Transnational NGOs: Creative Connections of Development and Global Governance

Edited by Abdulkadir Osman Farah

AALBORG UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the heads of our department, Culture and Global Studies, Aalborg University, the former Henrik Halkier and the current Marianne Rostgaard, for their understanding and support for the Transnational Workshop and subsequent book publication.

I am similarly grateful to my colleagues at the Department of Culture and Global Studies particularly Li Xing, Søren Drosenrøde, Wolfgang Zank, Steen Fryba Christensen, Peer Møller Christensen, Søren Schmidt, Ane Bislev, Jiuang Zhang, Elijah Nyaga Munyi, Zakaria Lassen Abdul-Hanan for their contribution in the workshop. Thanks to Professor John Kuwada from Department of Business and Management for invaluable comments as a discussant and Maria-Fernanda Gonzalez Rojas and Jeanne Dyrskjøet for their participation and input.

I would also like to express my gratitude to distinguished scholars on Global Civil Society and transformation Professor Peter Willets of City University London, Professor John Clammer of United Nation University, Tokyo, Professor Ananta Giri of Madras Institute of Development, India and Professor Chunrong Liu, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, China and Professor Tim Shaw, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA/ Honorary Professor Aalborg University for reading parts of the book and providing insightful comments and suggestions.

Finally I would like to thank to the anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and suggestions and Ashley Kim Stewart for copy editing.

Osman Farah November 2014
Transnational NGOs, Development and Global Governance

Li Xing and Abdulkadir Osman Farah

Transnational NGOs: New Wine in an Old Bottle or Old wine in a New Bottle?

Transnational non-governmental organisations (TNGOs), as organisations, often operate, recruit membership, and attract funding from multiple sources. The term “transnational” refers to activities, organisations, and movements that occur across national boundaries with limited or no involvement by national governments (Stearns, 2008). TNGOs have often two main contradictory roles. On the one hand, such organisations pursue civic mobilisation and grass-roots-oriented roles in, for instance, linking to the masses by responding to their basic needs (Tarrow, 2005). On the other hand, these organisations contribute to organisational strategic calculations by participating in the formulation of organisational institutional frameworks. We can thus interpret the activities of these organisations from multiple theoretical perspectives/approaches that can help us understand this dualism.

The first is the idea that these non-governmental organisations (NGOs) originate from a network of individuals with moral considerations that aim to change certain social injustices, and to mainly by-pass the state in solving transnational challenges (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Their aim is to create new cultural identities, new forms of solidarity emerging from the grass-roots level. Secondly, these networks may also consist of people with cosmopolitan roots and creative structures of leadership, organisation and technology, who try to contend in politics and power by strengthening and consolidating the institutional organisational dimension (Tarrow, 2005). Core professional groups often lead such organisations, consequently leading to a marginal relationship with the masses. Thirdly, these networks might not link to the grass-roots level at all but may concentrate more on the institutional and organisational dimension. In this context, TNGOs become part of the hierarchical structure and an integrated part of global hegemonic order (Ferguson, 2009).

Empirically, recent global developments have shown that transnational NGOs operate between the civic mobilisation dimension and organisational and institutional dimensions, depending on the particular contextual event. NGOs have demonstrated the quality of moving between civic mobilisation grass-roots orientations, and top-down organisational platforms (Stachursky, 2013). In this regard, the state remains significant in the process of NGO activities. Although globalization in the form of mobility and technological advancements diminishes state monopolies, NGOs continue to struggle to overcome basic priorities, not just for acquiring funds, but also for engaging in an increasingly-complex but still state-centric world.
We can, nonetheless, agree on the point that transnational NGOs as non-state actors have the capacity to simultaneously operate locally, globally and transnationally. On one hand, these are competent organizations that participate in global politics and governance. On the other, these are movements that operate between state and society. How you see transnational NGOs, therefore, depends on where you are in the world. In Africa, depending on whom you ask, NGOs could be either saviours or neo-colonial neo-liberal opportunists. In China, NGO work, until recently, mainly remained within the national framework. It was seen as either supplementary to state strategies or as providing potential intermediaries between state and society. For many parts of the Middle East, NGOs remain controversial as agents of colonial expansion, perpetual elites, and foreign agencies. In the West, NGOs are seen as organisations that more-or-less design and pursue projects designed for the South and developing countries.

The paradigm of an international order, based on one-sided nation-state governance around the notions of “the end of history”, “democratic peace” and the “new world order” after the end of the Cold War in 1989, was soon replaced by the anti-terrorist global wars driven by the beliefs and discourses of “the clashes of civilisation”, “illiberal democracy”, and “global chaos”. Today, the world is struggling to survive the economic crises which disseminated from the core countries of the capitalist world system while it is also disturbed by global terrorism, civil wars and hegemonic competition at the national, regional and international level. Such transformations have shown that the nation-state struggles to dealing with global issues, and international institutions have so far been ineffective in finding global solutions. Clearly the state seems not to survive in its original Westphalian form with the traditional emphasis on nation, boundaries and the monopolisation of coercive power, authority, sovereignty and legitimacy (Sen, 2002).

Instead it can be argued that NGOs and civil societies should perhaps be given a greater role in order to create a peaceful and equitable world. Coincidently, “civil society” as emancipatory movements, whether national, international or transnational, has influenced global politics. Thus, contemporary transnational civil society organisations, together with their social movements, are an outcome of the wide-ranging social transformations in tune with the liberalisation, marketisation, and privatisation promoted by the Washington Consensus. It is firstly becoming a recognized phenomenon that emerging transnational corporate NGOs are increasingly part of the globally diverse efforts to solve security and sovereignty issues, for example as security contractors and consular managers processing visa applications for example. Secondly, although through diverse governmental and non-governmental institutions and organisations, political, economic, cultural, and social interactions are becoming increasingly transnationalised and globalised, citizenship and nationhood formally remains state-centric. The problem is that the world still lacks what we could refer to as global citizenry. Although the interactions that take place do resemble global citizenship, democratic processes and socio-economic and political justice does not project influence across boundaries, nations and states. There are elements of disjuncture, where decision-makers at the macro level continue to entertain the existence of a national and state platform. In the process such constituents often monopolise and might even dictate national socio-economic and political processes as well as transnational social, political, and economic realities that demand alternative epistemological and ontological configurations.
Research Questions and Conceptual Discussions

One of the research questions addressed here, in connection with the rise of transnational NGOs, is whether the hegemony and counter-hegemony embedded in the conventional state-centric system of national capitalism and interstate order is able to transcend it to become “transnational hegemony” and “transnational counter-hegemony” in the current era of globalisation and transnational capitalism. In other words, the research questions this book intends to find some answers to are: 1) whether the resilient passive revolution capacity of capitalism (Gramsci, 1975) is able to transfer from a nation-state domain to a global one; and 2) whether transnational NGOs in their varieties of organisations, networks, associations, and interactions represent the organic counter-hegemonic social forces, and whether they are able to relate problems at the national level to those at global level. These two aspects are two sides of the same coin. Based on the collation of the chapters from the authors, who contribute their analyses from a variety of perspectives, the book’s theoretical and analytical contributions are to look for some answers to the following broad research questions, among others (some of which are conceptual, while others are empirical):

The first question to ask is [to what extent] the foundations of hegemony of nation-state capitalism are being challenged and being extended to the global level and arenas with the ever-increasing globalization process and the transnationalization of global affairs. Meanwhile, it is problematic to discern at the current transnational capitalism does not really constitute in organic substance a “global state” vis-à-vis a necessary counterpart in the form of a “global civil society” which could represent the social basis of hegemony (Germain and Kenny, 1998: 15-16).

The second question is whether economic globalisation, through the increased functional integration of the market, is promoting a tangible historical bloc of global capital/elite classes. Or whether it has also created organically-founded global civil societies? Globalisation and transnational capitalism necessitates the increasing role of civil society and NGOs, both at the national and global levels, but globalisation and transnational capitalism also make it difficult to envisage a genuine Polanyian “double movement” (Polanyi, 1957), i.e. civil societies responding to the alienation and repression of the market and capital manipulation. Both nation-states (the “transmission belt” which promotes economic globalisation) and transnational civil society/NGOs in their diversified forms, are currently being pulled in various directions. On the one hand, nation-states are becoming committed to the transnationalisation of economic activities (production, finance and services) while, on the other hand, they are organically tied to national structures through a wide range of functions and provisions, not least of which is welfare.

The third question is whether the “resistance movements” found in self-proclaimed transnational NGOs can be argued to be merely conjunctural responses to the immediate effect of the mal-developments of economic globalisation (poverty, environmental prob-
lems, terrorism, and so on) or to general principles of common concern (democracy and human rights, and so on). Could we, for instance, argue that what we are witnessing is a genuine transformation of global human relations, where states, at least in their modern form, no longer remain the centre of human development? Has humanity overcome national and institutional barriers to address global issues that risk not just the existence and survival of human progress but also the planet Earth itself? The dichotomy of institutions vis-à-vis public mobilisation might have long constrained human beings in unleashing potential resources and commonalities. At least for the time being, in many parts of the world a common understanding that environmental problems, health issues and trans-boundary criminal activities should be addressed and managed responsibly and, if possible, collectively, prevails. In addition, most admit that transnational NGOs seem to have the upper hand when it comes to global discourse-generating platforms, in which states first come on board after some time, and mostly under pressure. Nonetheless, the essence is, to what extent transnational civil society and NGOs are still facing challenges, limits, and constraints in playing an organic role in having concrete influence on both state politics and market mechanisms.

Since the 1990s, transnational NGOs have grown in number, size and scope. Seen from Keane’s point of view, this previously-unfamiliar notion was historically derived from the “neologism of the 1990s” and the “revival of the old language of civil society” of the 1980s, and became increasingly popular not only in domestic socio-political contexts, but also in international and regional economic and financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (Keane, 2003). Rieff also argues that the rise of the transnational civil society is more in tune with the post-Cold War dominant ideology of liberal market capitalism, representing “a projection of our desires”, than with the ideal roles of civil society in fostering democracy and good governance (Rieff, 1999: 11-12).

Furthermore, the rise and struggle of global civil society, in the view of some scholars, should be comprehended through analysing global civil society—its movements, organisations, groups, and individuals—as an outcome and effect of global complexity.

These [organizations] are shaped by a number of ideological inputs, including liberal constitutionalism (human rights, anti-corporatism, fair trade, democratic representation); socialism (trade unions, welfarism, internationalism); anarchism (participation, direct democracy, direct action); and, ecologism (environment, sustainability, nature) — each of which interacts with the others exchanging, assimilating, and adapting concepts, slogans, symbols and other cognitive, emotive, and affective resources (Chesters, 2004: 14).

In line with this thinking, the heated debate has concerned the paradox of transnational NGOs as counter-hegemonic social forces. A variety of social movements, under the banner of opposing the polarising inequalities, declining social and environmental conditions, economic liberalisation, and unaccountable corporate power, and so on, are coalescing
into transnational networks in the process of shaping transnational civil society. They are voicing a strong protest against injustice, advocating radical democracy, and promoting the “global public sphere”. They embrace participatory democracy, but without a globally-shared narrative or grand ideology (Esteva and Prakash, 1998). They have a strong belief in cosmopolitan or transnational citizenship and have a great faith in global governance. But the central question remains: are these cross-border interest groups, cultural groups, and social networks able to create transnational organic social forces that are capable of reshaping the political structure of the global order and governance, and bringing about democratic and redistributive justice for the capitalist world system?

**Transnational NGOs: Indispensable Relevance and Roles in the Contemporary Era**

Nevertheless, global civil societies/NGOs, whose roles are impossible to ignore, are visually and vocally active today. If one looks carefully at what state-centric politicians and others do, it is clear that they incorporate transnational and sometimes globally-debated decisions (often generated by transnational actors such NGOs) into national governance. Thus, many national decisions originate from places such as the World Economic Forum, the World Social Forum, and Rotary international, incorporating powerful individuals and groups that operate at transnational and multilateral levels. After annual gatherings, many of them return to their respective constituencies/countries with alternative strategies to engage globally. The challenge is that multiple actors exploit such resources for particularistic political ends (DeMars, 2005).

One can eternally debate on how much transnational NGOs represent an institutionalised organisational platform or how much these organisations constitute a reliable voice of the ordinary masses. But one thing is for sure: many of these organisations are locally entrenched and they not only address socio-political, economic and cultural issues, but due to their closeness to local environments, also generate information, activism and contacts more quickly and effectively than state mechanisms, which are often associated with reluctant institutions with bureaucratic and systematic requirements and administrative procedures. For instance, viruses and infectious diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome among others which pose a threat have been first detected and documented by transnational local NGOs that gathered more reliable global information than that of the World Health Organization, which is the organisation formally and institutionally responsible for global health data collection. Similarly, transnational NGOs contributed a variety of attempts to eliminate polio and malaria in poor developing counties. States are also relevant in these important global efforts, but their engagement takes more time and co-ordination than that of more informal and direct transnational NGO efforts.

With global attention on WikiLeaks and the Snowden affair, we are entering an era where people around the world become suspicious about mass surveillance and the security of their personal and private lives. Developed democratic states are thought to ensure individual liberty, justice, and freedoms. Transnational NGOs will be the first to provide solutions for maintaining global openness and interaction while preserving personal integrity and trust.
Transnational human interaction in trade, spirituality, and other forms of cross-boundary associations prevailed for centuries, if not for thousands of years. The drivers of such endeavours included faith-based organisations, philanthropists and even fundamentalists (Weber, 1959; Tarrow, 2005). Interestingly, some of these organisations maintain significant influence in our current, partially post-modern globalised world. We say partially because it is only some parts of the world that might experience post-modern tendencies.

Although modernisation and post-modern socio-political and economic processes transformed societies, traditional structures such as kinship relations, and those inspired by religiosity maintain significant power and leverage in the world. Some of the most powerful transnational and global movements, such as World Vision and Jama-Al-Islamia belong to these traditional socio-mechanisms. With the establishment of post-World War Two multilateral economic, political, social and developmental organisations, transnationalism and the role of NGOs have been taken to a higher institutional, formalised, macro level.

This process had an impact on the formation of NGOs, where states influenced multilateral institutions and created international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to operate in an increasingly open and dynamic socio-economic world, where coercive state power no longer maintains an exclusive monopoly. NGOs and INGOs were already diverse, but with complex multilateral and transnational engagements, these organisations become more complex and diverse, depending on the priorities of alliance building and fund-raising opportunities.

Later, multilateralism was seen as beneficial, but due to the principles of geographical distance and closeness, organisations begin to create regional structures and branches in accordance with the ones formed by national states, establishing regional economic co-operation. In recent years, scholars have suggested that non-governmental organisations become significant parts of even micro- and meso-networks within cities, states and beyond (Castells, 2011). For instance, the different actors that exist in a city, a country, or in different nations, such as the business sector, universities and think tanks, establish joint NGO networks to pursue particular focused transnational plans with the aim of advancing strategies and interests in an increasingly-changing global world.

In addition, small, wealthier states, such as Denmark and Qatar, which comparatively confront challenges to exercise hard power, like the Chinese, Russians and Americans, have in recent years, also allied with diverse civil society groups and funded transnational NGOs in order to assert soft power and in pursuing global strategic interests. The Danish have created strategies which mix transnational business and development, while the Qataris have the notorious Qatar Foundation, an NGO that, due to the economic resources it can project, has greater power than many countries (Stig et al, 2013). Transnational NGOs also co-operate with these small and wealthier states, as they provide resources without attracting global attention.

In contrast to these increasingly-powerful small states, you have small states which, in the political science literature, are popularly called fragile and failed states. Most of these countries are in Africa and the Middle East and are in Asia. Apart from sharing governance
challenges in terms of consolidating internal and external legitimacy, these countries are almost governed – at least externally – by multilateral and transnational institutions and NGOs. Powerful states such as the USA have failed to stabilise countries like Somalia. It seems that small, wealthier states like Denmark, Qatar and Norway, by using multilaterals and transnational NGOs, have, in co-operation with hegemonic states, established themselves as development and security agents in regard to minimising challenges from so-called peripheral societies.

Furthermore, in the past decade, a number of countries in the South, like Brazil and South Korea have shifted from being donation recipients to being donors (Mawdsley, 2012). This process impacted the dynamics of transnational NGOs. Not only would transnational NGOs have to change their strategies in relation to emerging economies, but the new economies would become targets for transnational interest.

Finally, with the roles and varieties of capitalism in these processes, capitalism itself as a dominant economic model struggles and adapts to complex developments. For instance, major transnational companies have, in recent years, established transnational and regional NGOs. The strategy aims to combine running profitable businesses and profits with morally-appealing multilateral companies with an emphasis on corporate social responsibility. Time will tell whether transnational critical NGO activists and associated networks will accept global oil and gas exploration companies, such as Shell, when they establish organisations for sustainable environmental protection and development, as well as the recent activities of McDonalds and Coca-Cola sponsoring transnational NGOs which promote healthier eating.

The Book’s Background and Contribution

In order to find clarification for such puzzles, our research group on Development and International Relations at Aalborg University, hosted a May 2013 seminar on the theme of “The Transnational and Development: NGOs and global governance”. Prominent scholars from Europe, the USA, China, Qatar, and Ghana attended the gathering. The seminar reflected on and discussed the general theoretical debate and rationale on the emergence, role, and activities of transnational NGOs. NGOs, due to their capability of mobilising and organising, have a significant impact on our increasingly-globalised world. This influence remains particularly relevant on contributions to development. Increased transnational networking, mobility, and interaction provide civil society groups and NGOs with opportunities to actively and positively contribute to global development. Today, NGOs are partially integrated in global governance when it comes to developmental, health, technological, and developmental issues. States and international organisations interact and use NGOs for global activities.

Apart from the insightful and inspiring papers presented at the seminar, the aim was to establish a transnational research exchange and relationship, advancing research strategies for the topic of transnational NGOs and governance. So far, the transnational NGO research areas remain under-researched, especially in relation to development and in-
ternational relations. Furthermore, the seminar introduced selected transnational NGO empirical cases, and examined their impact on development, particularly on their complementary and occasionally-conflicting roles with international and multinational development aid agencies.

The seminar firstly highlighted that we live in a world that is gradually shifting from internationalism (interstate relations) towards transnationalism (inter-society relations). Secondly, transnational social and political activities have profound implications for regional and global development. Nonetheless, the term seems all-encompassing, calling for critical and creative theoretical and methodological reflections on the movement, as well as the organisational aspects of such enterprises. Thirdly, in Africa, transnational NGOs contribute to numerous developmental sectors, but so far a gap between expectations and outcomes in an increasingly-complex world system exists. This might lead to new forms of society-centred dependence and underdevelopment. Fourthly, in China, NGOs contribute to the transformation of the internal and the external dynamics of Chinese society, by undertaking greater social, technical, advocacy, and policy tasks. Fifthly, in the Middle East and Africa, Islamic movements and NGOs have been more-or-less successfully filling the welfare gap fragile, weak and authoritarian states leave behind for increasingly and consciously strong and mobilised societies.

In recent years, national donor agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development and the Danish International Development Agency, and other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the World Bank, have increasingly recognised the significance of transnational NGOs and the need to co-ordinate developmental efforts with them. States and related IGOs admit that, in certain areas, non-governmental actors have performed better in achieving development strategies, faster and more efficiently. For their part, transnational NGOs consider themselves as real bottom up agents for social empowerment and justice. Such organisations, though partially dependent on state funding, provide direct relief and support for a wide range of areas with social, political, and economic consequences.

The conclusions from the contributions to this book conceptualise NGOs – whether national or transnational – as organisations confronting significant conundrums to deal with and balance society-state dialectics. This is the case, whether we allude to the more historically-transnational Caribbean, China (a sizeably strong, centralised state system) or to countries with lesser organisational capabilities and relatively weaker states – most of them on the African continent. On one hand, contributions stress the significance of the institutionalisation dimensions under which NGOs, more-or-less voluntarily, apparently operate under national and possibly state-centric platforms. On the other hand, NGOs often portray themselves as aiming at living up to the expectations and wishes of ordinary people at the movement and grass-roots bottom-up levels. This dual character firstly requires civil society groups and NGOs to circumspectly balance the dynamics between the society and the state, and in the process determine whether to selectively co-operate with one side or to bridge the gap between the society and the state. Whether such an intermediate meditative role exists – and eventually prevails – depends on the different structures in the society, nation or state concerned. Secondly, in recent years, NGOs increasingly aimed at and expanded into balancing national and transnational lev-
els. These are two parallel processes that neither generate nor foster cohesive demands and objectives.

Chapter Contributions

In the following chapters, contributors present theoretical and empirical reflections on transnational NGOs, with an emphasis on the relations and dynamics within the contextual frame of consolidated state and weak state conditions.

In Chapter 1, Timothy Shaw analyses Caribbean transnationalism and argues that the Caribbean pattern follows multiple transnationalism in which people experience simultaneous positive and negative transnational processes. In addition, Caribbean transnationalism emanates both from the top as well as from the bottom. The first follows a formal organisational pattern, while the latter concentrates on informal community approaches. The chapter argues that we could interpret Caribbean transnationalism – both in its more positive civic approaches as well as its more negative components – as responding to the hegemonic global governance mainly dominated by established governmental, non-governmental and marked transnationalism. In this regard, diverse Caribbean transnationalisms are embedded in dialectical relations with regional and global transnationalism. Timothy Shaw expands the framework for the classification and activities of transnational NGOs. His position is that transnational NGOs are a significant factor in development and will remain so. We should include an analysis of transnational civil society, diasporas, multinational corporations, think tanks and media. The reason is that these are increasingly influential in policy debates and directions from the local to global, especially varieties of old and new regionalisms. The case of the Caribbean(s) generates myriad heuristic transnational governance, families, civil societies, supply chains, crime networks, and old and new security patterns. This leads to the proposition of citizen rather than national or human or private security, with profound implications for development policy/practice/outcomes in the post-2015 world.

Empirically, in China, we have a country with a relatively strong state, with a somewhat co-opted civil society that often provides public services and contributes to mobilisation efforts. Nonetheless, prevailing state restrictions on independent expression and mobilisation tendencies prevents civic communities from pursuing and achieving their national and transnational potentials.

In Chapter 2, Chen Hongbing, Li Xing and Zhou Chunfang contend that Chinese NGOs undertake numerous civic empowerment approaches and provide services dealing with human rights, social, and developmental issues. But these civic processes seem not to be properly consolidated, as NGO initiatives confront challenges from both the state and society. The NGOs confront the dilemma of operating within the institutionalised frame versus accommodating grass-roots organisational demands. It will, therefore, take time before this gap is fully reduced. Chen, Li and Zhou’s chapter shows that this paradox and dilemma is not just a dilemma in transnational NGOs is not just restricted to Africa, but it could also exist in Asia and elsewhere. The chapter aims to provide a framework for
conceptualising the development dilemma of grass-roots NGOs in China and to explore the factors behind this dilemma. The chapter posits that the development of grass-roots NGOs has played a significant role in promoting social development in China, in which they carry out a number of functions in the areas of social assistance, social justice, rights protection, environmental protection, and the neutralisation of social contradictions. Being organisations close to populations at the grass-roots level, these NGOs contribute to the emergence of a new social phenomenon in China – an active civil society. In recent years, they have been constantly expanding their social influence and actively participating in discussions of public policy. With the deepening of the reforms in Chinese society, on the one hand, grass-roots NGOs are facing a wide variety of roles that they are requested to play, but on the other hand they are confronting many development dilemmas. The chapter proposes to examine their challenges from a number of perspectives, such as the questions of legality, the low public awareness of volunteer services, the shortage of funds, irregular internal management, as well as the contradictory attitude of the Chinese government towards grassroots NGOs.

In response to the limitation of the liberal political public sphere in China, Chinese people, particularly cyber-activists, devise alternative national and transnational public spheres with the aim of subverting state-sanctioned public sphere limitations.

In Chapter 3, Ane Bislev discusses Chinese NGOs confronting state restrictions through the utilisation of the internet as a “space for salvage”. This could be a space where movements and organisations can express and exchange public opinions. NGOs have, nonetheless, often managed to bypass state restrictions through transnationally-created internet mechanisms. This means that restrictions of the normal public sphere lead to the creation of a digital sphere that, nonetheless, demands a higher cost. Under such circumstances, transnational NGOs working in China also create public spheres with bilingual capabilities. In this regard, Chinese NGOs share similar characteristics with other NGOs that also confront challenges in balancing the institutional and activist approaches. The difference in China is the expanded state control of the public sphere. The presence of transnational NGOs and the increasing application of the internet as a transnational public space results in the emergence of an “associational sphere”. But the proper emergence of a vibrant national and transnational civil society depends on the extent of state funds, as well as the prevailing restrictions to curb independent civic mobilisation. Ane Bislev recognises the dynamics of Chinese civil society and NGOs and their transnational and probably global implications. In this regard, Bislev reviews the explosive internet use in China. This will certainly have enormous impact on social and community organisations not just for national development, but also for transnational development.

The introduction of Chinese labour legislation reform in 2008 does not just demonstrate the existence of a strong, centralised state, but the robustness of national civic mobilisation as well as transnational NGO-involvement in the formulation of national laws in China. In addition, the labour legislation reform case shows that, although NGO demands within and outside China might occasionally converge, national patriotic sentiments often lead local NGOs to stick to state priorities, rather than transnational relations.
In Chapter 4, Peer Christensen suggests that China’s integration into the global economic system has implications both for China itself and for the wider world. One obvious implication is the emergence of transnational NGOs’ interest in the development of China, particularly the transnational interest of the consequences of labour legislation reforms in China – and the subsequent responses from NGOs within and beyond the country. Obviously, despite some legislative reforms, transnational and national NGOs seem to be dissatisfied because, in China, civic mobilisation – whether non-profit or profit oriented – exerts limited transformational influence (in comparison with other more-democratic systems where transnational civic mobilisations occasionally leads to concrete reforms and policy changes). Another challenge or deficiency of reforms relates to the tension between Western transnational NGOs and Chinese NGOs – a clash which the Chinese state exploits. Moreover, transnational NGOs are far from homogeneous. There are those with profit-orientation and those with humanitarian- and justice-orientation, each of which express opinions on Chinese legislative reforms.

While in China NGOs do engage in debate – whether it is dealing with national or transnational activities – NGOs continue to operate within the framework of the state which remains powerful. In Africa the weakness of the state provides the top-down imposition of both positive and negative transnational mechanisms that often attempt to operate beyond the state. Egypt is an exception in this regard. Here there is a well-organised military – that claims to dominate and represent the state. National NGOs, together with transnational human advocates, try to balance the authoritarianism of the military regime, with grass-roots demands for fairness and inclusion.

In Chapter 5, Osman Farah presents the Egyptian case, illustrating the mobilisation ambivalence of TNGOs. The cases of engagement by Human Rights Watch’s and the Carter Center in Egypt following successive public uprisings in the country shows that civil society transnationalism and mobilisation has limitations. Because of the need to balance public mobilisation needs and the structural realities of dealing with the still state-dominated international system, TNGOs adhere to more institutional frames of subordinating state hegemony. Osman Farah argues that the current scholarly debate on the so-called “Arab Spring” considers the mobilisation of disempowered youth, intense media-tech applications, and sustained international pressure as crucial to ousting authoritarian regimes in North Africa. Delineating the role of TNGOs complements such findings. TNGO activities and responses to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and to the ensuing coup in 2013 reveal the capability of such organisations to balance civic transformational-oriented mobilisations with state-centred institutional considerations. Furthermore, though TNGOs cannot directly change the current political stalemate in Egypt, the power elite might misinterpret the changing, and sometimes contradictory, positions of these organisations to have encouraged the return of authoritarianism to Egypt.

There is the obvious ambivalence of the NGOs – whether national or transnational – on whether to maintain support for the democratic aspirations and demands for justice from the people - or to maintain some kind of acceptance of the prevailing international order. Transnational relations opened certain opportunities for African civil society and NGOs, but there is a paradox in this process. Although transnational NGOs bring certain develop-
ments, these organisations – especially Western or Northern NGOs, seem to have the upper hand in transnational relations. One of the reasons for this is that these organisations link to their states, while Africa still struggles to institutionalise the relationship between state and society. Therefore, transnational NGOs’ efforts – due to the lack of proper state institutions – end up with elite manipulation. In addition, projects planned for civic and bottom-up implementation do not reach their stated objectives.

In Chapter 6 Paul Mensah contends that, in Africa, established transnationalism prevailed – as these transnational NGOs, instead of supporting grass-roots communities, fail to confront the need to change politics in their countries. The role of transnational NGOs in Africa remains normatively more institutionalised, and less transformational, in civic terms. Transnational NGOs do not transform, but maintain the status quo increasingly favouring established transnationalism (in the North and in the capital cities of poor African countries) through a DOSTANGO – a closer donor-state-NGO co-operation system – and other neo-liberal mechanisms. Paul Mensah argues that since the 1980s – the “NGO Decade” in African development discourse – transnational NGOs have become major actors in African development, with the capacity and resources to match UN agencies and, in some instances, dwarf governmental ministries in African countries. Indeed, from service delivery to advocacy, transnational NGOs, such as World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam, Plan and Action Aid, Paul adds, have become household names engaged in cross-cutting development issues in a number of African countries. Their role in African development is “premised on normative expectations of their ability to serve as agents for social empowerment, transformation and justice”. He, therefore, questions this normative expectation of the transformational roles of transnational NGOs, arguing that the role of transnational NGOs in African development presents a paradox. While they play critical developmental roles, their activities also undermine the long-term structural changes that are necessary for transformational development on the continent. Evidence from the case of the African Commission for Human Rights, with a progressive history of engaging NGOs, provides good examples.

