

Securitisation Discourse and Identity Constructions: Danish Politicians' Representations of the War in Ukraine

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Abstract

This thesis examines how Danish politicians mobilize securitization discourse in their representation of the war in Ukraine to justify and argue for certain political decisions and actions in the name of security and defence as well as how constructions of a Western and a European identity figure in this representation. In regard to this, a theoretical framework outlining the concept of discourse, securitisation and identity is provided within this thesis in order to gain a better understanding of the concepts as well as how they are understood in relation to this thesis. The data for analysis in this thesis consists of various statements made by Danish politicians that address and represent the war in Ukraine after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The primary focus of this thesis lies in political discourse and representation, specifically in terms of how Danish politicians employ securitization discourse to justify and argue for political actions and decisions in the name of security and defense. Therefore, securitization is utilized as an analytical resource to understand the dynamics of these representations within political discourse. Consequently, Critical Discourse Analysis, particularly Fairclough's three-dimensional framework, is employed as the analytical framework for this thesis. This approach involves a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the data corpus across different genres, examining discursive devices such as semantics, structure, metaphors, lexical choices, grammar, and more, which enables us to examine how actors, identities, discursive categories, and relations are represented, constructed, and reinforced, as well as how these representations contribute to and constitute certain perceptions of the world.

From our analysis, we find that there is a dialectical relationship between securitisation discourse and discursive constructions of identity in connection to the Danish politicians' representations of the war in Ukraine. This is so as discursive constructions of collective identities are not only a part of securitisation discourse when it comes to characterizing a threat in opposition to what is being threatened, but securitisation likewise facilitates and reinforces the establishment of a collective European and Western identity and community in opposition to a common enemy, legitimizing certain security and defense actions. Furthermore, we find that the Danish politicians represent Russia and Putin as an imminent threat to not only Ukraine, but Europe and the West as well. In this way, they are able to construct a sense of urgency, emphasising an immediate requirement for action and the legitimacy of decisions. As Russia and Putin are especially represented as a threat to the shared values that Europe and the West are built on the politicians construct the war as a threat

to core aspects and values of Europe and the West as a whole, including Denmark. Thus, the war is not only represented as a conflict between two nations, but it is also represented as an ideological struggle between Europe and the West on one side and Russia and Putin on the other. Moreover, we find that that a collective European and Western identity and community is established in connection to shared experiences and values - repeatedly emphasised as democracy, peace and freedom – as well as in opposition to an Other, namely Russia and Putin.

We find that the Danish politicians establish and reinforce polarizing categories of us versus them, right versus wrong and good versus bad in their discursive representation of the war in Ukraine. By utilizing and reinforcing such binary oppositions, complex issues are reduced to simplified and polarized categories and thus leaves no room for nuances. Thus, by polarizing the war into such stark dichotomies, the portrayal is not only used to legitimise certain actions in the name of security and defence, but it neglects the potential for varied perspectives, motivations, and factors at play.

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1. Introduction

In the early morning of 24 February 2022, following a Russian military build-up on the Russia-Ukraine border in late 2021, Russian forces invaded Ukraine. This invasion is only the latest exacerbation of tensions that date back to 2014, with Russia's annexation of Crimea, and it is widely acknowledged as a continuation of Russia's long-standing desire to exert control over Ukraine, as well as a response to Ukraine's growing ties with the West and its pursuit of closer relations with NATO and the European Union. In the lead-up to the invasion, tensions had been escalating between Ukraine and Russia over issues such as Ukraine's territorial integrity and the rights of Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine (Elliot Davis, 2023). The effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have been significant and continue to be felt a year on, having had devastating consequences for Ukraine and far-reaching effects on the global economy and international relations. For the West, the war has already had substantial consequences. This includes the extensive political-economic decoupling of Russia; massive military build-up and refocusing on (territorial) defence and deterrence in NATO's eastern flank (Niels Byrjalsen & Kristian Søby Kristensen, 2022, p. 11). Moreover, the invasion has created one of the largest humanitarian crises in Europe's recent history, causing destruction, increasing numbers of casualties and massive displacement of people (European Parliament, 2022).

The EU's response to the 2022 Russian war against Ukraine has been widely described as unprecedented in scope and unexpected speed, displaying a rare unity among its member states (The Economist, 2022). Byrjalsen and Søby Kristensen (2022) state that, so far, the situation has provoked cohesion, action and displays of solidarity in Europe and in the transatlantic alliance (p. 11). The EU and its member states have strongly condemned "Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine", and their response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been multi-faceted, providing Ukraine with humanitarian, political, financial and military support including sanctions, military aid, and diplomatic efforts (European Council, 2023). Moreover, as a response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU and European nations have made significant leaps in security and defence by seriously reformulating their security and defence interests, strategies and policies, and especially increasing their focus on deterrence and territorial defence (Bosse, 2022, pp. 531-532; Simón, 2023; Bergmann et. al, 2022, p. 1). In connection to this, Bergmann et. al (2022) note that perhaps most critically, European member states have also announced substantial increases to their defence budgets (p. 1). Across much of Central and Eastern Europe, politicians are committing to increase their defence spending to 2% of GDP (David Hutt, 2022, EuroNews); a target that was

agreed upon by NATO members in 2006, though, several EU member states – including Denmark – have not yet met (Noel Dempsey, 2018). However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has catalyzed NATO’s European allies to actively re-commit to this target, with each member state explicating the respective years they will reach this (David Hutt, 2022).

In a Danish context, security and defence have likewise gained a more central position in Danish politics as a response to the war in Ukraine. Notably, Danish politicians and the Danish government have increased their focus on territorial defence and have made and argued for a number of political measures, decisions and actions in the name of security and defence in response to this war. (Anders Lomholt, 2023). Specifically, an agreement on Denmark’s security policy has been made between a majority of parties in Denmark’s parliament, Folketinget, including Social Democrats, The Liberal Party of Denmark, the Socialist People’s Party, the Social Liberal Party, and the Conservative People's Party. As a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these parties have agreed that “the European security is under threat”, and thus, Denmark must prepare for this new situation in fellowship with NATO and EU allies (National Compromise, 2022). The parties to the agreement – named a “national compromise on Denmark’s security policy” – have therefore agreed on a number of measures to facilitate and strengthen Danish defence preparedness (National Compromise, 2022). These measures include greater investment in defence as a key element; aiming to become independent of Russian natural gas; gradually increasing the defence budget until it reaches 2% of GDP by 2033 and a referendum on the abolition of Denmark's “defence opt-out”, so that Denmark can participate in the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (National Compromise, 2022). A defence opt-out means that Denmark does not participate in EU military operations, does not finance them, does not provide soldiers and military hardware to EU-led conflict areas and is not part of the discussions about this. Thus, removing this opt-out, will enable Denmark’s participation in the CSDP and take part in joint EU military operations and cooperate on the development and acquisition of military capabilities within the EU framework (Harding, 2022).¹ With regard to this, it could be interesting to examine these security and defence measures and policies that are presented and made by the Danish politicians (and government). However, we are not interested in these policies themselves in terms of their material content and nature or their specific material outcomes. Instead, this thesis is concerned with how politicians

¹ On 1 June, a referendum was held in Denmark about the defense opt-out. A majority of Danish citizens voted for the government’s proposal to abolish the defense opt-out – with a vote of 66.9% to 33.1% – deciding that Denmark should participate in the CSDP (Danmarks Statistik 2022).

discursively represent the war in Ukraine to justify and argue for certain national policies and actions in the name of security and defence. In relation to this, securitisation thus becomes a significant concept in regard to this thesis.

At its core, securitisation theory provides a framework for understanding the role of language and performative utterances, or speech acts, in the construction of security (Wæver, 1995b, p. 55). The Copenhagen School does not seek to identify objectively defined “real” threats and thus does not engage in discussions concerning the material nature of security (Buzan & Wæver, 1997). Instead, it offers a means of examining security as a quality that is imposed upon issues through securitisation, a process that involves constructing an issue as a security concern, warranting the implementation of exceptional security measures and defensive actions (Buzan et al., 1998). In this regard, as stated by Shipoli (2018), language and discourse are important in politics, but they are especially important when it comes to the construction and constitution of a security threat in politics (p. 76). Therefore, we find it interesting and important to investigate how Danish politicians construct and employ securitisation discourse in their representations of the war in Ukraine, specifically in relation to how a threat is constructed, how it is constructed as imminent and urgent and what is represented as a threat in opposition to what is threatened. This means that in this thesis, we are not concerned with analyzing the process of securitisation itself or if it has been successfully accomplished and accepted. Instead, we want to examine how securitisation discourse is constructed and employed by Danish politicians in regard to their representation of the war to justify certain security and defence actions and decision.

We have chosen to focus on Danish politicians’ discourse specifically, as opposed to media discourse or public discourse, for several reasons. For one, politicians have the power and authority to propose and implement political decisions made in response to the war; for instance, in relation to areas such as security and defence policy, humanitarian aid and immigration policy. Second, they are in a unique position to define crises and threats and are responsible for the official response and thus hold significant influence over the public perception as they have the ability to affect, re-shape and reinforce how people perceive and understand certain “issues”, situations and relations through their discursive representations. Third, politicians are the people’s elected officials, and therefore, what they say – and perhaps more importantly – how they say it, is important and significant. For these reasons, we are interested in examining political discourse, specifically how Danish politicians discursively represent the war in Ukraine in relation to securitisation discourse.

Furthermore, the concept of identity is regarded as crucial in examinations of securitisation discourse as identity constructions and the process of othering are central in the (discursive) constructions of securitisation (Cardoso dos Santos, 2018, p. 236). The discourse of securitisation constructs particular groups in relation to one another, where a particular group is defined in relation to an Other, who is perceived and constructed as an imminent threat, thus enabling the construction of us and them polarizations. Cardoso dos Santos (2018) asserts that by examining these factors we can gain a deeper understanding of how securitisation is constructed and works (p. 236). Therefore, this thesis is interested in examining how identity constructions figure in the politicians' representations of the war in Ukraine in relation to securitisation discourse. As mentioned earlier, the war in Ukraine has spurred a wave of solidarity between European and Western nations (The Economist, 2022; Byrjalsen and Soby Kristensen, 2022), therefore, we are specifically interested in examining how the construction of a collective European identity and Western identity figures in the politicians' representations of the war when mobilizing securitisation discourse to justify and argue for certain actions.

The data for analysis in this thesis will consist of statements from Danish politicians that address and represent the war in Ukraine after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These statements are specifically from interviews, speeches, press conferences, an article and a press release, meaning our data is representative of various genres. However, we are not concerned with doing genre analysis and are, therefore, not interested in the construction and employment of discourses within one single field (e.g., speeches). Instead, we are interested in examining the dynamics of the war in Ukraine in terms of representation in political discourse and specifically how securitisation discourse is employed by politicians in these representations regardless of genre. This means that we are likewise not interested in (conducting a) securitisation analysis in connection to examining the securitisation process itself. Instead, we use securitisation as an analytical resource to facilitate our analysis and help us explain the dynamics of these representations of the war in Ukraine in political discourse. Thus, in order to conduct a systematic and comprehensive analysis of our data across different genres, we systematically focus on the same discursive devices such as semantics, structure, metaphors, lexical choices and grammar, etc. across our data.

In regard to this, we apply Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) as a theoretical and analytical framework for this thesis. CDA aims to make the relationship between language and power clear and reveal its hidden influence on social relations and society by examining both the

discursive practices which construct representations of the world, social actors and relations – including power relations – and the role they play in furthering the interests of particular social groups and reinforcing such relations. The ways in which language is used and interpreted influence and affects the ways in which we understand and perceive the world and its specific aspects of it (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258; Fairclough, 2003, p. 26; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002a, chapter 1 p. 1)). Moreover, it is often interested in the study of ideologically biased discourses and the ways in which these polarize the representation of Us in opposition to Them. Thus, CDA will enable us to uncover what common sense assumptions and ideological expressions are embedded in these discourses and how different actors, identities, discursive categories and relations are represented and constructed – and reinforced – specifically in relation to the war in Ukraine and how it is represented by Danish politicians, and thus, how these representation impact our understanding and perception of the war. Specifically, this thesis will use Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for analysis to guide our analysis, which will be elaborated on in our method section.

All these considerations establish the basis for our problem formulation which is presented as follows:

How do Danish politicians mobilize securitisation discourse in their representations of the war in Ukraine to justify and argue for certain political decisions and actions in the name of security and defence? How do discursive constructions of a Western and a European identity figure in these representations?

Following this introduction, we have developed a substantial and adequate theory section for this thesis. Our theory section is divided into three overall parts that are reflective of our problem formulation: 1) discourse, 2) securitisation and 3) identity constructions. First, we present and elaborate on the concept of discourse, especially in relation to Critical Discourse Studies (henceforth CDS) as well as political discourse and representation as this thesis is first and foremost interested in Danish politicians’ discursive representations of the war in Ukraine. Second, as we are specifically interested in examining how these politicians employ securitisation discourse in their representations, we provide our theory with a section on securitisation theory. As mentioned, we are not interested in examining the process of securitisation itself or if it has been successfully accomplished and accepted. However, we use securitisation as an analytical tool to facilitate our analysis of and help us explain the dynamics of these representations of the war in Ukraine in political discourse, specifically, in relation to how the Danish politicians mobilize securitisation discourse in these representations. Therefore, we find it necessary and important to have a section

in our theory that outlines the different aspects of securitisation theory in order to understand the concept itself as well as to support the discussion of our analysis findings. Moreover, and as presented in our problem formulation, we are interested in how the discursive constructions of a Western and a European identity figure in the Danish politicians' representations of the war in Ukraine when employing securitisation discourse. Therefore, we likewise have a theoretical section that outlines the concept of collective identities and specifically in relation to the political construction and utilization of collective identities.

Our theory section is followed by a substantial method section that provides an account of the ontological and epistemological stances relevant and central to this thesis; a detailed overview of the data selection and treatment process as well as an account of how Fairclough's three-dimensional framework is used as a method to guide our analysis. Our method section is followed by our analysis, which consists of two main sections that included several subsections. These are expanded upon in the introduction to our analysis. Our analysis is followed by a discussion where we discuss our analysis findings in relation to our theory. This is followed by a conclusion, that sets out to answer the problem formulation. Lastly, all sources and literature used in this thesis are listed in our references. This is followed by our appendices, which contain our data – i.e., the transcriptions and specific examples used for the analysis.

2. Theory

This theory is structured into three main sections (with various subsections). As this thesis is first and foremost concerned with the construction and employment of discourse – specifically in relation to Danish politicians' representations of the war – this theory begins with a section that outlines and elaborates on the concept of discourse, especially in relation to CDS in terms of Fairclough (2003; 2015) and Fairclough and Wodak (1997) as well as political discourse and representation. This is followed by a section that outlines securitisation theory in order to establish an understanding of the concept of securitisation. Mainly this section outlines the concept of securitisation in relation to the Copenhagen School. Moreover, it gives an account of the relation between securitisation discourse and identity which is considered important to this thesis when considering our problem formulation. Moreover, in order to gain a greater understanding of identity constructions in relation to political discourse, this thesis also briefly elaborates on the concept of

identity and collective identity. As a central part of our problem formulation is examining how the construction of Western and European identities figure in politicians' representations of the war in Ukraine, we have to understand how such identities are established and constructed, and thus, the concept of 'nations' and of 'imagined communities' – in addition to collective identities – become central as they provide a theoretical understanding and framework for such constructions as well as how they may be politically motivated and mobilized.

2.1 Discourse and Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)

2.1.1 Discourse

Discourse can be a difficult concept to define, as asserted by Norman Fairclough (1992), largely because there are so many conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints (p. 3). For instance, in linguistics, “‘discourse’ is sometimes used to refer to extended samples of spoken dialogue, in contrast with written ‘texts’” (p. 3). In this sense, discourse analysts are then not limited to analysing sentences or/and smaller grammatical units, unlike traditional linguistic analysts; instead, discourse analysts focus upon “higher-level organizational properties of dialogue (e.g. turn-taking, or the structure of conversational openings and closings) or of written texts (e.g. the structure of a crime report in a newspaper)” (p. 3). However, more commonly, discourse is used in linguistics to refer to extended samples of either spoken or written language and “in addition to preserving the emphasis upon higher-level organizational features, this sense of ‘discourse’ emphasizes interaction between speaker and addressee or between writer and reader, and therefore processes of producing and interpreting speech and writing, as well as the situational context of language use” (p. 3). Here a “text” is regarded and acknowledged as one dimension of discourse: “the written or spoken ‘product’ of the process of text production” (p. 3). Additionally, discourse is also used for different types of language used in different sorts of social situations e.g. newspaper discourse, advertising discourse, classroom discourse, the discourse of medical consultations, etc. (p.3). Thus, discourse can in its most general usage, refer to any form of “language in use” (Baker and Ellece, 2011, p. 30).

In social theory and analysis, discourse is widely used to refer to “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 3). In this regard, Fairclough (1992) uses the term discourse more narrowly to refer to language use in speech and writing (p. 62) and regards discourse as a form of “social practice” rather than a “purely individual

activity or a reflex of situational variables” (p. 63). This understanding implies that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure. On the one hand, discourses are shaped and constrained by the social structure in the widest sense and at all levels: by class and other social relations at a societal level; by the relations specific to particular institutions; by systems of classification; and by various norms and conventions – both discursive and non-discursive (p. 64). And on the other hand, discourses are socially constitutive, meaning they contribute to the constitution of all the dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and constrict them (p. 64).

2.1.2 Discourse and Critical Discourse Studies

In Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), discourse is likewise acknowledged and understood as a form of social practice (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 5-6), with Wodak and Meyer (2016) describing CDS approaches as understanding discourse as “relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life” (p. 6). In essence, this means that describing discourse as a social practice assumes a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event or act and the situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s) in which they are embedded, meaning discourse is not only shaped and affected by the situational, institutional and social contexts which frame it, but it also shapes and influences them (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). Thus, discourses do not merely “reflect” or represent social phenomena, structures, and relations, they “constitute” them and contribute to shaping and reshaping them (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002b, ch. 3 p. 3). Thereby, as presented by Fairclough and Wodak (1997), discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. (p. 258). Thus, in CDS, discourse is considered to be a particular way of talking about, representing and understanding the world or aspects of it (Fairclough, 2003, p. 26; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002a, chapter 1 p. 1).

2.1.3 Discourse, Ideology and Common Sense

Fairclough (2003) asserts, language and discourse can be seen as expressive of ideology, where ideology in his view is “representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination, and exploitation” (p. 9). This

means that discourse is socially consequential as it gives rise to important issues of power where Fairclough and Wodak (1997) explicate that discursive practices may indeed have major ideological effects as they can (re)produce and reinforce commonsense understandings and unequal relations of power between people and groups of people – e.g. social classes, men and women, and/or cultural/ethnic majorities and minorities – through the way in which they represent social phenomena and position people (p. 258). Specifically, Fairclough (2015) focuses on ideologies as embedded in features of discourse that are taken for granted as matters of “common sense” that constitute, represents, legitimise and reinforce certain world views and understandings of reality over others (p. 101). The commonsense world of everyday life is built entirely on assumptions and expectations which control both the actions of members of society as well as their interpretation and perception of others and the actions of others. The term “assumptions” include types of implicitness such as presuppositions, logical implications or entailments, and implicatures (2003, p. 40), and thus, assumptions are “implicit, backgrounded, taken for granted, not things that people are consciously aware of, rarely explicitly formulated, examined or questioned” (2015, p. 101). That such assumed meanings are of particular ideological significance is an important notion as relations of power are best served by meanings that are widely taken as given, and so, the effectiveness of ideology depends to a considerable degree on it being merged with this common-sense background to discourse and other forms of social action (2015, p. 101). Thus, as Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (2016) assert, it is not the explicit types of ideology that are interesting to CDS, but rather the implicit types; “the more hidden and latent inherent everyday-beliefs which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies, thus attracting linguistics attention” (p. 8).

2.1.4 Naturalized and Dominant Discourses

Considering this, dominant discourses (and ideologies) can appear as “neutral”, legitimate and even natural, linked to ideological assumptions that remain largely unchallenged (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 9). The term “naturalization” is used to describe how practices and discourses (have) become dominant and even universal (Baker & Ellece, 2011, p. 74), and thus, naturalized discourses can be used to sustain unequal power relations as Fairclough (2015) asserts “naturalization is the royal road to common sense” (p. 113). The naturalization of discourse types is thus an effective way of constraining the contents of discourse as well as – in the long term – knowledge, and beliefs (p. 124). So, the ideological workings of implicit assumptions in discourse may provide a commonsensical framework and procedure for treating social phenomena as given. This is, as

Fairclough (2015) puts it “common sense in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power” as it helps deflect attention away from an idea that could lead to power relations being questioned and challenged; that there are social causes and social remedies for social problems (original emphasis, p. 107-108). From this, Fairclough (2015) suggests that “in the naturalization of discourse types and the creation of common sense, discourse types actually appear to lose their ideological character” (p. 113), which is – paradoxically – in itself an ideological effect as ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible or disguised.

This theoretical understanding of discourse forms the basis for our methodological framework where we use CDA as a method for analysis in this thesis.

2.1.5 Political Discourse and Representation

As stated by Wilson (2015), the term political discourse can refer in a number of ways to a range of different types of talk or text: a type of discourse which is a political production – a speech, debate, political interview, policy document, any talk or textual output that is either about a political subject or which is politically motivated (p. 775). One of the central concerns of political discourse is the question of how the world is presented to the public through particular forms of linguistic *representation*. For instance, how is language used in attributing meaning to individuals and groups with reference to the performance of their social practices? How are actions and events perceived and described? Which modes of reference are used to signify places, objects and institutions within particular positive or negative frames? (Wilson, 2015, p. 776). Considering this, Wilson asserts that “‘reality’ is not simply given to us through language; rather it is mediated through different forms of language representation (p. 776). In the past 25 years the “critical” approach to language, and to political discourse in particular, has been one of the fastest-growing areas of applied linguistic research. Many of the scholars writing on CDS have also been leaders in the field of political discourse; for example, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak. The critical analyst sees political discourse as the use of words and phrases, syntactic processes, and discursive positioning, to either hide or distribute responsibility in certain ways or designate specific individuals or groups as belonging to categories that may serve particular political purposes (p. 781-82). Thus, how we represent social phenomena, relations and people is not, or not always, a neutral act, and can be affected by culture, context, and practice. This then becomes central to this thesis when considering our problem formulation as we examine how Danish politicians mobilize securitisation discourse in their representations of the war in Ukraine to justify and argue for certain political decisions and

actions in the name of security and defence and how discursive constructions of a Western and a European identity figure in these representations. Thus, how politicians use discourse and discursive devices such as for instance semantics, structure, metaphors, lexical choices and grammar, etc when constructing a threat and security issue to distribute responsibility in certain ways and assign belonging of groups to certain categories, for instance in relation to Us and Them polarisations is central to this thesis.

2.2 Securitisation

Securitisation theory is mainly associated with the Copenhagen School, which represents an alternative to traditional security theories. This approach expands the range of security referent objects to encompass society and identity (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p.30-45 and p. 212-217). Various scholars note how securitisation represents a third level of addressing political issues. The first level is characterized by non-politicization, whereby the issue is undermined and constructed as unimportant. The second level, politicization brings up the issue for public discussion and debate. In the third level, securitisation, political issues are elevated beyond public discourse to the upper echelons of political power, where high-level politicians and institutions give them exceptional importance and urgency (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1998; Buzan & Hansen, 2009), rather than addressing them in the public domain (Shipoli, 2018, p. 72). Through securitisation, the issue is positioned as an existential threat that must be addressed urgently, thereby transcending traditional political boundaries and prioritizing its resolution above all other concerns. This process of securitisation involves convincing the public, often through implicit agreement, that the referent object must be protected by any means necessary (Shipoli, 2018, p. 1). According to Buzan et al. (1998), securitisation can be considered a “more extreme version of politicization” as it can be seen as a continuation of politics in a more radical form when “normal” politics does not work (p. 23). An issue that is being securitized is presented as existential and the threat presented to be a threat to one’s own existence and thus as requiring urgent attention. This does not always mean that the securitized issues are socially constructed, and the fact that an issue is securitized does not necessarily imply that it is a mere social construct without any basis in reality. In fact, many securitized issues are real security concerns. However, what is important is that something is constructed and represented as a security concern regardless of whether it is an actual security issue or not (Shipoli, 2018, p. 72).

The securitisation framework, as presented by the Copenhagen School, aligns with the

constructivist approach and commits to the discursive and linguistic turn in International Relations and security studies, building upon the notion that language not only reflects the external world, as posited by realists and neorealist perspectives but also actively shapes the social reality it represents (Balzacq, 2010, p. 56). In line with this, security is seen not as a given but as constructed through inter-subjective social and discursive interactions between actors who propose definitions of threats and audiences who acknowledge these definitions (Stepka, 2022, p. 18). At its core, securitisation theory provides a framework for understanding the role of language and performative utterances in the construction of security (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). In contrast to realist perspectives, the Copenhagen School does not seek to identify objectively defined “real” threats and thus does not engage in discussions concerning the material nature of security (Buzan & Wæver, 1997). Rather, it offers a means of examining security as a “quality actors inject into issues by securitising them, which means staging those issues on the political arena in the specific way that makes them acceptable as a security problem, sanctioning security actions and defensive moves” (Buzan et al. 1998, qtd in Stepka 2002, p. 18). In regard to this/in line with this, we likewise do not seek to identify objectively defined “real” threats and do not engage in discussions concerning the material nature of security. Instead, we are interested in how securitisation as a discourse is mobilized by Danish politicians in regard to their representation of the war to justify and argue for certain decisions and actions in the name of security and defence, specifically in relation to how a threat is constructed, how it is constructed as imminent and urgent and what is represented as a threat in opposition to what is threatened.

2.2.1 Securitisation and Language

The Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory combines the concept of security as a socially constructed phenomenon with John L. Austin’s and John Searle’s theory of speech acts, introducing the notion of performativity of language to the concept of security. Austin (1975) posits that language is not limited to statements that convey information that can be judged in terms of true or false but that it is performative and introduces change into social reality (p. 10). Accordingly, a securitizing speech act should incorporate two key elements: a definition of an existential threat and a referent object. The definition of an existential threat is necessary as it introduces a sense of drama and extreme urgency that can justify exceptional measures and the suspension of normal politics. The referent object should be acknowledged as socially relevant and refer, for instance, to shared values, identities, or issues that resonate with the most part of the target audience. By incorporating

these elements, a securitizing actor can produce a successful securitizing speech act that is widely recognized as a legitimate and dominant security problem warranting exceptional security measures (Stepka, 2022, p. 19-20). The actors who make the speech act, or “those who speak security” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 40), and their authority are likewise important. Known as securitizing actors, these signify a person, or group, who performs the securitizing speech act from the position of power, which can substantiate the introduction of extraordinary measures (p. 40). According to Wæver (1995), these are political elites, governmental agencies, bureaucrats, and pressure groups, that hold a special position in defining and implementing security (Wæver, 1995, pp. 49-50). As Buzan et al. (1998) indicate, the element of security is not held within the subjective and isolated minds of individuals, but rather it is a social quality, a part of discourse which is socially constituted and exists within the inter-subjective realm. Therefore, the mere act of individuals or groups speaking security does not necessarily ensure its success (p. 31).

