

Aalborg Universitet



**AALBORG
UNIVERSITY**

Coppers Chasing Usual Suspects

An Embedded Search for a Proactive Police Performance and the Detective Métier

Hestehave, Nadja Kirchhoff

DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
[10.54337/aau429770172](https://doi.org/10.54337/aau429770172)

Publication date:
2021

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication from Aalborg University](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Hestehave, N. K. (2021). *Coppers Chasing Usual Suspects: An Embedded Search for a Proactive Police Performance and the Detective Métier*. Aalborg Universitetsforlag. <https://doi.org/10.54337/aau429770172>

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal -

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

COPPERS CHASING USUAL SUSPECTS

– AN EMBEDDED SEARCH FOR A PROACTIVE POLICE
PERFORMANCE AND THE DETECTIVE MÉTIER

**BY
NADJA KIRCHHOFF HESTEHAVE**

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED 2021



AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

Coppers Chasing Usual Suspects

*- An Embedded Search for a Proactive Police Performance
and the Detective Métier*

Nadja Kirchhoff Hestehave

2021

Dissertation submitted: 8 March 2021

PhD supervisors: Professor Michael Hviid Jacobsen (main)
Department of Sociology and Social Work
Aalborg University

Professor Helene Oppen Ingebrigtsen Gundhus (supporting)
Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law
University of Oslo

PhD committee: Associate Professor Sune Qvotrup Jensen
Aalborg University (Chair)

Senior Lecturer Bethan Loftus
Bangor University

Professor Martin Innes
Cardiff University

PhD Series: Faculty of Social Sciences, Aalborg University

ISSN (online): 2246-1256

ISBN (online): 978-87-7210-799-8

Published by:
Aalborg University Press
Kroghstræde 3
DK – 9220 Aalborg Ø
Phone: +45 99407140
aauf@forlag.aau.dk
forlag.aau.dk

© Copyright: Nadja Kirchhoff Hestehave

Illustrations: Claus Gade Sørensen

Proof reading: Nina Skyum-Nielsen

Printed in Denmark by Rosendahls, 2021

“Coppers”

- Slang term used for police officers.

Can be traced back to the early 19th century in New York City when the first police force consisted of an eight men unarmed patrol unit who wore an eight point copper badge on their shirt to distinguish themselves as officers of the law. As a result the general public started calling them *coppers*.

(UrbanDictionary.com)

- The term was the original unsharpened word, originally used in Britain to mean ‘someone who captures’ (the term ‘*cop*’ is recorded in the sense of ‘to capture’ from 1704, derived from the Latin word ‘*capere*’). The common myth is that it is a term referring to the police officer’s buttons which are made of copper.

(*A Dictionary of Historical Slang*, 1972)

“Panser”

- synonyms: (nouns) *gadebetjent, ordenshåndhæver, patruljebetjent, ordensbetjent, strisser, brynje, strømmer* (DK).
- (noun) *cop, armour* (UK).

(Wiktionary.org)

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	5
Acknowledgements	12
Abstract	17
Resumé	20
PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE	24
Chapter 1: In a Nutshell	26
Introduction	27
Puzzles and Background	32
Research Field and Knowledge Gaps	32
Research Interests and Motivations	35
Focus and Contributions	38
Relevance and Structure	38
Analytical Process	41
Knowledge Ambition	43
Chapter 2: New Trends in Modern Policing	48
Introduction	49
The Rise of a New Policing Paradigm: From Reactive to Proactive Policing	51
Understanding Changes and Innovations within Policing	51
Defining Proactive Policing	55
A New Perspective on Crime Prevention	56
The Old and the New Paradigm	59
Policing Uncertainties: From Reactive to Proactive Investigation	63
Widening the Field of Criminal Investigation	63
A New Approach to Investigating Organised Crime	64
Exploring the Concept of Proactive Investigation	67
Problems Regarding Police Proactivity	70

Investigating Investigation: Key Studies About Reactive and Proactive Approaches	73
Research on Criminal Investigation	73
Two Theories of Criminal Investigation	77
Key Studies on Proactive Investigation	78
Chapter 3: The Drama of Police and the Police Métier	82
Introduction	83
The Dramaturgical Model: A Performative View on Police Work	86
Policing as a Theatre	86
Goffman's Main Theoretical Concepts	89
<i>Performances and Teams</i>	89
<i>Two Regions: Front Stage and Backstage</i>	90
<i>The Art of Impression Management</i>	91
Contextualising the Dramaturgical Model: Limitations and Potentials	91
A Democratic Model of Policing: Composing the Police Métier	98
A Matter of Justice	98
The Police Métier: a Stabilising Medium	100
<i>Assumptions about Policing</i>	100
<i>The Incident Focus</i>	102
<i>The Shaping Forces of the Métier</i>	102
Contextualising the Police Métier: Limitations and Potentials	106
PART TWO: FRAMING THE STUDY	110
Chapter 4: Friend or Foe?	112
Introduction	113
Designing Embedded Research: Philosophy of Science and Researcher Position	124
The Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Embedded Stance	124
Unfolding the Embedded Stance	126
<i>The Importance of Backstage Knowledge</i>	128
<i>Diverse Methods to Capture Impression Management</i>	130
<i>The Current Embedded Study</i>	131

Generating Empirical Material: Research Arena and Embedded Research Methods	133
The Danish Police	133
The Organisation of Organised Crime Policing	133
Empirical Material	134
<i>Participant Observation and Ethnographic Interviewing</i>	135
<i>Qualitative Interviews</i>	138
<i>Document Research</i>	141
The Centrality of Operation Goldilocks	141
Studying Proactive Police Practices: Embedded Positions and Role Engagements	144
Researcher Positions	145
<i>The Professional Stranger and the Embedded Friend</i>	146
<i>Closeness and Distance</i>	148
Role Engagement	151
<i>Being an Organisational Member</i>	151
<i>Being Part of the Group</i>	156
<i>Being Loyal</i>	160
<i>Being in an Organisational Function</i>	163
<i>Being Too Much</i>	166
<i>Being Funny</i>	168
<i>Being an Object of “Humour”</i>	173
Wrapping Up: Analysing and Rendering Proactive Investigation	178
Method for Analysis	178
<i>First and Second Order Analyses</i>	181
Getting it ‘Right’: Assessing the Quality of the Study	183
Being a Critical Friend: (Embedded) Ethical Dilemmas	187
Confidentiality, Anonymity, and Informed Consent	187
The Blue Code of Silence	190
Critical-Constructive Embeddedness	193
<i>Self-Censor-Ship</i>	194
PART THREE: BEHIND THE SCENES	198

Chapter 5: Police in Times of Turmoil	200
Introduction	201
Crimes and Crises	204
Waves of Terrorism (from 2001)	204
Gang Conflicts (from 2008)	206
Migrants and Refugees (2015)	207
Internal Reforms and Initiatives	208
Police Reform (2007)	208
New Public Management	211
Management Reform	212
Task Forces (from 2009)	215
Police Education	218
Summary & Discussion: From Force to Service and Back Again?	220
Chapter 6: The Measure of Success	226
Introduction	227
Politics and Strategy: Introducing the Formal Frame for Policing Organised Crime	233
Strategic Objectives and Performance Goals	233
Response Models	238
<i>The Broad Response Model</i>	238
<i>The Narrow Response Model</i>	240
Playing the Numbers' Game: Implementing Formal Demands	244
Handling Political Expectations	244
Conflict Creating Demands	247
Trying to Change Demands	249
Further Challenges	252
The Impact of NPM	257
Good Results, Good Police Work: Identifying Informal Assumptions	260
Internal Discrepancies	260
Good Coppers, Bad Suspects	262

<i>The (Typical) Counterpart</i>	264
<i>Crusaders Against Crime</i>	269
<i>Real Police Work</i>	271
<i>Perceptions of Proactivity</i>	274
<i>Epistemic Rationales</i>	278
Summary & Discussion: A Rapid Response to Organised Crime?	281
Chapter 7: The Drama of Cops and Robbers	288
Introduction	289
Rounding Up Usual Suspects: Conventional Approaches to Targeting	294
The Good Old Days	294
<i>Investigation-led Targeting</i>	294
<i>Informant-driven Targeting</i>	296
Informant Work: A Necessary Evil	297
<i>Different Methods for Information Collection</i>	299
<i>Informant Handlers as Information Collectors?</i>	301
<i>Challenges for Informant Work</i>	303
Risks of Informant-Driven Targeting	310
<i>Over-policing Regular Customers</i>	310
<i>Under-policing Hidden Populations</i>	311
<i>Random Selection</i>	314
Beyond the Usual Suspects: Analytical Approaches to Targeting	316
Proactive Perspectives	316
Strategic Targeting	317
Developing a Framework	319
Implementing Strategic Targeting	321
Round One	321
<i>Round Two</i>	325
Challenges for Strategic Targeting	330
<i>Time Consuming and Resource Demanding</i>	330
<i>Lack of Organisational Maturity</i>	331
<i>Internal Resistance</i>	333

Cohesion or Conflict: Ritual Performances of Recognised Dramas	338
Two Models for Targeting	338
Favouring the Familiar	340
Illuminating Police Epistemic Culture	342
<i>The High-Status of Anecdotal Evidence</i>	343
<i>The Power to Know</i>	345
<i>Reduction of Complexity</i>	347
Summary & Discussion: A Random Approach to Targeting Priority Offenders?	349
Chapter 8: The Act of Proactivity	358
Introduction	359
The Black Box of Proactive Investigation: Searching for an Investigative Methodology	365
A Process Description of Proactive Investigation	365
<i>Start-Up</i>	366
<i>Instigating Initial Lines of Action and Tactics</i>	367
<i>Instigating Additional Lines of Action and Tactics</i>	368
<i>Instigating Supporting Lines of Action and Tactics</i>	369
<i>Considering Lines of Action and Tactics</i>	370
<i>Closing</i>	371
Investigation Organisation and Structure	372
<i>Roles, Functions, and Meetings</i>	372
Instigating Covert Operations	377
An Analytical Model for Proactive Investigation	378
<i>Models for Criminal Investigation</i>	378
<i>Stage 1: Initial Information Collection and Ordering Information</i>	380
<i>Stage 2: Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing Information Collection</i>	381
<i>Stage 3: Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence</i>	383
<i>Stage 4: Constructing or Closing Cases</i>	385
The Social Organisation of Proactive Investigation	386
Lines of Action vs. Lines of Enquiry	389
Proactive Investigation as Information Work	392
<i>Types of Information Work</i>	393

<i>Sources of Information Collection</i>	396
The Nature of Proactive Investigation: Revisiting Concept and Practice	404
Tactics, Methods, or Methodology?	404
Investigative Mindset	408
<i>'Solving Cases'</i>	408
<i>Suspect-Driven Case Building</i>	410
<i>Investigation as Action and Art</i>	413
Summary & Discussion: A Reactive Practice of Proactive Investigation?	418
Chapter 9: True Detective	424
Introduction	425
The Dramaturgical Performance of Proactive Investigation	427
The Proactive Detective Métier	431
The Socio-Political Context	432
<i>Components and Shaping Forces</i>	433
PART FOUR: CURTAIN FALL	448
Chapter 10: Closing	450
Conclusions	451
The Socio-Political Context	452
Strategic Frame and Organisational Structures	453
Informal Collective Assumptions	455
Informant-driven Targeting	457
Police Epistemic Culture	459
The Practice of Proactive Investigation	461
Investigative Mindset	463
Proactive Investigations as Performances	464
The Stabilising Medium of the Proactive Detective Métier	466
Contributions	470
Perspectives	475
References	479

Acknowledgements

When I am handing in this PhD thesis in a couple of days I have been working in the Danish police for more than 11 years – seven of them working on/off on this research project and at the same time attending my job as senior advisor in the National Police. Handing in this thesis marks the end of this specific project and the process of undergoing a doctoral education. It has been both a privilege and a burden. A privilege since I have had the opportunity to embed myself into the world of proactive policing and analyse a specific area in depth. A burden since the process of carrying out this research has been intense and demanding in ways I never would have thought.

Since the beginning of my employment in the Danish police, I have been attached to app. 8-9 different units or departments, and I have had app. 12-13 different managers. I have visited almost all police districts and many departments and units within the Danish police and thereby met several hundreds of people; police officers, detectives, managers, clerks, prosecutors, analysts, intelligence personnel etc. I have also visited a handful of European police organisations and have encountered international police researchers, police officers, detectives, analysts etc. All these encounters and people have influenced my perspectives on police organisations and policing in different ways and particularly their place and role in society. They have thereby directly or indirectly contributed to this PhD research. There are a number of people who deserves to be mentioned here as a way for me to show my humble appreciation for their engagement, commitment, and contribution to my work with this thesis.

I am deeply respectful of the complex task of policing and admire police officers' and other police personnel's ability – despite difficult working conditions, stressful situations, political demands, and organisational dysfunctions – to be committed, engaged, and carry out their work with great dedication and strong ideals about justice and fairness to the benefit of the public. It is difficult to find comparable

jobs with the same degree of diversity and complexity as policing – and with such significant consequences and implications for those individuals who are receiving and needing help or support from the police or those who are being policed. This thesis is first of all made possible due to the entire personnel in Alpha Investigation Unit (who will remain anonymous) who were brave and willing to tell me about their work and let me come close to this covert police practice. In this unit, I will especially like to thank the Police Commissioner, the Chief Superintendent, the Superintendent, and the Senior Investigating Officer, and the detectives involved in *Operation Goldilocks*.

The Danish National Police and Aalborg University have funded this research and I would like to thank both institutions for their engagement. In this connection, I would like to thank Assistant Police Commissioner Jørgen Harlev, Assistant Police Commissioner Jørgen Bergen Skov, Chief Advisor Anne-Stina Sørensen, Deputy Chief Superintendent Jens Dünweber, and Professor Michael Hviid Jacobsen for initially supporting and enabling the project. Former Chief Superintendent Michael Ask deserves special thanks for welcoming me to The National Centre of Investigation and for showing continuous interest and support. Assistant Police Commissioner Klaus Munk Nielsen has always supported, guided, and advised me and promoted my work, which I truly appreciate. Chief Superintendent Svend Foldager has also supported research and development and we have had many fruitful discussions and collaborations over the years. Former Chief Advisor Camilla Hald believed in the project and me from the very beginning and provided me with backstage knowledge and many ideas. She has always been an inspiration to me. Copenhagen Business School gave me the opportunity to become visiting scholar at The Department of Management, Society and Communication, and I would especially like to thank Dr. Mia Koss Hartmann for making this possible as well as Head of Department Dorte Salskov-Iversen and Professor Hans Krause Hansen for welcoming me and taking such good care of me.

My present and former colleagues in the Danish police John P., John V., Rikke W., Maria L., Peter D., Lars S., Bjørn B., Per J., Niels K., Daniel L., Therese H., Kristian

W., Mikael S., Søren H., Søren N., Peer T., Christian F., Mette B., Christina W., Helle A., Morten V., Jane S., Dina N., Klaus J., Jens M., Steen H., Anette A., Søren R., Thomas B., Rasmus S., Peter J., Robert F., Christina P., Anniken M., Preben H., Kristian L., Flemming F., Morten T., Henrik W., Rikke K., Jesper B., Jan M., Marianne L., Tine S., Thomas R., Adam D., and Peter H. have all supported me in different ways over the years and I am deeply grateful to all of them. Police Inspector and Senior Advisor Jakob Lindergård-Bentzen has been a close working partner in a number of years and I truly appreciate his friendship, our joint experiences, shared ideals, and all the opportunities he has provided. Dr. Hanne Stevens helped me at a crucial point in the process to take control of my work and offered motivation and qualified support along the way. PhD Fellow Sidsel Haarder was a tremendous help in a big crisis and her company has always provided laughs and new energy.

Words cannot express how extremely grateful I am to my PhD twin Kristina Kepinska Jakobsen who has been my closest friend and colleague in this process since we have had parallel PhD processes. She has been a life-saver on more than one occasion and I am deeply dependent on her tireless and resolute help and encouragement and her enjoyable and life-affirming company. I could not have done this without her.

Dr. Christa Moesgaard Løwenstein is the funniest person I know and one of the brightest analysts and researchers. She has not only been a true and loyal friend, but also a tremendous help throughout the process by providing both crucial comments and feedback to this thesis, but also by rooting for me along the way and picking me up when I stopped believing. Her continuous support has been vital for my ability to finish this work. I have especially enjoyed the many entertaining, rewarding, and comforting dinners at The Løwensteins.

My dear friends and colleagues from the research network NAPIP: Dr. Kira Vrist Rønn, Dr. Mia Koss Hartmann, and PhD Fellow Lotte Palm Høgh are some of the smartest, courageous, and toughest people I know and they are my academic role

models. Their unique insights into both Academia, policing, and life have helped me on so many occasions – not least in the review process.

Travels, Christmases, and New Years’ Eves’ over the years with my loyal travel partners Lotte Palm Høgh and Louise Johansen have enabled endless discussions of policing and life and has improved my perspective on a variety of issues and has manifested our friendship of which I am deeply thankful.

The Norwegian Police University College (PHS) in Oslo is for me a ‘second working home’ as I have always been welcomed here with open arms. The staff has become both good colleagues and friends over the last twelve years and their hospitality is extraordinary. I would especially like to thank Eileen Schreiner Berglie, Brita Bjørkelo, Paul Larsson, Torstein Eidet, and Johannes Sjo Steinsvåg for providing support, encouragement, and valuable insights into the field of policing.

I am deeply grateful to Police Superintendent and Dr. Ivar Fahsing as he has been a stable and steady reader of the entire thesis in draft providing not only crucial feedback and motivation along the way, but also for sharing my enthusiasm of proactive and covert policing and the importance of police research. I have enjoyed and benefited extremely from our many conversations and discussions over the years.

I owe Deputy State Prosecutor Gyrithe Ulrich great thanks for assessing my interpretations of the legal framework in this thesis and I commend her for providing fast and constructive feedback.

I would also like to thank my main supervisor Professor Michael Hviid Jacobsen first of all for giving me the opportunity to begin this PhD research, but also for inviting me to join other academic projects and engagements such as book projects and visits to other academic institutions. I especially commend him for promoting junior researchers and engaging them in various academic activities, which are most often reserved for more established academics.

My supporting supervisor Professor Helene Oppen Ingebrigtsen Gundhus has been truly dedicated and engaged in my work, has spent countless of hours reading thoroughly through the thesis, and has provided constructive and positive feedback. She has also motivated and supported me along the way and I admire her great qualities both as an academic, as a supervisor, and as a person.

My PhD and life coach Dr. Lisa Dahlager has made me overcome crises which I did not think I could. Besides from providing constructive comments and specifically helped me ‘crack the code’ of my methodology she has made me re-discover the joy of writing. For that reason, I dedicate this thesis to her.

My family – Jesper, Maja, Rebecca, my parents, Morten, and Bullet have all assisted me, rooted for me, and kept me company along the way. Jesper’s endless support, belief in me, and endurance is beyond what can be expected and for that, I am so deeply grateful. Beside from being a person to rely on in crises, Maja has stepped in as ‘project manager’ in the last and most crucial time of the process. Her unique overview and ability to prioritise, analyse, and getting things done have been an invaluable help for me. I cannot think of a better and more selfless person than her. My parents have always encouraged me to be ambitious, to work hard, and to make the most of my potential, but most importantly to stand up for myself and not to be afraid to take a stand even when standing alone. These abilities have been much needed in this process for which I am obliged.

My family of friends – Julie & Robert, Kenneth & Maria, Selma, Christian, Ingeborg, Kirch, Lise, Naja, Trine, Monica, Alexander, Malthe, and Mads are almost all people who I have known since I was a small child and whose lifelong friendships again and again have proved that I have true and loving friends. My best friend Julie has helped me take some critical decisions all through life and also in this PhD process and I am forever grateful for her insights and advice.

Abstract

This PhD study explores how police respond to organised crime via proactive investigation as a representation of a new policing paradigm called proactive policing. Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition the study is based on comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork in the Danish police and examines: how do proactive investigations unfold in the police and which conditions impact this and why?

The study's empirical findings are analysed and interpreted through a theoretical framework compelled by Erving Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model for social interaction and Peter K. Manning's (2010) theoretical concept of the police *métier*. Throughout the thesis, a theoretical framework is built and developed concerning *the police's proactive performance* which is determined by a specific *proactive detective métier*. Moreover, the groundwork for a comprehensive *embedded police research methodology* is developed and proposed (Hartmann et al. 2018).

The analysis examines first the broader context of the Danish police in which the practice of proactive investigation is carried out. A selection of key external and internal events which within the last decades have affected and shaped the current state of the Danish police and contemporary policing are analysed. The purpose is to explore how these events have impacted the police organisation and the conditions for proactive police work. These events concern societal changes such as crime problems and internal matters such as organisational reforms. More precise they deal with governance, strategic priorities, and occupational conditions in the police in general and proactive policing specifically. Social and political structures are important to the police institution, which reacts to and interacts with the different stimuli it is exposed to. Even the micro-cosmos of proactive investigation is connected to macro-oriented politics and societal developments which have direct and indirect influence on how this practice is carried out.

Second, the formal frame of the police's strategy against organised crime as well as aspects of the informal world of proactive policing are explored. The analysis focuses on how success of proactive policing is measured, and how proactive investigation is performed both on the police's front stage and backstage (Goffman 1959). This is done by scrutinising the political backdrop and underlying notions of the police's strategy, strategic and operational objectives, and key performance indicators. Moreover, the analysis examines the ruling epistemic culture (Cetina 1999) in the police and culturally anchored assumptions about police work which impact police practice.

Third, the central and preparatory phase leading up to the launch of proactive investigations is analysed by looking at how prime targets (priority offenders) for proactive investigations are identified and what influences this process. The analysis explores the organisational battle between the sustainment of traditional approaches to identifying investigation targets and the efforts to implement more analysis-driven strategic approaches. The ruling methods for targeting are analysed as well as how the implementation of new methods meet challenges when encountering the police's organisational and cultural frames, including the dominant police epistemic culture. The implications of different targeting approaches for proactive investigation as a central component of the police's strategy towards organised crime are moreover discussed.

Forth, the concrete practice of how proactive investigation is carried out is examined and analysed by looking into the different investigative phases and various investigative measures (tactics and techniques), which are set in motion during a proactive investigation. A model for proactive investigation is proposed with the purpose to identify a specific methodology and it is discussed why this is a difficult task. Moreover, the organisational collective notions concerning the professional endeavour of detective work – and consequently detectives' investigative mindset – is identified and discussed in terms of how this impacts proactive investigation practice.

Fifth, all analytical findings are combined and a cohesive narrative about the performance of proactive investigation and the shaping forces of the proactive detective métier is developed and presented. The study contributes with unique empirical, methodological, and theoretical knowledge about proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically and how these phenomena can be studied, interpreted, and understood.

Keywords

Proactive policing, covert policing, invisible policing, proactive investigation, organised crime, police performance, detective métier, police research, police sociology, qualitative methods, embedded police research methodology.

Resumé

Denne ph.d.-afhandling undersøger, hvordan politiet responderer på organiseret kriminalitet via proaktiv efterforskning som en del af det nye politiparadigme proaktivt politiarbejde. Forankret i en fænomenologisk-hermeneutisk tradition baserer dette ph.d.-studie sig på omfattende etnografisk feltarbejde i dansk politi og undersøger; hvordan udfolder proaktiv efterforskning sig i politiet, og hvilke forhold har indflydelse herpå og hvorfor?

Studiets empiriske fund er analyseret og fortolket udfra en teoretisk ramme bestående af sociologen Erving Goffmans (1959) dramaturgiske model for social interaktion og sociologen Peter K. Mannings (2010) teoretiske koncept *politimétier* (*police métier*). Gennem denne afhandling opbygges og udvikles en teoretisk forståelsesramme omhandlende *politiets proaktive performance*, som er determineret af en specifik *proaktiv efterforskningsmétier* (*proactive detective métier*). Herudover udvikles og præsenteres en omfattende metoderamme for *embedded police research methodology* (Hartmann et al. 2018).

Først analyseres den brede kontekst for dansk politi, hvori proaktiv efterforskning praktiseres. Fokus er at analysere et udvalg af centrale eksterne og interne begivenheder fra de sidste årtier, som har påvirket og formet dansk politis nuværende tilstand og status, herunder den måde hvorpå politiarbejde aktuelt udføres. Formålet er gennem analysen at undersøge, hvordan disse begivenheder har påvirket politiorganisationen og rammerne for at udføre proaktivt politiarbejde. Begivenhederne omhandler samfundsforandringer såsom kriminalitetsproblemer og interne forhold såsom organisationsreformer. Mere specifikt drejer det sig om ledelse, strategiske prioriteringer og arbejdsforhold i politiet generelt og i relation til proaktivt politiarbejde specifikt. Sociale og politiske strukturer er essentielle for politiet som institution, idet den reagerer og interagerer med de forskellige stimuli, den er udsat for. Selv proaktiv efterforsknings mikrokosmos er forbundet til makroorienteret politik og samfundsmæssige udviklinger, som dermed har direkte og indirekte indflydelse på, hvordan den praktiseres.

For det andet udforskes den formelle ramme for politiets strategi over for organiseret kriminalitet, såvel som aspekter af den uformelle ramme for proaktivt politiarbejde. Analysen fokuserer på, hvordan succes i forbindelse med proaktivt politiarbejde måles, og hvordan proaktiv efterforskning udspiller sig både på politiets forscene og bagscene (Goffman 1959). Den politiske baggrund for politiets strategi, og de underliggende forestillinger herom sammen med de strategiske og operationelle mål og måltal, analyseres. Derudover afdækkes den dominerende epistemiske kultur (Cetina 1999) i politiet, samt de kulturelt forankrede antagelser om politiarbejde, som har indflydelse på praksis.

For det tredje analyseres den helt centrale, indledende fase, der leder op til igangsættelse af proaktive efterforskninger ved at undersøge, hvordan prioriterede efterforskningsmål identificeres og udvælges, og hvad der påvirker disse processer. Analysen udforsker den organisatoriske konflikt mellem fastholdelsen af traditionelle tilgange til at identificere efterforskningsmål og forsøg på at implementere mere analysebaserede og strategiske tilgange. De dominerende tilgange til måludpegning analyseres, samt hvilke organisatoriske og kulturelle udfordringer implementeringen af de nye metoder møder, inklusiv politiets epistemiske kultur. Implikationerne af de forskellige tilgange til måludpegning for proaktiv efterforskning diskuteres som en central komponent af politiets strategi mod organiseret kriminalitet.

For det fjerde undersøges og analyseres den konkrete proaktive efterforskningspraksis ved at afdække de forskellige efterforskningsfaser, taktikker og teknikker, som igangsættes i løbet af en proaktiv efterforskning. Der præsenteres og udvikles en model for proaktiv efterforskning med henblik på at identificere en metodologi, og det diskuteres, hvorfor dette viser sig vanskeligt. Derudover identificeres og diskuteres de organisatoriske, kollektive forestillinger og holdninger til efterforskningsprofessionen, og analysen identificerer og diskuterer et særligt efterforsknings-mindset, og hvordan dette påvirker efterforskningspraksis.

Til sidste kombinerer afhandlingen de analytiske fund og udvikler og præsenteres et sammenhængende narrativ, der beskriver politiets performance for proaktiv efterforskning, og hvordan denne influeres af den proaktive efterforskningsmétier. Ph.d.-studiet bidrager med unik empirisk, metodologisk og teoretisk viden om proaktivt politiarbejde generelt og proaktiv efterforskning specifikt, samt hvordan disse fænomener kan studeres, fortolkes, og forstås.

Nøgleord

Proaktivt politiarbejde, skjulte politimetoder, usynligt politiarbejde, proaktiv efterforskning, organiseret kriminalitet, politiforskning, politisociologi, kvalitativ metode, politiperformance, efterforskningsmétier, embedded police research methodology.

PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE



Chapter 1: In a Nutshell

- *On the study's background, knowledge contributions, and structure*

The investigation of crime is fundamentally a form of information work, it is concerned with the identification, interpretation and ordering of information with the objective of ascertaining whether a crime has occurred and if so who was involved and how.

- *Investigating Murder* by Martin Innes (2003: 113).

Introduction

Regarding: OPERATION GOLDDLOCKS
Report: *Investigation Proposal*
ATT.: *Regional Coordination Staff*

Through several years the police have received information that Mr. NIGEL SMITH who is a long-time member of the organised crime group FALCONS has been involved in extensive trafficking of illicit drugs. Mr. Smith has been linked to previous investigations and he has also been the subject of inquiry himself. It has not yet been possible to build a case against Mr. Smith probably because of his suspected role as a kingpin. Within the last three years, Mr. Smith has been linked to two ongoing investigations/operations.

In connection with Operation Seagull, 26 kilos of cocaine were found in the basement of an apartment building in the centre of Metropolis. The police were able to link one of the residents to the area of the basement where the cocaine was found, but the inquiry disclosed that the actual users of the basement were two young members of Falcons. DNA analysis of forensic evidence connected the two organised crime members to the basement, but also DNA from a senior member of Falcons Mr. FRED ROSS HUNT was found. All three were arrested and charged with distribution of illicit narcotics.

During Operation Seagull intelligence information was obtained from other police districts and departments:

- Intelligence report from November 14, 2015 stating that Mr. Fred Ross Hunt is dealing illicit narcotics and the kingpin behind it is Mr. Nigel Smith.*
- Intelligence report from June 3, 2016 stating that Mr. Fred Ross Hunt and Mr. Nigel Smith have access to two large lorries, which they use to transport illicit narcotics. The lorries are owned by Miss LOUISA BROWN, who is the cousin of Mr. Fred Ross Hunt.*
- Intelligence report from August 20, 2017 stating that Mr. Nigel Smith is the sole distributor of cocaine in the Eastern part of Metropolis and that the drug storage is located in the basement of an apartment building.*

Through forensic analysis it has been determined that the seized 26 kilos of cocaine are compatible with several other cocaine seizures. The forensic report concludes that the cocaine origins from the same production as:

- 8 kilos of cocaine seized from a lorry in connection with a random custom control at the Southern border (lorry driver Mr. NEIL HASTINGS arrested and charged with distribution of illicit narcotics. Mr. Hastings had no previous criminal record or connections to organised crime).*
- 10.5 kilos of cocaine found in a warehouse in February 2018 (Operation U-turn, suspect fled abroad and is currently sought through Interpol).*
- 15.7 kilos of cocaine seized in connection with a joint police operation with co-operating European law enforcement partners (Operation Lucky Star, charged: Mr. SONNY DAVIS).*

Concerning Operation Lucky Star, it is reported that Mr. Sonny Davids is connected to Mr. ALLAN VOUNG, who is a long-time member of Falcons. Their contact and communication is well established and have been frequent and predominantly conspicuous, as they on several occasions have been seen holding face-to-face meetings in remote and rural areas.

Two different intelligence sources state that Mr. Nigel Smith often travels to South America and South Asia where he supposedly invests millions of Euros in businesses and real estate.

Based on the above information from previous investigations and intelligence reports, the instigation of a proactive investigation against Mr. Nigel Smith as the prime target and against the people working for him as secondary targets is proposed. The purposes are:

- 1) to disclose Mr. Nigel Smith's criminal activities,*
- 2) to identify the criminal network around him including his business partners,*
- 3) to identify dealers and buyers,*
- 4) to collect information and documentation to support the national monitoring of the members of organised crime.*

A successful outcome of such an operation will depend on the establishment of a large proactive investigation team with continuous available resources. The investigation will be time-consuming, longitudinal, and resourceful with a proposed extension for up to 18 months.

The report above is a re-constructed narrative based on a police record from an authentic case file attached to a police operation named *Operation Goldilocks*. It represents an investigation proposal (efterforskningsoplæg) addressed to police management at national and regional level with the suggestion to launch a so-called *proactive investigation* (fremadrettet efterforskning)¹ against specific individuals in the organised crime environment in Denmark. These individuals were by Danish police considered to be *priority* and *prolific offenders* and as such *high-value investigation targets* (prioriterede efterforskningsmål) as they were suspected of committing serious and considerable drug offences through several years.

A number of studies have explored police patrolling and order maintenance (McLaughlin 2007; Reiner 2010; Brodeur 2010), but both in an international and in a Scandinavian context there is little research regarding police's criminal investigative practice despite the fact that this is an important, key function in policing (Innes 2003; Stelfox 2009; Brodeur 2010; Hald & Rønn 2013; Fahsing 2016; Weisburd et al. 2019). Moreover, investigation practices regarding *proactive investigations* are particularly under researched (Manning 2004; Brodeur 2010; Bacon 2016; O'Neil 2018).

This PhD study explores how police respond to organised crime via proactive investigation as a representation of a new policing paradigm called *proactive policing*. The introduction of this paradigm in different reform efforts has proved to be a sustainable trend in modern policing in most Western countries (Manning 2010; Sherman 2013; Weisburd et al. 2018). Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition, I have carried out a comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork to examine the following research question:

How do proactive investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in the police and which conditions impact this and why?

Through this approach, I have developed and laid out the groundwork for a comprehensive methodology which I – building on the works with colleagues Hartmann, Høgh and Rønn (2018) – label as *embedded (police) research methodology* suggesting a comprehensive methodology proposing a specific scientific stance, specific research design, and the use of specific research methods to undertake an embedded (inside) researcher position (see **Chapter 4**).

The works of sociologists Erving Goffman (1959) and Peter K. Manning (2010) have guided the theoretical interpretation of the analytical findings. Throughout the thesis, I build a theoretical framework for proactive investigation as a specific policing discipline and as a social performance (Goffman 1959) determined by specific external and internal conditions by developing a theoretical concept called *the proactive detective métier* (Manning 2010).

Consequently, this study contributes with unique empirical, methodological, and theoretical knowledge about proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically and how these phenomena can be studied, interpreted, and understood.

In this first chapter of the thesis, I introduce, frame, and unfold the patchwork of parts, which make up this particular research study and the thesis as a whole. The purpose is to provide the reader with a contextual foundation for reading the coming chapters, and consequently understanding of the origins of the study, and the circumstances around it. The chapter therefore aims to introduce the reader to the research field, in which this study is situated, to account for the motivations and research interests behind it, and thus the specific research focus. Moreover, the chapter is intended to make clear how and why this study is relevant, and what its unique empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions are. Lastly, the chapter is meant to provide the reader with a framework of expectations – a clear

structure of the thesis and the separate chapters, and in what way the content is presented and why.

The chapter is structured as follows:

First, I present the general themes of the study and its knowledge gaps as well as my motivations and research interests.

Second, I introduce the research question and the study's scientific relevance and submit a structure of the thesis.

Third, I account for the study's knowledge ambition and thereby empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions.

¹In Danish two different expressions are used about proactive investigations, which I will discuss further in Chapter 2.

Puzzles and Background

Research Field and Knowledge Gaps

Policing varies in historical, cultural, and social context (Manning 2013). It includes a variety of diverse activities, which have changed considerably since the origin of the police (Brodeur 2010; Reiner 2010; Ellefsen & Larsson 2014; Terpstra & Salet 2019; Bowling et al. 2020). Some of these activities are at public display for example the traditional law and order related duties such as traffic controls, preventive patrolling, crowd control, conflict resolution, and even some elements of criminal investigation (e.g. crime scene investigation, house-to-house enquiries, and other information gathering). Every now and then the public is moreover invited to assist the police or to participate in police work for example in connection with searching for missing people, keeping an eye out for burglars in the neighbourhood, or providing information on specific offenders or criminal events.

Nevertheless, a certain amount of police activity takes place ‘behind the scenes’ without any public insight or knowledge. This type of policing is what police researchers Bethan Loftus and Benjamin Goold (2012) label as *invisible policing*. Criminal investigation overall is to some extent encumbered by confidentiality and is therefore rarely something the public, journalists or others will be granted access to. Even though it is a key function in policing, police’s investigative practice is the least researched police activity (Brodeur 2010). It may have to do with the nature of investigation work and its sensitivity to outsiders’ (including researchers’) insight. This is the case when it comes to so-called *reactive investigations* – meaning investigations of crimes which have already occurred (such as the burglaries, fraud, violent assaults, homicides etc.). It is, however, indeed the case when it comes to police’s investigation of organised crime namely *proactive investigations* (Bacon 2016).

Organised crime is generally not reported to the police. The investigation of organised crime is therefore largely depending on police's own initiative. This calls for police being *proactive* and *assertive* employing activities which can uncover *potential ongoing* criminal events or criminal activities *under planning*. As such, police are in a peculiar vacuum. Often, they have no tangible events or leads in organised crime cases and consequently they are bound to work with suspicion as their primary line of enquiry. Suspicion which is typically compelled by information stemming from *confidential informants* – other criminal agents with questionable reliability (Marx 1988) (a dilemma which I discuss in detail in **Chapter 7**).

Like the police response, threats from organised crime are predominantly invisible to the public. Organised crime encompass typically diffuse threats and subversive measures such as infiltration of and exploitation of legal markets, systematic social fraud, money laundering etc., which police themselves do not fully overview or comprehend. It comes from a variety of social environments and social agents; some who are known or unknown to the police – and some who are very difficult to gain knowledge of. Due to this invisibility and diffusiveness the police themselves co-producers and co-constructors of the phenomenon (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 2013). As such, organised crime investigations evolve around overwhelming amounts of fragile and sporadic information, which is identified, collected, processed, and interpreted with the purpose of building arguments (eventually evidence) that criminal activities are in fact taking place and that specific individuals are responsible. That being so, the policing of organised crime and specifically the instigation of proactive investigations is far from a straightforward job. It raises complex professional and ethical issues and dilemmas in relation to accountability, transparency, public security, privacy and so on. At the same time, police organisations are experiencing increasing political awareness and demands in most Western societies with aggravating concerns about potential security and crime risks, which they must balance together with a professional and responsible practice (Harfield & Harfield 2016).

External conditions such as the emerge of new crime challenges, organised crime, and terrorism have together with dramatic fiscal changes as a consequence of financial instability all over the Western world meant that police are urged to prioritise their resources differently and to develop new innovative methods in their approach to crime and disorder (Terpstra & Salet 2019). Conventional policing methods have failed in terms of meeting the challenges of modern society including the changes within criminal environments and the public's demand for service (see e.g. Weisburd & Braga 2019; Manning 2008c). This condition has been imperative in introducing a new policing paradigm namely *proactive policing* to replace conventional police approaches mirrored in the *reactive policing paradigm* (Fyfe et al. 2018; Weisburd et al. 2019) (see further elaboration in **Chapter 2**). Proactive policing refers to all policing strategies that have as one of their goals the prevention or reduction of crime and disorder and that are not reactive in terms of focusing primarily on uncovering ongoing crime or on investigating or responding to crimes once they have occurred (Weisburd & Majundar 2018). An implicit condition within proactive policing is that police should have 'smarter' strategies, approaches, and methods for police work (Maguire 2000). This new paradigm therefore also promotes a shift from conventional experience-based policing towards knowledge-based policing. In terms of the response to organised crime this suggests amongst other that police should work *proactively* based on knowledge from e.g. criminal intelligence and focus their resources on those groups and offenders who pose the greatest threats to society and cause most damage and harm to get most value for money (Ratcliffe 2016; Weisburd & Majmundar 2018). The question is, however, if policing generally and proactive investigation specifically in practice have changed because of the introduction of the new paradigm and if so, in what ways?

Research Interests and Motivations

Despite an increased public interest in police work and the accumulating public awareness of police performance and implicit legitimacy there is generally speaking a knowledge gap when it comes to how police work is carried out (Innes 2003; Manning 2010). Although criminal investigation is a popular theme for mass media, crime novels, television series, and films, it is generally surrounded by mystery, stereotypical conceptions, and overrated notions of police's actual capabilities and prospects (Perlmutter 2000; Brodeur 2010). According to Norwegian police researcher Helene Gundhus (2014) the emerging of proactive methods within policing has moreover not been given the attention it deserves within police science. Consequently, it remains 'a black box' how proactive policing is manifested in police organisations and specifically in investigation practice; how proactive investigations are organised and instigated, how targets for investigation are selected, and how investigations are carried out – and this is the focus of this study. There are notable paradoxes, challenges, conflicts, dilemmas, and potentials connected to proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically as it represents police's use of covert measures on behalf of, but also towards the public. British scholars Harfield & Harfield (2016: 4) categorise covert policing as a 'moral minefield' as they say it:

(...) operates in an arena of permanent tension between preserving respect for the individual human dignity and maximising the utility so long as any good generated outweighs any harm caused.

To fulfil an overall public demand of legitimacy, proactive investigation therefore requires a professional practice rooted in dominant principles of e.g. legality and proportionality where enforcement, legal rights, and concerns for the individual are balanced in a responsible way, and where basic human rights are considered (Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018; Harfield & Harfield 2016). This is what Manning (2010) refers to as *democratic policing*; a redistributive mechanism resting on notions of

trust, equality, and legitimacy. The police are, for example, the only ones in democratic societies who are entrusted with the power to use coercive and potential lethal force against its citizens. This condition in itself makes policing a relevant and necessary study object for scientific research. It is also ultimately what defines the police: although police's use of force is generally rare, and even though the police have a number of other responsibilities and tasks, their mandate to use force is the determining difference between them and other democratic institutions. Therefore, the power to use force against, to incapacitate, and to sanction citizens make police and police action of immense significance for both society as a whole and its individuals (Manning 1977; Klockars 1985).

Since the beginning of my employment within the Danish National Police (Rigspolitiet) from 2009, I have primarily been working with the field of organised crime, specifically the police's response to organised crime groups (rockere og bande, kriminelle netværk og grupperinger). Through this work, I have gained insight into how the police and the criminal environment respectively operate. My educational background in sociology and criminology has additionally increased and influenced my interest in policing as a research field and the broader implications of different types of policing for society. In my daily observations of 'the world of policing' in this context meaning both policing as a process and police as an institution (see for example Jaschke et al. 2007) I have furthermore at first hand encountered the competition between the reactive and the proactive paradigm and consequently the rivalry between the two epistemological rationales of experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing. This made me interested in and curious about the conflicts and contesting interests which arise when trying to implement new ways of doing things within a police organisation. I have as such found it pertinent to explore the implications of these challenges for policing specifically and for society generally. At the same time, my function as an employee within the police puts me in a privileged position as I can study these

conditions from the inside – a rare and advantageous, but also windy position in police research (see further discussions of this researcher position in **Chapter 4**).

The above components have altogether raised my overall interest in how police deal with organised crime through proactive measures while balancing societal expectations of providing public safety and security, political demands regarding quality and efficiency together with the preservation of democratic values? Further, how do police integrate a new paradigm and new methods in established practices and organisational assumptions? The police do not exist in a vacuum, they are not derived from society; they are, on the contrary, a social institution with independent agency operating in a bureaucratic system of crime control, which has tremendous impact on people's welfare and lives (Garland 1990). It is therefore relevant to explore how this social institution reacts to and interacts with the external stimuli and demands it is exposed to, and how the democratic legitimacy it has been given is administered.

Focus and Contributions

Relevance and Structure

The research puzzle that drives this study is concerned with the exploration of how police respond to organised crime via proactive investigation, why they do so, and the implication for society in general. The police are not merely responders to organised crime – they have in wide terms both the power to define (organised) crime and the power to process it and they are as such both co-constructors, co-producers, and co-contributors of the phenomenon (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 1988; 2013; Manning 2010). The study is situated within the Danish police, which becomes an example of ‘the police’ as an organisation and as a social institution. The microcosmos of proactive investigation becomes an example of police work, and of how the police as a bureaucracy and its agents as professionals with wide discretionary powers react to and integrate new stimuli. It is within this microcosmos that not only the impact of external social structures and formal conditions can be examined, but indeed the informal subterranean mechanisms which guide policing get exposed and their magnitude become clear (Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012). In this study, I seek to investigate the dynamic interplay between macro and micro level by looking at the research question of how proactive investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in the police and which conditions impact this and why. By ‘unfold’, I refer to how the police organisation conceptualise and interpret proactivity, and how it is implemented and practiced. By ‘conditions’, I refer to how external and internal, formal and informal structures, rationales, and assumptions influence and shape this practice.

As many police studies, this study is interdisciplinary and anchored in a variety of research fields such as *proactive policing*, *covert policing*, *invisible policing*, *criminal investigation*, *intelligence studies*, *organisational studies* etc. Throughout the analysis, I

therefore draw on key studies from police science, which I present in **Chapter 2**, where I outline 'state of the art' of the research field.

The study's theoretical framework concerns the dramaturgical model of policing and the police *métier* (Goffman 1959; Manning 2010), which I present in **Chapter 3** together with an account of how central theoretical concepts are applied. This framework is indeed a part of my preunderstanding and additionally it guides the analysis as it continuously provides the spectacles through which I view and interpret the empirical findings. A particular embedded research methodology guides how the study is framed and designed, how information is collected, and how the empirical material is analysed and interpreted – which I introduce and unfold in **Chapter 4**.

In **Chapter 5**, I examine a selection of external societal changes (such as crime problems) and internal organisational matters (such as reforms), as I ask and analyse: *how have these events impacted the police organisation and the conditions for proactive police work?* It is important to understand the social and political structures, which the police react to and interact with, as even the microcosmos of proactive investigation is influenced by macro-oriented politics and societal developments. The analysis is therefore meant to provide a contextual frame of the Danish police in which the practice of proactive policing is carried out.

In **Chapter 6**, I explore the formal frames and aspects of informal structures in which proactive investigation unfolds. I ask and analyse specifically: *how is the success of proactive policing measured?* I look at both political and strategic demands for the police together with culturally anchored assumptions and rationales about what makes up good police work. I discuss how these formal and informal conditions impact the practice of proactive investigation, and the overall police response to organised crime.

In **Chapter 7**, I focus on the central and preparatory phase leading up to the launch of proactive investigations by asking and analysing: *how are prime targets for proactive investigations identified and what influences this?* I identify ruling methods for targeting and analyse how new methods are sought instigated as a part of the policing paradigm and the challenges this implementation meets when encountering the police's organisational frames and police epistemic culture. I discuss the implications of different targeting approaches for proactive investigation as a central component of the police's strategy towards organised crime.

In **Chapter 8**, I focus on the practice of proactive investigation as I ask and analyse: *how is proactive investigation carried out?* I scrutinise and analyse the process and content of central investigative tactics which are set in motion during a proactive investigation. Throughout the chapter, I seek to identify a specific methodology and discuss why this is a difficult task. Moreover, I examine the collective notions concerning the professional endeavour of detective work, and consequently how these impact proactive investigation practice.

In **Chapter 9**, I combine the analytical findings from the previous four chapters and ask and analyse: *how is proactive investigation performed and what makes up and shapes the proactive detective métier?* As such, I seek to display a cohesive narrative about the dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation and to identify and develop a concept of the proactive detective métier and its shaping forces.

In **Chapter 10**, I draw conclusions based on the analysis and answer the study's research question. I account for the study's knowledge contributions to research and practice, and finally I offer some perspectives of these in relation to the broader discussion of proactive policing and proactive investigation and its implications for society.

Analytical Process

As I will unfold throughout **Part One** of this thesis, police work is by many scholars regarded as a practice built on tacit knowledge and silent work experiences (Finstad 2000, Gundhus 2006, Loftus 2010; Hald 2015 etc.). This is indeed the case for invisible, covert policing and as such proactive investigation which is surrounded by a high degree of secrecy. Practices and procedures seem obvious for and are rarely questioned by detectives and members of the police organisation and consequently they are poorly defined and described (Hartmann et al. 2018). Additionally, the classic literature on police occupational culture underlines that police are notorious sceptical of outsiders and their potential critical view on the organisation (Reiner 2010).

These conditions combined indicate that it requires a specific research methodology to study and capture the subterranean structures and underlying assumptions of police practice cf. embedded police research (see **Chapter 4**). The embedded approach relies on the foundation that police work in general and proactive investigation in particular to a large extent is context dependent and sensitive to situational factors. To explore the meaning of context and situational factors it is important to understand the lifeworld, informal norms, and collective values which bind the police profession together as these conditions have vital implications for e.g. investigation practices. To gain insight into these, however, requires a close participation in everyday police activities. I do this by taking a qualitative approach carrying out a comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork looking at both strategic documents, strategic and operational decision-making, investigative case work, and views and perspectives of police managers as well as detectives. In the context of this study and in accordance with the theoretical framework (see **Chapter 3**), I view police action as a combination of organisational and individual action based on both institutional and professional premises and conditions. Consequently, in the context of the Danish police I investigate both the

circumstances surrounding the police organisation and the perspectives of individual police officers and their agency. Moreover, I look at both the strategic level (management/decision-makers), the operational/tactical level (frontline policing/detectives), and the dynamic interplay between these. The different empirical parts are thereby derived from different levels (strategic/operational-tactical) and perspectives (organisation/agents) and I view them as influencing each other continuously. The study is furthermore composed by a variety of research methods including participant observation, ethnographic interviewing, and document research. This is in accordance with the phenomenological-hermeneutic scientific stance, which is framing the methodological approach and likewise informs the method for analysis.

The research question is explorative and requires both a theoretical examination and an empirical study. I apply a hermeneutic analytical approach conducting a *first-degree analysis* (førsteordensanalyse), which is explorative and phenomenological in nature and intended to answer the question of *what goes on?* Subsequently, I conduct a *second-degree analysis* (andenordensanalyse), which is hermeneutic and interpretative in nature looking at *why does it go on this way?* (Van Maanen 1979). The analytical method is indeed an ongoing circular process where additional layers of interpretations, knowledge, and understanding are progressively added through each chapter. The continuous analytical process is therefore an ongoing interaction between theory, methods, and empirical findings with the aim to identify and generate patterns, moving from specific situational characteristics of actions or statements in relation to proactive investigation (the individual empirical parts) to a general level looking at the proactive phenomenon as a whole (the entire empirical material) (Dahlgren & Fredslund 2008). Every part and chapter of the thesis is thereby intended to provide a (new) contextual frame for analysis for the coming parts and chapters and serve thereby as (new) hermeneutic circles of interpretation (see **Chapter 4** for further elaborations).

Knowledge Ambition

It is the starting point of this study that the role of police research primarily is to build in-depth knowledge about the police itself, aspects of police work, the police's role in society, and the interplay between the police and the public. In relation to the latter, American sociologist Carl B. Klockars (1985) claims that there are two approaches to explore this: 1) to look at the norms expressed in laws, written policies which govern police work, and 2) to look at the way the police actually go about their work and use the means at their disposal. In this study, I seek to combine the two approaches and as such generate knowledge of the dynamic interplay, but also formal and informal conditions, and inherent conflicts and counter conceptions between ideals and reality.

Manning (2010) differentiates between sociology *of* the police and sociology *for* the police. Sociology of the police explores the relevance of theories and concepts as they apply to the organisation, occupation, and its impacts – analytically driven and data based. Sociology for the police is devoted to evaluating the status, management and level of performance of the police while reducing negative matters e.g. corruption, violence, malfeasance etc. Manning (ibid.; 2005) is generally critical towards police studies as, he argues, they often lack theoretical grounds and analytical questions and instead focus on practical problems or issues stemming from the practical world. He says (ibid.: 100):

In many respects, policing studies is too much about the police and too little about the context of culture of policing, including its legitimacy, grounding in democratic values, restraint, and tolerance of differences.

This, Manning (ibid.) says, has the consequence that police studies fail to recognise the police and police action in the context of society suppressing contradictions and impediments and thereby have a willingness to please 'the police audience' rather than 'the scholarly audience'. Although this study is occupied with specific

police practice, it is certainly my ambition to view this practice in a societal context concretely by exploring the dynamic between external drivers and internal responses. I will moreover argue that the embedded approach seeks to combine the two approaches in search for a middle ground of sociology *of* and *for* the police.

This middle ground can be said to consider requirements from both the scholarly audience and the police audience. A key ambition of mine is to produce scientific knowledge, which can constitute a foundation to support a continuous professional development of proactive investigation practice in service of society and as such function both as ‘a mirror’ and ‘a motor’ (Innes 2010a). Such different requirements of research and practice are therefore interdependent in my view; in order to impact the practical context of policing it is necessary to produce sound and well-founded (scientific) knowledge about this practice – but also knowledge about the prospects of this practice by delivering a broader, theoretical discussion. Since proactive and covert police work is tacit and poorly described, a fundamental aim of this study is therefore first and foremost to uncover and clarify aspects of proactive investigation practice and thereby make parts of invisible policing visible. A field as complex and comprehensive as proactive investigation cannot be fully grasped. Accordingly, this thesis does not represent the truth about the world of proactive investigation as this would be impossible. Instead, it offers an interpretation of this world and suggests possible theoretical explanations. It therefore represents a snapshot of *what goes on and why it goes on this way* seen through a particular set of spectacles. The study has three main purposes:

First, based on extensive empirical material it is my aim to explicate and analyse existing practices around proactive investigation in regard to the police’s response to organised crime and the surrounding conditions which shape and influence this performance. A precondition for change and development of police’s professional practice is namely specific knowledge about the current state of affairs and ruling ways of doing things.

Second, through this examination I wish to build a theoretical framework for the performance of proactive investigation as a specific discipline within policing and by developing a theoretical concept called *the proactive detective métier*. My ambition is that the study thereby contributes to some of the knowledge gaps within the research fields of both proactive policing and criminal investigation, but perhaps more importantly to the field of police sociology and police science.

Third, I seek to develop and lay out the groundwork for the contours of a comprehensive embedded police research methodology. Ideally, this study delivers a methodological contribution to the field of police science and police research and perhaps even serve as an example of *sensitive sociology* (Jacobsen et al. 2005). This methodological contribution shall be seen as directly connected to and as a precondition for the thesis' analytical findings and thereby its combined theoretical contribution. A combination of these empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions does not exist in the literature at present time. Thus, this will be my significant original contribution to the research field and police practice.

Along the lines of Manning (1977; 2004), the study is based on extensive fieldwork but it is not an ethnography and it is not a detailed description of day-to-day police work. It is an attempt to articulate a perspective on (proactive) policing as an activity, as an organisation, as a set of symbolic repertoires and situated actions, as a source of myth, drama, and common sense theories of social conduct (ibid.).

Although the study has a rather narrow starting point (proactive investigation), it touches upon many themes within policing and police science. As mentioned earlier, my ambition is therefore that the study does not only comment on the microcosmos of investigation practices. My ambition is to add to our deeper understanding of the world of proactive policing not only through proactive investigation as an observable practice, but as an example of an enduring, pragmatic

phenomenon in modern society (proactivity) with important implications for democratic ideals.

Consequently, I strive to understand and explain the professional practice field of proactive investigation and the conditions under which it unfolds. As I explore how a new paradigm is interpreted and implemented within the police organisation, I also produce knowledge about how police organisations handle societal changes, new crime and security threats, and shifting public and political expectations and demands. For that reason, the insights of the study can be useful in the broad and pertinent debate that considers the evolution and implications of policing in society and the question of: *what kind of policing and police service is needed in democratic societies?*

Chapter 2: New Trends in Modern Policing

- *On the study's position and empirical and theoretical backdrop*

Some general programmatic changes in policing (...) have emerged in the past twenty-five or so years: community policing, problem-solving policing, hot-spot policing, and crime mapping and crime analysis. All these are essentially tactical modifications in resource deployment and thus require neither reorganisation nor change in strategies. They require neither new resources nor resource allocation. They do not require policy change or rethinking the standard operating procedures (...) They are on the surface quite significant attempts to reform, but no shifts, even in large and innovative departments, have been made in the fundamental random patrol, responses to 911 calls, and investigative functions. Investigative work, subject of research in the 1970s, remains now outside any reform efforts.

- *Democratic Policing in a Changing World* by Peter K. Manning (2010: 155).

Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the research field in which this study is situated. The chapter therefore displays ‘state of the art’ in the sense that it accounts for the empirical and theoretical backdrop of the field of proactive policing and proactive investigation – including the rise of the new proactive policing paradigm, as well as research about criminal investigation and related issues. The purpose is to give an overview of the different research fields in which this study is situated and contributes to and to provide definitions for central concepts from these.

My main argument in this chapter is that there has been an international paradigm shift (Kuhn 1962) from reactive to proactive policing in most Western countries, including Denmark, over the last decades. This shift is predominantly understood as a change in logics – from a reactive to a proactive focus which has impacted the way policing is perceived, practiced, and organised due to primarily external conditions e.g. societal developments, which is mirrored in a proactive commitment in strategies and police documents of police organisations. This new-orientation towards proactivity and knowledge-based policing can be observed in connection with many aspects of police work including criminal investigation. However, I also argue that the transformation of police organisations and clear changes within police practice meet several obstacles for various reasons. The aim is therefore to present the drivers of the proactive paradigm as well as its key challenges by accounting for central police research which is relevant for this study's focus and analysis.

The chapter is structured as follows:

In the first part of the chapter, I present the changes and innovations within the field of policing with the purpose of explaining why a new policing paradigm has emerged. I account for new perspectives on crime prevention which, I argue, indeed has influenced the conceptualisation of the proactive paradigm. Furthermore, I present the differences between the old and the new policing paradigm and lay out the groundwork for the definition of proactive investigation.

In the second part of the chapter, I introduce the proactive paradigm in the context of criminal investigation. I account for the distinction between reactive and proactive investigation and introduce the backdrop of proactive investigation in relation to the emerging of organised crime. Additionally, I point to current research on proactive policing which has brought attention to some of its challenges. Finally, I take on a conceptual exploration of proactive investigation as a distinct policing discipline.

The third part of the chapter is an introduction to a selection of key studies on criminal investigation in general and proactive investigation specifically and I furthermore introduce two central theories of criminal investigation. I discuss how this research is relevant in this study.

The Rise of a New Policing Paradigm: From Reactive to Proactive Policing

Understanding Changes and Innovations within Policing

In the last three decades, there have been some significant developments within policing in many Western countries. Various changes within society combined with new crime challenges have led to an introduction of what could be described as a genuine paradigm shift within crime policy and policing.¹ This shift is predominantly understood as a change in logics – from a *reactive* to a *proactive* focus. Thus, instead of responding to and solving criminal offences, which have already occurred one at a time, the focus is directed at identifying ‘dangerous’ and prolific offenders and high-risk localities with the purpose of preventing or disrupting criminal activities (Lomell 2018; Weisburd et al. 2019). The idea is to move from a general case-by-case focus which leads to the prosecution of responsible individuals to a general preventive focus where the purpose is to prevent crime and manage risks – popularly referred to as a move *from detection to disruption* (Innes & Sheptycki 2004).

The complex backdrop of this change consists of a variety of components. American criminologists David Weisburd and Anthony Braga (2006; 2020) argue that international innovation within policing began as a consequence of the crisis of confidence in American policing in the 1970s. Growing alienation between the police and the public as a result of confrontations and conflicts in connection with race riots and anti-war demonstrations led to concerns about police misconduct and police violence. The police’s relationship with certain societal groups especially minority communities – was severely strained. Both policy makers and scholars raised questions about the impact of the dominant strategies of policing especially in regards to the questionable success of *the standard model of policing* (I

will explain this model later in this chapter). American criminal justice and policing scholar David Bayley (1994: 79) argues that the need for change in policing is strongly connected to the police's lack of effectiveness:

Police are in a bind. They are costly without being clearly effective. The usefulness of their core strategies—mobile patrolling, visible presence, and deterrent criminal investigation—is doubtful. Understandably, therefore during the 1980s, as crime and costs of policing both rose inexorably, the police came under acute political pressure to demonstrate that they were giving value for money. Their legitimacy was no longer guaranteed by their mission and their authority under the law.

The increased complexity of the criminal environment, the increased prevalence of organised crime, and the diffuse threat from terrorism must be seen as key drivers especially within the last decade and has changed not only the police's maneuver room and resource allocation considerably (Ratcliffe 2008a). These drivers have indeed changed the political agenda and the public debate of safety and security. This adds to the complexity in police work as the police are continuously experiencing increased expectations from the public not only to maintain law and order and solve crimes, but also to collaborate (and compete) with public and private institutions to offer security and safety to the public and consequently manage the risks of post-modern risk society (see e.g. Beck 1992).

The logic of focusing on prevention and managing risks in relation to prioritising police resources puts pressure on the performance culture as this is strongly connected to the introduction of *New Public Management* (NPM) as a governing model within the police. NPM has meant an overall focus on efficiency, internal control, and 'value for money' within all public institutions leaving the police to prioritise operational results. This has accumulated a performance culture where police activities and their impact are to be documented and measured continuously (Fyfe et al. 2018; Wathne 2018). This form of governance where control and efficiency are used as disciplinary motivators proposes measurement, which offers


some challenges for the police organisation (I elaborate this discussion in **Chapter 5** and **6**).

Increased globalisation and offender mobility have changed for example organised and transnational crime significantly and the prevalence of organised criminal networks and gangs have resulted in e.g. the expansion of police's intelligence work (Ratcliffe 2016). New technological changes have developed new crime types such as cybercrime and expanding economic crime, which has put additional demands on the police (Loveday 2017; Fyfe et al. 2018). The demanding gap between an increase in recorded crime and the lack of allocation of resources to the (British) police in the period of 1970s to the 2000s can perhaps be reframed: as conventional crime through the last 10-20 years might have been declining, there has been an increase in recorded complex crime types and an increase in service obligations of the police². These conditions have internationally proposed new demands in terms of police's efficiency and the quality of police work.

Furthermore, international research (see e.g. Weisburd & Braga 2006a; 2019; Sherman 2013, Ratcliffe 2016; Weisburd et al. 2019) has indicated that conventional methods for crime prevention and crime reduction such as e.g. preventive patrolling, rapid police response and follow-up investigations are not very efficient. As such, modern policing becomes 'knowledge-intensive' in the sense that individual police officers are expected to possess a number of specific competences to function as an authoritative and capable professional in a more complex policing landscape. Dean et al. (2010) propose a comprehensive analysis of the challenges police meet in encountering entrepreneurialism in organised crime and point to a 'knowledge war' between police and organised crime offenders. Criminal organisations are, as they argue (ibid.) to a large extent 'knowledge organisations' whereas police organisations are bureaucracies which propose a fundamental challenge for the police response. Therefore, they say (ibid.), the success of police is

on the whole depending on police organisations’ abilities to carry out what they refer to as *competitive policing* (se **Figure A** from Dean et al. 2010: 175).

Figure A. *Strategic Knowledge Framework for Sector Policing of Organised Crime.*



Targeted policing and *competitive policing* require specialist competences in terms of knowledge work and knowledge management as policing organised crime businesses is fundamentally different than policing individual or groups of offenders. Therefore, this brings about the question of police generalists versus police specialists (this entire discussion can be referred to as *the professionalisation agenda*). In connection hereto, the police’s service obligations and with that their interaction with the general public seem to be an increasing part of police work and the public’s demands as to how they are encountered and serviced by the police keep increasing (see e.g. Tyler 2017).

Defining Proactive Policing

The police are as any other social institution affected by various external conditions pushing new crime policies and a new policing agenda and thereby altering the demands for police work and the police's response to crime and disorder.

Therefore, since the 1980s and 1990s – especially in the US and in the UK – new approaches, strategies and models for policing have been developed in order to transform *traditional police forces* to *modern police services* to meet the future of policing. A number of dichotomist 'labels' and concepts have emerged in this process in the effort to illustrate the change in policing and hereby explain some of the developments. *Holistic, smart, innovative, preventive, proactive policing* are concepts to describe the move from *experience-based* to *evidence-based policing* whereas *problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, community policing, hotspot policing, predictive policing* all refer to specific policing strategies or models, which require and prescribe definite methods and procedures for police work and have the goals of prevent or reduce crime and disorder (Weisburd & Braga 2019 provide a comprehensive introduction to some of these policing strategies and models which they call 'innovative', see also). This contrasts with the standard model of policing, which has an emphasis on reacting to particular crime events after they have occurred, mobilising resources based on requests coming from outside the police organisation, and focusing on the particulars of a given criminal incident (Weisburd & Majumdar 2018). Some of the innovative concepts are describing more or less the same developments and are therefore interchangeable, but still they have been implemented with different purposes across Western nations and police departments in various forms and with various results.

What I will underline here is that these concepts, models and approaches have the commonalities of being centered around and conditioned by *knowledge production*. By this I mean that that there is a requirement of a continuous development and practical use of a knowledge base consisting of: 1) knowledge about crime, and 2)

knowledge about police responses. As such they share the founding principle of what I refer to as knowledge-based policing. In a practical context, this suggests that the police in order to be competitive (Dean et al. 2010) should apply analytical processes when identifying crime problems and planning police responses and operational tactics. Moreover, they should apply systematic assessments and evaluations of these with the purpose of establishing steady learning processes within the organisation. In this thesis, I refer to the *proactive policing paradigm* as an overall categorisation of this change in policing in accordance with Fyfe et al. (2018) and Weisburd et al. (2019). I do so as it is my view that the fundamental difference lies in the shift from a reactive to a proactive focus. Along the lines of Gundhus (2010), I define this shift as a shift from police as being merely responders to crime and disorder reported by others to police as being proactively defining their work field and objectives themselves. Such a proactive focus is conditioned by a transformation of the police into a *knowledgeable organisation* (Holgersson 2006; Bjørge 2006; Hestehave 2018) which focuses on further education of police officers and implementation of academic research. In this regard, I view *knowledge-based policing* as an umbrella of those approaches which hold the ambition to plan and carry out police work on the basis of knowledge of police methods and tactics and knowledge of crime, disorder, and societal conditions.

In the Danish police the orientation towards a more proactive paradigm began in the late 1990s where ideas from intelligence-led policing were introduced together with concepts such as crime analysis intelligence gathering etc. (Strand 2011; Christensen 2012; Rønn 2012).

A New Perspective on Crime Prevention

The introduction of the new policing paradigm has concurrently, and perhaps as a consequence, deployed a new perspective on the concept of crime prevention which is another important element to mention in this connection. Although the

mission statement of e.g. the Danish police clearly states that one of the general objectives of the police is to prevent crime (see *The Danish Police Act*), there has traditionally been a clear division between police's prevention and enforcement activities as these tasks have been viewed as separate within the police organisation (Gundhus & Larsson 2014). Consequently, crime prevention has within the police since the 1970s been viewed as a specific function carried out in those units working with youths and social authorities (kriminalpræventive afdelinger og sekretariater). Police officers in these units have primarily focused on school visits providing information about traffic rules or drug abuse, hosting preventive meetings in the local community and informing citizens about how to avoid burglary and so on. The social status of preventive police work has consequently been rather low internally within police organisations as it does not evolve around law and order (Gundhus 2014). Crime prevention has conventionally also been understood as non-punitive and as an alternative to punishment (Lomell 2018). However, in police research, police as a general preventive function towards crime has been criticised (see e.g. Reiner 2010) and Bailey (1994) even refers to the phenomenon 'the myth of police' concluding that the police do not prevent crime in contrast to public perception.

Regardless, a new tendency in the interpretation of prevention especially in relation to police work is a strong focus on prevention or disruption of *specific actions committed by specific individuals*. Norwegian criminologist Heidi Mork Lomell (2012) describes this new tendency with reference to the concept of *pre-crime society*,³ which is characterised by being future-oriented and focused on the prevention of possible risks.⁴ Within the literature the concept of pre-crime society is used more and more to describe a tendency within law-making as there is an increased focus on criminal acts, which have not yet been committed. Traditionally, the criminal justice system has been concerned with crimes *committed* and the evidence attached to these crimes. Throughout the last two decades, an international tendency is however that *potential* acts are criminalised and can be sanctioned or penalised (see

Lomell 2018 for an elaboration of this issue). Most clear is the tendency within anti-terrorism laws where a shift towards pre-crime due to a change towards civil liberties has taken place within the political climate in the last 15-20 years (see Flyghed 2000 and 2005 for a full introduction). Lomell (2018) argues that recent years' concepts and practices such as *pre-emption*, *precaution*, *prediction* and *disruption* have entered the preventive realm, along with coercion and punishment. This pre-crime and pre-emptive logic is part of the pursuit of security as opposed to the pursuit of justice. In that sense, Lomell argues (*ibid.*) referring to Zedner (2007) that there is a shift from a reactive criminal justice state to a new preventive security state as the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime logic of security. Lomell (2012: 89) concludes:

The new preventive paradigm actively uses criminal law and coercive sanctions tied to them to confront, disrupt and target threats before they emerge [...] In contrast to conventional crime prevention, it is the enforcement of criminal law that is the core of this new paradigm in prevention.

Similarly, the intelligence literature refers to prevention of pre-emptive, anticipatory actions where intelligence services are supposed to intervene before potential threats develop and intervention is thereby considered to be societal self-defense (Lomell 2012). New threats from especially terrorism have redefined the concept of prevention and this logic is increasingly transferred from intelligence services to police services. It is no longer (merely) about preventing individuals' offending careers or re-offending; rather it also involves the prevention of potential acts in the planning. This means that there is an implicit expectation that police work also includes the prediction of crime, the identification and the countering of risks and threats. Put in another way, police are expected to respond proactively to these instead of reactively responding to them. With the introduction of a more proactive paradigm for policing follows thereby a revised interpretation of the concept of crime prevention, which is also central in this study's exploration of proactive investigation and police's interpretation of this concept.

In the Danish police this redirection of prevention into disruption can e.g. be identified in the strategies for organised gang crime, which I look further into in **Chapter 6**.

The Old and the New Paradigm

As mentioned earlier, I ascertain the change within policing as predominantly illustrated by a shift in focus from reactive to proactive. This might seem minor, but it has a tremendous impact on the way policing and the role of the police is understood. More importantly, it is essential when looking at police work and the concrete tasks of the police as reactive and proactive objectives and tasks can be fundamentally in competition. Within the literature, there is a model for a proposed continuum of police work from traditional to innovative (Knutsson & Søvik 2005). With an outset in that model and based on the accounts in this chapter, I have proposed an illustration (see **Figure B**) of the continuum between the reactive policing paradigm and the proactive policing paradigm. This continuum proposes an ideal type model of the two paradigms, which reflects two underlying rationales of being respectively experience-based and knowledge-based. The practical world of policing is of course more diverse and complex and borrows elements across the different approaches. Within the continuum, there are as such hybrid models, blurring lines, and overlapping activities when it comes to police work and in the practical world of policing it is not merely one or the other, but a combination.

Apart from focusing on prevention and risk management, the proactive policing paradigm is based on the idea that police's strategies, responses, and everyday work should build on analysis of crime problems and disorder, and evaluation of the effect of the police responses to these. The overall purpose is to make police better capable of preventing and responding to different types of crime, disorder, and

societal threats and as such tailor and instigate the best-suited and efficient strategies and responses.

Figure B. *Continuum of Reactive and Proactive Policing.*

REACTIVE	PROACTIVE
Experience-based and discretion-driven	Knowledge-based and analysis-driven
Law and order Public safety Crime events Local presence	Prevention and disruption Public security Crime problems Prioritisation and risk management at international and national level
Random and routine patrols Rapid responses to calls for service Reactive investigations	Targeted patrols in e.g. crime hotspots Response to prioritised events Investigation into solvable crimes and high-impact crimes
Visible presence of police patrols in the community Focus on prolific and known offenders Focus on crime concentrations	Information gathering by police patrols Monitoring of crime groups Focus on priority offenders and potential offenders Focus on high-risk places
Case-by-case investigation Crack down-operations	Investigation into potential crime Investigation of invisible, but high-impact crime
Ad hoc-collaboration with other public institutions	Strategic collaboration with public and private institutions

On an operational and a tactical level, this is characterised by being problem-led; patrols are inserted in problem areas and the police respond to serious and harmful incidents. The fulcrum is the monitoring of potential crime threats and investigation of potential criminal acts and priority offenders. The traditional approach to policing mirrored in the reactive paradigm has conventionally been one-dimensional and pragmatic focusing on law and order-tasks and the response to reported crime. This is in the literature referred to as the before mentioned standard model of policing, which is still regarded as the primary operational model of policing (Manning 2010). American criminologist Lawrence Sherman (2013: 2)

explains the standard model of policing in terms of the three R's; *rapid responses*, *random patrolling*, and *reactive investigations*. This approach is case-by-case driven focusing on visible, but random patrolling in public, responding quickly to calls for service and investigating crimes already occurred (Tilley 2008). American criminologists David Weisburd & John Eck (2004: 44) explain:

This model relies generally on a “one size fits all” application of reactive strategies to suppress crime, and continues to be the dominant form of police practice in the United States. The standard model is based on the assumption that generic strategies for crime reduction can be applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of the level of crime, the nature of crime, or other variations. Such strategies as increasing the size of police agencies, random patrol across all parts of the community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-up investigations, and generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies are all examples of this standard model of policing.

Still, based on three decades of criminological and police research (for a comprehensive overview see e.g. Bayley 1994; 2015; 2016; Weisburd & Braga 2019; Reiner 2010; Sherman 2013; Weisburd et al. 2019; Bowling et al. 2020), the conclusion from both academic scholars, police practitioners, and the political environment has been that conventional policing methods are not adequate in terms of meeting the challenges of modern society, including the changes within the criminal environment and the public's demand for service. In other words, the more complex societal order, which police are part of, is continuously proposing new demands to the police as a public service institution, to prioritise resources more strategically, to focus on ‘what works’, and in terms of individual police officers' way of carrying out police work (see also Dean et al. 2010). These conditions challenge existing institutional frames and individual practices within police and police accountability and legitimacy become key components in this connection. Consequently, this raises questions about roles and responsibilities including the police as an active agent in the dynamic between internal adjustments as a reaction to external demands, which I will analyse in more detail in relation to proactive investigation in **Chapter 6**.

In this study, I differentiate between the proactive paradigm versus the knowledge-based episteme, and the reactive paradigm versus the experience-based episteme. Although these respectively share some commonalities, the epistemic notions of knowledge-based policing are not dominated by proactivity per default, just like experience-based policing does not hold the ambition to be reactive per se. In practice, these ideals are moreover blurry in the sense that knowledge includes experience just as experience includes knowledge. In this sense, the proactive and the reactive paradigms merely display some overall trends and developments within policing and society in general.

¹In this context I refer to Thomas Kuhn's (1962) perception of paradigms.

²E.g. Denmark: alterations within mental health institutions and psychiatric care.

³In the world of fiction, this concept can be dated back to Philip K. Dick's science fiction short story *The Minority Report* from 1956, where *Precrime* is the name of the police authority, whose responsibility is to identify and neutralise individuals who will commit crime in the future.

⁴Historically both biological, psychological and sociological criminology have been interested in examination of physiological and socio-economic characteristics of offenders with the purpose of predicting who will be criminals. Cesare Lombroso had for instance in the late 19th Century a theory of 'the born criminal' who could be identified based on physical traits before they had committed criminality (Sørensen 2013).

Policing Uncertainties: From Reactive to Proactive Investigation

Widening the Field of Criminal Investigation

The new policing paradigm has not only changed the general understanding of and approach to policing. It has additionally changed the nature of criminal investigation and criminal procedure. Gundhus (2014) claims that we are witnessing a possible shift towards a pre-crime society in everyday policing practices and a development of new phenomena in policing for some of which we even lack appropriate language. As Fyfe et al. (2018) note; reactive and proactive policing are often understood as fundamentally different and separate activities within the police which are even regulated by different legislation. However, as the reactive realm becomes more proactive, it is getting more and more difficult to distinguish between proactive and reactive policing.

Proactive policing is therefore not only in the process of replacing reactive policing, but it has the intention of changing policing activities that have traditionally been reactive – such as criminal investigation (ibid.). This change is mirrored in the increased focus on ongoing or ‘could-be-offences’ such as organised crime or terrorist acts with the aim of disrupting these (Bacon 2016). This suggests that police to a higher degree are working in the field of *uncertainties* as suspicion of potential events and actions becomes their primary line of enquiry. As a result, this is not only a conceptual change, but also a revision of the practical approach to investigation (I elaborate further on this issue in **Chapter 7**). As underlined in the prior section, proactive policing furthermore changes the fundamental understanding of crime prevention in the sense that crime prevention in the context of reactive policing would be regarded as a relatively uncontentious activity designed to reduce the potential for victimisation. However, in the context of

proactive investigation, the prevention and disruption of criminal offences are surrounded by more ethical questions, since the subjects of the new type of prevention are addressed with punitive methods in the process of preventing ongoing and future crimes in contrast to prevent crime to occur at all (Fyfe et al. 2018; Lomell 2018).

A New Approach to Investigating Organised Crime

Proactive investigation in itself is not a new phenomenon within policing. Undercover police work and covert tactics such as the use of confidential informants has its backdrop in the military field; the protection of the sovereign state against external threats and in times of war where spies were and are essential for providing information about ‘the enemy’ (Marx 1988; Maddinger 2000; Gundhus & Larsson 2014). Brodeur (1983; 2007; 2010) refers to this as *high policing*, which is primarily aimed to protect national security and evolves around intelligence work. Brodeur (ibid.) makes thereby a useful distinction between *high* and *low policing* where the latter is everyday police work performed by uniformed officers and detectives. The distinction was originally proposed to remedy the neglect of high policing research, but it has since become a valuable analytical concept when looking at for example the blurring lines between different types of police work e.g. prevention and investigation (see for example Atkinson 2018) and I apply the concepts in **Part Three** of the thesis.

Thus, it has long been part of various types of police operations to investigate potential hidden, victimless crimes and threats against society *in the making*. However, the establishment of proactive investigation as a separate discipline within policing is closely linked to the increased drug use in the 1960s and 1970s and the emerge of organised crime in the 1980s and 1990s (Marx 1988; Manning 2004; Gundhus & Larsson 2014; Bacon 2016). A *moral panic* (Cohen 1972) arose behind ‘the war on drugs’ in the United States in the 1990s due to amongst other frequent

media representations of young people's drug use as out of control. In Denmark, this moral panic concerned organised crime as a fairly new articulated phenomenon in the beginning of the 1990s (Bay 1998a; Strand 2011; Rønn 2012) which was linked to open drug sale and drug use at e.g. Freetown Christiania in central Copenhagen. It was, however, especially linked to the emerge of violent conflicts between organised criminal groups (Hestehave 2013). During the 1990s and 2000s the steady appearance of street gangs (*bander*) and other organised crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs (*rockere*) in Europe, as well as in Denmark, presented police with a significant challenge. Especially in those countries where gangs engaged in violent conflicts taking place in the public sphere (Larsson 2018).

Furthermore, societal developments such as globalisation and technological evolution have complicated the prevention and investigation of organised crime. Organised criminals are supposedly becoming more innovative taking advantage of less policed borders, open access to European countries and markets, technological communication devices such as mobile phones, internet etc. These conditions enable them to cooperate and operate worldwide (see e.g. Ekblom 1997; Coyne & Bell 2001, Larsson 2008, and Von Lampe 2008; Dean et al. 2010). Historically, there has been limited concern for drug trafficking, drug distribution and drug sale, which have been highly invisible and perceived as *victimless* or *consensual crime* (Manning 2008). Frequent shootings in public areas, on the other hand, are agenda setters for the general public, politicians, mass media, and consequently the police in an otherwise peaceful and safe country such as Denmark. A rather dramatic rise in violent conflicts since around 2008 has basically altered the Danish police's agenda and resource allocation and has instigated a more progressive policing strategy promoting e.g. offensive (reactive and proactive) investigations into organised crime groups and extensive patrolling in geographical areas where especially gangs operate (in **Chapter 5** and **6** I account for the organisation of the police response and analyse the different elements of the strategy).

The development within organised crime has therefore not in itself been a lever for implementing a new police strategy but is indirectly becoming a focal point. A new approach to investigation with a focus on criminal intelligence (see Strand 2011; Christensen 2012; Rønn 2012) therefore arose in the late 1990s. This new approach to investigation was conceptually based on the ideas from intelligence-led policing and the experiences from police's work on drugs in the 1970s and 1980s.

Intelligence-led policing is centered around criminal intelligence and crime analysis as vital components in creating knowledge about the criminal environment for police decision-makers (Ratcliffe 2016). The overall purpose is to allocate and prioritise police resources in the direction where they have most effect. In other words, the issue is to focus on those crime problems which are the most comprehensive and cause most harm and those offenders who commit the most (serious) crime. The traditional recipe for drug law enforcement was primarily centered around street-level police operations and 'crack-downs' against drug suppliers based on information from confidential informants. Thus, according to Strand (2011: 302, *my translation*), investigations were conceptualised into an intelligence-based investigation in the sense that:

A kind of proactive, preventive investigation was built which, in contrast to earlier, was providing intelligence about individuals and groups' capacity to commit organised crime and on this basis to instigate activities which could prevent this type of crime to be effectuated.

The ideal for the police was to be able to tackle organised crime by instigating more strategic (targeted) and proactive (future-oriented) investigations based on a national overview of its threats. This spawned a number of changes within the police such as altered organisational structures (the establishment of national and regional investigation and intelligence units) and work processes (the instigation of systematic monitoring of prolific and priority offenders in criminal groups and the initiation of investigations using predominantly covert measures) (see **Chapter 5** for an elaboration). These changes did not merely concern detectives but were

fundamental as to how police were required to operate. Suddenly, the collection of information regarding e.g. gang members to support the national intelligence requirements became a core task for every police officer on the street. The purpose with this information gathering was amongst other to identify key offenders in organised crime groups who played a significant and strategic role and to make them ‘high-value targets’ for investigation – the empirical focus of this particular study.

Exploring the Concept of Proactive Investigation

When looking at the policing literature and specifically the various introductory textbooks and handbooks on criminal investigation, it becomes clear that proactive investigation is not described or discussed comprehensively (see e.g. Stelfox 2009; Cook & Tattersall 2014; Bjerkness & Fahsing 2018). Moreover, it is a source of confusion as proactive investigation is a complex concept which is described in many different ways and interchangeably with the terms *covert investigation*, *organised crime investigation*, *undercover policing*, *invisible policing* etc. O’Neill (2018: 6) operates with the following definition:

Proactive investigations concern activities (usually covert) designed to capture a suspect in the act of committing the crime, or implicating a criminal in a crime in some fashion, whether by association with other criminals in a conspiracy or any other reason.

In defining the conceptual meaning further, I have looked at the term *proactive*, which in the *Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary* is described as “...(of a policy or person or action) controlling a situation by causing something to happen rather than waiting to respond to it after it happens” and “taking action by causing change and not reacting to change when it happens”. These definitions suggest that police are in a fairly active role (taking action and causing something to happen) towards criminal incidents and not waiting for it to happen or for it to be reported. Implicit lies furthermore the understanding that the overall purpose is prevention.

Consequently, in the Danish legal framework, criminal investigation is in *The Administration of Justice Act* (2017, Chapter 67, § 742, section 2) described in the following way (*my translation and underlining*):

The police launch, after the reporting of a crime or by their own initiative, an investigation when there is a reasonable presumption that a criminal act, persecuted by the public, has taken place.

Furthermore, the objective is equally formulated in Chapter 67, § 743, *The Administration of Justice Act* (2017) (*my translation*):

The purpose of the investigation is to clarify whether the conditions for imposing criminal liability or other criminal sanction are present and to provide information for the verdict of the case and to prepare the case for the judicial process at the courts.

As opposed to reactive investigations of homicides, assaults, burglaries, thefts and the like (*after the fact*), proactive investigations are about exploring crime which has not yet occurred or is ongoing (*before the fact* or *during the fact*). Interestingly, the Danish translation of the concept investigation (*efterforskning*) indeed means ‘after research’ (*efter-forskning*) implying that an enquiry is taking place ‘after’ a certain event. The conventional translation of proactive investigation within the Danish police is moreover ‘*fremadrettet efterforskning*’ (translated as ‘future-oriented after research’) which in itself is a contrasting concept and directs no attention towards the preventive focus. However, the entire process is concerned with the *suspicion of ongoing criminal actions* or *criminal actions that have not yet taken place* as the fulcrum (Rønn 2012; 2013). This rather simple definition leaves, however, an open interpretation in the sense that it fails to mention which (criminal) acts can be characterised as suspicious and how this assessment is made? (In Chapter 7 and 8 I analyse this practice further).

Theoretically, proactive investigation can in principle concern all types of crime and all types of offenders (O'Neill 2018: 10). The dimensions of criminal investigation are, according to O'Neill (2018), concerned with *methods*, *seriousness*, and *perspective*. In a practical police context, however, proactive investigation are usually associated with drugs and covert measures – perhaps because this is how it originated (see also **Chapter 6, 7 and 8**). Yet, the definition seems to be connected to methods and techniques rather than its purpose and aim which initially seems logical as suspicion most often is explored by using ‘untraditional’ or covert measures. Accordingly, Stelfox (2009) argues that the distinction between reactive and proactive investigation lies within the starting point and in the techniques used to gather evidence. He says (*ibid.*: 148):

Reactive investigations typically start with the report or discovery of a crime. Thereafter, the investigation focuses on identifying material from crime scene, victims, witnesses and other sources to identify suspects and gather sufficient evidence to bring them to justice.

(...)

Proactive investigations typically start with the identification through intelligence analysis of those who investigators believe are committing offences. These are usually offences associated with organised crime such as drug-dealing, people-trafficking and money-laundering, but can include other types of crime, particularly where investigators are focusing on persistent or serious offenders. These investigations focus on gathering evidence to connect suspects to criminal activity usually through covert techniques such as surveillance.

The different investigation models are in this representation characterised by different investigative measures and moreover, according to Stelfox (*ibid.*), these approaches have much more in common than not. From the detective’s point of view, there is therefore no great difference when carrying out reactive or proactive investigation, respectively. In fact, Stelfox (*ibid.*) argues, many investigative techniques (e.g. investigative interviewing, evidence preparation for prosecution) are similar in the process and exactly the same once a suspect has been arrested. There are for that reason only minor differences when it comes to the investigation process and the decision-making within that process.

Problems Regarding Police Proactivity

Even though the traditional approaches to policing and the dominant reactive policing strategy and standard model of policing have been (academically) rejected as inefficient, there are still a number of concerns in connection to the introduction of the proactive paradigm which prior research have underlined. I find it relevant to include some of the most central themes concerning this in the following sections as proactive policing is far from unproblematic according to several perspectives. Weisburd et al. (2019) have produced a comprehensive overview of the scientific evidence in relation to the introduction of proactive policing strategies. They define four different approaches respectively *placed-based*, *problem-solving*, *person-focused*, and *community-based* approaches, which they evaluate in terms of their impact on crime reduction, crime prevention and the strengthening of the public's ties to the police. Thus, this research relates to the 'what works'-dimension.

First, in terms of proactive investigations which typically target individuals or groups and thereby fall into the category of a person-focused proactive approach there is no clear evidence on this police action as a single strategy (Weisburd et al. 2019). Research suggests those offender-focused deterrence strategies of e.g. "pulling-levers" (Kennedy 2009) which have been put into practice different places in the US looks promising in terms of having positive effects. However, such strategies consist of comprehensive programs including many different initiatives from the police as well as other authorities. Proactive investigation as an exclusive crime control strategy has not found support in research.

Second, another perspective in research into proactive policing is what I refer to as the 'what matters'-dimension (Van Dijk et al. 2016). On the contrary to efficiency, this relates to the impact of policing on democratic aspects. For example, Dupont et al. (2017) raise questions about the reach of the state and its use of diverse means of power to investigate and prosecute certain types of offences and offenders. In

connection with the introduction of multi-agency investigations, they argue that an ‘ad hoc-instrumentalism’ challenges existing accountability mechanisms and remind us that boundaries are often designed on purpose to prevent governmental over-reach. Thus, the very idea that police are active agents and initiators of investigative actions towards certain citizens are by some scholars perceived as potentially problematic – a theme I return to in **Chapter 7** and **8**.

Third, an additional concern is directed at the condition that the epistemic ideal of reactive policing is more or less directly transferred into proactive policing (Fyfe et al. 2018). This becomes clear within intelligence-led policing which strives towards providing ‘an objective decision-making framework’ via crime analysis (Ratcliffe 2008a) meaning ‘absolute truths’ when addressing future threats (Rønn 2012). Scholars as Innes & Sheptycki (2004) have emphasised that working with evidence in reactive investigation is very different from working with intelligence. The risk is amongst other that striving for ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ in proactive policing, which evolves around uncertainties, can produce a flawed vision, which can result in the illusion that crime is being dealt with in a rational and objective way (Rønn 2012) (see also **Chapter 7**).

Fourth, a further challenge for proactive investigation is that it is per default encompassing hidden activities against the public in the sense that a central characteristic is that the subject in question – the investigation target – does not know he or she is under investigation (Loftus & Goold 2015; Harfield & Harfield 2016; Bjerckness & Fahsing 2018). It is in this perspective imperative that the practice of proactive investigations is balancing potential conflicting interests such as law enforcement, the protection of individual rights, and security of justice (retssikkerhed). American sociologist Gary Marx (1988: 12 *my adjustments*) proposes a typology for police work (**Figure C**) and underlines that although covert or deceptive tactics offer a means to discover otherwise unavailable information – the deliberate convergence of covertness and deception makes undercover practices

powerful, but also problematic. This typology divides overall police work into four different categories (open and non-deceptive, open and deceptive, covert and non-deceptive and covert and deceptive) and can be used to analyse different types of police activities (I explore this typology further in **Chapter 8** in relation to proactive investigative methods).