In fragile post-conflict states, transnational NGOs, both from the West and from the East, compete for consolidation in countries where the state has less say. Though these transnational NGOs provide certain services and benefits, they seem to link and adjust to the interests of their original states and not those of the countries where these organisations operate as development NGOs. This can, in the long term, create structural transformation. The lack of a strong state also provides opportunities for profiles and activists as well transnational communities (diasporas) to step in and take leadership and organisational-providing services for vulnerable constituents in the society.

The situation is much different in a situation where the state is weak or absent.

In Chapter 7, Olivia Zank shows that transnational NGOs plan development initiatives strategically – but this creates challenges at the micro-implementation level. Initially, transnational NGO-generated projects start as rational and well-prepared, but over the course of implementation they encounter distortion by various actors, transforming the original developmental strategy that was assumed technically and rationally to be im-
plantable – leading to project plans that are unachievable or sustainable. This is also the case with the paradox of normative commitment to predesigned developmental projects versus organisational restrictions NGOs often confront within and around state institutions. Therefore, it would be suitable to take more human relations and empowerment-oriented approaches rather than those with a more institutional and organisational focus. There is a need for transnational NGOs to be more realistic and incorporate local agency.

Navigating between warlords and transnational NGOs and intergovernmental agencies, Somali civil society plays a pivotal role in reconstructing and contributing to peace – but the process confronts challenges from within and from outside. Transnational NGOs and UN agencies fail to take these civic groups seriously. But they have, in recent years, become more transnational through links to the diaspora, and thereby also have the opportunity to operate globally. This is, nonetheless, not enough to confront the hegemonic power of the transitional establishment (the state, the UN system, the market, and TNGOs).

In Chapter 8, Osman Farah and Shukria Dina suggest that Somali women mobilise nationally – through NGOs and civic movements. They succeeded in overcoming challenges, and confront warlordism and violence. This dimension is well documented and well known by the international community. Lesser-known Somali is the transnational dimension of Somali women’s mobilisation. Osman Farah and Shukria Dini contend that Somali Women’s transnational efforts for justice and social empowerment, and their efforts of co-operating with transnational NGOs and transnational communities, play a central role in peace and reconciliation processes in Somalia. The two authors argue that the collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s led to the total disintegration of the national security sector institutions, including the national police, the army, and the correctional services. The disintegration of security, combined with the absence of state protection, ushered in violence and human rights abuses, including gender-based violence, that have largely been perpetuated by armed groups who have turned against unarmed civilians for over two decades. As survivors of militarised violence, Somali women and men possess relevant information, knowledge that is essential in designing and implementing activities that are intended to improve security in their communities. This chapter argues that the insecurities faced by members of both genders in Somalia are amalgamations of a number of factors that Somalia, as a nation, has gone through. Some of these factors include bad governance, military regimes, and human rights violations that occurred in different periods of Somalia’s history and political stages.

In Chapter 9, Ladan Affi proposes that Somali civic mobilisation mainly takes place within the diaspora’s transnational framework. Here Somali women find a transnational context where they have to attend not just transnational development activities towards the homeland, but also maintain a decent life within challenging diaspora circumstances in the host country. The diaspora – though challenging – has provided Somali women with opportunities to pursue transnational activities within and beyond Somalia. Depending on the context, Somali women have found spaces for expression. Consequently, Somali women and their worldwide transnational communities fund and actively contribute to
numerous national and transnational NGOs – and thereby to the overall development of the country. Ladan Affi, in her chapter, proposes that, although certain positive developments are taking place, African women seem to struggle not just for political power and recognition, but also to establish NGOs and access resources provided by international donors. Referring to the case of the Horn of Africa, Affi argues that women have organised transnational NGOs that are more accountable and progressive than other organisations which suffer from accessibility, legitimacy and credibility challenges in local organic communities.

In Chapter 10, Afyare Elmi agrees with the existence of a more transnationalised Somalia, due to the collapse of the centralised authority. He contends that the number of TNGOs in stateless Somalia has increased since the collapse. There are now twenty-three transnational NGOs from the West and the Middle East and Islamic countries. Islamic NGOs focus on the health and education sectors, while Western NGOs provide humanitarian assistance. There is, however, a lack of connection between the macro- and micro-plans and strategies. Islamic transnational NGOs operate more at the grass-roots level, as they have created job opportunities for unemployed educators following the state collapse – thereby influencing overall economic opportunities. The NGOs have also mobilised civil society, leading to Islamic movements that, in recent years, have become dominant in the political arena. It seems that the national and transnational NGOs from Islamic and Arab countries have more roots and impact in the country than transnational NGOs from the West, which still have to establish themselves at the grass-roots level. Elmi further suggests that not all civil society organisations contribute equally to social emancipation and empowerment. He argues that, since the Somalia state collapsed in 1991, non-governmental organisations have taken the liberty of filling the vacuum, particularly in the area of service delivery. NGOs operate schools and health centres. They also provide relief to the needy and respond to natural and manmade disasters in Somalia. Elmi examines the role that Islamic NGOs play in the relief and development sectors. Based on interviews with some of the leaders of a number of the Islamic NGOs collected during the 2011 famine, he insists that NGOs (all of them) have replaced state institutions, and Islamic organisations have shown that they are more effective and efficient than their competitors.

In Chapter 11, Mammo Muchie and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie recognised the failure of post-colonial state consolidation due to the lack of an indigenous ideological platform for African development. Muchie and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie contend that, in order to make African transnational NGOs more efficient and progressive, there has to be a solid ideological platform. For the African continent, this could come from what they call “Ethiopianism”. In order to overcome the paradox and the continuing liberal Western hegemony, Africa needs an indigenous ideology and philosophical frame. Ethiopianism would help Africa to refrain from imitating external instructions and instead pursue transnational African Renaissance platforms, where Africans mobilise through organic socio-political mechanisms, rather than a colonial one. This process could help Africans not just to overcome the paradox of neo-liberalism and TNGOs, but could also make them innovative in confronting the current aggressive globalisation. Ethiopianism could inform the way Africa and the pan-African transnational civic movements, in particular, should approach globalisation issues, Western technological and ideological dominance, and the
dominance of knowledge production as a whole.

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Chapter 1
The Transnational, Development and Caribbean Insights: Five Sets of Transnational Relations

Timothy M. Shaw

Transnational relations...are contacts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government (Keohane and Nye, 1971: 331).

Governance refers to theories and issues of social coordination and the nature of all patterns of rule... (that) place less emphasis than did their predecessors on hierarchy and the state, and more on markets and networks (Bevir, 2011: 1).

Private transnational governance (PTG) schemes constitute by now fairly solid third pillar of global governance that complements intergovernmental regimes and transnational networks (Dingwerth, 2008: 608).

Introduction

Myriad and proliferating transnational relations increasingly define and determine development, not just familiar and ubiquitous Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), but also diasporas, certification, compacts, initiatives, regulation and so on. In the late-1960s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971) suggested that the transnational framework advanced analysis of global economy, science, security and so on, beyond MNCs. Their collection included foundations, religions and revolutionary movements. Since then, digital technologies, migration/diasporas, social media, and transnational organised crime have reinforced the perspective. And as the global South has become ever more central (UNDP, 2013), so the claim of Klaus Dingwerth (2008: 609) becomes more plausible, even an understatement:

Contrary to common assumptions, private transnational governance schemes exert a significant influence on southern stakeholders.

Dingwerth (2008) focussed on a trio of cases which we could now multiply, as indicated by the more than fifty in Thomas Hale and David Held (2011) such as the extractive industry transparency initiative (EITI), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and the United Nations Global Compact and so on. These include the World Commission on Dams, the Global Reporting Initiative and the Forestry Stewardship Council (see list of websites at the end of this chapter). He also highlighted such transnational relations in the environmental, financial, social, labour and telecommunications sectors. These and many others extend well beyond the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

And the burgeoning field has been reinforced in the second decade of the twenty-first century by a series of collections in addition to Bevir (2011) and Hale and Held (2011) – e.g. Sophie Harman and David Williams (eds.) (2013) and Tom Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (eds.) (2013) – along with Weiss’ 2013 monograph. These collections highlight a finite number of “governance” cases and sectors, including communications, corruption, ecology, finance, human rights, labour, migration, poverty, security, trade and so on. They, nonetheless, tended to overlook the informal and illegal sectors as well as focussing on the global rather than on the regional level. I will return to issues around generic, comparative transnational governance in (f) below, the penultimate section.

To inform the debate about approaches to the transnational and civil society dimensions of development, with an emphasis on one region – the Caribbean(s), however defined, including diasporas – I focus here on five sets of overlapping but not necessarily compatible “transnational” relationships (Held and Hale, 2011; Khagram and Levitt, 2007). These include transnational families, civil societies, supply chains, crime networks and governance nexuses. Transnational studies can be conceived of as heterogeneous relations among the trans- and inter- and intra-national, given changes in state-civil society and private sector relations everywhere, leading towards innovative forms of transnational, hybrid governance (Shaw, 2010b). And I see the regional and transnational as being quite compatible, especially the new regionalisms’ perspective, which privileges the non-state and informal.

To so conceive, several analytic traditions need to be identified and employed; not just international relations/international political economy/international development studies, but also anthropology, criminology, economics, history, sociology and so on, and especially notions of “new regionalisms” (Shaw, Grant and Cornelissen, 2012). Together these can inform the analysis and advocacy of several alternative definitions of and directions for the Caribbean and other regions in the global South. I return to them at the end of this chapter in the final part (g).

To advance comparative analysis of transnational relations in a variety of regions, sectors, genres and so on, this paper juxtaposes a set of transnational relations – families, civil societies, supply chains, crime networks and governance nexuses – with fluid definitions of “regionalisms”. Together these seem to fit or resonate in the case of today’s Caribbean(s) after their first five decades, as both perspectives develop their own genres such as “transnational studies” (Khagram and Levitt, 2007) and new regionalisms (Shaw, Grant and Cornelissen, 2012). Both approaches include economic, ecological, social and state relations, both informal and informal.
Such perspectives are particularly fitting as the Caribbeans’ first half-century coincided with the continuing global crisis, one in which the established neoliberal trans-Atlantic and the European Union (EU) are in a difficulty situation. Global rebalancing or divergence poses further challenges to the development prospects and policies of the Caribbeans. Hence we see the imperative of links, such as those of with the five BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), along with the resilience of varieties of new regionalisms and transnationalisms. Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2011: 22) recently captured the potential of such reordering with its regional and transnational dimensions:

*The rise of emerging societies is a major turn in globalization and holds significant emancipatory potential. North-South relations have been dominant for 200 years and now an East-South turn is taking shape.*

Given the contemporary variety of regional visions on offer at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the adoption of a new regionalisms perspective on today’s Caribbean would seem to be quite sensible and compatible with transnational approaches (Shaw et al., 2012). Orthodox frameworks cannot capture the diversity and dynamism of current regional connections: not just on micro-, meso- or macro-levels or that of inter-/non-state relations, but also increasingly the informal and illegal at all levels and in all sectors. And enquiring into the interconnections among these three or four distinct yet interrelated “regions” also challenges traditional disciplinary approaches as indicated in g) below.

And the distinctive, divergent character of regions has intensified as the current “global” financial crisis has impacted them differently – i.e. Asia has been less affected than the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, or the North Atlantic (Shaw, 2010a) – with implications for the salience and variety of transnational relations in 2015 and beyond.

**a. Many Regionalisms, many Caribbeans?**

_What constitutes the Caribbean...it...may be extended to include the Caribbean Diaspora overseas. As one scholar observes, there are many Caribbeans... In short, the definition of the Caribbean might be based on language and identity, geography, shorty and culture, geopolitics, geoeconomics, or organization (Girvan, 2005:304)._  

_Globalization has not just happened to the Caribbean, the Caribbean has participated in the making of globalization...four things circulate: people, capital, drugs and information (Bronfman, 2007: 5-6)._
The “Caribbean” can be more narrowly and broadly defined, from all/some of the heterogeneous islands to islands and mainland Central America – *el Gran Caribe* – and myriad diasporas. In formal intergovernmental institutional terms, this means progressing from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee (CDCC) to the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). But in terms of heterogeneous non-state, transnational actor definitions, it means progressing from the Caribbean Policy Development Centre to the Regional Coordination of Economic and Social Research think tank; the Caribbean Studies Association for civil society; and for the private sector, progressing from Unilever to Nestlé, from Republic Bank to the Royal Bank of Canada or Scotiabank, from Caribbean Airlines to Copa, and from B-Mobile and Flow to Digicel (Shaw, 2012). Certainly, spill-over from the current crisis in the form of the demise of the Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO) and Stanford corporate empires has had a continuing negative impact (ECLAC 2009). And cutting across such geospatial and economic networks are linguistic communities: Anglophone, Francophone, Dutch and Spanish, along with several creoles.

However, while a few analysts have recognised such diversity in the formal political economy extending to the diasporic, few have extended their analysis to the informal and illegal. Thus, arguably, just two chapters out of the thirty seven in the encyclopaedic reader on the Caribbean Economy by Dennis Pantin (2005) treat levels of interaction/integration (#14 by Norman Girvan) or diasporas/remittances (#29 by Wendell Samuel). This chapter seeks to go beyond such orthodoxies, given the spill-over from the informal and illegal especially in a period of global economic turmoil and divergence, and given the transnational role of such “Caribbean” cities as Miami, Montreal, New York City and Toronto.

The new regionalism(s) perspective (Shaw, Grant and Cornelissen, 2012) has itself generated a debate about the informal and illegal, with earlier and more formal analyses at the end of the last century tending to exclude these even in its framework of new regionalism (singular!) (Hettne and Inotai, 1994; Hettne, et al., 1999). Here, however, I take the informal and illegal to be inseparable from the formal and legal in terms of definitions and implications of Caribbean relations in the second decade of the twenty-first century (Shaw, 2011).

Symbolic of the contrast between the formal and informal, the legal and illegal is the irony of de facto free trade in drugs and guns by contrast to myriad de jure restrictions on trade in legitimate goods. So the CARICOM Single Market and Economy has been largely stillborn whereas, despite the efforts of the uniformed services, organised crime flourishes. Similarly, informal-sector traders – ubiquitous “higglers” – circumvent myriad obstacles even when regular supply chains cannot. And private security companies (local and global, legal and otherwise) are increasingly substituting for ineffective official police.

The borderline between legal and illegal, formal and informal, is of great importance in the Caribbean, given the fine line that link between, say, offshore banking and money laundering (Vlcek, 2008), jewellery and property development. This has resulted in Hence the evolution of international efforts at regulation, from the OECD Harmful Tax
Competition Report, to the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (www.fatf-gafi.org) including its Caribbean office (CFATF) established in Trinidad and Tobago in the early-1990s (www.cfatf-gafic.org), and the creation of Tax Information Exchange Agreements. And now the Obama Administration and global financial crisis have led to the establishment of a Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information to monitor or peer review these processes. Moreover, there is a rich variety of island jurisdictions, both independent and otherwise, from Jersey and Mauritius to Barbados, Bermuda, the British and American Virgin Islands, the Caymans, and Trinidad and Tobago (Cooper and Shaw, 2013). Due to the monitoring governmental and non-governmental systems as well as the multiple procedures we have the imperative of forms of compliance by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Non-independent overseas territories (OTs), like other small island developing states (SIDS), seek to minimise vulnerability and maximise resilience (Bishop, 2013) to reinforce their transnational identities and roles. In parallel to small states in Central Asia and Central Europe, they have continued to proliferate in numbers, most recently the Dutch Antilles splitting into three: two “autonomous countries” in the Netherlands – Curacao and St Maarten – and a trio remaining “special municipalities” of the Netherlands: Bonaire, Saba and St Eustatius on 10 October 2010. The diplomatic status of old and new OTs – formal intergovernmental rather than informal transnational – is problematic, but some of them do have associate status in regional or hemispheric networks like the ACS and/or the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), as well as in some Anglophone Commonwealth institutions like the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Commonwealth Games (Shaw, 2013).

Some of the diversity of the Caribbean can be captured in several sets of contemporary regional indicators, from GDP per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI), to competitiveness and homicide rates, all impacted by transnational relationships. Here I concentrate on the seven most developed countries identified by the CDCC of ECLAC (www.eclac.org/portofspain): the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago; this sub-branch of ECLAC includes nine “associated states” from among which the overseas countries and territories are drawn from the British, Dutch and US islands, several of which play important communications and financial roles, both legal and otherwise.

Per capita purchasing power parity incomes in the Caribbean strand at USD 23,507 for Trinidad and Tobago, to USD 1,155 for Haiti, through Barbados at USD 17,966, Suriname at USD 7,813, Cuba at USD 6,876, the Dominican Republic at USD 6,706, Jamaica at USD 6,079 and for Guyana at USD 2,782. The region likewise is mid-rank along the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (out of 133 countries ranked) (www.weforum.org): Puerto Rico at #42 and Barbados at #44 lead, with Suriname (#102) and Guyana (#104) trailing; in midfield, Trinidad and Tobago is #86, Jamaica #91 and the Dominican Republic is #95. The region scores quite well in terms of the UNDP HDI in 2009, being concentrated in the high and medium human development categories: from Barbados being the only one categorised as very high at #37 out of 182; otherwise the range is Antigua and Barbuda at #47 to Haiti at #149, with Cuba at #51, Trinidad and Tobago #64, Suriname at #97, Jamaica at #100 and Guyana at #114 (http://hdr.undp.org).
In terms of homicide rates, however, the region presents impressive statistics, with Jamaica’s 59.5 per 100 000 in 2008 (Harriott, 2003) being just below the highest one from Honduras at 60.9, while Trinidad and Tobago at 39.7 (UNODC 2010b: 27 and 237) beats out Columbia at 38.8; St Kitts at 35.32 just trails South Africa’s 36.5. Other high rates are reported for Anguilla at 27.6, the Dominican Republic at 21.5 and Puerto Rico at 20.4, with the lowest levels coming from the Bahamas at 13.7 and Barbados at 8.7; the US’ rate is 5.2 per 100 000 population (www.unodc.org).

Symptomatic of the transnational Caribbean in the North was a major police raid in Toronto in May 2010 by a thousand police officers, leading to the arrest of some eighty alleged members of the Jamaican “Shower Posse” gang or network, ahead of the month-long “battle” around Tivoli Gardens in West Kingston for the arrest and extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke. He was eventually captured and extradited to the US before the end of June 2010.

b. Transnational Families

The creation of Caribbean transnational networks rests on the foundation of a transnational family, in which migrants and their families have multiple home bases with ongoing commitments and loyalties that straddle territorial boundaries (Wiltshire, 2006: 175).

Contemporary historical migration has been very uneven throughout the Caribbean (Reis, 2004; Thomas-Hope, 2009). Most significant recent outflows came from Guyana and Jamaica to North America, and from Suriname to the Netherlands (some 200 000-250 000 are now in the Dutch diaspora, versus 450 000 at home). Such transnational communities/cultures are captured in “Forward Home”, a 2011 research-informed film produced by Keith Nurse (www.shridathramphalcentre.org) facilitated by the International Development Research Centre in Canada (www.idrc.ca) and premiered at the Toronto International Film Festival in September 2011. Both nexuses of transnational families/cultures, and remittances/crime constitutes relatively novel sets of relationships, which analysts have only recently discovered; hence the dynamic of Caribbean and development studies at the turn of the decade.

There are estimated to be as many Guyanese people in the US – especially in New York City – and Canada, particularly Scarborough, Ontario, as there are at home: approximately 700 000 each. Their presence, along with technological changes, has led to a dramatic rise in communications, such as phone conversations – especially using mobiles and phone cards – and airline flights, with remittances growing from USD 20 million in 2000 to USD 200 million mid-decade. Guyana’s reliance on remittances is highest in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries, even higher than Haiti a quarter of GDP. Similarly for Jamaica: some one million abroad and less than three million at home, with remittances totalling two billion dollars in the mid-2000s, some 20 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2008). For example, in 2007, per capita remittance flows were highest to Jamaica
(USD 790) and lowest to Trinidad and Tobago (USD 69); Grenada received USD 524 per person; Guyana USD 377; and Suriname USD 305 (UNDP 2009: 160). Thus Western Union, MoneyGram and Grace Kennedy have become ubiquitous in diasporic communities in the North and in capital cities in the South, even if remittance flows have been under pressure particularly from the US because of the financial crisis at the turn of the decade.

Remittances to LAC grew throughout almost all of the first decade of the twenty-first century, but peaked in 2006-2008, declining in 2009 back to 2005 levels as a reflection of the knock-on effects of the global financial crisis, particularly in the trans-Atlantic centres of the US and the UK. However, when inflation is factored in, remittances in local currencies may have actually increased in 2009.

Transnational Caribbean families can be considered symptomatic of the evolution of transnational civil society focussed on the region, facilitating the flows of communications, ideas, events, fashions, technologies and so on (Scher, 2009).

c. Transnational Civil Society

The Caribbean is a unique and complex concatenation of virtually every ethnic group in the world ... Far more interesting than the individual contributions of the various groups constituting the contemporary Caribbean is the process whereby their socio-political traits have been amalgamated and Eurocentric dominance has been mitigated. The region has truly been a crucible of various cultures. This blending, not only of institutions but also of ethnicity, has produced the uniquely Caribbean Creoles (Hillman, 2009: 11 and 12).

The digital revolution has transformed both the political economy and social culture of the Caribbean, especially a trio of “transformative processes: the introduction of cellular telephones, the adoption of the Internet, and the proliferation of offshore gambling sites” (Bronfman 2007: 12); on the latter, see Andrew Cooper (2011) on the rise and fall of Internet gambling offshore in Antigua, which the WTO has been unable to contain, under bilateral US pressure.

Given contemporary communications, especially the mobile phone revolution, diasporas can make powerful demands about development and democracy back home: “This may lead to a foreign policy impact in the North (see section (f) below) An aspect of “double” “public diplomacy”: both inside and about the Caribbean (see also (f) below), is symbolised by the last months in office of Michaëlle Jean (who was a celebrity diplomat for her native Haiti after its early-2010 earthquake) as Governor General in Canada, leading to her post-retirement appointment as a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Ambassador. Note also the proliferation of hometown associations, most active when natural disasters hit home, as in diasporic responses to the earthquake in Haiti in early 2010.
Without being too parochial or sentimental, we should recognise, even as we debate, the centrality of the federal University of the West Indies (UWI) in keeping the foundation of CARICOM intact and reinforced, even if increasingly virtually, via the Open Campus and so on (www.uwi.edu). This is apparent in numerous UWI-CARICOM functional relations, symbolised by the CARICOM-UWI project on regional development (Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 2010) which built on established Caribbean intellectual accomplishments and histories (Girvan, 2006; Meeks and Girvan, 2010). There are also myriad art forms and carnivals over centuries (Mohammed, 2009) now circulated through the digital revolution. Just as transnational Caribbean civil society has well-established historical roots, so too the region’s supply chains go back centuries, including the flow of forced as well as free people.

d. Transnational Supply Chains

*The circulation of commodities is one of the unifying aspects of Caribbean history. All islands are shaped by things that circulate, and more so in the recent past, when aspects of globalisation have made it easier for things to circulate at greater quantities and greater speed (Bronfman, 2007: 5).*

Supply chains around the region have evolved from barrels to containers and airfreight/couriers using cell phones and tracking devices, so each brands’ hubs apparent, plus personal post-boxes, are bought in Miami to be used as offshore addresses; i.e. from banana boats and cable and wireless, to Flow and B-Mobile Internet provision, DHL/FedEx/UPS courier services and so on. And Copa Airlines is now a member of the Star Alliance, so Panama is an Alliance as well as Copa hub.

Regional and global hubs rise and fall around older and newer supply chains (Gibbon et al., 2010), impacted by technological, infrastructural as well as security developments (e.g. the expansion of the Panama Canal and container ports or Copa as well as Caribbean Airlines): these include emerging economies versus emerging powers as well as emerging cities.

As Bronfman (2007) and others indicate, the region has “advanced” from spices to drugs, cutlasses to guns, pirates to gangs, and gunpowder to AK47s, depending on supply and demand, regulations and enforcement, and onto novel forms of supply chains given the “other” side of globalisation, including intellectual property violations via pirated CDs and apps and so on (Naim, 2006). Conversely, extra-territorial EU and US rules tend to impact goods and services (Gibbon et al., 2010), compounded by diasporic demands/expectations in the North. But the current global crisis has also exposed the challenges of economic/corporate governance in the region, given the pressures of liberalisation and competition new forms of effective transnational governance are needed to restore financial confidence, as treated in (f) below.
e. Transnational Crime Networks

Illicit flows of all kinds have been part of the Caribbean’s history. Goods have circulated to the region, from the region, and through the region (Bronfman 2007: 8).

Jamaica occupies a unique place in the history of illicit flows because both marijuana and cocaine move in and out of the island (Bronfman, 2007: 12).

As already noted, Caribbean crime has evolved from spices to drugs, cutlasses to guns, gunpowder to AK47s, and from pirates to drug lords (UNODC, 2010b). In turn, it has encouraged the parallel, albeit belated, development of analysis and policy at the turn of the century (Barley and Walker, 1994; Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1997; Friman and Andreas, 1999; Friman, 2009; Madsen, 2009). In response, policy discussions have generated intergovernmental institutions like the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (www.caricomimpacs.org), and professional networks like the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (www.accpolice.org) and the Caribbean Association of Judicial Officers (www.thecajo.org).

Given the failures, even counter-productiveness, of the so-called “war on drugs”, eminent Latin Americans established and advocated a Commission on Drugs and Democracy which called for a “paradigm shift” in February 2009 (www.droga2democracia.org); this escalated into a Global Commission on Drug Policy with the Igarape Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the Transnational Institute and other civil society/think tank partners (www.globalcommissionondrugs.com) In turn, as supply routes migrated from Central America and the Caribbean to West Africa, the Kofi Annan Foundation created a West African Commission (www.wacommissionondrugs.com).

The value of drugs increases the further they are away from production, where their value is low; their value multiplies two hundred times between production and retail levels, especially when they move from South to North. So, although the Caribbean may be of decreasing importance in global supply chains, the value of the global drugs trade is still greater than 90 per cent of the word’s national GDP (UNODC, 2010a and b), hence the spread of narco-states or shadow states into the Caribbean with their distinctive state-economy balances (Friman and Andreas, 1999; Naim, 2006; Naylor, 2005); among the region’s political economies so identified recently are the Eastern Caribbean, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Puerto Rico. Legal remittances and illegal money laundering (Naylor, 2005) have together attracted G8 and OECD attention, leading to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (UNODC, 2010a; Vlcek, 2008).

Meanwhile, as confidence in state security organisations declines, the private security sector has expanded and diversified, both nationally (e.g. guardsman in Jamaica and the northern Caribbean (www.guardsmangroup.com), and globally (e.g. G4S (www.g4s.com): but by whom or how are they regulated? The early-2011 Montreux Document, which proposes a code of conduct for private security companies, offers one such framework, and many agencies have signed up (www.eda.admin.ch/psc).

Together, these underline the imperative of informed, flexible transnational and/or global governance responses to burgeoning transnational relations (Harman and Williams, 2013; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2013), formal/legal as well as informal-illegal.

f. Transnational Governance

While private authority beyond the state has become a popular theme of academic writing, the role of stakeholders in the Southern hemisphere as objects and subjects of private transnational governance has rarely been addressed in the literature (Dingwerth, 2008: 607).

“Transnational studies” (Khagram and Levitt, 2007) have begun to juxtapose or situate several disciplines, genres or strands: capital, civil society, class, consumption, culture, informal sectors including drugs/guns, logistics, migration/diasporas/remittances, sports, supply chains, and so on. A central subfield can be identified as “transnational governance” (Held and Hale, 2011) which can be considered a generic set of responses to novel and emerging “global” issues. Given its characteristic inclusion of non-state actors, it is also referred to as “private transnational governance” (Dingwerth, 2008), “non-state transnational transfers” (Brown, 2009 and 2012) or “non-state market-driven” governance (Bernstein and Cashore, 2008). It is usually “hybrid” in character, typically involving a changing range of heterogeneous actors, non-state as well as state, acting in partnerships as in the classic International Campaign to Ban Landmines leading to the “Ottawa Process” on landmines. The rich variety of such alliances, campaigns, certification schemes, codes, commissions, councils, initiatives, networks, partnerships and processes and so on are captured in tables in Dingwerth (2008: 628-630) and Bernstein and Cashore (2008: 281-283).

Such transnational or “global governance” can be treated as an extension or contemporary form of established international law/organisation, which remains primarily, even exclusively, intergovernmental. These have evolved from the Ottawa and Kimberley Processes through Forestry and Fisheries Certification Schemes to Ethical Trade and EITI “initiatives” (Bernstein and Cashore 2008, Dingwerth, 2008). Thus, the rather traditional Law of the Sea (LoS) /SIDS the Alliance of Small Island States at independence in the 1970s have been superseded by myriad Caribbean/global concerns, including climate change in twenty-first century: will these lead to forestry and fisheries certification schemes along with EITIs in the second decade of the new century?
Contemporary public or network diplomacy (cf. part (c) above) has been adopted by SIDS to maximise leverage internationally using non-state partners such as private sectors and civil society, media and culture. Thus, diasporas can impact both home and host policies; hence their transnational leverage. As already noted, SIDS were very active around independence in LoS negotiations, albeit largely inter-state in character, but then went quiet as the bipolar context yielded to multipolarity, until the contemporary era of climate change when again engaged, but this time with non-state allies from INGOs to diasporas (www.acs-aec.org, Shaw, 2010a).

