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Writing History and Relations of Power

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Content

> "Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but
> because it comes from everywhere" (Foucault, 1993, p. 334)

Introduction

According to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, life forms are constituted through language games. Language is understood and applied in different situations by means of rules such as norms, traditions, uses, practices and so on. These rules are historically constituted. They are largely tacit and taken-for-granted within the practices of everyday life. As a consequence, organizational culture is linked to power since power is itself embedded in norms and traditions. This question is, however, too often ignored by most writers on organizational culture as noted in "*Some Dare Call It Power*" (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). To avoid the question of power is, however, to provide a one-sided presentation of organizations. This presentation is normally biased in favour of the privileged, the advantaged, the elite or the upper echelons. The purpose of Foucault's power analysis is to bring the moral foundations of the tacit, the unconscious and the taken-for-granted into debate and conscious reflection. A Foucauldian power analysis, therefore, demands that one focus on beliefs and ideologies embedded and embodied in the language games of everyday life (Fairclough, 2001). I refer to these beliefs and ideologies as *values*. When applying Foucault's power concept in organizational analysis, the aim is to question the distribution of both privilege and disadvantage in organizations. It is applied in order to question the moral values of inequality, imbalance, difference, domination and control embedded in everyday norms, traditions, uses and practices.

In this chapter a framework is developed for the analysis of values ingrained in the way that we speak, act and interact in everyday life. This is done by describing key elements in Foucault's work and the relations between them. The primary focus is on genealogy and power. However, it also includes elements of archaeology because this method is an important part of genealogy. This chapter, therefore, seeks to describe the purposes and

principles of genealogical power analysis. It is argued that genealogical power analysis is about confronting present day values with historical facts. Genealogy seeks to shake up the foundations of extant power relations and create new openings and possibilities in the ways that people perceive reality.

It follows that this chapter is about how to analyse values in organizations. Values are central to organization studies. The term "*values*" here denotes a person's motivating drive and the foundation for choice and assessment. They comprise what people like and dislike (Israelsen, Nørreklit & Nørreklit, 2002, pp. 5-6). Values are linked with motives, intentions, interests, feelings, passions, will and energy—and they are indispensable in any social process. Without values reality would be cold and numb and there wouldn't be any incitement for development and change in organizations or other social settings. The use of techniques, instruments, procedures, systems, concepts, sentences, and so on to construct reality would be completely meaningless without values. Values make it possible to assess consequences as right or wrong, good or evil, appropriate or inappropriate in any social process. When people act they do so on the basis of certain intentions, no matter if these are conscious and explicit or – as values most often are – unconscious and tacit. Values deal with questions of *truth* – what is right and appropriate – and also with *justice* – what is a fair distribution of rights and obligations? Values are presumptions, beliefs and ideologies of truth and justice.

In Foucault's formulation, relations of power are concerned with inequality, imbalance, difference, domination and control. Relations of power refer to uneven possibilities of defining truth and justice. Thus, there is no contradiction between values and politics, as history, politics and values are closely linked. Values are absolutely central in any process of social change. They are, however, also somewhat problematic. Even if unconscious and tacit, values are everywhere and, as mentioned before, they are implicit in the language games of everyday life. Such values are communicated through the techniques, instruments and so on used in everyday life and in language. Values are productive and create development. But people are also captives of their values and this leads to difficulties in questioning and learning in radically different ways. Why? - Because everything met, said and narrated in reality confirms the deep presumptions of that reality. Foucault's genealogy seeks to address this problem. Genealogy is simple. It seeks to confront presumptions and ideals of the world – the values – with a vast collection of historical facts. The purpose is to create new openings and new possibilities in the way reality is perceived. It cannot completely solve the problem. It will always be there to some degree. But genealogy is an attempt to open up reality. Kendall & Wickham refer to this opening up as "suspension of judgement" (1999, pp. 10-13). It is not so much the outcome of this process, which is important; "It is the process of attempting to escape the grid of second-order judgements, which is central to Foucaultian historical methods…" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 13).

The use of history to analyse and question the values embedded and embodied in the ways that we speak and act relates to three different, but mutually connected, uses of history: the *parodic*, the *dissociative*, and the *sacrificial*. These are introduced briefly here and further developed later in the chapter. The *parodic* is about going beyond

history with the intention of disclosing traditional history with its prototypes, heroes, knights and others as a disguise and as a masquerade (see Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The parodic use of history faces the problem that actions are blurred and shrouded in a network of stories, myths, legends and narratives which serve to legitimise certain versions of truth and justice without them being supported by actual events. The parodic use of history seeks to go beyond these imagined truths because such truths prevent "….access to the actual intensities and creations of life" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The *dissociative* is characterized by "…the systematic dissociation of identity" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The dissociative use of history faces the problem that identity, which we try to integrate into a unity, is pluralistic - "…it is plural; countless spirits dispute its possession; numerous systems intersect and compete" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The intention is to construct a more varied picture of ourselves. Who are we? Where do we come from? This diverse picture also includes the darker sides of history. The dissociative use seeks to give a more diverse and rich foundation for choice, assessment and judgement. The *sacrificial* use of history addresses the problem of objective truth. It concerns "…the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 95). This refers to the myth of traditional history as being free of passions and feelings and dedicated to the truth. The sacrificial use of history seeks to undermine the myth that presumptions and ideals about reality are ultimately true and objective. All knowledge is linked to special feelings, passions, intentions, and interests.

These three types involve a use of history, which seeks to shake up or stir up the values of the social world. Foucault's power analysis is first and foremost characterized by a special use of history (Alvesson, 1996, p. 95). The purpose is to sever the connection between traditional history and memory in the sense that Foucault wants to construct an *alternative memory* (Foucault, 1984a, p. 93). This is done in order to refuse who we are (Haugaard, 1997, pp. 43-44). According to Foucault, history is the means by which we can refuse the kinds of individuality and subjectivity which have been imposed on us for centuries. This project is described as writing the history of the present in the form of a radical critique of the present. This critique might serve as a basis for a reflexivity of the self and thus serve as a basis for self-control (Haugaard, 1997, p. 45) and new forms of self-direction.

