikke særlig meget', men det kostede mig et lille barn, som jeg havde elsket til i ottende måned, det synes jeg bagefter, det var krigen" (7B).<sup>6</sup>

However, they were, and are, embarrassed at the official Danish position of non-resistance and accommodation vis-a-vis the Germans - "we were not very proud of our politicians then" - though they admit to, initially, having been quite averse to armed resistance themselves. Later, "we were happy and grateful as the resistance movement became ever more apparent", and, in their own small way, they contributed to the salvaging of the Danish Jews. They are, moreover, strong admirers of the more determined Norwegian resistance against the Germans, and it is obvious that their sentiments of Nordic togetherness go deep ("except for Finland, perhaps"). The liberation in 1945 was "fantastic", but part of the aftermath shameful, because the petty collaborators and the 'German girls'<sup>7</sup> were captured, humiliated, and punished, but the real crooks got off scot free.

As for their images of Germans in the post-war period, they are - partly for these reasons - clearly ambivalent, caught between affective negation - "we have kept aloof from Germany to an incredible degree" (7B); "our travel plans never included Germany" (7A) - and some sincere attempts to be rational and forthcoming - "we should not blame the ordinary German citizen, not at all" (7B). They are, however, the only Danish respondents to openly acknowledge that their anti-German stereotypes derive from such historical encounters (see Chapter II). Today, they are worried about the effects of German Unification, but realise Denmark's dependence on the German economy, and, mainly for that reason, support Danish EC membership: "if we get an economic union, then <Germany> will dominate no longer" (7A). So, though "we" would like to know more about this "Maastricht book", "we have to vote YES" (7B), and, anyway, Danishness will be strengthened rather than weakened by membership and further integration. On the other hand, the EC must never develop into a state proper - "that's what we are scared of (...) and what our elected politicians must ensure (...) they have to be firm and competent

people who dare to stick their necks out" - and Denmark should not, and need not, be subservient to the great powers in Europe, a point epitomised by the following exchange, where the two respondents are slightly out of step with each other:

DK-7B: "<Taler om jyder og deres livsform:> De skulle gerne have lov til at blive ved med at leve. Tyskerne, der kommer så meget op på vores vestkyst der, de skal have en tysk tekst til alt, de kan akkurat lige så godt vende sig til at finde ud af, hvad der står på dansk. Der står ikke danske tekster rundt omkring i verden, hvor man kommer.

DK-7A: Nej, det er fordi vi er et lille land.

DK-7B: Nej, det er for meget, det er at overdrive servicen. De kunne akkurat ligeså godt tilegne sig lidt af det lands sprog, som de så godt kan lide at komme i.

DK-7A: Jamen, de er så vant til, at vi kan tale tysk.

DK-7B: Ja, men det er det, der er galt. Den vane skal vi ikke lade dem beholde. De der berlinere, som kommer til Læsø, og er lykkelige for Læsø, og føler det som et åndehul og et fristed i deres liv, de forstår næsten al mulig dansk efterhånden, de kan ikke tale det, de vil ikke tale det".<sup>8</sup>

In this way, the missionary zeal that both these respondents possess in religious matters - having, at various points, brought them to a number of Third World countries - finds its way into their Danishness as a rather militant component, based on the confident belief that Danish language and culture are not just worth having and defending, but are as fit for 'export' as any other national set of values. It is, of course, no coincidence that this inclination finds its catalyst in sentiments regarding Germans. On the other hand, their feelings for the British are not a whole lot stronger, for, though "very fond of the countryside", they are "not very enthusiastic about the English and their ... they definitely have a tendency for snobbishness and for being unbelievably proud of themselves" (7B). They find confirmation by imagining the attitudes of other nations, concluding that "Denmark has an advantage in not being a great power, so they are not afraid of us when we come to foreign countries. They do not like the English, the Germans, and the French, for they used to be colonial powers that used to suppress them, but the Danes are not a great power. We have no desires to exploit them" (7A).

Along the same lines of thinking, they feel that the Danish language must be protected from deleterious foreign influences - "it is being ruined by silly English

expressions" (7B) - expressions that are fast finding their way into the minds of the younger generations, and that Danish culture and customs must be insulated from immigrant Muslims. On this score, however, the respondents do not quite see eye to eye. DK-7A is far more accepting of both immigration and of the immigrants' right to take advantage of religious liberty in Denmark in order to practise their religion, build mosques etc.; whereas DK-7B maintains that "there is something about Islam that worries me. (...) The Christian Gospel reaches much wider. (...) I would not much like to be a Muslim myself and accept all the conditions they offer their women, their homes, their moral situation. (...) I do not think it is nice if it gets the upper hand, as humans it is all right that they are here, if they suffer and need help, then they are on an equal footing with the rest of us, but their message ...". It is logical and consistent that this respondent turn the tables on immigrants by adding that "we would prefer, of course, that this should point in the opposite direction, so that they could be allowed a glimpse of what we stand for".

This married couple combines a lyrical-'territorial' form of Danish pathos derived from a long lifetime of identifying with Danishness - and therefore regretting that some of the more orthodox features of Danish identity and culture (e.g. its rural core, its frugal idealism, its patient spirit of sacrifice) are being eroded -<sup>9</sup> with a very modern, aggressive, outward-bound, intercultural Danish identity strand. They are generally averse to contemplating that their religious profession and frame of mind might have a bearing on the forms of their national identity, but it is, nevertheless, quite obvious that it does. There is an almost messianic quality to their nationalism, an emotional immersion in what is, for them, simultaneously a code of ethics, a belief system, and a permanent mental horizon: the nation as 'Mother' to it all. They were, clearly, disturbed by questions that asked them to ponder the usefulness of religious tenets of 'universal brotherhood' in situations of war ("That's a nasty question..."), but otherwise the two, the profane and the religious, merge and mingle imperceptibly, organically, as is well encapsulated in this concluding call for national idealism by DK-7B, appropriately on the issue of WW II, which, above everything else, has exercised the most formative influence on their life: "We were carried through it, by the fact that people congregated and sang together and joined hands and suddenly were not so scared of each other. We are Danes, and we must see to it that we cultivate what we have got, we must stick together, and we must endure".

## Notes

1. As forestalled in Chapter I, this is the only example of a 'double portrait': A married couple, retired, born in 1906 (the male) and 1913 (the female), respectively, and married since the late 30s. They required each other's support for the rather demanding task of completing the questionnaire (though they did it in a way which made it easy to distinguish their differences of attitude and perception from each other) and, hence, were also interviewed collectively.
2. "We did live in a parish, a municipality, where the Inner Mission held a majority, and my family belonged to the Inner Mission, originally stemming from free church <dissenter> thinking up in the region of Thy <further up north in Jutland> in the case of my mother's parents, my mother's father was the leader of <specific congregation>. What with my father's and mother's work for the school, for the district, Inner Mission meetings in the school, where the parents of the children in the school district rallied and filled the school to breaking-point, and with missionary weeks, my parents were very active and dedicated, and the parish consisted of supporters of *Venstre* <the Liberal Rightist Party>, it was a rural parish, you see, so my father served on the parish council as a member of *Venstre*...".

The Inner Mission was, and is, a strict, ascetic, moralistic, almost calvinist version of puritan Christianity in Denmark, adhering to a notion of God as a stern, penalising disciplinarian, but also typified by its insistence on community loyalty, mutual help, and the construction of social networks, and, as such, to be found in more or less God-fearing, 'fire-and-brimstone' variants (see also the next Note). It has consistently rallied its main support from penurious fishing and agricultural communities in Central and Western Jutland, where it still has a sizeable following. As compared with Grundtvigianism, it represents the opposite pole on the religious scale, and has waged a number of spiritual battles against the perfidious and mundane secularisation and liberalism embodied in this other socio-religious set of national beliefs.
3. "Not just a rural society, but an Inner Mission society of the good and loyal kind, one which was not sombre and condemning vis-a-vis the outside world, but was a well-organised society, people had their own houses, and the teachers and the principal teachers were actively engaged in it, it was something which was attractive and good. These were not people with hairbrained political views, it was all very stolid and moderate".
4. I.e. to the old pre-1864 border. "Danmark til Ejderen" ('Denmark to the river Ejder') used to be a slogan of Danish revanchist origin, in the post-war period increasingly assuming humorous overtones.
5. "It is natural for me to be Danish (...). (...) the home of my family, of my childhood, my own home with wife and children. Here was my work, my calling. Danish is my language, my culture. The history of Denmark is my history. When I think of it, I love it all. We live in a good country!".

"To have a 'fatherland' is a privilege! even one that you love dearly! I have been enraptured by the heights and depths of history, empathise with the painful defeats; my

mother's father was a soldier in 1864. (...) There were rulers who squandered regions away in their own interest, that angers me! The *Danish* peasant mentality which acquiesced and obeyed, and carried all the burdens! To be Danish is, of course, also to be in love with a patch of land, as <Danish poets from Jutland> Aakjær and Blicher put it. As a 7-year-old, I took part in the Unifications celebrations at my school <1920>, I still remember this occasion as if it had been chiselled in stone".

6. "Just going through life, without a sorrow, and then to experience a 9th of April, when I was expecting a child in a month, and where the Germans were suddenly there, outside our windows, with their piles of machine-guns, then you get it very, very close. (...) This feeling of hostility which developed against Germany, that was quite a new thing, and we couldn't do anything else, we had to realise that they were enemies. (...) We have often told each other, 'oh well, it didn't cost us very much, did it', but it did cost me a little child whom I had loved up until the eighth month of my pregnancy - afterwards I still think, that was the war".

It must be stressed that the child lost was not identical with the child which this couple expected in April 1940, and mentioned at the beginning of this cluster.

7. "Tyskerpiger", a term used for girls who frequented the company of German soldiers during the war. They were not impugned by the courts after the War, but were despised, ostracised, and stigmatised/persecuted by ordinary people. It is still a highly charged, pejorative word in Denmark.

8. DK-7B: <Talking about people of Jutland and their way of life:> "They should be allowed to carry on with their life. The Germans who frequent our West Coast, you know, they need German signs for everything, they might as well get used to figuring out what it says in Danish. There are no Danish signs where we go in the world.

DK-7A: No, that's because we are a small country.

DK-7B: No, it's too much, it's overdoing the service. They might as well learn a bit of the language of the country where they so enjoy vacationing.

DK-7A: Yes, but they are so used to our speaking German.

DK-7B: Indeed, but that's what's wrong. We shouldn't let them keep that habit. Those Berliners, you know, who visit Læsø <small island in the Kattegat>, and see it as a place of freedom and a safe haven in their life, they can understand almost anything Danish by now, they don't speak it, they don't want to speak it".

