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## **Scandinavian attitudes towards pay**

*egalitarianism and aversion towards top excess*

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*Publication date:*  
2012

*Document Version*  
Early version, also known as pre-print

[Link to publication from Aalborg University](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Kjærsgård, A. P. (2012). *Scandinavian attitudes towards pay: egalitarianism and aversion towards top excess*. Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies, Institut for Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning, Aalborg Universitet. CCWS Working Paper

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**Scandinavian attitudes towards pay – egalitarianism and aversion towards top excess**

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[www.ccws.dk](http://www.ccws.dk)

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Tlf: (+45) 99 40 82 18  
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Layout: Connie Krogager  
Aalborg 2012

ISBN: 978-87-92174-33-8  
ISSN: 1398-3024-2012-77

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# 1.Introduction

The purpose of this paper is in depth to examine the Scandinavians' attitudes towards pay in a comparative perspective. Do they stand out from those inhabited by people in other western countries, and in that case in which way?

The Scandinavian countries are internationally renowned for consistently having maintained a high degree of economic equality. As such the Scandinavian countries consistently demonstrate net Gini-coefficients below 0.3, which by comparative standards are very low figures ([www.stats.oecd.org](http://www.stats.oecd.org)). There are two main reasons for this. *Firstly* the unique social democratic/universal Scandinavian welfare state has a well-described ability through an extensive proportional income tax regime and lavish income transfers to secure a high degree of net-income equality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Christiansen 2007; Larsen 2008; Ervasti et al 2008 and Fridberg & Kangas 2008).

The welfare state is not the only factor behind the very low net Gini-coefficients. The Scandinavian countries' gross Gini-coefficients are just above 0.4, which of course is well above the net-coefficient, but still low compared to other OECD-countries ([www.stats.oecd.org](http://www.stats.oecd.org)). The cause of the Scandinavian equality is thus not just the well-known redistributive effect of the welfare state, but also a quite compressed distribution of gross incomes. Attitudes towards redistribution and the welfare state especially among Scandinavians are by now well-developed research disciplines<sup>1</sup>. In contrast to this it remains to be investigated how the Scandinavians relate to the incomes paid to different occupations on the labour market. The purpose of this paper is trying to fill out this knowledge gap.

The next section will dive into the context of attitudes towards pay. This means a presentation and discussion of different theoretical perspectives on how to perceive pay. These perspectives are mainly general perspectives, but a Scandinavian focus will be maintained. Hereafter a methodological section will discuss how to measure attitudes towards pay. This section includes both a review and discussion of existing research on the subject as well as methodological considerations about the concept. The section ends up identifying four distinct dimensions of attitudes towards pay,

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<sup>1</sup> See Larsen (2006) pp. 34-37 for a review of the literature.



which in four separate sections will be operationalised and analysed. A conclusion will in the end sum up and discuss the findings.

The article is mainly explorative in its nature, while several of the operationalised dimensions of attitudes towards pay, are identified for the first time in this research field. As such no testable hypothesis will be presented regarding the Scandinavian attitudes towards pay. The purpose of the article is instead to identify and describe the multifaceted concept of the Scandinavian attitudes towards pay in a two-way comparative perspective – across time and space.

## **2. The context of attitudes towards pay– assumptions and possible consequences for the Scandinavians**

*“Who gets what, when and how”*, this classic definition of politics by Lasswell (1936) indicates that the distribution of income and therefore the question of pay is one of the most fundamental questions in the social sciences with a long theoretical history connected.

Already in classical Marxism the question of income and which pay the workers earn on the market was central. It’s argued that the objective materialistic conditions developing in the capitalist society in time will spur the formation of class-consciousness among the working class (the proletariat). More specifically this means a steadily worsening economic cleavage between the increasingly fewer and richer capitalists (the bourgeoisie), who owns the means of production, and the increasingly impoverished working class. Preventing the formation of class-consciousness the superstructure of the capitalist society – that is state, culture, institutions and rituals – will reflect the interests of the ruling capitalist class and provide the workers with a “false consciousness”. This will prevent the working class from realising their true objective economic interests until class-consciousness is achieved (Marx 1972; Marx & Engels 1968).

The Marxist theory of wages does not normatively answer the question of how big the workers’ salaries should be to be considered fair. Instead it just predicts that the competition on the labour market will imply that the salaries of the workers in time will be as low as on the minimum subsistence level of people (Marx 1972; Marx & Engels 1968). Subscribing to this analysis, it is obvious

that the salaries, workers will be able to earn if wage-determination is left solely to the market, easily could be seen as unfair. The non-revolutionary trade unions of the western countries historically found a solution of how to insure more fair wages of workers, without having to resort to revolution: By sticking together and organising in trade unions the workers were able to offset the unequal balance of power towards the capitalists, to get more bargaining power and contribute to securing higher and in their views more fair salaries for the workers (Gyes, Witte & Pasture 2001 and Adison & Schnabel 2003).

The narrative above implies that referring just to value on a free wage-market is not enough for determining fair wages. But, the narrative does not indicate, at which level a salary of a given worker<sup>2</sup> should be in order to be judged fair, nor does it specify on which background, or on the basis of which criteria, such an evaluation should be made. Furthermore it is left unanswered, what actually influences the views, people have on these issues. Could they actually be expected to sign up for the fight for higher salaries, or are they too influenced by the exposure to the superstructure and the values of the ruling capitalist class?

Åberg (1984) can be used to clarify some of these questions. He makes hypotheses about how and under which circumstances trade unions can influence the attitudes among their members and others, about what a fair wage for a given wage-earner actually is. Åberg (1984) argues that when the trade union-movement in a country moves to become almost completely centralised, a shift in point of reference in evaluating, what constitutes a fair salary, is made<sup>3</sup>. When a certain group of wage-earners puts forward demands about pay-increases, this demand no longer just needs to be justified towards the employers, but also towards other wage-earner groups. The wage-earner groups now need more neutral criteria, than value and maybe collective strength on the wage-market, to determine what constitutes a fair salary for a specific wage-earner group. This implies a shift towards certain “non-market criteria”<sup>4</sup> for making this evaluation. A consequence is that a group of wage-earners cannot legitimise demands of larger relative wage-raises than other groups, if this demand is not substantiated in “non-market criteria” arguments seen legitimate by other wage-earner groups. According to Åberg (1984) the consequence is that it becomes hard to legitimise both very high and

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<sup>2</sup> The more neutral concept of wage-earner will be used from now on.

<sup>3</sup> Åberg's (1984) example is the Swedish trade union-movement in the 1970's and 1980's.

<sup>4</sup> According to Åberg (1984) these include a company's financial capabilities in giving pay-raises, the situation of the company on the market and future developments, the nature of the work, how dangerous it is and how big an educational level certain groups of workers have.

very low relative salaries for certain wage-earner groups. Attitudinally the result is therefore hostility towards big wage dispersion.

The Scandinavian countries have traditionally been characterised by having uniquely centralised trade union-movements (Card et al 2003; Flanagan 2003; Visser 2003 and Svallfors 2004). Following Åberg (1984) it could be assumed that the Scandinavians could have been influenced by this unique centralised structure towards having more egalitarian views, on what constitutes fair salaries and differences in salaries, than the case was in other western countries. Furthermore this individual evaluation could also be assumed to a higher extent to have been based on “non-market criteria”, than the case was in other western countries.

The Scandinavian labour markets and trade union-movements have changed somewhat since the 1980's, which formed the context of Åberg's (1984) research. The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian trade union-movements' central organisations have abolished the centralised wage-negotiations. At first these were replaced by separate collective bargaining negotiations for each trade union. Gradually it also became possible to supplement the general terms of the collective agreements with individual negotiations with the employer. For some wage-earner groups this individual negotiation form has clearly superseded the collective bargaining in being the main determinant for the salary of the individual employee (Flanagan 2003; Visser 2003 and Svallfors 2004). The trade union density rates in all three Scandinavian countries have also exhibited a clear and constant declining tendency since Åberg's (1984) descriptions (Visser 2003 and [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)).

Following Åberg's (1984) logic, this should weaken the Scandinavian trade union's discursive, structural and socialisational power. Therefore the egalitarian values among the Scandinavians and the subscription to “non-market criteria” for evaluating, what constitutes fair salaries, should be weakened. Paraphrasing the Marxist terminology one could state that the workers are now again fully exposed to the superstructure and the values of the ruling capitalist class, without having a strong discursive opponent in the form of a centralised trade union-movement.

Furthermore it is often argued that globalisation induces a convergence towards market-conform attitudes and values across the nations of this earth (Osberg & Smeeding 2006). These two tendencies taken into account suggest that attitudes towards pay of the modern Scandinavians are probably not anymore particularly egalitarian, nor are they guided by “non-market criteria” in this evaluation. Instead they could be assumed, to at least some extent, embrace the notion that the salary paid on the market per definition is just.

A very different narrative than the above described, rooted in laissez faire capitalism and neo-classical economic, would claim just that. The invisible hand of the market will thus automatically insure equilibrium between the demand and supply of workforce. The competition on the labour market will therefore insure that the wage-earners always will get the salary they deserve. This is because a fair salary in this narrative is defined by the individual worker's productivity or worth on the market. Some wage-earner's productivity is higher than others, and it can often be increased by upgrading skills or getting further education. The differences in productivity between the wage-earners thus explain both why differences in wages exist, and why they should exist. Furthermore because the free market always is the most efficient allocation-mechanism securing a pareto-optimal condition, any attempts to interfere or regulate will lead to a loss of welfare not benefitting anyone. Strong trade unions can thus also be seen as harmful in this narrative (Esping-Andersen 1990, 41-44 and Kerr 2011).

The subject of this paper is to investigate how attitudes towards pay of the present day Scandinavians stand in this intersection of narratives. Do the Scandinavians still have exceptionally egalitarian attitudes towards pay in a comparative perspective as Åberg (1984) suggested in the 1980's. Or have declining trade union density rates and the decentralisation of the collective bargaining systems since the 1980's led to an erosion of egalitarian attitudes? Is the combined effect of the globalisation, individualisation and the weakened trade union-movement such that the attitudes towards pay of the present day Scandinavians do not stand out in western comparisons? And if they still stand out, in which way is this, and what does it tell us?

### **3. How to measure attitudes towards pay – methodological issues and dimensions**

In deciding how to measure the concept of attitudes towards pay two considerations are important. *Firstly* this paper subscribes to the principle of comparison. A comparative perspective helps to avoid ethnocentrically biased research. This could either be to think something national specific is actually just a general trend or to think something general is actually national specific (Svallfors 1995). Put plainly comparison helps us to know what is high and low, what constitutes a significant change and what not. It has therefore been found important to compare the attitudes of the Scandinavians to those inhabited by people in a range of other western countries.

*Secondly* attitudes towards pay is a rather broad topic to investigate. As it will be clear below, this concept is multidimensional, and for at least one of the dimensions several possibilities exist of how to measure the dimension. The actual measure or measures chosen must therefore be able to encompass these different dimensions.

Fortunately such a measure actually exists in the Social Inequality modules (I-IV) of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009. ISSP is one of the biggest international comparative survey-projects existing. It nowadays comprises 47 countries (including the Scandinavian countries) ([www.issp.org](http://www.issp.org)). The measure is the survey question: “*What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get...?*”, and the question is posed for a number of different occupations<sup>5</sup>.

In the sections below it will firstly be discussed, how the measure has been used in existing research. It is argued that the existing research is not using the potential of this measure fully, while the focus exclusively is on the dimension of *attitudes towards difference in levels of pay*. It will secondly be discussed if another measure is better in tapping this dimension and what actually are the advantages and disadvantages of the measure used in the article. Finally a section defining and operationalising four distinct dimensions of attitudes towards pay will be presented.

### ***3.1 Existing research – a narrow focus on the difference in levels of pay dimension, not utilising the potential of the measure***

Existing research using the above mentioned measure can be subscribed to a by now pretty diversified and well-established research field in “Social Justice Beliefs”<sup>6</sup>. A good indication of this is that both the mentioned Social Inequality modules of ISSP, but also “The international Social Justice Project”, were dedicated to investigate the attitudes to social justice (Kluegel et al 1995 and Larsen

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<sup>5</sup>In Social Inequality module I and II from 1987 and 1992 the question was posed to eleven different occupations that varied marginally between the modules. In the third module from 1999 the number of occupations was reduced to nine. In the recent fourth module from 2009 the number of professions was further reduced to five ([www.issp.org](http://www.issp.org) and Osberg & Smeeding 2006, 459).

<sup>6</sup> One possible reason for this is that questions about social justice always have been one of the core themes in political philosophy and theory. The literature about social justice is therefore very wide and encompasses not only empirical investigations about people’s beliefs, but also a wide normative literature (Kluegel et al 1995; Larsen 2006 and Miller 1995).

2006). “Social Justice Beliefs” are not just attitudes towards pay though. A wide range of dependent variables have been in focus within this research field<sup>7</sup>.

