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Disaggregating Scandinavian attitudes towards difference in levels of pay

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Disaggregating Scandinavian attitudes towards difference in levels of pay

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1. Introduction

The Scandinavian¹ countries are internationally renowned for their high degree of economic equality. The Scandinavian countries consistently demonstrate net Gini coefficients below 0.3, which by comparative standards are very low figures (www.stats.oecd.org). There are two main reasons for this. *First*, the unique social democratic/universal welfare state has a well-documented ability to redistribute resources and secure a high degree of net-income equality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Christiansen 2007; Larsen 2008; Ervasti et al. 2008; Fridberg and Kangas 2008). However, the welfare state is not the only factor behind the very low net Gini coefficients. The Scandinavian countries also demonstrate low gross coefficients, just above 0.4, obviously well above the net-coefficient but still low compared to most other OECD countries (www.stats.oecd.org). The two factors contributing to Scandinavian equality are thus a combination of redistribution and a fairly compressed distribution of gross incomes. Attitudes towards redistribution and the welfare state, especially among Scandinavians, constitute a well-developed research discipline. This research has documented the high level of support for redistributive policies in the Scandinavian countries². Many questions regarding Scandinavian attitudes towards the distribution of gross pay still have to be answered though.

Attitudes towards gross pay can be measured directly by the survey question: ‘*What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get...?*’ stemming from the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Social Inequality modules I-IV. Using this measure, existing research suggests that, comparatively speaking, Scandinavians at the *aggregated* level have rather egalitarian attitudes to differences in pay across occupations (Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Larsen 2006; Osberg & Smeeding 2006 and Kjærsgård 2012). The most recent and comprehensive data of ISSP 2009 remains almost unexplored though. Kjærsgård (2012) is to the present knowledge of the author the only one, who has yet explored attitudes to gross pay using the ISSP 2009 data. Table 1, which is created on the basis of results from Kjærsgård (2012), shows two measures of attitudes towards differences in pay based on questions about what different occupations should earn in 1999 and 2009:

¹ This article focuses on Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), excluding the Nordic countries of Finland and Iceland.

² See Larsen (2006) pp. 34-37 for a review of the literature.

Table 1. Median attitudes to differences in pay between occupations for Western countries in ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2009.

ISSP 1999				ISSP 2009			
^A Full difference in pay index		^B Reduced index		^A Full difference in pay index		^B Reduced index	
				Cyprus	6.47	Australia	8.00
				Australia	5.83	France	6.67
				USA	5.53	USA	6.54
				France	4.78	Germany	5.45
				United Kingdom	4.62	United Kingdom	5.26
				Germany	4.56	Russia	5.00
				Portugal	4.36	Hungary	5.00
Russia	4.67	France	6.25	New Zealand	4.33	Poland	5.00
France	4.52	Russia	5.71	Hungary	4.22	Portugal	5.00
United Kingdom	4.36	United Kingdom	5.56	Switzerland	4.17	Austria	4.83
Poland	4.33	Latvia	5.36	Poland	4.13	Estonia	4.67
Australia	4.18	Czech Republic	5.00	Austria	4.05	New Zealand	4.63
Czech Republic	4.17	Poland	4.67	Russia	4.00	Cyprus	4.57
USA	4.09	Hungary	4.61	Estonia	3.92	Switzerland	4.44
Portugal	4.00	Canada	4.47	Czech Republic	3.43	Slovenia	4.44
Latvia	3.93	USA	4.44	Turkey	3.33	Finland	4.17
New Zealand	3.89	New Zealand	4.44	Finland	3.33	Czech Republic	4.00
Hungary	3.89	Slovenia	4.44	Slovakia	3.30	Israel	3.64
West Germany	3.84	West Germany	4.44	Croatia	3.00	Slovakia	3.53
Canada	3.77	Portugal	4.35	Slovenia	2.89	Croatia	3.51
East Germany	3.73	East Germany	4.08	Bulgaria	2.87	Ukraine	3.33
Austria	3.64	Austria	4.00	Israel	2.87	Turkey	3.20
Slovenia	3.64	Australia	4.00	Ukraine	2.80	Bulgaria	3.08
Cyprus	3.30	Israel	3.64	Flanders	2.67	Latvia	3.00
Israel	3.30	Bulgaria	2.86	Latvia	2.67	Spain	2.86
Bulgaria	2.79	Cyprus	2.83	Spain	2.56	Flanders	2.83
Denmark	2.33	Spain	2.50	Iceland	2.53	Iceland	2.67
Spain	2.31	Norway	2.13	Denmark	2.53	Norway	2.33
Sweden	2.10	Sweden	2.08	Norway	2.32	Sweden	2.22
Norway	2.02	Denmark	2.00	Sweden	2.30	Denmark	2.00
Scandinavia	2.15		2.07		2.38		2.18
Other countries	3.82		4.38		3.70		4.42

^A The index is created at the individual level by taking the average of the higher level occupations: a general practice doctor, a chairman of a large national corporation, and a cabinet minister in the <national> government and dividing it with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory

^B The second index resembles the first, except that the general practice doctor and cabinet minister in the <national> government occupations are pulled out of the index.

As table 1 show, Kjærsgård (2012) do identify a persistent Scandinavian egalitarianism at the *aggregated* level also in 2009. In a range of other *aggregated* descriptive analyses he furthermore identifies the Scandinavian egalitarianism to be an expression of an aversion to top excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom. The perceived salary of the five occupations present in the 2009-battery are found exceptionally just, in a comparative perspective. Only the perceived earnings of chairmen of large national corporations are deemed quite unjust by the Scandinavians in both 1999 and 2009, also seen from a comparative perspective. Lastly, markedly increased standard deviations and coefficients of variation (CoV) from 1999 to 2009 also indicate potential cracks in the otherwise seemingly stable and homogenous Scandinavian egalitarian equilibrium.

The purpose of this article is to further investigate the interesting and potentially dynamic result revealed by Kjærsgård (2012) – the Scandinavians at large seems to become more polarised from 1999 to 2009. This article will probe deeper into this result and feature encompassing in-depth descriptive analyses *disaggregating* the results of table 1 and thus Kjærsgård (2012) further.

The analysis will focus *firstly* on just one measures of one of the dimensions investigated by Kjærsgård (2012). In table 1 above this is denoted *the reduced index*³. The reason for choosing this *dimension* is that the Scandinavian countries where clearly most exceptional in comparison with the other participating western countries. Focusing on this dimension thus means focusing on, what is uniquely Scandinavian in a comparative perspective.

The reason for choosing that exact *measure* is furthermore that the two other measures encompassing more occupations had fallacies, when wanting to create a general measure for attitudes towards difference in levels of pay (Kjærsgård 2012). The inclusion of the general practitioners in the highly paid occupational index actually means including an upper-medium paid occupation in the post-communist countries (Larsen 2006 and Kjærsgård 2012). Attitudes to the salary of ministers are furthermore probably influenced by the level of sympathy with the current government (Kelley & Evans 1993), as well as the level of political and institutional trust in the country. The reduced index thus seems to be the best choice most clearly reflecting general actual attitudes towards difference in levels of pay and the classic capital-worker dichotomy.

³ Kjærsgård (2012) denotes this index: "the chairman vs. low paid occupations" in his the "attitudes towards difference in levels of pay"-dimension.

Secondly the analyses below will be restricted to encompassing only the three Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In these ways the analyses of this article is thus more restricted than the ones in Kjærsgård (2012). They are encompassing in other ways though.

Firstly the analyses below will incorporate new comparable data of Norway and Sweden of 1992 to widen the timespan of the analyses. This data stems from ISSP's Social Inequality module II of 1992. Unfortunately only Norway and Sweden, but not Denmark, participated in this second round of the Social Inequality module and none of the three countries participated in the first round from 1987⁴, which prevents the possibilities of an even longer timespan. Furthermore the swedes were not asked about the salaries of shop assistants, why a slightly reversed dependent variable is created and used in the 1992 dataset. This reflects only the chairman – unskilled factory worker pay-ratio. It does not make much difference though: As it could be seen in Kjærsgård (2012) people in general hardly distinguish between the salaries of unskilled factory workers and shop assistants. Testing the Norwegian results of 1992 with the commonly used dependent variable also yields almost identical results.

