Summary

‘Crisis’ has been a word frequently heard of over the last couple of years, both in a global meaning (e.g. the environmental crisis, the financial crisis) and also in a more regional or national meaning, many times related to Africa (Horn of Africa, Ivory Coast, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Egypt ….), where the crisis referred to could be humanitarian, environmental, economic, political … Europe, too, has also according to mass media, been a victim of a crisis, the financial one. Could ‘crisis’ be a beginning of enhanced regional integration? This paper will try to look at the processes of regional integration in relation to ‘crisis’ in Africa and Europe.¹

First, this paper will look at the concept of ‘crisis’, before it moves on to discuss ‘regional integration’ and the correlation between the two, emphasizing the approaches of neo-functionalism and federal theory. This is the basis for two short case studies of African and European regional integration. The paper tentative answers to the question: will the crisis in Africa and Europe respectively further or block regional integration? With a ‘that depends’. But the use of Federalism theory and neo-functionalism is seen as fruitful.

1.0 Introduction

‘Crisis’ has been a word frequently heard over the last couple of years, both in a global meaning (e.g. the environmental crisis, the financial ‘crisis’) and also in a more regional or national meaning, many times related to Africa (Horn of Africa, Ivory Coast, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Egypt…. ), where the crisis referred to could be humanitarian, environmental, economic, political … Europe has also, according to mass media, been a victim of a crisis, the financial one.

Some scholars of regional integration have indicated, that a ‘crisis’ may further regional integration (inter alia Riker, Schmitter, Tranholm-Mikkelsen) and their work will be used in this paper hoping to

¹ Being a European, situated in Europe this might be a risky endeavor, but I trust in your comments and corrections!
give a tentative answer to the question: will the crisis in Africa and Europe respectively further or block regional integration?

First, this paper will look at the concept of ‘crisis’, before it moves on to discuss ‘regional integration’ and the correlation between the two, emphasizing the approaches of neo-functionalism and federal theory. This should form the basis for two short case studies of African and European regional integration.

2.0 A few concepts: Crisis and Regional Integration

In this part of the paper we will take a look at the two central concepts ‘crisis’ and ‘regional integration’ respectively.

2.1 Crisis

Having a look in a dictionary like the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary or the Encyclopedia Britannica, the word ‘crisis’ means turning-point in life, in history, or a time of difficulty, danger or anxiety. According to Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (2001/578) ‘crisis’ originates in ancient Greek medical practice where it describes a turning point between life and death. In political science it is the point between peace and war.

Turning to the classics of international relations theory, Holsti (1967/357) emphasized time as the central factor:

“[…] in crisis situations statesmen are denied the luxury of decision-making in leisure.” […]

“Beyond a moderate level, time pressure has an adverse effect on creativity, memory, productivity, accuracy, and other factors crucial to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.”

So key-words are time and uncertainty but Holsti avoids defining the concept of Crisis. Not so Charles F. Hermann, who in his important 1969 article defines crisis from a decision-making point of view as (1969/414):

“Specifically, a crisis is a situation that (1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence. “

Hermann’s hypothesis is that if all three factors are present, one has a very different decision process compared to a situation where only one or two of the factors appear. Hermann then goes on to set up eight models where the first, crisis, is characterized by high threat, short time and surprise. The second, innovative situation, is characterized by high threat, surprise, but extended time to reply to the challenge. We will take a closer look at these two situations. ²

² For the other six models I refer to Hermann 1969/415-420.
The crisis situation is characterized by “an extreme danger to national goals” (Hermann 1969/416) and it is the top echelon of the government making the decisions which often bypass or ignore standard operating procedures. And Holsti reminded us, that a high quality decision is not an obvious output of a crisis. In relations to regional integration, I would use Winston Churchill’s abortive suggestion of a French-British Union from May 1940 as an example of a proposal emerging as a response to a crisis (Great Britain Parliamentary Debates).

The ‘Innovative Situation’ according to Hermann (1969/417) contains both high threat and surprise, but is not limited by a short time span to formulate ones decision. Thus it encourages new or innovative solutions to the problem, and government is more responsive to alternative approaches. This could be solutions already fostered, but deemed too controversial to be launched, but with the new circumstances a window of opportunity will be opened. Hermann himself uses the creation and the launching of the Marshall Plan as an example, and I would like to add the Schuman declaration (1950) and the subsequent establishment of the European Coal and steel Community (ECST) in a very tense and insecure period where the Cold War had begun, with ‘incidents’ in Europe like the Prague coup d’etat 1948 and the Berlin Blockade 1948-49, and the Korean war 1950-1953 between initially the US and the Soviet Union also indicated instability and threat.

The discussion above was made from an international relations perspective, thus focusing on events among international actors. But ‘crisis’ (crisis as well as innovative situation) also occurs at the domestic level, with the same characteristic (threat, surprise) and also in this set of circumstances political decisions and the process leading to them varies from standard decision-making processes in their domestic policy as well as externally.‘Crisis’ and ‘innovative situations’ will be looked at as independent variables no matter whether they are of external or domestic nature.

Additionally, I will treat ‘crisis’ and ‘innovative situations’ as the two ends of a spectrum under the name ‘crisis’. I choose to do so, as they share the factors ‘threat’ and ‘surprise’ which are – in common language often the main ingredients of a ‘crisis’.4

Having looked briefly at the concept ‘crisis’ we will now turn to the other key-concept: regional integration.