9. Part of the blame for this is laid at the door of the politicians who have let the people down as moral beacons, and to some extent are seen to lack firm moral standards themselves - but, in the process, the active subject of these changes becomes slightly more vague, as the final "we" in the following will show. Commenting on a specific case of lacking morality, DK-7B argues that "it's worst for her <a female politician>, but in a sense the whole political occupation, the entire polity, takes a beating too, and it's like that on all scores, we have molested our people's moral status, and that is passed on to the children, it is passed on to the young people. We have deceived them".

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: FRG-20

### *"ACHTE JEDERMANNS VATERLAND, ABER DAS DEINIGE LIEBE": LYRICISMS AND DISILLUSIONS OF AN OLD GERMAN (EAST)<sup>1</sup>*

Born in Halle in 1920 - in the "centre of Germany" in his own symbolically charged formulation -, FRG-20 is not just the oldest German respondent, but also the one most romantically linked to a cultural notion of "Gesamtdeutschland", a national romanticism sometimes jarringly at odds with the hardships and fragmentations characterising his life, and also with his constant, albeit disappointed, insistence on "Vernunft" as the hopeful regulator of international relations.

His formative years deeply influenced by the Nazi regime, he was thrown into WW II in 1940: "Der 2. Weltkrieg hat mich sieben Jahre meines Lebens (4 Jahre Soldat, 3 Jahre Gefangener) gekostet und meine Entwicklung nachhaltig bestimmt. Ich (...) musste mit 27 Jahren mein Berufsleben mit grosser Verzögerung und mit erheblichen Anstrengungen beginnen" (C4, Q7).<sup>2</sup> In the course of these seven years, he was posted in Denmark, on the Eastern front, and further spent three years as a POW in British captivity. He bears no grudge, however: "The British were very fair"; "I had no enemy image" (Interview) - and even attributes his "kosmopolitische Neigungen" (C1, Q1)<sup>3</sup> to the friendliness he encountered among his 'enemies' (though Danes were a little "cold").

Though his professional efforts after the War played themselves out in the GDR, where the respondent did well in the field of "Germanistik" (defensively stressing that his 'enforced' SED party membership had nothing to do with it), in the data he nevertheless consistently emphasises his sentimental attachment to Germany as a totality, often in phrases of lyrical inflection otherwise only found in the comparable Danish data: "Meine Heimat (...) liegt in Deutschland. Da bin ich aufgewachsen, erzogen worden, da habe ich mich entwickelt zu einem erwachsenen Menschen. Ich bin der deutschen Kultur in meinem Denken verbunden und verpflichtet und auch von dieser in meinem Habitus wohl

auch geprägt worden. (...) Am wichtigsten erscheint mir wohl die Sprache, deren Geist mir beherrscht" (C1, Q1);<sup>4</sup> "Im Grunde bin ich Stolz, zur deutschen Kultur zu gehören" (C1, Q4);<sup>5</sup> "Die Ereignisse der 'Wende', der Wiedervereinigung beider Teile Deutschlands, die ich am Fernsehschirm verfolgen konnte und die Szenen der Freude der Menschen rührten an mein Nationalgefühl" (C1, Q3).<sup>6</sup>

FRG-20 is insistent, however, that this national sentiment is cultural rather than political ("nationalist"), tolerant in the spirit of Herder, and that it does not in any way stand in the way of a cosmopolitan inclination of which he clearly prides himself, and for which he sees the EC as the political vehicle in the world of realities: "Die Mitgliedschaft <der EG> sprengt die nationalen Fesseln, auch in den Köpfen der Menschen" (C3, Q2).<sup>7</sup> In this vein, he advocates as European "Bundesstaat" à la the USA, where the "frontiers" are gone but the cultural peculiarities remain, and is occasionally very confident that this will indeed happen: "Die bevorstehende europäische Integration wird (...) das nationale Bewusstsein (...) stark abschwächen und letztlich auf den Sektor der Kultur beschränken. Damit verliert der Patriotismus zunehmend an Bedeutung (...). Die Zahl der Menschen, die einen engstirnigen Nationalismus (...) ablehnen, wird an Zahl und Einfluss sicherlich zunehmen" (C1, Q12).<sup>8</sup>

In other places, however, and emphatically in the (later) Interview, he is much more doubtful and pessimistic about the ultimate "triumph of reason", both inside and outside Germany. Also, he is himself less than consistent. In the Questionnaire, he advocates the maintenance of German sovereignty: "Ledes Land (...) <soll> souverän über sein politisches System and seine politische Handlungen bestimmen können" (C1, Q8),<sup>9</sup> but in the Interview emphasises the diminution of sovereignty in the name of integration. He wishes to see the development of a "neuer Menschentyp (...) mit stärkerer weltbürgerlicher Gesinnung" (C3, Q2),<sup>10</sup> but simultaneously champions the inculcation of a "gesundes Selbstbewusstsein in der Schule" (C3, Q5),<sup>11</sup> and sees one of the great advantages in the increased possibilities for travel within Europe to be the correction of former notions about 'das Ausland', hopefully leading to the conclusion that "auch Deutschland ist schön und in mancher Hinsicht (Infrastruktur, Lebensqualität) vorbildlich" (C3, Q12).<sup>12</sup>

He is not completely unaware of such paradoxes, but consistently tends to attribute the ultimate solution to the application of 'Vernunft' at some point in the rather distant future, an international understanding based especially on "problemloses Reisen und Kennenlernen anderer Länder" (C3, Q1) -<sup>13</sup> from which he himself is unfortunately

debarred, since he is too old - but which will ultimately overcome the "nationalistisch-kleinbürgerliche Beengtheit und Dummheit mancher Deutscher" (C1, Q4)<sup>14</sup> that FRG-20 adamantly rejects. "It <European unity> will be a long way but it will come" (Interview); "Die nationale Einheit kommt bestimmt, etwa in sechs Jahren .." (C4, Q6).<sup>15</sup>

This idealised construction of the future (matching to some extent the respondent's self-construction as both a 'Gesamtdeutscher' and a cosmopolitan) is at odds, however, both with his outlook on things in the short-term and with his own subjective perspective. Optimism and pessimism, hopes and disappointments, cognitive and affective values, unity and division, ideal and material interests, identity and culture, are homologous oppositions that consistently invade the national configurations of FRG-20's mental terrain, and often in dissonant, pathetic, even tragic ways. The romantic lyricism that he ideally invests in Germanness grates against the realities of his national existence and assessments. This is nowhere more obvious than in his reflections and sentiments vis-a-vis German Unification, witness this from the Interview (he is asked about his feelings regarding Unification):

"We were very happy and enthusiastic. We have friends in Bonn, and they said, 'there will come one day when we are one', but now it is a disappointment. I am old, I do not think I will make this. I do not think that the most important thing is to have much money, but perhaps I have to live for four, five or six years, but I had the hope to make some good journeys with my wife to France and Denmark and England, but it is not possible because we do not have the money now, but that is not very important. I am very happy because I say, it is a very great luck for me to have the opportunity to live with this change. This change is a great thing for us, perhaps the most important event in my life".

Happiness, enthusiasm, and idealism against sadness, disappointment, and material concerns - these constitute the dual poles of the mental pendulum determining the contradictory aspirations of this old East German, zealously trying to shed the second predication in this epithet, and as constantly being disillusioned. In the Questionnaire, his affirmation of the Unification process - which had greatly strengthened "unserem Gefühl, Deutsche zu sein, Menschen einer Nation" (C4, Q5) -<sup>16</sup> is immediately followed by the recognition that "(d)ie Deutschen im anderen Teil (West) sind unsere Landsleute, aber noch uns fremd, weil sie einen anderen Lebensstandard haben, reicher sind, und die

Tatsache, dass wir unverschuldet nach dem Krieg auf der Schattenseite standen, nicht recht anerkennen wollen" (ibid.).<sup>17</sup> He ends these observations by noting that "(i)ch als Rentner fühle mich persönlich zum zweitenmal in meinem Leben unverschuldet benachteiligt" (ibid.).<sup>18</sup> And in the Interview, 1 1/2 years later, this spirit of despondency is enhanced: "we hoped we would be on the same level as the people in West Germany (...), these hopes have not been fulfilled. Now at this time I get 1280 marks a month, if I had been in West Germany (...), I would have 4000 marks a month. (...) I do not say that we have nothing to live for, but I am a bit disappointed. We now have two classes of Germans ...".

In a strange reversal of this frustrated instrumentalism - clearly informed by a feeling that after what he has been through, and based on his life-long professional involvement in the diffusion of an all-German culture, he morally deserves some material recompense - the respondent later in the Interview begins to upgrade the more idealistic political culture of ex-GRD as compared with the crude materialism of West Germany: "The people here were more interested in politics. (...) The people in Western Germany are more interested in private matters, journeys etc. (...) In Western Germany a generation who is not thinking very socially was born. They are thinking individually, <of> their luck and their capitalistic thinking". In other words, because their culture was less idealistic and 'political' than was that of East Germany, East Germans, such as the respondent, have been disappointed in their material aspirations. The respondent's sentiments of 'gesamtdeutsche' unity, sincerely articulated and culturally underpinned, here reveals itself as having a firm material grounding. It is also here that the rationale of his cosmopolitanism, based on 'Vernunft', comes into full view as totally consonant with his 'inner-German' aspirations and his revulsion against national narrow-mindedness. For ideology, idealism, and pious hopes aside, German Unification demands of West Germans precisely the kind of sacrifices and 'rational' orientations that the respondent universally lacks: "They want to give us a state <!>, and has <sic> developed a thinking which is not very social"; "(n)ationalism is a very bad thing, and one is very disappointed. I thought that after the war it would become a new age of thinking of 'Vernunft' of internationalism, of solidarity, and now ... I cannot understand it ..." (Interview).

Although the last quote explicitly addresses spouts of nationalism on the right, it is remarkable how perfectly it explains his disappointment with the shortage of material results from the Unification process; the incomprehensible, 'engstirniger' nationalism of West Germans, rejecting the "Überwindung der Teilung durch Teilen" (C4, Q5),<sup>19</sup> thus,

in his perception of things, proves itself as a sub-category of what is happening on the right, in the Balkans (which he mentions frequently), and in other parts of Europe as well. His hopes are, once more, pinned on long-term improvements, however diffuse: "there will be a new generation <i.e. in West Germany> in ten years time, who has forgotten the problems" (Interview).