The analyses below will *secondly* disaggregate the result of the chosen measure on different background variables. The analyses thus move from the solely aggregated, *macro* level comparisons of Kjærsgård (2012) and table 1 to a group or *meso* level. This seems the next logical step in trying to develop assumptions on, what, who and how is changing in the Scandinavian countries in the period – and if it differs between them. This article will not try to develop and/or test formal hypothesis though. It will be atheoretical and empirically explorative. The ambition is to lay a much needed solid empirical foundation for future more theoretically guided research on the field.

Lastly it is also important to mention there are certain data-wise limitations of the analyses. The Danish dataset was not included in the integrated dataset of 1999. Even if a separate Danish dataset is available, the background variables are not always alike, which of course has consequences. The Danish dataset does not contain any urbanisation variables, and the education of the respondent is measured in a different and more sophisticated way in Denmark using two questions both with numerous categories. But, these two variables are almost similar to the Danish educational questions of ISSP 2009. Thus using a slightly modified version of the syntax used to create the

⁴ See: <http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-profiles/social-inequality/>

Danish Degree variable of 2009, it was possible to create a Danish Degree variable also for 1999⁵. The Danish variable for household income in both 1999 and 2009 is categorical and not continuous as the Swedish and Norwegian variables. As it will be evident below, this of course have consequences in creating comparable measures. The Swedish data of 1992 is also clearly not as comprehensive as the corresponding Norwegian. No Swedish data of 1992 is thus available concerning employment status, household income, trade union membership and subjective social class variable, why this can't be investigated either. In spite the limitations mentioned; in most cases reasonable comparative measures in all three countries have been created, working over quite a long time-span.

2. Methods and approach

There are many ways to structure disaggregated comparisons. Because the focus is on identifying how the Scandinavian countries differ or are similar, the choice here has been to analyse one country at a time in alphabetical order. The analyses will proceed with disaggregating the scores of each of the three countries on the various social groups; it is possible to identify with the background variables in the Social Inequality modules II-IV (1992, 1999 and 2009). The analyses will be structured more or less in how "natural" or unchangeable the various background variables are. The structure of each of the three country analyses sections is thus:

⁵ The SPSS-syntax created and used was:

```
compute DEGREE=0.  
if a95=1 and a96=1 DEGREE=1.  
if any(a95,2,3,4,7) and a96=1 DEGREE=2.  
if any(a95,5,6) and any(a96,1,2,3,4,5,6,10) DEGREE=3.  
if any(a95,1,2,3,4,7) and any(a96,2,3,4,5,6,10) DEGREE=3.  
if a95=8 or a96=98 DEGREE=8.  
if a95=9 or a96=99 DEGREE=9.  
if a96=7 DEGREE=4.  
if a96=8 DEGREE=4.  
if a96=9 DEGREE=5.
```

execute.

VALUE LABELS DEGREE 0 'No formal qualification' 1 'Lowest formal qualification attainable' 2 'Qualifications which are above the lowest qualification' 3 'higher secondary complete'

4 'Qualifications which are above the higher secondary level' 5 'University degree completed' 8 'Don't know' 9 'No answer'.

See also the Danish technical report: <http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk/ISSP+til+universitets-+og+forskningsbrug/>

- 1) Age-groups (trying to distinguish between generation-, age-, and periodic effects)
- 2) Gender
- 3) Urbanization
- 4) Education
- 5) Objective social class
- 6) Household income
- 7) Employment status
- 8) Trade union membership
- 9) Vote in last election
- 10) Subjective social class

In each of these analyses the medians of each “social group”, and also the standard deviations of the same will be presented⁶. For both the medians and standard deviations of the various social groups compared, there will be a focus on both; how the general *level* between the groups is and how the *development* over time is. These two sub-dimensions held together tell us something about, whether the development in country X’s social groups X and Y leans towards increased polarization, consensus or neither. This of course also tells us something about, whether *macro or micro* level effects seem to drive the development. A similar effect on all groups over time indicates a macro level effect and vice versa.

It seems obvious that such a comprehensive disaggregating investigation of each of the three countries allows for an in depth understanding of the similarities and differences between the countries. Then, after each country has been analysed individually and three sub-conclusions have summed up the most important *within* country effects, a conclusion will elaborate on the most important *between* country effects. Is the overall level different or quite similar in the three countries? And do we find a similar development in the three Scandinavian countries or do they differ? Somewhat similar effects in the three countries indicate, we should look for common Scandinavian explanatory factors to understand the development. Very different effects in the three countries conversely indicate, we should look for country specific explanatory factors to understand the development.

⁶ For comparison the same scale will be used in each instance: 1.5-3.5 in medians, 0-1.5 in standard deviations.

3. Analyses

As elaborated above the analyses will proceed with one country at a time in alphabetical order. Denmark is the first country of choice.

3.1 Denmark

As elaborated above; the first section investigates the effect of generation on attitudes towards difference in levels of pay in Denmark. For all Danish analyses; data is as mentioned above restricted to 1999 and 2009.

3.1.1 Generations

Before embarking on the empirical results a classic demarcation, important when investigating respondents belonging to different age-groups, will be presented. The presentation will be based on Hellevik (1991, 378-386). *Firstly* age-group cleavages can be understood as an effect linked to the respondents being in a specific age-interval or in a certain part of their *life-cycle*. This means a somewhat homogeneity in attitudes can be expected within persons of a specific age-span, because they share concerns and life experiences i.e. most of the 25-34 year olds share the experience of finding the first real full-time job, being a parent etc. In this view the formation of values of the individual is assumed to be heavily influenced by near-present experiences of the individual, common interests or maybe a gradual socialization process.


Secondly generation-effects are very different, in that they put a heavy influence on the formative experiences in the childhood and early youth. Values are in this perspective seen as very static over time at the individual level, heavily influenced by the primary socialization process in the family, but also secondary socialization processes in the school and with friends plus maybe formative political experiences in the youth. This tradition argues that people growing up in the specific period of history share a common ground of reference, sharing the experience of formative “mega events” happening in their up-growing. This branch of sociology has at a basic level penetrated to everyday discussions of common people. In academic sociology on the other hand a great deal of effort has been put into trying to define for example, what actually is a formative experience being the reference point of a generation? This discussion surely also entails a disagreement on, what a generation really is, which generations exist and where to draw the boundaries between them (Corsten 1999 and Roche 2003). Not trying to resolve this discussion, our demarcation of generations below follows a very pragmatic approach:

- Born before 1945 - War and pre-war generations
- Born 1945-1959 – Often labelled the baby boom generation
- Born 1960-1969
- Born 1970-1979
- Born 1980 and thereafter

This demarcation will be used for each of the three countries⁷. *Thirdly* one can also speak about *periodic-effects*. Periodic effects are simply different kinds of events, media discourses etc. being present at the time of the investigation one conducts. These periodic effects potentially affect all respondents independently of generation or life-cycle effects. To make matters even more complicated, it is quite possible that periodic effects do not affect all-age groups in the same way. To use a statistic terminology, different interaction effects between various generations or respondents in a certain age-interval and a periodic effect can thus be expected. Because the reality often appears to be a mix of various effects, then even when time-series are available - as in our case - these effects are often hard to distinguish in actual analyses. Nevertheless the basic demarcations are useful tools, when interpreting outcomes. Keeping these considerations in mind, we will now turn to the empirical analyses:

⁷ It is possible to divide the eldest generation further especially in 1992, but this is not really relevant in our case since it is the current development we are interested in.

FIGURE 1-2. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different generations in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): War and pre-war generations=292, the baby boom generation=457, Born 1960-1969=339, Born 1970-1979=271 and Born 1980 and thereafter=59.