The remainder of this chapter highlights the connections between Foucault's method and Foucault's power concept. It contributes to the growing number of especially Australian and British authors within the organizational literature who deal with Foucault's writings. Examples include Burrell (1998), Hardy and Clegg (1996), Clegg (1989, 1998), Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullyvan (1998) and Mckinlay and Starkey (1998). These authors have mainly focused on the power concept but much less so on the methods associated with it. By highlighting the connections between Foucault's methods and Foucault's power concept, this chapter contributes new insights and understanding of how Foucauldian power analysis can be used in organizational analysis. The importance of highlighting these connections is grounded on considerations that are directly related to Foucault's own descriptions of the power concept. He argues that the purpose is not to work towards a theory of power but more towards an analytics of power (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Thus, Foucault's power concept and Foucault's methods are closely linked. To understand

power is to be able to use a specific analytics of power. Power analytics is characterized by a non-essentialist bottom-up analysis of power relations in specific social circumstances. It seeks to question the foundations of power, namely the presumptions of truth and justice intimately connected to it and with it. It follows that Foucault's power concept cannot be viewed independently of Foucault's methods of archaeology (Foucault, 1995) and genealogy (Foucault, 1980, 1984a). Gane (Ed., 1986), Haugaard (1997), Flyvbjerg (1991a, 1991b, 2001) and Elden (2001) are authors who deal thoroughly with the connections between genealogy and power. Apart from these writings, however, the connections between his methods and power have not been sufficiently explored in the extant literature. In almost all descriptions of Foucault's concepts, attention is focused on the connection between genealogy and power (for example Mckinlay & Starkey, 1998, p. 1. Burrell, 1998, pp. 17-18). Yet these relations are not thoroughly described with the consequence that one can easily misunderstand the purpose of Foucault's power analysis. It may lose its radical purpose and, further, the concept of power may not be used where it is best suited, namely in relation to concrete analyses of practices.

In the remainder of this chapter I build from the bottom up. . Firstly, key characteristics of basic elements in Foucault's work, discourse and practice are discussed. Secondly, the key principles of archaeology are described. Thirdly, the key principles of genealogy are described. Finally, the relations between genealogy and power are explored in greater detail.

Discourse and practice

While Chapter 2 introduced the concept of *language games* to describe knowledge, Foucault makes use of two other key concepts in his writings: *discourse* and *practice*. I will make a short comment on the differences between these latter two concepts and the relation to the concept of language games. The important difference between discourse and practice in Foucault's writings is that they refer to two different periods in Foucault's authorship. The initial question is whether there is any important difference here. Both *discourse* and *practice* describe a way of relating and acting in reality. Implicitly, they both hold specific notions of truth and justice. The concept of *discourse* here is somewhat difficult to grasp and it can be confusing as Foucault uses it in many different circumstances and in association with many other concepts. As examples we can mention discursive relations, discursive objects, discursive practices and so on. In the archaeology (Foucault, 1995) the favoured concept for knowledge is discourse—which, in turn, is used in the description of archaeology. In genealogy – described explicitly in the essay *Two Lectures* (Foucault, 1980) – Foucault uses the concept *practices*. This shift from discourse to practice is of course interesting in its own right. In his description of methodological guidelines for phronetic research, Flyvbjerg notes that these guidelines are characterized by putting practice before discourse (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 134). Kendall and Wickham (1999, pp. 39-41) discuss whether we should use the word discourse referring to an argument in an unpublished working paper by Ian Hunter. The point is that it could mean that people place too much emphasis on linguistics and language. In a similar discussion Prichard, Jones & Stablein argue that discourses are relatively

narrowly conceived in Foucault's earlier work because it is based on official writings and records (2004, p. 222). This may be one of the reasons that Foucault changed terminology and switched terms from discourse to practice. This shift may also be viewed as an attempt to distance his writings from poststructuralism. I do not have any definitive answer here. I have a sense, however, that the use of the word discourse seems to be used to denote a group of concepts and practices such as a professional discipline or theoretical paradigm like *organizational discourse*. Practice seems to be linked to saying and doing things. Practice is, in other words, linked much more directly to the everyday activities of life. As such, practice and language games are more directly related. In this book I have chosen the concept of language games as the primary reference to everyday life activities because I believe that this concept is more precise than the rather popular but fluid concept "practice." In any case, discourse and practice are parts of different methodological frameworks and this is the defining difference between discourse and practice put forward in this chapter. However, so as not to confuse the reader at this stage, I will not go into too much more detail at this stage on possible differences between discourse, practice or language games. All three concepts will be conceived in much the same manner, namely as a relation between the discursive and the non-discursive as discussed in the previous chapter. Foucault's concepts are used in this chapter to avoid confusion but these are perceived as concepts related to the different historical methods developed by Foucault and applied in this book for the analysis of language games. In this chapter a change also takes place in regard to which concept I make use of—in some sections, *discourse* is used, while *practice* is used in other sections. This is simply because they relate to different periods in Foucault's authorship.

Discourse/practice is the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive and, as noted in Chapter 2, these two dimensions cannot be understood independently of each other. This relationship is also referred to as the relationship between the visible and the sayable (see also Kendall & Wickham, 1999, pp. 40-41), or the relationship between objects and speaking subjects (see Latour, 1996, p. viii). To understand the concept of discourse/practice is to acknowledge that it comprises both the discursive and the context in which, and of which, the discursive is part. This is not only relevant for understanding the discursive - it is also relevant to the emergence of the discursive. The discursive and the non-discursive are dialectically related to each other. They condition each other, develop each other but remain mutually exclusive. This perception of discourse/practice may appear to those unfamiliar with Foucault to be confusing at first glance, but is actually quite simple:

> "…all it suggests is that we need to describe the various bits and pieces that had to be in place to allow something else to be possible (and note here how this rather careful formulation allows you to avoid even the remotest suggestion that the emergent event or knowledge or whatever was necessary)" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 37).

The way of speaking – the discursive – is conditioned on particular material circumstances and on what has been said and written before. As a consequence, the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive is productive.

In *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1979), for example, particular concepts and ways of speaking about criminality produce particular techniques and institutions such as the Panopticon, which in turn produce new concepts and ways of speaking. In *The History of Sexuality* (1978) new concepts and ways of speaking about sex produce techniques and architectures such as the schoolroom, which in turn produce new ways of speaking of and about sex. The discursive is only part of a material practice. Discourse/practice is, therefore, to be understood as a network of relations between concepts, ways of speaking, actors, activities, techniques, institutions and so on. The discursive comprises groups of concepts and ways of speaking, and their interrelations. It comprises a way of speaking *of* reality, which entails ways of understanding, approaching and solving problems. The function of the discursive is not only to communicate - it is also to classify, to separate, to evaluate and to measure. The discursive also contains explanations and representations. The non-discursive comprises such things as instruments, techniques, institutions (the hospital, the prison, and the laboratory), architectures, specific objects and instruments of verification, division of labor, machines, systems, tools, statistical data, and others. It also, however, includes people and bodies, which serve as objects of discursive: madness (Foucault, 1967), criminality (Foucault, 1979), and sexuality (Foucault, 1978). The relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive is central to understanding the concept of discourse/practice in Foucault's writings. As mentioned above, it also means that concepts and ways of speaking always be understood in relation to the conditions of their emergence.

There is another aspect to be considered here, which is perhaps not adequately described above, namely the aspect of *historicity*. This aspect emphasizes that discourse cannot be understood independently of what has been said and what has happened earlier. In Kendall & Wickham's suggestion noted above, they state (within the brackets) that the:

> "….formulation allows you to avoid even the remotest suggestion that the emergent event or knowledge or whatever was necessary" (1999, p.37) .