Thus, his almost professionally bound cosmopolitanism - "ich (...) liebe die englische und französische Sprache" (C1, Q1);<sup>20</sup> "I honour the French and the English way of life" (Interview) - is both the immediate extension, and also the complement, of his cultural Germanness: "I am German and I am proud to be German"; "Provincial thinking has good sides" (Interview). Or differently: since his Germanness is suspended between a common culture and a divided identity, it is international and national at the same time. His internationalism has a firmly rooted national rationale, where cultural - often 'Volkish' - articulations of nationality resonate with both cosmological and instrumental overtones at once: "das Erklingen deutscher Volkslieder (z. B. von Silcher) oder deutscher Musik (Beethoven) rühren an das Nationalgefühl. Das betrifft auch die Bilder im Fernsehen, welche die Flucht meiner Landsleute in die Botschaften in Prag und Budapest zeigten und dann die freundliche Aufnahme der Flüchtlinge in Westdeutschland" (C1, Q3).<sup>21</sup> He hardly needs to say it out loud: 'if only we had been received with the same friendliness'!

The ethnic Germanness that this quote reveals - obliquely evident in his perception of Danes as "ihrem relativ kleinen Land verbunden, und das ist gut und schön" (C2, Q8),<sup>22</sup> and more directly in his assessment that "Deutsche und Dänen sind wesensverwandt" (ibid.) -<sup>23</sup> is reflected in FRG-20's views of 'typical German characteristics', which, though substantively having great affinity with those of other German respondents, are normatively more positive: "Der typische Deutsche (...) ist arbeitssam und strebsam. Er liebt die Ordnung, Disziplin und Pünktlichkeit. Das Wort 'Treue' und auch die Verlässlichkeit haben für ihn einen hohen Stellenwert. - Der typische Deutsche ist bescheiden und zurückhaltend. (...) Ich glaube auch, dass dem Deutschen ein Zug politischer Leichtgläubigkeit zu eigen ist, einer gewissen Naivität und Beeinflussbarkeit" (C1, Q2).<sup>24</sup> The same yardstick is consistently applied to foreigners - e.g. Danes are seen to be respected by Germans (here clearly the projection of the respondent) because of their "Sauberkeit und Ordnung" (C2, Q7),<sup>25</sup> and the English are positively valorised because they are "diszipliniert", "fair", and are informed by a conservatism that gives to their views and political actions "etwas beständiges" (C2, Qs 1 & 2).<sup>26</sup> Perhaps most interestingly, however, it is applied to the question of immigration and multiculturalism

in Germany, which *per se* clearly militates against the gut feelings of the respondent - "Germany cannot have these thousands and millions of Russians and other people, it is not possible" (Interview) - but which he nevertheless feels compelled - for the above reasons - to tolerate, according to the following illuminating rationale:

"The time of nationalism in Germany, they thought that the northern race is the best of all, and there must be no mingling of the races. But that is no good opinion. (...) for Germany it would be perhaps an improvement if some cultural elements from Turkey or other countries would come here, why not? But they must ... Sie müssen sich angleichen.<sup>27</sup> They are good people, but if they come here... You see, I have been very astonished. If you come to France, you see a lot of Arabian people there, and if you go with the Metro in Paris, there is order, discipline. There is no difference, they are like all the other people, they are waiting and all is going... And in London I have seen it too. There is no difference, and the traffic is going, and why not when the others are coming here, and wenn sie sich eingliedern,<sup>28</sup> and if they are like the Germans so that all the traffic and the community lives are going on, why not?".

After this mental tug-of-war, stream-of-consciousness style, between cultural acceptance and national exclusivism, tolerance and dislike, 'Vernunft' and 'Gefühl', it is hardly surprising that the respondent then finds too much "Missbrauch" of the asylum laws, but on the other hand espouses the right of immigration and citizenship for "Auslandsdeutsche" as a completely natural and unproblematic thing, without making 'order' and 'discipline' on their part a precondition for acceptance, for "it is our people" (Interview). Again, organicist sentiments apart, this stance has its own inherent logic, former East Germans being a kind of "Auslandsdeutsche" too, after all.

This does not mean that FRG-20 is uncritical of what he sees as typical Germanness. The negative side is 'pride', 'political gullibility', and the 'ugly German' as embodied in Nazism and the former East German regime, and, also in his case, in (West) German politicians who "come here and they try to ..." (Interview). He never said what they tried to do, but obviously felt that they needed to be checked, though it would be difficult since - somewhat against his adulation of the political awareness of East Germans at an earlier point - "the people are not very learned in the political process of democracy, they are naive. (...) The young people and the elderly people do not like to work with politics here.

We have had enough of it. (...) It is a very serious situation" (Interview). Unlike many other German respondents, FRG-20 partly looks to 'Europe' for a solution to 'Politikerverdrossenheit', as well as to "nationale Überheblichkeit", in Germany and elsewhere: "It is the way of Maastricht, perhaps. The political approach will triumph, and the national and religious fanatics are shown away I think" (Interview).

In spite of its somewhat naive optimism - perhaps the "Leichtgläubigkeit" that he sees in Germans generally - this belief in the historical victory of reason over bigotry is still an impressive end-note for a person, steeped in a lyrical love of nation, who feels that his personal ambitions have been thwarted, his national hopes dashed, and that he is now, himself, too old and too poor to benefit from the improvements that he trusts the future is bound to hold.

## Notes

1. The German quote, meaning "respect everyone's country, but love thy own", is a borrowing from Gottfried Keller.
2. "WW II cost me 7 years of my life (4 years as a soldier, 3 years as a prisoner of war) and subsequently determined my life. At 27, I had to begin my professional life at a very late stage and mit considerable difficulties".
3. "Cosmopolitan proclivities".
4. "My home (...) lies in Germany. That is where I grew up, was educated, where I developed into a grown man. In my way of thinking, I am tied and committed to German culture, and probably also shaped by it in my sentiments and character. (...) Most important is the language, whose spirit is my guide".
5. "At bottom I am proud of belonging to German culture".
6. "The events of the 'Wende', the Reunification of the two parts of Germany which I was able to follow on my TV screen, and the scenes showing the happiness of people, touched my national sentiment".
7. "Membership <of the EC> breaks the national chains, also in the heads of people".
8. "The upcoming European integration will (...) heavily weaken (...) national mentalities and ultimately limit them to the cultural sector. In this way, the significance of patriotism will increasingly abate. (...) The number of people rejecting (...) a narrow-minded patriotism, will definitely increase in terms of both numbers and influence".

9. "Each country (...) <should> be able to decide over its own political system and its political actions in a sovereign manner".
10. "New human type (...) with a stronger cosmopolitan frame of mind".
11. "Healthy self-confidence in the schools".
12. "Also Germany is fine and in many respects (infrastructure, the quality of life) a model".
13. "Travelling in and getting to know other countries in an unproblematic way".
14. "Nationalistic/petty-bourgeois narrowness and stupidity of many Germans".
15. "National unity will definitely come, in approximately six years...".
16. "Our feelings of being German, people of one nation".
17. "The Germans in the other part of Germany (West) are our compatriots, but still strangers to us, because they have another living standard, are wealthier, and don't want to recognise that after the War we were left on the dark side for no fault of our own".
18. "I personally, as a pensioner, feel disadvantaged for the second time in my life for no fault of my own".
19. "Overcoming of division through sharing".
20. "I love (...) the English and the French language".
21. "The sound of German popular songs (e.g. by Silcher) or German music (Beethoven) touches my national sentiment. This also applies to the TV images showing the escape of my countrymen into the embassies in Prague and Budapest and then the friendly reception of the refugees in West Germany".
22. "Tied to their relatively small country, and that is good and fine".
23. "Germans and Danes share the same character".
24. "The typical German (...) is diligent and ambitious. He loves order, discipline and punctuality. The word 'loyalty' and also trustworthiness are held in high esteem. - The typical German is modest and withdrawn. (...) I also think that Germans possess a trait of political gullibility, a certain naivety and impressionability".
25. "Cleanliness and order".

Interestingly, FRG-20's wife, who listened in to the Interview, volunteered the opinion that "(i)ch finde die Dänen sind noch sauberer als die Süddeutsche. Ja, das was ich da gesehen habe, da ist alles tip-top in Dänemark" ('In my view, Danes are even cleaner than South Germans. From what I have seen, everything is squeaky clean in Denmark'). This tallies with a preponderance towards North German, protestant, and (self-admittedly) 'Prussian' values in the mind-set of FRG-20.

26. "Something permanent".
27. "They have to assimilate".
28. "If they integrate".

NATIONAL PORTRAIT: UK-46

*"BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA": A POSTMODERN IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN?*

UK-46 is not an easy case to grapple with. In her early forties, she embodies a mixed ethnic background, a varied professional and personal career, including a lengthy stay abroad, and ambivalent feelings about Britain and Britishness, bordering on paradox and (self-)contradiction. The following two statements - the first from the Interview, the second from the Questionnaire - provide the contours of this diversified national profile:

1. "I went to a Catholic grammar school, and then I followed into University. I come from a large family. My mother was of Irish extraction, my father of Italian, a second-generation immigrant from Scotland. I was born in Scotland, not in England, which I think makes a difference to me. Professionally, I have had a haphazard, chequered career, because I have always wanted to travel and experience life elsewhere (...). So, I moved around quite a lot, I followed the hippie trail for a little bit in the 1960s, and then I settled down for a while in <Southern European country>, and then I settled down for a while in <the Southern European country>, where I lived for quite a number of years with my <nationality> husband. He <died>, so I came back to this country".

She is presently employed as a language teacher somewhere in Yorkshire, on a temporary basis, living in a "large (...) family (...) which is not typically British". This wish to distance herself from being British comes across clearly in the second quote.

2. "Being British means very little to me, other than the way it has caused others to see me perhaps. I have always felt that I am an outsider, as I do not behave in a 'British' way. (...) I think my education has been British and I have developed a

British brain as it were, but not a British heart. (...) Since my return to Britain after an absence of 15 years (with visits), I feel even less British, but also I can see more clearly the Britishness that has been cultivated in me ... and which I fight against in myself and in others ... such as the constant tendency to self-deprecation, the putting-down of others, the belittlement of everything, the need to feel in control. So I invariably refer to myself as other than British ... I wish to deny my Britishness, so it is clearly not natural to me. Being British means being English and I suppose I have always told people that I am Scottish as I was born there, but even being Scottish is not natural to me as I associate that too with being British".

Obviously, quite a struggle is going on in the mind of this respondent to evade the straitjacket of 'Britishness', be it in the form of some extraneous definition by others, or of emotional - let alone sentimental - attachment to the embarrassing and negatively charged notion of a British identity: "I *refer* to myself as other than British", "I wish to deny my Britishness", "I have always *told* people that I am Scottish", or - as she puts it elsewhere - "<l> *prefer* to be internationalist in spirit". Such repeated discursive attempts to ward off the encroachments of a British sentimental "nostalgia" - "I find it one of the most destructive aspects of this society" - have a double origin.