2.2 Regional Integration

Regional integration should be easy to understand, as integration simply means combining parts into a whole, again leaning on the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, but it is less clear when used more specifically; in the literature it is used to describe a process as well a state. There has been quit a number of attempts to define regional integration (e.g. Lindberg & Scheingold 1970, Mattli 1999,

---

3 Andrew Mourawcisc has argued, that

4 But all together, the question remains whether ‘crisis’ is actually the right concept for the situations we are looking at, and whether we do not in reality are thinking of ‘innovative situations’ when using the label ‘crisis’ especially when analyzing the financial ‘crisis’.
Wallace 1999) but no common definition exists. Ernst Haas, the founder of neo-functionalism (1958 / 16) defined regional integration as:

“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”

In other words, regional integration is a process transferring loyalty, expectations and political decision making power, or with an outdated but still popular concept, ‘sovereignty’ to a new centre. Karl Deutsch, on the other hand defined regional integration as a state of affairs (1968/192):

“[…] a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack.”

To Deutsch integration does not necessarily include a new state like entity. But if the aim is to construct a supranational unit, the strategy must consist of four elements (1968/158):

“[…] 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity.”

This dualism has already been identified by Bella Balassa, when he defined economic regional integration in 1961 as both (1961/1):

“We propose to define economic integration as a process and as a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.”

This dualism, unfortunate as it may be, is accepted in this article.

Various authors have looked at regional integration as either a political process, or an economic process or both creating confusion, thus it may be useful to introduce the concept ‘full regional integration’ as name of the end stage to stress that regional integration can take place both within an economic and a political sphere but that the highest ‘stage’ of both economic and political integration includes the other one (see below). What distinguishes regional integration from cooperation is the presence of a supranational decision-making body. The aim of the process does not have to be a state-like entity, but it may be one of either unitary (Italy in 1870s) or federal character (like the USA 1787).

5 And the dualism is parallel to that of defining federalism as both structure and process, see below.

6 Ballassa’s definition has been criticized i.a. by Jovanovic (1992/4) for “its restriction in concentrating only on the process or state of affairs among the countries that integrate. […] Ballasa’s definition does not say if economic integration is the objective or a point on the way towards some target.”
For a comparative analysis it is important to be able to classify the level of integration in the cases one looks at. Here, for the purpose of analysis, I will divide integration into economic and political branch. Also I will categories the steps in the integration process inspired by Balasse, parallel to the way policy processes are analysed with the help of the policy cycle. And here, too, it goes without saying that the dividing line between one stage and the next in real life is not as neat as in the model. It is also here possible to argue for more or less stages (again a parallel to the discussions of how many phases are included in the policy cycle, suggestions ranging from 4 to 14). The stages, as presented here, form a hierarchy and suggest a linear progression … In the real world, the process may be less linear e.g. skipping a stage or two\. So it is necessary to remark that a division of the integration process into stages serves an analytical purpose and has a heuristic advantage.

2.2.1 Economic regional integration

Leaning on Bela Balassa’s works on stages of economic integration I will sketched the stages of economic integration moving from economic cooperation to supranational integration beginning with lowering and removal of trade barriers ending with a new state:\n
1) Ad hoc cooperation.
2) Free trade agreements. Their main task is to lover or eliminate import tariffs as well as import quota among the member states
3) Customs union. It extends the free trade agreement with the requirement of harmonization of the external trade policies of the member states as well as imposes a common external tariff on imports from non member states. It does not operate with a free movement of labor and capital among its members.
4) Common market. Adding to the customs union, a common market includes the free movement of labor, capital and other resources. It limits the member states ability to pursue an independent economic policies.
5) Partial integration or Economic Union. Supranational institutions are needed required to facilitate trade within the union to ensure coherent and uniform application of the rules.
6) Full integration, where the hitherto sovereign member-states formally hand over the majority part of their decision making power their ‘sovereignty’ to the new state, and they stop being immediate subjects to public international law.

2.2.2 Political regional integration

\n
---

7 As in the case of making the American and Australian federations.
8 For an in-depth description of the two models presented here (economic and political integration respectively) I refer to Dosenrode 2011 (forthcoming).
9 See also McCormick 1999 /13.
The stages from political cooperation to political integration can be listed in a parallel fashion to the economic integration process where one begins with a purely intergovernmental cooperation and ends with full integration. As it is possible with the model above, it is also here possible to argue for more or less stages.10

1) Ad hoc intergovernmental political cooperation.
2) Institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation are voluntary arrangements of persistent character which shapes behaviour, limits the freedom of action and creates expectations, as Keohane suggested in 1989.
3) Institutionalized intergovernmental coordination Coordination adds synchronization of activities among the states to cooperation.
4) Partial or supra-nationalized integration. The states have passed over a part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority which has autonomy and may follow policies independently of the member state governments. The member states remain formally sovereign.
5) Full integration. The member states have handed over the major part of their decision making power their ‘sovereignty’ to the supra-national entity and have stopped being direct subjects of international public law.

The difference between cooperation and supra-national should be seen as processual. The cooperation or inter-governmental stages may end in a supra-national one, when a majority of the policy areas of the member states are placed under supranational control, where the association has obtained the attributes – legally and de facto – of a state. This is so, because supra-nationalism, as a description of a way of making decisions, stops making sense, when the member-states stops being independent in a public international law understanding. On the other hand, there is nothing, theoretically, hindering a group of countries delegating for instance their monetary policy to a supranational authority while remaining totally sovereign on all other policy-fields.

The dividing line between ‘kinds of cooperation’ and ‘kinds of integration’ lies between the stages three and four, both in the economic regional integration process and in the political regional integration process as the institution is now able to make authoritative decisions within a certain policy area, which the member state will have to follow.

The difference between cooperation and regional-integration is important. Regional integration touches upon, and in some cases, eliminate the ‘sovereignty’ of states to create a new ‘sovereignty’, a new actor on the world stage whereas co-operation does not infringe on the involved states’ ‘sovereignty’ – or rather autonomy to make decisions11 12

10 It is obvious that it would have looked ‘nicer’ had both models had the same number of stages but unfortunately this is not so.

