Families' Poverty and Placed Children

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Danish social policy seems to move into a neo-liberal direction. The social policy is increasingly marked by tightening rules and increased control for people who are not able to comply with societal norms. This development has impact on, for instance, ethnic minority groups (lower allowances, greater demands for language abilities, postponed possibilities for getting citizenship), cash benefit receivers (lower allowances, and demands of activation in various projects in repay for this allowance), criminals (who are punished harder than before) - and on families with placed children (or in risk of placement). This last group is in focus in this paper. Through one hundred years the society has increasingly tried to integrate these families; in the beginning of the late century through compulsion and from the midth of the 20th century onwards through a still increasing row of ‘offers’. Now again, control and pressure seem to invade the conception of the ‘right’ attitude to those families (Julkunen & Harder 2004).

It is my intention with this paper to make propable that redistribution and recognition would be more valuable alternatives for integration of these families. Moreover, I raise the question why children from female headed lone-parent-families seem to be in much greater risk for being placed outside their homes than children from two-parent-families.

In order to explore this I will draw on critical theory. On the macro level, the paper will be informed by Jürgen Habermas’ thoughts about women’s general status in society; about certain group’s risks of getting further stigmatised by society’s intentions of offering them special and positive support, and about families’ risk of developing functional disturbances, when society (public authorities) intervene in the families with the law in hand (Habermas 1997, 1996). Some families react on this colonization by protesting and resisting. Axel Honneth’s concept of recognition (which he has adopted from Hegel) offers some concretization of such reactions to colonialisation. In this connection, I will shortly introduce Honneth’s and Nancy Fraser’s discussion about the concepts of recognition and redistribution and how these concepts according to Fraser and Honneth should be related to each other (Fraser & Honneth 2003, Honneth 2003, 1995). Furthermore, Michel Foucault’s thoughts of the creation of the modern family institution will inspire me to explore the current society’s conception of the lone-parent-family (Foucault 2002 a + b).

Empirically, I will present figures concerning the content of placed children, the reasons for their placement as they are explained by the public authorities, and their families’ characteristics. From my own study I will present some findings about placement of children through one hundred year (Harder 2000). Today’s share of poor lone-parent-families will be encircled (Hansen 2005). Furthermore, I will try to make the daily life experience of poverty
even more concrete by using a socio-psychological nordic poverty study (Unterlid 2005). I will start with the empirical data.

**Empirical data**

Most placements of children outside their own homes take place as voluntary arrangements, i.e. that parents and perhaps the children themselves accept the public suggestions about the placement. For about 12% of all, the arrangement has happened without the parents’ and perhaps the children’s will and wish. At the end of 2004, the number of all placed children was 14,074 while the compulsory placements amounted to 1,222. Bryderup argues that about 1% of the child population, at any time through one hundred years, has been placed outside home (Bryderup 2005). As concern the children, placed by compulsion, this share has changed rather dramatically over time. For instance, the share was 3% in 1987 (Hestbæk 1997).

The public intervention in families’ lives is caused by two main reasons - either it is supposed that the children’s environments are far from satisfactory and that this has a heavy influence on the children’s lives, or that the child suffers from severly problems related first and foremost to itself. The families were often characterized by accumulated difficulties. In my own qualitative study (Harder 2000, 1997) concerning voluntary associations’ support to families with (compulsorily) placed children, the associations report that they were addressed by and gave counselling to mainly lone-parent-families. Besides bearing this status, the families were characterized by the parent being currently or permanently marginalised from the labour market and in consequence of this by having a modest economy or being poor. The background for being a lone parent was often divorce/family dissolution. The parent was almost always a women. She often carried with her other problems such as mental and physical illnesses and/or dependency on drugs, alcohol and medicine. Some parents had themselves been placed outside their homes as children. Many of them had experienced severe conditions in their childhood. Other studies, especially using quantative methods, confirm this picture (for example Hestbæk 1997, Christoffersen 2002, Ploug 2003, Egelund/Hestbæk 2004). The children’s ‘own’ problems are defined by the social services as severe social difficulties; school problems; not wishing to remain at home; developmental problems and mental illnesses or disabilities (Hestbæk 1997). Rather many of the placed children have often problems of a character similar to abused children (Christoffersen 2002).