2.2.3 Securitisation and the Logic of Exception

Securitisation is often considered part of the Schmittian debate of exceptional politics and security (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Wæver, 2011). Indeed, the securitisation framework is very much concerned with the idea of security based on exception which is motivated by “existential threats and the radical enmity between friends and foes” (Rothe, 2016, qtd. in Stepka, 2022, p. 22). In Schmittian philosophy, the exception is defined as a situation of radical danger and contingency where no existing laws, procedures, or responses are sufficient. It is a moment of great risk that goes beyond what has happened before and what we can anticipate or plan for (Stepka, 2022, p. 22). Accordingly, the exception-driven security introduces an antagonism which constantly threatens the political community, thus preparing it for the possibility of the introduction of exceptional measures as well as the breaking of the established normative and legal order in the name of security (p. 22). For the Copenhagen School, securitisation marks a moment when an issue “breaks the barrier of normal politics, ends the political discussion and is handled with extraordinary measures” (Stepka, 2022, p. 23). This is based on identifying external existential threats and subsequently separating friends from enemies (Rothe, 2016, p. 48). By taking politics into a “security mode”, the political authority is granted almost unlimited and unrestrained powers, acting in the name of the survival of the sovereign (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 318). The authority, in this case, often becomes a securitizing actor, controlling the identity of political communities, promoting a sense of insecurity, and strengthening or weakening its coherence based on perceived threats and realized

antagonisms (Williams, 2003, p. 518). This implies that the political authority assumes a role that goes beyond the conventional exercise of political power and securitizes issues that may otherwise not be deemed necessary to address. When authority is viewed as such, it often assumes the role of a securitizing actor, having control over the identity of political communities. This control stimulates the community's sense of insecurity, and the authority can either strengthen or weaken its coherence based on perceived threats and actual conflicts (p. 518).

According to the Copenhagen school, the process of securitizing has a "dark side" (Wæver, 1995, p. 64), as securitisation may be obstructive to the development of creative policy solutions as it limits the political space "required to thinking through often complex issues and instead introducing an unhelpful degree of enmity and urgency" (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2015 qtd in Stepka, 2022, p. 23). Wæver (1995) also points to the societal dangers associated with increased securitisation such as increased hate speech, discriminatory discourses and the consequent reinforcement of antagonisms driven by an us vs. them logic (p. 65). However, Shipoli (2018), building on Williams' (2015) arguments, argues for bringing securitisation beyond the lens of Schmittian exceptional politics to the politics of the extraordinary. As the concept has principally been viewed through the lens of exceptional politics it has predominantly been concerned with the exceptional circumstances of enmity, emergency, exceptionality and negativity. However, they suggest that securitisation is a much broader concept that includes both the negative and positive dimensions of security and politics. Shipoli (2018) argues that like the politics of the extraordinary, securitisation also has the potential for positive mobilization and democratic processes through popular mobilization and consensus. Therefore, defining securitisation solely in terms of friend-enemy categories is too restrictive. By expanding the scope of securitisation theory to include positive mobilization, Shipoli (2018) emphasizes that securitisation is a process that can be neither good nor bad on its own. It all depends on how it is used. While some may misuse securitisation to serve their own interests, others may use it to draw attention to issues that are of vital importance (p. 78-79).

2.2.4 Securitisation and Context

According to the Copenhagen School, the success of securitisation is influenced by contextual factors, referred to as "facilitating conditions". Buzan et al. (1998) suggest that the internal linguistic rules of speech acts and external social aspects of context play a role in constructing security, with the power of speech and authority of the speaker intertwine to influence the outcome.

Wæver (1995) further emphasizes that the securitizing actor's resources and linguistic skills are crucial factors in determining the likelihood of success in securitizing an issue. However, Stepka (2022), building on literature on framing, proposes departing from looking at securitisation as facilitated by contextual conditions and instead treating it as situated within broader socio-political, socio-linguistic, and thus interpretive settings. The argument is that the interpretive context to various degrees envelopes and informs the socio-political and socio-linguistic settings, and therefore reflect already existing ways of thinking about and responding to proposed definitions of security problems. In this sense, securitisation should not be treated as a singled-out event but rather as part of an interpretive continuum, where pre-existing security frames structure and inform collective constructions of security (pp. 51-52). Accordingly, pre-existing security-frames deeply impact the field of possibility of what can be thought, said and done about a securitized issue in a given context. These pre-existing security frames derive from "existing types of securitizing frames reflected in e.g., historically and culturally embedded definitions of enemies and threats, resentments towards specific groups, negative stereotypes, security narratives, to name a few" (p. 52). As such, the interpretive context could be treated as a continuum in which the content and type of previous securitisation inform, but not automatically dominate, subsequent securitizing processes (p. 52).

Watson (2012) highlights that the problematisation of social issues cannot be examined in isolation from external developments (p. 287). Balzacq (2005) argues that framing and securitisation are not an autonomous process confined to the powers of speech or local interpretative repertoire. The collective problematisation of social issues is heavily influenced by the complex interplay of internal and external factors. These factors can be reinforcing or aversive and affect the specific interpretations of socially relevant issues. For instance, acts of terrorism in certain regions can contribute to the securitisation of refugees and migrants in other regions, while natural disasters can influence the securitisation of climate change (p. 193).

2.2.5 Domestic, International, and Systematic Securitisation

Since there are three levels of dealing with politics – the domestic, the international, and the systematic level – Shipoli (2018) argues that an issue can be securitized at these different levels as well. Domestic securitisation is rather localized, has a few but mainly recognizable actors, and typically deals with issues related to a specific country or nation. International securitisation, on the other hand, deals with international issues affecting more than two countries or nations, making it

more challenging and open to different voices. It includes more but less well-known actors, such as leaders of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions. In domestic securitisation, the focus is on preserving the status quo and preventing change, with territory, ideology, and nation as the usual referent objects. In international securitisation, however, non-state issues such as environmental issues, global economic issues, poverty, and natural disasters are increasingly tackled. Moreover, international securitisation involves the framing of global issues as threats to commonly held values, international security, humanity, and peace. This allows leaders or states to justify intervention in the affairs of other nations to the international community and justify their involvement in the eyes of their domestic public. Such intervention can take various forms, including military, financial, or political engagements. The leaders or states engaging in international securitisation also seek to protect the notion of “what we stand for”, including the obligation to defend and uphold the values they cherish, such as the responsibility to protect (Shipoli, 2018, p. 4 and pp. 91-92).

Systematic securitisation concerns the construction of threats beyond the individual and regional platform, i.e., issues that concern the whole globe and are beyond international securitized issues. This type of securitisation differs from international securitisation because it aims to securitize issues that affect the entire world, leading to the division of international politics into poles such as communism-liberalism, east-west, and Islamic-western. Unlike international securitisation, which can be initiated by a few leaders in a particular region, systematic securitisation is typically carried out by a large group or a superpower that is unitary in nature and has a global presence (Shipoli, 2018, p. 94). According to Shipoli (2018), the leaders of a state securitize domestic political issues in order to protect their interests, including their position and ideologies, meanwhile, leaders who engage in international securitisation aim to uphold their state’s or group’s position in the global arena, which in turn elevates their own individual status. However, actors at the system level securitize an issue “because they want to spread their own doctrine or ideology as the right one and promote that doctrine or ideology” (p. 4), which in turn benefits their interests and spreads their ideology. While securitizing actors do not explicitly state their interests, it is a crucial factor in the securitisation of an issue (p. 4)

2.2.6 Securitisation and Identity

According to Shipoli (2018), securitisation theory is utilized by political leaders for various objectives. These purposes include setting agendas, deterring threats, justifying past actions,

exercising control, maintaining the current state of affairs, and establishing a sense of “Self” in opposition to an “Other” (Shipoli, 2018, p. 82). In line with this, Cardoso dos Santos (2018) argues that identity plays a crucial role in securitisation and that its analysis is vital when adopting a discursive approach to security issues. According to him, the securitisation process is closely linked to the concept of identity, which is formed through the logic of equivalence and difference. This means that the Self is defined in relation to the Other, who is perceived as a threat to its survival. This involves designating a specific entity as the “Other” or an enemy, and the identification of such an entity enables the securitizing actor to define itself in relation to the Other. Understanding the concept of identity and Otherness is crucial in explaining how certain issues can shift from normal politics to the realm of securitisation and thus require the use of extreme measures (Cardoso dos Santos, 2018, p. 236).

It is not only the identification of the Other but also the construction of the Self that plays a vital role in the securitisation processes. Identity can sometimes carry much higher weight than anything else, because “it defines who ‘we are’ and what ‘we stand for’” (Shipoli, 2018, p. 77). Accordingly, threats against identity have been found to be more effective than threats against the state itself. While securing sovereignty is essential for state security, securing identity is crucial for societal security, as it implies survival (Wæver, 1995, p. 67). As Wæver (1995) argues, framing threats towards identity rather than towards the state can be more lucrative for securitizing actors (p. 67). Therefore, Shipoli (2018) suggests that we need to be cautious about what we regard as “sacred” as everything else can be framed as a threat (p. 77).

Overall, the role of identity in the securitisation processes is a complex and multifaceted topic that requires careful consideration of the discursive conditions of possibility, the degree of otherness, and the construction of collective identities. By examining these factors, we can gain a deeper understanding of how securitisation works and how it affects different actors and groups in society (Cardoso dos Santos, 2018, p. 236). As a central part of this thesis is examining how the construction of Western and European identities figure in politicians’ representations of the war in Ukraine when employing securitisation discourse, examining Otherness, specifically the construction of an Other, and examining constructions of collective identities become very relevant for this thesis. Therefore, providing a theoretical understanding of the concept of collective identities in relation to political discourse is necessary and beneficial to this thesis. This is done in the following section.

2.3 Identity Constructions

2.3.1 Identity and Collective Identities

Identity is a complex and manifold concept that has been approached in different ways throughout history. Benwell and Stokoe (2006) highlight how the understanding of identity has evolved from early conceptualizations of identity as a self-fashioning, agentive, internal project of the Self to more recent understandings of identity as social and collective, and to a postmodern understanding of identity as something fluid and fragmented and ultimately constituted in discourse. Moreover, Wodak and Boukala (2014) assert that identity is a complex construct that is shaped by social, cultural, and historical factors, emphasizing how there is not a single identity, but multiple identities (p. 172). Moreover, there are different forms of identity, namely individual and collective identities, however, neither form of identity is unique nor stable. As Wodak and Boukala (2014) state, identity is socially constructed through shared meanings and interactions and is thus flexible and able to change (p. 172). Nevertheless, collective identity, in particular, is an important aspect of identity that is socially constructed through shared meanings and interactions. Collective identity arises from the idea of a fundamental similarity that brings a group of people together which results in a sense of solidarity amongst the members. However, this sense of collective identity is socially constructed, i.e., consciously or unconsciously formed through social interactions. This sense of identity likewise involves creating a distinction between the group and those outside it anchored in shared conscious or unconscious meanings, ultimately constructing an Other, that is different from the group (Fligstein 2009 in Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 88). In line with this, Wodak and Boukala (2015) argue that identity has two basic meanings. On the one hand, identity is based on the idea of sameness, which creates a sense of belonging within a group. On the other hand, identity is based on distinctiveness, which differentiates the group from others and creates an “Us versus Them” mentality (p. 88). In this way, the concepts of in-group and out-group are central to collective identity based on the notion that “identities are constituted through a process of difference defined in a relative or flexible way dependent upon the activities in which one is engaged” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 25). This means that, in context-dependent ways, the in-group is constructed as the ones who “belong”, and the out-group is constructed as “outside” and different from this group.

2.3.2 Nations and European Identity

The idea of the nation is rooted in a cultural and political bond that unites a community of people who share the same myths, memories, symbols, and traditions (Smith, 1992, p. 61), and thus the

nation defines and legitimizes politics in cultural terms “because the nation is a political community only in so far as it embodies a common culture and a common social will” (p. 62). Although nations are often thought of as naturally occurring and ancient entities, it is actually a fairly modern concept (Thiesse, 2007, p. 15-16). Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined community” refers to the idea that nations are not naturally occurring entities, but rather social constructions that are imagined and created through shared cultural and historical symbols, traditions, and memories. Anderson (2016) argues that nations are “imagined” because they are not based on face-to-face interactions, in fact the members of a nation will never know or meet most of their fellow members, yet they share an imagined connection and sense of belonging to the same community (p. 14). Stuart Hall (1996) argues that nations are not solely political formations but also “symbolic communities” in which: “people are not only legal citizens ...; they participate in the idea of the nation as represented in its national culture” (qtd. in Wodak et al., 2009, p. 22). While Anderson’s (2016) concept of “imagined communities” provides a way of thinking about nationalism and national identity, which emphasizes the role of cultural and historical factors in shaping how people think about themselves and their place in the world, this can arguably also be applied to understand the idea of a transnational European identity. Europe, much like the nation, can be viewed as both a construction and an imagined community. Wodak and Boukala (2015) argue that a European identity defined as a collective identity unifies European nations or the residents of Europe and excludes the “Others” who are seen as outside of Europe’s “imagined” boundaries (p. 88-89). In line with this, Demossier (2007b) maintains that European identity is defined by both an internal dimension as well as external forces, however, the internal dimensions – in relation to language, geography, culture, religion, and so forth – remain difficult to grasp and are ambivalent (chap 3, p. 55). As such, the political elites of the European Union, in an effort to cultivate a sense of belonging amongst Europeans, have “launched various myths and/or reinforced traditional ‘European values’ across European nations” (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 92), yet according to Demossier (2007a), such shared values still remain to be clearly defined (p. 6). European identity can also be defined as a political tool operationalized with the aim of developing a new sense of collective and political identity among the peoples of Europe (Demossier, 2007b, chapter 3, p. 53) as well as to legitimize certain political decisions and agendas (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 92-93). The different forms of European identity are used in different contexts by European politicians and “are continuously reshaped, frequently in the name of national security” (Wodak and Boukalas, 2015, p. 105).

Accordingly, “the political machine imposes and dictates what European identity is or must be” (Demossier, 2007a, p. 3).

3. Method

This method section is divided into several subsections. First, we provide an account of the ontological and epistemological stances relevant and central to this project. Second, we present a detailed overview of the data selection process. Here we describe how and where we have found our data; we provide a description of our different data and we detail how our data will be treated in connection to transcription, method, and analysis. Lastly, we provide an account of how CDA as a method is applied in our analysis specifically in terms of Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework. We provide a detailed and substantial method section to insure the validity and credibility of this thesis.

3.1 Ontology and Epistemology

3.1.1 Social Constructionism

For this thesis, we embrace a social constructionist perspective. This perspective understands social phenomena as social constructs shaped by the perceptions and actions of social actors. As Bryman (2016) explains, “reality is context-dependent, where different contexts have different realities” (p. 28). According to Hacking (qtd. in Porta & Keating, 2008), constructionists argue that classifications are not determined by the objective nature of the world but rather by our convenient ways of representing it (p. 24). This view emphasizes the active role of individuals in constructing social reality and acknowledges that different articulations of the same subject may present multiple and different perspectives and worldviews, as well as assumptions about the individual’s position in the given situation. While positivists and empiricists see discourse and meaning as rather objective or neutral frames about the shared understandings of people about the social world, in such a way that language reflects the reality, “post-structuralists and members of other schools that are critical of pure positivism (such as members of CDA) place emphasis on the constructive or reproductive role of discourses on meanings and identities” (Erdogan, 2017, p. 7). Consequently, discourse is seen not as an objective or neutral reflection of reality, but rather a plane where the social world and identities acquire meanings and certain actions become possible (Howarth, 2000, p. 4).

Additionally, securitisation theory as presented by the Copenhagen School – as outlined in our theory section – aligns with this constructionist perspective as it recognises/persists that language not merely reflects the external world, as posited by realist and neorealist perspectives, but actively shapes the social reality it represents (Balzacq, 2010, p. 56).

According to George and Campbell (1990) understanding reality through language is to engage in complex social practices. As such, “the meaning of a term/word/symbol [can] not be assumed to correspond to some essential and externally derived foundation or object but [is] dependent upon the particular constitutive role it played in socio-linguistic systems or language games” (George and Campbell, 1990, 273). Accordingly, language does not reflect an external thing, it makes/creates/constitutes it. Erdogan (2017) notes how, in every constitution, it also attaches a certain meaning, role, normative weight, and function to it. As Holm (2018) argues, language use is a powerful tool that can both maintain and create a new shared social reality, thus shaping and re-shaping reality (p. 130). From a constructionist perspective, categories and classifications used by individuals to understand and make sense of the world are viewed as “social product[s]” that lack a “built-in essence” (Bryman, 2016, p. 30). Rather, their meaning(s) is constructed through social interaction. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002a), discourse analysis highlights the constructive role of discourses in shaping our understanding of the world, and it recognizes that knowledge is a product of discourse rather than an objective truth (ch 1., p. 4-5). Therefore, CDA emphasizes the importance of examining discourses as particular and varying ways of representing and understanding the world or aspects of it, rather than neutral reflections of reality. Thus, this ontological perspective is important to this thesis in connection to how we view discourse and in relation to our chosen method CDA. As constructionists, we engage in critical discourse analysis to examine the representation of social phenomena, specifically how Danish politicians discursively represent the war in Ukraine in connection to the concepts of security and identity. Furthermore, we acknowledge and discuss how the discourses used by Danish politicians in connection to the war construct, (re)produce, and reinforce certain representations and understandings of social reality in regard to the war in Ukraine in order to justify certain political decisions and actions in the name of security and defence. In this regard, it is relevant to examine what effect is achieved by employing such discourses in terms of how they contribute to (and constitute) certain perceptions of the world, specifically in relation to reinforcing Us and Them categorisations, and how this may affect public opinions and policymaking.

3.1.2 Interpretivism

The epistemological stance central to our thesis is interpretivism. This stance focuses on the interpretation of social phenomena, and according to interpretivists, social reality is complex and multifaceted and impossible to reduce it to simple cause-and-effect relationships. Instead, interpretivists believe that social phenomena are constructed through the interpretations and actions of individuals and that these constructions are influenced by social and historical contexts. In “The Social Construction of Reality”, Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue that reality is not an objective, pre-existing entity, but is constructed by individuals through social interaction and communication. They suggest that people create and maintain a shared understanding of reality through language and other symbolic systems and that this understanding is shaped by social structures and institutions. Consequently, human beings are emphasized as “meaningful” actors, and thus, the social scientist is required “to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman, 2016, p. 26). Accordingly, Porta and Keating (2008) state that researchers must discover the motivations behind people’s actions rather than relying on universal laws external to them (p. 24-25). The interpretivist stance aligns with the hermeneutic tradition, which is concerned with the interpretive understanding of social phenomena and social action, as opposed to finding context-free explanations or discovering universal laws about social phenomena and action (Bryman, 2016; Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 24-25). The interpretive process involves three levels of interpretation. The first level involves understanding the world as a series of interpretations that social actors give of their positions. The second level involves the researcher interpreting these interpretations. Finally, the third level involves the researcher's interpretations being further interpreted in terms of concepts, discussions, categories, and literature of a discipline, placing them into a social scientific frame (Bryman, 2016; Porta & Keating, 2008). However, it is important to note that interpretivism does not deny the existence of an objective reality. Rather, it assumes that such a world is always viewed and interpreted from a particular perspective and set of interests. This means that there are multiple versions of reality and that researchers are insiders with a partial view of the social phenomena they study (Taylor, 2013, p. 10). This perspective aligns with securitisation theory as presented by the Copenhagen School because even though the Copenhagen School does not seek to identify objectively defined “real” threats, it does not mean that it assumes that these ‘threats’ lack any basis in reality or are genuine security concerns. Instead, it emphasizes the importance and significance of examining how they are discursively constructed as such.

Moreover, in regard to this thesis, we as researchers examine and analyse how Danish politicians discursively represent the war in Ukraine, negotiating discourses related to security and identity and how they construct and reinforce certain understandings of the conflict, as well as how it relates to Denmark, and the West in general. Given that discourse is a way of interpreting and representing the world, influenced by power relations and ideologies, as explained in our theoretical framework, critical discourse analysis is essential for our research and our research development. It enables us to not only analyse and comprehend *how* these specific worldviews or versions of reality are constructed but also to recognize that they *are* constructions and interpretations, rather than inherent, objective, or singular versions of reality.

3.2 Data

This thesis is a qualitative study which aims to analyze and investigate how Danish politicians discursively represent the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine is a topic of great significance and relevance within various disciplines and contexts. Within the realm of Danish politicians' discursive representation of the war in Ukraine, there are numerous intriguing and pertinent perspectives to explore, including but not limited to issues related to refugees, international relations, securitisation, populism, and identity. However, in order to conduct a thorough and comprehensible study, we have deliberately chosen to limit the scope of our study. We narrow our scope by focusing on Danish politicians' representations of the war in Ukraine in connection to the concepts of discourse, security and identity. Specifically, we examine how Danish politicians mobilize securitisation discourse in their representation of the war in Ukraine to justify and argue for certain political decisions and actions in the name of security and defence. In connection to this, we likewise examine how discursive constructions of a Western and a European identity figure in these representations. This focused approach allows us to gain nuanced insights into this particular discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine in Danish politics. We have selected different statements made by politicians as our corpus of data, which will be expanded upon further in the following section.

Moreover, we have chosen to focus on Danish politicians' discourse specifically, and not for instance media or public discourse, for several reasons. For one, politicians have the power and authority to propose and implement political decisions made in response to the war, and secondly, they are in a unique position to define crises and threats and are responsible for the official response and thus hold significant influence over the public perception as they have the ability to affect, re-

shape and reinforce how people perceive and understand the dynamics of the war. Third, politicians have a significant reach in terms of the electorate and are extensively covered by the media, which also facilitates our data selection and collection process, providing us with sufficient and easily accessible data, meaning we did not have to ask for permission to use certain statements for this thesis. Fourth, politicians are the people's elected officials, and therefore, what they say – and perhaps more importantly – how they say it, is important and significant. Moreover, our decision is likewise due to practical reasons as we are Danish, and thus, we can understand the Danish language and we have useful knowledge of the different political parties, politicians, and government. Additionally, we have convenient knowledge of where to locate different data for this thesis i.e. statements from the politicians as we are familiar with the different media platforms and sources as well as having easy access to them in comparison to for instance if we wanted to examine how German politicians' represent the war in Ukraine.

3.2.1 Data Collection and Selection

In order to find our data for analysis, we conducted an internet search using specific keywords. These included more general keywords such as “the war in Ukraine” and “press conference on the war in Ukraine”, but also specific occurrences, for example, the “one-year anniversary” of the invasion of Ukraine. We searched specifically for this, because the anniversary is a recent instance where the war received significant attention in terms of media coverage and events in Denmark, and as the initial phase of this thesis process was not long after the one-year anniversary of the invasion, we could not justify excluding this from our data. Additionally, we searched for keywords connected to specific political decisions that were made in response to the war, such as the “defence opt-out” and the “Ukraine Fund” since these are notable examples of instances where specific political decisions were discussed and made in response to the war. As such, they serve as examples of how Danish politicians represent the war in Ukraine while defending and arguing for certain security and defence policies and actions. Moreover, there was a temporal criterion for our data selection, as we wanted our data to be representative of statements, actions and decisions made by politicians from the start of the invasion to the point of starting our thesis.

Besides, we used a publicly available search engine in order to identify publicly available sources where Danish politicians have spoken out or commented on the war or specific aspects of it. We focus on texts aimed at the general public, instead of, for instance, legal texts, as we are interested in how politicians mobilize securitisation discourse in their representation of the war in

order to argue for and justify certain decisions to the public. As such we are interested in texts that are aimed at and are easily accessible to the public, and not for instance ones that require permission to use. In the end, we narrowed down our selection to five sources which we will draw upon to provide examples for analysis. Specifically, the data corpus consists of two speeches held by Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen, a press conference about the national compromise on Danish security policy, as well as statements by various politicians in a press release on the Ukraine Fund and another on the referendum for the defence opt-out. A link to each source comprising our data set can be found under primary sources. Additionally, a detailed description of our data is found in the following section: 'Data Description'.

Furthermore, the texts selected for this study were limited to those sourced from traditional media outlets and official government websites, including the Prime Minister's Office's website www.stm.dk, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website www.um.dk and the Danish Broadcast Company's website www.DR.dk. The decision to adopt such an approach was motivated by the need to narrow down the scope of the study to concentrate on times when the politicians spoke in an official capacity, representing either their party or the government. By focusing on traditional media and official government websites we wanted to ensure that the data is representative of the discourse used by politicians when speaking in an official capacity and on behalf of their party or government. We deliberately excluded social media platforms, despite their growing influence as communication channels. This was done with respect to the time limitations of this thesis in order to prevent the dilution of the study's focus, ensuring an in-depth analysis of the subject/the chosen data. Social media is often used by politicians to express their personal views or opinions, which may not necessarily reflect their official - or their political party's - stances on policy matters. Therefore, the inclusion of social media posts in this study would have introduced an element of subjectivity and personal angle to political discourse. While this would be interesting to include, as it implements even more of the complexity and diversity of political practice and discourse, due to the limitations of this thesis, we have chosen to exclude this aspect. By focusing solely on traditional media outlets and official government websites, the study aimed to provide a more focused analysis, shedding light on the discursive representations used by politicians in an official capacity to shape public opinion and advance their policy agendas.

3.2.2 Data description

We have chosen to include the two speeches given by Mette Frederiksen, since she is the head of the elected government in Denmark and, therefore, serves as the chief government spokesperson. As such, she speaks on behalf of the government, and her statements in this context are rather significant and consequential. The first speech was given by prime minister Mette Frederiksen on 4 May 2022 at an event to commemorate the end of the Second World War and express support for Ukraine's "present fight for freedom". The second speech was given by the prime minister at a church service marking the one-year anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2023. Full transcriptions of both speeches are published on the Prime Minister's Office's website www.stm.dk. However, a direct link to these speeches, as well as their transcriptions, can be found in Appendix 2, transcriptions 1 and 2. These particular speeches reflect two distinct moments in time during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine; one delivered shortly after the invasion, and the other a year later.

In addition to the speeches by the Danish prime minister, our data corpus includes a press conference called by the prime minister on Sunday 6 March 2022 where a "new national compromise on Danish security policy" was presented. As a response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these parties have agreed that European security is under threat and consequently agreed on a number of measures to strengthen the Danish defence and the possibilities of manoeuvring in the new security policy situation. These measures include greater investment in defence as a key element; aiming to become independent of Russian natural gas; gradually increasing the defence budget until it reaches 2% of GDP by 2033 and a referendum on the abolition of Denmark's "defence opt-out", so that Denmark can participate in the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Present at the press conference were prime minister Mette Frederiksen and the different political party leaders that were part of the new agreement, i.e., Jakob Ellemann-Jensen from The Liberal Party of Denmark (V), Pia Olsen Dyhr from the Green Left (SF), Sofie Carsten Nielsen from The Danish Social-liberal Party (B) and Søren Pape Poulsen from The Conservative People's Party (C), as well as journalists from the news stations DR, TV2, Berlingske, Altinget, Jyllandsposten, Ekstrabladet, Politiken, Børsen, Bloomberg News and BT. The full transcription of the press conference is published on the Prime Minister's Office's website www.stm.dk. However, a transcription of this press conference can be found in Appendix 2, transcription 4.