Figure C. *Typology of Police Work.*

	Open	Covert
Non-deceptive	Uniformed patrol	Passive surveillance
Deceptive	Trickery by agent provocateurs	Undercover

Fifth, the demarcation between prevention and investigation in the proactive context becomes blurred as these activities are united since the tendency moves towards more preparatory acts to become criminalised (Lomell 2012). A risk in this connection is furthermore that some categories of people, such as potential drug users, outlaw motorcycle gangs, terrorists, sex offenders, and non-nationals are more closely monitored and perhaps over-policed compared to others and as such subjected to more intrusive state surveillance than others (Fyfe et al. 2018). The last and sixth dilemma I will mention here is the tendency to employ logics and methods from the field of intelligence into an increasing range of policing tasks; the expansion of ‘untraditional’ and covert methods to ordinary areas within policing which has traditionally been reserved for serious and organised crime (Larsson 2014). In other words, the spill-over from the area of high policing to low policing (Brodeur 2007). This brings about a discussion of individual rights of the citizen versus the general pursuit of security and public safety (Maguire 2000) and consequently the moral theory of policing as mentioned above. A concern regarding especially the proportionality of these methods in relation to the offences they target can therefore be raised and consequently the police’s accountability is at stake, which I analyse further in **Chapter 7**.

Investigating Investigation: Key Studies About Reactive and Proactive Approaches

Research on Criminal Investigation

One of the most public police activities and the primary focus of police fiction is criminal investigation, especially homicide investigation (Brodeur 2010). Since the introduction of modern policing in the 1840s, criminal investigation has been a fundamental function of the police and its quality is indeed vital for police legitimacy (Fahsing 2016; Maguire 2018). To some extent, investigation goes on in all areas of policing including uniformed policing as first responders to accidents, patrol officers, and traffic cops carry out investigative tasks (Stelfox 2009). As mentioned in the thesis' introduction, a number of studies within police sociology and police science have explored reactive police work, especially the work and practices of uniformed patrol officers (McLaughlin 2007), but detective work is under-researched. Still, there is a small but important body of knowledge when it comes to reactive detective work which is relevant to this study (see e.g. Maguire 2000; Innes 2003; Newburn et al. 2007; Brodeur 2010; Bacon 2016; Fahsing 2016; O'Neil 2018 for international overviews). However, research on covert and proactive investigations is sparse apart from a couple of comprehensive studies (see for example Manning 2004 and Bacon 2016). Brodeur (2010) divides investigation research into five main categories: 1) general textbooks, 2) manuals and primers on special techniques, 3) studies of criminal investigations in themselves, 4) studies of the judicial process, and 5) evaluations. In the following, I will briefly address some of the main themes in the bulk of research and present two ruling theories of criminal investigation.

Research into investigative practices and methods include for example the substantial and significant amount of research into investigative interviewing (Griffiths & Rachlew 2018). This investigation method is regarded as the core element of reactive investigations. During the 1980s in the UK, there were several judicial scandals and disclosures of miscarriages of justice which led to criticism of the police's method of interviewing suspects. The interviewing method predominantly built on manipulative and deceitful interrogation tactics of suspects with the purpose of making them confess (Gudjonsson 2007; Griffiths & Rachel 2018). The emerging of investigative interviewing was as a result of in-depth research and the police interview was converted into an information gathering process with a focus on providing comprehensive and accurate accounts from the interviewees to support the investigation. In fact, a general condition to understand when it comes to investigation processes is, according to British police scholar Martin Innes (2003) that investigation is basically information work:

(...) investigation of crime is fundamentally a form of information work. It is concerned with the identification, interpretation, and ordering of information with the objective of ascertaining whether a crime has occurred, and if so, who was involved and how.

Innes (2003) furthermore describes the organisation of major investigations (e.g. homicide investigations) in five stages (Fahsing 2016):

- 1) *the initial response*: the collection of available evidence from the scene and witness accounts
- 2) *the information burst stage*: the activation and active acquisition of the mass of potentially relevant (and mostly irrelevant) information
- 3) *suspect development*: the formulation of potential 'prime suspects'
- 4) *suspect targeting*: the evaluation of evidence necessary to charge one of the suspects
- 5) *case construction*: eliciting a full and comprehensive account of the crime for use in court.

Moreover, Innes (2003) operates with a hierarchy of information in investigations, which I have attempted to depict in **Figure D**.


Figure D. *Innes’ (2003) Information Hierarchy.*

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
<i>Noise</i>	○ Irrelevant or meaningless data
<i>Information</i>	○ Subject to multiple interpretations
<i>Intelligence</i>	○ Analysed information ○ Mostly derived from covert measures ○ Basis for generate further knowledge
<i>Knowledge</i>	○ Interpreted information ○ ‘Objective’, valid ○ ‘Factual’ status ○ Basis for police action
<i>Evidence</i>	○ ‘Knowledge’ in legal terms ○ ‘Personal’ or ‘physical’ ○ Direct or circumstantial ○ Corroborative or indicative ○ Can be used in court

As such, criminal investigation speaking broadly is about identifying, collecting, interpreting and categorising data, which have potential relevance for an investigation. In this sense, Innes (2003) argues, it is about distinguishing ‘noise’ (non-relevant data) from ‘meaningful data’ as it is interpreted and understood by the detectives. Meaningful data are often considered to be information that can be used as evidence in court, and which therefore, by the entire police and judicial system, is labelled as ‘knowledge’. Innes (ibid.) characterises this hierarchy as dependent on socially produced definitions by individual officers and the police organisation. Thus, the social production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use are constituted on the basis of how contextually situated social actors (detectives) make sense of their actions, interactions, and environment. Whether this also applies for proactive investigations I discuss in **Chapter 8**.

According to Fahsing (2016), the investigation process evolves around instigating information collection in various forms with the purpose of answering key knowledge questions such as the six W's; When, Where, hoW, and Why certain events have taken place (What), and Who was involved (see **Figure E**, Fahsing 2016: 20).

Figure E. *Fahsing's Investigation Model.*



Detectives can therefore, theoretically at least, be regarded as *knowledge workers* whose most dominant assignment is to collect, process, and produce information (Brodeur & Dupont 2006; Hald & Rønn 2013). The use of hypotheses to answer those key enquiry questions is moreover underlined as a valuable method in various textbooks and teaching material on investigation (Cook & Tattersall 2014). However, research of investigative practice indicates that it is the complexity of the case *in itself* rather than structured hypothesis-led procedures which determine the investigative process. Consequently, detectives tend to classify cases according to

the expected difficulties of solving them; this classification, in homicide investigations at least, stretches typically from *self-solvers* to *whodunits* (Innes 2003) from cases where the suspect is caught in the act or gives himself up to genuine ‘mysteries’ where there are no available clues as to the identity of the offender (Brodeur 2010).

Two Theories of Criminal Investigation

Innes (2003) and Brodeur (2010) have each proposed a theoretical framework of relevance for this study through which to see the work of detectives (O’Neil 2018). Innes’ perspective is, according to Brodeur (2010) epistemological as he looks at the investigation process and the construction of information and its inherent meaning. He says (2003: 178):

Crime investigations are composed of a number of discrete yet linked investigative actions, which are directed towards the production of knowledge about how and why the crime occurred. These actions, which are informed by, and part of, the investigative practices take place both sequentially and concurrently, with the information that they produce used to make sense of the crime, but also to inform the ongoing investigative work.

Brodeur (2010) is critical of Innes’ theory of crime investigation and points to the condition that this primarily applies to plain-clothes criminal investigators belonging to special units but fails to recognise all investigative work done by other police officers outside these units. He underlines that Innes’ theory does not consider the darker side of police information work e.g. post-case court processing where detectives become courtroom evidence managers, which, he argues, is an absolute vital part of detective work. On the contrary, Brodeur (ibid.) proposes a pragmatic approach which is a result-oriented theory of criminal investigations. This theory focuses amongst other on the diversity of detective work, recognising that not all tasks in the investigation process are concerned with information gathering (e.g. making arrests, putting up surveillance etc.). Brodeur claims that

solving a case is in a great number of instances a brief process that bears little resemblance to the painstaking gathering of clues and their clever interpretation. He argues further that (2010: 220):

Detective work extends in time much beyond the simple business of solving crimes, which is generally achieved quickly. For many investigators, real detective work is accomplished in securing a conviction through a guilty plea or a court verdict, after the case has been solved through the identification and arrest of the perpetrator(s).

Although the two theories of criminal investigation have different outsets, they are both central in understanding the conceptual and practical phenomenon of police investigations in general and they are accordingly relevant in this connection.

Granted, Innes' theory (2003) does not take into account the post-case processing, however, it gives us valuable insights into the process of attributing different types of meaning to investigative information and concurrently, how this influences the various investigative steps taken by detectives. Brodeurs' (2010) perspective raises concerns into the role of detectives reaching further than the common understanding of this role, namely as he view them as a kind of co-producers of court processes, which influence the question of guilt and sentencing.

Key Studies on Proactive Investigation

Although research on criminal investigation is limited and research on proactive investigation is even more limited (Brodeur 2010) there are some vital contributions. On the nature and conduct of detective work Ericson (1981) and Hobbs (1988) have provided seminal contributions to the field by offering alternative models of the behaviour of detectives. Ericson (1981) suggests that detectives are 'makers of crime' by bureaucratic case management of incidents which have been into police property. Hobbs (1988) analyses the entrepreneurial aspects of detective work and their occupational culture emerging from a dynamic interplay with the social environment (East End) they police. In *Lush Life* (2013) Hobbs continues the

analysis of the same ethnographic site now with a focus on ‘professional crime’ as supposed to ‘normal crime’ and indirectly he comments on the police’s involvement in the invention of and policing of organised crime. In this context, however, I will focus mainly on two central studies; *The Narcs’ Game* by Manning (2003) and *Taking Care of Business* by British police scholar Matthew Bacon (2016) as these have generated vital knowledge on these types of police investigations. The studies are both concerned with police investigation of drug offences and take on a qualitative and ethnographic methodological approach. This research builds on what can be labelled as the traditional police sociology, where scholars uncovered and analysed street-level police work by using e.g. participant observation of police practice (see e.g. Banton 1964, Skolnick 1966; Bittner 1967; 1970, Muir 1977; Manning 1977 see Reiner 2010; Brodeur 2010; Bowling et al. 2020 for comprehensive overviews). Early police studies were focused on the police mandate and the administration of this and common themes in this research were therefore *the police role, police discretion, police cultures, and police organisations*. Thus, police research was initially rather critical in its outset and focused specifically on the interplay between the police and the public. Accordingly, it focused on different kinds of police practice, conflicts between the police and various social groups within society, and took up themes such as police misconduct, police corruption, police violence, racism, discrimination etc. (Weisburd & Braga 2006b; Bayley 2015). There have been great variations in the findings in police studies. Still within the scholarly tradition of police science sociological theory and sociological methods are central components in analysing police work.

Manning’s study is situated in the US and he analyses not only police practice at a micro level, but explores the social order of drug control, the war on drugs, and the societal responses to ‘the drug problem’. He attributes the policing of drugs dramaturgical characteristics and concludes that it is primarily symbolic and instrumental. Manning calls the structure of drug policing a ceremonial drama of

“cops and robbers” (ibid: 260) which encompasses a ritual of affirmation of certain values and beliefs. He argues (ibid. 262):

While crime control serves many functions, as does drug law enforcement, such as gathering information, deterrence, and punishment, it has more to do with hopes, dreams, fears, myths, and ideologies than with producing any impact on, or evidence of any impact on, crime of any kind. It is a public affirmation privately shaped and moulded to quiet diverse agendas. Individual careers, security, and rewards; organizational expansion, survival, and maintenance; and, in general, autonomy on a day-to-day basis supersede concerns for achieving the publicly designated mandate.

Thus, Manning’s rather dim outlook on the policing of drugs reveals that internal processes within the police such as organisational demands, constraints, and politics together with individual conditions for police officers are determining the overall police response. The popular ‘war metaphor’, Manning says, is deeply misleading in the sense that the police and drugs dealers are not on different sides

on the contrary there are great overlap of what he calls ‘analogues between the dealing-using systems and the enforcement system’. For example, the pressure for sales and production of drugs and the pressure for police to produce cases and arrests. The social environment of working ‘undercover’, the concern for security and secrecy, and the daily assessment of reliability of information is moreover similar. Thus, the police and drug dealers make every now and then alliances as there are no unifying and clearly defined aim. In fact, there is no systematic battle plans, strategies, and tactics that unify the participating units. I find Manning’s work land-marking as well as controversial, and thus relevant in connection to this study as it does not merely explore police practice, but does so in the social and political macro-context of drug policing. It thereby presents an in-depth and comprehensive sociological analysis of not only policing, but also the police as a democratic institution. I furthermore built on his theorising of democratic policing and the concepts of the police *métier*, which I present in **Chapter 3**.

Bacon's work (2016) is a bit closer to home in the sense that he analyses the British context which resembles Scandinavian policing more than American policing. Moreover, Bacon provides a comprehensive analysis of the promoted changes within proactive investigation due to new legislative initiatives, organisational reforms, and shifts in thinking about values and norms of policing over recent decades. He argues that there is indeed a shift in both agendas and detective drug work with the introduction of e.g. *The National Intelligence Model* (NIM) especially when looking at detectives' occupational mandate and the organisation of drug investigations. Bacon shows how detectives act within their legal and organisational parameters because it becomes impossible for them to make cases outside these and as a result reforms have altered police practice by limiting decision-making autonomy through a concerted top-down programme. However, the changes as a whole are poorly received by detectives and thus perceived to have negative effect on operational efficiency. Therefore, Bacon concludes, the fundamentals of the detective role remain unchanged and the 'manifest' continues with older patterns. The focus on change in investigation work is especially relevant for this study as I look at how the proactive paradigm is translated into (new) investigative practice.

Chapter 3: The Drama of Police and the Police Métier

- *On the study's theoretical foundation, prisms, and core concepts*

Theories of policing must in a sense be metaphorical or about something rather than referential or about a person, role, or even an organisation. Social theory is a way of thinking about one thing in terms of another (...) It cannot be reduced to “variables”, “hypothesis”, and tests because theorising precedes the process of arguments concerning its truth value. (...) Policing, like medicine, should be judged by the extent to which it does the least damage to civility.

- *Democratic Policing in a Changing World* by P. K. Manning (2010: 97f; 100).

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the study's theoretical framework. This includes the theoretical foundation and the theoretical underpinnings which have informed and keep informing my preunderstanding, and the theoretical perspectives and core theoretical concepts, which I apply to analyse the empirical findings. In that sense, this chapter is a presentation of a distinct theoretical framework for understanding this particular research field. Albeit it also functions as a theoretical toolbox containing specific instruments, which I use to interpret and add meaning to the analytical findings derived from the empirical material. This particular theoretical framework have been helpful in surfacing pivotal fragments of the complex and wide-ranging area of proactive investigation *in action* while crystalising analytical interpretations.

As stated in **Chapter 1**, I seek in this study to examine how proactive investigations unfold in the police and the conditions which impact this and why they do so. I explore this from inside a police organisation and this calls for a theoretical foundation, which can capture both the dynamic interplay between the police and the external societal context in which they operate, and furthermore make sense of the internal interplay between formal and informal organisational structures and culturally anchored assumptions. Thus, the empirical investigation focuses on both the political and strategic frame of the police, the police organisation as an institution, individual police officers' worldview, and their mode of action.

In accordance with the phenomenological-hermeneutic scientific stance (see **Chapter 4**), theories are never innocent and they continuously inform, shape, and determine the analytical conclusions of any given study. The process of analysing and interpreting therefore goes on beyond the completion of this study as a process and the thesis as a product. This study has for the large part been inductive, and my

preunderstanding is constantly in motion in a circular process via a dialectic relationship between theory, methods, and analysis (Gadamer 1998). The “guilt” of theories therefore lies in the notion that theory A will promote a different analytical outcome than theory B or C etc.

A number of theories from police sociology, police science, organisational studies, studies of occupations and professions etc. could be relevant in terms of analysing the empirical findings and answering the study’s research objectives. The literature points to police culture as a pivotal and obvious research area when investigating police practices due to its impact on police work in general and the fact that it has been resilient to change (Maguire 2000). Moreover, later contributions to police sociology have underlined the relevance of perspectives from the field of organisational theory for example new developments within institutional theory have been applied and found essential in analysing e.g. police reform and innovations in policing (Terpstra 2020) and the dynamics of policing as it combines structural and cultural aspects and micro and macro (Scott 2001). As it is neither fruitful nor possible to include all of these perspectives, choices have to be made when deciding upon theory. The choice of theories in this thesis is unfolded throughout the chapter. In sum, the dramaturgical model of policing and the police *métier* are chosen as main theoretical perspectives as they together provide theoretical concepts to describe and understand both micro and macro levels, cultural and organisational aspects, and individual and organisational action in terms of proactive police practice – how it is carried out and why. The theoretical framework is therefore instrumental as it provides valuable explanations and understandings to the research subject and supports and adds meaning to the analytical process. Thus, it brings on a dialectic condition where the theory help to conceptualise and confirm the study’s empirical findings, but also where the empirical findings contribute to develop a tailored theory concerning proactive investigation practice which I present in **Chapter 9**.

The chapter is structured as follows:

First, I present the two main theories from Goffman (1959) and Manning (2010), which function as the primary theoretical prisms through which I view the field of proactive investigation in this study.

Second, I account for the specific relevance, limitations as well as contribution of these theories, and how I, in this study, understand and apply them.

Third, I clarify central and supporting theoretical concepts used to add further meaning and which function as analytical tools in analysing the empirical material.

The Dramaturgical Model: A Performative View on Police Work

Policing as a Theatre

Erving Goffman (1922-1982) presents in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) a general theory of social interaction proposing that aspects of social life can be viewed as a sort of theatrical drama, which is staged and played out between various actors. Goffman's (1959) focus is on the visible performances which are played, how the actors want to present themselves via these performances, how they are perceived by the audience, and thereby how they impact the way that others act towards them.

The dramaturgical model is frequently used within social studies to analyse a variety of social interaction and professional action (Kristiansen 2000; Jacobsen & Kristiansen 2006). Goffman's theatrical metaphor is as such a useful analogy for analysing social life – but the world is not a stage, and, at times, it is not even dramatic (Goffman 1959). Organisations are as such not mini theatres, but they supply the fronts, appearances, manner, routines, and stimulate the necessary teamwork. The idea is that in and through interaction, performances are selectively presented, selectively responded to, and selectively adequate to sustaining the working consensus on which interaction depends (Manning 2008c).

Accordingly, Manning (1977: 17) applies the theatre metaphor on police work claiming that: “*The police are dramatic actors, and they must wrestle collectively and individually with the salient dramatic dilemmas of their role and occupation.*” In his classic study within police sociology, *Police Work* (1977), Manning analyses what he calls ‘dramatic dilemmas’ of police work. A fundamental contradiction is, according to Manning, that the police mandate and as such legitimacy is tied to the myth that

the police can control and influence crime levels which they cannot. While the crime-related law enforcement tasks are widely spoken of and accepted by the police, most police work in democratic societies is in fact concerned with helping and supporting the public in both public and private disputes and conflicts when they call for service (ibid.). These tasks are by police viewed as thankless, demanding, onerous, boring, dirty, mundane, and sometimes self-demeaning duties. Therefore, Manning argues, the police are forced to instigate symbolic action to meet the public's expectations of being crime fighters. Indeed, the very definition of police work and the conceptions of this as presented by the police and reaffirmed by the public is therefore inaccurate. Accordingly, day-to-day police work becomes a dramatic performance where the police must appear in control of crime and disorder. Manning goes on to say about the police (1977: 19):

By narrowing their attention to something they can apparently control, the arrest rate, they have tied themselves to a socially determined process (crime) over which they have virtually no control. They have thus achieved success in focusing public attention upon an activity that can be seen as explosive and self-defeating.

In *The Narcs' Game* (2004, see also Manning 2008b; 2008c), Manning continues to use the dramaturgical model to analyse police's response to drugs. He argues that this type of law enforcement is *ceremonial* and represents a mode of both instrumental and symbolic social control as it is consistently directed at marginal and weak groups on behalf of the more powerful groups in society (ibid.: 4-5):

These little ceremonies, the arrest and humiliation of users, court-based dramas, and media coverage, all serve to sustain symbolic virtues, such as the overt commitment to still-lurking puritan values of restraint, deferred gratification, and denial of pleasure, and shift their foci and groups-as-targets as new threats to the status of dominant groups arise.

Manning (2004) labels drug policing as a ritualised 'drama of cops and robbers' inferring that this type of police activity, for various reasons, is indeed a ceremonial performance which has no impact on crime (ibid.: 261):

While crime control serves many functions, as does law enforcement, such as gathering information, deterrence, and punishment, it has more to do with hopes, dreams, fears, myths, and ideologies than with producing any impact on, or evidence of any impact on, crime of any kind.

Later, in Manning's work on democratic policing (2010) and on the role and function of police (2014) he goes on to develop the theoretical perspective of police as a 'drama of governance' in the sense that, he argues, the police act in the high and low dramas of society. Manning suggests (ibid.) that police in their everyday work seek to define and defend social order generally and its alteration as well as dealing with everyday risks and concerns called "crime" or "disorder". Low dramas are policing as usual, high dramas, on the other hand, are those which receive a considerable amount of public attention via the media. These dramas can, via for instance social media, become global-international. Police can therefore, according to Manning (ibid.) suddenly be featured as heroes, fools, or villains in unfolding international and national dramas as they perform their high and low local dramas in their little theatres. Police are as such continuously expanding their stages and roles. In this dramatisation of police work, the police have become aware of their own social capital and consequently they reproduce by habit and practice notions and images of social control. They frame ambiguous events as matters of police concern and they are as such the central players in communication dramas about themselves. Manning states (2014: 8):

The police are active actors, making up and playing roles. In this sense, they play themselves, acting out, mystifying, idealizing, and cooperating through teamwork to produce an imagery of discrete, mannered and stylized control and service. In other words, much of their play acting is designed to magnify their own importance and is redundant in communicational terms.

In the following, I will revert to the original source of the dramaturgical model by presenting some of its main theoretical concepts. I will hereafter summarise how this theory and its adaption to policing informs this study.

Goffman's Main Theoretical Concepts

Performances and Teams

The central theoretical concepts, which are connected to Goffman's dramaturgical model, are *performances*, *teams*, *regions*, *discrepant roles*, *communication out of character*, and *impression management* (Goffman 1959). The following presentation is additionally based on Kristiansen (2000). Performances are activities where individuals act in front of each other and try to convince their audience that they are in fact who they propose to be. A performance is therefore (Manning 2008c: 680):

...a 'seeable': something one sees, behaviour, not a value, a belief, or an attitude. A performance is a sequence of gestures, postures, verbalizations or actions seen by others (seen, not talked about) and responded to.

In connection to these performances the individuals have *fronts* which are their 'expressive equipment' more or less deliberately used during the performance. *Dramatic realisation* illustrates that the actors apply dramatical signs to the performance which underline what they want to communicate these can both be facial and bodily expressions. *Idealisation* is about how the actors present themselves as better or more perfect or consistent than the specific actions indicate. Idealisation demonstrates that the actors try to hide those expressions which conflict with the definition of the situation or the values of society, and to promote those expressions which are not. Idealisation is thereby a ceremonial celebration of the moral norms in society.

Kristiansen (2000) underlines that performances are not only concerned with the individual actors' self-presentation. It serves indeed a higher purpose for social interaction as a whole. Interestingly, the purpose of the performance is not merely to put the actor in a positive light, but that the individual's *appearance* and *manners* have a greater significance on a bigger scene. Performances require cooperation

between individuals on a *team* in terms of defining the social situation and staging a single routine. This team tries to sustain a consensus regarding the social situation in the sense that individual actors can act accordingly internally within the team, but also to keep up a specific front to the audience.

Two Regions: Front Stage and Backstage

Goffman (1959) differentiates between two different regions in which the actors exist. The front region can be seen as a *front stage* where all roles are played. There is an audience and the actors target their performance after the norms and standards which apply for the specific region. On the front stage, individuals are occupied with communicating a specific impression and self-presentation which means that other aspects are toned down or repressed. These aspects can instead be expressed on the *backstage* away from the audience's assessment. The backstage is thereby used to rehearse the performance and the backstage makes room for conflicting or contradicting self-presentations and mistakes can be made. Both physical ceremonial equipment can be hidden on the backstage and costumes can be tried on. The team can run through its performance, check for offending or inappropriate expressions, and the actors can relax, drop their fronts, go beyond the script, step out of character, and prepare for a new show (Goffman 1959).

Goffman (ibid.) discusses *discrepant roles* illustrating the problem which arises when actors are in the situation of being both audience and appearing on the backstage at the same time (Kristiansen 2000). Teams are working together to present a specific image of themselves to an audience and teams have certain secrets which are expressed backstage, but which the audience is not allowed access to. An actor can, however, be in a conflicting role where she is positioned as part of the audience and as a participant on the backstage simultaneously – on purpose or unwillingly. This, most often, concerns the event where an individual disguise herself and sneaks into the backstage to disclose secrets which potentially pose a threat to the team's

privileged position. With the term *communicating out of character*, Goffman (1959) describes those expressive impressions which are not natural in the specific performance which the team is cooperating about. In these situations, the actors' communication conflicts with the established performance and the attributed roles. Communicating out of character can as such function as a signal from the actor to the team that she wants to change the current interactional consensus.

The Art of Impression Management

Impression management refers to the central element of performing where the actors are obliged to control the impression which is expressed during a social meeting to avoid embarrassing situations or breakdowns. Impression management is therefore used to steer clear of *performance disruption* and there are several *defensive attributes and practices* which are connected to impression management. These attributes and practices concern first *dramaturgical loyalty* where the actors keep from exposing secrets to the audience, and second to keep a *dramaturgical discipline* where the actors are engaged intellectually and emotionally in their actions, but without spoiling a successful performance. Third, it concerns being able to show the ability to be forward looking and constantly consider how the performance is best played (*dramaturgical circumspection*). The audience also has a part to play in performances as impression management also encompasses the audience's protective practices where they try to shield the actors from the embarrassment of making mistakes or contradictions. This is a display of *tactful inattention* where the audience acts as if they did not note such situations with the aim to help the actor to save face.

Contextualising the Dramaturgical Model: Limitations and Potentials

Goffman's dramaturgical model can be applied to many aspects of police work and actions within the police profession. In this study, I find it accommodating to use several of Goffman's (1959) theoretical concepts when analysing different elements

of proactive policing and moreover to analyse my own role as an embedded police researcher as I examine police work from the inside (see **Chapter 4**). However, since Goffman's original theory primarily is developed in the context of understanding face-to-face interaction on a general level (Smith 1999), it needs to be operationalised and developed further to be applied to understand the specific organisational dynamics of policing. I therefore draw specifically upon Manning's framing of Goffman's theoretical model into a police context, which also include police organisations. I also expand on the concepts of e.g. stages to accommodate the empirical setting of policing/the police which I explain below.

Looking through the specific theoretical prism of 'dramatic policing' (Manning 2008c), I view (proactive) policing as a set of continuous performances played by individual actors (police officers, detectives, managers, and other police personnel) which form a number of crisscrossing teams. In accordance with Manning (1977), it seems important to distinguish – at least analytically – between instrumental and symbolic actions and thus performances. Although most police action have a symbolic element, performance can nevertheless be separated in *instrumental action* (such as actions with the purpose of obtaining a specific objective e.g. creating efficiency within the police) and even *staged action* (such as actions with the mere purpose of self-presentation showing e.g. visibility or activeness towards the public) (Holmberg 2003) – which I analyse further in **Part Three**.

As a supplement to and extension of Goffman's (and partly Manning's) original theory and understanding, I argue in connection with police work that regions unfold in different variations as there is first of all *front stage policing*, which is police work witnessed by an audience (the public) and *backstage policing* where police officers prepare for and rehearse their public performances. An illustrative example of this is The Police Academy (Politiskolen) which explicitly use roleplaying as an educational instrument in training police officers. However, as policing occurs in many (physical) places and on many (organisational) levels, the front stage of this

activity is not always obvious and the demarcation between front stage and backstage is at times blurred. There are of course situational and physical boundaries in the sense that traditional police work is carried out in the public sphere and therefore has an apparent audience here. Police work in public requires a certain police role for example as police officers in many situations need to act firmly and authoritatively and hide their personal and private feelings. In semi-public arenas, for example in the private homes of citizens, they can however alter this role slightly and downplay the authoritative aspects if the situation allows for it and where it for example calls for the show of e.g. empathy, understanding, compassion providing emotional support. Policing also requires a stable mandate as the audience (the public) needs to recognise that the actors performing are in fact police officers with the authority to use e.g. force against civilians.

Manning views Goffman's work as an "unrealised, contributory potential for the organisation studies field" (2008b: 678). Indeed, Manning says (ibid.) Goffman's analyses are interested in responses and resistance which are produced by constraints in organisations defined as ecological, material, structural, and cultural limits on choice. Therefore, Manning argues (ibid.), organisation is the framework for considering trust, order and ordering, framing and performance. To study organisations, he says, is to study not only what people do, but how they rationalise or explain the why's and wherefores of that work which is not 'organisation' as a set of fixed, measured, variable relationships. Thus, Manning interpret Goffman's view on organisations as abstract entities, while organising is the relational process of co-participants.

When it comes to the context of invisible policing, I will argue that much police work, for example intelligence work and (proactive) investigative work under scrutiny in this study, is carried out 'behind the scenes', but on an *organisational front stage*. On this front stage behind the scenes the audience consists of other members of the police organisation who view the performances of for example

police management or detectives forming different (professional) teams and playing different roles. Depending on the constitution of teams, there are multiple backstages within the police organisation. These *organisational backstages* are as such primarily defined by the different teams belonging to these stages. To put it more clearly: I propose that there are performances taking place within the police which occur on various backstages where police officers in different professional roles relax and rehearse their performances before entering the organisational front stage. This can for example be informant handlers, police managers, detectives, intelligence personnel and so on who are bound together as a professional defined team sharing the same manuscript, the same costumes, and the same props used in their specific performances. This means that police officers perform different roles, on different stages, facing different audiences using different scripts. Generally, as Manning argues (1977; 2014), police work encompasses a lot of roleplaying in both low level and high-level dramas and police officers are both trained and experienced in performing different acts and roles. They are therefore particularly skilled in impression management. Consequently, on a day-to-day basis they spend a lot of time shifting between different front stages and backstages where they play different roles depending on the situational circumstances, the other actors, and the audience.

In connection to carrying out this study, as an embedded researcher investigating police work and as an employee within the police, I consider myself an actor performing a role on the organisational front stage of the police organisation. Here I belong to various professional teams (e.g. other academics, analysts, representatives from the national police or NCI etc.) specifically depending on my organisational or professional attachment. However, I also consider myself as taking on what Goffman labels a discrepant role as I am additionally a participant from the audience (the public) visiting the backstage of policing. I even visit the organisational backstage of proactive policing as my objective, as a researcher, is to

gain information of how things are done and how backstage activities impact front stage action (I elaborate further on this researcher role in **Chapter 4**).

On that account, I use the theoretical concepts of the dramaturgical model analytically both in terms of this study's methodology and in connection with interpreting the empirical findings. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, no theories are innocent and the application of theoretical perspectives to empirical findings are first and foremost a matter of choice. However, Goffman's unique and enduring dramaturgical perspective together with Manning's application and further development of this have proven particularly relevant in connection with this study. The dramaturgical perspective is especially helpful in the first order analysis which looks at *what goes on?* investigating the actions connected to proactive investigation and when looking at organisational performance and organisational impression management (Shulman 2016).

Although the dominant view is that Goffman is primarily concerned with sociological analysis of situational interaction in demarcated social settings and as such a form of 'social psychology' this is, according to Smith (1999b), a misconception. Goffman's work is, on the contrary, decidedly sociological and his topic is more broadly 'social organisation' which his examinations of total institutions, stigma, gender, relations, role distance, and frames testify to (Smith et al. 1999a). These diverse topics suggest, according to Smith (1999b), that Goffman can be appreciated at several different levels. Thus, in my analysis of proactive police practice I do not merely look the interactional context. Instead, in line with Manning (1977; 2004), I use Goffman's theoretical framework to look at patterns and systems in police performance trying to deduce the social order and the essential drama of proactive policing. According to Manning (2008c) there is no correct, proper or even generally sanctioned reading of Goffman and although he favoured situational analysis, his theory can be applied to an organisational analysis as long as it focuses on how interaction takes place. There is no micro-macro distinction in

his work as, Manning (2008c) claims, Goffman's view is that society *is* constrained interaction; the work of society *is* interaction. Goffman's dramaturgical model has in accordance been applied by other scholars (see for example McCormick (2007) and Shulman (2016)) who operationalise this theoretical perspective to look at e.g. organisational change and conflict and people's experiences in the workplace. The potential of Goffman's metaphors as instruments to understand demarcated incidents of social interaction is therefore greater than merely brief encounters between people. In fact, in McCormick's view (2007) the dramaturgical frame allows us to examine the more irrational patterns of organisational behaviour in this context the deeper patterning of proactive police action. Additionally, Manning (2014) states: Goffman's proposed organisational analysis of the dramaturgical performance of organisations can help us understand how organisations cast themselves in the rhetoric and expectations that are formally communicated to its members. Another strength of Goffman and his theatre metaphors are that they appeal to practitioners and non-scholars as they have the advantage of providing the reader with clear mental images of what goes on and as such make complex interactions, relations, conflicts, dilemmas etc. to appear as clear and even meaningful social constructions. This is perhaps why some argue that Goffman is 'common-sense' and 'stating the obvious', however, in my view, the theory's explanatory power is much deeper than on-the-surface interaction. It provides a unique instrument to illustrate complex conditions of social organisation in a rather simple and visual manner. Or as Smith (1999b) underlines: although Goffman's work is accessible to non-specialised audiences and appeal to beginners it also persistently addresses perennial issues in the discipline of sociology which hold a complex core deceptively surrounded by a transparent exterior. Access to this therefore becomes a test of the reader's own sociological sophistication.

This study is neither a study of interaction nor of organisation per se. Instead, I deal with the conceptualisation and practice of a specific policing discipline (proactive investigation) and via the exploration of this I look at police (inter)action and police

organisation. In this sense, police practice is compiled by different types of interaction which differ in purpose – and this purpose is to a large extent built by obligations and connections to the large social enterprise: the police organisation. This is in accordance with Goffman’s (1959) view on formal organisations which he characterises as shaping and modifying interactions and thus it places ecological, material, structural and cultural limits on choice (Manning 2008c). Manning’s analysis in *Police Work* (1977) was one way in which elements of Goffman’s framework entered organisational analysis and Goffman viewed organised action as framed by either technical, political, structural, cultural or dramaturgical approaches. The dramaturgical model provides as such a dramaturgical perspective to social organisation and organisational theory (Manning 2014a; Shulman 2016).

However, since Goffman’s dramaturgical model does not cover motivations or underlying structures per se – but is primarily interested in observable interactions in specific situational contexts – I find it necessary to apply an additional theoretical framework. For that purpose, I draw on Manning’s continuous work (1977; 2003; 2010) which besides from looking deeper into *explanations of actions* has the advantage that it specifically evolves around and is developed within a framework of policing. Therefore, Manning’s work is intended to support the second order analysis in this study and as such the exploration of the question of *why* proactive investigation is carried out the way it is.

A Democratic Model of Policing: Composing the Police Métier

A Matter of Justice

In his paramount book *Democratic Policing in a Changing World* (2010), Manning builds on his previous investigations of police work (1977; 2004; 2008 etc.) and develops a theoretical framework for understanding the nature and function of (Anglo-American) democratic policing and its impact on social order in modern Western democratic societies. The aim is to explore police practices and the police's role in relation to the collective concern of justice as it is assumed to be shaping this role and these practices (ibid.). To explore this, Manning draws upon the work of American philosopher John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971, 1999) when he asks about the police's role in distributing rights and sanctioning obligations. Manning (2010: iX) argues:

(...) allocative justice reproduces present inequalities and in fact adds to them inevitably. In this sense, it sustains injustice and privilege. Modern societies, stripped of traditional religious beliefs, absent binding historical memories that constrain, and powerful mythopoetic enactments, require equality as a principle.

Thus, Manning's main claim is that democratic policing does not violate the tacit assumption or background expectations that agents of the law, and those who create it, are acting in good faith, attempting to clarify the meaning of rules, and treating crime as criminal and treating similar cases similarly. If it did repeatedly, the stability issuing from a shared sense of justice would be threatened. He argues further (ibid.: 191):

(...) if policing fixes on maintaining a stable level of crime control, ignoring some calls, responding rapidly to others, narrowing the vision of "success", dramatising the rare gun arrest and crime-suppression tactic, and if it as a result fails to provide support and increases inequality by action as well inaction, policing is failing.

Within this theoretical framework of democratic policing, which is much about the police's role in society, Manning develops a theoretical concept which is particularly relevant in this thesis, as I will explain in the end of this section. It concerns the concept of *the police métier*. This concept is connected to the nature of policing and outlines standard police practice and it serves as a prism through which policing can be seen and understood. In the following, I will concentrate on this part of Manning's theory and refer to Manning (2010) for a rigorous presentation of the framework of democratic policing. According to Manning (2010: 213), the police métier is:

(...) a window into the ways in which policing shapes the social order in which it is located. The métier contrasts with how policing manages the mandate publicly. Rather, the police métier captures the show occurring backstage, characterised by occupational assumptions and practices focused around and reflexively shaping the incident.

The police métier is a bundle of practices and ensembles of practices called routines and it reflects conventional wisdom about why and how policing works. Accordingly, this concept can be viewed in connection with the dramaturgical model of policing as it encompasses the central understanding that the police operate both front stage and backstage. The métier can thus be seen as a reflection of the backstage of policing comprised of both occupational assumptions and practices; the métier seeks to explain the dynamics and processes involved as the police shape their social order in ways that often contrast with how the mandate of policing is publicly managed. Moreover, Sheptycki (2017) underlines that police organisations are differentiated internally, but held together by the police métier – a cluster of assumed ideas about 'police work' since loose couplings between units within the organisation require tacit assumptions about what is processed and why.

The Police Métier: a Stabilising Medium

In Manning's understanding (2010), there is an endlessly elastic socio-political context in which policing operates and this elasticity results in shifting targets, deployment of resources, and new rhetoric which shapes the mandate over time through the stabilising medium of the *métier* (ibid.: 205):

While it is commonly assumed that the police enforce the law, and their core tasks surround crime control, this does not capture what they do or why they do it. It does not evaluate the consequences of crime control, only the *prima facie* notion that what work is right. The police are a flexible and shifting device that responds to that which raises distrust. They are governed by situated actions deemed proper. While the targets of action are shifting and shaped by politics, the range of police tactics remains much the same, and the unstated purpose remains the same.

There is as such a dynamic and stable side of policing. The police *métier* is gradually built up over time during the twentieth century and is forged by the interactions between police management, front-line officers, and the technological infrastructure of police organisations. It is that of an authoritatively coordinated, legitimate organisation employing practices aimed at tracking, surveillance and arrest and it remains ready to apply force, up to and including fatal force, in pursuit of the organisational goal of 'reproducing order', 'making crime', 'policing risk society' and 'governing insecurity' (Sheptycki 2017).

Assumptions about Policing

A central part of the police *métier* is habits and assumptions focused on the trope of crime that envisions only the need to control, deter, and punish the visible and known contestants (Sheptycki 2017). According to Manning & Raphael (2010), the assumptive world in which the police operate consists of assumptions about the politics of the field, the etiquette of treating citizens, mistakes at work, and routines and performances required of the practitioners. Within this assumptive world lies an assumed practical model or logic in action that informs choices made in line

with these assumptions. As such, police practices are verified with reference to the several compatible assumptions that produce them and the assumptions about policing are consequently the context within which the practices have a life and a social reality. The assumptions which are present in the police evolve around the police's knowledge of local areas, people, buildings, places, and their dynamics (Manning 2010: 214):

- The structural features of places, neighbourhoods, corners, and niches, “pockets of crime” are largely immutable
- The people found in problematic areas are incorrigible. If they are drug dealers, they are “always dirty” and have no rights because they have forfeited them and can always be arrested
- Long-term “prevention”, “problem solving” or efforts to change the contours of such neighbourhoods have no purchase of shaping policing reality
- Disorder can be altered superficially by local and personalised “treatments” and pragmatic, order-based policing
- It is only possible to disrupt, briefly deter, and make the occasional arrest as needed to maintain the essential authority of the officer
- Policing is differential by targets, time, place, and persons
- Policing should be personalised in the sense that officers identify with their district or beat
- While it is democratic in the sense of being responsive, policing in local areas, or neighbourhoods, is shaped by ethnicity, class, time of day, and the political context. There is little one can do to change the economy, schools, family life, or religious values; these rarely change.

In this perspective, there are specific assumptions about policing and the social world in which they operate which are shaping and informing police practice. Hence, there is a mutual dependable relationship between police officers' assumptions of policing and the practice they carry out and thereby provide a social reality. This means that the viewpoints of police officers to a high degree influence the work they do, which the vast literature on police occupational culture also

points to (see e.g. Chan 1997; O'Neill et al. 2008; Brodeur 2010; Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Bowling et al. 2020).

The Incident Focus

The theatrical core of the police *métier* lies, according to Manning (2010) in police patrol work and the work of detectives. The occurrence of crime and disorder ‘the incident’ is therefore its ‘sacred centre’. The *métier* is displayed in the cynosure of the incident which is grounding everyday policing. The incident is a microcosm of sensible, thoughtful, rational individualistic choices. Within the police organisation, the incident is framed and viewed exclusively as the officer at the scene describes it, unless otherwise known (Manning & Raphael 2010). ‘Otherwise known’ refers to potential later reviews by supervisors, media or photo documentation as it is not accustomed to question police officers’ statements or individual action (Manning 2010). As the incident is the theatrical core of policing, it is seen as responsiveness to public demands and a way to show activity to supervisors and managers. Still, it is seen as a low-visibility matter metaphorically through the eyes of the police officer (Raphael & Manning 2010).

The Shaping Forces of the Métier


Manning & Raphael (2010) describe four shaping forces, which serve as sustaining practices of the police *métier* – visualised in the illustration **Figure F** (Manning 2010: 216).

The Police Organisation

The first shaping force is the authoritative patterning of relationship called *the (police) organisation*. Manning & Raphael argue (ibid.) that police work is institutionalised, structured, routinised, unquestioned and done as if there was no other way to do it. It is as such taken for granted in terms of effectiveness, purposes,

and means. The basic foundational assumption is that this organisation is functional and rational. The organisation is designed to allocate officers to randomly patrol, to react and respond to calls, and to investigate “founded” calls. The police organisation structures and concentrates its resources at the bottom of the organisation primarily around ‘the incident’. Therefore “policy” is set on the ground by lower participants’ situated practices resulting from decisions made quasi independently and ad hoc by loosely supervised police officers. In other parts of the police science literature, this latter element is referred to as police officers’ wide discretionary powers (Kleinig 1997).

Figure F. *The Shaping Forces of the Police Métier.*



Interpersonal Tactics

The second shaping force is *interpersonal tactics* in the incident. The sanctioned interpersonal tactics of policing are those thought to guarantee successful asserting of authority, taking control, closing the incident in some fashion, and returning to service. These tactics are learned ‘on the job’ from experienced police officers and

especially field-training officers. Academic aspects of police training are viewed as irrelevant and even an obstacle for doing good police work. Consequently, good policing and good police work has the following features and as a dramaturgical act it requires (Manning 2010: 218):

- Sizing up the incident quickly
- Dealing with the current situation in a parsimonious fashion
- Avoiding violence or extended arguments
- Deciding what to do and how to do it with dispatch
- Minimising paperwork
- Producing solutions that facilitate returning to “service” that is becoming available for patrolling
- Reducing considerations about eventual guilt or innocence of the parties
- Eliminating remedies that are extensive, rehabilitative, educational, or transformative.

The belief is that the incident has the social reality attributed to it by the officer and thereby it takes organisational shape as the officer defines and describes it. An epigram of ‘you-had-to-be-there-to-understand-what-was-done-why-it-was-done-and-the-results-produced’ rules the occupational culture as it protects and elevates judgements on the scene from criticism or punishment. The epigram and the associated stereotype thereby reinforce the inviolate and sacred centre of the work the reasonable, thoughtful, rational, cogitating individual officer, on the street deciding things. Indeed, the officer’s account is virtually the rule of thumb and this provides flexibility of action and freedom from close supervision. Since police work is not defined in concrete terms or in terms of the content of the interactions involved, but rather is defined as a social form what is done is open-ended and can be described using the conventional rhetoric sanctioned within the culture (Manning & Raphael 2010).

Modes of Deploying Resources

The third shaping force is *ritualised, repetitive modes of deploying resources* which ground 'order' and 'ordering' in places and doings rather than in categories of crime, law, and morality. In this sense, policing is more about the control of territory and the symbolisation of that control. The deployment of resources is in accordance with the assumptions about policing and the understandings that police know where crime is occurring, which groups of people who commit crime, during what hours, days, and months of the year. The records, which are kept about these issues, sustain the validity of this practice as they are based on the same assumptions.

Rewarded Activities

The fourth shaping force is *the cluster of rewarded activities*. These are the organisational inducements and the distribution of these on how to perform policing. These are based on assumptions about how the social world operates as well as what practices which are necessary to cope with this world. They generally revolve around stops, arrests, and other visible interventions, while rewards for other activities such as problem solving, developing partnerships, working with community groups are absent. As such, the police organisation is continuously tied to its symbolic crime-control focus and ritual attachment to performance (Manning & Raphael 2010). As mentioned, the incident can be seen as a window in which police practices are displayed and when looking at the proposed shaping forces above underlines its ceremonial position for repeating what is valued and recognised in policing. The subjective and objective forces that govern police performance are, according to Manning (2010), mobilised in the incident. The activities surrounding the incident builds on a 'fuzzy logic' in the sense that they resemble coherence while this is not verbalised or described in nuance, but they are recognisable as 'police work' in the here and now. They are as such known despite of their emergent properties and complexities and these practices reproduce the modes of policing so frequently observed (Manning *ibid.*).

Contextualising the Police Métier: Limitations and Potentials

Since this study focuses on how proactive investigations unfold in the police and the conditions which shape and impact this and why, I find it imperative in my analysis to apply the police métier as a theoretical concept as it reveals deep patterning of police action and its shaping forces regardless of the overt manifestations and impression management. As Manning (2010) argues, it is important to step back from the obvious labels and rhetoric and step closer to the patterning of policing. In accordance to Manning, my aim is to examine the actual practices of the police on the ground, rather than inferring these from aggregated data as ‘crime’ and ‘crime control’ which are not things, obdurate matters, but rather shifting relational icons that change the meaning and consequence by place, by time, and as a result of changes in criminal and civil law. This ambition is indeed in accordance with the methodological approach of this study, which I present in detail in the following **Chapter 4**.

As police work in general and covert and proactive investigation specifically are practices built on tacit knowledge and subterranean assumptions, it is essential to analyse these informal aspects. This has since early police sociology often been addressed as an exploration of police occupational culture (e.g. Banton 1964, Skolnick 1966; Bittner 1967; 1970, Muir 1977; Manning 1977) which has been seen as a primary influencer of police action (see e.g. Maguire 2000). Manning does not use the word culture as a central theoretical concept. In fact, he raises critique of police studies of police culture as, he argues (2010), they lack taking into account the more formal impacting aspects of policing such as the organisational and societal context which he finds imperative. Manning builds on Goffman when he formulate organisation as (2008b: 687):

...an actor, or performer, a social object to which motives, purposes, aims and social features are attributed to and responded to by other actors. It could create and disseminate impressions to its advantage. It could create a sustaining imagery to

compete in an organisational environment. It could produce a line and create order in its audiences.

Thus, Manning labels (ibid.) his own sketch of police work in *Narcs' Game* (2003) as a kind of drama which passes for an organisationally based theory of modern policing since policing can be seen as engaged in a kind of dramatic game of impression management or effort to persuade audiences via strategies, tactics and information of the quality of its actions. The police organisation is an actor, it interacts with other actors in symbolically articulated games and its actions have consequences for other actors. Police practices – understood as what is done in the name of the police organisation – require therefore, according to Manning (ibid.) visible display of involvement in policing as an organisation. Therefore, Manning's continuous work – and ultimately his comprehensive theory of democratic policing (2010) – can as such be understood in part as organisational theory. This theory also builds on concepts from organisational studies such as Van Maanen's and Schein's *organisational socialisation* (1977) and Weick's *sense-making* (1995) – although he uses these concepts more or less indirectly. The theoretical anchoring of the concepts which Manning presents in connection with the police *métier* is therefore a little unclear besides his loyalty to and extension of Goffman's work.

Still, I view and interpret Manning's concept of the police *métier* as an effort to capture aspects and perspectives of both culture and organisation, micro and macro, formal and informal, individual and institution as it refers to the dynamics of policing where both external and internal conditions impact police practice and result in specific modes of action and routine practices determined by the shaping forces as presented above. The concept of the police *métier* therefore goes beyond the concept of (police) culture and (police) organisation as the police *métier* provides a broader understanding of *what goes on in policing and why* in the sense that the concept tries to capture not only the microcosmos of a specific occupational field and its goings-on, but contribute with meaning to the cycle of *the*

police profession within the police organisation and police within society. This study is neither an explicit study of police culture or police organisation as these concepts and scopes are too narrow in my view to capture the research question. Instead, by applying the concept of the police *métier* it becomes a study of proactive investigation work in the core dynamic in policing; the societal external structures in conjunction with the organisational internal conditions in line with my knowledge ambition (presented in **Chapter 1**).

I will additionally apply the concept of *epistemic culture* which stems from Austrian sociologist Knorr Cetina (1999) who analyses the epistemic cultures of science as the premier knowledge institution in modern society. Epistemic culture is conceptually different from the concepts of organisational and occupational culture and the police *métier* as it refers specifically to the specific aspects of cultures that create and warrant knowledge (Cetina 1999: 1): “(...) *those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms—bounded through affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence— which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know.*” The epistemic notions of detectives seem relevant to investigate especially when looking at the introduction of a new policing paradigm where knowledge production is a core task and a precondition and since two epistemic rationales (experience-based and knowledge-based) are competing within the police. In this study, it therefore becomes central to examine how detectives come to *know what they know* about crime as a phenomenon and policing as a practice generally speaking and specifically in relation to evidence production in proactive investigations. As Manning (2010) argues, the research knowledge of detective work is limited and especially that of specialised proactive units. This study, therefore, also becomes a further exploration of the dramaturgical model and the concept of the police *métier* as it investigates the mode of actions and the practical logics of organised crime policing and as such tries to capture what I refer to as *the dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation and the (proactive) detective métier* which are presented in **Chapter 9**.

PART TWO: FRAMING THE STUDY



Chapter 4: Friend or Foe?

- On the study's embedded approach to exploring police's investigation practices

I participated rather freely, but remained an anthropologist.

- Stranger and Friend by Hortense Powdermaker (1966: 115).

Introduction

Operation Goldilocks was initiated in the Springtime in Alpha Investigation Unit (AIU) located in Metropolis City. The main target was a ‘usual suspect’—a longtime member from an organised crime group, Nigel Smith, who was known by the alias “Jerry”. By chance, I joined the investigation team the same day the operation began and the manager of AIU, Chief Superintendent Brett Oakley, underlined this fortunate situation in my morning meeting with him at the central police station where the investigation unit operated.

“I’m gonna set you up with Sandy from today”, he said, “he’s gonna be the SIO (senior investigating officer (sagsstyrer)) on this operation we’re starting today targeting Jerry”.

“Oh, yeah, I heard about that”, I said, as I recently had been talking to some detectives in NCI (National Centre of Investigation) about the launch of the operation. I had also attended the strategic coordinating meeting (koordinationsmøde) between the police districts, the national and the regional units where investigation targets (etterforskningsmål) were discussed and prioritised.

Jerry was almost a legend within the police; his (criminal) activities could be traced back through decades and he was a noticeable figure in the environment.

“He’s tough, but we’re gonna get him this time”, the chief superintendent continued. “This time we have a confidential informant (kilde) close to him, it already looks promising. We’re gonna solve this case.”

I nodded, sitting in a chair at the meeting table in the chief superintendent’s office with my handbag on my lap, still with my coat on. I had arrived ten minutes before by train and was met by the smiling and welcoming chief superintendent in the reception downstairs, which also served as the police station’s service centre where people came to report crimes or to sort out various administrative matters.

“This one will be a good case study for you”. The chief superintendent looked enthused: “It has everything! We’re already setting up a formal JIT (joint investigation team) with another European police service.”

“So—should we go meet the team?”.

I hadn’t checked in to the hotel yet and carried a small suitcase and dragged a small trolley behind me as we walked down the hall to the staircase, going through a glass door using an admissions card. The entire investigation unit was placed on the second floor of the building on a hallway with about a dozen offices and around 25 working stations. The investigation team shared the space with the districts’

informant handlers who had their own office but used the big meeting room to eat their lunch and drink coffee. I placed my luggage and coat in the office of the superintendent (efterforskningsleder) and the clerk. The office was empty, and the Chief Superintendent said:

“I think they’re having breakfast in here”. He knocked on the door across the hallway and opened it to go in.

Around 15 people were gathered around a long table set with bread rolls, butter, cheese, deli meats, big coffee pots, plates, and plastic cups. The crowd turned their heads and stopped talking.

“Morning everyone.”

We entered the room and the conversation continued sporadically. There was an informal and relaxed atmosphere although I sensed I was being watched and found myself observing every little move and sound in the room. My heart rate was increasing as I was feeling a growing nervousness; in the coming months, I and the research I was carrying out depended on this group of people and their attitudes towards me and willingness to let me be a part of their everyday work. Moreover, no matter their sentiments they were forced to tolerate my physical presence as it was already decided upon by management. There was however no guarantees that this would be a peaceful co-existence. The first meeting would indeed be vital for the nature of the relationship the team and I was going to have in the time to come.

I found an available chair around the table between the detectives and the Chief Superintendent sat down on a chair at a desk alongside the wall.

“So, this is Nadja from NCI. She’s gonna stay with us for a long period of time. A few months to begin with. She’s doing a research project on proactive investigations, which is very exciting.”

I continued:

“Yes, I’m happy to be here. I’m employed at NCI and at the same time I’m a PhD fellow at Aalborg University. And I’m here to learn about how you carry out proactive investigations, which methods you use and what challenges you meet. I hope you’ll share your knowledge and experience with me.”

“I’m putting her on Jerry”, the Chief Superintendent said, “so she can see how we start up our cases.”

The detectives remained silent, carrying on with their breakfast.

“It’s a godsend for us that Nadja’s here to look into our work. It’s not a bad thing that all the good work we carry out in this unit is called attention to.”

The room was still silent, a couple of nods around the table.

“Don’t think we have this type of breakfast every day”, a Detective remarked.

“Yeah, I was wondering, it looks cosy...”, I smiled without finishing my sentence.

“No, it’s really a hardworking group of people”, the Chief Superintendent said in a sarcastic, but friendly tone of voice, “they don’t spend any time drinking coffee at all.”

“Or with our feet on the table”, a Detective sitting in the corner replied.

Mumbled laughter.

“All right, I’ll carry on...Sandy, can you coordinate with Nadja?”

The Chief Superintendent left the room and the detectives began talking to each other without any particular attention towards me.

“So, you’re from NCI.”

It was more a statement than a question from the detective sitting right opposite of me.

“Yes, it’s the national police, John”, another detective replied rolling his eyes while he was stretching his arm to get a piece of cake from a tray on the table.

“Alright, alright, I’m just finding out if you’re friend or foe!” John said.

He did not sound annoyed nor enthusiastic.

“Yeah, that’s an important thing to find out,” I replied smiling.

A Detective sitting next to me turned around and said:

“Alright, but here’s the most important question: do you drink beer?”

The situation above took place when I began my fieldwork at AIU two years after having started my PhD research. As an employee at the Danish National Police for seven years, I had already a fair amount of experience with policing and with the police organisation. I had been teaching at The Police Academy (Politiskolen). For two years, I had headed up a research working group about gang crime at the police’s Knowledge and Research Centre (Politiets Videnscenter). I had carried out several analyses of the organised crime phenomenon and policing practices in relation hereto. I had travelled across the country to nearly all police districts to observe and evaluate more than a dozen operational responses towards outlaw motorcycle gangs. I had been a member of the National Strategic Staff on Gang Crime (Rigspolitiets Nationale Følgestab Vedrørende Bandekriminalitet) since the beginning of my employment, and I had contributed to various strategies and response plans within that area. I had visited Nordic and European countries and police services to look at police organisations and attend conferences about police research and best practices in law enforcement. I had written a number of policy documents (notater), articles, and reports about gang crime and policing models.

And I had written a textbook on proactive policing for police officers (*Proaktiv kriminalitetsbekæmpelse for politifolk* (2013)) based on an evaluation of Copenhagen Police's operational and investigative response to gang crime. In other words, I had already been in contact with several hundred police officers, police managers, prosecutors, teachers, administrative and judicial staff from different police districts, departments, and units serving in different functions within the Danish police. Consequently, it was not the first time I was carrying out fieldwork and being in the policing environment was familiar to me. I was not a newbie coming straight out of a research environment meeting the world of policing for the first time. Because of this, I found myself reasonably prepared to join AIU – well aware that it would be a demanding task both professionally and personally.

In this chapter, I introduce this study's methodological framework and provide the reader with a detailed account of how this study is framed and designed, how information is collected, how the empirical material is analysed and interpreted and on which basis these choices are made. As unfolded in **Part One** of this thesis, police work is by many scholars regarded as a practice build on tacit knowledge and silent work experiences (Finstad 2000; Gundhus 2006; Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Hald 2015; Bacon et al. 2020). This is indeed the case for invisible policing (Loftus & Gould 2012) and therefore proactive investigation which is covert and surrounded by a high degree of secrecy. Practices and procedures seem obvious for and are rarely questioned by detectives and members of the police organisation and are poorly defined and described (Hartmann et al. 2018). Additionally, the literature on police culture underline that the police are notorious skeptical of outsiders and their potential critical view on the organisation. The main argument of this chapter is therefore that in order to capture informal conditions of policing such as subterranean structures, assumptions, rationales, and logics it is necessary to study the police organisation and police practice empirically and up close (Manning 2005; 2010; Bacon et al. 2020). Moreover, to gain insight into a hypersensitive area such as covert policing and consequently proactive investigation it is vital to study this from

within. In accordance with Manning (2005; 2010) (see **Chapter 3**), I view the role of police research as being primarily to build up in-depth knowledge about how police operate in its social context and the implications of this for society in general. For that reason, police research should focus not only on different aspects of police work, but also on police as a social institution and its agency in relation to the greater structure of crime control (Garland 1990). To support this ambition and thereby contribute with profound knowledge and meaningful explanations of how police through proactive investigation respond to organised crime and why, this calls for a qualitative approach and the use of a variety of research methods, and empirical material stemming from different sources in order to shed light on this research query.

There are a substantial amount of pioneering police ethnographies from Banton (1964), Skolnick (1966), Westley (1970), Bittner (1972), Cain (1973), Reiss (1973), Van Maanen (1973; 1978a), Manning & Van Maanen (1978) to Punch (1979) and more (see e.g. Brown 1996; Brodeur 2010; Manning 2005; 2010; 2014a; 2014b; Reiner & Newburn 2008; Innes 2010b; Reiner 2010; Fassin 2017; Karpiak & Garriot 2018; Bacon et al. 2020; Bowling et al. 2020 for overviews). Additionally, there are even central as well as essential insider ethnographies in police studies (see e.g. Young 1991; Waddington 1993; Holdaway 1980; 1989; Moskos 2008) which have pointed to imperative and unavoidable conflicts and dilemmas, advantages and difficulties of conducting police research. These scholars have set the agenda and standard for police research and constitute continuous sources of inspiration and must-reads. Their contribution to our understanding of policing is profound as they offer insights into the processes, structures, and meanings of the police (Fassin 2017; Bacon et al. 2020).

However, for me and my colleagues Hartmann, Høgh, and Rønn these contributions have not been sufficient in order to provide a comprehensive and clear methodological recipe for all aspects of the delicate insider position. For that reason

we have, in the article *Knowing from Within: Making the Case for Embedded Police Research* (2018), proposed the conceptualisation of or even a manifest for embedded police research. In this thesis, I continue the development of this concept to encompass a specific stance in relation to philosophy of science, researcher position, research ethics, choices of research methods, methods for analysis, and the overall purpose with and application of the research not only to support organisational development, but also to build theory. More precisely, my ambition and main errand with this chapter is to propose a comprehensive embedded methodology for police research which constitutes this study's methodological contribution.

The embedded researcher position builds naturally on the works of prior police research as mentioned above, but an important distinction from other insider positions is for example that the embedded position is not merely defined by the researcher's attachment/disattachment to the police organisation under scrutiny, or by the researcher's professional background (academic/police practitioner), *backstage knowledge*, or the research topic (operational/structural) (Brown 1996). I understand *embedded* as *an object which is implanted or put firmly and deeply in a surrounding mass*. It is per default an implant (and therefore not a natural habitat) and it is not something which blends in with this mass over time; it stays encapsulated without leaking into its surroundings and preserve a continuous outsider perspective in its embeddedness. This is an important characteristic of the embedded researcher as the objective of providing critical, but constructive analyses of any police activity and its implication for society should never be departed. Further, I define embedded police research as a comprehensive methodology for sensitive empirical research in closed and powerful organisations or social institutions, which are usually omitted from public insight and thereby holds an *endemic secrecy* (Fassin 2017). The methodology builds moreover on distinct principles from phenomenological and hermeneutic science in terms of both ontological and epistemological world views where the researcher engages with the

research field as an active agent. In sum, the embedded methodology encompasses clear ideas of how scientific knowledge is produced and understood, how the researcher is positioned, what research methods to use, how to apply theory, and how to analyse and interpret empirical findings. As other insider positions, the position of *the embedded police researcher* is therefore a unique position for better or worse; a privileged position and at the same time a very lonely endeavour. Concurrently, it is regarded both as a high status and low status position within police and within academia. As an example, I am within the police by some regarded as a specialised expert with a privileged and independent task. By others, I am regarded as not even being worth the payroll money (Hartmann 2014 has similar examples). In academia, I am often envied the “easy” access to information and informants, but also perceived as a *dirty researcher* (Hunt 2010; Hartmann et al. 2018) doing inside or so-called *government research* (*myndighedsforskning*), which is regarded as too entangled into the research field without the ideal scientific distance (Sheptycki 1994; Holmberg 2014; Davies 2016).

The positions described above are of course extreme and seldom expressed in such rigid categories. However, they capture quite well the most prevalent and persistent dilemma which an embedded (police) researcher doing (police) research in the organisation she is employed in has to tackle. Sociological research is all about sound and sober analysis of the social world’s various phenomena, structures, behaviours, interactions etc. which seldom are what they appear to be (Berger & Kellner 1982). Such research is not only in risk of being critical of the issues it investigates. It is in fact critical *per default* as it thoroughly scrutinises specific parts of the social world through strict methodological processes. This study, for example, looks at inherent conflicts and paradoxes, and ideals versus practices in the case of proactive investigation. This condition presents dilemmas and risks for both me as a researcher and for the organisation in which the research is carried out (the Danish police). As the embedded researcher, in Goffman’s (1959) terms, can be viewed as an actor playing a discrepant role by being both a member of the performing police

organisation and a member of the audience observing this performance there is a possibility that she will get access to secrets from the backstage of policing. So, what if the research turns out to be critical of ‘the way we do things’? What if the findings point to a need to do things differently or to rethink concepts, processes, values and the like?

As I have accounted for in **Part One**, two epistemological rationales are currently competing within contemporary policing: experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing. These rationales are central for understanding the way this study is carried out and why it was carried out this way. When I began this research, there was an increasing anti-intellectualism (as Granér 2004 similarly describes) or at least a growing resistance amongst police officers within the Danish police towards academics entering the field of policing. This resistance was partly based on discontent with the fact that other professional groups were included as members of the police, and on a more or less well-founded fear that such groups would take over important functions which earlier had been occupied by police officers. My employment and subsequently my engagement in this research project therefore mirror some of the police’s attempts to transform from one paradigm to another, which I will elaborate in **Part Three**. On that account I indeed find myself being an active agent in this process. Consequently, I have named this chapter *Friend or Foe?* as it sums up rather well the essential dilemma in my research specifically and perhaps of police research in general: There is no recognised position for an embedded police researcher within the police organisation. However, based on the experiences from this study it certainly makes sense to embed yourself in a ‘middle-position’ between friend and foe as *a critical friend* (Finstad 2000). This embedded position, however, does not reduce the professional and personal dilemmas, on the contrary. It raises distinct methodological and a variety of practical, and professional concerns about research ethics, researcher positions, research methods, knowledge production, and the appliance of research into practice.

In this thesis, special attention is therefore given to unfolding the embedded methodology in this rather extensive chapter which might seem immense compared to a more conventional prioritisation of methodological issues in other academic products. However, my intention is to operationalise the methodological framework and the theoretical concept of the embedded police research methodology into practice. The ambition is to give a detailed account of this by embedding the reader into small vignettes of empirical examples, as the one in the beginning of this section, my reflections in connections with these, and how they correspond with the embedded methodology. Accordingly, I discuss and unfold prospects and pitfalls of the embedded approach through an introduction to specific circumstances concerning this study and how I dealt with them with various degrees of success. An important notion to underline in this preliminary stage is that certain ethical considerations have to a large degree determined the methodological framework here understood as the process from formulating the initial research question to writing up the last conclusions. This study deals with a research area, policing in general and investigation in particular, which can be labelled as a form of *sensitive sociology* (Jacobsen et al. 2005). This type of sociological research is characterised by amongst other a sensitive relationship between researcher and research field. Within this sensitivity lies notable methodological and ethical dilemmas concerning sensitive empirical material, and distinct demands for anonymity and confidentiality.

Based on these grounds, I have processed and used the empirical material in this thesis with great carefulness and consideration concerning the ethical conditions. As such, the empirical examples might seem to have a more passive role than in a conventional qualitative study. In accordance with Manning (1977), the study is based on extensive fieldwork and combines both sociological and anthropological methodologies, and the empirical material stems from many different sources, and are collected in different ways. However, as mentioned in **Chapter 1**, it is not a

traditional ethnography nor is it a description of day-to-day investigation work. The empirical material function as a comprehensive backdrop which guides the main analytical findings. These findings are supported by illustrative examples and quotes from interviews which I have carefully selected and put forward as representations of the main findings – rather than being a study where I rigorously disseminate and actively and continuously review the empirical material. As the chapter will demonstrate, a fundamental principle of the embedded methodology is that the researcher is embedded – not only in the field of study, but in the process of producing knowledge. The scientific stance of the embedded methodology thereby proscribes that I as an embedded researcher becomes a part of the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer 1998) in interpreting and actively using preunderstandings and understandings in order to get insight into the field of proactive policing. Moreover, the analytical method is an ongoing circular process where additional layers of interpretations are added – and this is progressively done through each chapter. Every part of the thesis therefore becomes a contextual frame for analysis and for that reason this chapter concerning the study’s methodology in itself becomes a (new) contextual analytical frame with independent analytical findings. The chapter therefore serves as a preunderstanding for the coming (analytical) chapters.

The chapter is structured as follows:

First, I begin drawing the counters of the embedded approach and identify the ambition for developing the methodological framework. I present the perspectives from philosophy of science and theoretical aspects of qualitative research which constitutes the phenomenological-hermeneutic worldview behind the embedded methodology and consequently this study. This includes underlying epistemological assumptions and preunderstandings of the field of study and a clarification of the embedded stance and its researcher positions.

Second, I give a brief introduction to the field of study – the Danish police organisation as a research arena – and provide a detailed overview of the study’s empirical material and unit of analysis. I account for and discuss choices concerning research methods through an introduction to fieldwork as a primary research method for embedded research – including its different components such as participant observation, qualitative interviewing, and document research.

Third, I introduce different circumstances regarding the practical conditions of carrying out this study through an elaboration of embedded researcher positions and various embedded researcher roles – and consequently the interactional dynamic between me as researcher and the research field. I explore different types of embedded role engagements and discuss these in terms of access and the constant negotiation between researcher and the research field and the implications of this for the study.

Forth, I present the study’s method for analysis which combines a four-step phenomenological and hermeneutic approach together with the use of first order and second order analyses as vital components of embedded research. I discuss a central element of the embedded methodology which is the circular process between preunderstanding and understanding in interpreting and creating analytical findings. Moreover, I propose a number of central principles to assess the embedded study’s quality and limitations.

Finally, I discuss the sensitive position of being an embedded researcher who produces critical-constructive research, and the most pivotal ethical issues in relation hereto. Moreover, I discuss censure and self-censure in embedded police research.

¹This was expressed informally, but also officially from the Danish Police Union (Dansk politiforbund) in e.g. articles and point of views from the police union’s president (formand) see <https://politiforbundet.dk/english>

Designing Embedded Research: Philosophy of Science and Researcher Position

The Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Embedded Stance

The central research question guiding this study is explorative in nature as the study is concerned with presenting an in-depth analysis of how proactive investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in police and which conditions impact this and why? For that reason, I employ a qualitative, exploratory, and inductive methodological approach where questions such as *how* and *why* can be answered. Danish sociologists Kristiansen & Krogstrup (1999: 13, *my translation*) have a useful distinction between *methodology* and *methods* as methodology is seen as:

...a fundamental epistemological and scientific level which amongst other has to do with the relation between theory and empirical material, how one achieves valid knowledge, and what scientific knowledge actually is.

Methods are on the contrary seen as “...*the practical approaches which are taken into use in connection with collecting data*”. Accordingly, I separate the concepts of research methodology and research methods; the research methodology in this study is framed by respectively phenomenological and hermeneutic research traditions founded by German scholars as Alfred Schütz (1975) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1998) in the sense that social life and human behaviour is understood as a dynamic everyday practice driven by the subjective meanings of its social agents. For me, as a researcher, this means that in order to explain and understand behaviour and actions in the social context of proactive policing it is vital to understand detectives’ interpretation of their life worlds – motives, thoughts and feelings – as they are driven by these (Kristiansen & Krogstrup 1999). This position contrasts with a positivistic and empirical-analytic scientific position claiming that social life can be

observed objectively and value-free (Robson 2002). As Weber (1982) claims, the researcher is always shaped by her own conditions and preunderstanding, and social phenomena will always be products of human rationales. Hence, there is no such thing as objective scientific analysis attached from the cultural setting. The researcher will choose her field of research and observe her surroundings from subjective criteria of relevance.

Thus, this study is equally influenced by my preunderstanding, beliefs, experiences, and lifeworld from the process of selecting the research topic to the interpretation and analysis of the empirical findings. However, this condition should not to be seen as a disadvantage or obstacle, on the contrary. The phenomenological ideal of researching social phenomena from the inside (Månson 1996) in order to obtain a *current understanding* (aktuel forståelse) and an *explanatory understanding* (forklarende forståelse) is in this study for example pursued through the embedded researcher position and as such the interaction between the researcher (me) and the research field during the fieldwork (the world of policing). As an embedded researcher, I therefore become a co-creator of the knowledge I generate.

When searching for understanding and meaning of e.g. police practices, the hermeneutic approach moreover prescribes that different parts of a field can only be understood if they are seen in connection with their unity while the unity can only be understood through the different parts which create the unity (Gadamer 1998). According to Gadamer (ibid.), in order to obtain this understanding, the subject and object are not parted. In fact, the researcher becomes a part of the hermeneutic circle (instead of standing outside of it) in interpreting as *preunderstanding* and *understanding* are mutual dependent. This is similarly the central scientific theoretical stance of the embedded methodology and it means e.g. that I actively use my preunderstanding and prejudices in order to get insight into the field of proactive investigation practices. In the following section, I

account for the concept of embedded police research by exemplifying the methodological choices in this particular study.

Unfolding the Embedded Stance

The embedded approach draws upon different traditions from philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. It is not merely characterised by using qualitative or ethnographic methods to investigate the field of policing or by taking on an insider position in order to get better access to information. It encompasses a distinct and comprehensive methodology and its different elements cannot be parted. There are some apparent similarities to ethnographic research, but there are also some differences which I explain in the following.

The typical approach in police sociology has been the ethnographic approach and the use of fieldwork in police settings (Manning 2014b; Fassin 2017; Karpiak & Garriott 2018; Bacon et al. 2020). An ethnographic research design has the purpose of providing descriptions and interpretations of the culture and social structure of a social group (Spradley 1979). Ethnography is traditionally rooted in anthropological science and adapted by sociologists from amongst other the Chicago School in their study of social deviance in urban settings in the 1940s and 1950s (see e.g. Becker 1963; Whyte 1943). The purpose is to produce ‘thick descriptions’, which allow others to understand the culture from the inside (Geertz 1973). As Hartmann (2014) argues in her study of police innovation in the Danish police: the purpose is to provide dense descriptions of some of the contextual meanings and cultural fragments within the police as these do not lend themselves easily to be interpreted by a researcher. An ethnographic approach is additionally considered useful when wanting to gain insight into an undiscovered area or field, and where depth rather than breadth is the norm (Robson 2002).

The classic anthropological tradition of ethnography and the method of fieldwork is to some degree skeptical of theorising and is more concerned with being explorative, open, and guided by the research field over a very long time (Robson 2002; Kristiansen & Krogstrup 1999). This is very much in line with the phenomenological research position as it is occupied with understanding human actions and behaviour in the subjective perspective of the agents and, by Weber's statement (1982), to avoid any normative or value-based conclusions. A number of police researchers (see e.g. Gundhus 2006; Loftus 2010; Holmberg 2014) agree to the notion formulated by Norwegian police researcher Liv Finstad (2000: 342) that fieldwork is the "...*obvious method for doing police research.*" Similarly, British police researcher Bethan Loftus (2009) argues that an ethnographic approach is undoubtedly the most appropriate available to access the inner world of policing and goes on quoting Van Maanen (1973) to say (2009: 201):

Ethnographic approaches are particularly appropriate for studying the deeper level assumptions of police officers because such assumptions invariably operate beneath the presentational canopy of police organizations (...) By immersing themselves in their host society, the job of the police researcher is to pierce this structure and capture the informal face of the organization.

British police scholars Reiner & Newburn (2008) suggest that much policing is dangerous 'dirty work' which proposes that police research might uncover information which the agents of the research field wish to keep secret (backstage activities). Police work has historically had low visibility and in order to gain insight into the world of policing (culture, working practices, daily routines) it is imperative to observe it up close and over time. Ethnographic police research, however, has mainly focused on front-line police work and as such patrol officers doing everyday tasks in the public sphere (Reiner 2010), but to a more modest extent explored the area of covert policing and detective work such as this study (although see e.g. Ericson 1981; Marx 1988; Hobbs 1988; Innes 2003; Manning 2004; Hobbs 2013; Loftus et al. 2015; Bacon 2016).

Another reason for the value of doing fieldwork over a longer period of time compared to other research methods is that the police organisation by many managers and police officers is viewed as ‘a bureaucratic Kafkaesque nightmare’ (Moskos 2008), or ‘a Monty Python nut case factory’ as Hartmann (2014) refers to. Hartmann was continuously made aware that “*nothing is what it seems to be*” concluding that a lot goes on in large police bureaucracies that lie beyond the perspective capacity of any individual. These logics of the police organisation refer to both the implications and unpredictable political/bureaucratic concerns and the condition that decisions and processes are not transparent.

The Importance of Backstage Knowledge

As the section above has pointed to, the researcher’s ethnographic approach is indeed essential when wanting to explore police practices and underlying and informal structures of policing (Fasson 2017; Bacon et al. 2020). Specific backstage knowledge important as it serves as a way to access other or additional information. Backstage knowledge is, however, difficult to get access to if you are merely a visitor within police – even as a long-term ethnographer. Below, I provide a couple of examples of the informal world of policing:

The term that I have heard the most over the years is the description of the police as being ‘a sheltered workshop’ (beskyttet værksted) – implying that it is not an ordinary workplace. Police officers will often use the phrase “*policing is just for fun*” (vi er her kun for sjov) in frustration referring to the notion that one should not take one’s work too seriously (as no one else does); it will only give you grievance.

Another example addresses the issue that many police officers in fact have a second job (for example farmer, photographer, gym trainer, plumber, carpenter etc.) and some of the most dedicated and committed police officers will at times be encouraged to “*carry out police work in their leisure time*”. This implies that they involve themselves too much in the job and care too much about the outcome of it

rather than just coming into work and serving no more than the obligatory eight hours. Getting to know police officers have made me realise that many joined the police with an idealistic purpose of ‘making a difference in other people’s lives’, ‘securing law and order for Mr. and Mrs. Smith (hr. og fru Jensen)’ and so on. However, over time many police officers become disillusioned in the sense that they lose faith in the organisation, management, and the value of their own job.

As I accounted for in **Chapter 3**, a host of examples support the notion that a fair amount of policing on the front stage is symbolic (Goffman 1959) and has to *look good* rather than *be good* (Holmberg 2003). This has become an organisational embedded line of action and as such an established inherent logic that this performance is unavoidable, but also a natural part of modern policing (Manning 2013). Examples of decisions, initiatives, and measures without any (rational) meaning such as the purchase of things without any application, the lack of cooperation between two units due to personal matters between managers, the instigation of various processes or projects when already launched in other departments etc. is additionally a part of this performance. This underlines the notion of roleplaying as expressed in the organisational saying “*we’re only playing*” (det er bare noget vi leger); the staging of an act on the front stage (police business in public) while the backstage is used for putting on costumes and props (uniforms and equipment) and where the true self is shown. A former co-worker at the Police Academy told me: “*We spend time on digging holes with the purpose of filling them with dirt again*” (vi graver huller for at fylde dem op igen) implying that the work we did was performative and just for show. Metaphors such as ‘circus’ and ‘freakshow’ are often used to describe organisational life within the police, which points to the presumption that decisions and actions to a large extent lack rationality and sometimes even sanity. “*Why do it the smart way, when you can do it the police-way?*” as a Superintendent with 30 years of service once remarked and explained: “*You can rely on one thing; if there is a smart, flexible, and inexpensive way of doing things, the Danish police will always choose the opposite solution.*”

I mentioned earlier that it is an unobtainable ideal to produce high quality qualitative research if one upholds a distant researcher position to prevent impacting the field of study. As an inside researcher, I had backstage knowledge of the field and had been taking part in *backstage activities* (Manning 2009; Chan 2013) in the organisation through several years. Such backstage activities, hidden conditions, implicit understandings, and collectively shared logics of policing and organisational life would be impossible to capture or to at least capture the *significance* of at a distance. This study relies on the assumption that police work in general and proactive investigation specifically to a large extent is context dependent and sensitive to situational factors. To explore the meaning of context and situational factors it is important to understand the lifeworld, informal norms, and values of policing as these conditions have vital implications for e.g. investigation practices. Gaining insight into these requires a close participation in everyday activities both front stage and backstage. Consequently, I will argue that this calls for an explorative qualitative research design taking on an ethnographic and even embedded approach.

Diverse Methods to Capture Impression Management

The embedded methodology promotes the use of varying methods such as including participant observation, field interviews, qualitative research interviews, and document research, which produce different kinds of empirical material such as field notes, transcriptions of conversations, case notes, policy papers etc. This is partly connected to the condition that a substantial amount of impression management (Goffman 1959; Manning 1977; Manning 2014a; Van Maanen 1978a) takes place within the police. Police work requires daily interaction with many different members of the public – often illustrated with stereotypical examples of the homeless alcoholic or the wealthy CEO as representatives for different social arenas. Sometimes these individuals are encountered by police officers in everyday situations, sometimes in extreme circumstances stretching from ordinary traffic

violations to violent deaths. A police officer needs to perform the role of being a police officer rather well and needs to find an appropriate front suitable for all these different situations and people, and impression management therefore becomes a vital skill (see **Chapter 3** for an elaboration). For researchers, this impression management can turn into a serious problem in the sense that one will rarely be told the whole story or even occasionally be told untruthful stories with the purpose of presenting a specific impression or front of a certain person or group (Goffman 1959; Jacobsen & Kristiansen 2001). In this case, the police community can be seen as a separate performing team managing a specific impression of the police organisation, or police officers as a professional group.

As I will account for in **Part Three**, an organisation which is preoccupied with impression management and presenting a polished front does not wash its ‘dirty laundry’ in public. Like in many organisations, there is within the police a great difference between what is presented in the official statements, strategies, and operational plans, and how police in reality prioritise and allocate resources. This discrepancy, which is presented in detail in **Chapter 6**, is uncovered by combining document research with participant observation. There are additionally variations between what police officers say (expressed in interviews) and what they do (how they act observed through participant observation). I examine the connection between the strategy for organised crime and proactive investigation practice by comparing strategic policy documents (document research), accounts from management and detectives (interviews) with everyday performances both front stage and backstage such as daily activities, meetings, and informal conversation etc. (participant observation and field interviews).

The Current Embedded Study

In this embedded study, I have followed several lines of inquiries and visited different social arenas in order to gather empirical material from different sources

and places including national, regional, and local level. I have moreover looked at both the strategic, operational, and tactical level in relation to the police's response to organised crime and I have done so over a number of years (2013-2018).

Altogether, this study's empirical material derives from many parts within the police, which I have examined through a combination of different perspectives and methods. This study is therefore not to use Van Maanen's (2011) term a 'full-blown' traditional ethnographic or phenomenological study. Instead it combines the anthropological occupation with looking at phenomenon through the members of a social group or culture with the sociological focus on the structural mechanisms and the interplay between organisation and its agents. The ethnographic approach and fieldwork in this connection is therefore used as an instrument to obtain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon proactive investigation. This stands in contrast to a more conventional ethnographic study where the purpose is to let oneself be driven by the field and experience new cultures and unpredictable events (Kristiansen & Kroghstrup 1999). The study also differs from typical ethnographies, which etymologically refers to "writing about culture" (Van Maanen 2011; Manning 2014b; Bacon et al. 2020), in the way that the empirical material is presented. This study is not reduced to looking at cultures or social groups (Walters 2007; Cunliffe 2010) and it is not particularly concerned with ascribing a voice to those who are researched (Bacon et al. 2020) by presenting a holistic portrait of the social group of organised crime detectives through multiple stories and voices in the text and tales from the field (Cunliffe 2010; Walters 2010; Van Maanen 2011).

This embedded study is occupied with investigating, understanding, and demonstrating the complex world of proactive policing and how it is performed and why in the dynamic interplay between external and internal structures and cultures and the shaping forces (Manning 2010).

Generating Empirical Material: Research Arena and Embedded Research Methods

The Danish Police

Before presenting an overview of the study's empirical material, I will briefly introduce some central aspects of the Danish police and the organisation of its response towards organised crime. The Danish police are a unity police service with a police force consisting of around 11,000 police officers (Politiforbundet 2019).¹ The entire police organisation has around 15,000 employees, including administrative personnel, prosecutors, criminal forensic technicians, IT-consultants, analysts, psychologists, teachers etc. The police's and the prosecution service's budget is around 10 billion Danish kroner per year (Justitsministeriet 2019), and the Minister of Justice (Justitsministeren) is overall responsible for the police and the prosecution service. The Danish National Police (Rigspolitiet) is the highest authority within Danish police, and The National Police Commissioner (Rigspolitichefen) is overall responsible for operational and administrative management. The Danish Police have 14 police districts including Faroese Police and Greenlandic police (Politi.dk 2020). Every year app. 330,000 criminal offences are reported to the police, and additionally app. 600,000 are charged with traffic offences (Politiet og Anklagemyndigheden 2018).

The Organisation of Organised Crime Policing

The Danish police's organisation of its response towards organised crime has varied over the years, but since around 2009 it has primarily consisted of a national, regional, and local organisation. In **Figure G**, I have primarily illustrated tasks and responsibilities in relation to proactive investigations (I will elaborate further on this in **Chapter 5, 6, and 7**).

Figure G. Organisation of Response to Organised Crime.

LEVEL	TASKS & RESPONSIBILITIES	UNITS
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National overview of organised crime groups • Monitoring of national gang conflicts • International coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Investigation Unit (NCI)
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation and coordination of operational responses at regional level • Proactive investigations at regional level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tasks Force East/Regional Investigation Unit East • Task Force West/Regional Investigation Unit West
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Response to local organised crime groups and offenders • Investigations at local level • Monitoring of organised crime groups and offenders within the district 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police Districts' Organised Crime Investigation Units and Intelligence & analysis Units

As illustrated in **Figure G**, the national unit is responsible for having a national overview of organised crime groups and gangs and violent conflicts between them. They assist regional and local level with e.g. coordination and information. The two regional units are operational and carry out proactive investigations at a regional level, whereas the police districts handle both reactive and proactive investigations towards organised crime offenders who operate on a local level. To explore as many of these processes and practices as possible, I circulated between the national, the regional, and to some extent the local level in different phases of the study. An overview of the empirical material and the unit of analysis is presented next.

Empirical Material

The time period for collection of empirical material in this study ranges from Spring 2013 to Summer 2018. Still, in my document research I include material going back to 2008 and onwards until 2019. I also refer to a few situations, which took place before Spring 2013. The reason is that some documents and situations

are significant to describe in order to understand the backdrop and implications of the development of e.g. performance measures, which I analyse in **Chapter 6**. The study's empirical material consists of the following:

- I have carried out extensive participant observation with an overall duration of approximately 900 hours at a regional investigation unit (AIU) over a period of eight months consisting of field visits lasting from three days to three months.
- I have used participant observation (around 50 hours) in coordination meetings (koordinationsmøder) and target selection meetings (måludpegningsmøder) which took place at both national and regional level.
- I have used participant observation in three international meetings outside Denmark with police agencies from two other countries concerning collaboration in a specific investigation operation.
- I have carried out 29 semi-structured qualitative interviews with managers, detectives, analysts, police officers, prosecutors from both national and regional units, and the police districts.
- Document research includes case files from primarily one specific investigation (*Operation Goldilocks*) composed of all official documents (included in the official investigation's report material) and unofficial documents (excepted from the official investigation's report material), which are produced during a criminal investigation.
- All policy documents, strategies, and operational action plans for the police's response to organised crime and in regards to proactive policing are included along with meeting minutes from all meetings I have attended, as well as intelligence products such as investigation proposals (efterforskningsoplæg) and target profiles (måludpegningsoplæg), which were presented at these meetings.

Participant Observation and Ethnographic Interviewing

As one of the main objectives of this research is to provide a contextual framework for how proactive investigation is carried out, participant observation is particular

useful as this research method has enabled me as a researcher to look at processes where people act routinely and with certainty (Finstad 2000: 342). As Hald (2015) argues, and as the analysis will explore further in **Chapter 8**, there is a methodological gap between the legal framework, procedures, and techniques within the field of criminal investigation. This makes (proactive) investigation a ‘silent’ practice building on tacit knowledge and silent work experience which presents the researcher with a challenge trying to describe, analyse, and interpret what detectives actually do in their everyday practice. Participant observation in this study is therefore as a research method not only a way to look at informal aspects of policing, such as police officers’ values, norms, beliefs and as such ‘uncover hidden truths about police assumptions’ (Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Manning 2010). It is also used as an almost mandatory procedure in documenting, describing, and explaining concrete working practices and hence uncovering the ‘black box’ of proactive investigation, which is in accordance with the knowledge ambition presented in **Chapter 1**.

Figure H. *Overview of Research Methods and Empirical Material.*

RESEARCH METHODS	EMPIRICAL MATERIAL
Participant observation	Field notes of app. 950 hours
Qualitative interviewing	Audio recordings and transcriptions of 29 semi-structured interviews (36 hours)
Document research	App. 3,000 pages of policy documents, strategies, operational plans, reports (case files), meeting minutes, investigation proposals, target profiles.

The characterisation of proactive investigation as a tacit practice implies that it is similarly a rather unpredictable practice to study scientifically and the type of participant observation which I have applied can be labelled as *unstructured observation in natural surroundings* (Kristiansen & Kroghstrup 1999: 48). Clearly, I used my backstage knowledge to prepare and plan the fieldwork, however, an

important part was to go along with the field of study and try to be open to where it might lead me. This approach is in line with the phenomenological approach, which suggests that human action should be viewed from the agents' subjective perspectives and the researcher needs to participate in the lifeworld of the agents in order to investigate the socially constructed common sense-thinking of it (Burgess 1984) (see **Chapter 8**). To put it another way: I had prior knowledge and thereby a general impression of how proactive investigations are carried out, but my observations gave me the possibility to explore in more detail what the different phases in the investigation process consisted of, and what techniques detectives used. In this sense, I was constantly reevaluating my preconception and developing my understanding of the field in accordance with hermeneutic interpretation (the hermeneutic circle) (Gadamer 1998).

