Diversity, National Identity and Social Cohesion

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Introduction

One of the very first Nordic Migration Conferences was held in 1970 at Korsør, Denmark. I was supposed to participate, but could not make it for family reasons. However, my paper was published in the conference proceedings. It was a paper on the concept of adjustment, which at that time was the key term employed by the Swedish authorities to refer to the process of incorporating migrants into mainstream society. As a young PhD candidate I was critical of this approach and sought to problematize the concept, to disentangle its various meanings and uses. A lot has happened since then. We have covered a lot of ground, moving from the idea of adjustment and assimilation as the way to incorporate migrants in the early 1970s to the more liberal approach of promoting integration and accepting cultural and ethnic diversity as a natural condition of our societies in the 1990s. Today, however, we regretfully find indications of a return to less liberal views on immigration and multiculturalism in some of the Nordic states.

Although the Nordic states have much in common in terms of social structure, democratic values, social welfare systems, and views on equal rights, there are significant differences in their experiences of modern immigration, as reflected in the statistics on first and second generation migrants in the Nordic countries (table 1).

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Table 1. First and second generation in per cent of total population for 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Generation 1</th>
<th>Generation 1 &amp; 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.1 %</td>
<td>8.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.0 %</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>6.4 %</td>
<td>7.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12.0 %</td>
<td>15.5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Statistikbanken (Denmark); Statistikcentralen (Finland); Statistiska sentralbyrån (Norway); Statistiska centralbyrån (Sweden).

These percentages reflect different country experiences of immigration and emigration. While Sweden was receiving labour migrants in the 1950s and 1960s, Finland was sending labour. Denmark and Norway were somewhat later than Sweden as countries of immigration, starting in the 1960s and 1970s respectively. Immigration to Finland did not get started until the 1990s.

None of the Nordic countries adopted the continental guest worker system. Instead they regarded labour migrants as staying on a permanent basis. The Nordic model was to ensure immigrants the same basic social, economic, educational and welfare rights as the host population. Migrants were incorporated into mainstream society through the mechanisms of the welfare state. In the early 1970s labour migration was brought to an end in all Western Europe. Thus a ban on labour recruitment was enforced in 1972 in Denmark and Sweden, and in 1975 in Norway. Finland was at that time still a sending country.

Starting in the 1970s the Nordic countries and Western Europe in general became target countries for asylum-seekers and refugees from countries of conflict and political oppression outside Europe itself. The Pinochet coup d’état in Santiago triggered a wave of refugees, not only from Chile but also from other military dictatorships in southern Latin America. Political conflict in the Middle East brought refugees from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey as well as more recently from Afghanistan. All Nordic countries accepted Vietnamese boat refugees along with refugees from Eritrea and Somalia. The breakdown of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo brought about the largest refugee emergency in Europe since World War II. All Nordic countries have resettled refugees from Bosnia.

Looking at the individual countries we find that Turks constitute the largest ethnic group of migrant origin in Denmark followed by Germans and Iraqis. In Finland Russians are by far the most numerous migrant group followed by Estonians. Pakistanis and Swedes are the largest groups in Norway. Finns, Iraqis, Iranians, Bosnians and Turks are the largest migrant groups in Sweden.

What all Nordic countries have in common today is that unemployment rates for the migrant populations are significantly higher than for the host populations, even when
the economy is booming (Berg 2004; Hagos 2004; Laakonen 2004; Willadsen 2004). The evidence is that Nordic migrants are the least affected while migrants of non-European origin face considerable difficulties. Obviously migrants from neighbouring Nordic countries have advantages in terms of language proficiency and cultural affinity but they also enjoy certain labour market and legal rights. The consistently high unemployment rates for non-European groups are most likely an indication that systematic ethnic and racial discrimination is in operation. There is every reason to suspect that this discrimination is institutional, that is to say, it is part of the formal and informal rules and regulations of companies, organisations and, not least, of the authorities. Today researchers regard this discrimination as an inherent part of social structure itself.

In the 1960s the Swedish authorities were concerned about potential tension between native Swedes and immigrant minorities. Subsequently restrictions to spontaneous immigration were introduced. Moreover, the trade unions only accepted labour migration as long as labour was in demand. They opposed any kind of division of the labour market into a cheap and an expensive sector. Restrictions on immigration that were gradually introduced were justified politically by the presence of a critical public opinion. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that this critical opinion was moulded to quite a large extent by the very restrictive policies.