First, they are rooted in a lengthy list of what the respondent sees as negative British character traits (insularity, complacency, conservatism, racism, self-deception etc.), most of which are seen to be the cultural-psychological excrement of problems with mastering and relating realistically to the British past: "The British have gone out, not as immigrant, poor, needy people looking for work, they have gone out as the conquerors. It is all to do with the history and the roots, and they are slowly beginning to realise that they are not a power, and they are having problems, as a person would, in accepting that and admitting that they are old and decrepit, and maybe finished". This rubs off on the British as an erosion of their national iconography and symbols of identity: "They try to cling on to it, of course, because you do not have the army, and you do not have the royalty, and you no longer have got the Empire and the colonies, there is precious little left, except the language (...) which is not <even> distinctively British".

From this fact the respondent, who principally defines her 'Europeanness' in terms of her wish "not to be British", evolves the desirability for Britain to go wholeheartedly "into Europe", "because it has got to replace the old symbols with something new, and I do not think they have got anything at the moment". However, on this as many other

counts, UK-46 withdraws somewhat from this absolute position, admitting that (e.g.) the Monarchy "is very powerful. It is like an old oak tree, it has got very, very deep and strong roots, and it will take a long time. (...) I think they will do what they do with a lot of old trees, they will just prop it up, but they will keep it there in a decrepit stage for as long as they can". This studiously maintained observer's "they" (rather than "we") both refers to the people in general, but more specifically to another root cause of the implosion and embarrassment of Britishness, which is the next point.

So, second, the rot at the heart of Britishness is defined as political, and is set out by the respondent in the following terms:

"I used to always say that I was apolitical, because I was brought up by a father who said that all politicians are scoundrels (...). I believed him, and I think basically it is true, I suppose, from my experience. Especially, having lived in another country as well, I think it is true and it is just a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea really. <In the upcoming Election> it will either be Labour or Liberal, but definitely not Conservative. If you could make a positive abstention that meant something, that I disapprove of all of them, then that is probably what I would go for".

She would not abstain, however, for "you have got to fight, because otherwise you might as well jump out of the window". Asked whether a change of Government would make any difference, the respondent proved, also here, to be split between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, between her rationalism and her idealism - and she was fully aware of it, too: "I would love, idealistically, romantically as my younger self, to say that it would, but I have a horrible suspicion that it might not (...). I am trying not to become a cynic (...) but an overall change in the culture of the country? I do not think it will bring about any change". The (perceived) state of the British polity feeds directly into the identity denials so frequently encountered in this respondent, severing affection from reason, dream from reality, past from present, resulting in an oddly fragmented discourse suspended between the extremes of the mental pendulum and riddled with blanks, hesitation, pause markers, a highly signifying, expressive absence, a style sometimes approaching stream-of-consciousness and relegating national sentiment to an extra-textual - or a least non-verbal - dimension: "Politics has a great deal to do with being proud of Britain but not perhaps to do with feeling British unless one can equate being British with feeling human then Politics has everything to do with being British. But again I'm not sure .... that I need to

feel British .... so difficult to answer but yes Politics is important .... Americans, for all their faults, do have the Bill of Rights so that would make <me> feel comfortable as <an> American". This groping, rambling discourse also, occasionally, leads to a forgetfulness of this respondent's otherwise cultivated non-British identity mantle, allowing us a glimpse into an extant affective layer beneath: "I have no wish to see Britain turned into a museum. If I truly love these isles we call Britain then I want a live culture in its biological sense .... a country of living organisms not of fossils. Why can't British Culture change and still be British?"

It is not easy to logically reconcile such national affectiveness with statements to the effect that "(a)s I don't feel British, this question only arises in that I often feel ashamed on behalf of the British and try to distance myself from being seen as British". However, both stances are predicated on a gap between the respondent's ideal-romantic version of Britishness and her disillusioned rejection of its contemporary, 'fossilised' format (making her repudiate her British sentiments though they are clearly in evidence in the negative form of 'shame'), between the 'Deep Blue Sea' and the 'Devil'. Her personal solution to this problem is - and in this she is totally unique in the British group - to define 'identity' as a fluid, flexible, dynamic concept: "I can see that I am English, because my roots are here, my language is English, but it does not mean that I cannot extend my identity to include certain European perceptions of the world. And when necessary I slip into my European identity, and when necessary I slip into my English identity. (...) Not consciously, it is very, very difficult to be able to do it, and that is when you have a crisis of identity, when you cannot do that. I can see the danger that people might have <sic> of losing a sense of identity of being British (...) I think Great Britain will soon be Little Britain and feels threatened by this and is reacting accordingly".

She identifies a conflict within the British people "between those who wish to be more European and those who wish to be British", and despite the fact that she would clearly categorise herself with the former, it is more true to say that this dichotomy creates a thoroughgoing rift within her own psyche, a gamut of contradictory and paradoxical perceptions and positions. She may deride the xenophobia and anti-European attitudes of the British, but she quite as emphatically identifies with their fears of losing their Britishness, of "losing their power, losing their jobs, losing their money, what everybody is frightened of, being hungry". She may see in Europe "an alternative set of values to teach my child" and champion EC integration "as I am dissatisfied with the government here", but she still speaks affectionately of "maintain<ing 'Britishness'> with care and

tolerance within the EC as in a family different children can develop their own individual characters", and of the "luxury" of "living in a democracy" which permits her to criticise it. She may argue that being British is not "natural" to her, but her discourse on Britain is chock-full of organicist images. She may wish to "change my national residence if I could", but this wish for exile did not prevent her, while actually living in the South of Europe, from deliberately going back to Britain for the birth of her son, since "if he was born abroad <!> he might not get British citizenship, and I wanted him to have it", since "a British passport will take him round the world"! And she may talk slightly pejoratively of a British identity, but 'Scottishness' presents her with a handy escape route towards a more unproblematic, somewhat exotic identity within Britain, where her national sentiment may find an unembarrassed outlet: "I am always proud to say that I am Scottish (...) something to do with having an imagination, something to do with the politics of the country (...). It is wild there, and it appeals to my particular personality".

*Outside* Britain, she had the opportunity to cultivate such vicarious feelings in the South European country of her marriage, preventing her, paradoxically, from fully integrating into that society, for "I would get to know people too well, and I would lose my slightly golden vision of <the country>. It would become tarnished a little bit, *like my picture of Britain*, and being a romantic, I mean, one always wants to have one little golden part in one's life, you do not want to reach that final point where you are disillusioned with everything" <emphasis added>.

Such effusiveness on account of the exotic Other demonstrates the degree of disenchantment with Britain in this respondent. But it also demonstrates the sentimental attachment to Britain that she constantly wishes to deny. As with many of the other British respondents, the national identity of UK-46 is most clearly in evidence, least ambivalent, when the subject is the Other - whether, as in the above quote, in the shape of an exotic alterity, or, as in the following ruminations on Germans, in that of a potential enemy:

"<In Germany> (t)he government comes before the individual, whereas in this country the individual comes before the government, you know the British eccentric or stereotype character. I think it is true that in this country there is a greater freedom to be a little bit crazy, although sadly it is diminishing, a little bit individual, a little bit different, if you wish. There is a greater variety, whereas in Japan and Germany it is 'Conform, conform, conform', and they are beaten into submission in some

respects, and I think that in Japan it is just more blatant, whereas the Germans have become slightly more sophisticated, and I do not think it is conscious anymore. Once it gets imbued into one set of generation, they know of nothing else, so they carry on into the next generation. So, until somebody comes and breaks it all up with the big stick and makes them look at things again, how will they learn?"

This respondent is demonstrably fearful that the "big stick" will soon be necessary once again: "the Germans are becoming more arrogant"! And though she is respectfully admiring of their 'efficiency', 'diligence', and 'conscientiousness', still she cannot refrain from neutralising the admiration and introducing a more acerbic and self-righteous tone when she immediately appends the comment that "they have never been given the chance or the opportunity or the freedom to be anything other than that". In the Interview, we went on to discuss the possibility of European integration resting on a common base of cultural values, but the anti-German thrust carried over nonetheless. Where, earlier, she had expressed considerable support and even some enthusiasm for a European (multi-)cultural set-up, here she more sceptically ponders as follows: "Well, idealistically speaking, I think it would be nice for there to be common cultural values, but I have got a horrible suspicion that the common cultural values are becoming the common currency of money".

That it is the German associations that trigger this downgraded image of EC-Europe becomes directly obvious when the respondent immediately moves on to a renewed comparison between Germany and Britain in terms of 'democracy', and initially can think of no better similarity than that "(w)e are all human beings". Indirectly, the respondent has already presented the overture to this by describing her image of German "folk-culture" as one of "men dancing in a rather clumsy way (...) and men singing in beer-halls, and that is all. Women, unfortunately, do not appear at all". Hardly a promising basis for a common European culture, and all in all reason enough to question the wisdom of constantly "<holding Germany> up before our eyes as a model ... (...) it is very successful but I wonder at what price ..... and also I wonder about the values of the society ... is it a caring one, a caring government?"

However, one thing is for certain: "it is better than the British Government". In addition, one of the "reasons why the British <i.e. English> are panicking is because they do not have a culture in a way" - and because of this cultural and political wormwood at the heart of Britishness, also this Self-Other configuration, for the respondent, remains as a nagging, unresolved set of ambivalences, unable completely to extricate the Devil from

the Deep Blue Sea and provide her with a relatively untainted, contrastive identification with Britishness. She characterises the British school system as one in which "the children are taught to be proud of being British but not told why ... being British is reason enough to be proud".

For her, clearly, such commensensical acceptance of national identity is no longer possible, since the 'why' cannot be answered satisfactorily. Nor, however, has the lack of rational reasons for keeping her Britishness managed to stamp out her national sentiment, no matter how estranged and exiled she may feel in Britain or how deeply her own 'imaginative' character may jostle with the emotional 'repression' and 'repressiveness' of the British character and way of life: "the British, especially, like to feel very safe and very secure in the gardens, very neat". This respondent feels exiled at home, but did not feel completely at home in her former exile. She has internalised a great many of the British values that she dislikes, and yet sympathises and identifies with them at the same time. She is seriously trapped between the "Devil" of contemporary Britain and the "Deep Blue Sea" of what Britain *might be*, between rejecting and embracing national identity, between Negative Self and Exotic Otherness, between celebratory and diabolical visions of Europe, between various versions of 'home' and as many of exile, between the eschatology of disaster and glimmerings of hope, between the caring politics of never-never land and the cynical powers-that-be.

No wonder that UK-46 would prefer "more than one citizenship (...) freedom of choice (...) so that if one did not like the country of one's birth one could choose to adopt another 'homeland'". However, she realises that this is no more than a pipe-dream, and settles for (rather than in) life in Britain, for "when you have to learn to be able to live with that sort of double-think all the time, which I am perfectly ... I live on a tight-rope all my life", even that can be made to feel something like home. In this way, the respondent is a good example of the implosion - rather than explosion - of contemporary British identity, in a form which might almost be characterised as postmodern, but one which is also, of course, indebted to the cosmopolitan strand in the texture of traditional Britishness.