Moreover, we have incorporated a news article from the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR), a publicly funded and independent media organization. This article features comments from

members of each political party in the parliament regarding their stance on the referendum for the abolition of Denmark's "defence opt-out", which was instigated in response to the Ukrainian conflict. In a 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty that laid the groundwork for the modern European Union, Denmark was given exemptions, i.e. opt-outs, from some EU policy areas, including the euro currency, police and justice and defence and security policy. A defence opt-out means that Denmark does not participate in EU military operations, does not finance them and does not provide soldiers and military hardware to EU-led conflict areas. Removing this opt-out will allow Denmark to participate in the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), thus enabling Denmark to take part in joint EU military operations and to cooperate on the development and acquisition of military capabilities within the EU framework (Harding, 2022).-As these statements are included as part of an informative news article, the article itself includes text besides the different statements made by the politicians, however, only the statements will be included in the transcription as well as the analysis, and not the article itself. A link to this article as well as the statements themselves can be found under Appendix 2, transcription 3.

Lastly, we have included a press release about the Ukraine Fund from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website www.um.dk. This brief press release likewise features comments from politicians, specifically the government politicians Nicolai Wammen, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Troels Lund Poulsen, Morten Bødskov, and Dan Jørgensen. The Ukraine fund is an agreement between the government and the political parties the Liberal Party of Denmark (V), the Green Left (SF), Liberal Alliance (LA), the Conservative People's Party (C), the Danish Social-Liberal Party (B), the Danish People's Party (DF), and the New Right (D) that establishes a fund of approximately EUR 935 million (DKK 7 billion). The fund addresses Ukraine's needs regarding military, civil and commercial support (www.um.dk). As these statements are likewise included as part of a press release, the press release itself includes text beside the different statements made by the politicians, however, only the statements will be included in the transcription as well as the analysis, and not the press release itself. A link to this press release as well as the statements themselves can be found under Appendix 2, transcription 5.

3.2.3 Data Treatment

While all our data is originally spoken discourse, it has later been transcribed and published to the public on various channels as mentioned. We have chosen to include these already made and publicly available transcriptions as our data and in our appendices. However, we have added the

relevant titles as well as line numbers for each transcription for easy reference. In relation to the articles, we have included only the statements made by the different politicians in the respective transcriptions, also adding the relevant titles as well as line numbers for easy reference. Moreover, in each transcription, it is made clear to whom the statements belong in regard to the different politicians. Since we are only interested in what is being said and not how it is said, our transcriptions are basic transcription that does not include symbols indicating for instance intonation, stress, latched utterance, and pauses.

As the different statements are in Danish, the transcriptions are likewise in Danish. However, in our analysis, we refer to and analyse specific sections from each transcription, which we have compiled as examples that are translated for analysis. Each specific example that is translated and analyzed in our analysis section is accordingly named and categorized as examples 1, 2, 3, etc., and can be found in Appendix 1. The full examples – and not just the single words or sentences that are directly used in the analysis – are presented and translated in Appendix 1 so that they can be understood and regarded in their full context. Additionally, every example that is presented in Appendix 1 is accompanied by the precise line numbers that correspond with the respective transcriptions. We have chosen to translate only the specific sections that we comment on in our analysis to make clear that it is aspects of the Danish language we are examining.

English translations of the two speeches have already been published alongside the Danish transcription, however, we deliberately choose not to use these, because we wanted to include the source text and make our own translations instead as we acknowledge that every instance of translating an original statement or word from Danish to English, involves a certain level of interpretation. Translation between languages always presents challenges and considerations in terms of linguistic differences and cultural nuances as every language has its unique grammatical structures, vocabulary, idiomatic expressions, and cultural references. Translators must understand and bridge these linguistic gaps while ensuring that the meaning and intent of the source text are accurately conveyed in the target language. Consequently, there are two approaches to translation: source-oriented vs. target-oriented. Source-oriented translation prioritizes fidelity to the source text, aiming to reproduce its form and meaning as closely as possible while target-oriented translation focuses on producing a text that is natural and appropriate in the target language, even if it means deviating from the source text. Since we are interested in Danish language but need to translate certain parts for the purpose of this thesis, we have adopted a source-oriented approach, and attempt to reproduce the form and meaning of the original statements as faithfully as possible. This also

means that in instances where a word lacks an exact direct translation with the same connotations, we use the original word and provide an explanation of its meaning as well as clarify the meaning (and connotations) of the original word in its context in the analysis.

Moreover, as is evident, our data corpus comprises various genres, including political speeches, news interviews, and a press conference. We recognise that including different genres as data for analysis may present certain issues as each genre has its unique conventions, structures, and practices for achieving specific communicative goals. However, we are not concerned with doing genre analysis and are therefore not interested in the analysis of a specific genre or how discourses in a single genre manifest. Instead, we are concerned with CDA, examining discourses employed by politicians irrespective of genre. Thus, we engage in a systematic and comprehensive analysis across different genres by systematically focusing on the same discursive devices such as semantics, structure, metaphors, lexical choices and grammar, etc across our data. Furthermore, analysing the discourse across genres enables us to comprehend the diversity and complexity of political practice and the different contexts in which this discourse occurs and not how they manifest in one field. Additionally, this approach allows us to identify patterns of discourse on this topic and in this area.

Therefore, in our analysis, we do not conduct separate analyses of the different data sources as we are not interested in conducting a genre analysis, and thus, not interested in the construction and employment of discourses within the individual genres. Instead, we draw on and examine the different data as appropriate and when relevant for the analysis as we are interested in examining the dynamics of the war in Ukraine in terms of representation in political discourse and specifically how securitisation discourse is employed by Danish politicians in these representations regardless of genre. Thus, we find it relevant and beneficial to use CDA as an analytical framework for this thesis and specifically Fairclough's three-dimensional framework as a method for this thesis, which will be expanded upon in the following section of this method. CDA will allow us to uncover what common sense assumptions and ideological expressions are embedded in these discursive political representations and how these representations impact our understanding and perception of the dynamics of this war.

3.3 CDA Method

This section presents an overview of the research method employed in this thesis, which is based on Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is a comprehensive analytical framework that enables the examination of language use in social and political contexts. Fairclough's three-

dimensional framework guides our analysis, and this section provides a description of Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model, outlining each dimension and its role in the analysis process.

The first step within this three-dimensional approach considers the *text* and centres on the linguistic features of language use. Thus, the first dimension of Fairclough's model involves a detailed examination of linguistic features, textual structures, and discursive devices employed within the discourse. This includes the analysis of grammar, vocabulary, morphology, metaphors, and other linguistic choices. Hence, in this study, we conduct an in-depth and systematic analysis of our data in regard to linguistic features and discursive devices: lexical choices, semantics, metaphors and grammar, especially in terms of modality, voice and tense. The importance of examining these linguistic elements lies in the fact that they shape the local meanings of situations, objects of knowledge, social identities, and relationships between individuals and groups of people (Fairclough & Wodak, as cited in Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 6). As such, this step is crucial to uncovering the ideological expressions and common-sense assumptions embedded in discourses and how different actors, identities, and discursive categories are represented and constructed through the use of language.

The second dimension of analysis focuses on the *discursive practices* and processes involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of texts. It involves investigating the social and institutional contexts in which the discourse takes place, as well as the power relations, social roles, and identities of the participants involved (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002b, chapter 3, p. 8). The analysis of this dimension aims to uncover the discursive strategies, discourses, and ideologies that are prevalent in a given context (interdiscursivity). It explores how language is used to construct social realities, maintain or challenge power structures, and shape social interactions. By investigating discursive practices, we can understand how language is employed to persuade, negotiate, construct identities, and exert influence.

The third dimension considers the text as *social practice* and explores the broader social structures, practices, and relations that shape and are shaped by discourse. This dimension investigates how language use and interpretation impact our perception of the world and certain aspects of it. It is also concerned with how language use contributes to the construction and maintenance of social relations, power structures, and discriminatory practices. As Fairclough (2003) asserts, language use and interpretation play a significant role in influencing our understanding of the world, and the power dynamics that govern it. This dimension of analysis aims to understand how discourse reflects and reproduces social and cultural ideologies, norms, and

values. By examining discourse as social practice, we can uncover the social meanings and cultural implications embedded in discourse, as it helps us understand how language negotiates and reinforces social norms, ideologies, and cultural practices. Additionally, it allows us to examine how discourse contributes to the construction of social identities and subjectivities. Therefore, in this thesis, we consider how Danish politicians' discourses in connection to the war construct, (re)produce, and reinforce certain representations and understandings of social reality/phenomena and relations. In this regard, we examine what implications such discourses have, specifically in terms of how they shape and reinforce certain perceptions of the world, and how this may affect public opinions and play into policymaking as well as international relations.

4. Analysis

This analysis is divided into two overall sections: securitisation discourse and identity constructions, reflecting the structure of our problem formulation. Each of the two main sections includes various smaller subsections. The main section "securitisation discourse" is divided into four subsections. The first subsection examines how a threat is constructed and the second subsection considers what is constructed as being threatened. The third subsection examines how a sense of urgency is constructed in relation to the represented threat, thus warranting exceptional measures. The fourth subsection examines how the represented threat/security situation draws on exciting established discourses of security, specifically in relation to the Cold War and the Second World War. The main section "Identity constructions" is divided into five subsections. The first subsection examines how a European identity is constructed, including us and them representations. The second subsection examines how Russia and Putin are constructed as an Other in relation to the European and Western community, and likewise examines binary categorisation of us and them. The third subsection examines how Ukraine is placed in this binary opposition. The fourth subsection examines the construction and representation of a unified and collective Western identity and community – in addition to a European one – rooted in shared values and experiences. The final subsection examines how the politicians position Denmark within this community in relation to the political actions and decisions.

4.1 Securitisation Discourse

4.1.1 Construction of a threat

Through the repeated use of negatively charged descriptions, these Danish politicians construct the situation in Ukraine as a serious threat. For one, by referring to the situation as an “attack” (example 1, example 11, example 16, example 17, example 18), an “assault” (example 19, example 20) and a “threat” (example 11), which are nominalized nouns of the verbs “to attack”, “to assault” and “to threaten”, these politicians encapsulate the action and quality of the original verbs. As nominalised nouns, the employment of these nouns to refer to the situation encapsulates the action and quality of the original verbs and correlates the situation with these associations, creating a sense of aggression and danger. The actions that are denoted by these nouns are attributed as the actions of Russia and Putin, through the use of the possessive case – “Putin’s” and “Russia’s” – which indicates ownership. Consequently, this constructs them as the aggressors and the threat. This is likewise emphasized in the active constructions in example 29, where Mette Frederiksen states “a peaceful, democratic, free country is under attack by Russia” and in example 11, where Sofie Carsten Nielsen states “it is a threat to the freedom and safety of all citizens of Europe which Putin is exerting now”. In the first example, the adverbial clause “by Russia” is used in the passive voice construction in order to assign agency to Russia in connection to attacking Ukraine. The subject “a peaceful, democratic, free country” is thus acted upon by the verbal phrase “is under attack” in this passive voice construction, where, by adding the by-adverbial, agency is explicitly assigned to Russia as the one attacking Ukraine. In the second example, Putin is likewise assigned agency by constructing him as the subject in the present progressive aspect, who is actively exerting the threat. Using the progressive aspect “is exerting”, indicates an action that is incomplete and/or ongoing, thus this expresses how Putin is still in the process of exercising a threat, which likewise indicates that this threat is very much still active, further emphasising its urgency. Thus, Russia and Putin are represented as a common enemy and threat. Moreover, the situation is frequently characterised by adjectives such as “brutal” (example 2, example 16, example 19, example 4, example 5), “serious” (example 22), “inhuman” (example 4), and “unbearable” (example 4), which indicate a violent, aggressive and serious nature of the conflict. By employing these negatively charged words, Danish politicians construct a representation of the conflict in Ukraine as a threatening and dangerous situation which in turn creates a sense of urgency and therefore a need to take action and address the situation. This urgency is similarly indicated in example 15 when Alex Vanopslagh states the decision to abolish the defence opt-out regards “security policy in a time when Russia is knocking

at the door”. Here, “knocking at the door” is being used figuratively to suggest a potential threat or intrusion. The metaphorical use of Russia knocking at the door indicates a close proximity of the threat posed by Russia to Denmark and evokes images of a potential intrusion. This constructs a sense of immediacy and danger and frames the decision to abolish the defence opt-out as a necessary response to the supposed threat posed by Russia to Danish security. The use of the present progressive tense further enhances the sense of urgency, as it implies that Russia is currently near and actively threatening Denmark, constructing it as a pressing external threat that requires immediate attention.

Furthermore, these Danish politicians discursively construct the invasion not only as a threat to Ukraine but to all of Europe and Denmark as well. The repeated use of the phrase “war in Europe” (example 4, example 20, example 23) creates a perception that the conflict is not limited to Ukraine but has wider implications for the entire European continent. By discursively situating the war in Europe, it is depicted as a European issue rather than simply a Ukrainian one, which amplifies the sense of a threat posed by Russia to the entire continent. Moreover, in example 38 and example 3 the politicians introduce the idea that the conflict in Ukraine is “not just” a battle for Ukraine's own freedom, but for the freedom and safety of Europe as a whole. In both examples, the contrastive conjunction “but” is used to oppose the idea of Ukraine fighting for its own freedom with the broader concept of fighting for the safety and freedom of all of Europe. Likewise, the use of the adverbial phrase “not just” introduces a hierarchy of importance as “just” is an adverb of degree, suggesting that what comes after the “but” is more significant, in this case, the collective Europe and “our freedom”. This hierarchical representation of the situation consequently constructs Ukraine’s fight as more than a local issue, namely a larger, transnational one that affects all the European nations and creates a sense of a shared struggle and shared stakes in the outcome of the conflict, as well as signify how the collective safety, including that of Denmark, and “our” freedom is constructed as more important and therefore urgent. Moreover, the repetitive structure in example 3 further emphasizes this idea of the conflict transcending the borders of Ukraine. The repetition of “not just for your own” and “but for our” emphasizes this idea that Ukraine’s fight is not separate, but one that affects the entire continent, thus indicating a commonality of the threat. These discursive constructions work to position Ukraine’s fight as a collective struggle against a common enemy, rather than an isolated conflict. By portraying the fight for Ukraine’s freedom and safety as intertwined with the fate of Europe, these constructions create a sense of urgency and shared responsibility among the broader European community to support Ukraine – which will be

examined in the following sections of the analysis. Thereby, these representations create an us/them categorisation where the “us” encompasses the European community including Ukraine and Denmark, and the “them” is constructed as Russia and Putin who are positioned as a threat to this community, essentially creating an in-group in relation to an out-group. However, through the use of the adverbial phrase “not just”, there is likewise created a hierarchy within the in-group itself, where Ukraine alone is not as important as the community as a whole, which will be explored in subsequent sections of this analysis.

4.1.2 Representation of What is Being Threatened

Besides, what is represented as being threatened by the war in Ukraine, is often not the Ukrainians, or even the people of Europe in general. Instead, what is frequently constructed as being threatened is “freedom”, “democracy” and “our way of life”. This can be seen in example 18, “we are facing a massive threat to our security and to our freedom”, where “our security” and “our freedom” are being positioned as the object threatened by a “massive threat”. The use of the preposition “to” implies that the threat is directed towards security and freedom and the employment of the adjective “massive” to modify the threat, suggests a high degree of seriousness and urgency. Further, the sentence uses parallel structure by repeating “to our” in relation to both “our security” and “our freedom” which arguably creates a correlation between “security” and “freedom” and thus presents them as equally threatened. Accordingly, freedom is considered alongside security representing it as a value that needs protection. Likewise, in example 20, Putin’s “threat” is directed, again through the use of the preposition “to”, at “our democracy, peace, and freedom”. This positions these qualities as those being threatened by Putin, identifying him as an opponent of “our democracy, peace, and freedom”. Moreover, by the use of the possessive determiner “our” – which describes these qualities as belonging to us, i.e., Denmark and Europe – these qualities are implicitly constructed as not belonging to Putin, who is explicitly characterised as a “mad despot” (example 30) and “war criminal” (example 38), which is examined further in subsequent sections.

Additionally, in example 7, freedom is once again positioned as a central concept that is under attack and needs to be defended. In the subordinate clause, “when freedom is under attack”, “freedom” is the subject being attacked. The verb “attack” implies a deliberate and aggressive action taken against something and the active construction “under attack” suggests a sense of vulnerability and danger by implying that something, in this case freedom, is being actively targeted or threatened, framing the situation as urgent, and in need of immediate action. This first part serves

as a justification for the subsequent clause “we have to be ready to defend freedom”, where the use of the modal verb “have to” conveys a sense of obligation and necessity. Besides, the verb “defend”, which means to protect someone or something from harm or danger, often by taking action against an attack or threat, further implies that freedom is actively under threat and emphasizes the need for action. This need for action is also indicated by the clause, “it is not enough, that we tell each other about its importance”, as it employs a negative construction to emphasize the inadequacy of simply discussing the importance of freedom. This construction positions the act of talking about freedom as insufficient and implies that action is required to defend it.

Particularly the word “freedom” is repeated in various examples in the context of being threatened which constructs it as a central quality and value that is threatened by the war in Ukraine. This again emphasizes the connection between the concept of freedom and security which suggests that this is a defining value of “us”, i.e., Denmark, Ukraine, Europe and the West. This will be expanded upon later under identity constructions. As the concept of freedom, along with democracy, peace, and security, are represented as being threatened, it discursively constructs the situation as a threat to the core aspects and values of our society, rather than just a conflict between two nations. As such, the war is represented more as a threat to our values, and thus our identity, than our physical safety. This is further suggested by example 18, in which Sofie Carsten Nielsen states that “our way of life” is “under attack”. The use of the present tense of the verb “to be” suggests that this attack is currently happening, creating a sense of urgency and importance. As argued previously, the verb “attack” implies a deliberate and aggressive action taken against something while the active construction “under attack” suggests a sense of danger by implying that “our way of life” is currently being actively targeted or threatened. Additionally, the use of the verb “is” presents the attack on “our way of life” as a fact rather than a possibility or speculation. In this way, what is constructed as being threatened in Europe is not physical objects or people’s physical safety, but rather “our way of life”, i.e., certain values and culture.

4.1.3 Constructing an Extraordinary Situation

In our data, it is clear how the politicians construct the current situation in Ukraine as exceptional and extraordinary by representing the World, Europe and security policy as fundamentally changed and different from previous times. The use of phrases such as “during the last 10 days, the world has changed” (example 16), “now we have a completely changed world situation” (example 12) and

“now it is a different time” (example 24) constructs a sense of historical rupture as the use of temporal markers, i.e., “during the last 10 days” and “now” creates a clear before-and-after division, implying that the situation is radically different from what came before and it has fundamentally altered the course of events. This is likewise emphasized by the statement “there was a Europe before 24 February and a different Europe after” (example 16) which expresses a comparison between two periods of time. “24 February” serves as a temporal marker that marks a dividing point and a change, which constructs two separate and distinct time periods. Overall, the use of “24 February” as a temporal marker creates a clear and concise comparison between two time periods, emphasizing the significance of the event that took place on that date, i.e., the invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, “Europe” is used as a concept that stands in for a complex set of political and social circumstances during these time periods. As such, “Europe” is not being used to refer to the physical continent but is instead used to represent a broader set of political and social conditions before and after 24 February. By using “Europe” in this way, it is implied that the invasion of Ukraine was so significant that it altered the very nature of the political and social landscape of Europe. Moreover, the use of generalizations such as “the world is changed” (example 23 and example 33) and “now we have a completely changed world situation” (example 12), implies that the situation has had a significant impact on the world as a whole, which emphasizes the magnitude of the event and creates a sense of urgency and importance, which is used to justify certain political actions and decisions in connection to security and defence. However, the war in Ukraine arguably does not have the same effect across the whole world but is mainly a conflict that concerns Europe, the West and Russia, and not literally the world in general as stated in the examples. Thus, this generalization positions the Western countries and their conflicts as the most significant and important since this is seen as affecting the entire world. Thus, it centres on the experiences and interests of the Western countries and assumes that this is the case for the rest of the world as well.

Furthermore, since “new” signifies a change and difference and suggests that something is different from what came before it, the recurring use of it to describe “time” (example 8), “reality” (example 16) and “situation” (example 13, example 11) emphasizes the idea that the change is significant and transformative. Using it in this context then suggests that the current situation is not just an evolution of previous events, but a radical shift in the political and social landscape. Likewise, it creates a sense of urgency and importance by implying that the situation or reality is now different and thus requires attention or action. The use of the adverb “completely” in “now we have a completely changed world situation” further emphasizes the exceptional nature of the current

situation. As an adverb used to describe degree, “completely” is used to indicate that something has been done or happened in a thorough, absolute, or total manner, leaving no part or aspect incomplete or unfinished. When used to modify “changed” in this example, it indicates the change of the world situation as absolute; that nothing is as it was before. It likewise suggests that there has been a total and irreversible shift in the world order and constructs the situation as exceptional and unprecedented, thus emphasizing the gravity of the situation. By framing the situation as completely changed, creates a sense of urgency and highlights the need for immediate action, thus legitimising the different actions proposed by the politicians. Furthermore, by emphasizing the complete nature of the change, through the use of the adverb “completely”, it suggests that any attempts to maintain the status quo or to resist the change are futile which delegitimizes any opposing viewpoints. Besides, both the examples “the world is changed” (example 23, example 33) and “now it is a different time” (example 24) are declarative sentences that express statements of fact. The first sentence suggests that some significant alteration has occurred in the world, while the second sentence indicates a new period or era. The use of the declarative structure conveys a sense of certainty about the situation, thus presenting it as a given, which can be limiting in terms of nuance.

Moreover, several times the politicians employ the word “historic” to describe either the situation in Ukraine or the decisions being made in regard to it (example 23, example 39, example 26), thus ascribing a sense of importance and significance to the event or decisions being described. The adjective “historic” describes something as important or significant in history. Thus, the word can serve to emphasize the importance or significance of an event or situation, elevating its status in the collective memory and suggesting that an event or situation has the potential to shape the course of history. For example, in the statement “we are at a historic crossroad” (example 39), the use of “historic” creates a sense of urgency and importance by positioning the current situation as a pivotal moment in history. Likewise, the noun “crossroad” is a metaphorical expression which indicates a critical point in time where a decision or a change of direction must be made. Consequently, the use of this metaphorical expression conveys a sense of urgency and importance, constructing the current situation as significant and requiring action. The word “crossroad” also implies that there are different paths that can be taken, and the choice made will have a significant impact on the future. In this way, the use of the word “crossroad”, modified by the adjective “historic”, contributes to the discursive construction of the situation as exceptional and pivotal. Similarly, in example 26, “historic times also call for historic decisions”, the use of historic to describe both “times” and “decisions” highlights the significance of the current moment as well as the decisions being made in

response to it. Additionally, the phrasal verb “call for” in this example expresses a sense of necessity, obligation, or recommendation, and implies that particular decisions are required or appropriate in this situation, which serves to legitimize these particular political decisions. Overall, the repeated use of the word “historic” in describing the situation and decisions being made in relation to the event constructs a sense of importance, significance, and urgency as it indicates that the situation has shaped the course of history. This use of “historic” contributes to the discursive construction of the situation as exceptional and pivotal and helps to legitimize the decisions being made.

4.1.4 Historical Perspective

In both her speeches, Mette Frederiksen makes a connection between the war in Ukraine and World War II. In both speeches she notes how “the war is back in Europe” (trans. 2, l. 17-18) and “the war returned to Europe” (trans. 1, l. 14). It is significant that she uses a definite article to define the noun “war”, instead of “war” in general, since the definite article is used to refer to a specific noun that has already been introduced or is understood from the context. In this case, it does not refer to a previously introduced war, but the addition of “returned to Europe” and “is back in Europe” hints at the previous time a war was fought on the European continent and calls to mind the World War II, which was fought on European soil and involved most of the European nations. In essence, the ongoing war in Ukraine is being framed within the context of World War II, evoking the historical significance of the conflict, and emphasizing the potential dangers it poses to the entire European region. Additionally, it helps establish a common history which unifies Europe through shared experience, and this figures into the perception and interpretation of the war in Ukraine.

Similarly, the politicians repeatedly refer to “the free world” – e.g., “we send a clear signal to Putin that in the free world, we stand together” (example 23), “let us now fully and completely join the free world” (example 27), “we need to be part of the free world” (example 14), “Denmark stands behind Ukraine’s struggle for freedom along with the rest of the free world” (example 39) – a term that originated during the Cold War, a period of geopolitical tension and ideological rivalry between the United States and their allies and the Soviet Union. According to the Cambridge dictionary, the concept of “the free world” is usually used to refer to the Western world in contrast to other countries, specifically those that have a totalitarian or Communist political and economic system, since the concept emerged as a contrast to the “Eastern Bloc” which consisted of countries

aligned with the Soviet Union. It was used to emphasize the values of liberty, democracy, human rights, and free-market capitalism that were seen as characteristic of Western countries, particularly the United States and its allies. The term gained prominence during the Cold War as a rhetorical tool to highlight the ideological divide between the two superpowers and their respective spheres of influence. Moreover, as “the free world” is inherently a comparative concept that implies the existence of a part of the world that is free and another part that is unfree, it creates a division which constructs a binary opposition, emphasizing the stark contrast between the two groups.

Consequently, the term carries echoes of the historical binary between “the East” and “the West”, reflecting a legacy of Cold War-era divisions. Therefore/hence, “the free world” draws on pre-existing notions and images of Western values and positions Russia, or the East, as an adversary to these values, thus reinforcing a dichotomy between East and West, associating the former with notions of being unfree or opposed to freedom.

4.2. Identity constructions

4.2.1 European identity

As stated in our theory section, politicians often refer to a common history and reinforce shared “European values” across European nations in an effort to cultivate a sense of belonging, unify European nations and establish a collective European identity. When examining our data, we find that this is no different here as the different Danish politicians similarly refer to and characterize Europe and Europeans in terms of values, specifically the shared values that differentiate the “us” – i.e. Europe, Denmark, Ukraine and the West, which will be examined further in following sections – from the “them” – i.e. Russia and Putin. This is for instance expressed by Mette Frederiksen during the press conference, where she states that “Europe is a family. We are bound together by a strong thread spun by a shared history, shared challenges and shared values” (example 28). Here Europe is described and referred to as a family, a noun expressing a group of people that is united by certain common ties or bonds, suggesting that the countries within Europe have a sense of interconnectedness, mutual support, and common interests, similar to how family members relate to one another. This emphasizes the idea of unity and closeness among European nations, which is likewise emphasized by the use of the metaphor “bound together by a strong thread”. The phrase “a strong thread” symbolizes the strong bond that exists among European countries. The use of “spun” implies that this bond has been carefully woven over time. Therefore, adding the adverbial phrase “by a shared history, shared challenges and shared values” to explicitly describe what the thread is

spun by, suggests that common historical experiences, struggles and values act as the “thread” that holds the different European nations together. Moreover, the metaphoric language implies that the different European nations are united in dealing with these challenges, and it emphasizes the idea that these values are not only individual but are also collectively embraced, further strengthening the sense of unity within Europe. Overall, the figurative language in this statement conveys an idea of a tightly knit European community, bound together by a common history, shared struggles, and shared values, emphasizing the unity, cohesion, and similarities among its nations. Using metaphorical language in this way to convey the idea that shared values serve as a kind of foundation for this strong bond, highlights the significance of establishing common values, beliefs and ‘way of life’ when it comes to maintaining, reproducing and reinforcing a sense of unity in the European community and when establishing a collective European identity.