11 Cooperation implies relations between states, not necessarily aiming at the creation of a new organization or a supranational entity. Cooperation takes place to solve practical problems, be they of shorter or longer duration. Cooperation “[…] has been defined as a set of relationships that are not based on coercion or compellence and that are legitimized by the mutual consent of members, […]” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001/505). Cooperation is inter-governmental, and the states may withdraw from it.
Also, it should be noted that neither for economic nor for political integration is it the wish to indicate that the process is automatic or irreversible; integration processes are made by man, and can be stopped by man.

3.0 Theories of Regional Integration

In this part of the paper I will look at two regional integration theories, federalism theory and neo-functionalism which are complementary, as argued elsewhere (cf. Dosenrode 2011)\(^\text{13}\).

3.1 Federalism Theory

Federalism Theory may be considered the oldest theory of regional integration with a pedigree dating back to the 16\(^{\text{th}}\) century.

The terminus *federation* is derived from Latin *foedus* meaning pact, alliance, covenant an arrangement entered into voluntarily and implying a degree of mutual trust and duration. A federation is one form of state among others in international relations. Daniel Elazar’s words phrases it like this (1987/5):

“Federal principles are concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared rule”. Thus, what differs it from unitary states is that it consists of two or more levels of government: a number of (member-) states with each their government and the totality of states with the central, or federal government. At least one policy area is assigned by constitution to the member states and can not be overruled by the central legislative power.

*Federalism* implies a process which leads or try to lead to a state of federation and is in this sense a normative, ideological approach. Elazar (1987/67f.) points to the confusing fact that federalism is both a process and a structure. Burgess (2000/27) describes the process of federalism as:

“It is ideological in the sense that it can take the form of an overtly prescriptive guide to action, and it is philosophical to the extent that it is a normative judgment upon the ideal organization of human relations and conduct.”

\(^{12}\) The distinction between co-operation and regional integration is not present in New Regionalism (e.g. Andrew Hurrel 1995); one gets the impression that it encompasses all activities within a region, and thus it is less useful as analytical tool\(^{12}\). Andrew Hurrel (1996/ 331-3) identifies five characteristics of New Regionalism: 1) large diversity, ranging from the then Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States, via ‘micro-regional bodies’ like the Visegrad Pact and the Arab Magreb Union, SADC to the Conference on Security and Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 2) North-South regionalism, where he mentions NAFTA, 3) variety of institutionalization, 4) the multidimensional character meaning a blurred dividing line between economic and political regionalization. And 5) regionalism forms ‘part of a broader resurgence of questions of identity and belonging [...]’.

\(^{13}\) Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991 is close to the same conclusion, when stating that neo-functionalism is a partial theory (,...)
Federalism theory, on the contrary, is attempting to explain, based on analysis, how federations emerge and how they are organized and are functioning and should not have a normative bend.\textsuperscript{14}

Federalism theory can, broadly, be divided in a liberal and a realist tradition. In this paper the realist tradition based on Riker’s and McKay’s contributions in a modified way will be applied\textsuperscript{15}.

What interested Riker was what brought statesmen to render sovereignty to a larger unit. Here the central concept is what he calls ‘the federal bargain’. This concept, bargain, implies an element of voluntary action, as noted above. Riker isolates two circumstances which make politicians willing to strike the federal bargaining (1964/14):

1. “The politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control by peaceful means, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement. [...] The predisposition for those who offer the bargain is, then, that federalism is the only feasible means to accomplish a desired expansion without the use of force.
2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so, because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. [...] And furthermore the desire for either protection or participation outweighs any desire they may have for independence. [...]”

Later Riker accepted that the threat could be diplomatic, too, and others have argued that there is basically nothing hindering that the threat might be of a societal or economic nature, too (McKay 1999/29 & 32; McKay 2004/171, Dosenrode 2007/31). The important factor being that the threat, or crisis, is being perceived as genuine, and that the statesmen believe that it may be countered by joining or founding a federation.

The ‘threat or crisis aspect’ is central. Without a crisis statesmen would not give up sovereignty fast, but it is not enough. Riker-McKay lack an explanation as to the intervening variables or factors which facilitates the integration process and help keeping the federation together in other words a common culture.

If the states joining or creating a federation share the same basic culture, it ensures that there is a common understanding of the central concepts like ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘rule of law’. But what is culture? Hans Gullestrup defines Culture as (2003/55, my translation):

“Culture is the worldview and the values, rules, moral norms and actual conduct – as well as the material and immaterial products and symbols related thereto - as human beings (in a given context and

\textsuperscript{14} Forsyth (1996/33-35) distinguishes three traditions of federalist writing: one similar to federalism theory (a scholarly approach), one focusing on expansion of federations as means of peace and one more concerned with organizing the federation in an efficient and democratic way.

\textsuperscript{15} I refer to Dosenrode 2011 for a analysis of the liberal as well as the realist traditions.
over a given time span) take over from the previous ‘generation’; which they – eventually in a changed form) try to pass over to the next ‘generation’ and which in one or the other form differentiates them from human beings belonging to another culture.”

Culture is not static; it develops over time, among other reasons, due to socialization. Common believes are build over the years as to how ‘things are done’. This variable has been present in all federations entered into on a voluntary basis. The dissolution of India into India and Pakistan, and the breakdown of the Soviet Union into a very fragile Commonwealth of Independent States including a fragile Russia may – *inter alia* – be attributed to the lack of a common cultural basis.

On this background I suggest a model with two elements, when analysing why federations arise; the first element (the independent variable), concerns the federal bargain, the second element (intervening variables) concern the preparation of the grand decisions.

1) The wish to counter a perceived threat or crisis (be that military, economic, societal etc) by expanding one's territory by peaceful means; or the wish to join a federation or territorial entity, to counter a perceived threat, and thus secure the survival of one's own state,

2) A common cultural basis.