Participant observation includes in this study *interviews in the field* or *ethnographic interviews* (Spradley 1979) understood as the countless conversations with detectives, analysts, and managers I had during field visits and daily work activities. These conversations sometimes resembled a 'structured questioning' where I inquired about many of the same topics and asked some of the same questions as I did during the formal interviews (merely in an informal setting). I never took notes when observing and participating in the daily activities in AIU, which was a deliberate decision. The processes surrounding *Operation Goldilocks* were very informal besides the afternoon briefing which was held every day at 2 PM. During this meeting, and in meetings with the prosecutor or management, detectives seldom took notes or even brought a notebook. It would therefore be noticed if I were to take notes (this issue seems to be a general condition within policing and is similarly discussed by several police researchers see e.g. Finstad 2000; Hartmann 2014; Valland 2014). Instead, I spent a couple of hours every day after office hours writing up field notes and trying to reproduce the events of the day and my understanding of what I have experienced. This is a very demanding task as it is quite difficult to recall details in conversations, meetings, interactions etc.

Sometimes I had to wait until a couple of days after the actual events and conversations, as my working schedule was very tight and this of course influenced which events I remembered and how I experienced them. In contrast to the informal investigation meetings at tactical level, the meetings at management level (target selection meetings and coordination meetings) had a more formal setup and a clerk was there to take minutes. In these meetings, I could easily bring a notebook or even my computer and I always sat around the meeting table together with the other meeting participants. Sometimes I was even invited to participate in the conversation if I could contribute with knowledge about the international or national context. In the investigation meetings at AIU I had a more neutral role as I always sat in the periphery of the meeting table and never participated in the conversation.

Qualitative Interviews

I carried out a total of 29 qualitative interviews using a semi-structured interview guide (see **Appendix X**). The main topics and what they were supposed to uncover are depicted in **Figure I**. My aim for the qualitative interviews was to get insights into how detectives, managers, and analysts viewed their work, the police's response to organised crime, and the circumstances in which they operated. The choice of themes for the interviews was guided by the research question and sub questions, but also influenced by my backstage knowledge and preunderstanding of the field as described primarily in **Chapter 2**.

All interviews were audio recorded and I presented an informed consent form and confidentiality agreement (**Appendix Z**) which all interviewees signed. Additionally, I had interviewees to fill out a small questionnaire – primarily about their formal function, years on the job, and educational background (**Appendix Y**). The shortest interview lasted 21 minutes and the longest lasted almost three hours – in total 36 hours of audio recordings. Interviewees were chosen differently, and the interviews

were carried out under different conditions. Some interviewees were chosen as I knew these people possessed specific knowledge (for example a specialist), and some were chosen due to their function (for example a detective in a specific unit). Interviews were sometimes planned beforehand (I usually travelled through the country to meet the interviewee), sometimes I spontaneously asked a person after a meeting if he or she had the time and wanted to give an interview.

Figure I. *Overview of Interview Topics and Content.*

TOPIC	CONTENT
Career in policing	Warm-up, opener, the interviewees’ individual background and experience.
Organised crime and the organised crime environment	Views and assumptions regarding the phenomenon the work is directed at, views on (organised crime) offenders and their associates
The police organisation	The organisational frames and structures as enablers/preventers of carrying out investigation practice
Proactive vs. reactive investigation	Differences in mindset, approaches, methods
Target selection	Processes and methods before and after the new organisational set-up
Investigation management	Management of investigations – differences from management and detectives p.o.v.

The interview situation was almost always informal and relaxed. Sometimes it resembled a typical conversation as I most often spoke ‘the police lingo’ (for example understood abbreviations) and had backstage knowledge of people from the criminal environment or within the police or specific (criminal) events or cases they referred to. I consider this to have been a great advantage as the process of *building rapport* did not require much effort and did not take very long even with those interviewees I had just met for the first time (Moesgaard 2013 underlines a

similar experience in her research on private and state intelligence actors). The embedded researcher position was in this connection a great advantage and I experienced much less resistance or skepticism towards me or the research project during interviews, than what I expected. As I interviewed different professional groups (detectives, managers, police officers, analysts, informant handlers, prosecutors) this also enabled me to get different perspectives on the police and police work. In **Figure J**, I present an overview of interviewees.

Figure J. *Overview of Interviewees.*

CATEGORI	NUMBER
Police managers	10
Detectives/police officers	13
Analysts/civilians	6

I realised early on that ethnographic interviews in the field were to some extent more valuable in terms of getting elaborate information about investigation practices. The informal setting of everyday life within the investigation unit seemed more comfortable (at least for some detectives) than the formalised situation of giving an interview in a closed office with an audio recorder. For that reason, I changed the research design and downgraded the number of interviews that I had initially planned (approximately 50). Although I made this decision, the use of qualitative interviews as a research method still serves the methodological purpose of gaining knowledge of the social world of policing through interpretations of narratives of police managers, detectives, analysts, informant handlers etc. These individuals possess key knowledge and insights about a range of topics e.g. investigation, crime analysis, intelligence work, and the police organisation. One of the strengths of this method is that it can capture the variety of people’s perspectives on a certain topic (Kvale, 1996; Fog, 2004). In-depth interview is

furthermore difficult to obtain through ethnographic interviews in the field were other people for example might be present and can influence the interviewee in different ways. The two types of research methods therefore provide different types of narratives which can shed light on the issues from different perspectives and as such in this study they came to complement each other rather well.

Document Research

As part of my daily function as senior advisor within the police, I had access to all official documents such as strategies, operational plans, analyses, intelligence reports, legal briefs etc. connected to the area of organised crime. Additionally, I had access to the police's internal databases containing intelligence information and case files on criminal investigations and I used this access to search relevant information connected to the operations in AIU or the work with investigation targets at NCI (see **Chapter 7**). The purpose of investigating such documents analytically has been to explore the police's framework for proactive policing and examine the use and operationalisation of various concepts and to look at the police's self-representation; idealisation and impression management (Goffman 1959). These documents can all be characterised as *documents in use* (Duedahl & Jacobsen 2010) and they are therefore not solely to be regarded as historical documents. Many of them are still active in the sense that they are continuously being reviewed. Due to sensitivity and confidentiality issues, I only refer to documents which are public, and many documents are used indirectly and serve as a backdrop for my preunderstanding and overall analysis.

The Centrality of Operation Goldilocks

The above overview of empirical material and research methods suggests that there are many different sources and types of information stemming from different organisational levels and agents within the police collected in an extensive time

period which are included in and provide the basis for this study. Such a diversity of empirical material and research methods is crucial in embedded research as it allows one to analyse both formal and informal parts of police practice in this case proactive investigation. The intensive and coherent fieldwork carried out at AIU has supplied me with deep insight into the proactive investigation *Operation Goldilocks* which therefore serves as an illustrative case example throughout the thesis. One reason for the dominant focus on this case in the thesis is that I had the opportunity to observe the investigation first-hand from start to finish, which has made me familiar with all its operational content details and the investigation process as well as the detectives who worked the case. This does not mean that this study falls into the category of case studies (Walters 2010; Yin 2014). On the contrary, I am not interested in this particular case or its specific details. The case was randomly chosen for me to follow by police management since it was a new start-up and since they had high hopes for the success of the case. I have no indications that this operation is unique in any way in comparison to other investigations in specialised organised crime units or other cases in AIU. The case was launched with great optimism and large-scale resources and ambitions, but to my knowledge this is typically the case in connection with high-value priority offenders. The case of *Operation Goldilocks* as a phenomenon is not the unit of analysis in this study; instead it is the approaches, practices, priorities, decisions, assumptions etc. that police management and detectives display which are of relevance as it tells us a story of how police investigate organised crime and why they do so in that particular manner. In connection with my participation in strategic police forums, my work in relation to target selection, and during my fieldwork in AIU, I acquired additional knowledge about a number of other investigation operations, but I have decided primarily to use examples from *Operation Goldilocks*. This decision is primarily due to concerns regarding sensitivity, confidential information, and informed consent. However, by unfolding a single case I get to present the different and significant layers of complex meaning which it encompass and I can hereby build a comprehensive argument. The devotion to a

single case give me both pragmatic, contextual, and situational insight and provide me with a condensed, embedded understanding of its content and circumstances. which I have used to present a complex and layered analysis.

Consequently, I assess that *Operation Goldilocks* is quite the illustrative case example of proactive investigations in the empirical setting of the Danish police. This assessment is founded on the basis of the assessment of the case itself, but also since it was prioritised, launched, and investigated by quite specialised and experienced police managers and detectives who were carrying out ‘business as usual’ as they transferred and repeated their extensive experience and modes of action into this case.

¹The total population of Denmark is 5.8 million citizens per January 2020 (Danmarks Statistik 2020).

Studying Proactive Police Practices: Embedded Positions and Role Engagements

Some of the most central elements when carrying out embedded (police) research are researcher positions and researcher roles. In this study, they have impacted how I was able to explore and understand as many aspects of proactive investigation as possible – and how I was received in the world of policing. In accordance with the phenomenological-hermeneutic stance, it is necessary to present both methodological and ethical conditions and dilemmas in detail. The hermeneutic tradition prescribes an interpreting method (Dahlager & Fredslund 2008), which suggests that the interpretation always depends on the social context and the social agents in them and build on the researcher’s preunderstanding, expectations, and backstage knowledge. Consequently, the researcher becomes an active rather than passive or neutral agent in the social research arena. The accounts of my meeting with the research field in this embedded study are therefore not objective presentations or ‘truths’ – they are interpretations anchored in my *biographical situation* (Schutz 1975).

I differentiate between *researcher positions* and *researcher roles*. Positions are characterised by the researcher’s scientific anchoring and fundamental world view in combination with the choice of research methods. It is moreover conditioned by the researcher’s perspective – an inside or outside perspective for example. Roles can and will, on the contrary, vary during the research process and can be used actively to promote certain agendas and purposes. Roles can be taken on and off and can either be given by the research field or taken by the researcher (I will return to these matters later in this chapter).

Researcher Positions

A common debate amongst both international and Scandinavian police researchers evolves around the ideal researcher position in order to take an objective/neutral stance. This discussion exists primarily on a macro-level discussing outside-inside perspectives and government research versus independent research etc. (Reiner & Newburn 2008; Høigård 2011; Holgersson & Knutsson 2012; Holmberg 2014; Davies, 2016; Hartmann et al. 2018). A popular reference in this connection is British police scholar Brown (1996) who places police researchers in four categories:

- 1) *inside insiders*: police officers conducting police research (can be referred to as ‘cross- overs’)
- 2) *outside insiders*: police officers conducting research after having left the police service in the pursuit of an academic career (can be referred to as ‘cross- overs’),
- 3) *inside outsiders*: civilians employed by the police or in official roles within the police, carrying out research for government departments etc. (can be referred to as ‘pracademics’)
- 4) *outside outsiders*: independent academics not employed or commissioned by the police or other governmental bodies.

As American sociologist Joseph Styles (1979) points out, practical problems can turn into professional problems and vice versa during the research process. There are furthermore no privileged researcher positions, no positions stripped from biases and preunderstanding about the social group one is studying. It is therefore difficult to claim an ideal researcher position as they all come with pros and cons. The embedded position, which is primarily situated within the first and third category as *inside insiders* or *inside outsiders*, however, is privileged in the way that it makes access to information easier than for outsiders. Even so, being a ‘researcher in one’s own organisation’ (Wadel 1991) and indeed an embedded researcher is connected to a variety of specific methodical conditions and ethical dilemmas which I will account for in the following sections.

The Professional Stranger and the Embedded Friend

The dichotomy of *stranger* and *friend* (Powdermaker 1966) in qualitative research is a typical reference and it can be said to concern both researcher positions and researcher roles. One of the most common police researcher positions is thus described by Finstad (2000: 344, *my translation*) as she labels researchers as ‘professional strangers’ and says:

A professional stranger can be regarded very differently depending on where one is placed on a scale from being seen as a spy and to be an adopted mascot. The ideal, as I see it, is to get a position in the environment to such a degree that they do not think too much (about the fact, *my addition*) that the researcher is there (meaning a person one should be tactical aware of) while the researcher feels so much at home that it does not become too personally tiresome (meaning being rejected and neglected).

Furthermore, she argues (*ibid.*), that the biggest challenge of fieldwork is how the researcher can avoid influencing the interaction which plays out. This so-called ideal researcher position is in the embedded methodology not viewed as possible or even desirable to obtain for a number of reasons. Taking on different researcher roles and the ability to carry out fieldwork very much depends on the professional and personal characteristics of the researcher and the researcher’s biographical situation (Schutz 1975). Finstad (2000) describes how having a ‘local history’ as a researcher is significant for the entire fieldwork. In her case, her activist background and profile as a ‘critical criminologist’ which was publicly known at the time of her research, turned out to be both an advantage and a disadvantage. My situation was a little different as my ‘local history’ was that I was in fact employed within the organisation and knew or knew off many of the police officers and detectives in the field from my daily job – or they knew me by name. In that sense, I could definitely not be characterised as a ‘stranger’ in the organisation. I was, however, still not considered a colleague along the lines of other police officers. Due to my employment in The National Police and my academic background I was viewed as a kind of stranger in some settings and with regards to professional

differences. There are many different cultures and sub-cultures within most organisations and the social dynamic can vary even in two different investigation teams working door to door. As such, on a micro-level the insider-outsider roles change dynamically depending on the organisational setting and the people who are present. In Goffman's (1959) terms this can be labelled as having a discrepant role.

Still, the inside-embedded researcher position makes it difficult to fully impose typical researcher roles such as 'the interested apprentice' (Wadel 1991), 'the naïve outsider with a numerous of explorative questions' (Hartmann 2014; Valland 2014), or 'the neutral observer who tries to tag along' (Finstad 2000). Many researchers take on these roles in order to get the agents to act as they usually would in their social arena and gradually talk about their work and thereby articulate e.g. a tacit practice. The ideal of trying to be neutral or invisible in the classical sense of 'being a fly on the wall not attracting too much attention', as Finstad (2000) describes it, was not a possibility during my fieldwork. Access to the field of covert police work (and what that the possibility of generating information) is in general difficult to obtain for any researcher. My assessment is that the access I was granted was to a high degree depending on my local history and experience and position within the police. As such, access was connected to my biographical situation; personal characteristics and the fact that I was known by the agents in the field rather than for example the police organisation's assessment of my professional capacity or interest in the research topic. Participating and joining in the proactive investigation community was therefore required in a number of ways. This condition can be regarded as the anthropological condition of *going native* (Powdermaker 1966) although in this context it becomes a little more complex as the inside position as employed within the organisation results in the researcher position as *being native* at least in a formal manner (Kanua 2000).

Wadel (1991) argues that doing fieldwork in one's own culture requires one to study a part of one's own social life. This can have some (practical) advantages as it gives the researcher easier access to e.g. study sites, information, and informants. However, it also has some (professional) disadvantages as it becomes more demanding for the researcher to notice the content of *mutual knowledge* (Giddens 1976) and as such discover the obvious (Wadel 1991). For an insider, it is per default impossible to take on Simmel's (1972) archetypical role of *the stranger* which purpose is to strengthen the researcher's objective stance via the outside-perspective, and gradually become familiar with the social world of a specific society or group in order to describe and analyse their behaviour and cultural patterns. Thus, for me as a researcher it was an ongoing reflection how to remain critical towards a known culture which I myself was a part of. I will elaborate on this reflection in the following section.

Closeness and Distance

In accordance with many qualitative researchers, a neutral or objective position in an embedded study would be impossible in the classic meaning of the concept. However, both Schutz (1975) and Weber (1982) are critical towards such a rationalisation of reality and underline that social phenomena are not solely analysed by objective technical methods, but are influenced by values and norms, and the researchers themselves. The notion of being 'objective' is, in the context of this study, therefore not considered particularly important, whereas, the ability to create methodological transparency is. This transparency can for example shed light on the active use of different researcher roles with the intention of getting embedded into the field and thereby achieve a greater insight and understanding (see also the discussion of accessing the quality of this study later in the chapter). Another important issue has been the creation of analytical distance to the empirical material especially in the process of formulating the analytical findings and writing up the thesis. I had long breaks (months and even years) from my

fieldwork (while still being embedded) and this helped me to revisit and view the empirical material with ‘new’ eyes challenging the views of my initial assumptions and understandings. This revisitation and reinterpretation of my preunderstanding lasted throughout the analytical process including during the completion of the thesis. The distance to the field has thereby not only been a physical and temporal one – it has indeed been an analytical one. As a result, the theoretical perspectives and concepts which are activated during the analytical phase have for me become essential instruments to uphold an analytical outlook towards the phenomenon of proactive investigation. Continuous feedback from and discussions with my supervisors, research groups, and co-readers have been an additional way to ensure analytical distance and a constant assessment of my preunderstanding and interpretations.

My argument in this regard is twofold: the embeddedness in the field has given me a fuller and more comprehensive picture of things at stake within the world of proactive investigation than a more detached and distant researcher position would have done. In fact, it gave me the possibility of being even *more* critical towards the strategies and practices of proactive investigation which I observed in daily interactions or found in organisational documents and statements from managers and practitioners. The fact that I for a long period of time have been a daily observer of and active agent within the world of (proactive) policing has made me understand and interpret analytical findings in a contextual frame which I am quite familiar with. As such, I would argue that this study provides an example of how some part of Academia’s fear of and concern about inside/government research and researchers serving as advocates for their own organisation can be diminished. Disengagement does not mean disentanglement (Hartmann et al. 2018) and backstage knowledge and insights can serve as the researcher’s instruments to get close to and to disclose more in-depth aspects of organisational habits, assumptions, and established practices.

As mentioned before, there are of course several ethical concerns and pitfalls related to this type of embedded research both in connection with getting access to information, generating information, and analysing findings. More importantly it therefore seems to be able to exercise *auto-ethnography* (Hayano 1979) and become what Wadel (1991) labels as “*being a sociologist with regard to oneself*”. Wadel (1991: 59, *my translation*) puts forward three criteria of this:

- (1) being conscious of one’s own repertoire of researcher roles and which roles one at any time takes or is given by one’s informants. This requires moreover that one is aware of one’s informants’ roles.
- (2) being able to use yourself as an informant at any time. In any fieldwork the researcher will take/be given a number of local roles. These local roles can be used in the sense that the researcher becomes one’s own informant.
- (3) being aware of one’s own cultural categories and not one’s informants’ categories often dictates what one is observing. This is more the case with the study of own societies than strange societies.

In the methodological analyses of this study, I have used these three criteria actively both when I was generating information and when I systematically analysed the empirical findings. This process builds on the hermeneutical stance that there is a mutual influence between researcher and field (Giddens 1976) and that the researcher often shifts between an inductive and explorative approach being respectively a *total or partial participant* (Kristiansen & Kroghstrup 2004). This creates an inconsistent and sometimes conflicting feeling as one shifts between closeness and distance. In this sense, the researcher is bound to take on several researcher roles where the *researcher awareness* can momentarily be ousted (Steffen 1995), which I accordingly experienced on/off during my research. Albeit an embedded researcher can engage in a process which involves one’s personal identity deeply, but without losing one’s professional identity. The researcher awareness will always lie underneath and influence the researcher’s perspective and behaviour and can return when needed – for example in writing up the analytical findings. As such, the degree of involvement into the field and the degree of

nativeness should not be seen as solely a risk or a pitfall. Rather, as in this study, it is used as an active instrument to gain closeness or distance towards the field and the empirical findings. In the following sections, I will elaborate on some of the various researcher roles and how I have navigated in these. I discuss the pros and cons of 'being' one or the other – different types of role engagements and their centrality to the embedded methodology.

Role Engagement

As mentioned earlier, researcher roles play out on a day-to-day basis. According to Wadel (1991), these roles often vary and are developed and transformed over time during the fieldwork. A role as an observer of conversations can for example be converted to a role as a participant and vice versa. An underlying predicament is continuously: how much must, can, and should the researcher involve herself in the research field?

Being an Organisational Member

Formal Access

The formal access to information and interviewees in this study was of course made easier by the fact that I was employed within the police. Due to my daily function, I already had the required security clearance and access to relevant databases, and as an employee of NCI, I had access to more databases and information than the average detective given the obligations of NCI to have a national overview of the development within organised crime, intelligence gathering, and criminal investigations. There were as such no formalities which stood in the way of getting (formal) access. Another advantage was that I for several years had been a member of The National Strategic Staff on Gang Crime. This staff had the task of developing strategies, overviewing the police's response to gang crime nationally, and to serve

as an advisory board to the Police Directorate and the Ministry of Justice in the process of policy development and decision-making. My function within the staff was primarily to provide an overview of academic research and experience-based knowledge from other police agencies concerning gang crime and police responses. Furthermore, I participated in a number of working groups producing policy paper, strategies, operational plans etc., and carried out evaluations of specific operational and investigation concepts and initiatives on request of the head of staff (formanden). Consequently, this gave me insights into the current status of organised crime policing in the Danish police and via the staff I also had access to several key decision-makers at national level and in the police districts. The fieldwork at AIU came about very informally as I one day after a staff meeting more or less just asked the head of the regional investigation unit if I could visit his unit and follow an investigation in process, which he willingly agreed to. I had been working in the police for six years when I began my fieldwork at AIU and besides knowing the Chief Superintendent I had also on several occasions worked together with one of AIU's Superintendents and investigation managers (efterforskningsledere) on tasks related to the organised crime field. Moreover, I knew some of the detectives, analysts, and managers from other units within the police district in which the headquarters of AIU were situated. For a period of about five months prior to the fieldwork, I had continuously been participating in monthly coordination meetings.

For those reasons, I was recognised as an *organisational member* with at least some degree of legitimacy. I define an organisational member as a part of the organisational context, and as such an observer of and participant in everyday activities within the police, but without necessarily being a police officer. It differs from an insider in the sense that organisational members count all employees whereas the inside/outside categories specifically seek to place researchers by their different functions and institutional belonging. Nevertheless, in contrast to Hartmann (2014) who was welcomed as a 'member of the family' by her manager in

the police, I do not view this ‘familiar’ position as a genuine possibility for other staff than police officers – let alone academic researchers. Individuals with other professional backgrounds than police are tolerated and sometimes even appreciated, but not accepted as members of the police family. I therefore regard the notion of being an organisational member as a temporary position and to some degree characterised by being on a ‘sustained stay’ (på tålt ophold). As an analyst expressed it: *“It’s like being an artificial organ which is gradually repelled from the body.”* This fits quite well with my prior definition of the embedded researcher as an ‘object which is implanted or put firmly and deeply in a surrounding mass’, but which is per default an implant and therefore not a natural habitat, but stays encapsulated without leaking into its surroundings.

The membership of the police family is in contrast not defined by an organisational employment, but rather by other formal requirements and informal conditions and is regarded as a permanent or long-term ‘tribal membership’ which lasts beyond organisational retirement. The formal demands are of course first and foremost attached to police officers’ terms of employment (tjenestemandsansættelse) and the fact that they have completed more or less the same training (the police’s basic education). Informal factors include the possession of collective value systems, joint beliefs and ways of doing things – in other words: cultural-cognitive guiding principles and assumptions about the world of policing which reflects e.g. epistemic notions (see also the presentation of Manning’s (2010) shaping forces of the police *métier* in **Chapter 3**). As Hartmann (2014: 97) argues: *“... ‘real membership’ of the police is something you earn on the street, not something you receive together with your police ID plastic card.”* However, the fact that civilians lack police authority (politimyndighed) means that this particular experience cannot be obtained, and real membership is consequently unattainable (for further discussion see also **Chapter 7**).

The informal exclusion of other professional groups within the police is expressed in many forms and ways. The most dominant exclusion is however through the constant articulation and reproduction of a specific *police identity*. This contains amongst other elements the notion of a shared experience-based knowledge of ‘what it’s like to be a police officer’ and the expression of a shared attitude towards ‘what capabilities the job/function requires’. Accordingly, within the organisation there is a strong collective mindset of *being police* rather than *carrying out police work*. This is expressed in for example the retelling of tales of the streets; a shared police history which consists of anecdotes serving as both concrete and symbolic illustrations of the endeavours of policing such as the management of stressful and dangerous situations, conflict mediation between citizens, the pursuit of bad guys, and heroic actions related to accidents. Individual characteristics are often presented as collective traits such as the possession of specific executive functions; the ability to make fast decisions and take action when needed, and being a person with ‘people skills’ (at have menneskekundskaber) e.g. being able to intuitively detect and sense suspicious or illegal behaviour (I elaborate on these issues in connection with the analysis of police epistemic culture in **Chapter 7, 8, and 9**.)

The construction and reconstruction of police identity is accordingly not defined by the nature of the work (carrying out tasks which qualifies as police tasks) or by the overall purpose of policing (providing helping and supporting functions to the general public and keep law and order), but instead *who* this work is carried out by. The term *colleague* therefore does not refer to a co-worker, but rather a fellow police officer. I experienced an illustrative example of this when I was attending a staff seminar a few years ago and the Assistant Police Commissioner of our department gave a presentation on the current state of affairs. She spoke of the importance of recruiting academic competences and underlined that police officers who were present needed to get used to this condition as there were new (political) winds blowing within policing. She looked around in the room and made a gesture towards me and said: “*Well Nadja, you’ve been here for such a long time, you’re almost*

one of us". The sentiment was no doubt friendly, perhaps even complimentary. However, the condition of being regarded as merely a partial member (of the police family) creates a continuous in-group/out-group situation where I – together with other professionals within police such as clerks, administrative staff, analysts, academics – are constantly reminded of our out-group position despite the fact that we might perform actual police functions or operational support which can be characterised as police work (I discuss this further in connection with the concept of the detective *métier* in **Chapter 9**).

Informal Access

The position of being an organisational member has clearly given me the advantage of getting easier formal access to information about the research field. However, as ethnographers agree – formal access is not necessarily the hard part. In order to provide *thick descriptions* (Geertz 1973) of the complexity and common sense actions of everyday life (Schutz 1975), the researcher needs to obtain an in-depth understanding of it both in regards to asking the right questions about and in the field, but also to be able to interpret the answers. The degree of embeddedness and thereby the amount of backstage knowledge is for that reason decisive for the development of a comprehensive understanding; building rapport and gaining trust to get informal access is consequently crucial. Hartmann (2014) remarks that she constantly had to negotiate access and legitimise her presence and the potential value of her research during her fieldwork. Although I was generously granted *full access* by strategic management, it became likewise clear to me that informal access could be revoked on a daily – sometimes hourly basis – depending on various external conditions and my own behaviour, as I will explain further in the coming sections.

Being Part of the Group

In this study, the position of being an organisational member is not enough for me to get close to the field. As an embedded researcher, I still needed to be accepted as a member of the specific social groups I frequented within organised crime policing, and the terms of acceptance were not necessarily the same in each group. Consider the following example:

On the first day when I began my fieldwork at AIU, one of the detectives repeatedly encouraged me to make coffee and thereby ‘make myself useful’. The sentiment was friendly and teasing. I made coffee just before a meeting in the afternoon between the investigation team and the prosecutor.

As the meeting started one of the detectives took a sip of coffee, spat it out in a bin and cried:

“Oh my God, who made this coffee? It’s awful!”.

Overwhelmed with a mixture of surprise and guilt, I quickly responded:

“I made that coffee!”.

The entire room laughed—including me.

Afterwards, they began their meeting.

The example above is an excellent illustration of how detectives in the early part of my stay with AIU tried to test me and explore the limits for their behaviour towards me. The purpose with the coffee-framing-event was of course to test my reaction to such a stunt; would I be sad, mad, or find it funny? It was a friendly and innocent joke and it made me laugh. In fact, it made me feel welcome and included in the group. I drew the conclusion that this kind of attention would probably not be given to a person who was unwelcome – such people are most often ignored within the police. In my field notes that day I wrote: “*Thankfully it seems as if I will experience a quick acceptance!*” Later, I revised this conclusion as the notion of acceptance is much more complicated. The less peripheral you become, the more you know, and your interpretations of the social interactions patterns change sometimes quite dramatically. However, the situations where I felt most welcome

and enjoyed most acceptance was at times when I was ‘being useful’ and had an actual function to the investigation team. This could include cleaning up the table after a meeting, making coffee, or translating an investigation report from Danish into English. The ‘being useful’ role was a way to create a natural place for myself as a researcher with the purpose of blending in with the investigation environment and making detectives and myself feel more relaxed. At one point, I volunteered to make travel arrangements for a large group of detectives going on a three-day formal visit in a cooperating European country. Such an administrative task was not very popular amongst the busy detectives and they were happy for me to take over and it fortunately provided me with an invitation to come along. I thereby earned inclusion through scout work.

Testing

Testing is a typical process when individuals are approaching a new social group (Simmel 1972). As a civilian and especially an academic employee in the police, this testing is close to being a daily event until the time comes when one’s presence is more or less accepted or at least tolerated. I also experienced this intensive testing when I was doing fieldwork with an operative gang unit in 2009 in Copenhagen Police. At that time, the police officers seemed worried that I was a *management spy* (as Hunt (1984) and Hartmann (2014) similarly explain). Police officers in the gang unit would insinuate that I was stationed in their unit by The National Police Commissioner to report back to him about problems within the unit: “*You can tell ‘Commissioner Joe’* (‘RigsPeter’ – a nickname for every sitting National Police Commissioner within the Danish police) *that we’re doing our best down here to keep the troops (gangs) from killing each other each day*”. This was of course said in a joking tone of voice, but the sentiment was genuine: they feared their work was under scrutiny and that it perhaps would result in a budget cut or reorganisation if some elements of their work were (mis)represented in a certain way. Rumours of consultants from private firms who enter the police to carry out hit-and-run

calculations of so-called efficiency potentials are thriving. Years of reductions in budgets and the subsequently odd organisational changes have made staff averse to such processes which are regarded as superficial and pseudo and with the purpose to undermine “good” police work. Thus, police officers often tested my attitudes towards various topics and both directly and indirectly assessed my loyalty: “*What do you think about what we do here, you’re not one of them defending the assholes (røvhullerne) feeling sorry for them are you?*” a police officer would ask. Another frequent situation was that police officers would speak to each other remarking things like: “*Guess we have to do it properly now we have such posh company (fint selskab fra de bonede gulve), we wouldn’t want our observer to get the wrong impression of police work*” but where the statement was obviously directed at me. This could indicate that police officers actually have backstage practices they do not wish to reveal, or wanted me to think they have, or just wanted to see my reaction.

Testing has the purpose of finding out if newcomers fit in or, if not, can be assimilated to the group taking over the dominant values, beliefs, and behaviour. In other words, to be absorbed into the lifeworld of the group. As mentioned before, many social groups and also different occupational cultures exist within the police; some are defined by the professional field (e.g. patrolling or investigation), some by function (e.g. rank and file or manager), some by age, gender and so on. Some groups are more cohesive than others. Within AIU, I detected a strong group identity derived from a shared organisational community. The unit was first of all a high-status unit which received significant attention from both political, national, and local level. Moreover, all employees had actively applied for a job in the unit and were as such quite dedicated to this work and no one was transferred against their wishes which is otherwise quite common within the police. A Detective explained:

Honestly, we can’t complain, we’re quite spoiled. Look at those poor bastards in other divisions who have to go on night shifts and assist patrol units every other day while their case files are piling up. Thankfully, we are excused from those kinds of tasks and can concentrate fully on our investigations.

This statement reflects the fact that the unit was regarded as an independent resource detached from the usual obligations within the police districts. The unit had its own budget and a clear politically defined scope, but at the same time they had a high degree of autonomy. These conditions seemed to strengthen the attachment to the group and the sense of belonging amongst detectives. The group identity was further underlined by the group as a performing team and their self-presentation and impression management where collective features rather than individual features were highlighted (Goffman 1959). This was for instance expressed via the way detectives talked about ‘we’ saying things like: “*We are a crazy and friendly group of people, but don’t believe a word we’re saying!*” implying that they shared common characteristics, behaviours, and sense of humour.

Personal friendships within the group also seemed to enable a strong group identity as detectives spent time together both at work and in their sparetime. They would help each other out with practical things such as garden work, house maintenance, construction work, baby sitting and the like. Socialising with their respective families provided insight into each other’s private circumstances and they knew each other very well – some of them through decades. As such, there was no clear demarcation between front stage and backstage as the professional work environment and private zones melted together (Goffman 1959). This condition enabled a familiar tone of voice and a relaxed atmosphere. However, as I discuss in **Chapter 9**, it also inhibited professional development within the unit in terms of improving investigative practices and create a systematic learning structure (Bjørkelo & Gundhus 2015) since the solid group identity and the personal relations became a hindrance for critically scrutinising the unit’s work. The participation in group activities such as social events, parties, after hours socialising (fyraftensøl) was something I regard as essential for the “success” of my fieldwork and stay at AIU. Detectives’ attitudes towards me seemed to a high extent affected by my participation in these events in a positive way. I was, for example, invited to their Summer party held in one of the detectives’ private home. At the end of my stay at

AIU, they gave me a present and took me out for dinner and a night on the town to say goodbye. I also participated in their Christmas party a few months after I had left the unit. Such social events were an important part of this group's occupational culture and therefore their cohesiveness. My experience was that participation in these events made the demarcation between me as a researcher and them as practitioners more blurred which improved my position as part of the group.

Being Loyal

Loyalty and trustworthiness in different versions are qualities that are viewed as absolutely essential within the police and as a precondition for carrying out police work (see e.g. Valland 2014). Signs of loyalty therefore becomes an instrument to measure both police officers and police researchers. If the researcher is not able to show loyalty towards the social group in the field, access to information becomes difficult. Hunt (1984) speaks about how she experienced the informal testing of *police-like-behaviour* such as her willingness to lie and cover up corruption as a measurement of her loyalty towards the police. In my research, I did not find testing as extreme or even explicit as for example Hunt (1984) did; the test of loyalty is primarily connected to one's attitudes towards the organisation or the dominant police discourses and thereby assumptions of various occupational groups. Loyalty is commonly divided into *professional loyalty* and *organisational loyalty*, *horizontal loyalty* and *vertical loyalty* (Valland 2014). Kleinig (1997) argues that even though these are often practically connected they need to be analytical differentiated to better understand the practice observed (Valland 2014). Hence, the demonstration of loyalty is equally important for an embedded researcher on different levels.

Within the group of rank and files and detectives, the aversion towards (top) management is quite dominant and even though I had a strong network at management level, I felt I could not spend as much time and affiliate with managers as I had before becoming attached to the investigation unit. At ground level, police

officers are famous for being critical towards management decisions and are notoriously complaining about the general state of the police. They are as such more loyal to the profession than the organisation and often more loyal horizontally than vertically. For me as a researcher, this meant that I had to limit my contact with management as I did not want detectives at ground level to get the impression that I would report back or speak about what I experienced to management. This represented a significant ethical dilemma as I first and foremost needed to continue to have the approval from management to carry out my research and the management perspective of proactive investigation was equally important to my lines of inquiry as the tactical perspective. Moreover, I did not see myself as on anybody's side and in that sense, I wanted to be seen as a neutral party between the two groups. This was of course impossible. My access to people and meetings at strategic and national level meant that I often knew more about resources, future plans, and strategies even information about individual detectives which was discussed in those management meetings I attended than the investigation unit. I did not get the impression that management was concerned about this dilemma as they carried on as before I began my studies. Perhaps they had difficulties differentiating between when I was a researcher and when I was an employee. However, I was very much aware that I did not breach any levels of confidence and talked about the content of different meetings or what I had discussed with individual officers to others. When detectives now and again asked about the meetings, I had attended, I most often responded vaguely and in general terms, and after a while it seemed as if both managers and detectives had come to terms with my double role. Still, I tried to handle the demand for loyalty by 'being authentic' and showing a certain amount of vulnerability, as I will explain next.

Authenticity and Vulnerability

The informal world of policing is indeed dominated by 'the game of internal politics' and different strategic agendas connected to different groups and

individuals (Cockbain & Knutsson, 2015). One of my first lessons when I began working in the police was given to me by my first manager and mentor who told me to learn to ‘play the game of police politics’ in order to survive. An analyst describes this as “*a game of chess on 27 levels*” and underlines the game’s lack of rationality and logic and thereby the impossible condition of trying to predict it and consequently participate in it. People who are detached from agendas and game playing are seen as more dependable and trustworthy and as such loyal to the police profession rather than loyal to one’s own position or agendas.

‘Being authentic’ in this context therefore means being honest and trustworthy *as a person* – not covering up one’s opinions about specific (policing) issues or other e.g. political issues which are debated, and not voicing different opinions in different arenas. Being authentic includes showing vulnerability and as such to interact backstage and not performing on the front stage with a high degree of impression management (Goffman 1959). Backstage performances tend to reveal less appealing aspects of one’s persona or at least less controlled presentations of the self. In a practical sense, this involved in my case for example participation in situations where I would experience loss of self-control and thereby making myself vulnerable for example in connection with the intake of alcohol. Participation in social activities within police is important as it continues the socialisation (Van Maanen & Schein 1977) and cultivation of police identity and supports the police organisation’s cohesiveness. One of my episodes with limited impression management was to drink too much alcohol at a party at AIU with the consequence that I walked directly into an “invisible” glass door. The incident was afterwards referred to by detectives several times and they laughed about it, mainly because I had managed to save my G&T without spilling it. This apparently gave me some credit as detectives admired my concern for the alcohol rather than for my own safety. The situation is a clear example of vulnerability (as I was potentially a laughing stock), but at the same time authenticity as it showed another side of me than just the ‘academic’, ‘the researcher’, ‘the representative from the national unit’,

and perhaps it diminished some of the detectives' perception of me as a *nice-young-girl-straight-of-out-university-with-no-life-experience-always-doing-the-right-thing* a classic stereotypical representation of police officers' perception of newly hired academics.

Being in an Organisational Function

As mentioned earlier, being an organisational member is a temporary position in contrast to being part of the police family, which is a permanent position. A part of my job as senior advisor, I held an organisational function which was directly connected to my doctoral work as I was given the task to review and evaluate existing processes and practiced for identifying and selecting investigation targets and to develop a new analytical methodology. Thus, during 2012-2015 and again in 2017-2018, I followed the police's process for targeting priority offenders in strategic fora (coordination meetings) and at operational level (targeting meetings) and held formal interviews with a selection of the key agents involved. I also reviewed documents related to targeting such as meeting minutes, prime target shortlists, target profiles, investigation proposals etc. In 2017-2018, I was furthermore instrumental in the launch of the new model for strategic targeting as coordinator for an analysis team which was established to compose strategic threat assessments on organised crime groups as part of an initial phase of strategic targeting. Moreover, the acceptance of one's presence as an organisational foreign body is dependent on one's professional and/or personal characteristics or status within the organisation. On several occasions, I was recognised by some of my most dependable gatekeepers who spoke in positive terms about me to others, which thereby heightened my organisational status, but also made sure that negative narratives were contained. An example of this was when I had been participating in a couple of police operations in relation to monitoring gang members as I was carrying out an evaluation of the police's response model in this area. A couple of police officers had complained and asked why an academic suddenly was present at

a police operation, just walking around observing without having any (operational) function. A police officer told me that one of my gatekeepers – a well-respected and highly experienced police officer – immediately had shut down their protests saying: “*She’s on our side, she’s been helping us out the last year, if it wasn’t for her we couldn’t get things passed on a national level*” – referring to my position in The National Gang Crime Staff.

The approval from gatekeepers and the informal access is underlined earlier as essential. At one point, I asked a detective in AIU what it had meant for them and their reception of me that local management had spoken about me in positive terms and had decided that I should have ‘full access’. The detective laughed and said: “*We couldn’t care less about that. If we didn’t like you, it wouldn’t have been easy for you.*” As such there are issues connected to one’s personality, professional competences, or status within the organisation which influence (both positively and negatively) one’s possibilities within the police – as a researcher and otherwise. To possess an organisational function is essential for an embedded researcher, however, this does not always makes one popular. Therefore, when one’s work is depending on social acceptance, it becomes important to have gatekeepers, and on the contrary, gate-closers can impose a significant problem, as I will explain in the coming section.

Gate-closers

During the time when I was collecting information in regards to the internal evaluation of the police’s approach to identifying priority offenders for investigation, I was met with a couple of *gate-closers* who were managers at superintendent level. In the beginning, I was not sure if it was a personal or professional issue, but I experienced a number of times that I was not invited to relevant meetings or given the information I needed. I had to ask around and check calendars to find out when specific meetings were held. When I asked these managers why I had not received a meet invite, I was told that it was merely an

oversight. In the corridors, I heard differently. Explanations such as: “*she shouldn't interfere with police work which she knows nothing about*” and that “*she makes very academic (langhårede) suggestions which have no operational value (kan ikke bruges til noget)*” was supposedly proposed by various managers and staff, but they were never said directly to me. One day I asked one of the managers for a lift to a meeting across the country, but he dodged the question saying something about driving there on the day before. The resistance from some managers and staff in my own department made me uncomfortable and frustrated: I had been given a task by the head of The National Gang Crime Staff, and my doctoral work was commissioned far up the chain of command. But I was in a difficult bind as I feared that making noise or any type of conflict would make it worse. At some point, I took it to my current boss:

“I can't carry out my work if I don't get access to the information I need.”

My boss sighed.

“Can't you work out your differences?”, he said.

“I'm not sure about these differences,” I said, “I'll be happy to discuss the different approaches, but I'm not given the chance to explain my point of view.”

My boss was reluctant to step in.

“I'm sure no one is trying to keep you from doing your job. I think they're (the managers, *my addition*) just worried that there'll be a lot of changes in the way they do things and they've been used to doing things the old way.”

I did not take the matter any further but tried to collect the information I needed through other channels. Still, I reflected over the reasons as to why these things were happening and my own role in them. Although I felt very isolated, I did not get the sense that it had much to do with me as a person or even my professional background. In fact, the explanation my boss had provided was probably more accurate: they tried to exclude me as they feared I was pushing for changes moving e.g. the process of selecting investigation targets from the meeting table of investigation managers (superintendents) into a systematic analytical process where targets were to be prioritised from certain analytical criteria (I elaborate on this in **Chapter 7**). Nevertheless, the gate-closers presented a consistent obstacle to my

information gathering. Moreover, it underlined my position as an isolated and temporary member of the world of policing. In the coming section, I elaborate on how isolation can even happen in friendly environments.

Being Too Much

Consider the following example:

We were sitting in the car on our way to a meeting with cooperative partners. The atmosphere was good and as always humorous. Sandy and Fred were in the front seat and I was sitting in the backseat with Clem. The conversation moved over to one of the chiefs in The National Police and an ongoing project about the future organisation of the investigation units. Sandy complained: “Please”, he said, “what does he know about investigation, really? Has he ever investigated more than a stolen bicycle? Roaming the halls of The National Police all his life...” “He’s actually been a manager in three different districts over the last five years”, I said. “Both as head of the investigation unit and the local police”. Sandy snorted: “So what?? It doesn’t mean that he knows anything about investigation!” There was silence for a while. The others did not say anything. I considered my response briefly and then suggested: “Just because one isn’t a detective—does that mean one doesn’t know anything about police work or investigation?” I continued: “I mean, you can have knowledge about a field but from a different perspective. A doctor, for example, doesn’t need to have experienced an illness himself to understand it...” “Oh, come on!”, Sandy interrupted me and raised his voice clearly annoyed and potentially angry, “please, stop that!”—Fred made a supporting sound (stemte i). An awkward atmosphere arose in the car and no one spoke for quite a while. Clem avoided looking at me and took out his computer from his briefcase and started working. I realised that I had overstepped the line—upsetting Sandy who was always in a good mood and he had never talked to me that way before. I suddenly felt very much as a visitor, an inconvenience, a burden to the entire group. The rest of the trip, I tried to be almost invisible, keeping a low profile.

The day after the meeting with the cooperative partners, we were on our way down the stairs in the headquarters and we passed some posters on the wall displaying uniformed patrol officers with handguns. Sandy was in front of me.

“Ha! Guns,” he said, “I don’t even know where my gun is. I wouldn’t even know what kind of guns we have nowadays!”

“Don’t you have Glock’s?” I asked.

Sandy stopped on the stairs. He turned around and shook his head.

“No, not Glock’s,” he said, “and really—what do YOU know about that?”.

He carried on down the stairs and I walked quietly behind him without saying anything, but with a clear sense that I might have overstayed my welcome.

The next day when I returned to work, I walked down the hall to Sandy's office where the detectives usually drank coffee in the early hours of the morning and held informal meetings about the investigation and whatnot, the door was closed. I didn't knock but walked back to the desk that had been assigned to me in the meeting room and waited for them to finish.

Apart from being one of the least pleasant experiences of my fieldwork, the example above underlines the essentials of 'friend or foe'. It reveals how fragile the relationship between researcher and field can be and how fast the access you are given can be revoked if you behave in a manner that your gatekeeper does not like. However, the narrative above also mirrors at least one ongoing more or less latent discussion within the police which I explained in the beginning of the chapter. The discussion very much concerns the competing rationales of experience-based and knowledge-based policing as accounted for in **Chapter 2**: who 'knows' about police work and what does it take to be an 'expert' in police work – a *doer* or a *knower*? (Gundhus 2012). The issue also relates to the question of the cultural notion of being 'real police', which means having learned police work 'on the job' and on the streets of the 'real world' rather than reading a book at university far away from real people and real problems (I elaborate on this in **Chapter 6**). Moreover, it relates to the issue of *knowledge monopoly*: The struggle of knowledge within the police equals the struggle of organisational power. Knowledge is in many ways a strong currency within the police as Hartmann (2014) equally underlines (see **Chapter 7** for further analysis).

As I will address in **Chapter 6**, the police can be seen as a *hybrid organisation* (Granér & Kronkvist 2014) with hierarchal rule governing and formally centralised decisions, but also where many discretionary decisions are taken in the front line implying that formal structures are less important (Granér & Kronkvist 2014; Lipsky 2010). Day-to-day knowledge about 'how things are done' is implicit and it therefore

requires both experience and a considerable amount of legwork to comprehend. Knowledge about current issues (for example criminal incidents, ongoing operations or investigations or the latest “news” from the criminal environment), is equally important and this requires a large network throughout the organisation which can provide reliable, but more importantly fast information. Therefore, ‘being knowledgeable’ or ‘being in the know’ is not only crucial for police officers but also for a police researcher and her prospects in the field (see **Chapter 7** for further analysis). Yet, occasionally this knowledge can be a hindrance as we saw in the example above: the detectives grew tired of my ‘claim to know’ or at least claim to have knowledge of specific aspects of policing and as such threaten the dominant narrative that such knowledge is reserved to police officers. Yet, other instruments, such as humour, can be used to get acceptance and closeness, as I will account for next.

Being Funny

An important feature of being tolerated/accepted within police is having *funny bones*; a sense of humour. I devote an entire section to this theme, as I continuously see this as determining for one’s organisational survival since the characteristic of having a sense of humour is symbolically transferred into another feature namely *stamina* or *robustness* (how much one can stomach). Humour is moreover used as a coping strategy for many members of the police organisation. In job listings from the police there is generally referred to ‘an informal and jovial tone of voice’ and the ability for applicants to ‘be in good spirits’ and contribute positively to the social atmosphere is much appreciated. The social unity and laughs are typically what is emphasised as one of the most positive aspects of the police as a workplace and I will propose that humour is a cultural trait of the police.

For an embedded researcher, the handling of *police humour* is as such significant. Police research shows (see Granér 2014 for an overview) that humour is typically

used: 1) to express resistance towards the official police world, 2) as a coping strategy to tackle stressful and frustrating parts of police work, including challenges within the police organisation, and 3) as a way of creating social cohesion within the group of police officers. Although humour obviously is not a formal requirement, researchers have pointed to the fact that in a practical sense it almost is (Finstad 2000; Granér 2004; Wieslander 2021). Humour is connected to the police's backstage and characterises the social convention with colleagues internally. As such, it is rarely expressed on the public front stage and is even toned down on the organisational front stage or in the presence of (certain) managers. Typically, police humour is characterised by being politically incorrect, sarcastic, sharp, and dominated by masculine and anti-intellectual values. There are elements of the kind of humour which goes by the Danish expression *blue collar humour* (*værkstedshumor*) referring to a kind of humour which can be both sexist and racist. The degrees of the brusqueness vary; from affectionate teasing to hostile provocations, bullying, or the diminishing of individuals or certain professional/minority groups (for instance civilians or ethnic minorities). A common denominator is, however, that the acceptance of the dominant humour is a basic requirement within the police. The general attitude is that employees who are sensitive towards this should find another job (*hvis man ikke kan lide lugten i bageriet, må man finde et andet sted*).

As such, humour is used as glue to create group cohesion and thereby strengthen the unity between police officers. This is certainly necessary as much police work depends on collaboration, teamwork, and mutual trust in e.g. critical incidents (*skarpe situationer*) where officers need to walk in line and 'have each other's backs'. However, it is also used as an instrument to create a strong in-group/out-group condition and thereby promote a demarcation between those who are considered to be in and out respectively. This distinction is between e.g. the stereotypical profile of a police officer (white male) contrary to e.g. the stereotypical profile of an academic (young female) each with group specific physical

characteristics, social background, norms, values, and world views. Humour is in such cases used both as a friendly and warm indication of inclusion and sense of community, but also to indirectly confront latent organisational conflicts such as differences between professional groups (cf. the competing epistemological rationales of knowledge and experience). The latter part goes on under cover of a convenient reference to the need for employees to be robust (understood as not a 'sissy') and 'endure the tone of voice' (understood as having a sense of *police* humour) in order to fit in. In this regard, police humour can be seen as an important symbolic gatekeeper for organisational acceptance or exclusion as other researchers similarly have underlined (Granér 2014 gives an overview). This is the case for the average employee, but certainly for an embedded researcher as well. Context and character of the social interaction are of course key in interpreting police humour's function.

In the following, I will provide some examples of police humour and analyse the function of it both in relation to organisational life in general and specifically related to my fieldwork. An important finding is that police humour is a part of the testing process of organisational members' characters and abilities to fit into specific groups and surroundings. Also, it is used as a coping strategy to deal with organisational instability and absurdness. For me as a researcher, I used humour as a way of building rapport and establishing social bonds and trust in order to get access in the field. Over time, I have furthermore found myself applying humour as a coping strategy for organisational endurance. Consider the following example:

It had been arranged that I should accompany the surveillance team on one of their shifts during the day. I had many times followed surveillance tasks from the detectives' point of view at 'the base' (basen) at the police station where detectives on duty were directing and supporting the surveillance team via radio communication. Now, I was given the opportunity to see the viewpoint of the surveillance officers whose work in many ways laid out the groundwork for the investigation. The task was to follow (skygge) the main targets of the investigation and map and record their movements and meetings.

The detectives had in advance set me up with Eric who was a young, outgoing type whose visits to AIU almost always involved an extra coffee break and friendly conversation about

this and that with the detectives. It was obvious that he was well-liked and perceived as a capable surveillance officer (observatør).

“You should ride with Eric”, Fred said, “he’s the best.”

When Eric came to pick me up that day in the office—which also served as a lunchroom—Fred and a couple of other detectives were present eating their lunches.

“So, are you ready to ride with Eric?” Fred asked.

“I am”, I said, “the question is: is Eric ready to ride with me?”

“That I can promise you!”, Fred said.

Eric smiled:

“You’re most welcome.”

“Did you take a motion sickness pill?” Fred wanted to know, “he drives like a mad man in his big, flashy car. I’m afraid that you’ll most definitely vomit.”

“Oh, I don’t drive that fast,” Eric said joking, “only a couple of hundred kilometres per hour.”

“I actually did take a pill”, I said, “I know the old police trick of getting civilians on the backseat of their car driving recklessly to make them vomit. So, Eric, I hope, I don’t fall asleep as they are a bit numbing.”

I had in fact tried this a couple of times when accompanying police patrols and heard stories from other civilians who had experienced the same. Patrol officers were testing how much one could ‘stomach’ going on ride-alongs.

“Ha!”, Fred said, “I don’t think Eric will mind if you fall asleep at the backseat—he’s tried that many times, and I promise you, you won’t feel a thing, just a tiny sting (et lille prik), isn’t that right, Eric?”

We all laughed.

“Well,” I said, “sounds like I should take precautions?”

Eric smiled and shook his head.

“Don’t listen to them. I’m honestly a gentleman.”

The example above illustrates typical daily social interactions of my fieldwork. The subtle sexual innuendo could be perceived in the span from innocent to inappropriate. The context determined whether I considered it to be funny or uncomfortable. The importance of participating in the daily dialogue, play along and be active in jolly ping-pongs cannot be stressed enough in terms of being tolerated and accepted. Depending on the specific group dynamic, it required me sometimes to go along and contribute further to the conversation or sometimes to challenge various statements and thereby draw a line. It was now and again a difficult balance. As a participant observer, my main priority was to be able to stay in

the field without making too much noise, but also, if possible, to contribute positively and actively to the group on their terms as this would bring me closer to their life world and thereby to be able to understand it better. I did not fool myself by thinking that my presence would be forgotten at any time and an active engagement was therefore in-evident. My tolerance of potentially (in my view) inappropriate comments such as sexist or racist remarks would again vary depending on the situational contexts. The tone of voice could be rather harsh and sometimes overstepping my personal boundaries, yet my purpose was to understand the proactive investigation community and not to scold them. This purpose was therefore more important than the consideration of my own personal boundaries. Plus, I myself have a rather dark and boundary pushing sense of humour. As I was only once in a while the direct object of police humour the observations I did primarily involved others. Two examples:

One of the few ethnic minority police officers in the police district would often come to AIU and eat lunch or have a coffee break or take care of administrative tasks. He was often met with comments referring to his ethnic minority background and religion. On one occasion he was asked by a detective if he wanted a cup of coffee or perhaps a pork chop? a remark which some would find rather offensive. But the police officer laughed and made a rapid and sarcastic response to the detective. When I spoke with him on another occasion he brought up the subject himself:

I love coming to AIU, it's my favourite section in the police. It's so vibrant and fun compared to some of the other sections. They give me a hard time here and I find it amusing, it makes me feel very much at home.

An appendix to the story is that the officer had a high status within AIU and was well respected not only for his skills as a police officer, but he was well-liked as a person, which the detectives often expressed. A female detective was also subjected to a number of amongst other sexual comments, e.g. a suggestion from a detective

to move her computer screen so he could have a better view of her “tits”. A remark that would make at least some people feel uncomfortable. But the detective herself was rather foul-mouthed and coarse in her communication and laughed and responded with a sharp and humorous comment. She never gave the impression that she was offended, on the contrary, she was regularly actively engaged in conversations with sexual content and it is genuinely my feeling that she was quite happy in this working environment, which she also underlined many times.


Thus, situations which isolated can be seen as improper, badging, or overstepping the boundaries of conventional social norms were instead used to create a specific dynamic and to make specific members of the group feel appreciated rather than harassed and to underline the cohesiveness of the group. Other less controversial examples include the detectives putting up posters with collages of pictures and paper clippings of each other, to put glue on each other’s desks, or to duck tape each other’s phones and the like.

Being an Object of “Humour”

In regards to social contexts as being significant for assessing various statements as funny/not funny, there are some examples where I believe that humour is also used to express an organisational dissatisfaction with e.g. academics as a professional group in police. Consider the following examples:

The notes (**Picture A** and **Picture B**) were observed at different bulletin boards within Danish police. **A** was observed at NCI, where I was employed, and **B** was observed in a lunchroom in a police district. Cf. the knowledge-based vs. experience-based rationales, it is quite common that academics as a professional group are highlighted as ‘enemies’ of the police (e.g. ‘djøffisering’).

Picture A:



Text translated (*my translation*): “Academic: A person who finds pleasure in taking a plain idea and making it complicated.”

It is not seldom that critique of academics (including many different academic backgrounds) are put forward openly in daily conversations, formal meetings, and at social events. A fellow academic remarked at one point: “*It seems like the hunt is on for academics*” (der er fri jagt på akademikere) implying that he felt as a kind of outlaw in police settings. When I was transferred from my old unit to NCI one of the police officers in the section commented: “*Oh, so you’re one of those who let the police pay for an expensive PhD and then you’re off to get a job outside the police where you can get a high salary*” implying that my job motivations were only driven by career wishes and financial gain and that I was taking advantage of the organisation.

Picture B:



Text translated (*my translation*): “- You! What is an academic?
- It is when you've studied what other people already know!”

At a lunch in the canteen with my department, a senior clerk spoke about my former colleague who was hired as an analyst and said: “*I don't know why they hire people like her (academics) when they could hire three like me (clerks) for the same salary!*” supporting the claim that academics are paid (unreasonably) high salaries which do not reflect their value for the police. At a staff meeting with about 100 persons present, the spokesman from the police union complained openly that an overload of academics “*who knows squad about police work and the real world*” were hired taking jobs from police officers. In my fieldwork one of the detectives constantly referred to me as the ‘seismologist’ or ‘geologist’ in a teasing tone of voice as he claimed he had never heard of a criminologist before. Still, he never asked me

about my professional background or what my work actually consisted of. Comments regarding academics are not exclusively negative or disparaging. Often police managers will in some arenas talk more respectfully about academics and give credit to their professional competences saying for example “*we need an academic to solve this task*” (often referred to as a person ‘who can write’ (en skrivekarl)). Once, I participated in a strategic meeting about a new strategy and operational action plan with managers from the districts, the regional units, and the national units. For a while, they had discussed a particular problem regarding how to define the new strategic goals without being able to solve the issue, and I was eventually given the floor and proposed a solution. The room was quiet for a while. Then the Assistant Police Commissioner who was sitting at the end of the meeting table facing the whiteboard turned towards the others and said: “*Are you listening, boys? This is why she’s here.*” The compliment was not directed at me but seemed to be more of a comment for the others to step it up.

My point regarding the examples above is that they reflect real and current, but latent conflicts within police in a somewhat passive aggressive manner. In written form (such as the two pictures) they prevent the sender from engaging in an open conflict about the matter or even having to elaborate or explain any further. Thus, examples A and B refer to (some) police officers’ resistance towards academics as a professional group in the police. As these are written examples, they lack the social context and dynamic between sender and recipient which can normally be analysed and interpreted during verbal interaction. The reader of these notes must therefore ‘fill in the gaps’ herself. Moreover, I will argue that the placement of these statements on more or less official bulletin boards turn them into a continuous component or even an uncontradicted “truth” in the working environment and thereby legitimise these as cultural artefacts. A parallel can be drawn to Danish social scientists Baarts & Mortensen (2018) who through their research of medical working environments have concluded that some groups of doctors and nurses use ‘humorous bullying’ in their informal social power struggle. They create a social

dynamic where they feel continuously humiliated by a derogatory teasing from each other and at the same time they participate in this as they fear to be socially excluded. On the surface health personnel seem accordingly to accept and condone this social dynamic but digging a little deeper it shows that they are aware of its constraining and detrimental nature (which the authors formulate as *killing themselves with laughter*). Some of the same conditions can be observed within police; a way of being able to participate in the social dynamic certain minority groups (academics, women, ethnic minorities, homosexuals etc.) as well as police researchers need to tolerate a specific police humour reflecting hyper-masculine values in order to be accepted. Humour within the police is a contributor to suppress organisational conflicts and thereby prevent them from being handled and diminished. This fear of dealing with conflicts interestingly dominates the police internally which encompasses a paradox and stands in contrast to police's status as *conflict workers* (konfliktarbejdere) (Mosebo 2012) and as such their responsibility to handle conflicts in the surrounding society. However, in connection with my role as a researcher, I used humour as a way to negotiate and achieve organisational access and acceptance.

In conclusion, with the purpose of embedding myself sufficiently into the research field to provide access to information and in-depth understandings, I have engaged in different roles of 'being' as presented above. These roles play out on a day-to-day basis, they vary continuously, and are developed and transformed over time. Some of these roles were given to me by the field and some I took myself. This role engagement is a central part of the embedded methodology; it depends on my ongoing analyses of the research field and the varying social contexts and my active engagements in these. Backstage knowledge in this regard is essential as it provides the contextual foundation on which I carried out these analyses. In this process, I continuously revised my preunderstanding and understanding and used these actively to direct my agency.

Wrapping Up: Analysing and Rendering Proactive Investigation

Method for Analysis

Explorative studies which primarily employ qualitative methods are in constant development and circles between theory, methods, and empirical information (Wadel 1991). The research process cannot be planned in advance – the researcher might not get the access she had hoped for, or the empirical findings might not be as interesting as she had expected etc. Hence, as a researcher one must be willing to revisit one's initial expectations (preconceptions) and impressions (preunderstanding) of the field and even change the research question. The scope in this study changed constantly as I got wiser (expanded my preunderstanding) and found new themes of relevance. This impacted consequently the way I analysed the empirical material. In accordance with the hermeneutic tradition, the method for analysis can be understood as a way of organising one's observations (Gundhus 2006). Danish sociologists Lisa Dahlager & Hanne Fredslund (2008) present some important aspects of analysing empirical findings namely:

- 1) to be aware of one's own preunderstanding
- 2) the willingness to put this preunderstanding at risk throughout the study
- 3) to be able to put oneself in other's place with the awareness that this process is influenced by one's own understandings.

My embeddedness – and continuous stay within the police – challenged on a daily basis my preunderstanding and helped to broaden my horizon (Gadamer 1998). This process goes beyond gathering empirical material and analysing findings. In practice, I tried for example to pressure test some of my observations or findings in discussions with colleagues – police officers, detectives, analysts etc. For a long period of time, I had viewed the constant shift between academia and police

practice as exhausting as these two worlds are fundamentally different and I had to navigate in them in different ways. Though, in the final analytical stage of my research it became instead an advantage to shift between the two worlds, and I used this actively in the analytical process. As such, my link to both police practice (police staff) and the academic world (my supervisors and fellow police researchers) enabled me to put my ideas and findings forward and discuss them with competent people who had insight into both the practical and scientific world of policing. This process has continued throughout the work with this thesis until the very last full stop.

The empirical material in this study is extensive and builds on seven years of research. The official documents represent more than 3,000 pages (case files, policies, strategies, operational plans), the audio recordings of interviews last more than 36 hours, and my field notes from approximately 950 hours of observation exceed a couple of hundred pages. This calls for a structured and thorough approach, which consists of many repetitive processes and enables the empirical findings to come forward in the initial phase. My method for analysing the empirical material is therefore inspired by the recipe proposed by Dahlager & Fredslund (2008). It combines a phenomenological and hermeneutic approach and consists of four steps:

- 1) General impression
- 2) Identifying meaning-bearing units
- 3) Operationalisation
- 4) Recontextualisation and hermeneutic interpretation.

In the first step, I have looked at the entire empirical material to create a general impression of it and to generate an overview. In the second step, I have tried to ask ‘*what* goes on’ by systematically identifying themes and categories which appeared including both the ones I expected cf. my preunderstanding (e.g. themes from the

interview guide), and the ones which I did not anticipate (e.g. issues which were brought up in interviews or during participant observation). I did not use any computer programme for this coding process. While reading through my field notes and listening to interviews, I wrote additional notes and scribbled down important quotes, but I ended up transcribing almost all interviews fully to ensure a full overview. The initial operationalisation and meaning categorisation which represents the third step was done manually with different colour post-its, which I used for different themes and put on a wall. The themes were, for example, organisational frames, “real” police work, technological challenges, top-down management, political steering, performance measures, creative accountancy, investigative competences, conflicts between national and regional level etc. Themes and categories were subsequently put together and organised bringing down the number of themes and adding to the richness in the remaining themes. Although this process was probably more time consuming than using a computer software, it gave me a graphic overview which appealed to my need to be ‘hands on’.

The last and fourth step concerns recontextualising and interpretation of the organised categories. As my research purpose is to investigate how proactive investigations unfold in the police, I revisited the literature on proactive policing and used it as a guide to look systematically after the (theoretical) characteristics in the representation of proactive investigation and the operationalisation of it into specific actions on both strategic and operational level. As the analytical process proceeded, I revisited the empirical material continuously while writing up the analytical chapters. The writing process in itself gave new insights and changed my preunderstanding over and over which has ultimately resulted in a constant circular movement between the four stages presented above. Consequently, I often returned to e.g. step two and looked at meaning-bearing units, recontextualised these and proposed an additional layer of hermeneutic interpretation to the empirical material.

First and Second Order Analyses

During the analytical process – the ongoing interaction between theory, methods, and empirical findings – the purpose has been to move from specific situational characteristics of actions or statements concerning the proactive phenomenon (the individual empirical parts) to a general level looking at the phenomenon as a whole (the entire empirical material) (Dahlgren & Fredslund 2008). In relation to the analytical process, Van Maanen (1979) proposes a distinction between *first order constructions* and *second order constructions* (derived from the work of Schütz (1963)). Therefore, I regard *first order analysis* as the process where the empirical material comes forward as raw information and for example maintains so-called *emic concepts*; the language of the field such as terms and expressions used by informants and participants (Headland et al. 1990). *Second order analysis* represents, however, what Van Maanen (ibid.) refers to as ‘interpretations of interpretations’ – the researcher’s theoretical constructions of the empirical material – which also lies in the concept of recontextualisation.

During these analytical phases, it became clear that instead of a comprehensive narrative about and methodology of proactive investigation in the theoretical frame of proactive policing, I was looking at empirical findings which showed a continuation of a reactive policing paradigm. The reason was that the characteristics of ‘proactivity’ in police actions and the assumptions they were based on could not be identified. Instead, both in conceptualisation and practice I observed clear elements from reactive policing. This realisation became a turning point in my analytical phase and I had to alter my entire understanding of the phenomenon proactive investigation – which I had studied. In all analytical chapters, I draw on the theoretical framework, presented in **Chapter 3**, concerning the dramaturgical model of policing, and the police *métier*. These theories have provided a prism through which I have looked at the proactive phenomenon – but they have at later stages in the analytical process also served as analytical instruments in the

hermeneutic interpretation of empirical findings. The re-activation of these theories has therefore provided new insights and understandings in each circular motion. Additionally, I will underline that the entire thesis and specifically the thesis' analysis (**Part Three**) is built progressively in terms of both knowledge and understanding. Each chapter encompasses an analytical context which serves as analytical instruments in the coming chapters. The chapters encompass in accordance with the hermeneutic principle independent analyses of specific individual parts of the proactive phenomenon which contribute to understanding the phenomenon as a unity. This means that the order of the chapters is important in terms of understanding the individual conclusions and the analytical narrative as a whole – each chapter serves as a preunderstanding and precondition for understanding the sequential chapters. In fact, in accordance with the hermeneutic approach, all chapters serve as (new) layers of contextualisation and interpretation and represents as such (new) hermeneutic circles of interpretation – and thus circular movements between preunderstanding and understanding.

To answer the research question of this study – namely how proactive investigations as part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in police and which conditions impact this and why – each analytical chapter (**Chapter 5, 6, 7, 8**) encompasses both first order and second order analyses. Thus, each chapter is first concerned with answering the question of “*what goes on?*”, and second “*why does it go on this way?*” in relation to their specific topics and sub questions (see **Chapter 1**). Still, the progression of the analysis provides deeper insights and understandings as I unfold the layers of the proactive phenomenon. In this sense in **Chapter 8**, for example, I build on the conclusions from **Chapter 5, 6, and 7** to allow deeper interpretations. Finally, **Chapter 9** collects the findings of each analytical chapter and serves as a cohesive narrative of a collective second order analysis as it theoretically explores the underlying mechanisms of why the proactive phenomenon unfolds the way it does by proposing a specific proactive performance and the detective métier.

Getting it ‘Right’: Assessing the Quality of the Study

The concepts of generalisability, reliability, and validity are widely recognised within social sciences and viewed as *the* parameters for assessing the quality of research. Nevertheless, these concepts stem from quantitative research and (often) positivist paradigms which make it difficult to transfer them into qualitative phenomenological-hermeneutic research (Kvale & Brinkman 2015). For example, as every researcher’s preunderstanding is unique and as every researcher is given a unique position/role in the research field it does not make sense to talk about reliability as the specific study cannot be repeated by another researcher. Or as Richardson (2000: 253) argues in connection with evaluating ethnography:

The ethnographic life is not separable from the self. Who we are and what we can be—what we study, how we can write about that which we study—is tied to how a discipline disciplines itself and its members, its methods for claiming authority over both the subject matter and its members.

The findings in qualitative research are, however, critiqued by some scholars as they view them as biased or unreliable and since they have concerns about generalisation from single or small number of cases (Bacon et al. 2020). This is often the case when concepts such as ‘evidence’ and ‘data’ from positivists research traditions are applied. In this connection, Tracy (2010) argues that qualitative research should avoid a policy of consent to a public atmosphere that favours broad quantitative studies and thus quantitative standards when assessing qualitative research. Accordingly, Fredslund (2001: 86-90, *my translation*) has for example proposed three criteria for quality which can be used to assess this study:

- 1) The researcher presents her preunderstanding explicitly and thereby makes the researcher visible as a subject
- 2) Every step of the research process is accounted for and justified
- 3) The study’s interpretations are discussed in regards to their transferability to other situations.

In order to accommodate these criteria, I have taken a number of steps. **Part Two** in this thesis is overall my attempt to meet the first and second criteria. I have tried to give a detailed account of all phases in this research process – from the planning of the study to writing up the thesis. The practical circumstances, my reflections, considerations, and feelings I had underway and during specific situations e.g. in the field or afterwards are put forward with the purpose of providing transparency. In other words, the nature of my preunderstanding and how it changed along the way is accounted for and justified and I have made myself visible as a subject.

Tracy (2010: 840) has furthermore suggested eight criteria for excellent qualitative research: 1) worthy topic, 2) rich rigor, 3) sincerity, 4) credibility, 5) resonance, 6) significant contribution, 7) ethical, and 8) meaningful coherence. In order to accommodate these criteria in the thesis, I have both in **Chapter 1** and **10** accounted for the relevance and importance of the research topic and the specific research question. Throughout **Chapter 1-4** I have tried to create transparency and sincerity by continuously displaying self-reflexivity accounting rigorously for both theoretical framework, the research process, and my preunderstanding and continuous deliberations as well as considering ethical aspects. In **Part Four** I have sought to build meaningful coherent narratives about the study's findings by providing a number of analyses on both micro and macro level based on a variety of empirical material derived from different research methods. I have thereby strived to provide a significant and credible contribution both empirically, methodologically, and theoretically. The assessment of the quality of this contribution can hereby determine the study's future and potential resonance, influence, and implications which I present in **Chapter 10**. *Quantity* (for example the number of cases or participants) is accordingly not a central or even relevant quality criteria in this connection.

Knowledge is organised information (Hastrup 2004). This means that knowledge is both selective and reductive as the production of knowledge clarifies and organises mess and empirical complexity, but also limits it as it leaves out information (Baarts 2015). Knowledge cannot be objective or detached from judgements. Knowledge about proactive investigation practice which is depicted in this thesis is socially constructed and context dependent. It is situated in a specific time and space, and created and produced in the simultaneity in the span between a practical and theoretical knowledge field and anchored in my (the researcher's) preunderstanding and autobiography and as such backstage knowledge, perspectives, norms and values (ibid.). Knowledge production in the context of this study and within the embedded methodology is therefore never descriptive nor neutral, but will always reflect the researcher's idiosyncrasies since 'the self' becomes a research instrument (Bacon et al. 2020). Accordingly, this thesis does not represent the truth about the world of proactive investigation as this would be impossible. I have a certain preunderstanding of this field, and I impose a specific perspective on this field in order to try to understand it. Instead, the thesis poses an interpretation of the world of proactive investigation and suggests possible theoretical explanations and as such represents a snapshot of *what goes on* seen through a particular set of spectacles. However, the study builds on scientific methods and quality criteria which means that the proposed analysis and conclusion are based on systematic and rigorous professional academic standards and should be judged accordingly. Therefore, 'getting it right' does not refer to the depiction of objective facts in the world 'out there'; facts which can be collected and passed on (Wadel 1991). 'Getting it right' is about being loyal, honest, and authentic towards the field of study (Hastrup 2004), but also in terms of passing on the analytical findings with both engagement and respect. Or as Gundhus (2006) argues; conscious subjectivism is better than unconscious objectivism.

Van Maanen (1988) categorises various forms of tales of the field in his classic work on ethnographic writing. In accordance with the embedded approach, I find

inspiration in the techniques of *confessional* and *impressionist tales* where fieldwork or participant observation is sought to be demystified and where an intimacy is developed between the author and the reader. The author is in this tradition an active agent; not in order to be centre of attention – but with the purpose of giving the audience a fuller picture of the endeavours of the fieldwork to better understand the field of study. The author's 'I' is therefore not an 'I' as the person (me), but as a reflexive and reflecting writing subject. The subjects/'I's presented in the thesis are therefore different and transformed via the process of writing and in the meeting with the reader (Baarts 2015).

Thus, this thesis as an end product is not to be viewed as a final interpretation of the empirical material. Other interpretations and explanations can be proposed through different perspectives, in different times, by different researchers. However, I will argue that the systematic scientific process in which this research has become suggests that it is valid to talk about *scientific knowledge*. This implies that the analytical findings can be lifted to comment on a more general level and be transferred to other parts of e.g. policing and police organisations. The robustness of this knowledge and thereby its 'truthfulness' and 'rightness' is for that reason based upon its concrete empirical anchoring which is qualified through theory and the attempt to meet Fredslund's (2001) first and second criteria of quality. I will discuss this in connection with the third criteria for quality which I unfold in **Chapter 10**.

Being a Critical Friend: (Embedded) Ethical Dilemmas

Confidentiality, Anonymity, and Informed Consent

There are three main concerns when it comes to ethical obligations in connection with presenting this study.¹ The first has to do with the sensitivity of the empirical material as it deals with covert police action and hidden organised crime activities. This means that I have been obliged to leave out a considerable amount of information from e.g. casework and strategic decision-making. Specific details are moreover camouflaged throughout the thesis to prevent the recognition of specific events, individuals, investigations and so on. This decision is founded in both a demand for *confidentiality* in regards to specific individuals and investigations which are not publicly known, but it is also an ethical consideration to both the Danish police organisation and the police officers involved. As a consequence, only the most necessary empirical examples are put forward to illustrate and support the analytical findings. All other “intriguing matters” and ‘thick ethnographic descriptions’ which would serve as a general backdrop to get closer to an understanding of the field of organised crime policing are omitted.

In regards to police tactics, I have not portrayed any actions or lines of inquiry which are not described in the general legal framework of policing or proactive investigation or have been made public in connection with the general news coverage, or via court cases. Perhaps this condition has the consequence of making the thesis’ overall narrative of proactive investigation a little narrow and anemic compared to a rich ethnographic study with a generous portion of ‘tales from the field’ (Van Maanen 1988). However, this has been inevitable with considerations to sensitivity and confidentiality.

The second issue has to do with *anonymity* of agents within the field. This has been secured by the use of aliases and most often the alteration of time and place. I have only included titles and ranks of police officer when it seemed relevant for the events which played out or for the specific context. In those situations where the circumstances were particularly delicate, I have reconstructed the empirical examples in such a way that it should be difficult to recognise places, events, and individuals both by the people involved and by others within the police. For example, I have in a few cases merged different events together which took place some time apart, and I have typically changed the location of the setting or added a person, a vehicle or the like. In regards to the material from casefiles, I have altered the characteristics and made them as generic as possible.

The third issue is an ethical dilemma which is persistent for most ethnographers but indeed to embedded researchers. The matter is *informed consent* and concerns information generated through observations of a third party (see e.g. Lundgaard 2019). In this context, it first has to do with the individuals who are being policed meaning individuals from the organised crime environment and the people e.g. family around them. They have been unaware that their actions for example aspects of their private life have been exposed to a researcher through wiretapping, covert observation etc. while I followed the covert investigation towards them. Indirectly these peoples' actions have influenced the action of the police and thereby informed the study of investigation practices. Second, it has to do with those individuals within the police who were not at all times aware that I was a researcher carrying out participant observation. Although being an embedded researcher certainly has advantages, the position can also be problematic as it is not clear at all times and to all people. Sometimes I attended meetings in the capacity of my job function within the police and sometimes in the capacity of being an embedded researcher. Although people in general within police knew that I was carrying out doctoral research I have not asked all the people I have observed to sign a consent form or a confidentiality agreement. Such forms have only been used in connection

with formal interviews. The reasons have overall been practical in nature. For example, when I was doing fieldwork at AIU, police officers and civilian employees would often come by the unit to talk or to solve various tasks. As such, they were interacting with the detectives I was intensely observing and have thereby indirectly been participants in this study. On those occasions, I did not ask them to sign an informed consent form as this would quite frankly have been inappropriate in the specific social context. They have therefore not been able to give their informed consent to participation which is otherwise a general rule in research ethical guidelines with reference to protection of personal data.

Although recognising that this is a difficult ethical dilemma, Norwegian police researcher Geir Aas (2009) still argues that there are and must be exceptions to the use of informed consent in police research. He provides a number of examples of practical and ethical nature where informed consent cannot be applied. There is, however, a greater issue regarding the purpose of the research which possibly can set aside the demand for informed content. For example that the specific research indeed has the purpose of investigating police action which has great consequences for individual citizens and the general public's trust in the police. Police research can thereby function as an instrument to create reflection and support improvement of police work through professionalisation to the benefit of society as a whole. In relation to this study, I therefore concur with Aas' (2009) arguments above. It would not have been possible to obtain the insights in this study if I had not at certain times put aside the demand for informed consent. Criminal justice research, and specifically research concerning a vital societal institution such as the police, has significant political and therefore also ethical dimensions as knowledge produced by researchers has potentially real consequences for criminal justice practices and those who are subjected to these (Chan 2013). Thus, I find this study of great importance as it tries to uncover parts of covert policing – an area which lacks knowledge and transparency in order to secure democratic principles.

Additionally, I have the following reflections: Since I was already employed within the police, my position gave me on a daily basis insights into information about crime, offenders, victims, next of kins, and police responses, investigations, police practices, and tactics which I have a general obligation to keep secret. The information that I encountered during my research did not in that respect differ from the type of information which I usually have access to and am bound to keep confident. Within this thesis I have, as mentioned, deliberately omitted a vast amount of information in regards to its sensitivity. During the extent of *Operation Goldilocks*, I did for example experience an interconnected dilemma as I came across some information in my capacity of working in the national unit which had particular relevance for the investigation. This information which is too sensitive to specify here had implications as to how the investigation was carried out, and how AIU detectives would allocate resources and interpret certain information. In this situation I had no choice but to keep the information to myself despite the fact that I knew the investigation team struggled with this throughout the investigation. Consequently, I have tried to navigate in this by respecting the different confidentiality considerations in connection with information sharing.

The Blue Code of Silence

As mentioned earlier, a debate continuously goes on within police research about government research versus independent research (see e.g. Høigaard 2011; Holmberg 2014; Davis 2016; Hartmann et al. 2018). Some scholars are concerned that inside/government research will be too loyal towards the organisation on the expense of being critical. When promoting the embedded approach earlier, I underlined the condition that critical perspectives are in some ways easier to impose as an organisational member as the backstage knowledge permits the researcher to question common-sense actions more in-depth. However, when it comes to presenting critical views internally or publicly the embedded position can be rather difficult, and this presents an additional ethical obligation in connection

with presenting research findings. I have argued that police organisations to a high degree are occupied with front stage work; impression management, keeping up appearances, and putting up polished fronts (Goffman 1959; Manning 2004; 2010; 2014a). This is also the case with the Danish police as Holmberg (2014) amongst other implies. To publish the organisation's 'dirty laundry' is perceived as a disloyal action and can result in organisational suicide. Besides from the haphazard support from sporadic individuals, there exists an informal *blue code of silence* (Holgersson 2019) within the police which dictates that criticism internally, but especially externally is neither encouraged nor welcome despite of what the formal policy about freedom of expression for public servants states (Moderniseringsstyrelsen 2017).

Initiatives regarding whistleblowing within the police have been launched within the last couple of years on the backdrop of various concerning issues which have received extensive critique from the media, citizens, and politicians in the police's handling of these (e.g. e.g. the police's handling of demonstrations for Tibet in connection with state visits from China, and the use of cellphone data evidence in the courts² (Teledata-sagen)). However, it is still early days; The Independent Police Complaint Authority (Den Uafhængige Politiklagemyndighed) which investigates possible police misconduct and breaches of the law is similarly quite new (established in 2012) and a dominant perception amongst police officers is that this institution is an enemy which seeks to undermine and make life difficult for honest and hardworking police officers. In other words, the resistance against critical voices is not just to serve management convenience. It has to do with the entire police history from recruitment, to socialisation, and the development of police identity, and specific organisational practices over time. The police organisation is traditionally not a place where critical assessments and up front professional discussions 'on one side' and 'on the other side' about various aspects of police work are taken. As some police officers underline: "*It's not a debating society!*". It is

on the contrary a rule of law-organisation where people are expected to walk in line and follow orders without questioning them. As an Analyst explains:

My impression is that within the police culture the demand for loyalty is from the moment that you are hired. It's about the collaboration there needs to be in an operative unit—we have to stand shoulder against shoulder when they throw bricks at us or when we take down an apartment. We need to be sure that number two goes in when number one has kicked the door in. We need to trust each other; we need to be loyal.

As such, the duty of loyalty is regarded as binding as a Police Officer explains: “*When we're in a critical incident (skarp situation) no one has an opinion besides the operational manager (operativ leder)—opinions come after at the debrief.*” Although police officers are no strangers to complaining or voicing their opinions, this is done carefully and most often in an informal setting or at least very context dependent. The different characteristics of the competing epistemological rationales of experience-based and knowledge-based policing become clear: The implicit organisational expectations in the police stand in opposition to those values of scientific research and academia where public scrutiny, debates and criticism are obligatory. As I have heard Swedish police researcher Rolf Granér remark on several (informal) occasions: “*When participating in an academic event you will be disappointed if no one critiques your work. It is the opposite within policing.*” In fact, divergent perspectives and opinions are seen as a threat to the cohesive structures within the police (Granér & Holgersson 2012).

For that reason, it certainly takes a brave organisation to engage in an (embedded) research study as there is a strong possibility of exhibiting its most sensitive and least appealing aspects. The organisation's ‘dirty laundry’ is in other words in risk of being washed and hung out to dry in a semi-public arena such as Academia. The maturity of the organisation in terms of being occupied with organisational learning and development is therefore essential for its ability to process and operationalise (potential critical) research findings. At the same time, it calls for a bold embedded

researcher with an adequate amount of stamina. Loyalty towards the research and its findings together with considerations for the organisation's needs and interests should be balanced in a sensible way. This balance is crucial when it comes to communicating and perhaps applying the research findings in a constructive manner. My experience with and thereby preunderstanding about the police was that there is an imminent risk that the researcher suddenly stands alone with her research conclusions in the organisation.

As an embedded police researcher, I have therefore found myself in a burdensome tension between the world of Academia and the world of policing; on one hand the requirements to deliver and publish critical and sound research, and on the other hand to be considerate of a command-and-control system in the police organisation hypersensitive of critique (see e.g. Hunt 2010; Holmberg 2014; Holgersson 2015; 2019; Knutsson 2015). For those reasons, I will be frank about the fact that I for a long time have been anxious and worried about going public with this study as I first and foremost fear the reception within the police. Without being close to solving this issue, I expand on the statement provided together with fellow researcher colleagues (Hartmann et al. 2018) that this calls for the position of a critical-constructive friend.

Critical-Constructive Embeddedness

The idea of the researcher positioning herself as a critical-constructive friend (Finstad 2000) assumes that the identification and analysis of organisational potentials and challenges are required before the police are able to promote professional development as mentioned in **Chapter 1**. My role as an embedded police researcher is therefore twofold: first I need to be a diagnostic providing constructive criticism in the shape of scientific knowledge, and second I need to be an active agent engaging in making an actual impact on policing. The principles within the embedded methodology therefore support the promotion of honest

critique without burning any bridges in the police organisation and indeed without ‘selling out’ in terms of my professional integrity as a researcher. The critical-constructive embeddedness should ideally promote critique that invites and enables joint reflection and action, rather than simply exposing defects and pointing fingers from a safely distanced ‘armchair’ position (Hartmann et al. 2018). This calls for an additional task of me as an embedded researcher, namely the active engagement in and willingness to assist in creating change with the police in a friendly and respectful environment. As such, the critical-constructive role in the police also includes taking up advisory positions in e.g. formal settings and meetings, and moreover to be available for informal dialogue with both managers and co-workers about policing in general, the police profession, the organisation, and the challenges it faces. Together with Hartmann et al. (2018), I argue that the mere presence of embedded researchers/critical friends have an independent value as it often opens up important discussions about organisational development which are not usually taken in the routine-focused police organisation. On many occasions, I have indeed been acknowledged by a variety of police officers who appreciate the presence of non-police personnel who commission reflections and discussions and a more diverse professional environment. Embedded police research comes with a responsibility and an obligation for me as a researcher to support constructive change for the benefit of society. Still, the process of bringing about changes is not the sole responsibility of the researcher as knowledge sharing cannot be enforced by the researcher alone. Likewise, the researcher does not hold much control of how the research is interpreted (Hartmann et al. 2018). Thus, considerations for a critique-sensitive police organisation or political agendas therefore come in second when producing police research.

Self-Censor-Ship

The issues which are treated analytically and debated in this thesis might possibly be regarded by some as a process of ‘washing dirty laundry in public’. Self-censor-

ship has on that account been an important and pertinent dilemma for me as a researcher during this PhD process especially when I was writing up the thesis. Identifying problems and being critical towards one's own organisation and the work being carried out is not an easy or pleasant task. I am deeply respectful of the complex task of policing and very much admire police officers' ability to be committed, engaged, and carry out their work with great dedication and strong ideals about justice and fairness to the benefit of the general public despite of difficult working conditions, stressful situations, political demands, and organisational dysfunctions. It is difficult to find comparable jobs with the same degree of diversity and complexity as policing and with such significant consequences and implications for those individuals receiving and needing help or support or being policed. Consequently, I have been guided by two overall principles in regards to this thesis' analytical findings. These are as follows:

First of all, I take my job as a researcher seriously just like policing is a serious business and just like police officers are serious about their work. Both Hartmann (2014) and Holmberg (2014) point to the contradiction that police officers themselves are quite critical towards the police although they do not like this critique to be voiced externally especially when it comes from the outside. Still, not being critical enough will be regarded as merely having a superficial knowledge about policing matters and/or not having the guts to tell it like it is. In this situation, the researcher's reliability and trustworthiness is thereby diminished.

Second of all, the critical analysis in this thesis is systemic and not individual or personal. The purpose is not to identify and critique specific people or units, but rather to discover systemic factors which influence the frame in which proactive policing is carried out, how it is carried out, and why it is carried out this way. In that sense, this research could have been conducted in any organisational context, not just within the world of policing. Thus, the above principles guide the next part of this thesis in the sense that it proposes an in-depth, critical scrutiny of proactive

investigation and its conditions with the purpose of identifying and analysing systemic factors and make us wiser on this complex phenomenon.

¹I have overall followed the principles from Aalborg University's ethical guidelines for social research (2018): https://www.fak.samf.aau.dk/digitalAssets/513/513149_retningslinjer-til-fremme-af-ansvarlig-forskningspraksis-e18_.pdf

²For further information see Tibet-kommissionen <https://tibetkommissionen.dk> and The Ministry of Justice <https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2019/fakta-om-tiltag-i-teledatasagen>.

PART THREE: BEHIND THE SCENES



Chapter 5: Police in Times of Turmoil

- *On external and internal events shaping and impacting the contextual frame of the Danish police*

The police organization acts, has an audience, and is a social object that people understand as real, constraining, important and standing for something other than just a person in a blue coat and funny hat. The organization has legal status and is a legal actor. It is thus a “social unit” that has collective meaning, consequence, and symbolic significance. It performs. People respond to and animate the organization as real and doing things—fighting crime, being patriotic, issuing statements, and being an expense. It is in this sense a social actor with a social role in the game that is society. This is not a playful or whimsical notion; it is a way of considering the multifaceted role of the police in society.

- *The Role and Function of the Police*, Peter K. Manning (2013: 6).

Introduction

In this chapter, I provide the reader with a broad contextual frame of the Danish police. I select and examine an assortment of external and internal ‘shaping’ events from the last decades which I consider to have significantly influenced the current state of the Danish police organisation and contemporary policing as a whole. I analyse: *how have these events impacted the police organisation and the conditions for proactive police work?*

These shaping events are both external and internal and concern social and political structures, governance, strategic priorities, criminal incidents as well as internal matters and occupational conditions within the police. Such events must be explored in order to understand how they have influenced the police organisation, policing generally, and proactive police work which is under scrutiny in this study. Social and political structures are indeed important to a social institution such as the police (Garland 1990), which react to and interact with the different stimuli it is exposed to. Even the microcosmos of proactive investigation is connected to macro-oriented politics and societal developments which have significant direct and indirect influence on how police work is organised and carried out.