NATIONAL PORTRAITS III

DK-3

FRG-2

UK-19

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: DK-3

### *DANISHNESS ON THE BORDER: PRAGMATIC EUROPEANNESS OR EMOTIONAL NATIONALISM?*

True to the Grundtvigian influence in his upbringing in the western part of Jutland, an influence with which he identifies strongly, DK-3 states, without qualifications, that "I am a cultural Dane, not a national Dane (nationalist). (...) It is quite natural for me to be Danish, and I would not dream of taking advantage of a possibility to send my children to a German school on the argument that they would benefit from learning more German than I did - in the process replacing Grundtvig with Goethe and Schiller. (...) I symbolise joy or sorrow by means of the Danish flag. (...) I am part of the Danish collectivity. (...) I am normally proud of being Danish".

The reference to the German schools indicates that, in this case, we are close to the Danish-German border, right in the middle of the historically disputed border country straddling the current frontier in South Jutland, where this respondent moved in the early 70s from further north on the Jutland peninsula. He is thus not a true-born native of South Jutland, for which the criterion seems to be that one has to have "an uncle who fell at Dybbøl",<sup>1</sup> but a "tilflytter", an immigrant to the area, and, hence, poised between outsider and insider status in the region, between observation of and immersion in the historically steeped Danishness of this particular stretch of Denmark. The relevant data bears clear witness to this dualism, and is naturally permeated by the Danish-German question. On the other hand, there is no doubt that this respondent's own, subjectivist Danishness is heavily influenced by the precariousness, contrastiveness, and sensitivity of the Danish identity question in South Jutland, locking his identity pattern into a quite peculiar mix between economic-political pragmatism - accepting and advocating European integration, a diminution of traditional Danish sovereignty - and an almost all-out and quite militant defense of Danish identity, culture, and language: "Denmark as a geographical area and Danish culture will remain for all eternity. (...) I want to fight for <Danishness>".

Male, in his late 40s, a "social-liberal" by political orientation, and leading a traditional form of family life, he has supervised a medium-sized vocational school for quite a number of years, a school self-confessedly constructed as a "bulwark against Germanism", on arguments erected on the foundation of the German "scare" ('angstforestilling') in Denmark, but also a school which is deeply involved in setting up inter-European exchange networks for its students - also comprising German schools - something which this respondents strongly supports, *inter alia* because it will help diminish prejudice and negative stereotypes among European nations and teach "young people" foreign languages. He generally takes some pride in the fact that "we" - meaning the population in South Jutland - have learnt, in spite of an extant "inferiority complex", to "get along with the Germans, being dependent on them", and that, in spite of German influence and European integration, people in South Jutland have found a way to "live and maintain their identity in a larger Europe", something which people from Copenhagen allegedly have not. As an example of such pragmatism, he cites the case of not celebrating, at his own school, Danish red-letter days commemorating WW II, and, on occasions where the school hosts German visitors, of flying both the Danish, the German, and the EC flags simultaneously, "to indicate to the world around us that we are in a good mood". He recounts that this tradition got a particular twist to it one year "on a certain day in April" <i.e. the 9th of April, the day on which Nazi Germany occupied Denmark in 1940>, where it is normal in Denmark to "fly the flag at half-mast":

"Hvad gør vi så? Og dér havde vi tyske gæster der havde været der hele ugen, altså udvekslingsgæster. De sagde også om morgenen, 'hvordan kan det nu være at det tyske flag ikke er oppe?', og danskerne sagde, 'hvordan kan det nu være at Dannebrog er på fuld stang fra morgenstunden af?', og den historie måtte vi så fortælle dem. Det var altså vores måde at løse det problem på. Det er jo et reelt problem, og der er nogen der synes det er en god ide at blive ved med at gå og 'fejre' det. Vi har aldrig 'fejret' det her, fordi vi synes ikke, at vi kan lære befolkningen, at det faktisk er nazisterne, vi er sure på, ikke tyskerne".<sup>2</sup>

However, this spirit of pragmatic, internationalist acceptance of Germans and Germany today does not mean that DK-3 has fully come to terms with "the German" - who "lives in a small flat, has a big car, and takes every opportunity to go somewhere else" - though he does find traditional animosities in South Jutland to be "irrational" ("one of my good

friends never learnt to accept that his father lost his job, because he had allegedly helped the Germans. A 50-year-old man, today!"); nevertheless, he finds the corresponding sentiments of Danish identity "deeply touching". So, "Germany can still be a threat"; "we can't quite get used to the fact that applause in Flensburg <Germany> is expressed by thumping the table and not by clapping one's hands"; "A united Germany does contain a risk. (...) That's why I believe we should maintain NATO, less because of our external enemies, and more because of our enemies within. (...) It's a damned pity our common enemy has disappeared in that power game, isn't it?" But, like many other Danish respondents, DK-3 is loath to admit the imprint of Danish-German history on his own national mentality; basically rooted in a sense of embarrassment at the Danish war record ("it is a burden for one's self-confidence"),<sup>3</sup> this, as he perceives it himself, would run counter to the liberal, open-minded internationalism that he tries to advance, both in himself and others, and would mean bracketing himself with the "irrational" prejudices of his local *entourage* to an extent that he finds unacceptable.

Rather, he prefers thinking in strategic and future-oriented terms, along the lines of what the best ways of containing and controlling Germany would be (EC integration, military cooperation and blending of forces, regulating border disputes using agreements like the "Bonn-Copenhagen accords" dealing with the Danish and German minorities on the 'other' side of the border, more aggressively trumpeting Danish values abroad etc.). Asked whether he would favour, or at least accept with equanimity, a possible disappearance of the Danish-German border in a more fully integrated Europe, he replies by splitting himself into two halves: a personal and a professional. From a personal point of view, he would not mind, would have no problems, would even find it to be "a good idea, since Danfoss <a major Danish company with extensive exports> has long since divided Europe according to cultural rather than geographical boundaries". From a professional viewpoint, however, he would be "rather sad" at seeing the border go, because his school and its significance largely depend on it. In the language question, he is also split between pragmatism and idealism, but this time the other way round: From a personal point of view, as the cultural, Grundtvigian nationalist that he is, he would strongly champion a strengthening of the Danish language, also within the EC; but as a professional, he rather veers towards the position that as few languages as possible, and preferably only one, is what is pragmatically needed in the future world of international cooperation, and that Danish does not stand a chance in that game.

Thus, by and large, this respondent is, apparently, severely split between international pragmatism - including, as one of the few Danish respondents, support for a European federalist system along US lines - and a national affectiveness which runs very deep indeed, though it is here bounded and discursively hemmed in by a commonsensical attitude to nationalism which makes him, in one and the same statement, profess his aggressive support for the maintenance of Danish culture, only the next moment, more cynically, to dismiss a large portion of the culture he wishes to defend as "foreign 'inventions' product-adapted for the Danes". In the same vein, he tersely characterises the South Jutland culture as "predominantly German": "lots of German things reach quite a way into Jutland". Conversely, his support for European federalism has the sting removed from it by being relegated to the fantasies of never-never land: "It is risk-free to be pro-Union, for it will never materialise. (...) Not a state like the USA. (...) The European populations will never accept it".

Such paradoxes indicate that the mental splits diagnosed so far are more apparent than real, at least that they do not reach very deep into the mental structuring of the respondent's identity. He is, ultimately, extremely confident, like so many others in the Danish group, that Danish cultural identity can assimilate quite a lot of political integration and 'sovereignty pooling' without splitting at the seams, that Danishness is a quality worth fighting for, and that - hopefully, though here he is less convinced - Danes generally will know how and when to draw the necessary limits. Being placed on the real as well as the symbolic border, this respondent is part of the vanguard of Danishness, and chooses a modernised, outward-looking, Europeanised strategy for his defense of Danish values, a proactive rather than a reactive tack, never in any doubt what he is fighting for - and why:

"... jeg vil agitere for det danske, fordi det <EF> kan da godt true. Når jeg møder unge mennesker i Europaskolerne, som er født i Holland og bliver undervist på engelsk og fransk, så mener jeg, at man har ophævet nationalitetsbegrebet, det er jo en europæer, han er ingenting. Det tror jeg er farligt, fordi Johannes V. Jensen siger, at han var så berejst, at han var fremmed alle steder. (...) vi skal have et tilhørsforhold til noget jord, og der er et sprog man taler til nogle mennesker, man taler med. Og det vil jeg agitere for, og sige 'I skal knag'me være gode til engelsk, så I kan være med i EF, men I skal også være gode til at leve i det lokalområde, I lever i'. Og det har jeg oplevet her, fordi dem, der bor hernede er jo gode danskere. (...) Jeg tror på, at

danskheden sagtens kan overleve i et større Europa, uden at vi har nogle nationale grænser til at værne om danskheden. Nu har vi jo været i Europa i ret mange år, og har haft den trussel. (...) det har jeg ikke mange bekymringer om, og jeg vil kæmpe for det".<sup>4</sup>

This is a person who would welcome the establishment of Danish cultural institutes abroad for the promulgation of Danish language and culture, who thinks many more foreigners ought to learn Danish, at least so that they understand it in a manner facilitating the conduct of international negotiations on a dual- or even multi-language basis, and who is deeply suspicious of not just Muslim immigrants to Denmark, but also of Southern Europeans. The former, "the Arabs", "who give us quite a lot of trouble", should only be admitted strictly on the condition that they honestly "desire to become Danish and learn the Danish language" (and this should apply to EC migrants as well). Concerning the latter, "I have never understood the Mediterranean region, they sit around doing nothing, the men play cards all day and the women work their butts off. (...) I was a soldier in Cyprus, and at that time I decided that I was definitely not going down there again, i.e. to that region, I can't bear looking at it".