N (2009): War and pre-war generations=236, the baby boom generation=385, Born 1960-1969=287, Born 1970-1979=205 and Born 1980 and thereafter=190.

Looking at the medians in general; there seems to be no clear cleavages between different generations in either 1999 or 2009. Among all generations except the youngest and the baby boom generation, the medians are in practice unanimous in 2009. The median of the youngest groups – whether we call them 18-24 year olds or born 1980 and after⁸ - rise somewhat between 1999 and 2009. The baby boom generation⁹ keep their low median of 1999 also in 2009. The picture could indicate possible age-cleavage emerging between these three groups, something which only future data will reveal.

Turning to the level of intra-age group consensus; in 1999 all generations have very small and almost similar standard deviations. In 2009 on the other hand all groups – maybe except the baby boomers – portray radically increased standard deviations. Interestingly it is especially the eldest respondents, followed by the youngest respondents, who show the largest standard deviations. The 65-74 year olds are off the charts with a standard deviation of 1.9 in 2009.

If we are to elaborate on the results based on the demarcation between *life-circle*-, *generation*- and *periodic effects*, the baby boomers development seems to correspond with a quite clear *generation effect*. They median level and standard deviation remains low and practically unchanged from 1999

⁸ See appendix 1.


⁹ In the Danish political debate, this generation known as the “sixtyeight’ers”, are often described as having special political views and orientations.

to 2009. The attitudinal mark imprinted in this generation's youth persists through time, and the mark has furthermore been quite unanimous across the generation's members, indicated by the persistently low standard deviations. The results of the other generations can best be explained as a result of a *periodic effect*, generally leading the majority of the respondent in each group towards a common median or equilibrium in 2009¹⁰. This periodic mark is not as strong or consistent as the mark put on the baby boomers in their youth, reflected in the markedly risen standard deviations of 2009. The somewhat deviant result of the youngest generation could indicate both a *generation-* and a *life-circle effect*. Only future data will show.

3.1.2 Gender

Figure 3-4 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to gender can be identified in Denmark in 1999 or 2009:

FIGURE 3-4. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A of males and females in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.
 N (1999): Male=757, Female=661. N (2009): Male=646, Female=657.

What we see is that the male median levels in both years are slightly higher, than the female levels. As the females increase somewhat from 1999 to 2009, while the males are stagnant, there seems to be no tendency for cleavages between the two genders in Denmark over time median-wise. Within each gender the disagreement clearly rises from 1999-2009 though. Especially the males in Denmark seem to move towards polarisation. Though not surprising, because the two genders


¹⁰ This is even clearer in appendix 1, following respondents of specific age-intervals.

entails all generations above; the tendency to rapidly rising standard deviations is much less outspoken, but still present, in figure 4 than figure 2.

3.1.3 Urbanization

Figure 5-6 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to urbanisation can be identified in Denmark. As mentioned above unfortunately there is no urbanisation variable in the Danish version of ISSP 1999, why only 2009 results can be shown:

FIGURE 5-6. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A of respondents in areas with different degrees of urbanisation in Denmark in ISSP 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.
 N (2009): Urban=272, Suburban=267, Rural=751.

Though there is not much to tell, when there is only data from 2009, the results again seems to repeat the pattern of above. There is almost no difference in the medians, while the standard deviation of the urban group is markedly higher, than the two other groups. The urban standard deviation of 0.83 is not at the level of the elder groups of above though.

3.1.4 Education

Education is often argued to be the most prominent cleavage existing in late-/postmodern societies. Figure 7-8 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to education can be identified in Denmark:

FIGURE 7-8. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different educational groups in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): Lowest formal qualification=48, above lowest formal qualification=85, higher secondary completed=651, above higher secondary=422, university degree completed=186.

N (2009): Lowest formal qualification=51, above lowest formal qualification=73, higher secondary completed=449, above higher secondary=519, university degree completed=184.

Median wise Denmark in 1999 had an almost linear effect of education, where higher education meant more tolerance for inequality. In 2009 there is a slight tendency of a gap appearing between “lowest formal” and “above lowest formal”, versus the other educational groups. There is thus in general a rising tendency, not followed by “university degree completed” and “above lowest formal”. The differences still seem rather small, but are on the other hand as notable as the generational differences seen above.

Turning to the standard deviations of the various educational groups we see clear polarisation tendencies. While respondents with lowest formal qualifications consistently show large standard deviations and above lowest plus above higher secondary education show consistent low standard deviations, university degree completed and higher secondary complete portray a clear rising trend, in accordance with above. The analysis thus more or less replicates what is found above – in 1999 there are very low standard deviations for almost all groups. In 2009 on the other hand the standard deviations have exploded, for a majority of the groups investigated.


3.1.5 Social class (ESeC)

Since the days of Karl Marx and Max Weber, social class has been a key concept in sociology and the social sciences in general. Who belongs to different classes, which classes do actually exist, and

how can we precisely define and measure social classes are and has always been a matter of controversy (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992; Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996; Ganzeboom & Treiman 2003; Svallfors 2004; Harrison & Rose 2006 and Harrison & Rose 2007). Although this discussion will probably continue, the European Statistical Office has, as a part of their Statistical Harmonization Programme and the recommendation of an appointed group of experts, created a common European Socio-economic Classification schema (ESeC). The classification is a categorical schema based on the concept of employment relations and the most widely used social class schema – The Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992 and Harrison & Rose 2007). The ESeC comes in a 10, 6, 5 and 3 class-model¹¹. The dilemma in actual analyses using the ESeC on surveydata is obviously the trade-off, between using a class-model with many classes, gaining precision and richness in information in measuring many logically distinct classes, but at the same time sacrificing statistical significance in having especially higher classes with very few respondents. In this article a compromising solution has been chosen in using the 6 class version. This also secures continuity with for example Svallfors (2004), who also use a 6 class-model, albeit slightly different. In figure 9-10 below the Danish results are portrayed:

¹¹ See appendix 2 for, what the different classes more precisely entail and how the different class models are related.

FIGURE 9-10. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay ^A for 6 different social classes in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1999): Salariat=405, Intermediate employee=230, Small employers and self-employed=55, Lower sales and service=110, lower technical=95, Routine=126.

N (2009): Salariat=512, Intermediate employee=268, Small employers and self-employed=59, Lower sales and service=148, lower technical=68, Routine=158.

Although median differences between the highest class – the salariat – and the two lowest classes emerges in 2009, the differences are as above small and probably in most cases insignificant. The medium level classes in-between the two extremes are not surprisingly also placed in-between the two extremes in 2009. The pattern of 1999 is stranger though.

Turning to the standard deviations, the pattern of above with drastically risen standard deviations in 2009 is very clear here. If one trusts the demarcation, not much class consciousness thus seems to be present in Denmark in 2009.

3.1.6 Household income


The analyses above tap into quite stable attitudinal cleavages often thought to have its base in socializational processes of the childhood or youth. We now move to a more experience or interest based and volatile view on attitudes by investigating, which effect ones household income has on ones attitudes. In attitudes to pay the income of your household seems an obvious explanatory factor to investigate. Unfortunately the variables measuring the household income of the three

countries differ a lot in the three datasets, why comparison has been difficult. As mentioned neither of the Danish datasets have a raw continuous household income variable, as the Norwegian and Swedish have, the 1992 dataset only contains a Norwegian- and not a Swedish household income variable, and even for the continues variables the scales vary¹². Great difficulties thus exist trying to create one comparable scale. To solve this dilemma, a very pragmatic approach has been followed. In each case it has been tried as precisely as possible to divide the three samples into five groups: the poorest 20 % of the samples' households, the 20-40 %, 40-60 %, 60-80 % and the richest 20 %. Although the groups in each case do not exactly match 20 % of the respondents, and especially not when categorical recordings have been used, the results should be rather accurate¹³. Figure 11-12 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to household income can be identified in Denmark:

¹² The Norwegians and Danes have been asked about gross yearly salaries in their national currency, while the Swedes have been asked about gross monthly salaries in their national currency (<http://www.gesis.org/en/issp/issp-modules-profiles/social-inequality/>). Of course the general tendency for inflation in all countries also make the value of a certain amount of Danish, Norwegian or Swedish kroner change between the three datasets.