What Riker’s theory, and most federal theories, are explaining is the ‘all out’ situation, where sovereign states within a shorter period, strike a federal bargain and create or join a federation. It is harder for them to explain an ‘organic’ or stepwise creation of a federation, it is not their concern how a slow or piecemeal transfer of autonomy, ‘sovereignty’, from the constituent entities to a political center is taking place. The federal theories are able to explain one kind of regional integration process, but not another. We are talking of two processes possibly leading to the same goal, a new state. An obvious choice of complementary theory for explaining the organic integration process would be newest version of neo-functionalism, as proposed by Tranholm Mikkelsen (1991) and by Schmitter (2005). And federalism and neo-functionalism share several assumptions *inter alia*:

- Integration is an attempt to create a stronger unit than the individual member states before the integration.
- Interests drive the process, not ideology.
- An external ‘kick’ (threat, crisis) may be necessary to ignite a higher stage of integration.
- The attitude of the elites is important.
- The participating states are democratic.

We will look at neo-functionalism in the next section

### 3.2 Neo-functionalism

---

16 As perhaps the most advanced regional integration theory neo-functionalism has provoked numerous critical comments. A collection of benevolent critical essays were published under the authorship of Tanja Börzel in 2006.
Is it possible for humans to live together without war in a state of peace? Classical realism (Carr, Morgenthau) answers negatively. Not so David Mitrany, the ‘farther’ of functionalism. Mitrany believed that rational, peaceful progress was possible. It would be possible to accomplish cooperation within functional sectors, and through a process of ‘ramification’ the fields of international cooperation would be extended more and more.

This approach was an inspiration for Ernst Haas, when he studied the emerging European integration. But contrary to Mitrany, Haas and his followers focused on regional, not global integration, and they extended the process of ramification from the functional to the political sphere under the over all name of ‘spill-over’. Thus the prefix ‘neo’. Another source of inspiration was Jean Monnet, who was at least coauthor of the Schuman declaration and extremely important in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (Schmitter 2006/40).

The spill-over process thesis said that the process of regional integration should begin in a functional or technical policy sector and then proceed to other areas of the same nature. It would do so because of necessity: e.g. if the European Economic Community should work, then one was to make a functioning internal market, and then one needed a common external tariff policy, a common trade policy etc. In the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s it looked as it worked ‘automatically’ but then came de Gaulle and the momentum elapsed, leading to various redefinitions of the concept and the theory (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970, Schmitter 1970). It should be remarked, that the theory builds on a pluralist approach with interest groups with conflicting interests, trying to maximize their own welfare. Thus there is not much space for idealistic approaches, although it is not totally ruled out.

According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen spill-over may be dividend into three types (1991/4-6): A: functional spill-over where the basic mechanism is, that some sectors are so interdependent, that they can not work isolated. If they are integrated, it will lead to technical problems which can only be solved by further integration. B: political-spill over is based on the concept of pluralist societies in which the elites will undergo a learning process, when they see all the welfare benefits coming from the EC (Haas focuses on non-governmental elites, Lindberg on governmental elites). These groups generate pressure for further integration. C: What Tranholm-Mikkelsen calls ‘cultivated spill-over’ is another way to stress the importance of the High Authority respectively the Commission as already Haas and Lindberg did (in other words: the secretariat). They were seen as mediators providing solution, when conflicts or crisis arose; solutions which would bring integration further17. We will stick to crisis for a moment.

In Schmitter’s article from 1970 (A Revised Theory of Regional Integration) external factors, ‘crisis’, are important in all of the cycles he operates with, but especially in the beginning of the process and when qualitative developments are taking place (1970/842):

---

17 In his article, Tranholm-Mikkelsen seem to understand the three processes as separate processes, whereas the classical understanding is to see at least A and B as one continuous process. That is also one of the points of neo-functionalism, that integrational progress in the functional or technical sectors may lead to a spill over into the political sector (cf. Haas & Schmitter 1964/707)
“The process whereby an emerging regional center gains or loses in the scope or level of its authority vis-a-vis preexistent national centers is best conceived as involving a series of crisis-provoked decisional cycles.”

And later, too, crisis (external or internal) is an important ‘tool’ for further integration, as illustrated by one of the hypotheses of the model (1970/487):

“This hypothesis […] suggests that all integration processes will tend towards a state of rest or stagnation – unless disturbed by exceptional (i.e. unpredictable) or exogenous conditions not present in the original convergence or in the institutions themselves.”

Regional integration needs an impetus to drive it on, and Schmitter is more open than others to including external crisis, not only a crisis within the organization.

But what kicks off the integration process? To answer this, we will take a look at Haas and Schmitter’s 1964 article, in which they try to disentangle neo-functionalism from the European Economic Community, and apply it to Latin-America. We will look into their model. In the beginning of the article they write of (regional) integration as (1964/707):

“[…] involving the gradual politization of the actors’ purposes which were initially considered ‘technical’ or ‘noncontroversial.’ Politization implies that the actors, in response to miscalculations or disappointment with respect to the initial purposes, agree to widen the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them. […] Politization implies that the actors seek to resolve their problems so as to upgrade common interests and, in the process, delegate more authority to the center.”

In other words, here we have the organic approach we lacked when discussing the federal approach.

What Haas and Schmitter are looking at is (1964/709):

“[…] any form of ‘economic union’ which involves some measure of continuing central administrative control, whether on the basis of a supranational or an intergovernmental principle of authority.”

They are in other words looking at a level which can be both intergovernmental and supranational, and they do not relate explicitly to higher levels of regional integration.

According to Haas and Schmitter one can subdivide the integration process into three phases, 1) the period before the integration takes off (one analyses the background conditions), 2) the period, where the union is negotiated (one analyzes the conditions present at the time of negotiation), and 3) the process after the union has become operational (one analyzes the process conditions).