As I argued in **Chapter 2**, it is fair to speak of an international paradigm shift within policing in the last decades which has proposed a move from a traditional law and order and response focus (the reactive paradigm) towards a more problem-oriented, analytical, proactive service (the proactive paradigm). This paradigm shift is certainly mirrored in the strategic commitment to its ideals in e.g. the reformation of organisational structures and education, and a change in the strategic direction to analytical and intelligence-led policing (see e.g. The Police’s

Business Strategy (Politiets virksomhedsstrategi), The Political Agreement of the Police's and the Prosecution Service's Budget (Flerårsaftale)). The question I raise at the end of this chapter is, however, if this shift has manifested itself in police practice or if this practice is even returning to the 'old' paradigm as a consequence of specific crime challenges, political agendas, and organisational matters.

Regardless of this, the Danish police have indeed experienced considerable turmoil within the time frame of this study (2013-2020), which I find relevant to account for. The chapter does not provide an exhaustive systematic review of historical events or organisational changes in the time period from 2001 until today. Instead, in the historical review of events I have selected those which I consider to be principal in terms of having impacted the current state of the Danish police and the conditions for carrying out police work. My selection is based on a broad variety of documentation and empirical material such as research studies, newspaper articles, internal policy documents, accounts in interviews, and field observations. Many of these events have not been assembled and analysed by scholars yet, and I recognise that the selection and analysis presented in this chapter is incomplete.

For a thorough examination and comprehensive analyses of the history of the Danish police, I refer to three Danish historians: First, Henrik Stevnsborg (2010) who presents the development of the Danish police from its origin in 1682 to the recent police reform in 2007, and the historical scrutiny of the Danish police in the period 1945-2007 (2016). Second, Mikkel Jarle Christensen (2012) who provides a historical-sociological analysis of different ideologies within the Danish police (from a traditional force-oriented to a more project-oriented idea of police). Third, Fredrik Strand (2011) who focuses entirely on the historical development of criminal investigation and the shifts in investigative paradigms from 1863 to 2007. The time period from 2007 until today has not been examined systematically. Moreover, I refer to five central studies of the Danish police which I also draw upon in the following analysis, namely Flemming Balvig, Lars Holmberg and Maria Nielsen's study (2011) of the police reform in 2007, Rex Degnegaard's study (2011) of

change management in connection with the police reform, Camilla Hald's study (2011) of the production of evidence in police's criminal investigations, Kira Vrist Rønn's study (2012) of intelligence work in relation to organised crime, and Mia Koss Hartmann's study (2014) of police innovation. Despite these studies different foci, they all provide important analyses of and insights into the contextual frame of the Danish police.

My main argument in this chapter is that although the Danish police have been underway with a transformation from a reactive response organisation to a modern police service guided by ideals of proactive policing specific external and internal events have reactivated the reactive policing paradigm and impeded a genuine paradigm shift.

The chapter is structured as follows:

First, I identify and analyse at some of the most imperative crimes and crisis the police have experienced and their impact on the police organisation and the long-term consequences they have generated.

Second, I examine a variety of reforms and initiatives which have been launched internally within the police and have altered the organisational context and reorientated the strategic direction.

The chapter ends with a summary of its key findings together with a discussion of the conditions for a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive policing.

Crimes and Crises

Waves of Terrorism (from 2001)

Some of the most decisive events for police and intelligence services all over the Western world in this century have of course been the different terror attacks carried out in Western countries. The first wave began with the attack on World Trade Center 11. September 2001 (US) followed by a line of attacks in e.g. Madrid 2004 (Spain), and London 2005 (UK). The second wave included the terror attack 22. July 2011 in Norway, and the attacks in Paris 7. January, and 13. and 14. November 2015 (France). These events together with others have had a profound significance for the way police and intelligence services have prioritised and organised their work in the years after. The terror attacks on the culture community centre *Krudttønden* (which ironically means ‘the powder keg’), and the Jewish synagogue in Copenhagen (DK) 14. and 15. February 2015 meant that the Danish police came to experience this international wave of terrorism firsthand.

The various evaluations of these attacks and the authorities’ responses to them (see for example Kripas 2011; NOU 2012; Rigspolitiet 2015a and 2015b; Johannessen 2015; Renå 2019) have underlined a number of areas within policing (in Scandinavia) which suggested alterations and improvements both in terms of organisational structures, management, coordination, training etc. These incidents therefore raised both public and internal discussions about the Danish police’s preparedness for and ability to handle terror attacks and other major unannounced incidents (*større uvarslede hændelser*). Comprehensive analysis of the Danish police’s ‘operational preparedness’ (*Beredskabets operative parathed*), strategic contingency plans, crisis management etc. were as such instigated and recommendations implemented both after the attacks in Norway and in the aftermath of the Danish attacks.

Yet, organisational changes were already made within the Danish police not long after 9/11 as The Danish Intelligence and Security Service (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)) was strengthened and on several occasions given extra resources both in terms of staff and technological equipment. New anti-terror legislation was additionally implemented in 2002 and 2006, and personnel resources (about 150 police officers) were transferred from The National Investigation Unit (National Centre of Investigation (NEC)) to The Intelligence & Security Unit (PET) (Strand 2011; Christensen 2012; Heiberg 2016). As Christensen argues (2012), the police's intelligence service thereby became a central component in the anti-terror response and as such their scope was widened as they became a fulcrum to intelligence gathering and intelligence coordination – also when it came to international working partners. The strengthened anti-terror agenda has derived a vast amount of resources at the 'closed' police organisation¹ to support high policing activities (such as covert policing). This has, although perhaps necessary, to a large extent been at the expense of the 'open' police organisation and low policing activities (everyday calls for service, volume crime such as property crime etc.) as resources such as personnel were allocated to the anti-terror agenda.

After 2015, new training initiatives were furthermore launched within the Danish police including the certification of all operational managers (vagtchefer) and a new training programme for the use of firearms together with a range of other initiatives and operational concepts with the purpose to strengthen the police's operational capacity and preparedness. The police's daily operational response was moreover expanded to include new 'response patrols' (reaktionspatruljer) in all police districts – these were specially trained to handle the first police response to critical incidents such as school shootings, terrorism etc. All these initiatives were developed and implemented while the police's crisis and emergency level (beredskabsniveau) was at 'increased emergency level' (forhøjet beredskab) (level 3 of 5) or 'elevated emergency level' (markant forhøjet beredskab) (level 4 of 5) since

the Copenhagen attacks. This challenged the Danish police tremendously in terms of both resources and personnel.

Gang Conflicts (from 2008)

Even though crime in general has decreased within the last decades (Balvig 2015; Rigspolitiet 2017), the tasks for the police have not been fewer and the complexity of these tasks seems to have increased. Especially new and diffuse threats from terrorism, organised crime, mobile offenders from Eastern Europe, and new criminal arenas (such as cyberspace) have presented the police with severe challenges and have redistributed police resources internally. Furthermore, in August 2008 a violent gang conflict arose on the organised crime scene in Copenhagen. A homicide on a young man from a loosely organised street gang can be characterised as a symbolic catalyst to a number of violent incidents taking place in the following years. These incidents are connected to conflicts primarily between outlaw motorcycle gangs and ethnic minority street gangs (Hestehave 2013). The violence included shootings, assaults, attacks with hand grenades, knife stabbings etc. Between 2009-2018 there have been 345 shootings related to gang conflicts in Denmark, 361 people have been injured, and 31 people have been killed (internal statistics). Over time, the conflicts have become widespread and intricate as new gangs and crime groups have risen and have blurred the picture due to their somewhat complex mutual relations. Moreover, these conflicts have gone from more local and territorial conflicts to national conflicts with international connotations.

Consequently, these crime problems and their threat to public safety have become a critical issue in the public and political discussion of the police's service level and legitimacy. As a result, the police's response to gangs was singled out as the number one priority in political agreements about the police and the prosecution service and in the overall strategies from 2012-2019 (Holmberg 2019). This moreover meant

that the police re-organised their police response and their strategies as I will show later in this chapter and in **Chapter 6**.

Migrants and Refugees (2015)

As the police were still struggling to keep up the enhanced operational presence as a consequence of the increased emergency level (beredskabsniveau) and thereby carry out day-to-day tasks in the police districts with reduced personnel, some rather dramatic events took place at the Danish-German border during the early fall of 2015. Thousands of refugees mainly from Syria traveled through Europe by busses, trains, and on foot. Their primary goal was supposedly Sweden due to Sweden's rather liberal asylum legislation. Between 6. September to 15. November 2015 about 64,500 people are believed to have passed the Danish border, whereas about 20,000 of these had applied for asylum in Denmark (Holm 2015). The Danish police's political mandate was initially blurry due to both complex EU legislation, the Schengen cooperation on open borders within Europe, and the rather extraordinary circumstances. The police's mandate was as a consequence vague, and ultimately the Danish government decided to violate the Schengen agreement and install temporary border control at the Danish-German border to prevent thousands of migrants and refugees from entering Denmark and overloading the Danish asylum system. This temporary border control has now become permanent, and the police are consequently present at the border carrying out random stops and passport control supported by the Danish military and the national guard (Hjemmeværnet).

¹ Within the Danish police a distinction is made between the 'closed' police organisation (The Intelligence and Security Service, PET) and the 'open' police organisation (the police districts and The National Police). PET is an independent unit and PET's Police Commissioner is directly subjected to the Minister of Justice (Justitsministeren) rather than The National Police Commissioner (Rigspolitichefen).

Internal Reforms and Initiatives

Police Reform (2007)

Although I first began working in the police in the beginning at 2009, one of the most frequent conversational topics amongst both managers and police officers were the police reform, which was launched in 2007. This reform is by historians Stevnsborg (2010) and Christensen (2012) considered to be the most comprehensive change within the Danish police since 1938 as it was not only a structural reform, but most of all as it represented a new idea of police. The police reform was based on a report from an expert group The Vision Committee (Visionsudvalget) (2005) called *The Future of Police* (Fremtidens Politi).

The report recommended amongst other a new organisational structure of the Danish police as the current structure was considered to be outdated in a modern context and presented police with significant barriers and difficulties in terms of coordinating and cooperating across police districts (Stevnsborg 2010). The Danish police was therefore reduced from 54 to 12 police districts with an elimination of the regional level. The aim was to build notable stronger and independent districts and to decentralise the regional tasks to new bigger districts, which were now believed to have the resources and staff to fulfil these. At the same time, a new organisational model for the districts was implemented. Although the argumentation was to decentralise regional tasks, according to Balvig et al. (2011), Christensen (2012), and Holmberg (2019), the overall theme of the reform was in fact centralisation. Another important component of the reform was that the traditional divide between uniformed patrol police (Beredskabet, tidligere Ordenspolitiet) and plainclothes detectives (Kriminalpolitiet) was moreover abolished (at least in a formal sense) as this division was considered to be an artificial boundary between police professions and a distinct barrier to solve tasks

and work efficiently and flexible (Christensen 2012). The Vision Committee presented on the contrary the idea of a unified police service with generalists, and outlined a future working method building on an analytical and problem-oriented approach where teams should be deployed across different skills and professions within the police.

Initially, the 2007 police reform was considered to be rather uncontroversial (at least politically), but shortly after the implementation of it a massive critique was put forward in different newspapers and other media outlets where a series of police neglect (*politisvigt*) – specifically the police’s fail to respond to calls for service – were uncovered through several months. This impacted the public’s trust within the police in general and questioned the police’s effort to implement the reform specifically (Balvig et al. 2011; Christensen 2012; Holmberg 2019). The idea that the police reform would enable a better police service and a more efficient police response to the public’s needs and high demands for service was consequently questioned both outside and inside the police. Meanwhile, a rather comprehensive budget deficit around 800 million DKK was “discovered” in the police’s budget in 2008, which consequently led to the dismissal of the former National Police Commissioner (*Rigspolitichef*). A number of budget analyses were hereafter initiated and the police – which traditionally had been spared financial cutbacks, in contrast to other public areas such as health, welfare, and education – were now in a position where they were forced to find additional 300-500 million DKK in their budget and at the same time had to improve the level of police service and efficiency. Therefore, for several years after the launch of the police reform it had an enormous impact on the police organisation and on the way police work was organised and carried out. Thus, the organisational structures and frames proposed in the reform are still framing the Danish police organisation (there have been various organisational changes since, but minor ones compared to the reform). The external criticism from both politicians, the media, and the general public combined with the internal chaos of the implementation process shook the

organisational robustness and confidence (see e.g. Degnegaard 2010; Balvig et al. 2011) a condition underlined by a statement from a former Superintendent: *“It was like getting buckets of cold water thrown at you from all angles and you just had to move forward”*. As a consequence, the police reform left the Danish police in a rather unstable condition. I will argue that external events and (new) crime problems such as gang conflicts meant that stability was never really established since the police had to tackle these problems in an already turbulent time and unsettled organisational environment.

Furthermore, strategic management researcher Rex Degnegaard (2010) argues that the implementation of the police reform was based on change management technologies developed and based on premises other than those of the police organisation. Instead of turning to resources and informal relations within the police which are essential to law enforcement organisations the police turned to external consultants and advisors. This meant that the reform process did not take into account the positive aspects of the organisation and its working practices, structures etc., but focused solely on implementing new initiatives from the reform. Moreover, Degnegaard argues (ibid.), the reform was based on a functional-rational logic, which disregarded the relevance of symbolic action and therefore created confusion within the police as they as a public institution are confronted with demands of both providing genuine security for the public and having to create the ‘feeling of safety’ (tryghedsfølelse) e.g. visible presence in the communities. Another important factor was an over-focus on implementation of technologies rather than enhancing the necessary skills to handle these technologies within the police, and the implementation therefore became extremely complex to control. Ultimately, the police reform and its derived ramifications presented the Danish police with significant challenges long after it was considered to be implemented and operational. The idea of a generalist police service working problem-oriented across organisational boundaries was moreover little by little abolished as I will explain in the following sections.

New Public Management

Along the lines of management styles in other Scandinavian and Western police services (Hoque et al. 2004; Wathne 2018; Holmberg 2019), a new governance model and thereby management style was introduced in the Danish police namely *New Public Management* (NPM). This governance model had considerable support from the Treasury Department (Finansministeriet) and was already introduced to other parts of the public sector in Denmark during the 1980s and 1990s (Christensen 2012). Inspired by the private sector, NPM was considered to be a more efficient and modern way to govern public institutions. As such, ideas of rationalisation and streamlining were implemented via a strict financial management and the introduction of a market inspired system of performance measurement (Wathne 2018; Holmberg 2019) (I will return to this in **Chapter 6**).

The strengthening of NPM within Danish police was also rooted in the significant deficits in the police's budget and as a consequence of both public and political demands to produce more visible and tangible results for policing. Performance measures have (as well as in other Nordic countries see e.g. Holgersson & Knutsson 2011, Johannessen & Glomseth 2015; Wathne 2018; Holmberg 2019) been thoroughly criticised, for example by the police union, as it is viewed as undermining the police service's ability with its focus on the quantification of police work. In January 2014 the former National Police Commissioner, Jens Henrik Højbjerg, gave an interview where he said (Kejser 2014, *my translation*):

I think that performance measurements make sense when we organise them so that people can see the reasoning behind them. It also helps when we plan from the beginning of the year so that everything doesn't need to be gained in November and December. Besides that, you have to remember that it's a very small part of our activities, which are based on performance measurements. (...) There is a tradition in the Danish police of providing an enormous commitment and I don't see that as disappearing. That being said, I do understand that we need to focus on the core tasks of policing. I understand completely that people need stability and there have

been big changes within recent years. We have experienced pressure in terms of the economy and demands for efficiency. But we are close to the goal.

The statement can be seen as in support of the critique of the one-dimensional focus on 'efficiency'. However, NPM still persists within the Danish police as well as other Scandinavian and Western countries six years after the dominant governance model (Fyfe et al. 2013; Holmberg 2019). This focus have amongst other resulted in the on/off instigation of internal analyses of police efficiency over the last decade carried out by external consultants with the purpose of controlling budgets and identifying necessary resources to secure the future challenges of policing (Kejser 2013). Moreover, these analyses were instigated as The National Police ultimately wanted more centralised control and overview of police activities in the districts and as the organisational structure and the role of The National Police in relation to the police districts was still unclear. It was argued by top management that further centralisation and efficiency would lead to more streamlined and homogeneous policing, however, along the lines of Christensen et al. (2018), many police officers saw it merely as an old-fashioned budget cut.

Management Reform

Along with the implementation of the police reform and NPM a new management model was introduced in 2007 proposing an executive board (koncernledelse) and line management (linjeledelse) throughout the organisation from The National Police to the districts. The purpose was amongst other to professionalise the governance of the police and to make responsibility and transparency clearer. The previously autonomous management within the police districts from the deputy national police commissioners (politimestre) was minimised, and 12 police commissioners (politidirektører) were appointed in the newly established districts. Together with The National Police Commissioner constituted The Executive Board (Christensen 2012; Holmberg 2019).

From 2012-2014 the Danish police initiated a process to lay down a new management foundation (*ledelsesgrundlag*) as various consultant reports since 2005 had uncovered unclear roles and responsibilities within management, a lack of collaboration across management lines, and a gap between expectations and managerial space for each manager. The management philosophy *leadership pipeline* (Dahl & Molly-Søholm 2012) was introduced to clearly define and delimit specific tasks and responsibilities at every management level and across the management group. To support this management foundation, new recruitment and training processes were instigated, and two operational concepts were additionally developed: *corporate management* (*virksomhedsledelse*) and *front-line management* (*føringsledelse*). These concepts can be seen as two different worlds meeting each other; a modern management thinking, where dialogue and staff involvement are seen as necessary measures to attain strategic goals, motivations, and quality, and a traditional ‘command and control’ police management where a direct and authoritative management style is used to ensure the provision of certain operative and risky tasks (Cockcroft 2012). Thus, the practical implementation of these management styles seems to have challenged the police – a traditional bureaucracy with many years of command and control governing is not easily transformed into an involving and collaborative organisation. Such a critique is likewise raised within the academic field; Dahl & Nielsen (2014) for example claim that leadership pipeline contains opposing management styles and that this particular management model is therefore sensitive to the complex, dynamic, and distributed management which many modern organisations are in fact characterised by. Despite great organisational efforts, this is perhaps why daily management within Danish police, as Wathne similarly finds in Norwegian police (2018), does not seem to have changed fundamentally as a consequence of leadership pipeline. As a Police Officer remarks:

It’s just a hurra-word (*hurra-ord*) they use to make it sound better than before. But everything is top down anyway (*topstyret*), so managers down the line don’t have

any space to make their own decisions and what good does leadership pipeline do then? They just call it something different, but we don't see the change.

In addition, as a part of the management reform (Lederreform 2.0), the number of managers was reduced by 25 per cent in 2014. Some managers were offered other positions within the police and some were given notice. The National Police Commissioner (Jens Henrik Højbjerg), stated in a press release (Rigspolitiet 2013, *my translation*):

We are challenged by a rapid changing crime picture and demands and expectations from the public and politicians to provide more for the same amount of money. At the same time, staff within the police expect—in a modern organisation—management who can create an appealing and modern workplace. This requires an effective and professional united management with clear roles and responsibilities, and short chain of commands and fast decision-making. (...) The purpose is to secure that managers in their daily work promote a high professional quality, show trust, and make staff responsible and develop the organisation as a whole.

Short chains of commands was one of the primary arguments for the reduction of the number of managers and for removing the entire chief police inspector level (vicepolitikommissærer). As such, many young, aspiring managers were either transferred to other functions or let go—and the process was equally badly received amongst managers and police officers. My observations indicate that the general perception internally within the police is that the principles of front-line management are still dominant and that the management mandate is to a high degree assembled at the top of the organisation (topstyret). Although these management reforms may not have had the desired outcomes in terms of transforming the entire management model within the police and significantly impacting management styles at all levels, these efforts have contributed to organisational unrest for a number of years and as such can be seen as a component to a shift in the police's strategic focus, and the preoccupation with performative change (I elaborate on this in the coming chapters).

Task Forces (from 2009)

As mentioned earlier, violent conflicts within the gang environment constitute a tremendous problem for the police in terms of trying to prevent, control, and investigate the conflicts. The organisational frames and the amount of staff available were not at all sufficient to staunch the conflicts and as a result it was difficult to employ a preventive and proactive strategy towards the problem. Hence, the organised crime unit within Copenhagen Police was transferred into a gang unit (Bandeenhed) in the spring of 2009 and was given both operational and investigative resources. The unit consisted of approximately 100 police officers; detectives with investigation tasks and uniformed staff who were initially supposed to perform so-called public safety and preventive patrols (tryghedspatroljeringer). However, the conflicts continued and the public and political pressure to stop the violence increased and in the fall of 2009, The National Police Commissioner released a statement (politi.dk, 24. October 2009, *my translation*):

The police's efforts have so far provided good results (...) Unfortunately, despite of an intensified police response shootings continue especially within the capital region and in Zealand. The police have charged offenders in every third of these cases, but they are extremely difficult to solve as victims and witnesses typically will not collaborate with the police. As a result, the police response must be further intensified (...) It has been decided to establish a specialised unit to strengthen the proactive investigation against those people who directly or indirectly are key players in these conflicts.

A new specialised unit, Task Force East (Task Force Øst) was established and became operational in November 2009. It consisted of approximately 75 staff recruited from all police districts in Zealand (Sjælland). The task force was a collaboration between the police districts on Zealand and the National Centre of Investigation (NEC). The organisational set up was that it remained a 'shielded resource' (skærmet ressource) in the sense that it had an independent operational plan, independent economy (a separate government appropriation), independent management, and an independent prosecution service. The task force was kept from

other police tasks in the districts and was omitted from the daily police operation, which meant that they could concentrate entirely on gang crime and gang conflicts.

Regardless of these additional efforts, the problems with violent conflicts continued. The Western part of Denmark had since the 1990s been influenced by outlaw motorcycle gangs, Hells Angels and Bandidos, which to a large extent controlled the drug market. However, ethnic minority street gangs began to appear in various forms and structures and a strained relationship between the groups in Western Denmark became a considerable concern for the police. Thus, the political agreement of the police's and the prosecution service's economy from 2011 included the establishment of a second task force, Task Force West (Task Force Vest), in the Western part of Denmark to further intensify the police response to gangs. Task Force West was implemented in the beginning of 2012 and consisted of approximately 100 employees; primarily detectives, prosecutors, and administrative staff. Along with complex violent gang conflicts a problem with burglary started to occupy the general public and the media. Together with stories in the press about the police's failure to respond to calls for service when it came to burglary, the police were once again under great pressure from both the public and at a political level. Yet another task force, Task Force Burglary (Task Force Indbrud), was therefore established in the spring of 2012 in the Northern part of Zealand. Its purpose was to investigate organised burglary and the purchase of stolen goods, and the former Minister of Justice, Morten Bødskov, said on April 24, 2012 (*my translation*):

The police response and a consistent legal policy will contribute to all citizens feeling safe in their everyday lives. The anti-burglary response is therefore important. People feel unsafe when strangers have broken into their homes. As such, burglary is one of the prioritised areas of response, which I as the Minister of Justice has identified. I'm happy to note that we can see from the figures that the police have intensified their response to burglaries.

In conclusion, five years after the launch of the most revolutionary police reform since 1938, specific crime problems and external pressure resulted in the above

presented alterations in organisational structures and division of task. The large-scale reform was to some degree abandoned. First, the idea of a unified police with police *generalists* who could solve a broad variety of tasks and duties within policing (whether it was uniformed patrol work and response to calls for service or investigative work in complex organised crime cases) was in some ways rejected. On the contrary, specialised profiles (such as detectives with organised crime experience) were suddenly in high demand in order to cover the areas of responsibility within the task forces. Second, the new big police districts were not thought to be sufficient in terms of providing the necessary organisational frames and the cooperation across police districts did not go as well as expected in terms of meeting (new) crime challenges such as organised gang crime and organised burglary.

An internal evaluation of the three taskforces (established in 2009, 2011 and 2012 respectively) was instigated in 2015-2016. The conclusion from this evaluation was that these taskforces had been successful in terms of providing good investigative results (measured in cases, arrests, seizures, convictions etc.). However, a stronger strategic focus, a clear national steering, and more transparent prioritisation and decision-making were identified as required in the future to meet the complex crime challenges. The evaluation recommended that two large regional 'investigation communities' (Efterforskningsfællesskaber) were to be established in the two largest police districts – one in Copenhagen (Regional Investigation Unit East), and one in Aarhus (Regional Investigation Unit West) by January 2017. The new regional investigation units were to replace the existing taskforces and cover their tasks and crime areas, and additionally include the police response towards mobile offenders and organised burglary. These regional investigation units were established to provide a permanent and sustainable solution to the complex area of organised crime. Once again, the organisational structure for the Danish police was altered and a regional level between The National Police and the local police

districts was reinstated – an organisational structure which was abandoned with the police reform in 2007.

Police Education

Other important changes over the years (from 2007 and forward) include, in my view, various reforms and alterations of the police education as this makes up the recruitment foundation for most human resource in the police. For an in-depth analysis of changes of the police education I will however refer to Diderichsen (2017). Still, a couple of things deserves to be highlighted. First, in connection with the police reform in 2007 it was recommended that the police education should be transferred into a three-year bachelor's degree in policing (professionsbachelor) instead of a non-credited education (etatsuddannelse). The new police education was proposed for mainly two reasons: 1) to ensure that future police officers had the qualifications needed to handle more complex crime problems and satisfy the increased demands from the public, and 2) to harmonise the police education with the established educational system in Denmark and internationally (Diderichsen 2017). The rationale behind the police reform was moreover that police officers needed a more analytical approach to police work with the implicit need for every police officer to be reflective and make independent and professional decisions in many different and difficult situations based on general knowledge rather than individual experience. This is in accordance with the ideals and aims of the proactive policing paradigm and indeed the rationales of knowledge-based policing. The alteration of the police education (training) was implemented in 2011 and the first class of bachelors graduated from The Police Academy (Politiskolen) in 2014. However, in the aftermath of the terror attacks and the migrant crisis in 2015, it was decided in the political agreement about the police's and the prosecution service's budget that the intake of police aspirants at The Police Academy should be increased by 900 over four years. To accommodate the critical resource problem, it was additionally decided to alter the formal police education again. The political

agreement in 2015 therefore proposed a non-credited two-year police education. The overall purpose was to produce new police officers fast so that they could engage in the resourceful tasks of primarily target protection and border control. The internal argument was moreover that the bachelor's degree was not flexible enough to meet new educational needs and requirements due to political demands and altered crime trends.

The public and political response to this alteration was surprisingly uncritical, which probably had to do with the fact that the Danish police were seen as being in a crisis, but the internal critique of this decision within the police was massive (Diderichsen 2017). The police were in this political agreement furthermore bound to raise the overall qualifications for police officers in general which meant that in-job training (efter- og videreuddannelse) was to be developed on a variety of themes and areas in order to compensate for shortening the basic police education. Moreover, a year later in the fall of 2016, a six-month police training programme was introduced for 'police cadets' (politikadetter) to provide additional operational resources as fast as possible. The reasons for these reforms and alterations of the police education are many and complex and include political, structural, and union-related explanations (see e.g. Christensen 2012; Stevnsborg 2016; Diderichsen 2017 for further elaborations). My overall argument in the context of this study is, however, that it mirrors the competition between the epistemic rationales of knowledge versus experience. Throughout the coming analytical chapters (**Chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9**), I analyse police epistemic culture and the consequences for the possibilities of a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive policing, and for the practice of proactive investigation in particular.

¹The overall number of managers was reduced from about 1,400 to 1,050 across the national police and the police districts (internal statistics).

Summary & Discussion: From Force to Service and Back Again?

In this chapter, I have identified and analysed some of the most significant events within and around the timeframe of this study which I argue have shaped and impacted the current state of the Danish police organisation and thus the conditions for carrying out proactive police work. In the current section, I account for the central findings and discuss the implications of these.

Some overall conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the years from the beginning of the millennium until current days have been rather turbulent for the Danish police. The political and public pressure on the police has increased remarkably, and the new ministerial governance, including the introduction of NPM, means that the police are no longer an unchallenged authority. Moreover, the police's priorities, dispositions, work processes etc. are increasingly being examined and critiqued by both the media, at a political level, and by the general public (for example via social media). This includes the earlier mentioned examples of the police's response to calls for service, and the police's handling of crime issues which are seen as particularly important to the public (burglaries, violent conflicts etc.). Additionally, high-level political and delicate issues such as the police's handling of demonstrations supporting Tibet in connection with state visits from China (Tibet-sagen), and the use of cellphone data and DNA evidence in the courts¹ (Teledata-sagen) have further questioned the police's accountability (Holmberg 2019). For the police, this pressure has resulted in a condition where different parts of day-to-day policing are a subject of political interference reducing professional decision-making and prioritisation within the organisation.

Second of all, even though the general crime level is decreasing, the assessment of risks, threats, and potential harm to society in general, depict a more diffuse and complex crime picture (Rigspolitiet 2017). The perception of risk and the implications of postmodern risk society (Beck 1992) and culture of control (Garland 2001) propose great challenges for police to plan and carry out police work in order to meet public demands. Moreover, it raises questions to police's capacity and capability to meet these challenges in terms of organisational robustness, leadership, competences, equipment, training etc. Due to single crime events and isolated threats and risks (especially terrorism, gang conflicts and migration), the Danish police are spending a vast amount of resources carrying out reactive law and order-related tasks such as target protection and border control, which remove resources and staff from day-to-day policing and complex crime investigation (see also Christensen 2012). As such, the police are struggling to keep up a minimal service level in terms of aiding and assisting the general public and carrying out basic tasks of low policing such as service duties, preventive work, traffic controls, and investigating volume crime (this is in accordance with a finding within Norwegian police (Wathne 2015)).

Third of all, the amount of internal processes such as structure reforms, reorganisations, budget adjustments, implementation of information technologies, changes within management, demands for certified personnel in specific functions etc. have created a great deal of turbulence within police and interfered with daily tasks. As Degnegaard (2010) argues in relation to the police reform in 2007: the implementation process created confusion at a time when it was necessary to create cohesion. There was not a clearly defined strategy to lean upon in turbulent times, which acknowledged the specific characteristics of the police organisation. This seems to be true not only for the implementation of the police reform in 2007, but is rather becoming an organisational trait of the police, which therefore continuous to be a recurring problem in all processes of change (this is moreover an observation in police organisations internationally see e.g. Fyfe et al. 2013). For both

managers and staff this condition results in an unclear general direction of the organisation and generate concerns about the tasks of tomorrow. This instability seems to a large extent to have affected the degree of cohesiveness within the organisation, which is an indispensable part of any police organisation both in quiet times, but especially in crises. Terpstra et al. 2019 introduce the concept of ‘abstract police’ when explaining the increasingly abstract character of police due to unintended changes of police organisations – a similar condition to the situation presented here.

Accordingly, a central finding is that both external and internal conditions have indeed influenced the police as a public institution and have indirectly negotiated the role of police in society. This discussion, however, has been under the guise of ‘what kind of *tasks* should the police solve?’ and ‘by whom’ – an indirect discussion of *plural policing* (Rogers 2017). Furthermore, I argue that this discussion is often related to ‘what can be prioritised within the budget’ whereas other pertinent issues which relate to the role of police in society are to a minor extent included in the political and public debate as well as internally within the police. The police are in fact a value-based social institution in society operating on a social mandate (Gundhus 2012), which make issues such as legitimacy, ethics, accountability, public trust, legal equality, and professional ethics etc. important (Manning 2010). However, such matters are at risk of becoming secondary at the expense of rationality and efficiency which is reflected in new management ideals in terms of performance measurement, and tight control of police budgets. As I will present in the coming chapter these new forms of governance and management have to a high degree meant that police work is seen as definite processes, tasks, or services in a production line, which can be examined and standardised individually. The process of *policing* as a broad activity – including the complex span between prevention, enforcement, and the provision of service to the general public – is as such minor in this management focus. This presents a problem for the police, a so-called *human service organisations* (Granér & Kronkvist 2014), with all its interdependencies if not

taken adequately into account. The basic principles of policing are easily overruled in the current climate as the focus in processes of change is to a large extent on how current – and sometimes acute – problems are dealt with in the here and now instead of how these tasks fit in with the general idea of policing, which enjoys democratic legitimacy and therefore both public and political support.

The above analysis has shown that there has been considerable efforts to reform and thus move the Danish police towards the new proactive policing paradigm focusing on analytical problem-solving and prevention rather than merely law and order-oriented reactive responses to isolated incidents. However, there are also indications that this paradigm is continuously constrained. Although the police reform in 2007 introduced a new governance and organisation model and a new police education along with the idea of a unified police, a few years later the police already began moving from the generalist education towards more specialisation, and the reinstatement of regional units (taskforces). The present resource situation in the Danish police puts pressure on both everyday policing and specialised tasks. This means that e.g. preventive tasks are downsized and that proactive perspectives on police work are set aside as for example border security and guarding physical objects are continuously prioritised. The current police education is moreover too basic to specialise any police officer and this results in a situation where police officers need a considerable amount of subsequent advanced education (efter- og videreuddannelse). The conversion between different strategic directions for the police (proactive/reactive), organisational structures (regional/local), approaches to recruitment and education (generalist/specialist) covers areas which usually require long term strategic planning and years of development work in order to be successful – however, this does not fit the time frame of political demands.

Consequently, my main argument in this chapter is that the Danish police due to both external and internal conditions drowse between different policing paradigms, organisational models, management styles, and educational programmes with such

a pace that the ideas and the implementation of them seem to be abandoned before their potential positive outcome manifest themselves in the practical world of policing. Within the organisation there is therefore discussions about a move from a police service to a guarding police force (bevogtningspoliti). The move from a police service to a guarding police force can also be illustrated by a move from a proactive to a reactive operational model and thus from proactive to reactive policing. Although the discussed events concern primarily the political and structural level, they also impact everyday policing. Thus, the ideals of proactivity and modernisation reforms are difficult to sustain due to both external and internal conditions as discussed above.

¹ For further information see Tibet-kommissionen <https://tibetkommissionen.dk> and The Ministry of Justice <https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2019/fakta-om-tiltag-i-teledatasagen>.

Chapter 6: The Measure of Success

- *On police's instigation of rapid responses towards organised crime*

*Something-ought-not-to-be-happening-about-which-something-ought-to-be-done-
NOW!*

- Egon Bittner's definition of 'police' (1974: 30).

Introduction

Just after New Year's, on the first official working day, I called Sandy, the senior investigative officer in the Alpha Investigation Unit, to get an update on how the investigation, *Operation Goldilocks*, had proceeded during the Christmas holidays.

"We're closed down."

It took a while before I understood what he had just said.

"Excuse me?"

Sandy laughed briefly.

"I'm sitting here...we're sitting here, and we've been talking about it for hours now. We don't understand it!"

"But why?" I asked.

"Due to the lack of expected progress in the investigation."

I could sense that he was quoting management language.

"But didn't you carry on over the holidays...didn't you tend to the wires (passede aflytningerne)?"

"We did. We had a whole team in here...the surveillance team too, we were going for Justin. A few more days, maybe, we would've had a case."

Sandy laughed once again, he sounded bewildered.

"So, what happened?"

"I think they—Brett Oakley and all those people up there (on the management floor, *my addition*) - sensed that this wasn't getting us Jerry (the prime target of the operation, *my addition*). It's no longer a winning case (vindesag). We're far out in the circles with Justin. It'll take forever to get Jerry. BUT we're starting a new case tomorrow. A bit closer to home, thank God. A usual suspect (en gammel kending) called Rob from downtown. He's supposedly dealing a large amount of cannabis in the neighbourhood. At least we don't have to drive so damn far each time we have to put up that damn equipment."

Sandy was referring to problems related to wiretapping in open air (aflytning i det fri). During *Operation Goldilocks* the detectives had experienced a number of difficulties when it came to placing technical equipment in strategic places to record sound and conversations between suspects in different public spaces for example streets and parking lots.

We talked for a while about the matter. Sandy and the team were frustrated about the shutdown of the operation. Especially after a holiday break with around the clock staffing. Apart from the lack of progress in the investigation the Chief Superintendent had pointed to the fact that there was a general lack of resources due to the situation regarding increased border security as a consequence of an escalating migration from the south. Moreover, there were uncertainties regarding another imminent reorganisation in the police districts. These were put forward by management as additional reasons for terminating the investigation. On the other hand, the team was growing weary as the investigative measures they had

initiated did not really succeed. As Sandy had declared on many occasions: “Everything we’ve tried in this investigation has failed.”

Another disturbing issue was the growing impatience from police management when it came to providing tangible results.

“We’ve told them from the beginning: Jerry’s not gonna be easy. They’ve started several investigations against him before (har kørt på ham før)—it’s not something you just wrap up overnight. We’ve made that clear from the very beginning!”

I asked if they were going to gather the team and have a session to evaluate the investigation process as I of course was eager to participate in such a session.

“Hm, it’s not been discussed”, Sandy said, “I don’t know if we’ll get around to it as we’re starting *Operation Close-to-Home* right away. Tommy is already in court today (to get a court order for interception in communications, *my addition*), but I think maybe Jed is writing up a summary. Don’t worry. We’re still the same team carrying on.”

The paraphrased conversation above took place exactly eight months after I was introduced as a researcher, a participant observer, to AIU and the launch of *Operation Goldilocks*. The investigation’s prime target was Nigel Smith also known by the alias “Jerry” a usual suspect connected to the organised crime environment and a specific criminal group. Jerry was suspected of being responsible for the import and distribution of large amounts of illicit drugs. He had been an active offender in the drug environment through decades and was in some ways regarded as a legend within organised crime. Besides that, many police officers had followed his “career” alongside their own. He was considered to be a very influential person in the criminal environment, a key player (*en stor spiller*), and one of his greatest resources was his international connections.

In the investigation proposal for *Operation Goldilocks*¹ (presented in **Chapter 1**), the estimation of the operation’s duration was 18 months. The investigation was from the beginning allocated substantial resources; the team consisted of eight detectives from AIU and four detectives from an adjoining police district. Additionally, two detectives from the former Serious Crime Squad (Rejsehold) at The National Centre of Investigation (NCI) were assigned to the operation. Moreover, the operation had a clear and prioritised international angle. For that reason, considerable resources were put into establishing both official and bilateral agreements with cooperating

law enforcement partners in two European countries through Eurojust. The purpose was to create a *joint investigation team* (JIT). No official agreement about a JIT was ever made in connection with *Operation Goldilocks*, but bilateral cooperations were established which meant that the two detectives from the national unit were stationed in one of the cooperating countries to coordinate the investigation with local law enforcement through several months. In other words, the investigation was launched with great ambition and confidence.

As the months passed, however, the investigation team grew frustrated and tired as their attempts to get close to Jerry and his presumed criminal activities (the import and distribution of illicit drugs) did not seem to lead anywhere – or at least not to Jerry as a prime culprit. Meanwhile, management was becoming more absent and seemed less and less interested in the investigation as other investigations were prioritised and launched alongside. Three weeks before the shutdown of *Operation Goldilocks* one of the internationally stationed detectives was redirected to another assignment for a period of three months. The general understanding amongst the detectives was that management was realising that the current investigation set up did not get any of the desired operational results (seizures and arrests). The continuation of the investigation would as such require a vast amount of resources over a considerable amount of time which management apparently were not prepared to allocate. As such, the rather dramatic resource situation regarding the strengthened border security (as discussed in **Chapter 5**) was used as a plausible explanation for shutting down the investigation.

The example above illustrates a number of important themes, core challenges, and not least dilemmas when it comes to proactive investigation. As it evolves around crime which is ongoing or yet to be committed there is no specific criminal event to investigate, but instead suspicion as the primary line of inquiry. For that reason: when should a proactive investigation be launched or closed down? How many resources should be invested, and when are the efforts enough? When does a

proactive investigation qualify as a success, and how is this success measured and by whom? And further: which external and internal circumstances impact these conditions?

In this chapter, I explore the formal frame and informal aspects of the world of proactive policing. The chapter is concerned with the political and social context and organisational framework of the police's response to organised crime in which police managers and detectives operate and where proactive investigation is carried out. I examine both political and strategic demands for the police together with culturally anchored assumptions and rationales about what makes up good police work. Thus, I explore the dynamic between discourse and practice and the performance and impacting mechanisms of proactive investigation as it is carried out both front stage and backstage (Goffman 1959). Overall, I ask the question and analyse: how is successes of proactive policing measured?

In accordance with Manning (2010), the aim with this chapter is to demonstrate how and why the connection between macro politics and micro practices is particularly important. In accordance, I analyse strategic and operational objectives and key performance indicators which are described in policy and steering documents for the police (e.g. political agreements, strategies, action plans etc.). I unfold how political and strategic demands and expectations are operationalised into two response models – respectively a broad response model and a narrow response model. These two response models are my analytical take on how political expectations are operationalised into modes of (police) action, and thus create meaning within the police organisation. I focus further on how the political demands and expectations are perceived (primarily by police management) and consequently dealt with in the police organisation. I examine the informal structures by looking at the assumptive world and epistemic culture of proactive policing specifically by investigating the culturally anchored perceptions of good

police work and the police's criminal counterpart and as such the impact of these collectively shared assumptions on police practice.

My main argument in this chapter is that the police's response towards organised crime is formally guided by a tough-on-crime approach prompting repressive, punitive, and reactive efforts measuring successes in multiple arrests, seizures, and incarceration of offenders. This, in combination with an informal organisational preference and preoccupation with providing fast and visible results, contributes to a police response which is primarily characterised by reactive police work solving 'problems of the day' and thus delivering a *rapid response* to organised crime. Accordingly, this mirrors the persistent dilemma of instigating reactive responses dealing with short-term problems at hand *or* proactive long-term responses focusing on subversive structures of organised crime.

The chapter is structured as follows:

First, I look at the political backdrop and the underlying notions of the police's organised crime strategy and thus the formal frame. I scrutinise the strategic and operational objectives and key performance indicators in policy documents, action plans etc. to identify the formal measures of success and the presumed logic model behind these.

Second, I identify and analyse two different response models which operationalise the strategy into police action. I unfold how the political and strategic demands and expectations plays out on the front stage and are perceived internally within the police on the backstage, and how these are dealt with at an organisational level. Furthermore, I look at the various challenges and dilemmas it creates and what the implications are for police work in connection to organised crime and proactive investigation.

Third, I begin to examine parts of police epistemic culture and assumptive world of proactive policing which is expressed both front stage and backstage. I specifically look at the culturally anchored perceptions of good police work and the criminal counterpart and as such the impact of this epistemic culture and collective assumptions on police practice.

The chapter ends with a summary of the key analytical findings together with a discussion of how the political level concretely affects everyday policing – proactive investigation in particular – and how the difficulties connected to organisational predicaments and discrepancies between ideals and aspirations, abilities and reality influence the police’s overall response to organised crime.

¹ Such a document functions as the foundation for strategic and operational decision-making regarding the launch of proactive investigations.

Politics and Strategy: Introducing the Formal Frame for Policing Organised Crime

Strategic Objectives and Performance Goals

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there has been an intensified public and political focus on problems regarding organised criminal gangs in Denmark since 2008. As a result, the number one priority for the Danish police from 2009-2018 has been the response to organised gang crime and violent conflicts linked to this environment. The total population of this environment varies over the years but is believed to consist of approximately 1,100-1,800 focus persons which the police systematically monitor (internal statistics). These individuals are attached to different gangs, criminal groups, and loose criminal networks. The number of individuals who are under systematic police monitoring varies a great deal due to different circumstances such as legal grounds and practices for the police's monitoring and registration of these suspected offenders (see e.g. Klement et al. (2010), Klement (2016) and Pedersen (2018) for further details).

The process of systematic information collection about suspected organised crime offenders and their affiliated groups was established in the late 1990s as a consequence of the Great Nordic Biker War (Strand 2011). This violent conflict between outlaw motorcycle gangs (Hells Angels and Bandidos) indicated the need for police to develop an overview of the organised crime environment and its members and to obtain a more structured approach to dealing with these. A decade after this conflict, both biker and street gangs (rockere og bander) have caught police attention mainly due to their involvement in violent conflicts and their involvement in drug related offenses. Justified or not, the issue of organised crime in Denmark has historically largely been synonymous with this specific group of people and drug offences broadly (Bay 1998a; Strand 2011; Rønn 2012). At a

political level, in the public and media, and within police organised crime is therefore regarded an equal to the biker and gang environment (rocker- og bandemiljøet). The police's response towards bikers and gangs is therefore seen as the police's response towards organised crime – even if it does not capture the problem of organised crime as a whole. The formal framework and demands for the police's performance are defined through strategic and operational objectives, resource allocation, priorities, performance goals, and key performance indicators in several policy documents:

- 1) political agreements (flerårsaftaler, politiforlig, mål- og resultatkontrakter)
- 2) strategies for the police and the prosecution service (virksomhedsstrategier, Rigspolitiets og Anklagemyndighedens strategier)
- 3) national and local strategies and action plans for various crime areas (operative strategier og operationsplaner).

These documents constitute the political and strategic frame for the police's response towards organised crime, including proactive investigations and the organisational premisses. In this context, I put aside the specific details of the strategy and action plans and focus primarily on the main strategic objectives and performance goals which have been most significant for the police districts' work in the time frame of this study. Some of these details are moreover classified and specific tactics of the operational plan cannot be disclosed.

From 2012-2018, specific strategic objectives, demands for lines of action, and performance goals operationalised into a national strategy and action plan (operationsplan) for biker and gang crime. Building on the analysis that I have carried out, I divide this plan into two main parts; a *broad police response model* and a *narrow police response model* with two supporting and varying perspectives and foci – a short-term and long-term perspective and a reactive and proactive focus.

As I illustrate in **Figure K**, the broad response model was meant to tackle the organised crime environment as a whole, whereas the narrow response model was targeting a small group of offenders within this environment. The short-term perspective was aimed at urgent problems such as violent conflicts between competing crime groups and had a reactive focus. The longterm perspective was aimed at the accumulating criminality and underlying structures of the organised crime environment and had a proactive focus. In support of this strategy two key performance goals were set. The police should:

- 1) continuously incarcerate between 225-300 members of organised criminal gangs/ groups
- 2) select 15-25 priority offenders for proactive investigations.

As such, proactive investigation was throughout this time period an instrument to obtain these performance goals but was also a goal in itself. In **Figure K**, I clarify and compare the two response models’ different perspectives, focus, aims, and performance measures.

Figure K. *Response Models.*

	BROAD RESPONSE MODEL	NARROW RESPONSE MODEL
PERSPECTIVE	Short-term	Long-term
FOCUS	Overall reactive: urgent problems and violent conflicts	Overall proactive: accumulating crime and underlying structures
TARGETING	The organised crime environment as a whole	Priority, prolific, and persistent offenders
PERFORMANCE MEASURES	225-300 incarcerated gang members	15-25 potential offenders selected for investigation

Strategic objectives and performance goals have over a decade focused primarily on punitive efforts, such as multiple arrests and incarceration of offenders. A *tough-on-*

crime-approach has consequently guided the police's response to this crime area. My analysis of the political process and the judicial ground work (juridiske forarbejder) leading up to legislation and the different statements from the Minister of Justice (Justitsministeren) and representatives from various political parties, it becomes clear that there has been a constant political desire to instigate initiatives which focus on enforcement rather than e.g. prevention. The latest example of this is the political agreement entitled "Gangs Behind Bars" (Bander bag tremmer) from 2017. Former Minister of Justice, Søren Pape Poulsen, stated on the launch of it (press release from The Ministry of Justice, 24 March 2017, *my translation*):

With this gang legislation (bandepakke) we want to make Denmark a more safe and secure country. The purpose is to put an end to the bikers' and the gangs' unacceptable and mad behaviour. I'm proud to have a majority behind me so that we can get some action behind all the words and put a massive pressure on the bikers and the gang members.

The political majority, which the Minister referred to consisted of the governing coalition parties (Venstre, Liberal Alliance, Det Konservative Folkeparti), as well as two opposition parties (Socialdemokratiet and Dansk Folkeparti). The political agreement proposed moreover (2017, *my translation*):

With this agreement we act firmly (sætter hårdt mod hårdt). The objective is clear: the safety and security of the public has to be assured. Bikers and gang members must be kept inside the prisons as long as possible so that they cannot harass, threaten, or shoot ordinary citizens. It must have far-reaching and comprehensive consequences if you turn your back on the community to become a biker or a member of a gang.

The rhetoric from various politicians has over the years been quite similar in the public debate; over a broad political spectrum it has continuously been underlined that it is important to 'send a clear message' to organised crime groups that especially violent assaults and gang related shootings in public will be punished severely. The tough-on-crime-approach is apparent in the three legislative acts (Bandepakker) respectively entitled *Enforced Response Against Gang Crime* (Styrket

indsats mod bandekriminalitet) from 2009, *Firm Grip of the Gangs* (Fast greb om banderne) from 2014, and *Gangs Behind Bars* (Bander bag tremmer) from 2017. This legislation primarily consists of enforcement initiatives granting the police and the prosecution service (and other authorities such as the prison service) extended powers to target both organised crime groups, and the individual members of these groups. These initiatives include more restrictive rules for imprisonment (afsoningsvilkår), limited or no probation for gang members, increased sentences for certain crime types e.g. violence and the possession of guns etc. (see Retsinformation 2009; Retsinformation 2014; The Ministry of Justice 2017). One of the most altering initiatives in terms of the standard judicial practice (retspraksis) in Denmark is perhaps the launch of ‘double penalty’ (dobbel straf) in connection with the first anti-gang legislation from 2009. The legislation says (Retsinformation 2009 § 81 a *my translation*):

The penalty (...) can be doubled if the violation arises from a mutual confrontation which takes place between groups of individuals and where as a part of the confrontation either firearms or other weapons or explosives have been used which on the basis of their extreme dangerous features are suitable for causing substantial harm or committed arson included in this law’s § 180.

This means that individuals who are associated with the gang environment (on the account of certain criteria composed by the police) risk getting their penalty increased to a double prison sentence if the offence they have committed is connected to inter-crime group rivalry. The underlying assumption is that a double prison sentence will serve as a deterrence or at least keep people away from ‘the streets’ and work as an instrumental preventive measure. Despite political differences and changing governments the various initiatives have over the years been launched with broad political support from the Danish parliament (Folketinget). Prevention and proactive police work are pinpointed as central components of the police’s strategy – however, only a small proportion of political and legislative initiatives are actual preventive measures or other approaches such as initiatives aimed at pulling out people from gangs (exit strategies). Thus, over the

years preventive efforts have only to a limited extent been reflected in the performance measurement (målopfylldelsen) in the strategic framework. Emphasis has predominantly been on repressive and punitive measures and in this sense the formal frame and thereby the political expectations and demands to the police's performance in this area are highly focused on an ideological and political perception that sanctions such as incarceration are effective instruments in solving crime problems (Balvig 2000; Garland 2001; Matthiesen 2005; Larsson 2018; Holmberg 2019, Smith & Uglevik 2017).

Response Models

The Broad Response Model

I view the first performance goal regarding the continuous incarceration/imprisonment of approximately 300 gang members as supporting both the short-term and the long-term objectives of the strategy: first, it is meant to stop violent conflicts in the public arena, and second to reduce crime levels. This performance goal is achieved through a broad response model involving everyday police work including traditional street-level operational work, traffic controls, and reactive investigations initiated on the basis of crime reports of burglaries, assaults, homicides, drugs, weapon offences etc. It is by its outset primarily reactive in nature as it deals with past events. The nationally monitored organised crime groups (often referred to as bikers or gangs in the press or by politicians) typically consist of habitual offenders who commit crimes on a regular basis. Research suggests that this population is around 40 per cent more criminally active compared to other prolific and persistent offenders in Denmark, and they commit a variety of offences e.g. property crimes, traffic violations, violent crimes, drug crimes etc. (Klement et al. 2010; Klement 2016). Moreover, due to their habitual offending and the strategic focus within police they are identified, categorised, and labelled as *focus persons* in the police's databases. Consequently, they receive a lot more attention from police

than other offenders or citizens for that matter. Thus, the analysis shows that the rationale behind the broad response model is that it can be incorporated within the 'traditional' police response model and everyday policing.

It is underlined by many managers and police officers down the ranks that the broad police response and hence a general focus and pressure from the authorities¹ on the organised crime environment brings about a positive result when looking at changes within this environment and specifically when it comes to deescalating violent conflicts between different competing groups. The repressive initiatives and the continuous 'policing' these individuals experience are believed to diminish their (criminal) activities and as such prevent crimes as it complicates their everyday life and diminishes their organisation and crime business. An Assistant Police Commissioner explains:

I see that now...it has great value that we have a basic population (grundmasse) incarcerated no matter who they are. Because it weakens their organisation all the way down that people are taken out of circulation. Because everyone on the front has some kind of task otherwise they wouldn't be there. In that sense we're disturbing their business by constantly doing this. So on those grounds it has a value that a large percentage of them (members of crime groups, *my addition*) are imprisoned constantly. It inhibits their business.

A Police Officer elaborates:

They must sense that we're breathing down their necks (ånder dem i nakken). That we're constantly in the area that we know what they're up to and who they socialise with. Otherwise they think they're free to do stuff and it escalates. If we hadn't been there you know on a day to day basis I'm sure they would have taken over much more territory and bothered many more people. They need to feel that being a member of this crime community (gå til narko) has great consequences and is not something which is taken lightly by the authorities.

The continuous focus on a particular group of people in which the police have specific interests (focus persons) is moreover believed to provide the added bonus of producing systematic information (data and documentation), which can be used

in other areas of policing for example to serve analytical purposes within the intelligence area:

There's a reason why we have such a good overview of our outlaw motorcycle gangs and street gangs compared to other countries. We have consistently followed these people since the early 1990s—we have gathered information about them systematically and in that sense, we have a unique overview which is not seen in other places in the Western world that I know of.

The statement from the police officer above refers to the intensive policing of the organised crime environment's focus persons and thereby information concerning these which is gathered through everyday police work. This information can e.g. be about individuals' geographical movements, who they are accompanied by, how they behave, which vehicles they drive etc. This process is seen not only as instrumental in supporting specific investigations or meeting the 300-performance goal, but as a vital component of the entire intelligence process.

The Narrow Response Model

The second performance goal mainly supports the long-term objective of the strategy, namely the disruption of the underlying structures and criminality of the organised crime environment and is accordingly proactive in its outset. This results in what I identify as a narrow response model in the sense that it is aimed at a small number (15-25) of priority offenders who are to be identified as key targets for proactive investigations. These priority offenders are seen as kingpins, money men, and 'shot callers' who are not necessarily prolific in terms of offending, but who enable and facilitate other individuals' offending, and the maintenance and development of criminal organisations (in **Chapter 7** I analyse in more detail these processes). In other words: these offenders are believed to be of high value to the criminal environment and to the police accordingly. Due to their experience and skills they are furthermore viewed as specialists who require the police to instigate

so-called high-end police work. From most strategic managers' point of view, this group of people was believed to be 'the right one to target' and the prioritisation of offenders and the instigation of proactive investigations as 'the right thing to do' from a policing standpoint (Dean et al. 2010). This perception was as such expressed at many different meetings at strategic level (such as meetings in The National Gang Crime Staff and in the national and regional coordination groups). In fact, it is quite clear that this stance is seen as 'the right stance' for a strategic manager to have as it clearly supports a proactive approach, which for a long period of time has dominated strategic management language within the police. The central argument of proactive policing is, as mentioned in **Chapter 2**, to allocate police resources based on knowledge of where they are most effective and as such becomes competitive policing (Dean et al. 2010). Several proactive policing models, approaches and philosophies such as problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, hotspot policing and the like are as such based on criminological research pointing to the fact that it is often a small group of offenders who are responsible for the vast amount of offending when looking at for example volume crime and property crime (Sherman 2013; Ratcliffe 2008a).

The logic model behind the narrow response model is therefore that a focus directed at a small group of prolific offenders will diminish the overall amount of crime. Although research concerning serious drug crimes such as import and distribution of illicit drugs are sparser, the rationale of prolific offending can still be continued and make sense when it comes to financial kingpins (bagmandsvirksomhed). One of the reasons is that such offending is dependent on a certain degree of specialisation and criminal entrepreneurialism and therefore can be seen as something which is built over a long time period (see e.g. Dean et al. 2010). The knowledge and competency level of such individuals must therefore be seen as relatively high and they are as a result not easily replaced and thus of high value to the criminal environment. If police manage to be competitive and thereby weaken or incapacitate these offenders this will as a result, following the argument

above, have a significant impact. Consequently, the presumed logic model behind the narrow response model is therefore that an investigative focus directed at so-called high-value targets/priority offenders (bagmænd) will be more effective in terms of destabilising crime groups as these are believed to be dependent on strong leadership and stable organisations (Kennedy 2009; Dean et al. 2010; Ratcliffe et al. 2014). The justification is therefore that a police response disrupting significant individuals will lead to e.g. internal conflicts, instability, and a general weakening of the groups, and hence their ability to govern the criminal environment (see **Figure L**). I will therefore argue that the narrow police response can in some ways be seen as a representation of the principles within the proactive policing paradigm both in terms of its focus, but also its methods as it encompasses the ideal of a knowledge-based approach and targets a small amount of carefully selected offenders. A Chief Superintendent explains:

Take for example Kevin from “Falcons”. He’s sitting there playing all the aces. If we’re to catch him we can’t do it through a traditional investigation we need to be more advanced and use all the possibilities that we have even if it’s gonna take a year or two (...) before we ever get close to him. But maybe it’s value for money (hele investeringen værd) because if they can be toppled maybe the house of cards is overrun (så vælter korthuset måske) for the people who are left there, because these people are so much in charge as they are (så styrende som de er). I think it’s very much a hierarchy. It’s specific people who controls it. If they are not there who’s gonna control it?

This process is therefore seen not only as instrumental in supporting specific investigations or meeting the 300-performance goal, but as a vital component of the entire intelligence process. **Figure L** illustrates in comparison the broad and the narrow response models and their components.

Figure L. *The Broad and Narrow Response Models.*

	BROAD RESPONSE MODEL	NARROW RESPONSE MODEL
GOAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diminish crime • Stop violent conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Destabilise crime groups • Disrupt underlying structures of organised crime
RATIONALE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Few offenders on the streets = less crime • Swift and consequent sanctions = less crime • Incarceration as prevention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diminishing the most influential offenders = less (serious) crime • Incarceration as weakening groups
FOCUS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All members of organised crime environment • Most visible and prolific offenders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Priority offenders • Most influential and specialised offenders
OUTCOME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lesser crime • Fewer violent conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weaken crime groups organisationally • Internal group conflicts • Less (serious) crime • Inhibits underlying crime business
CRIME PERSPECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deterministic • Organised crime = business and profit maximisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organised crime = business and profit maximisation • Competitive markets needs specialisation and expertise
OFFENDER PERSPECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Habitual career criminals • Crime as a life-style • Rational choice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Habitual career criminals • Crime as a life-style + crime as a business • Rational choice • Specialised skills
POLICE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All districts • Patrol units • Local investigation, organised crime and violent crime units • Special patrol units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional and national level • Proactive investigation units • Intelligence and analysis units
METHODS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Everyday police work (e.g. traffic controls) • Operational street-level work • Reactive investigations • Low policing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-end and specialised police work • Proactive investigations • Covert surveillance
APPROACH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional (well-known practices) • Opportunistic (random, not targeted) • Reactive (police action after criminal incident) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Innovative • Targeted (strategically initiated) • Proactive (police action before or during criminal incidents) • High policing

¹This include the tax authorities, local governments, and social services and other cooperating public institutions which are included in the police’s strategies and additionally have their own focused responses towards organised crime groups and gang members.

Playing the Numbers' Game: Implementing Formal Demands

Handling Political Expectations

When performance measures concerning specifically biker and gang crime were introduced in 2012, they were initially not considered to be particularly demanding or problematic or requiring for example a specific organisational set up. In fact, senior management within police were instrumental in the design of these performance measures and key performance indicators as this was a way of getting more operational control of the police districts and thus more consistent policing nationally. The need for uniformity was a result of the 2007 reform, as mentioned in **Chapter 5**, and The National Police certified as the national directive and controlling unit over the 12 police districts which grew larger and more powerful and competent due to amongst other their new size (Holmberg 2019). With regards to the 300-performance goal, one of the Chief Superintendents on The National Strategic Staff on Gang Crime (Den Nationale Følgestab for Bandekriminalitet) said at a meeting in the beginning of 2012:

I'm not worried about that particular performance goal (the 300-number, *my addition*). They can't help themselves; they are committing crimes to survive; they don't have a penny to their name (Kongens mønt)! And we are there to catch them just doing normal police work. Everyone is happy.

The statement expressed the assessment that police's efforts to meet the 300-performance goal was seen as a joint effort between all police districts and an outcome of everyday policing. However, it became clear for strategic management at both national, regional, and local level during the first couple of years that this was not a straightforward task. During meetings in the national strategic gang crime staff in the period of 2012-2016 it was a returning subject how performance measures were to be met as they constituted a continuous challenge for the police

districts. Police's resources both in the special units (task forces) at regional level and locally within the districts were first and foremost allocated to obtain the 300-performance goal – and this proved to be a more resourceful task than initially anticipated as an Assistant Police Commissioner explains:

We had huge problems meeting that performance goal (the 300-number, *my addition*) even though we had our organisation changed (...) The reason was that so many people (members of crime groups, *my addition*) were released as they were imprisoned in the period of 2009-2011. There were a large number of “conflict people” (konfliktfolk) who were arrested in times of conflict and they are the soldiers in the front (frontsoldater) who commit violent assaults (personfarlig kriminalitet) and they are put in jail for a couple of months or maybe 1-2 years and then they are released. So we were really under a lot of pressure (på hælene)...we had to meet the number...

As a result, the police's primary focus when it came to the response towards organised crime was to ‘meet the number’. The police districts and the regional units provide monthly reports to the national unit on their performance as a part of the general performance measurement. The regional units and the police districts are allocated individual and local performance goals which are specified in the contracts between The National Police and the district's police commissioners (politidirektørernes kontrakter) and thereby regulate these contracts and the commissioners' individual performance dependent bonuses. Besides being a part of the internal competition of the allocation of resources between police districts and regional units, it can also be regarded as an image issue. The ambition for most top managers is therefore to have their individual district to perform well on a national level as low performance is generally embarrassing. At a seminar lunch a top manager commented on the issue:

Everyone want's to be top of the class in the eyes of the national police. Of course, we want our district to be the best and to have the other 11 districts to envy you...it gives a certain degree of respect even though the performance measures are mad...we all know that. But that's not what it's about.

In this sense, police management appears quite conscious of the use of, in Goffman's terms (1959), expressive equipment and they use impression management to idealise their own front stage performance even internally. Consequently, much is at stake when it comes to organisational performance and as such a lot of effort are put into obtaining the performance goals and the front stage performance on the organisational stage.

However, the politically set performance goals were, as implied by the Assistant Police Commissioner, not entirely in accordance with the reality of the police's capacity or the available resources. Although it was seen as a part of everyday policing, the incarceration of e.g. gang members did not just happen without a targeted effort – especially in times after violent conflicts and times of rivalry where a decidedly downturn were taking place in the criminal environment. Various crime groups hereafter often keep a low profile, regrouping, changing strategies, or even licking their wounds after periods of stress and battle and a massive police response to follow. Thus, this presented a problem for police as they were lacking focus persons who were actively committing offences and as such could be arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated. This condition led to the phenomenon of *organisational decoupling* – that is the gap between strategy and practice and thus what is said and what is done – which is a fairly well-known phenomenon in most large organisations (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). As such, the instigation of so-called 'innovative initiatives' which is broadly known within the police as *creative accountancy* (kreativ bogføring) to meet the performance goals. An Assistant Police Commissioner reports:

We didn't know what to do...we were sitting here in this office and we did not want to blow this one (bomme målet). And then there's one of them (a member of a crime group, *my addition*), he has so much 'on the book' (stående) on traffic violations and driving without a license (kørsel med frakendelse) that he can expect to serve a sentence (afsone) and if we catch him 'on wheels' (på hjul) he's to be put inside. And we did. We used the surveillance team from the regional unit, and we took him on wheels, and he was put inside and we met the number and everyone was happy.

Thus, as it was a significant challenge to meet the 300-number performance goal a considerable amount of resources was put into this, but resources were also put into the process of creating the illusion that the police were actually meeting ‘the number’ – an idealisation of the performance (Goffman 1959). Gradually, throughout the police and down the ranks performance measurement and political demands were seen as an obnoxious interference with police work and with no regards to the actual circumstances in which policing is carried out. In this sense, political initiatives and performance measurements are especially on ground level not taken particularly seriously and creative solutions to work around them and various forms of creative accountancy are present in all areas of policing. Not just in relation to meeting performance goals: reports of manipulation with numbers or ‘making the shoe fit’ in terms of providing the strategic or political level with an adequate response to avoid any further investigation or with the purpose of meeting demands of performance measurement are not rare. On the contrary, creative accountancy is on many levels considered to be necessary to instigate as the gap between political demands and the reality of policing is per default too big – a conclusion which a number of international police researchers have already drawn (Eterno & Silverman 2006; Eterno & Silverman 2010; Hartmann 2014; Wathne 2015; Eterno et al. 2016). There are several reasons for this, which I will unfold in the following.

Conflict Creating Demands

Despite some degree of support for a broad response model, including arrest and incarceration as an instrument to reduce crime, frustrations about ‘playing the numbers game’ within the police were quite clear. An Assistant Police Commissioner explains:

But the downside is...did he (the last offender who was apprehended to meet the performance goal, *my addition*) really make a difference? Or was this just to meet the performance goal? And we have to conclude that he did not make a pressing

difference, but he made us meet the performance goal which was agreed upon by the National Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Government (Regeringen).

A Chief Superintendent elaborates further:

There's a difference between 10 men in prison...it's not the same as 10 other men in prison when we talk about bikers and gangs. There's a performance goal that we need to have a number of people in jail, but this is to the best of my knowledge irrelevant because it's about getting the right people in jail to establish a certain degree of stability (ro). And to get those who commit the most organised crime held accountable. And not the people who roam the streets acting like minions (håndlangere).

These statements mirror the constant debate about the 'audit regime' (måltrengemet) and its obvious blind spots which has as such been present within and outside the police since the introduction of NPM (Wathne 2015; Stevnsborg 2016; Hartmann et al. 2018). This is in accordance with most police services across the Western world which have experienced a political agenda of measuring 'what works' and 'value for money' in terms of controlling the public sector and its resources. The police have as many other public institutions been characterised by a strive towards cost-efficiency and "objective" and strategic allocation of limited resources (see also **Chapter 2**). A tighter control with police's budgets as a consequence of dramatical fiscal changes due to financial instability all over the Western World and historic examples of overspending (as we saw in **Chapter 2**) seems both necessary and rational and police officers are not *per se* against a more focused allocation of police resources. My analysis shows that their concerns are more directed at the risk that what can be counted in a rather simple and quantitative manner initially gets to count for police activities as a whole. Or as a Superintendent once remarked at a strategic meeting: "*People dance where the lights are shining* (der bliver danset der, hvor lyset skinner)".

Resources and energy are consequently primarily put where the performance gets measured. A Police Officer observes: "*The problem with performance measurement is*

that it will never get to measure what we really do. All the things which prevents things from happening, it's impossible to measure." Measuring crime prevention initiatives is difficult and does require specific efforts and competences, albeit the argument here is perhaps more that this type of measuring does not capture the complexities of policing. Moreover, from the perspective of police officers it threatens the notion of autonomy in the job and the degree to which they can use their individual discretion. The increased use of performance measurement has also resulted for instance in more management interference and control – at least on the front stage. Most detectives are usually skeptical towards police management becoming a central part of their investigative work, and they express they over the years have experienced more top-down and micro-management especially from senior management. During *Operation Goldilocks* it became clear that strategic management were meddling on and off with operational and tactical investigative decisions which frustrated middle managers and SIOs and detectives as it made the hierarchal chain of command unclear (I return to this issue in the end of this chapter). The introduction of performance measurement and KPIs in relation to proactive investigations therefore create new conflicts between (top) management and detectives as every investigation can potentially become a (political) success or failure which top management feels imposed to deal with.

Trying to Change Demands

As mentioned earlier, police management overall supported the organised crime strategy and tried to implement it loyally. However, in connection with negotiations of political agreements, strategic objectives, and performance measurement between the national police, the police districts, and the Ministry of Justice both formal and informal internal processes were initiated on several occasions over the period of 2012-2017 with the purpose of changing the specific performance goals and key performance indicators. As an example, under the auspices of the national strategic staff on gang crime, I was involved in a working group in 2012-2013 tasked with

reviewing the entire model for performance measurement in relation to bikers and gangs which indicated that there were several challenges regarding performance measures. One of the problems which had been identified was that some performance goals were counterproductive or even conflicting. As a consequence, different parts of the police worked in different directions. For example, those sections working with anti-recruitment and gang exit had the overall objective of crime prevention whereas the operative and investigation sections had the task of investigating and arresting gang members. The target group for these two objectives were essentially the same group of individuals, but performance points were given primarily in connection with arrests, not anti-recruitment. The same offender would therefore potentially shift category from one of the '225 imprisoned gang members' to the category of 'former gang members involved in an exit programme' and the police could therefore lose credits in the 'imprisoned' category by instigating preventive initiatives. The absence of crime (or prevention) and the perceived safety in local communities were as such not performance indicators or police activities which produced a lot of performance points. Consequently, the motivation within the organisation to prioritise preventive activities was not overwhelming. However, one of the performance goals during the time period 2012-2017 was that a certain percentage of the group of gang members must be screened for their eligibility to engage in the police's exit programme. A conflict therefore presented itself in the sense that such a performance goal competes with the number of incarcerated.

Moreover, the technical issues in relation to the systematic monitoring of focus persons and the assessment of when a specific person was qualified to be put on or taken off 'the list' meant that there was a risk that the pressure to reach the performance goal could lead to a variation of creative accountancy in terms of registering or keeping focus persons in the database as they would produce points if they were apprehended for an offence. Furthermore, the total population of this group of people would be larger and thereby pose 'a bigger pool to fish in'. That being said, attempts to influence the nature of performance measurement were

directed first and foremost at making the performance goals much more attainable when looking at capabilities and resources within the police. The performance goals should, according to the aforementioned working group, therefore shift in favour of a more qualitative nature and support a more proactive and targeted police response, and hence mirror the activities that the police were actually carrying out. The working group ended up with a proposal to direct the performance measurement and thereby the police response in a way where the efforts matched the outcome. At the same time, the proposal tried to accommodate the political preference for incarcerating a specific number of gang members as this was announced from the political level as a nonnegotiable performance goal. A new model of performance points was developed suggesting e.g. that an investigation against a high-value target (e.g. a kingpin) would produce twenty times as many points as a randomly apprehended gang member. The rationale was that certain police activities, such as proactive investigations of e.g. the crime groups' underlying organisational structures, are more demanding in terms of time, resources, and competences than reactive response activities.

The proposal was put forward in a memo which was handed over to the chairman of the national strategic staff who brought it into the political negotiations via the police top. The feedback (verbal) was that a new model for performance measurement in relation to gang crime did not fit the political preference of being able to communicate and present a simple message of e.g. incarceration of X number of gang members to the public. It was considered too complex. Throughout the years, I observed that the subject of alternative performance goals from time to time was brought up as a theme within the political negotiations by police management. However, although there were minor alterations of the performance goals within the time period (2012-2018), the broad police response model¹ was maintained and the request for new performance goals was rejected.

The police were locked in the sense that they were to loyally pursue the political agenda and align strategies and allocate resources to support the politically performance measurement. However, frustrations regarding the one-sided focus to meet the performance goals lay just beneath the surface in both strategic and operational settings within the police. Gradually, a certain degree of alienation towards the entire strategy could be detected on many levels in the police. Moreover, additional problems regarding the second performance measure and the narrow response model presented themselves as I will account for in the following sections.

Further Challenges

Even though a focus on a small group of (priority) offenders received broad support from strategic management there is wide awareness within police that it requires both time and resources to investigate ‘on the top shelf’ meaning high value targets with significant influence and impact in the criminal environment. The experience within the organised crime units in the police districts and the regional task forces/investigation centres is that such investigations are often resourceful and long lasting. They have consequently historically presented a problem for the police. A Chief Superintendent states:

We can instigate all kinds of investigations, but are they the right investigations who target the right strategic goals? To get the strategic intention translated into the right investigations—that’s always been our big problem. Because we’ve always investigated someone where we more or less randomly had knowledge and intelligence that they were committing crimes. And then we’ve started investigations and have continued until we’ve proven that fact and then put them in jail.

Accordingly, the second performance goal regarding investigation of a small group of priority offenders was seen as an organisational hassle since the introduction of it but for other reasons than the ones concerning the 300-performance goal. First, it continued to be a rather difficult and resourceful task to identify priority

offenders using analytical approaches rather than traditional approaches (such as target selection led by ongoing investigations or driven by information from confidential informants which I unfold and discuss in further detail in **Chapter 7**). Second, targeting and instigation of such ‘substantial investigations’ (tunge sager) were not prioritised in situations where: 1) the first performance goal was not obtained, and/or 2) in times where violent conflicts required all police attention. Third, substantial investigations targeting high value targets were not producing the same kinds of fast and visible results and as such successes as the broad police response and consequently meeting the first performance goal.

I will leave the first hassle to be discussed in **Chapter 7**, but in relation to the second and third hassle I will draw attention to several relevant conditions. As mentioned in **Chapter 5**, there had been a number of violent conflicts, gang related shootings, homicides, and injured victims since 2008. Such a situation was quite rare and dramatic for an otherwise safe and peaceful country as Denmark. The situation had of course undivided attention from politicians, the media, and the general public. As a result, the police were spending a substantial amount of resources tackling these issues. On one hand, the police were investigating all the different incidents; violent assaults, homicides, and attempted homicides. On the other hand, they were trying to prevent new incidents from happening for example by ‘being present and visible’ (synlig tilstedeværelse) and increasing the number of police patrols and community police officers (nærpolitibetjente) in the affected areas. This was first and foremost a political demand as the public in these areas were startled and required more police presence. Within the police, this was albeit primarily seen as a symbolic performance (Manning 2004) which had no significant impact on gangs’ behaviour.

During the spring and summer of 2009, I visited Copenhagen Police’s gang unit for three months to learn about their police response to the gang situation. As a consequence of the circumstances, they had established a large specialised unit

including both an investigative section and an operative section which had the sole task of handling gang-related issues. The situation continued to be chaotic over time and the complete overview of the situation was not obtained until a few years later. In one weekend for example, there were two homicides and four attempted homicides at three different gang related shootings in Copenhagen – an immensely demanding and unusual situation for the Danish police. A typical sum up from the Superintendent chairing the morning meetings in the gang unit was: “*So let’s hope they don’t shoot each other today*”. During those years, not many people questioned why the police were busy trying to sort out these issues and extensive resources were spent on reactive investigations.

Another thing which kept police busy and therefore represented an obstacle for instigating substantial proactive investigations against priority targets was in times where the 300-performance goal was not obtained. A Chief Superintendent explains:

The entire idea behind targeting priority offenders was that we’ve been pressured to produce a number of incarcerations (antal fængslede) which meant that in the beginning at least 2/3 of our time was spent meeting that performance goal (the 300-number, *my addition*). In those situations, we don’t start up substantial investigations (tunge efterforskninger) which might take half a year or a year. But alongside having put some people behind bars (ind at sidde), our investigations have made it possible to release some resources to put into something long-lasting. So that we could get the right people. That we didn’t get to do this in a large scale is a different matter but it was the original idea; instigating a long-lasting response to get some of the biggest ‘players in the field’ (spillere på banen) out. That was the ambition.

Violent conflicts are clearly seen as circumstances which with good reason nullify all other police priorities. Moreover, from a strategic management point of view, the broad response model targeting low-level offenders were considered necessary to obtain the 300-performance goal. However, a straightforward calculation of the available resources will point to an obvious fact: the more resources that are allocated into the broad police response in order to meet the quantitative

performance goal the less resources are available to support strategic objectives directed at disrupting and destabilising kingpins and crime facilitators. As such, the instigation of proactive investigations targeting priority offenders were to a large extent conditioned by fulfilling the 300-number. From the viewpoint of many police managers and detectives a substantial amount of resources were put into policing low-value targets and to grab what was referred to as 'low-hanging fruits' which were not believed to have a significant position in or influence on the organised crime environment as a whole. In general, the perception was that this type of low policing should not be this highly prioritised. A Chief Superintendent explains:

In our attempts to fight bikers and gangs, we need to be careful not to forget that there are other things happening, for example economic crime. (...) We need to be careful so we don't just run after the obvious targets. It's a danger. But it's not strange that we do so because it's where the focus is, especially the political focus.

Some strategic managers express great concerns about the issues concerning limited resources for proactive initiatives. However, the general overview of resources in police are overall sporadic and sparse and only recently the police have begun to look at spending, staffing etc. in connection with criminal investigations and for example providing rough estimations of costs and duration when suggesting instigation of proactive investigations (for example in investigation proposals). The sustainability of strategic decisions is moreover limited as it is seen as something which can be altered on a day-to-day basis. Police management therefore see themselves as being bound by both considerable political interference and political constraints mirrored in the introduction of NPM. An Assistant Police Commissioner explains:

It's a farce. We don't have any room to manoeuvre in terms of managing this shop (butikken). Everything is decided by the Ministry of Justice (Justitsministeriet) and a couple of specific officials (embedsmænd) who know absolutely nothing about police work and have an agenda of communicating fast political statements. They have no real interests in resolving problems for Mr. and Mrs. Smith (hr. og fru Danmark) or making conditions better for the police. That's what it has come to.

The political steering of the police and even interference in police operational decision-making was by management viewed as having increased over the years. Besides being a management trend across the entire public sector since the major budget deficit within the police's 2008 budget, there has been a zealous scrutiny and oversight from the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet) into the area of policing (see **Chapter 5** for an elaboration). Both public and political demands are put forward to produce more visible and tangible results for policing (cf. the latest political agreement). Political agreements are no longer negotiated between the police and the Ministry of Justice – but between the police and the Ministry of Finance and these are driven by somewhat practical questions of which police activities and results can (easily) be measured in a quantitative way. Moreover, examples of political involvement in more tactical police decisions include amongst other the political demand for the launch of mobile police stations, and the increase of police patrols in certain geographic areas and the like. At the same time, the amount of reporting on the police's performance on a variety of subjects has intensified. The National Police are answering an increasing number of official questions from The Danish Parliament (folketingsspørgsmål) on a variety of police related matters. What's more, the Ministry of Justice is continuously requesting detailed reporting of police performance on both a strategic and an operational level. Thus, police managers see political managing and involvement as a basic and inevitable organisational condition within the police. My observations of the conversation at strategic level are at times dominated by notions of reducing the overall strategies for the police or making them more 'dynamic' and 'adjustable' so they do not take up too many resources and can be moved if they are needed elsewhere from day-to-day. As a result, there would no longer be a clear strategic direction.

Although a lot of effort has generally been put into producing and shaping e.g. the police's strategies and action plans aimed at a number of vital areas such as gang crime, burglary, mobile offenders, such strategies are within the organisation mainly

seen as pieces of papers holding all the ‘right words’ and good intentions, but without any operational value whatsoever. The processes are often perceived as a so-called ‘tick in the box’-task implying that if anyone should ask, police management would be able to say that something had been done about the matter. The general perception within the police however is that such strategies have no impact in the real world of policing.

The Impact of NPM

Considering the presentation of the political and strategic framework above, I will argue that the governing of the police as a politically driven bureaucracy encompasses more and more components from the area of NPM where control and efficiency are central values (Wathne 2018). Police organisations are, according to Granér & Kronkvist 2014 and Bjørkelo & Gundhus 2015, moreover people service organisations and *hybrid organisations* as their overall mandate, duties, and tasks are both broad and diffuse including the complex span between prevention, enforcement, and the provision of service to the general public. The quality of police work or even its purpose – such as preventive police work including elimination of threats or handling escalating situations between two parties, controlling violent conflicts between gangs, or the patient build up of relationships between police and communities – is not easily measured. This was also viewed as a predicament in relation to the review of the model for performance measurement, which I discussed earlier.

In this situation it is often politically convenient rather than knowledge-based arguments which decide the content of police work, the allocation of resources, and the measure of success. For example the very idea that the police’s first performance measure is bound to the ‘success’ of another public institution of which they have no control (it is the courts and not the police who decide if people get incarcerated or not) seems rather counterproductive in terms of the police’s possibility of

meeting their demanded goals. The consequences of the implementation of NPM as a governing model, the production line-thinking, and consequently the increased political interference with police work therefore goes beyond political and strategic decisions as they to a certain extent frame operational police work. This (new) police reality results in problems regarding organisational decoupling and conflicting, inadequate or misleading performance measures which incite to manipulation and work as a counterproductive motivation for doing 'what counts' in policing in favour of 'what is countable' (Hartmann et al. 2018). NPM has as such introduced a form of commercial accounting practices which are not only vivid within Danish police, but through police services all over the Western world (Hoque et al. 2004). Police therefore become occupied with impression management and idealisation of the police's front stage performance, which becomes symbolic rather than instrumental, as the consideration for political demands are perceived as unavoidable (Manning 2004). Let me elaborate further:

Organisational decoupling and hence the gap between strategy and practice and thus what is said and what is done is a fairly well-known phenomenon in most large organisations – public as well as private (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). In this context, the gap between strategy and action becomes clear when the practical problems present themselves in the implementation of the broad and narrow response model. Several international researchers have examined the implications of introducing NPM in police organisations (Silverman 2006; Eterno et al. 2016; Wathne 2018). They draw among other the conclusion that the divergent idea of rational management of private companies focusing on raising profits collides with steering of political controlled organisation such as the police, which is basically sustained by (democratic) values and dependent on the public's confidence and support (Gundhus 2012). The implementation of NPM within the police has therefore been viewed as undermining the police service's ability to focus on: what is good police work, how should it be carried out and eventually measured in the best possible way? (Loader & Walker 2001). Creative accountancy and as such

manipulation with numbers in relation to performance measures are thus considered to be a frequent and common consequence due to e.g. the shift in focus from democratic principles and as such the police's *accountability* to internal control and administrative routines in a form of *accountancy* (Reiner 2013).

The numbers' game and the energy being put into impression management and idealisation of the front stage performance therefore inhibits a long-term focus and as such long-term planning and resembles a symbolic rather than an instrumental performance (Manning 2004). In this context, the introduction of the two specific performance goals in terms of organised crime dominates the police's response in a sense where it impounds resources and captures the strategic agenda and as a result steer the police response into a more reactive rather than a proactive direction. This is reflected in the focus on arrests, and incarceration as the primary measures of success derived from the reactive paradigm and consequently a reactive logic employing measures from the standard model of policing (see also **Chapter 2**).

¹The narrow response model was maintained until 2018 when it was omitted as an performance measurement, see also **Chapter 7**.

Good Results, Good Police Work: Identifying Informal Assumptions

Internal Discrepancies

In national meetings some strategic managers would from time to time shake their heads resignedly and express great concern when some of the political initiatives and legislation was discussed. They perceived for example the broad response model and the 300-performance goal as a limited model in order to affect the organised crime environment in the long run. The sense was moreover that first of all prevention initiatives from social services were to hinder recruitment into the crime and the gang environment since ‘there’s only so much we can do...’. A Chief Superintendent states:

We cannot meet the requirements by putting people into jail. I think that everyone who’s researched or knows something about organised crime would say that it is doubtful what works on hardened gang members. There are of course exit-programmes in the prisons, but basically, I don’t think there’s any evidence that imprisonment helps to reduce crime. So there are other tools that needs to come into play. (...) I believe that if we don’t put on our crime prevention glasses and really puts resources into this...we won’t be able to win the battle in the long run. It won’t happen in five years, but perhaps in a generation’s time if we really commit ourselves to do the right things concerning this environment.

Another concern was the lack of a ‘follow-the-money strategy’ to counter e.g. money men, kingpins, and crime facilitators in connection with e.g. money laundering. A Police Officer says:

We’ve never really got into the game of disrupting their businesses, their finances. We usually give up because it’s too complex and overwhelming with all the information. And the people in the organised crime units...they might not be the right people to immerse themselves to this kind of paperwork...for the duration. They’re more into seizing drugs, being on the road (på farten).

A Detective explains:

We don't use it enough (investigation of economic crime and finances, *my addition*). But that's what hurts them the most. It would be a good idea to have the unit of economic crime who could help us with the cases. And the tax agency (Skat) in terms of their companies, money laundering and the like. But it's a hassle. And it can be very complex and that's why it's often removed from the case (skåret fra i sagen). But it's obvious to unite those two lines of inquiry. As it says in § 191: you need to make money.

The critique of a one-sided enforcement focus and the broad response model seems, however, to a certain extent to be rather superficial: it is presented sporadically and incomprehensively primarily in interviews with managers. It appears to be a genuine concern and organisational dilemma, but I also view it as a way of trying to manage the impression of the police (and the managers themselves) and support of the modern and innovative approach rather than being traditional and reactive. As mentioned earlier, the proactive paradigm, knowledge-based policing, smart policing etc. is overwhelmingly congratulated and idealised by most managers as 'the right thing to do', whereas the support becomes more diffuse at ground level and amongst detectives.

There are as such at least two front stage performances in this regard – the public front stage performance where the police support the political demands and create public notions of security and safety by being action-oriented, making arrests, and meeting the 300-number. Internally, on the organisational front stage police management rhetorically perform the act of being critical towards the enforcement focus and call for a more proactive approach. On the organisational front stage, the rhetorical performance about the ideal of proactivity is as such convincing (Manning 2014a). However, as I will demonstrate in the following section, when observing especially the police's organisational backstage and the dialectic dynamic between front stage and backstage performances – the rhetoric concerning proactivity becomes superficial without depth. In its substance, the principles of the

proactive paradigm and knowledge-based policing are not inherent, but rather seem to be reduced to ‘management lingo’ expressing a variety of memorised sentences. And in depth knowledge of what the proactive paradigm encompass and requires in order to function is not expressed neither in interviews nor otherwise. This is in accordance with other research looking at for example the implementation of problem-oriented policing programmes where the components of analysing and assessing crime problems are often omitted or treated superficially (Gundhus 2009; 2012; Fielding et al. 2020). Moreover, decision-making and action in support of the proactive paradigm is moreover limited, which I will show in **Chapter 7**. The vast number of criminal incidents, reactive investigations, and political pressure to provide fast results seem to impact the police response in a way so it becomes predominantly reactive and short-termed. However, this is not the sole explanation. In fact, although these conditions do seem to hinder the police in instigating a more proactive approach, my analysis shows that along the lines of Gundhus (2006; 2012) there are some culturally anchored informal conditions within the police which contribute to the continuance of a reactive paradigm. These informal conditions are amongst other made up by collectively shared conceptions and assumptions amongst police managers, police officers, and detectives about:

- 1) organised crime and organised crime offenders
- 2) the role of the police and proactive policing of organised crime.

Accordingly, these informal conditions are about what constitutes good police work, and what are the successes in organised crime policing which I discuss in the sections below.

Good Coppers, Bad Suspects

It seems fairly obvious that the perception of what a crime problem looks like is closely linked to the perception of how it is identified, defined, and reacted upon.

The notions of the police role, the police mandate, and the individuals being policed are therefore strongly influencing and even dominating police action. This is underlined by many researchers of e.g. police culture (see e.g. O'Neill et al. 2007; Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012). Such culturally anchored notions can be said to constitute the informal world of policing. As such, this informal world is where police officers make sense of their work and create meaning around it. It is the organisational backstage of policing where police officers speak freely about police matters and rehearse and prepare for their performance front stage in their team of actors (Goffman 1959). Sense-making and creation of meaning (Weick et al. 2005; Van Hulst 2013) are important motivational drivers which provide a logic model for action and thus a comprehensive performance. Recalling Manning (2010) from **Chapter 3**, this is what he refers to as the assumptive world of policing in which the occupation operate and as such which informs habitual choices and action – a central part of the police *métier* (I develop this concept further in **Chapter 9**).

In accordance with Bacon (2016), my analysis shows that organised crime policing, particularly the policing of bikers and gangs, is both within and outside the police regarded as a high-profile and high-status occupational environment for several reasons. First, this type of policing brings about a considerable amount of political, public, and media attention, and is probably the second most valued type of policing next after anti-terrorism (Innes & Levy 2017). Consequently, organised crime policing is often prioritised in terms of fundings and resource allocation and hence regarded as important police work (see also **Chapter 5**). Second, the internal acknowledgement of this occupational field is linked to the perception that organised crime policing and proactive investigation specifically is specialised police work which requires certain skills and extensive experience (see also Bacon 2016). Third, the field is surrounded by secrecy and mystery and people working organised crime have certain security clearances – they are privy to information other police officers are not. As a result, organised crime policing and consequently the community of organised crime detectives is one of the highest-ranking

occupational fields within the informal status hierarchy in the police and thereby enjoys a privileged position (Finstad 2000; Gundhus 2009; Loftus et al. 2015; Bacon 2016). Furthermore, I find that the high status of organised crime policing is indeed connected to the internal perception of it as being ‘real’ police work (Holmberg 1998; Finstad 2000; Granér 2004; Gundhus 2012; Loftus et al. 2015). This is also attached to the fact that it targets what Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (1986) characterises as *ideal offenders* committing *ideal offences*, as I will elaborate in the following section.