¹³ See N for the various groups below figure 11-12.

FIGURE 11-12. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different household income groups in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=182, 21-40 %=207, 41-60 %=439, 61-80 %=219, 81-100 %=317.

N (2009): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=180, 21-40 %=150, 41-60 %=272, 61-80 %=306, 81-100 %=356.


The pattern of above again seems to repeat, being very clear in this instance. The group medians clearly move closer from 1999 to 2009. Only the richest 20 % of the respondents here stand a bit out from the rest. The difference is very small though.

The standard deviations of the various groups also repeat the pattern of above. A clear rising tendency can generally be subscribed to the groups – the 21-40 % group's standard deviation reaches a value of 2.17 in 2009. Only the richest 39 % of the sampled Danish respondents portray more or less stable low standard deviations in both 1999 and 2009.

3.1.7 Employment status

In figure 13-14 below it will be investigated, which effect a respondent's current employment status has on his/her attitudes towards difference in levels of pay. Unfortunately there are very few unemployed respondents, why only the result of unemployed in 1999 is shown in the figures below:

FIGURE 13-14. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for groups with different employment status in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.
 N (1999): Full time employed=852, Part time employed=52, unemployed=61, Student=87, Retired=82.
 N (2009): Full time employed=727, Part time employed=61, unemployed=35, Student=97, Retired=265.

The employment status medians generally behave in the same way as seen above. What is seen is thus a move towards almost completely unanimous medians in 2009. The only group deviating – and this time markedly – is the students, with a median of 2.75 in 2009 - this of course mirrors the youngest generation of figure 1. As seen above with the elder and youngest age groups; the retired and students portray huge rises in standard deviations from 1999 to 2009. The two employed groups rise, but not excessively.

3.1.8 Trade union membership

Trade union membership is argued to be of obvious importance for wage attitudes (Marx 1972; Marx & Engels 1968; Gyes, Witte & Pasture 2001; Adison & Schnabel 2003; Card et al 2003; Flanagan 2003; Visser 2003; Svallfors 2004 and Åberg 1984). The trade union membership variables changes from being a dichotomous variable denoting if a respondent is a trade union member, to not to a trichotomous variable with the added category “former member” in 2009. Figure 15-16 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to trade union membership can be identified in Denmark:

FIGURE 15-16. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for trade union members, former trade union members and never trade union members in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): Trade union member=771, not member of a trade union=258.

N (2009): Trade union member=903, once member, not now=269, never member of a trade union=124.


In contrast to what could be expected from the literature presented, being a trade member or not does actually not seem to make much difference in Denmark in either 1999 or 2009. The medians are almost in line in both 1999 and 2009, rising a little bit, while the standard deviations all rise from 1999 to 2009.

3.1.9 Political vote on last general election

Maybe the surprising result with the trade union membership is caused by the Danes not orienting to trade unions and old fashioned class-membership anymore. This does not mean that they are not devoting their political identity towards the political system and political parties though. Figure 17-18 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to general political orientation can be identified¹⁴:

¹⁴ The Danish political system is a multiparty system with a low barrier for running and getting into the parliament. On each election a multitude of parties therefore run and quite a lot of those get seats in the parliament. For the sake of simplicity and the small N problem; only the 7 big parties are represented in figure 17-18 below.

FIGURE 17-18. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for people voting for various political parties on the last general election in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): The Social Democrats=363, The Social Liberal Party=67, The Conservative Party=116, The Socialist Peoples Party=136, The Danish Peoples Party=75, The Liberal Party=323.

N (2009): The Social Democrats=270, The Social Liberal Party=67, The Conservative Party=104, The Socialist Peoples Party=208, The Danish Peoples Party=109, The Liberal Party=294.

For Danish standards the differences between the medians of the different political parties are quite large in 2009. Especially the voters of “radikale venstre” (the social liberal party), do not seem that “social” or egalitarian after all in 2009. A look at the corresponding standard deviations does show a very big tendency for polarisation within the party though. Also excluding the tendency of “venstre” (the liberal party); belonging to a certain political party do seem to matter more for the consistency of the Danish attitudes in 2009, than the various cleavages of above.


3.1.10 Self-reported social class

The analysis in figure 19-20 below investigates the effect of feeling; one belongs to a specific social class¹⁵. It is worth mentioning that even if the categories exist, in neither Denmark, Norway nor Sweden, did more than a few (maximum 10) respondents admit belonging to either the under- or upper class in neither 1992, 1999 nor 2009, why these groups are omitted. This result is of course interesting in its own right and could be seen as an indicator of the Scandinavian egalitarianism, identified in existing literature, where everybody more or less see themselves as belonging to the

¹⁵ Here we are thus dealing with a more subjective version class relations. The ESeC or “objective” class position defined class position on the basis of one’s employment relations.

not-extreme classes (Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Larsen 2006; Osberg & Smeeding 2006 and Kjærsgård 2012):

FIGURE 19-20. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for groups with belonging to different subjective social classes in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): Working class=209, Lower middle class=147, Middle class=657, Upper middle class=326.

N (2009): Working class=207, Lower middle class=185, Middle class=680, Upper middle class=191.

Together with the results of disaggregating on political orientation, then as one of only two analyses so far, we see some tendency for an expected median divide appearing in 2009, between the upper middle class being quite anti-egalitarian and the working class being very egalitarian. The middle/lower middle class lies in between. People's subjective class identity in Denmark thus seems to matter more for their attitudes to differences in pay, than the other potential cleavages presented above, except maybe from political orientation.

The class consciousness of the working class has clear limits though, reflected in the very low degree of intra-group consensus in 2009, presented in the right figure above. The other groups, except the middle class, also portray rising standard deviations from 1999 to 2009.

3.1.11 Summary of the Danish development

In this section we will try to sum up the general Danish trends identified in the sections above. Starting with the *medians*, the Danes in general showed clear signs of an unaltered- or even increased degree of unanimousness across the groups investigated. There are only three real

exceptions from this picture. *Firstly* the students of figure 13 and the youngest generation of figure 1 show a dramatic increase in median values from 1999 to 2009. These groups of course reflect more or less the same respondents, and because they are the young people of the future a rise in the aggregated Danish median can possibly be expected, as the more egalitarian generations pass away. This interpretation is of course based on the assumption that the attitudes towards difference in levels of pay remain more or less stable for a generation over time, which given the results above does not seem totally realistic. The baby boom generation also have a median that is consistent from 1999 to 2009 and somewhat lower than the remaining generations. *Secondly* some political orientation- or subjective class divide was also reflected in figure 17 and 19. Surprisingly this political- or class consciousness apparently did not have much to do with “objective” class position, education, income, employment status or trade union membership.

When we look at the *standard deviations* on the other hand, we see a dramatic development. The development is not incompatible with the medians’ development though. The general picture is that in 1999 there was a very big within group-consensus in all cases, except for the respondents with the lowest formal qualifications, and the voters of the conservative party. In 2009 almost all groups have clearly raised standard deviations and several of these considerably. The groups being stagnant or only rising marginally are *firstly* the political parties in general minus the liberal- and social liberal followers in 2009. *Secondly* it is the females, the baby boom generations, the full time employed with above lowest formal qualifications or above higher secondary school and the subjective middle class. Everybody else raises tremendously, some even out of the scale. The results thus reveal a very low level of group-consciousness in Denmark in 2009, with political orientation as the only real general exception.


In the analyses below it will be exciting to see, whether the same tendencies can be found in Norway and Sweden and we thus have to look for common Scandinavian explanatory factors, or they differ and we need to look for national-specific explanatory factors. The analyses thus continue in a similar fashion with the Norwegian results.

3.2 Norway

The Norwegian analyses follow the same structure as the corresponding Danish above. The only difference is that we are able to see further back in time, because Norway participated in ISSP 1992. The analyses again start out with generations. The results are portrayed in figure 21-22 below:

3.2.1 Generations

FIGURE 21-22. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different generations in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1992): War and pre-war generations=401, The baby boom generation=419, Born 1960-1969=306, Born 1970-1979=203.