Events are not *necessary*, they are always only *possible* – that is, one possibility amongst many. In this connection, Kendall & Wickham's further suggest that we should "...Look for contingencies instead of causes" (1999, p. 5-9). Both archaeology and genealogy see history as destined by a particular rationality, which presses forward particular events. Haugaard distinguishes between "govern" and "determine" where Foucault's position is very much more inclined to the former. When Foucault (1995), for example, speaks of rules of formation in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he means that these rules "govern" things that are said and done. Haugaard describes this as a process-of selection:

> "In the literal sense, actors can obviously say what they like – in this sense they are completely free – but not everything they might say will constitute a serious statement or truth" (1997, p. 56).

This argument will become clearer in the following sections. It is important to emphasize historicity in relation to how change, including change in organizations, is perceived. It

suggests that what has been said and what has happened earlier forms part of the conditions that make it possible that a particular event occurs in the present. When the researcher looks for contingencies instead of causes, it means that she doesn't conceive of this event as necessary. It is not the only event, which may occur. Historical events limit what can happen afterwards but this doesn't imply that events are predestined in the sense that only one thing can happen—there is always the possibility that something else may happen. It follows that change is not causal, as too often represented in the mainstream organisation literature, but is contingent on what has happened before. This point is absolutely crucial to an understanding of Foucault's authorship, and he never - I repeat never - deviates from this fundamental starting point.

Archaeology

Foucault's methods are developed with the explicit purpose of confronting the values of everyday life with the hard facts of history. Archaeology is the first element in this strategy. Central to archaeology is the presence of the archive, which is the name for the collection of historical material from which the researcher conducts his analysis. The term archaeology gives the impression of a researcher who excavates forgotten, lost and buried - in other words marginalized - knowledge from this archive. Archaeology is the method used in Foucault's early writings but this method is later substituted with genealogy. This does not mean, however, that Foucault leaves archaeology behind. While the concern for power is very explicit in genealogy, it is merely implicit in archaeology (Haugaard, 1997, p. 42). Archaeology is subsumed within genealogy; it is, in other words, subjected to genealogy's tactical purposes. Archaeology must, therefore, be discussed here since a lot of what later becomes genealogical power analysis is grounded in archaeology.

Archaeology is described in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1995). The emphasis on historicity is to be found here in the notion of *discontinuity* (Foucault, 1995, pp. 4-6). This term is developed as a contrast to sciences in which the purpose is to describe continuity and totality across time and space. In this sense, Foucault characterizes his methods as anti-scientific (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) because they oppose approaches in which the purpose is to describe the same – that is essential truth – in all differences (Foucault, 1995, p. 21). Rather, Foucault recommends that instead of viewing events as having an "…unqualified spontaneous value" (1995, p. 22), we have to accept that "…they concern only a population of dispersed events" (1995, p. 22). He suggests that we abandon the idea of a common theory and rationality which gathers different events under the same umbrella. Instead, events have to be studied as different events. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1995, p. 27), he states that we are lead towards:

> "…the project of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form within it".

He makes two key points here: firstly, he characterizes archaeology as a pure description of discursive events; and secondly, it is a part of a search for "unities." I will return to this

second point below. There is a third point, which is related to this pure description of discursive events. Events have to be seen and understood in the concrete historical context of their emergence in order to determine the conditions of their existence.

> "The analysis of the discursive field is orientated in a quite different way, we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it excludes." (Foucault, 1995, p. 28).

That is, events must be seen in the exact specificity of their occurrence—they have an identity of their own. The organizing principle in the ordering of events is not a common rationality or truth but simply chronology and space. The archaeology is a method for organizing such events. In this respect, Foucault defines it as a non-interpretative discipline and as a systematic rewriting of history (Foucault, 1995, pp. 138-140). It is a "disinterested" (Flyvbjerg, 1991a, p. 98) rewriting of history. What he seeks through this rewriting of history is to lay down the rules of formation in a given discursive formation. A discursive formation is the name of a discipline, similar to "political economy", "biology", or "psycho-pathology." The rules of formation are conditions of existence but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance (Foucault, 1995, p. 38)

When Foucault speaks of "rules of formation" in relation to the formation of objects, he speaks of the different conditions determining that certain discourses are put in the position that they are put in. This lends attention to why some discourses become dominating and obtain the status of truth, why others disappear and are perceived as illegitimate and so on. When Foucault asks the question, "Is it possible to lay down the rule to which their (the objects) appearance were subject?" (Foucault, 1995, p. 41), he means to describe the circumstances which made it possible that certain discourses became dominating, while others disappeared.

He mentions three methodological guidelines: First "…the first *surfaces* of their *emergence*" have to be mapped in which the object is first considered a subject for categorization and conceptualization in relation to rationality and type of theory (Foucault, 1995, p. 41). It is an attempt to describe the origin of discourse, where it is first applied, and in relation to what kinds of problems. Second "…the *authorities* of *delimitation*" have to be described (Foucault, 1995, pp. 41-42). This describes how different actors are recognized as those who have the right to determine, define, name, establish and form an object. It concerns the question of who has the legitimate right to define truth, and how they are given this right. Third, "…the grids of specification" have to be analysed (Foucault, 1995, p. 42). These are the filters applied when different types – madness, sexuality, etc. – are divided, contrasted, related to, regrouped, classified and so on. The main concern here is with the content of the discourse.

Such descriptions are, however, not enough. These will leave us with only single descriptions of the objects of discourse, not descriptions of relations. Furthermore, the actors who apply this discourse are not the guilty ones. They didn't come up with it.

Foucault (1995, p. 43 describes this problem as uncovering how certain discourses became possible:

> "Such facts lie beyond the grasp of contemporary research: indeed the problem is how to decide what made them possible, and how these "discoveries" could leave to others that took them up, rectified them, modified them, or even disproved them".

The purpose is to uncover how certain discourses became possible and what makes it possible to apply discourse the way it is applied. To do this is to uncover a complex web of relations—such webs established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, norm systems, techniques, classification types, and ways of characterizing (Foucault, 1995, pp. 44-45).

The purpose of archaeology, therefore, is to uncover the conditions for how certain discourses emerged, what made them possible, how they grew and how and why they changed. Foucault doesn't assess whether these discourses are true or not, or indeed whether they are truer than others. The truth-value is of no interest whatsoever here. What is of interest is the discourse as a historically conditioned way of speaking of and understanding objects. In this way truth and justice are viewed as historically conditioned. They are not fundamentally true. By uncovering the historical conditions of conceptions of truth and justice, these conceptions are questioned.

> "To define these *objects* without reference to the *ground*, the *foundation of things*, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance." (Foucault, 1995, pp. 47-48).

This is the overall purpose of archaeology - and this purpose is repeated in genealogy and in the analysis of power. Discourses are questioned by describing how they emerged and from whence they came (the first surfaces of their emergence), how they gained their legitimacy (the authorities of delimitation) and what their concrete operation and content is (the grids of specification). The way people speak of and understand events are always conditioned on something, something which happened before. It is not the result of some underlying truth or rationality. Archaeology shares these basic premises with genealogy. Archaeology is also applied in order to question the values of everyday life as its purpose is to question discourses from within.