Public intervention concerning children’s conditions in families has been covered by Dansih law at least since 1905: the law concerning criminal and neglected children. This law - as any later law in the area - distinguishes between dangerous children and children in danger (Egelund 1997, Løjke 1990). Even if the law has been modernised during the last century the main message concerning compulsory placed children is still the same.

*Lone female parents in comparison with women from two-parents-families*

Hansen (2005) states, that there are in Denmark currently about 115.000 families with one parent, i.e. roughly 4% of all households (including singles and families without children). Since 1999 the number has increased by about 10% and the number of these families’ children by 14%. That means that around 20% of families with children consist of one or more children and one parent. The parent will for 90% be a woman (Halskov et al. 2000).

As to education these parents have relatively low education compared with other women. 5% have an academic education. Lone parents with more than two children represent the lowest
level of all women\(^1\). Two thirds of them are in the labour market\(^2\) while the comparable figure is 90% of women in two-parents-families (Hansen 2005). Half of the women have received contemporary public allowances for some of the year 2003, while one fourth received such allowances for most of the same year. Lone female parents are in very varied economic situations. Looking at family income they earn from 100,000 to 400,000 D.kr. per year. 6% of lone parents with one child had in 2002 available income lower than EU’s poverty border of 50% of medium income while the number was 13% when looking at the 60% border\(^3\). This means that lone female parents are not as a whole a vulnerable group but those who are (and their children) are in a marginalised position with serious consequences. It is the latter group I concentrate on in this paper.

CASA (Centre for Alternative Societal Analysis) who produced the above figures has furthermore analysed which forms of deprivations (“afsavn”), caused by economy, these families did suffer from (Year 2000 and concerning all families with children). The lone-mothers-group reported most deprivations but with a massive dispersion as 17% reported deprivations in relation to all questioned areas and 40% reported none. In two-parents-families 78% of the women reported no deprivations. The most reported issue from the lone-parent-group were no possibilities for holiday outside the home. To be able to replace house equipment; to go to hairdresser; to visit people - were other needs that could not be fulfilled (Hansen 2005).

A rather substantial part of lone female parents is an underprivileged group, especially as regards education, paid work and economic possibilities. This group has a relatively lower income. As to deprivations they seem to be in a considerably worse situation than others. At the same time, the above mentioned report stresses that lone mothers’ situation actually did improve during the last few years, as generally higher economy and employment in society has been beneficial for this group like for other groups as well (op.cit.).

What does poverty mean for human beings? In Unterlid’s study concerning poverty and possible differences between ‘old’ and ‘modern’ poverty, he concentrates on poor peoples’ feelings connected to their situation. He interviewed 25 persons, living in Bergen, who had received public allowances over a long period (Unterlid 2005). Since both Norway and Denmark, according to Esping-Andersen’s ideal types of welfare states (as referred to in Pringle & Harder 1999), could be said to approximate to the Scandinavian welfare regime, I take the liberty of presuming that experiences of people in Norway and Denmark are to some extent comparable - even though we are increasingly aware of heterogeneity between the Nordic welfare systems.

Unterlid outlines different conceptions of the poor during the centuries. The philanthropic or the public assistance approach has been regulated according to how poverty has been

\(^1\)In comparison, 10% of women in two-parents families are at a low educational level while 15% of these are educated at an academic level (Hansen 2005)

\(^2\)This number has earlier been higher but during some years the situation has improved (op.cit.)

\(^3\)For the population as a whole these figures are 4,2% respectively 8,9% (op.cit.)
conceived - as a moral question, i.e. if the person in question had the will or motivation for taking care of herself (if not, the assistance takes form of punishment); if she had the abilities to do so but did not use them (assistance in form of treatment); or if she was unable to take care of herself (assistance would then be material and/or immaterial). From ancient to modern times, poor people have been dependent on other people’s desires to help. They have been expected to be humble and thankful for the help. They have also experienced that poverty is not ‘only’ about economy but that it influences other parts of life also (Unterlid 2005:23-4).