The shared values that then serve as a foundation for a collective European identity and community are repeatedly mentioned and recognized as “democracy”, “freedom”, “peace”, “security” and “human rights” (example 3, example 21, example 23, example 25, example 11, example 13) – as previously mentioned. For instance, in example 25 Sofie Carsten Nielsen states that “it is a threat to the security and freedom of all citizens of Europe, which Putin is exerting now”, and in example 13 Pia Olsen Dyhr states that we have a “different community of values in Europe that we need to utilize in relation to defence, democracy, and freedom against the Russians”. Using the adjective “different” to modify “community of values”, expresses that Europe encompasses a different set of values in opposition to Russia, who in turn are represented as not possessing these values at all, instead, they are recognized as the complete opposite. Thus, Russia and Putin are excluded from this community as Europe is “bound” by these shared values, which Russia is not, thus marking how Europe is different from Russia and Putin. In addition to this, by using the preposition of opposition “against”, “Russians” are also implicitly constructed as a threat, because Europe is presented as needing to utilise its differences, specifically in relation to values, against Russians, thus implicitly constructing them as what is threatening these. Thereby, a European community and identity are not just established by characterizing and reinforcing an idea of shared values, but they are constructed in relation to an “Other”, that in turn is represented as very different from the “Us”. Thus, a *us and them* dichotomy is constructed.

In addition to this, “the different community of values in Europe” in example 13 is not only represented as being threatened by Russia but also as something we need to embrace, fight for and protect against Russia. Explicitly, the European values are constructed as something we need to

“utilise” against Russia, thus this “community of values” is constructed as a resource that can be employed against Russia, essentially weaponizing them. Thus, by representing ‘values’ as a useful and necessary – which is expressed through the modal verb “need” which denotes requirement or obligation – a weapon to be used in this conflict, the war is then not only represented as a conflict between nations but as an ideological struggle between Europe and Russia, which only emphasises the *us and them* binary.

4.2.2 Russia and Putin as the Other

An *us and them* dichotomy is likewise expressed and reinforced in example 20 where Pia Olsen Dyhr states that “everything that we as a society have done right since World War II with the creation of a strong welfare state, good education, a high degree of equality, and robust democratic institutions, is everything that Russia has not done. It is everything that Russia is not”. This example engages in an instance of othering by portraying Russia as fundamentally different and even inferior to “we as a society”, as Russia is presented as not having developed welfare, good education, equality or strong democratic institutions. Thus, a binary opposition is employed, where the “us” is established in relation to the Other. Specifically, the “us” is positioned as the positive in-group through the positive and valued accomplishments and qualities, and Russia is constructed as the negative out-group and Other. Moreover, a *right and wrong* binary categorization is simultaneously constructed, as “everything that we have done” is represented as being the “right” thing in opposition to what Russia has not done and everything Russia is not, which is implicitly constructed as everything that is “wrong”. Arguably, the “we” encompasses not only Denmark but extends to the broader European and Western community, in the reference to democratic institutions established post World War II as this indicates the construction of the European Union, the UN and NATO following the end of that war. As such, Denmark is positioned within this community/society, and by emphasizing what “we as a society” have accomplished – that Russia has not done – the example suggests a sense of collective accomplishment. However, in this example, it is not necessarily about explicitly defining the “we” and the qualities of the in-group, but more about characterizing what Russia is not by comparing Russia and Putin to Europe and Denmark in this way.

Moreover, and as previously mentioned in earlier sections of this analysis, the frequent adjectives used by Danish politicians to describe Russia, Russians and Putin and their actions are “brutal” (example 1, example 16, example 19, example 5), “serious” (example 22), “inhuman”

(example 4), “unbearable” (example 4), and “gruesome” (example 6), which express the violent and negative nature of the qualities attributed to Russia and Putin and their actions. Moreover, in example 30, Sofie Carsten Nielsen describes Putin as “a mad despot”, where the noun despot denotes a person with absolute power – often a tyrant – thus characterizing Putin as undemocratic and explicitly as a sort of tyrant. By modifying “despot” with the adjective “mad”, Putin is additionally described as an unstable and irrational tyrant, thereby, delegitimizing and condemning him and his actions. Carsten Nielsen uses this characterization of Putin to argue for why Danes should vote to abolish the defence opt-out, as she suggests that in contrast to the actions of a despot, the way forward for Europe is “unity” which Denmark acquires by abolishing the opt-out, thus justifying the politicians' decision to hold a referendum about the defence opt-out.

Additionally, by repeatedly characterizing the European community and establishing a European identity as democratic, free and peaceful in contrast to Russia and Putin, who is described as “everything we are not” – as examined previously – then Russia and Putin are implicitly constructed as *undemocratic*, *not* free and *not* peaceful – i.e. violent or aggressive, which is emphasized by the words “attack”, “assault” and “threaten” used to explain Russia and Putin’s actions (example 20, example 16, example 18, example 11, example 7, example 29). These adjectives and verbs – and the normalization of them – are used as descriptors for both Putin and Russia who in turn become conflated categories as they are used as one and the same. This contributes to a simplified narrative, portraying all of Russia, all Russians and Putin as a unified, homogeneous group – which is common in *us and them* representations.

The adjectives, verbs, nouns and phrases used to describe Russia and Putin in contrast to Europe, do not only create binary categorizations of *us and them* and *right and wrong* but also *good and bad* polarizations. The out-group, represented by Russia and Putin, is clearly positioned as the bad and the wrong based on how they, their values, and actions are described and represented. On the other hand, Europe, including Denmark and Ukraine, their values and actions are depicted as the good, doing what is right. By utilizing and reinforcing binary oppositions such as *good versus bad*, *right versus wrong* and *us versus them*, complex issues are reduced to simplified and polarized categories and thus leave no room for nuances. This is explicitly expressed in example 20 where Pia Olsen Dyhr states that “the situation is what it is. Neither apologies nor attempts at historical explanations can excuse Putin and the attack on Ukraine - nothing can excuse his threats to our democracy, peace, and freedom”. As she states that there is nothing that can explain the dynamics of this conflict because it “is what it is”, and by characterizing “the situation” as such, she neglects the

complexities of this war. Instead, this representation expresses a simple black-and-white description, thus reinforcing the *us and them* and *good and bad* categories, constructing and expressing a binary understanding of the conflict as well as the world.

Despite Russia, Russians and Putin being represented as a unified homogeneous group through the use of the same adjectives, verbs and phrases to describe them and their actions the emphasis, however, primarily falls on Putin as the leader of the group. This is for instance expressed in example 6, where Mette Frederiksen states that she has seen the destruction and ruin in Ukraine committed by “Putin’s war machine”, thus crediting the attack of Ukraine and the following destruction to “Putin’s war machine” specifically. The phrase “war machine” is a figurative expression that employs metaphorical language to describe a powerful military force or apparatus. It compares the military capabilities of a country or entity to a machine specifically designed for warfare. By using the possessive form “Putin’s” as a modifier for “war machine”, it conveys the idea that Putin is the driving force behind the country’s military operations, making decisions and exerting control over its actions. Thus, by associating the metaphorical concept (war) machine directly with Putin, it also assigns responsibility and control over Russia and its military capabilities to Putin specifically. This suggests a certain level of accountability or blame to Putin for any perceived aggression or militarism exhibited by Russia as Putin is constructed as operating the “machine”. Moreover, in example 12, Jakob Ellemann-Jensen states that “Putin’s side” has invaded a “peaceful European country”. Using the possessive form “Putin’s” in the phrase “Putin’s side” reinforces the construction of Putin as the primary figure in the out-group. Additionally, by using the noun “side” modified by the possessive form “Putin’s”, an *us and them* dichotomy is again reinforced and maintained. This emphasises his role and characterization as an undemocratic tyrant, specifically a “despot” (example 30), in opposition to Ukraine and Europe as democratic, peaceful and free.

4.2.3 Ukraine and Europe

Ukraine is repeatedly constructed as part of Europe both implicitly and explicitly through the frequent and repeated adjectives that are used to modify “Ukraine” or the noun “country” when it refers to Ukraine. These adjectives are “democratic”, “peaceful”, “free” and “European”, with some being used in the same instance. For instance, in example 31 Mette Fredriksen describes Ukraine as “a democratic country” and in example 29 as “a peaceful, democratic free country”. Likewise, in example 12 Jakob Ellemann-Jensen explicitly describes Ukraine as “a peaceful European country”

and as “a free country” in example 23. Through the repeated use of such modifiers, Ukraine is not only explicitly described as a European country but also as sharing European values i.e., democracy, freedom and peace, thus being acknowledged as part of Europe. This is further illustrated by Mette Frederiksen who states, in example 8, that before the war, Ukrainians have “led completely normal lives ... like us. Escorted the kids to school. Went to work. Went shopping. Went to football practice. Visited friends”. Here similarities are drawn between Ukrainians and Danes, through the use of the preposition “like”, which indicates similarity or resemblance between the Ukrainians and “us”, i.e., the Danes. It establishes a comparison, suggesting that the Ukrainians share characteristics, behaviours, or experiences that are similar to those of “us”. Thus, the phrase “like us” serves to create a sense of inclusion and identification between the Ukrainians and “us”, emphasizing the similarity and commonality between them, and consequently establishes an in-group based on sameness. Such parallels in combination with the inclusive use of these specific modifying adjectives are used to construct Ukraine as part of Europe – or at least very close to Europe when it comes to values – which in turn is used to legitimize why Denmark as a nation, and Europe, should support Ukraine in this war.

Even though Ukraine is constructed as part of the in-group i.e. being a part of Europe, there is a hierarchy within this in-group as Ukraine is simultaneously and continuously regarded in relation to Europe and Denmark. This is seen in examples 3 and 38 where different politicians state that “Ukraine’s fight” is *not just* Ukraine’s but *the whole of* Europe’s. For instance, in example 39, Lars Løkke Rasmussen states that “the Ukrainians fight not just for their own freedom but for the whole of Europe’s security” and in example 3, Mette Frederiksen states that Ukrainians “are not just fighting for their own country but for the whole of Europe”. By using the noun “whole” – which denotes a total, complete or undivided sum or entirety – with the adverbial phrase “of Europe” as a postmodifier, Ukraine is implicitly constructed as part of Europe. The noun “whole” could just as easily have been excluded in these examples, instead stating “for Europe” which would have separated Ukraine from Europe and not implicitly constructed it as a part of Europe in this way. Conversely, at the same time, a hierarchy is also constructed within these examples when the adverb “just” is used in conjunction with the negator “not”. The adverb “just” expresses something that is limited or exclusive to some people, thing or group, however, as these adverbs are negated by “not”, the statements emphasize that Ukraine’s fight for freedom – and (by extension) the current ongoing war – is not limited to Ukraine but also concerns all of Europe, and therefore, we – Europe and Denmark – have to take action also. Thus, such discursive representations are likewise used to

reason and legitimize that certain security and defence decisions are being made. Thus, unequal power structures are reinforced/produced within the in-group itself by using the adverbial phrase “not just” that in these examples constitutes a hierarchy between Ukraine and other European countries and Europe as a whole. This is so as the fact that this war affects – or has the possibility of affecting – the broader European community, which includes Denmark, and not solely Ukraine constructs the conflict as more urgent and more important – as stated in the earlier section of this analysis – than it otherwise would be if it only affected Ukraine. This hierarchical representation is used (by the Danish politicians) to legitimize and justify the different security actions and decisions that the Danish politicians and government are adopting and proposing.

This notion, that the war in Ukraine is represented as more important because it does not just affect Ukraine but also the whole of Europe, is reinforced when the Danish politicians compare the war in Ukraine to other wars that are likewise ongoing. For instance, in example 32, Pia Olsen Dyhr states that “we were involved in Afghanistan for 20 years. We were in Iraq for almost a decade. We must stop engaging in meaningless desert wars and use our defence efforts where they make the most sense”. Characterizing these conflicts as “meaningless desert wars” and stating a specific timeframe, implies that the efforts and resources invested in these conflicts have been pointless because it has not changed anything. This indicates that Denmark’s involvement and efforts in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been wasted and even pointless, since the progressive aspect in the phrase “we must stop engaging” indicates that these wars are incomplete and ongoing, and almost unavoidable. Moreover, it constructs a clear contrast between the war in Ukraine and the wars in the Middle East as the war in Ukraine is implicitly constructed as meaningful as opposed to the “meaningless” wars in the Middle East. This comparison is used to construct the war in Ukraine as more important, by essentially constructing it as exceptional and meaningful in contrast to the wars in the Middle East that in turn are constructed as unexceptional and meaningless. Additionally, as she states that Denmark should use their defence where it “makes the most sense”, it likewise positions the war in Ukraine as more significant which is used to legitimise the defence actions and policies presented in response to this war.

In addition to this, Jakob Ellemann-Jensen states in example 33 that “before we have had an expedition force that has gone out in the world to fight for our values” and now we need “territorial defensive forces that focus on areas close to us (nærområde). This requires different capabilities and the ability to mobilize larger forces, which is why we need to make this change”, thus he is justifying why we need to, for instance, increase our defence budget and abolish the defence opt-

out. In this example Jakob Ellemann-Jensen does several things, first by stating that our security and defence efforts have focused on expedition forces that have gone “out in the world to fight for our values”, it implies that outside of Denmark, and more specifically outside of Europe – i.e. places that are not “close to” Denmark as expressed in the example – do not share the same values, and thus, this is what our forces are fighting for. However, by invading Ukraine, Russia and Putin have brought war to Europe and therefore we need “territorial forces that focus on areas close to us”. Thus, the threat to us and our values is no longer “out in the world” but it is close to us – indicating an urgency – and thus we need to make significant changes to our security and defence overall.

Second, he indicates that it is no longer enough for Denmark to have an expedition force because there is a threat that is close to us, and close enough that we need to focus on territorial defence instead. The war is no longer something that is out there and far away – like the aforementioned “meaningless desert wars” – but the war is in Europe, it is close to us, which is emphasised by the characterisation “nærområde”, indicating that proximity is a factor when it comes to what actions we need to take in terms of security and defence. In the example “nærområde” is translated to “areas close to”, however, “nærområde” is a complex word, and thus making an adequate translation is not straightforward. “Nærområde” is a compound noun, meaning that it is made up of two words where the stem “område” is modified by the prefix “nær”. This means that when examining the complex compound noun “nærområde” in terms of morphology, we find that the stem “område” can be directly translated to “area”, and the prefix “nær” can be directly translated to “close”. However, when regarding the two separate words in combination – as they form a compound noun and are thus examined as such – the prefix “nær” denotes proximity or close proximity and “område” denotes an understanding of a place and/or space. Thus, the notion “nærområde” signifies an understanding of proximity connected to an idea of space or place, which on the surface invokes a geographical understanding of the term. In this example Denmark’s ‘nærområde’ is constructed as Europe, which is used to justify why we need to make changes to our defence, focusing on territorial defence. Moreover, by emphasizing that the threat to us and our values is no longer “out in the world” but is close to us – as mentioned – it indicates this idea of proximity related to a geographical understanding, but as previously stated, Ukraine is likewise constructed as close to us in terms of shared values and similarities. As such, the justification of these political decisions in terms of defence and support is based on both a sense of geographical

closeness as well as a sense of *feeling closer to (or belonging to)* some groups in contrast to others based on shared values and experiences.

4.2.4 Community – a Unified European and Western community

The shared values such as democracy”, “freedom”, “peace” and “security” that establish a collective European identity and community – in contrast to Russia and Putin – are also values that are represented as being indicative of a broader Western identity and community. For instance, in example 34 Mette Frederiksen states that “every country must decide for themselves how to best contribute to further strengthening the West and our democracy and our freedom”.

By using the possessive determiner “our” before the nouns “democracy” and “freedom”, these nouns are constructed as qualities belonging to the West. Using the adverb of degree “further” in relation to “strengthening the West and our democracy and our freedom” implies that Western democracy and Western freedom democracy are not only existing qualities of the West but that they – including the West overall/in general – are already strong. However, this adverb of degree indicates that they have the capability of becoming even stronger or/and more effective, which is presented as something that can be done by each country by the actions they decide to take. This indicates that these values are fundamental to the identity and aspirations of the Western community and suggests that they are ideals worth defending and promoting. Thus, the specific values and qualities of ‘democracy and freedom’ are not only values that are indicative of and establish a European identity, but they are also representative of a broader Western community. Additionally, in example 1, Mette Frederiksen explicitly recognized the Western community as including Denmark, Europa and the USA and in example 5, she includes the institutions FN, NATO and EU.

In addition to this, a unified West against a common Other, namely Russia and Putin, is frequently constructed by the different politicians by establishing a sense of community, unity, collectively and collaboration among Western countries, which is especially done by their use of the Danish compound word “fællesskab”. Depending on the different uses of the word and the context, “fællesskab” denotes several meanings, including community, unity, collaboration, partnership and alliance (example 5, example 23, example 14, example 12). This means that every time “fællesskab” is used by the politicians, there is not a single English word used as the translation for ‘fællesskab’ when translating it to English, even though the overall statements may express a sense of unity and community. The word “fællesskab” is a compound word, meaning it is composed of

two words: “fælles” and “skab”, where the stem “fælles” is modified by the suffix “skab”. The word “fælles” expresses something that is shared or common among several people or that a group of people are united against something, and the suffix “skab” is in a derivational morpheme used to make nouns from adjectives. This means that when adding the derivational morpheme “skab” to the adjective “fælles” the grammatical category is changed, meaning the adjective “fælles”, becomes the noun “fælleskab”. "Fællesskab" signifies a state in which a group of people share something in common, such as for instance, values, interests, goals, or a physical location, expressing a community where members share a sense of belonging and connection. Moreover, when combined with the preposition “in”, it describes a state where a group of people are united in support of or against something. Thus, adequate translations are community, unity, collaboration, partnership and alliance.

This is for instance the case in example 25, where Mette Frederiksen states that “we stand together in Europe – and in partnership with partners and allies across the world”. Here the word ‘fællesskab’ is translated to “partnership” as this is what is expressed in the original statement, and thus, community would not be an adequate translation. However, when examining this in relation to the prior statement “we stand together in Europe”, it is a sense of community that is expressed which is not limited to Europe but extended to a broader community of allies. The idiom “stand together” expresses the meaning that a group of people are in strong agreement about something and take collective action against it; they are or remain united in support of and/or opposition to something. In this example it is specifically Europe in “partnership” with its allies that are represented as united – “standing together” – in support of Ukraine and against a common Other, – Russia and Putin – consequently reinforcing and maintaining the us and them categorization. The idiom “stand together” is repeated in example 23, where Jakob Ellemann-Jensen states that “the West stands together”, while Mette Frederiksen in example 35 articulates a similar sentiment: “we come together in the Western world”. Additionally, in example 9, Mette Frederiksen mentions that “the West unites”. The phrases “stand together”, “come together” and “unite” share a common theme of solidarity and collective action yet have slightly different connotations. The idiom “stand together” suggests a sense of unity and support, through the image of standing side by side with others in the face of challenges or adversity. It implies a shared purpose, resilience, and commitment to support and protect one another. “Come together” conveys the idea of individuals or groups joining forces or gathering in a common space or cause. It implies the act of coming together, often for a specific purpose or to achieve a common goal. It emphasizes the importance of

collaboration, cooperation, and shared effort. Lastly, “unite” signifies the act of bringing different individuals, groups, or entities together into a cohesive whole. It implies the merging of separate entities into a unified entity. “The West unites” thus suggests a higher level of integration and cohesion, with the aim of achieving a shared objective or common interest, in this case “against injustice and war”. These similar phrases thus serve the purpose of explicitly constructing, representing and emphasizing the West as a cohesive and unified entity, which supports, join forces and collaborate in response to the war and the threat posed by Russia and Putin. As such, it reinforces the idea of belonging to a larger collective against external challenges and a common Other (i.e. Russia and Putin), thus fostering a sense of community. Thus, these representations of unity and collaboration among European and Western countries – that establish a community – are used to legitimize and justify the different security and defence measures and decisions that the Danish politicians are adopting.

Russia and Putin are not just represented in opposition to a united Western and European community, but Russia and Putin are also represented as wanting to undermine and destabilize this unity. This is seen in example 5 and example 1 where Mette Frederiksen states that “Putin thought he could divide Europe” and again in example 1, “Russia and Putin thought they could divide us” when invading Ukraine. The phrase “thought he could” introduces the element of intention and agency, implying that there was a deliberate plan or strategy to divide Europe. It suggests a calculated effort on their part, where the modal verb “could” has past time reference expressing ability, i.e., Putin and Russia’s perceived capability of dividing Europe. Thus, these examples indicate that Russia and Putin had an alternative agenda when invading Ukraine, namely that the invasion of Ukraine is not only or simply about Ukraine, but it is also – and more importantly – about Europe, specifically about creating division among European countries – as well as undermining Ukraine’s relationship with Europe. However, in both examples, Mette Frederiksen states that Russia and Putin did the “opposite” (example 5) and were “wrong” (example 1) and instead “the bonds between Ukraine and Europe” (example 1) and “the bonds between us are stronger than ever” (example 5). As the noun “bonds” expresses a relationship between people or groups based on shared feelings, values, and/or experiences, then stating that “the bonds ... are stronger than ever” emphasizes that – despite the attempts by Putin and Russia to create division – the unity within Europe is strengthened. This indicates that this (shared) experience and struggle has united the European community even more firmly in their values and against Russia and Putin. This emphasises the importance placed on this community and unity in relation to this war, further

accentuating how the Danish politicians continuously represent Europe and the West as a united partnership and community, establishing a collective identity and community based on shared values and experiences in opposition to a common enemy or Other that is represented as being on the outside of and even actively against this community.

Additionally, the politicians repeatedly represent the actions and decisions presented in response to the war as directly related to identity in terms of participation in and belonging to this community. For one, in example 29 Mette Frederiksen states, in relation to Russia's attack on Ukraine that "each individual country must assess for itself who they are, whom they want to be, and with whom they want to be what they aspire to be". The phrase "who they are" implies a reflection on identity and values, suggesting that the response to the war is related to a country's fundamental characteristics. It implies that the actions taken are not merely pragmatic responses to a security threat but are rooted in and expressive of a sense of self. Likewise, the following phrase "whom they want to be" suggests that the response to the war provides an opportunity for countries to shape their future trajectory and align themselves with a particular vision of themselves and their role within the European and Western community since the verb "want" indicates a desire or intention and the infinitive phrase "to be" functions as the complement of the verb and describes the desired state or identity. This links the security decisions with the assessment of identity and aspirations. Moreover, the last phrase "with whom they want to be what they aspire to be" suggests a connection between these actions and the participation in certain communities and alliances. The prepositional phrase "with whom" introduces the notion of association or partnership, indicating that countries have the ability to choose with whom they align themselves in terms of their desired identity through their actions. Together with the modal verb "must" which expresses a strong sense of obligation or necessity, this suggests the necessity and obligation for each country to select their desired associations and actively pursue the identity they aspire to have in relation to this conflict.

Thereby the actions taken are presented as not solely about supporting Ukraine or protecting Europe and European values from Russia but are likewise suggested to be about how we position ourselves in this conflict. This is similarly indicated by Sofie Carsten Nielsen in example 11 where she states that "it's about which side we are on". This construction of "sides" is likewise established in example 12 where Jakob Ellemann-Jensen refers to "Putin's side", and in example 20, where Pia Olsen Dyhr mentions "the side of freedom and peace" in response to Putin's threats against "our democracy, peace and freedom". As such, the conflict is represented in terms of sides, one being Putin and Russia's and the other the side of "freedom and democracy" – indicating the European

and Western community as established previously in this analysis – which furthers the binary opposition and antagonism between the two. Consequently, the actions and decisions presented by the politicians in response to the war are equated with actively demonstrating and positioning Denmark as part of the European and the Western community i.e., the side of freedom and democracy. Moreover, as the West and Europe are presented as the side of freedom, peace and democracy, while Putin and Russia are continuously presented in terms of violence, danger and tyranny, it arguably constructs a right side and a wrong side, or a good side and a bad side, demonstrating and reinforcing the binary categorization of *right and wrong* and *good and bad*. As such, these political actions are presented as much about performing our obligation to the partnerships, as about actively and explicitly positioning ourselves in this polarization of *us and them*, *right and wrong* and *good and bad*, meaning the representation of this conflict essentially divides the world into two binary sides.

4.2.5 Responsibility and Commitment to the Community

Moreover, the Danish politicians emphasize how Denmark has an obligation and responsibility to show – through the actions in response to the war in Ukraine – that they are a part of these communities. This is for instance expressed in example 17, where Mette Frederiksen states that “the discussion about the defence opt-out is first and foremost about where Denmark belongs and about the responsibility we should assume”. By using the phrase “first and foremost”, Mette Frederiksen indicates the primary focus of the discussions about the defence opt-out and the referendum is Denmark’s position and responsibility internationally. By employing this expression, she establishes a hierarchy of importance, indicating that other considerations or factors are secondary in comparison. This framing implies that Denmark’s decision regarding the defence opt-out is not just a matter of policy or strategy but a fundamental question of identity and belonging. Moreover, the phrase “the responsibility we should assume” further emphasizes a discursive construction of duty and obligation. The modal verb ‘should’ indicates weak obligation and intention, and thus, expresses that Danes are obliged to assume the responsibility as part of a European community and partnership. Likewise, the verb “assume” means to take on or accept the responsibility or role. It implies that Denmark has a duty or obligation to embrace and fulfil certain responsibilities that they are not currently fulfilling, specifically regarding the defence opt-out. This reinforces the notion that Denmark’s decisions and actions carry broader implications beyond its own interests, and that assuming responsibility is a crucial aspect of its role within the community.

Besides, Denmark's obligation to the community is likewise constructed as being realized by not merely participating in the community but by participating "fully", "wholly" and "completely". This is emphasized in example 36 by Sofie Carsten Nielsen, who states that "it is now that one must show that we are fully and completely in" and thus the national compromise – and the measures it includes – "is a fundamental decision about wanting to participate in taking responsibility in Europe and also showing all the other countries in NATO that we can take our share of the responsibility". By using the verb "wanting", which expresses the wish to do something, in relation to "participate" and the modal verb "can", which expresses ability or possibility, in the sentence "we can take our share", along with the adverbs "fully" and "completely" in connection with participating "in taking responsibility in Europe", it implies that Denmark is not already participating completely in the community and thus does not live up to their share of the responsibility. As such, the measures included in the national compromise are represented as a "fundamental decision" that allows Denmark to both fully participate in the community and thus fulfil its responsibility and actively contribute to the collective efforts. The term "fundamental decision" likewise suggests that the decision is fundamental in nature, meaning it goes to the core or essence of Denmark's participation in the community and its commitment to fulfilling its responsibilities. It signifies that the decision is not merely a superficial or temporary adjustment but a substantial and enduring choice that shapes Denmark's engagement within the community. Describing the decision as "fundamental" also implies that Denmark cannot fully participate or meet its responsibilities without making this decision. It frames the choice as a critical prerequisite for Denmark to align itself more closely with the community's values, objectives, and collective efforts. Thus, Denmark's actions are constructed as an indication of its commitment to the community.