Foucault mentions three more concrete methodological guidelines in relation to the analysis of concrete situations. The first guideline is to determine *who* is speaking. Who is accorded the right to use such language? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it his status and prestige and from whom does he get the assurance or presumption that what he says is true (Foucault, 1995, p. 50)? This involves determining from where the criteria of competence come from; justice, tradition, systems, norms and so on. The second question is to describe the *institutional sites* from where discourse operates and from where discourse gains its legitimacy and purpose (Foucault, 1995, p. 51). Finally,

we have to describe the *positions* that are possible for individuals to occupy in concrete situations (Foucault, 1995, p. 52). What part is the individual able to play?

Archaeological description is thus a systematic rewriting of history in order to determine the conditions of existence of a given discursive formation. It is a systematic rewriting of history in terms of:

- Mapping the first surfaces of their emergence: Where does the discourse come from?
- Describing the authorities of delimitation: How are different actors recognized as those who have the right to determine, define, name, establish and form an object?
- Describing the grids of specification: What is the content of the discourse? What language does it use?
- Describing how the discourse became possible: What relations between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, norm systems, techniques, classification types, and ways of characterizing made the discourse possible?

These are the key questions of archaeology. In term of guidelines for analysing single situations, the questions are:

- Who is speaking: Who is accorded the right, who is qualified etc?
- From which institutional sites does the discourse gain its legitimacy and purpose?
- Which positions are possible for the individual to occupy?

This is a systematic rewriting of history in terms of chronology, actor, and context (see also Jørgensen, 2002). This systematic rewriting of history is adopted by genealogical power analysis and subjected to the latter's tactical purposes. It is clear from the above description that the archaeology also operates – albeit implicitly - with a conception of power. The archaeological analysis is the analysis of the foundation for the presence of phenomena such as inequality, imbalance, difference, domination and control in society. All the questions posed by archaeology lead us in the direction of power.

There are, however, a number of aspects of archaeology, which are somewhat confusing and probably part of the reasons why Foucault turns to genealogy. As mentioned earlier, the concept of discourse could lead readers to place too much emphasis on linguistics and language. But there are more serious problems in addition to the fact that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a very difficult and very theoretical read. In any case a *plethora of new terminology* is introduced (Haugaard, 1997, p. 47). This makes it more difficulty than necessary both in terms of reading, and particularly using, archaeology. But there are other more serious methodological problems in archaeology. After his critique of the discourses of science for being unitary, systematising and totalising, it seems rather curious that the alternative concepts presented by Foucault are "discursive formation," "rules of formation," or even "systems of dispersion." As noted by Haugaard (1997, p. 55), Foucault argues that despite his rejection of unities, he operates with subdivisions. These subdivisions are governed by rules of formation. As mentioned

above, govern should not be understood as deterministic but rather as rules, which govern "…what can and cannot be said as part of the language of truth" (Haugaard, 1997, p. 56). Neither should rules be understood as a deep common structure to be found underneath statements (see Haugaard, p. 55). Foucault, however, goes to great lengths to actually describe or even define these rules of formation. But since these are extremely complex, *The Archaeology* becomes longer and longer without ever getting closer to a workable definition of rules apart from that the fact that they are historically conditioned. His attempts to define a unity (see Foucault, 1995, pp. 31-39), in particular, are more confusing than illuminating because unities are described as paradoxical, inconsistent, fairly loose structures and full of gaps. In any case, I think he tries to express and to define more clearly these tacit rules, and in the process of trying to define rule, unity, etc., he, in my opinion, paralyses history instead of allowing history to move on and to change. This means that archaeology becomes static. The discursive formations become almost as static as the unities opposed by archaeology. The subdivisions almost become closed systems of what Haugaard calls "…mutually systematically relationally self-constituting truths" (Haugaard, 1997, p. 66).

> "…while this makes absolute sense for a hypothetically static episteme, what is missing is any sense of dynamic locus upon which to locate change" (Haugaard, 1997, p. 66).

The unconditional *purity* is a related problem. Descriptions are never pure but contain choices, selections and interpretations. A pure description of events makes it impossible to describe *relations* or *connections* between events, between actors, or between institutions. When it is impossible to do this, it is also impossible to describe transformation and change. Such phenomena are about relations: relations between actions, events, actors, institutions, that can only be captured through interpretation. To suggest that these interpretations have to be carried out on the basis of detailed descriptions of events with reference to the actual conditions in which these events emerge, are not the same as suggesting any kind of purity inherent in these descriptions. To claim purity also means that the purpose of analysis becomes very unclear; it cannot be anything but unclear. Thus, the intentions of questioning our ideals and presumptions of truth and justice are, in other words, only implicit in the archaeology. It is not entirely clear to what degree these considerations comprise some of Foucault's reasons for leaving archaeology and turning to genealogy—and, of course, to power. It is probably appropriate, however, to see genealogy as a resolution of these methodological problems (Haugaard, 1997, p. 66). With the introduction of genealogy and power, Foucault is equipped with a stronger, more focused and tactical vocabulary than in his previous reliance on archaeology alone.

Genealogy

Foucault notes the distinction between archaeology and genealogy as follows:

> "If we were to characterise it in two terms, then "archaeology" would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and

"genealogy" would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play" (Foucault, 1980, p. 85).

Genealogy is the tactics by which archaeological descriptions are brought into play. The tactics is to question the values of everyday life. Genealogy is Foucault's method in *Discipline and Punish* (1979) and *The History of Sexuality* (1978), both of which are written in the period after *Madness and Civilization* (1967) and *The Order of Things* (1970). An early description of genealogy appears, however, in the article *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* (1984a), published in 1971 (see note in Foucault, 1984a, p. 76). In this article, Foucault describes the foundation of genealogy as Nietzsche's writings. It is also Nietzsche, who originally used the term "grey" about genealogy (Nietzsche, 1992b, p. 457; on this point see also Jørgensen, 2002, p. 42, and Flyvbjerg, 2002, pp. 113-114). This origin is not apparent from *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, even if Foucault starts by characterizing genealogy as grey (Foucault, 1984a, p. 76). The importance of this article cannot be overestimated. There are few places in Fouclult's massive ouvre in which the link to Nietzsche is described so deeply. In this article, Foucault describes genealogy as a way of questioning the values of everyday life by means of different uses of history. Foucault also introduces the concepts, directly linked with power, of "Herkunft" and "Entstehung." The exploration of "Herkunft" and "Entstehung" constitutes the genealogical analysis (Foucault, 1984a, p. 86). Both concepts are absolutely central to understanding the unique historical method, which is linked to Foucault's power analysis.

The concept of discourse is now substituted with, or superceded by, the concept of practice in genealogy. This serves to eliminate some misunderstandings linked with the use of discourse. As noted above, however, practice is perceived as the relation between the discursive and the non-discursive. The part it plays in relation to the analysis of relations of power is the important characteristic of genealogy. It seeks to bring "subjected knowledges" into play. The purpose is described as follows in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1979):

"I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No - if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes - if one means writing the history of the present." (Foucault, 1979, p. 31).