The theoretical base of his study is theories of emotions and needs, a social cognitive perspective and a socio-cultural context (op.cit.:152). Unterlid found that emotional reactions about poverty could be placed in four categories: The aggressive category, the anxious one, the depressive and the category characterized by shame and guilt. He also found that these modern feelings did seem to be comparable to ‘ancient’ feelings of poverty. When he experienced positive feelings he also found that they were independent of the poverty situation (op.cit.:157). He saw such feelings and emotions as connected to unfulfilled needs. He specifically looked at psychologically and psycho-socially unfulfilled needs and found central unmet needs such as the need for security, the need for autonomy, the need of care and the need of self care (op.cit.:210). These are unfulfilled needs which have a strong influence on people’s capacity for participating in society. He underlined that poverty is heterogeneous, i.e. multidimensional; that it is continuous, processual and contextual. He also emphasized that new poverty is not so visible as it is easier nowadays to camouflage it. Nevertheless, poverty has a material side with practical consequences and an emotional side with negative psychological experiences (op.cit.:230-6). Unfortunately, Unterlid was not able to make distinctions between men’s and women’s reactions in situations of poverty.

Unprivileged lone mothers and social services
As Unterlid states, poverty also bring with it other types of under-privilegedment. Such, Halskov et al. emphasize (based on qualitative interviews with twenty lone mothers in marginalised situations) the difference between social policy in Denmark in general and (some of the) lone mothers’ reality. This difference or gap seems to expand over these years (Halskov et al. 2000:231). The contrast with the CASA study might be explained by the very different groups the two studies relate to. In the Halskov-study the women have experienced lack of helpfulness from social services. On the contrary, they felt they were met with suspicion and reluctance (op.cit.:234). The level of social support seems to decrease. The Halskov-study concludes that factors such as labour market discrimination, limited possibilities for education, lack of legal protection against family violence, isolation, lack of time and material ressources, lone responsibility for taking care of sick children and public stigmatization work towards loss of rights. These factors also have negative consequences for the children involved (op.cit.:263). In her doctor’s thesis concerning child protection Egelund states (on the basis of examination of social services’ journals) that lone-parent-families’ economic possibilities (or rather lack of them) do not seem to explain - for the social system - the families’ apparently ‘irresponsible’ behaviour. On the contrary, receivers of public allowances seem to be exposed to even stronger demands of an archaic character (Egelund 1997:197).

During the last few years public intervention in lone-parent-families has been even more intimate, according to Åkerstrom Andersen. The ongoing development of social contracts between citizens and social administration/management tends to intrude into families’ intimate lives. Such a contract might concern how many hours and when the child should be
in its home; how often the family should eat together; how many different men who should be allowed access to the home by the mother etc. Andersen considers this development as a major shift in social policy and in the conception of the client but also as a regulative mechanism towards in- and exclusion (Andersen 2003). I consider this as a form of disciplining the client - though in a certain perspective, as it has the shape of a contract even if you can in no way speak about participants in symmetrical situations. It also seems in a strange way to suggest a touch of user involvement and self decision in it.

Theory concerning societal intervention in families
Habermas considers public intervention in family lives via law as a dilemma-filled area because the family institution and public social authorities represent different functions and principles. The system tends to colonize the life world, i.e. the system’s goal-rational operational capacity is constantly increased at the expense of the life world’s communicative rationality. This happens also when the system - with the law as a medium - intervenes in families, even if the life world does not necessarily feel this colonization. But when basic values are threatened, families might recognize that (Habermas 1996). This is what seems to happen when the parents of placed children approach the above-mentioned associations.