This mentality, so clearly influenced by North European protestantism, does not want to exclude the South European countries from the EC, however, for "I would like to impart to them some of our norms, we could do that by throwing some money at them and get their economies going. (...) I do believe they lead quite a lovely life, particularly those who do nothing but play cards all day". This puritan mentality rejects Denmark as a multicultural society - "I simply do not believe in that"; dismisses the Law of Jante, because it makes it "difficult to cultivate one's self-confidence"; prides itself on the non-intelligibility of "Grundtvig" and "hygge" for foreigners, and on the fact that Germans "like our easy-going, informal way of life, though we keep saying "De"<sup>5</sup> to them"; and, finally, aptly describes itself as "religious", in the following vivid and convincing terms:

" <Talking about the Church of Denmark:> ... jeg tror på, at det præger os i bund og grund som samfund, også at vi har en folkekirke gør os også til danskere. (...) Og den er dansk, ligesom andelsbevægelsen i høj grad er blevet udviklet i Danmark, ligesom den selvejende institution <the respondent's school> er dansk, og dér er kirken også en del af danskheden. Men min pietistiske ven ville sige, 'du har vist et lidt løsagtigt forhold til det der'. (...) Altså én, som jeg i øvrigt har et meget fint forhold til, og hvis

kones familie er meget stærkt pietistiske, hvor jeg tror på, som grundtvigianer, at de snyder sig selv. Det er dem der lever nu og skal igennem dette meget besværlige liv for at komme til det næste liv, hvor alt det morsomme opstår. Jeg tror at de bliver snydt for deres røde sodavand. Og det jeg siger nu er vel også religion, er det ikke? Jeg har forholdt mig til hvordan de har tilrettelagt deres tilværelse. Jeg har tilrettelagt min egen tilværelse anderledes".<sup>6</sup>

Where his pietist friends go for the religion of delayed compensation, our more orthodox puritan respondent opts for the less tidy and much more mundane religion of nationalism, which, in his case, is not only a question of personal conviction or sentiment, but is also deeply integrated into his professional activities, impacting on his work ethic and interests, and allowing for a number of seemingly contradictory positions which, however, dissolve gradually, almost unnoticeably, into the fluid onomatopoeia of Danishness: "Danish culture will remain for all eternity"! And this respondent will be there to pitch in, on the border.

#### Notes

1. On the meaning of "Dybbøl", see the pertinent Note in the Portrait of DK-25.
2. "What were we to do then? There we were, with some German visitors who had been there all week, i.e. exchange visitors. And they said in the morning, 'how come the German flag is not flown?', and the Danes said, 'how come the Danish flag is at full mast from the early morning?', and then we had to tell them the story. That was our way of dealing with the problem. It's a real problem, you see, and some think it's a good idea to continue 'celebrating' it. We have never 'celebrated' it here, for we don't seem to be able to teach the population that it's actually the Nazis, not the Germans we resent".
3. Along the same lines, he finds the Danish contribution to the Gulf War to be "ridiculous", whereas the USA "had a brilliant President, capable of 'setting the stage'".
4. "... I want to agitate for Danishness, for it <the EC> may indeed pose a threat. When I meet young people in the Schools of Europe, born in Holland and being taught in English and French, then I believe that the nationality concept has been abrogated, that's a European, he is nothing. I think that is dangerous, because Johannes V. Jensen <Danish poet and novelist from the early 20th century> says that he had travelled so much that he felt as a foreigner everywhere. (...) we need a sense of belonging to a patch of land, and there is a language you speak to the people you speak to. And I want to agitate for that and to say, 'you had damn well better be good at English so that you may be members of the EC, but you also have to be good at living in the local area you live in'. And this is something I have found here, for the people living here are good Danes. (...)

I believe Danishness can survive without a problem in a larger Europe, without national borders to protect it. We have been in Europe for quite a number of years now, and have been faced with that threat. (...) I am not greatly concerned about that, and I'll fight for it".

5. Unlike English, which has only got "you" as a direct second-person personal pronoun, Danish and German have two pronouns, "du"/"De" and "du"/"Sie", the former used when addressing people you are familiar with, and the latter being the formal mode of address. The respondent's half-ironic insistence that Danes will maintain the "Sie"-form when addressing Germans is expressive of the mental gap still existing between the two nations, seen from the Danish viewpoint. His observation that Germans are attached to the Danish way of life is, incidentally, confirmed by the data - witness Chapter IV.
6. "I believe that it affects us deeply as a society, also the fact that we have the Church of Denmark is something that makes us Danish. (...) And it is Danish, like the peasants' cooperative movement, like the independent institution <his school's name> is Danish, and in that sense also the Church is part of Danishness. But my pietist friend would say, 'I do believe you have a very cavalier approach to all that' (...). That is, someone I generally relate to very well, and whose wife's family is very pietistic, where I, as a Grundtvigian, believe that they delude themselves. It is they who live now and who have to go through this very cumbersome life in order to get to the next one, where all the fun is going to happen. I think they will be cheated out of their red soda. And what I'm saying now is also religious, isn't it? I have taken a stand on how they have organised their life. I have organised my own life differently".

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: FRG-2

### *NATIONAL SATISFACTION, POLITICAL DISAFFECTION: THE WESTERNNESS OF A YOUNG GERMAN (WEST)*

FRG-2 was 30 years' old at the time of the Interview in 1993. Coming from a working-class family in Baden-Württemberg, he had become involved in the practical (alternative) politics of the Greens at a fairly early stage, and had, for that reason, moved to Bonn, where for some time he had also studied at the University. Now he was no longer an active student, nor was he active in Green politics, but instead exerted his political interests and energies within the framework of a paid job in an international organisation - and was apparently quite satisfied with this state of affairs.

In this way, he personally embodied a tendency that he himself saw as characteristic of Germans overall: to have become disenchanted with party politics and party politicians, to vote as an act of protest or, in the same vein and for the same reason, not to vote at all ("Americanisation", as he called it), and to wish for a more direct influence on political affairs whilst simultaneously being debarred from this by the undemocratic mind-set of German politicians: "Voter turn-out in elections is really dropping, and it is not really laziness, it is really sort of a conscious non-voting, because they do not trust any of the parties" (Interview). The political system is good - clearly better than the "archaic" systems of France or Great Britain (C1, Q6) - but should be made more participatory, because "die Politiker regelmässig die Wählerinnen und Wähler betrügen und belügen (...). Die Politiker in der BRD sind schlecht, provinziell, borniert und nur am Eigeninteresse orientiert" (C1, Q6).<sup>1</sup> Though himself opposed to the Unification process - "I felt rather abroad over there" (Interview) - this respondent interprets the 'ethnic' gap between 'Ossies' and 'Wessies' as less serious than this growing chasm between politicians and people: "in East Germany all these wonders that Kohl promised did not happen. And here <i.e. in the West> you already meet shocked people who would like to see Kohl put

before a criminal court for ruining the German economy" - "the reactions are turning against politicians, (...) against the political class" (Interview).

This political revulsion is, as this respondent perceived things, exacerbated by the fact that people are never being asked about their views on European integration, having led to "growing scepticism" about "this kind of European Community": "always if a politician has no other argument to justify something, then European harmonisation comes as the last resort, and you justify with that" (Interview). FRG-2 is a strong advocate of referenda in Germany, and would, if the Maastricht Treaty had been subjected to a referendum, have voted against it. He applauds the Danish rejection of Maastricht in June 1992, and, at the time of the Interview (March, 1993), predicts the reversal of the Danish vote two months later, which he puts down to the Danish electorate being duped and cajoled by *their* 'political class'. In his view, the EC - which, as such, "is a fact of life" (Interview) - is solely about economic growth, and will be harmful to the ordinary people, to the environment, and to the Third World as well. Hence it should not be allowed to develop into a federation, a "multinational superstate", since such constructions are "never rooted in the people" (Interview). The argument that the EC is necessary to promote peace is seen as "pure legitimation". The EC - to which the respondent has gradually accustomed himself - should, nevertheless, be democratised rather than abolished, and, most importantly, should be "decentralised". If this is not done, the politics of blame that is constantly being conducted among the various EC countries will make it "fall apart" by the time of "the next economic crisis" (Interview).

Nevertheless, it may not be surprising that FRG-2, despite his obvious antipathy against party politics and politicians in Germany, should feel quite confidently and unashamedly German - more so than most of his fellow respondents: "Natürlich ist es für mich eine natürliche Sache, deutsch zu sein. (...) Schliesslich wurde ich als Deutscher geboren" (C1, Q1).<sup>2</sup> It may come as more of a surprise that, also as one of the few German respondents, he convincingly states that he "eigentlich immer" feels *European*, "insbesondere ausserhalb Europas".<sup>3</sup> Clearly, his Europeanness has little to do with the EC, and, also, is not to be confused with an 'identity'. Rather, for this internationally knowledgeable respondent, it is a question of a certain pragmatic and cognitive frame of mind, in which 'to be European' is no alternative to 'being German', but the cultural (Other-)complement of a sense of (Self-)identity. Hence, "Deutschsein bedeutet, in Kontakt mit Menschen aus anderen Ländern deren nationale Identitäten offen akzeptieren zu können und weder Über- noch Unterlegenheitsgefühle ihnen gegenüber zu entwickeln"

(C1, Q1).<sup>4</sup> In this abstract framework of international egalitarianism, the Other becomes part and parcel of this respondent's German identity - accepting the Other is an integral component of Germanness - something that does not preclude, but rather constitutes the prelude to, frequent criticisms of the specific 'Ausland', and thereby a certain confirmation of Germanness: "Besonders Stolz darauf, Deutscher zu sein, bin ich nicht, weil es eben auch viele Schattenseiten gibt. Manche Dinge sind in Deutschland natürlich besser als woanders (...). (...) Bei Diskussionen mit Amerikanern oder Franzosen bin ich in gewisser Weise durchaus 'stolz' darauf, dass Pazifismus und Friedensbewegung in Deutschland so stark sind (...), und kritisiere die Amerikaner und Franzosen für den starken Hang zum Militarismus in ihren Gesellschaften" (C1, Q4).<sup>5</sup>

He can also find his identity to be "embarrassing" in some situations - and certain other countries are viewed with both respect and admiration (e.g. Denmark and Switzerland) - but unlike many other German respondents, the German guilt syndrome is almost absent, only faintly evident in a pattern of international comparison reminiscent of FRG-4, though here much less emphatically so. On the whole, FRG-2 is confident that the WW II calamity has had positive and lasting impacts on Germany and Germanness, and that the effects of its "Bewältigung" (mastering) today may even be allowed to give grounds for some national satisfaction: "Dennoch ist es <2. Weltkrieg> für mich persönlich ein sehr weit zurückliegendes Datum, und dass Deutschland auf den Golfkrieg überhaupt keine patriotische Begeisterung entwickelte (im Gegensatz zum Weltkriegssieger Grossbritannien) macht deutlich, dass auch die grosse Zahl der Menschen ohne persönlichen Bezug zum 2. Weltkrieg in Deutschland aus diesem Weltkrieg etwas gelernt haben: Krieg und Militär sind diskreditiert" (C4, Q7).<sup>6</sup>

Along the same lines, he does not believe that Germans are generally interested in a world-power role for Germany (though they may, like himself, view the role of Great Britain in e.g. the UN to be ludicrously out of proportion to that country's economic strength), and certainly not in the military area - though neither of these positions may apply to the "political class", which thus again is excluded from the respondent's vision of a positive Germany, a vision basically predicated on the disaggregation between 'nation' and 'politicians/parties'. He is confident enough to articulate this national vision and identity on a more general level, too: "... you have to have some positive identity, not just a negative one. (...) All this talk about national identity withering away, I think it has no real substance. (...) It is sometimes striking how people do not want to admit certain parts

of what they are, although there is absolutely no way to deny it" (Interview). For FRG-2, being German is as close to a 'normal identity' as the total German data will provide.