To perform a genealogy in other words is to write "the history of the present"—which means that we use the past to describe the present. Genealogy is not about the past, it is about the present. This includes why we think, act and interact in the ways that we think, act and interact. It is to try to see how history influences our daily practices because our ways of thinking, acting and judging are descended from history, but not a manifestation of history. Genealogy also connects the concept of power (discussed in more detail below) with these everyday practices, and this power analysis aims at showing or revealing power in how we deal with everyday life. As Hardy and Clegg (1996, p. 631)

put it, power is "…embedded in the fibre and fabric of everyday life". Power now becomes stronger, relevant, and concrete.

Genealogical analysis aims at questioning the present by means of history. It seeks to make people conscious of who they are, where they come from and why things are the way they are. Nietzsche, in his introduction to *The Genealogy of Moral*s notes that:

> "We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves – how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves?" (Nietzsche, 1992b, p. 451).

Through the use of history, Foucault wishes to bring subjected knowledges into play in order to show that things need not be so. History is his critique (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44). Genealogy is rather cynical in this respect and seeks also to bring forward the darker sides of history which provides it with critical intent. The darker sides are those events that people might like to forget because they are embarrassing, shameful or just do not fit with their constructed images of themselves. People are not necessarily polite, civilized, noble, pragmatic or reasonable. Genealogy is open for the worst case to occur (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 95). People can be evil, immoral, obnoxious, selfish and capable of doing whatever it takes to promote their own intentions or interests. Genealogy reveals that the concept of liberty is an invention of the ruling classes and not necessarily the basic condition of man (Foucault, 1979, pp. 78-79)—an insight that is, of course, open to challenge from other discourses. It reveals that rationality was born in an altogether reasonable fashion – from chance (Foucault, 1984a, p. 78). Genealogy doesn't see history as necessarily logical or continuously directed to improvement and enlightenment.

> "…historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 79).

Power should also be understood in an equally less glorious and more mundane manner. Power does not derive from the king. The constitution of social life is, on the contrary, derived from "…a complex set of petty and ignoble power relations" (Haugaard, 1997, p. 43). Power is the consequence of local strategies and is the overall effect of petty confrontations between actors fighting over what is true and what is just (see Haugaard, 1997, pp. 68-69). Genealogy is to write "wirkliche Historie" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 87; see also Flyvbjerg, 2001, pp. 114-115). The starting point is a concrete description of everyday practices, where each is described as having its own identity. "It must record the singularity of events outside any monotonous finality" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 76). Genealogy requires patience and knowledge of details (Foucault, 1984a, pp. 78-79). Genealogy is patiently documentary - as is archaeology. It doesn't, however, assume to be pure. It is tactical in bringing out the darker sides of history.

Genealogy, as a special kind of historical analysis, is described by means of Nietzsche's concepts: *Urkunft*, *Herkunft* and *Entstehung* (Jørgensen, 2002). Urkunft is consistent with unities like "science," "ideology," "theory" or "domain of objectivity." It is used to

describe the "…the miraculous origin" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 77) at which a given rationality or truth is established and thence has some determining effect on everything that comes after. Events are thus a manifestation of history and this common truth. As a consequence, events are not perceived as having an identity of their own. Nietzsche and Foucault describe Urkunft as an invention, an artifice, and a sleight-of-hand or even as black magic (Foucault, 1984a, p. 77), which is rather useful, if not very satisfactory, when one cannot explain facts otherwise. Instead, genealogical analysis is linked to Herkunft and Entstehung.

The English word for Herkunft is *descent*. It emphasizes the historicity of words and actions. History influences, limits and makes possible. But at the same time it is not history, which repeats itself. Events are in other words not reflections or manifestations of history:

> "…rather, it seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel. Far from being a category of resemblance, this origin allows the sorting out of different traits…" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 81).

The analysis of descent is the analysis of "numberless beginnings...(which)...permits the dissociation of the self" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 81). Herkunft is thus associated with the use of history as being "dissociative." The "self" - and the values linked to it – is in other words a historical construction, which has numberless beginnings. Thus, the self is not a unity but is fragmented, differentiated and shaped by accidents:

> "…to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us: it is to discover that truth and being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents." (Foucault, 1984a, p. 81).

In genealogical analyses, descent is inscribed in the body, in nervous systems, temperament, systems of digestion and so on—"its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and process of history's destruction of the body" (Foucault, 1984a, pp. 82-83).

The English word for Entstehung is *emergence*. In the same way as descent is not be considered as an undisturbed continuity, neither is emergence the final part of historical development. It is only an episode in a series of "subjugations" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 83). The descriptions of emergence in many ways resemble Foucault's descriptions of power. Genealogy, for example, "…seeks to re-establish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 83). Concepts such as subjugation, subjection and domination were already used by Foucault in 1971. Emergence is also linked with *force*, which, in turn,

strengthens the resemblance between genealogy and power. The purpose of an analysis of emergence is to delineate the interaction between different forces:

> "Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of the *Entstehung* must delineate this interaction. The struggle these forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid degeneration and regain strength by dividing these forces against themselves." (Foucault, 1984a, pp. 83-84).

"Force" and "struggle" are central to any analysis of emergence. The latter is the scene on which different forces meet face-to-face (Foucault, 1984a, p. 84). While descent describes the character of the instinct and its inscription in the body, emergence is "…a place of confrontation" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 84). Emergence is the result of a relation between forces. As a consequence, no one is responsible for emergence; "…no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85). To reiterate, emergence is always a relation between forces and no one is responsible for it. The actions of people have to be viewed in interaction with particular material circumstances and other actors. As a consequence, emergence is never finished or complete. It moves through new relations and new confrontations, which carry with them new objects and new ways of speaking. According to Foucault, this means that there is only one drama, namely "…the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85).

> "The domination of certain men over others lead to the differentiation of values; class domination generates the idea of liberty; and the forceful appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to them account for the origin of logic." (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85).

This endless play of dominations is fixed, through history, in rituals, in procedures, in norms and rules, which prescribe truth and justice. To suggest that civilized societies are equal to the rejection of violence and war would be very naïve. Violence, war, and the bloody confrontations are rather installed in the rule- and norm systems, which go from dominance to dominance (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85) and produce inequality and difference in the possibilities of defining truth and justice.

Genealogical analysis is the analysis of the relationship between descent and emergence. Descent is embodied and living history and is practiced passionately and emotionally in the arguments and actions of individuals in everyday life. It is rich in motives, intentions, interests, passions, feelings and hence values. Emergence, on the other hand, is the result of the interaction between these different forces. The result is the manifestation of values in norms, rituals, rules, procedures and traditions which prescribe truth and justice. The key problem here is that emergence is not the result of an interaction between equals. In emergence, the participants are *different* people with *different* intentions and with *different* opportunities to produce such emergence. It follows that people have different possibilities of influencing history, of writing history and of creating the history of the future.