When the focus is narrowed down to encompass only the research actually using the above mentioned measure, the field is more limited (Szirmai 1991; Kelley & Evans 1993; Miller 1995; Blanchflower & Freeman 1997; Austen 1999; Austen 2002; Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Knudsen 2001; Larsen 2006; Osberg & Smeeding 2006 and Kerr 2011).

Reviewing this literature it becomes apparent that all scientific contributions so far have focused on just one dimension of attitudes towards pay. This is attitudes towards *difference in levels of pay* or pay-inequality if you like. Despite only a dozen studies exist actually using the measure; the dimension is measured in different ways. Typically an index is constructed on the basis of a ratio between a number of higher level occupations to lower level occupations (Kelley & Evans 1993; Miller 1995; Blanchflower & Freeman 1997; Austen 1999; Austen 2002; Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004 and Kerr 2011). A different approach compares the ratio of a single occupation to either one other or to groups of other occupations (Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004 and Larsen 2006). Knudsen (2001) is the only one making a measure, where he is focussing just on the highly-paid occupations. His argument for this is that, while there is a big degree of consensus, concerning what pay is just for the low-paid occupations, the variation is much larger at the top.

In contrast to the other research contributions using the measure Osberg & Smeeding (2006) and Szirmai (1991) also try to include the measures for the perception of, what the same occupations are actually paid on average, in a combined measure. These measures then denote, how much the ideal of the respondents for a fair degree of pay-inequality deviates from their perception of, what the actual degree of pay-inequality is (Osberg & Smeeding 2006, 460 and Szirmai 1991, 231).

While Osberg & Smeeding (2006) and Szirmai (1991) have a somewhat different approach than the other research contributions; the focus is firstly still on a form of measure of attitudes towards difference in levels of pay. Secondly these two articles follow a general trend in the contributions in trying to create just one measure on the basis of the survey-question posed for a number of occupations. A possible explanation, of why this is often the case, is that the contributions in general seem to be regression-analysis focused. There is of course nothing wrong with writing scientific articles applying regression-analysis, but to conserve space and meet the page-wise limitations of any scientific journal, the authors have probably been forced to limit the preliminary descriptive analyses.

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<sup>7</sup> See Larsen (2006, 34-37) for a short review of this literature.

The purpose with the preliminary descriptive analyses thus seem to be to create and present one measure that can be used as a dependent variable in the focal point of the article; a regression model seeking to explain variance within and between countries (see especially Szirmai 1991; Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Austen 1999 and Austen 2002).

In this paper the focus is not on creating one dependent variable, but on making in depth descriptive investigations of different dimensions of attitudes towards pay. Therefore the analyses below will not be restricted to one dimension or not even necessarily one measure per dimension, as the trend certainly have been in the existing contributions.

More practical methodological considerations are also important. Larsen (2006) wisely emphasises two important aspects of how to treat the data. *Firstly* one is wise to use the median instead of the regularly used average as a measure of central tendency. The measures, one can create on the basis of the mentioned survey question, all seem to be infected by the presence of extreme outliers influencing the average a lot. The median is not to the same extent affected by these outliers, why it is a more obvious choice for a measure of central tendency. *Secondly* as with all aggregated measures, the measures of the existing research conceal important information in the data. A high degree of tolerance towards pay-inequality can thus be caused by both; tolerance towards top-excess, accept of very low salaries for the lower skilled parts of the workforce or both. By disaggregating and using “skilled factory worker” as a middle category Larsen (2006) finds interesting differences between the countries that are not possible to detect with the aggregated measures (pp. 37-43)<sup>8</sup>.

Reviewing the existing research on the field it becomes apparent that there is room for improvement - a quest which this article seeks to undertake. *Firstly* a very concrete and practical methodological improvement is using medians instead of averages, as the measure of central tendency. *Secondly* as quoted above Svallfors (2004, 82) correctly pinpoints the great versatility of the measure. The existing research is not taking full advantage of this. As a starting point the measures will be disaggregated much more, than what's usual in the existing research. *Thirdly* and most importantly the versatility allows for using the measure to investigate a number of other aspects or dimensions relevant for investigating attitudes towards pay, than just the attitudes towards pay-inequality, as the existing studies do.

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<sup>8</sup> As mentioned Knudsen (2001) and Osberg & Smeeding (2006) find that the respondents disagree much more about the salaries of the better paid occupations than the lower paid ones. These results suggest are an effect of disaggregating and indicates the value of doing so.

Below four such dimensions of *attitudes towards pay* will be identified and operationalised. These are:

- *Levels of pay*
- *Difference in levels of pay*
- *Degree of justice in levels of pay*
- *Consensus*

Before diving into these dimensions, the methodological aspects of the measure: “*What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get...?*”, will be discussed. This section includes a discussion of whether another more commonly used measure: “*Differences in income in <country> are too large*”, is better in tapping the dimension of difference in levels of pay.

### **3.2 Methodological considerations - A relative or more absolute measure of difference in levels of pay?**

As Osberg & Smeeding (2006) argues the most straightforward way to investigate people’s attitudes towards income or pay-inequality is asking them directly. Often the right questions are not present in the surveys, one wants to use, and researchers then use proxies or try indirectly to measure a concept, but this is actually not the case here. In the same Social Inequality modules of ISSP as well as numerous other surveys the question: “*Differences in income in <country> are too large*”<sup>9</sup> is asked.

In spite the presence of this question in numerous surveys and the fact that it seems the most direct measure of the concept of attitudes towards income-inequality, good arguments exist of why not to use it in the analyses of this article. The main critique of the ordinal scaled question is that has a *relative* bias. It is clearly less obvious to give a confirmatory answer to the question in the Scandinavian countries, where the actual level of income-inequality is very low by comparative standards (Esping Andersen 1990; Esping Andersen 1999; Larsen 2008; Ervasti et al 2008 and Fridberg & Kangas 2008), than in countries, where this is not the case (Larsen 2006 and Osberg & Smeeding 2006). The Scandinavian attitudes measured by this question are thus often found to be very anti-

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<sup>9</sup> It is an ordinal scaled variable with the categories “Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree and Strongly disagree”. The question is also posed in the “Role of Government” modules of ISSP as well as a number of Eurobarometer surveys (Larsen 2006, 35).



egalitarian compared to other western countries (Evans 1996; Lübker 2004; Larsen 2006 and Osberg & Smeeding 2006).

The measure presented above: “*What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get...?*”, can be argued not in the same degree to have this relative bias. It can thus be transformed into a more *absolute* measure of attitudes towards pay-inequality. Many of the factors influencing the *relative* measure can thus be argued to a higher extent to be kept constant (Osberg & Smeeding 2006 and Larsen 2006).

*Firstly* the effect of the actual income-distribution in a country hampering the relative measure is kept quite constant. A respondents opinion on, what an unskilled factory worker ought to earn, is not at the outset connected to the actual level of income-inequality in the respondents country. Arguments do exist that contextual factor is of importance for the more absolute measure also though<sup>10</sup>.

A *second* but related advantage is that the welfare state is more out of the picture in the more absolute measure. The reason is that the question concerns attitudes towards pay and not attitudes towards the distribution of income. The *relative* measure on the contrary could be interpreted as a proxy for an ideological position on the economical right-left scale of politics (Larsen 2006). A confirmatory answer to the question can thus also be interpreted as a proxy for a political or ideological statement, also correlating with positive attitudes towards the welfare state, taxes and redistribution in general<sup>11</sup>.

A *third* and more survey-methodological advantage of the more absolute measure is that it is a very concrete and not abstract question. It is an often heard critique of the survey-method in social sciences that the respondents’ answers reflect the norms of society, and not their actual opinions. Acting on a logic of appropriateness the respondents seek to please the interviewer by giving answers matching the norms and values of the society. Experimental results suggest that this bias is especially prominent in very general and abstract questions (Lolle & Goul Andersen forthcoming). The *relative*, but not the more *absolute*, measure is exactly such an abstract and general question, why the researcher cannot rule out that the respondents’ answers on this question to a high extent reflects the

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. The adaption-hypothesis (Kelley & Evans 1993; Miller 1995; Blanchflower & Freeman 1997; Austen 1999; Austen 2002; Knudsen 2001 and Kerr 2011).

<sup>11</sup>In a factor analysis and reliability test all the six items of the batteries of Q6 and Q7a-b correlate strongly. They form a clear and reliable factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0,637. These items all tap classical political questions of the role of government towards unemployed and poor as well as questions about the tax level. This indicates that when answering the more relative question, the underlying bases for the respondents to a high extent are their ideological position on the economical right-left scale.

norms of the societies, rather than the true opinions of the respondents. In the more *absolute* measure on the other hand, the respondent is “tricked” to give his/her opinion on a quite general and abstract concept, answering a very concrete question. As Szirmai (1991) points out the risk of “socially desirable responses” is clearly minimised using the more absolute measure.

*Finally* the absolute measure is very versatile. It can be manipulated and adapted in a lot of ways – all giving insight in different aspects of attitudes towards pay (Svallfors 2004, 82). The analyses below will make good use of this advantage and adapt the measure to be able to tab all four dimensions: *levels of pay, difference in levels of pay and degree of justice in levels of pay, consensus*. Only in the operationalisation of the dimension – degree of justice in levels of pay – another survey item will also be used. This resembles the more absolute measure, only *should earn* is switched with *actually earn*.

## **4. Operationalisation and analyses of the four dimensions of attitudes towards pay**

In the sections below the four dimensions will be operationalised and analysed in turn. The focus is in all sections the Scandinavian countries. For each of the dimensions data and tables from both ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2009 will be presented. In this way it is possible to investigate the development over a 10 year time span. The comparative approach is thus not just cross-country, but also longitudinal. Because the number of occupations is reduced from 9 to 5 from ISSP 1999 to ISSP 2009, it has not been possible to replicate all analyses. The lacking occupation “skilled factory worker” makes it impossible to follow the approach of Larsen (2006), and disaggregate the general measures of attitudes towards pay-inequality on ISSP 2009-data.

### **4.1 Attitudes towards level of pay – the ordinary Scandinavians**

The first dimension – *attitudes towards level of pay* – simply treats the question of, how much the respondents in the different countries generally think the various occupations should earn. As such it should be the first very simple descriptive measure presented, giving a quick overview of the data. Straightforwardly the medians for the different occupations in the different countries should be sufficient to measure this dimension. Unfortunately it is not that simple – and one could suspect the

difficulties in acquiring comparable measures are one of the reasons, others have not ventured into this task. *The first difficulty* is noted by Kelley & Evans (1993):

*“Cross-cultural comparisons are difficult because the original answers are in local currencies – dollars, pounds, forints, and so forth”* (s.85).

To overcome this and set a common standard all indications of pay have been recalculated to “purchasing power parity” (PPP) corrected dollars \$<sup>12</sup>. Hereby it should be possible to compare directly, how much a person can actually buy for the pay indicated:

*“The PPP currency values reflect the number of units of a country’s currency required to buy the same quantity of comparable goods and services in the local market as one U.S. dollar would buy in an average country.”* (World Resources Institute 1996, box 7.2).

There is also a difficulty with the 1999-data for the countries, who were then members of the Eurozone. In a non-physical form the Euro was introduced on 1. January 1999, but the physical currency of the countries was still local until 1. January 2002. This means that while the respondents in these countries are asked to give their statements in French francs, German marks and Austrian schilling etc., the PPP-conversion rates for the same countries in 1999 assume, their currency is Euro. Therefore I have had to firstly recalculate the local currency statements to Euros for the then members of the Eurozone (also Slovenia)<sup>13</sup>, and then to PPP corrected \$.

The *second difficulty*, which Kelley & Evans (1993) did not face, is that it has been up to the individual countries to decide certain specifics of the question in 1999 and 2009 (but not in 1987 and 1992). The instruction in 1999 and 2009 was merely that it had to match the traditions in the country<sup>14</sup>. The result has been a great deal of variation, in how the question has been posed in the various countries. Firstly it varies, whether the respondents are asked to give their opinion on monthly salaries or yearly salaries. The monthly indications have easily been recalculated to yearly salaries by multiplying with 12.

The second variation is causing bigger problems though. It thus also varies, whether the respondents are asked about gross or net salaries. I have chosen to recalculate all the respondents’ statements into net salaries. Income tax regimes are by default difficult to compare. I have thus been forced to

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<sup>12</sup> Furthermore I have also recalculated to Euro’s. See Appendix 7.1 and 7.2.

<sup>13</sup> The original members of the Eurozone where: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, the Vatican state and Austria. Therefore recalculations from local currencies to Euros have been made for: France, Portugal, Spain, West-Germany, East-Germany and Austria. Furthermore the same recalculations have been made for Slovenia in 1999. Even if this country was not one of the original Eurozone-members (they became so in 2004) their PPP-conversion rates clearly assumes that Slovenia had Euros in 1999. The same is not the case for Cyprus, even if they became Eurozone-members in 2008.