In the United States Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan presented data showing that the Melting Pot theory no longer was an adequate description of the process of migrant incorporation into American society (Glazer & Moynihan 1963). The Nordic countries officially abandoned the concept of assimilation and adopted an approach that came to be known as integration. In practice it implied an application of general welfare policies to migrants with permanent residence permits. In Sweden it was supplemented by support for language maintenance at the family level, vocational training, public support to immigrant organisations and an extension of the franchise in local and county elections to foreign citizens residing permanently in the country.

The other Nordic countries also adopted a policy referred to as integration. It soon was fairly obvious that integration Norwegian style actually boiled down to a policy aimed at assimilating the migrants culturally. Deep down the same thing applied in Denmark and Sweden but in subtler ways.

**From integration to diversity**

The concept of integration is problematic. In the Swedish context it has been given a social psychological interpretation and understood as an individual property. This understanding has been disseminated by social psychologists, for instance by the Canadian social psychologist John Berry (Berry 1990, 1997) who has developed a theory of acculturation strategies in ethnically diverse societies. Integration and other strategies are operationalized in terms of the individual’s identification with the majority culture/society and with the minority culture/society. See figure 1.
Sociologist Nimmi Hutnik independently developed a similar conceptualisation. According to Berry’s theory, integration is about participation in the economic and educational (and other) domains of the majority society while at the same time maintaining values, traditional language and life styles within the secluded domains of family life. When used in cross-cultural psychological research, instruments developed from Berry’s conceptualisation tend to produce consistent and significant results that confirm his theory. Karmela Liebkind (2001) has suggested that migrants first of all are confronted with marginalization. Then they progress through a stage of separation to integration, and eventually arrive at assimilation. As Berry’s model has not been used in longitudinal studies there is (as yet) no empirical support for this analysis. The empirical studies that make use of Berry’s ideas tend to give a rather static view on integration.

American sociologist Milton Gordon (1964) presented a theory in the 1960s in which integration is understood as a process of increasing participation in the institutions of mainstream society. Important arenas of participation are the economy, working life, language, education, housing, organisations, leisure-time activities, the political system, social life and ultimately family life. One finds an increasing readiness to cherish values, norms and ways of life that are characteristic of majority society. According to this approach integration is seen as a phase on the way to assimilation. Gordon’s ideas may be more dynamic than Berry’s but integration is still regarded as an individual property and task. It was the task of the migrant or ethnic minority member to “integrate” into mainstream society. The Nordic countries all adhere to the concept of integration but with slightly different connotations, depending on country-specific experiences.

In the mid 1990s a government commission on integration in Sweden introduced the notions of multiculturalism and diversity, the meanings of which were far from clear to the general public. The concept of diversity has descriptive as well as normative connotations. In political rhetoric these connotations are used interchangeably, which
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adds to the conceptual confusion. In a descriptive sense diversity is about the actual distribution of people in terms of ethnicity, religion, social class, sexual orientation, language and origin. The normative use of “diversity” may be understood by way of an analogy from bio-ecology. Diversity implies more options and alternatives for action, and will therefore serve to promote growth and development in society. An underlying value premise of diversity has to be equality.

In the Nordic countries policies that aim to promote equality have developed against a backdrop of conceived national homogeneity. As a consequence equality has been seen as a matter of same treatment. How should equality be asserted in a context of substantial differences with respect to crucial collective identities. Some maintain that affirmative action, compensatory measures, and even allocation by quotas are justified, and even recommendable, so as to ensure people’s equality of opportunities. Others oppose this view.

To the general public the notion of diversity policy is not well understood, and to companies and organisations in Sweden which are expected to implement diversity policy it is not clear what exactly is required of them. Certain proposed strategies may not necessarily be the most appropriate ways of ensuring equality.

Normative diversity is linked to descriptive (distributive) diversity. In Sweden one of the strategies to justify a diversity policy has been to monitor immigration. All Nordic states have taken measures to check the influx of asylum-seekers and refugees. Labour migration from non-EU member states is strictly limited to a small number of experts in various fields. The political bargain seems to be that by strict control of immigration the government is hoping for acceptance of diversity. Logically speaking, however, a restrictive immigration policy and a policy of promoting diversity are contradictory.