Genealogy is explicitly directed against this problem. Emergence produces inequality, difference, domination and control, which in turn produce emergence. The writing of history depends on relations of power. The winners write history. Contesting arguments, viewpoints, meanings and actions are lost and forgotten. The latter comprise the subjected knowledges. They are also referred to as marginalized voices in Foucault's writings. The writing of history - whether it is in books, in stories, in narratives, in techniques, in procedures, in rules, in concepts, in sentences and so on contains a specific version of what is true and what is just. Values are productive and create development but at the same time people are also prisoners of their values. This makes it very difficult to see other possibilities and openings. This is precisely the point of genealogy. Foucault gives us history in order to provide us with the possibility of reflecting on the self (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44).

Genealogy seeks to overcome the problem of moral imprisonment by writing *wirkliche* or *effective* history as distinct from *traditional* history. The claim that genealogical analysis is not produced in order to understand but with the intention of cutting off the roots should also be understood in this sense.

> "This is because knowledge is not made for understanding: it is made for cutting" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 88).

"Cutting" means to shake and disturb the foundation: what we consider true and proper including presumptions of who we are and where we come from (see Foucault, 1984a, pp. 87-88). As a consequence, effective history is "…without constants" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 87). The focus on values is now made explicit here. A genealogy is conducted in order to shake and disturb the values used to understand, evaluate and judge. "To cut off the roots" implies that the emergence of our concepts, words, methods and tools is different from what people may think. People are not the final product of a process towards emancipation and enlightenment—but merely the results of accidents. Events are not part of a continuous or rational development—an event is what it is and must be analysed in relation to its most unique characteristics (Foucault, 1984a, p. 88). An event, therefore, has an identity of its own and must be analysed as such (see also Jørgensen, 2002, p. 30). The forces operating in history are not controlled by one destiny or other forms of regulatory mechanisms. Such forces react in relation to accidental events or conflicts (Foucault, 1984a, p. 88). Thus, the difference between effective history and traditional history is that the former doesn't conceive of history as a planned, rational and progressive process written by noble people with noble and rational intentions. History is, on the contrary, a discontinuous and accidental process written by many different people with many different and very often contradictory intentions. The whole spectre of human characteristics is to be represented in effective history: Nobility, generosity, heroic deeds, reason and vision—but also war, massacres, blood, conflicts, violence, exploitation and so forth. The purpose of effective history is to write a more varied history of the present and the social changes that have lead to it. Understanding is thus a much deeper and more complex understanding of the phenomena of the present instead of the narrow and often one-eyed understanding provided by traditional history. Traditional historians are dangerous, because they attempt to hide behind the "objective viewpoint" and present

such history as the ultimately true version. This way of writing is, according to Foucault, demagogical and speaks to the lowest or basest in people:

> "What is the source of history? It comes from the plebs. To whom is it addressed? To the plebs. And its discourse strongly resembles the demagogue's refrain: "No one is greater than you and anyone who presumes to get the better of you – you who are good – is evil." (Foucault, 1984a, p. 91).

An explicit rejection of traditional history is fundamental for the genealogist. The former presents history as neutral and objective, while the purpose of genealogy is precisely to bring forward the feelings, the passions, the motives and the intentions in the history of the present.

Foucault summarizes the purposes of genealogy in three different – albeit interconnected – uses of history: the parodic, the dissociative, and the sacrificial. These are now discussed in more detail than in the brief introduction presented earlier.

The parodic: The first use of history concerns getting "behind" history and avoiding being seduced by the web of stories, legends, myths, and narratives, all of which conceal the emergence of practices. Genealogical analysis seeks to go beyond imagined truths and question the legitimacy of practices. These imagined truths include, for example, stories of heroes and scoundrels, rational explanations, romanticism, images and so on. Genealogical analysis seeks to tear off such masks and map actual events in their correct chronological order, in the proper context, and with a proper description of who is involved, and what part they play. This includes the winners, the losers, the marginalized and the privileged. Genealogy, therefore, will tell a different, more detailed and diverse story and thereby shake the one-sided imagery of, for example, an organization to its core. The importance of the parodic use of history may be illuminated by drawing on the recent emphasis placed on narrative and story telling in organization studies (Boje, 2001; Czarniawska, 1997, 1999). For both Boje and Czarniawska narrative is a way of making sense of reality. Narrative provides a means of constructing meanings from what may otherwise appear as a flowing heterogeneously amorphous amalgam of events, images and symbols. In this sense, every actor is a story teller. Moreover, every word, symbol or action has a story to tell; such stories, of course, are dependant on the story teller. It follows that narrative always originates from something that precedes narrative; Boje (2001) prefers the term *antenarrative*. Antenarrative emphasizes that narrative is constructed from equivocal, fragmented, inconsistent and loosely coupled bits, pieces and fragments that may be interpreted in many, many different ways. As such narrative and story depend heavily on the story teller's position. It depends on time, place and mind (TwoTrees, 1997; Boje, 2001). Such positioning also indicates that narratives and stories must also heavily depend on power relations. The writing of "Wirkliche Historie" is precisely an attempt at remaining faithful to the spirit of antenarrative; this is essential in order to avoid being seduced by particular narratives and stories constructed by story tellers with specific intentions and interests which are masquerades or disguises of history. This inconsistency between the masquerade and factual events has been well

documented in some recent studies. Flyvbjerg (1991b) demonstrates, amongst others, how the decision of locating a bus terminal in the city of Aalborg is taken before the official decision-making processes and investigations had even started. Similarly, Latour (1996) demonstrates how none of the actors involved in the Aramis-project were interested in the whole project but only took an interest in bits and pieces of it. In reality this meant that the official goals, which were the foundation of the economic funding, were not consistent with reality. Further, much of the organizational literature may be subjected to genealogical analysis thereby providing us with a different picture of what this kind of literature can be used for. O'Connor's case study (1999) of how the *The Human Relations School* and *The Harvard Business School* grew to become powerful institutions in organization and management thought demonstrates clearly how the emergence of theories and concepts are themselves saturated with relations of power. This story is quite different from the ordinary story of the Hawthorne investigations (For example, see Homans, 1966). The emergence of these institutions is presented as the result of an alliance between powerful businessmen, such as John D. Rockefeller and others, as a reaction to the prevailing fear of Marxism and the labor movement.