N (1999): War and pre-war generations=221, The baby boom generation=287, Born 1960-1969=210, Born 1970-1979=188.

N (2009): War and pre-war generations=179, The baby boom generation=412, Born 1960-1969=299, Born 1970-1979=276, Born 1980 and thereafter=214.

All Norwegian generations portray a rising almost linear median-trend over the course of the three surveys investigated¹⁶. It is thus even more difficult than in the Danish case to speak of a tendency towards polarization, since everybody rises, also the baby boom generation.

If we look at the standard deviations; we see a slightly less radical version of the similar Danish results. As in the Danish case; we see a radical rise for the youngest and oldest generation between 1999 and 2009. The other groups follow in a slightly different pattern, than in the Danish version, but the differences between these are small. The generation born between 1960 and 1969 thus follow the young and old, while the generation born between 1970 and 1979 follow the baby boom generation, with relatively low standard deviations also in 2009.


If we elaborate further, there are some weak signs of a *generational-effect* of the baby boom generation in Norway. On one hand the medians' portrayals of a linear rising tendency of all generations only indicate a *periodic-effect*. On the other hand, the baby boomers and also the born 1970-1979 generations manage to agree internally to a quite high extent on their opinions also in 2009.

¹⁶ You get the same result, when dividing the respondents in age-intervals instead. See appendix 1.

3.2.2 Gender

Figure 23-24 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to gender can be identified in Norway in 1992, 1999 or 2009:

FIGURE 23-24. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A of males and females in Norway in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.


N (1992): Male=705, Female=624. N (1999): Male=451, Female=485. N (2009): Male=676, Female=704.

Median-wise, the two genders are practically at the same level in all three surveys, and the linear rising tendency seen above is repeated. This tendency is not that far from the development of the Danish males and females. Turning to the standard deviations; the Norwegian males and females portray an extreme degree of consensus in 1992 and 1999. Both genders' standard deviations rise somewhat in 2009, in the same range as the females do in Denmark in 2009.

3.2.3 Urbanization

Figure 25-26 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to urbanisation can be identified in the Norway:

FIGURE 25-26. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A of respondents in areas with different degrees of urbanisation in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. N (1992): Urban=226, Suburban=397, Rural=706. N (1999): Urban=217, Suburban=329, Rural=382. N (2009): Urban=377, Suburban=197, Rural=798.


Median-wise, we see some, but small cleavages in 2009. Strangely the scale goes from rural, to urban and suburban. This probably indicates, the difference between urban and suburban is not significant. The differences between these three groups have emerged gradually since 1992, where the three groups' medians were alike. The rural Norwegians have been almost stagnant since then, while the two other groups show a gradual rising tendency. This could indicate a cleavage emerging slowly. The level of the three urbanisation groups in 2009 is also similar to the corresponding Danish of 2009.

When we look at the standard deviations; we again see the pattern of above repeating. For all groups there is almost no disagreement in 1992 and 1999. In 2009 the deviations in answers are markedly bigger for all three groups, though not quite at the level of the comparable Danish urbanisation groups.

3.2.4 Education

Figure 27-28 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to education can be identified in Norway in the period covered by the three datasets:

FIGURE 27-28. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different educational groups in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.
 N (1992): Lowest formal qualification=108, above lowest formal qualification=235, higher secondary completed=603, above higher secondary=266, university degree completed=94.
 N (1999): Lowest formal qualification=81, above lowest formal qualification=135, higher secondary completed=333, above higher secondary=119, university degree completed=263.
 N (2009): Lowest formal qualification=118, above lowest formal qualification=119, higher secondary completed=431, above higher secondary=205, university degree completed=487.

As usual we will start with the medians. Norway in 1992-1999 as Denmark in 1999-2009 seems to portray a small, but significant cleavage between two groups. As in Denmark, there is also a general almost linear rising tendency over the period. In 2009 two groups behave strange though. The “lowest formal” group rises extraordinary to become the most anti-egalitarian, while the “above higher secondary” declines to become the most egalitarian. These strange results can probably be trusted, as the N’s of both groups are quite high also in 2009. In 2009 we thus see quite big median differences between the educational groups in Norway.


In terms of standard deviations; as in Denmark we also see some educational groups rising quite a lot from 1999-2009, while others almost are stagnant (as usual all Norwegian educational groups have very low standard deviations in 1992 and 1999). In Denmark we saw the “higher secondary”, “university degree” and “lowest formal education” as frontrunners in rising standard deviations. The “above lowest qualifications” plus “above higher secondary”, were on the other hand more or less stagnant. In Norway on the contrary “university degree” and “lowest formal” are among the

stagnant groups, while “above higher secondary” shares the role as frontrunner with “higher secondary”.

3.2.5 Social class (ESeC)

Figure 29-30 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to social class can be identified in Norway in the period of 1999-2009. The social class demarcation was both for Norway and Sweden only possible to create with the 1999 and 2009 datasets:

FIGURE 29-30. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for 6 different social classes in Norway in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.
 N (1999): Salariat=310, Intermediate employee=173, Small employers and self-employed=78, Lower sales and service=123, lower technical=57, Routine=102.
 N (2009): Salariat=571, Intermediate employee=301, Small employers and self-employed=55, Lower sales and service=162, lower technical=76, Routine=102.

The Norwegian development in class differences in many ways resembles the comparable Danish figures. As above the Norwegians portray somewhat bigger median differences between the groups, than their Danish counterparts. Also the three highest social classes are able to remain having low standard deviations in 2009. In Denmark all classes on the other hand rose markedly. A peculiar difference is also, that the most egalitarian Norwegian classes do not include the routine workers. There is thus somewhat of a cleavage emerging, between the lower classes minus the routine workers and the rest of the respondents in Norway. The lower classes on the other hand have a low degree of class consciousness in 2009, measured by the high standard deviations.

3.2.6 Household income

Figure 31-32 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to household income can be identified in Norway in the period covered by the three datasets:

FIGURE 31-32. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different household income groups in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1992): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=168, 21-40%=264, 41-60%=200, 61-80%=311, 81-100%=273.

N (1999): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=165, 21-40%=171, 41-60%=167, 61-80%=233, 81-100%=163.

N (2009): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=232, 21-40%=267, 41-60%=265, 61-80%=250, 81-100%=302.


The median-wise Norwegian developments in household income groups resemble both the Norwegian patterns of above and the corresponding Danish patterns. We see a general rising trend over the investigated period following an expected linear pattern from the poorer respondents to the richer. In contrast to Denmark it is the poorest and not the richest respondents standing out in 2009, as being somewhat different from the rest.

Turning to the standard deviations; we again see a rising trend from 1999-2009 for all groups. The effect is furthermore linear, meaning the lower the household income, the larger the standard deviation in 2009.

3.2.7 Employment status

Figure 33-34 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to employment status can be identified in Norway in the period covered by the three datasets. As with Denmark very few Norwegian respondents are in each of the three surveys unemployed:

FIGURE 33-34. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for groups with different employment status in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.
 N (1992): Full time employed=721, Part time employed=74, unemployed=61, Student=183, Retired=185.
 N (1999): Full time employed=563, Part time employed=61, Student=89, Retired=111.
 N (2009): Full time employed=891, Part time employed=60, Student=94, Retired=179.


In median terms we also see the same pattern as above: an almost linear inclining trend through the period, with no big cleavages: Only the part-time employed and the unemployed in 1992 deviate somewhat from this pattern.

Turning to the standard deviations; the Norwegians again repeats a less radicalised version of the Danish results. All groups portray very low standard deviations in 1992-1999, while the retired and especially the students have exploding standard deviations in 2009. The patterns of these two groups of course are quite similar to the eldest and youngest generation in figure 22, because the groups entail more or less the same respondents. The development is less radicalised, than the comparable Danish - the retired only have about half the score of the comparable group in Denmark in 2009 (0.56 vs. 1.28).