The (Typical) Counterpart

Although proactive investigations are a police activity mostly regarded as targeting victimless or consensual crimes, such as the distribution and sale of narcotics, the analysis shows that both managers and detectives view these as ideal crime types as they regard them as serious and subversive to societal cohesion. In accordance with Bacon (2016), an explanation of this might be that it typically takes place in a classic criminal environment with social agents who are regarded as being on the bottom of society both socially and morally. Regarding the question of why the field of proactive investigation interests him, a Detective explains:

Because you can get the people who are worth getting. Because you can put people in jail for many years (...) I think it's more fun to go after these (offenders, ed.), they deserve it more than Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their traffic violations.

Thus, organised crime offenders are not perceived as people worthy of protection from the police, but on the contrary, as people who have earned negative police attention as they are per default criminals and wrong doers. This is in accordance with Holmberg (1998; 2003) who explains how police divide citizens into ‘customers’, ‘assholes’ and ‘good Danish citizens’ based on stereotypical categorisations. Organised crime offenders such as bikers, gang members, drug dealers are generally amongst police staff referred to as ‘assholes’ (røvhuller). These

offenders fall into the category of *police property* (Holmberg 1998; Finstad 2000; Granér 2004; Reiner 2010) in the sense that they belong to a distinct social group with whom the police have a long history of dealings and who are considered problematic or distasteful by the public.

Historically, the police have been occupied with especially the outlaw motorcycle environment (*rockere*) since the 1980s and street gangs from the 2000s (Christensen 2012). Some active police officers have been working with outlaw motorcycle gangs their entire careers and have over time even developed an almost personal relationship with some of these individuals. In some ways, their own careers in policing are mirrored by the criminal careers of their counterparts. Proactive investigations and especially covert surveillance often provide a window into people's lives including private and intimate details such as personal health issues, love lives, family relations, state of finances etc. Through surveillance and wiretapping detectives therefore get to know these people and their life circumstances quite well over the years. At national assemblies in the police or in the everyday lunch setting in the canteen it is not uncommon to hear detectives' anecdotes about 'the usual suspects' (*gamle kendinge*) and events from the past or present; biker wars or investigations where these individuals have been active. These stories are often told with somewhat condescending remarks exposing these individuals' failures and their "sad" lives, but interestingly, these anecdotes are also in some connections told with some degree of admiration or at least acceptance of these individuals' life choices: occasionally anecdotes describe a proper counterpart in an ongoing battle between good and bad (Shearing & Ericsson 1991). The war metaphor (the war against drugs) is commonly used in for instance British and American drug policing (Manning 2004; Bacon 2016), whereas 'the game' (*gamet*) is more often used as an expression within the Danish police to define the criminal environment. The 'drama of cops and robbers' therefore seems to define the general performance with a team of police and team of offenders enacting their respective

roles which are preconditioned by strict role descriptions and thus a strict script (Goffman 1959; Larsson 2015) (see **Chapter 7** for further elaboration).

Observations of police practice and conversations with organised crime police officers reveals that the classic ‘counterpart’ is a predetermined role. It refers broadly to the entire population of organised crime offenders who are generally speaking considered to be persons of interest, focus persons, and persistent, prolific or priority offenders within the organised crime environment. For historical and other reasons, it therefore fits with general stereotypical characteristics. The classic counterpart is by police officers and detectives perceived to be a (male) individual who:

- is a member of an outlaw motorcycle gang or a street gang
- wears visible patches and insignia
- has a criminal life style (committing primarily drug offences and recreational violence)
- is highly visible in specific social settings (e.g. the nighttime economy (værtshusmiljøet), the inner city party scene, and at certain VIP sporting events)
- through illegal means acquires and displays status symbols such as expensive cars, motorcycles, jewellery etc.

The counterpart’s visibility in the public consists of both a quantitative measure in terms of frequency and a qualitative measure in terms of the appearance and behaviour; for most of these offenders promoting status symbols, causing disorder and insecurity in certain social settings or in the local community is a vital part of being associated with a strong and powerful crime group. These crime groups’ activities are both officially and informally by police perceived as primarily focused on generating profit and secondly focused on the collectiveness of the subcultural ‘brotherhood’. The community of these subcultures are therefore believed to be superficial promotion for recruitment purposes, and the proposed values of unity rather fragile. A Detective explains:

We see it time and again. The club (the crime group, *my addition*) is not there for them when they need it. If they get into trouble...privately or financially they can't expect to get help. They're on their own and the club doesn't give a damn (*vil skide dem et stykke*)...if they have good personal relationships with people in the club they usually get their help...but if they don't produce any money to the club, to senior members, and provide new business (...) All that talk of brotherhood and community is a scam.

Moskos (2008) and Manning (2010), as explained in **Chapter 3**, describe the police's assumption about people from 'problematic areas' as incorrigible and for example drug dealers as 'always dirty'. Accordingly, in this study, police overall view the organised crime counterpart as a 'criminal of choice' anchored in a rational choice perspective of crime. Here cost/benefit assessments of individual action including the risk of getting caught and the subsequent police action are central aspects (Felson 2014). The counterpart's use of violence is explained as either instrumental action to support organisational concerns or objectives of the crime group, as part of the criminal code, or as a result of limited impulse control, or excessive drug consumption. The association with the criminal environment and gang membership is perceived as a rational choice that provides a sense of belonging, protection, status, and privileges. Still, some police officers recognise that some offenders, in accordance with various research on the matter (see Pedersen 2018), join gangs in a fluid process which takes place over a long period of time as opposed to an active recruitment process or individual (rational) decision over night.

Pity and sympathy are from time to time expressed by police officers as for example the low-ranking gang members such as 'hangarounds' and 'prospects' are considered to be "sad" people leading "sad" lives. Such lives are revolved around hunting profit and business, providing services for other group members, and at the same time being hunted by police and by rival groups. It is especially on the wires (*aflytningerne*) it becomes clear just how chaotic, unstructured, and unpredictable lives some of these individuals live, and how they deal with constant conflicts and problems both inside and outside their groups. However, detectives usually

conclude that they should have made different life choices instead of opting for a life of crime (gå til narko).

Ingrained in these notions is the deterministic assumption that these offenders cannot change. They are seen as notorious career criminals with flawed morals and deep-rooted deviant behavioural patterns. As such, police regard them as either on the streets committing crime or in prison. The conclusion drawn is therefore that it is the job of the police to make sure that these people spend more time in the prisons than outside (see also Manning 2004). The prediction is that they are ‘in the game’ per default as they “cannot stop being criminals”. Some police officers even propose these offenders to have ‘a criminal mind’ – a particular criminal way of thinking. Exit programmes which have been a persistent part of the police’s prevention strategy are not considered to be a viable alternative. On the contrary, these are by many police officers viewed as a free ticket (badebillet) to privileges rather than a genuine attempt to seek a life without crime. In this sense, the counterpart is judged in advanced (dømt på forhånd). If it is a question of continuous crime and harm to society or incarceration of these offenders, then arrest and prosecution is the logical objectives for the police to pursue. This is indeed in accordance with the political expectations mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, demanding “the continuous imprisonment of a certain amount of gang members”. As the crime this group of offenders commits and certainly the lifestyle they lead is morally rejected by the public they are prepared to turn a blind eye to the manner in which the police deal with them (Manning 2010), or as Reiner (2010: 123) explains: “*The prime function of the police has been to control and segregate such groups, and they are armed with a battery of permissive and discretionary laws for this purpose...*”

In the Danish context, this legal framework includes tailored laws specifically aimed at targeting members of organised crime groups (bandepakkerne), as presented earlier in this chapter. Due to the historical interest in bikers and gangs and the

continuous political attention, the members of organised crime groups are actually a well-defined group of people of which the police have much information. They are continuously and routinely identified and targeted through *the police gaze* (politiblikket) (Finstad 2000), which describes the police's ability to spot what deviates from the norm. This ability is based on experience and collectively shared assumptions about 'bad guys' and 'average citizens'. Consequently, what is sought after is what is found: the circle of information gathering for intelligence purposes and the identification of focus persons and potential suspects etc. are as such deeply dependent on who catches the attention of the police's eye and why? Therefore, due to the police's assumptions about the counterpart and 'the bad guys' there is a risk of reproducing organisational anchored stereotypes. In **Chapter 7**, I discuss how this narrow perception of organised crime represents a problem in terms of looking at the broader field of organised crime both in regards to crime areas and groups of people.

Crusaders Against Crime

Building on the section above, the notions and assumptions about the counterpart can be said to shape and support 'the drama of cops and robbers' (Manning 2004) a play where the police are assigned the role as coppers (protectors) of society and their counterpart perform the role of notorious criminals (Bacon 2016). This drama with its fixed role description of the counterpart furthermore reflects the collective views on the police's role and mandate in society and thus the aim for proactive policing. As a Detective says: "*My job is to make sure that as few as possible are harassed by bikers and gangs. And we have to do something about those people running around shooting each other in the streets.*" And another Detective remarks: "*We are in fact employed to put people in jail. I know that not all see it that way; but in my world, we are here to put people in jail.*"

In accordance with Gundhus' findings (2012), detectives perceive themselves fundamentally as experts in crime fighting and law enforcers instead of e.g. crime preventers and knowledge workers. Interestingly, they typically use the phrase 'putting people in jail' about their mission and task although this task is definitely not within the police mandate as it instead lies within the courts. The rationale of 'getting gang members off the streets' as a preventive measure for further violence and offending is firmly mirrored in many managers, police officers', and detectives' perceptions of crime and offenders. In this perspective, the notion of putting people in jail truly makes a difference as incapacitation discard them from committing further crime (Reiner 2010). As such, prevention is seen as a goal which is fulfilled through repressive enforcement measures such as investigation and incarceration, along the lines of the politically defined strategy. A Superintendent argues:

The success of each case is measured by whether or not the perpetrator goes to prison. And yes, if there are more of them (arrests, *my addition.*) it might have the consequence that the entire group closes down. It's effective. If it's done in a targeted way. And you need to keep pushing when they're lying down, you need to give it time, years, to finish the work. (...) If you remove some of the important ones, things will fall apart.

That being so, the overall effort against organised crime is viewed as pointless. It is primarily portrayed as tiring Sisiphos work:

It has no impact on society. Mr and Mrs Smith will never notice it. There would be unrest in the market (of narcotics, *my addition.*) for a while. But new people will just come along and start selling. It doesn't mean anything.

A Detective argues further: "*It's futile in terms of drugs (som at slå i en dyne). But if the police were to sit back it would go completely nuts (balalajka). There has to be a price to pay.*" Detectives therefore seem to find purpose and meaning in the investigation process rather than in its (societal) impact, as a Superintendent says: "*We've learned that we cannot save the world. But you can get high from running a case...*". A Senior Detective continues:

I couldn't care less who they are. It's the case! I have no interests in gangs. What interests me is that someone's going to jail. It's the case which is important to me. And there are enough of them!

Although police officers are concerned about the impact of the overall police response, in contrast to Gundhus' findings (2009), the notion of enforcement and proactive investigation as effective countermeasures against organised crime is still maintained – at least when talking about the individual offender. My analysis shows, that during casework, the offender – the investigation target – is therefore by detectives transferred into the role of the classic counterpart who holds the stereotypical characteristics of a bad guy. In this sense, each case is still perceived as meaningful, despite the recognition of the dim prospects of the police's overall efforts. Thus, the performance of the drama of cops and robbers relies on consistent role descriptions and a predictable script; it becomes a ritual where uncertainties are reduced to well-known categories (for example of good guys and bad guys) which function as a way to maintain stability and motivation to continue the work.

Real Police Work

The findings above regarding the ritualised performance of investigative work seem to be closely linked to one of the strongest cultural notions within the police: the idea of “real” police work and “pseudo” police work. Real police work has to do with catching ‘bad guys’ while protecting ‘the innocent’ (Holmberg, 1998; Granér 2004; Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012) – a notion strongly associated with the perception of ideal offenders and ideal victims. Moreover, within this assumption is the belief that real police work is carried out ‘on the streets of the real world’ and as such is in sharp contrast to ‘pseudo police work’ defined as office work, where police officers and other personnel are “pushing papers back and forth” or providing an (unnecessary) support function such as management support, human resource support, or analyses. Most strategic work focused on long-term police responses or

preventive work automatically falls outside the category of ‘real policing’. Recalling **Chapter 3**, Manning (2010) argues that patrol duties and detective work are at the core of the police *métier* where the occurrence of crime and disorder – the incident – is its sacred centre. Gundhus (2005) for example finds that police officers working in the streets label the analytical staff as ‘the passive PC-police’ working on ‘the valley of death’ illustrating that this type of work is not regarded as meaningful or relevant. Several police researchers have identified such perceptions amongst particular rank and files and detectives (Gundhus 2005; Loftus 2010). Another important feature of the notion of ‘real policing’ is that it is an action-orientated endeavour and therefore encompasses the assumption that policing requires officers who are able to handle stressful or dangerous situations without hesitation and to solve immediate conflicts between parties through their function as first responders in accidents, deaths, violent fights etc. Additionally, this feature is identified as a universal, stable feature across countries and police agencies (O’Neill et al. 2007; Brodeur 2010; Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Gundhus 2012; Bowling et al. 2020). Action-orientation supports the view of policing as a masculine occupation where the ability to take action is highly valued together with the execution of what is perceived as common sense-decisions (Granér 2004). This definition of ‘real policing’ is, according to Finstad (2000), the highest ranking in the status-hierarchy in police culture. Of course, patrol duties fit the description of being real police work rather well, however, criminal investigations, detective work and the process of solving crimes are moreover seen as key functions within real policing. This is the case especially when it comes to crimes with a high degree of severity (for example homicide) and when it comes to offenders and victims respectively who fit the profiles of ideal offenders and ideal victims.

Since proactive investigation practice, as I will explain in **Chapter 8**, in the practical reality first and foremost takes place within the office, behind the computer screen, and in front of the wiretapping devices, detectives interestingly refer to this work as operative and action-oriented. With its components of covert measures; observation,

covert searches, surveillance, informant handling etc. it might be considered from the outside as a predominantly operational discipline and organised crime detectives are additionally successful in their description of this work as being carried out ‘on the streets’. The narrative about proactive investigation is therefore that it is indeed ‘real police work’. This is also reflected in the view of policing as an essentially masculine occupation counteracting a tough social environment such as the organised gang environment which is often grounded in hyper masculine and violent subcultures. The ability to handle and handle oneself in such an environment is therefore per default regarded as masculine since it often requires both physical strength and courage. Perhaps for that reason, detectives in proactive investigation teams are often recruited from operational street-level work such as plain clothes specialised units or task forces working in the nighttime economy, with drug offences, informant handling or the like. Knowledge about this type of offenders and the local community in which they operate is regarded as one of the most important skills in the organisational recruitment. A Superintendent once described this as “having the blood of the streets inside oneself” (at have gadens blod i sig) pointing to the capability to understand how these offenders think and act. A Senior Detective explains:

The lack of local knowledge is a huge problem. We’ve been investigating all over the country and the surveillance team has taken more than 1,000 pictures (of the suspects, *my addition*) and we don’t know who they are. But along come Peter and Thomas (officers from the special operative unit (‘Uroen’), *my addition*) and in more than a few hours, we’ve identified all of them, because they know them (from the environment, *my addition*).

In this sense, proactive investigation is primarily viewed as a continuation of action-oriented street-level operational work, rather than information-oriented investigative work. This is an important aspect of the epistemic culture of proactive investigation, which I will return to in **Chapter 7, 8, and 9**.

Perceptions of Proactivity

Along the lines of Manning's findings (2004; 2010), my analysis shows that the general perception of 'good' police work amongst managers, police officers, and detectives concerns classic police activities, patrol duties, and detective work carried out on street-level. The measure of success evolves around the amount of arrests, the number of conviction years, and the seizures of illicit goods. This includes the measure of success for proactive investigation as an Assistant Police Commissioner explains:

When there have been gang conflicts in many different geographical areas we have been looking at criminal agents. Not because their crimes have been immense, but to find out: who are the conflict instigators? On those grounds, we have sat down and looked at: who should we try to control when they are out roaming the streets, who should we activate a targeted police response towards, and who should we definitely demonstrate our clear presence towards? Broadly speaking there are some of these people in contrast to others who are able to secure law and order in the local community if we put them in the can (spjældet). So, we are looking at a criminal agent who might be more or less criminal. And then we begin activating our informants (kildeindhentning), we try to get information about that person's criminal activities with the purpose of building a criminal case and getting a conviction. Out of the picture, right?

Proactivity is understood as a way of being 'one step ahead' of the criminals (være på forkant med) rather than to 'run behind' them (halse bagefter dem). The logic model is that if the police are ahead, the more people can be arrested and prosecuted (incapacitation), and the police will thereby gain more control of the organised crime environment. Some, but not all, police officers connect this to a way of creating deterrence and thereby preventing further crime and violent conflicts. At operational level, however, the most common understanding between detectives is that proactive investigation has the same purpose as reactive investigation: to identify a perpetrator, seize drugs and money, arrest the culprit and prosecute him with the aim of incarceration and this becomes a goal in itself. Gundhus (2012) has a similar finding in her study of a Norwegian organised crime unit, where intelligence-led policing was translated into 'rounding up the drug-

trafficker’. Preventing crime is not a high-status task in police and specifically not for organised crime detectives. This is amongst other reasons due to the notion of ‘real policing’, but it also has to do with an organisational preoccupation with fast and visible results which create immediate gratification, a version of *short run hedonism* a concept Cohen (1955) uses in relation to delinquent boys. Preventive efforts do not produce the same visible and tangible results as reactive efforts the arrest of a perpetrator is a satisfying and concrete outcome of police work, whereas the prevention of a potential crime event seems rather abstract.

The case of *Operation Goldilocks* clearly shows that the aim of the police operation was collecting and producing enough evidence for the seizure of illicit drugs or perhaps dirty money and consequently the arrest of the prime target. This was both the objective amongst detectives, but also the directive from strategic management as the investigation was to produce ‘a number’ (seizure or arrest). This points to the condition about how difficult it is to instigate proactive approaches in the police and in these types of investigations with preventive aims such as disruption or destabilising of organised crime groups (Bacon 2016). Such investigative efforts simply do not produce fast and visible results capable of meeting political expectation and performance goals while at the same time fitting organisational perceptions of ‘real policing’. On the contrary, instigation of for example substantial investigations such as the investigation of the money trail, the business economy surrounding the organised crime groups, money laundering and the like are complex, resource demanding investigative tasks. An Analyst explains:

Now new winds are blowing (nye vinde blæser) within the organisation—new strategies are needed in terms of how we use our resources and there has to be a focus on cost-benefit. It requires stamina for a manager to sit with an investigation proposal (efterforskningsoplæg) that, if taken on, will require a great amount of resources and overtime—and which *might* lead to bigger seizures than they usually get and which *might* remove some players from the game they don’t usually get. And it is easier for managers to get results by focusing on low-hanging fruits. There has to be an overall strategy and prioritisation—but the problem with this strategy is that even though it is the most appropriate in terms of resources it is difficult to ‘feel it’

right away. It is difficult to explain to people that in six months we will eradicate one of the top players (within the organised crime environment, *my addition*).

Initially, the shutdown of *Operation Goldilocks* therefore might look like a pragmatic and rational decision on the basis of cost-benefit assessments. However, when taking a closer look, my analysis shows that it also mirrors an organisational preference. Decision-making within the police seems to only support the proposed ideas of a proactive paradigm contingently. In the general run of things, both strategic and operational decision-makers seem to a great extent to rely on the familiar course of action and thereby a reactive approach to policing. This is amongst other illustrated in at least two conditions which I will elaborate in the following:

First, the condition that proactive policing is per se not seen as an entirely different paradigm for police action. The organisational conversation indeed speaks of implementing ‘a different mindset’, but proactive approaches are primarily seen as the application of new methods and technologies which are believed to support existing police responses and police action (Chan 2001; Manning 2008d; Gundhus 2009; Gundhus 2012). This includes the introduction of ‘smarter’ and often technologically substantiated approaches to patrol work (for example apps to function as platforms for structuring police reports or advanced technology to predict crime hotspots and direct patrols), and to investigation (for example the use of larger data platforms to collect and categorise information from various sources or the introduction of new “analytical” tools such as social network analysis to identify offenders in a more systematic and “objective” way). Interestingly, such measures and the implementation of them are in themselves seen by police as proactive which distance them from a more traditional and reactive experience-based approach (I will discuss this finding further in **Chapter 7** and **8**). Still, the police response overall is not altered radically (Manning 2010; Bacon 2016). To put it bluntly, the perception of proactive policing is that it is a smarter way of doing

police work, and it therefore becomes an instrumental understanding instead of a revolutionary paradigm shift. My analysis shows in regards to proactive investigation that this is predominantly seen as a categorisation of covert measures and the instigation of specific investigative techniques (such as interception in communications and observation) belonging to a specific legal framework. The objectives, however, remain the same as in reactive investigations and the notion of prevention is therefore not central (see **Chapter 8** for further discussion). The aim, as I showed earlier, is not specifically to disrupt ongoing or crime in the making, but to hold priority offenders such as kingpins responsible (see also Gundhus 2012).

Second, there seems to be a continuous organisational need to reduce complexity: the police seem notoriously preoccupied with 'quick-fix' solutions which can be planned and applied fast and without too much organisational change. As well as promoting easily understood and easily communicated quantitative performance goals, strategic management are as mentioned above continuously on the lookout for new technological equipment and tools in the solution of various crime problems. Massive investments in data systems and software have been undertaken due to decades of neglecting this area, but it also has the purpose of modernising the police as an organisation and to professionalise and make the police more proactive through technology. The ambition to meet the challenges of modern policing through the development of technological tools, standardisation, checklists, and improved software reveals a somewhat superficial understanding of police work and all its complexities and a tendency towards reducing intellectual aspects of police work. This reductionist position can moreover be seen as a management style, which I label *one-page management* (Hestehave 2018) as it refers to the general rule within police that information regarding analytical findings, evaluation results, current issues-statements and the like should preferably be accounted for in no more than one page as no one in the police will read 'lengthy academic reports'. From top management to front line officers there is a fatigue when it comes to written material, which they are in fact bombarded with on all sorts of issues.

Consequently, this leaves often complex crime problems, societal threats, and internal organisational challenges to be comprised and minimised to fit the one page-form preferably in a ‘plainspoken format’ presented in ‘bullet points’ if possible. Important nuances and complex causal explanations are therefore in constant danger of being neglected.

Epistemic Rationales

The above analysis shows that the epistemic rationales of experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing once again compete in defining and understanding good results, and good police work. In analysing the implementation of knowledge-based policing in Norwegian police, Gundhus (2006; 2012) develops a competence hierarchy – a useful ideal type model of police’s perceptions of professionalism and high- and low-ranking knowledge within police. I have put these together in **Figure M** (derived and assembled from Gundhus (2012)).

Figure M. *Ideal Types of Professionalism and Knowledge Hierarchy.*

	EXPERIENCED-BASED	STANDARDISED
PROFESSIONALISM	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Thick</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gut feeling • Sudden impulses • Intuition • Loyalty to colleagues • Normative affinity with crime control 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Thin</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal competences • Standards • Use of technology • Loyalty to truth and science • Principles of due process
KNOWLEDGE	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>High</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brand-new information • Concrete and individual knowledge • ‘Vivid’ information from informants • Experience – gut feeling and data 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Low</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis • Statistics • Procure information • Theoretical knowledge

Gundhus (2012) argues that in order to become knowledge-based implies a particular view on knowledge; a logic based on evaluation of codified, standardised information systems rather than an experience-based, action-oriented collegial logic. Still, useful information is within police regarded as ‘thick’ information based

on informants whereas ‘thin’ information is viewed as more abstract knowledge which is valued by management and leading to external forms of regulation and performance measurement. Several police scholars refer to an anti-intellectualism as a cultural characteristic within police, where e.g. theoretical education/thinking is seen as an obstacle to action orientation (Granér 2004; Loftus 2010; Manning 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Ratcliffe et al. 2014). In this study, police management accordingly seems to return to familiar modes of action where fast solutions, experience-based knowledge, and ‘gut feeling’-decisions are applauded in opposition to ‘academic roundtable discussions’ where matters are made ‘unnecessary complicated’. Although, academic skills within the last decade have been increasingly requested and employed within the (Danish) police, especially by strategic management, it is still in certain situations clear that police management to a high degree carries and values experience and knowledge from the world of operational policing into the world of strategic management. Examples of this include high-ranking strategic managers (e.g. assistant police commissioners) who involve themselves in operational decisions on an everyday basis rather than prioritising strategic issues. A Superintendent once explained:

Apparently, they (strategic management, *my addition*) have a very long screwdriver which goes all the way from the top office down to the operational machinery (helt ned i maskinrummet) and makes all kinds of disturbance.

This prioritisation can be viewed as an expression of these managers being promoted within the police from ground level and as such wanting to remain in a domain that they know and feel comfortable in and basically are passionate about. In connection with a discussion about the targeting of priority offenders, I presented the argument to a former manager at NCI that we needed to carry out thorough analysis of the various crime groups in order to prioritise between them. He asked if there was no easier way to make this prioritisation and said: “*You know what, no one gets any wiser reading 30 pages about “Falcons”. I’m an old copper (strisser) —I just want to see people go to jail”* .

This way of making sense of policing reflects Gundhus' (2012) competence hierarchy from above and seems to make police officers, both managers and rank and files, to return to their familiar mode of action and familiar perception of role categories. The purpose of arrests and seizures is therefore much more concrete than diffuse aims of avoiding criminal events to take place – an example of the much-valued experience-based and concrete 'thick' knowledge as opposed to the more abstract 'thin' standardised knowledge. A central characteristic of the job is indeed to constantly perform through arrests (Maguire 1994; Fahsing 2016). The above conditions present a fundamental paradox for proactive policing: the proactive domain is dominated by reactive notions of police work and how it is carried out. Although proactive policing promotes prevention per default this is not a central aspect of neither perception nor practice.

Summary & Discussion: A Rapid Response to Organised Crime?

In this chapter, I have explored the political, organisational, and strategic context of the police's response to organised crime and how the police perform and measure their success in this context. I have analysed both formal and informal conditions, organisational structures and culturally anchored assumptions with the purpose of identifying what shapes and impacts this performance. In the current section, I account for the chapter's central findings and arguments and discuss some of the difficulties connected to the organisational and cultural predicaments and discrepancies between ideals, aspirations, abilities, and reality in terms of responding to organised crime, and thus how these conditions impact the overall police response and proactive investigation specifically. I return to the empirical example presented in the introduction of this chapter and discuss the circumstances surrounding the shut-down of *Operation Goldilocks* with an outset of the analytical findings in this chapter.

Some vital conclusions can be drawn. The formal frame for the police's response to organised crime is constituted by a number of policy documents and operationalised into a strategy and action plan which is intended to have both a long-term and a short-term perspective, and a reactive and proactive focus. The police's response is trying to deal with urgent crime problems and conflicts as well as accumulating crime and the underlying structures enabling the organised crime environment. The logic model behind this strategy reflects primarily criminological theories of rational choice and deterrence. This leads to the instigation of what I identify as two different response models; 1) a broad response model targeting the members of the organised crime environment as a whole through everyday police work, and 2) a narrow response model targeting a small group of priority and high-

value offenders by instigating proactive investigations. Although prevention and proactive police work are pinpointed as central components of the police's strategy, this is only to a limited extent reflected in the politically determined objectives and performance goals. These have, on the contrary, through a decade been guided by a tough-on-crime approach prompting repressive and punitive efforts, such as multiple arrests and incarceration of offenders. The formal objectives and measures of success for the police's response, including proactive investigation, are as such reactive per default. The police try to implement political demands and initiatives loyally and to the best of their abilities. Still, police management has some genuine concerns about this strategy's ability to provide a comprehensive police response towards systemic and persistent crime problems from the organised crime environment.

In the practical world of policing, however, police are under significant pressure to allocate their time and resources into primarily reactive investigations and operational responses focusing on damage control, and dealing with criminal incidents and conflicts here and now whilst trying to meet the political performance goals. Accordingly, these conditions come to capture the strategic agenda and as a result tie the police's time and resources to the short-term perspective and the broad response model. Consequently, police's response to organised crime is primarily characterised by reactive police work and solving 'problems of the day'. This stands in contrast to the inherent notion of the proactive paradigm which e.g. prescribes a knowledge-based police response focusing on a long-term perspective and a problem-oriented operational model targeting the underlying structures of organised crime and as such 'problems of tomorrow'. This is reflected in the focus on multiple arrests and incarceration as the primary measures of success which employ measures from the standard model of policing.

There is a constant organisational battle of police's strategy and action plan as the police are forced to choose between what they identify as a focus on violent

conflicts here and now and on underlying structures of the organised crime environment which are believed to pose the foundation for the root causes of organised crime. Accordingly, it mirrors the persistent dilemma of being either a reactive response service dealing with the short-term problems at hand or a proactive police service with a focus on instigating problem-oriented responses with a long-term focus. Yet, from my analysis of the informal and assumptive world of policing it becomes clear that managers, police officers, and detectives evolve around some of the same measures of success as presented in the formal strategy. The general perception is namely that ‘good’ police work is ‘real policing’ focusing on catching and arresting ‘bad guys’ who fit certain stereotypical characteristics. The success is as such measured in the amount of arrests, the number of conviction years, and the seizures of weapons and illicit goods. On strategic level, the immediate impression of how proactive investigation is interpreted is that it is rooted in the ideas of the proactive paradigm understood as a strategic and knowledge-based policing approach focusing on analysis of crime problems and with prevention as an overall purpose of the police’s activities. Although this perception to is some extent expressed in management language and reflected in the various policy documents, it appears as a rhetorical and on-the-surface performance to accommodate the front stage of policing where the ideal of proactivity and smart policing lives. On the backstage, however, the informal world of policing dominates which is compelled by collectively shared assumptions about police work and the criminal counterpart in support of the reactive paradigm.

With its offset and embeddedness in a reactive response service and an experience-based epistemic culture ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ is performed relying on consistent role descriptions and a predictable script. It becomes a ritual where uncertainties are reduced to well-known categories (for example of good guys and bad guys) which function as a way for detectives to maintain stability and motivation to continue their work. Each case is thereby perceived as meaningful, despite the broad recognition within police of the dim prospects of the police’s

overall efforts to impact organised crime. The front stage performance of proactivity therefore becomes symbolic celebrating the ritual subculture of patrol (Manning 2010). The main argument here is that the reactive approach indeed seems to mirror an organisational preference of being a response service focusing on delivering a rapid response to criminal incidents sanctioning those offenders involved as it is prescribed in the standard model of policing (Sherman 2013). Proactive investigation is viewed as having the same purpose as reactive investigation: to identify a perpetrator with the aim of prosecuting and arresting him. Although proactive policing promotes prevention per default this is not a central aspect of neither perception nor practice. The fact that prevention of crime is not a high-status task within police is connected to the notion of real policing, but also to an organisational preoccupation with fast and visible results which create immediate gratification and short-run hedonism (Cohen 1955). In the general run of things, both strategic and operational decision-makers seem to rely on the familiar course of action as proactive policing is not regarded as a different paradigm for police action, and since there seems to be an organisational need to reduce complexity in police work and instigate 'quick-fix' solutions without too much organisational change. Thus, these conditions present a fundamental paradox for proactive policing: the proactive domain is dominated by reactive notions of police work and how it is carried out. Furthermore, experience-based policing is the highest-ranking professionalism within the status hierarchy as it is based on concrete 'thick' knowledge as opposed to more abstract 'thin' standardised analytical knowledge. The police response overall is not altered radically – the perception of proactive policing is that it is a smarter way of doing police work, and it therefore becomes an instrumental understanding instead of being integrated into a knowledge-led and wide-ranging revolutionary paradigm shift.

Returning now to *Operation Goldilocks*: this investigation was launched as part of the narrow response model with the purpose of diminishing the influence of one of the (assumed) most significant priority offenders in the criminal environment and as

such a high-value target for the police. A proactive investigation should thereby uncover the suspect's criminal activities and provide enough evidence to build a criminal case leading to arrest and prosecution. This should lead to the disempowerment of the offender with great consequences for his criminal organisation. The operation was in the beginning viewed as part of 'the long haul' (det lange seje træk) targeting the underlying structures of organised crime. It had been launched with great ambition and was allocated substantial personnel and resources. However, as displayed in the introduction, the investigation was shut down when it had run for eight months. Over time, police management lost interest in *Operation Goldilocks* and became impatient with the investigation process for a number of reasons. First, there were other imposing priorities such as new (political) and more publicly visible priorities including terrorism, immigration, and border security. But also new investigations which were assessed by police management to demand an acute investigative response (a coincidental discovery of a large amount of illicit drugs). This mirrors indeed the organisational habitus of focusing on problems of the day. Second, the investigation lacked the expected progression and seemed to stomp as one line of enquiry after another did not lead to incriminating evidence. The amount of resources needed to carry on with the investigation was supposedly not considered to be a good investment. Many of the investigative measures were of a technical nature, but technology kept failing which impacted the investigation's potential for identifying evidence. Third, *Operation Goldilocks* is an illustration of one of the most central issues regarding proactive policing (and proactive investigation towards organised crime): high-value targets such as crime facilitators and kingpins (bagmænd) as counterparts (modstandere) are always several steps ahead of the police. There are two main reasons for this.

The first and most obvious reason is that criminal agents are inherently not bound by laws, regulations, bureaucracy, technological, and economical restrictions and ethical considerations for democracy, privacy, and human rights. In contrast to police, criminal agents can operate freely which gives them a huge advantage. The

other reason is of a methodological nature. It is a difficult and complex task to build a criminal case against a high-value target. Especially those who are characterised by being criminal entrepreneurs with high degrees of criminal knowledge, years of experience, and criminality as both a lifestyle and profession (Dean et al. 2010), as it was apparently the case in *Operation Goldilocks*. Such offenders are very aware of employing safety measures as they have years of experience with police action and can therefore protect themselves against e.g. investigation techniques. Additionally, they often have a supporting network both internationally, in the organised crime environment, but also within the legitimate part of society such as legal and financial advisors (lawyers and accountants). This gives them competitive advantages and makes them capable of e.g. blurring their own involvement in criminality (for example import and distribution of illicit drugs) and abilities to keep the profit without having it traced back to illegal activities (for example via money laundering) (Dean et al. 2010). In sum, the operation, as I will show in **Chapter 8**, presented the investigation team with difficulties, and police management were not prepared to prolong the investigative resources despite of the belief that proactive investigations towards high-value targets was the right thing to do. The operation was at risk of not attributing to the numbers' game and the political and organisational demands. Moreover, the investigation team started to become frustrated and impatient as they were not seeing any immediate results of their efforts and they began to lose motivation and interest in the case.

The case of *Operation Goldilocks* is far from unique when it comes to proactive investigations, and it illustrates quite well how difficult it is for the police both on a structural and individual level to maintain focus on and make long-term investments in proactive efforts as these are generally not rewarded when measuring both political and organisational success. The 'drama of cops and robbers' where the police perform the roles of crime fighters and crusaders against ideal offenders include a script where the counterpart makes mistakes for the police to pursue. This performance can be seen as a rerun from uniformed patrol policing

with underlying assumptions which stem from the standard policing model and promote a logic of responding rapidly to events and acting upon them (Sherman 2013). According to the script, this performance should according to the script end with the arrest of the offender, which is applauded by the political and public audience.

Summing up this chapter, both the formal, organisational structures and aspects of the informal world of policing altogether seem to commission the instigation of an enforcement strategy which focuses on the emic concepts of low-hanging fruits rather than the long haul. This is understood as catching and prosecuting ‘easy targets’; prolific offenders who indeed commit serious and organised crime on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale. These offenders do not require the same efforts or present the same difficulties from a policing or investigative standpoint as individuals with a more strategic and as such valuable function within a crime group such as e.g. crime facilitators, kingpins, and ‘money men’ (bagmænd). The police response overall is as such not altered radically; proactive policing is viewed instrumentally as a smarter way of doing police work, and this hinders a revolutionary paradigm shift. Due to these conditions, it seems uncertain if the police can instigate long-term, proactive, and high-end police work targeting high-value offenders who do not fit the role description of the typical counterpart and where the script for the performance is unknown. The question is if this approach can be altered? The identification and targeting of offenders is the theme of the next chapter.

Chapter 7: The Drama of Cops and Robbers

- *On police's instigation of random investigations towards priority offenders*

The police, by surveillance and tracking selected groups of people and known suspects, making arrests, traffic stops, and sweeps of areas, keeping a jail, and applying street justice under the disguise of "discretion" can radically alter life chances, enhancing some, and rarely even ending life. They act as a redistribution mechanism in the context of the present inequalities of even a wealthy society.

- *Democratic Policing in a Changing World* by Peter K. Manning (2010: xiii).

Introduction

“So you see—we’re not doing target selection ‘the academic way’ yet... but it’s much better now than when we started.”

Superintendent Carlyle had come into my office and sat down on the small meeting table, leaving his feet dangling in the air.

I had just attended my first targeting meeting where high-value targets—priority offenders from the organised crime environment—were selected and prioritised for proactive investigations. The meeting had representatives from the national unit (NCI), and from the police districts, primarily superintendents from local organised crime units. The meeting lasted about two hours and the participants from the districts each had their own list with names of individuals in the organised crime environment whom they wanted to start an investigation towards. A shortlist with ten names was decided upon at the end of the meeting. The superintendent from the national unit was the meeting chair sitting physically at the end of the oval meeting table. I was there as an observer, but sat together with the others around the table. A clerk sat in the far end and took minutes. She only interrupted when she needed someone to spell out a name.

Especially the gang environment consists primarily of people with ethnic minority background and as such Arabic, African, Middle Eastern names which—for a Dane—are hard to spell and pronounce. Names are difficult, but crucial in this kind of setting. Also, the organised crime environment uses a lot of nicknames and the police use them too. If you don’t know who *Fat Joe* is, you are not getting the latest information from ‘the sources’ (kilderne) or off ‘the wire’ (‘lytteren’/the wiretap). The conclusion can fast enough be that you haven’t been around for a very long time and as such you are not ‘in the know’. I find myself constantly impressed by the fact that many police officers and detectives can remember names and faces of so many different individuals. I have wondered how much time they spend going through the pictures in the police databases and rehearsing these names. Some can even remember the social security number of some of the ‘key players’ who have been around for a long time. A portion of these offenders have been known by police for more than 20 years—some of them grew up together with police officers who started to ‘police’ them later on: street-level work, investigations, surveillance, wiretapping etc. Still, new faces appear all the time, and police officers must really have a good memory.

I smiled at Superintendent Carlyle.

“It’s okay,” I said, “you don’t need to take a more scientific approach to targeting just to please me. You should do it because it makes sense to you to be more systematic in the targeting process, and because we want to look at more comparable features than we usually do. No point in changing things if you feel you’re doing it the best way possible already.”

The Superintendent looked at me without commenting. He said:

“You should have seen how it was done in the beginning. We only targeted the ones that were already prime targets of our inquiries. To please the KPIs,” (the key performance indicators in the national strategy, *my addition*).

I got a sense that Carlyle was apologising for the way they had handled the meeting. It made me think of the day before where a former colleague at NCI, Peter, dropped by my office to chat and ask me about the unit and the tasks I was currently working on. I told him about the review I was doing of targeting practices and we discussed the issues regarding how targets for proactive investigations were chosen.

“Oh, they investigate exactly who they want to! Ha! You cannot get these old boys to change their priorities, and they’ll do what they want no matter what management decides.”

We discussed this for a while and came up with a couple of suggestions as to why this might be the case—that detectives were reluctant to try new approaches to targeting or investigations.

“It’s the culture!” Peter said, without specifying his comment further.

A Norwegian book called *Investigative Methods* (Etterforskningsmetoder) was lying on my desk. Peter looked at it and said:

“Be careful that you don’t become a spearhead of the kind of thinking where one believes one can learn about investigation by reading a thick book. You can’t!”

Peter smiled and raised his arm in a salute while leaving.

Although, I did not perceive the comment as a distinct critique, merely as Peter stating an—from his point of view—obvious fact, the situation was present in my mind when speaking to the superintendent. It made me choose my words carefully. I did not want to offend Superintendent Carlyle by saying something he would perceive as a critique of the established approach. My experience was that when different approaches or issues were discussed e.g. at meetings or simply around the coffee machine it quickly went in the direction of heated discussions which rarely had a constructive outcome. I wanted to present my views in a way that did not overrule the viewpoints of the superintendent, but to put forward an alternative to the established approach.

“It could give us an advantage if we looked at the groups (organised crime groups, *my addition*) first and their individual members afterwards. You know; trying to determine who has which functions and who is most influential in terms of crime, but also the organisational issues within the groups.”

“But we know that already from the sources (confidential informants, *my addition*) and the investigations,” Carlyle said, “I don’t think an analysis can tell us something we don’t know.”

“That might be,” I said, “but wouldn’t it be useful to have a more systematic overview of this knowledge which is already out there? Writing it down on paper, backing it up with relevant data? If we look at the long-term, it might help us in three or six months if we’ve tracked the different developments within the groups. It might also be relevant in relation to violent conflicts for example?”

“But there’s a lot of work in it and I’m not sure it’s gonna be worth the effort...writing something down we already know...”

Carlyle stayed on for a while and we continued to talk about the different approaches to targeting, but also the shortlist with ten names—the suggested high-value targets for proactive investigations. Before he left, Carlyle commented on the list which was composed at the end of the targeting meeting:

“There’s no question that these people are very influential (toneangivende) in the environment. If we could eliminate them (tage dem ud af spillet), it would really make a difference.”

The incident above took place about the time when police management wanted to instigate a new model for targeting—that being the identification of priority offenders for proactive investigations. The narrative above illustrates quite well some of the organisational hassles and dilemmas which are at stake in the police especially for police management when it comes to identifying high-value investigation targets, and in terms of prioritising investigation resources for proactive investigations. On one hand, police management holds the ambition to get a better overview of threats from organised crime, and a more strategic way of allocating resources. The conventional targeting practice within police was believed to be insufficient in terms of targeting high-value offenders operating ‘on the top shelf’ as prescribed in the narrow response model. Additionally, strategic management called for a more top-down process which left reduced powers to managers at an operational level, and detectives and informant handlers at a tactical level. On the other hand, the analytical-based model for strategic targeting proved to be a challenge to implement for a number of reasons—but mainly as it did not suit organisational habits and ways of doing things. Therefore, despite of several attempts being made, strategic targeting was never fully implemented and established as a practice within police. Instead, what police managers referred to as an *interim targeting model*—which predominantly relied on conventional and well-known measures to targeting—was launched and eventually made up the permanent model for targeting.

The example above therefore draws attention to the two different rationales of experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing as discussed in the

previous chapters. These rationales are competing in many different areas of contemporary policing and especially in regards to proactive investigation and the targeting of priority offenders. The rationales reflect the ultimate concern about how police work should be carried out and what type of knowledge this practice should build on. So, in relation to the launch of proactive investigations; who can be regarded as priority offenders in organised crime? Which methods should be used to identify these high-value targets? What constitutes the information base of these offenders' threats, and how is this information produced? And further: how do police handle both external and internal demands for implementing more knowledge-based methods within the frame of the narrow response model and at the same time considering organisational preferences to sustain established experience-based practices?

In this chapter, I explore the circumstances under which proactive investigations are initiated. The chapter is as such concerned with the preparatory phase leading up to the launch of proactive investigations in which (suspected) offenders are identified, selected, and prioritised as high-value investigation targets. Such proactive investigations are primarily launched within the counters of the narrow response model, which I presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I analyse two different approaches to targeting namely the conventional and established approach within police and a new analytical-driven approach which is sought implemented and I identify these as reactive and proactive models for targeting respectively. Further, I explore the organisational competition between these two approaches and the underlying explanations for and consequences of this. Overall, I ask the question and analyse: how are prime targets for proactive investigations identified and prioritised? My main argument in this chapter is that due to organisational preferences and habitual thinking, proactive investigations often target priority offenders for proactive investigations using predominantly conventional and experience-based approaches such as informant-driven targeting. This can be compared to the approach of *random patrolling* from the standard

policing model which mirrors a narrow perception of proactive policing both as a concept and as a practice (Bacon 2016). Inherent in this approach lies a practice where offenders are randomly identified through the police gaze as they meet the criteria of being highly visible, usual suspects who police can easily recognise and moreover prefer to deal with. It mirrors as such the performance of the street-level drama of cops and robbers between good and bad (real police catching real criminals) where police identify and round up usual suspects as a ritual revolving around a well-known script and well-known role descriptions. On the contrary, the performance of targeting hidden populations has no predefined role descriptions or predictable script and therefore despite a strategic inclination to instigate a knowledge-based approach it is difficult to replace standard routines in police practice. Proactive investigation therefore becomes an informant-led police activity rather than a component to intelligence-led policing.

First, I investigate the conventional and established practices for targeting and their historical origin within the police with the purpose of exploring their inherent principles, assumptions, and logics.

Second, I examine how and why new methods for targeting are sought to be instigated as part of the narrow response model, and the challenges these processes meet when encountering the police's organisational and cultural frames and ruling practices.

Third, I explore the organisational battle between these reactive and proactive models for targeting and consequently the competition between the rationales of experience-based and knowledge-based policing.

The chapter ends with a summary of the key analytical findings together with a discussion of the impact of police's targeting practices towards the overall response to organised crime and as such the field of proactive investigation

Rounding Up Usual Suspects: Conventional Approaches to Targeting

The Good Old Days

Investigation-led Targeting

Historically within the (Danish) police there have been two dominant ways to select targets for proactive investigations. The first approach I identify as *investigation-led targeting*. This refers to the practice when an ongoing investigation uncovers suspicion of further criminal activity related to individuals in the periphery of the investigation. These individuals are omitted from the initial investigation for different reasons e.g. lack of resources, or decisions made by the prosecution service in terms of ‘modelling the case’ (skære sagen til). A new investigation is therefore initiated subsequent to the first investigation and the periphery person is transferred into a prime target. This is a form of ‘snowballing practice’ where one investigation ‘snowballs’ into another so to speak.

Detectives talk about this approach as being dominant in ‘the old’ narcotics units which were run more or less autonomously by plain clothes detectives and operative personnel (operativt personale) with little interference from police management. A Detective explains:

Often, we would come across an ‘asshole’ when investigating others. If we were liking a guy for his activities (fik et godt øje til en), we would remember him (vi skrev ham bag øret) and once we’d finished the investigation we would go right after him. No problem whatsoever, we were never jobless! Sometimes we would sit drinking coffee and decide: who needs to be taking care of now (hvem skal have en tur for lopper). This guy—okay, let’s begin tomorrow. As long as we produced results, management was happy. I don’t think they cared much about what our unit did as long as we didn’t cause any problems and could keep street activities to a somewhat satisfying level.

Street activities refer, in this connection, to the open drug market (åbenlyst gadesalg) and the crime and the violence it brings on. A Chief Superintendent further states:

Back in the day you looked at a case for the sake of the case. When you launched an investigation there was no trailing edge (bagkant). And we didn't have a budget. We instigated an investigation and saw where it brought us. There was no plan whatsoever. And it didn't lead to anything big. We continued to investigate into infinity! (...) And you were not held accountable to anyone. No one asked: what are you actually spending your money on? Because we knew better! No one should interfere with the police's work. (...) Management didn't have an overview. It wasn't the manager who decided that we needed to launch an investigation. A very competent and powerful detective would come into unit N (afdeling N, the old narcotics unit in the national police, *my addition*) and say: "This is a good case." And then they said: "allright, let's just launch that one". Today there's a very different management focus.

The autonomy and bottom-up decisions in terms of drug policing are described by many detectives and is often referred to as 'the good old days' in the 1980s and 1990s. These were times where performance measures were yet to be introduced and where detectives and police officers working in street-level narcotics units were free agents who received little attention from police management (see also Wathne 2018). During the 1990s and as a consequence of amongst other the events connected to the Great Nordic Biker War (as described in **Chapter 2** and **5**) organised crime as a phenomenon received more and more political and public attention (Bay 1998a; Larsson 2015). As a result, drug policing and organised crime policing experienced increased management supervision due to escalating demands from the political level and strategic level within the police. In this time period, the most common approach to launch proactive investigations was through a snowballing practice stemming from existing investigations. Targeting was as such investigation-led.

Informant-driven Targeting

The second targeting approach I identify as *informant-driven targeting*. It builds on the use of information from police's confidential informants which calls attention to specific criminal activities carried out by specific people (see also Manning 2004 and Bacon 2016). This information is usually compiled in an intelligence report (kilderapport) which provides the basis of a concrete suspicion of criminal activity (mistankegrundlag). A common estimate amongst detectives within the Danish police is that nowadays 90 per cent of all proactive investigations begin on the basis of information from 'a source' – however, a systematic overview or specific documentation of this estimation does not exist. The launch of all proactive investigations has to meet certain legal criteria of suspicion (mistankegrundlag) (see *The Administration of Justice Act 2017*) and the police's use of specific covert investigation techniques (indgreb) (such as interception in communications) are conditioned by a formal permission, a court order (retskendelse), from the local court. An intelligence report containing information from a source is usually adequate to get a court order – this is in accordance with Bacon (2016) who similarly finds that a single piece of information from a reliable informer was sufficient grounds for drug warrants (see also **Chapter 8**). Informant-driven targeting was by 2013 (when I began this research) the dominant approach to targeting, and in 2018 (when I finished collecting information), this was still the predominant approach, which I explain later in this chapter.

In this analysis, I will primarily pay attention to the use of informant-driven targeting as a basis for launching proactive investigations, and as such I omit the practices surrounding investigation-led targeting. The reason is that informant-driven targeting is considered to be the most commonly used approach within the Danish police, and since it was also the set off in *Operation Goldilocks*. The centrality of the informer in drug investigations is moreover underlined by Ericson (1981), Manning (2004) and Bacon (2016). In the following section, I will briefly examine the

historic origin of the police's use of confidential informants and the implication for current practice in relation to targeting priority offenders. If around 90 per cent of all proactive investigations are typically launched on the basis of source information, the professional quality of this area of police practice indeed sets the standard for proactive investigations. In relation to the proactive paradigm which proposes to do things smarter – in terms of methods and resource allocation – informant work therefore becomes a central element.

Informant Work: A Necessary Evil

The use of confidential informants has historically been and is central for (covert) police work, and the systematic use of this covert tactic has its backdrop in the military field and is viewed as essential for providing information about 'the enemy' to protect the sovereign state against external threats (see e.g. Dunnighan & Norris 1996; 1999; Maddinger 2000; Gundhus & Larsson 2014; Larsson 2014; 2015). Before the police took up various technical aids to support information gathering, the use of confidential informants was the most important way to get information about criminal environments, the local drug scene, the products, prices, and purities, knowledge of 'key players'; their backgrounds, street names, last known whereabouts, routines activities etc. (Bacon 2016). Therefore, specifically in connection to drug cases it is often by police suggested to be essential and even necessary in order to provide a successful case (Maddinger 2000; Manning 2004; Bacon 2016).

In this context, I refer to confidential informants (or merely 'sources'), as individuals from the criminal environment with whom the police establish a "professional" relationships. Confidential informants possess or have access to specific knowledge regarding a certain crime area or criminal environment and police pay them to provide this information (Rachlew 2009). In Greer's (1995) terms an *inside multiple event informant*. The 'classic' source is as such a career criminal who possibly risks a

great deal when ‘narc’ing out’ other criminals, but who is also a person with various motivations for providing the police with information. The confidential informant’s own position in the criminal environment is thereby a corner issue when assessing this information as e.g. reliable/not reliable. According to the narrative within the Danish police, the practice of informant work stems from street-level operational divisions and *vice squads* (narcotics and other special units dealing with drug offences, illegal weapons, prostitution etc.). Police officers in these units would as such ‘handle’ a number of ‘snitches’ (stikkere), sources, who could provide details about people in the criminal environment and their (illegal) activities. This would then lead to ‘crackdowns’ and searches (ransagninger) where drugs and other illegal goods were seized, and the people possessing them were arrested. This is in line with Bacon’s (2016) and Manning’s (2004) analyses of *raids*, and I identify this police tactic as *informant-driven police operations*.

At some point throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as drugs were increasingly put on the political agenda, this police tactic was apparently the most applied police response to drug offences and the activities around them – which is reflected in the international literature as well (see e.g. Manning 2004; Rachlew 2009; Larsson 2014). During the 1990s these offences and activities were gradually described and defined as organised crime activities (see also **Chapter 2**). As a consequence, the Danish police found the need to gradually centralise the police response by establishing national units (amongst other *Narcotics Information* (Narkotikainformationen) in 1984 and NCI in 1998) with the purpose of getting a better overview of the problem and in order to focus on the structures behind the criminal networks – instead of merely dealers on street-level (Strand 2011). In this process, police’s informant work went from being merely an operative tactic to a central part of the police’s intelligence work. This is an important widening of this working field which also research in e.g. the UK and Norway has shown (Gundhus 2006; 2012; James et al. 2017; Larsson 2014; 2015; 2018) I will return to this issue later in this chapter.

Different Methods for Information Collection

The current use of confidential informants in the Danish police entail a practice where informant handlers (kildedeførere) at both local and national level continuously provide the police with information from their sources regarding past or ongoing criminal activities, or activities in the planning. This information is documented in intelligence reports (kilderapporter), which are kept in a national database with strict, limited access due to the sensitivity of the information. Information from confidential informants is to a varying degree used as a basis for different police activities which I divide into three main categories:

- 1) intelligence purposes (knowledge-building, production of intelligence and analysis products)
- 2) operational responses (searches and crackdowns/raids)
- 3) investigations (before and during proactive (and reactive) investigations).

Thus, information from confidential informants is currently applied broadly within the police and support a number of different police functions and personnel (intelligence units, operational units, and investigation units) primarily within area of organised crime and drug policing. As informant work serves different purposes, it might also encompass different methods for information collection. Some propose a divide between two main strategies for collecting information in intelligence organisations, namely *the traditional method* and *the requirement-based method* (see **Figure N** derived and altered from CISC 2009 and Hestehave 2013). The traditional method (also referred to as *the dragnet method* or *trawler-based method*) emphasises collection of information to identify ‘something of interest’ (*collection in case it is needed*). The requirement-based method emphasises targeted information collection based on predefined intelligence-requirements such as intelligence-gaps (*collection of what is needed*) (CISC 2009).

Figure N. *Two Methods for Information Collection.*

TRADITIONAL	REQUIREMENT-BASED
Data-oriented	Analysis-oriented
Explorative	Reflective
Focus on collecting information	Focus on targeting information
General and broad collection of information	Selective collection of information based on pre-defined prioritisation
Investigates collected information to see if there are questions to answer (collection in case it is needed)	Collect information to answer intelligence-requirements (collection of what is needed)
Produces intelligence for potential use (just in case it is needed)	Produces intelligence to support ongoing operations/investigations (as it is needed)

There are pros and cons in terms of both methods. The traditional method is concerned with broad non-specific information collection which gives the advantage that information, which at a later stage becomes relevant, can be found and come into use. However, this method often leads to information overload and it is difficult to differentiate between important and less important information (Sheptycki 2004; Hestehave 2013). The requirement-based method is a central element in intelligence-led policing as it is focused on specific information collection based on the most pertinent crime problems/crime events or intelligence-gaps (James 2013; Bacon 2016; Ratcliffe 2016). This calls for well-defined intelligence needs, which cannot always be predicted, and other information is in risk of being overlooked. Moreover, the requirement-based method depends on highly structured and systematic practice. Most police services, however, have little experience as intelligence organisations and function in very informal ways – the most dominant method for information collection is therefore the traditional method (CSIC 2009). A central point here is that the differentiation between these main strategies for information collection is also relevant when it comes to the specific area of informant work, as I will elaborate next.

Informant Handlers as Information Collectors?

In this study, I focus primarily on confidential informant information in relation to investigations – but it should be noted that there is a close connection between source information used in intelligence, operational police work, and investigations as the practice of informant handlers are basically the same. In fact, informant handling (*meddelerhåndtering*) is currently in the (Danish) police officially viewed as a separate policing discipline and as such informant handlers often work in independent units or sections. This is connected to continuous attempts to professionalise this working area, and within this professionalisation lies the principle that informant handlers should not be involved in for example investigation activities, but should merely be viewed as collectors of information (or knowledge workers as Gundhus (2012) argues). This mirrors the historical transition I proposed earlier in this chapter; from informant handling being used as an operative tactic to a central part of the police’s intelligence work. I underline this condition as historically, informant handlers were to be found on street-level and they were indeed active in police operations such as searches and crackdowns (Larsson 2014; Larsson 2018). Thus, they were central in seizing drugs which defined and entailed the police’s response to organised crime. They acted therefore both as informant handlers, operational police, and detectives. However, the recruitment of informant handlers still in some ways seems to mirror the conventional understanding of this police activity as an operational tactic, as an informant handler explains:

My impression is that the recruitment of informant handlers depends on that officer who picks up an informant on the street who turns out to have valuable and reliable information—then he becomes an informant handler. (...) There are no objective criteria or standards or personal characteristics as to what one should possess in order to do the job. It’s not necessarily bad, but there is no systematic method for recruitment in the organisation.

In regards to proactive investigations, one of the explanations as to why these are often informant-driven is due to the practical condition that an intelligence report with information from a confidential informant is often necessary for the police to get a court order and as such get ‘the green light’ to begin a § 191 investigation (the import, production, sales, distribution, possession etc. of illicit drugs, *The Criminal Justice Code*). This green light enable the police to instigate certain covert investigative techniques for example wiretapping which is typically the first step in a proactive investigation (see **Chapter 8** for further elaboration of these investigative steps). Another reason is that the use of informants is not believed to be particularly resource demanding and relies on a historically established practice within the police. As an Analyst describes it is regarded and used as a ‘rapid investigative tactic’:

It is a short term way of working with investigation: Go ask some people if they know where drugs or guns are lying around and then go get them. The advantage is that you ‘feel it’ right away! You don’t need a long-term plan involving three or 17 meetings—you just go and ask if he (the informant, *my addition*) knows something.

The practice of informant-driven investigations is as such fairly straightforward and builds on a long experience as an operational tactic providing fast and visible results in accordance with the external and internal demands as discussed in **Chapter 6**. Accordingly, there are obviously some clear advantages associated to the police’s use of informants, as the information they provide is difficult or even impossible to obtain in any other way (see Marx 1988; Maddinger 2000; Billingsley et al. 2001; Manning 2004; Clark 2007; Rachlew 2009; Bacon 2016; Harfield & Harfield 2016). Information from confidential informants is as such vital for the police’s possibilities to gain knowledge of specific criminal events and developments within the organised crime environment and as such to instigate police preventive or enforceive responses in due time (Bacon 2016). A preventive response can for example include the deescalating of an arising gang conflict through active communication with the involved parties whereas an enforceive response can

include the arrest of people suspected of various offences. However, the police's use of confidential informant information entails some difficulties and involve a number of predicaments which as a result becomes problematic when talking about informant-driven targeting and proactive investigations, which I discuss in the section below.

Challenges for Informant Work

As mentioned before, the apparent relevance of looking at the police's practices in connection with informants in this study lies in the circumstance that the quality of this type of police work indirectly sets the standard for the police's priorities when it comes to proactive investigations. Thus, the practice of using confidential informant information as a street-level operational tactic employing searches and crackdowns with the purpose of finding e.g. illicit drugs or guns seems to be transformed into the fields of intelligence and proactive investigation. Recalling the presentation of research and Marx' (1988) typology of police work in **Chapter 2**, covert and deceptive tactics of policing are powerful, but also problematic as they impose some challenges in connection with the tangible "professional" relationship between informant and police raises both legal and ethical questions concerning its use as a police tactic. In connection to this study and consequently the use of information from confidential informants in targeting and proactive investigations, the risks are specifically associated with: 1) methods for information collection and information evaluation, and 2) the application of this information in operational responses. According to Dean et al. (2010) knowledge is the main resource for an organisation – including the police; in fact, police organisations are first and foremost knowledge organisations (Ericsson & Haggerty 1997). In regards to the first two issues, I refer to two central arguments in Rønn's work (2012).

In her PhD study of the Danish police's intelligence work, she concludes first that there are two main epistemological challenges in terms of this police activity:

- 1) We do not know what we know
- 2) We do not know what we want to know.

The first challenge suggests that there are organisational issues connected to distributing relevant information to relevant officials – implying that police do not have the necessary overview of the knowledge they actually possess and where this knowledge actually is. This is connected to the condition that not all information is processed and stored systematically and correctly in the appropriate systems or databases and therefore it cannot be searched and applied by analysts whose main functions are to ‘connect the relevant dots’ (Rønn 2012). Instead, pieces of information exist tacitly amongst police officers, detectives, and other intelligence personnel and this information is therefore kept outside the intelligence cycle which is supposed to distribute information and knowledge in the intelligence organisation (Ratcliffe 2008a). As such, this challenge impacts the entire foundation and existence of the intelligence organisation – it undermines its purpose, function, and efficiency.

The second challenge suggests that information gathering is unfocused and trawler-based – reflecting the traditional method for information collection. One explanation, Rønn (2012) puts forward is that intelligence personnel are in fact unable to express which pieces of information they regard as relevant and why. Instead, these decisions are often based on practical knowledge and professional expertise which are not easily elucidated. Thus, the predefinition of relevant and necessary information and knowledge gaps are quite difficult, and the approach therefore becomes to collect all available information ‘just in case it is needed’ (ibid.). Sheptycki (2004) argues that this approach, worst case, leads to information noise, overload of low-quality data, and thus a general reduction of the quality of intelligence organisations. The two epistemological challenges therefore become central in regards to the quality of intelligence work. Second, Rønn (2012)

concludes that the current practice for information evaluation (primarily the assessment of 1) the reliability of the source, and 2) the credibility of the information)¹ in police intelligence organisations are not sufficient in assessing the overall level of trustworthiness of a testimony. She therefore proposes a more qualitative evaluation methodology which incorporates six distinct categories to strengthen and improve these assessments (see Rønn 2012 for further elaboration).

In sum, I find the epistemological challenges mentioned above and the issues concerning evaluation of information central for the specific area of informant work. The overall method for information collection and information evaluation in police intelligence systems is namely reflected in the practice of informant work. An unstructured approach to information collection generally can result in sporadic collection of information from confidential informants as well. Furthermore, the empirical material in this study supports at least two areas of the challenges mentioned above. First, it seems as if informant work is based on a random process from the recruitment of source handlers and recruitment of informants to collection and use of source information. An Analyst explains:

There are no objective criteria or standards or personal characteristics in terms of what you need to possess in order to do this job. It is not necessarily a bad thing—but it can narrow down the possibilities you have to collect information if you don't reflect on your role in the relationship (between confidential informant and informant handler, *my addition*). (...) Organisationally, it's more subjective criteria of who is able to 'talk to people'—they use their intuition in the work. (...) 'We just do what we've always done, we go and have a cup of coffee and talk to them and ask them what they know!' But this is not always appropriate...

Another Analyst elaborates on the recruitment of confidential informants:

These people have become informants for many different reasons. They might have felt pressured in connection with an arrest or search, under custody and so on. Or they might have other motives. But we don't concern ourselves with that until much further down the line. There's no methodology in this area. It seems random.

Along the lines of Bacon (2016), police officers and detectives moreover report how information from confidential informants is rarely checked or verified systematically via other sources or channels – a fundamental function of the secrecy regarding such information which is furthermore connected to its inherent risks (see also Marx 1988; Manning 2004; Clark 2007; Rachlew 2009). Instead, it is most often stored, labelled and perceived as 'trustworthy' – and operational responses are often instigated on the basis of this information. A Detective explains how information from confidential informants leads to proactive investigations:

Suddenly, you have 15 people on a team (etterforskningshold) working the case—and then six months later, you find out that there was nothing there! (der var ikke noget i det alligevel).

Second, information from cover human sources was imperative both in the launch of and underway in connection with *Operation Goldilocks*. However, detectives were increasingly becoming skeptical regarding the trustworthiness of the sources and thus the ability of the source handlers to evaluate this information correctly (a similar conflict is described in the work of Gundhus 2006). A Senior Detective explains:

It was information from a source (confidential informant, *my addition*) which launched the investigation. But we couldn't use the information. Suddenly, it had to be launched right away because there is a tendency in this firm (the police, *my addition*) where people love to play fast and efficient instead of holding their horses (lige at synke spyttet) and see what's really going on. And it had to be 'right now' as the source information was burning...but as it turned out we couldn't use it at all...

During the investigation, a broad assumption spread amongst detectives that the information from the confidential informant the police was receiving in connection with *Operation Goldilocks* was ultimately misinformation. The investigative measures which were taken and the events during the investigation strengthened this perception further. Misinformation, deceit, and treason propose some of the most fundamental problems and pertinent risks for the police in connection with

informant work (Marx 1988) but it was never officially dealt with in connection with *Operation Goldilocks*. It remained an almost unspoken or at least indirectly addressed issue amongst detectives. This condition can be due to the general reluctance to deal with internal conflicts within police and the sometimes sensitive relationship between e.g. national and local level or different units and working areas. Still, I identify this circumstance as predominantly being a consequence of the lack of internal evaluation processes in connection with investigations, and ultimately the condition that police organisations often lack systematic processes for learning (Bjørkelo & Gundhus 2015). Based on the analysis above, I argue that police primarily operate with what I call a *reactive model for informant work* as opposed to a *proactive model for informant work*. These different models are ideal type models and illustrated in **Figure O**. The differences lies both in the approach, methods, purpose, and focus.

Figure O. *Reactive and Proactive Models for Informant Work.*

	Reactive Model	Proactive Model
CHARACTERISTIC	<i>Information-that-fell-into-our-lap</i>	<i>Information-we-need-now-and-in-the-future</i>
DESCRIPTION	Conventional informant handling	Strategic informant handling
PURPOSE	Collection of information which quickly can be transferred into operational responses	Systematic information collection to build a knowledge-base over time to support strategic priorities, operational decisions, and intelligence collection plans (ICP)

FOCUS	<i>Topicality</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information collection based on changeable external and internal political issues - Short-term here and now problems e.g. violent conflicts between gangs and “pop-up” crime problems 	<i>Sustainability</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information collection concerning a selection of prioritised crime areas, crime groups, and criminal agents - Reduce knowledge gaps - Long-term threats to society e.g. subversive and undermining criminal structures
CONTENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information which is allowed to be “burnt” (used/acted upon) - Information which’s importance decline with time 	Information which can be transferred into intelligence and knowledge
OUTCOMES/ GOALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seizures - Arrests - Prevention of violence - Investigation support - Case-solving 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Knowledge of prioritised crime problems and threats - National overview of organised crime - Support of strategic and operational decision-making - Investigation support - Prevention of violent conflicts - Prevention of crime
METHODS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recruitment of source handlers who have good sources - Recruitment of confidential informants who continuously provide information about e.g. narcotics, weapons, and violent conflicts - Recruitment of confidential informants in the most important crime groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic recruitment of source handlers with specific professional competences as information collectors - Targeted recruitment of confidential informants who possess information about specific social environments and specific crime areas
APPROACH	Traditional	Requirement-based

The reactive model for informant work builds on the established and conventional practice for informant handling and as such a traditional approach to information

collection. The purpose is to collect information which as fast as possible can be used in police operations (such as informant-driven police operations) with the aim to make arrests or seizure illicit goods or money or disrupt ongoing violence. It is short-term focused and occupied with immediate problems and issues (Gundhus 2012). Since informant handlers are recruited mainly as they already have (good) sources it is not characterised by meeting organisational priorities, but the priorities are rather set by the information which it brought in. Similarly, Manning (2004: 87) concludes, in connection to drug law enforcement overall, that this is in fact *fact-based* rather than *information-based*:

In many respects, short-term pragmatic police action based on the here and now obviates longer-term considerations of the information content and increase the salience facts. Because drug enforcement is based on short-term action, it is fact-based, rather than information based. Fact-based work is that which assumes a short-term, fading signal in a message and a declining importance with time. This means it is not easily converted, re-framed, or re-contexted.

In this context, I still use the word information rather than facts, but the sentiment from Manning (ibid.) is mirrored in the reactive model for informant work; this model too indicates that the relevance of the information is limited spatially and temporally, and that the quality of the information can be questioned since it is characterised by information-that-fell-into-our-lap. The proactive model for information work is founded in a requirement-based information collection model and has a long-term perspective as it seeks to aim for knowledge-building used to police the underlying structures of organised crime. It is selective and targeted in nature as it is concerned with prioritised areas, problems, and people who are assessed to encompass the greatest threats and risks. Therefore, recruitment of informant handlers is based on professional criteria in terms of competences for collecting and producing information and the recruitment of sources is carried out in those environments the police wish to gain knowledge of cf. their priorities. This model's success is deeply dependent on a well-founded selection of police priorities and these still hold the risk of being wrong or inadequate.

Risks of Informant-Driven Targeting

Risks and problems with police informant work as discussed above are connected to this work in general – but these issues are indirectly impacting proactive investigations in circumstances where these are based on informant-driven targeting. On top of the issues presented in the analysis above at least three dilemmas present themselves in terms of the conventional approach to targeting, which I unfold below.

Over-policing Regular Customers

The first issue is connected to the discussion of ideal offenders, presented in **Chapter 6**, and the practice of policing by typology (Holmberg 2003). As stated in **Chapter 1**, the police are not merely responders to organised crime – they have in wide terms both the power to define it and the power to process it in the way they see fit and they are as such both co-constructors, co-producers, and co-contributors of the phenomenon (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 1988; 2013; Manning Holmberg (2014). The organisationally shared assumptions in the police of the typical counterpart with specific stereotypical characteristics lead to a rather narrow perception of organised crime and consequently subjects for proactive investigations in the sense that these investigations target specific offenders committing specific offences. In accordance with Bacon (2016), the general understanding of proactive investigations within police have traditionally, as mentioned earlier, been that these investigations are drug investigations. This means that proactive investigations almost always are launched as § 191 investigations into illicit drugs (*The Danish Criminal Justice Code*). Proactive investigations are as such rarely concerned with other crime areas within organised crime (for example economic crime or environmental crime) as these do not meet the internal criteria in the police for the ideal crime type. For historic reasons (see **Chapter 6**), the continuous political attention towards bikers and gangs together with collectively shared assumptions of the typical counterpart within

police means that members of organised crime groups have become a well-defined group of people of which the police possess much information. Information is found where it is sought, and the circle of information collection is as such deeply dependent on who catches the attention of the police. If police are primarily occupied with this group of offenders, it is also this group of offenders they will gain knowledge of and as such they are widely ‘makers’ and ‘constructors’ of organised crime (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 2013). This is problematic as it runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and as such *over-policing* some types of individuals or social groups whilst *under-policing* others.

The typical counterpart is in this sense in risk of being over-policed as these individuals are ‘regular customers’ (Holmberg 2003). They do not only commit a great amount of offences but are also caught by the police gaze again and again (Finstad 2000; Holmberg 2003). This operational practice – known from uniformed police patrolling the streets looking for deviation from the norm e.g. “suspicious” behaviour and people, stopping suspicious cars and individuals based on certain visible characteristics and employing discretionary powers – is in this sense transferred into targeting priority offenders for proactive investigations. As this practice is based on an operative tactic historically used as the police’s main response towards drug crimes, this practice too has established a typical counterpart – the usual suspects (Gill 2000). Thus, the police can be said to have developed a sort of *organisational tunnel vision* leading them to focus on, target, and police the same group of offenders over and over again (see also Fahsing 2016 for the concept of *systemic tunnel vision*).

Under-policing Hidden Populations

The condition of over-policing some consequently means under-policing others. Thus, within the field of organised crime there is the issue of organised crime offenders operating below the surface, the so-called *hidden populations*, which is

frequently raised as a pertinent issue by detectives and analysts. An Analyst remarks: *“The general picture is that we know a lot about bikers and gangs. And then there is a huge part that we know nothing about”*. A Chief Superintendent elaborates:

I think we have a good picture of parts of the organised crime environment—the part which is on the political agenda meaning bikers and gangs. And of course, we’re told that we need to focus on these and we do. But in my opinion, we have organised crime which operates under the radar. I can’t know for sure because we’re lacking intelligence. But it seems strange that groups that we know for sure are present in Denmark are very active in other countries. And we don’t know a lot about them. (...) Of course, we’ve done something about this occasionally, but it has been random. And there hasn’t been the same focus.

Thus, the one-sided focus on bikers and gangs produce concerns within police that a ‘full picture’ and a complete overview of the organised crime problem does not exist. As a result, the police response in this sense randomly targets only a small portion of the problem (Hobbs 2013). This condition can be explained by the political demands and the specific performance measures as discussed in **Chapter 6**. However, it can also be seen as a consequence of conventional targeting practice where these specific groups of offenders historically have been preferred. If confidential informants are recruited within the biker and gang environment by street-level police personnel operating in this environment this will of course be reflected in the general information collection. Each investigation, moreover, provides additional information about this environment and the people in it, and as a result, the police have a disproportionate amount of information of the organised crime environment regarding bikers and gangs in comparison to other organised crime groups. In this context, under-policing therefore refers to two groups of hidden populations: 1) organised crime groups and networks which operate below the surface (for example Asian or Eastern European mafia or crime groups), and 2) organised crime offenders within the biker and gang environment which are less visible than the usual suspects (crime facilitators or money men working behind the scenes). Regarding the first group, a Chief Superintendent explains:

You can easily imagine that there are mafia-like activities which are isolated from bikers and gangs. And then we have a problem because we don't have the excessive resources right now to try and elevate ourselves and look at it analytically to find out: what's even there.

A Senior Detective elaborates:

There are so many out there under the radar and who are 100 times much more capable than one from the biker and gang environment. And we don't get to them. And it would be nice if we were given the chance. But it's the damn number (performance measure, *my addition*).

However, in regards to the second group, it is also assumed that this group of high-value targets is difficult to collect information about and subsequently to investigate. A Chief Superintendent says:

And you could say: are there others from e.g. "Falcons" who lurk under the surface? You don't see them and we know that, but we also know that they're established over so many years that they're capable of working themselves out of the spotlight and to get others to work for them and I'm thinking: it requires other investigation methods and we need to work more targeted on them.

Thus, the targeting of priority offenders is not just a question of whom the police possess information about, but also the level of difficulties in gaining this information and moreover investigating these offenders. As I discussed in **Chapter 6, *Operation Goldilocks*** for example which aimed for a high-value target, was eventually closed down as the investigation measures did not provide the desired results in the expected time frame. Although it was not the official explanation, detectives viewed this management decision as a conclusion that the target was too difficult to investigate. Thus, both formal requirements of meeting performance measures and organisational habits as well as preferences in regards to targeting usual suspects prevent the police from focusing on hidden populations and offenders operating under the radar and as such these are in risk of being under-policed.

Random Selection

As argued earlier, the established practice within police for information collection is based primarily on the traditional dragnet-based approach and moreover a reactive model of informant work (see **Figure O**). This model has the immediate advantage that it often collects information regarding ongoing problems or events, violent conflicts between gangs, homicides, etc. It deals with the here-and-now and ‘problems of the day’ which can accommodate timely information which can be redirected into operational responses immediately. The weakness of such a model in terms of targeting is that it is not based on analytical principles for critically scrutinising, assessing, processing, and reviewing information and it therefore is in risk of passing over inaccurate information or even misinformation. Moreover, it fails to include a variety of other information as it does not reflect information concerning a national overview and a well-founded knowledge base of organised crime and its threats. Targeting therefore becomes, what Manning (2004) similarly argues about drug enforcement; *fact-based* rather than *information-based*, leaving decision-makers to prioritise on the basis of absent or flawed information.

Informant-driven targeting is as such prone to select the most visible offenders who from a here-and-now perspective are ‘problems of the day’ but who in a broad perspective and long-term does not pose the most significant threats. If information from confidential informants, moreover, is used raw to direct targeting without any particular analytical processing, this means that this type of information prevails over other intelligence information and is perhaps given a proportional status which it does not deserve and more severely it risks distorting the intelligence picture. Recalling Dean et al.’s (2010) model for strategic knowledge framework for sector policing of organised crime (presented in **Chapter 2**), this leads the police to carry out police work in sector 1 (random policing) and/or 2 (disadvantaged policing). The reason is that informant-driven targeting is prone to become a random selection of the most visible and active offenders who the police are given

information about. Consequently, this targeting practice does not only result in informant-driven targeting, but as a central nerve in the police's response towards organised crime it becomes a response model of informant-driven policing.

¹The predominant models in police organisations are the NATO Intelligence Evaluation System (6x6), the National Intelligence Model of the UK (5x5), and the Europol Intelligence Evaluation Matrix (4x4) (Rønn 2012).

Beyond the Usual Suspects: Analytical Approaches to Targeting

Proactive Perspectives

When analysing both policy documents, meetings, and individual reports it becomes clear that especially strategic management had a number of concerns about this approach as informant-driven targeting was first of all seen as a bottom-up tactic and thus mirrored an operative/tactical rather than strategic prioritisation. To accommodate the narrow response model and the performance measures attached to this, strategic management wanted more control of the decision-making processes around targeting as they felt middle managers (superintendents) and informant handlers operating at tactical level had too much influence on decision-making and prioritisation. Second of all, informant-driven targeting was not viewed as sufficient in terms of targeting ‘the right people’ meaning high-value targets with a considerable amount of influence and impact in the organised crime environment. Overall, strategic management perceived conventional approaches behind the launch of proactive investigations as scattered since cases often snowballed into each other, and haphazard information from confidential informants sat priorities as it was passed on to the police. This led to a condition where investigation resources were almost always tied up in ongoing casework and as such not available for management dispositions. Moreover, it was a concern that high-impact offenders and kingpins remained untouched as these were seldom targeted through the conventional approaches. In sum, strategic management requested a more systematic and transparent targeting process, and a firmer control with investigation resources.

As discussed in **Chapter 6**, the performance measures connected to the political agreements and the police’s strategy included in the period of 2012-2018 a

performance goal which focused on targeting 15-25 priority offenders through proactive investigations and consequently the instigation of a narrow response model. Policy documents advocated a more strategic approach to targeting and this requirement was founded on the ambition to instigate a more proactive response towards organised gang crime and the specific offenders involved. For example, policy documents underline the need for a national overview of organised crime with the purpose of identifying and targeting key agents who have significant impact on the launch of and facilitation of criminal activities. The overall aim of this targeting is described as “...*disturbing, reducing, and eliminating these agents’ influence in the organised crime environment*”. Thus, in connection with the first set of performance measures in 2012 (*National Operativ Strategiplan 2012*) a key performance indicator was established directed at developing a specific ‘targeting tool’ (måludpegningsredskab). This ‘tool’ was to be used to identify individuals on a national basis who were believed to have significant influence on bikers’ and gangs’ criminality and/or the violent conflicts between them. First, a *conceptual framework for targeting* (måludpegningskoncept) (instead of a ‘tool’) was developed and included e.g. methodological guidelines and templates for analysts and intelligence personnel. In 2013-2016, this framework and its implementation was evaluated and on the basis of this evaluation a new *methodology for targeting* (metodisk ramme for måludpegning) was developed and launched in 2017. In this context, I draw upon the experiences from these two different targeting processes, which I refer to as the *first round of targeting* (2012-2015) and the *second round of targeting* (2017-2018).

Strategic Targeting

Both the initial conceptual framework and the latter methodology for targeting were concerned with the concept of what internally was referred to as *strategic targeting* (strategisk måludpegning). The purpose was to introduce a problem-oriented approach which could enable the organisation to launch a proactive and coordinated police response towards organised crime within the narrow response

model. On the basis of a national overview of groups and individuals in the organised crime environment, strategic targeting was expected to form the basis of national and regional prioritisation. A change was proposed from the existing ad hoc and case-to-case approach to targeting to a more strategic and top-down managed process where proactive investigations were prioritised on a national level and on the basis of threat assessments. Strategic targeting was expected to for example:

- Provide decision-makers with a better foundation to make strategic and operational decisions
- Contribute to a systematic and homogenous process for an analytical-based prioritising of investigation targets
- Target and coordinate investigation resources
- Record decisions and priorities with the purpose of ensuring continuity and transparency of the process, and to provide knowledge for future dispositions.

Furthermore, strategic targeting was aimed at e.g.:

- High-impact offenders (toneangivende aktører) (e.g. kingpins)
- Crime consultants (for example professional accountants)
- Crime facilitators (for example spouses and family)
- Organisations and businesses used for money laundering.

Thus, it was the aim that strategic targeting should direct a police response towards under-policed offenders and hidden populations who were usually not incorporated in the ordinary police response and as such the broad response model. In the second round of targeting, the focus was specifically aimed at the connections between organised crime and legal businesses with the purpose of reducing money laundering and economic crime. This particular focus assumed that a police response towards these structures helps diminishing the crime business models and thereby the economic livelihood – the presumed central nerve of crime groups. In Dean's et al. (2010) terms (see **Chapter 2**), this was supposed to

create a police response in sector 3 (targeted policing) and/or 4 (competitive policing) where the police operate with a policing strategy with a long-term contingency approach to organised crime targeting different forms of criminal enterprises. The ambition for the two strategic frameworks was to create common grounds for targeting practices by introducing guidelines for approaches and methods together with a proposed organisational model for tasks and responsibilities between different units and functions within organised crime policing.

Developing a Framework

The general idea behind the framework for strategic targeting was to collect information about crime groups and suspected offenders, and to analyse this in accordance with a variety of proposed themes such as the offenders' capacity, specialisation, operational logics, connections, finances, applied crime business models etc. (see e.g. Dean et al. 2010). Overall, such analyses were meant to provide the basis for risk and threat assessments for individual targets looking at: 1) what current threat does the individual hold? and 2) which potential risk can the individual become in the future? This approach was initially inspired by practices within the intelligence area where assessments of threats and risks are central (see e.g. the *Criminal Networks Prioritisation Matrix* from the UK and the *Criminal Group Risk Assessment Model* from New Zealand Police Auckland (Avdija 2008; Alach 2012), as well as the literature on entrepreneurship and criminal specialisation in organised crime networks (see Dean et al. 2010). There is a great deal of experience and literature regarding 'offender profiling' meaning the targeting of unknown offenders who are responsible for specific crimes or certain crime types through a variety of techniques, data analysis, and methods (see e.g. Rossmo 2000; Fox & Farrington 2012). However, research about targeting processes in relation to organised crime is much sparser although sought after (Maguire 2000; Ratcliffe et al. 2014; Innes & Levi 2017).

However, *The Sleipnir Model*, developed at Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2010) is a well-known, widely used, and published method for measuring organised crime groups capability and thus producing strategic threat assessments of crime groups. *Sleipnir* operates with twelve different ‘attributes’ which are to be assessed qualitatively for each crime group on the basis of information and data from police databases and intelligence and police personnel. These attributes are ranked on the basis of prescribed points due to the attributes’ severity (the use of corruption is for example viewed as more serious than e.g. the use of violence). When threat assessments are produced for every crime group these can be compared with each other and ranked. *Sleipnir* is moreover humble in the way that it does not take for granted the significance of the collection and processing of information or as other models assume high quality data reliability and validity regardless of the fact that data accountability is a well-known problem in police agencies (Ratcliffe et al. 2014). In round two of targeting, *Sleipnir* was therefore introduced to strategic targeting as it was considered to be highly relevant in relation to the Danish organised crime groups. Besides from providing police management with an information-based analytical foundation for decision-making and prioritisation of investigation resources, strategic targeting was moreover promoting a proactive approach to targeting as it relied on a requirement-based intelligence model and advocated a long-term and group-oriented response to disrupt, prevent, and reduce organised crime (Ratcliffe 2008a). Such an approach included the notion that a market logic can be applied to organised crime in the sense that groups can be seen as cohesive entities or organisations where (criminal) activities and courses of action impact the entire crime market and result in reactions from competing agents or groups. This notion is related to the perception that crime groups can be viewed as crime businesses which’s existence and success are dependent specialisation and as such division of labour (Dean et al. 2010). Moreover, strategic targeting was based on the assumption that specific dynamics and subcultural logics rule the behaviour of gangs in the way that incidents which initially appear to be limited to a couple of individuals suddenly can expand into a conflict between two groups (Hestehave

2013). This *collectivisation of individual actions* implies that individual relations and interests become a matter for the entire group due to subcultural values such as fraternity and loyalty (Bay 1998b).

For those reasons, strategic targeting was supposed to demarcate from informant-driven targeting which focuses on demoting one individual at a time. Strategic targeting was therefore supposed to provide a proactive alternative to the informant-driven operational model which was not believed to be very efficient in terms of disrupting the organised crime environment as a whole. The ambition was to go beyond the targeting of individuals operating on a lower level and as such were considered to be ‘small potatoes’ in the big picture. Instead, the ambition was to support the narrow response model and target hidden populations and offenders who were usually under-policed but held key and significant functions for the groups’ perseverance and entrepreneurism (Dean et al. 2010).

Implementing Strategic Targeting

Round One

Organisation

The organisational set up regarding strategic targeting was initially implemented in the existing governance model for the task forces (see also **Chapter 4** for an overview of the organisation of organised crime policing). This model included representatives from both national agencies, regional, and local level in the police districts. In **Figure P**, I have illustrated responsibilities and tasks at different organisational and geographical levels in relation to targeting:

Figure P. Organisational Set Up in Targeting (Round I).

	TASKS & RESPONSIBILITIES	AGENTS
Steering Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall responsible for the police’s strategy, operational plans and performance measurement on a national level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assistant Police Commissioners from NCI and the districts The Director for the Public Prosecution The State Prosecutor Cooperating partners
Coordination Groups (East & West)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsible for implementation and coordination of operational responses on a regional level Decision-making and prioritisation regarding investigation targets and allocation of investigation resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assistant Police Commissioners from the host districts of East and West Chief Superintendents from NCI, the task forces and the investigation departments in the districts The Prosecution Service Cooperating partners
Targeting Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritisation of investigation targets, target profiles, and investigation proposals for decision-making in coordination groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Superintendents from NCI, the districts’ investigation units for organised crime and task forces and the intelligence and analysis units
Intelligence & Analysis Units (national, regional, and local)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production of target profiles and investigation proposals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysts and intelligence personnel from NCI, the task forces, and the districts

Preparation and formulation of strategies on organised crime and proactive policing, and the operationalisation of political goals and performance measurement takes place at national level and is the responsibility of the national police. These tasks involve primarily management level but include also ad hoc staff representatives from the police districts and the national units. Decision-making processes in connection with targeting and prioritisation of investigations took place on regional level, but with national coordination (coordination groups) based on suggestions from the targeting group. The various Intelligence & Analysis Units at both regional level and locally within the police districts produced moreover target profiles and investigation proposals for the targeting group and coordination groups.

Internal Learning Points

In connection with round one of strategic targeting (2012-2015), there were some overall learning points. First, the conceptual framework for targeting was interestingly used to a limited extent. Although strategic targeting was gradually

integrated in organisational language, the perceptions of the content of this concept were not aligned. In coordination meetings and targeting meetings, the criteria for being a high-value target, as proposed in the conceptual framework, were seldom discussed (see Gundhus 2012 for similar findings). Thus, the process of prioritising offenders as investigation targets mostly revolved around resources instead of the assessment of different strategic (or other) implications of a police response towards these targets. In targeting meetings especially, a common course of action was that representatives from the police districts put forward lists of names as a contribution to the overall ‘pool’ of potential targets and at the end of the meeting a prioritised list of targets was composed. In coordination meetings, target profiles and investigation proposals were discussed, prioritised, and decided upon – however, most discussion concerned current investigation capacity, and how resources could be divided and deployed between districts and units. Interestingly, an implicit notion within both meetings was that all proposed targets were ‘extremely criminal’ (*særdeles kriminelle*) and in this sense they were per default viewed as relevant to instigate proactive investigations off.

Second, the practice of identifying targets (the analytical process and the construction of target profiles and/or investigation proposals) was rarely based on the conceptual framework and its inherent processes and methods. Additionally, the products were of a poor analytical quality. Even the template for target profiles included in the conceptual framework was hardly ever used by analysts and intelligence personnel. In those cases where it was used, it reflected a sense of ‘filling out a form’ rather than mirroring an analytical process guided by particular queries and methods. Target profiles were often based on a limited amount of or single-source information, which was not critically assessed. The statements and conclusions were general rather than specific, and in many cases target profiles were characterised by a sort of circle argumentation as in: “*NN is a known criminal and is associated with known criminals, therefore he is likely to commit crime*”. As a basis for decision-makers’ prioritisation between Target A or Target B, target profiles

lacked both sound analytical grounds and directive conclusions and recommendations about threats and risks beyond implicit organisational notions. Target profiles, as genuine analytical products did not meet the general standards for intelligence work such as systematic scrutiny of information, assessment of validity etc. (Ratcliffe 2008a).