New governance networks are being developed in service sectors like finance, telecommunications and tourisms. The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce advances such private innovation (cf. Iheduru, 2012, on the private sector in the Economic Community Of West African States). But tourisms and other services are also very transnational: such varieties include business, diasporic, ecological, medical, sports activities.

And Hale and Held (2011: 25), reflecting on their fifty-plus case studies, echo Dingwerth by noting the “governance gap” between North and South:

While many of the programmes rely on Southern participation and serve the interests of Southern stakeholders, almost none of the innovations in transnational governance gathered here have been led by Southern actors. Instead, institutional innovation has been led by Northern states, NGOs, corporations and international organizations.

Moreover, the Caribbean is also active in inter-regionalisms, often as the “junior” partner, such as the not-uncontroversial CARIFORUM- Economic Partnership Agreement, but also in links with Mercosur, the Organization of American States (Herz, 2010), and now the Union of South American Nations in the hemisphere (Mace, et al., 2010) and with the African Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Gaens, 2008) outside the hemisphere (De Lombaerde and Schulz, 2009).

The Transnational and Development: beyond the Caribbean

World politics is changing but our conceptual paradigms have not kept pace (Keohane and Nye, 1971).

This lament of Keohane and Nye of four decades ago is ever truer today, about the deficiencies in approaches to development, as well as to the regional and transnational, as has been reinforced by Dingwerth (2008) and Hale and Held (2011). Hopefully, novel comparative case studies assembled by Harman and Williams (2013) and Weiss and Wilkinson (2013) will serve as correctives?

So, in conclusion, lessons may be derived from, as well as for, the transnational – i.e. heterogeneous relations among the trans-/inter-/intra-national. Given the changes in
state-civil society/private sector relations – leading towards innovative forms of hybrid governance via a variety of analytic perspectives, along with their policy implications, we will see complex new forms of governance. In addition to new regionalisms such as: development studies – the proliferation of issues and actors, especially around “Asian drivers” like China and India; environmental studies – especially climate change, ocean rise and species depletion, plus the challenges of complexities; global governance/multilateralisms, we might see varieties of actors and interests, especially in “soft” law arenas like fisheries and forest certification; global studies – going beyond inter- and non-governmental, even the transnational, towards global structures (www.theglobalsite.ac.uk). This is reflected increasingly in academic programmes, publications, appointments and associations (www.globalstudiesassociation.org; www.globalstudiesfoundation.org), including the new global governance PhD at the University of Massachusetts; migration/diasporas/remittances nexus – looking beyond the movement of people to diasporic communities and cultures, especially remittance flows and novel forms of communications, from phone cards and texting (Bronfman, 2007: 86-107) to financial and technological flows and FDI along with drugs and guns; regionalisms, old and new. These are evolving balance between old and new given post-neoliberal world and proliferating micro-, meso- and macro-level responses to uneven globalisation and so on; security studies – threats to national, human and now citizen security from “old” and “new” factors such as climate change and gang culture (Bronfman 2007: 63-85). The kaleidoscope of Caribbeans, both contemporary and historical, that advance and reinforce notions of varieties of capitalisms and civil societies, as well as the plurality of regionalisms. It continues to inform debates about the compatibility or competitiveness of such formal and informal, more macro- and more micro-regionalisms: what will the futures for the Caribbean and for the transnational be by the end of this decade?

Just as we may identify several Caribbeans, so we may abstract several futures over their second half-century, particularly along the vulnerable and resilient divide (Cooper and Shaw, 2013). But this dialectic becomes more problematic or complicated when more informal and illegal transnational relations are incorporated, with diasporas and remittances becoming increasingly salient. Nevertheless, clearly only a minority of political economies are likely to achieve “developmental” status. And the majority will have their prospects largely determined by a mix of regional, global and transnational fortunes, increasingly impacted by climate change.

So, what are the regional balances among macro-, meso- and/or micro-levels, in part a function of the balance between the more transnational versus the more trans- or inter-governmental, and the more formal versus more informal? And whither cycles in the global economy, including balances among sectors, are exacerbated by continuing global crises and rebalancing?

Developmental and democratic deficits will persist through post-2015, moderated by ubiquitous connectivity facilitating continuous transnational communication. And by 2020, if not before, Caribbean relations with the BRICS will come to balance, if not exceed, those with the North Atlantic rim, accelerated by the current crisis, which is advancing divergence. And for much of the Caribbean, will such relations be more formal with China.
and Russia, and more informal/diasporic with Brazil, India and South Africa? I conclude by echoing Girvan (2005: 315):

*If the Caribbean was an invention of the 20th century, it seems certain to be reinterpreted and perhaps transcended in the 21st. The Caribbean of tomorrow will not be an exclusively Anglophone or Hispanic conception; and it will not be tied exclusively to geographic space or definition. If it survives at all, it will be a community of shared economic, social and political interests and strategies that encompasses different languages and cultures and the Caribbean Diaspora.*
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*This chapter is based on but has a different emphasis from (2013) “Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean after a Half-century of Independence: insights from transnational and regional perspectives”, Contemporary Politics, 19(3): 293-303.*
Chapter 2
The Development of Grassroots NGOs in China: Progress, Challenges and Dilemmas

Hongbing Chen, Xing Li, Chunfang Zhou

Introduction

Building and nurturing the development of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) is an important issue in social governance. To recognise and analyse the problems related to the construction and development of NGOs in China, one needs to particularly consider both the practical and the theoretical contexts behind the national project of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.

Because of different cultural traditions and language expressions, the term “nongovernmental organisation” connotes a variety of expressions, such as “social organisations”, “non-enterprise units”, “civil organisations”, “non-profit organisations”, and the “third sector”, among others. These terminologies have been discussed in both formal and informal contexts in many previous studies. There is no Chinese term that is able to accurately express the meaning of the internationally-applied term “NGOs”. Since China’s reform and opening-up, the term “civil organisation” is put forward and is used in connection with the reform of the administrative system. This is a unique term which is embedded with Chinese characteristics.

The New China, which was established in 1949, implemented a system of planned economy, and developed a highly-centralised administrative system. However, since 1978, China has begun to practice a policy of reform and opening-up, and to gradually reform its centralised administrative system.

In 1988, China’s State Council approved some reforms within the Ministry of Civil Affairs in which the Bureau of Civil Organisation was translated into English as the “Bureau of NGO Management”. This implies that the “civil organisation” in the name was, in China, interpreted to be the equivalent of the internationally-applied term “NGOs” (Wang and Liu, 2004). After the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP’s) National Congress, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which governs the affairs of civil organisations, began to employ the term “social organisation” to replace that of “civil organisation” (Huang and Cai, 2008).

In the past three decades, China has conducted six reforms of its centralised administrative system. These reforms were implemented in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. Among them, the Second Plenary Session of 17th CCP National Congress held in February in 2008 discussed and approved the “Opinions on the Deepening the Reform

1 The “Opinion” is one kind of policy document issued by China’s central and local governments at various levels.
of Administrative System” and the “Program of the State Council’s Institutional Reform” (Translation, Chinese government document). The latter document clearly stated that one of three priorities of the institutional reform was to focus on protecting and improving people’s livelihoods, and strengthening social governance and public services. Through the six administrative system reforms, the government has increased their ability to fulfilling such functions as social governance and public service (Wang, 2009).

In February 2011, former Chinese President Hu Jintao pointed out that China needed to “improve the social governance pattern characterised by the leadership of Party Committee, the government’s responsibility, social coordination, and public participation” (Translation, his address to provincial officials, February 19, 2011). The political thoughts of Hu Jintao facilitated a new style of social governance and management in China. With the gradual deepening of the administrative system’s reform, the role of the government has been changing from a management type of government to a service one. On 14 March 2013, the Chinese State Council issued an important plan – the “Program of Institutional Reform and the Functional Transformation of Agencies of the State Council” (Translation, Chinese government document). This reform programme has brought about a historic opportunity for the development of social organisations. As the ruling paradigm shifted the main body of government administration from a single mode to a diversified mode of public governance, the management concepts and patterns of civil society organisations were faced with many adjustments and changes. In order to analyse and understand the issues of the construction and development of grassroots NGOs in China, the premise of the macroscopic characteristics of Chinese contemporary society cannot be ignored.

In order to keep consistent with the thematic terminology of this book, the authors apply the term “NGO”, rather than “civil organisation” or “social organisation” in this chapter.

The Objectives of the Chapter

What is a grassroots organisation? And how do we conceptualise this emerging social phenomenon? According to Wang, Ming and Liu (2004), NGOs in China can be categorized by different classification standards. Among the different standards, legal status is the most important classification basis for NGOs. Taking this as the basis of classification, NGOs in China can be divided into legal NGOs, grassroots NGOs, and quasi-NGOs.

Grassroots NGOs is a category of NGOs which does not have a legal status in line with current laws and regulations, but they possess several basic characteristics of NGOs in terms of autonomy, voluntary work, non-profit status, and a lack of government involvement. Most of them were spontaneously established from the bottom, and they cannot get permission to be registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and therefore they do not qualify according to the core characteristics of legal NGOs (Wang and Liu, 2004).

Grassroots NGOs have a variety of organisational forms, and the most common one is that they are a kind of social organisation or second tier organisation that is affiliated to public institutions, and that they still need to perform the necessary registration pro-
cedures. Therefore, they attain the status of legitimacy but, strictly speaking, they are not independent legal bodies and do not have the legal right to carry out activities as independent legal entities.

Another of their forms is that of a kind of organisation registered as having an affiliation with Industrial and Commercial Administrative Departments, and is therefore able to attain an independent legal status. They carry out various charitable activities, and need to be registered with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in order to apply for tax deductions. In addition, there are many non-registered NGOs, such as community public welfare organisations, rural grassroots mutual-beneficial non-profit organisations, etc. These various grassroots NGOs are not under the protection of current laws, regulations, and policies when they accept donations and carry out activities.

Because Chinese society is in a transition period, the actual data of grassroots NGOs are not in complete conformity with the data registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Due to the lack of statistical data in the existing literature, this chapter is not able to provide the exact number of grassroots organisations in China.

With the encouragement of the Chinese government in the past decade, NGOs have been developing rapidly. The sharply increasing number of NGOs has brought both positive and negative impacts to both state and society. Meanwhile, the number has also drawn more and more public concern.

In the nexus between internal modernisation and external globalisation, grassroots NGOs have more opportunities to enlarge their manoeuvring space, while at the same time their roles need to be further developed. In line with the rapid emergence of social issues brought about by China’s reform and marketisation process, the development of grassroots NGOs has important significance and relevance in current China. These social issues cover a whole range of areas: aging society, the needs for social assistance of vulnerable groups caused by inequality as a result of the marketisation process, environmental protection, social emergency rescue from natural disasters, and the transformation of government functions in the process of adapting to the market economy and market society, etc.

At present, China is in a period of social transition in which the reform is moving into “deep water” areas. Grassroots NGOs have played many significant roles in promoting social development, and they have carried out a number of functions in a number of areas, such as social assistance, social justice, human rights protection, environmental protection, and the neutralisation of social contradictions, etc. Therefore, grassroots NGOs are an indispensable social force in contemporary China. However, the development of grassroots NGOs in China is facing challenges and dilemmas.
The Legitimacy and Identity Dilemma of Grassroots NGOs

As well as sharing the usual meaning of the English word “legitimacy”, in Chinese the word also has the connotation of legality. This implies that Chinese grassroots NGOs suffer legitimacy problems that are associated with the issues of legality.

Whether grassroots NGOs are legal or not is directly related to their survival and development. If NGOs want to obtain legal status, they need to apply for official registration and get the official approval of the government. The relevant laws issued by the state include the Social Organization Registers Management Regulations (SORMR), the Civilian-run Non-enterprise Units of the Interim Regulations on Registration and Management (CNUIRRM), and the Fund Management Regulations (FMR). The Chinese government has implemented a dual management system of NGOs since China’s State Council issued and implemented the laws, statutes and illustrations on their development and management (SORMR and CNUIRRM) on 25 October 1998. This kind of dual management system of NGOs in China is changing, due to the programme of institutional reform and functional transformation of agencies that China’s State Council issued last year. This document stipulates that NGOs (“social organisations” are usually used as the conception of NGOS in Chinese official document) can apply for registration directly to departments of Civil Affair in accordance with the law.

According to the current regulations (such as the SORMR, CNUIRRM, and FMR), the NGO management system in China can be divided into three categories 1) “under centralised registration” 2) “dual responsibility”, and 3) hierarchical management. Under centralised registration refers to the fact that, besides the specific cases stipulated explicitly by the laws and regulations, under normal circumstances NGOs should be registered with the state’s Civil Affairs Department. If any of them are registered by other departments, the registration will be considered to be invalid. Dual accountability means that NGOs are managed and supervise by both the registration administration organs and the competent authorities for the business. Hierarchical management refers to the different levels of NGOs which are managed by different levels of government in China. The registration administration organs of the State Council and the competent authorities for the business are responsible for the management and supervision of NGOs at the national level; the local registration authorities at various levels and the corresponding business units are responsible for the management and supervision of NGOs at the local level.

In other words, the NGO management system in China indicates that law enforcement is involved in nearly all aspects of NGOs, including the setting up of organisations, organising daily activities and as well as clamping down on illegal NGOs. Theoretically, this management system should be able to hold back or effectively resolve the legality problems of NGOs. However, the practical situation is a different case. If the national laws and regulations were strictly implemented, this would require a very large management system, together with a budget, in order to truly realise the effective supervision and management of NGOs.

In addition, the shortage of manpower is one of the important problems in the manage-
ment of NGOs. According to a survey on development of NGOs in China (Huang and Cai, 2008), there are a lot of issues about management of NGOs, such as the low efficiency of the registration administration organs, the strict requirements for registration, and the difficulties in cooperating with business units, etc. The dual management system causes many grassroots NGOs without government backgrounds to fail to register with the Civil Affairs Department, because they cannot find the business units. Some of them have to choose industrial and commercial registration.

Meanwhile, the high threshold for registration nearly deprives grassroots NGOs from most of the possibilities of gaining legal status. For example, according to the SORMR, if NGOs (social organisations) are to be granted legal status, they must have a fixed residence, a number of full-time staff, and plenty of activity capital (at least CNY 30,000 for local level NGOs, or more than CNY 100,000 for national-level ones). These conditions are part of the barriers for NGOs to obtain legal status. For example, in spite of much effort, Shenyang Youth Volunteers failed to get their official registration in the early years of its attempts. Due to its illegal status, this organisation had difficulty in getting the approval of the government when it undertook some projects (Li, 2009). Li (2009) carried out an investigation of thirty-five AIDS grassroots NGOs. The results demonstrated some common characteristics of grassroots NGOs, including most of the AIDS organisations are not registered legally and officially, and some of them choose industrial and commercial registration as their identity, while others choose civil registration.

Moreover, the lack of human resources in registration and management spurred the illegal survival of NGOs. For example, in the registration management agency within nineteen districts in Shanghai, there are only just over sixty members of staff who are responsible for the management of 6,279 NGOs, so each staff member would have to deal with the management of more than a hundred nongovernmental organisations. As a result, the management authority engages in fostering NGOs’ development, but fails to take care of the supervision and administration of NGOs. It is beyond its capacity to cover both the development/enlargement and the management of NGOs simultaneously (Wang and Liu, 2004).

The lack of human resources causes the problem that the ability of government managing NGOs cannot meet the needs of development of NGOs in China. This causes situation of laissez-faire in relation to problems such as registration, management and supervision. And this further causes the illegal survival of the NGOs. Due to the limitation of manpower, material, and financial resources, the registration administration authority has to allow the existence of lots of illegal NGOs. Those NGOs which have not been officially registered cannot be supervised or managed in accordance with the requirements of the regulations (Bai, 2005).

The establishment and existence of grassroots NGOs is a product that intends to meet the needs of society, especially in an era of great social and economic transformations. They are the result of social necessities that have been accepted by society. Thus, from this sense, they have the basis for social legitimacy. As some grassroots NGOs are illegal due to a lack of having gone through the legal registration procedure, they have no le-
legal status to operate activities as independent legal entities in accordance with official regulations. As a consequence, grassroots NGOs often fall into the dichotomy of standing between legality and illegality.

The illegal status of grassroots NGOs results in the predicament in which they cannot be controlled or be protected by the regulations in the course of their operation. Neither can they receive various forms of donations and financial support. For that reason, grassroots NGOs often face the dilemma between for-profit and non-profit. Grassroots NGOs are autotrophic organisations and finance is the key to their existence and development. Because of their illegal status, it is often hard for them to get formal social donations and government financial support; they can only rely on the market when seeking resources. Thus, some of them are forced to turn themselves into virtually economic organisations with the purpose of profitability and marketability, leading to a deviation from the original purposes of their establishment.

The illegal status of some grassroots NGOs also leads to further problems. Their illegal status isolates them from taking advantage of opportunities for equal competition for resources. This is one of the barriers to free, fair, and open competition between NGOs.

Another problem caused by the issue of illegality is the contradiction between the current registration system and the spirit of the civil right of association. The nature of the current regulations that requires restrictive licensing and professional certification could be interpreted as a restriction of citizens’ freedom and civil rights of association, which deviates from the principles and spirit of the Chinese constitution, and weakens the foundation of developing China into a law-based society. The system of dual management in China is a typical license registration that is based on the excuse that the applicant is seen as too immature to carry out the project. There are close relationships between the law environment of generation of NGOs and the practice of development of NGOs in China. This can be clearly indicated by the changes of numbers of NGOs influenced by several times of changes of laws in relation to management of NGOs. The point that the regulatory model of the management system is a barrier to the good development of NGOs has been well evidenced by the coincidences between the change of numbers of NGOs and the adjustment of regulations. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there were three significant adjustments of the regulations for NGOs (1951, 1989, 1998) (Wang, 2007). It is clear that, after each new regulation was issued, the number of NGOs that were legally registered decreased rapidly in a short time. Therefore, the development of grassroots NGOs requires the future improvement of the current regulatory model of the management system that has impeded the healthy development of NGOs.

**The Financial Dilemmas of Grassroots NGOs**

Financial support is one of the basic conditions for grassroots NGOs to operate their activities. According to the results of three large-scale surveys carried out by Tsinghua University (1999, 2001 and 2004), the most prominent problem for almost all NGOs is the funding shortage. In other words, the funding shortage is seen as a bottleneck, restricting the development of NGOs in China (Huang and Cai, 2008).
Even taking the example of grassroots NGOs in Shanghai which have relatively good financial statuses, there are still about one-third of the organisations that are only able to pay the salaries of their staff and cover office rental and related expenses, but which have little money to develop programmes or carry out projects. Moreover, for those illegal organisations, the shortage of fund becomes more serious and leads to a lack of office space, making them incapable of carrying out daily activities. Because of the lack of funds, many grassroots NGOs suffer from a survival dilemma.

However, there are many reasons for the lack of funds of grassroots NGOs. Firstly, NGOs’ source of income relies on few channels; most NGOs have no access to diversified funding channels. Some NGOs’ revenue sources mainly rely on the very limited fiscal appropriation and the allowance provided by the government. And some other NGOs which are civilian-based non-enterprises mainly depend on their own business income and the fiscal appropriation provided by the government. External donations are also quite limited. Secondly, the capability of NGOs to provide services and earn income themselves is relatively low. Thirdly, there is not a strong social charity ethos and tradition in current China, so revenue from social donations is relatively limited. Moreover, most social donations mainly centre on a small number of foundations.

Furthermore, one of the consequences directly caused by illegality is that grassroots NGOs have no access to official support from tax policies, financial policies, and other benefits. Due to the little amount of attention paid to, and little effort made to promoting grassroots NGOs by public and mass media, the lack of understanding of grassroots NGOs further leads to a lack of public credibility, voluntary assistance, channels of funds, and social donations. In fact, society is not reluctant to contribute donations to grassroots organisations. However, the problem of illegality has increased general concerns and reduced confidence in or passion for social donations.

Consequently, grassroots NGOs have to seek foreign donations to improve the situation of their lacking funds. Once grassroots NGOs excessively rely on foreign capital, they will likely lose their independence and become an instrument for foreign powers, which can be seen as a threat to national security by the Chinese state. It means that if more and more grassroots NGOs prefer overseas funds and keep close relationships with NGOs from other countries, it can be calculated that external forces will attempt to penetrate their interventions via these NGOs. This will further endangers the security of the state and the healthy development of Chinese society and leads to the loss of interest of the state in the sphere of NGOs (Wu, 2010).

Thus, for most NGOs in China, a lack of funding is the barrier to the development of “public space” in China, i.e. the ability to participate in social management and the provision of social services. Such status quo has been directly exemplified by the small scale of revenue for social services to meet the needs of society.

The emergence of NGOs is an outcome of societal development, and their ability to participate in social management and to provide social services are the keys to gaining social acceptance, social funding, and social status. Due to the shortage of funding, NGOs are
confronted with constraints to providing social services at a high level, and thereby this may further weaken their livelihood from social funding support, without which it is difficult to launch projects or activities. Facing the dilemma of a vicious circle, grassroots NGOs have more and more difficulties in meeting increasing social needs. Such a vicious circle will lead grassroots NGOs into the dilemma between the shortage of economic resources and the objective of their sustainable development.

The Internal Weakness Dilemmas of Grassroots NGOs

Compared with NGOs in Western countries, NGOs in China have weaknesses, such as a lack of funding, the quality of staff, operational ideas, information sources, mobilisation abilities, and so on. Their internal weaknesses are also a main component of the dilemmas.

Firstly, the low quality of human resources is a general phenomenon in most grassroots NGOs in China. According to A Report on Civil Organizations in Shanghai (Zheng, 2008), the overall situation of NGOs in Shanghai has the following hurdles: aging staff and a lack of attractiveness to highly-educated and high-quality talents. Regarding the age condition, more than 50% of staff (both full-time and part-time) are older than fifty years of age. At present, the main workforce of NGOs is the elderly retiree, and this indicates the problems of an aging staff. Regarding the education level of staff, the top three levels are college degrees (22.33%), high school and technical secondary school degrees (30.68%), and bachelor’s degrees (22.33%). Staff with master’s degrees or those of higher levels only account for 2.02%.

The low education level of staff is closely connected with the weak capability of grassroots NGOs. This has also led to weaknesses in the selection of projects, the operation of ideas, and the mobilisation of resources. Thus, NGOs are unable to provide the expected quality of service and to effectively contribute to society, due to their low credibility connected with human resources. In turn, these kinds of conditions are able to restrict the further development of nongovernmental organisations that lead to the low attractiveness of grassroots NGOs to high-quality talents.

The reasons for the low qualitative level of the workforce in grassroots NGOs are quite complicated in China. They are partly related to social and economic development and the levels of social cognition, and are partly influenced by policies and the attractiveness of grassroots NGOs.

Secondly, grassroots NGOs in China have weaknesses in operation mechanisms. These factors, such as the insufficient financial resources and the lack of high-quality talents, have directly affected the organic development of NGOs in China. The constraints in their organic development are primarily embedded in the weakness of their operating mechanisms. According to a report on a nationwide survey of NGOs by Tsinghua University, 46.6% of NGOs make decisions on strategies and activity plans through formal decision-making organs such as a board of directors or plenary meeting, 47.4% do not have formal decision-making organs; in 10.7% decisions are made by all personnel, in
17.8% decisions are made by two or more heads, and in 18.9% the head of organisation makes the decisions. The above data indicates that nearly half of NGOs lack formal decision-making structures (Huang and Cai, 2008).

For grassroots NGOs, one of the manifestations of their weak operating mechanisms is that decision-making often reflects the personal will of managers. The significant decisions are basically made by a few leaders. Such kinds of NGOs are more likely to be utilised by some Western NGOs. Another manifestation of their weak operating mechanisms is the fact that some grassroots organisations gradually suffer from a lack of organisation and purpose. Because grassroots NGOs are, per definition, built from bottom to top, they do not have perfect organisational systems. Leaders of NGOs are not qualified enough to exercise authority. Therefore, in the course of their operation, such organisations are not able to form a unified idea and approach in an efficient manner.

The third manifestation of a weak operating mechanism is the lack of cooperation between NGOs. Activities by similar types of grassroots organisations tend to coincide with those of one another. If they could cooperate with each other, the goals of these similar types of grassroots organisations would be conducive to better achievements. However, there are quite a few conflicts and competitions among similar types of grassroots organisations. The main reason that causes their competitive relationship is the fight for funds through organising interesting activities, which leads to a competitive relationship rather than cooperative one. Generally, grassroots NGOs take applications for funding as the premise in promoting their activities. However, a large number of grassroots NGOs focus on those funding areas that get high levels of social attention. It is hard to avoid clashes within NGOs or with other funding applicants from domestic and overseas relevant organisations. Competition for funding applications makes the relationship among them antagonistic, full of slander and mutual distrust, and leads to situations in which they even compete to provide additional services to foreign organisations in order to show their competitiveness.

Thirdly, an irregular structure in internal management is found in grassroots NGOs. Strong institutional governance with professional management standards is an essential condition for an organisation to efficiently achieve its goals. Domestic grassroots NGOs have a lot of work to do in the area of institutional development and standards management.

At the present, some of problems characterised by the above two aspects can be analysed as follows:

In terms of personnel systems, the first problem is that recruitment and the selection of personnel is too simplistic. The second problem is that there is a lack of effective management of volunteers and in providing scientific training to them. The third problem is that these organisations are weak in incentive mechanisms (incentive mechanisms means that grassroots NGOs, through reforming the system and regulations within the organisations, adopt new measures and methods to mobilise and inspire employees’ incentives, initiatives, and creativity). In terms of accounting systems, revenue operation in grassroots NGOs is lack of transparency. It means the public cannot get clear information
about financing management such as the income of donation and the expenditure of different kinds of activities. However, the transparency of financing management is the lifeline for charitable organisations. The vast majority of grassroots NGOs do not have financial transparency, and the main reasons are as the follows:

(1) In the context of current China, some social expenses cannot be inscribed as items in official accounts,

(2) The goals and purposes for the establishment of partial grassroots NGOs are not well defined,

(3) The state supervises part of capital movement (mainly foreign capital),

(4) Some projects of grassroots NGOs cannot be implemented to society in general.

Currently in China, the grassroots NGOs also have the following problems including the internal economic corruption, becoming organizations as instruments of gaining personal benefits, appearance of raising money illegally and making money illegally, etc. Some grassroots NGOs even carry out feudatorial and superstitious activities or biking money activities. Such existing problems seriously influence the social reputation of grassroots NGOs. Some of the problems caused by grassroots NGOs even threaten the social stability of the whole nation. So due to the poor management of some NGOs, economic frauds and the personalisation of public wealth by some individuals or some leaders often takes place. This has also alarmed the authorities in the government that some grassroots NGOs in China can become possible elements of social unrest.

At present, affected by historical reasons together with the social environment and their own positions, the quality of grassroots NGOs in China is uneven. Functional alienation exists in some NGOs. For example, the establishment of some grassroots NGOs has not met the basic requirements of NGOs. They are redundant organisations or are the means of some individuals for making profits. After their establishment, the organisations breed internal corruption, management chaos, illegal fund-raising, and illegal profits. Some of them engage in feudal superstition or swindling activities, and even terrorist activities.

Problems such as internal mismanagement, financial chaos, and even crimes can happen in grassroots NGOs, regardless of whether they are legally registered or not. These factors can be explained from the perspectives in connection with irregular internal management:

First, grassroots NGOs are not involved in civil organisation regulations. They have neither civil rights nor obligations, and neither interests nor responsibility. In practice, the government basically holds laissez-faire attitudes to them, while mass media supervision of them is limited. Ideally, grassroots NGOs should exist in a state of growing or dying without outside interference. There is no real sense of legal responsibility. The restriction mechanisms of the regulation system do not work. Their actual operation basically relies on the self-discipline and supervision of individual members in these organisations. However, self-discipline is not completely reliable and the strength of individual supervision is very weak.
The lack of responsibility causes unchecked activities in grassroots NGOs. This makes them vulnerable to *anomie*, even resulting in the corruption of leaders which hinders healthy development.

Second, as in the problem of voluntary failure proposed by Salamon (1987), such a phenomenon also exists in NGOs in China. The phenomenon refers to the fact that the personal and organisational voluntary spirit is demotivated, due to various organisational and operational problems. In summary, the voluntary failure in China often manifests in the following characteristics: commercial operation, a lack of independence, and a lack of volunteers, and inefficiency. There are deep causes behind the phenomenon of the voluntary failure of NGOs in China. During the transformation period, economic changes and social transformations bring the *anomie* of ethical and moral constraints.

**Conclusion**

In the above analysis, we recognise that the different development dilemmas of grassroots NGOs are closely interconnected. These dilemmas have deep roots in many factors, such as politics, economic, and social-culture ones.

From a political point of view, the attitudes of the government towards grassroots NGOs are contradictory. On one hand, the development of society requires a larger role for grassroots NGOs in maintaining social stability, promoting social harmony, eliminating poverty, protecting the environment, and taking care of disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, grassroots NGOs may be utilised by hostile foreign forces aiming to undermine China's social stability, destroy social unity, and even threaten its national security.

From an economic point of view, in the process of consolidating the market economy in China, and due to the dual failures of the market and the government, the important position of NGOs has been highlighted in the course of economic and social development. However, some negative impacts on values, ethics, and morality brought by the marketisation process are understood as the factors causing the phenomenon of “voluntary failure”.