3.2.8 Trade union membership

Figure 35-36 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to trade union membership can be identified in Norway:

FIGURE 35-36. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for trade union members, former trade union members and never trade union members in Norway in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1992): Trade union member=593, not member of a trade union=721.

N (1999): Trade union member=480, not member of a trade union=431.


N (2009): Trade union member=726, once member, not now=265, never member of a trade union=368.

The Norwegian development disaggregated on trade unions again repeats the pattern of above with linear rising trends median-wise, no big differences between group levels and rising standard deviations in 2009. The former trade union members portray a remarkably high median of 2.86 in 2009 though.

3.2.9 Political vote on last election

Figure 37-38 below investigates, whether political cleavages as in Denmark can be identified in Norway:

FIGURE 37-38. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for people voting for various political parties on the last general election in Norway in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1992): The Labour Party=271, The Party of Progress=74, The Conservative Party=213, The Christian Democratic Party=60, The Centre Party=122, The Socialist Left Party=155.

N (1999): The Labour Party=224, The Party of Progress=108, The Conservative Party=173, The Christian Democratic Party=94, The Centre Party=39, The Socialist Left Party=106.

N (2009): The Labour Party=369, The Party of Progress=219, The Conservative Party=289, The Christian Democratic Party=36, The Centre Party=79, The Socialist Left Party=73.

The Norwegian development, both in terms of medians and standard deviations to a large extent resembles the corresponding Danish, albeit with different names for the political parties. The Norwegian party of progress takes the role of the social liberal party in Denmark, displaying a markedly higher median, than the other parties in 2009. The medians of the other parties raise throughout the period, and the more socialist the party, the lower median.

The standard deviations are as in the Danish case in general low. The centre party (in part because of the few respondents identifying with them), and the labour party portray a quite big rise in internal polarisation in 2009 though. As in Denmark, political orientation seems to be quite important for your attitudes to the level of difference in pay in Norway.

3.2.10 Self-reported social class

Figure 39-40 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to subjective social class can be identified in Norway in 1992, 1999 and 2009:

FIGURE 39-40. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay[^] for groups with belonging to different subjective social classes in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



[^] The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1992): Working class=455, Middle class=538.

N (1999): Working class=208, Lower middle class=81, Middle class=434, Upper middle class=159.

N (2009): Working class=246, Lower middle class=112, Middle class=657, Upper middle class=241.

Figure 39-40 almost totally resemble the corresponding Danish. As in the Danish case we again see some signs of a stable and even expanding divide between subjective social classes median-wise in Norway. The working class and the lower middle class seem to have switched places in 2009 though, meaning that these subjective class differences are probably smaller than in Denmark. Turning to the *standard deviations* the middle class holds the line in 2009, with a quite low score, while especially the lower classes raise a lot.

3.2.11 Summary of the Norwegian development

As above we will now try to sum up the general Norwegian findings. Starting with the *medians*, the Norwegian results to some extent mirrored the comparable Danish results, but with differences. In both cases in general the median-values of the various groups were not far apart. In Norway this level of unanimousness in medians is more or less constant in the three surveys, while it increased somewhat in Denmark in most cases. The Norwegian social groups also in general portrayed a rising tendency over time, while the Danish groups were more or less stagnant.

There were also differences between the countries though. The median differences between groups were somewhat bigger between educational groups, ESeC-groups and household income groups. Apart from this; the Norwegians were also different in the way that the youngest respondents/students were not deviant from the other generations. Instead a quite mysterious development is seen for two educational groups in 2009. Furthermore the former union members were surprisingly anti-egalitarian in 2009.

Turning to the *standard deviations* and the intra-group differences, the Norwegians again can be said to portray a somewhat less radicalised version of the Danish results. In 1992-1999 all groups portray very low standard deviations and in 2009 most have raised quite a lot, though not as much as in Denmark. As in Denmark it is the youngest and oldest/students retired respondents taking the lead. Also quite big intra-subjective class group cleavages seem to exist in 2009 for the two lower classes.


In general Norway both in terms of medians and standard deviations portray more or less similar results to Denmark. This is also reflected in the Norwegians political orientation. The Norwegian party of progress is taking the role of the social liberal part in being anti-egalitarian in 2009. Besides from this, the standard deviations within parties in general are quite low also in 2009. As in Denmark the Norwegian attitudes to difference in pay to a large extent seem to correlate with their political orientation, plus maybe subjective social class - rather than a range of other possible social cleavages. We now turn to the last of the Scandinavian countries Sweden, performing the same analyses.

3.3 Sweden

The Swedish analyses follow the same structure as the corresponding Danish and Norwegian above. The analyses again start out with generations in figure 41-42 below:

3.3.1 Generations

FIGURE 41-42. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different generations in Sweden in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1992): War and pre-war generations=262, The baby boom generation=203, Born 1960-1969=130, Born 1970-1979=27.

N (1999): War and pre-war generations=268, The baby boom generation=288, Born 1960-1969=189, Born 1970-1979=182, Born 1980 and thereafter=40.

N (2009): War and pre-war generations=177, The baby boom generation=299, Born 1960-1969=199, Born 1970-1979=170, Born 1980 and thereafter=158.

Sweden portrays much larger median differences between generations, than Denmark or Norway do¹⁷. Furthermore in direct opposition to Denmark, it is not the youngest respondents, who are the most anti-egalitarian, but instead the eldest¹⁸. The effect of age actually seems more or less positive linear in Sweden.

In terms of intra-group differences, the general tendency of highly risen standard deviations found especially in Denmark, but also in Norway in 2009, is not repeated. The exception is the war and pre-war generations that as in Denmark and Norway show markedly larger standard deviations in 2009, than in the other two surveys. In contrast to Norway and Denmark, the youngest respondents in Sweden do not show seriously rising standard deviations.

If we elaborate on the patterns above we both see signs of *generational- and periodical and even age effects*. Most obviously the patterns suggest clear *generational* effects. Looking at the medians, three groups seem to appear – the youngest, the eldest and everybody else. The low standard

¹⁷ Again we can see the same result in appendix X, when dividing the respondents on age-intervals.


¹⁸ See also appendix 1 for the Swedish respondents divided into age-intervals.

deviations for all groups except the oldest generation also suggest a clear attitudinal pattern within each generation. Especially when looking at the age-intervals of appendix 1, the results could also suggest an *age-effect* appearing in Sweden in 1999 and 2009. The effect of age thus seems more or less linear, with a higher age correlated with less egalitarianism. Lastly the results as in the other cases also suggest some periodic effect, resembling the Norwegian somewhat; all generations portray a rising tendency in general.

3.3.2 Gender

Figure 43-44 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to gender can be identified in Sweden in 1992, 1999 or 2009:

FIGURE 43-44. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A of males and females in Sweden in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. N (1992): Male=329, Female=293. N (1999): Male=484, Female=483. N (2009): Male=488, Female=515.

Median-wise, we see consistent and much bigger gender differences, than the case was in either Denmark or Norway. The Swedish females portray a clear rising trend over the whole period, while the males are stagnant from 1999-2009. In this way Sweden is similar to Denmark, but the general picture is very different. The development in the Swedish standard deviations here more or less mirrors the corresponding Norwegian ones, sustaining a quite high intra-group consensus also in 2009.

3.3.3 Urbanization

Figure 45-46 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to urbanisation can be identified in the Sweden:

FIGURE 45-46. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A of respondents in areas with different degrees of urbanisation in Sweden in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.


N (1992): Urban=104, Suburban=351, Rural=88. N (1999): Urban=331, Suburban=527, Rural=109. N (2009): Urban=233, Suburban=187, Rural=574.

Again we see larger differences in medians in Sweden than the case was, when investigating urbanisation in Denmark and Norway. As in Norway the development over time is generally rising, but in direct contrast the tendency goes towards reduced differences between groups. The Swedish standard deviations again remain rather low through the whole period. A minor rising tendency can be identified and there is only a marginal difference compared to the Norwegian results.