This emphasis on full participation and commitment is recurrent, e.g., in example 10, "the European cooperation will further evolve in the times to come, and it will only be further strengthened by Russia's attack on Ukraine. We desire that Denmark wholeheartedly participate in this cooperation ... We want to be fully committed, wholeheartedly, and without reservations", example 27, "let us now fully and completely join the free world" and example 14, "I think we should commit fully and completely". Accordingly, the politicians consistently utilize adverbs such as "fully", "wholly", "wholeheartedly", and "completely" in combination with phrases like "join", "commit", and "participate in" concerning the community and partnerships. These examples similarly express that Denmark is not currently a full part of these communities and partnerships. For example, the use of the infinite phrase "want to be" in example 10 expresses a desire or

intention, and the imperative phrase “let us now” in example 27 indicates a suggestion for present action. Likewise, the modal verb “should” in example 14 has future time reference and indicates weak obligation in terms of what is advisable and correct and implies a suggestion for action. Consequently, the actions and decisions in response to the war in Ukraine are represented as a way for Denmark to commit to and position itself in full within the European and Western community and partnerships.

Besides, in example 36, Sofie Carsten Nielsen underscores that “now is the time to show that we are fully committed” and “we want to ... show all the other countries in NATO that we take shared responsibility”. Using the verb “show” here indicates that the actions, taken by Denmark have implications for how it is perceived within the community. Similarly, example 37, where it is stated that “it has an impact on how we are perceived”, highlights the impact of Denmark’s actions on its perception. The representation of the actions included in the national compromise as a means of demonstrating Denmark’s value as a member of the community and fulfilling its share of the responsibility enables the politicians to legitimize the political actions and decisions as a way to actively align Denmark with the European and Western community, or the “free world” in this conflict. This positioning also emphasizes the importance of perception and actively shaping Denmark’s image within the community, highlighting the significance of taking actions that showcase Denmark’s commitment and contribution. This indicates a certain level of performativity in terms of supporting Ukraine and adopting various policies in terms of security and defence since it is presented as a means of demonstrating Denmark’s connection and belonging to these certain communities.

5. Discussion

As outlined in our theory section, Buzan et. al (1998) and Buzan and Wæver (1997) state that securitisation theory is concerned with security as a quality that actors inject onto issues by constructing a threat and thus making them acceptable as security problems. By constructing an issue as a threat and a security problem, politicians are able to give it exceptional importance and urgency and thus transcend traditional political boundaries and prioritize its resolution above all other concerns, warranting exceptional security measures. In our analysis, we found that Danish politicians, in their representations of the war in Ukraine, construct the situation, and specifically Russia and Putin, as a threat not just to Ukraine, but to Denmark, Europe and the West in general.

For one, negatively charged words are used to describe and characterize the situation as violent and dangerous. Putin and Russia are portrayed as the actors exerting the threat, while both they and their actions are characterized as aggressive, violent, and dangerous through the use of adjectives, nominalized nouns and figurative language. These characterizations and descriptions likewise create a sense of urgency and thus immediate need for action. This urgency is emphasized by how the war is discursively positioned as being in Europe instead of Ukraine, and the threat constructed as being to Europe and the West and their values. As Russia's invasion, as well as Ukraine's fight, is represented as more than a national concern, but rather one that affects all of the European nations and the broader West, these politicians are able to create a sense of a collective struggle and fate, which situates Denmark and Europe as similarly threatened by Russia, adding to the perception of the war as a security concern for Europeans and Danes. By representing the war as a security concern for not "only" Ukraine, but also the European community the situation is constructed as more pressing, which imbues the issue with a sense of urgency and importance. This likewise creates a hierarchical representation of the situation in which the collective safety and "our" freedom are constructed as the most significant and important in this conflict since a threat to this is what establishes and emphasizes the urgency and importance. Moreover, by positioning the conflict as a European issue rather than merely a Ukrainian one, the politicians establish a sense of shared responsibility and collective struggle among European nations. This legitimises and supports political decisions that prioritize European unity and cooperation and national defence and security measures in response to the perceived threat.

Furthermore, in our analysis, it becomes clear how the politicians construct the current situation in Ukraine as exceptional and extraordinary by representing the world, Europe and security policy as fundamentally changed. They construct the invasion as a historical rupture through the use of temporal markers to create clear before-and-after divisions, and thus imply that the situation is radically different and has fundamentally altered the course of events. Consequently, the invasion of Ukraine is portrayed as so significant that it has fundamentally changed the political and social landscape of Europe. Yet, they also widen this fundamental change to encompass 'the whole world' by implying, through the use of generalizations, that the situation has had a significant impact on the world as a whole. This emphasizes the magnitude of the event, creates a sense of urgency and importance, and thus serves to justify and legitimize political actions and decisions related to security and defence. Moreover, the politicians continuously refer to both the situation and the decisions being made in response to it as 'historic'. The repeated use of this adjective

contributes to the construction of the situation as important, pivotal and extraordinary and thus helps to legitimize the decisions being made. Significantly, prime minister Mette Frederiksen also connects the war in Ukraine to World War II by discursively constructing it as the same war that has returned. This adds the connotations of World War II to the interpretation of the current situation in Ukraine and imbues it with the historical significance and images associated with World War II, simultaneously establishing a shared history among Europe and the West.

Moreover, as the politicians repeatedly mention ‘the free world’ - a term that carries historical echoes of Cold War-era divisions between East and West - they create a binary opposition between a “free world” and an “unfree world”, reinforcing a dichotomy between East and West. For one, it aligns Denmark and other European nations with the values and principles that are seen as characteristic of the free world and construct a collective European and Western identity, and further, it portrays Russia, or the East, as an adversary to the free world and its values. Consequently, the repeated references to “the free world” contributes to the construction of identity and reinforce a binary understanding of the world. On one side, there is the free world represented by Western countries and their allies, and on the other, there is the unfree world associated with Russia and Putin. This binary understanding of the world simplifies complex geopolitical dynamics and conflicts by reducing them to a struggle between two sides.

Furthermore, and as stated in our theory section, Wodak and Boukala (2015) argue that politicians often refer to a common history and reinforce shared “European values” across European nations in an effort to unify European nations and establish a collective European identity. In our analysis, we find that the different Danish politicians similarly refer to and characterize Europe and Europeans – as well as the West – in terms of values, specifically the shared values that not only serve as a foundation for a European identity and community but a Western one. These values are repeatedly characterized and explicitly named as democracy, peace and freedom and are especially established through the politicians’ discursive use of possessive determiners, where the shared values are determined as belonging to and characteristic of Europe and the West, including Denmark. Moreover, these values are attributed to Europe and the West through the frequent use of metaphorical language that represents Europe and the West as a tightly knit community, bound together by a common history, collective struggles, and shared values, emphasizing the unity, cohesion, and similarities among its nations. Moreover, a sense of community is further emphasized and constructed in relation to the repeated use of the word ‘fælleskab’, representing the West and Europe as a unified group, community, and partnership as well as positioning Denmark within this

community. In this way, a sense of unity in the European and Western community is reinforced and a collective European identity is established, which in turn is represented as what is being threatened and under attack and thus needs to be protected.

However, the collective European and Western identity and community and the shared values that bind them, are not only represented as something that is being threatened and attacked by Putin and Russia, but it is likewise constructed as something that needs to be embraced and utilized against Russia. This means that it is not just the actions we take - e.g. increasing the defence budget, abolishing the opt-out or focussing on territorial defence force, as presented by the Danish politicians - that will protect us but collectively embracing and being resolute in our values and thus 'who we are' can be used against Russia and Putin also as they do not have these, essentially weaponizing these values to be used against Russia and Putin. Consequently, the war is constructed more as a threat to core aspects and values of our society, i.e., our identity, and these values are represented as a resource to be utilised against Russia in this conflict. Thus, this constructs the war not only as a conflict between two nations – which is 'close to us' in terms of proximity being in Europe – but also, if not predominantly, as an ideological battle between the West and Russia and Putin. A collective European and Western identity and community is thus not only established based on sameness in relation to common values and shared experiences, but it is also continuously defined in relation to Russia and Putin who in turn are represented as different from Europe and the West – in addition to being constructed as a threat to this community and its values. Putin and Russia are ultimately constructed as 'everything the West and Europe are not': *undemocratic*, *not* free and *not* peaceful, i.e. totalitarian, violent and aggressive.

Defining Europe and the West in relation to a common Other reinforces the idea of belonging to a larger collective that stands united against external challenges and a common Other (i.e. Russia and Putin). Moreover, it establishes polarizing categories of *us versus them*, *right versus wrong* and *good versus bad*. Europe and the broader West, their values and actions are depicted as the *good*, doing what is *right* in opposition to Russia and Putin, who is clearly positioned as the *bad* - a common threat and enemy to 'us' - and doing what is *wrong*, which positions 'us' against 'them' by essentially declaring a *good us* and *evil them*. Moreover, these representations employed by the politicians likewise indicate that there is a right and wrong side to take and be on in connection to the war, where Europe and the West are explicitly established as the 'right side' in opposition to Russia and Putin which is the wrong side. Thus, this war in Ukraine is represented in terms of two poles: with us or against us, reinforcing an antagonism driven by an *us and them* divide, which is

recognised by Wæver (1995) as one of the dangers of securitisation. Moreover, the different security and defence actions promoted by the Danish politicians are thus constructed as a way for Denmark to position itself within this divide. By utilizing and reinforcing binary categories of *good versus bad*, *right versus wrong* and *us versus them*, complex issues are reduced to simplified and polarized categories and thus leave no room for nuances.

Representing this war in terms of binary categories overlooks the complexities and nuances within this geopolitical conflict, leading to an oversimplification of something that is inherently complex and not black and white. By polarizing the conflict into such stark dichotomies, the portrayal is not only used to legitimise certain actions in the name of security and defence, but it neglects the potential for varied perspectives, motivations, and factors at play. It disregards the intricacies of the political, historical, and cultural dynamics involved. Likewise, as Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2015) suggest, the employment of securitisation discourse may be obstructive to the development of creative policy solutions, as it limits the political space “required to thinking through often complex issues and instead introducing an unhelpful degree of enmity and urgency” (qtd. in Stepka, 2022, p. 23). Thus, the politicians’ representation of the war in Ukraine, both through the construction of binary categories and the construction of urgency and enmity limits our ability to engage critically in meaningful dialogue and develop a more nuanced comprehension of the conflict.

6. Conclusion

This thesis set out to examine how Danish politicians mobilize securitisation discourse in their representations of the war in Ukraine to justify and argue for certain political decisions and actions in the name of security and defence as well as how constructions of a Western and a European identity figure in these representations. We find that Danish politicians employ securitisation discourse in their representation of the war by constructing Russia and Putin as an imminent threat to not only Ukraine but Europe and the West as well. In this way, they are able to construct a sense of urgency, emphasising an immediate requirement for action and the legitimacy of decisions. As Russia and Putin are especially represented as a threat to the shared values that Europe and the West are built on, the politicians construct the war as a threat to the core aspects and values of our society. By doing so, they are able to present the war, and Russia and Putin, as not merely a threat

limited to Ukraine but expanded to concern the whole of Europe and the West, which is emphasized by the Danish politicians' discursively positioning the war in Europe instead of Ukraine. Thus, the war is not only represented as a conflict between two nations, but it is also - and if not more so - represented as an ideological battle between Europe and the West on one side and Russia and Putin on the other. By contributing Europe and the West - in addition to Ukraine - as what is being threatened by Russia and Putin imbues the threat with a sense of urgency, establishing a security issue that warrants the implementation of certain actions in the name of security and defence (argued for by the Danish politicians).

Moreover, we find that the construction of a European and Western identity and community as well as binary categories of *us and them*, *right and wrong* and *good and bad* facilitate the discursive construction of securitisation as a collective European and Western identity is established and constructed a what is threaten - in addition to Europe as a continent - in relation to Russia and Putin that in turn are constructed as the threat to 'who we are', our way of life and values. Hereby, we find that there is a dialectical relationship between securitisation discourse and discursive constructions of identity when employed by Danish politicians in their representations of the war in Ukraine. This means that identity is not only a part of securitisation when it comes to identifying and characterizing a threat in opposition to what is being threatened but securitisation likewise facilitates and reinforces the establishment of a collective European and Western identity and community in opposition to a common enemy, legitimizing certain security and defence actions. In this way, these representations construct binary categorisations and antagonism of *us and them*, *good and bad* and *right and wrong*, which then shapes and reinforces certain representations and understandings of social reality and relations in connection to this war, which has implications for the actions that are developed and deemed appropriate and legitimised in response to the war.

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9. Appendices

9.1 Appendix 1: Examples

Example 1

The attack on Ukraine was a breach of everything we Europeans took for granted. That peace and freedom had come to stay. That's not the case. We see that now. Our worldview has been shaken. But perhaps we have also managed to shake something into place. Ourselves. Europe, the USA, and our allies stand stronger and more united than in many, many years. Putin and Russia thought they could divide us. But he and they were mistaken. Russia does not want peace. We do. And we know it requires us to fight for it. The bonds between Ukraine and Europe are stronger than ever.

(Transcription 1, l. 73-85)

Example 2

On 24 February 2022, Russia brutally invaded Ukraine. The war returned to Europe. (Transcription 1, l. 12-14)

Example 3

Ukrainians and your brave, tireless/untiring president Zelensky – you fight not just for your own country, but for the whole of Europe. Not just for your own freedom, but for our freedom.

(Transcription 1, l. 45-47)

Example 4

This time, the war is back in Europe. Brutal. Inhuman. Unbearable. War in Europe. To think, that our generation once again has to be confronted with it (Transcription 2, l. 17-20)

Example 5

In all its horror, it reminds us that freedom comes with responsibilities. That democracy doesn't happen on its own. And that we Europeans share a common destiny. On the ruins of World War II, we built the institutions that ensured Europe won the peace. The UN. NATO, and the EU. Putin thought he could divide Europe. But his brutal actions have led to the opposite. The bonds between us are stronger than ever before. (Transcription 2, l. 21-28)

Example 6

I will never forget it. So much destruction. So much pain and sorrow. Houses that will never be habitable again. Homes riddled with bullets. Entire neighbourhoods were destroyed by Putin's war machine. But the worst has been the accounts of the crimes against people. Gruesome rapes. Brutal murders. (Transcription 2, l. 32-36)

Example 7

When freedom is under attack, it is not enough that we tell each other about its importance. We have to be ready to defend freedom. That's why we send weapons and military supplies, and we will continue to do so. That's why we have agreed on sanctions and will continue to do so. That's why we assist with the humanitarian aid. (Transcription 2, l. 48-55)

Example 8

We know that not that long ago, you led completely normal lives at home, like us. Escorted the kids to school. Went to work. Went shopping. Went to football practice. Visited friends. Now you need to be here. Regain as normal a daily life as possible. You should know that you are welcome. Denmark takes care of you. (Transcription 2, l. 77-83)

Example 9

On the evening of May 4th, we light candles in our windows to celebrate Denmark's liberation. We have been doing this for 76 years. But tonight - on May 4th, 2022 - we will light candles for Ukraine. The candles are our symbol that hope, and peace will prevail. They represent our resistance against injustice and war, which the West unites against. (Transcription 2, l. 84-88)

Example 10

European cooperation will further evolve in the times to come, and it will only be further strengthened by Russia's attack on Ukraine. We desire that Denmark wholeheartedly participate in this cooperation. We strongly recommend that the Danish people abolish the defence opt-out. We want to be fully committed, wholeheartedly, and without reservations. (Transcription 3, l. 1-7)

Example 11

It's about which side we are on. Are we actively taking responsibility in Europe and participating in the decision-making process where political decisions are made? Currently, we are not. It is true that we have addressed it in different ways, but we are facing a new security situation in Europe. It

is a threat to the freedom and security of all citizens of Europe, that Putin is exerting now.
(Transcription 3, l. 31-38)

Example 12

The Liberal Party of Denmark has always wanted the defence opt-out gone. Now we have a completely changed world situation, where there has been an invasion by Putin's side of a peaceful European country. This calls for common European solutions, and it calls for us, from the Danish side as well, to state that we want to be part of that community and the security that comes with it.
(Transcription 3, l. 9-16)

Example 13

We recommend that the Danes abolish the defence opt-out. We need Denmark to be fully and completely in on this dimension of EU cooperation. We are in a new situation in terms of security policy. There is no doubt that Europe will need to act together, also in terms of defence. In the Green Left, we want Denmark to be able to do this. It is important that we strengthen the EU because we cannot expect that the Americans will always be there. We also have a different community of values in Europe that we need to utilize in relation to defence, democracy, and freedom against the Russians (Transcription 3, l. 18-29)

Example 14

We need to be part of the free world. That is what this is about. We must be able to go on all the missions we choose. But that does not change the fact that NATO is the axis of our defence and the core of it all. I also believe that we have an obligation to be part of the community. It's always nice when others pay, but I think we should commit fully and completely. (Transcription 3, l. 49-55)

Example 15

Anyone who knows me knows that I am fundamentally sceptical of much within the EU. I can't stand the extent to which the EU interferes in various matters. The EU should be limited to freedom and free trade - and transnational issues. It's not about maternity leave and quotas for women on boards - but it is indeed about climate, Europe's external borders, and of course, security policy in a time when Russia is knocking on the door.

However, even for an EU sceptic like me, the benefits of abolishing the opt-out outweigh the disadvantages. (Transcription 3, l. 73-83)

Example 16

Over the past ten days, the World has changed. Putin's pointless and brutal attack on Ukraine has heralded a new time in Europe. A new reality. There was a Europe before 24 February and a different Europe after (Transcription 4, l. 6-12)

Example 17

The European cooperation will continue to evolve even further in the coming time. And it will only be further strengthened by Russia's attack on Ukraine. We desire that Denmark fully participate in this cooperation. The discussion about the defence opt-out primarily revolves around where Denmark belongs and the responsibility we should undertake. (Transcription 4, l. 65-72)

Example 18

I believe that many of us, including many Danes, carry a mix of concerns and anger these days. Concerns for our security, but also anger that our way of life is under attack because Putin's cowardly assault on Ukraine has changed our reality and the realities in Europe as well. We are facing a massive threat to our security and to our freedom. And when the greatest crises knock on our door, two things are needed - the courage to think differently and on a larger scale. (Transcription 4, l. 229-239)

Example 19

The times call for unity/solidarity. Therefore, I am also glad that we can stand here today united around a new national compromise on Denmark's future defence and security policy. No one should be in doubt or can be in doubt, about the seriousness that is the reason we stand here. We have been united in the condemnation of Russia for its disgraceful and brutal attack on Ukraine. We have been united in our sanctions and restrictions to pressure Putin. If Putin wanted to test the unity of the West, he has miscalculated. Denmark stands together - the Nordic countries stand together - the EU stands together - Europe stands together. And we stand together with the USA and NATO. (Transcription 4, l. 158-171)

Example 20

I was young in the eighties, and the Cold War cast shadows over my childhood and youth. So, it deeply affects me that our children and young people, after two years of dealing with the pandemic, illness, and lockdowns, may now also have to witness war in Europe. It is painful for me to think about. But the situation is what it is. Neither excuses nor attempts at historical explanations can

excuse Putin and the attack on Ukraine - nothing can excuse his threats to our democracy, peace, and freedom. For me, it is therefore crucial that the Green Left stands on the side of freedom and peace. Everything that we, as a society, have done right since World War II with the creation of a strong welfare state, good education, a high degree of equality, and robust democratic institutions is everything that Russia has not done. It is everything that Russia is not. (Transcription 4, l. 196-213)

Example 21

We must certainly protect our democracy and freedom together with our allies. And we must be prepared to defend them, even if it comes at a cost. Even if it will be felt. All that we, as a country, have built. All the peace and freedom - we must naturally defend it. For without that, what are we? What are we fighting for then? (Transcription 4, l. 214-221)

Example 22

First of all: We will significantly strengthen the Danish defence - both in the short term and in the long term. Together, we have decided to allocate 7 billion Danish kroner over the next two years to enhance the Danish defence, diplomacy, and humanitarian efforts, and the associated consequences this may have for Danish society. These funds are intended to enable us to, as of at this moment, address the serious security situation. To enhance the preparedness of the defence and strengthen our ability to protect Denmark and our allies in NATO. To increase the resilience of the defence - replenish stockpiles - provide support to Ukraine. (Transcription 4, l. 30-42)

Example 23

This is a historically strong agreement for Danish defence. This is a milestone for our country. The world has changed, and there is war in Europe. A free country has been invaded. It calls for clear and decisive responses. It is time to end our naivety, and we must not hesitate in this situation. With this agreement, we send a clear signal to our allies in NATO as well as in the EU that we stand united. And we send a clear signal to Putin that in the free world, we stand together and are ready to fight for our freedom and for peace. (Transcription 4, l. 128-138)

Example 24

This year marks the 30th anniversary since SF was the architect behind the national compromise. Now, it is a different time/the times have changed, and the EU needs to strengthen its security policy cooperation. Denmark must be fully and completely involved in it. (Transcription 4, l. 186-190)

Example 25

Ukraine's fight is not just Ukraine's; it is a test of strength for everything we believe in – our values, our democracy, human rights, peace, and freedom. Our actions in the West will not only determine Ukraine's future. They will also define who we are, what we stand for. We stand together in Europe – and in partnership with allies and partners around the world – in imposing unprecedented sanctions on the Russian regime. The unity in NATO is strong, and it has hit Putin hard. (Transcription 4, l. 13-23)

Example 26

Historic times also call for historic decisions. And when we stand together here today, it is because we have made exactly that – significant decisions. About Denmark's security. About our common future. In other words, we have reached a national compromise on Danish security. (Transcription 4, l. 24-29)

Example 27

NATO will always be the core of our security. Let us now fully and completely join the free world. The only honourable thing as a country is to contribute to the security that we ourselves benefit from. (Transcription 4, l. 304-307)

Example 28

Fourthly, and this is important, the crisis has shown us how strong we are when we stand together on our continent. Europe is a family. We are bound together by a strong thread spun by a shared history, shared challenges, and shared values. (Transcription 4, l. 60-64)

Example 29

And we have a military commitment primarily in terms of defence within NATO, and we also have it in the context of the United Nations, and we will continue to have that. But the whole difference is Ukraine, and the fact that a peaceful, democratic, free country is under attack by Russia. Each individual country must assess for itself who they are, whom they want to be, and with whom they want to be what they aspire to be. (Transcription 4, l. 610-617)

Example 30

And it is groundbreaking that red and blue (referring to political parties) now agree to put the defence opt-out to a vote. Because the way forward in Europe, which is threatened by a mad despot, is not reservations, it is solidarity. (Transcription 4, l. 248-251)

Example 31

There can be many opinions regarding the other opt-outs. But now we are in a situation where a democratic country is under attack from Russia. And it is a national compromise on Danish security and defence. And it is in light of that, one should understand why we want to abolish the defence opt-out. If the Danish people support it. An active decision must be made – not only politically, but by us as individuals and as a country. (Transcription 4, l. 569-573)

Example 32

And maybe just a sixth thing. We were involved in Afghanistan for 20 years. We were in Iraq for almost a decade. We must stop engaging in meaningless desert wars and use our defence efforts where they make the most sense. (Transcription 4, l. 191-1195)

Example 33

Because the World is changed. Because the task has changed. Because before we have had an expedition force that has gone out in the world to fight for our values. Now we have, to a greater extent ... we will because the World is/has changed and have territorial defensive forces that focus on areas close to us. This requires different capabilities and the ability to mobilize larger forces, which is why we need to make this change. (Transcription 4, l. 832-840)

Example 34

It's about placing Denmark in the right position now. And I sincerely mean what I said before and can endorse what has been said here today, that Europe is a different Europe. There was a time before the attack on Ukraine, and there is a time after. And every country must decide for itself how to best contribute to further strengthening the West and our democracy and our freedom. (Transcription 4, l. 338-344)

Example 35

So, what has been the strength for the past week and a half is that the West stands together. We do it in our military, the defence in our defence alliance. We do it with sanctions. And I do remember, when we started, that some people... almost laughed a little at the sanctions track, wondering if it could be of any use. But I think the past 10-11 days have shown that sanctions can be effective in this situation. The strength of the sanctions lies in their breadth and depth. That is when we come together in the Western world, and therefore we agree, and I would recommend that we continue to do so in the future, that we don't have individual sanctions for each country that we can subtract or

add, but that we adopt sanctions collectively. And this will also apply to the gas sector. (Translation 4, l. 893-907)

Example 36

Now is the time to show that we are fully committed, also to taking shared responsibility in the binding communities we belong to – both in NATO and in the EU. Then there is a discussion about how we use it, how we best do it over the years we are investing in. That will be addressed in the defence agreement. There is a lot of breadth in this, including what Denmark can contribute compared to others and perhaps focusing on that. We will address that there. But it is a fundamental decision that we want to be part of taking responsibility in Europe and also shows all the other countries in NATO that we take shared responsibility. (Transcription 4, l. 844-855)

Example 37

It has an impact on how we are perceived – do we take shared responsibility in Europe or not? In other words, will we let others – both in NATO and in the EU – handle it for us? Getting rid of the reservation has always been a radical standpoint as well. But now it's about the fact that the security situation in Europe is different. And it is incredibly important that we stand together on this. (Transcription 4, l. 786-793)

Example 38

But this is not just about us. It is also about Europe. And in Denmark – well, we have limited dependence on Russian gas... There are some countries that are completely dependent on Russian gas, quite literally, to keep warm. Therefore, we also owe it to those countries to ramp up our efforts here at home – be it in the North Sea, be it with biogas – so that we can also contribute our share in a responsible manner, and not be reliant on a war criminal. (Transcription 4, l. 428-437)

Example 39

We are at a historic crossroads. The Ukrainians fight not just for their own freedom, but for the whole of Europe's security. (Transcription 5, l. 2-3)

Example 40

Denmark stands behind Ukraine's struggle for freedom along with the rest of the free world. Therefore, we will continue to support the Ukrainians through donations of military equipment, financing, and training to bolster their fight against Russia. (Transcription 5, l. 15-19)

9.2 Appendix 2: Transcriptions

Transcription 1

Transcription of Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen's speech at a church service on the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, 24 February 2023

- retrieved from the Prime Minister's Office's website www.stm.dk

[Statsminister Mette Frederiksens tale ved gudstjeneste på årsdagen for invasionen af Ukraine, 24. februar 2023 - Statsministeriet \(stm.dk\)](#)

1 "Min drøm er at se et fredfyldt og lykkeligt Mykolajiv - en by,
2 som kun fugle flyver hen over - ikke raketter."
3 Sådan har en ung, ukrainsk kvinde sat ord på sit håb for
4 fremtiden.
5 Den drøm, det håb og det ønske om fred i Ukraine. Det er, hvad vi
6 er samlet om i dag.
7 Deres kongelige højheder.
8 Kære ukrainere. Kære danskere. Kære alle sammen.
9 And a special greeting to you, mr. Ambassador.
10 Med fredsgudstjenesten markerer vi en dag, som ingen af os i
11 virkeligheden har lyst til at mindes.
12 Den 24. februar 2022.
13 Rusland invaderede brutalt Ukraine.
14 Krigen vendte tilbage til Europa.
15 På et splitsekund forandredes hverdagen og livet. For millioner af
16 ukrainere. Fra en normal hverdag som den, vi alle kender. Til et
17 liv i krig.
18 For et år siden vågnede ukrainerne til lyden af sirener.
19 Mens bomberne faldt over Kyiv. Odessa. Kherson. Kharkiv.
20 Forvandlede byer til kamppladser.
21 Grønne marker blev skyttegrave.
22 Skoler blev ruiner. Børn blev myrdet.
23 Krigen er ubærlig.