From the social-cultural point of view, factors such as the rise of China’s economy and the general improvement of living standards provide a strong social demand and lay a solid economic foundation and social conditions for the existence and development of NGOs. However, a question that has to be asked here is: Are enterprises, the mass media, and the public ready for the emergence of a new culture of charity and donations?

Therefore, by being actively involved in resolving the development dilemmas of grassroots NGOs, the Chinese government is able to demonstrate its capacity in realising its transition from management to service, especially while China is in the process of promoting the innovation of social management. The mass media's coverage and reports on charity need to give society and people a correct picture of what doing charity is. At present, there are still some people think that doing charity is exactly “Following the
Examples of Comrade Lei Feng,”2 i.e. making a personal choice rather than general social awareness. The mass media plays an important role in raising the public’s awareness of the value of charity. Enterprises can increase their “social responsibility” stake and go beyond the profit-first and market logic. Thus, they can better publicize their enterprise images. Their support to NGOs is a good and effective way to publicise their social responsibility. The development of NGOs also indicates how Chinese society is able to transcend individual personal Love to social Love beyond family and ethnic bond.

Meanwhile, when the whole society is constantly improving living conditions of grassroots NGOs, grassroots NGOs need to critically reflect how to improve their service capacity, and provide more services to society by continuously strengthening their self-cultivation. All of the above points in this chapter will provide researchers and policy-makers references to improve grassroots organisations in China in the future.

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2 “Following the Example of Comrade of Lei Feng” was a slogan during the Cultural Revolution period in China. Lei Feng was a People’s Liberation Army soldier who became a national hero due to his life’s devotion to supposedly “serving the people”, i.e. helping others and doing good things for society. After his death, he was praised by Chairman Mao, who called Chinese people to “Follow the Examples of Comrade Lei Feng”.

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References


Chapter 3

Interactive NGOs: Bridging Civil Society and the Public Sphere in China

Ane Bislev

Introduction

Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) play a crucial role in the building of civil society in China. Yet the restrictive political climate means that the degree of autonomy these organisations enjoy is relatively low – especially when dealing with politically-sensitive subjects. Successful NGOs have found ways of carving out a sphere of action for themselves within complex state-society relations in China, becoming, in Peter Ho’s words, embedded in Chinese state corporatism. However, an added challenge for these NGOs is how to negotiate the complicated political sphere while, at the same time, maintaining a degree of legitimacy through their link with the general public, engaging with their members as well as the rest of the population in the public sphere. This chapter explores how Chinese NGOs attempt to negotiate two interlinked challenges: dealing with Chinese government bureaucracy and the restrictions placed on them, while seeking to create civic engagement in the transnational public sphere through their Internet presence.

The link between technological advancement and political development is not a new subject of study. About thirty years ago, Benedict Anderson posited that an invention, movable type, ultimately helped bring about the birth of one of the strongest political forces in the modern world: nationalism (Anderson, 1991). Some twenty years earlier, Marshall McLuhan had argued that it is technology in itself, and not the content it carries, that has the potential to bring about social change (McLuhan, 1964). Today, there is an enormous interest in the transformative potential of the Internet, and developments such as the Arab Spring are seen as a direct result of the strength of social media platforms. However, expecting the Internet to automatically create a transnational public sphere and bring about societal changes towards a more open and democratic political structure is an expression of what has been called “black box thinking” (Kalathil and Boas, 2003) or “technological determinism” (Yang, 2011) as the impact of technological developments depend very much on the local context, actual usage, and political restrictions. Internet usage in China is a case in point. Today, China has the world’s largest Internet population and, despite Western social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook being banned in China, the home-grown Sina Weibo (a Twitter-like social media platform) and most recently WeChat (Weixin in Chinese) have become immensely popular in the Chinese-speaking world, thereby creating hopes for the development of an actual public sphere in China. However, it is still an ongoing subject for debate to what extent the growing Internet penetration in China will contribute to the development of an actual civil society or public sphere, as government control over the Internet and the ubiquitous
self-censorship leads to a continued cat-and-mouse game between the Chinese censors and netizens. The efficiency of Chinese censors means that, though the Internet is popular and Internet penetration has risen rapidly in recent years, the actual nature of Internet usage perhaps points more to what has been called an “online carnival” (Cockain, 2012) than a true public sphere/civil society.

The potential for the development of civil society in China has become a major topic for discussion, since China’s successful economic reform process has led to the emergence of a relatively-affluent middle class that could become politically active as their newfound material security leaves room for interest in matters beyond daily survival (for a discussion of the political interests of China’s middle class, see for instance, Cai, 2005 and Unger, 2006). However, as is the case with so many other developments in modern China, the civil society that is slowly emerging in China does not quite fit the Western definitions of the phenomenon, but seems to be a civil society with Chinese characteristics, due to the overwhelming domination of the Chinese state. This, of course, also influences the role of one of the primary forces of Western civil society, the NGOs, who often cooperate quite closely with the state in China.

Much attention has been paid to the difficult working conditions of NGOs in China in recent years (see for instance Sima, 2011; Yang, 2009; Ho, 2008; or Shieh and Deng, 2011). While there has been a significant increase in the number of NGOs and a growth of new forms of civic association, for instance, student voluntary groups, the restrictive political climate in China ensures a very special relationship between NGOs and the government, as NGOs are subject to strict rules and government control both in order to register as a civic association and in order to operate legally. The largest associations in China, for instance, the All China Women’s Federation, belong to the self-contradictory category of GONGOs (Government Organised NGOs) who, despite some degree of autonomy, are often perceived as an integrated part of the state bureaucracy by the general population (Chen, 2006; Bislev, 2012). Larger, well-organised associations have found ways to maximise their influence in the current situation by acting in accordance with government regulations in the political system (Ho, 2008). Finally, some organisations stay below the radar by avoiding registration altogether or by registering as a privately-owned business rather than a social organisation.

While much attention has been paid to the relationship between NGOs and the government in China, this has perhaps overshadowed another crucial factor in the development of a civil society, the link between these associations and the general population in an emerging public sphere. The public sphere as represented by the Internet and the civil society realm of the NGOs together form a contested reality between state and society in China. As Sabine Lang (2013) argues, this is not only the case in China. There has been a tendency to forget the importance of actual public engagement and take the very presence of civic associations as an indicator of the creation of social capital, and thereby in itself considered a desirable outcome. However, the public sphere is an important component of civil society. Only by combining organisational density and public debate culture can we explain all aspects of civil society formation. Lang argues that NGOs often face a choice between institutional advocacy and public advocacy, where the institutional
approach is often perceived as yielding more immediate/efficient results but can, in her opinion, lead to a loss of legitimacy as the organisations lose their direct link to public engagement (Lang, 2013). Whether we consider the public sphere as an integral part of civil society, as Lang does, or as a bridge between the state and civil society (Bhaduri, 2004), what is important in our context is the fact that a vibrant public sphere is an important component of a functioning civil society. In other words, in order to increase the scope of a civil society based on more or less autonomous civic organisations, it is necessary to focus on the link between these associations and the possibility of participating in public debates for the general public.

The analysis of this chapter focuses on the area where the potential public sphere in China (the Internet) meets the backbone of civil society (NGOs), in order to identify the difficulties encountered by the NGOs in gaining and retaining public legitimacy through their Internet presence. This will be done through a discussion of the conceptualisation of civil society and the public sphere in a Chinese context, followed by an overview of Internet usage in China and a review of the literature on NGOs operating in China, as well as a quick survey of the websites of some of the major Chinese NGOs. Finally, the challenges Chinese NGOs face when trying to engage with the emerging transnational NGO networks will be discussed.

State-Society Relations in China: Civil Society and the Public Sphere

The discussion of the development of a civil society with Chinese characteristics has occupied scholars for the last couple of decades, as observers speculate on to what extent the economic reforms in China will be accompanied by political reforms. The typical dichotomy between a Republican-liberal-democratic model of civil society – where civil society is seen as an independent third sector – and the Gramscian hegemonic model – where civil society is seen as an extension of the ruling hegemony that reproduces the existing political and economic system (Goetze, 2008) – does not quite capture the current situation for civic associations in China. While the state still plays a dominant role in all spheres of society in China, there is room for non-state actors to manoeuvre in various ways vis-à-vis the state. This has led to an ongoing academic debate on the precise nature of the Chinese version of a civil society. Some scholars debate how a concept rooted in Western political traditions can be made to fit the political reality that is China today. Others (for instance Sima, 2011) question whether the term is at all relevant in a Chinese context with a political history significantly different from the West and a state sector that is as dominant as the Chinese party-state is today, leading at best to a quasi/semi-civil society. Yet, others have suggested that it might be necessary to coin a new term to describe the area between the state and the private sphere when discussing state-society relations in China, as Western terminology is too firmly-rooted in local political traditions (Huang, 1993). This has led some China scholars to coin their own theoretical concepts in regard to civil society, beginning with Philip Huang’s Third Realm (Huang, 1993) and Tong Yanqi’s (1994) Non-critical Realm, describing the sphere between the state and society as a possible precursor of a critical realm/civil society.

Reflecting the difficulty of accurately classifying the Chinese version of civil society, Pe-
ter Ho describes the present possibilities for change as embedded within the existing political system, as relatively widespread opportunities for pushing for change without challenging the current order exist, despite limitations on freedom of speech and so on (Ho, 2008). Yang Guobin, on the other hand, looks at the co-development of widespread Internet usage and civil society in China and simply defines civil society as the intermediate public realm between state and society (Yang, 2003: 406). Ernest Gellner’s similarly rather-broad definition clarifies the role of civic associations in this sphere as “that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role as keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society” (Gellner, 1994: 5). This definition, though very inclusive, clarifies an important point: the state checks individual interests, whereas civil society checks the state. This is done partially through the formation of public opinion, as in Habermas’ classical definition of the public sphere:

By “the public sphere” we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body [...] Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions about matters of general interest (Habermas 1974, p. 49).

These broad definitions will be the point of departure for the discussion of the role of NGOs in bridging civil society and the public sphere, as the question of to what extent NGOs are able to fulfil the role as a counterbalance to the state is a central part of the civil society discussion in China.

The above debate on the nature of civil society in China and the role of the most important component of this civil society – civic associations/NGOs – has been mainly concerned with the interplay between the Chinese state at various levels and the civic associations themselves. However, the very reason that NGOs are seen as paramount in the development of a functioning civil society is that they represent the public, the population at large. This further complicates the already-delicate balancing act required to function as an autonomous NGO in China. As Sabine Lang points out, NGOs have to function between civil society and the public sphere, gaining legitimacy from public engagement and financial support from the state (Lang, 2013).

**NGOs in China**

Whether we choose to use Western concepts such as civil society or public sphere, or insist on seeing the Chinese reality as too fundamentally-different from the Western development of civil society to be covered by these terms, what is important for the purposes
of the argument in this chapter is how NGOs can manoeuvre in the grey zone between government control and the interests of their target groups. This dilemma is not limited to Chinese NGOs. In her study of European NGOs, Sabine Lang (2013) finds that maintaining a balance between engaging the public and receiving government funding leads many NGOs to restrict themselves to more-peaceful and less-confrontational activities, as NGOs perceived as unruly are ignored by the state and therefore find it near impossible to raise funds for their causes. Though this is a less direct type of control over NGO activities than the Chinese bureaucratic control system, it still has an important impact on the scope of action of NGOs in Europe. As Sabine Lang demonstrates, obtaining a balance between the interests of the state and the public can be a challenge even in democratic states with a long tradition of the engagement of civic associations in the public sphere. Before discussing the activities of NGOs in China, a short overview of the current status of civic association in China is needed.

Providing an adequate description of the NGO landscape in China is complicated by a number of factors, not least the government restrictions on registering civic associations. Formally, these associations are required to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as either social organisations, private non-enterprise units, or foundations, but as the requirements for being allowed to register are quite strict, only a fraction of the current number of grassroots organisations are formally registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Shieh & Deng, 2011). Some choose to register as private businesses with the Industrial and Commercial bureau instead, or simply remain unregistered. Currently, there are more than 400,000 organisations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but a large number of these are actually so-called GONGOs, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation. In addition to these registered associations, estimates suggest that there are anywhere from a few hundred thousand to one-and-a-half million unregistered NGOs, if rural associations are included (Deng, 2010).

The rapid growth in civic associations began in China in 1980s, but accelerated in the early 1990s which saw the birth of a number Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) e.g. Friends of Nature – still one of the most influential NGOs in China – as well as other groups campaigning for issues like rural women, poverty alleviation, HIV victims, and so on. This was made possible by changes in the political atmosphere, as well as marketisation and privatisation, which created a space for NGOs to manoeuvre in, as the state withdrew from some areas of the increasingly-complex social fabric and allowed NGOs to play a role in, for instance, monitoring the environment (Sima, 2011). Also, globalisation opened the door for international contacts which provided inspiration as well as funding opportunities for the newly-established NGOs. These ENGOs are characterised by having more independence than GONGOs and resembling Western ENGOs more, but they are most often dependent on a few dedicated individuals for their survival and do not depend on membership contributions to survive (Sima, 2011). Another important milestone in the development of the NGO landscape in China was the 2008 Earthquake in Sichuan. The extensive media coverage led to a widespread desire to help, which again resulted in a new upsurge of voluntary organisations all over China. 2008 has even been called the Year of Civil Society in China (Shieh and Deng, 2011), as the newfound interest in volunteering created an upsurge in civic engagement.
For the purposes of this chapter, it is especially important to look at what possibilities NGOs have for manoeuvring in the space between state and society – whether we choose to speak of it in terms of a non-critical sphere, a third realm, a semi-civil society, or something else entirely. Behind all these various designations we can sketch out some important observations as regards the role of civic associations in Chinese society today. First of all, even though the state is still very dominant in China, there is room for manoeuvring for non-state actors in the Chinese version of civil society. Most civic associations/NGOs have carved out a niche for themselves where they know the limits of their actual powers. They have the necessary expertise to determine which subjects are deemed politically-innocent and therefore safe to engage in, and which causes require a lighter touch and more consideration before being put on the agenda. Secondly, the Chinese state is, by no means, an unmovable monolith. Organisations have to deal with state bureaucracy from different levels of the state system, as well as various ministries/administrative entities that may have conflicting interests on, for instance, environmental protection (Yang, 2009; Spires, 2011). By manoeuvring wisely within this complicated system, associations can carve out a room for action for themselves, creating what Spires (2011) has called a contingent symbiosis where ostensibly illegal (that is to say, unregistered) associations fulfil certain roles that are perceived as helpful by local governments.

Finally, connections matter. In the delicate balancing act performed by NGOs in China, it is quite important to have the right connections within the government bureaucracy (Tsang and Pak, 2013). This sometimes takes the shape of having an influential person as a chairman or as one of the founding fathers, as in the case of the China Disabled Person’s Federation, where Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping, was the president from its inception in 1988 until 2008. In other cases, it can be a friendly official in the tax office who helps NGOs registered as private companies to avoid paying the taxes to which they would otherwise be liable. In the case of the many new associations created as part of the relief effort after the 2008 earthquake, connections to local official enabled organisations to access the disaster area (Shieh and Deng, 2011). There are also examples of NGOs founded by government officials, or even NGO leaders, joining the state administration in order to further their cause (Spires, 2011). Chinese NGOs are also quite adept at creating international linkages to transnational NGOs, relying on them for funding and inspiration (Morton, 2005).

2008 was seen as a watershed in the creation of civic associations in China – not least due to the organisational capacity of the Internet. The growing Internet penetration has also become the centre-point in the discussion of the possibility of an autonomous public sphere in China but, as will be shown in the next section, even here there are many limitations for Chinese netizens.

**The Internet in China**

The ongoing discussion on the actual nature of the Internet in China and its potential political impact has become central to the discussion of the development of civil society in China (see for instance Yang, 2009 & 2011; Tai 2006; Sun, 2010). Young people’s on-
line activities have been described as everything from an online carnival (Cockain, 2012: 147-151) to a cat-and-mouse game with local governments (Sun, 2010: 6). Contrary to McLuhan’s classic argument that the media is the message, Yang Guobin argues that the Internet is “contentful” and that technological determinism – assuming that the media in itself can influence the surrounding world – is wrong. In his opinion, it is necessary to understand the actual content in order to understand the Chinese Internet (Yang, 2011), and therefore necessary to understand how Internet culture in China is developing.

China has the largest Internet population in the world, with more than 590 million users in June 2013 and an Internet penetration rate of forty-four per cent, well above the average twenty-seven and one-half per cent for Asia, but below, for instance, the European average of 63.2 per cent (CINIC 2013). If you look at the age composition of China’s Internet users, it is primarily the young who are active Internet users, with only sixteen per cent of Internet users aged forty and above, and this is, to some extent, reflected in the preferred online activities for Chinese Internet users, where social media, online gaming, music downloads, and so on are among the most popular (CINIC, 2013; Sun, 2012). The new star in China’s social media firmament is WeChat, a semi-private network service which allows you to chat with people both within and outside your own immediate network. Sina Weibo, the Chinese micro-blogging giant, has more than 500 million registered users and, even though more than half of these accounts are actually passive, social media has become a very influential source of news, influential enough that there are regularly exhortations in the traditional media not to believe every rumour on the Internet (for an example, see China Youth Daily on May 3rd 2013: “Do not misread China based on exaggerated Internet rumours” (别在被放大的网络舆情中误读中国)). There is also an ongoing debate on the actual nature of Internet users in China, with state media claiming that Internet users are actually less well-educated than the average Chinese person, while research shows that Chinese netizens are both critical and well-informed. They tend to get their information from other sources than traditional state-controlled media, and they are actually more politically interested than the average Chinese citizen (Lei, 2011).

Chinese Internet users are also very adept at acting within the strict boundaries set by censorship. In a study of more than two hundred popular posts on Sina Weibo regarding politically-sensitive issues in the spring of 2012, Johan Lagerkvist found that about sixty per cent of these posts express what he terms loyal dissent (Lagerkvist, 2013), thereby voicing criticism against certain government actions or policies, but never questioning the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Only five per cent express open criticism of the CCP, while a slightly larger percentage express their support of the CCP. These numbers do not necessarily reflect the actual situation as regards political interest in China, as they only reflect the attitudes of people interested enough in politics to post on political issues, and only include posts that made it past the Sina Weibo censors, thereby leaving out posts that were deleted immediately. What they do tell us, however, is the nature of

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political discussion on the popular social media platforms, where direct criticism of the political system is avoided, but criticism of concrete issues is tolerated. This reflects the delicate balancing act that any Internet user has to perform in China.

Despite the popularity of Weibo and the initial interest in this platform as the foundation of a public sphere in China, at the moment the increased harshness of government control has led to a large degree of self-censorship, as well as the forced closing of accounts and so on. In August 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that a libellous post viewed more than five thousand times or reposted more than five hundred times can lead to a jail sentence. This has landed so-called Big-Vs (owners of popular Weibo accounts) in detention, and led others such as He Weifang, law professor at Beijing University and Charter 08 signatory, to close their accounts despite his having a following of more than 1.1 million fans on Sina Weibo (Boehler and Zhou, 2013).

As can be seen from the above discussion, there are certain limitations to considering the Internet a public sphere in China. First of all, the young and the well-educated are overrepresented among Chinese netizens which, to a certain extent, means that the public opinion generated on the Internet is not representative of the population at large. Secondly, though there is certainly greater scope of expression online than in traditional print and broadcast media, the ubiquitous self-censorship, as well as direct censorship by the government and private Internet hosts alike, means that open political discussions are mostly focused on loyal dissent or take place in veiled terms that makes them difficult to find and understand for the average Internet user.

**NGO 2.0**

The growth in the number of Internet users in China has been remarkable and the Internet has become an important source of news and entertainment in China, as well as providing an alternative social space for Chinese youngsters, thereby penetrating deeply into daily life in urban China (Sun 2010; Cockain, 2012). However, maintaining an Internet presence is a challenge to many NGOs in China for several reasons. First of all, there are the simple practical difficulties involved in developing and running an efficient website. Using the web as a communication strategy is expensive, since the skills involved in doing so are relatively specialised and the salaries are therefore high. Also, keeping a website up-to-date and monitoring online discussions are costly expenditures for organisations that often lack resources for this kind of administrative expense. As Chinese NGOs often do not rely on direct private donations, the economic gains from maintaining a website are very limited. Secondly, many NGOs use mailing lists rather than discussion boards to communicate with their members, since public discussions need to be monitored quite closely in order to stay clear of sensitive topics. And finally, even though many NGOs are very dependent on funding from international NGOs, there is a continued challenge in maintaining a truly bilingual website, as this demands a high level of language skills as well as the abovementioned technical skills.
In a survey of about four hundred Chinese NGOs\(^3\), MIT New Media Lab found that one of the main barriers for Chinese NGOs in using the Internet are actually a lack of funding and trained personnel, especially for NGOs located in inland/Western China. The NGOs from the survey represented grassroots NGOs from all regions in China, and showed a clear geographical difference in their Internet skills. NGOs from Western China reported significantly lower computer skills, and they generally had lower levels of funding, and therefore fewer resources to dedicate to communication purposes. In general, only twelve per cent of the NGOs reported having full-time technical or communication staff, which matches the reported expenditure on communication, where fifty-seven per cent of NGOs spent between nought and five per cent of their overall budget on communication purposes (NGO 2.0, 2010). When asked about their primary purpose in communication, about a third of the NGOs answered that this was for maintaining contact with other NGOs, while another third found that being known by the public was most important.

Below we will look at a selection of NGO websites to show how these various challenges affect the actual Internet presence of some of the major Chinese NGOs. The websites studied here have been selected to represent some of the well-established Chinese NGOs, in the expectation that they have more resources at their disposal compared to more-recently established organisations.

**Global Village Beijing** (北京地球村) is a large ENGO, at least in the Chinese context, but still struggles to maintain its website (Sima 2011). A quick visit to their website shows that they have apparently given up on maintaining an English version of the site. Their current Chinese website has no English version – there is a link called “English” on the site, but there is no actual English content.\(^4\) The only English version of their website, found through Google, is apparently an older website that is currently flooded by commercials masked as articles from dating companies and travel agencies.\(^5\) The website proper contains no discussion board, but does contain traditional contact information and information on how to donate. They do, however, link to a Weibo account\(^6\) where they currently have four hundred and ninety-three “fans” – a small number in the Chinese context.

A glance at other Chinese NGOs reveals similar challenges. The Beijing-based NGO Rural Women (农家女) has a comprehensive Chinese language website with plenty of information on different projects, personal stories from rural women and information on how to donate and get involved, and of course a link to a Weibo account, but the link to the English version of their website takes you to an old version that has not been updated since 2009.\(^7\) **Friends of Nature** (自然之友), one of the first ENGOs established in China, has both an English and a Chinese version of their website, though the Chinese version

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\(^3\) The NGOs included in this survey represent many different types of NGOs, but generally the largest and most well-established NGOs were excluded as well as very small NGOs without sufficient organisation backing to participate in the training courses offered. Also, as this survey was conducted online, it excluded NGOs with absolutely no Internet capabilities. (NGO 2.0, 2010)


\(^6\) [http://e.weibo.com/gvbbeijing](http://e.weibo.com/gvbbeijing) accessed January 15th 2014

\(^7\) The Chinese version of their website can be found here: [http://www.nongjianv.org/index.html](http://www.nongjianv.org/index.html) while the obsolete English website is here: [http://old.nongjianv.org/web/english/index.html](http://old.nongjianv.org/web/english/index.html). Both accessed January 16th 2014)
contains significantly more information. There are links to Weibo as well as other social media platforms on the Chinese version, and a (defunct) link to a Facebook page as well as a Twitter account (containing 100+ tweets, but none later than April 2013 on the English version).

If we turn to international NGOs and their websites in China, the situation is different, but apparently the task of maintaining both Chinese and English language websites is still quite burdensome. Planet Finance, an international NGO supporting the development of microfinance, has a truly bilingual website where the Chinese and the English content is almost completely the same. Oxfam Hong Kong has a Hong Kong based website which is completely bilingual, while their site based in Mainland China only has a Chinese version. The Ford Foundation has a bilingual website but with a more comprehensive English version and links to their profiles on various Western social media, but not to Weibo.

As the above tour of Chinese NGO websites demonstrates, significant resources are spent on constructing and updating websites with information about the organisations, but the task of maintaining an updated English version and hosting online discussions remains beyond the scope of these organisations. Discussions are relegated to their Weibo accounts, which allow interaction with the general public, but mainly contain organisational news or re-posts of items relevant to the causes supported by the NGOs. The Internet has proven an extremely-important tool in organising events, and in garnering support for causes that has made it into the news, such as the 2008 Earthquake or various local environmental causes (Weber, 2011), but constructing public opinion in the public sphere on a lasting basis has proven much more difficult, due to both the restraints on NGO registration and activities and the nature of Chinese Internet culture.

Conclusion

NGOs in China lead a contested existence. They are subject to strict regulation from the Chinese state but, through various strategies, many NGOs succeed in carving out a niche for themselves where they are able to pursue their stated goals with support from, or at least without interference from, the Chinese government. As the Internet has become the major source of communication and news for a large part of the Chinese population, the presence of these organisations on the Internet becomes of increasing importance. There are certain barriers to this, not least the high cost associated with maintaining an efficient Internet presence and the importance of keeping strict control over the actual content of discussion groups and forums. Many NGOs have consequently relegated the interactive component of their websites to social media platforms. Their websites are primarily sources of information about the organisation and their activities, as well as important signifiers in placing themselves within a web of Chinese and international NGOs through links to the homepages of partners and supporting organisations. As for

11 [http://www.oxfam.org.cn/]
the potential for international/transnational contact, the language barrier is quite significant. Several of the organisations surveyed here have only a minimal English language web presence, and only international NGOs operating in China seem to have the necessary funding to maintain truly bilingual websites. Even though Chinese NGOs are quite adept at maintaining contact with the transnational NGO community, this is done through other less-public channels than their websites.

Some of these difficulties are not unique to China. NGOs in many parts of the world will struggle to find enough funding to maintain their websites and hire qualified staff, and the balance between what Sabine Lang (2013, p.6) calls institutional and public advocacy is an omnipresent challenge to NGOs. However, the efficient censorship of the Internet and the special demography of Chinese netizens add an extra dimension to the attempts to engage with the public through interactive web tools.

What does this tell us about the potential of NGOs integrating the budding civil society and public sphere in China? First of all, NGOs do recognise the importance of maintaining an Internet presence, but are hampered in this by the high cost of hiring skilled staff to do so. Secondly, the same restrictions that govern NGOs’ actions in real life also apply to their Internet presence – perhaps to an even larger extent, as activities on their websites are public and are therefore subject to tighter control than private lobbying or networking. This is matched by the survey quoted above (NGO 2.0, 2010), where only a third of NGOs found that their most important purpose in communication was to be known by the public. If we take the classical definition of the public sphere as a place where public opinion can be formed and which is available to all citizens (Habermas, 1974), then there are severe limitations to seeing the Internet and social media in China as a public sphere. But, as Habermas himself argues, his definition of the public sphere and civil society is, to a large extent, grounded in specific historical developments in Europe, not least the development of democracy. Instead of using the definition of public sphere as a Weberian ideal type, it is therefore more productive to look at to what extent the Chinese NGOs discussed in this chapter are actually engaged in forming public opinion online. Even though the number of organisations discussed in this chapter is quite limited, the picture emerging here still provides an indication of one of the existing dilemmas for Chinese NGOs: balancing the importance of engaging the general public and harnessing public opinion, while at the same time husbanding limited resources and maintaining the “embedded” relationship with the Chinese state. Therefore, NGOs in China certainly struggle to be present in the online public sphere, but what seems to be emerging so far resembles an associational sphere linking Chinese and international/transnational NGOs, rather than a forum for the creation of public opinion through engagement with the general public. While Chinese NGOs are important stakeholders in the creation of a transnational public sphere, they are also severely limited in this role by the level of government control over the Internet, the language barrier, and the symbiotic nature of Chinese civil society.
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Chapter 4

Transnational Business NGOs and the Chinese Labour Contract Law

Peer Møller Christensen

Introduction

Post-Cold War globalisation has led to the emergence of theories of international politics dealing with the development of a global civil society based on moral and ethical values, and where the actors, among others, are transnational nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). This may be seen as a development towards an international system governed more by moral principles, and less by power; a kind of replacement of Cold War realist and neorealist interpretations of international relations, where power and national interests are seen as the main factors of motivation. Instead, it is assumed that a big but modest idea with fresh potency – global civil society – is today on the rise. ...it [the idea] champions the political vision of a world founded on non-violent, legally sanctioned power-sharing arrangements among many different and interconnected forms of socio-economic life that are distinct from governmental institutions” (Keane, 2003: xi-xii). Empirically, the interference from transnational business NGOs in the political process in China of drafting, passing and implementing the Chinese Labour Contract Law seems to paint a more-complicated picture of the nature of the so-called global civil society, and the role of transnational NGOs. The efforts by transnational business NGOs seem to have been specifically aimed at preventing the improvements of Chinese labour standards prescribed by the new law. It thus seems that the emerging global civil society is still the battlefield of global power struggles between labour and capital, where nation states also play a role.

In 2008, the Chinese government implemented a new labour contract law. Before its implementation, the drafting of the law had been followed by heated discussions in China and abroad about the consequences of the law. In China, the discussion took place among legal experts from the academic world, and between representatives from the business community and the official trade union. Outside of China, lobbyism, directed against the improvements in working conditions for Chinese workers to be provided by the law, was undertaken by transnational business NGOs and countered by international trade unions and labour rights- and human rights NGOs.

The following chapter will present the history behind the development of the Chinese Labour Contract Law and a theoretical explanation of the policies of the Chinese government and transnational NGOs – business- and labour rights NGOs alike – behind this development.