I conceive Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and, especially, the part of it which concerns the struggle for recognition, as a concretisation of Habermas’ colonization-thesis (Honneth himself might not agree to this). Honneth’s concept of recognition is differentiated in three spheres - the private one, the legal one and the solidarity sphere. Recognition in all of these spheres are central for human beings’ (good) development. Each form of recognition expresses, at different levels, subjects’ relation to themselves. In the private sphere, love and care are central for creation of the child’s basic trust. In the legal sphere, legal rights (of different kinds) bring with them to a person the general recognition as is due for anyone else in society. This results in the person’s trust in herself as a full-fledged member of society. In the sphere of solidarity, people are sharing mutual values and norms. The feeling of belonging to groups or to society creates for the person a basic feeling of being worthy, which could be said to be a parallel category to basic trust (Honneth 1995, 2003). When people are in lack of recognition, or even directly denied of it, the basis for a positive development could be lost or reduced and the human being will, in accordance with the actual extent of the violation of love, rights or solidarity, suffer from fragile basic trust, feeling of being unworthy and of not being legally respected at the same level as other citizens. As to the recognition theory, these losses occur because human beings are deeply depending on recognition from other people and are only able to establish and to preserve a positive relation to themselves by confirmation from other persons (op.cit.). If we do not receive a sufficient amount of recognition, we might turn the feeling of this loss against ourselves (for example in the shape of abuse of drugs etc., or depression) or we might turn our reaction against the outer world.

Philosophically, Honneth sees recognition as the overarching concept. This brings him in opposition to Habermas and also to Nancy Fraser. In their mutual book (Redistribution or Recognition - Fraser & Honneth 2003) she has suggested ‘justice’ as the superiour concept which according to Fraser places redistribution and recognition as subordinated but equal concepts.

I will now turn to women’s position in society as Habermas considers it. And to the ‘danger’ of being in need for societal assistance. In Habermas’ discussion about legal policy (Habermas 1997), he uses women’s position in society to show how legal policy helplessly
swings between two traditional paradigms and how this will go on until the interplay between persons’ individual rights and citizens’ public autonomy becomes recognized. The original purpose with liberal policy was to uncouple status from gender identity and to secure for women a neutral equality regarding competition in the labour market; social status; education; political power etc. These efforts accentuated, however, the fact that women were actually treated in an inequal way. Welfare policy therefore reacted by creating special rules for women in female situations (conditions concerning childbirth, divorce etc.). Feminist criticism called attention to a row of other issues which should also be addressed and which were to a certain degree consequences of these ‘special rights’. For instance, this is the case regarding women’s and mothers’ risk of losing their paid work; women’s higher share of low paid jobs; what Habermas calls the ‘problematic question of what is best for the child’ and the increasing feminization of childhood. Such discrimination might be caused by general classifications that the law uses in identifying these issues. But these classifications can at the same time lead to ‘normalising’ interventions in women’s lives. What was meant to be compensations (for being a woman), might be transformed into new forms of discrimination and therefore result in depriving women of freedom instead of extending their freedom. Habermas sees the creation and management of law as accompanying traditional patterns of interpretation and therefore contributing to consolidation of existing stereotypes. Habermas pleads for a procedural conception of right. The democratic process should at the same time secure private and public autonomy. Individual rights for women cannot be adequately formulated if the affected persons are not themselves involved in the articulation and justification of their demands (op.cit.). Foucault would see an important power issue embedded in such struggles: that the fight for rights would concentrate the essence of the group and thereby be a tool for power (Foucault 2002a).

This brings me to Foucault’s thoughts about discipline and the ongoing inspection of the family. Foucault understands ‘discipline’ as control with bodily functions which ensures, on the one hand, a constant subjugation of the human body and its strengths; and, on the other hand, ensures that it reacts with compliance and usefulness - without being aware of it (Foucault 2002a). The human body thereby becomes a part of a power machinery which examines itself, separates itself and assembles itself (op.cit.:153-4). The instruments of power are anonymous. They have many tools: hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration, endless evaluation and classification (op.cit.:238). The examination combines surveillance techniques with the normalizing technique of sanctions. This concerns the relation between power and knowledge. Disciplinary power works by invisibility. The subjects are on the contrary quite apparent. They are placed in a documentary field and are classified as ‘cases’, i.e. objects for knowledge and fixed points for power (op.cit.:201-8). In the development from closed discipline (such as social quarantine) to the panopticon, the disciplinary society is created (op.cit.:233).