The dissociative: The second use of history resembles the parodic in many ways but is more closely linked with identity. Power analysis demonstrates the complexity, the contradictions and the paradoxes in relation to who people are and how they have become who they are. The dissociative use of history reveals that people are part of history and as such are subjected to influences and pressures to behave in particular ways. It demonstrates how people are capable of practically anything in order to promote their own intentions and interests. They cooperate, they work hard, they see the visions, and are capable of making tough decisions when their backs are pressed against the wall. But they also argue, they struggle, they fight, they manipulate, they exploit, they deceive and they lie. The dissociative use of history reveals the whole spectrum of human characteristics and human history. It doesn't allow us to forget the darker sides in the panoply of human identity and integrity. The dissociative use of history is directed towards peoples' image of themselves. Their 'own image' is conceived of as a construction and a mask, which may only provide a one-eyed and maybe even a narcissistic representation of who people really are. It is backed up by constructed myths, sagas, stories and narratives. In genealogical terms this own image is, if in part, often a form of self-deception. First of all it tends to exclude the darker sides of one's history, the sides that people don't wish to see or to acknowledge. There are probably numerous different reasons for people not wanting to see these sides of their own histories. They may simply produce images that are illegitimate in terms of how people want to be perceived – as such they may even have undesirable political consequences. But it may also be caused by the simple fact that some peoples' realities are almost unbearable. I find my inspiration here in Gabriel's psychoanalytic story telling approach (Gabriel, 2000; see also Pritchard, Jones and Stablein, 2004, p 219). In this way imagined identities – and thus sagas, stories and narratives – are a way out, so to speak, a way of coping with difficult everyday realities. They provide a way of maintaining a human face that allows the suffering individual to rebuff rationalization, control, oppression and exploitation. Without going into further depth on the psychology of the self the main point here is that the own image of self is a potential cage from within which people cannot learn anything

new. Narrow-mindedness, intolerance and stupidity are the results. Genealogical analysis is directed towards shaking this own image by providing a more varied historical analysis of who people really are and where they come from.

The sacrificial: The third use of history demonstrates how actions in organizations originate and are driven from peoples' intentions, interests, passions, feelings and will. Foucault refers to this as "the will to power" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 89) or "the will to knowledge", which is, of course, inspired by Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1992b, pp. 514-515). The "will" penetrates the production of knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is anything but neutral, objective or value free'. Knowledge is saturated with passions, interests and intentions and exists in a continuous struggle and confrontation with other's passions, interests and intentions. Violence, blood, conflict, dominance and slavery are embedded in the production of knowledge – not liberty, equality or fraternity (see also Foucault, 1984a, p. 96). The sacrificial use of history perceives social processes as driven by people with different passions, intentions, interests and feelings.

> "But if it examines itself and if, more generally, it interrogates the various forms of scientific consciousness in its history, it finds that all these forms and transformations are aspects of the will to knowledge: instinct, passion, the inquisitors devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 95).

Developments are not the result of any objective truth. The sacrificial use of history demonstrates how practices in organizations are the results of many small force relations which interact in particular ways to create the larger patterns. Foucault's power analysis is unique since it not only assumes that reality is socially constructed—it also demonstrates in a very deep fashion *how* it is socially constructed.

The three uses of history are very closely linked and are mutually inter-dependent. A sacrificial use of history, for example, carries with it the parodic and the dissociative. It is also impossible to speak of a parodic use of history without showing how reality is socially constructed. As such power analysis almost always contains aspects from all three uses of history. It follows that I will not distinguish as sharply between these aspects of power in the ensuing case analysis as in this more descriptive outline. The analysis concentrates on showing how reality is socially constructed - this is the sacrificial use of history, but it also implies the two other uses of history. The aim is to construct an alternative memory and this demands that all three are incorporated in any substantive Foucauldian analysis.

Genealogy and power

We have seen that both archaeology and genealogy incorporate a conception of power— and that both methods are aimed at questioning the values of everyday life. An unequal distribution of privilege, advantage, domination, and control is embedded and embodied in everyday life. Therefore, both methods are really an analysis of the values on which power relations are founded. This aim is implicit in archaeology but explicit in genealogy

where it is much more clearly linked to power. Relations between genealogy and power are further clarified in this section.

These relations are described, amongst others, in two seminal lectures, which took place in January 1976. These lectures were later transcribed and published in the essay *Two Lectures* (Foucault, 1980) where power is described in much the same fashion as *Entstehung* in genealogy, namely as "…a relation of force" (Foucault, 1980, p. 89). This makes Foucault's power concept distinct from a juridical or liberal understanding of power, and also from the economic analysis of power presented by Marx (see Foucault, 1980, p. 88). From both juridical and economic perspectives, power is perceived as a commodity which may be exchanged as such. Foucault calls these perceptions "contract-power" (Foucault, 1980, p. 91). In contract-power, economy is at a higher level than power in the sense that power is always analysed in terms of the relations of production (Foucault, 1980, p. 88). Foucault suggests instead that power be analysed as a relation of force. Concretely this means that one analyses power in terms of "…struggle, conflict and war" (Foucault, 1980, p. 90). The difference is central to Foucauldian analysis. As mentioned above, archaeology lacks any sense of change. In genealogy, on the other hand, Foucault situates change and development in a theory of power. But again, this is not to be understood as either a teleological or a subject-centred solution. The social subject is neither given the power to shape history, nor is power seen as a core essence. It is not the individual who possesses power (subject-centred solution). Neither is it the economy which determines the course of history (Marx' essential solution) (Haugaard, 1997, pp. 66-67). Power is not the motor of history: according to Foucault "Power is located at the level of struggle and manifest in its effects" (Haugaard, 1997, p. 67).

When Foucault speaks of power in *Two Lectures*, he speaks of war. War is thus a good example of how Foucault perceives the relations between genealogy and power. Foucault describes power by means of a reversal of Clausewitz' claim that "…war is politics continued by other means…" to "power is war, a war continued by other means" (Foucault, 1980, p. 90; see also Foucault, 1993, p. 334). The key point is to view power relations as historically constructed and war as eternal in the sense that peace doesn't suspend the effects of war or neutralize imbalances (see also Haugaard, 1997, pp. 67-69).

> "The role of political power, on this hypothesis, is perpetually to reinscribe this relation to a form of unspoken warfare; to reinscribe it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and everyone of us" (Foucault, 1980, p. 90).

Social institutions, including organizations, should, in the same way, be perceived as places or loci characterized by unbroken "warfare." Conflicts and inequalities are inscribed in the structure of the organization, its distribution of rights and obligations, its language and in the bodies of the participants. Inequality is within people, in their ways of perceiving reality, their ways of working in the world, their ways of communicating, and so on. Political battles – changes in the relations, support and amplifications of certain tendencies within this "civil peace", as Foucault puts it (Foucault, 1980, p. 91), should be seen as nothing other than the continuation of warfare.

>"They should, that is to say, be understood as episodes, factions and displacements in that same war. Even when one writes the history of this war, it is always the history of this war that one is writing" (Foucault, 1980, p. 91).

Such conflicts and battles continue in the sense that the organization - its structure, its technology, its culture or in its general ways of operating – is founded on inequalities and confrontations. Power is, therefore, communicated from everywhere. This conception of power and its foundation is known as *Nietzsche's hypothesis*, which accordingly claims that the foundation for a relation of power is the relation of hostile forces (Foucault, 1980, p. 91). Repression is the simple effect and continuation of a dominating relation - it is a realization of the eternal relation of force (Foucault, 1980, p. 92). Organizations are, in the same manner, always emerging from the relations between hostile forces. These relations are characterized by inequality, dominance and difference. The organization is in a permanent state of imbalance. This doesn't mean that the relationship is perceived as illegitimate or untrue by some the participants. On the contrary, they subject themselves to the social rules and the implicit perceptions of truth and justice. The values of these social rules – that is, the values of everyday life – are what Foucault wishes to question.