On 1 January 2008, the new Labour Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China was implemented by the Chinese government. Before the final passing and implementation of the law, the world had seen a long period of comments, suggestions and lobbying efforts which were directed against the Draft Law and the improvements in labour standards it would bring to Chinese workers and migrant workers, called nongmingong.¹

The new Labour Contract Law, alongside a number of other Chinese labour laws, had been made necessary by the restructuring of the Chinese economy which took place from 1979 onwards. Before 1979, China was a socialist planned economy with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the main industrial production units, and collective ownership was dominant in agriculture and among smaller industrial enterprises. Within both industry and agriculture, the production units also formed the basic framework of the welfare system. In industry, the economic unit, the so-called danwei, was responsible for supplying the employees with lifelong employment, pensions, health service, childcare and education and, in the rural areas, the People’s Communes had the same obligations towards their members. This system was based on what has been described as a socialist social contract (Lee, 2007). In the industrial sector in China, the basis of this social contract was the acceptance by the workers of not having the right to establish independent trade unions to struggle for improvements in their labour conditions and wages. The only trade union allowed by the party-state was the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) which was, and still is, closely connected to the Communist Party and in accordance with the above-mentioned socialist social contract, was actively involved in the management of enterprises in different ways, with the aim of raising production. Growth in production was perceived as being in the common interest of Chinese society and the people, and was something workers willingly sacrificed their organisational freedom for.

From 1979, this system was fundamentally-changed through a process described by the double concepts of reform and opening up. Reform meant the gradual transformation of the planned economy towards a market economy – a so-called socialist market economy. As the first step in this process, the collective rural production system which centered on the People’s Communes was broken up, and agricultural land was divided among the households of the commune; the households then becoming the actual production units in rural areas. During the 1980s and 1990s, the SOEs in the industrial and service sectors were first granted wider autonomy and independence from state planning, allowing them to decide themselves about production, surplus and manpower, and gradually the SOEs were privatised and a large number of workers fired. In 2001, eighty-six per cent of all SOEs had thus been partially or fully privatised, and during the years from 1998 to 2005, thirty million SOE employees were laid off (Lee, 2007).

In this way, the socialist social contract was broken; lifelong labour security was abolished together with the social security network provided by the industrial danweis and the People’s Communes, and a new labour market was introduced with a flexible labour force responsive to the demands of the market (So, 2010).

¹ Nongmingong are peasants migrating from China’s rural districts to the newly-established special economic zones (SEZs: export processing zones) in the southern part of China.
Opening up meant the gradual integration of China’s economy into the international economy. The disintegration of Communist China from the world market has often been described as a decision made by the government of the People’s Republic of China itself. Susan L. Shirk describes the opening up of China as an act by the Chinese government: “to end China’s two-decade-long self-imposed isolation” (Shirk, 2008: 14). To call China’s economic isolation “self-imposed” is, however, not correct. In 1949, at the end of the civil war in China between the armies of China’s Communist Party and the US-supported Guomindang (Nationalist) rulers, the US government imposed a trade embargo against China. The embargo lasted until the beginning of the 1970s, when the US government decided to lift it and allow American companies to trade with China. The American government thus played an important role in establishing the preconditions for the new integration of the Chinese economy into the world market, a development which took place from the 1970s onwards, culminating with China being accepted as a member of the World Trade Organisation in 2000. The main rationale behind this change in US-China policy was the desire to include China in the global encircling of the Soviet Union of that time. The strategic alliance between the Chinese and the US government was further consolidated when China, in 1979, alongside the introduction of the reform and opening up, started a proxy war on behalf of the US against Vietnam.

Apart from gradually making it possible for Chinese enterprises to trade directly with foreign companies, the most important change made during the process of opening up was the establishing of export processing zones (EPZs) in South China, the so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In these zones, foreign companies were invited to invest in production facilities, at first mainly in the form of joint ventures with Chinese companies, but gradually also as Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) without a Chinese partner. The Chinese government created the necessary infrastructural environment and tax exemptions, and allowed a large number of peasants to migrate from the Chinese countryside to work in these SEZs. The SEZs were first concentrated in four localities in South China but, gradually, EPZs or industrial development zones as they were often labelled, emerged along the Chinese East Coast. It has been estimated that, in 2008, up to two hundred million peasants had migrated to work in China’s industrial centres, and that more than sixty per cent of workers in industry and service in China were migrants (Global Labor Strategies, 2008). “In the garment, textile, and construction industries, these migrant workers constitute 70-80 per cent of the total workforce” (Lee, 2007: 6). In 2010, around two-thirds of the increase in Chinese exports since the late 1980s was estimated to stem from foreign global companies and joint ventures. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, foreign-owned global corporations accounted for sixty per cent of Chinese export to the USA, and more than eighty per cent of the toys sold in the US were made in China (So, 2010). Of the sixty-six million workers employed in EPZs spread all over the globe, forty million were Chinese people working in Chinese EPZs (Madeley, 2008: 154).

The privatisation of SOEs caused a landslide growth in unemployment in China; in the period from 1996 to 2001, around thirty-six million workers in SOEs were laid off and, in the same period, collective firms sacked seventeen million workers (So, 2010). As a result of the abolition of the socialist social contract, working conditions in China deteriorated immensely. In 2008, the International Labour Organization (ILO) reported that China had
more deaths per capita from work-related illnesses each year than any other country, and the number of Chinese workers who died of occupational illnesses in 2005 was as high as 386,645 (Global Labor Strategies, 2008). The migrant workers employed in the FIEs or joint ventures in the Chinese SEZs experienced extremely harsh working conditions, and often received their wages too late or not at all.

Of course, this development led to an immense growth of popular protests. According to China’s Ministry of Public Security, the number of riots and demonstrations in China rose from 15,000 in 1990 to 74,000 in 2007. The bulk of these were caused by labour strife (Leung and So, 2013). Laid off SOE workers protested against losing their jobs, social security, pensions and so on; migrant workers’ protests were mainly caused by the lack of the payment of their wages, and inhuman working conditions. Added to this labour strife were demonstrations by the youth “sent down to the countryside” during the Cultural Revolution who, in the latter part of the 1970s, were allowed to return to the cities, only to realise that it was impossible for them to find employment.

The growth of public protests forced the Chinese government to develop an alternative to the socialist social contract in the form of a system of labour standards based on the “rule of law”. In the last decade of the twentieth century, a number of labour laws and regulations were drafted, and among these was also the Labour Contract Law. Labour contracts had already been introduced in the late 1970s for two reasons: first, to make it easier for the youth returning from the countryside to find employment and, second, in order to create a system for employing migrant workers in the FIEs and joint ventures in the SEZs. Provisions for contracts were promulgated in enterprises involving foreign capital, alongside the Joint Venture Law of 1979 (Lee, 2007). The labour contract system was later extended nationally to all joint ventures throughout China (Wei, Yan and Ye, 2013), and in 1986 the labour contract system was introduced nationwide in the SOEs (Harris and Luo, 2008). This process mainly favoured the employers who were now able to replace ordinary lifelong employed workers with contract workers on fixed-term contracts and with no universallyaccepted rules for contract employment. In order to place labour relations inside the confines of the “rule of law”, the Chinese government had to create a system of labour legislation, and the first step was taken with the Labour Law of 1995. The Labour Law, among other provisions, formally required that all employees sign labour contracts with their employers and established a system of minimum wages. Prior to the Labour Law of 1994, workplace rules had to be decided upon in a democratic process with participation of workers’ representatives and the trade union. The 1995 Labour Law changed this, stating that workplace rules should be in accordance with law, and that the opinion from the trade union should be heard during this process. This actually diminished workers’ influence on their working conditions, but this rule of democratic participation was later reintroduced with the new Labour Contract Law of 2008 (Qian et al., 2013). When passing the 1995 Labour Law, Chinese legislators had planned follow-up legislation, including the Labour Contract Law, the Employment Improvement Law, the Labour Disputes Resolution Law, and the Social Insurance Law (Wei, Yan and Ye, 2013).

The Labour Law of 1995, however, was not a success. Despite the fact that long term or open-ended contracts were encouraged under the law, labour contracts in China contin-
ued to be non-existent or short-term, and informal. Approximately eighty per cent of all enterprises did not sign contracts with their employees, even though the Labour Law had made it mandatory to do so, and by 1999 most labour contracts for workers in FIEs were one-year contracts with renewal depending upon the agreement of both sides (Leung, 2012). Minimum wage laws were not enforced and enterprises often did not pay wages on time; some did not pay wages at all. “In 2005, 7.8 per cent of employees did not receive payments on time or at all. Overwork and overtime rule violations are rampant” (Global Labor Strategies, 2008: 35).

The Drafting of the Contract Labour Law

In 1996, the drafting of a labour contract law was put on the agenda of the Chinese State Council, but work on the draft did not start until 2004. Actively participating in the drafting were personnel from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) and the ACFTU (Karindi, 2008) Also involved in the drafting was the Institute of Labour Relations at the Renmin University in Beijing. The institute was founded on 8 October 2004, and was given the task of doing “Research on Drafting the Labour Contract Law” by the Legislative Office of the State Council. The director of the institute was Professor Chang Kai, who would later play a central role in academic discussions in China on the Draft Labour Contract Law (Karindi, 2008). Apart from this involvement by Chinese legal experts, the drafting of the Labour Contract Law was also supported by communications and cooperation with international organisations like the ILO, and with the US and German governments.

The cooperation with the ILO took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, signed in May 2001, which stipulated that the ILO should “assist in improving labour contracts and collective contract practice (in China)” (Karindi, 2008:10). Communication with US governmental institutions was also quite intensive. On 10 April 2003, the MOLSS and the US Department of Labor signed a letter of understanding on technical cooperation on labour legislation, with the aim of cooperating on the drafting and the enforcing of Chinese labour laws, including the Labour Contract Law, and in 2004 four letters of understanding were signed, to broaden cooperation between China and the US in the areas of labour, employment and workplace-safety. There was also cooperation between the Chinese government and the German government on these issues. Since 1994, the MOLSS has cooperated with the German government on the reform of China’s labour and social security laws, and this was further developed in 2006 with a programme to promote the rule of law in China. In 2005, a seminar on labour contract law was organised in China, during which Chinese and international experts discussed the Draft Labour Contract Law, and in 2006, this seminar was followed by a labour contract law study tour to Germany and Italy (Karindi, 2008).

This international cooperation on developing labour laws in general and a labour contract law in particular, must have given the Chinese government the impression that what they were drafting was in accordance with ideas about labour standards universally agreed upon in the international community. The very aggressive reactions from the transna-
tional business NGOs following the publication of the draft must, therefore, have come as a big surprise to the Chinese government and legislators.

The Publication of the Draft Law

On 20 March 2006, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in China published the Draft Labour Contract Law, and invited public comments on the draft. As a consequence of the close cooperation between the Chinese government and Western organisations and governmental institutions described above, many of the provisions in the draft were parallel to those found in the legislation of Western countries, such as enforceable labour contracts, severance pay regulations, and negotiations over workplace policies and procedures (Global Labor Strategies 2006). The basic provisions of the Draft Labour Contract Law were (Leung and So, 2013):

- All employment in China had to be based on a valid written labour contract that should be signed and agreed upon by the employer and employee before the employee started working;
- If no contract was signed, the existence of a contract was to be presupposed by the authorities, and the worker would thus be guaranteed the protection prescribed by contract regulations anyway;
- Open-ended contracts were mandatory for workers who had completed two fixed-term contracts, or who had worked more than ten years in a firm;
- Employers must give severance payments to all workers at the end of their employment;
- Employers must contribute to their employees' social security accounts;
- Company policies and work rules must be negotiated between employers and representatives of the employees, including issues from compensation to health and safety issues, vacations, and days off. This provision would reintroduce the system with democratic discussion removed by the 1995 Labour Law;
- The draft expanded the role of the ACFTU by allowing a broader scope for collective bargaining at the enterprise level. For instance all enterprises have to negotiate with the local trade union or representatives of the employees before firing twenty employees or ten per cent of the total number of employees;

The law would indeed have strengthened the position of workers by making written contracts mandatory in all kinds of enterprises, discouraging short-term contracts, and expanding the participatory rights of trade unions. Within a few months after the publication of the draft, the Legal Affairs Committee had received almost 200 000 comments and suggestions for revisions of the draft; the majority of comments were positive, origi-
nating from what was called “ordinary workers” (Karindi, 2008). Some critical comments, however, expressed by Chinese legal experts and transnational business NGOs also arrived at the office of the Legal Affairs Committee. The publication of the draft, furthermore, gave impetus to academic discussions in China and a lively discussion between transnational business and labour rights NGOs, and even caused reactions from a group of members of the American Congress.

The discussion among Chinese legal experts about the draft started on 3 April, when an academic seminar on the subject was organised at Beijing University’s School of Law. Legal experts from different academic institutions from all over China had come to Beijing to participate in the meeting, and the discussions soon concentrated around two different approaches to the draft – one supportive, and one more critical. The main representative of the supporters was Professor Chang Kai, Director of the Institute of Labour Relations at Renmin University in Beijing. As mentioned above, he had actively participated in the drafting of the Labour Contract Law and naturally supported the draft, emphasising that the purpose of the coming Labour Contract Law was to protect the interests of the workers who were the weaker parties in labour conflicts and therefore needed a legal framework of protection. The critics of the draft among the Chinese legal scholars present centered themselves around Dong Baohua, Professor of Labour Law at East China University of Politics and Law in Shanghai. Dong Baohua stated that the draft put too much emphasis on the protection of workers’ rights and neglected the interest of the employers; the provisions of the draft would, therefore, make it much more difficult for the employers in China to conduct their business. The two groups continued their discussions after the meeting at Beijing University in a public debate which was described by the media as a discussion between a Beijing-camp around Professor Chang Kai, and a Shanghai-camp led by Professor Dong Baohua (China Labour Bulletin, 2006). Academic disagreements in China thus seemed to be expressed in two different viewpoints, each representing one side of the contradiction between the interests of workers and business interests.

International Reactions to the Draft

The publication of Chinese Draft Labour Contract Law also started global discussions about labour rights and the business climate in China. Immediately after the publication of the Draft Law, transnational business NGOs reacted by sending very critical comments and suggestions for revisions of the draft to the Legal Affairs Committee. Some of these critical comments and suggestions were accompanied by concealed threats to withdraw investments from China. The transnational business NGOs most prominent in this intense lobbying campaign were the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (AmCham), the US-China Business Council (USCBC), and the EU Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC). These transnational business NGOs represented a number of multinational corporations: AmCham more than 1300, the USCBC 250, and the EUCCC more than 860.

In March 2006, AmCham forwarded the document: Comments and Suggestions on Revisions to Labor Contract Law (Draft) (American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, 2006) to Chinese legislators. The document was divided into two sections, one in Chinese and
one in English, and was addressed to the Law Committee, the Financial and Economic Committee, and the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. It started with some introductory remarks, where the AmCham emphasised that they “believe American companies are leaders in creating a safe, fair, and fulfilling workplace” (American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, 2006: 1), but soon started criticising the draft:

While AmCham Shanghai welcomes the intent of the new draft labor contract law, our member companies have expressed reservations about the draft in its current form... it is a step backwards for Chinese economic reforms – away from global trends of flexible labor markets needed to ensure continued economic growth (Ibid.).

The comments and suggestions state that “the Draft has certain defects”, and offer suggestions for revisions. The AmCham document questions whether it was necessary at all to carry out such significant changes as the draft represents, and recommends that the Labour Law of 1995 is maintained instead. AmCham criticises the automatic establishing of labour relationships and the strict regulation of dismissal of employees, which, according to AmCham, “may disable enterprises from optimising and integrating human resources in a normal way... provisions under the Draft make people feel that it is a product of the planning economy and the old way of thinking, which conflicts with the internationally accepted human resources management concepts and impacts on all aspects of the normal recruitment, dismissal, performance management system and employees retaining scheme of enterprises” (Ibid: 22). The comments also included an implicit threat of the withdrawal of investments: “provisions under this Draft are not consistent with the persistent position of Chinese government, and may exert negative influence on China’s investment environment” (Ibid.).

On 18 April 2006, EUCCC sent the document Re: Comments of the European Chamber of Commerce in China on the Draft Labour Contract Law (EU Chamber of Commerce in China, 2006), including critical comments, and the advice not to let the Chinese Labour Contract Law be too influenced by the existing “overprotective” Labour Laws in Europe:

The European Chamber acknowledges that many of the articles presented in this draft stem from labour laws in Europe. However, we would like to take this opportunity to stress that the current labour regulations in several European countries pose a number of challenges to respective governments. Due to employee overprotection and rigid obligations for employers, many European companies have decreased their hiring rates, increasing the burden on the state social systems... Indeed, the current labour laws in several European countries have resulted in increased labour costs leading a number of European companies to relocate their production lines to countries outside Europe or to countries with more liberal labour legislation within Europe.
As it stands, if China chooses to implement the changes suggested in this draft, such challenges will undoubtedly be experienced here as well” (Ibid.).

The threat by the EUCCC that companies might withdraw their investments should the draft be passed is even more explicitly stated than those of the AmCham:

The strict regulations of the draft will limit employers’ flexibility and will finally result in an increase of production costs in China. An increase of production costs will force foreign companies to reconsider new investment or continuing their activities in China (Ibid.).

Following these general comments, the document presents a number of more detailed suggestions which all have the aim of increasing employers’ managerial powers.

On 19 April 2006, Chinese legislators received the document Comments on the Draft Labour Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft of March 20, 2006) authored by the USCBC (The US-China Business Council, 2006), also including an implicit threat of withdrawal of investments, and which contained the following remarks:

US companies generally bring world class employment practices to their China operations ... We applaud the National People’s Congress for working to create a more uniform legal structure for the protection of rights that employees and employers have. In practice, however, several provisions would result in the loss of rights rather than the gaining of rights, as the draft law intends. The Draft Law may also reduce employment opportunities for PRC [People’s Republic of China] workers and negatively impact the PRC’s competitiveness and appeal as a destination for foreign investment (Ibid.).

When the criticism against the Chinese Draft Labour Contract Law expressed by the transnational business NGOs became publicly known, they were broadly interpreted as lobbying efforts by the Western business community aimed at preventing the improvement of the employment and working conditions of Chinese workers, and a number of organisations reacted. The transnational business NGOs were criticised for their lobbying by international trade unions, transnational labour rights and human rights NGOs and even by a group of American congressmen.

Soon after the lobbyism had been publicly known, the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation issued a statement demanding that EU and US corporations stopped their lobbying campaigns, and this was followed by The International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations also calling for action by European trade unions to fight against the lobbyism performed by the EUCCC. In June 2006, the European Trade Union Confederation complained to the
European Commission about the threats by the EUCCC to withdraw investments or reconsider new investments in China. The European Commission communicated the concerns of the trade unions to the EUCCC, and on 8 December 2006 it issued a “clarification” on its attitude to the problem stating that,

In light of recent media attention concerning the European Chamber’s position on the Draft Labour Contract Law, the Chamber would like to take this opportunity to clarify its position on this important piece of legislation. The Chamber believes that there is a serious need to improve working conditions in China and stands firmly behind the Chinese government’s efforts to improve working conditions (Quoted from Global Labor Strategies, 2008: 39).

Many human rights groups and other NGOs have also been involved in the fight to protect the workers’ rights included in the new law. Most impressive was the action taken by The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, chaired by former UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson, and affiliated with Amnesty International. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre contacted leading member companies of the NGOs and asked them about their role in opposing the law; the answers from responding companies were then posted on its website (http://www.business-humanrights.org). Among them, Ericsson and Nike explicitly distanced themselves from the lobbyism (So, 2010). In the response from Ericsson, the company stated:

Ericsson supports the Chinese government’s legislative efforts to improve the labor law and relations for working standards in a variety of labor contexts... Ericsson is in no way actively lobbying against the proposed legislation by the Chinese government. Nor has Ericsson threatened to pull out of China if the new labor laws were to be passed......just because we are a member of the European Chamber of Commerce does not necessarily mean we endorse every lobbying initiative (Ericsson, 2007).

Members of the US Congress also reacted. 31 October 2006, a group of congressmen sent a letter to President Bush “protesting the efforts of US corporations to undermine the most basic human rights of Chinese workers and block proposed new worker rights and labor standards protections in the proposed new Chinese labor law” (Quoted from Global Labor Strategies, 2007: 29).

Revision of the Draft Law and New Comment Process

The many reactions, in particular the critical remarks from Chinese academics and transnational business NGOs caused the Chinese government to reconsider the draft and finally revise it. On 11 December, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress held a meeting to debate the many comments and suggestions. The Committee
met again on 19 December and, soon after, a revised draft was issued. In contrast to
the first public comment period, the government invited only select parties, such as the
transnational business NGOs, to submit comments on the second draft and provided cop-
ies of the legislation only to these invitees (Global Labor Strategies, 2008).

According to Global Labor Strategy, the revised draft was a proof that US and European
lobbying efforts through transnational business NGOs had been effective in diminishing
the various provisions in the original draft protecting workers’ rights. The new draft had,
for instance, watered down the role of the trade union in collective bargaining. It was
now stated that the employer only needed to listen to the advice (but need not seek the
approval) of the local trade union or meeting of employees’ representatives, before the
company made any lay off of more than twenty employees or ten per cent of the total
number of employees (Leung and So, 2013).

Still, the transnational business NGOs continued their criticism of the (now revised) Draft
Labour Contract Law. AmCham secretly sent new detailed comments to the Chinese gov-
ernment demanding changes in the worker protection provisions, and the USCBC issued a
commentary, “insisting that elements of the revised draft are overly ‘burdensome’, ‘pro-
hibitively expensive’, and will have ‘an adverse impact on the productivity and economic

The Final law

The final Labour Contract Law implemented on 1 January 2008 had, in several aspects,
been softened by the criticism by the transnational business NGOs. Where the earlier
draft had given the trade union the right to “approve or reject” layoffs of more than
twenty employees or ten per cent of the total labour force of the company, companies
now only need to “consult” the trade union. But, on the other hand, the final law limits the
use of “probationary contracts” used by many employers to avoid fulltime employment.
Furthermore, the law widens the power of company-based branches of the ACFTU or em-
ployees’ representative committees to engage in collective bargaining with the company
about salaries, bonuses, training and other work-related matters (Leung and So, 2013).

The Outcome of the Law

It is difficult to evaluate the consequences of the Labour Contract Law because the im-
plementation of the law coincided with the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Some
companies which closed down at this time may blame the Labour Contract Law for caus-
ing their costs to rise, while the true cause of their economic problems may be the fall in
global demand following the financial crisis. Some companies actually tried to circumvent
the provisions in the law forcing companies to give open-ended contracts to workers who
had been employed in the company more than ten years. Already in 2007, Huawei, the
world-renowned Chinese electronics producer fired all employees whose employment in
the company had lasted close to ten years, and reemployed them as new employees. Chi-
inese companies have acted alongside transnational business NGOs, against the full im-
plementation of the law in a number of ways. In 2008, China's richest woman, Zhang Yin,
Board Chairperson of one of the world's largest paper makers, Nine Dragon Papers, who
is also a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (an advisory
body to the Chinese government), forwarded a proposal to the Conference “to amend the
Labour Contract Law... to exempt labour-intensive companies from signing permanent
contracts with the employees who have worked for more than 10 years” (China Daily,
2008-03-10).

The opposition to the Labour Contract Law inside China has continued since its imple-
mentation in 2008. Problems with the law and companies' attempts to circumvent the
provisions of the law led to the drafting of a revision in 2011:

[which was] designed to address abuses of the employment
agency system .... in an attempt to avoid signing contracts
with their employees, as stipulated by the Labour Contract Law,
more and more employers have hired workers from employment
agencies, in spite of the provisions that restrict the use of such
labour to temporary, auxiliary and substitute positions....the
problem is most acute in large-scale state-owned enterprises
involved in petro-chemicals, telecommunications and finance,
where an estimated two thirds of employees are agency staff “

The Legal Office received more than 500 000 comments on the draft revision and this
caused the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to postpone discus-
sions on the draft, “the greatest pressure on the government to postpone discussion of
the proposed revisions came from this powerful business lobby, which has openly voiced
concerns about the need for flexible hiring and firing during the current economic slow-
down in China and across the world” (Ibid.). The struggle over the establishment of a le-
gal framework for labour contracts in China goes on, with the active participation of both
Chinese and foreign companies.

Analysis

The process of drafting, passing and implementation of the Chinese Labour Contract Law
raises two questions: Why did the Chinese government find it necessary to establish a
Labour Contract Law? And why did the transnational NGOs – business and labour rights
NGOs alike – find it necessary to interfere with the legislative process leading to the im-
plementation of the new Labour Contract Law in China?
Why did the Chinese Government find it Necessary to Establish a Labour Contract Law?

The passing of the Labour Contract Law may be seen as a natural consequence of the many worker protests against the abolition of the socialist social contract, and the transformation of the Chinese economy from a socialist planned economy towards a socialist market economy may be explained by referring to the bad economic results of the planned economy. Professor Wang Shaoguang from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, however, explains the development with reference to Karl Polanyi’s theory about market and double movement (Wang, 2008).

According to Polanyi, a market has existed in all societies through most of the history of mankind. If a self-regulating market is allowed to subordinate society under itself, it will inevitably have a destructive effect on human beings, society and the natural environment. Therefore, markets have, in most known societies, been what Polanyi calls embedded, i.e. subordinated to society, and have not been allowed to regulate themselves. The kind of economy where the market is embedded may be called a moral economy, because the economic activities therein are subordinated to political, religious and social relations. In the nineteenth century, however, global economy became gradually disembodied from society. Societies experiencing the emergence of a competitive capitalist global economy gradually did what classical economic theory advised them to do, namely freeing the economy from the control of society. The disembodied market economy led to the destruction of society and, as a consequence, what Polanyi calls a countermovement to protect human beings, nature, and productive organisations through protective legislation, and other interventions by the state and the society emerged (Polanyi, 2001: 79). After the Great Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Second World War, the market became increasingly embedded with growing Keynesian control of the destructive fluctuations of the market and its subordination to the development of the welfare state. By the end of the 1980s, the Keynesian embedding of the market was, however, replaced by neoliberal globalisation, which may be seen as a process of a new disembodiment of the market – now from the constraints placed upon it by state interventionism and the welfare state.

Wang Shaoguang describes the economy People’s Republic of China until the start of the economic reforms in 1979 as a moral economy. The market in this economy was not self-regulating, but constrained by collective and national interests, expressed in two control mechanisms: soft budget constraint and the ‘iron bowl’. Soft budget constraint means that the activities of any economic organisation are not constrained by its own resources. If the organisation has a function within the planned economy, it does not matter if it experiences no surplus or even has a deficit. A deficit would be compensated by the state by the allocation of resources from surplus-producing economic organisations.

‘Iron bowl’ means lifelong, guaranteed employment and social security for all members of society, not dependent on work performance. People’s communes in rural areas and the danwei in cities were both economic institutions and social and political institutions. The soft budget constraint and the iron bowl thus “became the two pillars of the planned economic system because it gave priority to human subsistence and equality at the expense of efficiency” (Wang, 2008: 17).
When the Chinese government started the process of reform and opening up, the Chinese moral economy was gradually transformed into a market economy and the Chinese political leaders replaced the ideology of basic welfare and equality with a search for economic efficiency and GDP growth. The market has thus been disembedded from society and has instead become a force controlling society. China has been effectively transformed into a market society.

Since the initiation of the reform and opening up, China’s economy has experienced a remarkable growth in GDP, but this growth has, as a side effect, brought with it many problems for society, like the growing inequality and social polarisation, the deteriorating environment, and so on. The social problems have necessitated a protective counter-movement with the aim of reembedding the market into society.

The Labour Contract Law may be seen as part of this development. The reforms have meant a total commodification of labour power. Labour power is sold and bought on a basically self-regulating labour market, and fluctuations on this labour market may kick workers and migrant workers out of their jobs or put a downward pressure on their wages, thereby undermining their living conditions. Without rules about working conditions, employers striving for higher labour productivity and lower costs may squeeze the workers to the limit. In order to prevent the destruction of workers’ lives, the Chinese government has to interfere and create a legal framework protecting workers against the negative consequences of market fluctuations and the quest of employers for lower costs and higher profits. Otherwise, society will see disrupting occurrences of social misery and a rioting, dissatisfied population.

Why did the Transnational NGOs Interfere with the Legislative Process Leading to the Implementation of the New Labour Contract Law in China?

The opening up of the Chinese economy was part of the neoliberal globalisation which started in the 1980s. Some people, like Wallerstein and other World Systems analysts, would argue that the capitalist economy has always been global, but they would also agree that neoliberal globalisation changed the global economy in important ways. The collapse and economic changes in the communist block and the opening up of China’s economy created an all-inclusive global labour market, and this caused a very significant widening of wage differences, with a difference of more than a hundred times between the highest level in Western countries, and the lowest level which is found in China (Keane, 2003). These differences in the average wage level made productive investments in low-wage countries very attractive for Western companies – especially in China. The flow of foreign direct investments to China was accompanied by a global reorganisation of the global commodity chains.

The concept of global commodity chains was first created by Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 1983: 16) in connection with the development of his World Systems Analysis, and the concept was later further developed by Gary Gereffi.
Global commodity chains (GCCs) are rooted in transnational production systems that give rise to particular patterns of coordinated international trade. A ‘production system’ links the economic activities of firms to technological and organizational networks that permit companies to develop, manufacture and market specific commodities (Gereffi, 1994: 215).