24 Alligevel har I ukrainere båret krigens byrde hver eneste dag
25 gennem et helt år.
26 Krigen er blevet jeres hverdag.
27 Hvad gør det ved mennesker?
28 Hvad gør det ved et menneske at leve i frygt?
29 At flygte med alt, hvad du ejer, i en bærepose?
30 Hvad gør det ved et barn at tage afsked med sin far?
31 Hvad gør det ved en mor at sende sine drenge i krig?
32 Det er ikke lang tid siden, jeg selv var i Ukraine.
33 Jeg mødte en kvinde. Mor til fire sønner.
34 Vi stod på gaden. Hun tog min arm, så på mig og fortalte, at alle
35 hendes fire sønner er i krig.
36 Hun vaklede ikke i troen på deres deltagelse i krigen. Men det var
37 en mor i sorg. De stille tårer ned ad kinderne fortalte mig det
38 hele.
39 Der er den dobbelte følelse. Sorg - og stolthed. Frygt - og mod.
40 Usikkerhed - og håb.
41 Når vi i Danmark ser på jer ukrainere. Så ser vi ikke et knækket
42 folk.
43 Vi ser styrke.
44 I viser os det.
45 Ukrainerne og jeres modige, utrættelige præsident Zelenskyy - I
46 kæmper ikke kun for jeres eget land. Men for hele Europa.
47 Ikke kun for jeres frihed. Men for vores frihed.
48 Derfor *kan* vi ikke svigte jer. Derfor *vil* vi ikke svigte jer.
49 Til jer ukrainere, som er i Danmark, vil jeg sige: Vi vil passe på
50 jer, så længe I har brug for det.
51 Og vi vil hjælpe med at genopbygge jeres land.
52 Danmark støtter Ukraine så meget, vi kan. Og vi gør det, så længe
53 vi skal.
54 Der er dybt i os alle et behov for at hjælpe.
55 Som jer her i Danmark, der indsamler tøj, tæpper og legetøj. Jer,

56 der pakker det i sække. Jer, som kører bussen fra Danmark til
57 Polen med nødhjælp.
58 Jer, der har en ekstra seng, en udstrakt hånd, et venskab at give.
59 Tak til alle i Danmark, som hjælper det ukrainske folk. Af hjertet
60 tak.
61 I er billedet på, hvordan vi står sammen som samfund.
62 Hver eneste handling gør os stolte.
63 I dag vil jeg også nævne tragedien, som har ramt Tyrkiet og
64 Syrien.
65 Et historisk ødelæggende jordskælv.
66 Titusindvis af omkomne. Mange, mange kvæstede.
67 Hertil kommer ødelæggelserne. Hundredtusinder af menneskers liv
68 ligger bogstavelig talt i ruiner.
69 Lad os sende de varmeste tanker til de mange ofre og deres
70 familier.
71 Danmark hjælper de ramte områder i Tyrkiet og Syrien.
72 Selvfølgelig.
73 Angrebet på Ukraine var et brud med alt det, vi europæere tog for
74 givet.
75 At freden og friheden var kommet for at blive.
76 Sådan er det ikke. Det ser vi nu.
77 Vores verdensbillede er blevet rystet. Men måske har vi også fået
78 rystet noget på plads.
79 Os selv. Europa, USA og vores allierede står stærkere og mere
80 forenet end i mange, mange år.
81 Putin og Rusland troede, de kunne splitte os. Men han og de tog
82 fejl.
83 Rusland vil ikke freden. Det vil vi. Og vi ved, det kræver, at vi
84 kæmper for den.
85 Båndene mellem Ukraine og Europa er stærkere end nogensinde.
86 Kære ukrainere.
87 Ord kan ikke beskrive, hvad I går igennem.
88 Men I skal vide: Vi ser jer. Og vi er med jer.

89 Jeg indledte med den unge, ukrainske piges drøm.
90 Drømmen om et land, hvor kun fugle - ikke raketter - flyver hen
91 over himlen.
92 Den drøm må ikke være forgæves. Det er vores løfte til jer.
93 Så længe håbets flamme brænder, vil Ukraine bestå.
94 Freden vil komme tilbage.
95 Friheden vil vinde.

Transcription 2

Transcription of Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen's speech at the event "A light in the dark"

4 May 2022 - retrieved from The Prime Minister's Office's website www.stm.dk

[Statsminister Mette Frederiksens tale til arrangementet "Et lys i mørket" - Statsministeriet \(stm.dk\)](https://www.stm.dk/da/nyheder/2022/maj-4-2022/statsminister-mette-frederiksens-tale-til-arrangementet-et-lys-i-morket)

1 Kære danskere. Kære ukrainere.
2 I aften for 77 år siden kom den nyhed, som alle danskere havde
3 ventet med længsel: De nazistiske tropper overgav sig. Danmark var
4 atter frit.
5 Forestil jer Rådhuspladsen. Lige her, hvor vi er nu. En smuk aften
6 i maj.
7 Her samlede mennesker i tusindvis. Dengang i 1945.
8 Folk dansede. Kravlede rundt på sporvogne. Kastede sig i hinandens
9 arme.
10 Med grin og gråd. Kys og kram.
11 Der blev viftet med dannebrog. Danmark var igen et rigtigt land.
12 Et frit land.
13 Præcis 77 år efter den bedste aften i moderne Danmarkshistorie
14 står vi her igen. Tusindvis af mennesker samlet på Rådhuspladsen.
15 Tak! Til alle jer, der er mødt frem.
16 I aften vifter I med ukrainske flag.
17 For denne gang er krigen tilbage i Europa. Brutal. Umenneskelig.
18 Ubærlig.
19 Krig i Europa. Tænk, at vores generation igen skal konfronteres
20 med det.
21 I al sin gru. Så minder det os om, at frihed forpligter.
22 At demokrati ikke kommer af sig selv.
23 Og at vi europæere har et skæbnefællesskab.
24 På ruinerne af Anden Verdenskrig rejste vi de institutioner, som
25 gjorde, at Europa vandt freden. FN. NATO. Og EU.
26 Putin troede, at han kunne splitte Europa. Men hans brutale
27 fremfærd har ført til det modsatte. Båndene mellem os er stærkere
28 end nogensinde før.

29 Og lad mig gøre det helt klart:
30 Ukraine tilhører ingen andre end Ukraine.
31 For to uger siden rejste jeg til Ukraine.
32 Jeg glemmer det aldrig. Så meget ødelæggelse. Så meget smerte og
33 sorg. Boliger, der aldrig igen bliver til at bo i. Sønderskudte
34 hjem. Hele bydele smadret af Putins krigsmaskine.
35 Men det værste var beretningerne om forbrydelser mod mennesker.
36 Grusomme voldtægter. Brutale mord.
37 Kvinder. Mænd. Unge. Gamle. Små børn.
38 Det vil jeg aldrig glemme. Det vil vi aldrig glemme. Det må verden
39 aldrig glemme.
40 Vi bliver nødt til at love hinanden. At de ansvarlige bliver
41 stillet til regnskab.
42 Midt i mørket er også et lys. For på trods af smerten kæmper I
43 ufortrødent videre mod Putins overmagt.
44 Vi har netop hørt den ukrainske nationalsang. "Vi giver krop og
45 sjæl for vores frihed." Sådan synger I.
46 Som folk kan I ikke synge noget andet. Opgiver I jeres frihed, så
47 har I intet. Intet!
48 Når friheden er under angreb, er det ikke nok, at vi fortæller
49 hinanden om vigtigheden af den. Vi skal også være klar til at
50 forsvare friheden.
51 Derfor sender vi våben og militært udstyr. Og vi bliver ved med at
52 gøre det.
53 Derfor har vi vedtaget sanktioner. Og vil blive ved med at gøre
54 det.
55 Derfor hjælper vi med humanitær bistand. Og kære Danmark, skal vi
56 ikke blive ved med også.
57 Vil Danmark være med til at genopbygge Ukraine? Det spørgsmål
58 stillede Zelenskyy mig i Kyiv.
59 Mit svar og Danmarks svar er selvfølgelig: Ja! De første danske
60 gravemaskiner er allerede på vej.
61 Ukraine kan regne med Danmark og danskerne.

62 Dengang i 1945 - i aften for 77 år siden - betød befrielsen, at
63 de, der var flygtet fra Danmark, kunne vende hjem til Danmark
64 igen.

65 I de følgende dage og uger kom de hjem - de tusindvis af jøder,
66 som var sejlet over Øresund til sikkerhed i Sverige.

67 Langt de fleste danske jøder overlevede krigen. Danske jødernes
68 skæbne er et lys i det nazistiske folkemords mørke.

69 Hundredvis af danske familier hjalp deres jødiske medmennesker med
70 husly og mad. Skjulte de forfulgte. Organiserede flugten til
71 Sverige.

72 I aften vil jeg gerne rette en særlig tak til alle i Danmark, som
73 hjælper de ukrainske flygtninge. Jeg er dybt taknemmelig over den
74 store gæstfrihed, I viser. Tak for den.

75 Og en helt særlig hilsen til jer ukrainere, som er flygtet til
76 Danmark.

77 Vi ved, at I for kort tid siden levede et helt almindeligt liv
78 derhjemme. Som os. Fulgte ungerne i skole. Gik på arbejde. Købte
79 ind. Tog til fodbold. Besøgte venner.

80 Nu har I behov for at være her. Genfinde så normal en hverdag som
81 muligt.

82 I skal vide, at I er velkomne.

83 Danmark passer på jer.

84 Om aftenen den 4. maj sætter vi lys i vinduerne for at fejre, at
85 Danmark blev frit. Det har vi gjort i 76 år.

86 Men i aften - den 4. maj 2022 - der tænder vi lys for Ukraine.

87 Lysene er vores vartegn for, at håbet og freden vil sejre. For
88 vores modstand mod uret og krig, som Vesten samles om.

89 Kære danskere. Kære ukrainere.

90 Jeg er beæret over, at præsident Zelenskyy i aften vil tale til
91 det danske folk.

92 Det er Zelenskyy, der lige nu viser os, hvordan nationalt
93 sammenhold og modstandskraft ser ud i vores tid.

- 94 Han bærer ukrainernes smerte i sig. Og den giver ham styrke.
95 Kampgejst. Mod.
96 Kære alle. Tag rigtig godt imod Ukraines fantastiske præsident
97 Zelenskyy, der vil tale til os lige om lidt

Transcription 3

Transcription of various political party leaders' statements in connection to the defense opt-out referendum from the article "Only three want to keep/retain it: This is what the parties think about the defense opt-out"

(org. title: Kun tre vil bevare det: Dét mener partierne om forsvarsforbeholdet)

7 March 2023 - retrieved from www.dr.dk

[Kun tre vil bevare det: Dét mener partierne om forsvarsforbeholdet | Forsvarsforbeholdet | DR](#)

MF: Mette Frederiksen, Prime Minister and political leader of The Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet)

JEJ: Jakob Elleman-Jensen, political leader of The Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre)

POD: Pia Olsen Dyhr, political leader of the Green Left (Socialistisk Folkeparti)

SCN: Sofie Carsten Nielsen, former political leader of Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)

MV: Mai Villadsen, political leader of the Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)

SPP: Søren Pape Poulsen, political leader of the Conservative party (Konservative)

MM: Morten Messerschmidt, political leader of the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)

PV: Pernille Vermund, political leader of New Right (Nye Borgelige)

AV: Alex Vanoslagh, political leader of the Liberal Alliance (Liberal Alliance)

SS: Sikander Siddique, political leader of Independent Greens (Frie Grønne)

FR: Fransicka Rosenkilde, political leader of the Alternative (Alternativet)

JR: Jens Rohde, political leader of Christian Democrats (Kristendemokraterne)

LLR: Lars Løkke Rasmussen, political leader of the Moderates (Moderaterne)

HV: Henrik Vindfeldt, political leader of the Vegan Party (Veganpartiet)

1 MF: Det europæiske samarbejde kommer til at udvikle sig endnu
2 mere i den kommende tid, og det vil kun blive yderligere
3 forstærket af Ruslands angreb på Ukraine. Vi ønsker, at
4 Danmark fuldtone skal kunne tage del i det samarbejde.

5 Vi anbefaler danskerne meget klart at afskaffe
6 forsvarsforbeholdet. Vi vil være med helhjertet,
7 fuldtonet og uden forbehold.

8

9 JEJ: Venstre har alle dage ønsket det forsvarsforbehold hen,
10 hvor peberet gror. Nu har vi en helt forandret
11 verdenssituation, hvor der fra Putins side er sket en
12 invasion af et fredeligt europæisk land.
13 Det kalder på fælles europæiske løsninger, og det kalder
14 på, at vi, også fra dansk side, siger, at vi vil være en
15 del af det fællesskab og den sikkerhed, der også ligger i
16 det

17

18 POD: Vi anbefaler, at danskerne afskaffer
19 forsvarsforbeholdet. Vi har brug for, at Danmark er fuldt
20 og helt med i den dimension af EU-samarbejdet. Vi står i
21 en ny sikkerhedspolitisk situation. Der er ingen tvivl
22 om, at Europa får brug for at handle sammen, også
23 forsvarsmæssigt. Vi har fra SF et ønske om, at Danmark
24 kan være med til det.
25 Det er vigtigt, at vi styrker EU, for vi kan ikke
26 forvente, at amerikanerne altid er der. Vi har også et
27 andet værdifællesskab i Europa, som vi skal bruge i
28 forhold til forsvar, demokrati og frihed over for
29 russerne.

30

31 SCN: Det handler om, hvilken side vi er på. Er man med til at
32 tage ansvar i Europa og med til at udøve
33 den indflydelse inde ved bordet, hvor de politiske
34 beslutninger træffes. Det er vi faktisk ikke i dag. Det
35 er rigtigt, vi er kommet omkring det på forskellige
36 måder, men vi står i en ny sikkerhedspolitisk situation i

37 Europa. Det er en trussel mod frihed og sikkerhed for
38 alle borgere i Europa, som Putin udøver nu.

39
40 MV: Vi synes, det er meget, meget vigtigt at bevare
41 forsvarsforbeholdet. Vi står i en situation, hvor
42 rammerne for det europæiske forsvar slet ikke er på
43 plads, så vi risikerer at melde Danmark ind i en klub,
44 hvor man slet ikke kender reglerne endnu.
45 Jeg er bekymret for en EU-hær, der vil føre ørkenkrig i
46 Afrika. Det synes jeg simpelthen er en alt for stor
47 risiko at løbe.

48
49 SPP: Vi skal være en del af den frie verden. Det handler det
50 her om. Vi skal kunne tage med på alle de missioner, vi
51 vælger at gøre. Men det ændrer ikke på, at Nato er vores
52 forsvars akse og kernen i det hele.
53 Jeg synes også, vi har en forpligtelse til at være en del
54 af fællesskabet. Det er altid dejligt, når andre betaler,
55 men jeg synes, vi skal gå fuldt og helt med.

56
57 MM: Vi vil ikke acceptere, at Danmark skal med i en EU-hær,
58 som kan komme til at engagere sig alle mulige steder.
59 Der er ingen tvivl om, at den store drøm fra Frankrigs
60 side om at få en EU-hær er, at man er træt af kun at
61 sende franske soldater af sted for at forsvare interesser
62 i de tidligere franske kolonier. Nu vil man gerne have
63 hele EU til at bidrage, og det skal Danmark selvfølgelig
64 ikke være en del af.

65
66 PV: Det fungerer fint, som det er. Jeg ser ikke nogen grund
67 til at fjerne det. Vi ved, hvad vi har, vi ved ikke, hvad
68 vi får. Jeg synes også, politikerne skylder et svar på,
69 hvorfor vi skulle gøre det.

70 Vi skal styrke vores forsvarssamarbejde i Nato, men vi
71 skal ikke bevæge os mod en EU-hær, siger Pernille Vermund

72

73 AV: Enhver der kender mig ved, at jeg grundlæggende er
74 skeptisk over for meget fra EU. Jeg kan ikke fordrage,
75 at EU blander sig i så meget, som tilfældet er. EU bør
76 være begrænset til frihed og frihandel - og
77 grænseoverskridende problemer. Det er ikke barsel og
78 kvoter for kvinder i bestyrelser - men det er nu engang
79 klima, Europas ydre grænser og selvfølgelig
80 også sikkerhedspolitik i en tid, hvor Rusland banker på
81 døren.

82 Men selv for en EU-skeptiker som mig, opvejer fordelene
83 ved en afskaffelse af forbeholdet ulemperne.

84

85 SS: Vi bakker op om en afskaffelse af forsvarsforbeholdet og
86 en folkeafstemning, men vi er bekymrede for, om danskerne
87 kommer til at stemme ud fra frygt eller fornuft, når et
88 sådant valg udskrives midt i en krig. For os er det
89 altafgørende, at danskerne foretager et oplyst valg, mere
90 end vi er bekymrede for, om de mener det samme som os.
91 Når vi siger ja til at afskaffe forbeholdet, handler det
92 om, at vi gerne ser et styrket europæisk
93 forsvarssamarbejde i stedet for Nato-samarbejdet. Og så
94 er det væsentligt for os, at Danmark ikke afgiver
95 suverænitet, men at det nationale parlament stadigvæk
96 skal inddrages.

97

98 FR: Alternativet ønsker et stærkere fællesskab med EU og en
99 fælles forsvarspolitik, så vi øger trygheden og
100 samarbejdet i Europa. Derfor er vi også for at fjerne
101 både rets- og forsvarsforbeholdet og melde os endnu mere

102 ind i et stærkt europæisk samarbejde for demokrati, fred
103 og frihed.

104

105 JR: Kristendemokraterne har tilsluttet sig aftalen
106 mellem regeringen, Venstre, SF, De Radikale og De
107 Konservative.

108 Der er ingen modsætning mellem EU-forsvar og Nato.
109 Tværtimod har de i 20 år været hinandens forudsætninger.
110 Danmark er fuldgyldigt medlem af Nato. Derfor giver det
111 ikke mening, at vi ikke også er det af EU. Derfor
112 anbefaler vi et rungende ja.

113

114 LLR: Jeg er tilhænger af, at forbeholdet skal væk. Men jeg er
115 først og fremmest tilhænger af, at det sker på baggrund
116 af en konsolideret debat og kollektiv viden om, hvad det
117 her kommer til at betyde. Nu er der sat en dato på, og
118 jeg går ud og kæmper for, det skal blive et ja. Det her
119 er i virkeligheden et værdipolitisk signal, vi sender
120 til omverdenen.

121

122 HV: Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation i Europa ændrer sig i
123 øjeblikket. Vi vil gerne være med, når beslutningerne
124 skal træffes i Ministerrådet.
125 Sikkerhedspolitisk er vi tættere på vores europæiske
126 naboer, end vi er på amerikanerne. Vi skal fortsat være
127 med i Nato, men vi kunne godt forestille os, at nogle af
128 fremtidens udfordringer skal løses i EU-regi og ikke
129 nødvendigvis med amerikanerne.

130

Transcription 4

Transcription of the press conference on the national compromise, 6 March 2022 - retrieved from
The Prime Minister's Office's website www.stm.dk

<https://www.stm.dk/presse/pressemoedearkiv/pressemoede-soendag-den-6-marts-2022/>

The politicians present at the press conference:

MF: Prime minister Mette Frederiksen (Socialdemokratiet)

JEJ: Chairman of The Liberal Party of Denmark Jakob Ellemann-Jensen (Venstre)

POD: Chairman of the Green Left Pia Olsen Dyhr (Socialistik Folkeparti)

SCN: Former party leader of The Danish Social-liberal Party Sofie Carsten Nielsen (Radikale Venstre)

SPP: Chairman of The Conservative People's Party Søren Pape Poulsen (Det Konservative Folkeparti)

Media present at the press conference:

TV2

DR: Danish Broadcasting Corporation

B: Berlingske

A: Altinget

JP: Jyllands-Posten

EB: Ekstra Bladet

P: Politiken

BØ: Børsen

BN: Bloomberg News

B.T.

O: Omnibus

1 MF: Velkommen til pressemøde. Jeg vil gerne starte med at
2 sige tak til formændene fra Venstre, SF, Radikale
3 Venstre og Konservative, som står her sammen med mig
4 i dag.

5 Tak for at tage ansvar.

6 I løbet af de seneste 10 dage har Verden forandret
7 sig.
8 Putins meningsløse og brutale angreb på Ukraine har
9 varslet en ny tid i Europa.
10 En ny virkelighed.

11 Der var et Europa inden den 24. februar og et andet
12 Europa efter.

13 Ukraines kamp er ikke bare Ukraines, det er en
14 styrkeprøve for alt, hvad vi tror på - vores værdier,
15 vores demokrati, menneskerettigheder, fred og frihed.

16 Vores handlinger i Vesten vil ikke kun være med til
17 at afgøre Ukraines fremtid.
18 Det vil også definere, hvem vi er, hvad vi står for.
19 Vi står sammen i Europa - og i fællesskab med
20 partnere og allierede over hele Verden - om hidtil
21 usete sanktioner mod det russiske regime.
22 Sammenholdet i NATO er styrkt, og det har ramt Putin
23 hårdt.

24 Historiske tider kalder også på historiske
25 beslutninger. Og når vi står sammen her i dag, så er
26 det, fordi vi har truffet netop dét - store
27 beslutninger. Om Danmarks sikkerhed. Om vores fælles
28 fremtid. Vi har med andre ord indgået et nationalt
29 kompromis om dansk sikkerhed.

30 For det første: Vi vil styrke det danske forsvar
31 markant - både på den korte bane og på den lange
32 bane. Vi har i fællesskab besluttet at afsætte 7
33 milliarder kroner over de næste to år til styrkelse
34 af dansk forsvar, diplomati, den humanitære indsats
35 og de afledte konsekvenser, det også kan have for det
36 danske samfund.
37 Det er penge, der her og nu skal gøre os i stand til
38 at håndtere den alvorlige sikkerhedspolitiske
39 situation. Til at forhøje forsvarets beredskab og
40 styrke evnen til at beskytte Danmark og vores
41 allierede i NATO. Øge robustheden i forsvaret - fylde
42 lagrene op - yde støtte til Ukraine.

43 For det andet har vi besluttet os for kraftigt at
44 skrue op for de årlige bevillinger til dansk forsvar.
45 I det kommende forsvarsforlig vil vi øge udgifterne
46 til forsvar og sikkerhed, så vi når 2 % af BNP inden
47 udgangen af 2033.

48 Konkret betyder dét, at vi løfter de årlige
49 forsvarsudgifter med ca. 18 milliarder kroner, når
50 beslutningen er fuldt realiseret.

51 Det er selvsagt den største investering i dansk
52 forsvar i nyere tid.

53 For det tredje vil vi styrke det danske samfunds
54 modstandskraft i vores energiforsyning. Det er sagt
55 før: Energipolitik er ikke længere energipolitik, det
56 er i høj grad også blevet sikkerhedspolitik. Derfor
57 har vi besluttet, at Danmark skal gøres uafhængig af
58 russisk gas. Og vi vil arbejde for, at hele EU
59 træffer samme beslutning.

60 For det fjerde, og det her er vigtigt, så har krisen
61 vist os, hvor stærke vi er, når vi står sammen på
62 vores kontinent. Europa er en familie. Vi er bundet
63 sammen af en stærk tråd spundet af både en fælles
64 historie, fælles udfordringer og fælles værdier.

65 Det europæiske samarbejde kommer til at udvikle sig
66 endnu mere i den kommende tid. Og det vil kun blive
67 yderligere forstærket af Ruslands angreb på Ukraine.
68 Vi ønsker, at Danmark fuldtonet skal kunne tage del i
69 det samarbejde.

70 Diskussionen om forsvarsforbeholdet handler først og
71 fremmest om, hvor Danmark hører hjemme og om det
72 ansvar, vi bør påtage os.

73 I vores optik hører Danmark hjemme i hjertet af
74 Vestens sikkerhedspolitiske samarbejder. I NATO -
75 derfor de 2 %. I hjertet af Europa klar til at
76 bidrage uden et forbehold.

77 Vi, der står her sammen i aften, har derfor givet
78 hinanden hånden på, at der skal afholdes en
79 folkeafstemning den 1. juni i år, hvor vi anbefaler
80 danskerne meget klart at afskaffe
81 forsvarsforbeholdet.

82 Alt dét, vi gør nu, det skal selvfølgelig
83 finansieres. Det forholder vi os nøgternt til. Når vi
84 har behov for at investere milliarder i dansk forsvar
85 og i vores sikkerhed - både i år og i de kommende år,
86 og når vi udfaser afhængighed af russisk gas, så vil
87 det koste penge.
88 Det skal ske på en måde, så vi fortsat kan udvikle
89 vores velfærdssamfund og fortsætte den nødvendige og
90 ambitiøse grønne omstilling.
91 Danmark skal stadig være Danmark - et stærkt
92 velfærdssamfund, en global grøn frontløber.
93 Og derfor vil vi som det femte ændre budgetloven, så
94 vi kan gennemføre de markante investeringer, som vi
95 her lægger op til samtidig med, at der er et
96 manøvrerum i dansk finanspolitik.
97 Helt konkret ændrer vi grænsen i budgetloven, så den
98 ikke er strammere end dét, EU-reglerne kræver, og så
99 vi i den kommende 2030-plan sigter efter et moderat
100 offentligt underskud. Det er ansvarligt, og det er i
101 øvrigt i fuld tråd med anbefalingerne fra landets
102 fremmeste økonomer og økonomiske eksperter bl.a. det
103 økonomiske råd, som også bakkes op af Nationalbanken.

104 Dansk økonomi er stærk, og den er robust. Den
105 offentlige nettogæld vil forblive fortsat tæt på nul,
106 og finanspolitikken vil fortsat være holdbar på lang
107 sigt.
108 Når det er sagt, vil jeg gerne tilføje, at der
109 selvfølgelig stadigvæk og måske endda endnu mere end
110 tidligere vil være behov for politiske
111 prioriteringer.
112 Danmark vil fortsat føre en ansvarlig økonomisk
113 politik.

114 De ting, jeg har nævnt her, vil vi nu, vi fem der
115 står her, drøfte videre med Folketingets øvrige
116 partier i de respektive forligskredse, hvor
117 beslutningerne skal forankres.

118 Og til os alle sammen: Der er få nedslag i vores
119 historie, der har en egentlig og definerende
120 betydning for vores fælles fremtid. Vi står på et af
121 de nedslag lige nu. Derfor har vi lavet et nationalt
122 kompromis om dansk sikkerhedspolitik. Og det håber vi
123 på, at alle danskere vil bakke op om.

124 Og med de ord giver jeg ordet videre - i første
125 omgang til Venstres formand.

126 Værsgo, Jakob!

127 JEJ: Tak for det!

128 Det her, det er en historisk stærk aftale for dansk
129 forsvar. Det her, det er en milepæl for vores land.

130 Verden er forandret, og der er krig i Europa. Et frit
131 land er invaderet. Det kalder på klare og på kontante
132 svar. Det er slut med at være naive, og vi må ikke
133 tøve i den her situation.