Third, the lack of analytical anchoring of target profiles was connected to the condition that a national overview of the organised crime environment was sparse. In this context, a national overview refers to a knowledgebase of analytical products which explore different crime groups and networks with the purpose of describing and exploring their historical origins, functions, organisation, capabilities, capacities, resources, relations, connections etc. (Dean et al. 2010; Ratcliffe et al. 2014). This is not to say that this overview did not exist – indeed specialised police officers who have monitored this environment through decades possessed such information, but in accordance with Rønn's finding (2012) it was probably based on tacit knowledge which was not documented in any database or written down in analytical products.

The lack of analytical products in the police can be explained by e.g. a historical practice as it indeed is a predominantly 'verbal' organisation. Albeit it can also be explained by the condition that intelligence work, and as such the monitoring of crime groups and offenders, traditionally have been regarded as processes rather than products. Demands from police management have usually been requests of 'one-pages' providing a quick overview of for instance ongoing conflicts between groups, weekly newsletters or reports regarding pertinent crime events, or assessments of issues 'here and now' rather than analyses. Therefore, every time analysts were to construct target profiles, they had to begin by collecting and constructing new information and data and for example actively assemble narratives and organisational knowledge from relevant police officers and detectives. Since this was a resource demanding and time-consuming task, it was often omitted in

favour of 'fresh' information from confidential informants. Consequently, the conclusion from 2012-2015 was that strategic targeting was never really implemented according to the conceptual framework. As a result, targeting was practiced in accordance with the established course of action and as such primarily informant-driven despite of a new organisational set up.

Round Two

Organisation

Round two of strategic targeting was initiated in 2016 in support of an updated version of the police's strategy towards organised crime, and in connection with a new organisational set up and launch of two large regional investigation units (see **Chapter 5 and 6**). Yet, the advocacy for strategic targeting was more or less the same as in connection with round one. Strategic management required more overview and control of priorities and resources in investigation units and as such the police response overall. They were skeptical in regards to the outcome of informant-driven targeting as they feared it overlooked hidden populations and was merely aimed at people operating at a low-level (Dean et al. 2010). Moreover, they found it problematic that the informant-driven approach empowered the operational/tactical level in the police as information and knowledge about the criminal environment and high-value targets were concentrated at and filtered through this level. The second round was as such instigated not only as a result of political demands, performance measurements, and a new organisational model, but as a reaction to internal demands. The new methodological framework was therefore launched with great ambition at a kick-off meeting in the beginning of 2017 with participants from several national units, police districts, and co-operating partners. The outcome of strategic targeting was by management predicted to be a success.

Figure Q. Organisational Set-Up in Targeting (Round II).

	TASKS & RESPONSIBILITIES	AGENTS
Steering Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall responsible for the police’s strategy, operational plans and performance measurement on a national level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assistant Police Commissioners from NCI and the districts The Director for the Public Prosecution The State Prosecutor Cooperating partners
Coordination Groups (East & West)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsible for implementation and coordination of operational responses on a regional level Decision-making and prioritisation regarding investigation targets and allocation of investigation resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assistant Police Commissioners from the host districts of East and West Chief Superintendents from NCI, the task forces and the investigation departments in the districts The Prosecution Service Cooperating partners
Targeting Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritisation of threat assessments, target profiles, and investigation proposals for decision-making in coordination groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deputy Chief Superintendents from NCI, all the districts’ investigation units, the regional and task forces and the intelligence and analysis units
Analysis Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production of threat assessments target profiles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysts and intelligence personnel from NCI and the regional investigation units
Regional Investigation Units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production of investigation proposals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detectives from the regional investigation units

The new organisational set up, illustrated in **Figure Q**, called for the national unit to be responsible for targeting overall and imposed NCI to contribute with the majority of analytical resources. An independent analysis team was established with both national and regional participants, and two new targeting groups (måludpegningsgrupper) were established to support the regional coordination groups in their decision-making.

Phase One

The first phase concerned the production of strategic threat assessments of crime groups in accordance with *Sleipnir* in the course of 2017. As no prior group analyses existed and as much information was tacit knowledge, the initial and corresponding tasks for the analysis team was to:

- 1) build a knowledge base about crime groups

- 2) develop general methodological guidelines for analysts and intelligence personnel to suit the context of the Danish police.

The relevance and potential use of various databases and other sources for information for targeting purposes were therefore explored and included or excluded in an instructions sheet for analysts. Phase one of targeting was therefore not just about producing analytical threat assessments for decision-makers – the entire process was a methodological experiment with the aim of providing knowledge and best practice regarding strategic targeting processes. Since strategic targeting from the beginning was considered to be a long-term exercise which required resources, patience, and investments, it could not produce monthly target profiles for the targeting group and coordination groups. Strategic management therefore decided to establish what they called an *interim targeting process*, while waiting on the process of strategic targeting. This interim targeting imposed target profiles to be produced at regional level in the investigation units and in the Intelligence & Analysis Units in the districts. These target profiles were submitted monthly to the targeting group for assessment and further action. The initiative of interim targeting was taken by strategic management to meet steady operational demands from investigation units and administrative requirements for performance measurement. Interim targeting was as such an extension of the practice in the first round of targeting, although the analytical quality of the products was this time prioritised considerably.

The outcome of phase one of strategic targeting was presented at a coordination meeting in the beginning of 2018. This included the presentation of analytical products ranking all crime groups in terms of their potential threats individually and in comparison with each other. Cf. *Sleipnir*, the amalgamation of the different threat assessments provided decision-makers with an overview of which groups were most pertinent for the police to deal with in terms of posing the most critical

and subversive threats such as e.g. their abilities to corrupt public institutions, to use of violence, to infiltrate legal businesses etc.

Phase Two

The next step, phase two, which proposed, in accordance with the methodological framework, in-depth analyses of those two-three groups which had the highest scores in the *Sleipnir* assessments and as such were ranked as posing the greatest threats overall. The analyses should evolve around inherent conditions specifically the groups' finances and crime business models including methods for money laundering (Dean et al. 2010). The purpose was through these analyses to be able to point to key individuals within the groups whom, due to their functions, capacity, network, responsibilities, knowledge etc., were considered to be highly specialised and as such indispensable for the groups and their inherent function. These would then be nominated as high-value targets via target profiles which were then to be put forward to the targeting group for further assessment and decision-making. As it turned out, phase two never really got started. Throughout phase one it had proven difficult to shield the analysis team's resources from other tasks and obligations as the analysts, due to their specialisation and skills, were in high demand throughout the organisation. They were for that reason never released from their regular tasks and responsibilities. 'Problems of the day' gradually took over from targeting and the long-term work in the analysis team. It was therefore difficult to maintain the analysis team as a unity, and the schedule was constantly altered, and deadlines postponed. Time estimations of the work were essentially difficult to produce due to the experimental stage of the process. Meanwhile, no manager was dedicated to the analysis team meaning that the coordinators had no real overview of resources or were in no position to decide over these. The same management who had launched the targeting process was increasingly imposing the analysts with other assignments. As a result, the process was delayed on more than one occasion, and management became increasingly impatient and

dissatisfied, and gradually they seemed to lose interest and focused primarily on interim targeting. I discussed the situation with one of the participants in the team:

“I’m not surprised about this”, he said.

“Really?”, I said, “but they’ve always been aware that this would take time. That this was the long haul and not something which could provide fast results. It was agreed to be an investment in knowledge-building and testing of various methods for future purposes.”

“But they don’t have that kind of patience. They don’t think long-term. They think about the pressure they’re experiencing right now—from the Commissioner (politidirektøren), from the media, from the Ministry of Justice, and political level. And perhaps they’re not even here next year, then they’re off to another management position, and meanwhile they want to serve at the pleasure of the people above them.”

When phase two was about to begin, management requested new time schedules and resource estimations. Such were produced and put forward by the team coordinator and me. The proposal was attached with a number of reservations due to the difficulties of estimating an experimental process of which we had no experience. However, management never returned with a decision and gradually other agendas came in focus, new assignments were prioritised, and the analysts returned to their prior tasks. Strategic targeting was as a result phased out during 2018 and interim targeting became consequently the permanent targeting approach. In 2019, the second performance goal regarding the selection of priority offenders for proactive investigations was omitted from the strategy. At the same time, the first performance goal about the incarceration of members of organised crime groups was increased from 300 to 400 (Justitsministeriet 2018).

Thus, the conclusion from both the first (2012-2015) and second round of strategic targeting (2017-2018) is that despite great efforts, organisational alterations, dedication from analysts, and good intentions from police management, the strategic targeting model did not find its grounds within the police. Consequently, strategic targeting was never fully implemented and established as a practice.

Targeting practices therefore still rely primarily on informant-driven targeting and on established modes of action. Moreover, due to amongst other alterations of performance measurements (increased numbers of incarcerated gang members), the broad response model has become the dominant operational model for the police's response against organised crime promoting a policing strategy, which can be characterised as random or disadvantaged policing (Dean et al. 2010).

Challenges for Strategic Targeting

Time Consuming and Resource Demanding

One of the most pertinent challenges for the introduction of a model for strategic targeting within the police was its experimental character and thus unpredictable nature. Time consumption and analytical resources were almost impossible to forecast in detail besides the overall and obvious prognose that it required long-term investments. This condition resonates poorly within an action-oriented response organisation which is occupied with solving pressing issues here and now. The constant focus from ministerial and political level with new requests, demands, and expectations made it difficult for strategic management to instigate long-term experiments without certain prospects of operational results. In accordance with the findings in **Chapter 6**, even though police management was keen to introduce a new model for targeting, they were pressured from political level to provide results in terms of performance measures and the broad response model, and from within the organisation, the police districts, to provide operational support in order to sort of violent conflicts and pertinent crime problems. Strategic targeting was never meant to compete with fast operational results and decisiveness, but instead it was supposed to contribute with long-term strategic products to support a proactive response with the aim of impacting subversive criminal structures (Dean et al. 2010). Still, the long haul in terms of collecting and producing relevant data and tacit information, and the long-term task of building analytical-based knowledge

about crime groups etc. became a second priority for police management. The request for methodological 'tools' and organisational 'quick fixes' (as discussed in **Chapter 6**) should therefore be seen in relation hereto. Thus, the aspect of time certainly impacted the possibilities for implementing strategic targeting as a practice. Strategic targeting was, to put it bluntly, viewed as too demanding. The consequence, however, seems to be that strategic and proactive responses are less sustainable within the police as these depend on rich investments in knowledge resources (Dean et al. 2010).

Lack of Organisational Maturity

The condition above is additionally connected to the issue of organisational maturity. Intelligence work is indeed information work (Brodeur 2010), which requires a specific organisational set up, long-term perspectives, well-defined tasks, and responsibilities in terms of information collection, data processing, analyses, and decision-making accordingly. Moreover, according to Dean et al. (2010) it is not the absolute amount of knowledge that policing has that is important, but rather it is the relative quantum of knowledge that will to a large extent determine how winnable this knowledge was for policing against organised crime. Historically, the police have a limited amount of experience with intelligence work and knowledge work (see e.g. Strand 2011; Christensen 2012). As Swedish criminologist P.O. Wikström (2007) explains this impacts the police's possibilities in terms of preparing and carrying out knowledge-based crime prevention strategies which specifically require a long-term focus and a sound knowledge-base. This becomes a hindrance in terms of implementing analytical-based methods such as strategic targeting as the organisation can be viewed as immature in this regard. The organisational maturity evolves around at least three areas which are also found in other research on knowledge-based policing (see e.g. Williamson 2008; James 2013):

First, as we saw earlier in this chapter, organisational information collection and knowledge building about for instance crime groups and priority offenders can overall be characterised as sporadic. Information is often tacit and connected to specific personnel, which makes it fragile and without organisational anchoring. Yet such information is by Dean et al. (2010) regarded as the main resource for the police's competitive advantage against organised crime. The active collection of information is moreover primarily dragnet-based and depending on confidential informants and 'information-which-fell-into-our-lap' as opposed to for example requirement-based strategic intelligence collection via e.g. intelligence collection plans (Rønn 2012).

Second, the analytical competences available within the organisation are moreover sparse. The hiring of analysts and the training of police officers in intelligence work is merely in its beginning. Analytical work is therefore not cemented as a professional discipline and established practice within the police (see also a discussion of knowledge categories and levels of knowledge within police in Dean et al. 2010: 126f).

Third, the management of knowledge work is still handled by police managers and legal managers with no experience or formal qualifications when it comes to analytical work or intelligence work. Thus, the management experience and management style from classic police work is transferred into analytical processes which require rather different management ideals, perspectives, and methods (Cope 2004; Ratcliffe 2008b; Dean et al. 2010). Thus, organisational maturity can be said to have had great impact on the possibilities for implementing strategic targeting in the sense that the above described conditions are vital for knowledge work. The lack of experience with strategic knowledge work within the police therefore had the consequence that strategic targeting was dealt with in the same way as any operational police issue.

Internal Resistance

An additional challenge for implementing strategic targeting is more delicate in nature as it involves the internal resistance within the police. As the empirical narrative from the introduction in this chapter suggests, there are two competing rationales within contemporary policing namely experience-based versus knowledge-based policing with an organisational dilemma of choice to follow. This is amongst other mirrored in notions and actions of resistance, and in this connection, the opposition towards strategic targeting evolved around at least three different notions, which I explore in the following sections:

“What’s wrong with the old way?”

The first notion is a basic question of why new approaches and methods even need to be introduced in the police. Many police officers and detectives have great confidence in their own and their colleagues’ abilities of doing a good job as real police (see also **Chapter 6**) and therefore they see no reason to change the way of doing things. Another frequent critique of the conceptual framework for strategic targeting was that it was ‘too comprehensive’ and ‘too academic’ (langhåret) and as such difficult to read and operationalise for police officers. I have often wondered about this complaint given that police officers are exposed to much legal stuff which can be particularly difficult to understand for people outside the judicial system. However, I have never come across police officers who opposed having to familiarise themselves with the law. Perhaps this issue then does not have to do with the difficulties of reading and understanding an analytical (academic) product with complex content, rather it might have to do with the authority and status of the sender which is in line with similar research findings (see e.g. Cope 2004; Sheptycki 2004; Gundhus 2006; 2012). It can also be a consequence of what is considered to be legitimate knowledge as discussed earlier and as such as legal knowledge is viewed as instrumental and thereby legitimate (Hoel 2011). Another explanation might be ‘the curse of expertise’ (Hinds 1999) where experienced expert view

themselves as too knowledgeable to learn. Analysts or academics are, as explained in **Chapter 4**, not regarded as high-status personnel within the police. A former colleague, now manager, told me once laughing about the status hierarchy within the police: it begins with police officers at the top, then prosecutors and legal staff, then clerks, and academics at the bottom. Thus, analysts are viewed as some who can contest strategic functions – but definitely not operational functions including investigation work. Thus, the idea to approach investigation work analytically was generally not supported by police officers and detectives. From operational level, it was also a concern that targeting became strategic in the sense that it suddenly embedded top management in investigations – a matter they felt was best resolved at tactical level. A Senior Detective explains:

In the old days, before the police reform (in 2007, *my addition*), if you were in a narcotics unit and had a snowball (udløber) you could just run with it. We could usually go from investigation to investigation keeping ourselves busy. More and more it was based on information from confidential informants (...) Now it's external information which is the basis before we start up a case...And sometimes it's from 0 to 100 as these cases are very top-down (topstyrede). There are many stakeholders now a days and that's okay, but I wish we could see the investigations proposals and its documents before we are to begin.

The issue raised here by the detective is that decisions about investigations are taken before consulting detectives. In the case of *Operation Goldilocks* for example, this investigation was decided upon at Chief Superintendent level and along the way it turned out that the information from the key informant were leading the police in a wrong direction (see **Chapter 8** for further elaboration). This top-down management induce detectives not to trust any information they have not collected themselves and to explore and double check all information they receive from 'the outside' for example from informant handlers and analysis units. A classic issue of information sharing resistance (Brodeur & Dupont 2006; Gundhus 2012). At operational level, superintendents, police officers, and detectives are as such concerned that the control of proactive investigations, especially in regards to targeting, are passed over to strategic management and other personnel groups

such as analysts. This condition has for them unwanted operational and practical implications, but it also reduce the discretionary powers of tactical level.

“This is what we’ve always done!”

The notion of wanting to maintain things as they are also supports the notion that strategic targeting is no new practice – that’s what police have always done just without a ‘fancy’ name. Accordingly, many knowledge-based approaches, including strategic targeting, are time and again referred to as ‘old wine poured onto new bottles’. The argument is that a tacit practice of strategic targeting exists within the police as priority offenders are targeted based on detectives’ local knowledge about offenders. A Chief Superintendent explains:

I have doubts (about strategic targeting, *my addition*). I don’t know if we should work with those big performance indicators (måltal), but instead work in the direction which adds value to the investigation...we know in the districts that there are some high-impact offenders (toneangivende personer) in a certain environment who controls the agenda (sætter dagsordenen) and we want to target and eliminate these (rydde dem af vejen) anyway. So, to spend time putting them on a prioritised list...I don’t know if it would be any different than if there was no list. We would target these offenders anyway.

An Informant Handler argues further:

That’s all well and good with all those analyses and analysts with all their great new skills—but it doesn’t tell us anything we didn’t know before. Try talking to anyone in OC (the organised crime units, *my addition*) with just a little bit of knowledge about this field and he’ll be able to point to the top key targets in the organised crime environment in his sleep. You can’t analyse your way to an investigation.

Consequently, the first criticism is directed towards the assertion that strategic targeting is something different than conventional practice, and the second critique is that no analytical approach can provide any new information – concluding that analytical work does not provide any value (merværdi). To understand this, it might be helpful to refer to Ratcliffe’s (2008b) concepts of ‘old’ and ‘new’ knowledge

respectively case-specific and offender-centric knowledge possessed by individual police officers and detectives, and knowledge about crime patterns, themes, and the relations between crime events. The first type of knowledge can be valuable in case-solving and making arrest while the second type of knowledge is relevant for resource management and operational prioritisation. Implicitly lies the competition of different notions and assumptions of what is important, necessary, and meaningful in policing. This indeed reflects the organisational battle between knowledge-based and experience-based approaches and Gundhus' (2012) depiction of police's perception of the status of knowledge and professionalism, as I presented in **Chapter 6**.

“Mind the top shelf!”

The last issue I will investigate in this connection is the notion that strategic targeting is mostly focused on offenders in top of the crime groups. This is sometimes viewed as problematic as it is believed to be a group of people too difficult to investigate. Investigation ‘on the top shelf’ is seen as demanding and with little assurance of fruitful results (arrests) due to the offenders specialisation and long-term experience in the criminal environment. In general, it is viewed as too much of an effort to investigate these offenders as they are too professional and cannot be targeted through a typical proactive investigation or even covert measures. A Senior Detective explains:

Some of these groups are managed by the top (topstyret). They are professional. Some of them have known each other all their lives and they've been committing crime together for 20 years. (...) These people speak in codes and they do so because they've known each other for so long and know what each other are thinking. They don't have to mention anything about coke or amfetamin or money (...) They are loyal towards each other and they keep high security standards. They don't need to speak on the phone about 'who does what'. They know it. All agreed upon is 'walk and talk'.

Thus, detectives propose an approach where offenders on low-level are targeted instead in order to get to the top. Or as a Detective states: “*In the old days, we began from the head and then moved to the ass to work our way up again*”. The rationale behind this approach is that investigations towards low-level targets will as such generate information about the bosses in the groups for new snowballing cases. In the case of *Operation Goldilocks*, Jerry who was the prime investigation target had no formal leadership but was believed to be one of the most influential individuals in the crime group. A Detective explains:

Jerry is one of the greatest catches. He’s big business. And he shouldn’t have been targeted. We should have tapped the wire (gået op på) one of the others. We’ve used too many resources to follow up on Jerry. And he doesn’t talk! He’s very disciplined (...) But it’s not a new mistake. We often begin with the head and are forced to work our way down...and then up again.

Detectives are generally sceptical towards investigating ‘big catches’ using the most conventional proactive investigation techniques. In order for the police to be successful in regards to these offenders, detectives suggest either extended legal powers, more advanced technical equipment, or the extensive use of police agents. I will return to these issues in **Chapter 8**. Thus, internal resistance within the police towards implementing strategic targeting seems to have played a central role for its survival. Informal structures are often essential when it comes to police practice and due to amongst other the autonomous character of police work, notions about this work are indeed essential for how it is carried out. Therefore, the notion of e.g. ‘real policing’ can be seen as a hindrance when it comes to the implementation of new knowledge-based approaches.

Cohesion or Conflict: Ritual Performances of Recognised Dramas

Two Models for Targeting

In the prior sections, I have identified and presented the counters of two different approaches and operational models for targeting priority offenders, which I illustrate below in two ideal type models (see **Figure R**). The first approach is experience-based and has historically been the ruling approach to target offenders for proactive investigation. It builds on investigation-led targeting or informant-driven targeting and encompasses the established practice within police. Based on the prior analysis in this chapter, I will characterise this as a *reactive targeting model* as it stands on practices such as reactive approaches to informant work including information collection, and as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus. The aim is to instigate proactive investigations and hold offenders accountable for their criminality. Consequently, proactive investigation becomes both a mean and an end. Additionally, the model mirrors experience-based notions of police work which are included in the reactive policing paradigm.

The second approach is knowledge-based and builds on a strategic targeting model which proposes structured information collection and intelligence analysis in order to identify and prioritise targets in terms of their threats. Based on the prior analysis in this chapter, I characterise this as a *proactive targeting model* as its operational focus is aimed at disrupting crime groups and their subversive activities through the most appropriate use of investigative resources. This mirrors the ideals of the proactive policing paradigm, and proactive investigation is as such primarily an instrument to support a preventive goal.

Figure R. *Two Models for Targeting.*

	REACTIVE	PROACTIVE
PERSPECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informant-driven 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information-driven
KNOWLEDGE QUESTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who can we get information about? • Which sources do we have, and what do they tell us? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who are high-value targets?
AIM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information about specific individuals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge about agents, groups, environments
METHODS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection of information from CIs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection of all available information and data • Systemic analysis of information
PRODUCTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence reports providing grounds for suspicion (mistankegrundlag) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat assessments ranking all crime groups • Analyses of individual groups • Target profiles of high-value targets
FOCUS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Instigation of proactive investigations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritisation of investigation resources • Prevention/disruption

Based on these findings, I will draw some conclusions. First, the police’s strategy and performance measures prescribe the targeting of priority offenders based on a proactive approach. Second, police’s strategic management advocate for a more strategically anchored targeting practice aimed at high-impact offenders with the purpose to disturb the crime groups overall (Ratcliffe 2008a; Dean et al. 2010). Despite two comprehensive attempts, the implementation of a strategic targeting model has not been successful in the sense that this model has not found its grounds in the police and become an established practice. Instead, an interim targeting model – resembling the experience-based approach – has been made permanent. Thus, the attempts to replace the conventional practices – a reactive model of targeting – with new analytical practices in line with the new policing paradigm – a proactive model of targeting – have failed. In the prior section, I have analysed some of the most apparent explanations as to why it has proven difficult to alter the established targeting practice despite of organisational desires and efforts. However, in this section, I will explore some of the underlying explanations as to why the reactive operational model takes over in the organisational battle between the reactive and the proactive paradigm. In this exploration, I will concentrate on

two dominant questions asking: 1) why the target group of priority offenders does not change, and 2) why the practice of targeting remains the same.

Favouring the Familiar

As I have made clear through the analyses in the current chapter and in **Chapter 6**, organised crime policing is to a great extent concentrated on a typical counterpart which includes individuals from a specific social group which can be defined as police property (Bowling et al. 2020). Anchored in a practice stemming from uniformed patrol, police operate with a typological categorisations of citizens where the police gaze is used as an instrument to identify what deviates from the norm. Thus, the typical counterpart is perceived as an ideal offender committing an ideal crime type. Despite an organisational desire to go beyond the usual suspects and aim the police's response towards more high-level targets and perhaps even hidden populations, police still seem to have an organisational tunnel vision in the sense that they again and again focus on the classic counterpart. This illustrates an apparent paradox: if the police are keen to move beyond the usual suspects why do they not direct their attention towards these?

In this connection, I will propose two possible explanations which are somewhat linked namely: 1) the organisational preference to focus on usual suspects and 2) the unfamiliarity with hidden populations. First, there is an organisational preference on both the strategic, the operational, and the tactical level to focus on well-known usual suspects as this classic counterpart is easy to identify, and police's experience with this group of people is extensive (Manning 2004). Managers, police officers, and detectives are in other words in their comfort zone when they are working with this counterpart, and they are additionally somewhat motivated by their personal relations to these. The counterpart is recognisable and familiar in terms of characteristics and behavioural patterns both as a social group (police property) and as individuals. Their modes of operation in relation to criminal

activities are as such easily caught by the police gaze even on a strategic level. In strategic meetings, for example, it became clear that strategic managers at chief superintendent level have had personal encounters with those priority offenders who were investigation targets going back when they themselves were street-level officers or detectives. This condition perhaps has to do with the one Manning (2004) points to namely that the police organisation becomes a social mirror of the environment it is mandated to monitor. Accordingly, the enforcement world mirrors the illicit world and there are some analogs between the dealing-using system and the enforcement system such as the pressure for sales and production of cases, concerns of security and secrecy, the use of covert action etc. According to Manning (ibid.), the business and enforcement of narcotics therefore share some similarities and covert policing can consequently come to mirror organised crime. Manning explains (2008b: 692):

They resembled, by costume, manner, appearance and front, the people they hunt and arrest. In sum, they were marginal and symbolically distinctive from the rest of the organization and they dramatized this in action (...) They are entrepreneurs, work secretly, act illegally, and in this and other ways they act much like their opponents. These could be called mutually shared projections of social reality, now a part of the working mandate of the drug unit and the beliefs of drug dealers. The secret of the menacing, omnipresent and effective drug police is that there is no secret. They are daily enacting, in Weick's (2001) terms, their sense of the job.

Thus, perhaps police are focused on the usual suspects not only as they are familiar to them, but because the social world of these offenders' street-oriented way of life resembles the traditional world of street-level organised crime policing. A central element in this regard is that the role of police make them morally superior of the counterpart – this street-level drama of organised crime policing plays out between the good and the bad.

Second, the social world of the suspected hidden populations – money men and crime facilitators and advisors – is not familiar to the average police officer or detective. Besides from being unknown and unfamiliar per default, 'the

suits' (habitterne) often belongs to another social group and perhaps even social class of police; the language, the environment, the behavioural pattern etc. therefore require different social skills and competences to navigate in – and not least to investigate. If the environment and how it operates is a black box, it becomes difficult for detectives to instigate the appropriate investigation measures (Dean et al. 2010). This resembles high policing where threats and risks are cornerstone and as such the counterpart becomes more abstract (Brodeur 2007). Accordingly, this performance has no predefined role descriptions or script, and the unpredictability of how this investigation drama plays out seem to deter police to engage with this group of targets. In other words, the knowledge police have is the one they navigate from – underlining why knowledge and its content is the key asset of any (police) organisation (Dean et al. 2010). On the contrary, the conventional drama of cops and robbers has through decades been performed almost as a ceremonial ritual revolving around the same script and roles. In this drama, the counterpart is predictable in characteristics and behaviour – but more importantly they are known criminals and not only suspects and as such guilty until otherwise known. The investigation process therefore resembles a worrying suspect-driven case-building instead of exploration of suspicion, as I will show in the coming **Chapter 8**. Hence, the organisational preference to focus on a preferred group of offenders therefore becomes a barrier in terms of shifting the organisational focus to hidden populations and lesser known social environments such as those more sophisticated criminal entrepreneurs and professional agents (e.g. accountants or lawyers) working with (crime) businesses in the grey zone of legal and illicit operations (Dean et al. 2010).

Illuminating Police Epistemic Culture

As I have illustrated through the previous analysis, strategic management was dissatisfied with the conventional targeting model and consequently prioritisation and decision-making taking place at operational/tactical level. The prospects of a

targeting model aimed at hidden populations was furthermore desirable from a strategic management point of view. Still, despite this organisational inclination to replace conventional practices with a more prosperous approach to targeting, police returned to conventional and well-known measures. This manifests a second paradox: if police (management) was keen to alter established practices why did they not maintain the strategic targeting model? In this connection, I will propose an overall explanation to this question which evolves around epistemic matters. The epistemic culture (Cetina 1999) of police is compelled by at least three essential and cohesive notions of knowledge and consequently *how police come to know what they know* about crime as a phenomenon and policing as a practice. These are the ‘high-status of anecdotal evidence’, ‘the sustainment of the power to know’, and ‘the need to reduce complexities’. In accordance with Gundhus’ findings (2006; 2010), these notions are imperative in order to understand why new or different forms of knowledge of crime and policing have so strenuous conditions within the police, which I unfold in the following sections.

The High-Status of Anecdotal Evidence

Along with a number of researchers (see Van Hulst 2013 for an overview) Manning (2004: 87) argues that experience within the police is passed on by storytelling:

Talk and immediate experience is passed on powerfully by analogical communication: stories, pictures, and maps. This is perhaps why the oral culture of policing is so important and durable—the work is case-oriented, reactive, and full of contingencies that are rich materials for storytelling.

Furthermore, as I illustrated in the previous chapter experience-based knowledge is the highest ranking in the status hierarchy of knowledge for police officers (Ratcliffe 2008b; Manning 2010; Gundhus 2012). This condition is founded on the assumptive world of policing and interpersonal tactics of policing (Manning 2010) and notions of ‘real policing’ being taught on the streets and through one’s own and other police officers experience instead of for example being taught at The Police

Academy. Academic aspects of police training are viewed as irrelevant and even an obstacle for doing good police work (Manning 2010). Experience is as a result regarded as the most genuine and worthy and therefore legitimate knowledge, which the competence hierarchy from Gundhus' (2012) also express and this experience is often explicated through the telling of anecdotes. Even at strategic meetings I have observed that a content-based discussion of a certain topic including presentations of research knowledge, statistics, analyses etc. can suddenly take a different direction if someone tells an anecdote about the matter (or cop stories see Van Maanen 1978a). This can change the entire agenda of a meeting as anecdotes are not only used to exemplify matters or making them more concrete, but since anecdotes are perceived as highly reliable information if they are told by a trustworthy and well-respected source. I find this even to reflect the core of the police *métier* (Manning 2010) the incident focus which is framed and viewed exclusively as the officer at the scene describes it. The epigram of 'you-had-to-be-there-to-understand-what-was-done-why-it-was-done-and-the-results-produced' which, according to Manning (2010), rules police culture thereby reinforce the inviolate and sacred centre of police work the reasonable, thoughtful, rational, cogitating individual officer, on the street deciding things. Therefore, the officer's account (the anecdote) becomes virtually the rule of thumb. The strength of the anecdote can therefore easily match for example a peer-reviewed research article as anecdotes are the highest valued currency of knowledge within the police. I refer to this condition as *anecdotal evidence*.

In accordance with other research (Shearing & Ericsson 1991; Van Maanen 1973; Van Maanen 1978a; Waddington 1999), telling of anecdotes can be viewed as a ritualised practice within police where the same stories are told over and over; a retelling of different performances in regards to 'the incident' where idealisation is used to manage the impression of the various actors (Goffman 1959). This seems to have two main functions namely to 1) articulate police practice (as this is characterised as being mostly tacit), and 2) preserve institutional memory within the

police (as this is characterised as being a non-written organisation). Waddington (1999), however, suggests that talk and actual doing have not much in common and that this canteen cop culture is not helpful to understand the essentials of policing; it is pure nostalgia. However, in this study, I view the ritualised practice of telling anecdotes as passing on and sustaining both experience (police practice/ interpersonal tactics), but perhaps more importantly world views and assumptions (about policing and crime) – a similar finding of Van Hulst's (2013). It is therefore an important part of police epistemic culture. In relation to the sustainment of strategic targeting, the above argument suggests that anecdotal evidence turned out to be stronger than analytical-based knowledge simply because this knowledge type holds the highest status within police epistemic culture.

The Power to Know

Since experience function as the most valued knowledge type within police this means, as e.g. Gundhus (2012) shows, that other types of knowledge – for example analytical knowledge or educational knowledge – are not regarded as similarly valuable or trustworthy and consequently such knowledge forms have lower status. This condition mirrors obviously the competition between the two epistemic rationales from respectively experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing. Ratcliffe's (2008b) differentiation between 'old' and 'new' knowledge and Gundhus' (2012) division between 'thick' and 'thin' professionalism are important in the sense that the conflict also concerns *who* possess these different types of knowledge. The detective is generally exponent for the old knowledge and the experience-based professionalism, whereas the new knowledge and standardised professionalism is more associated with intelligence or crime analysts and other personnel groups who do not carry out 'real' police work. I recall a discussion I had once with a former colleague at NCI – a police officer in an analytical function about whether or not a civilian could possess the job as an operational analyst (operativ analytiker), and he explained:

It has to be a police officer. It has to be someone who has or at least has had experience with the gangs and the 'world out there'. Someone who has had the environment under his nails (op under neglene) in order to understand it. It's like— if you get a woman disease, wouldn't you rather have a female doctor? One you know has felt it on her own body?

The quote underlines the argument in accordance with Gundhus' findings (2012) that many police officer do not value educational skills as adequate, and an authority figure is thus merely one whose skills are based on experience. Manning's (2010) conclusion that there is a belief within police that the incident has the social reality attributed to it by the officer draws attention to the condition that the police officer is the authority of and source to how incidents play out. This implies that knowledge derived from other than police officers are in itself questionable. The assumptions and the interpersonal tactics of policing which constitute and shape the police *métier* suggest that experience-based knowledge gives one the necessary insights and since e.g. analysts, academics, or others in non-police functions are occupied with other types of knowledge produced in other ways they cannot know about police work and crime.

In **Chapter 4**, I discussed the latent debates within police concerning: 1) who has the right to be part of the police organisation? and 2) who has the right to speak about police work? The two issues are interlinked, but the second discussion is particularly relevant in this context as it concerns the issue of knowledge monopoly and as such the power to know. Since policing is a tacit practice and the police organisation is ruled by informal structures (Manning 2010), knowledge is a strong currency in a number of ways as Hartmann (2014) equally concludes. The struggle of knowledge therefore equals the struggle of organisational power and the powerful are as such the ones whose knowledge is high-status and sought after and who are regarded as trustworthy. Manning (1977) argues in this connection that the rhetoric of police professionalism is the most important strategy employed by the police to defend their mandate and thereby build self-esteem, organisational

autonomy and occupational solidarity and cohesiveness. This is similarly linked to the condition in relation to *Operation Goldilocks* earlier in this chapter, namely, that detectives verified the information they received from the source handlers and the analysis unit. They did not trust the information as they did not trust the processors of this information – analysts (generally) and informant handlers (specifically). The oral passing of information is therefore closely connected to the notion of ‘a good man’ which is a frequent used expression within police – it characterises a police officer who is trustworthy and whose backlist is reviewed and approved (see also Valland 2014 for a similar observation). Consequently, my argument suggests that it is not only a matter of old or new knowledge being right or wrong, but indeed who is the source of this knowledge. Since knowledge is power – a shift from conventional to strategic targeting would also suggest a shift from thick to thin professionalism and as a result a shift in who are knowledgeable and thus which organisational groups (analysts, managers, detectives, informant handlers etc.) who hold organisational power and thus has *the power to know*.

Reduction of Complexity

The last notion of police epistemic culture I will present here is already introduced in **Chapter 6**, namely *reduction of complexity*. In the prior chapter, it was discussed in relation to police’s preoccupation with providing quick-fix solutions and one-page management. In this connection, it concerns the epistemological understanding of the social world and policing which promotes a tendency to reduce its complexities and intellectual aspects. An Analyst explains:

They (management, *my addition*) find it difficult to understand when I try to describe some of the tasks as integrated in organisational conditions—that it makes a difference for the way the job is carried out. They don’t understand it. That it makes a difference (the organisational surroundings, *my addition*). They don’t have that perspective; to live with a high degree of complexity within the organisation that’s not something they consider. They like to reduce the complexity in the tasks. Instead of saying: there are many different considerations we need to take into account, and we need to prioritise... Or that two different answers to the same question can both

be right at the same time...those sort of things... And I'm an example of that complexity.

The point I derive from the statement above is that the efforts to reduce complexity of the social world and police work can create even more complexity. For example, when intelligence personnel and analysts encounter complex and sustainable crime problems or organisational challenges and management requests simplistic and fast solutions to these. In this sense, the need to reduce complexity generally can become a hindrance for instigating comprehensive police responses, but it can also become a barrier for organisational innovation and lead to a condition where police fall back on old habits and well-known practices.

Since high-status knowledge in police is experience-based, this promotes decisions which are built upon individual officers' discretion and the development of the police gaze. A central issue here is policing by typology which divides events and people into demarcated and conformist categories with little room for nuances and uncertainty. In terms of strategic targeting and the initial request for a 'tool' to identify targets, this implies that the epistemic notion of reducing complexities results in a search for 'absolute' knowledge or binary systems to categorise the social world (Atkinson 2013; Gundhus & Jansen 2020). In this perspective, the search for methods can be understood as a search for 'tools' to determine if offender A or offender B should be targeted. Strategic targeting, however, is on the contrary a model which *increases* complexities as its aim is to explore unknown or uncertain characteristics and perspectives in its focus on inherent threats and risks. The strategic knowledge framework is as such to build up competitive knowledge about the counterpart (organised criminals/crime businesses) which make the police able to plan, develop, and put in operation a wide and diverse range of intervention strategies to disrupt and dismantle organised crime (Dean et al. 2010).

Summary & Discussion: A Random Approach to Targeting Priority Offenders?

In this chapter, I have explored the circumstances around the preparatory phase leading up to the launch of proactive investigations. I have analysed two competing approaches within police to target priority offenders – their pros and cons, and what make them successful and unsuccessful within police. I have explored how attempts were made to introduce new knowledge-based approaches to replace conventional experience-based approaches, and I have analysed the various reasons as to why this has proven difficult. In the current section, I account for the central findings and arguments outlined in this chapter. I discuss the continuous organisational conflict between aspirations and actions taken in reality in terms of transforming targeting of priority offenders from a reactive to a proactive practice, and how this impacts the overall police response towards organised crime. I return to the case of *Operation Goldilocks* and the empirical example presented in the introduction of this chapter as I discuss the circumstances surrounding these in relation to the analytical findings.

Some vital conclusions can be drawn. Historically, two different approaches to launching proactive investigations and selecting investigation targets have been dominant within police: investigation-led targeting and informant-driven targeting. Informant-driven targeting is considered to be the most commonly used approach within the (Danish) police; a practice stemming from street-level work where information from confidential informants led to informant-driven police operations primarily aimed at drug offences – gradually during the 1990s referred to as organised crime. In this process, informant work went from being merely an operative tactic to becoming a central part of police’s intelligence work and additionally a cornerstone in police’s response to organised crime. The use of

information from confidential informants has some clear advantages such as the fast collection of actionable information with the possibilities of producing seizures and arrests. In relation to targeting and proactive investigations there are, however, some risks associated with e.g. methods for information collection and information evaluation, and the application of this information in operational responses. Police primarily operate with a reactive rather than a proactive model for informant work. This has to do with the condition that informant work is based on undirected approaches to recruiting source handlers as well as informants and is based on unstructured methods for collecting and applying source information. In connection with informant-driven targeting, this results in three main risks; 1) over-policing regular customers by targeting the same group of offenders over and over, 2) under-policing hidden populations e.g. organised crime groups operating below the surface or organised crime offenders with lesser visibility than the usual suspects, and 3) random selection of the most visible and active offenders whom police receive information about, but who are operating on a low-level scale. Informant-driven targeting as a central nerve in the police's response towards organised crime is therefore in risk of becoming a response model of informant-driven policing.

Two different attempts were made to implement a strategic targeting model with the purpose to provide police management with an analytical-based foundation for decision-making and prioritisation. The reason was that strategic management wanted more control of investigation resources and influence on investigation targets, and since informant-driven targeting was believed to be insufficient in terms of targeting high-value offenders with considerable impact on organised crime. Strategic targeting promoted a proactive approach relying on a requirement-based intelligence model and advocated a long-term and group-oriented response to disrupt, prevent, and reduce organised crime. The conclusion from the two rounds was that despite great efforts, organisational alterations, dedication from analysts, and good intentions from police management, the strategic targeting

model did not find its grounds within police and was never established as a practice. Consequently, strategic targeting was phased out during 2018 and an interim targeting model became the permanent targeting model. As a result, targeting practices therefore still rely primarily on conventional targeting approaches – informant-driven targeting – and established modes of action. In 2019, the second performance goal regarding targeting priority offenders for proactive investigations was omitted from the police’s strategy. Meanwhile, the first performance goal concerning the incarceration of members in organised crime groups was increased from 300 to 400. The broad response model was as such cemented as the dominant operational model for police’s response towards organised crime, and the police continues to operate with a random and/or disadvantaged knowledge framework. A key challenge for strategic targeting was that on both strategic and operational level it was viewed as too time consuming and demanding. Moreover, the lack of organisational matureness in regards to strategic knowledge work meant that strategic targeting was dealt with in the same way as any operational police issue. An additional challenge was internal resistance within police towards analytical-based approaches which seems to have played a central role for strategic targeting’s survival given that informal structures are often essential for police practice. The notion of e.g. ‘real policing’ stemming from police occupational culture (Reiner 2010) can as such be seen as a hindrance when it comes to the implementation of knowledge-based approaches.

Thus, within police there is a competition between two ideal type models for targeting namely a reactive and a proactive model. The reactive model for targeting is predominantly experience-based building on investigation-led targeting or informant-driven targeting which stand on reactive approaches to informant work and information collection. The proactive model for targeting is knowledge-based building on strategic targeting which proposes structured information collection and intelligence analysis in order to identify and prioritise targets in terms of their respective threats. Despite organisational inclinations, the attempts to replace

conventional practices – a reactive model of targeting usual suspects – with new analytical practices – a proactive model of targeting hidden populations – failed. There are two overall explanations. First, there is an organisational preference to focus on the classic counterpart and the usual suspects as these are recognisable and familiar in terms of characteristics and behavioural patterns and since the social world and behavioural patterns of hidden populations such as ‘the suits’ (e.g. money men and crime facilitators) are not. Second, police epistemic culture is compelled by at least three essential and cohesive notions of knowledge which are imperative in order to understand why new or different forms of knowledge of crime and policing have so strenuous conditions within police. Experience-based knowledge is highest ranking in the status hierarchy of knowledge in police and it is often explicated and passed on through the telling of anecdotes. This becomes a ritualised practice and functions to articulate police practice and to preserve institutional memory. Anecdotal evidence can easily outweigh for example scientific knowledge. Since strategic targeting is concerned with analytical-based knowledge this meant that experience-based knowledge and the conventional model was preferred at the end.

Moreover, since experience function as the most valued knowledge type within police other types of knowledge are not regarded as similarly valuable or trustworthy. A knowledge monopoly exists within police and as such the power to know. The struggle of knowledge therefore equals the struggle of organisational power – and the powerful are the ones whose knowledge is high-status and sought after and who are regarded as trustworthy. A shift from conventional to strategic targeting would also suggest an inconvenient shift in which organisational groups who has the power to know. Lastly, the epistemological understanding of the social world and policing promote a tendency to reduce its intellectual aspects and its complexities. Contrary to this, strategic targeting increases complexities as its aim is to explore unknown or uncertain characteristics and perspectives in its focus on threats and risks. Thus, the need to reduce complexity can be seen as a hindrance

for instigating comprehensive police responses, and a barrier for organisational innovation leading police to fall back on old habits and well-known practices. My main argument in this chapter is that due to organisational preferences and habitual thinking, proactive investigations often target priority offenders for proactive investigations using predominantly conventional and experience-based approaches such as informant-driven targeting. This can be compared to the approach of *random patrolling* from the standard policing model which mirrors a narrow perception of proactive policing as both a concept and practice (Bacon 2016). Inherent in this approach lies a practice where offenders are randomly identified through the police gaze as they meet the criteria of being highly visible usual suspects whom police easily recognise and prefer to deal with.

This stands in contrast to a systematic knowledge-based process consisting of e.g. the production of a comprehensive overview of high impact targets and the (relative) threats they compose. It runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as it preserves and reproduces stereotypical organisational notions of ‘bad guys’ instead of widening the scope to hidden populations. It mirrors as such the performance of the street-level drama of cops and robbers between good and bad (real police catching real criminals) where police identify and round up usual suspects as a ritual revolving around the same script and the same role descriptions. This well-known drama has been performed through decades and along the lines of Manning’s findings (2008c), it maintains a front stage performance of proactivity where police manage the impression of being able to control and impact the setting of organised crime as much as possible. It remains, however, a symbolic rather than an instrumental performance celebrating the ritual subculture of patrol as it predominantly evolves around offenders operating on a low-level scale whose threat to society may possibly be relatively limited. On the contrary, the performance of targeting hidden populations has no predefined role descriptions or predictable script and therefore, despite a strategic inclination to instigate and support strategic targeting, it has met difficulties when it comes to replacing standard routines in

police and is often set aside on the grounds of being too complicated and too resourceful. Thus, proactive investigation becomes an informant-led police activity rather than a component to intelligence-led policing (Cope 2004). Its impact as a central part of the strategy and police response against organised crime as a whole can as such be debated.

Returning now to *Operation Goldilocks* and the empirical example presented in the introduction of the chapter: two main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the prior analysis. First, the investigation target in *Operation Goldilocks* was identified through conventional methods for targeting source information. Jerry had for a long time been on the police's wish list as an investigation target as prior efforts to investigate him had failed. As the analysis in this chapter shows, the investigation was instigated rapidly as source information about Jerry came to police's attention (information-that-fell-into-our-lap). Jerry was regarded as a high-value target and in some ways as an under-policed agent. He was not a part of a hidden population as he was both familiar to police and visible in the organised crime environment, but he had a long past of steering clear of police's measures. Police management saw this as an opportunity to get Jerry as they believed they had a source close to him. Since information from confidential informants most often can be transformed into police action it is regarded as valuable knowledge as it function as an instrument to perform good police work (making arrests) and as such meeting both formal and informal demands of policing. The source information in relation to *Operation Goldilocks* was as such by police management regarded as convincing in terms of making Jerry an investigation priority. Thus, the first step in the investigation process was to get a court order for interception in communications (indgreb i meddelelshemmeligheden), and the investigation team instigated wiretapping on Jerry and his suspected collaborators from day one. This left little room to prepare the investigation process and most investigation resources were quickly bound to wiretapping. Detectives' spent a lot of time in the initial phase to collect information about Jerry, his connections, and their movements and actions,

as I will elaborate further in **Chapter 8**. Moreover, Jerry's function within the crime group he was attached to was not analysed in detail, and the source information which the decision about targeting him was built upon was not verified through other channels. Along the way, detectives became sceptical about the validity of the source information they had received on Jerry – both as they lacked trust in the department from where it came, and as they during the investigation found little support for the information from the confidential informant. In this sense, source information was critical for the entire operation – it encompassed the foundation for initiating the case, but it was also seen as vital for the investigation process as source information was supposed to support case work underway. When detectives found out that this information was not reliable it meant that they were to direct the investigation elsewhere. Since Jerry was considered to be 'top shelf', detectives had no inclinations that they could be successful building a case against him using merely conventional investigation tactics – source information was considered to be essential. Thus, informant-driven targeting and informant work as case support was crucial in relation to *Operation Goldilocks*. The quality of informant work therefore became imperative for the success of the investigation and consequently an indirect reason as to why the investigation did not progress in the way it was expected to, and ultimately why it was closed down.

Second, in relation to the empirical example from the introduction of this chapter, through the analysis I have shown that the rationales of experience-based and knowledge-based policing were competing in the organisational battle of targeting methods. The comment from the police officer, Peter, about how it is not possible to 'learn investigation by reading a book' is therefore essential for police epistemic culture; it is, in accordance with Gundhus' findings (2012) perceived merely to be taught through experience and policing the streets. The perceptions about targeting expressed by Superintendent Carlyle equally reflect an epistemic notion that analytical processes do not contribute with new or valuable information – it merely is a process of 'writing down what is already known' – understood as organisational

knowledge derived from experience. Strategic targeting can therefore be seen as an exponent for analytical knowledge or standardised knowledge (Gundhus 2012) and additionally this knowledge is possessed by people who are not viewed as knowledgeable since their knowledge does not stem from experience and accordingly is viewed as ‘thin’ professionalism. This tells us something essential about attempts to implement strategic targeting and why conventional approaches became the preferred model.

All in all, there are some predicaments and discrepancies between the strategic ideal of being proactive and the reality of police action. In the practical world of proactive investigation, however, informant work in its conventional form proposes some essential problems for instigating proactive and high-end police work; targeting hidden or under-policed populations who can be said to impact the underlying structures of organised crime. Consequently, the structures for reactivity are still dominant even for proactive investigations potentially leading to for example suspect-driven case-building which we shall see in **Chapter 8**.

Chapter 8: The Act of Proactivity

- *On police's instigation of reactive measures in proactive investigations*

Police organisations and criminal organisations have to rely substantially on their stock of knowledge as a resource. Such resource knowledge adds capacity to their performance capabilities and also positions them to build on competitive advantages. To that extent, policing and criminal entrepreneurs are engaged in a knowledge war. (...) it is not the absolute amount of knowledge that policing had that is important but rather it is the relative quantum of knowledge that will to a large extent determine how winnable this knowledge war is for policing against organised crime.

- *Organised Crime* by Dean, Fahsing, and Gottschalk (2010: 174).

Introduction

“Let me tell you a story. A couple of officers from patrol are doing their rounds one afternoon in the rural areas. They’re driving alongside the meadow outside Little Village. They observe a car parked on a narrow country lane in the outskirts of the forest. They turn and drive into the road to investigate further. A farmer is coming towards them with a group of cattle. So they stop and ask him; ‘is that your car?’ and the farmer says: ‘no, it’s not my car. I suppose it belongs to those two men over there’—and the farmer points to the field. And in the middle of the cornfield two men are standing, talking to each other. The officers park the patrol car and walk towards the two men through the cornfield. The men stop talking. When they get closer, one of the officers recognise the men; it’s Jerry and Norman. The officers ask about their business at the cornfield and Jerry says: ‘we’re just enjoying the view of the ships approaching the harbour.’ I mean—this is what we’re up against!”

It was late in the afternoon and we were sitting in Senior Detective John’s office. We had just discussed the difficulties in making investigational progress in *Operation Goldilocks*. I hadn’t heard that particular story before, but I was aware that detectives experienced significant challenges in terms of technical surveillance.

John continued: “We had surveillance on Jerry one night and he had a visit from ‘King’. They leave Jerry’s house; they pass the surveillance team which is parked on the opposite site of the road. They talk about bitches and big tits when they pass the car. They go to a parking lot at the end of the road. They stand there for one minute and talk. One minute! Then they return and talk about bitches and tits again. We are lacking technical equipment which can be used in those situations and that’s our main challenge.”

A couple of weeks later, I came into work early as always to make coffee (my most entrusted task in the investigation unit) and prepare myself for the day. But the office was busy—almost all detectives from *Operation Goldilocks* were in their offices or walked around carrying out various tasks. I met Michael in the meeting room (which also served as an office and a lunchroom). He looked tired and was in his overcoat.

“What’s going on?”

“Our cover was blown”.

“What?”

“Yeah, during the night, I haven’t slept so I’m going home to sleep now.”

Thomas entered the room carrying a stack of papers.

“Shit,” I said.

“Yeah,” he said. “I’ve just finished the report. They’ve asked for an account.”

By ‘they’, I assumed he referred to investigation management.

“What happened?”, I asked.

“It’s that fucking equipment!”

Michael shook his head in resignation.

The technical equipment for interception in open air (aflytning i det fri) had caused big problems from the very beginning of the investigation. The group of investigation targets and focus persons were upholding a disciplined use of a considerable amount of safety measures. This included amongst other the use of encrypted communication and walk-and-talk meetings. These meetings were taking place in open air, typically in rural and isolated areas such as the above-mentioned cornfield, parking lots, rest stops etc. Such open-air locations made it difficult to place technical equipment, but also made it impossible for the surveillance team to come close. The detectives had tried in a number of ways to install the equipment in many different places and at many different distances, but even if they were successful the quality of the sound turned out to be too poor.

Michael sat down in a chair around the meeting table, still in his overcoat. I went across the room to my working station, took off my jacket and put down my bag. No one spoke. Thomas placed the report on his desk and sat down. Two detectives from another investigation operation came into the room to have their morning coffee.

“Morning,” they said.

Fred, the investigation manager, entered the room, red-eyed and harried.

“This is no one’s fault,” he said, “it’s just the conditions in which we operate,” he shrug his shoulders, “if we don’t try anything, we don’t get anywhere—that’s just the name of the game.”

“Yeah, I know,” Thomas said, “and I’ve told Lou, but he’s absolutely gutted. He went home to sleep.”

Fred was persistent: “It’s no one’s fault, it could have happened to anyone who was there, so that’s just how it is. This is not something we need to spend a lot of energy on.”

I was sitting quietly wondering what might have happened and a little regretful that I’ve missed it all. It was obvious that the atmosphere had changed—the team’s frustrations concerning the lack of progress and success within the investigation had built up over a long time. These frustrations seemed now to have turned into some sort of resignation and perhaps even self-blame. The use of sarcastic remarks and black humour which typically dominated the team’s language and atmosphere was clearly lacking.

Sandy and Peter showed up in the doorway, nodded ‘good morning’, joined the other detectives, and reached for the coffee pot. The room was tense with suspense.

Fred approached Thomas: “did you finish the report?”

Thomas nodded and gave Fred the stack of papers, Fred left the room while beginning to read, heading for the upstairs management office.

“So, let’s hear it. Was it Lou or the surveillance team?” Andrew, one of the detectives from another operation asked the straight-forward question; he sounded genuinely concerned and sympathetic.

Peter shook his head: “no, it was...they had to replace the batteries in the camera...and suddenly Joey appears with a girl...out of nowhere. He sees both Lou and Thomas, and they had to make up a story. We were here at the base waiting...”

Thomas sighed: “it was around 3 am! And all the lights were out. They must have come out through the main entrance and went behind the building to the basement entrance.”

“What story did you give them?” Andrew again.

“That we were called to a burglary in the basement. But we didn’t have on uniforms. It’s a long shot, I don’t think they bought it...”

“They didn’t say anything,” Michael said. “Perhaps they were just there by coincidence...”

The conversation continued the entire morning. Several detectives joined and some of the surveillance officers. It was discussed how the night’s actions have played out, who said what, when and how, and there were speculations about how Joey, one of the investigation targets, and his girlfriend would interpret their random meeting with two detectives coming to investigate a burglary in a basement building in the middle of a Wednesday night. And further: how many and who had he and would he inform about this event in the entire criminal network?

Despite the potential consequences for the investigation operation, there was no sign of internal conflicts or tensions between the detectives on the team, quite the contrary. The detectives showed undivided support to the officers involved—no jokes were made; no blame was assigned. ‘It could’ve happened to any one of us’ was expressed frequently. Instead, the discussion primarily concerned the possible ramifications for the investigation. Was the investigation cover blown? Were investigation targets and focus persons now aware that police were carrying out an operation? Would they install additional security measures, would they replace all their phone numbers, would they cut off communication, would they postpone the suspected incoming package (import of drugs)? The questions and uncertainties were many.

Fred joined the conversation after his meeting with upstairs management: “what’s done is done,” he said, “now, we need to look ahead.”

The narrative above reflects a number of central issues in regards to understanding the black box and the nature of proactive investigation. What differentiates proactive investigations from other types of investigative work is its covertness as it takes place in the shadows (Loftus et al. 2015). It can be nerve-racking, tense, and stressful. The condition that decisions about what to do and when; how to assess incoming information, when to shut down a surveillance operation, when to instigate crackdowns and arrests is it too soon or is it too late is wearing. Moreover, although covert operations mostly consist of passive activities the constant concern for ‘getting caught’ and getting one’s cover blown when instigating certain investigative action can lead to persistent paranoia a

circumstance which detectives' share with their criminal opponents (Manning 2004). Proactive investigation is truly 'the policing of uncertainties' (Innes 2006) and it requires a constant balance between being passive, waiting, and proactively instigating investigative action. The investigation of organised crime is therefore not merely the investigation of separate criminal action or a single criminal event; it is an ongoing process, a non-stop train, if you will, without an end station, which police jump on and off, but which they are never able to stop. The criminal agents of organised crime are as such several steps ahead of the police, and some of them are even 'professionals' (Dean et al. 2010) in the sense that they take security precautions and direct their actions towards what is sensible in a criminal business perspective. Many detectives share as such the assumption that success in proactive investigations comes from 'being there and being ready' when the counterparts' make mistakes. This is not merely a rational assessment but is connected to how detectives engage in and find meaning in 'the narcs' game' (Manning 2004).

The example above also draws attention to other important aspects of proactive investigation for example how this is organised, how it is practised, and detectives' notions and assumptions about this policing discipline which is connected to the dominant police occupational culture (Reiner 2010). For example, the lack of technical equipment and the capabilities of criminal agents are by detectives perceived as the two overwhelming challenges for proactive investigations. This deserves some analytical attention. So, in relation to the practice of proactive investigations; which lines of enquiry guide lines of action and investigation tactics in order to uncover organised drug crime? What characterises the process and the various phases? On what grounds and rationales is investigative action instigated, and how valuable are different investigation tactics to the investigation process? And further: which collective assumptions are impacting investigative practice? In this chapter, I explore in detail how proactive investigations are practised. The chapter is concerned with exploring the black box of proactive investigation as an activity within the narrow response model and as an outcome of targeting priority

offenders as analysed in **Chapter 6** and **7**. Through this exploration I am searching for a fundamental methodology of proactive investigative work. Moreover, I am occupied with an exploration of the nature of proactive investigation by revisiting concept and practice in order to understand this specific phenomenon. Overall, I ask the fundamental question and analyse: how are proactive investigations carried out?

My main argument in this chapter is that the process and practice of proactive investigation are mainly guided by the routine instigation of several lines of action and covert tactics founded in the accessible legal framework. This stands in contrast to a methodological framework led by context-dependent investigative queries and various lines of enquiry. Proactive investigation seems to be performed as a tacit practice where detectives follow a predetermined ingrained, unarticulated script and a set of inherent collective actions which are impacted by both individual and shared experience, the specific setting of the investigation team, and a number of collective epistemological notions about proactive police work and the criminal counterpart. Consequently, proactive investigation practice seems to be lacking deliberate, intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative action and ultimately encompass a proactive investigative methodology. Although proactive investigation is a practice of information work which empirically and by its content resembles intelligence work this is not recognised by detectives who uphold a collective perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-level operational work or reactive investigative work known from the standard policing model. Detectives' investigative action are furthermore impacted by an investigative mindset which are comprised by collective assumptions about proactive detective work stemming from the reactive paradigm and the experience-based regime. Proactive investigation is therefore based on reactive practices in terms of investigation and information work, but also the proactive investigative mindset is dominated by a reactive epistemology.

First, I investigate the process, practice, and social organisation of proactive investigation with the purpose of identifying a comprehensive methodology. I present a process description of proactive investigative work and propose a model of proactive investigation and analyse this practice as a form of information work.

Second, I discuss the difficulties of establishing a proactive investigative methodology and analyse some of the reasons for this which are grounded in detectives' collective assumptions about proactive investigations and detective work.

The chapter ends with a summary of its key analytical findings together with a discussion of how detectives' investigative mindset impact proactive investigation practices overall.

The Black Box of Proactive Investigation: Searching for an Investigative Methodology

A Process Description of Proactive Investigation

A central characteristic of all police work that I have ever observed – whether it was operational responses or investigation tactics – is that it is carried out in a quiet and unarticulated manner. Policing is a tacit and silent practice. Of course there is the odd briefing or coordination before a large-scale police operation such as multiple arrests, searches, controls and the like, but day-to-day policing, investigation or patrol work, although it is carried out in teams, is predominantly carried out as a set of inherent routine actions by individual officers (Finstad 2000; Loftus 2010). This was also the case in *Operation Goldilocks*. The investigation team and its detectives had little structured coordination regarding the investigation process underway. On the contrary, the investigation proceeded and carried on following an unarticulated script for performance and actions and as such tacit practices. Within the (Danish) police there are no formal comprehensive procedural descriptions, guidelines, or methodological framework when it comes to investigation processes or practices other than the legal framework and various separate policy instructions or action cards. The detective occupation is therefore to a large extent depending on individual discretion. I will explain this observation in more detail during this chapter, but because of this condition, I will in the following sections describe and account for how the investigation proceeded chronologically as I observed it day-by-day and as it was logged in the internal investigation database and in the investigation summary.

I refer to this as *a process description of proactive investigation*. I do this before making further analytical categorisations and interpretations with the purpose of embedding the reader into the investigation process through an overview of the

different investigation steps that were taken. The aim is to show how the specific operation proceeded, what the main lines of investigative action were, and the rationales behind these as they were put forward by detectives. Afterwards, I categorise and analyse this process as I propose a generic *model for proactive investigation* by scrutinising the various stages in proactive investigation and core investigation tactics in order to develop a comprehensive methodology for proactive investigation practice.

Start-Up

Operation Goldilocks was initially planned to be a long-term operation with an expected duration of 18 months (see also the investigation proposal presented in **Introduction**). It was directed at a key target in organised crime, Jerry, who the police had years of dealings with and who they had already spent substantial investigation resources on over the years without significant results. In Brodeur's (2010) and Marx' (1988) terms this was accordingly a suspect-centered covert investigation operation. Jerry was considered to be a priority target and at the same time a demanding challenge as he operated 'on the top shelf' in organised crime. The categorisation of him as a priority target was, according to the investigation proposal and detectives, due to his:

- 1) alleged influence on and high status in organised crime especially in those organised crime groups which he had dealings with
- 2) long criminal career making him particularly capable in carrying out criminal activities especially in making large profits and setting up durable crime businesses
- 3) years of experience with police and thereby an ability to apply countermeasures towards investigation tactics.

The operational aims of the investigation were moreover to:

- 1) disclose Jerry's criminal activities,
- 2) identify the criminal network around him including his business partners,
- 3) identify dealers and buyers,
- 4) collect information and documentation to support the national monitoring of the members of organised crime.

The operation was instigated on the basis of source information from a confidential informant (as accounted for in **Chapter 7**) who provided the necessary grounds of suspicion (*mistankegrundlag*) for the police to instigate a proactive investigation according to § 742 and § 743 in *The Administration of Justice Act*. This source information concerned Jerry's (and his collaborators') import and distribution of illicit drugs and as such *Operation Goldilocks* was instigated as a § 191 investigation referring to *The Criminal Justice Code*.

Instigating Initial Lines of Action and Tactics

Wiretapping, Surveillance, and International Cooperation

A few days after the operation was officially launched, the investigation team instigated three main lines of investigative actions.¹ First, the investigation team got court orders to intercept telecommunications (*kendelse til indgreb i meddelelseshemmeligheden*) which is regulated in § 780 in *The Administration of Justice Act*. The court orders included Jerry, as the investigation's prime target and a handful of individuals which police believed to be Jerry's crime companions. The purpose was to monitor their supposed internal communication concerning illicit drug importation. Second, a surveillance operation was instigated using a separate surveillance team – a group of surveillance officers who had undergone training in surveillance tactics. At first, this operation consisted primarily of direct observation of the prime target, Jerry, with the purpose of monitoring and documenting his movements and contacts. Such an operation is not dependent on a court order but can be instigated by the police themselves if certain criteria are met (cf. § 791 a *The*

Administration of Justice Act). Third, as the suspicion concerned the import of illicit drugs from other European countries, investigation management began to pursue a cooperation with the involved countries. They were as such initially trying to instigate a JIT (joint investigation team), which typically are set in motion via Europol and Eurojust. The purpose was to collect information about the investigation targets abroad and to establish cooperation with other police authorities which could become useful later on in the investigation process. Moreover, the purpose was to try to convince the cooperating authorities that they should instigate separate investigations themselves. Investigation management pointed to the condition that this would increase the amount of accessible information about the criminal network that Jerry was believed to be a part of and would perhaps increase the chances of getting a drug seizure. These initial lines of action and investigation tactics were persistent throughout the entire operation.

Instigating Additional Lines of Action and Tactics

Surveillance in Open Air and Intrusive Surveillance

As the investigation proceeded, it became clear that its focus persons – besides being rather busy people, driving long distances and interacting with a lot of people including each other – had a high frequency of physical meetings; some reoccurring at fixed intervals and some spontaneously arranged. Moreover, they took a number of what detectives viewed as ‘countermeasures’ or ‘security measures’ towards police such as speaking in codes in telephone conversations and holding meetings in open air. This required detectives to attempt to intercept in communications by audio or video recording these meetings (aflytning i det fri) cf. § 780 in *The Administration of Justice Act*. Moreover, using the same legal grounds, detectives tried to instigate ‘intrusive audio surveillance’ (rumaflytning) by placing surveillance devices in cars and residential locations of focus persons. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, these particular tactics required advanced techniques and presented considerable problems and concerns for the detectives throughout the

investigation. Despite of numerous attempts, they were never able to get any solid information from these tactics which could support the investigation process.

Instigating Supporting Lines of Action and Tactics

Historical Telephone Data, Covert Searches, and Financial Monitoring

During the investigation process there was a shift in focus persons. Through wiretapping it became clear that some focus persons were of lesser interest than initially expected and after 1-2 months the monitoring of these individuals was terminated and the wires were taken down (aflytningerne blev taget ned). The investigation had instead accumulated information that other individuals were somehow connected to other focus persons or specifically to Jerry. Some of these were unknown to the police and some were usual suspects. In connection with some of these individuals, detectives requested historical telephone data (historiske teledata) which was used as a supporting tactic to find out which kind of contact there had been between these individuals and the investigation's focus persons and other relevant contacts prior to the launch of the investigation. Covert searches (hemmelig ransagning) require court orders (cf. § 799, *The Administration of Justice Act*) and are exceptional since the suspect is not made aware of this as it is required in the case of regular house searches. In *Operation Goldilocks* it was attempted as a tactic on a few occasions. The purpose was to search cars and property in order to find e.g. illicit drugs, money, written correspondence, or other relevant incriminating information. Although it was a difficult and high-risk tactic as it required detectives to take chances with the danger of having their cover blown while carrying out these searches, detectives liked this tactic as it could be rather valuable. They had for example used covert searches in other cases where they were able to keep accounts of money and stash (of illicit drugs) in order to document sales and profits over time. However, in *Operation Goldilocks*, covert searches were not unfolded successfully until the investigation was shut down. The monitoring of financial transactions (edition) was used on a few occasions in the operation. It

requires a court order (§ 804 and § 806 in *The Administration of Justice Act*) which can impose financial institutions (such as banks) to hand over information to the police regarding specific people's finances, transactions, deposits, assets etc. during a specific period of time. Such information can help disclose any irregularities in suspects' income and as such strengthen the suspicion of illegal earnings or money laundering.

Considering Lines of Action and Tactics

The use of infiltration via an undercover agent (agentvirksomhed, cf. § 754 a *The Administration of Justice Act*) is a very rare investigative tactic as this is only to be applied under extraordinary circumstances and the rules are quite restrictive. It was considered at one point during *Operation Goldilocks* and the initial steps towards engaging the national unit of undercover operations were made. One of the investigation's focus persons, Tim, was believed to be a "weak link" in the sense that he seemed to be a rather unstable person and served as a 'useful idiot' (nyttig idiot) for Jerry. He was unknown to the police and detectives wondered how he even had gotten involved with this network of organised criminals. Apparently, Jerry's network used Tim as a driver and to make various deliveries across the country, to shop specific items they required, and as a storage for money. From the wires it became clear that Tim was quite loyal to Jerry, but that he lacked the experience as a criminal operative and therefore his security measures were not as well rehearsed. Thus, once in a while he would begin to talk about unsuitable issues over the phone which made Jerry frustrated and angry. Eventually, the relationship between the two got so tense that Tim became frightened of Jerry and withdrew from all contact with Jerry and his network before detectives were able to instigate an undercover operation.

Another useful and typical investigation tactic in covert operations, according to detectives, was the use of a 'controlled delivery' (kontrolleret leverance). This means


that police passively follow and observe a particular transportation and consequently deliverance of illegal goods (e.g. illicit drugs) moving from one location to another – typically coming in over the borders. This import of drugs can be controlled by police in the sense that they know it is coming and when, but perhaps not where it is going and who is involved. Such a controlled deliverance can be crucial for and even determine the success of a proactive investigation as it brings about the possibility for detectives to catch the suspects in the act so to speak. The situation never presented itself in *Operation Goldilocks* as detectives were never able to collect information about how the network around Jerry imported and distributed drugs as they were suspected of. Other common proactive investigation tactics include for example the use of anonymous witnesses, but these were never relevant in *Operation Goldilocks*.

Closing

As revealed at an early stage in this thesis (**Chapter 6**), *Operation Goldilocks* was shut down after a period of eight months. Officially, this was done with regards to resource allocation. But amongst detectives, this management decision was perceived as a consequence of the lack of progress in the investigation against Jerry. Detectives' assessments were that they could have built a case against some of the other focus persons in the periphery, but that this would not necessarily have led to Jerry. In terms of the lack of progress and success in relation to their efforts towards Jerry detectives identified at least three different reasons for this. First, Jerry was too experienced and had instigated too many countermeasures for the police to get close to him. Second, the investigation was not given the time needed to test all investigations tactics and different investigation 'paths' to Jerry. Third, technical issues – the lack of quality equipment to support especially the monitoring of meetings in open air – presented detectives with daily challenges and was considered to be the main obstacle for success in *Operation Goldilocks*. I will discuss these grounds for lack of success later in the chapter. The above presentation of the

investigation process of *Operation Goldilocks* proposes a typical recipe or script for main lines of action and investigation tactics and as such a process description of proactive investigation. Various investigation tactics can be selected and applied in different orders, but **Figure S** illustrates a typical process for proactive investigations.

Figure S. *A Process Description of Proactive Investigation.*



Investigation Organisation and Structure

Roles, Functions, and Meetings

The practical organisation of *Operation Goldilocks* consisted of an investigation team of around 10 detectives (two of these operated in another police district and two were lent from The National Investigation unit). Additionally, there was an investigation manager (efterforskningsleder), and a SIO (sagsstyrer). Moreover, the team was supported by a separate surveillance team consisting of a handful of surveillance officers. Another support function was a small team of technical/IT detectives (IT-efterforskere) who provided all operations in AIU with technical support. This could for instance be in terms of surveillance equipment, but also confiscated evidence (koster) such as computers, phones etc. Moreover, one of the detectives had the role of operational analyst (operativ analytiker) which meant that

he provided an intelligence and analytical support function to investigation teams in AIU. This consisted, however, primarily of making searches in the intelligence database (PED) on investigations' focus persons to see if there were any historical intelligence information regarding these persons of interest. The access to this database was restricted to this detective. Yet, sometime in the middle of the operation this operational analyst was allocated to another investigation as a full-time detective (which was his background before becoming an analyst) as there was a shortage of detectives. Furthermore, a particular prosecutor from the Prosecution Service (Anklagemyndigheden) was assigned to the case.

The investigation team had daily investigation meetings every afternoon which were held in the meeting room with a video link to the detectives in the other police district. These meetings revolved around the progress in the investigation primarily by an 'around the table presentation' (bordet rundt) where detectives individually summarised today's the events of the day such as actions taken by focus persons or conversations detectives found 'interesting'. The investigation process focused overwhelmingly on information from wiretapping supported by information from the surveillance operation. Each detective was assigned a focus person which meant that their main task was to 'keep up with' their focus person in terms of movements, contacts, and conversations. The team worked as a general rule in the hours of 8 AM to 4 PM and as such they were not monitoring focus persons in real time, unless there was an (important) surveillance operation. Instead, they played back conversations from the day before and summarised these in investigation reports. However, on many occasions they coordinated to put in overtime during nights and weekends if they had surveillance operations or their focus persons had specific plans involving meetings which detectives wanted to monitor simultaneously. One detective was given the role of attending court together with the prosecutor when warrants and court orders were applied for. The prosecutor presented detectives' reports to the judge who granted new court orders or extended existing ones. Extensions for interception in communications had to be

applied for every four weeks meaning that detectives continuously had to collect information from wiretapping and document these in investigation reports which could provide sufficient grounds for the court's decision. During the entire process of the investigation all court applications were granted and my overall impression after studying the field and by talking to detectives is that such applications for the most part seems like formalities.

Case Material and Case Management

Other case material consisted of investigation reports regarding the movements, contacts, and conversations of focus persons. These reports could also be summaries of investigation steps – the ones that had proven successful and the ones that had not. An example could be if a detective had enquired about a particular person looking at e.g. residency, registered vehicles, criminal record, income and tax information etc. they would summarise this in a report and file it to the case. The surveillance team had a standard report which they produced for each day they had been in operation. This consisted of logs of times, places, and observations supported by photographs of the monitored individuals. A technical function in the investigation database made it possible to keep an investigation diary with the purpose of posting the most significant and recent events and investigation steps. This function was meant to provide detectives and investigation management with a comprehensive and quick overview of the investigation's progress and as such swift information sharing. Nevertheless, during the operation I observed that this function was used in an unstructured and ad hoc manner and in terms of following the progress of the investigation it was necessary continuously to read all underlying report material. A long the way, a detective was assigned the role of indexer having to ensure a structured categorisation in the investigation database of the thousands of documents and reports which the investigation accumulated (bilagering).

Senior Investigation Officer (SIO)

The SIO (a detective police inspector) managed the case as he coordinated and delegated investigation tasks at an overall level. He also monitored a focus person himself as they were too few detectives compared to focus persons. This meant that he was quite busy as he also had to read all investigation reports and was overall responsible for deciding upon new investigation steps. He was also supposed to plan ahead in terms of new investigation steps. Additionally, he was the detectives' go-to-person when they had reflections about their focus persons or questions regarding investigation tactics. The SIO was overall an immensely experienced detective and he had a high status amongst detectives who viewed him as very competent. Moreover, he was friendly and had an engaging nature which resulted in his role as SIO being more advisory rather than issuing orders.

Investigation Manager

The investigation manager (a superintendent) was overseeing all operations in AIU not only *Operation Goldilocks*. He had the formal management responsibility and superintendent for all personnel. He had to monitor all progress in each operation and was the link between the unit, detectives, and investigation management. He reported about developments in each operation and status in terms of e.g. resource allocations to regional management and attended investigation manager meetings with the other investigation managers in the regional unit. In spite of a range of tasks, he was quite engaged in and attended almost all investigation meetings in *Operation Goldilocks*. The SIO consulted and coordinated moreover to a high degree investigation steps and lines of actions with him which he occasionally had to clear with the Chief Superintendent (politiinspektør). The reasons for his dedication to this particular operation was first of all that it was a large-scale investigation including an international dimension, and second of all that investigation management had launched it with great ambition and expectations of success. Thus, the internal awareness and interest for the operation at many levels was at least in

the beginning – considerable which resulted in the need for the investigation manager to follow the operation up close in order to continuously provide reports ‘upstairs’.

International Delegation

Just about in the middle of the investigation, a delegation of Danish detectives was sent to one of the cooperating European countries’ law enforcement agencies in support of the investigation. Investigation management had been successful in terms of instigating a small-scale operation abroad and consequently to get court orders to intercept in communications of a couple of focus persons in those countries. The role of the delegation was as such to monitor the movements, contacts, and conversations of these focus persons taking place outside Denmark in order to keep up with their international activities. The detectives reported on a daily basis back to the SIO and the investigation team in Denmark about key events and investigation progress. This international cooperation agreement was decided upon bilaterally by the respective investigation units. The national unit (NCI), which had the responsibility and authority to handle international communication and collaboration, was only to a limited extent involved. The reason for this, as explained by investigation management, was that the time factor was crucial and that the bureaucracy which accumulated by involving NCI, Europol, and Eurojust would delay the investigation at great cost.

Above, I have presented a process description of proactive investigation as I have accounted for the main lines of action which were taken in *Operation Goldilocks*, which central investigation tactics detectives instigated, and how the investigation was organised in terms of team structure, management and specific investigative functions and roles. In the following, I will analyse the processes and practices of proactive investigation by presenting an analytical model of proactive investigation

including investigation stages and main lines of enquiry. I will look into which purposes they serve, and what role they play in the investigation process.

Instigating Covert Operations

Covert police work offers means to discover otherwise unavailable information about crime (Marx 1988). Recalling Marx' typology of police work (ibid.), presented in **Figure C, Chapter 2**, this can be done as non-deceptive passive surveillance or by using deceptive undercover measures or trickery by agent provocateurs.

According to Bacon (2016) such techniques are used to confirm suspicions, fill in the gaps or connect the dots of the intelligence picture. More controversially, according to Loftus & Goold (2012), the 'invisibilities of policing' are also used to manipulate the environment, perceptions, and behaviour of the suspect in order to entice them to commit an offence or enable an officer to infiltrate a criminal network (agent provocateurs). Marx (1988) categorises covert operations by their types and dimensions as *intelligence operations*, *preventive operations*, and *facilitating operations*, and he distinguishes between operations directed at known targets and/or based on prior intelligence. The case of *Operation Goldilocks* can in Marx' (ibid.) terms be characterised as an *intelligence operation* and *focused investigation* as it was directed against a known target based on prior intelligence information with the purpose to uncover ongoing criminal activities. The operation consisted primarily of the use of passive surveillance although it was at some point considered to insert an undercover agent. The operation never progressed into manipulative actions or infiltration and as such it was more concerned with confirming a suspicion of the import and distribution of illicit drugs (Bacon 2016).

An Analytical Model for Proactive Investigation

Models for Criminal Investigation

As accounted for in **Chapter 2**, there are several models in the literature explaining criminal investigation as a circular process of problem-solving and information work (Innes 2003; Fahsing 2016; O’Neill 2018). Fahsing (2016) underlines that the lack of a shared conceptual model for legal fact-finding (investigation) stands out as a major systemic shortcoming both in daily investigative tasks and in the critical interaction between detectives, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Fahsing proposes a model (2016) (see **Chapter 2**) which depicts a generic and cyclic process for investigation tasks in six stages, involving *collecting*, *checking*, *connecting*, *constructing*, *considering*, and *consulting* to answer the six investigation questions of *What*, *Where*, *When*, *Who*, *Why*, and *How*. This can be compared to models within crime analysis and the intelligence field (for example the SARA model for problem-oriented policing (Eck & Spellman 1987) or the intelligence cycle (Ratcliffe 2008a), which are not linear, chronological processes, but instead are in moving back and forth between the separate stages. It therefore illustrates the process of information work in criminal investigations rather than lines of actions. Criminal investigations and all other forms of legal fact-finding should, according to Fahsing (2016), be approached and understood as sense-making processes which are heavily dependent on two critical factors: 1) the access to data, and 2) the ability of the observer to explore them with all the relevant hypotheses. These factors are strongly dependent on the phenomenological insight and the diagnostic capacity of the sense-maker since certain data only will appear in light of certain schemata and vice versa (ibid.). The close interaction between assumptions and data can be seen as fundamental to all discoveries – scientific or not (Kuhn 1962; Fahsing 2013). This is in line with Innes’ (2003) general categorisation of investigation work as information work in the sense that the majority of investigation steps are concerned with upholding some kind of information and making sense of it (see also **Chapter 2**).

Innes' (ibid.) hierarchy of information (see **Figure D, Chapter 2**) – contending noise, information, intelligence, knowledge, evidence – depends on socially produced definitions by individual officers and the police organisation. Thus, the social production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use are constituted on the basis of how contextually situated social actors (detectives) make sense of their actions, interactions, and environment. Accordingly, this is also the case in proactive investigations which I will discuss further in the coming sections. Although they are generic, the models and processes above are based on and focus on reactive investigation work and the investigation stages and processes in proactive investigation therefore look somewhat different, which I analyse in the following. In this context, I differentiate between *the process of proactive investigation* and *the proactive investigation process*. The first refers to the stages and phases within proactive investigation in terms of main lines of action, and the latter refers to the tactical content and purposes of these lines of action. I find this distinction important in the discussion of either descriptive/normative/prescriptive investigation models for investigation (Fahsing 2016) in the search for a proactive investigation methodology as the stages of proactive investigation do not equal the lines of action. My main argument in this chapter is that the methodology of proactive investigation is not as pronounced as of reactive investigation, which my analysis in connection to the process description shows.

In the following sections, I therefore propose a model of proactive investigation in which I combine aspects of the process description introduced above together with lines of enquiry, lines of action, and investigation tactics and investigation purposes. My aim is not to produce an ideal type normative or prescriptive model, but rather to explore the explicit and implicit and tacit as well as clearly expressed practices analytically. The purpose is ultimately to investigate if a comprehensive methodology of proactive investigation can be identified.

Stage 1: Initial Information Collection and Ordering Information

Since proactive investigations begin with a concrete suspicion against a specific person or persons, the first stage of proactive investigation consists of two main lines of action: 1) Information collection, and 2) the ordering of this information.

The underlying lines of enquiry which are guiding these lines of action are: *who are peripheral individuals, focus persons, and investigation targets in a specific operation, and how does the social environment they operate in function, and what is going on?* Thus, the tactical content at this stage is about: 1) *Identifying investigation targets*, and 2) *ordering the criminal context*.

Although, detectives overall label all ‘person of interests’ within the investigation as focus persons, I will argue that these have different status and are by detectives attended to in different ways. In this context, investigation targets can be compared to *prime suspects* (Innes 2003) in the world of reactive investigation as these are the ones who are believed to be responsible for or main drivers behind carrying out the potential crime under scrutiny – depending on the strategy and focus of the investigation. Investigation targets are often identified before the launch of a proactive investigation, but they can also be identified during the investigation. Focus persons are the bulk of individuals who are active in an investigation and perhaps/perhaps not are engaging in the ongoing crime, but whom the police have grounds of suspicion against in order for them to be for example wiretapped. Peripheral individuals are people who appear in the investigation on/off as they are e.g. in contact with focus persons or investigation targets (family, friends, colleagues), but whom police have no direct suspicion against. These three categories can interchange during an investigation meaning that investigation targets can turn into focus persons or peripheral individuals and vice versa. In the case of *Operation Goldilocks*, it happened on several occasions that peripheral individuals turned into investigation targets, that investigation targets turned into focus persons, and that focus persons turned into peripheral individuals.

The other main line of enquiry in this early stage of the investigation process is what I call the ordering of the criminal context. On a practical level, detectives do this by trying to establish how these individuals communicate, what they communicate about, what they do (general behaviour and routines), and who they meet. This line of enquiry provides information about how this particular criminal network functions and carries out its crime business, and what the different roles and responsibilities in the network are, and who makes decisions. The two main lines of enquiry are closely linked and interdependent. My analysis shows that they are overall trying to uncover:

- Internal hierarchy and pecking order
- Contacts and communication platforms
- Behaviours and routines
- Functions and roles
- Indications of security and countermeasures
- Indications of criminal activity.

Through initial information collection and the ordering of this information, detectives begin to map these different themes, and thereby they start building an overall picture of the specific environment they are monitoring and the persons in it. To do this, they use investigation tactics such as for example wiretapping, surveillance, historical tele data, etc.

Stage 2: Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing Information Collection

Often, or at least occasionally, an investigation strategy or investigation plan is produced before the launch of a proactive investigation. This is e.g. formulated in the investigation proposal and is concerned with the objectives, resources, and duration of the investigation. However, due to the condition that proactive investigation operates in the world of uncertainties more than in the world of facts,

it can be difficult at an early stage to specify exactly how the investigation is going to proceed. Therefore, the second stage of proactive investigation is concerned with what I formulate into two lines of action: 1) *specifying and deciding the investigation strategy*; and consequently 2) *focusing information collection* to support this strategy.

The purpose is to target investigation resources and investigation tactics where they are most useful. Wiretapping, directed surveillance and intrusive surveillance are extremely time consuming and resource demanding investigation tactics and they can easily overwhelm and incapacitate an entire investigation team if they are not used in a targeted manner. As detectives underline, these decisions are difficult to make as they can potentially exclude vital information from the investigation but they can also provide the opposite. If the first stage of proactive investigation can be considered as exploratory, the second stage is much more focused and concentrated on specific investigation targets and the information collection around these with the purpose of building a case. The second stage build on the information collection in stage one and is as such concerned with the underlying lines of enquiry: *How is the criminal operation unfolding, and who is involved?* The tactical content at this stage is thus concerned with: 1) *Determining the criminal operation*, and 2) *including/excluding the relevant operators*.

As mentioned earlier, when investigating presumed experienced criminal counterparts, such as Jerry, the amount of security and countermeasures which they take can be rather comprehensive and if practiced in a routined and disciplined manner the police's use of various investigation tactics can be diminished. For example, if investigation targets use encrypted communication platforms, prefer physical meetings in open air, or avoid talking about potentially incriminating topics on the phone. Although it was not formulated as an actual investigation strategy neither verbally nor in writing, the overall aim of *Operation Goldilocks* was, by my interpretation, to map the whereabouts and contacts of Jerry to identify the "weakest" link (a person who might talk or brag about his criminal involvement on

the phone) or to identify a distributor/seller of drugs and concentrate the investigation on those individuals and hope it would lead to Jerry (also referred to as the ass to head-strategy in **Chapter 7**). Another possibility was to find the storage (of either illicit drugs or money) and to monitor this and the activities around it. Such approaches are common in proactive investigation and they encompass this investigation stage to try to identify the most successful investigation approach:

- Interpersonal conflicts (liabilities)
- Strengths (security measures)
- Weaknesses (weakest links)
- Production location (whereabouts)
- Import (actions/crime business model)
- Distribution lines (people)
- Storage location (money/drugs).

The purpose is to determine which investigation targets detectives should spend their time and energy on and which investigation approach to use. This can include a variety of investigation tactics such as wiretapping, intrusive surveillance, undercover operations, controlled delivery etc.

Stage 3: Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence

When the strategy for investigation has been determined and the necessary investigation tactics have been employed, the next stage of the process of the investigation is to follow this strategy in terms of collecting targeted information which can be used concretely to build a case against the suspects. This stage is therefore concerned with *the production of investigation knowledge and evidence*. This knowledge and evidence production can be said to encompass an investigation process where detectives assess information which in the eyes of detectives is viewed as ‘knowledge’ and hopefully by the courts can be assessed as ‘evidence’.

This distinction is important as information within the police and the prosecution service is of course sometimes regarded differently by the courts. Although detectives often talk about ‘evidence collection’ when they talk about ‘information collection’ they are somewhat humble towards the court’s assessment of this information and consequently their approval of this as ‘evidence’. Still, detectives can disagree with the courts and as such maintain their own perception of this information as ‘investigation knowledge’ and ‘evidence’ in this sense may be regarded as ‘judicial/legal evidence’. Thus, the main lines of enquiry at this stage are concerned with: *How, when, and where are the suspects carrying out their criminal operation?* and the tactical content at this stage is focused at: 1) *Proving the suspects’ criminal activities*, and 2) *making arrests*.

In the case of *Operation Goldilocks*, this stage of the investigation was limited, but for as long as it proceeded, it focused on targeted information collection in terms of documenting meetings and contacts and distributions lines. This information collection was supposed to provide documentation to support the production of investigation knowledge (e.g. the certainty of guilt of the suspects), and eventually compose sufficient grounds for making arrests. In proactive investigations, arrests often take place after a carefully planned operation for example in connection with a controlled delivery, import or distribution of illicit drugs, money, or the like. Other types of arrest operations include coordinated arrests where the police plan a ‘crackdown’ at a specific time towards the entire criminal network. The grounds for arrests are discussed with and sometimes decided upon by the prosecution service and occasionally arrests are employed at a much earlier stage than detectives would prefer. This is primarily due to the legal issue regarding the police’s duty to act when encountering a criminal offence (*politiets handlepligt*).

Stage 4: Constructing or Closing Cases

The final and fourth stage is termination of the investigation in a police context. This is not as such concerned with lines of enquiry and action, but rather there are two main options: either the continuous construction of a case or the closing of a case. The first option is about putting together a full and comprehensive account of the criminal activities of the network which has been under investigation with the purpose of taking these to courts. Such a case construction is primarily a ‘desk job’ in the sense that it is concerned with evaluating the information which has been collected all through the investigation and to assess if it can provide the necessary evidence to charge the suspects. The case is hereafter handed over to the prosecution service and they decide whether to prosecute or not. The second option is to close down an investigation which was the case of *Operation Goldilocks*. This decision was made by investigation management and was almost effectuated within days. Thus, all investigation tactics and information collection were terminated. By law (§ 788, *The Administration of Justice Act*) it is required that suspects in a given case are made aware that they have been under suspicion and under investigation by the police. However, to avoid investigations targets and focus person to become aware of police’s covert operations, the police can apply for postponement or exemption of this information (undladelse eller undtagelse af underretning) at the courts if it can harm the investigation, or other similar investigations (§ 788, section 4). Generally, it is difficult to close down proactive investigations as both detectives, investigation management, and prosecutors are continuously hoping to get ‘the big catch’ and thereby that the resources turned out to be well spent. This investigation stage is therefore primarily concerned with the assessing and processing information in terms of evidence. Either option ends the primary investigation process and typically resolves or reduces the investigation team significantly (until the case has gone to court). The model for proactive investigation is depicted in **Figure T**.