Global commodity chains have three main dimensions: (a) an input-output structure(i.e. a set of products and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding economic activities); (b) a territoriality (i.e. spatial dispersion or concentration of production and marketing networks, comprised of enterprises of different sizes and types); and (c) a governance structure (i.e. authority and power relationships that determine how financial material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain) (Ibid.).

In the global economy before neoliberal globalisation, the links in these production systems mainly had the form of market exchange but, as a result of neoliberal globalisation, the commodity chains changed into systems of intra-firm links. What Gereffi calls “the lead company”, i.e. the company governing the commodity chain, slices the production into different subparts placed in the most cost-efficient geographical localities, either by outsourcing of production facilities or through subcontracting with local companies.

Gereffi distinguishes between two different types of commodity chains: producer-driven commodity chains and buyer-driven commodity chains. The buyer-driven commodity chains are the most common type in the production pattern connecting Chinese export production with the global economy.

Buyer-driven commodity chains refer to those industries in which large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, and trading companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting countries typically located in the Third World....common in labor-intensive consumer goods industries (Gereffi, 1994: 216).

This type of commodity chain is governed by the company which has the position of seller of last resort; often a company without production facilities but controlling the brand, design and final distribution of products. Companies in China – not necessarily Chinese by ownership – often have important roles in these commodity chains. Two examples may be mentioned in this connection: Apple’s production of iPhones and Walmart’s system of supplies.

The production of Apple’s iPhones has, since the first model was marketed in 2007, been centred in China, where the components are assembled and the final product is marketed worldwide labelled as Made in China, but Designed in USA. Actually, only a very small
amount, three to four per cent of the total costs in producing an iPhone are spent in China, while the rest goes to suppliers of components from Japan, South Korea, Germany, and the USA (Xing and Detert, 2010). The components are assembled in a Taiwanese company, FoxConn. Still, because of the pivotal position of the assembly line in China, Chinese working conditions and labour costs are extremely important for Apple.

The US based global supply/retail chain, Walmart, established itself in China in 1995 as Walmart China, and soon created a web of subcontractors supplying Walmart with daily consumer goods. In 2005, seventy per cent of all products sold by Walmart were made in China, and eighty per cent of the six thousand factories that supply the company were Chinese (Sum, 2009). Walmart thus created an efficient buyer-driven commodity chain, in which governance was performed by the use of specialised computer software called Retail Link. All stores, distribution centres, and suppliers are connected with this software, which channels detailed information about all suppliers directly to the management of Walmart. “Armed with information about suppliers’ cost and margins, Wal-Mart managers can routinely evaluate changes in each suppliers’ costs and margins as well as require it to match its lowest price or even cut it. It also introduces a form of coordinated competition among suppliers, for example by asking a specific supplier to match the lower price of competing suppliers” (Sum, 2009). Of course, a system like this demands a very high level of flexibility by the suppliers of Walmart, a flexibility which may easily be challenged by changes in labour standards in China.

Neoliberal globalisation, the reorganisation of GCCs, and the role of China’s economy in all of this has had profound consequences for both workers and businesses around the world. Transnational companies have experienced the opening up of a myriad of new business opportunities in countries with — compared to international standards — an extremely low average wage level, and thus extremely cost-effective production opportunities, giving them full control over all steps in production and marketing processes. With the opening up of China’s economy and the inclusion of the Chinese labour pool in the global workforce, pressure on worldwide wage levels created what has been called a “labour arbitrage” (Roach, 2004) or “race to the bottom”. Of course, companies and business NGOs are interested in preserving this situation which gives them so many advantages and, on the other hand, workers and their representative NGOs all over the world are interested in fighting the deterioration of their own working conditions and wage levels caused by the inclusion of the large additional workforce working under very few rules and at very low wages.

Conclusion

The drafting, passing and implementation of the Labour Contract Law in China was a replacement for employment conditions embodied in the socialist social contract of the planned economy of China. It may be interpreted as part of the development of what Polanyi calls a countermovement to the disembedding of the Chinese market from the controls of society actualised by the reform and opening up of the Chinese economy. The process was the result of, on one hand, popular protests against the destroying conse-
quences of the disembbeding on the lives of workers and migrant workers and, on the other, reactions by the Chinese government to these protests.

The interference by transnational business NGOs in this process was the result of the growth in business opportunities for transnational companies resulting from neoliberal globalisation, which made investments possible in the newly-included parts of the world with immense numbers of low-wage workers accessible to these companies. China was the most important of these newly-included areas. With the reorganisation of global commodity chains, the internal working conditions in these newly-included countries and the rules governing these working conditions became a matter of enormous importance for the transnational companies. Both the companies themselves and the organisations representing their interests would have to be aware of and try to influence changes in this advantageous situation. For workers all over the world and their trade unions, the situation was the opposite. They witnessed their own and their colleagues’ places of employment being outsourced to countries newly included in the global market with low labour costs, and experienced a downward pressure on wages in their own countries. For them, working conditions in the newly-included countries also became of central importance, because they influenced working conditions and wage levels in their own countries. Working conditions in countries like China have become of immense importance in the struggle led by workers all over the world to defend and improve their own working conditions.

As a result of this development, the legal framework of working conditions in a country like China is no longer a matter of interest exclusively for business and worker organisations in China, but has become extremely important for business and worker organisations all around the world. Global civil society has become the battlefield of the global struggles between business and labour.
References


Chapter 5

Transnational NGOs and Reconstitution of Military Regime in Egypt

Abdulkadir Osman Farah

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the role of transnational nongovernmental organisations (TNGOs) in recent developments in Egypt. The current scholarly debate on the so-called “Arab spring” considers the mobilisation of disempowered youth, intense media-tech application, and sustained international pressure as crucial to ousting authoritarian regimes in North Africa. Delineating the role of TNGOs complements such findings. TNGO activities and responses to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and to the ensuing coup in 2013 reveal the capability of such organisations to balance civic transformational-oriented mobilisations with state-centred institutional considerations. Furthermore, though TNGOs cannot directly change the current political stalemate in Egypt, the power elite might misinterpret the changing and sometimes contradictory positions of these organisations, and might eventually encourage a return to authoritarianism. After introductory remarks on the background of the uprising, the chapter proceeds to a theoretical discussion of transnational engagement, followed by recent historical and current empirical developments.

Among the countries of the “Arab spring” in the Middle East and North Africa, only Egypt claims both a popular revolution and a coup. With a civic revolt in 2011, Egyptians mobilised resources to overthrow an authoritarian ruler. Two years later, with a military coup, the public fragmented into antagonistic factions: (i.) those continuously insisting on shariyah, the legality of the original revolution of 25 January 2011; and (ii.) proponents of the inqilab, the army takeover of 3 July 2013. This chapter explores the role of TNGOs in this unresolved political stalemate. With nationwide mass protests in January 2011, Egyptians demanded rahil, the departure of Hosni Mubarak, the country’s long-term autocratic ruler. Protesters called for eish bread (life), karama (dignity), and huriya (freedom) for all. These euphoric public eruptions marked the culmination of long-term, entrenched civic engagement. Over the years, Egyptian activists established grassroots, critical social movements and organisations to directly and indirectly challenge the military regime. With diverse civic-associational life, Egyptian nongovernmental organisa-

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1 “We define Transnational NGOs as organizations that normally operate, recruit membership and attract funding from more than three nations.” “The term “transnational” refers to activities, organizations, and movements that occur across national boundaries with limited or no involvement by national governments. Use of the term “transnational” as opposed to “international” is intended to accentuate the fact that the activities, organizations, and movements being described do not occur at the behest of national governments”. See more in Peter N. Stearns (eds.), Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World, OUP, 2008.
tions (NGOs) filled the welfare gap left by the state in providing basic services for vulnerable communities. Meanwhile, domestic movements complemented the national civic efforts with trans-boundary interaction and collaboration with TNGOs. Such transnational connections enabled local NGOs to join global civil society mobilisations, particularly those concerned with peace struggles and social justice in connection with the Iraq Wars and Palestinian Intifadas (Abdelrahman, 2009). The participation of transnational actors with embedded framing opportunities had strengthened the foundations for the subsequent popular uprising that, for the Egyptians, reached a climax with the fall of Mubarak (Sakr, 2006). Later, a military-administered distressing transitional period ended with an internationally-observed democratic experiment in 2012.

Among the winners of the closely-contested national election were activists and leaders from previously politically-oppressed movements and NGOs. In retrospect, the transformation was historic for the troubled nation. The transition, however, resulted in a more confrontational political conundrum. The electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood undermined the fragile national and transnational civic convergence that earlier disgraced authoritarianism. In Egypt, Islamist resistance has a long history. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, alongside associated organisations, had pursued a counterhegemonic platform for almost one hundred years. The movement resisted colonial power accumulation and the coercion of successive military regimes. Both colonial powers and the militarily oppressed religious organisations, while occasionally behind the scenes negotiating with the religious leadership. Over the years, the Brotherhood maintained a civic mobilisation profile with, for instance, private educational institutions and clinics, enabling the organisation to sometimes operate as a de facto welfare state. As the uprising gained momentum, although not among the prime initiators, the Brotherhood promptly capitalised on the volatile situation for political ends. Unlike the digitally-minded youth and non-activist civic components, the Brotherhood maintained certain organic connections to local communities. Consequently, the civic mobilisations congregating at Tahrir and other Egyptian squares for the common objective of *iqad al-nidam*, the fall of the regime, expanded into diverging ideological clashes: a return to belligerent military rule, interwoven with prospective civil conflict (Mahmood, 2003).

The Challenge

This study focuses on the contradictory response by some TNGOs to the 25 January uprising and the military coup in July 2013. The chapter argues that the inconsistent proclamations by such organisations reflect broader national and transnational civic divergence. For instance, Human Rights Watch, a focal TNGO operating in Egypt, applauded the January 2011 upheaval, describing it as the product of “Egypt’s transformers and revolutionaries”2. In comparison, the organisation’s response to the military coup in July 2013 expressed caution that “Egyptian authorities should take the necessary steps to protect churches and religious institutions against mob attacks”3. Absent from the statement

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2 Feature by Human Rights Watch at: http://www.hrw.org/features/revolutionaries-egyptstransformers
was reference to the revolutionaries in 2011, and there was unwillingness to categorise the military takeover as a coup. Even the prime stakeholders, the Egyptians, remain divided in determining the classification of such a dramatic national rupture.

This is due to the leaders of the decades-long military rule often legitimising the acquisition of power with violence and with constitutions which divided society. Another US-based, powerful TNGO, the Carter Center, had a similar approach to the Egyptian turmoil. The former President, Jimmy Carter, who leads this organisation, has a somewhat paradoxical relationship with Egypt. Under his presidential supervision, the Camp David treaty mediating Egypt and Israel sponsored and launched a long-term US-Egypt security partnership. The retired statesman, and Nobel laureate, this time as the head of a civic transnational platform, articulated willingness to help Egyptians towards “self-governance”.

The dual approach to the Egyptian predicament seems clearer when, in response to the Egyptian uprising, Carter, on behalf of the Carter Center, “congratulate[d] the people of Egypt on their courageous steps towards a new era of democratic legitimacy and respect for human rights... [and let Egyptians] know that they have the support of the international community as they embark on the difficult path of building a truly democratic nation”4. During the parliamentary elections and the short-lived Morsi presidency, both the US embassy in Cairo and the Carter Center sponsored numerous coordination meetings to “mediate” opposing political forces in Egypt5. Later reacting to the military coup, the Carter Center refrained from direct association with Egyptian protesters, but instead “placed an extra responsibility on the armed security forces of Egypt to remain within reasonable limitations of not only applying lethal force but also showing fundamental respect for the human rights of their fellow Egyptians”6. Furthermore, when Morsi took power and changed the constitution, both Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center adopted a critical discourse highlighting themes such as gender inequality and increasing violations against religious minorities in Egypt.

The position of the two TNGOs coincides with the US government’s scepticism towards democratic Islamist rule (Gerges, 1999: 89). Although TNGOs often seek to reconcile civic movement and grassroots-oriented priorities with formal organisational and institutional objectives, the statements by Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center confirm organisational ambivalence aiming at an intermediate position. Such a standpoint would require the implementation of parallel and occasionally overlapping functions. Hence, organisations build partnerships with states or state-linked institutions such as the United Nations (UN) system (Willetts, 2001: 356-383). Under such a framework, organisations interact with home and host states, as well as international institutions. The recent legal actions by Egypt against “foreign NGOs” attest to the existence of competing ideological and institutional platforms within and around TNGOs (Malmvig, Helle and Lassen, Christina, 2013). The Egyptian judiciary accused Western TNGOs of undermining the country’s political authority, sovereignty and state legitimacy. For their part, Western states, from which most of the NGOs and funding indicted here originate, defended the credibility of

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these organisations. Consequently, TNGOs create tension within Egypt and beyond. As an intense debate sent in Aljazeera English shows for the supporters of the military regime, the action of raiding “foreign NGOs” and confiscating their equipment was justified, as Egypt is a sovereign state with the legitimacy to control national territory. For them, democracy has limitations as “there are red lines” under which civil society could not exist unregulated and beyond the state. For human rights activists, the action against the TNGOs was “unprecedented and directly targeted all NGOs”. For them, the campaign resulted from the long-term government manipulation of public discourse portraying TNGOs as “serving [for] external actors”. In contrast, TNGOs consider themselves as “the voice that upholds human rights, exposes abuses [making them] heroes of the revolution which the military aims to silence”. Such claims remain debatable, but powerful states and international organisations such as the UN, though formally supporting the prevailing discourse of national sovereignty, funded and encouraged TNGO efforts. For their part, TNGOs interact and cooperate with national and transnational civil society constituents in creating “transnational governance spaces” (Lang, 2013: 29). With emphasis on mobilisation-oriented activities, TNGOs contribute to the formation of essential associational and expressive spaces. Though such efforts might occasionally appear partial and reflect ideological frames, their involvement generates alternative transnational mechanisms for Egyptians and their NGOs to counter military rule.

The Recent History

Military elites with authoritarian leaderships have dominated Egyptian politics since 1952 (Said, 2012). All three former presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, reigned because of usurpation and with the systematic persecution of political opponents (McDermott, 2013). The military restricted non state-sponsored alternative public spheres. Under such circumstances, civic movements and organisations had the option of either accepting co-option or risking long-term imprisonment and torture. Through successive emergency measures, authorities curbed public liberties and mobility (Stachursky, 2013: 89-90).

For decades, the Egyptian military elite justified such actions with reference to nation-building priorities, prevailing Cold War geostrategic considerations, and threats from global extremism. The pattern consolidated a Praetorian state under which the military and collaborative elites reproduced socio-political, as well as economic, underdevelopment and increasingly polarised civil society (Cook, 2007: 6-8).

Nonetheless, citizens, victimised by years of military rule, maintained indomitable resistance countering excessive state oppression. In order to undermine any emerging opposition and consolidate “oligarchic kleptocracy”, Egyptian rulers perennially employed a “divide and rule” strategy, creating social fragmentation and enmity among the population (Teti, Andrea and Gervasio; Gennaro, 2012). Equally critical, powerful states such as the

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7 See more at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCdSSYXOVE (An Aljazeera program “Inside Story”, which invited an Egyptian scholar supporting the regime, a Human Rights Watch representative and a political commentator to discuss the implications and consequences of Egypt’s treatment of NGOs.)
USA, from which the regime received sizable funding, as well as international organisations and TNGOs complicated the state-society relationship in the country. The externalisation of development mechanisms worries Arab public opinion that considers Western TNGOs as “elitist organisations with limited accountability promoting particular interest” (Pratt, 2005: 123-150). Consequently, for the military regime, the quest for external legitimacy appears desirable, rather than securing a more accountability-demanding internal legitimacy. Eventually, the waves of uprising that engulfed Middle Eastern and Northern African countries in 2011 temporarily overturned this elite and state-centred political structure. Witnessing the involuntary departure of the Tunisian dictator Ben Ali, the military elite in Egypt initially unsuccessfully tried to constrain the Egyptian people from diverse social, economic and ideological backgrounds from mobilising. The efforts failed as protesters occupied public squares demanding rohil, the departure of the nid-am (regime). Likewise, the international impetus and media attention surrounding the uprising at the time facilitated and, to a certain extent, accelerated national, regional, and transnational political and technological opportunities. In the past Egyptians mainly engaged transnationally to bypass domestic pressure and avoid persecution. The political opportunities in early 2011 of a world witnessing a potentially-changing region additionally reduced the gap between national and transnational mobilisation and institutionalisation dimensions of civic engagement. For instance, for a period, Tahrir and other Egyptian protest squares attained global inspirational status (Stiglitz, 2011).

The national and transnational civic mobilisations occurred on diverse, competing, and complementary levels; firstly, the local social level in which organic associations best articulate relevant socio-political issues. Among such constituents are religious and traditional kinship components. During the uprising, their main goal was to achieve change, with the basic demands of freedom and autonomy. The second level arises from the interaction with the state (the military regime). The army controls the security apparatus such as the military and other enforcement agencies. At the national level, both supporting and oppositional networks operate under this hierarchical structure. Depending on declared policies, such diverse groups could either support the status quo or advocate for change. The third level relates to the international/supranational level on which international organisations such the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and the World Bank pursue designed strategies and projects. Similar to the national arena, transnational networks include constituents calling for change, and others preferring the status quo. Finally, we have national NGOs operating on the transnational networking level. Under such circumstances, TNGOs often sympathise with local activism in demanding change, while in practical terms, organisations rely on states (regimes) for institutional collaboration and networking within the transnational public sphere.

The regime in Egypt controls and occasionally degrades NGOs. One of the main sources for NGO funding is the United States Agency for International Development, while the US government is the main donor for the Egyptian regime. Meanwhile, religious NGOs such as the Muslim Brotherhood remain in a precarious situation due to the movement’s resistance as well as its semi-political function. The stated religious goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and related movements differ from the aims stressed by the secular leftists and feminist organisations. Similarly, their relationships with the state and TNGOs di-
Though religious groups remain locally-rooted, their networks operate and extend transnationally (Mandeville, 2011). After accessing power with contested democratic elections, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood missed a unique opportunity to reach out to opposing ideological forces for compromise. Instead, the Brotherhood embarked on a transnational ideological campaign.

Transnational activism and TNGOs

In theory, TNGOs participate in networks driven by individual activists and related groups sharing beliefs and identities. These activists pursue trans-border social, humanitarian and political activities in which cultural framing plays a central role. More specifically, TNGOs obtain the transnational expertise and knowledge that is necessary for global developmental debates, seeking solutions for “instances of Problematic justice” (Habermas, 1990: 108) and social inequalities. In countries like Egypt where such organisations confront bureaucratic obstructions, TNGO activists employ the so-called “boomerang networking pattern”. The aim of this is to externalise and, through the collection of sensitive information, valorise domestic claims which the authoritarian regime initially ignored and suppressed. The motivation for such endeavour derives from moral/ethical values rather than political ambitions and the personal gains of transnational activists (Keck and Sikkink, 2014). From this perspective, TNGOs often put maximum pressure on authoritarianism, while leaving others to compete for access to influence and power.

Such transnational activists also qualify as “rooted cosmopolitans” (Tarrow, 2005: 2) with the involvement of not just transnational networking, but also with concrete social movement engagement and trans-border activism. Apart from politically framing issues, such activists and organisations engage in contentious politics with the purpose of accessing national and transnational power and resources. TNGOs operate through connective structures in which institutions, technology, management, and leadership play critical roles. In practice, TNGOs implement “franchising” activities by establishing branches and offices in different countries.

The existence of “political opportunity structures” enhances the capability of TNGOs to mobilise relevant civic activities in home and host environments. Therefore, the domestic national structure remains foundational for the operation of TNGOs. In addition, the unpredictability of “scale shift” makes a significant difference, if transnational engagement seeks to reconfigure civic capability. Scale shift refers to “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, invoking a new range of actors, objects and broadened claims” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 331). With this approach, TNGOs might negotiate and even share institutional power with authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, TNGOs reproduce not just moral and cosmopolitan norms through transnational networking, but also as new forms of governmentality and asymmetric power relations trying to bypass nation states. Such transnational networks have, together with international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, “taken over the governmentality of, for instance, vulnerable parts of the world. TNGOs often bridge the sovereignty of developing nations in comparison to the
developed countries. Operationally TNGOs might reflect the characteristics of “western bureaucratic organisation” designed to maintain “liberal global order” with an emphasis on secularism (Ferguson, 2006: 44-45). Under this hegemonic and hierarchical structure, TNGOs often seek institutional privilege.

In relation to the African continent, TNGOs might exercise “independent sovereignty”. Unlike other more consolidated regions (states) in the world, “both the African state and the civil society operate within a trans-nationalized environment and global context” (Ferguson, 2006: 100-101). Consequently, countries find themselves almost “ruled by trans-nationalized networks under which condition few countries remain sovereign not because countries are invaded or conquered but because complex networks rule and pressure these countries from distance”. In countries like Egypt, we often see diverse projects designed by “people sitting in transnational distant places” (Durac, 2009). In recent years, due to technological and communicational development, global civil society attained greater significance in issues of transnational social mobilisation and organisation. Liberalisation, originally designed to expand global markets, provided civil society with alternative opportunities to confront and bypass the state. Over the years, expanded liberalisation had, however, instead of promoting democratisation, undermined state capacity and fragmented society into haves and have-nots. Under such a global liberal environment, we find not just cosmopolitans- the activists involved in global justice movements and cultural innovation- but also TNGOs with contentious organisational hegemonic capacity (Tarrow, 2005: 24).

Diverging Egyptian Forces with Conflicting Political Goals

In a complex globalised world, diverse civil societies maintain formal and informal connectivity across diverse nations and territories. During political upheavals, i.e. the Arab uprising, civil society movements and organisations have intensified transnational civic exchanges. Similarly, TNGOs systematically engage and invest in actual processes with the aim of influencing and achieving suitable outcomes (Stachursky, 2013: 89-90). The ideological and organisational priorities of these organisations, combined with the tension and suffering often expressed in the national and transnational public spheres, as well as the concerns of the communities scattered across the world, contribute to such endeavour (KUŞCU, 2012). The general public discourse also mobilises communities, linking them to their host countries and societies. The grievances and the daily pictures projected by national movements and organisations, and their confrontations with oppressive states also inspire “global public protest”, motivating people to act individually as well as collectively (Milne, 2012: 260). TNGOs operating in developing countries such as Egypt often have to balance the dynamics of mobilisation necessary for the empowerment of wider civil society and the institutionalised pragmatism tendencies required in dealing with powerful political and institutional constituents. This creates a dialectical tension and controversy. The ambivalence further explains the reluctance of TNGOs in initially taking sides in controversial state-society conflicts. TNGOs depend on the backing of both the civic mobilisation side, as well as the institutional side. While the roots and sympathy might lie on the mobilisation side, managerial and structural aspects belong
to the institutional dimension of the state. The absence of a transnational public sphere with the capability of connecting local indigenous traditions sustains this collective action dilemma (Fraser, 2009: 12-14).

One crucial factor, in this context, is the external funding that plays a critical role in state-society relations in developing countries, and is occasionally a source of tension and struggle among NGOs for accessing economic privileges and recognition (Ozlem and Icduygu, 2012). Funding regimes often exercise influence and might even seek to govern local NGOs directly. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the essence of transformative agency emanates from nationally-mobilised movements and organisations, or whether it is from the link with and supervision from TNGOs. In most circumstances, for developing countries like Egypt, the distinction between national and international boundaries appears blurred, as both the state and civil society depend on external support, eventually undermining national sovereignty (El-Ghonemy, 2004).

In this complex environment of interdependence with multiple competing actors, TNGOs seem better-positioned to deal with challenges. Their ability to link and influence both the diverse transnational social groups and different states confirms the centrality of such organisations. Similarly, local NGOs often navigate between transnational ideological demands and state hegemony. While counterhegemonic NGOs risk exclusion and underfunding, cultural, religious and women's NGOs could become targets for ideological exploitation (Challand, 2011). Such tendencies raise doubts with respect to TNGOs’ objectivity in relation to the mobilisation and empowerment of locally-rooted cosmopolitans confronting an antagonistic national regime.

TNGOs, through “rooted cosmopolitans”, activists and “connective structures”, influenced the struggle to oust Mubarak. They sympathised with and valorised the protests, innovating expressional space in Tahrir and other squares (Newby, 2012). NGOs originally started their work with humanitarian and advocacy activities partially-funded and encouraged by neoliberal tendencies. The IMF-sanctioned liberalism disrupted the socio-economic pattern, as structural adjustment programmes severed basic food subsidies for the poor (Salevurakis and Abdel-Haleim, 2008). Furthermore, the creation of a transnational frame and space attracted rooted cosmopolitans from both the West and East together. Initially, the Egyptian state tolerated such global protest mobilisations taking place in Tahrir Square, mainly because it dealt with the Palestinian Intifada and the Iraqi Wars. This window of opportunity mobilised Egyptians nationally and transnationally, and gradually generated more or less formalised popular activism connected to different parts of the world. When the right moment came with the Egyptian uprising, civic groups exploited the relationships with diverse national and transnational movements and organisations from which Egyptians received support. The affiliations with external foreign actors, though seemingly beneficial in certain aspects, divide Egyptian NGOs, fragment society and confirm the existence of postcolonial dependence (Elyachar, 2002). Henceforth, TNGOs might avoid directly promoting public mobilisation and prefer instead to pursue networking, opportunities for valorisation, and creating platforms for exchanging and transmitting ideas of “the good life”. One of the major problems confronting TNGOs in contributing to lasting political transformation is the lack of the so-called indigenous
connection to communities at the local level. So far, the scattered Diaspora communities have the capacity to deliver some sort of simultaneous transnational links to host and homeland environments. In addition, global movements for justice promote targeted projects on issues such as democratisation, human rights and gender. Undoubtedly, transnational NGOs provide alternative platforms for oppressed civil society. With transnational networks, global deliberations and civic engagements emerge from the existing connection on local, national and transnational levels.

In Egypt, the case of the Academy for Change shows that Diaspora originated TNGOs have empowered the mobilisation and education of Egyptian youth during the uprising8. Unlike conventional TNGOs, Diaspora-rooted organisations build upon indigenous connections that facilitate the flow of transnational resources to concrete local entrepreneurship developments. In contrast, the activities of, for instance, the Carter Center, Human Rights Watch, and other TNGOs, show the continuing struggle to reduce the gap between competing mobilisation and organisational tendencies.

Transnational networking emanates from diversified sources. Egypt has been the target of EU liberalisation and democratisation policies oriented towards the region. Such policies fostered both favourable and oppositional social mobilisation platforms. For instance, Western countries funded transnational projects which facilitated transnational civic negotiations and empowerment. In addition, there are opposition groups, often exiled from their countries by authoritarian regimes, linking in Western countries, and from which Diaspora activists and organisations mobilise resources (Yom, 2005). Transnational community movements, i.e. Diaspora constituents, link to transnational NGOs at the beginning to contribute to humanitarian tasks, but gradually pursue greater political and social institutionalisation. The liberal public space in more-democratic countries provides Diaspora communities with opportunities to mobilise and engage.

**Removing an Authoritarian but not Authoritarianism**

The January 2011 uprising removed an authoritarian ruler, but the current situation attests to the failure of the upheaval in dismantling dictatorship. Though not the major cause, TNGOs’, as well as their home countries’, calm reactions to the military partially contributed to this outcome. TNGOs no longer unambiguously side with civic mobilisation against the continuing military consolidation. In accordance with policy positions taken by home states, TNGOs call for national dialogue, restraint, and better management from military rulers:

For the first time in the history of the world, a coup is not a coup. The army take over, depose and imprison the democratically-elected president, suspend the constitution, arrest the usual suspects, close down television stations, and amass their armour in the streets of the capital. But the word “coup” does not – and cannot – cross the lips of the Blessed Barack Obama9.

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It was not just TNGOs and their sponsoring states, but Egyptian intellectuals also refrained from opposing the coup. A prominent Egyptian leftist scholar contended the following:

The fall of Morsi and of the rule of Muslim Brotherhood came as expected. Firstly, the government of the Muslim Brothers has been pursuing the same neoliberal policies as that of Mubarak, and even worse. It could not solve any of the problems faced by the Egyptian people. Secondly, Morsi was elected as a result of a gigantic fraud ... Millions were given to people to buy their votes. The Muslim Brotherhood were mobilised to control the polling stations, which made it impossible for the others to vote, to such an extent that the Egyptian judges who normally oversee the election were disgusted and withdrew their support for the election process. Despite that, the US Embassy and Europe declared the election was perfect. This is how Morsi was elected.10

Amin expresses a valid critique that both the military and the religious organisations embrace a neoliberal orientation in their economic priorities. Together, they manage a large portion of the Egyptian economy. Many Egyptians work for and get so-called “welfare” services from them. The almost never-ending conflict between the two powerful organisations (one supposedly secular, the other religious) might lead to the collapse of order. It happened in Somalia, and it is currently generating the semi-collapse of Syria – and it might possibly lead to some sort of ongoing disorder and disenchantment in Egypt. Both organisations benefit from powerful transnational networks. On the other hand, Africans have, this time, chosen the civilian side. African leaders suspended Egypt’s membership in the AU, while some countries on the continent severed diplomatic relations with Cairo. Historically, the continent has had considerable experience of military coups.