134 Med den her aftale, så sender vi et klart signal til
135 vores allierede i NATO, såvel som i EU, om, at vi vil
136 fællesskab. Og vi sender et klart signal til Putin
137 om, at vi i den frie Verden står sammen, og vi er
138 klar til at kæmpe for vores frihed og for fred.

139 Jeg er glad for, at vi nu har forpligtet hinanden på
140 at nå de 2 % af BNP. Og jeg glæder mig over, at vi
141 skal til en folkeafstemning om forsvarsforbeholdet.
142 Det er vigtigt for vores forsvar. Det er vigtigt for
143 vores sikkerhed. Det er vigtigt for Danmark.

144 Jeg vil gerne takke alle partierne i Folketinget, som
145 har presset på for at få styrket dansk forsvar. Det
146 gælder selvfølgelig partierne her. Det gælder også
147 alle de borgerlige partier, som har presset på netop
148 for en styrkelse af det danske forsvar.

149 Det her - det er en dag, hvor Danmark for alvor tager
150 ansvar for vores egen sikkerhed. For befolkningens
151 sikkerhed.
152 Det her - det er stort, og det er et lille lyspunkt i
153 en meget mørk tid.

154 Tak!

155 MF: Tak for det Jakob!

156 Så er det SF's formand. Værsgo, Pia!

157 POD: Tak til statsministeren!

158 Tiden kalder på sammenhold. Derfor er jeg også glad
159 for, at vi kan stå her i dag samlet om et nyt
160 nationalt kompromis om Danmarks fremtidige forsvar og
161 sikkerhedspolitik.
162 Ingen skal være i tvivl, eller kan være i tvivl, om
163 den alvor, som er baggrunden for, vi står her.

164 Vi har været fælles i fordømmelsen af Rusland, for
165 deres skammelige og brutale overfald på Ukraine.
166 Vi har været samlet om sanktioner og restriktioner
167 for at presse Putin. Hvis Putin ville teste Vestens
168 sammenhold - så har han forregnet sig.

169 Danmark står sammen - Norden står sammen - EU står
170 sammen - Europa står sammen. Og vi står sammen med
171 USA og med NATO.

172 I dag står de her partier sammen om et nyt nationalt
173 kompromis om de kommende mange års forsvars- og
174 sikkerhedsindsats. Fra SF's side er vi særligt
175 optaget af fem ting:
176 Vi skal massivt styrke vores it-sikkerhed, og ruste
177 os mod cyberkrig.
178 Vi skal massivt investere i vedvarende energi og grøn
179 omstilling - for klimapolitik er sikkerhedspolitik.
180 Vi skal styrke søværnet og vores tilstedeværelse
181 omkring Grønland og i Arktis.
182 Vi skal styrke vores diplomati og udenrigstjeneste og
183 dermed forebygge konflikter og styrke hjælpen i
184 Verden.
185 Og vi skal af med forsvarsforbeholdet.

186 I år er det 30 år siden SF var arkitekten bag det
187 nationale kompromis.
188 Nu er tiden en anden, og EU har brug for og skal
189 styrke sit sikkerhedspolitiske samarbejde. Det skal
190 Danmark være helt og fuldt med i.

191 Og så måske bare lige en sjette ting. Vi var med i
192 Afghanistan i 20 år. Vi var i Irak i næsten et årti.
193 Og fra SF's side så mener vi, at vi skal holde op med
194 meningsløse ørkenkrige og bruge vores kræfter
195 forsvarsmæssigt dér, hvor det giver allermost mening.

196 Jeg var ung i firserne, og Den Kolde Krig kastede
197 skygger over min barndom og ungdom. Så det berører
198 mig dybt, at vores børn og unge nu efter to år med
199 corona, sygdom og nedlukninger - nu heller ikke skal
200 spares for at opleve krig i Europa. Det, synes jeg,
201 er smerteligt at tænke på.
202 Men situationen er, som den er. Hverken
203 undskyldninger eller historiske forklaringsforsøg kan
204 undskylde Putin og overfaldet på Ukraine - intet kan
205 undskylde hans trusler mod vores demokrati, fred og
206 frihed.
207 For mig er det derfor helt afgørende, at SF står på
208 frihedens side og på fredens side. Alt dét, som vi
209 som samfund har gjort rigtigt siden 2. Verdenskrig
210 med skabelsen af en stærk velfærd, gode uddannelser,
211 høj grad af lighed, stærke demokratiske
212 institutioner, er alt dét, Rusland ikke har gjort.
213 Det er alt dét, Rusland ikke er.

214 Vi skal i hvert fald værne om vores demokrati og
215 frihed sammen med vores allierede.
216 Og det må vi naturligvis være parate til at forsvare,
217 også selvom det kommer til at koste. Også selvom det
218 kommer til at kunne mærkes. Alt dét, vi som land har
219 opbygget. Al den fred og frihed - den skal vi
220 naturligvis forsvare. For uden dét, hvad er vi så?
221 Hvad kæmper vi så for?

222 Jeg vil gerne takke statsministeren og de andre
223 partiledere her for de drøftelser, vi har haft, og
224 for det nationale kompromis. For mig er det helt
225 afgørende, at vi står sammen i de her svære tider -
226 og det er svære tider, vi står i.

227 MF: Tak for det!

228 Så er det Radikales formand. Værsgo, Sofie!

229 SCN: Jeg tror rigtig mange af os og rigtig mange danskere
230 går i de her dage med sådan en blanding af
231 bekymringer og vrede. Bekymringer for vores
232 sikkerhed, men jo også vrede over, at vores måde at
233 leve på er under angreb, fordi Putins feje angreb på
234 Ukraine har forandret vores virkelighed, og også
235 realiteterne i Europa.

236 Vi står over for en massiv trussel mod vores
237 sikkerhed og mod vores frihed. Og når de allerstørste
238 kriser banker på vores dør, så er der brug for to
239 ting - at vi tør tænke nyt og stort. Og det er jeg
240 enormt stolt over, at vi på tværs af røde og blå har
241 kunnet finde hinanden i en historisk aftale, som det
242 her nationale kompromis. En aftale om at forsvare
243 Danmark og tage medansvar i de forpligtende
244 fællesskaber vi er en del af.

245 For mig der er det epokegørende, at røde og blå nu er
246 enige om at løfte vores NATO-forpligtelse fuldt og
247 helt. Vi vil på sigt bruge 2 % af BNP på forsvar og
248 sikkerhed. Og det er epokegørende, at røde og blå nu
249 er enige om at sende forsvarsforbeholdet til
250 afstemning. For vejen frem i Europa, der trues af en
251 gal despot, det er ikke forbehold, det er sammenhold.
252 Og det er også epokegørende, at vi, røde og blå, nu
253 er enige om, at Danmark skal af med Putins gas og kul
254 og olie hurtigst muligt, og vi vil arbejde for det
255 samme i Europa.

256 Vi vil i stedet sætte tempo på den grønne omstilling.
257 Så når det er allerværst omkring os, så er det her
258 altså dansk politik, når det er allerbedst.

259 Den her aftale, den viser jo, at når store kriser
260 truer med at vælte os omkuld, så står vi sammen i
261 Danmark på tværs af rød og blå. Og på tværs af rød og
262 blå har vi også i dag lagt hverdagsfnidder til side
263 og flyttet os sammen. På tværs af rød og blå har vi
264 fundet sammen om epokegørende løsninger. Og på tværs
265 af rød og blå styrker vi nu alle danskeres tryghed og
266 frihed.

267 Det gør mig faktisk virkelig glad og stolt, men det
268 gør mig også håbefuld. For når vi kan dét, så kan vi
269 rigtig meget andet også.

270 MF: Tak for det!
271 Jeg kom til at sige formand for Det Radikale - det er
272 vist rettelig politisk leder ...

273 SCN: ... det lever jeg med.

274 MF: ... men så giver jeg til gengæld ordet til formanden
275 for Det Konservative Folkeparti, værsgo, Søren.

276 SPP: Og tak for det!

277 For mig vil den 6. marts 2022 fremover altid være en
278 særlig dag.

279 Vi går fra at være et land, der beder andre om at
280 beskytte os. Til at være et land, der fuldt og helt
281 indgår i et fællesskab, hvor vi beskytter hinanden.
282 Jeg er bevæget over, at vi nu endelig kommer til at
283 holde, hvad vi har lovet vores allierede. At vi
284 endelig kommer til at betale vores forsikringspræmie
285 for at kunne leve i tryghed og sikkerhed. Og jeg er
286 stolt af dansk politik i dag.

287 Her er det lykkes med at gøre det rigtige, selvom det
288 er svært.

289 Alle er gået på kompromis med noget, men sikkerheden
290 bliver bedre for os alle sammen.

291 Ordet historisk, det bliver ofte brugt i politik, nok
292 også for ofte. Denne gang der er den god nok. Jeg har
293 lyst til at sige, måske viser det også, at alt på et
294 tidspunkt bliver moderne, selv konservativ
295 forsvarspolitik.

296 Jeg håber, at vi får afskaffet forbeholdet, så vi
297 frit kan vælge at deltage i missioner. Jeg synes
298 faktisk, det er naturligt, at vi får muligheden for
299 at deltage i missioner, der stabiliserer områder,
300 hvor vi får mange flygtninge fra, eller hvor Danmark
301 har meget store kommercielle interesser - i dag er
302 vi nogle gange sat uden for døren. Jeg synes, vi skal
303 give Danmark chancen for at vælge, som vi ønsker.

304 NATO vil altid være kernen i vores sikkerhed. Lad os
305 nu melde os fuldt og helt ind i den frie Verden. Det
306 eneste klædelige som land, det er at bidrage til den
307 sikkerhed, vi selv nyder godt af.

308 Vi skal ikke tage vores sikkerhed for givet, og
309 derfor så skal vi øge udgifterne til Danmarks
310 forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitik. Og dét skal vi gøre
311 nu.

312 Finansieringen har været det muliges kunst. For os
313 har det været vigtigt, at vi blev enige om noget, der
314 er ansvarligt og uden skattestigninger. Og det er det
315 her.

316 Når man læser de udtalelser, der har været fra bl.a.
317 vismændene, så bliver man jo forsikret om, at dansk
318 økonomi er holdbar, også efter denne aftale.

319 Jeg blåstempler ikke alt muligt nyt offentligt
320 forbrug, men jeg accepterer, at vi står i en
321 situation, hvor et underskud i nogle år er med til at
322 gøre Verden mere sikker. Og det jeg står bag, det er,
323 at forsvaret får flere penge. Og det gør jeg med
324 stolthed.
325 Frihed er ikke gratis.

326 Tak!

327 MF: Det var dét, vi ville sige som en indledning.
328 Og så er der åben for spørgsmål.

329 TV 2 først!

330 TV 2: Mit spørgsmål til dig først Mette Frederiksen om den
331 folkeafstemning, som I nu ville sende danskerne til,
332 fordi indtil nu har regeringen jo sagt, at
333 forsvarsforbeholdet ikke har været en hindring for den
334 forsvarspolitik I og Danmark gerne vil føre.
335 Mener regeringen nu, at forbeholdet alligevel er en
336 forhindring for forsvarspolitikken, eller handler det her
337 om at sende et signal?

338 MF: Det handler om at placere Danmark det rigtige sted nu. Og
339 jeg mener oprigtigt, hvad jeg sagde før og kan bifalde,
340 hvad der ellers er sagt her i dag, at Europa er et
341 andet Europa. Der var en tid før angrebet på Ukraine, og
342 der er en tid efter. Og hvert land må gøre op med sig
343 selv, hvordan man bedst muligt bidrager til at forstærke
344 Vesten yderligere og vores demokrati og vores frihed.

345 I min optik er der to ting, udover dét vi allerede gør
346 konkret omkring Ukraine, som Danmark skal gøre.
347 Det ene er fuldtonet i forhold til NATO at komme op på de
348 2 %, som vi har talt om længe, og som vi nu forpligter os
349 til. Og det andet er at afskaffe forsvarsforbeholdet for
350 med meget, meget klar og tydelig stemme at være en del af
351 den samlede europæiske sikkerhedsstruktur, så for mig,
352 som landets statsminister, er det mere en værdimæssig
353 beslutning om, at Danmark nu skal være med i EU og
354 forsvarssamarbejde uden forbehold.
355 Og så er det jo helt rigtigt, som det er sagt, at der er

356 operationer, der er aktiviteter, vi ikke har kunnet være
357 med i. Det har vi kunnet navigere os igennem, så det er
358 først og fremmest en værdibeslutning, i hvert fald for
359 regeringen.

360 TV 2: Og så lige et spørgsmål til det her med, at Danmark nu
361 skal op og bruge 2 % af BNP på forsvarsbudgettet. Når I
362 kalder det her en historisk aftale, så er det jo også,
363 fordi det er mange, mange milliarder, der fremover skal
364 postes i det danske forsvar. Og udover I laver en
365 revurdering af budgetloven, så tror jeg, der er mange
366 danskere, der gerne ville vide, kan man poste så mange
367 milliarder mere i dansk forsvar i de kommende år, uden at
368 det også kommer til at kunne mærkes på velfærden?

369 MF: Jeg ved ikke, om der er nogen, der vil sige noget først,
370 eller så gør jeg det.

371 Man kan sige den beslutning, vi træffer med det samlede
372 nationale kompromis er en vigtig ændring også i den
373 økonomiske politik i de kommende år. Skiftende regeringer
374 har sammen med skiftende flertal i Folketinget igennem
375 mange år truffet vigtige beslutninger - vi fører en
376 grundlæggende sund ansvarlig økonomisk politik i Danmark.
377 Det giver os muligheden for i den situation, vi står i i
378 dag, hvor vi har behov for at forhøje udgifterne på
379 forsvars- og sikkerhedsområdet meget markant - 18
380 milliarder kroner ekstra om året er rigtig, rigtig mange
381 penge. Samtidig med vi ser ind i nogle udfordringer,
382 fordi vores demografi nu engang er, som den er, så giver
383 det os muligheden for i en periode at køre med et
384 underskud. Det er fuldt ud økonomisk ansvarligt. Og når
385 vi vælger at træffe den beslutning, så er det
386 selvfølgelig også, fordi vi ikke ønsker, at det her skal
387 betyde massive besparelser og nedskæringer i vores
388 velfærdssamfund.

389 Jeg vil dog til det tilføje, at selv med den ændring af
390 budgetloven, som vi er enige om her, så fører vi en
391 relativ stram finanspolitik i Danmark. Det, mener jeg på
392 mange måder, er det rigtige at gøre. Det er i øvrigt også
393 dét, der har givet os muligheden for at kunne navigere i
394 coronakrisen, at vi havde en ansvarlig økonomisk politik
395 også inden, og derfor vil der også i de kommende år være
396 behov for svære prioriteringer - ligegyldig hvem der
397 sidder i regeringskontorerne - og ligegyldig hvem der
398 laver finansloven.

399 DR!

400 DR: I siger, at I vil udfase brugen af russisk gas, men
401 hvornår skal vi være uafhængige af russisk gas?

402 Statsminister Mette Frederiksen: Det skal vi så hurtigt
403 som overhovedet muligt. Vi har jo en gasproduktion selv i
404 Danmark, som imidlertid er sat ud af drift på grund af
405 nogle problemer omkring Tyrafeltet, så det skal foregå så
406 hurtigt som overhovedet muligt herhjemme, og det vil vi
407 også arbejde for kommer til at ske i resten af Europa.

408 DR: Men er I klar til, at Ørsted, de skal opsige deres
409 kontrakt med russerne?

410 MF: Vi er enige om i EU at gå sammen på sanktioneerne, og det
411 vil jeg kraftigt anbefale, at vi bliver ved med at gøre -
412 altså, at hvert land ikke sidder og laver egne
413 sanktioner, men at vi i EU i øvrigt i tæt sammenspil med
414 vores øvrige allierede, ikke mindst den vigtigste -
415 nemlig USA, men også Canada, at vi er enige om de
416 sanktioner, der er. Og som I ved, har vi vedtaget
417 sanktioner af flere forskellige etaper, og der er jo
418 løbende overvejelser om yderligere - jeg tror, Sofie
419 markerer.

420 Politisk leder for Radikale Venstre: Bare for at
421 supplere. Altså, det er jo også vigtigt, at det her
422 signal bliver sendt fra os nu. Vi skal være 100 %
423 uafhængige, fordi det også er nu, at EU skal beslutte en
424 ny uafhængighedsstrategi og derfor også ny strategi for
425 grøn forsyning, og derfor så vigtigt, at vi viser, at det
426 kan vi.

427 MF: Og Jakob

428 JEJ: Men det her handler jo ikke kun om os selv. Det handler
429 også om Europa. Og i Danmark - jamen, der har vi en
430 begrænset afhængighed af russisk gas ... der er nogen
431 lande, som er fuldstændig afhængig af russisk gas,
432 bogstaveligt talt, for at kunne holde varmen. Vi skylder
433 altså også de lande, at vi herhjemme skruer op de steder,
434 hvor vi kan - det være sig i Nordsøen - det være sig på
435 biogas, således at vi også kan levere vores del af det
436 her på en ansvarlig måde, så vi ikke er afhængige af en
437 krigsforbryder.

438 DR: Jeg bliver lige nødt til at følge op, fordi I har jo lige
439 brugt over en milliard kroner på en varmepakke, fordi

440 gaspriserne er steget herhjemme. Hvis man skal gøre sig
441 fuldstændig uafhængig af russisk gas, kul osv., så kommer
442 det jo formentlig til at blive dyrere at få gas ind i de
443 danske hjem, så vil I ikke give en nogenlunde tidsramme
444 på, hvornår man skal være fuldstændig uafhængig af
445 russisk gas, sådan at danskerne kan forberede sig bare i
446 det mindste.

447 POD: Men det kræver jo, vi laver de her investeringer, og
448 noget af det tager tid. Hvis vi skulle udbygge vores
449 biogasanlæg, som jo er en grøn gasform, så kan vi ikke
450 gøre det på en uge eller to. Det kræver nogle
451 investeringer. Det vil det også gøre, når vi skal
452 elektrificere Danmark, for det er jo vejen frem, da vi
453 laver energi ... Det kommer også til at tage tid. Det er
454 derfor, vi siger, alt dét vi kan pulje nu af gas, det er
455 Tyrafeltet, det er oppe at køre i 23. Det er Baltic Pipe,
456 det bliver i virkeligheden også, hvad vi ellers kan samle
457 sammen. Det bliver vigtigt, for danskerne kan jo allerede
458 mærke det nu. Danskerne kan mærke meget massive
459 stigninger på deres energiregninger. Og hvis vi skal
460 sikre os på den lange bane, at det bliver mere
461 balanceret, så forudsætter det ret store investeringer.

462 Jeg vil sige, jeg kan huske i 70'erne, jeg ved ikke, hvor
463 mange af jer, det kan huske det i 70'erne, men hele
464 diskussionen om energibesparelser og grunden til, at vi
465 skulle investere i energi, det var jo netop, at energi
466 blev sikkerhedspolitik og uafhængighed af Mellemøsten.
467 Det er præcis den samme diskussion, vi står i nu. Man kan
468 sige, det er træls, at der ikke har været noget rettidigt
469 omhu og større politisk vilje til at lave den omlægning.
470 Det sker nu, og jeg ikke kun det sker i Danmark. Jeg
471 tror, det kommer til at ske i hele Europa.

472 MF: Og så går vi herover på første række.

473 B: Mit spørgsmål er til statsministeren.
474 Det handler om finansiering. Du siger med dine ord, I vil
475 tillade et moderat underskud over de kommende år. Hvorfor
476 skal fremtidige generationer betale for vores sikkerhed
477 nu? Hvorfor ikke bugser på reformer og øge råderummet?

478 MF: Altså, for det første er det jo vigtigt at slå fast, at
479 dansk økonomi er så stærk og så robust, at vi kan gøre
480 det her. Og når vi på tværs af skiftende regeringer har
481 fået afdraget på gælden og i øvrigt gennemført reformer,
482 så er det, fordi det dels er det rigtige at gøre, men

483 også for at give en buffer til samfundet på andre
484 situationer. Nu er vi i en ny situation, hvor vi mener,
485 at det her er den rigtige måde at gøre det på. Det
486 betyder ikke, at der ikke kommer til at være masser af
487 politisk diskussion. Jeg kan sige for regeringens
488 vedkomne, er vi stadig tilhængere af reformer for at
489 forstærke en dansk økonomi endnu mere.

490 Jakob!

491 JEJ: Så handler det her jo også om, at der er appetit på
492 forskellige ting hos de forskellige partier. Og det her,
493 det er et nationalt kompromis. Det er noget, som vi alle
494 sammen skal kunne se os i.
495 Altså der er nogen, der har appetit på skattestigninger.
496 Det kan jeg sige, det har vi ikke i Venstre. Der er
497 nogen, der har større appetit på reformer, end andre har.
498 Det her, det handler jo om at finde en økonomisk
499 ansvarlig måde, som vi alle sammen kan stå inde for, og
500 hvor vi ikke klatre op i nogle træer for at melde
501 hinanden ud af denne her aftale.

502 MF: Søren, værsgo! ...

503 SPP: Bare lige for at sige, at den her aftale betyder jo ikke,
504 at så er al politik låst fast frem til 2033, det vil jeg
505 gerne understrege. Altså, det her det er jo en aftale,
506 hvor vi sikrer, at Danmarks økonomi stadigvæk er holdbar.
507 Men uanset, hvilken regering der sidder, og hvordan det
508 politiske flertal er, så vil vi jo få nogle diskussioner
509 derudover. Jeg kommer da stadigvæk til at kæmpe for både
510 skattelettelser og reformer i dét at få et samfund til at
511 komme med i den retning, jeg synes er rigtig. Og det
512 forhindrer det her jo ikke på nogen måde. Det tror jeg
513 bare lige er vigtigt at sige.

514 B: Du siger, at I alle er gået på kompromis med noget, og
515 statsministeren siger, at der kommer til at ske svære
516 politiske prioriteringer.
517 Hvad er det for nogle svære politiske prioriteringer, vi
518 kommer til at se?

519 MF: Men der er jo hele tiden svære politiske prioriteringer,
520 og det er jo ikke sådan, at vi med den ændring af
521 budgetloven får et markant større økonomisk råderum.
522 Vi har behov for et øget råderum for dels at kunne
523 håndtere de demografiske udfordringer, Danmark står
524 overfor, og fordi vi har behov for, og det har vi

525 vitterligt behov for at styrke dansk forsvar og
526 sikkerhed, men hvert år, når der skal laves en finanslov,
527 og det uagtet hvem der måtte være politisk flertal eller
528 regering på det tidspunkt, så vil der være de almindelige
529 politiske prioriteter og uenigheder.

530 POD: Og så vil jeg godt lige anholde dét, du siger, med, at
531 det er kommende generationer, der kommer til at betale.
532 Dét, at vi laver de her strukturelle underskud i nogle
533 år, det betyder jo ikke nødvendigvis, at Danmark
534 gældsætter sig mere, fordi det går så godt i dansk
535 økonomi, så i virkeligheden kommer der ikke til at være
536 mere gæld. Men muligheden, der skabes ved det her, det er
537 jo med SF's øjne, at vi stadigvæk kan investere i
538 velfærd, i uddannelse, i klima, som jo er noget af dét,
539 der faktisk gør os stærke, for vi lever ikke at det, vi
540 kan hive op af undergrunden. Vi lever faktisk af vores
541 viden, og det er vi fortsat nødt til at styrke. Og der
542 tror jeg da klart, der er nogle uenigheder, også her,
543 hvad det er, vi vil prioritere osv., de vil fortsat være
544 der. Men jeg vil bare understrege, vi efterlader altså
545 ikke en gæld med den her forandring.

546 A: Et spørgsmål til de to borgerlige partiformænd.
547 Hvis vi så når de her 2 % i 33, så er det jo 19 år efter,
548 at Helle Thorning underskrev Wales-erklæringen, og det er
549 9 år efter, at, som der står i Wales-erklæringen, man
550 skulle have nået 2 % i 2024.
551 Er det særlig ambitiøst?

552 JEJ: Man kunne sagtens have ønsket, at det skulle gå
553 hurtigere. Det tror jeg også, at vi et par stykker
554 derinde, der advokerede for. Det her, det handler om at
555 finde en balance. En balance, som sikrer, at vi alle
556 sammen kan være med. En balance, som sikrer, at der også
557 er et fornuftigt afløb på de her investeringer. Fordi,
558 hvis man hæver forsvarsbudgettet med 19 milliarder i
559 morgen, så er det måske ikke alle penge, der vil blive
560 brugt lige hensigtsmæssigt.
561 Det her, det tager tid. Det tager tid at indkøbe
562 materiel, særligt når hele Verden de kommer til at
563 efterspørge det. Hele den frie Verden kommer til at
564 efterspørge det her pga. den aggression, som Putin har
565 udvist.
566 Det skal vi sikre. Og så skal vi sikre, at økonomien den
567 også kan følge med, og det gør vi med den her måde at
568 strikke det sammen på.

569 Jeg synes stadigvæk, at dét, at vi tager skridtet til de
570 2 %, vi forpligter hinanden på de 2 %, det er jeg meget,
571 meget glad for.

572 SPP: Ja, hvis jeg må dele det lidt op i to. Altså, der skal 90
573 mandater til den slags ting ikke.
574 Og ja, det er lang tid, det har taget. Altså, nu siger
575 jeg bare lige så stille, at grunden til, at vi
576 overhovedet gik i regering i 2016, det var, at én af de
577 to knaster, vi havde, det tror jeg den tidligere
578 statsminister kan bekræfte, det var, at når vi skulle til
579 at forhandle forsvarsforlig, så skulle der et
580 substantielt løft til af forsvaret, der blev et løft på
581 20 % ... Det var, hvad vi kunne dengang.
582 Nu laver vi så en ny aftale, der får os op på 2 %. Ud fra
583 faglige kriterier om, at det er den gode måde at fase det
584 ind på, og så har vi en god debat til gode om, hvad skal
585 der så være i det forsvarsforlig. Der har vi sikkert
586 mange gode, spændende forslag.
587 Og så vil jeg bare gøre opmærksom på et enkelt lille ord,
588 der står i aftaleteksten - vi skal op på 2 % varigt, så
589 det betyder, når vi er på 2 %, så skal vi blive der. Det
590 ord, synes jeg, er rigtig, rigtig vigtigt i den her
591 aftale.

592 A: Og så lige et spørgsmål til statsministeren.
593 I forbindelse med præsentationen af den udenrigs- og
594 sikkerhedspolitiske strategi for kun godt 1 måned siden
595 sagde Jeppe Kofod, at der var ikke noget ...
596 forsvarsforbeholdet forhindrede os ikke i at føre den
597 udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, vi gerne ville.
598 Hvad er det i den aktuelle krise, som forsvarsforbeholdet
599 sådan helt konkret blokerer for - det er jo en meget
600 Rusland-NATO-konflikt.

601 MF: Det er den aktuelle krise, der er forskellen. Der var et
602 Europa før februar 2022, og der er et andet Europa efter.
603 Og det er nu alle lande, det er nu alle befolkninger, det
604 er nu alle politikere, det er nu alle politiske partier,
605 det er nu alle, alle i den vestlige Verden skal gøre
606 deres stilling op. Det er dét, der er forskellen. Det er
607 ikke et spørgsmål om den enkelte operation eller ej,
608 fordi der vil vi sige det samme, som vi sagde for en
609 måned siden. Det har vi kunnet navigere i.
610 Og vi har jo et militært engagement først og fremmest
611 selvfølgelig forsvarsmæssigt i NATO, og vi har det også i
612 FN-sammenhænge, og det vil vi jo fortsætte med at have.