<sup>14</sup> See the source questionnaires available at [www.gesis.org/issp](http://www.gesis.org/issp)

choose a specific conversion factor. Using the OECD statistics for "Taxing Wages" I have chosen the conversion factor "average rate of income tax and employees' social security contributions (%)" for "single person at 100 % of average earnings, no child" ([www.stats.oecd.org](http://www.stats.oecd.org))<sup>15</sup>. Surely this choice of tax conversion factor has some limitations. In recalculating there are probably some deviations from the actual income tax, a given occupation ought to earn in a certain country. On the other hand it is difficult to find a better general conversion rate. A further advantage is that OECD does not have tax regime data for all the western countries present in the two datasets. By choosing net salaries and not gross salaries the numbers of countries in the following tables are maximised. After all these corrections and recalculations it is possible to present simple descriptive tables describing, what the median-respondent in the various western countries think, the various occupations should earn net per year in PPP corrected \$ in 1999 and 2009. In the table for 2009 all the five available occupations are presented. In the table for 1999 the same five occupations as well as "skilled factory worker" presented<sup>16</sup>. The result is presented below<sup>17</sup>:

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<sup>15</sup>I have recalculated from gross to net salaries using the following formula:  $Net\ salary = Gross\ salary * (1 - income\ tax\ rate)$ . In the opposite recalculation from net to gross salaries used in appendix 7.1 and 7.2, I have used the following formula:  $Gross\ salary = \frac{Net\ salary}{1 - income\ tax\ rate}$ . In both instances the income tax rate is measured in proportions.

<sup>16</sup>Obviously the different price levels in the countries affect the PPP conversion rates a lot. Furthermore especially for the countries with high income taxes (including social contributions), there is a big difference between net and gross salaries. For the sake of comparison I have therefore calculated two alternative tables for each dataset. Here I am firstly recalculating to gross salaries and secondly to Euros instead of PPP corrected \$ (see appendix 1 and 2).

<sup>17</sup> To conserve space in the tables below, which are already very big, abbreviations for the countries have been used. In appendix 7.6 a list of these country abbreviations can be found.

TABLE 1. Attitudes to yearly net pay<sup>A</sup> for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country median in PPP corrected \$<sup>B</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		A skilled worker in a factory		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory		Country - averages	
FR	57.949	FR	96.582	USA	75.090	USA	26.657	NO	<b>19.574</b>	CDN	18.825	USA	45.117
AUS	57.747	CDN	90.988	CDN	62.750	CDN	26.355	CDN	18.825	USA	18.773	CDN	44.134
USA	56.318	GB	85.472	AUS	57.747	NO	<b>23.302</b>	USA	18.773	NO	<b>18.642</b>	FR	42.174
GB	53.563	USA	75.090	FR	48.291	AUS	23.099	AUS	17.324	FR	15.453	GB	38.748
AT	52.815	AUS	57.747	NO	<b>46.604</b>	GB	20.513	ES	15.633	ES	15.124	AUS	38.016
CDN	47.063	WD	53.011	GB	45.585	ES	19.802	FR	15.453	AUS	14.437	NO	<b>32.002</b>
IL	45.466	AT	52.815	NZ	42.215	FR	19.316	DK	<b>14.480</b>	DK	<b>13.822</b>	AT	31.359
PT	44.470	NZ	52.768	AT	39.611	NZ	18.469	GB	13.676	GB	13.676	NZ	30.342
WD	42.409	SLO	49.347	WD	35.341	AT	16.505	IL	13.640	AT	13.204	IL	27.027
NZ	42.215	NO	<b>46.604</b>	DK	<b>32.909</b>	DK	<b>16.454</b>	AT	13.204	NZ	13.192	PT	24.755
ES	41.688	IL	45.466	IL	30.311	WD	15.903	NZ	13.192	SE	<b>12.318</b>	WD	28.273
NO	<b>37.283</b>	ES	41.688	ED	28.273	IL	15.155	WD	12.369	IL	12.124	ES	26.839
SLO	37.010	PT	44.470	ES	27.097	SE	<b>14.987</b>	SE	<b>12.318</b>	WD	10.602	DK	<b>23.694</b>
ED	35.341	ED	35.341	PT	26.682	ED	14.136	SLO	11.103	PT	8.894	SLO	23.645
CY	34.783	PL	33.538	SLO	24.673	PT	13.341	PT	10.673	ED	8.835	ED	22.088
PL	33.538	LV	32.941	SE	<b>24.636</b>	SLO	11.103	ED	10.602	SLO	8.636	SE	<b>20.291</b>
DK	<b>32.909</b>	CZ	32.456	CY	22.609	PL	10.061	CY	7.826	CY	8.087	PL	17.887
CZ	29.210	DK	<b>31.593</b>	PL	16.769	CY	10.435	LV	7.059	PL	6.708	CY	17.725
SE	<b>28.742</b>	SE	<b>28.742</b>	CZ	12.982	LV	9.412	PL	6.708	CZ	5.193	CZ	15.795
RUS	24.793	RUS	24.793	BG	11.673	CZ	8.439	CZ	6.491	LV	4.706	LV	14.510
LV	23.529	HU	22.960	HU	11.480	RUS	7.438	HU	5.357	BG	4.669	HU	12.245
HU	22.960	CY	22.609	LV	9.412	BG	7.004	BG	4.669	HU	4.592	BG	9.728
BG	16.342	BG	14.008	RUS	7.438	HU	6.123	RUS	3.719	RUS	2.479	RUS	8.110

<sup>A</sup>The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. The following countries have asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remaining countries have asked about gross salaries.

<sup>B</sup>The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: "National currency per current international dollar", the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current PPP-conversion rate. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx>.

For the following countries preliminary recalculations from local currency to Euro have been made – followed by another recalculation to PPP-corrected \$: France, Portugal, Spain, West- and East Germany, Austria and Slovenia. The reason is, that the PPP-conversion rates for these countries prescribes that the local currency is Euro also in 1999.

The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguesestatements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, while the respondents here where asked to answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/social-inequality/1999/>).

Table 1 show that the Scandinavian respondents in a comparative perspective are not characterised, by wanting exceptionally high salaries. The tendency is rather that the Scandinavians' scores are quite average in a comparative sense. In both of the alternative tables (see appendix 7.1 and 7.2), the Scandinavian countries score higher for all occupations. Firstly the high income taxes pull the Scandinavian, but also Continental-European countries down, when one calculates net- instead of gross salaries. Not surprisingly the tax rate matters much more in these countries than in other western countries. Secondly one could speculate that high staple goods prices in the Scandinavian countries pull down the score of the PPP corrected \$ of table 1. The Scandinavian positions are surely higher in the alternative table displaying non-corrected Euros.

Turning to the general pattern in the countries the respondents seem to agree on a hierarchy of the occupations. The highly paid occupations of the first three columns score above the country averages in all instances, while the lower paid occupations in the three last columns score below. Also the poorer countries/the ones with lowest wage levels – especially the Central- and Eastern European countries - have a tendency to be placed in the lower half of the columns, while the opposite counts for the richer countries. Even if correcting with PPP rates, the actual context in a country thus seem to matter a lot for the score. This is probably because the individuals' assessment of *should earn* in general takes the departure in an assessment of *do actually earn* (Miller 1995).

Probing deeper into the position of the different occupations of the Scandinavian countries in a comparative sense, a rising tendency from left to right can be seen in the table. Denmark and Sweden are in the lower half of the table concerning the salaries of ministers and chairmen. For the three lowest paid occupations Denmark and Sweden are instead in the upper half of the table. Norway in each instance score higher than Denmark and Sweden.

Other groups of countries do not follow the same rising pattern from left to right as the Scandinavian countries. The Continental European countries portray the exact opposite pattern of a declining tendency from left to right in the table. The Anglo-Saxon countries with the exception of New Zealand are consistently in the top of the table, while the Post-Communist countries consistently are at the bottom.

Nor the Scandinavian positions or averages are thus very unique in a comparative perspective. The pattern of the positions in the table on the other hand does not seem to be replicated by other groups of countries. In table 2 below it will be investigated, if a similar tendency applies in 2009. The table is a replication of table 1 with newer data, except the missing fourth columns of a skilled factory worker.

TABLE 2. Attitudes to yearly net pay<sup>A</sup> for five occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country medians in PPP corrected \$<sup>B</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> gov-ernment		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory		Country -averages	
CH	140.515	AUS	160.381	USA	115.845	CH	31.616	CH	28.103	CH	85.012
AUS	80.191	USA	154.460	AUS	96.229	USA	23.169	USA	23.169	USA	79.959
FR	79.034	CH	140.515	CH	84.309	NO	<b>22.590</b>	NO	<b>22.590</b>	AUS	75.914
USA	77.230	FR	131.723	GB	76.264	IS	22.324	IS	22.324	FR	63.491
NZ	75.082	GB	113.826	NZ	66.174	DK	<b>21.446</b>	AUS	21.384	GB	58.962
GB	68.296	FI	88.873	FR	65.862	AUS	21.384	SE	<b>21.227</b>	NZ	51.666
DE	66.118	DE	82.648	NO	<b>52.709</b>	FR	21.076	ES	20.103	DE	45.622
IL	64.918	NZ	81.444	IS	52.089	FL	20.339	FL	20.339	FI	44.436
PL	61.475	AT	75.999	DK	<b>50.040</b>	SE	<b>20.262</b>	DK	<b>20.016</b>	IS	43.159
IS	59.530	SL	75.117	DE	49.589	IL	19.475	FR	19.759	AT	42.707
AT	56.999	PT	68.966	AT	47.499	ES	18.557	IL	19.475	IL	42.196
SL	56.338	FL	65.763	FL	47.458	GB	18.212	GB	18.212	SL	42.065
FL	54.237	ES	61.856	SL	46.948	NZ	17.816	NZ	17.816	FL	41.627
DK	<b>53.614</b>	PL	61.475	FI	44.436	FI	17.774	FI	17.775	NO	<b>41.414</b>
FI	53.324	IL	64.918	SE	<b>43.419</b>	AT	17.100	AT	15.437	PT	38.103
NO	<b>52.709</b>	IS	59.530	PT	43.103	SL	16.901	SL	15.023	ES	37.114
EE	52.493	EE	59.055	IL	42.196	DE	16.530	DE	13.224	SE	<b>36.279</b>
PT	51.724	NO	<b>56.474</b>	ES	38.660	PT	13.793	EE	13.123	DK	<b>36.172</b>
SE	<b>48.243</b>	SE	<b>48.243</b>	PL	30.738	EE	13.123	PL	12.295	PL	35.656
ES	46.392	RUS	45.859	HR	28.255	PL	12.295	PT	12.931	EE	32.808
RUS	45.859	HR	42.383	EE	26.247	HR	11.302	HR	11.302	RUS	24.895
SK	43.361	HU	42.119	CZ	26.023	SK	10.844	SK	10.844	SK	24.576
HU	42.119	CZ	39.034	TR	25.862	LV	10.370	LV	10.370	HR	24.299
TR	41.379	SK	36.146	SK	21.687	TR	10.345	TR	10.345	TR	23.793
CZ	32.528	DK	<b>35.743</b>	HU	18.427	RUS	9.827	RUS	9.827	HU	23.692
LV	29.630	TR	31.034	LV	17.778	CZ	9.758	CZ	9.758	CZ	23.420
HR	28.255	UA	30.447	RUS	13.103	HU	7.897	HU	7.897	LV	19.556
UA	26.641	LV	29.630	UA	11.418	UA	7.612	UA	7.612	UA	16.746

<sup>A</sup>The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12.

The following countries have asked about gross salaries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries, while this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have asked about net salaries.

<sup>B</sup>The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: "National currency per current international dollar", the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current PPP-conversion rate. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx>.

Table 2 generally repeats the patterns of table 1 (the same goes in the alternative tables of appendix 7.1 and 7.2). The Scandinavian countries' averages are still in the middle of the table, and a rising tendencies from left to right in the table are displayed. Going more into detail the Scandinavian countries' medians are somewhat closer in 2009 than in 1999. Furthermore the countries are placed a little bit higher for the lowest paid occupations, but still below USA and Switzerland. As the case was in 1999, the Scandinavian countries are placed higher, when re-calculating to gross salaries or Euros (see appendix 7.2).

Also the other groupings of countries more or less repeat the pattern of 1999. The Post-Communist countries are in general still placed in the bottom of table 2. Countries as Slovenia and Poland now have medians resembling the Mediterranean countries though. The Anglo-Saxon countries are still in the top of the table, while the Continental European countries still display a declining tendency from left to right in the table.

Several new western countries are present in ISSP 2009. These also include the Nordic countries Iceland and Finland. Iceland more or less follows the pattern of the other Scandinavian countries, though with a somewhat higher median for ministers. The same is not the case for Finland. Finland's pattern resembles the Continental European countries of Germany and Austria, rather than the Scandinavian countries. The only exception is the minister median. The Finnish median is here at the Scandinavian level.