3.3.4 Education

Figure 47-48 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to education can be identified in Sweden in the period covered by the three datasets:

FIGURE 47-48. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different educational groups in Sweden in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.

N (1992): Lowest formal qualification=186, above lowest formal qualification=210, higher secondary completed=96, university degree completed=126.

N (1999): Lowest formal qualification=189, above lowest formal qualification=302, higher secondary completed=204, above higher secondary=84, university degree completed=163.

N (2009): Lowest formal qualification=160, above lowest formal qualification=272, higher secondary completed=172, above higher secondary=102, university degree completed=286.


The large and consistent Swedish median cleavages also identified with gender and generations are also found disaggregation on educational groups. Respondents with a university degree completed and t education above higher secondary school are consistently much less egalitarian, than all other educational groups. In 1992 it looks like the higher secondary completed group belonged to the top group – this was the case in Denmark. But in 1999 and 2009, these three bottom groups have virtually identical medians – this was the case in Norway.

In Denmark and Norway, we saw some educational groups' standard deviations rose tremendously from 1999-2009, while others remained quite low. This is also the case in Sweden – but only the above higher secondary school-group belongs to the sharply rising group. The Swedish pattern thus again seem to deviate from the Danish and Norwegian one in that the general level of intra-group consensus is higher.

3.3.5 Social class (ESeC)

Figure 49-50 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to social class can be identified in Sweden in the period from 1999 to 2009:

FIGURE 49-50. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for 6 different social classes in Sweden in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index.
 N (1999): Salariat=307, Intermediate employee=178, Small employers and self-employed=52, Lower sales and service=167, lower technical=67, Routine=114.
 N (2009): Salariat=386, Intermediate employee=176, Small employers and self-employed=36, Lower sales and service=163, lower technical=68, Routine=113.

The consistent Swedish median differences, this time between social classes, are again enormous compared to the Danish and Norwegian figures. They furthermore follow a classical class pattern with the lower classes in the bottom rising towards the higher classes in the top, being very anti-egalitarian for Scandinavian standards. Turning to the standard deviations, the figures are almost as low for all Swedish social classes also in 2009, as they were for the top three Norwegian classes. The main reason small-employers and self-employed are off the charts are most likely the low Ns for this group.

3.3.6 Household income

Figure 51-52 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to household income can be identified in Sweden in the period from 1999-2009:

FIGURE 51-52. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different household income groups in Sweden in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=168, 21-40 %=168, 41-60 %=186, 61-80 %=162, 81-100 %=219.


N (2009): 0-20 % lowest family incomes=176, 21-40 %=189, 41-60 %=168, 61-80 %=209, 81-100 %=197.

In median-terms the Swedish results disaggregating on household income are noticeable. Whereas a more or less linear effect was seen in Denmark and Norway (higher household income indicates less egalitarianism), in Sweden the richest 19 % of the respondents are clearly much less egalitarian, than everybody else, who are quite alike. Turning to the standard deviations a rising pattern can be seen for all groups except the 21-40 % respondents. The development is again not as dramatic as in the Danish and Norwegian case though.

3.3.7 Employment status

Figure 53-54 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to employment status can be identified in Sweden. Unfortunately no Swedish employment status data exist in the ISSP 1992 dataset and as with Denmark and Norway very few respondents are in each of the three surveys unemployed:

FIGURE 53-54. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for groups with different employment status in Sweden in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.
 N (1999): Full time employed=519, Part time employed=133, Student=101, Retired=111.
 N (2009): Full time employed=573, Part time employed=123, Student=70, Retired=153.


The Swedish employment status groups again portray much bigger median differences, than the case was in the other two countries. In 1999 this difference was huge spanning from 1.67 for the part-time employed to 3.21 for the retired swedes. The tendency in 2009 is on the other hand one of much smaller, but still significant cleavages. The retired swedes median thus fall steeply, while the part-time employed rise sharply.

In terms of standard deviations we again see only one group departing from the trend of steady low standard deviations in all three surveys: the retired Swedish respondents in 2009. They rise from 0.36-0.75 from 1999-2009.

3.3.8 Trade union membership

Figure 55-56 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to trade union membership can be identified in Sweden:

FIGURE 55-56. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for trade union members, former trade union members and never trade union members in Norway in ISSP1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): Trade union member=694, not member of a trade union=250.


N (2009): Trade union member=574, once member, not now=233, never member of a trade union=188.

The median difference between trade union members, former members and never/non-members to a higher extent resembles the pattern of the corresponding figures of Denmark and Norway with small median differences between groups, than the case has been in the Swedish analyses so far. In terms of standard deviations we also see rather big differences in the development between the groups – also a pattern more closely resembling Denmark and Norway.

3.2.9 Political vote on last election

Figure 57-58 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to political orientation can be identified in Sweden:

FIGURE 57-58. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for people voting for various political parties on the last general election in Sweden in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1992): The Centre Party=37, The Liberal Party= 49, The Liberal Conservatives= 109, The Social Democrats= 131.

N (1999): The Centre Party=30, The Liberal Party= 46, The Liberal Conservatives= 157, The Social Democrats= 247, The Christian Democrats= 75, The Left Party= 87.


N (2009): The Centre Party=59, The Liberal Party= 71, The Liberal Conservatives= 256, The Social Democrats= 320, The Left Party= 62, The Green Party= 61.

As a start it is worth noticing that the most Swedish respondents, in opposition to the Danes and Norwegians, consistently say they voted for one of the two major parties – “Moderata samlingspartiet” here translated to the liberal conservatives and “Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti” here translated as the social democrats. The medians and standard deviations of the other parties portrayed are thus suffering from the small-N problem, and the results of these are somewhat uncertain. Between these two major parties we see big and consistent median differences. The standard deviation of the liberal conservatives rose markedly already in 1999. This maybe reflects that this party started to gain more voters, not traditionally identifying with all their views of a more right-wing character. The same interpretation probably applies to the similar results of the Danish liberal party above.

3.3.10 Self-reported social class

Figure 59-60 below investigates, whether cleavages linked to subjective social class can be identified in Sweden:

FIGURE 59-60. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for groups with belonging to different subjective social classes in Sweden in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



^A The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.

N (1999): Working class=312, Middle class=436, Upper middle class=165.

N (2009): Working class=226, Lower middle class=124, Middle class=484, Upper middle class=137.

The polarised median tendencies again turn out to be rampant in Sweden disaggregating on subjective social class – and even more so than in Denmark and Norway. The pattern is furthermore the predicted; ranging from the consistently egalitarian working class to the anti-egalitarian upper middle class. Turning to the standard deviations; for Swedish terms two groups portray quite significant rising tendencies from 1999 to 2009 – the upper middle and the lower middle class.

3.3.11 Summary of the Swedish development

As the last of the three countries we will now try to elaborate the Swedish results. If we start with the group *medians*, Sweden clearly stood out from Norway and Denmark in having much bigger between group differences in almost all instances – only when disaggregating on urbanisation and trade union membership did results mirror the other two countries. It should be mentioned that even if these differences between groups are consistent, for gender, urbanisation and employment status; there are some tendencies for the groups' median levels approaching each other in 2009. One could maybe also notice that in contrast to Denmark and Norway, the ranking of the groups in Sweden

follows a not so surprising pattern. The least egalitarian groups are thus: males, elder/retired, urban, 19 % richest, full-time employed, the voters of the liberal conservative and higher social classes/subjective upper middle class respondents. The well-off groups in society are thus the least egalitarian.

In terms of intra-group differences or *standard deviations*, the Swedish results in general also deviated from the Danish and Norwegian results, although to a lesser extent. The groups' standard deviations in most cases in Norway and especially in Denmark rose significantly from 1999-2009. In Sweden on the contrary most groups remained at a low, almost 1999-level in 2009. The only real exception from this is in Sweden in 2009 is the elder/retired, the above higher secondary educational group, former and non-members of trade unions, the voters of the liberal conservatives and lower- and upper middle class. In the conclusion below we will further elaborate on these findings and more specifically present some thoughts, of whether similar effects are likely to have caused the results revealed in the analyses.