Figure T. Model for Proactive Investigation.

STAGE 1	Initial Information collection & Ordering Information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifying investigation targets • Ordering the criminal context
STAGE 2	Determining Investigation Strategy & Focusing Information Collection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determining the criminal operation • Including/excluding relevant operators
STAGE 3	Producing Investigation Knowledge & Evidence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proving suspects' criminal activities • Making arrests
STAGE 4	Constructing or Closing Cases <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessing and assembling evidence • Applying for postponement/exemption of notification

The Social Organisation of Proactive Investigation

According to Innes (2003), the social organisation of homicide investigation is an important issue in terms of understanding homicide investigation work as the organisational system acts to co-ordinate and control the actions of the individual investigators. This can equally be said to be the case for proactive investigations. An empirical finding in the context of this study is that proactive investigation is carried out as individual rather than collective acts. Thus, the process of proactive investigation can be viewed as a series of individual acts and tasks carried out by individual detectives which together make up and encompass the entity of the investigation. As a result, the processes and practices of proactive investigation are made up by a large amount of individual actions and a small amount of collective actions. Let me elaborate and provide examples:

The work during *Operation Goldilocks* encompassed a range of collective actions, for example daily investigation meetings which were formally arranged and structured as ‘around the table presentations’ of significant events or developments within the operation or the planning of specific lines of action (e.g. the installation of surveillance devices, searches etc.). However, although these actions were taking

place in a somewhat formal and structured manner, the content of these actions was not particularly significant for the progress of the investigation. By this I mean that it was the informal process rather than the formal process which influenced direction, decision-making, and progress of the investigation, and the informal process depended much more on individual than collective action. The formal investigation meetings functioned primarily as a 'status forum' where investigation targets' and focus persons' movements and actions were accounted for, and where detectives presented their assumptions and ideas about 'who has done what and why' and to a much lesser extent 'what will happen next and why'.

Although the SIO often sought to instigate reflection amongst detectives, this process never became collective and the meeting forum rarely provided a forum for joint reflection or collective construction of hypotheses which perhaps could impact or change the direction of the investigation or investigative action. Instead, such processes took place tacitly in the minds of detectives or in informal settings (for example in spontaneous morning meetings) where a small group of detectives had their coffee and discussed the case and how to go about it. The SIO expressed an ambition to instigate joint reflection as he wanted to engage all detectives in decision-making and make sure that everyone could present their thoughts and ideas. Still, the investigation team seemed unfamiliar with this type of joint scenario-thinking and ultimately decision-making and it was difficult to get them involved in collective discussions. Furthermore, as I will explain later in this chapter, the processing of information as the essential core of investigative work predominantly took place in an individual manner where detectives individually assessed, interpreted, and added meaning to the information they collected through various investigation tactics, but based on individual rather than common grounds.

Thus, the distinction between collective vs. individual and formal vs. informal may seem minor, as the investigation progressed altogether, but it has considerable significance for at least two reasons. First, since collective and formal processes

around the investigation are limited this results in an absence of structure in the investigation process which makes it difficult to maintain a clear direction of the investigation and to focus and coordinate decision-making around this specific direction. Granted, structure and direction can exist tacitly and informally, but proactive cases are per default made up by massive amounts of information which for a single human mind are impossible to overview without having some sort of clear structure to prevent e.g. overlooking relevant information. According to Fahsing (2016), all criminal investigations should early on generate all investigative hypotheses and follow up by real attempts to falsify the initial suspicion. Such procedures encourage the decision-maker to generate evidence that supports alternative outcomes, resulting in a more balanced and objective evaluation of the relevant evidence at the time of judgment. Fahsing (ibid.) adds that if detectives ignore this fundamental professional knowledge it may lead to ‘modern-day witch-hunts’, tunnel vision, and confirmation bias.

Second, the lack of collective and formal investigation processes can result in individual and perhaps autonomous practices which do not necessarily support the overall aim and direction of the investigation. Indeed, detectives seem to perform a well-rehearsed (common) drama for investigative action, but this appears as automated rather than supporting a clear collective determined method. Moreover, individual, tacit actions are prone to greater margins of error as it is difficult to evaluate and thereby certify. Consequently, investigative decisions are taking place primarily on a tactical level focusing on ‘investigative problems of the day’ as it is based sporadically on yesterday’s operational events and behaviours of investigation targets rather than on a clear strategic direction determined by proactive scenario-building. The social organisation of proactive investigation becomes in that sense a composition of detectives’ separate acts which are based on their individual and preferred approaches to the investigation. Therefore, the application of predominantly informal and individual processes fails to instigate and support a

common methodology for proactive investigation practice amongst detectives and leaves investigative action to be based on various individual discretion.

Until now, I have analysed proactive investigation practice comprised in an analytical model of proactive investigation directed by four overall stages accompanied by certain lines of enquiry and a variety of investigation tactics. I have furthermore analysed the social organisation of proactive investigation and the implications of this in relation to investigation work. In the following section, I will illustrate the differences between lines of action and lines of enquiry and how this distinction is important when trying to understand the practices of proactive investigation.

Lines of Action vs. Lines of Enquiry

According to Innes (2003), a line of enquiry is comprised of a number of interlinked and interdependent actions, which have the potential to collectively promote an enhanced understanding of a particular aspect of the crime. In the descriptive and in the analytical models for proactive investigation presented above, I also differentiate between ‘lines of action’ and ‘lines of enquiry’. I regard lines of action as ‘investigation steps’ (efterforskningskridt) which are sometimes referred to in the literature and in the practical world of policing as lines of enquiry (Stelfox 2009; Cook & Tattersall 2014). However, based on the analysis in this study and the specific search for a methodology of proactive investigation in this chapter, I find this to be a misleading label, as the *actions* of detectives are very much different from the *purposes* of those actions. Thus, in the mentioned terminology I do not regard lines of enquiry to be equal to investigation steps (such as for example the instigation of wiretapping or surveillance). Lines of enquiry indicate that there are specific questions to enquire about and as such a specific reason to instigate certain actions understood as investigation tactics. This distinction does not merely have an

analytical value – it is based on empirical observations and it is therefore rather significant for the practice of (proactive) investigation as I will explain.

A central analytical finding in this study is that investigation tactics (lines of action) in proactive investigation seem to be decided upon and instigated *before* investigative questions (lines of enquiry) are developed. This means that the instigation of investigative tactics (as illustrated in the process description of proactive investigation) are predominantly the ones that determine the investigation process rather than context dependent investigative queries (undersøgelsesspørgsmål) or hypotheses (lines of enquiry) constructed based on the case at hand. Thus, as in the case of *Operation Goldilocks*, various (covert) investigation tactics seem to be employed routinely even in the early stages of proactive investigation (e.g. wiretapping) as a kind of compulsory ritual, but without stemming from specific and tailored information requirements regarding the social environment and the social agents who are under scrutiny. Detectives were, in hindsight, sporadically critical towards the operation's start up and the routine application of investigation tactics and viewed this as too abrupt and fast and not adequately prepared which they also connected to the lack of success in the investigation. A Senior Detective explains:

The mistake was that we had an immediate start-up. Going from 0-100. I have often asked management if we could spend a little more time assessing the case before launching the investigation. But these start-ups are often managed from the top. (...) It's not that I don't want us to instigate all those investigation tactics, I just wish that we as detectives are given the initial investigation material in advance and try to illuminate some of the information through other channels than for example through the intelligence and analysis unit. We as detectives have a huge network and we know people who might be able to illuminate the investigation proposals further.

Thus, the sudden launch of a proactive investigation from one day to another were regarded by detectives as serving primarily the needs of management to show action rather than being a requirement derived from the case. However, despite the fact that detectives encouraged management to change this approach they referred

to this as ‘typical practice’ in the launch of proactive investigations where investigation targets were decided upon by management. Moreover, the instigation of interceptions in communications are generally perceived as the very first step of proactive investigation and as such in the eyes of detectives this investigation tactic marks and defines the very beginning of a proactive case.

Another example of routine actions is the construction of an investigation strategy, which is typically presented in the initial investigation proposals. This strategy was, in the case of *Operation Goldilocks*, viewed by detectives and even some managers as a procedural requirement and instrumental in terms of getting the operation approved higher up the chains of command. During the investigation, this strategy was never reviewed or altered as the investigation progressed and it was therefore guiding neither investigative actions nor decisions. The direction of the operation and consequently the ‘strategy’ of the investigation changed a number of times, however, this happened in an implicit and tacit manner and was rarely articulated as a change of strategy, but instead as a change of e.g. focus persons or investigation tactics. Similarly, in strategic meetings concerning prioritisation and coordination of investigation resources, reports about investigation progress are hardly ever described in strategic terms, but are rather accounted for in terms of which events have taken place, which people are involved, and what lines of action detectives have (tactically) instigated. The examples above underline that investigation actions are instigated routinely in almost a ritualised manner somewhat detached from strategic considerations. In this sense, there *is* a recipe, a procedure, a predetermined script for proactive investigation which is applied in each case, however, these are tacit and unarticulated and mainly handed over from senior detectives to junior detectives through apprenticeship and ‘watch and learn’. This experience-based, tacit practice building on silent work experiences, is well connected to the observation that measures are taken routinely and that lines of action are employed before formulating lines of enquiry.

The difference between the process description and the model for proactive investigation lies primarily in the fact that the first illustrates the investigation process as it can be identified empirically in detectives' investigation practice. On the contrary, the model is my construction and analytical interpretation of this practice and which underlying lines of enquiry the lines of action are supposed to answer. Within this distinction lies furthermore the condition that the investigation process in the process description is carried out as a tacit practice following an inherent, unarticulated script for performance leaving little collective awareness to detectives and the collective investigation process explaining why things are done when they are done. My search for such a collective or even individual transparency, awareness, and structural order in investigative practice is not entirely based on an outsider's need for structured and clear meaning and action. In fact, the lack of what I call 'collective deliberate action' represents an obstacle for the practice field of proactive investigation and the innovations within this field, which I discuss further later in this chapter.

In the following section, I will analyse proactive investigation as a practice which predominantly consists of information work. Accordingly, I explore how proactive investigation can be determined and understood through 1) types of information work, and 2) types of information sources.

Proactive Investigation as Information Work

When looking at both the proactive investigation process (stages) and the process of proactive investigation (content) it becomes clear through the empirical analysis that although there are similarities these differ to a great extent from those of reactive investigation (Innes 2003; Fahsing 2016). This has to do with both the starting point of proactive investigations, the investigative questions which are to be answered, the lines of action – investigation steps and tactics – and not least the type of information work and information sources. First, the analysis above shows

that the stages of proactive investigation if compared to those of Innes' (2003) looks somewhat different in a proactive investigation, for example in terms of the order of those stages:

- (3) *suspect development* – identification of investigation targets based on suspicion
- (2) *the information burst stage* – information regarding the targets is collected
- (1) *the initial response* – the actual 'crime event' takes place, for example the import of illicit drugs, and information is collected
- (4) *suspect targeting* – the suspects are arrested
- (5) *case construction* – the evidence is assessed in regards to prosecution.

Second, the analysis shows further that investigative questions such as What, When, Where, and How cannot be clarified in the first stages of a proactive investigation as it is occupied with future or ongoing crime. Instead, the Who and Why questions are more or less clear from the beginning. This results in fairly different investigation approaches, processes, and practices, which are influenced by the types of information work and the types of information sources.

Types of Information Work

As underlined in **Chapter 2**, one of the most important conditions to understand when it comes to investigation processes is that it is predominantly information work and that detectives are knowledge workers (Innes 2003; Hald & Rønn 2013; Fahsing 2016). As such, almost all stages in the investigation and all investigation steps are concerned with identifying, collecting, and processing information. Innes (2003) characterises his information hierarchy as dependent on socially produced definitions by individual officers and the police organisation. Thus, the social production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use is constituted on the basis of how contextually situated social actors (detectives) make sense of their actions, interactions, and environment. The entire investigation process can therefore be seen as an analytical sense-making process (Fahsing 2016)

as detectives try to assess the information they collect in terms of categorising this in an information hierarchy and evaluate its relevance in terms of a particular set of events, or the behaviour and actions of particular individuals. This is, in that sense, anything else but objective information collection – it is in fact a constant interpretation process where detectives categorise, add meaning, socially construct, and give certain powers to the individual pieces of information (Innes 2003; O’Neill 2018). According to Hald & Rønn (2013), these processes even resemble those from social science and humanities e.g. hermeneutic analytical interpretation processes (Gadamer 1998). Accordingly, this is also the case for proactive investigation as I unfold in the following.

Recalling the typological characterisation of strategies for information collection, presented in **Chapter 7**, and the model for proactive investigation, presented above, the type of information work in proactive investigation can be characterised as initially to follow a trawler-based strategy and later on to follow a requirement-based strategy. Even though the social environment and some of the social agents are fixed from the beginning in a proactive investigation (as these are identified as suspects/targets), information collection at the initial stages (1-2 in the analytical model) is not directed, but instead explorative, data-oriented, general and broad with the purpose to identify ‘information of interest’ (just in cases it is needed) (see also **Chapter 7**). Using Innes’ (2003) terms, this information can both be ‘noise’ and ‘information’, which have the possibilities of being turned into both ‘intelligence’, ‘knowledge’, or ‘evidence’, as I demonstrated in the previous analysis. A key characteristic of proactive investigation is that the collection of what detectives regard as ‘factual information’ or ‘evidence’, which is central to reactive investigations (such as witness accounts and forensic evidence) is not as straightforward in proactive cases. As it, per default, investigates crimes which have not yet occurred or crimes in the making, proactive investigation operates in the world of suspicion, potential actions, and uncertainties. Information collection thereby becomes much broader as it is difficult to determine beforehand which information

that will become relevant (stages 1-2 in the model of proactive investigation). At later stages in the investigation process, information collection becomes, however, more selective as it is employed to support assumptions of guilt of the main investigation targets (stages 2-4 in the model of proactive investigation).

Proactive Investigation as Intelligence Work

Due to this condition, the premises of information work are perhaps even more central to and explicit in the processes of proactive investigation than the processes of reactive investigation as there is little concrete information (such as forensic evidence, witness accounts etc.) to deal with. Instead, in its practices and processes I argue that proactive investigation resembles more intelligence work than reactive investigative work as it is indeed concerned with policing uncertainties, scenario thinking and building, and interpretation (Rønn 2012; Sheptycki 2017; Fyfe et al. 2018). In this type of investigative work, detectives become to a high-extent co-producers of events and ‘investigation knowledge’ (Innes 2003; O’Neill 2018) for two main reasons.

First of all, detectives have the power to selectively engage the police in potential criminal events and are able to influence how such events play out in the future for example by influencing these through the instigation of investigation tactics such as e.g. surveillance and undercover agents. Second of all, the assessment and interpretation of such events, of the social environments in which they occur, and the behaviour(s) of these environments moreover provide the police with a monopolised power to present these as ‘factual information’ or ‘evidence’ and bring them to court with potentially (severe) consequences. Brodeur (2010) underlines that the police’s influence on the construction of evidence and of what is perceived as factual circumstances is generally an overlooked and downplayed part of criminal investigation in both research and practice. Another reason as to why proactive investigation is similar to intelligence work is that it is typically very much

concerned with intelligence validation and further intelligence collection. As proactive investigation most often build on intelligence information (e.g. source information) this plays a central role as it provides the grounds for the entire case. Therefore, detectives are occupied with trying to validate this intelligence information throughout the investigation as they seek information which can support this intelligence which resembles a form of confirmation bias (Rossmo 2009; Fahsing 2016) Moreover, further intelligence is often needed throughout the operation, and detectives agree that a good case is a case with a criminal informant close to the investigation target, as a Superintendent underlines:

We need to be close to the targets through the source. We can't depend on them communicating over the phones and sometimes it even seems like a waste of time, listening to the wires, as they seldom talk. But if we have a source up close, we have a chance to get insights of what they're doing and when.

Accordingly, the continuous flow of source information throughout a proactive investigation is by detectives viewed as being a crucial component in terms of a successful proactive investigation. Interestingly, however, information work in proactive investigation is not regarded by detectives as being similar to intelligence work and it is, for example, not viewed as part of any analytical process, which I will explain in more detail later on.

Sources of Information Collection

My analysis shows that the primary investigation tactics and thereby sources of information collection during a proactive investigation are first and foremost interception in communications (wiretapping) and secondly directed surveillance. I base this conclusion on both quantitative and qualitative components and begin with wiretapping.

Wiretapping

Wiretapping of suspects' phones has been used as an investigation tactic since almost the birth of proactive investigations towards organised crime around the 1970s. Historically, this has gone from the wiretapping of land lines (fastnettelefoner) or perhaps even phone booths with more than one regular user to the wiretapping of individual mobile phones with only one permanent user. This investigation tactic is extremely time-consuming and has become even more so over time especially within the last 10-15 years since the amount of communication data has grown tremendously. In *Operation Goldilocks*, it was not uncommon that investigation targets had over one hundred phone conversations per day plus sent and received several hundred text messages. This accumulates an extreme amount of information for detectives to go through and assess on a daily basis and often results in information overload. The collection and ordering of such information seem at times to be overreaching the phases of interpreting this and thereby providing grounds for investigative action. Moreover, detectives viewed this investigation tactic as becoming less and less useful over time since the criminal environment had adapted its behaviour to avoid incrimination by instigating security measures against the police's investigation tactics e.g. speaking in coded messages or using encrypted communication platforms.

Despite of these conditions, wiretapping of the suspects' phones is an assured part of proactive investigation and furthermore; it encompasses the majority of resources (detectives) and time (hours) in an investigation process. In quantitative terms, wiretapping is therefore the primary part of an investigation process. In qualitative terms, wiretapping is maintained as a main line of action based on at least three conditions. First, it contributes to determine the suspects' (communication) network, contacts, and whereabouts (via GPS locations) which are essential to proactive investigations. Second, it provides at least some idea of the suspects' behaviour and interpersonal relations, hierarchy, ways of

communication etc. Third, although being time consuming and perhaps ineffective as a tactic to collect ‘smoking guns’, it still provides detectives with small pieces of information which can be interpreted individually and put together in a larger, coherent narrative of the subject of investigation: the specific crime under scrutiny.

Therefore, the process of information work in at least stages 1-3 of proactive investigation is to a great extent connected to collecting, assessing, and making sense of information from ‘the wires’ and ascribing meaning to this in the greater context of a specific investigation. This interpretation process is socially anchored in collective assumption between detectives of what can be considered as e.g. ‘noise’, vs. ‘evidence’ and can be regarded as both an individual and collective process. Earlier, I presented the social organisation of proactive investigation work and underlined that this consists predominantly of a large amount of separate parts of individual actions and a small amount of collective actions. Thus, this social organisation is exemplified by the practices of information work, for example in connection with wiretapping as detectives collect, assess, add meaning, and interpret information individually and on a daily basis as they carry out their individual investigation tasks and instigate lines of action using their occupational discretion (Innes 2003; Manning 2004; Bacon 2016). As detectives are assigned one or sometimes even two suspects to monitor, they are individually the first and sometimes the only persons to select and interpret conversations and as such in deciding which conversations are ‘interesting’ in the context of the investigation and which are not. The initial information collection and interpretation of ‘noise’ therefore lies as an individual tasks at the individual detective who ‘trawls’ hundreds of conversations and texts each day to look for ‘interesting’ information and summarise these in investigation reports.

This condition directs the analysis towards the investigation teams’ collective and the detectives’ individual competences in terms of assessing and interpreting information generally which is a key component of e.g. intelligence work (Ratcliffe

2008a). In the practical world of policing, this competence is by detectives viewed as a ‘an ability to wiretap’ which is furthermore perceived as one of the key components of being a good detective:

It’s about having that ‘nose’ which means that you know what you’re looking for. To listen is not just ‘to listen’—it’s all the details, a pause in a sentence...that’s what you’re looking for. (...) To have a nose for what goes on in a muddy world rotten to the core.

Another Detective explains:

The most important thing is to listen and hear what’s being said—not what’s ‘being said with words’, but ‘what’s being said’. There’s a difference. Some can do it and some never learn. An ability to hear what’s being said between the lines. To be skeptical about what they (the suspects, *my addition*) say and do. For example if they’re agreeing to meet over a bite to eat. Is that their real intention? If they only meet for 10 minutes they probably haven’t eaten. Then it probably has to do with something else which they can’t discuss over the phone. It can be quite simple. But it can also be quite complicated to hear what they are saying...and you need to piece it together with all kinds of other things (...) You need to pay attention and look for that one little mistake which they might make during an entire investigation. And then you need to act. You need patience and the ability to act when an opportunity arise.

Thus, detectives talk about a certain ability, a ‘nose’ or instinct to ‘hear what is being communicated between the lines’, to be critical about the information, which is provided, and to logically piece things together. A Senior Detective elaborates further:

This conversation...how does it fit with this one? You can hear that sometimes they’re talking about something which is meant to be uninteresting...but then it’s really interesting! And then you need all your antennas open. And we do have some detectives, they can’t hear it and they’re lethal for such an investigation. We’re not better than the ones who are listening (on the wiretaps, *my addition*). And if there’s one who can’t manage, we loose valuable information...or loose...that thing: there’s something dodgy about that one...and then it turns out you’re right and then we’re suddenly following them to another country! That’s what we’re doing for a living: that the intuition tells us: it’s right over there it’s happening. And if you don’t have it, you can investigate for an entire year without a success...

The last quote points furthermore to detectives' perception of the core elements of being a good (proactive) detective; namely the inherent flair, intuition, or 'sense of things' which relies on gut feelings and cannot be assigned to just anyone or any detective for that matter. The notions about good investigation work underline that these abilities or competences lie beyond experience, but rather reflect the notion of investigative work as an innate quality or 'art form' (Tong & Bowling 2006; Innes 2010b). One of the anecdotes I was told by detectives in relation to 'the art of wiretapping' was a story about a detective in a particular investigation who had attended the wires (passet aflytningerne) during a weekend where everybody else were off duty, but who had failed to realise that one of the phones had actually switched owners. As such, the detective had been listening to conversations without noticing the different voices and the differences in themes of conversation. This story was used as an example of a police officer who was utterly incompetent as a detective and as such a claim to the general notion that not all police officers are fit for detective work – it requires a certain 'gift'.

As mentioned earlier, the collective assumptions which are socially constructing meaning of investigation processes and information work (Innes 2003) are produced in a dynamic interplay between individual and shared experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, and the epistemological notions of police work and the criminal counterpart. These are for example the assumptions mentioned earlier that conversations about casual themes such as cooking or shopping (non-suspicious information) can in reality be information sharing about criminal actions between two criminal agents (suspicious information) (see also Rønn 2012 for an elaboration of such assumptions within intelligence work). The small amount of collective processes of information work is connected to two areas; the collective investigation process, as explained earlier in this chapter, and what I refer to as quality assurance and underlying management control of information work. As there are no structures or procedures to assure the quality of or validation of information work in (proactive) investigations this is

carried out in a sporadic and ad hoc manner (Innes 1999; Dunnighan & Norris 1999). In *Operation Goldilocks*, quality assurance was carried out, if one of the detectives wanted a second opinion from another detective or the SIO in terms of what was said on the wires or how to interpret this. They discussed the statements and agreed upon an interpretation. Once in a while, investigation management wanted to oversee some of the detectives' work to ensure that they were thorough enough or were able to make 'the right interpretations', and as such they logged in and listened to conversations and compared these with investigation reports.

Directed Surveillance

Directed surveillance has not always been such a central part of proactive investigation as it is in its current form. Historically, detectives have themselves sporadically carried out observations of suspects instead of having a dedicated surveillance team. Especially since GPS locations from mobile phones have been made available, directed surveillance has been an important element in proactive investigation and information from GPS locations has been an invaluable support of directed surveillance. This has probably also impacted the increased use of this tactic – now a core element of proactive investigation due to both its extended quantifiable application and its inherent qualities. A significant difference historically is that surveillance teams, unlike earlier, in the large regional investigation units nowadays are regarded as professional in the sense that they have specific training and are full-time allocated to this task. The surveillance team in *Operation Goldilocks* had a distinct conceptual practice when they received surveillance tasks from detectives. They had a team manager, fixed meeting points, 'costumes' to choose from, coded language in radio communications, a recipe for keeping observation logs, and a standard report form for their surveillance reports. The surveillance teams' main purpose was to monitor and map the movements and meetings of investigation targets and focus persons to document this through observed accounts and preferably photographs. They took detailed notes about the

events they observed, and they logged places and times which could often be supported by GPS data and information from wiretapping. Due to the character of the information (accounts and observations of surveillance officers, photographs, and GPS data) this information was by detectives regarded as ‘investigation knowledge’ or ‘evidence’ as they perceive this to be incontestable, objective information about factual events. Therefore, the status of information stemming from directed surveillance is high and much treasured in proactive investigation. Interestingly, surveillance officers believed to possess much more information about the investigation’s suspects than merely information about contacts, places, and times. When driving around observing and monitoring suspects for days and months they got to know these individuals and felt they were able to decode their body language and behaviour. For example, they interpreted suspects’ and focus persons’ inter-relational status and their state of minds. A Surveillance Officer explains:

I spend time with them (the suspects, *my addition*) everyday sometimes several hours and even on a distance I can see if Tom is having a bad day, if he’s rushed, if he looks over his shoulder or seems paranoid. If they have a meeting I can see if they’re arguing or enjoying themselves even though I’m too far away to hear they are saying.

Such information was, however, by detectives regarded as ‘redundant’ or ‘surplus’ subjective information which was usually not logged in the surveillance reports. For that reason, detectives rarely asked surveillance officers about other than their ‘objective’ observations of times and places. Not because they regarded other observations as untrustworthy, but because these were categorised as ‘subjective’ and therefore not suited for the investigation’s case files. In comparison, the interpretation of information from wiretapping was rarely referred to as subjective information assessment – it was in fact not addressed as information work and the implicit understanding was that ‘listening to the wires’ captured the very essence of proactive investigative work and depended on the individual detectives’ innate abilities to do this. Consequently, information collected by surveillance officers was

perceived as objective and factual information and directed surveillance as an investigation tactic was deployed as an instrument to document contacts, meetings, and factual events. Still, the task of assessing and putting together the investigation's various information with the purpose to produce meaning and a comprehensive narrative about what was going on, how, why, where, when and who was involved was assigned to the role of detectives. As I have presented in the analysis above, wiretapping and directed surveillance are both quantitatively and qualitatively the most central tactical components of proactive investigation. This does not mean that other investigation tactics are not important or even more effective – I merely argue that empirically these components are fundamental and have considerable significance for how proactive investigation is conceptually understood and practiced in the world of policing. In fact, in their dynamic dialectic these investigation tactics encompass the very essence of proactive investigation practice. When instigating demarcated surveillance operations during investigative work, detectives and surveillance officers perform and fulfil 'the drama of cops and robbers' in its purest form: surveillance officers are out on the streets driving around, observing, monitoring and 'chasing' usual suspects while detectives are 'on the base' wiretapping suspects phones, following their GPS locations, interpreting their actions, building possible scenarios, assessing investigative possibilities, and deciding which tactical steps come next. This can be said to illustrate 'the act of proactivity' – a drama which is performed by detectives over and over to meet the ideal of being one step ahead of their counterparts. In the following sections, I discuss further if proactive investigation can be defined as a distinct policing methodology and I investigate some of the underlying notions and collective assumptions concerning proactive investigation and detective and their impact on proactive investigation practice.

¹ Within *The Danish Administration of Justice Act*, Chapter 71, there are different legal rules as to which investigative tactics require court orders and when the police can instigate investigative tactics on their own based on situational discretion (på øjemed). In general, the Danish police have wide powers of discretion – also when it comes to covert investigations.

The Nature of Proactive Investigation: Revisiting Concept and Practice

Tactics, Methods, or Methodology?

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, my primary aim is to unfold the black box of proactive investigation practice and thus to identify a comprehensive methodology for proactive investigation. The purpose is to get closer to an understanding of the nature of this specific policing phenomenon. In the prior sections, I have analysed proactive investigation and presented both a process description and a model for proactive investigation.

The process description illustrates the investigation process as it can be identified empirically in detectives' investigation practice, whereas the model for proactive investigation is my construction and analytical interpretation of this practice and its underlying and implicit lines of enquiry. I have moreover analysed proactive investigation practice as a process of information work relying on specific sources for information collection, which primarily consist of interception in communications (wiretapping) and directed surveillance. Proactive investigation resembles empirically and by its content more intelligence work than reactive investigation work due to its focus on future and potential criminal action rather than past events and as it is occupied with scenarios and uncertainties. However, this is not recognised by detectives who uphold a collective perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-level operational work or reactive investigative work (see also **Chapter 6 and 7**). A central analytical finding in the empirical observations suggests furthermore that the process and practice of proactive investigation is mainly guided by the routine instigation of covert tactics founded in the legal framework of proactive investigation. This stands in contrast to being a process and practice led by context-dependent investigative queries or

hypothesis and consequently various lines of enquiry. As such, proactive investigation is concerned with the questions of: *what can be done within the legal frame* and *which investigation tactics are there grounds for using?* rather than *which investigation tactics are most appropriate to answer the queries we have?* I will elaborate and support this finding by emphasising three main observations.

First, my analysis shows that detectives routinely apply the same investigation tactics in more or less the same order regardless of the specific characteristics of the (crime) problem at hand. Not all crime problems look the same and are effectively to be dealt with in the same way. This practice routine therefore runs the risk of focusing narrowly on specific tactics and perhaps excluding other relevant and valuable investigation approaches which might be useful. As I have discussed in the two previous chapters, detectives perceive to a high degree proactive investigations in one way; as drug investigations where usual suspects with specific characteristics are primary operators (Manning 2004; Bacon 2016). This collective perception in combination with external and internal structures to measure the success of proactive investigation enables the exclusion of other potentially relevant types of organised crime (e.g. environmental crime, human trafficking, economic crime etc.) or types of criminal agents. Consequently, proactive investigation practice has the tendency to over-police some while under-police others.

Second, the framework which guides proactive investigation is a *legal* framework rather than a *methodological* framework derived from the professional field of criminal investigation. It is obviously not surprising or undesirable that legal requirements set the frame for investigative action, quite the contrary. However, in the search for a methodology for proactive investigation this distinction is essential. According to Innes (2003: 177), investigative methodology is:

...comprised of the combination of practices, procedures, processes, routines, conventions, theories, and techniques through which police respond to a crime. It informs the methods which police officers employ to acquire and interpret

information when investigating different types of crime, accounting for the situational factors pertaining to the specific incident.

Moreover, Innes (*ibid.*) argues, the investigative methodology shapes how information is produced, interpreted, and constructed as knowledge and evidence in the process of investigation. As of now, the empirical analysis in this study has shown that proactive investigation is carried out as a tacit practice following an ingrained, unarticulated recipe and predetermined script for performance. There are as such specific practices, processes, routines, standards, and techniques which all together can be said to characterise proactive investigation as a distinct policing practice. This practice follows thereby a set of collective inherent actions which are informed, guided, produced, and supported in a dynamic interplay between individual and shared experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, and by a number of collective epistemological notions about proactive police work and the criminal counterpart. As such, this proactive policing practice indeed makes sense for the detectives involved as it is those collective assumptions which are socially constructing meaning of investigation processes and information work (Innes 2003).

Third, although proactive investigation is carried out in a routinised manner following an (inherent) recipe and a collectively recognised script for performance, as I discussed earlier, there are differences between lines of action and lines of enquiry. Proactive investigation is primarily tactical and consists of detectives' individual lines of action rather than lines of enquiry. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify a clear methodological approach when applying Innes' (*ibid.*) definition as this police activity mainly seems to be guided by covert measures founded in the legal framework of 'what can be done' rather than an investigative methodology of 'which methods are most appropriate' involving a combination of practices, procedures, processes, routines, conventions, theories, and techniques (Innes 2003). Consequently, proactive investigation practice seems to be lacking deliberate, intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative action and

ultimately encompass a proactive investigative methodology. Along the lines of a finding from Hald (2011), this leaves proactive investigation practice in a gap between a broad legal frame guiding investigation tactics and the routinised employment of such tactics as a compulsory ritual, but without clear investigation methods or even methodology.

Forth, due to the implications of the increasing societal threats and consequently the current political climate as described in **Chapter 2, 5, and 6**, proactive investigation towards organised crime enjoys wide legal frames and extensive powers. This field of policing therefore adopts more and more tactics from the field of high policing (such as e.g. the vast use of interception of communications, directed and intrusive surveillance, the use of confidential informants, infiltration, undercover agents, and covert searches etc.) (Brodeur 2007; Gundhus & Larsson 2014). Still, proactive investigation is by detectives perceived as a continuation of traditional investigative work or street-level operations. Therefore, although these modern measures to a high degree are instigated in proactive investigation of drug crimes they seem to have an instrumental function as they are transferred without the essential knowledge-based notions of the proactive paradigm, for example the analytical dimension of intelligence-led policing (the assessment of intelligence information, structured scenario-thinking, risk assessment, crime analysis etc.). Instead, the extended legal measures from high policing are by themselves seen as innovative. Thus, proactive investigation becomes the instigation of high policing measures carried out in a low policing context of reactive policing. In the coming section, I will explore some of the underlying explanations as to why a methodology for proactive investigation is difficult to establish by looking at detectives' implicit and explicit collective assumptions and perceptions about proactive investigation work. These collective assumptions and perspectives can be seen as vital components in sense-making processes (Innes 2003; Weick 1995; 2005) and I will categorise these as composing a specific *investigative mindset for proactive investigation*.

Investigative Mindset

According to Fahsing (2016) there is or at least has been an existing culture within police organisations of being overconfident in terms of discretionary judgement and decision-making which to a high degree impacts the process of criminal investigation. It is therefore important, he argues (*ibid.*), that detectives are aware and humble towards the highly complex task of criminal investigation and their own proneness to cognitive bias, tunnel vision, and other psychological shortcomings. Cook & Tattersall (2014) introduce the so-called ‘investigative mindset’ which is defined by ACPO and the ABC rule (*Assume nothing, Believe nothing, Challenge and Check everything*). The nature of such an investigative mindset is essential in terms of understanding and explaining detectives’ approaches, practices, and actions. In the following sections, I identify three overall components of an investigative mindset for proactive investigation work which, as I will show, differs somewhat from the international standard. My analysis points to the notions of ‘*solving cases*’, *suspect-driven case building*, and *investigation as action and art*.

‘Solving Cases’

As stated earlier in this chapter, a central characteristic of criminal investigation is that it is predominantly information work and the detective can be seen as a knowledge worker (Innes 2003; Hald & Rønn 2013). Investigation can therefore, when broken down and analysed into its various steps, be seen as an analytical process as it resembles any other (scientific) analytical practice (Hald 2011; Fahsing 2013). An overall characteristic of detectives’ proactive investigation practice is accordingly that it resembles intelligence work as it is indeed concentrated on the analysis of information, yet this is not articulated or recognised by detectives. In fact, detectives are quite skeptical about the domain of intelligence or analysis and regard this as being redundant in the world of policing. Whenever I asked detectives about analysis or intelligence work, they refused this as being a relevant

part of investigation work. “*We have never been able to use any of it*” or “*you cannot analyse your way to an offender*” were typical statements. Throughout *Operation Goldilocks*, the intelligence and analysis unit was accordingly never involved. Gundhus (2006) has a similar finding as analytical knowledge was by detectives viewed less relevant as it was more ‘distant’ or ‘thin’ knowledge (see also **Chapter 7**). Another ‘road not taken’ in the operation was furthermore the instigation of a ‘follow the money-strategy’ or financial investigation. Instead, the dominant approach was continuously a traditional focus on narcotics and the search for seizures. A Detective explains:

It has been neglected for many years. It almost never gets exposed. It’s difficult. They (*moneyman, ed.*) might even be gone when we’re in the picture. The moneyman can be utterly separate from narcotics—someone they trust, perhaps an old friend. Preferably one who’s not known to the police and who they don’t communicate with. And you need luck to uncover this in an investigation. Maybe if they’ve bought some real estate abroad...(…) We should do more about it. Also, the confiscation of their values... But you can’t because it’s so difficult to build the evidence. And when you have that large seizure then you’re quit happy with that since they’re put away for many years...(…) and people like us don’t know much about that...money laundering and tax fraud...it’s a science in itself. We are focused on narcotics and sometimes other accounts such as extortion or violence, but usually we compromise the case (skærrer sagen til).

This preference to stick to narcotics seems to be anchored in both cultural and organisational conditions which have to do with stereotypical notions of ideal offenders and ideal crime types and plain and simple habitual thinking (which I accounted for in **Chapter 6** and **7**). Hence, the more difficult and unfamiliar investigative approaches are often omitted or downgraded which on many occasions changes focus from ‘bigger fish’ (high-impact offenders) to ‘smaller fish’ (low-impact offenders). The implications are that the police response rarely has a disruptive effect, but merely gives a momentary break to the usual offenders. Moreover, detectives keep the language from reactive investigation in the sense that they express that they are ‘looking for clues’ and ‘the needle in the haystack’, ‘the conclusive evidence’ or are concerned with ‘solving the case’. As such, they are to a

large extent focusing on ‘solving crimes’ and ‘putting people in jail’ rather than preventing harm or disrupting crimes in the making. One of the fulcrums of reactive investigation, the collection of what Innes (2003) refers to as ‘personal’ and ‘physical’ evidence (e.g. witness accounts and forensic findings), is similarly the driving force in proactive investigation practices even though the inherent logic of the proactive framework entails a focus on criminal incidents which has yet to be committed. Instead of including an analytical approach and systematic information work from the field of intelligence (for example handling uncertainties, assessing risks, building scenarios), proactive investigation is occupied with tracing and uncovering specific evidence to prove the suspects’ involvement in criminal activities. This reactive notion of proactive investigation work can easily lead to classic case-building as the measure of success is large drug seizures and multiple arrests instead of preventing, fending off, or disrupting criminal actions (Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018), which I also accounted for in **Chapter 6**.

Suspect-Driven Case Building

Proactive investigation in general and the specific case of *Operation Goldilocks* was by detectives and investigation management never viewed or talked about as a covert operation which could also support intelligence purposes. It was, however, continuously described as a (proactive) investigation operation and the purposes were neither intelligence collection, prevention, nor facilitation (Marx 1988). Instead, detectives were, as explained in **Chapter 6** and **7**, predominantly concerned with identifying and documenting information which could be used as evidence to build a case against the prime investigation target, Jerry, and his collaborators. Detectives were overall convinced that this network of focus persons was importing, distributing, and selling illicit drugs – and that facts to prove this existed ‘out there’ and their job was accordingly to find and document this ‘evidence’ through various investigation tactics. Accordingly, their use of legal measures can as such be viewed as a sort of *ad hoc instrumentalism* (Sklansky 2012). As a result of this collective

assumption, daily conversations between detectives and investigation meetings expressed speculations regarding how drugs were imported, where they were stashed, how money was handled or kept, and whom other than the identified focus persons was involved. All information and case material which detectives collected throughout the investigation was interpreted in this 'frame of guilt'. For example, when focus persons met with peripheral individuals together with other focus persons this led detectives to conclude that these peripheral individuals were playing a role in drug dealing. Or that the majority of physical meetings between focus persons (e.g. arrangements to meet for coffee) were planned with the purpose of arranging criminal activities. Such activities were per default regarded as 'suspicious behaviour'. It was therefore rarely a question of 'if', but rather of 'how', 'where', and 'when'. Occasionally, peripheral focus persons were replaced as it became clear through wiretapping that they had little contact with key investigation targets and that there were no indications that they played a prominent role in the particular criminal operation which was under scrutiny. At one investigation meeting, for example, a Detective said about his current focus person, Tom:

I'm sure Tom is committing social fraud against the municipality as he works on a construction site while collecting welfare...and he definitely has a big consumption of hash...I just don't think he's involved in Jerry's operation...he spend so much time at that construction site and at home with his girlfriend that I don't know when he would have the time to do it...he has occasional contact to Martin (*an investigation target, ed.*), but nothing suspicious.

Thus, the rationale was that Tom was probably a dubious and tragic type with his criminal record, drug use, and social fraud – he just was not active in Jerry's operation. On those grounds, it was decided not to apply for an extension of intercepting in communications of Tom and he was excluded from the investigation as soon as the court order expired. New focus persons were added along the way if detectives became suspicious of their frequent contact to other focus persons or their general 'suspicious' behaviour. Still, detectives never raised questions about the involvement of key focus persons – Jerry, Martin, Mik, Joseph – as part of the

alleged criminal network. Their main concern was how to prove it. This certainty of guilt built on some of the same grounds which were presented in the initial investigation proposal and consisted of the following:

- 1) the criminal history of focus persons and their affiliation to organised crime groups
- 2) recent intelligence information from confidential informants
- 3) police's prior investigations against focus persons
- 4) focus persons' use of security and countermeasures.

Accordingly, both historical information from prior investigations, detectives' own experience with this environment and their criminal history together with current information from confidential informants and the information which was collected on a daily basis during the operation contributed to and supported the same assumption and claim: the central focus persons of *Operation Goldilocks*, and particularly Jerry as a prime target, were conspiring and carrying out considerable and serious drug offences. The specifics of how and when they did so were as such the aim of the investigation operation to clarify. Therefore, besides being a focused investigation (Marx 1988), I will furthermore categorise proactive investigation, in the described form, as *suspect-driven case building* (Fahsing 2016). The practice of proactive investigation, although being knowledge-intensive and time critical police work (Dean et al. 2010) just as reactive investigations, therefore diverges from other criminal investigation practices. Proactive investigation is in its outset not occupied with the (objective) process of discovering, collecting, checking, and considering clues from various sources of information with the purpose of trying to construct a coherent account of the (criminal) event, as proposed by Fahsing (2016). As proactive investigation is per default building on police's self-selection (Marx 1988), the suspect is in this regard identified as 'guilty beforehand', and the investigation process is no longer concerned with uncovering and documenting a series of past events, but rather to support the initial suspicion with new information and evidence. The result of the investigation seems to be given in advance and

detectives are in the investigation process most occupied with how to get there. This kind of investigative practice has in the classic literature raised concerns about investigative tunnel vision and detectives conviction of guilt (see e.g. Rachlew 2009; Fahsing 2016; O'Neill 2018 for overviews). It can moreover be seen as pragmatic way to deal with the 'police predicament' (Reiner 2010).

Investigation as Action and Art

The earlier mentioned reluctance detectives have towards analytical work is connected to the condition, which I have accounted for in **Chapter 6** and **7**, that detectives consider themselves as craftsmen and do not consider investigation or any part of policing to be an intellectual exercise. The perception of the detective as a craftsman is founded in the experience-based paradigm and the notions of real police work where policing is seen as an action-oriented and tacit practice taught 'on the job' through apprenticeship (*mesterlære*) and should not be made overly complicated. A Detective explains:

It's first and foremost good old police work which gives us the successes (of closing a case, *my addition*). You need to be willing to put a lot of hours in this job, to be flexible and available. The wife needs to pick up the kids, you can't just leave work at 4 pm if something has happened in the investigation.

Together with a genuine interest in the field and the display of engagement by for example being available after working hours, certain practical skills are by detectives and managers moreover highlighted as vital competences for detectives to have. These skills evolve around technical competences such as being able to operate the equipment for wiretapping and case management systems in terms of organising case files, and procedural competences such as insight into the legal framework, the production of police reports and request for the courts (*anmodninger til retten, fristforlængelser*) and the case work around arrested suspects (*arrestantbehandling*). Consequently, criminal investigation is viewed as an action-oriented practice focusing on carrying out various (individual) practical

investigative functions instead of an intellectual endeavour of information work (Innes 2003) involving (collective) systematic processes of collecting, analysing, and synthesising data. In the practical world of policing, though, proactive investigation did not present itself as a classic action-packed profession – compared to e.g. operational street-level work. On the contrary, in *Operation Goldilocks* detectives were most of the time sitting in their offices, behind their computers processing information. However, they sought to instigate action continuously (for example covert operations or new investigation tactics) as they were quickly impatient and wanted ‘something to happen’. The frustration which built up during time in the investigation team was very much connected to the fact that detectives had the perception that ‘nothing happened’ in the operation and detectives complained occasionally: “*we can’t just sit here without doing anything!*” A Superintendent categorised this behaviour from detectives as ‘classic’:

There’s no doubt that people get frustrated when they sit banging their heads against the wall. And nothing happens. Then it’s easy to blame the technical issues. It’s a well-known fact in all investigations that frustrations go up and down. And then you need to catch people before there’s too much hassle (brok). That’s just how it is.

Detectives view the process of policing organised crime as a form of ongoing game between themselves and the counterpart where different measures are dialectically set in motion. This ‘game playing’ is not directly articulated but is indirectly expressed at all levels within the organisation. The absence of action and as such detectives’ passive waiting for the counterparts’ countermove is as such perceived as unfitting and insufficient as it bears little resemblance to ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ known from street-level work. When talking about skills of detectives, another central component of detectives’ notions of the investigation endeavour is that it requires a particular and undefinable talent, gift, instinct, or ‘nose’ (*politinæse*). This can be captured in a particular *je ne sais quoi-ability*; which police officers and detectives are believed to possess. This ability makes them reason in a certain way and notice specific details at e.g. crime scenes or during

wiretapping, and even to assess the potential guilt of a suspect. A Senior Detective argues:

It's not something you can be taught (*proactive investigation, ed.*). Either you can or you can't. You need to have the ability. And I don't care if you are a detective or a traffic cop...I've seen so many...some of them from the special operational unit (uroen)...they have it...they have the ability right away! And you can have another who's been in an investigation unit for years and he still can't... (...) I don't care if they've attended 17 courses if they can't do the job.

The extensive literature on police culture (at least rank and files) points to a common finding; that police officers articulate policing as a 'craft' where experience, common sense, and a particular talent are vital skills (see e.g. Granér 2004; Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010; Cockcroft 2012). Finstad (2000) uses the concept the police gaze to describe the distinct competences of patrol officers, and Norwegian police researcher Johanne Yttri Dahl (2019) has developed this concept in regards to surveillance officers. The most common reference within the Danish police is the *police nose* (politinæsen). To understand this concept in an analytical context, the police nose can be said to capture police officers' individual experience together with their interpretation of the collective experience and institutional memory of police officers as an occupational group. Thus, both the police gaze and the police nose become symbols of the institutionalised organisational experience which is passed on through an ongoing socialisation process (Van Maanen & Schein 1977). The process consists of on the job training and the retelling of imperative anecdotes which represent specific ontological and epistemological notions about policing as an occupational field (see also **Chapter 7**). These ontological and epistemological notions are concerned with two main areas: 1) how to assess and categorise various social groups within society and specific situations and incidents which take place (e.g. crime and disorder), and 2) how police officer should manage these groups and situations when encountering them (Holmberg 2003; Diderichsen 2013). Consequently, these notions impact police officers' and detectives' decision-making and as such their discretion (Kleinig 1997; Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010).

Interestingly, the police gaze or the police nose as central components of the police culture are identified in research across police services around the world despite its most distinct characteristic: that it is a skill which cannot be articulated or accounted for in detail (Manning 2010; Reiner 2010; Rachlew & Fahsing 2015). This *je ne sais quoi*-ability is instinctive, intuitive, context dependent, and perhaps even an emotional art form and is perceived as a skill which cannot be taught (for example through training at the Police Academy), but has to be *embodied* through one's own experience and to some extent through the experience of fellow peers (other police officers). Danish philosopher Adam Diderichsen (2013) argues that this indicates that police officers consider themselves as morally superior in the sense that they *know* things which others do not. He also points to police officers' accounts of the police nose as a central issue and goes on to say (ibid.: 66, *my translation*):

Especially, when it comes to the type of knowledge which builds on a particular "police nose" it is essential that this is context dependent and will not be generalised into universal rules. "The nose" is a flair for the specifics of a particular situation or criminal incident which may be refined through experience, but which is not to be formulated in a specific wording to be passed on to others.

In that sense, the notion of policing as an art form stands in contrast to the other essential and domineering notion which I discussed; that police work is first and foremost a practical endeavour (as opposed to theoretical) where experience and rational common-sense thinking are driving police officers' decision-making and their discretionary actions. However, despite of the inconsistent experience and action-oriented notion of policing as a craft and the notion of policing as an art form (Tong & Bowling 2006; Innes 2010b), these notions seem to come together in the domineering epistemic rationale and as such how detectives view proactive investigation and detective work. Thus, the proactive investigative mindset can be said to be comprised by the three essential components; 'solving cases', suspect-driven case building, and investigation as action and art, as analysed above, which are imperative to understand and explain detectives' approaches, practices, and

actions. This investigative mindset is well in accordance with the experience-based epistemological regime and as such the other epistemological notions which I have analysed and discussed in this study in **Chapter 6** and **7**. This stands in contrast to the knowledge-based regime in which policing is viewed as a knowledge-driven profession which encompasses certain professional competencies – taught and developed through a theoretically anchored education and practiced in a specific methodological framework (O’Neill 2018). Moreover, the proactive investigative mindset is derived from and mirrors the one from reactive policing.

Consequently, this mindset is therefore not merely guiding detectives’ tactical investigation approach but can be said to encompass an organisational mindset as it is generally expressed and reflected on all levels in the police organisation.

Proactive investigation therefore stands on reactive practices to investigation and information work as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus with an aim to instigate proactive investigations in order to hold offenders accountable for their criminality rather than as a means to prevent emerging societal threats and/or (new) crime threats in a broad understanding of these. For those reasons, I will argue that not only the proactive practice, but also the proactive investigative mindset is dominated by the reactive paradigm.

Summary & Discussion: A Reactive Practice of Proactive Investigation?

In this chapter, I have explored in detail how proactive investigation is carried out and practised. I have uncovered and explicated the black box of proactive investigation by analysing its processes, phases, and tactics. I have presented both a process description as well as a model for proactive investigation in my occupation with identifying a comprehensive methodology for proactive investigative work. I have furthermore explored detectives' investigative mindset in order to understand the nature of this specific policing phenomenon and the actions and rationales it encompasses.

In the current section, I account for the central findings and arguments outlined in this chapter. I discuss how detectives' assumptions and notions about detective work and their investigative mindset indeed impact the practice of proactive investigations. I return to the case of *Operation Goldilocks* and the empirical example presented in the introduction of this chapter and discuss the circumstances surrounding these in relation to the analytical findings.

Some vital conclusions can be drawn. Proactive investigation is carried out as a tacit practice following an ingrained, unarticulated predetermined script for performance and as such as a set of collective inherent routine actions. These actions are impacted by a dynamic interplay between individual and shared experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, and by a number of collective epistemological notions about proactive police work and the criminal counterpart. The social production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use are constituted on the basis of how detectives make sense of their actions, interactions, and environment. The entire investigation process can

therefore be seen as an analytical sense-making process where detectives try to assess and categorise collected information and evaluate its relevance in terms of the investigation at hand. Proactive investigation work is therefore not objective information processing, it is rather a constant interpretation process where detectives categorise, add meaning, socially construct, and give certain powers to the individual pieces of information. Although there are similarities, the analysis shows that the investigation stages and processes in proactive investigation look somewhat different than existing generic models for criminal investigation as they are primarily based on reactive investigation. In its practice and process proactive investigation resembles more intelligence work than reactive investigative work as it is concerned with policing uncertainties, scenario thinking and building, and interpretation of information. As such, detectives become to a high extent co-producers of events and ‘investigation knowledge’.

In this chapter, I have presented a process description for proactive investigation illustrating the investigation process as it can be observed empirically in detectives’ investigative practice. This process description provides an overview of main lines of investigative actions in proactive investigation and detectives’ rationales behind these. Furthermore, I have identified a model for proactive investigation which illustrates my construction and analytical interpretation of proactive practice, stages and processes, core investigation tactics and lines of action and the underlying lines of enquiry. The model encompasses four stages: 1) Initial Information Collection and Ordering of Information, 2) Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing Information Collection, 3) Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence, and 4) Constructing or Closing Cases.

Wiretapping and directed surveillance are both quantitatively and qualitatively the most central tactical components of proactive investigation. They have as such considerable significance for how proactive investigation is conceptually understood and practiced in the world of policing. In their dynamic dialectic these

investigation tactics encompass the very essence of proactive investigation practice; when they are instigated simultaneously in a joint operation between detectives and surveillance officers they perform and fulfil ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ in its purest form. This performance as a clear illustration of ‘the act of proactivity’ a drama which detectives perform and reproduce over and over to meet the ideal of being one step ahead of their counterparts. There is an important difference between the process of proactive investigation and the proactive investigation process. The first refers to stages and phases within proactive investigations’ main lines of action, and the latter refers to the tactical content and purposes of these lines of action. This condition is connected to another important distinction between lines of actions and lines of enquiry; a central analytical finding is that investigation tactics (lines of action) in proactive investigation seem to be decided upon and instigated before investigative questions (lines of enquiry) are developed. Accordingly, the instigation of investigative tactics are predominantly determining the investigation process as opposed to context dependent investigative queries based on the specific case at hand. The process and practice of proactive investigation are furthermore mainly guided by a legal framework rather than a methodological framework led by context dependent investigative queries.

My main argument in this chapter is that the methodology of proactive investigation is not as pronounced as of reactive investigation as it seems to be lacking deliberate, intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative lines of enquiry and ultimately encompass a comprehensive methodology for proactive investigation. Although proactive investigation empirically and by its content resembles intelligence work this is not recognised by detectives who uphold a collective perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-level operational work or reactive investigative work (Manning 2004). Therefore, the application of high policing measures on proactive investigation of drug crimes seems to have an instrumental function as they are transferred without the central knowledge-based notions and analytical dimensions of the proactive paradigm.

Thus, proactive investigation becomes the instigation of high policing measures carried out in a low policing context. An important and essential part of understanding and explaining detectives' proactive investigative action is the nature of their investigative mindset. This can be said to be comprised by collectively shared assumptions about proactive detective work and at least three dominant components, which are the notions of 'solving cases', 'suspect-driven case building', and 'investigation as action and art'. These notions stem from the reactive paradigm and the experience-based regime and proactive investigation therefore stands on reactive practices to investigation and information work as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus where detectives are occupied with holding individual offenders accountable for their criminality rather than as a means to prevent emerging crime threats. This investigative mindset can be regarded as an organisational mindset as it is expressed and reflected on all levels in the police organisation.

Returning now to *Operation Goldilocks* and the empirical example presented in the introduction of the chapter: an overall conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the prior analysis. Proactive investigative work is indeed the policing of uncertainties (Innes 2006). It is a careful interaction between passive monitoring and (pro)active instigation of investigation tactics. As detectives continuously point to; a successful performance of proactive investigation work depends on the ability of knowing when to have patience and wait (observe, monitor), and when to make a move towards the counterpart (understood as investigative action). This ability is based on collectively shared assumptions of 'good detective work' as being partially formed by detectives' individual experiences, and to some extent other detectives' experience (taught through apprenticeship), and by an innate, inherent instinct, flair or 'nose' for this type of police work. As the empirical example in the introduction shows, the counterparts are by detectives perceived as a fairly competent components who have a variety of safety measures installed to counter police's response based on years of experience in the criminal business. Logically, the

police's success therefore depend to a great extent of the legal measures and investigation tactics they have at their disposal and if mistakes are made by the counterpart. As such, the conclusion which detectives draw that the technical equipment is casting for the outcome of the case is in accordance with these perceptions. The 'error' of 'getting caught' by Joey (the investigation target), which detectives Lou and Thomas experienced when having to change a battery in the surveillance equipment, is in this sense viewed as an accident but a predictable one as every active move in proactive investigations comes with a risk of 'getting caught'. The investigation team's support to the detectives and investigation manager Fred's immediate focus on the investigation's future rather than its past is therefore not only reasonable, but also understandable. Further, the circumstances point to another central condition: since proactive investigation work is based on the grounds of collective experience (a predefined script for performance), and detectives' individual abilities (an innate capability), there are as such limited reasons for discussing or even changing approaches, tactics, or measures.

Thus, the world of proactive investigation based on experience and routine action can be said to leave little room for evaluation or organisational learning as this is not regarded as a central nor important aspect of (traditional) detective work. The knowledge-based perspective emphasises, on the contrary, the constant application of analysis and evaluation as improvement of practice and deeper understandings of crime phenomena lie inherently in this paradigm. In conclusion, the collective epistemological assumptions about police work and the specific proactive investigative mindset which I have analysed in the previous three chapters direct and determine proactive investigative practice and help us understand why practice unfold the way it does. Proactive investigation becomes, in accordance with reactive investigation, a performance of "whodunnits" (Innes 2003) rather than of "what's happening". It focuses on "solving" the incident (which has not taken place), rather than looking at crime problems and crime patterns. It is occupied with individuals rather than groups, and as such it becomes a performance of suspect-driven case

building against ideal offenders rather than a knowledge-based hypothesis-driven examination of leads and scenarios (Fahsing 2016). With its offset and embeddedness in a reactive response service and in an experience-based epistemic culture, the fundamentals of the detective role remain unchanged and the ‘manifest’ continues with older patterns (Bacon 2016). The front stage performance of proactivity thereby becomes a symbolic celebration of the ritual subculture of patrol (Manning 2004; 2010).

Chapter 9: True Detective

- *On police's proactive performance and the proactive detective métier*

If it is constructed properly with all of its conventions arrayed in their right relations, the detective story is easy to read as a kind of morality play. When the detective's case involves murder or some other heinous offense, the freeing of an innocent person wrongly accused of a crime, a master criminal whom others are incapable of stopping, or a desperate plea for help from a friend wronged or a sympathetic stranger in dire straits, the case takes on a moral dimension. It takes it from its end: putting right some moral wrong. Under such conditions detectives are not merely doing a job of toying as expert amateurs with an intriguing puzzle. They are on a moral mission. If they solve their case, it is a moral victory, a victory for what is right and for everyone who believes that right should prevail. If not, it is a moral defeat and everyone who believes that good should triumph over evil loses.

- *The Idea of Police* by Carl B. Klockars (1985: 82).

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how proactive investigations overall can be seen and understood as dramatic, social performances carried out on different front stages and backstages watched by different audiences. Building on the dramaturgical model (Goffman 1959) and the concept of the police *métier* (Manning 2010), I propose the existence of a specific (proactive) detective *métier* which can be identified as a stabilising medium for this proactive performance and its shaping forces. I use the empirical backdrop and combine the analytical findings from the previous chapters and develop and put forward a cohesive narrative and theoretical conceptualisation of *the dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation* and *the proactive detective métier* seen through these particular theoretical prisms (Goffman 1959; Manning 1977; 2004; 2010; Manning & Raphael 2010). Overall, I ask and analyse: how is proactive investigation performed and what makes up and shapes the proactive detective *métier*?

My main argument in this chapter is that the proactive performance is predominantly shaped, impacted, and determined by what can be regarded as the stabilising medium of a proactive detective *métier*. The *métier* is a countermeasure to the dynamics of the socio-political context in which it is situated. As a theoretical concept, the proactive detective *métier* takes its starting point in Manning's (2010) police *métier* since this is aimed to reveal deep patterning of police action and its shaping forces – regardless of the overt manifestations. The proactive detective *métier* therefore shares similarities with the police *métier*. However, there are specific conditions, which are indeed connected to and affect especially proactive investigative work, which I find imperative to identify and analyse in the context of this study with the overall purpose to provide a better understanding of organised crime policing and proactive police performance.

First, I account for the dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation both on the public front stage and on police's organisational front stage and backstage and analyse what this performance is compelled by.

Second, I compose and develop the proactive detective *métier*. I analyse and introduce its shaping forces and components such as tacit assumptions, the police organisation, the proactive investigation operation, interpersonal tactics, modes of deploying resources, and rewarded activities and the socio-political context which the *métier* is situated in and stands in opposition to.

The Dramaturgical Performance of Proactive Investigation

As accounted for in **Chapter 3**, Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical metaphors can be applied as instruments to analyse social interaction and as such also (proactive) police work. In this context, I use and apply central concepts from Goffman's (ibid.) model and Manning's further work (1977; 2004; 2010) to the main analytical findings in the previous four chapters. Thus, I propose the following cohesive narrative about the performance of proactive investigation:

Proactive policing is carried out as a set of continuous performances played by individual actors – police officers, detectives, managers, and other police personnel – forming a number of crisscrossing teams where they act in front of each other, and try to convince their different audiences that they are in fact who they propose to be, and that they have the mandate to perform (Goffman 1959). These performances are carried out front stage where they are witnessed by an audience compelled by the general public, including the political level (government and politicians), and backstage where the public performances are rehearsed. The police organisation is not a mini theatre, but it determines and supplies the specific scripts, fronts, and appearances, and stimulate the necessary teamwork which is applied in proactive performances (Manning 2008c).

Due to its invisible and covert nature, proactive investigation is not at public display front stage as other types of police work. The front stage performance in this connection is as such a staged action (Manning 1977; Holmberg 2003) in the sense that police perform the roles as effective crime fighters with the purpose of showing the audience that the police should (continuously) be entrusted to have a number of covert measures at their disposal. The front stage performance of proactive

investigation serves as an illustration of the police's overall response to organised crime through, for example, the odd crackdown, arrest, and seizure of illicit drugs which becomes a manifestation of the proposed qualities of proactive investigation as a backstage police activity and its societal eligibility. These front stage performances of proactivity provide the police with a stable mandate from their audience – the public and the political level – as their symbolic and staged action enable them to appear as being able to manage, diminish and control organised crime as much as possible (Manning 2004; 2008c).

Thus, these front stage performances of proactivity function as ways of displaying action and operational results – and they are therefore essential for police's continuous support by its audience in terms of legitimacy and accountability. Additionally, the front stage performance elevates otherwise invisible, low dramas of proactive investigation into high dramas of proactive policing, where police receive public attention via the media and suddenly are featured as heroes fighting organised crime – a threat to societal cohesion (Manning 2013). In this dramatisation and staging action of proactive police work, the police are certainly aware of their own social capital. Consequently, they manage impressions and reproduce – by habit and practice – notions and images of social control and are as such the central players in communicating dramas about themselves (Manning *ibid.*).

Although the performance of proactive investigation is carried out 'behind the scenes', it is somewhat displayed on police's organisational front stage. Here, the audience consists of other members of the police organisation who observe the internal performances of teams of managers and detectives. On the organisational backstage, managers and detectives relax and rehearse their performances on both the public and the organisational front stage. The performance of proactive investigation on police's organisational front stage is focused on drug policing and follows a stable, ceremonial performance of the ritualised and well-known 'drama of

cops and robbers' relying on an ingrained, unarticulated, predetermined, and predictable script (Goffman 1959; Manning 2004; 2010). This drama has been symbolically performed through decades as it is a rerun from uniformed patrol policing celebrating the subculture of patrol (Manning 2010). It is embedded in an experience-based rationale stemming from the reactive policing paradigm which promotes the logic from the standard policing model of responding rapidly to events and acting upon them. It mirrors thereby reactive street-level dramas of drug policing where police identify, pursue, and catch usual suspects using a similar script, costumes, and props.

Features from high policing such as wiretapping and directed surveillance are in the performance of proactive investigation the most central tactical components. In their dynamic dialectic, these investigation tactics encompass the very essence of proactive investigation practice. Consequently, when they are instigated simultaneously in a joint operation between detectives and surveillance officers this fulfils the performance of 'the drama of cops and robbers' in its purest form. This performance is as such a clear illustration of 'the act of proactivity' which detectives perform and reproduce over and over trying to meet the ideal of being one step ahead of their counterparts.

In the 'drama of cops and robbers', uncertainties are reduced to well-known categories (e.g. the continuous fight between good and bad) and detectives rely on consistent role descriptions (crime fighters against ideal offenders). A successful performance ends with the arrest of the offender(s), which is applauded both internally within police and by the political and public audience. On the organisational backstage, this performance thereby functions as a way to maintain organisational stability and individual motivation to carry out detective work. Each case is as a result perceived as collectively meaningful despite the broad recognition within the police of the dim prospects of police's overall efforts to impact organised crime. Thus, the performing teams' dramaturgical loyalty and

dramaturgical discipline supports the collective notion stemming from reactive police work of 'solving' the incident. Proactive investigation therefore becomes, in accordance with reactive investigation, a performance of 'whodunnits' and of suspect-driven case building. This performance stands in contrast to a proactive performance with the aim of identifying and reducing more general risks and threats from organised crime and their overall impact on society as a whole. Still, on all stages the actors as well as the audiences perceive, understand, and rhetorically refer to these performances as proactive revealing a fundamental embedded paradox of proactive investigations.

The Proactive Detective Métier

As accounted for in **Chapter 3**, Manning (2010) proposes the concept of the police métier, which captures the nature of policing and outlines standard police practices and routines. Through this concept, Manning (ibid.) seeks to explain the dynamics and processes involved as police shape their social order in ways that often contrast with how the mandate of policing is publicly managed. The police métier captures as such ‘the show’ occurring both front stage and backstage characterised by occupational assumptions and organisational practices with a focus on ‘the incident’ reflecting conventional wisdom about why and how policing works. In the previous section, I have put forward a comprehensive narrative about the social performance of proactive investigation. I will argue that this performance is predominantly shaped, impacted, and determined by what can be regarded as the stabilising medium of a proactive detective métier – building on Manning’s (2010) concept of the police métier.

There are obviously some apparent similarities between the police métier and the proactive detective métier, and the concept of the police métier is overall useful in explaining the dynamics of how policing is performed generally and why. However, I find it useful to identify those specific conditions which are connected to and affect proactive police work, especially proactive investigative work, to provide a better understanding of it. As a theoretical concept, the proactive detective métier is, in accordance with Manning (2010), aimed to reveal deep patterning of proactive police action and its shaping forces – regardless of the overt manifestations. In line with Manning (ibid.) through the analysis presented in the previous chapters, I have aimed to examine actual practices – modes of action and inherent logics – of proactive investigation on the ground and thereby taken a step back from the obvious labels and rhetoric which dominates the public front stage of policing and

instead stepped closer to the underlying patterning of proactive policing and its backstage. In this section, I will account for the content of this concept and its shaping forces as a way of trying to explain and thereby understand organised crime policing and proactive police performance.

The Socio-Political Context

As I have unfolded during this thesis, within the last decades there are and have been considerable efforts to reform and move the (Danish) police towards the new proactive policing paradigm and accordingly modernise the police organisation as a public service institution. These reform efforts have been driven by both external and internal demands and pressure to improve police's performance in connection with both everyday and complex crime by employing e.g. problem-solving, preventive, and disruptive measures instead of the ineffective reactive standard model of policing. However, as this study has shown, over the last decades the socio-political context of policing has indeed resulted in shifting targets and objectives, conflicting rhetoric, and alterations in deployment of resources (Manning 2010; Holmberg 2019). These have, in the context of the Danish police, amongst other included conversions between different strategic directions (proactive/reactive), organisational structures (regional/local), approaches to recruitment and education (generalist/specialist) etc. This can be regarded as what Manning (2010: 213) refers to as "*...an endlessly elastic socio-political context in which policing operates*". In the context of organised crime policing, this has resulted in e.g. ideals and ambitions of proactivity, but politically set performance measures have amongst others resulted in reactive and repressive police tactics.

As a countermeasure to this dynamic and with the purpose of sustaining conventional police work and organisational stability, police have gradually built up the stabilising medium of the proactive detective *métier*. Therefore, as this study has shown, the police response towards organised crime overall is not altered radically

as in the general run of things, both strategic, operational, and tactical decision-makers seem to rely on familiar course of action. This is in accordance with the findings of Manning (2010) who argues that while the targets of action are shifting and shaped by politics, the range of police tactics in practice remains much the same, and the unstated purpose remains the same. Similarly, Bacon (2016) concludes that the fundamentals of the detective role remain unchanged and the ‘manifest’ continues with older patterns.

The proactive detective *métier* takes its outset in Manning’s (2010) police *métier*, but is specifically conditioned and shaped by: 1) assumptions about proactive detective work and the social world of organised crime, 2) the proactive investigation operation, 3) the police organisation, 4) interpersonal tactics and police epistemic culture, 5), modes of deploying resources, and 6) rewarded activities and measures of success. The *proactive investigation operation* resembles ‘the incident’ (Manning 2010) as such operations or cases are the theatrical core of the performance of proactive investigations. In the following sections, I will unfold what I identify as the six shaping forces and components of the proactive detective *métier* using the previous chapters in this thesis as empirical and analytical backdrops.

Components and Shaping Forces

Assumptions about Organised Crime Policing

A central part of the police *métier* is habits and assumptions focused on the trope of crime that envisions only the need to control, deter, and punish the visible and known contestants (Sheptycki 2017). In line with Manning & Raphael (2010), the assumptive world in which organised crime detectives operate consist of assumptions about the politics of the field, the ways of dealing with the counterpart, mistakes and successes at work, and routines and performances required of the practitioners. Within this assumptive world lies an assumed ‘practical model’ or ‘logic in action’ that informs choices made in line with these assumptions. As such,

the practices of proactive investigation are verified with reference to the several compatible assumptions that produce them and the assumptions about organised crime policing are consequently the context within the practices have a life and a social reality. As I have analysed and demonstrated in **Chapter 6, 7, and 8**, the ruling assumptions in organised crime policing evolve around that detectives know the typical counterpart, their motivations, typical actions, and dynamics, and know how they are best policed:

- Organised crime is primarily drug crimes, which are severe and moral crimes despite their consensual nature
- The general public and law-abiding citizens should be shielded from organised crime offenders and their destructive impact on everyday social life
- Organised crime offenders are typically members of outlaw motorcycle gangs and street gangs who are rational individuals who primarily engage in these crimes as a way of generating profits. They are individuals with doubtful morals and limited empathy guided by selfish objectives
- The organised crime environment should be controlled and policed continuously and stopped from developing, but there are no prospects of eliminating their criminality
- Policing by typology is a necessary tactic, which actually often provides fruitful results
- Usual suspects are time and again proving why the police are continuously policing them
- Long-term prevention or problem-solving in terms of organised crime is as naïve and a waste of resources. The most reliable and effective way to deal with these people are to arrest and incarcerate them on every given opportunity, removing them from the streets and preventing them from doing further harm
- All peripheral individuals who have relations to organised crime offenders are perhaps “innocent”, but must be viewed as potential benefitters from their criminal operation
- Democratic rights such as the right to privacy can be put aside in the policing of organised crime as the end outweighs the means. Systematic monitoring and surveillance of specific suspects are for example a necessary means

- New and supporting methods and tactics in organised crime policing should consist of technical advancements and extended legal frames.

In this perspective, some specific collective assumptions about organised crime policing and the particular social world of organised crime exist, which are shaping and informing detective work and proactive investigations. There is as such a clear dependency relationship between detectives' collective assumptions of organised crime and organised crime policing and the practice detectives carry out and thereby provide a social reality. The collective assumptive world of detectives is as such constructing and reconstructing the detective identity. Moreover, it is shaping and impacting the proactive performance as well as upholding and passing over this assumptive world again and again by reproducing this ritualised act.

The Proactive Investigation Operation

As mentioned before, whereas Manning (2010) identifies 'the incident' as the theatrical core of the police *métier* and as such its 'sacred centre', my analysis shows that for organised crime detectives this lie in proactive investigation operations or 'the case'. In these operations and cases, detectives perform the key drama of 'cops and robbers', where they in the purest form display what this type of policing is all about. It is also through these operations and cases that detectives show police management and occasionally the public their operational value and claim and manifest their specific societal mandate of covert policing. This is best done on the organisational front stage by continuously employing various investigative tactics and thereby demonstrating investigation progression through explicit investigative action such as getting court orders, instigating wiretapping, employing surveillance operations, covert searches, identifying informants etc. It is least displayed by invisible information work on the organisational backstage which is difficult to report about and does not provide tangible results which can be disclosed and presented to management and thereby presented on the organisational or public front stage.

On the public front stage, covert and invisible policing seems widely accepted by the public audience as long as they are now and again reminded of the threat from organised crime for example when violent conflicts occur in public (see also **Chapter 5**). However, police crackdowns, large-scale arrests, and seizures of illicit drugs in e.g. the gang environment are widely presented on the public front stage via the media and are applauded and viewed as indications that organised crime policing functions according to its societal mandate and is indeed necessary in terms of keeping and sustaining societal order and safety. Here police manage the symbolic impression of taking action and being efficient (Manning 2013).

The previous analysis shows that the entitlement to assess, interpret, and know about the social world of organised crime and how to effectively police it is given exclusively to the involved detectives by the police organisation. Organised crime detectives are predominantly seen as experts and specialists when it comes to both organised crime offenders and proactive police tactics. They are, as such within the police organisation viewed as both ‘knowers’ and ‘doers’ in this particular field of policing. This stands in contrast to other police officers who might be given the right to define ‘the incident’ at the scene unless ‘otherwise known’ (Manning & Raphael 2010), but who are not generally perceived as other than police generalists which possess this right only in their capacity of being police officers and being at the scene of the incident. Consequently, this means that organised crime detectives enjoy a high status in the police hierarchy with all the benefits that come with it. Efforts to reform and develop the professional field of proactive investigation are as such merely sustainable if they derive from organised crime detectives themselves (Loftus 2010).

The Police Organisation

According to Manning & Raphael (2010), police work is institutionalised, structured, routinised, unquestioned and done as if there was no other way to do it. It is as such taken for granted in terms of effectiveness, purposes, and means. The fundamental assumption is that the organisation is functional and rational (Manning 2010). In terms of organised crime policing and proactive detective work, my analysis has shown that the police organisation is designed to allocate detectives to different cases and operations, which are dealt with one at a time in a temporal series of repeated, demarcated investigative efforts. These operations focus on one, perhaps a few, primary investigation targets and they are thereby individual rather than group focused which stands in contrast to the collective nature of organised crime. Proactive investigation therefore stands on reactive practices to investigation work as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus with an aim to instigate proactive investigations in order to hold offenders accountable for their crimes rather than as a means to prevent emerging societal threats and/or (new) crime threats in a broad understanding of these.

In accordance with ‘the incident’ which structures and concentrates organisation and resources (Manning 2010) the organisational policy around proactive investigation work is set and derives from experiences and situated practices employed in operations and cases by individual detectives with limited guidance or supervision from management. As I have shown in **Chapter 8**, detectives enjoy, as such, in the organisational frame wide discretionary powers and are additionally, due to their organisational status as experts and specialist, instrumental in manifesting various approaches and tactics as best practice.

The police organisation encompasses the formal frame of organised crime policing and proactive detective work and it demands mainly specific (political) performance measures to be obtained. This leads sometimes to altered priorities and resource

allocations at a general level, but everyday detective work and the performance of proactive investigations are predominantly set by detectives and investigation managers. This means that even though there might be a strategic inclination within the police organisation to instigate and support knowledge-based and analytical approaches to e.g. identify investigation targets this does not happen as it is not embedded into organisational structures and collective routines. The police organisation does not urge detectives to replace their standard routines and they maintain their experience-based approaches which are derived from reactive policing.

Interpersonal Tactics

Manning & Raphael (2010) propose the force of sanctioned interpersonal tactics of policing in the incident which are those thought to guarantee successful asserting of authority, taking control, closing the incident in some fashion, and returning to service. This study's analysis shows that interpersonal tactics of proactive investigation are similarly concerned with the notion of 'real policing' and consequently 'real detective work'. These tactics are learned 'on the job' through individual experience and subsequently the experience of other detectives. They are anchored in a specific police epistemic culture, which forms how detectives come to know what they know about organised crime as a phenomenon and organised crime policing as a practice (Cetina 1999). The police epistemic culture is central in the sustainment of experience-based and conventional practices and the preservation of well-known and familiar aims and targets in proactive police work despite shifts in the elastic and dynamic socio-political context. As I have analysed and accounted for in **Chapter 7**, the police epistemic culture is compelled by three essential notions:

- the high-status of 'anecdotal evidence'
- the sustainment of 'the power to know'
- the need to reduce complexities.

I find that detectives' epistemic culture is founded on the assumptive world of policing where experience is regarded as the most genuine and worthy knowledge (Gundhus 2012) often explicated through the telling of anecdotes told by trustworthy, well-respected, and experienced detectives. Anecdotes about proactive investigation operations are as such central in supporting detectives' epigram of 'you-need-experience-and-a-sense-for-detective work' as this displays the detective's account (the anecdote) of the social world of the counterpart and how to police them. Anecdotes function as such as evidence which is elevated to becoming general organisational knowledge about best practice. The telling of anecdotes is a ritualised practice of the proactive detective *métier* where the same stories are told over and over; a retelling of different performances in regards to 'cases'. It functions as a way to articulate and thereby sustain proactive police practice, to preserve institutional memory, and to pass on world views and assumptions about organised crime policing and organised crime.

Experience and 'thick' knowledge (Ratcliffe 2008b) is in accordance the most valued type of knowledge in the eyes of detectives as opposed to e.g. educational skills and 'thin' standardised knowledge (Gundhus 2012). As such, the detective is the authority of and source to how cases are to be understood and handled. Tacit knowledge is the only knowledge type which gives one the necessary insights and since e.g. analysts, academics, or others in non-police functions are occupied with other types of knowledge produced in other ways their views on detective work and organised crime are therefore questionable and redundant. The rhetoric of detective professionalism is employed to defend their mandate and build collective self-esteem, organisational autonomy, and occupational solidarity and cohesiveness (Manning 1977). As a strong currency within the informal police organisation, knowledge equals organisational power and detectives hold the power to know (Innes & Sheptycki 2004).

Experience-based knowledge reduces complexities and intellectual aspects of detective work. Academic aspects of police training are e.g. viewed as irrelevant and even an obstacle for doing good police work (Manning 2010). This study has illustrated that proactive detective work resembles reactive detective work despite its inherent resemblance to intelligence work. Intelligence work is, however, occupied with uncertainties, risks, and threats and consequently it operates in a complex field of various social phenomena demanding nuanced perspectives on crime and its societal impact. Organised crime policing borrows indeed measures and rhetoric from high policing, but in its aim and practice it is like traditional police work focused on ‘catching criminals’ and ‘solving cases’ rather than disruption and prevention (Brodeur 1983; 2007; 2010). As I have displayed in **Chapter 6, 7, and 8**, good detective work and proactive investigation as a dramaturgical act have accordingly the following features:

- Focusing on import, production, distribution, or sales of illicit drugs which is perceived as equal to organised crime
- Identifying grounds of suspicion and prime targets quickly
- Targeting well-known offenders operating low or mid-level as these are possible to reach through conventional proactive measures in a short-term while ‘top shelf’ targets and hidden populations with considerable security measures require lengthy and resourceful efforts and should be avoided
- Employing essential investigative tactics such as wiretapping and covert surveillance immediately
- Instigating further investigative lines of action to keep up investigation progress
- Notifying management continuously of progressions and results
- Deciding what to do and how to do it along the way based on the actions of the counterpart
- Producing investigative solutions that make the case manageable – not overcomplicating it with e.g. complex financial lines of enquiry such as money laundering etc.
- Replacing prime targets if investigative results rescind
- Focusing on evidence production in terms of ‘proving’ the guilt of the suspect

- Seizing up the case by making crackdowns and arrests, confiscating illicit drugs, money, values etc.
- Closing the case by handing the evidence over to the prosecution preferably resulting in long-time incarceration.

The interpersonal tactics of proactive detective work are connected to both the collective assumptions of organised crime policing and police epistemic culture. Moreover, my analysis in **Chapter 8** has found that a true detective encompasses a specific investigative mindset which is comprised by three essential components:

- ‘solving cases’
- suspect-driven case building
- investigation as action and art.

The components of the proactive investigative mindset are derived from reactive policing and detectives keep for example the language from reactive investigation expressing that they are ‘looking for clues’, ‘the needle in the haystack’, ‘the conclusive evidence’, and ‘solving the case’. As such, proactive investigations focus on ‘solving crimes’ and ‘putting people to jail’ rather than preventing harm or disrupting crimes in the making. Proactive investigation is as such occupied with tracing and uncovering specific evidence to prove the suspects’ involvement in criminal activities. This reactive notion of proactive investigation work can easily lead to classic suspect-driven case-building as the measure of success is large drug seizures and multiple arrests instead of preventing, fending off, or disrupting criminal actions (Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018). Proactive investigation is in its outset not occupied with the (objective) process of discovering, collecting, checking, and considering clues from various sources of information with the purpose of trying to construct a coherent account of the (criminal) event (Fahsing 2016). Proactive investigation builds per default on police’s self-selection (Marx 1988) and the suspect is in this regard identified as ‘guilty beforehand’. The investigation process is therefore no longer concerned with uncovering and documenting a series of past

events, but rather to support the initial suspicion with new information which can be processed as evidence.

Detectives do seemingly consider themselves craftsmen and do not consider investigation or any part of policing to be an intellectual exercise. It is, on the contrary, an action-oriented and experience-based, tacit practice. A true detective is engaged in his work, he works dynamic hours, and has certain practical and technical skills such as being able to operate the equipment for wiretapping and case management systems in terms of organising case files, as well as procedural competencies such as insight into the legal framework, the production of police reports, requests for court orders, and the case work around incarcerated suspects. My analysis has moreover revealed that detective work is viewed as an endeavour which requires a particular and undefinable talent, gift, instinct, or 'nose'. This ability makes detectives reason in a certain way and notice specific details at e.g. during wiretapping, and even to assess the potential guilt of a suspect. This captures detectives' individual experience together with their interpretation of the collective experience and institutional memory of them as an occupational group. Thus, the police gaze and the police nose are symbols of the institutionalised organisational experience which is passed on through an ongoing socialisation process (Van Maanen & Schein 1977). This process consists of on the job training and the retelling of imperative anecdotes which represent specific ontological and epistemological notions about policing and detective work as an occupational field.

These ontological and epistemological notions are for organised crime detectives specifically concerned with how to assess and categorise various groups of people and organised crime offenders and the specific situations and incidents they are involved in, and how detectives investigate them. Consequently, these notions are indeed forming and impacting detectives' decision-making and their discretion (Kleinig 1997; Loftus et al. 2015). Detective work as an emotional art form is

instinctive, intuitive, and context-dependent, and has to be embodied through one's own experience and to some extent through the experience of fellow detectives.

The analysis shows that this investigative mindset is not merely guiding detectives' tactical investigation but can be said to encompass an organisational mindset as it is generally expressed and reflected on all levels in the police organisation. It reveals and displays therefore underlying patterns of how proactive and reactive police work in the practical world of policing take the same form and patterning, and therefore how the proactive detective *métier* functions as a way of sustaining the specific proactive performance.

Modes of Deploying Resources

According to Manning (2010), there are ritualised, repetitive modes of deploying resources within policing which ground 'order' and 'ordering' in places and doings rather than in categories of crime, law, and morality. In this sense, policing is more about the control of territory and the symbolisation of that control. In this study, I have shown that the deployment of resources within organised crime policing is, in accordance with the assumptions about organised crime policing and organised crime offenders, the understanding that police know which crimes are occurring, which groups of people who commit these crimes and why they do so.

For historical reasons, due to political attention, and as a consequence of habitual thinking and organisational preferences, organised crime offenders are primarily regarded as drug offenders predominantly members from organised crime groups. These are continuously and routinely identified and targeted through the police gaze (Finstad 2000) based on experience and the collectively shared assumption of their status as 'bad guys'. They are offenders who are – due to their social status and type of offending – perceived as police property (Reiner 2010). These prolific offenders can be considered to be 'easy targets' as they might indeed commit

serious and organised crime on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale which makes them less demanding for police to deal with. My analysis in **Chapter 8** shows further that the perception of their guilt built on some of the same grounds which make them continuous focus persons:

- 1) their criminal history and their affiliation to organised crime groups
- 2) recent intelligence information from confidential informants
- 3) the police's prior investigations against them
- 4) their suspicious behaviour and e.g. use of security and countermeasures.

However, what is sought after is what is found: the circle of information gathering for intelligence purposes and the identification of focus persons, potential suspects, and investigation targets etc. reproduces organisational anchored stereotypes. A key finding in the analysis is therefore that proactive investigations target often 'usual suspects', who are randomly identified as they meet the criteria of being highly visible classic counterparts whom the police can easily recognise and moreover prefer to deal with.

The information collection circle, therefore, produces records, which are kept about these issues and sustain the validity of this practice as they are based on the same assumptions, and moreover it supports the same mode of deploying resources (Manning 2010). This runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as it preserves and reproduces stereotypical organisational notions of 'bad guys' instead of widening the scope to bigger threats and hidden populations. Consequently, organised crime is overall viewed in a narrow scope failing to look at the broader field of organised crime both in regards to crime areas and groups of people.

Rewarded Activities


The cluster of rewarded activities are the organisational inducements and the distribution of these on how to perform policing (Manning & Raphael 2010;

Manning 2010). These are based on assumptions about how the social world operates as well as what practices are necessary to cope with this world. In regards to organised crime policing, this is where detectives are viewed as experts and specialists. This study shows therefore that the rewarded activities for proactive police work derive from the reactive policing paradigm and particularly the standard model of policing. They revolve around illicit drug seizures and arrests and the overall success is 'solving cases' meaning producing investigation information which counts as evidence and thereby provides grounds for prosecution.

Although the proactive policing paradigm proposes knowledge-based analytical work, problem-solving, and prevention, these are not activities which are rewarded at neither the public front stage nor the organisational front stage. In fact, my analysis has shown that proactive policing is not viewed as a different paradigm for police action – it is primarily viewed as a smarter way of doing traditional police work. Therefore, the police organisation and its response to organised crime is continuously tied to an instrumental understanding and its symbolic and staged acts of crime control and ceremonial proactive performance prevents a revolutionary paradigm shift.

The study points to the circumstance that the proactive investigation operation can be seen as a window in which detectives' proactive practices are displayed – similar to Manning's (2010) 'incident'. Here, the subjective and objective forces that govern proactive police performance are mobilised. The activities – the investigative tactics and lines of action employed by detectives – build on a predetermined and predictable script of 'best practice' and although this is tacit, non-verbalised and lacks description in terms of purpose and aim (lines of enquiry), it is widely recognised within the police organisation as 'drug policing' as it resembles street-level work evolved around 'crackdowns' and 'raids' against drug suppliers and distributors.

PART FOUR: CURTAIN FALL



Chapter 10: Closing

- *On the study's findings, accomplishments, and reflections*

*So much for endings. Beginnings are always more fun.
True connoisseurs, however, are known to favour the stretch in between, since
it's the hardest to do anything with.*

- From 'Happy Endings' in *Murder in the Dark* by Margaret Atwood (1983).

Conclusions

In this PhD study, I have explored how police respond to organised crime via proactive investigation as a representation of one of the most dominant international trends within policing namely the introduction of the proactive policing paradigm. The introduction of this paradigm in different reform efforts has proved to be a sustainable trend in contemporary policing in most Western countries and has proposed a move from a traditional law and order and response focus (the reactive paradigm) towards a more problem-oriented, analytical, proactive focus (the proactive paradigm) (Manning 2010; Sherman 2013; Weisburd et al. 2019). Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition and based on a thorough empirical investigation of the Danish police, I have examined the following research question:

How do proactive investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in the police and which conditions impact this and why?

Thus, I have scrutinised how the police organisation conceptualises and interprets proactivity, how proactivity is implemented and practiced in terms of investigations, and how external and internal structures as well as formal and informal worlds of policing influence and shape this practice. The study is aimed at contributing to the ‘black box’ of proactive investigation and the existing knowledge gap in current research on criminal investigation (Innes 2003; Manning 2004; Stelfox 2009; Brodeur 2010; Hald & Rønn 2013; Bacon 2016; Fahsing 2016; O’Niell 2018; Weisburd et al. 2019). To answer the research question, I draw the following conclusions:

The Socio-Political Context

Proactive investigations unfold in a specific social and political context, which on a structural level impacts conditions for all police work. The microcosmos of proactive investigation is therefore connected to macro-oriented politics and societal developments since the police as a social institution react to and interact with the different stimuli it is exposed to. My analysis shows that the contextual frame for the Danish police is shaped by both external and internal conditions which have direct and indirect influence on how proactive investigations are organised and carried out. These conditions include both specific criminal incidents and crime problems as well as political and organisational alterations and reforms.