With the January uprising of 2011, TNGOs expected a more open and Western-oriented democratic Egypt. Instead, better-organised Islamic groups won the elections and the subsequent referendum. Responses from several TNGOs indicated their disappointment with developments in Egypt. TNGOs criticised the process of constitutional reform, particularly on gender issues, and also the pressure on foreign NGOs operating in Egypt. TNGOs failed to take a tougher stand against the Egyptian coup for two main reasons. The first relates to “rooted cosmopolitans” that operate through transnational “connective” structures with contentious power and political national institutions that constrain TNGOs. According to this perspective, in “contentious politics” TNGOs might choose cooperation rather than confrontation with governments. In addition, some Western governments have little sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood taking power in Egypt. Islamists leading powerful countries like Egypt and Turkey might transform the region in favour of implementing alternative socio-political structures. It is possible that conflicting signals sent by Western governments and TNGOs after Morsi took power might have convinced the military to reclaim power. Secondly, the international impetus for the “Arab spring” no longer exists. With the absence of a global civic movement, TNGOs prefer to concentrate on institutional organisational conditions.

Conclusion

The case of Egypt following the January 2011 uprising and the subsequent July 2013 coup shows that TNGOs actively contribute to the development of, and political transformation in, developing countries. Their contribution depends on the prevailing power relations and dynamics of the local, national and transnational circumstances. TNGOs seek to balance the mobilisation dimension, which is often popular and civic-oriented, with the organisational aspects necessary for organisations to operate in politically-contentious institutional environments. Responses from TNGOs such as Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center to the Egyptian January 2011 uprising and the military coup in July 2013, confirm this pattern. The Egyptian conflict remains unresolved, and continues to dominate debates in international politics. Furthermore, the case illustrates the failure of postcolonial politics and decades-long authoritarianism sustained by geopolitically-motivated external interventions. Consequently, the Egyptian people fragmented into diverse political and social groups linked to complex transnational constituents. For instance, the two most powerful groups, the military complex and the Muslim Brotherhood, both retain international networks. Power and substantial political struggle in Egypt revolves around these two powerful contenders and their formal and informal national and international networks. The military remains the main industrial producer and property owner in the country. This economic platform links the army to the global economy. General Abdalaziz Sisi, the top military figure, currently gets funds from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which consolidates his position and a process of constitutional reform favouring military consolidation. General Sisi is now the elected president of post-coup Egypt. The election process has been mainly biased and unfair for opposition groups, as procedures seemed more of the crowning of an individual, rather than an equal contestation. With this new military head of a military regime expected to rule the country under harsh authoritarianism, Egypt’s future remains uncertain, unless some sort of bottom-up movement remerges.

For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a religious organisation – though banned within the country – continuously interacts with transnational devotional networks in almost every country in the world. Thus, their persecution and prohibition in Egypt is unlikely to succeed in the long term, as the organisation has transnational offices and a membership that will persist in challenging the military regime. In between the two competing heavyweights, the Egyptian people suffer. Increasingly, some new movements calling for consensus for the sake of Egypt are trying to emerge in the country. Activists established multi-religious and multi-ideological networks seeking to overcome the entrenched military-Brotherhood dilemma by concentrating on non-ideological solutions, rather than the usual confrontation\(^1\). These new movements have the potential to help Egypt overcome the stalemate.

Therefore, despite the presence of authoritarianism in Egypt, the civic call and mobilisation for eish, karama and huriyah (bread, dignity and freedom) continues to send a res-

onating message. The reason is that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians are young people, many of whom are connected to the world and exposed to the lifestyles in more prosperous parts of the world. Besides, the funding from richer countries currently partially-ensuring military superiority in the country might not persist.

At the moment, TNGOs seem reluctant to fully oppose Egyptian authoritarianism. Therefore, it is difficult to conclusively categorise these organisations as either transnational network activists – rooted cosmopolitans that depend on political opportunities – or as transnational cultural platforms for hegemonic states.
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Chapter 6
Rethinking Transnational NGOs in African Development

Paul Opoku-Mensah

Introduction

The publication in 1987 by World Development of a special issue titled, “Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs [Nongovernmental Organisations]”, brought to the fore actors that, hitherto, were marginal to both research and development practice. In addition, the issue also served to launch a veritable research industry on development NGOs that continues until today. But, even more important than introducing a new set of actors to research, was the fact that the issue, which has since become the locus classicus of the development NGO literature, introduced a normative framework within which the roles of NGOs was to be understood and promoted. Specifically, these were new actors whose roles were to change the nature of development itself by implementing new conceptions of development. In this conception, NGOs were to provide alternatives to the dominant development model. For instance, writing during the very early days of NGO growth, Robert Chambers argued:

Against the gloom and frenetic rise and fall of fashions can be set one steady trend which augurs well in the long term: the gradual emergence of a new set of ideas about the theory and practice of development ... NGOs are well placed to develop and implement the new paradigm (Chambers, 1986).

Similar sentiments are expressed by the authors of one of the early comparative studies on development NGOs:

NGOs inspire the thinking behind a theoretical reformulation of development and become the vehicles through whose actions that possibility might be made real (Farrington et al, 1993).

This attention to NGOs at the research level was also reflected at the policy level, where NGOs became the favoured channel of official development aid. Concretely, since the 1980s in particular, NGOs have become an important channel for development assistance across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, including the Nordic countries. For instance, in the US, a New Partnership Initiative by the Clinton Administration was introduced, which aimed to channel at least forty per cent of all USAID support through NGOs. Coming to Scandinavia, the case of Norway exemplifies this trend, with total assistance channelled through NGOs in 2000 amounting to close to three billion Norwegian Crowns (NOK), or almost fifty per cent of all bilateral aid. In 1999, the amount was close to 2.6 billion NOK. This is an increase of almost 200 million
NOK compared with 1998. In 2002, the amount channelled through NGOs was close to three billion NOK. The Norwegian situation partly reflects global trends, where in 1994, over ten per cent of public development aid (eight billion USD) was channelled through NGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined United Nations system (six billion USD). This increased attraction to NGOs contributed to massive growth of development NGOs all over, Denmark, included. The Norwegian situation was symptomatic of the general situation in most OECD countries. That is, an NGO channel in aid that, as I will be arguing later, came to be known as the Donor-State-NGO (DOSTANGO), and was established with implications for development. The establishment of this system, and the resources channelled through it, partly provided the impetus for the massive growth and proliferation of development NGOs that took place in the OECD countries.

Overall, this growth of the NGO channel in development was premised on the grounds that NGO activities were able to bypass the bureaucratic and corrupt state agencies in developing countries, thus ensuring that development reached the poorest and most marginalised. Additionally, their activities were said to contribute to strengthening “civil society”, essential to the consolidation of democracy in developing countries. Partly as a result of this policy shift in the OECD countries, transnational NGOs established a powerful presence on the institutional landscape of many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and became central actors in the debates, policies, and programmes related to the development and democratisation of these countries. While this normative expectation found expression worldwide, its impact was particularly felt in African development. Here, and beginning from the late 1980s, transnational development NGOs became major development actors because of normative expectations of their emancipatory potential to transform the nature of African development and democratisation.

Almost thirty years after this massive engagement of transnational development NGOs in African development, what is the result? Put differently, to what extent have transnational development NGO activities contributed to the objectives of development in Africa? In other words, have NGOs restructured African development in terms of contribution to the emergence and implementation of alternative conceptions of development? This is the focus of this chapter, which seeks to examine the evidence vis-à-vis their hypothesised roles in African development. To do so, the chapter is structured as follows: the next section looks at internal factors within Africa that led to the proliferation of NGOs. This is followed by an examination of the extent to which NGOs have actually restructured development, using mostly the case of Ghana, albeit with examples from other places. The section which follows examines the extent to which the activities of NGOs have transformed the nature of development in line with the expectations of the theoretical and policy literature. In other words, have they changed the dominant conceptions of development and aided the development of a viable civil society space and actors in Africa? The concluding section ties the thread together and examines the implications for the future of NGO roles in Africa.
Transnational NGOs and the Roots of Engagement

Writing two decades ago, at the height of the “NGO Decade” in African development, Eve Sandberg argued that, from relative obscurity, NGOs had become a “significant force”, not just a “category,” in African politics. The result, she stressed, is that one could no longer pretend to understand African politics, especially development politics, without a critical understanding of the relations among NGOs and African states (Sandberg, 1994: 3). Like other authors, Eve Sandberg was reacting to the dramatic increase in the activities of development NGOs per se, as well as a redefinition of power in development that their roles were engendering in Africa. In effect, Sandberg and other actors were referring to an “NGO-isation” of African society that was taking place. That is, while NGOs had always been a part of Africa’s institutional landscape, this phenomenal growth was a new development, and was unprecedented. The (domestic) context for this NGO-isation of African development were two domestic processes – economic and political liberalisation adopted by African countries in response to economic and political crisis.

Economic Liberalisation and NGOs in African Development

The initial impetus for the growing academic and policy interest in NGOs was an economic crisis that affected African countries between the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant attempts at addressing it. The economic crisis of African countries of the 1980s has been widely discussed and documented (World Bank, 1989). At base, this crisis involved a massive debt burden, balance of payments problems, political instability, and the preva- lence of poverty in the midst of autocratic and corrupt regimes. Three issues arising out of the crisis provide the context for NGO roles. These were i) the perceived “retreat” or “withdrawal” of the state from development, ii) the presumed comparative advantages of NGOs to contribute to addressing the crisis, and finally, iii) the “emergence” of a new global development orthodoxy highlighting the role of NGOs. First, as the crisis led to a “withdrawal” of the state in development, local communities responded by forming voluntary organisations. At the same time, there was a massive inflow of transnational NGOs to the continent to respond to this development crisis (Bratton, 1989). The second relates to policies adopted to address the crisis, which also focused attention on the roles of NGOs. The overall policy response in African countries to this crisis consisted of the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These neoliberal inspired programs, introduced under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) involved massive reductions of the role of the state, and a corresponding emphasis on private sector actors in development. In its prototype, the SAPs enjoined African governments to pursue liberal economic policies (e.g. the liberalisation of foreign trade, currency devaluations, cutbacks in social expenditure, removals of food and agricultural subsidies, tight controls of money supplies, reductions in public employment, and privatisations of state-owned enterprises). At the core of structural adjustment, therefore, was disillusionment with the efficiency of state intervention. The implementation of SAPs, therefore, specifically emphasised the size and inefficiency of the public sector as the main cause of Africa’s lack of economic growth. The goal, therefore, was to institute policy changes that would reduce the state’s role and revitalise institutional actors in the
private sector to fill the gaps resulting from the state’s withdrawal (Gibbon and Olukoshi, 1996).

The SAPs influenced the evolution of NGOs in Africa at two levels: first the World Bank, along with other multilateral and bilateral donors, supported an expanded role for NGOs because they were interested, ideologically, in the promotion of initiatives to circumvent the pervasive public sector. This is because the public sector was regarded as corrupt, over-bloated and inefficient, and indeed the cause of Africa’s dismal development performance. Therefore, a consensus emerged: to look for alternative actors in promoting Africa’s development. The private sector, including NGOs, was identified as such an actor as, in contrast to the public sector, it was regarded as more flexible and efficient (World Bank, 1989). NGOs were particularly targeted by the market-oriented economies whose agenda was the simultaneous expansion of the role of the private sector and a curtailing of state involvement in social and economic activities (Kanyinga, 1993). Second, in the implementation of the social aspects of the programme, NGOs were targeted because of what was perceived as their “comparative advantages” over the state and the multilateral agencies. Specifically, the perception was that NGOs had vast practical experience in mitigating local development problems: utilising cost-effective, innovative and flexible methods of development operations; understanding and incorporating local institutions and values; and targeting the poor and marginalised in their operations. As Bratton argues:

*Recent performance suggests that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have a comparative advantage over international donor agencies, national governments and private firms when addressing the basic needs of the rural poor ...* Operating with minimal resources on micro-projects in neglected regions, NGOs promise to strengthen rural people’s abilities to improve their own lives (Bratton, 1989: 569. See also Drabek 1987; UNDP, 1993).

This conception of the roles of NGOs was decisive in legitimising and funding their increased involvement in development programs in the 1980s and early 1990s. This is particularly evident at the level of implementing programmes which addressed the social costs of the adjustment process. In the face of sustained, and, in some instances, violent criticisms of the social effects of the adjustment regime, the SAPs were modified after 1987-88 to include “social safety nets” or “Social Dimensions” programmes. These activities, mostly project-based and funded by external donors, involve various compensatory initiatives directed at benefiting the poor. In implementing these projects, NGOs, because of their comparative advantages, were considered to be implementers par excellence by donors. Consequently, the funds for these compensatory initiatives were channelled through NGOs. As of 1996, the World Bank, for instance, had financed some thirty major social funds, mainly in Latin America and Africa, amounting to more than one billion US dollars, with a considerable part of that amount being channelled to NGOs. In the 1995 fiscal year, for instance, NGOs played an implementation role in 78 percent of Social Fund projects approved the World Bank (World Bank 1996a). In justifying its reliance on NGOs, it says:
Experience has shown the importance of ensuring NGO participation in the design as well as the administration of Social Funds – particularly to help guard against the funds being distorted toward political objectives. Furthermore, involvement of beneficiaries ... is vital to long-term sustainability, and often NGOs ... are well positioned to support local participation in community development (World Bank 1996a).

Beyond financial resources, the process of developing these social programs represented the first time that African governments were relating to NGOs as autonomous institutional actors in development policy discussions (Laryea, 1994). These African-specific policies coincided with developments in the international political economy, characterised by the dominance of a global development ideology with preference for the use of private non-state actors. With the opportunities created by these developments, NGOs were set up with the aim of sharing in the flow of international donor funding that had become available, thus tremendously increasing the number of NGOs on the continent. In effect, the development crisis, and its response in Africa, as well as the ideological dominance of neoliberalism, provided the initial context for the role of NGOs in Africa’s political economy.

**Political Liberalisation – Good Governance – and NGOs in African Development**

The context and justification for transnational NGO roles in Africa shifted in the 1990s in ways that reinforced, and in many respects strengthened, the continuous role of NGOs in African development. Specifically, the 1990s marked the third wave of democratisation that blew across the world, Africa included. In the African context, this period witnessed historically-unparalleled transitions from autocratic to democratic forms of governance, with implications for NGOs. Whereas before 1989, only nine sub-Saharan African countries held competitive multiparty elections, by the end of 2000, sub-Saharan Africa witnessed seventy presidential elections (spread across most of the region’s forty-eight countries) involving more than one candidate. Over the same period, legislative elections involving at least two parties were held at least once in forth-two countries. By the late 1990s, national legislatures in thirty-nine of the forty-eight sub-Saharan countries contained representatives from at least two political parties. Only Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, and Uganda resisted this trend towards the hosting of multiparty elections.

This development had profound implications for NGOs’ roles in African development in at least three ways. First, the democratic environment provided conditions in which NGOs and other civil society organisations could emerge. In other words, political liberalisation in Africa opened up more civic space for the formation of autonomous organisations in countries where previously it was impossible to do so (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997). Second, the development of this civic space and the organisations therein became a critical source of legitimisation and continued support for NGO roles on the continent. The argument was that the consolidation of democracy on the continent, as elsewhere, was critically de-
ependent on an active, well-resourced civil society able to engage, and limit, the autocratic reach of the state. Buoyed by civil society’s role in the transition, expectations were that civil society would play an active role in the consolidation of democracy on the continent (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997; Habib and Opoku-Mensah, 2003). This then became a central element in legitimising a continuous role for NGOs in Africa in the 1990s and beyond.

The third, and by far the most profound, effect of the wave of democratisation was the reformulation that occurred at the level of development theory and policy. The theoretical discussions on civil society and its roles in democratisation entered the development discourse in the 1990s. In its (re)incarnation within development discourse, it took the form of a “good governance agenda” (Lewis, 2002; World Bank, 1989; 1992; AbrahamSEN, 2000), also referred to as the new policy agenda (Edwards and Hulme, 1997; or new development paradigm (Tvedt, 1998). In general, however, “good governance” has been the dominant term in usage promoted first by the World Bank, but subsequently appropriated by other multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The good governance discourse represented the (re)discovery of politics and its relevance to development, and was thus a major departure from the neoliberal development orthodoxy of the 1980s, which largely ignored the political sphere. The agenda was a recognition that merely “rolling back the frontiers of the state” was not enough to promote development, and that closer attention had to be paid to politics. The agenda thus inserted democracy into the development discourse, and in the process, reversed years of development orthodoxy on the role of democracy in development, and the link between the two. Early development theorising alternated between views that democracy would be the ultimate result of development, to ideas that development and democracy were incompatible. This reversal was absolute, as democracy became the unifying theme of development discourse, an absolute necessity for a successful development process, and its main source of public legitimacy in donor countries (Abrahamsen, 2000; Tvedt, 1998).

As a policy prescription, it introduced some far-reaching changes with implications for NGO roles on the continent. Africa’s development crisis and its solution, diagnosed in the early 1980s as one of economic mismanagement, were reformulated to include the level of politics. The crisis therefore was also one of (good) governance. While this was a major departure from the 1980s, the crucial role of NGOs was, however, still a central part in the reformulation. Indeed, the ultimate aim of the good governance agenda was the liberation of civil society which, it was argued, had been weakened by the authoritarian governments of previous years (Abrahamsen, 2000). In this conceptualisation, attention was still focused on development NGOs. This time, however, their engagement was not to be limited to development. To the contrary, both development and democracy were dependent on building a strong “civil society” with strong organisations, represented by development NGOs. As Alan Fowler explains:

*The dominant western concept of socio-economic development based on liberalism and market forces maintains that NGOs must be supported because of their political role within civil society. It is envisaged that people must be empowered to take over some aspects of development from the overbearing, auto-
cratic, inefficient and corrupt states that have commonly ruled in Africa. NGOs must also provide countervailing power to govern-
ment expansionism; strengthen people’s ability to hold pub-
lic servants and politicians accountable for their actions; and, foster democratic change by expanding social pluralism (cited in Allen, 1997: 336).

The policy imperative, therefore, is to strengthen the position of NGOs vis-à-vis African governments. The expectation, therefore, is that, as NGOs are strengthened by channel-
ing funds through them and by increasing their control over development programs, so too would civil society be as a whole (Farrington et al 1993; 1996; Allen, 1997). This was a departure from the conceptualisation of the 1980s, where the role of NGOs was to re-
place the state in development, to ensure that development reached those who needed it most.

This, in sum, provides the context for the discussion of NGOs and their roles in African de-
velopment. It is a context that builds on normative expectations for NGOs to restructure the nature of development in ways that break the dominance of the state in development and governance. It is informed by, and feeds on the NGO channel in aid that was estab-
lished by the OECD countries, and which influenced the growth of transnational NGOs in African development.

Transnational NGOs and the restructuring of African Development

The culmination of the external policy context – the reformulation of development think-
ing and the OECD donor interest in NGOs – as well as the internal domestic dynamics in African countries, largely account for the roles that NGOs came to play in African develop-
ment. In large part, their activities were therefore legitimised at two levels: first they were to restructure development; and second, they were to build civil society. What has the result of the nearly thirty years of their involvement in African development been? Have they [NGOs] been able to influence African development along the lines conceptu-
alised above? In other words, have they transformed the nature of African development, as well as empowered civil society in Africa?

In answering these questions, it needs to be stressed that first, by their very presence on Africa’s institutional landscape, they have helped to change the institutional dynamics in African development. In a number of African countries, transnational NGOs such as World Vision; Oxfam, IBIS, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Plan; and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) have become household names and are engaged in crosscutting relations with a diverse set of actors, and contribute strongly to the discourse and practice of African development. Through their activities and resources, they contribute to the practice of development, particularly in rural areas. For instance, the city of Tamale, the capital of Northern Ghana where the field headquarters of the or-
ganisation I direct is located, is referred to as the “NGO capital” of Ghana because of the large presence of NGOs in the city and region. Beyond the development activities per se
is the level of employment that transnational NGOs provide in the country. From organisation like IBIS, World Vision, CARE, Plan, CRS, and Techno-serve, Conservation International, Compassion International, Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid and so on, NGOs have a ubiquitous presence on the developmental landscape, even in the midst of reduced roles in official development assistance. Public action by, and in support of, disadvantaged people undertaken by NGOs (and a range of other nongovernmental actors) is therefore an increasingly-important aspect of social and economic change at local and international levels (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2007).

But, thirty years after their increased involvement in African development, an assessment of their roles would have to engage the theoretical and policy debates that that heralded and supported their roles in African development. And this debate relates to the extent to which they have been able to rethink and develop alternatives to the dominant development practice, and the extent to which they have helped build civil society. To answer the first part of the question, I examine their roles in development policy-making in Ghana, a domain with the possibility of changing development policy directions. This is because of normative expectations that it is, at the level of policy-making, that NGOs can actually influence the macro-level changes essential to address Africa’s developmental problems. It is in this context that Michael Bratton, for instance, argues that “NGO contributions will be piecemeal and short-lived unless NGOs themselves develop the capacity to form and influence the public policy environment” (Bratton, 1994: 57); and Yash Tandon maintains that, given Africa’s problems, NGOs in Africa remain “unthinking” so long as they are not involved in policy discussions (Tandon, 1996). Against this backdrop, how and to what effect NGOs influence development policies remains an issue of both theoretical and policy importance, and is a crucial yardstick for measuring the overall impact of NGOs in African development. The next section therefore examines the extent to which NGOs are redefining the nature of the continent’s development politics, and does so in the context of an analysis of NGO roles in development policymaking in Ghana. The focus of the analysis is not on specific policies. Rather the focus is on the major development-policy-making processes in the country, and the extent to which NGOs – both as institutional actors as well as as individual organisations – influence these processes.

**NGOs and Development-Policymaking in Ghana: The Beginnings**

The initial impetus for NGO-involvement in development-policymaking in the country was the process of the SAPs initially adopted in 1983. Specifically, as a result of international campaigning by NGOs towards the World Bank, an agreement was reached in 1995 by NGOs and the World Bank to undertake a joint investigation into the impact of the SAPs worldwide. Ghana was selected as one of eight countries in which such an investigation, referred to as the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), would be implemented. The SAPRI review, formally launched in Ghana on November 25, 1996, and its implementation completed in 2001, began a process that has profoundly affected the nature of development-policymaking in the country. Specifically, it initiated a process of breaking the (historical) monopoly of the state in development policy, and legitimised and institutionalised the inclusion of civil society organisations, including NGOs, in the
process. This occurred at two levels. First, although SAPRI was a tripartite process involving the World Bank, the government and NGOs, the coordination of the process at all levels: global, regional, and national, was given to NGOs. At the global level, the process was coordinated by an NGO, the Development Group for Alternative Policies (Development GAP) in Washington D.C. (www.developmentgap.org), while the Africa regional office of the Third World Network (www.twn.org) was appointed the lead organisation for Africa.

Institutionally, however, the SAPRI process in the country was managed by the Civil Society Coordinating Council (CIVISOC), an elected body representing about forty NGOs in Ghana, which coordinated the review process on behalf of NGO and other civil society organisations. An important body was an eight-member CIVISOC management committee, which was responsible for management decisions and the provision of general direction to CIVISOC, in both the administrative and technical sense (Britwum et al., 2001). This process of assigning responsibility for SAPRI to NGOs had the effect of instantly conferring visibility and credibility to these organisations that had, historically, been peripheral to development policy processes (ibid). For instance, it allowed for high-level interaction between NGOs and government through, among others, the setting up of committees made up of representatives of NGOs, the Ghanaian government, and the World Bank. The first of such committees established by SAPRI, a twelve-member information team, had half of its membership made up of NGOs and the other half from the Ghanaian government and the World Bank. This SAPRI team had access to and reviewed confidential World Bank documents related to the structural adjustment programme in Ghana. CIVISOC also embarked on a series of development policy literacy programs to improve the low level of knowledge of economic policy issues by NGOs. The first of these CIVISOC educational activities on economic policy issues was a workshop on the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) held in February 1999. This meeting was designed to increase the knowledge of NGO participants about the enormous power and controversial roles of the IFIs over development policy in Ghana and the developing world at large (Britwum, et al, 2001).

Second, in addition to a review of the impact of the SAPs, a major objective of the SAPRI was to determine how NGOs and civil society organisations could participate in and improve development-policymaking (ibid). Consequently, the World Bank, through its influence in the country, began a process that has led to the gradual institutionalisation of NGOs and civil society participation in development-policymaking. First, as a product of the SAPRI process, a biennial National Economic Forum that brings together all the major institutional actors in the country: donors, the government, the private business sector and NGOs, to discuss the country’s development direction has been established. In addition, a number of developments have further consolidated this. For instance, and in what was a major recognition of the SAPRI process, the World Bank Country Director asked for CIVISOC-input into the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Ghana for the 2000-2003 period. In response, CIVISOC organised a series of national and regional workshops at which NGOs could express their views on the CAS. Similarly, on April 4 2000, a workshop was organised on The Work of the Finance Committee of Parliament for CIVISOC. The aim was to strengthen the relationship between NGOs and the economic committees of parliament, and to teach NGOs ways of influencing the work of parliament and its committees. A final symbolic recognition of the new role of NGOs as major devel-
opment actors occurred during the December 2000 Presidential Elections, when Ghana recorded its first democratic transfer of power from one elected government to another. The transition team of the new government invited CIVISOC to participate in the work of four subcommittees appointed to work on various aspects of the economy. A meeting was organised on the 17th of January 2001, between a nine-member civil society delegation and the transitional team. This meeting is symbolic, as it represents a final step in the consolidation of the position of NGOs as major development actors in the country (Britwum, 2001).

In effect, SAPRI began a process that is breaking the monopoly of the government in development-policymaking, turning it into a more-inclusive, participatory process of decision-making. The SAPRI process initiated activities which have had far-reaching implications for the nature of development politics in the country. Indeed, some of these activities have achieved a momentum of their own and, in the process, are leading to a tradition of participatory decision-making, involving state and non-state actors in the country. However, the most far-reaching effect of the impact of the SAPRI process on development-policymaking remains the establishment of biennial National Development Forums, three of which have been organised so far in the country.

The National Development Forums in particular provide an indication of the extent of these changes. They bring together representatives from the government, the World Bank, NGOs and the private business sector to discuss development policy directions for the country. The First National Forum was a three-day event held under the aegis of Vision 2020 at the Accra International Conference Centre under the theme, “Structural Adjustment – The Issues and the Debate” with the Speaker of Parliament as the keynote speaker. It was the first national consensus-building exercise for all stakeholders to discuss economic and development policy measures for growth under the Ghana-vision 2020. It was attended by the President, Vice-President, ministers and various other stakeholders, including NGOs, and was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The forum was intended to bring on to the discussion-table the impact of Ghana’s structural adjustment on health, education, governance, agriculture, micro impacts of macroeconomic policies, and gender. The unique feature of the Forum was the opportunity given to the World Bank and Ghanaian government to respond to the issues raised by civil society organisations, including NGOs. A total of 350 participants from the World Bank, Government of Ghana and Civil Society attended the meeting (Britwum, ibid). The second forum was held in March 2001, with the third in May 2003. The third dialogue, which just before the end of May 2003, was organised by the Ghana office of the World Bank, with the support of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and in collaboration with two NGOs: the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development and the Centre for Policy Analysis.

Through these dialogues, a process of institutionalising a new architecture of development-policymaking, involving the participation of state and non-state actors – including NGOs – is taking shape in the country. This new architecture reverses the monopoly of the state in development policy decisions, and formalises a role for NGOs and other civil society organisations in development-policymaking. Increasingly, there is evidence that
this has the potential to develop a national consensus for development, something that, so far, has eluded the country. Although the impetus is from the World Bank and the external donor system, there are expectations that the process will be sustained to become a permanent feature in the governance of the country. The indications, so far, indicate that this might be happening. Indeed, since the end of the SAPRI process in 2001, the forums have been transformed into annual National Economic Dialogues which are gradually becoming the forum for discussing national policy directions.

An evaluation of the SAPRI and the other processes indicates a definite shift in the nature of development-policymaking in ways that are completely different from just a decade ago, where development-policymaking was the preserve of the state. Currently, development-policymaking is becoming a consultative process, with NGOs and other civil society organisations becoming an institutionalised part of it. Increasingly, the utility of the process is acknowledged by all the major institutional actors in the country: the government, opposition parties, the private sector and NGOs. Overall, the evidence points to changes in the nature of development-policymaking in the country, in ways that allow participation by NGOs. But is it an indication of a long-term and permanent realignment of power relations, enabling NGOs to restructure the nature and content of African development? In other words, do these changes allow NGOs to outline and implement alternative conceptions of development?

The evidence so far indicates that, while NGOs have become actors in African development, the structural relations of power have remained relatively intact. Consequently, questions have been raised about the extent to which one can talk of substantive changes in the nature of development-policymaking in the country. For instance, an assessment of the process of developing the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) shows that the process did not represent a decisive break with the past, as it left the power relations and old practices intact:

First, the transparency of the process has been compromised by the inaccessibility of key information held by the IMF and the World Bank. For example, the World Bank Letter of Development Policy remains secret. The IMF’s staff review reports are released selectively. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries documents are also largely inaccessible, even to parliamentarians, let alone NGOs. Second, the credibility of the process has also been undermined by parallel commitments with the IMF (e.g. the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) and the World Bank (Poverty Reduction Support Credit), which predetermine the conclusions of especially-key macroeconomic and structural-reform policies. Thirdly, major, contentious sectoral policies contained in the GPRS were hardly debated. They appear to either have been transported from past programme commitments (e.g. the privatisation of utility services, energy policies, land reforms, the sale of state-owned enterprises, and so on) or were picked from official addresses and passed on or strongly pushed by donors (ibid).