In sum the Scandinavian attitudes towards level of pay at first glance does not seem exceptional at all. The Scandinavian averages in 1999 and 2009 are placed in the middle of the tables. Furthermore the Scandinavian medians for the individual occupations are in no case exceptional that is in the bottom or top of the tables. If one instead looks at the patterns across the occupations of different groups of countries in the two tables, the Scandinavian countries do seem exceptional, by displaying a rising pattern from left to right in both tables. This is firstly opposing the Anglo-Saxon and the Post-Communist countries, which are consistently placed at the top and the bottom of the tables respectively. Secondly it is opposing the Continental European countries (plus Finland), who display a declining tendency from left to right in both tables. The Scandinavians thus do not seem especially egalitarian in wishing very high levels of pay for the lower paid occupations compared to other rich western countries. Instead the higher paid occupations are consistently placed low. In everyday language, this preliminary result suggests a Scandinavian egalitarianism characterized by an aversion towards top excess, rather than a spoiled bottom. In the section below this subject will more thoroughly be investigated by looking into the attitudes towards difference in levels of pay.



## **4.2 Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay – the exceptionally egalitarian Scandinavians**

The second dimension – *attitudes towards difference in levels of pay* – treats the subject of, how much the respondents think some professions should earn *more* than others. As described above, the existing studies have solely focused on this dimension and different measures of this concept. The existing studies often use just one measure of this concept; contrasting this approach and making use of the described versatility (Svallfors 2004), competing measures will be constructed in table 3 and 4 below. *Firstly* in both tables three different measures of attitudes towards the general difference in levels of pay will be constructed. The first of these includes all five occupations present in both ISSP 1999 and 2009. It is a highly aggregated measure, indicating how much more the respondents think ministers, chairmen or general practitioners should earn than shop assistants or unskilled factory workers.

Even if highly aggregated measures is often used in existing studies, it could be argued not to be the most valid measure of the concept, possible to construct. As mentioned above, clear indications exist of a bigger variation concerning the highly paid occupations, than the lower paid ones (Knudsen 2001 and Osberg & Smeeding 2006). This could be caused by the inclusion of “general practitioners” in the top group. Larsen (2006) argues that in several countries the salaries of doctor’s are not top level, but closer to medium level (pp. 40). A second and less aggregated measure will thus be created by excluding the doctors from the top group.

A third and even less aggregated measure will be created by also excluding “cabinet ministers in the national government” from the top group. The argument is that a respondent’s view, on how much a minister ought to earn, could possibly be influenced by his/her level of sympathy with the current government (Kelley & Evans 1993, 85). Furthermore the same could also be the case with the general level of political and institutional trust in the country. In countries where these are low, like for example the post-communist countries, the Mediterranean countries and the USA, the respondents are probably not willing to pay high salaries to ministers. This index also reflects a classical worker-capital dichotomy.

*Secondly* as the case is with all aggregated measures, information is lost by aggregating (Larsen 2006). Following the approach of Larsen (2006), the general 1999-measures will be disaggregated. To tap the top-middle ratio two competing measures are created. The first indicates, how much more the respondents think ministers, chairmen or general practitioners should earn than a skilled factory worker. The second follows the arguments above and merely calculate a chairman- vs.

skilled factory worker ratio. Top tap the middle-bottom ratio just one measure will be constructed. This indicates how much more the respondents think a skilled factory worker should earn than a shop assistant or an unskilled factory worker. Because the occupation “skilled factory worker” is excluded from the occupational question battery in ISSP 2009, these disaggregated measures can only be constructed with 1999-data. The results are displayed in table 3 and 4 below:

TABLE 3. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country medians in levels of differences.

<sup>A</sup> Wage dispersion index	<sup>B</sup> High- vs. Low paid occ.	<sup>C</sup> Chairmen vs. Low paid occ.	<sup>D</sup> High paid occ. Vs. Skilled worker	<sup>E</sup> Chairmen vs. Skilled worker	<sup>F</sup> Skilled worker vs. Low paid occ.	
RUS	4.67	RUS 6.00	FR 6.25	FR 4.17	FR 5.00	RUS 1.85
FR	4.52	PL 5.19	RUS 5.71	RUS 4.08	SLO 3.75	LV 1.60
GB	4.36	CZ 5.00	GB 5.56	PL 3.83	HU 3.75	BG 1.50
PL	4.33	LV 5.00	LV 5.36	HU 3.75	GB 3.71	USA 1.45
AUS	4.18	FR 5.00	CZ 5.00	CZ 3.67	CZ 3.50	GB 1.43
CZ	4.17	GB 4.90	PL 4.67	SLO 3.50	LV 3.33	CDN 1.40
USA	4.09	HU 4.57	HU 4.61	PT 3.42	PT 3.33	CZ 1.36
PT	4.00	PT 4.50	CDN 4.47	GB 3.33	PL 3.33	CY 1.33
LV	3.93	WD 4.29	USA 4.44	WD 3.25	WD 3.33	AUS 1.33
NZ	3.89	ED 4.15	NZ 4.44	AT 3.17	NZ 3.33	ED 1.33
HU	3.89	SLO 4.08	SLO 4.44	NZ 3.00	AUS 3.33	PL 1.33
WD	3.84	USA 4.00	WD 4.44	ED 3.00	USA 3.25	NZ 1.33
CDN	3.77	NZ 4.00	PT 4.35	IL 3.00	AT 3.20	PT 1.30
ED	3.73	AT 3.89	ED 4.08	LV 3.00	CDN 3.20	WD 1.29
AT	3.64	AUS 3.75	AT 4.00	AUS 2.92	ED 3.00	AT 1.25
SLO	3.64	CDN 3.63	AUS 4.00	USA 2.86	RUS 3.00	ES 1.24
CY	3.30	CY 3.50	IL 3.64	CY 2.67	IL 3.00	FR 1.21
IL	3.30	IL 3.44	BG 2.86	CDN 2.50	CY 2.39	HU 1.20
BG	2.79	BG 3.11	CY 2.83	ES 2.08	ES 2.00	IL 1.20
<b>DK</b>	<b>2.33</b>	ES 2.57	ES 2.50	BG 2.00	BG 1.80	<b>NO 1.20</b>
ES	2.31	<b>DK 2.25</b>	<b>NO 2.13</b>	<b>DK 2.00</b>	<b>SE 1.78</b>	<b>SE 1.17</b>
<b>SE</b>	<b>2.10</b>	<b>SE 2.21</b>	<b>SE 2.08</b>	<b>SE 1.88</b>	<b>NO 1.75</b>	<b>DK 1.15</b>
<b>NO</b>	<b>2.02</b>	<b>NO 2.00</b>	<b>DK 2.00</b>	<b>NO 1.67</b>	<b>DK 1.67</b>	SLO 1.14
Average	3.60	3.96	4.08	2.99	3.03	1.33
Scand.	2.15	2.15	2.07	1.85	1.73	1.17
Others	3.82	4.23	4.38	3.16	3.05	1.35

<sup>A</sup>The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second.

<sup>B</sup>This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group.

<sup>C</sup>In the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.

<sup>D</sup>The index of the fourth column is constructed by dividing the index of the average statements of the top occupations, with the statement of a skilled factory worker.

<sup>E</sup>This index taps the chairmen skilled worker wage ratio.

<sup>F</sup>This index is the ratio of a skilled worker to the average of the two low paid occupations – shop assistant and unskilled worker in a factory.

Table 3 clearly shows that the Scandinavian countries are exceptionally egalitarian in 1999. This is true, no matter which of the three general measures are used (column 1-3), or when disaggregating

in top-middle/middle-bottom ratios (column 4-6). As the calculated averages show, Scandinavians only want the top occupations to earn around two times more than the bottom occupations, while average in the remaining countries is approximately four times. It is also worth noticing in the disaggregated measures of column 4-6 that the Scandinavian medians most clearly stands out from the remaining countries, when looking at the top-medium relationship of column 4-5. As suggested above, this again suggests that the Scandinavian egalitarianism is characterised by an aversion to top excess, rather than a spoiled bottom.

The extraordinary Scandinavian results are not the only result of interest in table 3. *Firstly* it is clear that subtracting the occupations general practitioner and minister in column 2 and 3 respectively actually makes a big difference on the country rankings. Withdrawing the general practitioner occupation, the scores of many Post-Communist countries are increased notably. When subtracting the minister occupation, a similar but somewhat smaller effect can be seen with the Anglo-Saxon countries. The explanation for these results can be found in table 1. The median should earn-salary of doctors in most Post-Communist countries are thus markedly lower, than the corresponding minister and chairman salaries. This is in line with Larsen's (2006) arguments, but not the case in general in other countries. In the Anglo-Saxon countries it is the ministers, who are not supposed to earn as much as the chairmen and doctors.

*Secondly* these results also indicate that many of the Post-Communist countries apparently have accepted the greater wage dispersion rates followed by the transitions to market economy. This attitudinal transition is also noticed in some of the exiting studies using earlier data of 1987 and 1992 (Kelley & Evans 1993; Austen 1999; Austen 2002 and Blanchflower & Freeman 1997)<sup>18</sup>.

*Thirdly* the results of Larsen (2006) seem to be blurred, when including the Post-Communist countries (column 4-5): Of the Continental European countries only France seems to be a real top-outlier, together with some post-communist countries not included in Larsen's analysis. There is not much difference between the remaining Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries though. In column 6 the Anglo-Saxon countries are as Larsen stated placed higher than the continental European countries, but this result is again "overruled" by the score of many Post-Communist countries (pp. 39-41). Table 4 below will replicate the analysis above albeit with 2009-data. The absent occupation "skilled factory worker" prevents the replication of column 4-6 of table 3:

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<sup>18</sup> Results of the next section oppositely indicate that the attitudinal transition is not finished yet. Even if the median values of differences in pay have increased in many Post-Communist countries, the respondents want to increase the actual pay of the low paid occupations and oppositely reduce the pay of the high paid occupations considerably.

TABLE 4. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay for the five occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country medians in levels of differences.

<sup>A</sup> Wage dispersion index		<sup>B</sup> High- vs. Low paid occ.		<sup>C</sup> Chairmen vs. Low paid occ.	
CY	6.47	CY	6.28	AUS	8.00
AUS	5.81	AUS	6.15	FR	6.67
CZ	5.74	AT	5.37	USA	6.49
USA	5.51	FR	5.36	NZ	6.01
FR	4.77	DE	5.05	DE	5.45
GB	4.61	USA	5.00	GB	5.26
DE	4.56	PL	5.00	H	5.00
PT	4.36	H	5.00	PL	5.00
NZ	4.33	RUS	5.00	PT	5.00
CH	4.17	CH	4.78	RUS	5.00
H	4.17	GB	4.67	AT	4.83
PL	4.13	PT	4.62	EE	4.67
AT	4.05	EE	4.50	CY	4.57
RUS	4.00	NZ	4.33	CH	4.44
E	3.92	SLO	4.08	SLO	4.44
EE	3.91	CZ	3.87	FIN	4.17
TR	3.33	PT	3.85	CZ	4.00
FIN	3.33	FIN	3.75	IL	3.64
SLK	3.30	TR	3.60	SLK	3.53
HR	3.00	UA	3.33	HR	3.51
SLO	2.89	HR	3.30	UA	3.33
BG	2.87	IL	3.25	TR	3.20
IL	2.86	BG	3.00	BG	3.08
UA	2.79	LV	3.00	LV	3.00
FL	2.67	FL	2.83	E	2.86
LV	2.67	E	2.83	FL	2.84
IS	2.53	IS	2.60	IS	2.67
<b>DK</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>2.33</b>
<b>NO</b>	<b>2.32</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>2.38</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>2.22</b>
<b>SE</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>2.27</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>2.00</b>
Average	3.80		4.05		4.24
Skand.	2.38		2.38		2.18
Others	3.95		4.24		4.47

<sup>A</sup> The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second.

<sup>B</sup> This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group.

<sup>C</sup> In the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.

Table 4 shows that the Scandinavian countries are still clearly the most egalitarian in 2009, no matter which of the three measures are used. The Scandinavian egalitarianism in attitudes towards differences in levels of pay is thus clear and consistent in a comparative perspective. However the Scandinavians have become slightly less egalitarian. The Scandinavian averages of approximately 2.38 are thus a little bit higher than 2.15 of 1999. This anti-egalitarian move still dwarfs, when comparing with the development, countries like Cyprus, Australia as well as several of the Post-Communist countries. As the case was in table 2, the Icelandic medians are actually on a Scandinavian level, while the Finnish are much higher.

The most notable development when comparing table 4 with table 3 is furthermore that the Anglo-Saxon countries have climbed up the table surpassing most Post-Communist countries. The Anglo-Saxon countries are followed closely by Continental European countries like Germany and France, while Flanders oppositely has values closely resembling the Scandinavian.

### ***4.3 Attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay – the unjust salaries of chairmen in Scandinavia***

The analysis of the third dimension – *attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay* – also incorporates data of the question, of how much the respondents think the people in different occupations actually earn usually. The disaggregated measures created below are inspired by Osberg & Smeeding's (2006) aggregated measure of:

*“...how much the respondents own personal estimate of the actual degree of inequality in pay among a range of occupations diverges from his or her own estimate of “fair” inequality within this range of occupations.”* (pp. 460).

But instead of pooling all occupations in one overall measure as done by Osberg & Smeeding (2006), the measures below will look at each occupation separately.