First, the political and public pressure on the Danish police's priorities, dispositions, work processes etc. have increased remarkably, within the last decade and the political and public focus on police accountability and public trust suggest that police are no longer an unchallenged authority. Second, even though the general crime level is decreasing, assessments of risks, threats, and potential harm to society in general present a more diffuse and complex crime picture for the police to deal with (Rigspolitiet 2017). Third, due to single crime events and isolated threats and risks (especially terrorism, gang conflicts, and migration), the police are spending a vast amount of resources carrying out reactive law and order-related tasks such as guarding physical objects (soft targets) and border control. This circumstance removes resources and staff from not only day-to-day policing, but also complex crime investigation and preventive tasks and innovative proactive perspectives on police work are downsized or set aside in favour of trying to keep up with e.g. reported volume crime (see also Christensen 2012). Fourth, the amount of internal processes such as structure reforms, reorganisations, budget adjustments, implementation of information technologies, changes within management, demands for certified personnel in specific functions etc. have created

a great deal of turbulence within the police and interfered with the core tasks of policing (Degnegaard 2010; Stevnsborg 2010; 2016; Balvig et al. 2011; Fyfe et al. 2013; Terpstra et al. 2019). Fifth, the introduction of new public management as a governance model promoting new management ideals of rationalisation, efficiency, and performance measurement has especially challenged the police as a value-based social institution operating on a social mandate, where issues such as legitimacy, accountability, public trust, legal equality, and professional ethics etc. are central (Gundhus 2012). These specific traits are consequently in risk of becoming secondary at the expense of rationality and efficiency even though these are not central in the police's social mandate.

This study shows that the five identified structural conditions have and are continuously impacting and shaping the Danish police and consequently the conditions for how proactive police work is carried out. Continuous conversion between different strategic directions for the police (proactive/reactive), organisational structures (regional/local), approaches to recruitment and education (generalist/specialist) go on with such a pace that the ideas and the implementation of them seem to be abandoned before their potential positive outcome manifest themselves in the practical world of policing. Consequently, this analysis of the socio-political and structural context of the Danish police shows that despite considerable efforts to reform and move the police from merely a reactive police force towards a proactive police service this paradigm is continuously constrained. The ideals of proactivity and modernisation have been difficult to pursue due to these specific external and internal conditions and have amongst other resulted in the sustainment of predominantly reactive police responses.

Strategic Frame and Organisational Structures

Proactive investigations unfold as part of and are impacted by a formal strategy and action plan which guides the overall police response towards organised crime. This

strategy is intended to have both a long-term and short-term perspective as well as both a reactive and proactive focus. My analysis shows that the police's response is trying to deal with urgent crime problems and violent conflicts as well as accumulating crime and those underlying structures which are believed to enable organised crime. This leads to the instigation of what I divide into two different response models: 1) a broad response model targeting members of organised crime as a whole through everyday police work, and 2) a narrow response model targeting a small group of priority and high-value offenders through proactive investigations. Although prevention and proactive police work are pinpointed as central components of the police's strategy, my analysis demonstrates that this is only to a limited extent reflected in the politically determined objectives and performance goals. These have, on the contrary, through a decade been guided by a 'tough-on-crime approach' prompting repressive and punitive efforts – such as multiple arrests and incarceration of offenders (Smith & Uglevik 2017).

The introduction of two specific performance goals in terms of organised crime regarding: 1) the continuous incarceration of 225-300 members of organised crime groups, and 2) the identification of 15-25 priority offenders for proactive investigations dominate the police's response in a sense where it impounds the police's time and resources and captures the strategic agenda. Consequently, the police are under significant pressure to allocate their time and resources into primarily reactive investigations and operational responses focusing on criminal incidents and conflicts here and now whilst trying to meet political performance goals. The energy being put into 'the numbers' game' (meeting performance goals) therefore inhibits a long-term focus and long-term planning. It steers the police in a reactive rather than a proactive direction focusing on the short-term perspective and the broad response model. Consequently, the analysis shows that police's response to organised crime is primarily characterised by reactive police work and solving 'problems of the day' and delivering a rapid response focusing on multiple arrests and incarceration as the primary measures of success. This stands in

contrast to the inherent notion of the proactive paradigm which e.g. prescribes a knowledge-based police response focusing on a long-term perspective and a problem-oriented operational model targeting the underlying structures and threats of organised crime including ‘problems of tomorrow’. The formal objectives and measures of success for the police’s response – including proactive investigation – are in other words reactive in nature.

The study illustrates how police try to implement these political demands and initiatives loyally and to the best of their abilities – despite the condition that especially police management have genuine concerns about this strategy’s ability to provide a comprehensive police response towards systemic and persistent organised crime problems. My analysis therefore uncovers a constant organisational battle over the strategy and action plan as police are forced to choose between what they identify as a focus on current violent conflicts and on underlying enabling structures of organised crime. Accordingly, this battle mirrors the persistent dilemma of police as being either a reactive response service dealing with the short-term problems at hand or a proactive service with a focus on instigating problem-oriented responses with a long-term focus. At the end, my analysis shows that in the practical world of policing the formal organisational and strategic structures seem to commission the instigation of a reactive enforcement strategy and repressive police tactics.

Informal Collective Assumptions

Proactive investigations unfold in and are impacted by an informal world of policing where the presiding assumptions amongst managers, police officers, and detectives evolve around some of the same perceptions of how to measure success as presented in the formal strategy. The dominant understanding is namely that ‘good’ police work is ‘real policing’ focusing on catching and arresting ‘bad guys’ who fit certain (stereotypical) characteristics (Gill 2000; Holmberg 2003; Manning

2004). The internal success of police work is therefore in accordance with political expectations measured in the amount of arrests, the number of conviction years, and the seizures of weapons and illicit goods. The study reveals that the immediate impression of how proactive investigation is interpreted on strategic level implies that this is rooted in the ideas of the proactive paradigm, which is expressed in management language and reflected in various policy documents. Nevertheless, this appears to be a rhetorical and on-the-surface performance to accommodate the front stage of policing where the ideal of proactivity and smart policing lives. Instead, my analysis uncovers that the informal world of policing dominates the backstage, which is compelled by collectively shared assumptions about police work and the criminal counterpart supporting the reactive paradigm.

For that reason, the study shows that the reactive approach is not only determined by political expectations and external structures it seems to mirror an organisational preference of being a response service focusing on delivering a rapid response to criminal incidents sanctioning those offenders involved as prescribed in the standard model of policing. Proactive investigation is in this perception viewed as having the same purpose as reactive investigation: to identify a perpetrator with the aim of prosecuting and arresting him. Accordingly, although proactive policing promotes prevention per default this is not a central aspect of neither police perception nor practice. The condition that prevention of crime is not a high-status task within the police organisation is connected to the notion of 'real policing', but also to an organisational preoccupation with fast and visible results which creates immediate gratification and short run hedonism (Cohen 1955). Consequently, in the general run of things, both strategic and operational decision-makers seem to rely on familiar course of action founded in the reactive policing paradigm. This can be explained by two overall conditions namely: 1) proactive policing is not perceived as a distinct paradigm for police action, but merely a smarter way of doing traditional police work, and 2) experience-based 'thick' knowledge (the cornerstone of reactive policing) is the highest ranking

professionalism within the status hierarchy of police which stands in opposition to more abstract ‘thin’ standardised analytical knowledge (the cornerstone of proactive policing) (Gundhus 2012; Ratcliffe 2008b). Hence, the study shows that the police response towards organised crime overall is not altered radically and a revolutionary paradigm shift is absent.

Informant-driven Targeting

Proactive investigations unfold in and are impacted by a historical context where two different approaches have dominated the launch of proactive operations and the selection of investigation targets. In this study, I divide these approaches into 1) investigation-led targeting and 2) informant-driven targeting. Informant-driven targeting is considered to be the most commonly used approach within the (Danish) police – a practice stemming from street-level work where information from confidential informants have led to informant-driven police operations primarily aimed at drug offences (since the 1990s referred to as organised crime). My analysis portrays how informant work in this process went from being merely an operative tactic to becoming a central part of police’s intelligence work and additionally a cornerstone in police’s response to organised crime. The use of information from confidential informants has some clear advantages such as the fast collection of actionable information with the possibilities of producing seizures and arrests. However, in relation to identifying investigation targets in proactive investigations there are some risks associated with e.g. methods for information collection and information evaluation, and the application of this information in operational responses (Innes 1999; Dunnighan & Norris 1999).

The reactive nature of policing is also reflected in the approach to informant work as the police primarily operate with what I identify as a reactive rather than a proactive model for informant work. This has to do with the condition that informant work is based on undirected approaches to recruiting informant handlers

as well as informants, and as it is based on unstructured methods for collecting and applying source information. The analysis shows that in connection with informant-driven targeting in proactive investigations, this results in three main risks; 1) over-policing regular ‘customers’ by targeting the same group of offenders over and over, 2) under-policing hidden populations e.g. organised crime groups operating below the surface or organised crime offenders with lesser visibility than ‘the usual suspects’, and 3) random selection of the most visible and active offenders whom police receive information about but who are operating on a low-level scale. As a result, proactive investigation is in risk of becoming an informant-led police activity rather than a component to intelligence-led policing. Additionally, informant-driven targeting as a central nerve in police’s response towards organised crime is consequently in risk of becoming a response model of informant-driven policing.

The study reveals that there is a competition between two ideal type models for identifying targets for proactive investigations namely what I identify as a reactive and a proactive model. The reactive model for targeting is predominantly experience-based building on investigation-led targeting or informant-driven targeting which stand on reactive approaches to informant work and information collection. The proactive model for targeting is knowledge-based building on strategic targeting which proposes structured information collection and intelligence analysis in order to identify and prioritise targets in terms of their respective threats. Despite organisational inclinations, the attempts to replace conventional practices – a reactive model of targeting usual suspects – with new analytical practices – a proactive model of targeting under-policed and hidden populations – have not found its grounds within police as an established practice.

My analysis demonstrates that a key challenge for strategic targeting in connection to proactive investigation is that on both strategic and operational level within police it is viewed as too time consuming and demanding. Moreover, the lack of organisational matureness in regards to strategic knowledge work means that

strategic targeting is dealt with in the same way as any operational police issue. An additional challenge is internal resistance towards analytical-based approaches in the police organisation. The analysis establishes how this resistance is connected to two overall conditions: First, there is an organisational preference to focus on ‘the classic counterpart’ and ‘the usual suspects’ as these are recognisable and familiar for police in terms of characteristics and behavioural patterns (Gill 2000; Manning 2004).

This preference makes police favour this group of people as opponents in organised crime instead of hidden populations such as ‘the suits’ (e.g. money men and crime facilitators) since the social world and behavioural patterns of this group is unknown. Second, the presence of a distinct police epistemic culture dominates and impacts how police work is perceived and carried out and is imperative in order to understand why new or different forms of knowledge of crime and policing have so strenuous conditions within police.

Police Epistemic Culture

Proactive investigation practice is impacted by a distinct epistemic culture, which is compelled by at least three essential and cohesive notions of knowledge: First, experience-based knowledge is highest ranking in the police’s status hierarchy of knowledge and it is often explicated and passed on through the telling of anecdotes. This becomes a ritualised practice and functions to articulate police practice and to preserve institutional memory. ‘Anecdotal evidence’ can easily outweigh for example scientific and analytical knowledge. Second, since experience and tacit knowledge function as the most valued knowledge types within police other types of knowledge are not regarded as similarly valuable or trustworthy. Within the police *métier* (Manning & Raphael 2010) lies therefore the notion that other personnel groups in non-police functions are excluded of valuable insights which points to the condition that police personnel have monopoly of knowledge and as such ‘the

power to know'. The struggle of knowledge therefore equals the struggle of organisational power which mirrors the competition of the experience-based and knowledge-based rationales. Third, the epistemic understanding of the social world and policing within the experience-based rationale promotes a tendency to reduce its intellectual aspects and complexities. Contrary to this, the knowledge-based rationale and e.g. strategic targeting increases complexities as the aim is to explore unknown or uncertain characteristics and perspectives as it focusses on future threats and risks. As such, these three identified conditions can be seen as a hindrance when it comes to implementing knowledge-based approaches within police and as a barrier for organisational innovation leading police to fall back on old habits, institutionalised routines, and well-known practices.

Consequently, my study shows that there are some predicaments and discrepancies between the strategic ideal of being proactive and the reality of police action. Despite a strategic inclination to instigate and support strategic targeting it becomes difficult when wanting to replace standard routines in police. As a result, due to organisational preferences and habitual thinking, proactive investigations often target priority offenders for proactive investigations using predominantly conventional and experience-based approaches such as informant-driven targeting. This can be compared to the approach of random patrolling from the standard policing model, which mirrors a narrow perception of proactive policing as both a concept and practice (Bacon 2016). Inherent in this approach lies a practice where offenders are randomly identified through 'the police gaze' (Finstad 2000) as they meet the criteria of being highly visible usual suspects whom police can easily recognise and moreover prefer to deal with. These prolific offenders can be considered to be 'easy targets' as they indeed commit serious and organised crime on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale which make them less resourceful for police to deal with. This stands in contrast to a systematic knowledge-based process consisting of e.g. the production of a comprehensive overview of high impact investigation targets and the (relative) threats they compose.

My analysis illustrates therefore that in the practical world of proactive investigation, informant work in its conventional form proposes some essential problems for instigating proactive and high-end police work targeting hidden or under-policed populations who can be said to impact the underlying structures of organised crime. As a result, the reactive model of targeting priority offenders for proactive investigations runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as it preserves and reproduces stereotypical organisational notions of ‘bad guys’ instead of widening the scope to other crime areas and populations.

The Practice of Proactive Investigation

Proactive investigation unfolds as a distinct policing discipline carried out as a tacit practice following an ingrained and unarticulated recipe as a set of collective inherent actions. This is impacted by a dynamic interplay between individual and shared experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, and by a number of collective epistemic notions about proactive police work and the criminal counterpart. The social production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use are constituted on the basis of how detectives make sense of their actions, interactions, and social world. The entire investigation process can therefore be seen as an analytical sense-making process where detectives try to assess and categorise collected information and evaluate its relevance in terms of the case at hand (Weick 1995; Innes 2003; Fahsing 2016). Proactive investigation work is therefore not objective information processing – it is rather a constant interpretation process where detectives categorise, add meaning, socially construct, and give certain powers to the individual pieces of information.

Although there are similarities, my analysis shows that the investigation stages and processes in proactive investigation look somewhat different than existing generic models for criminal investigation since these are primarily based on reactive

investigation. In its practice and process, proactive investigation resembles more intelligence work than reactive investigative work as it is concerned with policing uncertainties, scenario thinking and building, and interpretation of information. Detectives thereby to a large extent become co-producers of events and 'investigation knowledge'. Detectives' main lines of action in proactive investigations can be comprised into a model illustrating stages and processes, core investigation tactics, and the underlying lines of enquiry. The model encompasses four stages: 1) Initial Information Collection and Ordering of Information, 2) Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing Information Collection, 3) Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence, and 4) Constructing or Closing Cases. Wiretapping and directed surveillance are both quantitatively and qualitatively the most central tactical components of proactive investigation. They have as such considerable significance for how proactive investigation is conceptually understood and practiced.

A central analytical finding is that there is an important distinction between 'lines of actions' and 'lines of enquiry'; investigation tactics (lines of action) seem to be decided upon and instigated before investigative questions (lines of enquiry) are developed. Accordingly, the instigation of investigative tactics are predominantly determining the investigation process as opposed to context dependent investigative queries based on the specific case at hand. The process and practice of proactive investigation are furthermore mainly guided by a legal framework rather than a methodological framework led by context dependent investigative queries. A central argument in this study is consequently that the methodology of proactive investigation is not as pronounced as of reactive investigation. It seems instead to be lacking deliberate, intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative lines of enquiry and ultimately encompass a comprehensive methodology for proactive investigation.

Investigative Mindset

Proactive investigation practice is impacted by detectives' investigative mindset, which is an important and essential part of understanding and explaining how proactive investigations unfold. This can be said to be comprised by collectively shared assumptions about proactive detective work and at least three dominant components, which are: 1) the notions of 'solving cases', 2) suspect-driven case building, and 3) investigation as action and art. Although proactive investigation empirically and by its content resembles intelligence work this is not recognised by detectives. They keep instead the language from reactive investigation in the sense that they are concerned with 'solving the case', and they uphold a collective perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-level operational work or reactive investigative work occupied with 'putting people to jail' rather than preventing harm or disrupting crimes in the making. This reactive notion of proactive investigation work can easily lead to classic suspect-driven case-building of "whodunnits" rather than investigations of "what's happening" as the measure of success is large drug seizures and multiple arrests instead of preventing, fending off, or disrupting criminal actions (Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018). Therefore, the application of high policing measures in proactive investigation of drug crimes seems to have an instrumental function as these measures are transferred and applied without the central knowledge-based notions and analytical dimensions of the proactive paradigm and as such as sort of ad hoc instrumentalism (Sklansky 2012). Thus, proactive investigation becomes the instigation of high policing measures carried out in a low policing context. Furthermore, detectives consider detective work as an action-oriented and tacit practice taught 'on the job' through apprenticeship and experience which requires a certain innate gift or talent. It can for that reason not be taught through e.g. education.

These notions all stem from the reactive paradigm anchored in an experience-based rationale and proactive investigation therefore stands on a reactive investigative

mindset which has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus occupied with holding individual offenders accountable for their criminality rather than as a means to prevent emerging crime threats. This investigative mindset can be regarded as an organisational mindset as it is expressed and reflected on all levels in the police organisation.

Proactive Investigations as Performances

Proactive investigations unfold as continuous backstage and front stage performances following an ingrained, unarticulated, predetermined, and predictable script (Goffman 1959; Manning 2010). The police organisation is not a mini theatre, but it determines and supplies the specific scripts, fronts, and appearances, and stimulate the necessary teamwork of detectives which is applied in proactive performances (Manning 2008c). Due to its invisible and covert nature, proactive investigation is not at public display front stage as other types of police work. The front stage performance in this connection is as such a staged action (Manning 1977; Holmberg 2003) in the sense that police perform the roles as effective crime fighters with the purpose of showing the audience (the public and the political level) that police are to be entrusted to have a number of covert measures at their disposal. The front stage performance of proactivity functions as a way of displaying action and operational results and serves as an illustration of the police's overall response to organised crime through, for example, the odd crackdown, arrest, and seizure of illicit drugs. This becomes a manifestation of the proposed qualities of proactive investigation as a backstage police activity and its societal eligibility. These front stage performances of proactivity provide the police with a stable mandate from their audience as their symbolic and staged action enable them to appear as being able to manage, diminish, and control organised crime as much as possible (Manning 2004; 2008c).

Although the performance of proactive investigation is carried out ‘behind the scenes’ it is somewhat displayed on police’s organisational front stage. Here, the audience consist of other members of the police organisation who view the internal performances of managers and detectives. The performance of proactive investigation on police’s organisational front stage is focused on drug policing and follows a stable, ceremonial performance of the ritualised and well-known ‘drama of cops and robbers’ relying on a predictable script (Goffman 1959; Manning 2004; 2010). This drama has been symbolically performed through decades as it is a rerun from uniformed patrol policing celebrating the subculture of patrol (Manning 2010). It is embedded in an experience-based rationale stemming from the reactive policing paradigm promoting the logic from the standard policing model of responding rapidly to events and acting upon them. It mirrors the reactive street-level drama of drug policing where police identify, pursue, and catch usual suspects using a similar script, costumes, and props. In the ‘drama of cops and robbers’, uncertainties are reduced to well-known categories (e.g. the continuous fight between good and bad) and detectives rely on consistent role descriptions (crime fighters against ideal offenders). A successful performance ends with the arrest of the offender(s), which is applauded both internally within police and by the political and public audience.

On the organisational backstage, this performance function as a way to maintain organisational stability and individual motivation to carry out detective work. Each case is as a result perceived as collectively meaningful, despite the broad recognition within police of the dim prospects of police’s overall efforts to impact organised crime. Thus, the performing teams’ dramaturgical loyalty and dramaturgical discipline support the collective notion stemming from reactive police work of ‘solving’ the incident, and proactive investigation therefore becomes, in accordance with reactive investigation, a performance of ‘whodunnits’ and of suspect-driven case building. This performance stands in contrast to a proactive

performance with the aim of identifying and reducing more general risks and threats from organised crime and their overall impact on society as a whole.

The Stabilising Medium of the Proactive Detective Métier

Proactive investigations unfold in an endlessly elastic socio-political context in which policing operates impacted by shifting targets and objectives, conflicting rhetoric, and alterations in deployment of resources (Manning 2010). In the context of organised crime policing, this has resulted in e.g. ideals and ambitions of proactivity but also politically set performance measures which results in reactive and repressive police tactics. This is the dynamic side of organised crime policing, and as a countermeasure to this dynamic and with the purpose of sustaining conventional police work and organisational stability, police have gradually built up the stabilising medium of the proactive detective métier. While the targets of action are shifting and shaped by politics, the range of police tactics remains much the same, the unstated purpose remains the same, and the fundamentals of the detective role remain unchanged and the ‘manifest’ continues with older patterns (Manning 2010; Bacon 2016).

The detective métier represents the tacit assumed ideas about ‘detective work’ and ‘the social world of organised crime’ what is processed and why which is determined and shaped by several conditions and forces. The ruling collective assumptions in organised crime policing evolves around that detectives know the typical counterpart, their motivations, typical actions, and dynamics, and know how they are best policed. There is as a clear dependency relationship between detectives’ collective assumptions and the practice they carry out provide a social reality. The collective assumptive world of detectives is as such constructing and reconstructing the detective identity, and shaping and impacting the proactive performance as well as upholding, passing over, and reproducing this ritualised act. In the core of the proactive detective métier lies ‘the proactive investigation

operation'. The proactive investigation operation can be seen as a window in which detectives' proactive practices are displayed. Here, the subjective and objective forces that govern proactive police performance are mobilised. In these operations, detectives perform the key drama of 'cops and robbers', where they in the purest form display what this type of policing is all about. 'The police organisation' encompasses the formal frame of organised crime policing and proactive detective work and it demands mainly specific (political) performance measures to be obtained. The fundamental assumption is that the organisation is functional and rational (Manning 2010). In relation to organised crime policing and proactive detective work, the police organisation is designed to allocate detectives to different cases and operations, which are dealt with one at a time in a temporal series of repeated, demarcated investigative efforts. The police organisation provides detectives with wide discretionary powers as they are perceived as experts and specialist and both 'doers' and 'knowers'. Therefore, organisational policy around proactive investigation work is set and derives from experiences and situated practices employed in operations and cases by individual detectives with limited guidance or supervision from management.

The forces which shape the detective *métier* underline their ceremonial position for repeating what is valued and recognised in organised crime policing and reproduce the modes of action through 'rewarded activities', 'deployment of resources', and 'interpersonal tactics'. The cluster of rewarded activities are the organisational inducements and the distribution of these on how to perform policing (Manning & Raphael 2010; Manning 2010). The rewarded activities for proactive police work derive from the reactive policing paradigm and particularly the standard model of policing as they revolve around illicit drug seizures and arrests and the overall success is 'solving cases' – the production of investigation information which count as evidence and thereby provide grounds for prosecution. Although the proactive policing paradigm proposes knowledge-based analytical work, problem-solving, and

prevention, these are not activities which are rewarded at neither the public front stage nor the organisational front stage.

The deployment of resources within organised crime policing is, in accordance with the assumptions about organised crime policing and organised crime offenders, the understanding that police know which crimes are occurring, which groups of people who commit these crimes, and why they do so. This keeps the police in some kind of control of what they do and why and provides a demarcation towards unknown worlds of unpredictability and uncertainties (Innes 2006; Sheptycki 2017). For historical reasons, due to political attention, and as a consequence of habitual thinking and organisational preferences, resources are deployed to drug investigations predominantly targeting members from organised crime groups. These are continuously and routinely identified and targeted through the police gaze based on experience and the collectively shared assumption of their status as 'bad guys'. They are offenders who are – due to their social status and type of offending – perceived as 'police property' (Reiner 2010). These prolific offenders are moreover perceived to be 'easy targets' as they might indeed commit serious and organised crime on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale which make them less resourceful for police to deal with. Consequently, organised crime is overall viewed in a narrow scope failing to look at the broader field of organised crime both in regards to hidden crimes, crime areas, and groups of people.

Interpersonal tactics are sanctioned actions in proactive investigation operations which are thought to guarantee successful investigations which end in arrests and prosecution. They are concerned with the notion of 'real policing' and consequently 'real detective work'; the tactics are learned 'on the job' through individual experience and subsequently the experience of other detectives. They are anchored in a specific police epistemic culture, which forms how detectives come to know what they know about organised crime as a phenomenon and organised crime policing as a practice (Cetina 1999). This epistemic culture is central in the

sustainment of experience-based and conventional practices and the preservation of well-known and familiar aims and targets in proactive police work despite shifts in the elastic and dynamic socio-political context. Interpersonal tactics of proactive detective work are connected to both the collective assumptions of organised crime policing and police epistemic culture. A true detective encompasses moreover a specific investigative mindset which is derived from reactive policing. Proactive investigation builds per default on police's self-selection (Marx 1988) and the suspect is in this regard identified as guilty beforehand. The investigation process is therefore no longer concerned with uncovering and documenting a series of past events, but rather to support the initial suspicion with new information, which can be processed as evidence.

In conclusion, I have through a thorough analysis presented a cohesive narrative about how proactive investigations unfold in the police as well as identified a number of conditions which impact this specific practice and provided explanations of why this is. Through this, I have attempted to disclose the 'black box' of proactive investigation in order to provide grounds for better understanding this phenomenon and consequently its implications for society.

Contributions

In the beginning of this thesis, I stated a clear knowledge ambition for this study: First, through an extensive empirical examination to explicate and analyse existing practices around proactive investigation in regards to the police's response to organised crime – including the conditions which shape and influence this practice and why. Second, through this empirical analysis to build a theoretical framework for 'the performance of proactive investigation' and by developing a theoretical concept called 'the proactive detective métier'. Third, through a detailed account of the methodological approach to develop and lay out the groundwork for a comprehensive 'embedded police research methodology'.

The empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions are interlinked and should be viewed as a coherent research contribution. This contribution about proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically and how these phenomena can be studied, interpreted, and understood is accordingly my significant original contribution to the research field and police practice. My knowledge ambition is more specifically connected to two overall aims: 1) to contribute to parts of the knowledge gaps within the research field of police science – including proactive policing, organised crime policing, criminal investigation, and police sociology, and 2) with this contribution to deliver a notable and detailed knowledge foundation which is essential in order to develop police's professional practice in relation to proactive policing and proactive investigation. Consequently, I aim this contribution at both a scholarly and a police audience.

In order to create this contribution, I have in accordance with Klockars' (1985) recipe for police research, explored the concept and practice of proactive investigation on both a structural, organisational, and individual level focusing on

both policy and action. In accordance with Manning (2010), I have explored the dynamic interplay between external and internal structures as well as formal and informal conditions which impact the proactive concept and practice. I have strived to understand and explain this specific practice field and the conditions under which it unfolds both empirically and theoretically.

A key contribution is that I have uncovered and clarified aspects of proactive investigation practice and made parts of invisible policing visible. I have moreover presented a theoretical interpretation of this where the conditions surrounding the police's response to organised crime and the microcosmos of proactive investigation are elevated to knowledge about how police organisations act, interact with, and react to societal changes, shifting public and political expectations and demands together with established organisational modes of action. I have, for example, demonstrated how a societal orientation towards proactivity encounters a dominant reactive paradigm in the practical world of policing, and how different epistemic rationales of knowledge and experience compete within the police. This is done to clarify the obvious connection between the police and police action in the context of society and the police's role in society (Manning 2010). By this, I provide significant knowledge about the world of proactive policing – not only through proactive investigation as an observable practice – but as an example of an enduring phenomenon (proactivity) in modern society and the implications of this in relation to democratic policing. This is pertinent in the debate about police's continuous accountability and legitimacy. This specific knowledge contribution would not have been possible to produce without applying the embedded police research methodology. I regard therefore this methodology of producing knowledge from within to be essential for police research which focuses especially on invisible policing and the continuous dynamics between policy, organisation, and practice.

As promised in **Chapter 4**, I will now return to the issues regarding how this study can be assessed as a scientific research contribution. Even though the concepts of

generalisability, reliability, and validity are viewed as the dominant parameters in social sciences for assessing the quality of research these concepts stem from quantitative research and positivist paradigms which makes it difficult to transfer them into qualitative phenomenological-hermeneutic research (Kvale & Brinkman 2015). Knowledge is organised information – it is both selective and reductive as the production of knowledge clarifies and organises empirical complexity, but it also leaves out information (Hastrup 2004; Baarts 2015). The knowledge I have produced in this thesis about proactive investigation practice is socially constructed, context dependent and it cannot be objective or detached from judgements. It is situated in a specific time and space and created and produced in the simultaneity span between a practical and theoretical knowledge field. It is anchored in my specific preunderstanding, autobiography, backstage knowledge, experiences, perspectives, norms, and values. It is furthermore influenced by how I approached the research field, how I was met, who I met, what I observed, which roles I was given, which roles I took etc. These conditions are unique – and because of this it does not make sense to talk about reliability as this specific study cannot be repeated by another researcher. Accordingly, the thesis poses an interpretation of the world of proactive investigation and suggests possible theoretical explanations and represents a snapshot of *what goes on and why* seen through a particular lens.

The quality of the study should thus be assessed by imposing other criteria than the ruling criteria of social science. In **Chapter 4**, I presented three criteria for assessing the quality of this study proposed by Fredslund (2001): 1) the researcher presents her preunderstanding explicitly and makes the researcher visible as a subject, 2) every step of the research process is accounted for and justified, and 3) the study's interpretations are discussed in regards to their transferability to other situations. Additionally, I have suggested eight criteria for excellent qualitative research proposed by Tracy (2010): 1) worthy topic, 2) rich rigor, 3) sincerity, 4) credibility, 5) resonance, 6) significant contribution, 7) ethical, and 8) meaningful coherence. To accommodate these criteria, I have in **Part Two** given a detailed

account of all phases of the research process – from planning the study to writing up the thesis. I have presented and justified my preunderstanding and how it changed along the way and I have made myself visible as a reflexive and reflecting writing subject by providing several confessional and impressionist tales through conscious subjectivism (Van Maanen 1988; Ericsson 1991; Baarts 2015). Throughout **Chapter 1-4** I have tried to create transparency and sincerity by continuously displaying self-reflexivity accounting rigorously for both theoretical framework, the research process, and my preunderstanding and continuous deliberations as well as considering ethical aspects. Moreover, I have both in **Chapter 1** and in this chapter accounted for the relevance and importance of the research topic and the specific research question. In **Part Four** I have sought to build meaningful coherent narratives about the study's findings by providing a number of analyses on both micro and macro level based on a variety of empirical material derived from different research methods. I have thereby strived to provide a significant and credible contribution both empirically, methodologically, and theoretically. The assessment of the quality of this contribution can hereby determine the study's future and potential resonance, influence, implications and transference to other situations and thereby relevance for other policing contexts than the Danish context. For example, can the findings from this study be transferred to other police organisations in Scandinavia, in Europe, or in other Western countries? In other words: are the findings in this study generally valid?

Overall, I suggest that this study's findings and conclusions encompass an *analytical generalisability* (Fog 2004). The systematic scientific process in which this study has become suggests that it can be regarded as scientific knowledge. The analytical findings and conclusions can be lifted accordingly to comment on proactive policing and proactive investigation on a more general level, which does not only apply to the context of the Danish police. Of course, the particular empirical observations and findings, which are presented in this study, are context-dependent and my interpretations of these are unique, as accounted for above, and

consequently other interpretations and explanations can be proposed through different perspectives, in different times, by different researchers. However, I propose predominantly a systemic analysis which is an attempt to articulate a perspective on (proactive) policing as an activity, as an organisation, as a set of situated actions (Manning 1977). The context of the Danish police therefore becomes merely an example of 'police'. The robustness of this knowledge and thereby its 'truthfulness' and 'rightness' is based upon its concrete, detailed empirical anchoring which is qualified through theory. This process elevates the contribution to be able to comment on and therefore to be relevant in other police contexts as it is occupied with universal dynamics and mechanisms which are connected to 'police' and 'policing' in many places.

Perspectives

In this final section, I will concentrate on the study's conclusions' and contributions' implications for research, practice, and society. I have named this thesis *Coppers Chasing Usual Suspects* as I find it to capture the essence of what is actually happening when it comes to proactive investigation. Detectives, police officers, and police managers are attributed the role of 'coppers' – protectors of society – and they also view themselves in this role, as a shield against subversive actions. Accordingly, they chase and pursue a number of suspects which are visible and known to them; sometimes they catch them and sometimes they fail in catching them. This ongoing 'drama' is and should be viewed as a distinct policing discipline, which requires specific capabilities and resources. Since I have observed this practice up close, I have an utmost respect for and admire the work these detectives and police officers carry out on a daily basis; tirelessly trying to keep at least some threats from organised crime from evolving even though this is an overwhelming and endless task. I have seen how dedicated, engaged, and loyal these detectives are to this task and how they rarely give up even though it sometimes seems as a hopeless endeavour. This 'sense of mission' is one way of assigning meaning to the work and perhaps avoiding boredom (Innes 2003).

The job of policing organised crime also comes with a burden as the police are expected to be the ones who (solely) are to solve and fix this issue – which rarely lets itself be fixed – by providing public safety and security, and maintaining social order and a cohesive anti-corrupt society. However, this type of invisible policing also comes with a responsibility of doing so according to the social mandate the police have been given. This includes the use of covert measures and the wide degree of discretionary powers, which the police are entrusted with and have the mandate to use towards (a self-selected segment of) members of the public. For those reasons,

there are some implications and predicaments regarding proactive policing and proactive investigation, which my study has brought attention to.

As accounted for throughout this thesis, within the last decades, the police have been submitted to e.g. an increased attention from political level in terms of their use of resources and more specific demands in terms of the use of specific police tactics. They have experienced an increased critique from the public in terms of service levels and procedural justice. They are presented with a more complex crime picture and new crime and security threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, and migration. Further, they have been constrained as an organisation and as individuals within this organisation by management ideals from new public management promoting cost-efficiency and politically set performance measurements which are poorly suited for police work. These conditions have presented police with several challenges over the years for example the increasing loss of control and susceptibility towards random political initiatives on an organisational level, and loss of meaning and diminished discretion on an individual level.

Therefore, in my view, in order to maintain and live up to its social mandate, public support and trust, legitimacy, accountability, and their rightful position and high status in society, the police organisation and police practice need to be professionalised. As a result, the police needs to modernise the police organisation in the sense that it mirrors the surrounding society and modern, democratic values in terms of e.g. organisation, management, recruitment, working conditions, etc. This suggests a transparent and outwards looking organisation where the interests of the public and the duty to serve them is the core focus and task. Moreover, policing needs to become a professional practice rooted in robust scientific knowledge about what matters in policing and what works in policing (Weisburd & Neyroud 2011; van Dijk et al. 2016; Hartmann 2018). In order to become a professional practice, it is required to build on a professional framework of best

practice and the police education should be based on scientific derived knowledge about the police profession. This suggestion might seem naïve and too comprehensive, but other countries, such as the UK and Norway, have in fact done this successfully and these serve as international role models whereas the Danish police education for example has been demoted to a non-credited training education (Diderichsen 2017).

I find this transformation of police practice imperative to secure future public demands for democratic policing, where police action is carried out anchored in dominant principles of e.g. legality, proportionality, legal rights, and concerns for the individual and where basic human rights are considered (Manning 2010; Harfield & Harfield 2016; Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018). A central issue here is of course security of justice. Further, it is imperative to continuously examine that police resources are spent where they have the biggest impact on crime problems and public safety. The issues mentioned here are concerned with both ‘what matters’ and ‘what works in policing’ (van Dijk et al. 2016).

All types of police work need to be accounted for and justified and police responses should be appropriate and proportional in accordance with democratic values and cost-efficient in terms of public spending. This not only applies to everyday policing, but indeed to invisible policing such as organised crime policing and proactive investigation as these covert activities are certainly relying on public trust. Therefore, it requires transparency – not into its operational details – but into its methods and tactics and their qualities, effects, and potential outcomes. This study has taken a step to clarify and analyse aspects of this, but further research is needed to provide the necessary grounds for a professional framework for e.g. proactive investigation. A robust knowledge base will furthermore provide the grounds for developing a more competitive police practice, which is better equipped to meet the future challenges of (organised) crime and societal demands.

It is no secret that I – due to my preunderstanding, autobiography, and scientific position – since my initial employment within the Danish police have been driven by an overall ambition to contribute to develop policing as a profession. In this connection it concerns the particular field of (proactive) investigation. I find that the dominant perception within police of police work as a craft carried out merely as an experience-based endeavour guided by intuition and individual grounds of discretion, as my study has found in accordance with other research, inhibits professional development and organisational learning. It does so as this practice is not described in terms of actions taken or methods and as it is claimed to be a set of routine practical demarcated tasks and that the way that these should be solved best is through the individual officers' discretionary assessments of each situation. Within this perception lies the condition that there are limited motivations for discussing or even changing approaches, tactics, or measures since these are viewed as best decided upon by the individual officer based on his experience, innate capability, and situational discretion – leaving little room for innovation at an organisational level. This stands in contrast to having a collective methodology defining police work which can continuously be discussed, evaluated, developed, and improved. Consequently, it contributes to maintaining reactive practices – even in proactive policing – and stands in the way of improving policing. It moreover runs the risk of police spending time, energy, and resources on fruitless activities at best – and counterproductive activities at worst.

The police organisation is not a static institution, the police do not exist in a vacuum, and they are not derived from society. Policing should not remain the same – it should evolve to reflect the values and norms of the society in which it is carried out and consequently mirror these values and norms in how it is carried out to maintain its entrusted mandate to have tremendous impact on people's lives, safety, and welfare.

References

- Aas, G. (2009) *Politiinngrep i familiekonflikter. En studie av ordenspolitiets arbeid med familiekonflikter/familievoldssaker i Oslo*, PhD Thesis, Institutt for kriminologi og retssosiologi, Juridisk Fakultet, University of Oslo
- Alach, Z. (2012) 'A New Zealand Approach to Prioritising Criminal Groups', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol. 35 [3]: 491-504
- Anteby, M. (2013) 'Relaxing the Taboo on Telling Our Own Stories: Upholding Professional Distance and Personal Involvement', *Organisation Science*, Vol. 24 [4]: 1277-1290
- Atkinson, C. (2013) *Beyond Cop Culture: The Cultural Challenge of Civilian Intelligence Analysis in Scottish Policing*, PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow
- Atkinson, C. (2019) 'Where Were You While We Were Getting High Policing? The Consequences of Co-location for Broader Partnership Working in Tackling Organised Crime and Terrorism', *Policing & Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, Vol. 29 [8]: 922-935
- Atwood, M. (1984) 'Happy Endings', *Murder in the Dark*, Jonathan Pape Publishing
- Avdija, A. (2008) 'Evidence-Based Policing: A Comparative Analysis of Eight Experimental Studies Focused in the Area of Targeted Policing', *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences*, Vol. 3 [2]: 110-128
- Baarts, C. (2015) *Introduktion til etnografisk metode*, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag
- Baarts, C. & Mortensen, M. (2018) 'Killing Ourselves with Laughter: Mapping the Interplay of Organizational Teasing and Workplace Bullying in Hospital Work Life', *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management*, Vol. 13 [1]: 10-31
- Bacon, M. (2016) *Taking Care of Business. Police Detectives, Drug Law Enforcement and Proactive Investigation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bacon, M., Loftus, B., and Rowe, M. (2020) 'Ethnography and the Evocative World of Policing (Part I)', *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, Vol. 30 [1]: 1-10

Balvig, F. (2000) *Det voldsomme samfund. Om vold som problem og fængsel som løsning?* København: Djøfs Forlag

Balvig, F., Holmberg, L., & Nielsen, M. P. H. (2011) *Verdens bedste politi. Politireformen i Danmark 2007–2011*, København: Jurist- og Økonomiforbundets Forlag

Balvig, F. (2015) *Kriminalitetsudviklingen...* København: Det Kriminalpræventive Råd

Baudains, P., Braithwaite, A. & Johnson, S. (2013) 'Target Choice During Extreme Events: A Discrete Spatial Choice Model of the 2011 London Riots', *Criminology*, Vol. 51 [2]: 251-285

Bay, J. (1998a) 'Da organiseret kriminalitet blev indført i Danmark', *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab*: 175-201

Bay, J. (1998b) *Fra Subkultur til subsamfund - elleve historier om rockere og bikere*, København: Fortryk

Bayley, D. (1994) *Police for the Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bayley, D. (2015) 'Police Research: Trends and Prospects', in Kronkvist, O. & Granér, R. (Eds.), *The Past, the Present, and the Future of Police Research: Proceedings from the Fifth Nordic Police Research Seminar*, Växjö: Linnéuniversitetet, p. 7-14

Bayley, D. (2016) 'The Complexities of 21st Century Policing', *Policing*, Vol. 10 [3]: 163-170

Beck, U. (1992) *The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Sage Publications

Becker, H. (1963) *Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, Glencoe: Free Press

- Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York: Anchor Books
- Berger, P. & Kellner, (1982) *Nyfortolkning af sociologien*, Viborg: Lindhart & Ringhoff
- Billingsley, R., Nemitz, T. og Bean, P. (2001) *Informers. Policing, Policy, Practice*. Devon: Willian Publishing
- Bittner, E. (1974) 'Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: a Theory of Police' in Jacob, H. (Ed.) *The Potential Reform of Criminal Justice*, Beverly Hills CA: Sage
- Bjerknes, O.T. & Fahsing, I.A. (2018) *Etterforskning. Prinsipper, metoder og praksis*, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget
- Bjørkelo, B. & Gundhus, H. (2015) 'Å forbedre en etat. Om læring gjennom eksisterende systemer i politiorganisasjonen' *Magma*, [2]: 34-46
- Bowling, B., Reiner, R., and Sheptycki, J. (2020) *The Politics of the Police*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Boxenbaum, E. & Jonsson, S. (2008) 'Isomorphism, Diffusion and Decoupling' in Greenwood, R. Oliver, C., Sahlin, K. and Suddaby, R. (Eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Organisational Institutionalism*, London: Sage Publications
- Brodeur, J.P. (1983) 'High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities', *Social Problems* Vol. 30, [5]: 507-520
- Brodeur, J.P. & Dupont, B. (2006) 'Knowledge Workers or "Knowledge" Workers?', *Policing & Society*, Vol. 16[1]: 7-26
- Brodeur, J.P. (2007) 'High and Low Policing in Post-9/11 Times', *Policing*, Vol. 1 [1]: 25-37
- Brodeur, J.P. (2010) *The Policing Web*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Brown, J. (1996) 'Police Research: Some Critical Issues' in Leishman, F., Loveday, B. and Savage, S. (Eds.) *Core Issues in Policing*, London: Longman

Chan, J. (1997) *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Chan J. (2001) 'The Technological Game: How Information Technology is Transforming Police Practice', *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 1[2]: 139-159

Chan, J. (2013) 'Ethnography as Practice: Is Validity an Issue?', *Current Issues in Criminal Justice*, vol. 25[1]: 503-516

Christensen, M.J. (2012) *Fra det evige politi til projektpolitiet. En kamp om position og ideologi*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag

Christensen, T., Lægreid, P. And Rykkja, L. (2018) 'Reforming the Norwegian Police Between Structure and Culture: Community Police or Emergency Police', *Public Policy and Administration*, Vol. 33 [3]: 241-259

Christie, N. (1986) 'The Ideal Victim' in Fattah, E. (ed.) *From Crime to Policy to Victim Policy: Reorienting the Justice System*, London: Palgrave Macmillan

Clark, D. (2007) 'Chapter 17: Covert Surveillance and Informer Handling' in Newburn, T., Williamson, T. and Wright, A. (ed.) *Handbook of Criminal Investigation*, Oxon: Willan Publishing

Cockcroft, T. (2012) *Police culture. Themes and Concepts*, Oxcon: Routhledge

Cohen, A. (1955) *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*, Glencoe: Free Press

Cohen, S. (1972) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*, Oxford: Martin Robertson

Cook, T. & Tattersall, A. (2014) *Blackstone's Senior Investigating Officer's Handbook*, 3ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press

Cope, Nina (2004) 'Intelligence-led policing or policing-led intelligence. Integrating volume crime analysis into policing', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 44: 188-203

Coyne, J. & Bell, P. (2011) 'The Role of Strategic Intelligence in Anticipating Transnational Organised Crime: a Literature Review', *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, Vol. 39: 60-78

Cunliffe, A. (2010) 'Retelling Tales of the Field. In Search of Organisational Ethnography 20 Years On', *Organisational Research Methods*, Vol. 13 [2]: 224-239

Dahl, K. & Molly-Søholm, T. (2012) *Leadership pipeline i den offentlige sektor*, København: Dansk Psykologisk Forlag

Dahl, K. & Nielsen, J.A. (2014) 'Leadership pipeline: en neo-weberiansk revitalisering af bureaukratiet', *Økonomistyring & information*, Vol. 30 [2]: 521-546

Dahl, J. Y. (2019) 'Spaningsblikket – en utforskning av politispanerers lesning av omgivelsene', *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning*, Vol. 60 [3]:211-227

Dahlgren, L. & Fredslund, H. (2008) 'Hermeneutic Analysis - Understanding and Preunderstanding' in Vallgård, S. & Koch, L. (ed.) *Research Methods in Public Health*, København: Gyldendal

Danmarks Statistisk (2016) 'Befolkning og befolkningsfremskrivning, Folketal' <https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/emner/befolkning-og-befolkningsfremskrivning/folketal>

Dansk Politiforbund (The Danish Police Union): <https://politiforbundet.dk/english>

Davies, M. (2016) 'To what extent can we trust police research? Examining trends in research 'on', 'with', 'by' and 'for' the Police', *Nordisk Politiforskning*, Vol 3. [2]

de Vaus, D. (2001) *Research Design in Social Research*, London: SAGE Publications

Dean, G., Fahsing, I.A. & Gottschalk, P. (2010) *Organized Crime. Policing Illegal Business Entrepreneurialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Degnegaard, R. (2010) *Strategic Change Management. Change Management Challenges in the Danish Police Reform*, PhD Thesis, Ph.D. Series 7, The Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies, Copenhagen Business School

- Diderichsen, A. (2013) 'Kapitel 1: Vidensideal. Erkendelsesteori, politik og professionalisering' in Hald, C. & Rønn, K.V. (red.) *Om at opdage. Metodiske refleksioner over politiets undersøgelsespraksis*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur
- Diderichsen, A. (2017) 'Renewal and Retraditionalisation. The Short and Not Very Glorious History of the Danish Bachelor's Degree in Policing', *Nordic Journal of Studies in Policing*, Vol. 4 [2]: 149-169
- Dick, P.K. (2002) *The Minority Report and Other Classic Stories*, New York: Kensington Publishing
- Douglas, J. (Ed.) (1972) *Research on Deviance*, New York: Random House
- Duedahl, P. & Jacobsen, H. M. (2010) *Introduktion til dokumentanalyse*, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag
- Dunnighan, C. & Norris, C. (1996) 'A Risky Business: The Recruitment and Running of Informers by English Police Officers', *Police Studies*, Vol. 19 [2]: 1-25
- Dunnighan, C. & Norris, C. (1999) 'The Detective, the Snout, and the Audit Commission: The Real Cost of Using Informants', *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, Vol. 38 [1]: 67-86
- Dupont, B., Manning, P.K. & Whelan, C. (2017) 'Introduction for Special Issue Policing Across Organisational Boundaries: Developments in Theory and Practice', *Policing and Society*, Vol. 27 [6]: 583-585
- Eck, J.E. (2006) 'Science, values and problem-oriented policing: why problem-oriented policing?', in Weisburd, D. & Braga, A. (eds.) *Police Innovation. Contrasting Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Ellefsen, B. & Larsson, P. (2014) 'Kapitel 1: Skandinavisk politihistorie', in P. Larsson, H.O.I. Gundhus & R. Granér (Eds.) *Innføring i politivitenskap*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk
- Eckblom, P. (1997) 'Gearing Up Against Crime: A Dynamic Framework to Help Designers Keep Up with the Adaptive Criminal in a Changing World', *International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention*, Vol. 21 [4]: 249-265

Eterno, J. & Silverman, E. (2006) 'The New York City Police Department's Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?', *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, Vol. 8 [3]: 218-231

Eterno, J. & Silverman, E. (2010) 'The NYPD's Compstat: Compare Statistics or Compose Statistics?', *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, Vol. 12 [3]: 426-449

Eterno, J., Verma, A. and Silverman, E. (2016) 'Police Manipulations of Crime Reporting: Insiders' Revelations', *Justice Quarterly*; Vol. 33 [5]: 811-835

Ericson, R.V. (1981) *Making Crime. A Study of Detective Work*, Toronto: Butterworths

Ericsson, R.V. & K. Haggerty (1997) *Policing the Risk Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Fahsing, I. (2013) 'Tænkestile: Effektivitet, dyder og krydspres i efterforskninger', in Hald, C. & Rønn, K.V. (Eds.) *Om at opdage - metodiske refleksjoner over politiets undersøgelsespraksis*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur

Fahsing, I.A. (2016) *The Making of an Expert Detective. Thinking and Deciding in Criminal Investigations*, PhD Thesis, Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg

Fassin, D. (ed.) (2017) *Writing the World of Policing: The Difference Ethnography Makes*, Chicago: The Chicago University Press

Felson, M. and Eckert, M. (2014) *Crime and Everyday Life*, 5th ed. London: Sage Publications

Fielding, N., Bullock, K. and Holdaway, S. (2020) *Critical Reflections on Evidence-based Policing*, Oxon: Routledge

Finstad, L. (2000) *Politiblikket*, Oslo: Pax Forlag

- Finstad, L. (2014) 'Kapitel 9: Det konfliktfyldte politiarbeidet' in Larsson, P., Gundhus, H.O.I. & Granér, R. (red.) *Innføring i politivitenskap*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk
- Fog, J. (2004) *Med samtalen som udgangspunkt. Det kvalitative forskningsinterview*, København: Akademisk Forlag
- Fox, H. & Farrington, D. (2012) 'Creating Burglary Profiles Using Latens Class Analysis: A New Approach to Offender Profiling', *Criminal Justice and Behaviour*, Vol. 39 [12]: 1582-1611
- Fyfe, N., Terpstra, J., and Tops, P. (2013) (Ed.) *Centralizing Forces? Comparative Perspectives on Contemporary Police Reform in Northern and Western Europe*, The Hague: Eleven International
- Fyfe, N., Gundhus, H.I.O. and Rønn, K.V. (Eds.) (2018a) *Moral Issues in Intelligence-led Policing*, Routledge Frontiers of Criminal Justice
- Fyfe, N., Gundhus, H.I.O. and Rønn, K.V. (2018b) 'Introduction' in Fyfe, N., Gundhus, H.I.O. and Rønn, K.V. (Eds.) *Moral Issues in Intelligence-led Policing*, Routledge Frontiers of Criminal Justice
- Fredslund, H. (2001) *Når "vilde" problemer tæmmes - en filosofisk-hermeneutisk fortolkning af implementering af en forebyggelsessamtale på en afdeling på Bispebjerg Hospital*, PhD Thesis, Institut for Folkesundhedsvidenskab, København: Københavns Universitet
- Gadamer, H.G. (1998) *Truth and Method*, New York: The Continuum Publishing Company
- Garland, D. (1990) *Punishment and Modern Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Garland, D. (2001) *The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Geertz, C. (1973) 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture', *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books

Giddens, A. (1976) *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies*, New York: Basic Books

Gill, P. (2000) *Rounding Up the Usual Suspects?: Developments in Contemporary Law Enforcement Intelligence*, Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing

Goffman, E. (1959) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Penguin Books

Gotfredsen, K. (2008) *Terrorsagen fra Vollsmose*, Forlaget TV2 Danmark

Granér, R. (2004) *Patrullerande polisens yrkeskultur*, PhD Dissertation in Social Work, Socialhögskolen, Lund: Lunds Universitet

Granér & Holgersson (2012) *Att bekämpa kriminella gäng - utvärdering av SGI-projektet*, Lund: Linnéuniversitetet

Granér, R. & Kronkvist, O. (2014) 'Kapittel 2: Kontroll av og i politiorganisasjonen' in Larsson, P., Gundhus, H. & Granér, R. (Eds.) *Innføring i politivitenskap*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm

Granér, R. (2014) 'Kapittel 5: Selvstendige sheriffer eller lojale byråkrater' in Larsson, P., Gundhus, H.O.I. & Granér, R. (Eds.) *Innføring i politivitenskap*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk

Granér, R. (2014) 'Humorns funksjon i polisarbeidet', *Nordisk politiforskning*, Vol. 1 [1]: 9-23

Greer, S. (1995) 'Towards a Sociological Model of the Police Informant', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 46 [3]: 509-527

Greenwood, R. Oliver, C., Sahlin, K. and Suddaby, R. (Eds.) (2008) *The SAGE Handbook of Organisational Institutionalism*, London: Sage Publications

Griffiths, A. & Rachlew, A. (2018) 'From Interrogation to Investigative Interviewing. The Application of Psychology', in Griffiths, A. & Milne, R. (Eds.) *The Psychology of Criminal Investigation: Theory into Practice*, London: Routledge

Gudjonsson, G. (2007) 'Chapter 19: Investigative Interviewing' in Newburn, T., Williamson, T. and Wright, A. (Eds.) *Handbook of Criminal Investigation*, Oxon: Willan Publishing

Gundhus, H. (2005) 'Catching' and 'Targeting': Risk-Based Policing, Local Culture and Gendered Practices', *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention*, Vol. 6 [2]: 128-147

Gundhus, H.O. (2006) "For sikkerhets skyld" IKT, yrkeskulturer og kunnskapsarbeid i politiet, PhD Thesis, Det juridiske Fakultet, Universitetet i Oslo

Gundhus, H. (2009) *For sikkerhets skyld: IKT, Yrkeskulturer og kunnskapsarbeid i politiet*. Oslo: Unipub Forlag

Gundhus, H.I. (2012) 'Experience or Knowledge? Perspectives on New Knowledge Regimes and Control of Police Professionalism', *Policing*, Vol. 7 [2]: 178-194

Gundhus, H.O.I. (2017) 'Discretion as an Obstacle: Police Culture, Change, and Governance in a Norwegian Context', *Policing*, 1-15

Gundhus, H.O.I. & Larsson P. (2014), 'Fremtidens politi?', in Gundhus, H.O.I., Larsson, P. & Granér, R. (Eds.), *Innføring i politivitenskap*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk

Gundhus, H. O. I. & Jansen, P. (2020) 'Pre-crime and Policing of Migrants: Anticipatory Action Meets Management of Concerns', *Theoretical Criminology*, Vol. 24 [1]: 90-109

Hald, C. (2011) *Web Without a Weaver. On the Becoming of Knowledge - A Study of Criminal Investigation in the Danish Police*, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Humanities: University of Aarhus

Harfield, C. & Harfield, K. (2016) *Covert Investigation*, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hald, C., & Rønn, K. V. (2013) *Om at opdage - metodiske refleksjoner over politiets undersøgelsespraksis*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur

- Hald, C., & Rønn, K. V. (2013) 'Indledning' in Hald, C., & Rønn, K. V. (Eds.) *Om at opdage - metodiske refleksjoner over politiets undersøgelsespraksis*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur
- Hald, C. (2015) 'In Search of Method: Outline of a Methodology for Professional Inquiry' (unpublished manuscript)
- Hartmann, M.R.K. (2014) *Into the Gray Zone. With Police in Making Space for Creativity*, PhD Thesis, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School
- Hartmann, M.R.K., Hestehave, N.K., Høgh, L. & Rønn, K.V. (2018) 'Knowing from Within: Making the Case for Embedded Police Research', *Nordic Journal of Studies in Policing*, 4 [1]: 7-27
- Hastrup, K. (2004) 'Getting it Wright. Knowledge and Evidence in Anthropology', *Theoretical Anthropology*, Vol. 4 [4]: 455-472
- Hayano, D. (1979) 'Auto-ethnography: Paradigms, Problems and Prospects', *Human Organization*, Vol. 38 [1]: 99-104
- Headland, T.N., Pike, K.L. and Harris, M. (eds.) (1990) *Emics and Etics. The Insider/ Outsider Debate*, *Frontiers of Anthropology*, Vol. 7, Newbury Park: SAGE Publications
- Heiberg, M. (2016) 'De hemmelige tjenesters historie', in Rønn, K.V. *Efterretningsstudier*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur
- Hestehave, N. K. (2013) 'Kapitel 10: Røcker- og bandegrupperinger i Danmark: Kultur, konflikter og kriminalitet' in Jacobsen, M.H. & Sørensen, A.S. (Eds.) *Kriminologi - en introduktion*, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag
- Hestehave, N.K. (2013) *Proaktiv kriminalitetsbekæmpelse for politifolk*. Frederiksberg: Forlaget Samfundslitteratur
- Hestehave, N.K. (2018) 'Predicting crime? On Challenges to the Police in Becoming Knowledgeable Organizations' in Fyfe, N., Gundhus, H.I.O. and Rønn, K.V. (Eds.) *Moral Issues in Intelligence-led Policing*, Routledge Frontiers of Criminal Justice

- Hinds, P. J. (1999), 'The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing Methods on Prediction of Novice Performance', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied*, Vol. 5 [2]: 205-221
- Hobbs, D. (1988) *Doing the Business. Entrepreneurship, the Working Class, and Detectives in the East End of London*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Hobbs, D. (2013) *Lush Life. Constructing Organized Crime in the UK*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Holdaway, S. (1984) *Inside the British Police: A Force at Work*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Holdaway, S. (1989) 'Discovering Structure: Studies of the British Police Occupational Culture' in Weatheritt, M. (Ed.) *Police Research: Some Future Prospects*, Avebury: Aldershot
- Hoel, L. (2011) *Å gjenopprette orden: en studie av politibetjentens praktiske kunnskap - i et fenomenologisk-hermeneutisk perspektiv*, PhD Thesis, Senter for praktisk kunnskap, Universitetet i Nordland
- Holm, L. (2015) 'Vores 2015: På flugt', *Berlingske Tidende* <https://www.berlingske.dk/samfund/vores-2015-paa-flugt>, accessed 25 February 2020
- Holmberg, L. (1998) *Politiets skøn i rettsociologisk betydning*, PhD Thesis, København: Det Juridiske Fakultet, Københavns Universitet
- Holmberg, L. (2003) *Policing Stereotypes. A Qualitative Study of Police Work in Denmark, Mobility and Norm Change*, Vol. 4, Galda + Wilch Verlag
- Holmberg, L. (2014) 'Nordisk politiforskning: Udfordringer og muligheder', *Nordic Journal of Studies in Policing*, Vol. 1 [1]: 24-40
- Holmberg, L. (2019) 'Continuity and Change in Scandinavian Police Reforms', *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, Vol. 21 [4]: 206-2017
- Holgerson, S. (2006) *Police Officers Professional Knowledge*, Oslo: PHS

- Holgersson, S. & Knutsson, J. (2011) *Polisens arbete mot narkotika*, Stockholm: Rikspolisstyrelsens utvärderingsfunktion
- Holgersson, S. & Knutsson, J. (2012) *Hvad gjør egentlig politiet?* PHS Forskning [4] Oslo: Politihøgskolen
- Home Office (2004) *Prolific and Priority Offender Strategy. Initial Guidance. Catch and Convict Framework*, London: Home Office
- Hopkins, M. & Wickson, J. (2012) 'Targeting Prolific and other Priority Offenders and Promoting Pathways to Desistance: Some Reflections on the PPO Programme Using a Theory of Change Framework', *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, Vol. 13 [5]: 594-614
- Hoque, Z., Arends, S., Alexander, R. (2004) 'Policing and the Police Service: a Case Study of the Rise of "New Public Management" within and Australian Police Service', *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 17 [1]: 59-84
- Hunt, J.C. (2010) *Seven Shots. An NYPD Raid on a Terrorist Cell and its Aftermath*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
- Høigård, C. (2005) *Nytt politi? En kommentert bibliografi over nyere politiforskning*, K-serien nr. 2, Oslo: Afdelingen for Kriminologi, Universitetet i Oslo
- Høigård, C. (2011) 'Policing the North', *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 40[1]: 265-348
- Innes, M. (1999) "'Professionalizing" the Police Informant: The British Experience', *Policing and Society*, Vol. 9 [4]: 357-83
- Innes, M. (2003) *Investigating Murder. Detective Work and the Police Response to Criminal Homicide*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Innes, M. (2006) 'Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 605 [1]: 222-241
- Innes, M. (2010a) 'A Mirror and a 'Motor': Researching and Reforming Policing in an Age of Austerity', *Policing*, Vol. 4[2]: 127-134

Innes, M. (2010b) 'The Art, Craft and Science in Policing' in Kritzer, B. & Cane, P. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Innes, M. & Levi, M. (2017) 'Making and Managing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: the View from Criminology' in Liebling, A., Maruna, S. and McAra, L. (Eds.) *Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, 6th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press

Jacob, H. (Ed.) (1974) *The Potential Reform of Criminal Justice*, Beverly Hills CA: Sage

Jacobsen, M.H. & Kristiansen, S. (2001) *Farligt feltarbejde – etik og etnografi i sociologien*, Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag

Jacobsen, M.H., Kristiansen, S., & Prieur, A. (2002) 'Introduktion til kvalitative sociologiske strejftog' in Jacobsen, M.H., Kristiansen, S., & Prieur, A. (Eds.) *Liv, fortælling, tekst. Strejftog i kvalitativ sociologi*, Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag

Jacobsen, M.H., Jørgensen, A. and Svendsen-Tune, S. (2005) 'Sensitiv sociologi. Undersøgelse af udstødte og udsatte mennesker' in Jacobsen, M.H., Kristiansen, S., & Prieur, A. (ed.) *Liv, fortælling, tekst. Strejftog i kvalitativ sociologi*, Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag

Jacobsen, M. H., & Kristiansen, S. (2006) 'Goffmans metaforer: om den genbeskrivende og rekontekstualiserende metode hos Erving Goffman' *Sociologi i Dag*, Vol. 36 [1]: 7-35

Jacobsen, M.H. & Sørensen, A.S. (2013) (Eds.) *Kriminologi - en introduktion*, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag

James, A. (Ed.) (2013) *Examining Intelligence-Led Policing: Developments in Research, Policy and Practice*, Palgrave Macmillan

James, A., Phythian, M., Wadie, F. and Richards, J. (2017) 'The Road Not Taken: Understanding Barriers to the Development of Police Intelligence Practice', *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs*, Vol. 19 [2]: 77-91

Jaschke, H.G., Børgo, T., Romero, F.d.B., Kwanten, C., Mawby, R. & Pagon, M. (2007) *Perspectives of police science in Europe: final report. Project group on a European approach to police science*, Bramshill: European Police College

Johannessen, S.O. (2015) *Politi i krise. Spillet om norsk politi etter 22. juli 2011*, Oslo: Fagbokforlaget

Johannesen, S. & Glomseth, R. (2015) *Politiledelse*, Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk

Justitsministeriet (2011) *Politiets og anklagemyndighedens økonomi 2012-2015*, København: Justitsministeriet

Justitsministeriets Forskningskontor (2015) *Udviklingen i børne- og ungdomskriminalitet 2001-2014*, København: Justitsministeriet

Justitsministeriet (2015) “*Et styrket politi. Et tryggere Danmark*”. *Aftale om politiets og anklagemyndighedens økonomi i 2016-2019*, København: Justitsministeriet

Justitsministeriet (2017a) ‘Aftale om bandepakke’, press release, 24 March, accessed 1 November 2018: <http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2017/aftale-om-bandepakke>

Justitsministeriet (2017b) ‘Aftale mellem Regeringen (Venstre, Liberal Alliance og Det Konservative Folkeparti), Socialdemokratiet og Dansk Folkeparti: *Aftale om Bandepakke III – Bander bag tremmer*’, (political agreement: *Gangs Behind Bars*), from 24 March 2017

Justitsministeriet (2018) *Mål og resultatplan for politiet 2019*, København: Justitsministeriet

Justitsministeriet (2019) *The Danish Police Act (Politiloven) - Bekendtgørelse af lov om politiets virksomhed no. 1270 of 29/112019*, The Danish Ministry of Justice, <https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lt/a/2019/1270>

Kanuha, V.K. (2000) ‘Being’ Native versus ‘Going Native’: Conducting Social Work Research as an Insider’, *Social Work*, Vol. 45 [5]: 439-447

Karpiak, K.G. & Garriott, W. (eds.) (2018) *The Anthropology of Police*, New York: Routledge

Kejser, T. (2013) 'Politianalysernes første fem fokusområder', *Dansk Politi*, 2. april 2013, <http://www.dansk-politi.dk/artikler/2012/januar/politianalysernes-foerste-fem-fokusomraader#.VyH392OC2gQ>

Kejser, T. (2013) 'Politiet forbereder sig på det uventede', *Dansk Politi*, 18. december 2013, <http://www.dansk-politi.dk/artikler/2013/december/politiet-forbereder-sig-paa-det-uventede#.Vyb-fWOC2gQ>

Kejser, T. (2014) 'Tilbage til fagligheden', *Dansk Politi*, 31. januar 2014, <http://www.dansk-politi.dk/artikler/2014/januar/2014-tilbage-til-fagligheden#.VydGP2OC2gQ>

Kennedy, D. (2009) *Deterrence and Crime Prevention. Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction*, London: Rothledge

King, R.D. & Wincup, E. (Ed.) (2008) *Doing Research on Crime and Justice*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press

Klement, C., Kyvsgaard, B. and Pedersen, A. (2010) *Rockere, bander og risikofaktorer*, København: Justitsministeriet Forskningskontor

Klement, C. (2016) *Three Papers on Crime Among Outlaw Bikers in Denmark*, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen

Kripos (2011) *22. juli 2011*, Oslo: Politidirektoratet, Kripos

Kristiansen, S. & Krogstrup, H. (1999) *Deltagende observation. Introduktion til en samfundsvidenskabelig metode*, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag

Kristiansen, S. (2000) *Kreativ sociologi. På sporet af Goffmans sociologiske metode*, PhD Thesis, Aalborg University

Kuhn, T. S. (1962) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Larsson, P., Gundhus, H.O.I. & Granér, R. (red.) (2014) *Innføring i politivitenskap*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk

- Larsson, P. (2010) 'Fra armesterke bondesønner til akademikerbarn: om rekrutteringen til politiyrket', *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab*, Vol. 97 [2]: 150-159
- Larsson, P. (2014) 'Å danse med djevelen: Utradisjonelle politimetoder innen narkotikafeltet', in Storgaard, A. (Ed.), *Nsfks 56. forskerseminar: Skarrildshus, Danmark 2014*, Aarhus: Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi, p. 195-211
- Larsson, P. (2015) 'Drugs: What is the Problem and How Do We Perceive it?', *Policies on Drugs in the Nordic Countries*, 78-89
- Larsson, P. (2018) 'Policing Bikers: Confrontation or Dialogue?', *Trends in Organised Crime*, Vol. 22: 66-83
- Laub, J.H. & Sampson, R.J. (2001) 'Understanding Desistance from Crime' in Tonry, M. (eds.) *Crime and Justice*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Lee, M. & South, N. (2003) 'Chapter 17: Drugs Policing' in Newburn, T. (ed.) *Handbook of Policing*, Devon: Willan Publishing
- Liebling, A., Maruna, S. and McAra, L. (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, 6th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lipsky, M. (2010) *Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation
- Loader, I. & Walker, N. (2001) 'Policing as a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections between Policing and the State', *Theoretical Criminology*, Vol. 5[1]: 9-35
- Loftus, B. (2010) *Police Culture in a Changing World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Loftus, B. & Goold, B. (2012) 'Covert Surveillance and the Invisibilities of Policing', *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, Vol. 12 [3]: 275-288
- Loftus, B., Goold, B., and Giollabhui, S.M. (2015) 'From a Visible Spectacle to an Invisible Presence: The Working Culture of Covert Policing', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 56: 629-645

Lomell, H.M. (2012) 'Punishing the Uncommitted Crime. Prevention, Pre-emption, Precaution and the Transformation of Criminal Law', in Hudson, B. & Ugleviks, S. (Eds.), *Justice and Security in the 21st Century. Risks, Rights and the Rule of Law*, Oxon: Routledge

Lomell, H. (2018) 'Investigation or Instigation? Enforcing Grooming Legislation' in Fyfe, N., Gundhus, H.I.O. and Rønn, K.V. (Eds.) *Moral Issues in Intelligence-led Policing*, Routledge Frontiers of Criminal Justice

Loveday, B. (2017) 'Still Plodding Along? The Police Response to the Changing Profile of Crime in England and Wales', *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 19 [2]: 101-109

Lundgaard, J.M. (2019) *Kritisk kunnskap. Meningsdannelse og beslutningsprosesser ved politiets operasjonssentral*, PhD Thesis, Institutt for kriminologi og retts sosiologi, Oslo: Universitetet i Oslo

Maddinger, J. (2000) *Confidential Information. Law Enforcement's Most Valuable Tool*, Boca Raton: CRC Press

Maguire, M. & John, T. (1995) *Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated Approaches*, Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series: Paper 64, London: Home Office Police Research Group

Maguire, M. (2000) 'Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-led Crime Control', *Policing and Society*, Vol. 9: 315-336

Maguire, E. (2018) 'New Frontiers in Research on Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Policing', *Police Practice and Research. An International Journal*, Vol. 19 [2]: 107-110

Manning, P. K. (1977) *Police Work. The Social Organisation of Policing*, Cambridge: MIT Press

Manning, P.K. (2004) *The Narcs' Game. Organizational and Informational Limits on Drug Law Enforcement*, 2nd ed., Prospect Heights: Waveland Press

Manning, P.K. (2005) 'The Study of Policing', *Police Quarterly*, Vol. 8 [1]: 23-43

Manning, P.K. (2008a) 'A View of Surveillance' in Langlois, S.L. (ed.) *Technocrime - Technology, Crime and Social Control*, Devon: Willan Publishing

Manning, P.K. (2008b) 'Goffman on Organizations', *Organization Studies*, Vol. 29 [5]: 677-699

Manning, P.K. (2008c) 'Performance Rituals', *Policing*, Vol. 3: 284-293

Manning P.K. (2008d) *Technology of Policing: Crime Mapping, Information Technology and the Rationality of Policing*, New York: New York University Press.

Manning, P.K. (2009) 'Three Models of Ethnographic Research: Wacquant as Risk Taker', *Theory & Psychology*, Vol. 19 [6]: 756-777

Manning, P.K. (2010) *Democratic Policing in a Changing World*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers

Manning, P.K. (2013) 'The Role and Function of the Police', manuscript, accessed at www.researchgate.net, 2. February 2020

Manning, P.K. (2014a) 'Chapter 12: Organisational Analysis: Goffman and Dramaturgy' in Adler, P., Du Gay, P., Morgan, G., and Reed, M. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory & Organisational Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Manning, P.K. (2014b) 'Ethnographies of Policing' in Reisig, M.D. & Kane, R.J. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Manning, P.K. & Van Maanen, J. (1978) *Policing: a View from the Street*, Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Company

Manning, P.K. & Raphael, M.W. (2010) *Police Métier*, Dictionnaire de criminologie en ligne, International Centre for Comparative Criminology, online-access

Martin, R. & Bradford, B. (2020) 'The Anatomy of Police Legitimacy: Dialogue, Power and Procedural Justice', *Theoretical Criminology*, Vol. 24 [1]

Martin, S. (1986) 'Policing Career Criminals: An Examination of an Innovative Crime Control Program', *The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, Vol. 77 [4]: 1159-1182

Marx, G.T. (1988) *Undercover. Police Surveillance in America*, California: University of California Press

Mathiesen, T. (2005) *Prison on Trial*. Hampshire: Waterside Press

McCormick, D.W. (2007) 'Dramaturgical Analysis of Organisational Change and Conflict', *Journal of Organisational Change Management*, Vol. 20 [5]: 685-699

McLaughlin, E. (2007) *The New Policing*, London: Sage Publications

Moderniseringsstyrelsen (2017) *God adfærd i det offentlige*, pjece, www.mods.dk

Moesgaard, C. (2013) *Beyond the State: Private Companies and the Remaking of Intelligence. A Study of Private Intelligence Companies and Strategic Action in the Field of Intelligence*, PhD Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science

Moore, M.H. (2006) 'Improving Police Through Expertise, Experience, and Experiments' in Weisburd, D. & Braga, A. (eds.) *Police Innovation. Contrasting Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Mosebo, M.B. (2012) *Konflikthåndtering for politifolk*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur

Moskos, P. (2008) *Cop in the Hood - My Year Policing Baltimore's Eastern District*, Princeton University Press

Månson, P. (1996) 'Max Weber' in Andersen, H. & Kaspersen, K (ed.) *Klassisk og moderne samfundsteori*, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag

National Criminal Intelligence Service (2000) *The National Intelligence Model*, London: National Criminal Intelligence Service

Newburn, T., Williamson, T. and Wright, A. (2007) (Eds.) *Handbook of Criminal Investigation*, Oxon: Willan Publishing

NOU (2012) *Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen*, Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning

NOU (2013) *Ett politi - rustet til å møte fremtidens utfordringer. Politianalysen*, Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning

O'Neill, M., Singh, A., and Marks, M. (Eds.) (2007) *Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions*, Oxford: Elsevier

O'Neill, M. (2018) *Key Challenges in Criminal Investigation*, Bristol: Policy Press

Patridge, E. (1972) *A Dictionary of Historical Slang*, Penguin Books

Pedersen, M. (2018) *Joining and Leaving Gangs in Denmark. Four Empirical Papers*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Aalborg: Aalborg University

Perlmutter, D. (2000) *Policing the Media. Street Cops and Public Perceptions of Law Enforcement*, Los Angeles: Sage Publications

Politi.dk: "Intensivering af bandeindsatsen - Oprettelsen af Task Force" (oktober 2009)

https://www.politi.dk/da/aktuel/nyheder/2009/bandeindsats_taskforce_231009.htm

Politi.dk: "Nye tal viser øget politiindsats over for indbrudstyve" (april 2012)

<https://www.politi.dk/da/aktuel/nyheder/2012/politiindsats+over+for+indbrudstyve.htm>

Politiet & Anklagemyndigheden (2019) *Politiets og Anklagemyndighedens årsrapport 2018*, København: Politiet & Anklagemyndigheden

Powdermaker, H. (1966) *Stranger and Friend. The Way of an Anthropologist*, New York: W.W. Norton

Rachlew, A. (2009) *Justisfeil ved politiets etterforskning: Noen eksempler og forskningsbaserte mottiltak*, PhD Thesis, Department of Law, University of Oslo

Rachlew, A., & Fahsing, I. (2015) 'Politiavhør. [Investigative Interviewing]' in Aarli, R., Hedlund, M. and Jebens, S. (Eds.) *Bevis i straffesaker. Utvalgte emner*, Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk

Ratcliffe, J. (2008a) *Intelligence-led Policing*, Devon: Willan Publishing

Ratcliffe, J. (2008b) 'Chapter 9: Knowledge Management Challenges in the Development in Intelligence-led Policing' in Williamson, T. (Ed.) (2008) *The Handbook of Knowledge-Based Policing: Current Conceptions and Future Directions*, Wiley Publishing

Ratcliffe, J. (2016) *Intelligence-led Policing*, 2nd ed., London: Routledge

Ratcliffe, J., Strang, S. and Taylor, R. (2014) 'Assessing the Success Factors of Organised Crime Groups. Intelligence Challenges for Strategic Thinking', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol. 37 [1]: 206-227

Rawls, J. (1971) *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

RCMP (2010) *Sleipnir Version 2.0. Organised Crime Groups Capability Measurement Matrix*, Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence

Reiner, R. & Newburn, T. (2008) 'Police Research' in King, R.D. & Wincup, E. (Ed.) *Doing Research on Crime and Justice*, 2nd. Ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press

Reiner, R. (2010) *The Politics of the Police*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Reiner, R. (2013) 'Who Governs? Democracy, Plutocracy, Science and Prophecy in Policing', *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, Vol. 13 [2]: 161-180

Reisig, M.D. & Kane, R.J. (eds.) (2014) *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Renå, H. (2019) *Police Coordination in Crisis. Who knew what, when, where and why in Managing the Terrorist Attacks in Oslo and Utøya in 2011?*, PhD Thesis, Bergen: University of Bergen

Retsinformation (2009) 'Lov om ændring af straffeloven, retsplejeloven, våbenloven, lov om politiets virksomhed, lov om fuldbyrdelse af straf m.v. og forvaltningsloven (*Styrket indsats mod bandekriminalitet m.v.*)', legislation (*Enforced Response Against Gang Crime etc.*) 28 April 2009

Retsinformation (2014) 'Lov om ændring af straffeloven, retsplejeloven, lov om våben og eksplosivstoffer, lov om politiets virksomhed og lov om fuldbyrdelse af straf m.v. (*Initiativer mod rocker- og bandekriminalitet m.v.*)', legislation (*Initiatives Against Biker and Gang Crime etc.*) 4 June 2014

Richardson, L. (2000) 'Evaluating Ethnography', *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 6 [2]: 253-255

Rigsadvokaten (2018) *Rigsadvokatmeddelelsen: Meddelere og civile agenter*, CIR1H no. 9589 of 26. April 2018

Rigspolitiet (2010) *Rigspolitiets og Anklagemyndighedens strategi 2011-2015*, København: Rigspolitiet

Rigspolitiet (2012) *Bander og rockere 2011*, København: Rigspolitiet

Rigspolitiet (2013) Pressemeddelelse: Dansk politi slanker ledelsen, 30. august 2013, <http://www.mynewsdesk.com/dk/rigspolitiet/pressreleases/dansk-politi-slanker-ledelsen-899868>

Rigspolitiet (2014) *Politiets virksomhedsplan 2014*, København: Rigspolitiet

Rigspolitiet (2015a) *Strategisk analyse 2015*, København: Rigspolitiet

Rigspolitiet (2015b) *Politiets virksomhedsplan 2015*, København: Rigspolitiet

Rigspolitiet (2015c) *Evaluering af myndighedsindsatsen forud for og i forbindelse med terrorhændelser den 14. og 15. Februar 2015 i København*, København: Nationalt Beredskabscenter

Rigspolitiet (2016) *Politiets virksomhedsplan 2016*, København: Rigspolitiet

Rigspolitiet (2017) *National Strategisk Analyse 2017*, København: Rigspolitiet

Robson, C. (2002) *Real World Research. A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*, 2nd. ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Rogers, C. (2017) *Plural Policing: Theory and Practice*, Bristol: Policy Press

Rossmo KD. (2000) *Geographic Profiling*. Chemical Rubber Company: Boca Raton: CRC Press

Rossmo, D. K. (Ed.) (2009) *Criminal Investigative Failures*, Boca Raton: CRC Press

Rønn, K.V. (2012) *The Epistemology of Intelligence. A Dissertation on Epistemological Aspects of Intelligence-led Crime Investigations*, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Humanities, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen

Rønn, K.V. (2016) *Efterretningsstudier*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur

Schutz, A. (1975) *Hverdagslivets sociologi*, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag

Scott, R. (2001) *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications

Shearing, C. & Ericsson, R. (1991) 'Culture as Figurative Action', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42: 481-506

Sherman, L.W. (1984) 'Ethics in the Professions: Police: Should Police Target Repeat Offenders?' *The Hastings Center Report*, Vol. 14 [2]: 18-19

Sherman, L.W. (2013) 'The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking' *Crime & Justice*, Vol. 42 [1]: 377-451

Sheptycki, J. (1994) 'It Looks Different from the Outside', *Policing*, Vol. 10: 125-133

Sheptycki, J. (2004) 'Organisational Pathologies in Policing Intelligence Systems: Some Contributions to the Lexicon of Intelligence-led Policing', *European Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 1 [3]: 307-332

Sheptycki, J. (2017) 'Liquid Modernity and the Police Métier; Thinking about Information Flows in Police Organisation', *Global Crime*, Vol. 18 [3]: 286-302

- Shulman, D. (2016) *The Presentation of Self in Contemporary Social Life*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications
- Sklansky, D. (2012) 'Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism', *New Criminal Law Review*, Vol. 15 [2]: 473-480
- Smith, G. (Ed.) (1999a) *Goffman and Social Organisation: Studies of Sociological Legacy*, London: Routledge
- Smith, G. (1999b) 'Introduction: Interpreting Goffman's Sociological Legacy' in Smith, G. (Ed.) *Goffman and Social Organisation: Studies of Sociological Legacy*, London: Routledge
- Smith, P. S. & Ugelvik, T. (2017) 'Introduction: Punishment, Welfare and Prison History in Scandinavia' in Smith, P.S. & Ugelvik, T. (eds.) *Scandinavian Penal History; Culture and Prison Practice: Embraced By the Welfare State?*, Palgrave Macmillan
- Spradley, J. (1979) *The Ethnographic Interview*, Long Grove: Waveland Press
- Stelfox, P. (2009) *Criminal Investigation. An Introduction to Principles and Practice*, Devon: Willan Publishing
- Stevnsborg, H. (2010) *Politi. 1682-2007*, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur
- Stevnsborg, H. (2016) *Magt, krig og centralisering. Dansk politi 1945-2007*, København: Jurist- og økonomforbundets forlag
- Strand, F. (2011) *Efterforskningens anatomi. Kriminalpolitiet 1863-2007*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag
- Sørensen, A.S. (2013) 'Forbryderbilleder' in Jacobsen, M.H. & Sørensen, A.S. (Eds.), *Kriminologi – en introduktion*, København: Hans Reitzels Forlag
- Styles, J. (1979) 'Outsider/Insider. Researching Gay Baths', *Urban Life*, Vol. 8 [2]: 135-152

Terpstra, J., Fyfe, N. And Salet, R. (2019) 'The Abstract Police: A Conceptual Exploration of Unintended Changes of Police Organisations', *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 1-21, online access

The Danish Administration of Justice Act, online access www.retsinformation.dk

The Danish Criminal Justice Code, online access www.retsinformation.dk

Tilley, N. (2003) 'Community Policing, Problem-oriented Policing, and Intelligence-led Policing', in Newburn, T. (Ed.) *Handbook of Policing*, 2nd ed., Devon: Willan Publishing

Tilley, N. (2008) 'Modern Approaches to Policing: Community, Problem-oriented and Intelligence-led', in Newburn, T. (Ed.) *Handbook of Policing*, 2nd ed., Devon: Willan Publishing

Tong, S. & Bowling, B. (2006) 'Art, Craft and Science of Detective Work', *The Police Journal*, Vol. 79[4]: 323-329

Tonry, M. (ed.) (2001) *Crime and Justice*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Tracy, S. (2010) 'Qualitative Quality: Eight "Big-Tent" Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research', *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 16 [10]: 837-851

Tyler, T. (2017) 'Procedural Justice and Policing: A Rush to Judgment?', *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, Vol. 13: 29-53

Valland, T. (2015) *Lojalitet og profesjonell standard. En studie av mellomledere i politiet*, PhD Thesis, Oslo: Senter for Profesjonsstudier, Høgskolen i Oslo og Akershus

van Dijk, A., Hoogewoning, F. & Punch, M. (2016). Policing at a turning point. Implications for research. Chapter 3 in Brunger, M., Tong, S. & Martin, D. (Eds.) *Introduction to Policing Research. Taking Lessons from Practice*, Oxon: Routledge.

Van Hulst, M. (2013) 'Storytelling at the Police Station: The Canteen Culture Revisited', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 53 [4]: 624-642

Van Maanen, J. (1973) 'Observations on the Making of Policemen', *Human Organization*, Vol. 32: 407-418

Van Maanen, J. (1978a) 'Epilogue: On Watching the Watchers' in Manning, P.K. & Van Maanen, J. (1978) *Policing: a View from the Street*, Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Company

Van Maanen, J. (1978b) 'People Processing: Strategies of Organisational Socialisation', *Organisational Dynamics*, 19-36

Van Maanen, J. (Ed.) (1979), *Qualitative Methodology*, London: Sage Publications

Van Maanen, J. (1988) *Tales of the Field. On Writing Ethnography*, 2nd ed., Chicago: The Chicago University Press

Van Maanen, J. (2011) 'Ethnography as Work: Some Rules of Engagement', *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 48 [1]

Van Maanen, J. & Schein, E. (1977) 'Toward a Theory of Organisational Socialisation', Sloan School of Management, MIT, working paper

Visionsudvalget (2005) *Fremtidens politi*, København: Justitsministeriet

Von Lampe, K. (2008) 'Organised Crime in Europe: Conceptions and Realities', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Vol. 2 [1]:7-17

Waddington, P. (1993) *Calling the Police*, Avebury: Aldershot

Waddington, P. (1999) 'Police (Canteen) Sub-Culture: An Appreciation', *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 39: 287-309

Wadel, C. (1991) *Feltarbeid i egen kultur. En innføring i kvalitativt orientert samfunnsforskning*, Flekkefjord: Seek A/S

Walters, S. (2007) 'Case Study' or 'Ethnography'? Defining Terms, Making Choices and Defending the Worth of a Case', *Methodological Developments in Ethnography; Studies in Educational Ethnography*, Vol. 12: 89-108

Wathne, C. (2015) *Som å bli fremmed i eget hus - Politiets opplevelse av mening og motivasjon i lys av nye styringssystemer*, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Law, Oslo: University of Oslo

Wathne, C. (2018) *Målstyring i politiet. Teori og praksis*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk

Weber, M. (1982) *Makt og byråkrati*, Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag

Weick, K. (1995) *Sensemaking in Organizations*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications

Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K., and Obstfeld, D. (2005) 'Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking', *Organization Science*, 16 [4]: 409-421

Weisburd, D. & Eck, J. (2004) 'What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear?' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, [593]: 42-65

Weisburd, D. & Braga, A. (eds.) (2006a) *Police Innovation. Contrasting Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Weisburd, D. & Braga, A. (2006b) 'Introduction' in Weisburd, D. & Braga, A. (eds.) *Police Innovation. Contrasting Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Weisburd, D. & Braga, A. (eds.) (2019) *Police Innovation. Contrasting Perspectives*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Weisburd, D. & Neyroud, P. (2011) 'Police Science: Toward a New Paradigm', *New Perspectives in Policing*, National Institute of Justice

Weisburd, D. & Majmundar, M.K. (Ed.) (2018) *Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities*, Committee on Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime, Communities, and Civil Liberties, Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Washington DC: The National Academies Press

Weisburd, D., Majmundar, M.K., Aden, H., Braga, A., Bueerman, J., Cook, P.J., Goff, P.A., Harmon, R.A., Haviland, A., Lum, C., Manski, C., Mastrofski, S., Meares, T., Nagin, D., Owens, E., Raphael, S., Ratcliffe, J., and Tyler, T. (2019) 'Proactive Policing:

a Summary of the Report of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine', *Asian Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 14 [2]: 145-177

Whyte, W. (1943) *Street Corner Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Wikström, P.O. (2007), "Doing Without Knowing: Common Pitfalls in Crime Prevention", *Crime Prevention Studies*, 21, p. 59-80

Wieslander, M. (2021) 'Challenging and Destabilizing Official Discourses: Irony as a Resistance Resource in Institutional Talk', *Culture and Organization*, Vol. 27 [1]: 16-32

Williamson, T. (Ed.) (2008) *The Handbook of Knowledge-Based Policing: Current Conceptions and Future Directions*, Wiley Publishing

Winsnes, T. (2011) *Kunnskapsstyrt politiarbeid. Kulturelle og strukturelle barrierer i bekjempelsen av organisert kriminalitet*, Master Dissertation in Police Science, Oslo: Politihøgskolen

Wood, D., Cockcroft, T., Tong, S., & Bryant, R. (2018) 'The Importance of Context and Cognitive Agency in Developing Police Knowledge: Going Beyond the Police Science Discourse', *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, Vol. 91 [2]: 173-187

Yin, R.K. (2014) *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, 5th ed., Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications

Zedner, L (2007) 'Preventive Justice or Pre-punishment? The Case of Control Orders', *Current Legal Problems*, Vol. 60: 174

www.Justitsministeriet.dk

www.politi.dk

www.retsinformation.dk

www.urbandictionary.com

www.wiktionary.org

SUMMARY

This PhD study explores how the police respond to organised crime via proactive investigation as a representation of a new policing paradigm called proactive policing. Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition the study is based on comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork in the Danish police and examines: how do proactive investigations unfold in the police and which conditions impact this and why?

The study's empirical findings are analysed and interpreted through a theoretical framework compelled by Erving Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model for social interaction and Peter K. Manning's (2010) theoretical concept of the police *métier*. Throughout the thesis, a theoretical framework is built and developed concerning the police's proactive performance which is determined by a specific proactive detective *métier*. Moreover, the groundwork for a comprehensive embedded police research methodology is developed and proposed (Hartmann et al. 2018).

The study contributes with unique empirical, methodological, and theoretical knowledge about proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically and how these phenomena can be studied, interpreted, and understood.