---

18 Schmitter later (1970) criticizes this article, basically for not living up to the standards of behavioral social science, but I still find it useful.
Looking at the background conditions the authors identify (1964/711-712) four:

a) the size and power of the states, to establish whether they are functional alike or different. Next b) is an analysis of the transactions among the states involved, to have a point of reference later when analyzing whether integration takes place. Then c) follows the question of the pluralism in the individual states and in the union as a whole. The last variable, d) concerns the complementarity of the national elites; do they share the same values? Etc.

During the negotiations, Haas and Schmitter focus on two variables (1964/713-715): a) Governmental purposes and b) powers of the union. When looking at the governmental purposes one must distinguish between situations, where the governments are committed to a political development in relation to the union and the situation where they are not; and then there is the question of agreement on the purpose. The powers of the union refer to how development is foreseen: is further integration build in, or does one have to negotiate e.g. each and every lowering of tariff barriers? Her the role of the secretariat of the union is included; does it play an independent role or not?

The variables looked at after the launching of the union (the process conditions) include (1964/715-719): a) decision-making style, b) rates of transactions and c) adaptability of governments. The decision-making style relates to the question of whether decisions in the region is mainly taken in an inter-governmental matter or a supranational manner. The level of transactions is an indicator of growing interdependence; does the intra-union trade develop faster than the extra-union trade? The last variable is the question of adaptability (1964/716);

“We want to know if new purposes develop in the interaction among the participants as a result of difficulties and disappointments experienced with reference to the attainment of the original aims of the participants. [...] More frequently in economic unions, the original aims, identical or converging, were not achieved. Crisis arose, consensus broke down, distrust was rife. [...] Are they able to redefine their means of action at a higher level, i.e. involving more mutual interdependence and more delegation of power?”

If a Union scores ‘high’ on all the variables Haas and Schmitter foresaw a good chance for automatic politization. Which is where we stop. Integration is, as already mentioned, manmade and not automatic. Especially, the experiences of i.a. the European Union shows that ‘man does not live by bread alone’ that is, rational actor behavior and learning must always be contrasted with emotions (nationalism) like the attitude of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and the Check Republic clearly demonstrate. What the Haas—Schmitter model can, and will be used for, is (a) to analyze whether a region or sub-region possesses the necessary potential for an organic integration process or not; (b) to analyze the

---

19 Later Schmitter summarizes Haas’ precondition for spillover as (2006/42): “[...] increase in economic interdependence between member countries, crisis of sufficient magnitude due to unintended consequences, development of political competences and autonomy for intervention by regional bureaucrats and emergence of interest associations capable of acting on the regional level independent of national constraints, [...].”

20 The authors are very vague here as to the implications of size and power, but I interpret it as to whether the economies are open or closed, developed or underdeveloped i.e. a question of similarity.
likelihood of intergovernmental turning into a regional integration process, and (c) to analyze ongoing regional integration processes. Also, this will not be done in as strict a quantitative way as would have been requested during the ‘behavioral age’ but in a mixed quantitative – qualitative way.

Summarizing the Haas-Schmitter model for our purpose it will look like this:

1. Phase: take off:

   Background:

   a) the size and power of the states (functionally alike or different)
   b) the transactions among the states involved
   c) the pluralism in the individual states and in the union as a whole.
   d) the complementarity of the national elites (do they share the same values?)

   Negotiation phase:

   a) the governmental purposes
   b) the powers of the union.
   c) external crisis / pressure

2. Phase: strengthening the integration process

   a) the decision-making style,
   b) the rates of transactions
   c) the adaptability of governments.
   d) crisis (internal / external)

3.3 Summery

In his section two complementary models of regional integration have been set up: one for the situation where two or more states merge to form a federation within ‘short time’ and one explaining an organic, or gradual development which may end in a state like entity.

The aim of this exercise has been to prepare a frame for a comparative analysis of the situation in Europe (read: the European Union) and in Africa.

4.0 Regional Integration in Africa and Europe

Each of the two case studies begins by assessing the present situation (2011) seen with regional integration spectacles, before analyzing the potential for further development.
4.1 Regional integration in Africa

Like in Europe, the idea of a prosperous and united Africa is not new. Henry Sylvester-Williams (1869-1911) and W. E. R. du Bois (1868-1963) both had visions of a united Africa and were central figures in articulating this dream. In 1963 Tanzania’s president Julius K. Nyerere wrote an optimistic article on ‘A United States of Africa’. Admittingly, the road would not be easy, “[…] but […] certainly it can be won if the people of Africa so determine.” (1963/6). And with the old colonial powers retiring, handing over the power to the rightful owners, with the ‘winds of change’ blowing it did look as if the dream was about to come true and the artificial division of Africa could be remade. As we know this did not happen; elites in the different states were not inclined to hand over any of their power to anyone, and ‘national sovereignty’ has been an important blocking devise together with the constraints imposed by the Cold War.

As a result of different approaches to the future of African21, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was made in 1963 and dissolved in 2002 to give place for the African union (AU). The OAU did in its charter reflect traditional inter-governamentalism by affirming the principles on the member states integrity and sovereignty as well as the principle of non-interference (articles II and III), but it also mentioned ‘unity’ but not a way to achieve it. During its life its success rate was not impressive but it manage contribute to bring down colonialism in Africa as well as minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa., it established the African Development Bank and it kept the idea of African unity alive.22

4.1.1. The Situation in Africa Today

The African Union was established I 2002 with the seemingly contradictory purposes inter alia of 1) achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African counties and the peoples of Africa; 2) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; and 3) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. So, de facto the AU builds on inter-governmentality, state sovereignty etc., but seriously discusses a federation. An important exception to the intergovernmental approach was the 2003 amendment to the treaty establishing the AU, allowing for intervention in a member state in case of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity as well as serious threats to legitimate order and to restore peace and stability’ (Article 4, h Protocol).