The *first step* in creating these measures is, for each respondent, subtracting how much he/she thinks a certain occupation should earn, with the same respondents perception of, what the same occupation actually earns usually. A positive figure on this measure indicates that the respondent thinks, the occupation should earn more, than it is perceived to do usually. As the case was concerning the analyses of the first dimension, the problem with this preliminary measure is that it is in

local currency. It also varies whether the respondents refer to a net or a gross sum, and if they refer to monthly or yearly salaries.

To be able to compare the country median values in this case also, a *second step* is thus to standardise the preliminary first measure. This is done simply by dividing the preliminary measure, with the “actually earns usually” statement of the respondent for the same occupation. In this way a standardised measure is created. This denotes how big a proportion of the perceived salary of a certain occupation, the respondent would want the salary to increase or decrease. The results of 1999 and 2009 are displayed below in table 5 and 6:

TABLE 5. Degree of justice in levels of pay for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country medians of these measures<sup>A</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		A skilled worker in a factory		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory	
BG	0.00	BG	0.00	RUS	2.75	RUS	1.50	RUS	1.00	RUS	1.50
<b>NO</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	LV	0.00	LV	1.25	LV	0.88	LV	1.00	LV	1.00
<b>DK</b>	<b>-0.08</b>	ES	-0.13	BG	1.00	BG	0.67	BG	0.67	BG	0.71
USA	-0.17	CY	-0.15	HU	0.60	PL	0.67	PL	0.67	HU	0.71
<b>SE</b>	<b>-0.20</b>	PL	-0.17	PL	0.50	HU	0.67	HU	0.67	PL	0.60
GB	-0.20	IL	-0.17	CZ	0.25	SLO	0.43	CZ	0.50	SLO	0.50
AUS	-0.20	<b>DK</b>	<b>-0.17</b>	SLO	0.20	CZ	0.36	PT	0.43	PT	0.43
CDN	-0.20	SLO	-0.20	IL	0.11	IL	0.33	SLO	0.33	IL	0.40
HU	-0.22	WD	-0.20	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.00</b>	PT	0.33	GB	0.30	CZ	0.33
NZ	-0.25	AT	-0.22	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.00</b>	FR	0.29	FR	0.29	FR	0.33
FR	-0.25	<b>NO</b>	<b>-0.22</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.00</b>	ES	0.25	ES	0.27	ES	0.30
PT	-0.25	CZ	-0.25	USA	0.00	USA	0.20	CY	0.25	CY	0.25
CY	-0.25	HU	-0.25	GB	0.00	GB	0.20	IL	0.25	USA	0.25
IL	-0.25	PT	-0.25	AUS	0.00	AUS	0.20	ED	0.25	GB	0.20
LV	-0.25	ED	-0.25	NZ	0.00	ED	0.20	USA	0.25	AUS	0.20
WD	-0.28	USA	-0.25	CDN	0.00	NZ	0.17	AT	0.21	NZ	0.20
ES	-0.29	<b>SE</b>	<b>-0.32</b>	WD	0.00	AT	0.13	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.21</b>	AT	0.20
PL	-0.30	AUS	-0.33	AT	0.00	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.21</b>	ED	0.20
CZ	-0.30	NZ	-0.33	FR	0.00	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.11</b>	AUS	0.20	CDN	0.14
AT	-0.33	CDN	-0.36	ES	0.00	CY	0.11	NZ	0.20	WD	0.14
SLO	-0.33	GB	-0.38	PT	0.00	WD	0.10	CDN	0.20	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.11</b>
ED	-0.38	FR	-0.44	ED	0.00	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.10</b>	WD	0.19	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.11</b>
RUS	-0.40	RUS	-0.60	CY	-0.14	CDN	0.00	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.10</b>
Average	-0.23		-0.25		0.28		0.35		0.38		0.39
Skand.	-0.10		-0.24		0.00		0.11		0.20		0.11
Others	-0.26		-0.25		0.30		0.38		0.41		0.43

<sup>A</sup> Calculated by for each occupation subtracting, what the respondents in the various countries think that the occupations actually earns usually, from what the occupation should earn. This figure is then standardized by dividing, with the usually earns actually statement of the respondent.

The Scandinavian countries also in this analysis stand out somewhat in 1999. For all other occupations than the chairmen occupation, the Scandinavian median values are quite close to zero in a comparative perspective. This means that the salaries the occupations are perceived to earn usually seems more or less at a legitimate level in Scandinavia. The clearest example of this is that the Scandinavians on the average only wants to increase the perceived salaries of unskilled workers



with 11 %, while the average in the remaining countries is 43 %. The median Russian even wants to increase this salary with as much as 150 %.

A notable difference between Norway and Denmark versus Sweden is seen in the minister column. The very low Danish and Norwegian scores of minus 2 % and 8 % could be seen as an effect of the high level of political trust in these countries. The somewhat higher Swedish median of minus 20 % could be an effect of the economic and political crisis, Sweden faced in the early nineties - something that Norway and Denmark have not to the same extent faced.

Concerning the chairmen column the Scandinavian medians are more in line with the other countries. The Scandinavian countries on average do not stand out from the remaining ones, but this average hides a big variation between the Swedish median of – 32 % and the Danish – 17 %. In a Scandinavian perspective this overall result translates into a quite big dissatisfaction with the chairmen's salaries in 1999 – especially in Sweden. The aversion towards top excess appears in a very clear form in table 5 and is restricted to the chairmen occupation. The results thus suggest that the wage levels of chairmen are perceived to have increased too far from a country medium wage level to be considered just.

The Scandinavian medians are not the only results of interest. *Firstly* it is quite clear that even though the respondents in general probably take their point of departure in their perception of the actual wage level of an occupation, when deciding the just level (Miller 1995); the respondents do want the wage levels to change, often quite a lot. *Secondly* the pattern of median attitudes are quite similar: the two best paid occupations – ministers and chairmen – ought to have their wages reduced, the doctors salaries are generally seen as just, while the remaining lower paid occupations ought to have their salaries increased according to the respondents.

*Thirdly*, of course interesting intra-country variations in this pattern exist. Maybe most remarkably the Post-Communist respondents are not satisfied with the salaries of general practitioners, but want to increase these quite a lot. This could possibly be caused by the low salaries for publicly employed, including doctors, in these countries. Doctors take a long and hard education and perform a crucial task in the society. This would probably lead many to think a quite high salary for this occupation to be fair. *Fourthly*, although the Post-Communist countries have accepted the transition to market economy somewhat (see above), this table clearly indicates a socialist leftover (Kelley & Evans 1993; Austen 1999; Austen 2002 and Blanchflower & Freeman 1997). Table 5 show the Post-Communist respondents to clearly wish for a more compressed wage structure. Their medians indicate that they want to see the minister's salaries reduced by as much as 40 %, and the chair-

men's salaries reduced by as much as 60 %. It is even more outstanding that they want to see pay-raised for the remaining occupations for more than 100 % in some instances. The Post-Communist countries portray great internal variations in patterns though. Table 6 below will replicate the analysis of table 5, without column of skilled factory worker:

TABLE 6. Degree of justice in levels of pay for the five occupations of ISSP 2009. Shown are country medians of these measures<sup>A</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> gov-ernment		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory	
CH	0.00	BG	0.00	UA	1.50	UA	1.00	UA	1.00
<b>NO</b>	<b>-0.07</b>	TR	0.00	RUS	0.67	TR	0.75	TR	0.82
<b>DK</b>	<b>-0.11</b>	CY	-0.08	H	0.33	HR	0.67	RUS	0.67
IS	-0.11	EE	-0.17	IL	0.25	PL	0.67	SLO	0.60
NZ	-0.17	UA	-0.20	EE	0.25	H	0.64	HR	0.60
CY	-0.17	IL	-0.25	HR	0.25	RUS	0.60	H	0.54
AUS	-0.20	FL	-0.25	LV	0.14	BG	0.60	PL	0.50
EE	-0.20	NZ	-0.29	TR	0.11	EE	0.60	BG	0.50
<b>SE</b>	<b>-0.25</b>	SLK	-0.29	AT	0.00	LV	0.58	PT	0.50
GB	-0.26	HR	-0.33	AUS	0.00	SLO	0.56	EE	0.43
USA	-0.28	CZ	-0.33	FL	0.00	PT	0.50	LV	0.39
FIN	-0.30	LV	-0.33	BG	0.00	SLK	0.43	IL	0.38
BG	-0.33	<b>DK</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.00</b>	CZ	0.43	FR	0.36
FL	-0.33	PL	-0.36	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.00</b>	E	0.38	IS	0.33
DE	-0.33	IS	-0.38	FIN	0.00	FR	0.33	SLK	0.33
FR	-0.33	FIN	-0.38	IS	0.00	IS	0.32	CZ	0.33
PT	-0.33	<b>SE</b>	<b>-0.38</b>	FR	0.00	DE	0.25	E	0.33
SLO	-0.33	<b>NO</b>	<b>-0.40</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.00</b>	GB	0.25	DE	0.25
IL	-0.38	E	-0.40	NZ	0.00	AT	0.25	AT	0.25
TR	-0.38	GB	-0.40	PL	0.00	CY	0.25	GB	0.25
HR	-0.40	CH	-0.40	PT	0.00	IL	0.25	CH	0.22
PL	-0.40	PT	-0.44	SLK	0.00	FIN	0.25	AUS	0.20
SLK	-0.42	SLO	-0.44	USA	0.00	CH	0.25	FL	0.20
AT	-0.44	DE	-0.50	SLO	0.00	AUS	0.22	USA	0.20
E	-0.44	FR	-0.50	E	0.00	USA	0.20	CY	0.18
CZ	-0.47	H	-0.50	CZ	0.00	FL	0.20	NZ	0.17
H	-0.50	AT	-0.50	CH	0.00	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.20</b>	FIN	0.10
RUS	-0.50	RUS	-0.50	DE	0.00	NZ	0.19	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.09</b>
LV	-0.60	USA	-0.60	GB	0.00	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.09</b>
UA	-0.67	AUS	-0.67	CY	-0.13	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.09</b>
Average	-0.32		-0.35		0.11		0.41		0.36
Skand.	-0.14		-0.37		0.00		0.19		0.09
Others	-0.34		-0.35		0.12		0.43		0.39

<sup>A</sup> Calculated by for each occupation subtracting, what the respondents in the various countries think that the occupations actually earns usually, from what the occupation should earn. This figure is then standardized by dividing, with the usually earns actually statement of the respondent.

Table 6 reconfirms the same pattern in Scandinavian attitudes in 2009 as in 1999: The salaries of all occupations minus the chairmen-occupation are seen as comparatively speaking very just in Scandinavia (Sweden is also still lagging behind Denmark and Norway concerning the minister-occupation). The biggest intra-Scandinavian change in the 10 year period is clearly an increased degree of dissatisfaction with the chairmen's salaries, whose Scandinavian average increased from -0.24 to -0.37. This increase mirrors the general increase in the countries also found with the ministers' salaries. The Scandinavian countries do not fully follow suit here though.

The two other Nordic countries in each their ways resemble and dis-resemble the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish respondents are more dissatisfied with ministers' salaries and to a lesser extent the shop assistants' salaries, than the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish respondents. The patterns of the remaining occupations are quite similar. The Icelandic pattern is as the Scandinavian countries' for the three first columns. Concerning the two lower paid occupations the Icelandic respondents want significantly bigger wage increases.

Besides the Nordic results; table 6 reconfirms the general pattern of wishing higher salaries for the lower paid occupations, lower salaries for the higher paid occupations and fair salaries for general practitioner. Some Post-Communist countries are still among the most extreme in the columns. The transitional legacy is thus not becoming legitimate seen by this measure. Countries like USA and Australia seems to have experienced an attitudinal effect of the financial crisis in wishing drastically lower salaries of chairmen.

#### ***4.4 Degree of consensus in attitudes towards pay – the increasingly divided Scandinavians***

The *consensus* dimension concerns, to what extent the respondents in the different countries agree about the measures presented above. Dispersion measures like the standard deviation would normally be presented together with measures of central tendencies, as table 1-6 above displayed. This standard approach was not followed though. The tables above are big tables taking up a lot of space and containing a lot of information already. Graphically it was difficult to incorporate the dispersion measures in the tables. The tables furthermore already contained a lot of countries and as much as six different measures per table. Extra information in the form of dispersion measures could easily have led to more confusion instead of clarification.

To measure degree of consensus the standard deviation will in general be used. This does not apply concerning the *levels of pay* measures of table 1 and 2. As it is apparent in table 1 and 2, even if the national currency statements have been recalculated to PPP corrected \$, there are still quite big differences in levels between the countries. Interpreting a standard deviation is relative to which scale, the measure of central tendency has. The consequence is that it is not possible to compare the standard deviations of the countries (the standard deviation can be interpreted as the average distance from the average). To give an example; a standard deviation of 1.000 PPP corrected \$ is quite small, if the median/average is 75.000 PPP corrected \$. If the median/average instead is 7.000 PPP corrected \$, the standard deviation denotes a significant dispersion of the respondents statements. What is needed is therefore a standardised version of the standard deviation, setting the standard deviation values relative to the measures of central tendency. The “Coefficient of Variation” (CoV) is exactly such a measure, why it is used in these two cases<sup>19</sup>. If dispersion tables for all measures presented above would be present below, six new tables would be needed to be presented. To conserve space, the results of these tables will just be presented below (The tables can be found in appendix 7.3-7.5).