What makes disciplinary power so effective is its ability to grasp the individual at the level of its self-understanding. As ‘subjected’, the individual is either bound to others by dependency or control, or to categories, practices and possibilities which emerges from normalizational and panoptic disciplines. Nancy Fraser characterizes the scenario of the perfected Panopticon as one in which “disciplinary norms have become so thoroughly internalized that they are not experienced as coming from without” (Fraser 1989 referred in Sawicki 1998: 94-5).

How could this happen? Foucault saw discipline closely connected to the period of Enlightenment. In the 18th century, the population was invented as an economic and political
problem. Number of births, of mortalities, of estimated time of life, of state of health and of homes were variables which were placed in the intersection of life and institutions (Foucault 2002b:34). Foucault called it bio-politics (op.cit.:143). And here the inspection and examination also began. The discipline did not only concern the body but also the gender. During this development the issue of confession changed as well. According to Foucault, confession changed from the religious type and the type who showed your status and value to a type of confession where you confessed your own thoughts and actions. You confessed voluntarily - or you were forced to it. Foucault saw confession as an example of the fact that production of truth was permeated with power (op.cit.:63-8). This confession as well as the development of a set of conceptions about sexuality became crucial to the family institution. Sexuality could not be hidden or forbidden. Alternatively, sexuality became anchored in the family and thereby restricted. From the 18th century and onwards the family has been seen as the right place for affections, emotions, love, and the place where children should be born. In combination with disciplinary power, the need for confession and this installation of sexuality, the family opened itself for endless inspection (op.cit.:114-7). And it still is. But families do not any longer consist of mother, father, children. They can have all forms. It could be said that the conception of this former family has not left the minds of the inhabitants of the 21st century. If this is true, lone parents may fight not only with the administration and administrators of social law but also with old-fashioned ideas of the ‘real’ family, ideas that are difficult to bring to the surface and thereby to question them as they are more or less hidden in the veil of discipline.

It should also be stated that Foucault’s work since the early 1980’s had a strong influence on feminists, especially in the United States of America. Specifically, the “History of Sexuality” became a key text. Some of his work overlapped with feminists exploring the micro-politics of private life. His emphasis on biopower opened up understanding not only about production, but also reproduction and sexuality and the demands for freedom connected to these issues (Sawicki 1998:93). Furthermore, he emphasized the challenges contained within marginalized and unrecognized discourses. His analyses of disciplinary power were used by feminists to isolate disciplinary technologies that subjugate women as objects and subjects and those that acknowledged domination. He tried to give oppressed groups a voice in the struggle over interpretations. He believed it was possible to alter particular normalizing practices and thereby make particular lives more tolerable. Foucault was, however and naturally, also criticized. Most feminists point to his androcentric gender blindness; others to his apparent lack of explicit normative foundations. And others again to the dangers of relativism, nihilism and pessimism often associated with his work (op.cit.:95-100).

It should be said that Foucault in the early 1980s (he died 1984) entered into dialogue with critics who demanded criteria for distinguishing malevolent and benign or beneficial forms of power. And he softened his critique of the Enlightenment. “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous”, said Foucault in “The Subject and Power” (1983 ref. in Sawicki 1998:101). In response to, for instance, Habermas and Fraser he clarified the distinction between domination and power. An important question concerning society was whether it would be able to create a space for individuals’ liberty to transform the system. Foucault meant that people themselves should take care of this, since freedom could never be expected to be assured by the institutions and laws which formally should guarantee it. Foucault also, at that time, distinguished among forms of power such as exploitation, racial or ethnic hegemony and subjection. He did acknowledge systematic unequal power relations. And he attempted to provide tools for people struggling against subjection. He saw freedom as practice: “Liberty must be exercised” (Foucault in “Space, Knowledge and Power” ref. in
op.cit.:100-2). He continued to operate with liberal humanist values such as liberty, dignity and autonomy. And he saw humanism “dogmatically represented on every side of the political rainbow” (Foucault in “Truth, Power, Self” ref. in op.cit.:102-3).