One great step forward towards integration would be the establishment of a Union Government for Africa. This idea which would de facto turn the AU into a federation, has been looming since the AU’s creation in 2002, but it gained momentum by pressure from Libyan dictator Mohammad Gaddafi and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, promoted the idea of a African Union Government.

---

21 The Casablanca Block (Ghana, Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Mali and Libya) favored a federal solution, uniting Africa at once, whereas the Monrovia Block (Senegal, Nigeria, Libya and Ethiopia, as well as many of the former French colonies) opted for a gradual integration process.

22 Due to the principle of non-interference the OAU did not attempt to stop the flagrant violations of human rights in e.g. Uganda during Idi Amin’s dictatorship, neither did it attempt to stop civil wars like the ones in Angola and Nigeria. It was occasionally referred to as ‘the dictators trade union’ (The Somaliland Times nr. 206)
The African Union made a committee of heads of state to the question of a government for the AU, and in June 2005 Museveni presented its work and its recommendations and conclusions (XXX):

1. It reaffirmed the ultimate goal of forming a Continental Government.
2. It stated its resolve to form a regional political federations where conditions were ripe.
3. It identified 8 or so areas that, ‘rationally, can only be handled continentally’. The areas agreed on by the Commission were: Defense and Security; Environment, Foreign Affairs and trade negotiations; Energy; Scientific Health – research, Higher education
4. It suggested, that one should collectively deal with certain aspects of the infrastructure such as coordinating of the building of the rail links from East to West, North to South as well as roads, Communication satellites, the marine cables, etc
5. There should be more representation for the AU Commission outside Africa.
6. The process of economic integration, including the formation of the Customs union envisaged under the Abuja treaty should be accelerated and a time frame should be set by this summit for the realization of this goal.

Over the next years the Government became a perpetual item on the agenda of the Union’s semiannual meetings, and several rapports have been made on the issue23. In February 2009 the African Union Commission was requested to work out a report on how to change the African Union Commission into the African Union Authority. The official aim was to inaugurate the new government or African Union Authority by summer 2009, but it did not happen (AU Monitor 11.2.2009; 16.2.2009; 18.2.2009).

Looking at the African states, they continue to hail African unity, but they are very much in disagreement on the process leading to it, being divided in two groups parallel to the old division in a Monrovia Block and a Casablanca Block. Headed by Gaddafi a group of some 20 states are wishing for a fast decision to create a genuine political union. The ‘unionists’ are opposed by the ‘gradualists’ including South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia who are opting for a organic, or gradual development (AU Monitor 18.2.2009). The ‘gradualists are in general opting for a process, where economic integration in sub-regional groups should lead to African unification.

If one should venture to categorize the African Union, at the time of writing, it would be placed some where around ‘Institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation’ or perhaps ‘Institutionalized intergovernmental coordination’. On the economic side, the AU has not yet taken off in spite of the good work of the African Development Bank.

4.1.2 Explaining the lack of integration

---

Both federalism theory and neo-functionalism, are skeptical concerning the possibilities of genuine regional integration in Africa at the ‘Union level’ in the near future (but not less so at the sub-regional level).

From the Federal theory perspective, none of the essential factors are present; neither the important ones nor the less important ones. First of all, Africa is not facing a threat or a crisis – internally or externally – which is severe enough to make all states, or a majority of states, willing to give up sovereignty in spite of the rhetoric. The policy areas which are likely to be a part of an eventual Authority’s powers (Defense and Security; Environment; Foreign Affairs and trade negotiations; Energy; Scientific Health – research; Higher education) are all very important, and for the citizens in Darfur, Ivory Coast, DR Congo or Zimbabwe crucial, but not for their leaders. And this highlights a serious problem: peaceful integration takes place among democracies with a respect for human rights and the rule of law . . . and if one adhere to Freedom House’s latest analysis (Freedom House 2011), only seven of 53 are considered ‘free’, 24 are ‘partly free’, the rest is not free. Thus the central condition is not fulfilled. Should one consider the longevity of a would be federation, one would have to remember the question of a common cultural basis, which is not present either if one operates with the division of Africa the AU does. Had one split Africa up in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, one could argue the case of two distinct cultures (cf. Kwesi Prah 2000). In other words, federalism theory is rather pessimistic as to the future of African integration.

Neo-functionalists are rather pessimistic, too, though not quit as much as the federalism theory. To start out with, they would remark, that the states are very different (some democratic others not); they would notice that the level of transactions among the states in Africa is frightfully low (some 10% of African trade intra African, compared to 65% in Europe). As Zank has reminded us, African states are, when it comes to trade, much better integrated in Europe than in Africa (2009/__). Pluralism exists in some states, but in spite of the words on the paper, democracy and human rights still face a hard time in Africa in toto (in 2010 Gaddafi was chairman of the Union . . .). But there are encouraging signs of democratization on its way, if one look as the whole of the continent, Egypt and Tunisia are examples. And ‘creeping democratization’ seams to take place, too: the pressure on Cote d’Ivoire by the ECOWAS for the de facto president to hand over power to the elected president. Whether the elites share the same values is hard to say, and is less important as long as the majority of elites are not elected.

Thus the background factors are not in place, when looking at the whole of Africa. But if one turns to the sub-regional arrangements, the picture is different. The report ‘Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV’ gives the following overview of the situation in 2010, and according to the comments in the report, this is a optimistic assessment (2010/3):

24 This being said, one has to remember Karl Marx profesising that Russia would be the last country to have the revolution as it was an agrarian country without a large industrial proletariat.