Thus immigration policy needs to be reconsidered. The migration flows of our times originate in the uneven global distribution of resources, in the globalisation of markets, economy and communications, and in transnational connections and networks. Rather than complying with ethnocentric sections of public opinion at home, the Nordic countries need to adopt an immigration strategy which is realistic. This means to accept a certain amount of labour migration from outside Europe and furthermore to maintain a liberal refugee policy. This is support for distributive diversity. A liberal refugee policy is also in accordance with the foundational values that global society needs to build on: human rights. Diversity should not be seen as a means to deal with what is regarded as problematic immigration. Instead immigration should be regarded as a means to support diversity.

In the short run one could argue that diversity is not efficient in companies that are trying to reduce their costs. However, other values than efficiency need to be considered. Diversity is desirable because equality is the only foundation upon which a modern, democratic society can build. A burning question is whether the Nordic states that have developed into typical nation states are able to redefine themselves within a few years and become countries that uphold multiculturalism and diversity.
Diversity is much more than a question of ethnic and language identities. Diversity is about socially constructed identities – gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, origin, age or generation. Its value premises are equality, justice, and respect for people’s individuality and uniqueness.

Towards a multi-ethnic society. The Parekh report

In 2000 Bhikhu Parekh and a highly qualified team of social scientists presented a report called *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. It soon became the target of media criticism for its statement that “Britishness … has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations” (Parekh 2000, p.38). In my view the commentators were blind to the obvious merits of the report. We can learn a lot from this report. The Nordic states differ in many respects from the United Kingdom. They conform more closely to the notion of centralised nation states. But they also have quite a lot in common with the United Kingdom as regards parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy (in three of the states), well-developed welfare systems and (with the exception of Finland) half-hearted enthusiasm about the European Union.

The report consists of three parts:

1. A vision of a multi-ethnic society
2. An analysis of societal institutions
3. Strategies of change

Part 2 of the Parekh report deals with obstacles and enabling conditions for the development of a multi-ethnic society. The police force, the judiciary, the educational system, the media and institutions of culture, the health-care system, the social welfare system, the labour market, immigration and refugee policy, the political system and religion are societal institutions that are analysed. British researchers show a greater awareness of the problems of institutional discrimination and racism, in particular when it is linked up with the judiciary system and policing, than colleagues in the Nordic countries. On the other hand, there is a greater awareness with regard to issues of language (language maintenance, language support etc.) in the Nordic countries than in Britain.

Part 3 discusses strategies of change: The role of the government in leading the development of a multi-ethnic society, legislation and the implementation of new routines and strategies. The fundamental formula of the report is that a multi-ethnic Britain is to be “a community of individuals and a community of communities”. This means that a multi-ethnic society needs to recognise group rights in addition to the general recognition of individual rights. Nation states have not generally recognised group rights based on ethnicity, making this proposal controversial.

Part 1, a vision of a multi-ethnic Britain, is the most interesting contribution. It deals with identities in transition, social cohesion, equality and difference, racisms, plural
societies and human rights, and the radical issue of rethinking and rewriting the national story.

**A Swedish example**

Scandinavians see themselves as descendants of the Vikings. Stereotypical images about the tall, blond and blue-eyed Scandinavian emanate from this idea. National romanticism led us to believe that Denmark, Norway and Sweden were culturally homogeneous societies, that is to say, before the onset of post-war labour migration. A first step towards developing multicultural societies must be to problematize this notion.

In the Swedish case historical facts do not support the notion of a lost national homogeneity. What did, and in fact still does exist, is a strong centralized power. The idea of an ethnic and cultural homogeneity is a recent construction, the purpose of which is to legitimize the nation state. The nation state ideal is an obstacle to the formation of a multicultural society. If Sweden is to become a modern multicultural society, multicultural policies must also apply to the indigenous minorities in the north, the Saami and the Finnish speakers of Tornedalen.

For the reindeer herding Saami of Sweden, however, the problem is lack of real recognition of traditional rights to land usage. There exists a herding act, with an amendment as late as 1989, that recognizes this right to use land for grazing and to move herds from winter pastures to summer pastures and vice versa. Farmers, hunters’ organizations, timber companies, the mining industry and hydroelectric power companies have economic interests in the land that conflict with the interests of the herders. Farmers and landowners are compensated for the damage done to crops and seedlings through herding. However, since compensation implies a certain degree of bureaucracy, many landowners feel that their interests would be better served if the Saami did not enjoy their exclusive herding rights.