Concluding comments
There is in Denmark a rather substantial group (at least from a Danish perspective) of poor families with one female breadwinner. This does not mean that lone-parent-families, as a whole, are an exposed group. Most of lone-parent-families take care of themselves as do two-parent-families. But some of them are in need of assistance from society (or the assistance is forced upon them). When those families approach the social system for assistance they do not feel themselves recognized for their actual efforts. On the contrary, they seem to be met with demands from ‘another culture’, maybe in the shape of ‘contracts’. Public assistance, when needed, is a right provided by the Danish welfare state (and the corresponding social policy). It seems to be an ambiguous one as it might be followed by increased surveillance. In that way, the intentions of the system’s integrational efforts might lead to the opposite - the experience of disintegration. Habermas sees integrational efforts as (also) including the risk of stigmatizing people. Foucault would rather draw the attention to the population’s need of seeing themselves as normal which calls for a ‘magic mirror’ showing the ‘abnormality’.

Maybe this is a fair explanation of the fact that throughout hundred years, 1% of the child population has always be placed outside their homes. Foucault’s family inspection thesis might, furthermore, explain why most families with children, chosen to be placed outside their homes, are lone-mother-families. The efforts of encapsulating sexuality in a secure place, the nuclear family, might mean that lone-mother-families are conceived as a moral threat. The other issues characterizing those families: lack of paid labour, mental and physical illnesses etc. and a daily life with deprivations might contribute to this conception. Even if Denmark is far from, for instance, American, English⁴ and other West-European levels concerning poverty in the population, poverty does exist in Denmark. One of the poorest groups is low educated and labour market marginalized women with two or more children⁵. As Unterlid emphasises, economic poverty is often followed by other forms of problems that make it difficult for people to participate in society at an equal level. That goes also for children in such families as they are co-carriers of the families’ conditions. Poverty also brings with it low self-esteem, the risk of feeling not-good-enough as a parent, the necessity of refusing children’s fair wishes about being able to give a friend a birthday-gift; to be participating in a school outing; to being dressed in new and modern clothes etc. Not only poverty exists in Denmark - inequality does also⁶. The group’s underprivileged status leads to lack of recognition (lack of work is according to Fraser & Honneth especially leading to disrespect)

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⁴When comparing English and Danish lone mothers, older figures from EU shows that while lone female parents in Denmark in 1998 had a poverty risk of 10%, the figure for lone mothers in Great Britain was 24% (Munk 2002)

⁵A European comparative analysis showed that social class, education and status of employment are decisive parameters in explaining poverty as is also the type of welfare state. It was also found that studies seldom are focused on gender differences (Munk 2002)

⁶Even if Denmark is one of the world’s most equal countries as to income there are tendencies suggesting that this situation is under change. The Gini-coefficient regarding income/wealth differentials grew from 19,1 in 1995 till 21,9 in 2003 (Information September 22, 2005)
diminished possibilities for creating a fair life, i.e. a life similar to the majority’s lives. The women suffer from several difficulties and it is, on the one hand, likely that recognition and distribution will not be the answer to all families’ problems. On the other hand, it should be tested whether better economy and a more careful and recognizing attitude from the public authorities and maybe thereby from other parts of society would make children and women able to participate in society at a higher level. For the moment, the Danish government seems to go for a heavy reduction of public expenses to placements without no apparent intentions about redistributing the surplus of these cutbacks into the families themselves. On the contrary, a system of punishing the parents for their children’s unacceptable behaviour by reducing their benefits could be expected.

It should be remembered that - even though children in Denmark have been placed away from home since1905 (and even before) - research on this subject is limited and existing research does not present convincing results of placement (see for example Vinnerljung 1996).

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