The tables 11-16 in appendix 7.3-7.5 display a quite remarkable tendency: the degree of consensus in the Scandinavian countries generally becomes smaller from 1999 to 2009. Going more into detail, *appendix 7.3* shows that especially the Norwegians and Danes disagrees more about, what the occupations ought to earn in 2009 than in 1999. The Swedes have only slightly bigger CoV’s in 2009 than in 1999. This result can be found both by looking at the actual coefficients of the countries and comparing their position in the tables to those of other countries. *Firstly* the coefficients on average of Denmark and Norway respectively rise significantly from 0.026 and 0.008 to 0.151 and 0,199. For Norway this means that while the average deviation from the median was approximately 1 % from the median in 1999, it increased to approximately 20 % in 2009. *Secondly* especially Norway moves from the bottom of the columns in 1999 to the upper-middle of the table. This Norwegian result is furthermore in accordance with the remarkable degree of consensus Osberg & Smeeding (2006) found in Norway, albeit with a slightly different measure.

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<sup>19</sup> The formula for calculating the coefficient of variation is normally:  $C_V = \frac{\sigma}{\mu}$ , because the median is consistently used in the article as the measure of central tendency, a slightly modified version of the CoV is also uses here:

$$C_V = \frac{\sigma}{M}, (\sigma = \text{standard deviation, } M = \text{median and } \mu = \text{mean}).$$

*Appendix 7.4* confirms this tendency even more clearly. In 1999 the Scandinavian countries are in general in the bottom of the columns, with very low standard deviations in a comparative perspective (table 13). The exception is the two first columns for Norway, who is in the very top of the table. This drops drastically after excluding the minister-occupation in the third columns though. In 2009 Denmark, Norway and also Sweden have moved from the bottom of the columns to the middle of the tables. Most of the standard deviations have also increased quite significantly from below 0.1 to around 0.2.

*Appendix 7.5* again confirms the tendency. The Scandinavian countries are generally in the lower half of the columns in 1999, with standard deviations below 0.025 (table 15). The exception is again Norway, who in 1999 has statistics for the chairmen and doctor columns not making any sense, on the “proportion-scales”, the measures of the justice dimension operates on. These results thus serve as a textbook example of how much outliers can influence average-, and hence standard deviation measures. Ignoring these Norwegian results the Scandinavian countries have clearly moved from the lower half to the top of the table from 1999-2009. Sweden is again the only country “left behind”, but this time only in the three last columns.

The two other Nordic countries Iceland and Finland are not as Scandinavian, as measured on some of the other dimensions. Iceland in all the 2009-tables displays a very big degree of consensus, not mirrored in the Scandinavian countries. Finland is less extreme in this respect, but also a higher degree of consensus, than the Scandinavian countries in general.

Summing up the Scandinavian people clearly disagrees more about the attitudes towards pay in 2009 than in 1999. This result can be found in all tables of appendix 7.3-7.5, but is of course more clear in some than in others.

## 5. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was in a two-way comparative perspective to examine if and how the Scandinavians' attitudes towards pay stand out from those inhabited by people in other western countries and how the development have been from 1999 to 2009. The analysis of the four operationalised dimensions of attitudes towards pay – *levels of pay*, *difference in levels of pay*, *degree of justice in levels of pay* and *consensus* – clearly showed that the Scandinavian attitudes of both 1999 and 2009 were in fact quite exceptional. The thorough 2-way comparative design - that is comparative in both space and time - and in-depth analyses of as many as four dimensions of the concept, furthermore contributes to a more complex, but also potentially dynamic, understanding, of how the attitudes of the Scandinavians might be expected to develop in the future. This is in contrast to much of the existing research in the field.

The Scandinavian countries most clearly and consistently stood out from the other western countries, when investigating the dimension of *attitudes towards difference in levels of pay*: No matter which of the three aggregated, or the three disaggregated measures used in 1999 or 2009, the Scandinavians want exceptionally small differences in levels of pay (see table 3 and 4).

The analyses of the other dimensions furthermore substantiated that this egalitarianism seems like an effect of an aversion towards top excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom. In the analyses of the dimension of *attitudes towards levels of pay*, it was thus *firstly* clear and in time increasingly consistent that the Scandinavians want quite low salaries for the higher paid occupations, compared to other rich western countries. Contrasting the Anglo-Saxon-, the Continental European- and the Post-Communist countries, the Scandinavian countries displayed a rising tendency from left to right in both the tables of 1999 and 2009 (see table 1 and 2, appendix 7.1 and 7.2).

*Secondly* the aversion towards top excess seemed even clearer in the analyses of the dimension of *attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay*. The Scandinavians in general found the salaries of the occupations quite just in a comparative perspective. The two lower paid occupations thus ought to have their salaries increased by maximum 20 % according to the Scandinavians in both 1999 and 2009, which in a comparative perspective is very little. The only real exception from this pattern was the chairmen occupation. In a Scandinavian perspective the salaries of chairmen in 2009 are thus wanted reduced with between 33 - 40 % (table 5 and 6).

Summing up, in accordance with Åberg's (1984) descriptions in the 1980's, the Scandinavians does in fact seem to consistently be exceptionally egalitarian, compared to other western countries in 1999 and 2009. This egalitarianism furthermore seems clearly to be related to an aversion towards to excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom. In the analyses of the last dimension: *Degree of consensus in attitudes towards pay*, clear indications was found of cracks in the Scandinavian egalitarianism. Although clearer in some tables than in others, a clear tendency for a decreased degree of consensus, measures by various dispersion measures, could be seen. In 1999 the Scandinavian countries were among those with the lowest standard deviations and coefficients of variance. In 2009, the Scandinavian countries have crawled upwards to the center or even the top of the tables. The Scandinavians are thus clearly more polarised on these issues in 2009 than in 1999. This tendency could indicate a dynamic leading to a change in the Scandinavian egalitarianism in the future – in one direction or another.

A final remark about the choice of focus is also in order. The two other Nordic countries Iceland and Finland are both present in the 2009-dataset. Often the Scandinavian countries are not in themselves a focus of analysis in the social sciences. Instead the Nordic countries and the Nordic model are often described as being special (e.g. Ervasti et al 2008). In spite of this, the result showed that the Scandinavian or maybe “core-Nordic” attitudes towards pay clearly deviated from those of the Finnish and Icelandic respondents.

The *Icelandic* attitudes in several aspects actually resemble the Scandinavian. This is not the case when looking at the level of consensus and justice though. The Icelanders thus remain having a very high degree of consensus also in 2009. On the other hand a much bigger dissatisfaction, than the Scandinavian countries', with the salaries of the lower paid occupation, could be seen in table 6. The *Finnish* attitudes were even less similar to the Scandinavian. Only in the analysis of the justice dimension did the Finnish in general resemble the Scandinavians. The Finnish attitudes in fact more clearly resembles those of Continental European countries Austria and Germany, than the Scandinavian ones.



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# 7. Appendix

## 7.1. Other measures of attitudes towards levels of pay in 1999 – gross salaries and Euros

TABLE 7. Attitudes to yearly gross pay<sup>A</sup> for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country medians in PPP corrected \$<sup>B</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government	a chairman of a large national corporation	a doctor in general practice	A skilled worker in a factory	a shop assistant	an unskilled worker in a factory
FR 81.378	FR 135.630	USA 100.000	USA 35.500	<b>NO 28.245</b>	<b>NO 26.900</b>
AUS 77.942	CDN 121.951	CDN 84.104	CDN 35.324	<b>DK 25.940</b>	CDN 25.231
AT 76.499	GB 115.207	AUS 77.942	<b>NO 33.625</b>	CDN 25.231	USA 25.000
USA 75.000	USA 100.000	FR 67.815	AUS 31.177	USA 25.000	<b>DK 24.761</b>
WD 74.664	WD 93.330	<b>NO 67.249</b>	<b>DK 29.478</b>	AUS 23.383	FR 21.701
GB 72.197	IL 82.306	WD 62.220	WD 27.999	WD 21.777	ES 19.505
CDN 63.078	AUS 77.942	GB 61.444	GB 27.650	FR 21.701	AUS 19.456
ED 62.220	SL 76.936	<b>DK 58.955</b>	FR 27.126	ES 19.505	AT 19.125
IL 61.069	AT 76.499	AT 57.375	ED 24.888	AT 19.125	WD 18.666
<b>DK 58.955</b>	<b>NO 67.249</b>	NZ 52.356	ES 24.706	ED 18.666	<b>SS 18.587</b>
SL 57.702	NZ 65.445	ED 49.776	AT 23.906	<b>SE 18.587</b>	GB 18.433
PT 57.373	ED 62.220	IL 40.713	NZ 22.906	GB 18.433	NZ 16.361
<b>NO 53.800</b>	PT 57.343	<b>SE 37.175</b>	<b>SE 22.615</b>	IL 18.321	IL 16.285
NZ 52.356	<b>DK 56.597</b>	SL 38.468	IL 20.356	SL 17.311	ED 15.555
ES 52.012	ES 52.012	PT 34.406	SLO 17.311	NZ 16.361	SL 13.464
PL 46.452	PL 46.452	ES 33.808	PT 17.203	PT 13.762	PT 11.469
<b>SE 43.371</b>	<b>SE 43.371</b>	PL 23.226	PL 13.936	PL 9.290	PL 9.290
CZ 37.686	CZ 41.873	HU 17.845	CZ 10.887	CZ 8.375	HU 7.138
HU 35.691	HU 35.691	CZ 16.749	HU 9.518	HU 8.328	CZ 6.700

<sup>A</sup> The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. The following countries have asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remaining countries have asked about gross salaries.

<sup>B</sup> The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: "National currency per current international dollar", the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current PPP-conversion rate. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx>.

For the following countries preliminary recalculations from local currency to Euro have been made – followed by another recalculation to PPP-corrected \$: France, Portugal, Spain, West- and East Germany, Austria and Slovenia. The reason is, that the PPP-conversion rates for these countries prescribes that the local currency is Euro also in 1999.

The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguese statements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, while the respondents here where asked to answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/social-inequality/1999/>).

TABLE 8. Attitudes to yearly net pay<sup>A</sup> for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country medians in Euros<sup>B</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		A skilled worker in a factory		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory	
FR	54.878	FR	91.463	USA	63.571	USA	22.568	NO	<b>16.436</b>	USA	15.893
GB	48.948	GB	78.108	FR	45.732	NO	<b>19.567</b>	DK	<b>16.484</b>	DK	<b>15.734</b>
AT	48.167	USA	63.571	GB	41.657	GB	18.746	USA	15.893	NO	<b>15.653</b>
USA	47.678	CDN	59.987	CDN	41.370	DK	<b>18.731</b>	FR	14.634	FR	14.634
IL	43.413	WD	52.163	NO	<b>39.134</b>	FR	18.293	IL	13.024	SE	<b>12.592</b>
CY	41.797	AT	48.167	AUS	38.776	CDN	17.376	SE	<b>12.592</b>	GB	12.497
WD	41.731	IL	43.413	DK	<b>37.463</b>	WD	15.649	GB	12.497	CDN	12.411
AUS	38.776	NO	<b>39.134</b>	AT	36.126	AUS	15.511	CDN	12.411	AT	12.042
DK	<b>37.463</b>	AUS	38.776	WD	34.776	SE	<b>15.320</b>	WD	12.171	IL	11.577
ED	34.776	NZ	36.452	NZ	29.161	AT	15.052	AT	12.042	ES	10.818
NO	<b>31.307</b>	DK	<b>35.964</b>	IL	28.942	IL	14.471	AUS	11.633	WD	10.433
CDN	31.028	ED	34.776	ED	27.820	ED	13.910	ES	10.818	CY	9.718
PT	29.928	PT	29.928	CY	27.168	ES	13.703	ED	10.433	AUS	9.694
SE	<b>29.381</b>	SE	<b>29.381</b>	SE	<b>25.184</b>	NZ	12.758	CY	9.404	NZ	9.113
NZ	29.161	ES	28.848	ES	18.751	CY	12.539	NZ	9.113	ED	8.694
ES	28.848	CY	27.168	PT	17.957	PT	8.978	PT	7.183	PT	5.986
SL	18.622	SL	24.829	SL	12.414	SL	5.587	SL	5.587	SL	4.345
PL	15.130	PL	15.130	PL	7.565	PL	4.539	PL	3.026	PL	3.026
CZ	11.418	CZ	12.687	CZ	5.075	LV	3.610	LV	2.707	CZ	2.030
HU	9.303	LV	12.633	HU	4.652	CZ	3.299	CZ	2.537	HU	1.861
LV	9.024	HU	9.303	LV	3.610	HU	2.481	HU	2.171	LV	1.805
RUS	4.844	RUS	4.844	BG	3.072	BG	1.843	BG	1.228	BG	1.229
BG	4.300	BG	3.686	RUS	1.453	RUS	1.453	RUS	727	RUS	484

<sup>A</sup> The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12.