The reader will note that I have from time to time used the terms *truth* and *justice* throughout this chapter and, indeed, throughout the whole book. This is because Foucault in *Two Lectures* denotes as his primary interest the triangle *power*, *truth* and *right* (see Foucault, 1980, pp. 92-93). Foucault is interested in two systems at the level of society. The first is the system of justice, which is supposed to guarantee concepts such as freedom, liberty, sovereignty, democracy and obligations – that is *the right*. The other is the scientific system, which has to do with the production of *truth*. Foucault perceives these systems as defined by relations of power. Truth and justice do not define relations of power—but the other way around.

I now turn towards Foucault's formulation that power is first and foremost a relation of force. Foucault describes this in more detail in the section called *Method* in *The History of Sexuality – Volume I* (Foucault, 1993, pp. 333-341). More specifically, power is described as a gathering of a multiplicity of force relations, which are immanent in the sphere in which they operate and constitute their own organization.

"…that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; …" (Foucault, 1993, pp. 333-334).

Power comes from everywhere. It doesn't start in one central point from whence secondary and related forms will emanate. Power is a gathering of many different force relations. "Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (Foucault, 1993, p. 334) - from the immanent relations in the economic and productive processes to the relations in the smallest elements of society – relations in the family, in the school, in the group. Power is simply:

> ”…the overall effect that emerges from all these mobilities… …as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; …” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334).

Power emerges through the confrontations and the battles between all these different forces embedded and embodied in the everyday life of social and economic institutions at all levels of society. Power is the support that these force relations find in each other:

> ”…as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; …” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334).

These force relations are embedded in concrete strategies and institutions, in the formulation of the law and the constitution and in different social forms of domination and control. Even if power is described here as a relational concept, it has very concrete manifestations.

> "…and lastly as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies" (Foucault, 1993, p. 334).

Power is a concept which is put together or constructed from multiple forms. It is a more or less loose network which emerges from many different forces. How loose or tight this network is and how much it includes or excludes cannot be described beforehand. What is important is to maintain the unique features of Foucault's power analysis, namely its bottom-up character and that it is first and foremost considered as a relation of force. This means that it is cynical, senseless and cold in the registration and description of the manifestation of different practices, which through their interactions, constitute the relations of power. These interactions and relations of power create reality. Elden (2001, p. 106) refers to the fact that Foucault uses the French verb "pouvoir" about power – a verb meaning "to be able." This means that Foucault attempts to capture the creative and productive sense of power rather than merely the repressive sense.

> "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: It includes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains and objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (Foucault, 1979, p. 194).

Relations of power are not first and foremost repressive. They create reality including our perceptions of truth and justice. Because of its compound character of many different hostile forces, power is also a network, which continuously emerges and is under development. There are always internal tensions, which, in turn, might evolve into new relations of power:

>"It is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local
and unstable" (Foucault, 1993, p. 334).

In this connection, it should be noted that words and things, in Foucault's power analysis, do not make any sense independent of something else. They must be understood relationally and as context-dependent. The existence of particular discourses and forms of dominance are conditioned from something else - such as the presence of certain techniques, procedures, architectures. These are, in turn, again conditioned on, from or by something else. Therefore power is not something that people have, can acquire or share with others (see Foucault, 1993, p. 335). Power is conditioned on relations. In this way power is both *intentional* and *non-subjective* (see Foucault, 1993, p. 335). Actions are always intentional and purposive no matter if these are implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious, consistent or inconsistent. But even if actions are always intentional, no individual or groups of individuals can be said to have invented them, since these also – along with their values and rationales – have to be placed in a context of actions, interactions and relations. In this way, Foucault solves the apparent contradiction that power analysis is on the one hand about feelings, passions, meanings, intentions and interests but on the other hand appears to completely eliminate the individual or the subject. Rather, it is only the individual with no history who is eliminated. The individual is seen as "embodied history," one who expresses her fragmented character in words and actions under different conditions.

Power emerges in the confrontation between different forces and is always local. Emergence is thus produced in every relation:

>"The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating
everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one
moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point
to another" (Foucault, 1993, p. 334).

Power is a relation between forces, and every relation between forces is a power relation. The term r*elations* is central here as the concept of force is not singular. It exists in relation to other forces such that every relation is already a relation of power. In this sense, power is everywhere. Resistance also plays an important role in Foucault's power analytics. "Where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 1993, p. 336). Power cannot exist without resistance, which is found everywhere in the power network:

>"Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play
the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations" (Foucault,
1993, p. 336).

Resistance is something that emerges in the confrontations and struggles between different and hostile forces and is necessary and unavoidable in any form of interaction. All forms of emergence can, in this sense, be understood as defined in the interplay

between "power" and "resistance." They (resistances) are the odd terms in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter (relations of power) as irreducible opposites are" (Foucault, 1993, p. 336). But power/resistance does not reflect a battle between different groups or classes in society. The relationship describes how action leads to action, which leads to action *ad infinitum*. It is a question of how different actions give different opportunities and limitations for future actions: to stimulate, to make easy or difficult, to enhance or delimit, to make more or less probable (see also Kendall & Wickham, 1999, pp. 50-51). Resistance is thus not necessarily the resistance which repressed groups exercise against a superior force. Resistance can be compared with simple misunderstandings, compromises, failure to persuade, technical problems, breakdowns in systems or any kind of problems associated with transferring the intentions of actors' to other actors or systems. Resistance is simply an expression for the interaction between power and power's object. This interaction always causes minor or major shifts in the course of history. Kendall and Wickham (1999, pp. 48-49) suggest another use of the English word "power" in this connection, namely power as an energy source. This double meaning of the word power is interesting. It is much easier to console with the suggestion that power is productive when perceiving power as an energy source. However, this should not overshadow the fact that the primary description of power provided by Foucault is in terms of inequality, imbalance, dominance, difference and control. He doesn't condemn the presence of these characteristics in present day society. A genealogical analysis of power reveals the conditions under which certain discourses/practices emerged, evolved and changed. It shakes up the foundations of these practices by demonstrating that their claims to truth and justice are inherently fragile and questionable in light of the ruthless critique of history.

But this doesn't imply looking for a secret conspiracy. Rather a social configuration such as an organization must be perceived as constituted by continuous confrontations and struggles. Actors have – via the relations that they themselves are part of – different positions and strengths and thereby different possibilities of defining what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad, what is moral and what is immoral.

> "Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (Foucault, 1993, p. 334).

Genealogical power analysis therefore has no intention of pointing fingers at people. It does not seek to point out who is to blame and who is guilty. The relational aspect of genealogical power analysis does not allow this to happen. In genealogies no one is guilty—or perhaps it is more correct to say that everybody is guilty, as all play a part in the emergence of power relations to which all – at the same time – are subject.

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