613 Men hele forskellen er Ukraine, og dét, at et fredeligt
614 demokratisk frit land er under angreb af Rusland.
615 Der skal hvert enkelt land gøre op med sig selv, hvem er
616 man, hvem vil man være og med hvem vil man være dét, man
617 gerne vil være.

618 Og vi er enige om, og det er jeg ualmindeligt glad for.
619 Jeg er også stolt af at stå sammen med de her fire
620 kolleger og de her fire partier, at vi vil være med
621 helhjertet, fuldtonet, uden forbehold - både hvad angår
622 NATO, det er derfor, de 2 %, som jo - ja, har haft
623 tilsagn tidligere, men der har aldrig ligget en konkret
624 beslutning og i afskaffelsen af forsvarsforbeholdet.

625 JP: Skiftende danske regeringer har igen og igen kritiseret
626 NATOs opgørelsesmetode i bruttonationalproduktet.
627 Hvad er det, der har ændret sig, siden vi synes, det er
628 en god idé nu?
629 Og indebærer det her ikke en risiko for, at regningen
630 bliver meget højere, hvis nu det går rigtig godt i dansk
631 økonomi, og BNP vokser, så kan regningen meget vel blive
632 25 milliarder om året?

633 MF: Men det er helt korrekt. Det er jo en 2 %'s målsætning.
634 Og i takt med, at vi bliver dygtigere og rigere i
635 Danmark, og det har vi i øvrigt også en fælles ambition
636 om, at vi skal være, så vil der skulle tilføres
637 yderligere ressourcer.

638 Der har været masser af diskussioner i NATO om NATO-
639 opgørelsesmetoder. Alle de diskussioner er jo forstummet,
640 fordi der simpelthen er noget, der er vigtigere. Og det
641 er også dét, der kendetegner det nationale kompromis i
642 dag i Danmark, det er, at vi kunne diskutere utroligt
643 mange hjørner af alt muligt, men nu handler det om
644 Europas fremtid.

645 Vil du tilføje noget, Søren? Ja!

646 SPP: Jeg har lyst til at sige til Kong..., hvad ... vi kan også
647 spørge os selv, hvad er alternativet.
648 Tænk sig, hvis vi ikke var med i NATO. Vi vil gerne være
649 med i en forening. Vi vil gerne have, at amerikanske
650 forældre sender deres børn ud på missioner, men vi vil
651 ikke betale regningen.

652 Og så ved jeg godt, du har fuldstændig ret. Det kan jo
653 betyde, at et højere kontingent med tiden, hvis dansk
654 økonomi er stærk, men jeg mener ikke, der er noget

655 alternativ.
656 Jeg er stolt over, at vi nu endelig betaler hele vores
657 forsikringspræmie. Det synes jeg faktisk er ... det
658 vigtigste for os i hvert fald.

659 MF: Og Ekstra Bladet!

660 EB: Der er en verden før og efter den 24. februar, siger
661 statsministeren.

662 For en måned siden udelukkede statsministeren, at et
663 tættere forsvarspolitiske samarbejde med USA og Danmark
664 kom til at indebære udstationering af kernevåben på dansk
665 territorium.
666 Kan du i dag give danskerne en garanti for, at det løfte
667 kommer I ikke til at løbe fra?

668 MF: Ja, der er vores holdning den samme.

669 EB: Hvorfor er den den samme i dag, når Verden den er helt
670 anderledes. Hviderusland har givet Rusland tilladelse til
671 opstilling af atomvåben på deres territorium. Og Putin
672 har mere eller mindre indirekte truet med at bruge
673 taktiske kernevåben i Ukraine.

674 Hvorfor står I så så fast på lige præcis dét spørgsmål.
675 Altså, hvis amerikanerne kommer og beder danskerne om
676 dét, så udelukker I det?

677 MF: Ja, vores holdning er fortsat den samme.

678 EB: Gælder det også de borgerlige partier?

679 JEJ: Hvis der kommer sådan en anmodning, så vi se på den
680 konkrete anmodning.
681 Jeg må bare sige, Verden er forandret. Og det her med at
682 betale vores forsikringspræmie, som Søren Pape rigtig
683 siger, det er altså dét, der er omdrejningspunktet for
684 det her - det er, at vi helhjertet stempler ind både i
685 NATO, men også i Europa på vores forpligtelser.

686 MF: Og ... ja ... Søren.

687 SPP: Vi er ikke regering endnu. Kommer der så en anmodning fra
688 amerikanerne, når vi kommer det, så synes jeg, man sætter
689 sig ned og drøfter den.
690 Og så er jeg i øvrigt enig i de bemærkninger.

691 EB: Så I udelukker ikke, at I vil sige ja til kernevåben på
692 dansk jord.

- 693 SPP: Jeg synes, man skal passe på med at udelukke noget som
694 helst lige i øjeblikket. Jeg synes, det vigtigste det er,
695 at vi har en dialog med vores allierede, og det må vi jo
696 så se, hvad der sker en dag, hvis amerikanerne kommer med
697 den henvendelse.
- 698 JEJ: Jeg vil sige, jeg vil hellere have amerikanske end
699 russiske kernevåben i Danmark.
- 700 POD: Men det er så nok et område, hvor vi ikke er enige i
701 kredsen heroppe, vil jeg bare sige.
- 702 MF: Og værsgo!
- 703 DR: Mette Frederiksen lige for at vende tilbage til
704 afstemning af forsvarsforbeholdet - har der været nogle
705 konkrete ting i forbindelse med den russiske invasion i
706 Ukraine, hvor Danmark ikke har kunnet deltage på grund af
707 vores forsvarsforbehold?
- 708 MF: Nej, det er der ikke. Altså, når vi vælger, og i øvrigt
709 tak for opbakningen til dét - både fra partierne her, men
710 også andre - at donere militært isenkram, våben ind i
711 Ukraine, så er det en bilateral aftale.
- 712 Når vi styrker vores nationale beredskab, og når vi
713 styrker vores NATO-beredskab, så gør vi det i den ramme,
714 hvor den beslutning, den træffes.
- 715 Vi begynder at se nogen potentielle udfordringer på noget
716 cybersamarbejde, som jeg ikke kan redegøre for i
717 detaljen, som måske også kan have en relevans i forhold
718 til Ukraine. Men jeg vil gerne gentage, hvad jeg sagde
719 før - altså, den beslutning, vi træffer i dag om at
720 afskaffe forsvarsforbeholdet, er først og fremmest en
721 beslutning om, at Danmark skal være med i den europæiske
722 sikkerhedsstruktur - både hvad angår NATO og hvad angår
723 EU.
- 724 DR: Og så vil jeg også gerne spørge, om Ukraine har
725 appelleret til, at NATO indfører et flyveforbud over
726 Ukraine.
727 Hvad mener du om det?
- 728 MF: Det er der et ønske om fra Ukraines side. Jeg mener, der
729 er redegjort ganske tydeligt fra Vestens side, hvorfor
730 det ikke kan komme på tale. Og det gælder også set med
731 danske briller.
- 732 DR: Så det er ikke noget, du på noget tidspunkt vil støtte?

- 733 MF: Vi mener ikke, at det er dét, der er det rigtige at gøre.
734 Politiken!
- 735 P: Ja, du kalder det en værdibeslutning, at I vil have det
736 til afstemning - for at sende et signal forstår jeg.
737 Men reelt har det ikke nogen betydning for, hvordan
738 Danmark kan samarbejde.
- 739 Kunne man ikke bruge det samme argument til at sige -
740 jamen, så lad os dog afskaffe nogle andre af Danmarks
741 forbehold, fordi hvis man kigger på retsforbeholdet fx,
742 jamen, der er vi også lige indgået en aftale i EU, som
743 Danmark så på en eller anden måde laver en særlig for at
744 tilknytte os. Kunne vi ikke også bare gøre det ... bruge
745 argumentet dér?
- 746 MF: Man kan have mange holdninger til de øvrige forbehold.
747 Men nu står vi i en situation, hvor et demokratisk land
748 er under angreb fra Rusland. Og det er et nationalt
749 kompromis om dansk sikkerhed og forsvar. Og det er i
750 lyset af dét, man skal se, vi ønsker at afskaffe
751 forsvarsforbehold. Hvis danskerne ellers bakker op om
752 det. Der skal jo træffes en aktiv beslutning - ikke alene
753 politisk, men af os som folk og som land.
- 754 JEJ: Altså, man må også sige, at vores ønske om at afskaffe
755 forsvarsforbeholdet, det handler jo primært om fremtiden
756 og ikke om fortiden.
757 Altså, jeg har ønsket at afskaffe det i snart 30 år, det
758 er ikke nogen hemmelighed.
759 Men altså det her, det handler jo om - vil vi være med
760 ved bordet, når man taler om Europas fremtidige
761 sikkerhedsstruktur.
762 Det her, det er ikke en erstatning for NATO. Det her, det
763 er et supplement. NATO og EU skal gå hånd i hånd i det
764 her.
- 765 Men når der skal træffes beslutninger om Europas
766 sikkerhed i Europa, så skal vi da være med. Altså, det
767 bliver jo også bakket op af den amerikanske præsident, at
768 det her - det er en god idé.
- 769 MF: Og Pia!
- 770 POD: Og derudover kan vi jo sige, at NATO har jo, og især de
771 amerikanske tropper har jo haft et meget klart tilsagn
772 om, at de vil flytte dem hjem. Nu gør de det ikke. De har
773 valgt at fastholde dem i Europa på grund af krisen i

774 Ukraine. Men hvis vi kommer til at opleve, at
775 amerikanerne kommer til at fokusere mere på det
776 amerikanske kontinent, så er vi som europæere jo også
777 forpligtet til at forsvare os selv. Og derfor den der EU-
778 søjle, der er i NATO-samarbejdet, synes jeg og SF, at
779 Danmark skal være helt og fuldt med i.

780 P: Men hvis det vitterligt ikke har nogen konkret betydning,
781 om vi har forsvarsforbehold i den her situation -
782 udnytter I så ikke bare situationen - altså en
783 folkeafstemning m.m. og så siger vi - ok, så er det nu,
784 vi sætter den til afstemning.

785 MF: Sofie!

786 SCN: Det har jo betydning for, hvordan vi også bliver opfattet
787 - tager vi medansvar i Europa, eller gør vi ikke. Altså,
788 vil vi lade de andre - både i NATO, men også i EU, ordne
789 det for os. Det har også været en radikal holdning altid,
790 at vi skulle af med det forbehold.
791 Men nu handler det altså om, at sikkerhedssituationen er
792 en anden i Europa. Og hvor helt utrolig vigtigt, det er,
793 at vi er sammen om det. Der kommer nok også til at ske
794 sikkerhedspolitisk udvikling i Europa i den kommende tid.
795 Det går rigtig, rigtig stærkt lige nu, det kan man se,
796 også i de vendinger som andre europæiske lande tager. Det
797 skal vi være med i. Det skal vi være med til at tage
798 ansvar for og præge, også med alt dét vi kan i Danmark.

799 MF: Og Jakob!

800 JEJ: Så må man også sige det her med, at det havde haft nogen
801 betydning i den aktuelle krise - der var en historie i
802 Altinget for et par uger siden, der handlede om, at man
803 fra EU's side ønskede at bidrage med et træningsbidrag
804 til Ukraine, hvor eksperter stiller sig op og siger -
805 jamen, det kan Danmark ikke deltage i pga. vores
806 forsvarsbehold.
807 Helt ærligt - det, synes jeg er ærgerligt. Det, synes
808 jeg, er en skam.
809 Men som sagt det her - det handler om fremtiden. Det
810 handler ikke om fortiden.

811 MF: Men jeg vil sige i det hele taget, der er jo altid ting,
812 man kan lade være med. Altså vi kunne jo også lade være
813 med at leve op til de 2 %, men det vælger vi - vi vælger
814 nu endelig fra dansk side med hånden på kogepladen og med
815 en underskrift på papiret, at det vil Danmark. Vi kunne

816 også lade være med at sende panserværnsraketter til
817 Ukraine. Men vi har valgt i Danmark, så vidt jeg kan se
818 med solid opbakning fra vores befolkning, at hjælpe
819 Ukraine i den situation, man står i.
820 Og jo, man kan også godt lade være med at afskaffe
821 forsvarsforbeholdet. Jeg tror, det er vigtigt, at man ser
822 det hele i en sammenhæng, at det er nu, man skal beslutte
823 sig for, hvem man vil være, og hvor man vil være
824 Børsen!

825 BØ: I har tidligere, på det nærmeste alle partier, nok ikke
826 Søren Pape, men I andre i hvert fald, argumenteret for,
827 at det ikke handlede om, hvor mange penge Danmark brugte,
828 fordi vores forsvar så godt, så vi leverede meget mere
829 kvalitet for pengene.
830 Hvorfor har I skiftet mening?

831 MF: Jakob først!

832 JEJ: Fordi Verden er forandret. Fordi opgaven er forandret.
833 Fordi vi tidligere har haft et ekspeditionsforsvar, som
834 altså er draget ud i Verden for at kæmpe for vores
835 værdier. Nu har vi i langt højere grad ... kommer vi til,
836 fordi Verden er forandret, at have et territorielt
837 forsvar, at have noget, der fokuserer på vores nærområde.
838 Og det kræver nogle andre kapaciteter, og det kræver, at
839 man kan mobilisere nogle større styrker, og derfor så er
840 vi nødt til at lave den her forandring.

841 MF: Sofie!

842 SCN: ... det er jo et ryk for Radikale Venstre, det vil jeg
843 gerne sige højt og tydeligt, at gå ind fuldt og helt i
844 det her, men jo ud fra de samme logikker. Det er nu, at
845 man skal vise, at man er fuldt og helt med, også til at
846 tage medansvar i de forpligtende fællesskaber, vi har -
847 det er både i NATO og i EU. Så er der så en diskussion
848 om, hvad bruger vi det på, hvordan gør vi det bedst
849 henover den årrække, vi skal investere i. Det kommer vi
850 til at komme ind i forsvarsforliget med. Der er meget
851 bredde i der her, også hvad Danmark kan i forhold til
852 andre og måske fokusere på det. Det tager vi dér. Men det
853 er en grundlæggende beslutning om, at vi vil være med til
854 at tage ansvaret i Europa og også vise alle de øvrige
855 lande i NATO, at vi tager et medansvar.

856 POD: Dansk forsvar er faktisk et effektivt, et godt, et
857 rationelt forsvar, så det er jo ikke, fordi at de ikke

858 gør det. Og hvis man sammenligner dansk forsvar, og de
859 militæroperationer vi har haft rundt omkring i Verden med
860 fx andre forsvar, som er over de 2 %, så vil jeg sige, vi
861 får rigtig meget for pengene. Pointen er blot, at vi har
862 ting, vi mangler, og det er jo dét, vi skal kigge ind i.
863 Det er jo bare sådan en naiv tro om, at det er fedt at nå
864 2 %. Det er i virkeligheden de udfordringer, vi har
865 omkring cybersikkerhed, hvor Danmark virkelig ... vi er det
866 mest digitale land i Verden. Vi er ufatteligt udsatte,
867 derfor skal vi styrke vores cybersikkerhed.
868 Vi har et enormt farvand rundt om Grønland, omkring
869 Færøerne, ind i Østersøen, hvor vi har naturlige
870 interesser, bl.a. også at sikre energiinfrastruktur og
871 andet. Derfor er det en forudsætning, at vi faktisk skal
872 investere mere i Søværnet, og der er mange andre ting.
873 Lige nu sidder der jo eksperter og kigger ind i det
874 trusselsbillede, Danmark står over for, for at sige, hvad
875 det rationelle ville være ved investeringerne, og det vil
876 vi fra SF's side også sige. Vi vil ikke bare sådan sige -
877 vi skal have 8.000 tankvogne, eller hvad det nu skal
878 være. Det her skal være noget, der faktisk gavner vores
879 fælles sikkerhed, og det kan vi sådant set godt basere på
880 noget klogt materiel.

881 MF: Og Bloomberg.

882 BN: Jeg vil godt følge op på det spørgsmål, der var om Ørsted
883 før og i forhold til det her med at være afhængig af gas
884 fra Rusland. Det virker som om, at dét statsministeren
885 lægger op til, det er, at der fra EU's side skal komme
886 sanktioner, at Danmark er ikke ... regeringen, i det her
887 tilfælde som ejer af Ørsted, I ikke er klar til at gå ind
888 og bede ledelsen om at rive denne her gaskontrakt i
889 stykker.

890 Hvis det er tilfældet, hvordan ... altså, hvad er så sporet
891 hen mod de her EU-sanktioner, der så skal gøre det, hvis
892 det er dét, der ligesom er værktøjet?

893 MF: Altså dét, der har været styrken i nu 1½ uge, det er, at
894 Vesten står samlet. Det gør vi i vores militær, forsvaret
895 i vores forsvarsalliance. Det gør vi på sanktioner.
896 Og jeg kan jo godt huske, da vi gik i gang, at en del var
897 sådan ... næsten grinte lidt af sanktionssporet, kunne det
898 overhovedet bruges til noget. Der synes jeg, de seneste
899 10-11 døgn har vist, at sanktioner kan bruges til noget i
900 denne her situation.

- 901 Men styrken ved sanktioneerne er bredden og dybden i dem.
902 Altså, at vi går sammen i den vestlige Verden, og derfor
903 er vi enige om, og det vil jeg anbefale, at vi også gør
904 fremadrettet, at vi ikke har, hvert enkelt land, vores
905 egne sanktioner, som vi så kan trække fra eller lægge
906 til, men at vi vedtager sanktioner samlet. Og det kommer
907 også til at gælde på gasområdet.
- 908 BN: Men hvad skal Ørsted gøre i den her situation? De sidder
909 jo og råber politikerne op og siger - vi har behov for
910 lige præcis dét, du peger på her. Vi har behov for, at
911 der er politisk beslutning, for vi vil ikke bryde denne
912 her kontrakt alene, vi vil ikke stå solo med den.
913 Hvad skal de gøre? Du ... ejer den.
- 914 MF: De politiske situationer vi træffer, træffer vi sammen
915 med vores allierede, ikke hver for sig. B.T.
- 916 B.T.: Nu siger I alle sammen - både nu og også i andre
917 interviews, at man skal hjælpe Ukraine. Det handler også
918 om Ukraine. Der er en krig. Der er nu tegn på, at der
919 bliver brugt klyngebomber. Der er anklager om ... Ellemann
920 kalder det selv ... kalder selv Putin for en
921 krigsforbryder.
922 Konkret beder Ukraine om, at Vesten griber ind og laver
923 et flyveforbud, så man sørger for, at de 10.000, 100.000-
924 vis af mennesker ikke får missiler fra russiske jægerfly
925 i hovedet.
- 926 Hvorfor er det, at vi ikke vil gå det skridt og sikre, at
927 der ikke er potentielt 10.000-vis af mennesker, der
928 bliver dræbt i Ukraine. For det kan vi jo gøre. Hvorfor
929 er det, vi ikke går det?
- 930 MF: Altså, det ... ja, Jakob først.
- 931 JEJ: Fordi det risikerer at føre til noget, som er endnu mere
932 grusomt. Fordi du ikke kan have to atommagter i krig med
933 hinanden. Og hvis vi går ind og håndhæver et flyveforbud,
934 så er vi de facto i krig.
935 Det kan statsministeren ikke sige, for statsministeren er
936 statsminister. Men det er sådan virkeligheden er.
- 937 B.T.: Så i forhold til den røde linje, og man ikke går ind og
938 gør det. Det er jo meget veldokumenteret, at Rusland har
939 placeret de her Iskander-missiler langs grænsen til
940 Ukraine. Det er også missiler, der kan blive udrustet med
941 atomsprænghoveder, taktiske atomvåben, som jo ikke er
942 paddehatteskyer, men det er noget, der kan bruges og

943 potentielt igen slå rigtig, rigtig mange mennesker ihjel.
944 Også skabe strålefare. Det kan sprede sig ud over det
945 øvrige Europa.

946 Kan I sige, hvis Rusland rent faktisk gør brug af
947 taktiske atomvåben i Ukraine, så vil vi som Danmark, men
948 også som NATO-alliance stå og kigge på de eksplosioner og
949 sige - jamen, vi kommer ikke til at gøre mere?

950 MF: Vi kommer ikke til på noget tidspunkt i den her situation
951 at redegøre for, hvad vi gør i forskellige givne
952 situationer. Det er et svar, og det en respons, som vi
953 tilrettelægger sammen med vores allierede.

954 Og sidste!

955 O: Tak! Det er til Pia Olsen Dyhr og lige et kort spørgsmål
956 bagefter til statsministeren.

957 Det var fem fine skåltaler, vi hørte her. Man kunne jo
958 fristes til at sige, at de måske var en lille smule for
959 sent. Men nu har begivenheder jo altså gjort, at det
960 bliver sådant.

961 Vi har fået en bred orientering - danskerne får i aften
962 en bred orientering om, hvordan det hele ser ud. Men der
963 er ikke rigtig nogen detaljer omkring økonomien.

964 Vi ved, at de borgerlige ikke under nogen omstændigheder
965 vil have nogen former for højere skatter, og så må man ty
966 til en eller anden form for afgifter.

967 Og så er mit spørgsmål til dig: Disse afgifter vil jo
968 ramme de fleste i Danmark, men måske i særdeleshed dine
969 vælgere, SF's vælgere. Og så kunne jeg jo godt tænke mig
970 at vide - har du, hvis det her går for langt, har du så
971 en kattelerm at slippe ud af eller hopper du ud fra 10
972 meter-vippen med bind for øjnene og håber på, at der er
973 vand i bassinet?

974 POD: Der er intet med afgifter i den her aftale. Dét, der er
975 økonomien i denne her aftale, det er, at vi laver
976 muligheden for et større strukturelt underskud i de år,
977 hvor vi har en hængeskøjle i starten af 30'erne. Det gør
978 altså, at der kommer et større råderum i dansk økonomi.

979 Og jo, vi ville være uenige om, hvad det er, vi skal
980 bruge af finansskilder, hvis man skal finde yderligere
981 finansiering. Og der er jo ingen tvivl om, SF vil gerne
982 investere i vores fælles velfærd. Vi synes, det er

983 vigtigt, at investere i uddannelse. Vi synes, det er
984 vigtigt at investere i klima. Men så må vi jo kigge på,
985 hvad skal vi så snakke af finansieringsformer, og der vil
986 vi helt givet være uenige heroppe om, hvordan man skal
987 gøre det. Men der ligger altså intet om afgiftsstigninger
988 i denne her aftale.
989 Jeg tror faktisk, jeg vil have nemmere med
990 afgiftsstigninger end fx mine blå kolleger, ville jeg
991 tænke, men det ligger der altså ikke i denne her aftale.
992 Bare sådan så der ikke kommer nogen misforståelser
993 omkring det.

994 O: Vi går til statsministeren. Der er jo diskussioner om,
995 hvad vi skal udvide, at vi skal udvide NATO, og man skal
996 optage flere medlemmer, og der er jo så ligesom en kø,
997 hvor man har trukket et nummer.
998 Vil regeringen, vil statsministeren gå ind for, at
999 Ukraine, på grund af den nuværende situation, evt. skal
1000 rykke frem i bussen eller rykke frem i køen?

1001 MF: Både, hvad angår medlemskab af EU og NATO, der er der
1002 klare kriterier for, hvad man skal leve op til, og der er
1003 også en fuldstændig klar ansøgningsprocedure, og uagtet
1004 at alle nabolande ikke nødvendigvis, som tingene er i
1005 dag, lever op til det, så har både vi og vores naboland
1006 en meget, meget klar interesse i, at vi kommer så tæt på
1007 hinanden, som overhovedet muligt, også selvom det ikke er
1008 via et fuldt medlemskab, som det heldigvis er for en
1009 række andre lande.

1010 Jeg tror, alle har fået mulighed for at stille spørgsmål.

Transcription 5

Transcription of statements from the article “The government enters into a broad agreement to establish a Ukraine Fund in 2023”, 15 March 2023.

(org. title: Regeringen indgår bred aftale om at etablere en milliardstor Ukrainefond i 2023)

retrieved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website, www.um.dk

<https://ukraine.um.dk/nyheder/regeringen-indgaar-bred-aftale-om-at-etablere-en-milliardstor-ukrainefond-i-2023>

LLR: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (The Moderates)

TLP: Acting Minister of Defense, Troels Lund Poulsen (The Liberal Party of Denmark)

MB: Minister of Business, Morten Bødskov (The Social Democrats)

DJ: Minister for Development Cooperation and Global Climate Policy, Dan Jørgensen (The Social Democrats)

1 LLR: Vi står ved en historisk skillevej. Ukrainerne kæmper
2 ikke kun for deres egen frihed, men for hele Europas
3 sikkerhed. Med Ukrainefonden tager vi den danske støtte
4 til Ukraine til et nyt niveau. Det gælder ikke mindst på
5 erhvervsområdet. Danske virksomheder kan levere meget af
6 det, som Ukraine mangler, fx inden for drikkevand,
7 fjernvarme og fødevarer. Derfor skal vi styrke indsatsen.
8 Med fonden i ryggen vil vi bl.a. sætte mere kraft på
9 Udenrigsministeriets indsats for at hjælpe danske
10 virksomheder ind på det ukrainske marked og sætte flere
11 penge af til at skabe bedre betingelser for danske
12 virksomheders risikofyldte investeringer i Ukraine. Det
13 er godt nyt for både Ukraine og for dansk erhvervsliv.

14

15 TLP: Danmark står bag Ukraines frihedskamp sammen med resten
16 af den frie verden. Derfor kommer vi fortsat til at
17 støtte ukrainerne med donationer af militært materiel,
18 finansiering og træning, der kan understøtte deres kamp
19 mod Rusland. Danmark har indtil nu støttet Ukraine
20 militært med ca. 5 mia. kr., og med den nyetablerede
21 Ukrainefond lægger vi op til at fastholde et højt niveau
22 for den militære støtte til Ukraine. Det skal gøre en

23 reel og mærkbar forskel for ukrainerne. Deres kamp er
24 også vores kamp.

25

26 MB: Ukraine har akut brug for hjælp til genopbygningen af den
27 kritiske infrastruktur, som Putin målrettet ødelægger med
28 voldsomme missilangreb. Med en helt ny ordning i Danmarks
29 Eksport- og Investeringsfond sikrer vi omkring 1 mia. kr.
30 til lån og garantier til de danske virksomheder, der vil
31 bidrage til genopbygningen. Samtidig koordinerer vi tæt
32 med danske virksomheder i et operativt forum. For Putin
33 skal ikke vinde. Derfor løfter vi nu sammen med
34 erhvervslivet støtten til Ukraine til et nyt niveau.

35

36 DJ: Vi hjælper både her og nu humanitært med at opfylde de
37 mest basale menneskelige behov for de hårdt prøvede
38 ukrainere. Det vil fx sige at skaffe adgang til vand og
39 elektricitet. Samtidigt begynder vi allerede nu
40 genopbygningen af landet. Det handler om hurtigst muligt
41 at komme så tæt på normaltilstanden, som man nu kan i et
42 land under en krig.