The following countries have asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remaining countries have asked about gross salaries.

The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguese statements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, while the respondents here where asked to answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/social-inequality/1999/>).

## 7.2. Other measures of attitudes towards levels of pay in 2009 – gross salaries and Euros

TABLE 9. Attitudes to yearly gross pay<sup>A</sup> for the five occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country medians in PPP corrected \$<sup>B</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory	
CH	167.280	AUS	204.360	USA	150.000	CH	37.638	FL	35.037
CY	128.859	USA	200.000	CY	128.859	<b>DK</b>	<b>35.465</b>	CH	33.456
DE	112.676	CH	167.280	AUS	122.616	FL	35.037	<b>DK</b>	<b>33.101</b>
FR	109.344	FR	182.240	GB	102.134	<b>NO</b>	<b>31.723</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>31.723</b>
AUS	102.180	GB	152.439	CH	100.368	USA	30.000	USA	30.000
USA	100.000	DE	140.845	FR	91.120	IS	29.197	IS	29.197
FL	93.432	<b>FI</b>	<b>125.261</b>	DE	84.507	FR	29.158	<b>SE</b>	<b>28.454</b>
GB	91.463	FL	113.286	<b>DK</b>	<b>82.752</b>	DE	28.169	FR	27.336
NZ	91.218	AT	112.808	FL	81.753	AUS	27.248	AUS	27.248
<b>DK</b>	<b>88.663</b>	SL	112.015	NZ	80.396	<b>SE</b>	<b>27.161</b>	ES	25.066
AT	84.606	NZ	98.949	<b>NO</b>	<b>74.019</b>	AT	25.382	<b>FI</b>	<b>25.052</b>
SL	84.011	PT	89.126	AT	70.505	SL	25.203	GB	24.390
PL	81.338	PL	81.338	SL	70.009	<b>FI</b>	<b>25.052</b>	IL	23.354
IS	77.858	CY	80.537	IS	68.126	GB	24.390	AT	22.914
IL	77.848	<b>NO</b>	<b>79.306</b>	<b>FI</b>	<b>62.630</b>	IL	23.354	DE	22.535
<b>FI</b>	<b>75.157</b>	IS	77.858	<b>SE</b>	<b>58.202</b>	ES	23.138	SL	22.403
<b>NO</b>	<b>74.019</b>	IL	77.848	PT	55.704	NZ	21.645	NZ	21.645
HU	67.661	ES	77.127	IL	50.601	PT	17.825	CY	19.329
PT	66.844	EE	72.523	ES	48.204	PL	16.268	PT	16.711
<b>SE</b>	<b>64.669</b>	HU	67.661	PL	40.669	EE	16.116	PL	16.268
EE	64.464	<b>SE</b>	<b>64.669</b>	TR	35.447	CY	16.107	EE	16.116
ES	57.845	<b>DK</b>	<b>59.109</b>	CZ	33.487	TR	14.179	TR	14.179
TR	56.715	CZ	50.230	EE	32.232	SK	13.796	SK	13.796
SK	55.167	SK	45.987	HU	29.602	HU	12.686	HU	12.686
CZ	41.859	TR	42.536	SK	27.592	CZ	12.558	CZ	12.558
BG	25.210	BG	31.933	BG	20.168	BG	8.403	BG	8.403

<sup>A</sup> The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12.

The following countries have asked about gross salaries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries, while this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have asked about net salaries.

<sup>B</sup> The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: "National currency per current international dollar", the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current PPP-conversion rate. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx>.

TABLE 10. Attitudes to yearly net pay<sup>A</sup> for six occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country medians in Euros<sup>B</sup>.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory	
CH	161.355	CH	161.355	CH	96.813	CH	36.305	CH	32.271
FR	72.000	FR	120.000	USA	83.546	<b>DK</b>	<b>24.351</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>22.727</b>
<b>DK</b>	<b>60.877</b>	AUS	118.407	AUS	71.044	<b>NO</b>	<b>22.035</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>22.035</b>
AUS	59.203	USA	111.395	FR	60.000	FR	19.200	<b>SE</b>	<b>18.164</b>
DE	56.333	<b>FI</b>	<b>85.140</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>56.818</b>	FL	18.000	FR	18.000
USA	55.697	GB	77.700	GB	52.059	<b>SE</b>	<b>17.338</b>	FL	18.000
<b>NO</b>	<b>51.415</b>	DE	70.416	<b>NO</b>	<b>51.415</b>	<b>FI</b>	<b>17.028</b>	<b>FI</b>	<b>17.028</b>
<b>FI</b>	<b>51.084</b>	AT	64.675	NZ	44.642	USA	16.709	USA	16.709
NZ	50.652	FL	58.200	<b>FI</b>	<b>42.570</b>	IS	16.271	IS	16.271
AT	48.506	<b>NO</b>	<b>55.080</b>	DE	42.250	AUS	15.788	AUS	15.788
FL	48.000	NZ	54.944	FL	42.000	AT	14.552	ES	15.600
GB	46.620	PT	48.000	AT	40.422	ES	14.400	IL	13.639
IL	45.462	SL	48.000	IS	37.967	DE	14.083	AT	13.137
IS	43.390	ES	48.000	<b>SE</b>	<b>37.154</b>	IL	13.639	GB	12.432
<b>SE</b>	<b>41.282</b>	IL	45.462	ES	30.000	GB	12.432	NZ	12.019
SL	36.000	IS	43.390	SL	30.000	NZ	12.019	DE	11.267
ES	36.000	<b>SE</b>	<b>41.282</b>	PT	30.000	SL	10.800	SL	9.600
PT	36.000	<b>DK</b>	<b>40.584</b>	IL	29.550	PT	9.600	PT	9.000
EE	30.678	EE	34.513	HR	16.361	EE	7.669	EE	7.669
PL	28.820	PL	28.820	EE	15.339	HR	6.544	HR	6.544
SK	23.892	HR	24.541	PL	14.410	SK	5.975	SK	5.975
TR	22.451	HU	22.510	TR	14.032	LV	5.930	LV	5.930
HU	22.510	CZ	20.858	CZ	13.905	PL	5.764	PL	5.764
RUS	20.618	RUS	20.618	SK	11.950	TR	5.613	TR	5.613
CZ	17.382	SK	19.916	LV	10.165	CZ	5.214	CZ	5.214
LV	16.942	LV	16.942	HU	9.848	RUS	4.418	RUS	4.418
HR	16.361	TR	16.838	RUS	5.891	HU	4.221	HU	4.221
UA	7.847	UA	8.968	UA	3.363	UA	2.242	UA	2.242

<sup>A</sup> The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. The following countries have asked about gross salaries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries, while this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have asked about net salaries.



<sup>B</sup> The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: "National currency per current international dollar", the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current PPP-conversion rate. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx>.

### 7.3. Degree of consensus apparent in the measures for the different occupations of attitudes towards levels of pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are Coefficients of Variation.

TABLE 11. Coefficients of Variations for the statements of the salary of six occupations net yearly salary in PPP corrected \$ in ISSP 1999.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		A skilled worker in a factory		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory		Country averages	
RUS	0.102	RUS	0.159	PL	0.055	PL	0.036	CDN	0.055	GB	0.067	RUS	0.062
PL	0.098	CDN	0.110	BG	0.052	BG	0.033	PT	0.041	FR	0.055	PL	0.060
BG	0.093	PL	0.098	PT	0.043	RUS	0.032	PL	0.036	RUS	0.042	CDN	0.048
LV	0.074	HU	0.090	RUS	0.037	IL	0.024	RUS	0.035	LV	0.040	BG	0.046
NZ	0.067	LV	0.079	CDN	0.034	SL	0.021	IL	0.032	PL	0.037	LV	0.042
CDN	0.045	ED	0.060	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.032</b>	USA	0.019	BG	0.030	CDN	0.028	HU	0.037
HU	0.041	GB	0.054	HU	0.031	FR	0.018	SL	0.024	IL	0.027	PT	0.034
<b>DK</b>	<b>0.039</b>	USA	0.051	LV	0.031	HU	0.018	FR	0.024	CY	0.027	GB	0.034
ED	0.038	PT	0.050	ED	0.029	CDN	0.016	HU	0.021	BG	0.023	FR	0.033
PT	0.038	NZ	0.047	AT	0.028	LV	0.016	USA	0.021	USA	0.023	NZ	0.031
FR	0.031	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.045</b>	USA	0.026	PT	0.015	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.019</b>	SL	0.020	ED	0.029
GB	0.028	FR	0.043	FR	0.025	GB	0.013	GB	0.018	HU	0.019	USA	0.028
USA	0.027	BG	0.042	WD	0.025	ED	0.013	CY	0.017	PT	0.018	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.026</b>
SL	0.026	WD	0.041	NZ	0.024	WD	0.013	NZ	0.016	NZ	0.017	SL	0.024
WD	0.023	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.040</b>	GB	0.023	NZ	0.012	ES	0.016	ED	0.016	IL	0.022
AT	0.020	AT	0.037	SL	0.022	CY	0.011	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.016</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.016</b>	WD	0.021
IL	0.019	SL	0.029	CY	0.019	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.010</b>	ED	0.015	ES	0.015	AT	0.019
<b>SE</b>	<b>0.017</b>	IL	0.028	IL	0.018	AT	0.009	CZ	0.015	CZ	0.015	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.019</b>
CZ	0.017	AUS	0.026	CZ	0.015	ES	0.008	LV	0.014	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.014</b>	CY	0.018
ES	0.015	CZ	0.023	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.013</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.008</b>	WD	0.010	WD	0.012	CZ	0.015
AUS	0.014	CY	0.023	AUS	0.012	CZ	0.007	AT	0.009	AT	0.009	ES	0.014
CY	0.012	ES	0.015	ES	0.012	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.008</b>	AUS	0.012
<b>NO</b>	<b>0.010</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.008</b>	AUS	0.006	AUS	0.007	AUS	0.007	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.008</b>

TABLE 12. *Coefficients of Variations for the statements of the salary of six occupations net yearly salary in PPP corrected \$ in ISSP 2009.*

a cabinet minister in the <national> government		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory		Country averages	
USA	0,271	CH	0,573	USA	0,391	PL	0,302	DE	3,601	DE	0,862
GB	0,253	USA	0,554	<b>NO</b>	<b>0,222</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0,253</b>	PL	0,279	USA	0,295
<b>NO</b>	<b>0,158</b>	DE	0,541	PL	0,177	PT	0,236	PT	0,271	PL	0,204
PT	0,119	FL	0,248	PT	0,158	USA	0,233	GB	0,245	<b>NO</b>	<b>0,199</b>
<b>DK</b>	<b>0,123</b>	GB	0,241	GB	0,151	AUS	0,196	<b>NO</b>	<b>0,216</b>	GB	0,194
PL	0,107	<b>DK</b>	<b>0,181</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0,146</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0,103</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0,203</b>	PT	0,186
DE	0,081	PL	0,155	DE	0,057	GB	0,079	AUS	0,202	<b>DK</b>	<b>0,151</b>
RUS	0,071	<b>NO</b>	<b>0,148</b>	AUS	0,057	ES	0,032	UA	0,038	CH	0,137
CH	0,067	FR	0,148	HU	0,043	DE	0,030	ES	0,027	AUS	0,116
AUS	0,060	PT	0,144	FL	0,043	FI	0,026	LV	0,026	FL	0,072
ES	0,057	UA	0,140	ES	0,040	IL	0,025	RUS	0,026	UA	0,055
FL	0,053	LV	0,081	NZ	0,038	RUS	0,024	USA	0,026	FR	0,053
LV	0,046	<b>SE</b>	<b>0,079</b>	UA	0,034	UA	0,024	TR	0,025	RUS	0,045
FR	0,041	NZ	0,073	AT	0,034	FR	0,024	FR	0,020	ES	0,040
HU	0,041	RUS	0,071	RUS	0,034	EE	0,022	FI	0,017	LV	0,040
AT	0,039	AUS	0,066	FR	0,032	TR	0,020	SL	0,017	NZ	0,033
UA	0,039	AT	0,061	SL	0,031	CZ	0,018	EE	0,017	FI	0,032
FI	0,035	EE	0,058	EE	0,031	LV	0,017	HU	0,015	AT	0,031
NZ	0,034	IS	0,057	LV	0,031	HU	0,015	<b>SE</b>	<b>0,012</b>	HU	0,030
CZ	0,029	TR	0,056	FI	0,027	SL	0,013	AT	0,011	EE	0,030
TR	0,026	FI	0,055	CH	0,026	IS	0,012	NZ	0,011	TR	0,029
<b>SE</b>	<b>0,024</b>	ES	0,045	<b>SE</b>	<b>0,021</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>0,011</b>	IS	0,010	<b>SE</b>	<b>0,029</b>
SL	0,024	IL	0,042	TR	0,020	NZ	0,011	SK	0,010	SL	0,023
SK	0,021	HU	0,036	IL	0,020	AT	0,010	IL	0,010	IL	0,023
EE	0,020	SK	0,035	IS	0,018	CH	0,010	HR	0,009	IS	0,023
IS	0,019	SL	0,031	SK	0,015	FL	0,010	FL	0,008	CZ	0,020
HR	0,018	CZ	0,030	CZ	0,014	SK	0,009	CZ	0,008	SK	0,018
IL	0,016	HR	0,026	HR	0,011	HR	0,008	CH	0,007	HR	0,014

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**7.4. Degree of consensus apparent in the various measures of attitudes towards difference in levels of pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are standard deviations.**

TABLE 13. Degree of consensus apparent in the six different measures of attitudes towards difference in levels of pay in ISSP 1999. Shown are standard deviations.