The Saami are not interested in owning land but in using land according to traditional rights. The legal problem is that documents do not exist that confirm this right. The case of the Taxed Mountains (1966 – 1981) was one of the most lengthy legal proceedings in Swedish history, and one of the symbolically most important cases. Reindeer herders from the districts of Frostviken and Hotagen in the province of Jämtland claimed to be the rightful owners of land in these districts. They produced authentic documents that proved that their ancestors had paid taxes to the Swedish Crown in the 17th century for this very land. The County Court of Jämtland ruled in favour of the Saami claimants. However, the case was tried right through all courts of appeal. The Supreme Court found that evidence was insufficient to support the Saami claims of land ownership. According to the Supreme Court the documents in question were rather to be regarded as representing a kind of leasehold arrangement back in the 17th century (Svensson 1997). The problem of this ruling is that it contradicts precedents from previous court decisions in cases where non-Saami claimants have
been seen as the rightful owners of land for which ancestors had paid taxes to the Swedish Crown. Why should this principle not apply to the Saami?

One possible answer is that the Swedish state does not regard the Saami as an ethnic group, a people in its own right, but rather as an occupational group, a guild with certain specific rights. Similarly, in 1992 the Saami were bereft of their traditional exclusive right to hunt small game in the mountain region. Here the rights of the Saami conflicted with the interests of the large and politically powerful hunters’ lobby, an organisation enrolling more than 300,000 members (compared to the 17,000 officially recognized Saami). This was a decision with great symbolic repercussions for the Saami. It illustrates the problem that specific rights of one group (whatever the legal and historic grounds may be) will conflict with the aspirations of other groups. A multicultural society needs to handle conflicts of interest of this kind in such a way that the interests of the more powerful party are not just carried through by a simple majority vote in parliament.

The Office of the Ombudsman for ethnic discrimination was established in 1986. Former ombudsman Frank Orton found that Saami complainants, not immigrants, filed most complaints of discrimination. Again we have a small population of 17,000 Saami to be compared with 900,000 foreign born residents. The Saami are indeed a politically active group, but even when this is taken into account, we have a glaringly obvious discrepancy in sense of discrimination.

Sweden has not ratified the ILO convention number 169 concerning the rights of indigenous people from 1989. Other countries have done so, among them the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and New Zealand. Finland is expected to ratify this convention soon. Again, this goes to show that the Swedish state is not prepared to regard the Saami as an indigenous ethnic group. On the positive side, however, it should be mentioned that Saami was recognized as a national heritage language in 2000.

While a multicultural discourse informs the immigration and integration policies it is obvious that a nation state discourse characterizes the relations between Saami people and the Swedish state. If Sweden is to become a multicultural society a policy of diversity must apply all along the line. Diversity should not apply in relation to some groups but not to others.

Integration as social cohesion

Empirical social psychological research on integration has been concerned with individual strategies while sociological research has focused on participation in the labour market, education, political life etc., still with an individual (as opposed to systemic) approach. The concept of integration, and the practices accompanying this approach, needs to be problematized. This brings us to a second question addressed by the Parekh report, but not present in the Nordic debate, concerning social cohesion in a
multi-ethnic, multicultural society. I believe the reason why this approach has been
neglected in the Nordic debate is because the whole issue of integration has been
understood as a matter of individual choice.

An alternative way of looking at the question of integration is to understand it, not as a
concept referring to individual strategies and actions, but rather to understand
integration as a systemic concept. Integration is about the system as a whole, not its
individual components or parts. Applying this perspective in the social science
context, integration then refers to society as a whole, or subsections of society
(regions, cities or neighbourhoods, but also organizations, institutions and minority
groups). Society as a whole is, or is not, integrated, not its individuals members. We
naturally understand segregation as a systemic concept and not as an individual
property.

How is society possible, Georg Simmel asked, guiding us to a truly fundamental
question of sociology (Simmel 1971). This was a question that the founding fathers of
sociology were concerned with more than anything else. Two principal explanations as
to how societies can hold together are given.

In certain societies social cohesion results from the fact that members of society form
their lives on the basis of shared values, norms and beliefs. Social cohesion is the
result of uniformity. Traditionally the Church served as the most important moulder of
values and beliefs about the meaning of life. Ideas of national unity upon which the
conception of the nation state rests, partly replaced the role that the Church had played
before the 19th century. Émile Durkheim (1984) referred to this form of social
cohesion as mechanical solidarity.