25 Olivier (2010/...) is discussing the ability of African statesmen to fight strongly for African unity while at the same time vigorously defend national sovereignty.
**Status of efforts to establish FTAs and customs unions in the eight RECs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AMU</th>
<th>CEN-SAD</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>ECCAS</th>
<th>COMESA</th>
<th>EAC</th>
<th>IGAD</th>
<th>SADC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free Trade Area</strong></td>
<td>No progress</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Establishe d</td>
<td>Created and in force</td>
<td>Establishe d</td>
<td>Establishe d</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Launche d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customs Union</strong></td>
<td>No progress</td>
<td>No progress</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td>Propose d for 2010</td>
<td>Launche d</td>
<td>In full force</td>
<td>No progress</td>
<td>Proposed for 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV (2010/3)

So there might be a case for an organic development of regional integration in Africa, after all\(^{26}\). Still, the basic problem of regional integration in Africa is, seen with ‘theoretical’ eyes the low level of interactions among the states, the lack of democracy including a lack of human rights and rule of law, and a lack of a joint vision for a united Africa resp. a united sub-region. African leaders are perfectly able to adhere to ‘African Unity’ while at the same time fighting for national sovereignty.

**4.2 Regional Integration in Europe (EU)**

Since the Schuman Declaration from 1950 regional integration has moved onwards; sometimes fast at other times hardly at all, but never backwards.

**4.2.1 The Situation in Europe Today**

Is the European Union a state already? This has been argued by a number of authors, including this one (McKay 2001, Dosenrode 2003 and 2007, Smith 2005, Caporaso 2006), and the Lisbon Treaty has increased this impression. At the moment the EU looks very much like a messy federation, thus following the path which the US and Australia did before her, just (very much) slower, more ‘organic’. Especially in Northern Europe, in states which are traditionally centralized, the notion of the EU as a state like or federal entity is politically ‘no go land’\(^{27}\). With my eyes (cf. Dosenrode 2007) the discussion is whether one would place the EU on the second highest stage of the integration ladder or on the highest (partial or full integration). Thus my starting point is that the EU is some kind of a federation wrestling with finding its feet concerning the balance of power between the states level and the supranational or federal level.

**4.2.2 Explaining Further Integration (to be elaborated…)**

\(^{26}\) Due to the space available I will not look further into sub-regional integration here.

\(^{27}\) Margaret Thatcher was able of giving the concept of ‘federalism’ the meaning of ‘bureaucratic centralization’, thus adding ideological blinds to analyzing the EU and discussing it as a state.
Taking a look at the integration process there appears to have been a coincidence between perceived crisis and further regional integration in two cases which qualify for crisis in the meaning of ‘crisis’ or ‘innovative situation’: the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, and the financial crisis hitting Europe in 200828.

If 2000 was fairly peaceful, from an EU point of view, 2001 was not. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon made a heavy impact on the EU. A few days later the European Council met in Bruxelles to analyze the implications of the attack and to make precautions. ‘Antiterrorism’ turned out to be a word which could speed up cooperation (broadly) within ‘Pillar 3’ Justice & Home affairs. In October they confirmed their intentions of pressing forward. A Danish senior diplomat told this author in 2003 that “The attack on Twin Towers brought integration within Justice and Home Affairs 10 years forward in one day.” An assessment which EU Justice Commissioner Vitorino shares, according to Den Boer (2003/1), as the terrorist attack according to him has led to a “giant leap forward” for EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation.29 The fight against terrorism had entered the EU agenda to stay.

Additional to the concrete strengthening of the cooperation in Justice & Home Affairs, the Heads of State and Government meet in Laeken also in October, where they decided to launch a Convention for the Future of Europe. One of the reasons to do so, apart from what was perceive as an urgent need to bring Europe closer to its citizens, was external threats: “The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them.” As it was stated in the Leaken Declaration. The heads of state & government also demanded a stronger cooperation within foreign and security policy etc. Concretely a common arrest warrant was decided as well as initiatives against money laundering.

The Convention on the Future of Europe elaborated a draft for a Constitutional Treaty, which was delivered to the Heads of State and Government in June 2003. It was discussed over the next year and signed in October 2004 … and turned down by the French and Dutch populations in the middle of 2005. The Constitutional Treaty did include most of the elements of the later Lisbon Treaty, including a ‘solidarity clause’, as well as the abolition of the three pillar system and a the clear strengthening of the cooperation within Justice and Home Affairs by making it a subject to supranational decision making procedures removing it from the inter-governmental sphere.

Back in 2001 the European Council adopted the ‘Treaty of Nice’ which entered into force in 2003. The ‘9/11’ was mentioned but I have not found any substantial arguments during the negotiations leading to it relying heavily on it. But of course the Laeken had already set the developments in motion earlier.

Another consequence of ‘9/11’ was the US lead attack on Iraq in March 2003 which split the EU in what George Bush rather arrogantly called ‘New Europe’ (his supporters) and ‘Old Europe’ (those not

28 Due to the space available I will not look into the financial crisis here.

29 I refer to Monica Den Boer’s analysis for details.
supporting the invasion). This split did of course not support the federalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at all\textsuperscript{30}.

The Madrid bombing in 2004 lead to the decision of creating an EU public prosecutor, which was put into the Lisbon Treaty, and a general demands for a stronger cooperation within Justice & Home Affairs. This pressure was kept up by the London bombings in summer 2005. It was accomplished with the Constitutional Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty. In 2007 an ‘EU counter terrorism coordinator’ was installed, but without far-reaching powers.

The Lisbon Treaty was signed by the heads of state and government in December 2007 and entered into force December 1\textsuperscript{st} 2009. It \textit{inter alia} contained the proposals for strengthening the supranational aspects in Justice and Home Affairs as mentioned above as well art. 222, the ‘Solidarity Clause’ which promises that “The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources…” in case of terrorist attacks. This formulation was taken over from the Constitutional Treaty. Altogether one witnessed a federalization of policy areas previously regarded as ‘no go areas’ for the EU.\textsuperscript{31}

The EU was in 2001 already a mature regional integration project with certain statehood, but without a drive for further integration cf. Schmitter 1070. The ‘9/11’ changed this and ignited further regional integration both within the field of Justice & Home affairs and within the EU in general, starting the process ending eight years later with the Lisbon Treaty entering into force. Tentatively it looks as if the Haas-Schmitter 1964 model fits nicely to what happened in the EU in the first decade of this millennium describing an organic increase in the regional integration.