This relatively unproblematic and confident national self-image is also evident in FRG-2's assessment of the domestic Other. On the one hand, he dismisses a number of popular perceptions as "cliches" having little to do with reality. On the other, he sees features such as "Ordentlichkeit und Pünktlichkeit, Hang zum Bürokratismus und Perfektionismus, Tendenz zum Moralismus und zur Betonung von Ideologie" (C1, Q2)<sup>7</sup> as more pronounced in Germany than elsewhere. These traits are initially enumerated in a neutral-to-positive vein, only in the ensuing response to acquire a negative admixture. The respondent, trying to describe the situations in which his national sentiments might typically be evoked, among other things records "manchmal wenn man Leuten begegnet die stark als 'typisch deutsch' - im Sinne der übertriebenen Ausprägung bestimmter in Deutschland ohnehin überdurchschnittlich vertretenen Eigenschaften - auffallen" (C1, Q3).<sup>8</sup> Apparently the "cliches" sometimes take on the hue of reality, in a way that makes genuine Germanness become aware of itself when pitted against its live caricature. The same point of 'domestic binarism' underlies the observation that the respondent's Germanness becomes a consciously realised phenomenon for him "(i)m Konfrontation mit Rechtsradikalismus und Ausländerfeindlichkeit - mir ist es häufig peinlich, solche Leute im eigenen Volk zu haben" (C1, Q3).<sup>9</sup> However, where other German respondents mentioning such "Leute" often vicariously assume the shame and guilt of Germanness that they are seen to represent, FRG-2 spurns them as inherently non-German, in the process seeing his own modern-European version of German identity confirmed, even strengthened.

Basically, therefore, though the respondent agrees that racism and xenophobia are on the rise, neither do they necessarily prove that *nationalism* is increasing, nor are they seen to be central to Germanness: "It is interesting that it is much more a racist element than a nationalist element" (Interview). Nevertheless, it is something to be taken seriously, "because this type of arrogance or chauvinism can easily turn into different things" (ibid.). In the context of the entire data it becomes clear that the danger resides in the deleterious mix of two components: the racism of politicians and the racism of East Germany, consistent with the fact that the only development to have made inroads into the national confidence of this respondent is the "annexation" of the GDR: "Ab und zu verursacht die deutsche Vereinigung eine Krise in meiner nationalen Identität als BRD-Bürger. <Aber> zum Glück blieb die BRD erhalten und wurde nur etwas grösser ..." (C4, Q5).<sup>10</sup> A reason

for this minor "crisis" is that the respondent sees GDR-citizens as more (negatively) 'German', less international, and more xenophobic than Westerners, and that this is egged on by "Politiker in allen Parteien (...), die auf dem Rücken dieser Menschen Emotionen schüren und damit versuchen, Stimmen zu gewinnen" (C4, Q1).<sup>11</sup>

The national identity of FRG-2 is thus, unmistakably and self-admittedly, a *West* German identity, rooted in a positive valorisation of West German achievements and moderation after WW II, scathing of politicians whilst affirmative of the system as well as the ordinary people of the old FRG, and premised therefore on mental severances from - even scapegoatings of - a number of false Gods of the past. No wonder it is currently disturbed by the state-induced redefinition of Germanness through the "annexation" of the East, a process seen to be fraught with precisely the danger of bringing the past back when it should be discarded and mastered: "Als BRD-Bürger hatte ich wie die grösste Mehrheit der anderen BRD-Bürger (vor allem der nach 1940 geborenen) eine Identität als BRD-Bürger, nicht als Gesamtdeutsche. (...) die Verlegung der Hauptstadt nach Berlin <signalisiert> eine Gefahr, dass auf sehr schlechte Traditionen zurückgegriffen wird" (C4, Q5).<sup>12</sup> Although the respondent criticises the German left for "demonising German identity" in the context of Unification (Interview), a similar tendency is visible in his pretextual framing of his own current identity troubles. The important difference lies in the fact that where the left has continuously shunned and criticised issues of national identity as overburdened and traumatised by the past *eo ipso*, for this respondent Unification, as an uncomfortable intervention, has acted as the prime (almost sole) mover of such demons, ruffling a process of confident national identity-building, and confirming an already existing pre-Unification disaffection with the "political class", as well as his conviction that national pride and satisfaction are only to be had through self-activation and civic participation outside the compass of institutionalised politics.

It is consistent, therefore, that this respondent puts down, as a 'typical German characteristic', "rechts wie links grössere Bereitschaft, sich politisch zu engagieren in Initiativgruppen, Bürgerinitiative usw" (C1, Q2),<sup>13</sup> that he tries - like other respondents - to salvage ordinary (here: poor and working) people from having voted Kohl into office; that he explains rightist electoral behaviour in West Germany as an act of mere "protest"; and that he reinvents the political dimension of nationalism within a hopeful scenario of popular reaction, even though the people is generally viewed as rather provincial (though - comfortably - less so than in Britain), but also as inherently harmless, in the same way

that the country, on the international stage, is sometimes imagined as 'small' rather than powerful (a recurrent feature in the German data).

On the whole, this young representative of a modernised Germanness is well aware that the situation might move in less propitious directions, to some extent due to a fact that also provides one of the main reasons for his (inter)national confidence: "Deutschland ist heute ein Land das von vielen Bürgern anderer Staaten wegen seines Wohlstands beneidet wird. Nicht ganz zu Unrecht, insofern gehe ich davon aus, dass Deutschland ein ökonomisches Zentrum der EG wird. Dementsprechend kann dabei sowohl die Internationalisierung Deutschlands zunehmen wie auch ein gewisser eher überheblicher Patriotismus wieder zunehmen - das ist ambivalent" (C1, Q12).<sup>14</sup>

His own patriotism has no need for "Überheblichkeit". It blends internationalisation and nationalism, civic orientation and ethnic essentialism, in a way reflective of a Germany that has made its way back to the centre stage of European politics, is morally intact, and has little to be ashamed of (except its politicians). And should an "ausländerfeindliche Variante des Patriotismus an Zulauf gewinnen" (C1, Q12),<sup>15</sup> this for FRG-2 would not mean a regressive mental setback to a legacy of shame, but that he "gegen so eine Patriotismus angehen würde" (ibid.).<sup>16</sup> He probably would. This is a type of Germanness that is no longer content with quiescently adapting to a world determined by the Other (whether domestic or foreign), but wants to actively shape it - and feels it has a legitimate claim to do so.

## Notes

1. "The politicians continually deceive and lie to the voters (...). Politicians in the FRG are bad, provincial, narrow-minded, and only interested in their self-interest".
2. "Naturally it is a natural thing for me to be German. (...) After all, I was born as a German".
3. "Particularly outside Europe".
4. "Germanness means being able openly to accept the national identities of other countries when you come into contact with foreigners, and to develop neither feelings of superiority nor of inferiority in relating to them".
5. "I am not particularly proud of being German, since there are also many dark sides. Of course, many things are better in Germany than elsewhere (...). (...) Discussing with

Americans or Frenchmen, in a certain sense I will be thoroughly 'proud' that pacifism and peace movements are so strong in Germany (...), and will criticise the Americans and the Frenchmen for the propensity to militarism in their societies".

6. "All the same, <WW II> for me personally happened a long time ago, and the fact that Germany developed no patriotic enthusiasm at all during the Gulf War (in contrast to the World War victor, Great Britain) demonstrates that also the majority of people in Germany without any personal connection to WW II have learnt something from this world war: War and the military are discredited".
7. "Order and punctuality, a propensity for bureaucratism and perfectionism, a tendency towards moralism and towards emphasising ideology".
8. "Frequently when you come across people who strike you as 'typically German' - in the sense of an exaggerated expression of certain features which are already represented in Germany in more than common strength".
9. "When being confronted with rightwing radicalism and xenophobia - it is frequently embarrassing for me to have such people in one's own nation".
10. "Now and then German Unification causes a crisis in my national identity as a citizen of the FRG. <But> fortunately the FRG was retained and only became somewhat bigger".
11. "Politicians of all parties (...), who take advantage of the emotions of such people and in that way try to catch votes".
12. "As an FRG-citizen I had, like the great majority of other FRG-citizens (especially those born after WW II), an identity as an FRG-citizen, not as a citizen of Germany as a whole. (...) the movement of the capital to Berlin <signals> a danger that very bad traditions are now being reappropriated".
13. "A greater readiness, both on the left and the right, to engage politically in movements and initiatives revolving round particular issues and causes on a grassroots level".
14. "Today, Germany is a country that is envied by the citizens of other countries because of its material affluence. Not unjustly so, and I therefore assume that Germany is going to become an economic centre of the EC. In that regard, it is both possible for the internationalisation of Germany to increase and for a certain rather exaggerated patriotism to increase once more - that is ambivalent".

This is the only place in the entire German text where anyone reverses the usual post-war Self-Other nexus to the extent where the Other is represented as envious of Germany.
15. "Xenophobic variant of patriotism gain ground".
16. "Oppose such a patriotism".

## NATIONAL PORTRAIT: UK-19

### *BRITISHNESS AS A CONDITION OF THE MIND: BETWEEN EMBARRASSMENT AND EXILE*

UK-19 was born in London "at the tail end of the last war (...), at a time when this country was being blitzed by the Germans". He states that "almost all my political attitude <meaning, *inter alia*, his Europeanness> was shaped by the events that led up to and included <the> war". His father served in the British army at the time, but was simultaneously working as a journalist at night, a background which gave this respondent "an awareness (...) of current affairs". He never acquired a formal education, but studied at a theatre school, did design and direction for the stage, and eventually, after a spell in North America where he found that "his roots had been severely damaged", "came back to Europe, back to the UK" to work for television. He has worked in and with television ever since, most recently in a private capacity, as an independent consultant. This almost auto-didact, self-made man travels extensively, and "almost exclusively in Europe. I do not have any strong desires to go outside Europe actually".

In the British group, he is one of the most staunch adherents of the European integrationist ideal, quite aggressively embarrassed at being British ("It means nothing to me to be British. (...) To be British is to be part of an outdated value system based on Empire, Royalty and snobbism"), not least because of the Thatcher years, which represented "a disaster for this country". He is one of the British many respondents contemplating emigration from the British Isles, in this case 'exile' in the Southern European country whence his wife hails: "We have never given up the idea of going to <...>. We have considered settling elsewhere. (...) That would satisfy me enormously".