The other principal explanation for social cohesion is division of work and
professional differentiation. The end result is cohesion (societal integration) because
complex interdependencies develop in a system of division of labour. Durkheim
termed this organic solidarity. Other societal differentiations serve similar purposes,
for example gender and generation. In a democratic society a differentiated party
system also serves to reinforce social cohesion. One common denominator of these
examples is complementarity and interdependence, another is the presence of
institutionalized forms of conflict resolution, if and when differentiation leads to
conflict. Differentiation in terms of culture, religion and ethnicity do not seem to have
any corresponding inherent interdependence. Therefore collective identities founded
on culture, religion and ethnicity are more problematic when it comes to social
cohesion. Neither do institutionalised forms of conflict resolution exist when identities
clash in terms of culture, religion or ethnicity.

Citizenship and cohesion
Citizenship could serve as an essential instrument of social cohesion, and be the
common platform required for a multicultural society. All Nordic countries confer
citizenship to new members of society according to the *ius sanguinis* principle. The Nordic countries have also encouraged immigrants to naturalize and have reasonably liberal rules for naturalization. Regretfully the current Danish government has brought about a change in this respect with the aim to raise the demands for non-Nordic citizens to be eligible for Danish citizenship.

Most people in most countries have no reason to change their citizenship as they reside in the state of which they are citizens. The emotional significance they may attach to their citizenship will have little practical consequence in everyday life. However, once a person settles in another country for whatever reason (marriage and family, education, work or refuge) the emotional and subjective value attached to citizenship will become all the more important as it ultimately will affect how s/he decides to deal with the question of attachment to the state of residence. Some states do not permit their citizens to disown citizenship, while many countries of immigration have not been keen on dual citizenship. This explains why so many permanently residing immigrants have tended to maintain their original citizenship. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing acceptance of dual citizenship. Consequently more people have exercised their right to naturalize. Those who intend to return to their country of origin have no reason to alter their citizenship status. If we disregard this category, there still seems to be a significant number of persons who do not naturalize.

Why is it ‘natural’ to alter one’s citizenship one might ask, and to whom is it ‘natural’? From other sectors of social life we know that changes of fundamental and categorical identities are often extremely demanding. Normally family split-ups through divorce are emotionally trying. Many will testify that change of class affiliation resulting from individual social mobility will engender a sense of estrangement and alienation, both in relation to environments that one has left and in relation to those environments one has moved in to. Even a more permanent switch of spoken language in everyday situations is hardly experienced as ‘natural’. Yet some people in plural societies achieve great skills in passing between various environments and contexts. In these situations changes of presented identity may seem most natural.

Since it is the state that confers the rights and privileges of citizenship upon an alien, it must be to the state that the act of incorporating former aliens through naturalisation appears to be ‘natural’. Obviously, what is ‘natural’ about naturalization is that permanent residents should be member citizens because the state depends on their unswerving loyalty at times of international crisis or when the foundations of the state are threatened. What makes citizenship specifically different from many other collective identities, and in particular those categorizations reverting back to conceptions of ‘natural kinds’ (ethnicity, ‘race’, language, sex) is that citizenship is based on a contractual relationship between the individual and the state. Yet the terminology we encounter (the principles of blood and soil and the term naturalization) indicates that citizenship somehow may be conceived of as an equivalent to a ‘naturally given’ category. Sex and phenotypical characteristics originate from the sphere of genetics and biology. Ethnicity and language originate in human experience.
If citizenship were to be resembled to any essential identity categories of everyday life it would be marriage – marriage rather than sexual relations, or possibly party membership rather than class. One might put it that citizenship is to ethno-national categorizations what marriage is to sex. Rather than obscure primordial sentiments of Gemeinschaft with connotations of exclusiveness and superiority, citizenship is (or should be) about legality, justice, order, rights, responsibility, obligations, equality, transparency, reciprocity and common interests, in other words Gesellschaft. Maybe, after all, it is ‘natural’ to naturalize, at least in a political democracy.

Studies in Sweden show that those who naturalise come close to the host population in various social indicators such as education, employment, health, crime rates etc. in comparison to alien residents who are worse off (Westin 2000). On the whole those who naturalise have spent more time in the country than those who have not. They have had more time to settle in, and intend to stay. Probably because they are incorporated into mainstream society the decision to naturalise is a logical consequence of steps that have already been taken. The state encourages aliens who meet the requirements to naturalise, but naturalisation is an outcome rather than an antecedent of successful incorporation at the individual level.