5. Crisis and Regional Integration: Comparing Africa and Europe

Will crisis in Africa and Europe respectively tend to further or to block regional integration? This was the initial question of this paper. After a discussion of the concepts ‘crisis’ and ‘regional integration’ federalism theory and neo-functionalism were presented as complementary theories which together, potentially should be able to explain regional integration or the lack of it around the world.

Africa was the first case to be looked into, and both theories were rather negative concerning the immediate prospects for full regional integration at AU-level. From the federal point of view there was simply ‘no common crisis’ which could kick off a federal bargain; and the intermediate variable facilitating a federal bargain, a common culture lacked. Neo-functionalism was pessimistic, too, at least when the AU-level was concerned (lack of democracy, lack of transactions, lack of ‘common crisis’), but slightly more positive when looking at the sub-regional level. At the sub-regional level ECOWAS (with a rather mixed membership) has taken on the role as ‘security stabilizer’ and in Southern Africa

\textsuperscript{30} Interestingly this split did not seam to stop the cooperation between Franc and the United Kingdom for a long time. Begun with the Saint-Malo declaration from 1989 it has developed on a pragmatic basis until the two states in 2010 agreed to share hangar ships for their naval jets.

\textsuperscript{31} Concerning terrorism as policy area, Keukeleier & MacNaughtan (2008/239) refer to the lack of actual progress in spite of the institutions made.
SACU seem to work as customs union. In a longer perspective, these organic developments might develop in depth within the sub-regions and also as good examples, if they succeed with creating security and prosperity, eventually a patchwork of zones of peace and prosperity, thus building the AU from the bottom up and perhaps circumvating the boarders enforced upon African states by foreigners.

Looking at the European Union it is very plausible that the ‘9/11’ kicked of cooperation both concretely within Justice and Home Affairs very efficiently both in terms of new measures and in terms of the ‘quantum leap’ or ‘pillar leap’ moving the majority of this policy field from the inter-governmental to the supra-national orbit, and also as igniter for what ended as the Lisbon Treaty. It was not the great quantum leap creating a federation cast over the classical US-model, but an organic development of its own kind, conveniently letting it be possible to nationalist inclined politicians to argue that the EU is ‘some kind of international organization’ – which it is not.

Returning to the Haas-Schmitter model, one may say (and I would have to look more closely into this) that it did work. The starting point was an external crisis (terrorist attack) as well as a build up pressure for a preparation of the Union for the eastern enlargement. There was a clear political commitment to show firm action and the EU seemed to be the obvious starting point. Both the Barroso Commission and the members of the Council of Ministers shared the opinion, that the Union had to act, and there was agreement, that the decision making should be supra-national, not inter-governmental, where the tiniest member-state could block a decision in an emergency situation. And the crisis opened for the possibility to give the EU an overhaul, with the establishment of the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Constitutional Treaty was not ratified in its original form but under the name ‘Lisbon’ or ‘reform treaty’ which approx 90% of the same contents. For some countries the ratification of Lisbon was a matter of course, but not so in Ireland and Poland. In both countries the necessity of ‘a strong EU’ during the financial crisis beginning in 2008 was used by the proponents of the treaty, which was ratified in the end.

Schmitter is right when (as quoted above) he, in my circumscribing, says that regional integration processes tend to loose momentum, if they are not ignited occasionally. One saw that both concerning the beginning and the end of the process leading to the Lisbon Treaty.

These very preliminary writings suggest or rather reconfirm a number of things. First that there is a correlation between crisis and regional integration. Crisis does fuel regional integration in a neo-functional way, but first a certain level of transactions among the involved states has to be reached, democracy has to be present etc. and in Africa it is not the case. The same goes for the federalism theory’s starting point, and one is reminded of Rothstein’s remark about the efficiency of small states alliances, which I would like to paraphrase as: they are useless, as the sum of nothing is nil.

This paper has tried to argue, that the use of federalism theory and neo-functionalism is useful when trying to explain and perhaps even predicting the scenarios for regional integration. They were given up to readily and too early, so it is: back to the books!
References (incomplete):

Downloaded January 2011

Balassa, Bela: The Theory of Economic Integration, Richard Irwin, inc., Homewood, 1961

Den Boer, Monica: 9/11 and the Europeanization of anti-terrorism policy: A critical assessment; Notre Europe Policy Papers N°6, September 2003


Economic Crisis Barometer, February 2009

Elazar, Daniel J.: Exploring federalism, the University of Alabama Press, 1987


Haas, Ernst B. and Philippe Schmitter: Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration, in International Organization, Vol. 18, No. 4


21
Mattli, Walther: The Logic of Regional Integration – Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
McKay, David: Federalism and European Union – A Political Economy Perspective, Oxford University Press, 1999


Mitrany, D.: 1948 “. Habitually, federal experiments rest upon a number of similar elements: a degree of close kinship or relationship, a will to unity, but with it a clear intent to manage most affairs severally.” S. 351

Molle, Willem: The economics of European integration: theory, practice, policy, Ashgate, 2006


Political Integration and re-organization in Africa; Yoweri Museveni, 3. July 2005


Schmitter, Philippe

Schmitter, Philippe: Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism in Tanya A. Börzel ed.): The Disparity of European Integration, Routledge, 2006


Wallace, William: the Dynamics of European Integration, Pinter, London, 1999

Zank, Wolfgang: Clash or cooperation of civilizations? Ashgate 2009