<sup>A</sup> Wage dispersion index	<sup>B</sup> High- vs. Low paid occ.	<sup>C</sup> Chairmen vs. Low paid occ.	<sup>D</sup> High paid occ. Vs. Skilled worker	<sup>E</sup> Chairmen vs. Skilled worker	<sup>F</sup> Skilled worker vs. Low paid occ.
<b>NO</b> 0.432	RUS 0.744	RUS 0.967	<b>NO</b> 0.636	RUS 0.429	RUS 0.035
RUS 0.390	<b>NO</b> 0.637	CDN 0.426	RUS 0.312	CDN 0.286	BG 0.030
PL 0.218	PL 0.302	GB 0.414	NZ 0.242	PL 0.273	USA 0.030
GB 0.208	GB 0.254	LV 0.413	PL 0.217	HU 0.239	IL 0.027
LV 0.174	LV 0.253	PL 0.396	USA 0.195	GB 0.230	WD 0.020
CDN 0.171	CDN 0.236	HU 0.343	CDN 0.158	LV 0.230	LV 0.019
USA 0.159	HU 0.207	FR 0.255	GB 0.146	FR 0.205	SLO 0.018
PT 0.158	USA 0.203	PT 0.245	HU 0.146	SL 0.166	GB 0.018
HU 0.144	PT 0.183	USA 0.242	LV 0.145	PT 0.158	FR 0.016
FR 0.111	FR 0.157	ED 0.195	FR 0.128	NZ 0.155	PT 0.016
NZ 0.107	ED 0.134	WD 0.188	SL 0.119	ED 0.149	PL 0.015
ED 0.101	WD 0.124	NZ 0.186	PT 0.111	US 0.148	CY 0.015
WD 0.100	NZ 0.121	AT 0.157	ED 0.103	WD 0.139	CDN 0.015
AT 0.092	AT 0.109	SL 0.144	BG 0.100	BG 0.133	ED 0.014
SL 0.073	SL 0.102	CZ 0.136	WD 0.092	AT 0.119	HU 0.013
CZ 0.067	CZ 0.094	IL 0.105	AT 0.082	CZ 0.094	ES 0.011
BG 0.061	BG 0.074	<b>SE</b> 0.103	CZ 0.065	IL 0.091	NZ 0.010
IL 0.055	IL 0.072	AUS 0.099	IL 0.061	<b>SE</b> 0.081	<b>DK</b> 0.010
<b>DK</b> 0.055	AUS 0.067	BG 0.086	<b>DK</b> 0.057	AUS 0.073	CZ 0.009
AUS 0.054	<b>DK</b> 0.063	<b>DK</b> 0.083	AUS 0.050	<b>DK</b> 0.071	AT 0.009
CY 0.046	<b>SE</b> 0.061	CY 0.064	<b>SE</b> 0.048	CY 0.049	AUS 0.008
<b>SE</b> 0.045	CY 0.050	ES 0.050	CY 0.038	ES 0.036	<b>NO</b> 0.007
ES 0.037	ES 0.047	<b>NO</b> 0.032	ES 0.035	<b>NO</b> 0.026	<b>SE</b> 0.005

<sup>A</sup> The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second.

<sup>B</sup> This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group.

<sup>C</sup> In the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.

<sup>D</sup> The index of the fourth column is constructed by dividing the index of the average statements of the top occupations, with the statement of a skilled factory worker.

<sup>E</sup> This index taps the chairmen skilled worker wage ratio.

<sup>F</sup> This index is the ratio of a skilled worker to the average of the two low paid occupations – shop assistant and unskilled worker in a factory.

TABLE 14. Degree of consensus apparent in the three different measures of attitudes towards difference in levels of pay in ISSP 2009. Shown are standard deviations.

<sup>A</sup> Wage dispersion index		<sup>B</sup> High- vs. Low paid occ.		<sup>C</sup> Chairmen vs. Low paid occ.	
USA	56.13	GB	8.658	GB	16.89
GB	7.970	AUS	2.260	USA	3.889
AUS	2.021	USA	2.107	AUS	3.689
DE	1.264	DE	1.900	DE	3.649
CH	0.734	CH	1.077	CH	1.961
FR	0.325	FR	0.481	FR	0.914
PT	0.322	FL	0.451	FL	0.830
FL	0.309	PT	0.436	PT	0.763
PL	0.254	PL	0.368	PL	0.586
<b>DK</b>	<b>0.204</b>	UA	0.266	UA	0.449
<b>NO</b>	<b>0.183</b>	RUS	0.252	NZ	0.384
UA	0.181	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.232</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.326</b>
NZ	0.180	NZ	0.231	RUS	0.319
RUS	0.170	AT	0.182	FI	0.290
AT	0.137	FI	0.178	AT	0.279
FI	0.128	HU	0.171	EE	0.223
HU	0.125	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.162</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.195</b>
EE	0.095	EE	0.132	LV	0.194
LV	0.090	LV	0.128	HU	0.185
SL	0.083	TR	0.106	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.180</b>
TR	0.077	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.101</b>	IL	0.164
BG	0.076	CZ	0.099	TR	0.154
IL	0.073	ES	0.099	IS	0.141
<b>SE</b>	<b>0.072</b>	SL	0.098	SL	0.135
CZ	0.071	BG	0.095	BG	0.128
ES	0.068	IL	0.094	ES	0.127
SK	0.065	SK	0.089	CZ	0.124
IS	0.062	IS	0.085	SK	0.119
CY	0.060	HR	0.061	HR	0.095
HR	0.044	CY	0.061	CY	0.049

<sup>A</sup> The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second.

<sup>B</sup> This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group.

<sup>C</sup> In the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.

**7.5. Degree of consensus apparent in the various measures of attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are standard deviations.**

TABLE 15. Degree of consensus apparent in the degree of justice measures for six occupations of ISSP 1999. Shown are standard deviations.

a cabinet minister in the <national> government	a chairman of a large national corporation	a doctor in general practice	A skilled worker in a factory	a shop assistant	an unskilled worker in a factory
PL 0.106	<b>NO 153.3</b>	<b>NO 191.6</b>	RUS 0.188	PT 0.096	RUS 0.155
RUS 0.071	RUS 0.142	USA 2.068	BG 0.072	RUS 0.092	FR 0.101
PT 0.071	PL 0.137	PT 0.334	PT 0.059	BG 0.070	BG 0.066
USA 0.059	IL 0.093	RUS 0.289	USA 0.041	CDN 0.061	LV 0.066
NZ 0.057	PT 0.058	BG 0.160	PL 0.040	PL 0.055	PL 0.054
LV 0.040	BG 0.057	PL 0.082	LV 0.039	HU 0.050	GB 0.053
HU 0.039	USA 0.048	LV 0.076	SL 0.038	IL 0.040	PT 0.052
ES 0.036	NZ 0.046	HU 0.049	IL 0.031	USA 0.040	SL 0.047
BG 0.038	LV 0.041	GB 0.049	HU 0.031	LV 0.039	USA 0.046
FR 0.030	HU 0.034	IL 0.029	<b>DK 0.025</b>	SL 0.035	HU 0.042
ED 0.027	GB 0.031	CDN 0.025	<b>NO 0.023</b>	GB 0.034	CDN 0.038
CDN 0.025	CDN 0.027	AT 0.023	FR 0.022	ES 0.026	IL 0.032
IL 0.025	ES 0.021	SL 0.021	WD 0.021	FR 0.026	CY 0.031
WD 0.021	FR 0.021	FR 0.021	ES 0.018	CZ 0.023	ES 0.028
SL 0.018	SL 0.020	ED 0.018	ED 0.015	CY 0.020	CZ 0.025
AT 0.017	<b>SE 0.019</b>	<b>DK 0.018</b>	NZ 0.014	ED 0.019	<b>DK 0.019</b>
GB 0.016	AT 0.019	CZ 0.016	GB 0.014	NZ 0.018	ED 0.017
<b>SE 0.016</b>	<b>DK 0.017</b>	NZ 0.014	CY 0.012	<b>SE 0.013</b>	<b>SE 0.015</b>
<b>DK 0.014</b>	CY 0.017	WD 0.014	CDN 0.011	<b>NO 0.012</b>	NZ 0.013
AUS 0.013	ED 0.016	ES 0.013	CZ 0.011	WD 0.012	WD 0.011
<b>NO 0.012</b>	CZ 0.015	AUS 0.009	AT 0.009	<b>DK 0.010</b>	AT 0.010
CY 0.011	WD 0.014	CY 0.009	AUS 0.008	AT 0.009	<b>NO 0.009</b>
CZ 0.009	AUS 0.013	<b>SE 0.009</b>	<b>SE 0.007</b>	AUS 0.008	AUS 0.008

TABLE 16. Degree of consensus apparent in the degree of justice measures for the five occupations of ISSP 2009. Shown are standard deviations.

a cabinet minister in the <national> gov-ernment		a chairman of a large national corporation		a doctor in general practice		a shop assistant		an unskilled worker in a factory	
GB	0.749	USA	364.7	GB	2.126	AUS	38.64	DE	5.938
<b>NO</b>	<b>0.672</b>	DE	0.860	USA	1.568	GB	1.239	USA	4.245
<b>SE</b>	<b>0.656</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>0.723</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>1.038</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>1.095</b>	GB	1.244
PL	0.111	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.638</b>	UA	0.109	DE	0.406	<b>NO</b>	<b>1.220</b>
PT	0.063	NZ	0.135	TR	0.096	USA	0.352	AUS	0.778
NZ	0.054	FR	0.134	HU	0.078	PT	0.331	PT	0.420
UA	0.046	GB	0.072	RUS	0.051	RUS	0.050	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.067</b>
<b>DK</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.053</b>	BG	0.044	UA	0.048	UA	0.064
RUS	0.034	RUS	0.039	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.043</b>	PL	0.036	EE	0.048
SL	0.032	UA	0.037	PT	0.040	EE	0.035	RUS	0.042
USA	0.030	EE	0.035	EE	0.038	BG	0.035	SL	0.034
ES	0.028	IL	0.031	NZ	0.036	TR	0.035	LV	0.030
TR	0.028	PL	0.028	LV	0.031	HU	0.033	BG	0.029
DE	0.027	BG	0.028	PL	0.030	<b>DK</b>	<b>0.033</b>	TR	0.027
HU	0.026	LV	0.028	AUS	0.029	FI	0.031	HU	0.027
EE	0.025	TR	0.026	IL	0.027	LV	0.028	FI	0.027
BG	0.025	ES	0.023	FI	0.021	CZ	0.027	PL	0.024
AUS	0.024	SK	0.021	FR	0.021	IL	0.026	FR	0.023
FI	0.022	PT	0.021	ES	0.020	SL	0.026	SK	0.021
IL	0.022	CH	0.020	SL	0.019	ES	0.025	ES	0.020
AT	0.021	FI	0.020	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.019</b>	FR	0.022	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.018</b>
IS	0.020	FL	0.019	IS	0.018	<b>SE</b>	<b>0.020</b>	CZ	0.016
CH	0.018	AUS	0.018	AT	0.018	HR	0.016	HR	0.016
LV	0.018	HU	0.018	FL	0.018	SK	0.013	IL	0.016
CZ	0.017	CZ	0.017	CZ	0.017	NZ	0.013	IS	0.014
FL	0.014	IS	0.015	DE	0.014	IS	0.012	NZ	0.013
FR	0.014	AT	0.015	HR	0.014	CH	0.012	AT	0.009
CY	0.011	SL	0.014	SK	0.014	AT	0.010	FL	0.009
SK	0.011	HR	0.013	CH	0.013	FL	0.010	CH	0.008
HR	0.009	CY	0.004	CY	0.005	CY	0.009	CY	0.007

## **7.6. List of country abbreviations used in the various tables**

GB	United Kingdom	EE	Estonia
NO	Norway	BG	Bulgaria
SE	Sweden	AUS	Australia
PL	Poland	FI	Finland
PT	Portugal	IL	Israel
NZ	New Zealand	AT	Austria
UA	Ukraine	IS	Iceland
DK	Denmark	CH	Switzerland
RUS	Russia	LV	Latvia
SL	Slovenia	CZ	Czech Republic
USA	United States of America	FL	Flanders
ES	Spain	FR	France
TR	Turkey	CY	Cyprus
DE	Germany	SK	Slovak Republic
ED	East Germany	HR	Croatia
WD	West Germany	HU	Hungary
CDN	Canada		