As far as Labour (with which he basically sympathises) is concerned, it is, today, "no real alternative" to the Conservatives, and UK-19 is simultaneously certain that the manifesto of the Liberal Democrats, though intellectually (more) satisfying, would immediately be compromised if and when the Party's politicians were to acquire the power

necessary to transform it into practical politics. His disenchantment with British politics is near-total, and he is one of the few British respondents to suspect politics in Britain of being as corrupt as in Italy: "It is hard to get people in this country to agree that corruption exists. You only have corruption in places like southern Europe. (...) But corruption exists here (...) it is just very quiet here. So I think we are more politically naive than we like to accept".

There is no doubt that the respondent's lack of trust in the political establishment has a direct effect on his embarrassed British sentiments and identity, in the process reinforcing his European inclinations. At the same time, what he primarily likes about Europe are the *differences* of culture and identity, apart from the (negative) fact that Europeans have "for the last forty odd years succeeded in not fighting any wars with one another of any serious order". He is fond of genuine "multiculturalism" where people respect each other's differences, and can only imagine a European federation as "one of nation-states" - the "national differences will and should be maintained". And in spite of his abnegation of national sentiments ("I am not nationalistic, I am opposed to the idea of nationalism (...). I am profoundly UNhappy about being British"), the data leaves little doubt that, at bottom, his attachment to this "island in the Atlantic" with "<our> island mentality" is considerable, a fact evident in his frequent use of a national "we" quite uncomfortably wedged between positive affectiveness and aggressive criticism:

"... we still have the absurdity of Royal Family (...). We do have a Privy Council (...) and this, in my judgement, is not democratic, highly unacceptable, and more importantly, what goes on in Privy Council is secret! They are not accountable, not accountable to anybody. (...) So, yes, we do need a constitution, but it is no good just having a constitution (..), the more important issues are to say, 'yes, we recognise that without the constitution we are handicapped, now let us get on and do something about the problems we have in practical manner (...). The other problem is that we do not know what we want from the European Parliament. We do not know whether we are happy or not to be members of the European body of politics. We want all the benefits, and we are prepared to pay a major contribution, but we resent it at the same time. (...) We fight the Commission (...). And there are any number of issues which reflect the British intolerance toward the centralisation and harmonisation of Europe. (...) I think it probably has to do with the fact that we are an island in the Atlantic, and we have an island mentality. We are off shore, (...) it is philosophically

difficult for most British people to feel that they are European. (...) Their back is against the wall, or their back is against the sea, if you like".

This is an excellent example of what, in Chapter III, was called the embarrassed cognitive affectiveness of contemporary British identity, negative and positive, dismissive and sympathetic, objectivistically scathing and subjectivistically emotive at the same time. It is no wonder that, at a later point, this respondent comes clean and admits to believing that "yes, nationalism or a nation-state should exist, in so far as that culture is maintainable", "so that if Britain is going to have any control over the propagation of those things that are identified as being part of the British culture, its writing, the use of its language, developments of science and technology (...) then sovereignty needs to exist to the extent that it is possible for the government to do its job".

The respondent pinpoints his own logic in a separation between domestic and external sovereignty, and between culture and identity, but, that notwithstanding, he is caught in a veritable cross-fire between distance and immersion. He is dismissive of the "outdated value system" that he associates with notions of British identity - "Britishness is a condition of the mind. Ask the immigrant communities"; of the British class system and "this awful class consciousness which has torn the country apart and continues to prevent it from healing"; and of the snobbism, intolerance, and racism that he sees as the direct outgrowth of this class awareness. But, in strange and intricate ways, his own identity is clearly predicated on precisely the same normative system, despite his rational attempts to shed it.

Though he is more sympathetic towards the Liberal Democrats than the Labour Party, he would "find it impossible to actually go and vote for <the Lib-Dems>", since it would signal "an enormous departure from my emotional disposition toward a socialist ethic", i.e. from a kind of loyalty bred of the very same class-conscious, class-locked system; though he is a devout 'European', his more traditional Britishness is nettled by the fact that "most Australians", who "stem from this country", have greater difficulty getting through passport control at the British borders than do EC citizens; though he is critical of the insularity of the British, the frequently employed "we" and the understanding tone in which his discourse is couched make it clear that, in part at least, his arguments pertain to himself as well; though he denies that "there is any such animal as THE BRITON", he nevertheless has no problems identifying a typical or average kind of Britishness circumscribed by an "outdated value system"; though, in the Questionnaire, he was unambiguous

in his support for the introduction of proportional representation in Britain, during the Interview (immediately prior to a general election) he hedged his bets, opting to keep the centralised two-party system for the time being at least, because of its immanent strength, rather than go for a weaker, more diffuse, and unknown system, however democratic it might be; and though he is all for multiculturalism and the recognition of differences, his 'centripetal' Englishness refuses to recognise any North-South Divide in England (which, as will be noticed, in the following is constructed to comprise Wales as well): "It is an island and we have an island mentality, there is no getting away from that. I do not believe in the North-South Divide. I do not think there is any fundamental difference between the aspirations of people living in Plymouth, and the aspirations of people living in Aberystwyth or Newcastle". He does, however, recognise the hegemonic power of London, and also certain cultural differences between regions, but rejects the idea of any kind of correlation between forms of economic domination and cultural hierarchies of richness and disaffection: "<the cultures> are equal in their difference".

Also in the Scottish question he proves himself to be a true (Southern) Englishman, rejecting much of the talk of independence as a "lot of hype", and cynically opining that there is "no way the Scots are going to be allowed to do anything" <i.e. break out of the Union>, for "the British <!> have exploited Scotland from the beginning of time, and I cannot conceive they <!> will not go on exploiting it. We <!> exploited the sheep, we exploited the oil, we exploited the land (...)".

Of course, this is meant as a disillusioned citizen's revealing criticism of what he sees as the real, brutal ambitions underlying "British" politics, but, by virtue of its very form, it stamps its national origin on the identity pronouncing it. It is the same consciousness of aggressive, negative affection that declares that "(w)e are part of Europe and must come to terms with that", for, otherwise, "isolationism, patriotism and protectionism are going to be our damnation". This respondent advocates European cooperation and 'white-black' multiculturalism within Britain precisely for this reason: to avoid such "damnation" - which he obviously considers as fairly imminent - by choosing the only possible road ahead, and, in the process, uphold the "differences", including the positive sides of Britishness (or at least Englishness).

What these are, comes out negatively in his denunciation of Mrs Thatcher's premiership - "Her systematic destruction of the manufacturing base, the Health service, the educational service, the judicial system, the nationally owned industries and the foreign policy will take more than a decade to recover from" - properties and values that can

apparently only be recovered by using the EC as a springboard and by divorcing Britain/Europe from US influence, which this respondent deeply resents; not only has "my view of USA's foreign policy never been a good one", but "I feel at home on the streets of most European cities. Not so in North America".

He is, however, decidedly pessimistic that any such recuperation of the British disease will actually occur. Domestically, the ethnic/racial situation is, if anything, getting "marginally worse", though it might superficially seem as if it is improving, and the Northern Irish question is perceived by this respondent as not just intractable, but one that no one is interested in solving. Internationally, the Little Englandism of the British, their general "xenophobia", and specifically their distrust of Germany - "most people have not met Germans, and the fact that most <!> Germans do not click their heels when they meet you (...) is not appreciated or known by the majority. It's pretty difficult for me to sustain this position" - all militate against 'going into Europe' in any serious and committing sense, let alone for any three-point British-French-German axis to be constructed: "they <the British> do not want to enter"; "the majority of British people do not go on holiday in Germany or anywhere near it". Nor is this, apparently, a generational thing: "It's going to be a couple of generations before we could see any genuine integration". Across the board, there is "an enormous enthusiasm for the memorabilia of the last war (...) an incredible preoccupation with it", and though the respondent himself tries to stay aloof from this, being "reluctant to fall into the trap of regarding any group of people in general terms" and assessing Germany as "a major cultural force in the world", yet he cannot suppress the view that "the notion that the Germans are more efficient than the British is not the case. There was no evidence that during the Second World War that the British were anything but efficient in <their> battle against Nazi Germany".

As may be recalled from the beginning of this Portrait, the respondent regards WW II as the most significant influence on his life, "all my political attitude" being "shaped by the events that led up to and included <the> war": "my enthusiasm about Europe is set against the background that Europe was tearing itself asunder". He links this to the fact that "I am a third-generation immigrant to this country" (both sides of his family originating in an East European country) and to his revulsion at dictatorship, fascism, and extreme right-wing views that "breed" on ignorance. On this note, the professional interests and the personal background of the respondent come together: "That has always been one of the reasons why I always had an enthusiasm to move into news on television, as opposed to where I started. (...) Drama would never be able to satisfy my concern to

see television used to improve democracy. By that I mean, the people would be informed such that they would make better quality judgements about the situation in which they find themselves (...). So my answers to the questionnaire generally are against the background that I am fundamentally averse to fascism, and want to make sure that the things that went on in Germany never repeat themselves in any form, anywhere".

While there can be little doubt that honourable sentiments of this kind have contributed towards making UK-19 one of the most 'Europeanised' respondents in the British group, it should also be apparent that his initial q-statement, "(i)t means nothing to me to be British", does not allow for his extant repository of national sentiment. His embarrassment at being British, strongly fuelled by what he perceives as the dishonest, hollow discourse as well as the destructive policies of Thatcherism, effectively blinds him to his own national identity, which, being largely 'negative', is rejected as useless and outdated, cognitively ostracised, but still visible in the form of a number of ambivalences and emotional positions. He is clearly in favour of a modernised form of nationalism which bases itself on 'culture' rather than 'political sovereignty' or the like - and, in this sense, champions the maintenance of 'domestic' rather than 'external' sovereignty for the British government. But he also supports internationalism along truly 'multicultural' lines, finding the necessary prerequisites for this in Europe, in spite of the fact that its factual tendency to level out rather than preserve cultural-national differences makes him regard the future of a country like Denmark "with trepidation", for "as a country that stands for democracy and decency and good design it will be lost in the sameness that is likely to engulf us all as we drive toward the pursuit of the Eurodollar".

Thus, the Europe of his choice is apparently quite different from the Europe currently being created, whose "federalism" is probably an "inevitability", but not one that the respondent wholeheartedly supports. Ultimately, he is torn between his cultural national/international idealism and his basic distrust of politics, and between his national sentiments and his rational desire to suppress them. Hence, his position - true to his professional career as a media person - is consistently that of the observer and commentator, always trying to keep his own subjectivity and identifications either out of the picture or on a rationalistic level of discourse. Nevertheless, both his views and the aggressive-cynical modulations his mentality assumes make it clear that his level of immersion in 'British culture' is considerable, though exile in Southern Europe, to this kind of Britishness, possesses a continuous lure of its own. To use his own term, for this

respondent nationality is truly a "condition of the mind", a quality lost, rather than a factual property of lived, day-to-day life in Britain.