4. Conclusion and discussion

In this conclusion we will not so much recap the variety of empirical result presented in the 60 figures above. Neither will we try to formulate hypothesis on the direct drivers of development. Instead we will focus on, what the results tell us about, which type of demarcations and explanations one should look for in future research. Overall two points will be made below; *one* concerns the level of analyses and explanatory factor, *the other* concerns the type of explanatory factor.

Kjærsgård (2012) showed that when comparing a range of western countries in *aggregated* analyses, the three Scandinavian countries seem very similar. To recap, the three Scandinavian countries were found in both 1999 and 2009 to wish for exceptionally low differences between salaries at the top and bottom of the occupational hierarchy. The Scandinavians were comparatively speaking quite satisfied with the perceived salary of the investigated occupations, only the salary of chairmen was seen as increasingly unjust. The Scandinavian egalitarianism was therefore argued to be characterised more as an aversion to top excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom.

Because the Scandinavian respondents were found so alike, investigating all the three dimensions, one is clearly to look for common Scandinavian explanatory factors in explaining the *aggregated* results of Kjærsgård (2012). A good starting point here is thus to ask, what sets Scandinavia apart

from other western countries? Without going into detail, one could argue that the explanations could be found in macro level dynamics rooted in institutional factors (welfare regime and industrial relations system) and cultural/discursive factors possibly bounded in unique Scandinavian national narratives. A qualified guess on the mechanism of reproduction at the micro level could be found in social psychological post-rationalisation and justification processes (Lerner 1980; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006).

Interestingly quite different results appeared, when *disaggregating* the results on social groups of the three countries in this article. Whereas the overall development of the various social groups in Denmark and Norway followed more or less the same pattern, the Swedish groups followed an almost opposite pattern. Overly simplified the general result of the analyses of the article is that in Sweden big *between* group differences exist and remain, but at the same time the *intra-group* differences are small, also in 2009. In Denmark and Norway the differences *between* groups are small (with notable exceptions), whereas the *intra-group* differences skyrockets in 2009 for a majority of the groups investigated (more so in Denmark, than in Norway).

It thus seems obvious that in spite the *aggregated* or *macro* level similarity between the three countries, when one moves the level of analysis to the *meso* level by *disaggregating* to various social groups, it is likely that other factors are in play in Sweden, than in Denmark and Norway. This means in order to explain the variation between the three countries, we need as a minimum to look at factors unique for Sweden. As before a good starting point is therefore to ask, what sets Sweden apart from Denmark and Norway? A preliminary hypothesis emphasises the importance of the degree of *politicisation* or *mobilsation* in the country and *knowledge* of the actual conditions among the people of the various social groups in the country.

Svallfors (2004) finds and argues that the intra-class attitudinal differences in Sweden are much larger, than in other countries, where the actual class differences are much bigger. Svallfors (2004) explains this paradox by arguing that the class differences are both more institutionalised and politicised in Sweden, than in the other countries. As described in Kjærsgård (2012) all three Scandinavian countries still have uniquely high trade union density rates, though Norway's is somewhat lower (www.stats.oecd.org). In spite of this; one could on the basis of Svallfors (2004) assume that the level of salience of the class struggle (or more neutrally put; the question about the distribution of gross incomes), is much higher in Sweden, than in Denmark and Norway. Further

supporting this idea is that in all three countries, the result shows that this class struggle seems to be decoupled from the trade unions, at least on the micro level.

The higher salience level of the question about the just distribution of gross incomes in *Sweden* induces not only the “working class” to have firm egalitarian beliefs, but also the “bourgeoisie” to have the opposite. This is exactly why we see big and stable *median* difference between groups, following more or less a predictable “class” pattern.

The low *Swedish standard deviations* are also in accordance with what could be expected following the argumentation from above: The high degree of politicisation or mobilisation and the strong group- or class tie must lead to a high degree of within-group uniformity in norms. What is suggested here is furthermore that the Swedes, because of the degree of politicisation or mobilisation, have a high degree of *knowledge* about the actual conditions especially the average wage differentials on their labour market. In all three countries the elder respondent groups typically had very high standard deviations in 2009. In Denmark and Norway, but not Sweden, this also concerned the youngest age-groups. Retired respondents are not in much contact with the labour market anymore, they probably in general do not have much interest in it either. Therefore it is no surprise that their answers are unsystematic and vary quite a lot (Zaller 1992). The youngest respondents – especially the students - typically do not have much experience with the conditions on the labour market. One could therefore expect their answers to vary a lot, in the same way as the elder respondents. This is exactly what is seen in Denmark and Norway in 2009. An explanation for, why it was not so in Denmark and Norway before 2009 and in Sweden consistently, is that the youngsters must have gotten their information from somewhere else. Again the higher degree of politicisation and salience could explain this difference. For now these are just hypotheses. It is up to further research into the level of salience, politicisation and knowledge about the subject in the three countries to test these hypotheses.

Lastly it is worth mentioning two things. *Firstly* in spite the group- or meso level differences identified in the article, the aggregated- or macro level differences and factors are still very important: The highest group median values above¹⁹, would still be placed among the bottom six countries in the second column of table 1 above (displaying the same dependent variable in 1999). One could argue that it seems the macro level factors define a quite narrow range, the intra-country group factors can work within. Therefore it seems clear that whatever explanatory model is

¹⁹ Retired Swedes in 1999 = 3.21 and 65-74 year old Swedes in 1999 = 3.49.

developed by future research, needs to put a high emphasis on the effect of macro level differences, and their mechanisms of reproduction at the micro level.

Secondly if one wants to remain focused on the meso level in the Scandinavian countries, one of the most interesting groups of results comes from disaggregating on educational groups, political orientation and subjective class membership. In both median, but especially standard deviation terms, striking and surprising differences were found in the three countries. At the same time these between- and intra-group differences were among the largest of the 60 figures presented, so they must clearly be of significance.

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Appendix

Appendix 1 - attitudes to difference in levels of pay disaggregated on age-intervals

FIGURE 61-62. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different age-groups in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.




FIGURE 63-64. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different age-cohorts in Norway in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.





FIGURE 65-66. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay^A for different age-cohorts in Sweden in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations.



Appendix 2 – the content of the different ESeC classes and how the different class models are related

TABLE 2. The European socio-economic classification. Taken from Harrison & Rose (2007).

	<i>ESeC class</i>	<i>Common term</i>	<i>Employment regulation</i>
1	Large employers, higher grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations	Higher salariat	Service Relationship
2	Lower grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations and higher grade technician and supervisory occupations	Lower salariat	Service Relationship (modified)
3	Intermediate occupations	Higher grade white collar workers	Mixed
4	Small employer and self employed occupations (exc agriculture etc)	Petit bourgeoisie or independents	Not applicable
5	Self employed occupations (agriculture etc)	Petit bourgeoisie or independents	Not applicable
6	Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations	Higher grade blue collar workers	Mixed
7	Lower services, sales and clerical occupations	Lower grade white collar workers	Labour Contract (modified)
8	Lower technical occupations ¹	Skilled workers	Labour Contract (modified)
9	Routine occupations ¹	Semi- and non-skilled workers	Labour Contract
10	Never worked and long-term unemployed	Unemployed	Not applicable

TABLE 3. *Collapsing ESeC from 10 to 6 to 5 to 3 Class Models. Taken from Harrison & Rose (2007).*

ESeC Class	10 class version	6 class version	5 class version	3 class version
Higher salariat	1	1+2	1+2	1+2
Lower salariat	2			
Higher white collar	3	3+6	3+6	3+4+45+6
Petit bourgeois	4	4+5	4+5	
Small farmers	5			
Higher grade blue collar	6	3+6	3+6	
Lower white collar	7	7	7	7+8+9
Skilled manual	8	8	8+9	
Semi-/unskilled	9	9		
Unemployed	(10)	(10)	(10)	(10)