Suppose that we transfer Durkheim’s insights to the situation of managing diversity that multicultural societies face. The traditional conception of legal citizenship as a uni-dimensional, unambiguous relationship between the individual and the state would be comparable to Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity – social cohesion through social homogeneity – that was indeed the basic idea of the nation state. If we seek a situation comparable to Durkheim’s organic solidarity – social cohesion through reciprocity and interdependence – the obvious conclusion is that our conception of citizenship needs to be rethought. Citizenship should no longer be an instrument to homogenize a population by instilling national value, allegiance to the flag or other symbols of a majority population.

One could rather imagine a set of parallel interdependent citizenships. Some of the social rights and some of the duties are part and parcel of legal citizenship and could be moved down from the level of the state to the local community. Other rights and duties might more appropriately be conferred at the regional level. Still others would belong to a supranational level. Citizenship could thus be conceived of as sets of entitlements and obligations that apply at different societal levels. Consequently authorities at different levels of society would then confer specific citizenship entitlements upon individuals. Stripping legal citizenship of its contents and reallocating them to other, and possibly more appropriate levels, we find that what remains is national sentiment. Do we need this in a multicultural society? We need to address questions pertaining to new forms of citizenship, parallel citizenships applying at different levels of society, perhaps transcending state boundaries if our aim is to incorporate transnational communities under the umbrella of citizenship (Kondo & Westin 2003).
Concluding words

In everyday discourse the words – “Danish”, “Norwegian” or “Swedish”, do not only signify citizenship and membership of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish states.2 These terms also, and possibly more frequently, refer to ethnic identities. To natives of these countries naturalized citizens are not unquestionably regarded as Danes, Norwegians or Swedes in the way that immigrants to the United States are accepted indisputably as Americans once they have received American citizenship. An important task in the Nordic countries is to find ways of conferring “Danishness”, “Norwegianness” and ”Swedishness” to all citizens of these countries irrespective of culture, belief, phenotypical characteristics or language. The problem is to gain public acceptance for this approach, which can only be done if the general understanding of what it means to be Danish, Norwegian or Swedish is reconsidered. We need to rewrite the story of the peoples who through immigration, conquest or colonisation found themselves in the territories that became the modern states of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. We need to look far back in history, when these states emerged as historical entities, but we also need to update the story to include all those who have settled in the Nordic countries during the past fifty years.

To rewrite the national story is a task that involves society as a whole. It is not only about policy recommendations. Differences of language, culture and ethnicity should not be downplayed. Differences need to be understood as the normal state of affairs, however, most insistently against a backdrop of everyone’s equal worth.

What should replace the national myth? The answer is pretty obvious and in accordance with measures that have already been taken earlier: respect of human rights, equality, justice, solidarity, democracy, non-discrimination, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and organization. These are basic universal values that are necessary but yet not sufficient conditions to render social cohesion possible in a multicultural society. An essential complementary action is empowerment of groups that are in a position of weakness.

Avoiding conflicts, containing or concealing them or ignoring them will not promote social cohesion. On the contrary, conflicts that have their foundations in different interests, perspectives or ambitions play an important role in generating cohesion. Social cohesion is not consensus. The challenge is to develop means to cope with conflicts of interest in a civilized manner. This means to respect the other party’s right to its opinion but at the same time to seek solutions acceptable to both parties. We have obvious models right in front of us in the parliamentary process, in the rules that regulate the labour market and the conflicts of interest there. Social cohesion is promoted by reciprocity on a societal level, as Durkheim pointed out. The important political aim for a multicultural society is to make reciprocity possible. Citizenship is

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2 Finland, having two founding nations, represents a different case.
one platform which is needed in a multicultural and multi-ethnic society, where adherence to the basic human rights needs to replace national sentiments.

References


The Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark, AMID, is a consortium consisting of researchers at research centers representing three institutions of higher education and two research institutes. AMID is supported by the Danish Research Councils of the Humanities and the Social Sciences.

The Consortium consists of the following members:

**Aalborg University**--Department of Sociology, Social Studies and Organization, Department of Economics, Politics and Administration, as well as SPIRIT (School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research on Interculturalism and Transnationality) and Institute for History, International and Social Studies. Aalborg University is the host institution.

**The Aarhus School of Business**--CIM (Centre for Research in Social Integration and Marginalization).

**Aarhus University**--Department of Political Science.

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