In effect, while there are obvious changes in terms of the inclusion of more actors in policy discussions, these new actors hardly determine outcomes. It is for this reason that Charles Abugre, a long-time observer on the NGO and civil society scene in Ghana, argues
that development policy preferences in the country are predetermined by external donors, and therefore are outside the influence of civil society actors, including NGOs. This, de facto, ensures that NGOs – both transnational and national – can only react to policy prescriptions, rather than respond to policy choices. An assessment of participation of different actors in the formulation of the National Renewable Natural Resources Strategy, for instance, indicates that, although NGOs and civil society organisations have become part of the development-policymaking community, they are secondary actors whose input comes very late in the process. They do not participate in the initiation of policies. Rather, their participation is limited to strategy formulation and finalisation, at which stage they hardly have any room to change the contents of policies.

At the organisational level, capacity problems also work to preclude effective NGO participation in development-policymaking. In principle, effective participation in policy processes must rest on solid fiscal, cognitive and political legitimacy. Practically, this implies that NGOs have the requisite technical expertise and competence related to policies under discussion, the financial resources to participate, and finally the political legitimacy arising from their embeddedness in the domestic polity. At the institutional level, Ghanaian NGOs lack all these. First, technical competence has been lacking, leading to a reliance on external consultants from transnational NGOs to represent them in policy discussions (MacKay and Gariba, 2000). Indeed, at the national level, only one NGO, the Integrated Social Development Centre, is repeatedly mentioned as having capacity of any sort to effectively engage in policy discussions. Those with the capacity have been the transnational NGOs whose governments promoted their participation. This has led to concerns about the danger of crowding out African NGOs in the emerging policy spaces on the continent. With the relative thaw in state-civil society relations, and with it an opening up of policy spaces for NGOs and other civil society in most African countries, there are real concerns that these spaces are not occupied by African NGOs. Rather, because of a lack of capacity, they can be pushed out of these policy spaces by foreign NGOs. The example of development-policymaking in Ghana is also sometimes reflected at the continental level. The case of the African Commission for Human Rights (ACHR), with a progressive history of engaging civil society, is an example of this. The activities of African NGOs and civil society organisations are critical in ensuring national implementation of the rights enshrined in the Charter and enforcement of the recommendations of the Commission. Yet, access to and engagement with the Commission, as with other pan-African institutions, favours international NGOs because of their superior resources.

Second, without the support of external donors who have underwritten the participation of NGOs in national-level strategic policy frameworks, NGOs would have been prevented from participation due to a lack of financial resources. This is particularly reflected in the finances of the existing NGO networks that, as is discussed later in the next section, exist on the beneficence of external donors (ibid). The final challenge relates to a lack of political legitimacy by Ghanaian NGOs, as the evolution of NGOs into actors who relate to the state on issues of development policy has been achieved at the instance of donors, in particular the World Bank and the UNDP (Opoku-Mensah, 2004). In the case of SAPRI for instance, not only was the decision to involve NGOs taken outside Ghana by the World Bank, but indeed the selection of the particular NGOs to participate was made in
Washington D.C., without any involvement by Ghanaian NGO actors. The corollary is that the political legitimacy for NGO-involvement in development-policymaking is not derived domestically, but through donors. This in itself does not make the participation of NGOs illegitimate. However, it does raise questions of long-term viability, and continuous involvement of NGOs in the policy process, should donor support cease.

Additionally, and most importantly, not only are there indications that NGOs have not been able to change the content of African development politics, there is also growing concern that, through their participation in donor-sponsored processes like SAPRI and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), they serve to create consensus and legitimacy for a depoliticised neoliberal, market-oriented conception of development and poverty reduction that, it is argued, has caused much of the recent growth in poverty and inequality in Africa. For instance, while the legitimacy of this system is premised on its ability to reduce poverty, it is also a corporatist system in which NGOs, through their inclusion in donor-sponsored processes like the PRSPs, are mobilised in support of a depoliticised neoliberal conception of development and poverty reduction. Indeed, in Ghana and a number of African countries that adopted SAPs, the effect of donor support for NGOs has been to ensure the incorporation and acquiescence of the constituency which initially opposed the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the IMF. In effect, donor-NGO relations contribute to poverty production through their perpetuation of the very same neoliberal, market-oriented policies and structures that, as is often argued, produce the same poverty they seek to address (Manji and O’Coill, 2002).

Conclusion

Since the 1980s, the “NGO Decade” in African development discourse, transnational NGOs have become major actors in African development, with the capacity and resources to match UN agencies, and, in some instances, dwarfing governmental ministries in Africa countries. Indeed, from service delivery to advocacy, transnational NGOs such as World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam, Plan, and Action Aid have become household names, engaged in crosscutting development issues in a number of African countries. Their role in African development is premised on normative expectations of their ability to serve as agents for social empowerment, transformation and justice.

This chapter has sought to provide the context and rationale for this growth of NGOs in African development, and to assess and question this normative expectation of the transformational roles of transnational NGOs. Specifically, the chapter argues that the role of transnational NGOs in African development presents a paradox. While they play critical developmental roles, their activities also undermine the long-term structural changes that are necessary for transformational development on the continent. First, transnational NGOs, while rhetorically committed to transformational development, are, in reality, part of an international system referred to as the DOSTANGO system. This is a corporatist system in which transnational NGOs are mobilised in support of a depoliticised conception of development that, it is often argued, produces the same underdevelopment that transnational NGOs seek to address. Second, transnational NGOs which, through their superior
resources and capacity, crowd out national NGOs, undermining the urgent need to build a transnational NGO sphere that is embedded in African societies, are organically-linked to African organisations and respond to the specificities of pan-African development policy challenges. The case of development-policymaking in Ghana, as well as the ACHR, with a progressive history of engaging NGOs, is an example. While the activities of African NGOs are critical in ensuring national implementation of the rights enshrined in the Charter and the enforcement of the recommendations of the Commission, access to and engagement with the Commission, as with other pan-African institutions, nonetheless favours transnational NGOs because of their superior resources.

This has implications for understanding the future roles of NGOs in African development. A critical examination of these changes, however, does not support claims of a fundamental redefinition of development in the country. This is because NGO roles are a process micromanaged by the aid system (cf. Tvedt, 1998; 2002), and which leaves the structural relations of power intact. This has implications for assessing the impact of transnational NGOs in African development. Specifically, it questions the triumphalist claims (cf. Sandberg, 1994) of a permanent realignment of power relations in African development that allows NGOs to influence the content of African development in profound ways. While NGOs have become integral parts of development-policymaking, they are secondary actors who do not participate in the initiation of development policies. Rather, their participation and input comes very late in the process, and is limited to strategy formulation and finalisation, at which stage they hardly have any room to change the contents of policies.

This does not make the role of NGOs illegitimate. It rather highlights the limitations within which these roles are played and the existing disconnection between the normative theoretical discussions and practical reality of NGO roles. The challenge for development NGO research therefore is a reformulation that addresses foundational questions related to the formative role and structural impact of the international aid system on NGOs and their roles; that is, to frame NGO roles in relation to the opportunities and constraints provided by the donor system. Such a reformulation moves the discussions from the normative strictures within which it is currently enmeshed, and enables analyses that provide understanding of the actual and potential role of NGOs to transform development processes in Africa, as elsewhere. Indeed, reframed thus, it can offer a new impetus and a programmatic platform to understand transnational NGOs and their roles in development processes, including in Africa.
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For us, whatever development is, good or bad, success of failure, desirable or otherwise, it is first and foremost a social reality that has to be studied and carefully analysed (J.P. Olivier de Sardan, 1988: 217).

Introduction

Most development professionals would agree that the reality of a development project looks very different from the blueprint set out during the planning process. Explanations for this discrepancy are often project-specific, i.e. blaming the presence of corruption, last-mile problems, inappropriate strategy or technology, the absence of good governance or implementing partner capacity or something completely different but project-specific nonetheless. Some, however, including authors such as Ferguson (1994), Mosse (2004) and Olivier de Sardan (2001) consider inconsistency between policy and practice as inherent to and inevitable in what they call the “developmentalist configuration”, i.e. the billion dollar industry of government agencies, private foundations, NGOs and other civil society organisations with the stated aim of improving the lives of the world’s deprived. Employing anthropological methods on the industry itself rather than its supposed beneficiaries, these authors illuminate how and why various actors (“stakeholders” in industry jargon) with diverging and often opposing strategies, objectives and life-worlds transform development projects during the process of implementation. Implied is that by design the stereotypical transnational NGO-led development project is unlikely to reach its stated targets and aims, regardless of other contextual issues such as corruption, the appropriateness of the project’s technical solution and the implementing partner’s capacity.

Using Ferguson, Mosse and Olivier de Sardan’s theoretical frameworks, the present paper presents a case study of a transnational British-Kenyan employment generation and poverty reduction project. In this case study, other contextual and situational logics took precedence over the technical rationale of the project solution, resulting in an outcome that looked radically different from the one intended. This in turn had adverse effects on the achievement of the project’s two objectives, employment generation and poverty reduction. It is not the intention of this paper to offer ‘how to’s’ and general policy recommendations. Rather the intention is to show how a specific project inevitably was distorted when encountering reality and that project planners do well in anticipating this; and no-where more so than when working transnationally as is the theme of this volume.
At the present moment, the literature summarised below on the “development encounter” is non-normative in its analysis and explicitly avoids making generalised statements about the desirability of discrepancies between blueprint and reality. The present paper should therefore be seen as an extension of and a contribution to this theoretical work, analysing the outcome implications of said discrepancies in a specific case study setting. While the analysis of the present case study is carried out with a transnational development project in mind, the bulk of it easily lends itself to a purely domestic development project context.

The following section of the paper section deals with the literature and theoretical framework, setting out the actor-oriented framework and the ethnographic approach used for examining project distortions and the “developmentalist configuration”. This is followed by the case study description and analysis. Finally, the paper concludes and reflects on the significance of the above theories for development practice.

Theoretical Framework

The opening quote by Olivier de Sardan highlights the importance of non-normative analysis in development studies. As a discipline, development studies is generally concerned with the normative exercise of ranking various states of human existence according to perceived universal judgements on their desirability; a ranking that in turn informs the operationalized branch of development studies, namely development interventions or projects. However, all interventions must invariably encounter the reality that they aim to transform and it is this “development encounter” that constitutes the stage of the present analysis; the interface between the ideal model and the messy reality, between notions of how things should be transformed and how they actually are transformed (or not transformed). Furthermore, it is the interface between the “developmentalist configuration” and their beneficiaries, implying that inherent to the encounter is a meeting of cultures, knowledges and diverging interpretations of the same events as well as the physical meeting between the developers and developees. In the following, each aspect of the encounter is analysed to shed light on the various aspects of the encounter, central to which are the often underestimated differences between the different actors and the less-understood nature and functions of agents at the interface itself.

The “Developmentalist Configuration”

The developmentalist configuration is, as previously noted, an industry with the stated aim of increasing human wellbeing in developing countries and it is enormous. In 2012, the latest year for which data is available from the OECD (2014), total development-related disbursements from DAC countries alone amounted to almost USD 474 billion; with

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This includes official development assistance, ODA; other official flows i.e. transactions from the official sector but not primarily aimed at development efforts or developmental loans with a grant element of less than 25%; and private flows into direct and portfolio investments and export credits. This figure does not include commitments, only actual disbursements.
an additional annual USD 160-175 billion from multilateral aid agencies (QWIDS, 2014). Add to that the billions of dollars that is donated by members of the public to (often religious) foundations, large and small NGOs and local initiatives for which no reliable data is available. It is a highly unregulated and fragmented industry, defying comprehensive analysis, however, several authors have highlighted certain trends and organisational characteristics that have emerged in the post-WWII era. Ferguson’s seminal publication on the ‘Anti-Politics Machine’ in Lesotho (1994) showed how the effects of development projects were not the intended poverty eradication but instead the extension of the bureaucratic power of the Basotho State, a trend he claims is common in most developing countries. Subsequently, his work has informed a series of ethnographic studies on the development industry, many of which do not present a very favourable image of the industry. Rather, a number of studies accuse the industry of serving its own interests, especially the continuation of financial flows, over those of the people it purports to help (e.g. Gould, 2005; Chambers, 1997). Ferguson and others, however, focus their analysis on the structural changes brought about by the industry as social phenomena in their own right, developing positive as opposed to normative theories about the outcome of development encounters. These structural changes are heavily influenced by the certain operational logics inherent to the developmentalist configuration, chief among which is the Foucaultian deployment of policy discourse by powerful actors within the configuration. For instance, Holtom (2005 and 2007) offers insight into the negotiations for the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs that guide the Bank’s engagement with developing countries. Holtom shows how for the case of Tanzania the negotiations were heavily influenced by what he termed a “fraternity of economists”, i.e. an epistemic community that share a common understanding of how the world works, and that all efforts informed by this PRSP necessarily reflect that worldview. Furthermore, Wilson (2004) in a case study from Ethiopia shows how the speed with which discourse and policies change is much too fast for actual project practice to follow, leading her to conclude that projects must continuously reinvent themselves in order to maintain support. This point is of course much similar to Mosse’s (2004) findings that preserving a supportive, “interpretive community” is paramount for the perceived success (and thereby continued funding) of a development project and much more important than actually achieving the original goals on the ground. Common to all the studies mentioned here is the presence of seemingly inevitable, overwhelmingly upwards accountability and unintentional bias in project planning caused by the structural positions of the planners involved.

At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the developmentalist configuration appear to favour civil society organisations, CSOs, as vehicles for social change. This is informed by a liberal, de Tocquevillian reading of the health of societies and democracy as positively correlated with the number of CSOs that is currently in fashion amongst decision-makers. The most common setup is therefore as follows: A Northern transnational NGO identifies a perceived need in a Southern country and designs a project in such a way as to appeal to Northern donors. These include international and

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2 By which is regrettably often understood NGOs, despite the much wider forms of organisations encompassed by the term, including trade unions, social movements etc. See Lewis and Kanji (2009) for a detailed treatment of the role of NGOs, CSOs and development, by which this chapter is informed.

3 This is a stylised description and the reality is, as always, more complex with NNGOs basing their initial needs assessments on Southern inputs etc.
bilateral aid agencies and private foundations and together make up an (Northern) epistemic community on a certain policy issue. However, one of the currently central dogmas of the configuration is that the implementation of said project is best done by Southern organisations. Northern NGOs therefore require Southern “implementing partner organisations” that are enlisted into the configuration with the promises of funds, jobs and knowledge transfers in order to carry out the actual project work with the beneficiaries. The central importance of this dogma is that planners and implementers are separate groups and the result is an organisational setup comprising of four distinct groupings of actors (donors, NNGOs, SNGOs and beneficiaries). On the surface all four appear to share a common understanding of the nature of the development issue at hand; after all they have all bought into the proposed issue identification and project blueprint designed by the NNGO. Potentials for conflict, however, arise when deeper understandings of the issue at hand differ but the short term objective of continuing resource flows takes precedence. Olivier de Sardan (2004) identifies four levels of coherence that must be accommodated by a project design for it to go ahead, namely that i) the technical reasoning behind the proposed solution to the perceived problem must resonate with current sector standards and practices; ii) the ‘real’ mode of organisational behaviour at the project locality must be incorporated to minimise local resistance to change; iii) donor requirements as to budget spending and prioritisation must be accommodated, which, within a global trend towards micro-management under the banner of “results-based management” and “governance mechanisms” becomes increasingly invasive at the project level and iv) the internal, organisational logic in terms of staff-management interaction must be accommodated since internal dynamics have the potential to side-track the entire project. If we perceive the four groups of actors as having differing understandings and ultimate objectives and sharing only a short-term objective in the continuation of resource flows, then we have set the stage for a potentially problematic encounter due to the challenges posed by these four required levels of coherence inherent to any project.

What the Beneficiaries Bring to the Configuration: Peasant Logics and Principles of Side-tracking

No development project is implemented in a vacuum. After 60 years of development efforts virtually every village, town and rural spot in the global South has either had some experience or observed others experience the development encounter. The significance of this fact is that target beneficiaries have formed expectations of likely outcomes, based upon previous experiences but biased towards desired social change (or wish to maintain the status quo). As previously discussed it is plausible that these expectations differ from those of the actors in the developmentalist configuration. Olivier de Sardan (2004) finds that the three main logics underlying the actions of peasants faced with a development project are: to seek safety (minimising perceived risks); making the most of external aid (attempting to maximising resource receipts); and monopolising aid opportunities (not sharing widely within the community, presumably in fear of later losing out). The emerging principles commonly followed by project beneficiaries are therefore a selec- 

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4 Olivier de Sardan examines the stylised African, agricultural development project, but his findings are very relevant for the business development project analysed here.
tive adoption of package solutions and using resources for other-than-intended purposes as defined by the project. As the reader will notice, these logics and principles differ quite significantly from those of the developmentalist configuration. Its actors will have an interest in being perceived as being innovative and daring yet frugal with resources, reaching the maximum number of the most deserving beneficiaries. They may therefore attempt to prevent the appearance of these emergent principles by putting in place various governance checks and balances (or “nudges” or “incentives” if project planning has been informed by the behavioural sciences). In the event that such mechanisms are less-than-perfect in achieving their objectives and the emergent principles do materialise, Olivier de Sardan argues, the structural changes that occur from project interventions are likely to differ from planning blueprints. A similar point is made by Mosse (2004) who argues that planners have little or no control over what actually happens in practice and must instead rely on changing the policy discourse to maintain a perception of coherence within the “supportive communities” where financial and political support is raised. Policy thus becomes a tool for post-rationalisation of situationally ordered events. As will be evident in the case study analysis below, both principles and all three logics are observable in the way the project played out in reality, spurring changes in policy discourse amongst planners as it went along.

Power Relations and Hidden Transcripts

The work of Scott (1990) on the concept of “everyday resistance” is highly useful in the context of highly unequal power relations that can be found within development projects. While Scott’s framework of hidden transcripts was developed with a different type of power relation in mind, namely one that involves the deployment of overt force and control over certain populations, his sociological framework of how relatively powerless groups respond to perceived unjustly unequal power relations offers insight into the beneficiary principles and logics observed by Olivier de Sardan. Using a framework of situational logics, Scott states that power relations are best understood by comparing the official transcripts of public interactions to the hidden transcripts of the powerful and the powerless. The more unequal the power relation, the more the official, consensual transcript will resemble that of the powerful actors while differing from that of the relatively powerless. The powerless in turn engage in small gestures of resistance and seeming contempt for rules as a way of partially regaining dignity that is lost through conforming to the public transcript which is commonly humiliating and to a varying extent restricts their agency. Note that it is the perception of unjustly unequal power relations that brings this mechanism about, not the inequality itself. In the context of the developmentalist configuration’s relationship with its beneficiaries this is likely to occur in the face of behavioural restrictions or requirements that are intended to prevent side-tracking and selective adoption of resource packages. On the surface there may seem to consensus and beneficiary buy-in, but the hidden transcripts (what is intimated and discussed in private) may reveal beneficiary dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the developmentalist configuration and its overtly normative discourse and restrictions on agency. Due

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5 By ‘transcript’, Scott defines all aspects of communication, including verbal exchanges as well as body language, insinuations, hints, deployments of symbols and the intentional withholding of information.
to another situational logic in play, however, namely that of making the most of external aid sources, direct confrontation is perceived too risky, since it may result in the discontinuation of funds. The outcomes of the conflict between these logics (the loss of dignity associated with being subordinated to the developmentalist discourse and subsequent loss of agency on the one hand and the imperative of continuing resource flows on the other) are small acts of everyday resistance and contempt for project stipulations. The same analysis is easily adapted to the relationship between Northern planners and Southern implementers and between donors and Northern planners. While not denying that logics of corruption and personal enrichment may also inform the choice to not adhere to officially agreed-upon codes of conduct, it is important to note that everyday acts of resistance may have the same transformative effect upon projects as corruption if the relation to the Northern partner NGO is perceived as unjustly unequal. Dennehy et al.’s survey of Kenyan implementing NGOs with Northern planning partners (2013), indicates that issues of disempowerment and a lack of Southern engagement are highly salient and potentially destabilising due to widespread perceptions of unjustly unequal distributions of power. In any case, such tensions were highly present in the case study analysed below, with significant effects on the ways in which the project was distorted during implementation.

**Functions at the Interface: Brokerage and Intermediation and the Role of the Field Agent**

So far we have defined the actors and certain characteristics of their relations. We established the likelihood of the various actors coming from differing worldviews thus also introducing the possibility of them not sharing identical points of reference, having differing interpretations of and expectations to the same events. Furthermore, we have discussed how people are likely to respond to unequal power relations that are perceived as unjust. One final aspect to consider is how cooperation between these different interpretations and knowledge systems is facilitated. This is where the concept of development brokerage becomes incredibly useful.

Brokerage as an institution is very old but has received increased attention in international development circles since the 1970s (see Marsden, 1982 and Gould and Fernandez, 1989, for theoretical treatments of the brokerage concept in exchange networks). Defined as the process by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between others lacking trust and/or access to each other, brokerage is closely linked with issues of the distribution of power, influence and the transmission of information within networks. Bierschenk et al. (2002) find that while it is found in every society, it seems particularly common in African societies, which the authors attribute to its central administrative function under colonial rule. All colonial regimes on the continent relied heavily on intermediaries such as interpreters and local chiefs for governing vast territories through so-called indirect rule (e.g. Berry, 1992). Lewis (2006) shows how the function of brokerage has remained largely unchanged even if the actors performing the brokerage services have changed from government officials to NGO staff. Fundamentally, development brokerage is the specialisation in networking for development and hinges on the ability to
position oneself as an indispensable link of the chain connecting development institutions and their intended beneficiaries. For the developmentalist configuration brokers are absolutely crucial, since without them, donors and Northern transnational NGOs would have no access to their intended beneficiaries\(^6\). From the broker’s point of view, keeping the two separate is paramount lest they circumvent the broker, rendering him/her superfluous (current dogmas in the development configuration as mentioned above makes this somewhat non-salient threat). Poignant tools to this end are the monopoly over knowledge and using the trust vested in the broker by one universe to gain trust from the other; i.e. while obtaining legitimacy in the eyes of external donors and planners by claiming to represent the target group, the broker may use this legitimacy to gain authority in the eyes of the beneficiaries by claiming to understand donors and planners. Such understanding is measured by the broker’s success at directing resources to the target population, a move that resonate with the beneficiaries’ situational logics discussed above. As such increasing budgets will be the most salient preoccupation of any broker. Gonzalez emphasises the ability to ‘speak’ both cultures for successful brokerage; beneficiaries and donors alike must be comfortable in the broker’s presence and take this feeling of wellbeing as signs of the broker’s intelligence and higher moral standards (Gonzalez, 1972). Bierschenk et al. (2002) define four competences that successful development brokers must have (namely, rhetorical, organisational, scenographic\(^7\) and relational competences), while citing the availability of decentralised development funds as a crucial enabling condition. This is due to the fact that state bureaucracies may well perform the function of brokerage as has been evident in instances of state-led development efforts where individual brokers have played minimal roles. Finally, Olivier de Sardan (2004) makes a useful distinction between the functions of development brokers and development agents, assigning the former a somewhat negative connotation as someone who siphons off “development rents” in the form of aid flows from the developmentalist configuration. The latter is a more technical role as the field agent who acts as the face of the project to beneficiaries and who must not only mediate between the two knowledge systems but also act as a spokesperson for and interpreter of the technical solution proposed by the project. To a large extent, Olivier de Sardan claims, planning-practice discrepancies can be explained by lack of appreciation of the difficulties development agents have in translating technical solutions belonging to another knowledge system to the intended beneficiaries. In the case study, it will be evident how the project changed nature both due to the intentional actions of development brokers and the practical difficulties of development agents. Interestingly, the functions of both development brokers and agents were embodied in the same person albeit in different situations.

### The Fallacy of the Passive Beneficiary

By emphasising beneficiary and local staff agency, Mosse, Olivier de Sardan, Ferguson, Scott and their kindred follow a school of international development sociology associated with Norman Long and his actor-oriented approach to development interventions (e.g.  

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\(^6\) Brokerage remains necessary even if donors and planners are local to the country where projects are carried out; it is just as necessary to bridge urban-rural gaps as international ones. 

\(^7\) The skill of showcasing situations that correspond to the viewers unarticulated expectations
Long, 1977 and 2001). Within this approach the target population is considered as comprising of active, conscious agents with specific strategies, reacting to the specific context and changes in their environment and not merely passive developees receiving a service. Echoed in the ethnographic writings of his followers discussed here, Long questions the very existence of “planned interventions”, arguing instead that local economic, political, historical and cultural logics dictate the course and outcomes of events and that development projects are but one of many events taking place in the social world in which they are located. It is therefore not realistic to expect the technical logics of a development project to take precedence and dictate the outcome of events. As will hopefully be evident in the following case study, beneficiaries and development agents alike were very active during the implementation of the project, and all had many other spheres of social life that had to be catered for outside the project. The problems encountered by the project in terms of reaching its objectives were to a large extent due to the failure of the Northern planners to fully grasp this fact.

The Case Study

The Project in question here is a setup by a British NGO (the Planner) providing business loans to medium-sized entrepreneurs in several African countries. The technical rationale of the Project is that the African private sector holds enormous potential for creating jobs and thus for reducing poverty and adding value to the economy, but that this potential is constrained by lack of access to meaningful finance: Common microfinance and informal credit schemes are too small to be of use for a successful entrepreneur and in any case too indiscriminate in terms of entrepreneurial talent, while formal banks have prohibitively strict collateral requirements, requiring land title deeds which many people do not have. This lack of access to business finance is thought to explain the observed economic pattern in African economies whereby a plethora of small (informal) businesses with limited and insecure employment opportunities co-exist with a handful of large (formal) companies run by those few individuals with both access to finance and entrepreneurial talent. Not only does the lack of access to finance perpetuate inequality, but it hinders employment creation, especially in (semi-)urban areas where dependency ratios and unemployment rates are high. Through this reasoning, job creation has become the favoured metric of success used by the Project, not least since the 2013 World Development Report mapped out the seemingly automatic linkages between job creation and poverty reduction. The Project therefore attempts to restrict the beneficiary logics and emerging principles discussed above in favour of more job creation, and invariably, also restricts beneficiary agency in the process. The Project follows the two-tier donor structure common in the developmentalist configuration whereby Northern donors channel funds through the Planner to a Southern NGO (the Implementer), who handles the actual operations and acts as the representative of the Planner and donors in project contexts. The Planner has several governance safety mechanisms in place, the most important ones being that loans can only be used on non-movable equipment and that the Implementer

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8 The founders have requested that their organisation remains anonymous.
9 There is plenty of evidence in favour of this theory, e.g. Fafchamps (2004) and Ramachandran et al. (2009).
CEO has to oversee procurement in order to avoid fraud and side-tracking of resources. In addition to covering direct project costs, the Planner reserves significant budget allocations for “capacity building and training purposes” for the Implementer and its staff. These resources constitute half of the “development rents” associated with the Project, the other half being the loans themselves, rents a successful broker may attempt to capture. The Kenyan chapter was the Project’s first such chapter, opening in 2006 in Oyugis in the western province of Nyanza and the Implementer’s primary activities involve smallholder food security and assisting HIV-positive widows through various income generating activities. Loan applications are received at the main office in Oyugis, where the Implementer CEO screens and prepares them for sending to the Planner’s board of trustees in the UK via email. Here applications are evaluated on the basis of financial soundness as well as social impact criteria and if approved, sent back to the Oyugis office with required funding. The CEO in Oyugis is also in charge of repayment collections and borrower adherence to reporting requirements, which are monthly and quarterly reports on business performance and employment statistics for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The Planner remunerates the Implementer with a percentage-based commission of each loan disbursement and of each repayment. Frequently applications are approved that would only generate one job. As such, the incentives for the Implementer are biased towards bigger, safer loans which may not necessarily be the most effective at creating jobs.

As an internal impact evaluator, I worked with the Implementer when it had been involved with the Project for six years. By then it had administered 14 loans, ranging in size from £1000-3500 (€1200 -4175 or US$1600-5550) in various business sectors in Oyugis and the surrounding countryside. Three loans had been fully repaid, two of which resulting in a second round of (larger) loan disbursements to the same borrower. Through my evaluation, I did find that the loans had largely gone to firms with no or limited access to finance and that the employment generated did have a significant impact on poverty (employee poverty rates dropped to less than 1%, compared to close to one third pre-Project engagement and 46% average in Kenya; author’s findings and World Bank, 2013). However, total employment generation has been low at roughly 60 jobs created with a total loan disbursements of in excess of £30,000. The Project did not have a clearly articulated target for job creation, but 60 jobs has largely been considered a disappointment, especially as it became evident that nine out of the fourteen borrowers had personal connections to the CEO or the chairman of the Implementer’s board of trustees. There was therefore a sense amongst donors and Planner staff that the Project had been subject to elite capture and that it was being used to further other aims that poverty reduction.

Perceived Unjust Power Relations and Inherent Project Incoherence

The Implementer comprises of a head office and three field offices and has had a long history of discrepancy between official and hidden transcripts. This has had negative effects

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10 The Project has a policy of keeping funds in-country, i.e. additional funds will only be transferred if existing funds from loan repayments are insufficient for new disbursements.
on several projects, much to the frustration of both the Planner and the Implementer’s main donor. Internal bickering, gossiping and reluctance to share information amongst staff while keeping a pretence of congeniality and cooperation has been commonplace; all signs of what Scott would define as perceived unjust power relations. The staff is largely dissatisfied with the management and with reason; at various points in time there has been issues with (intentionally?) incompetent bookkeeping; budget items such as project officers perks have been prioritised over project inputs and staff has frequently felt humiliated by the little influence they have had on many decisions. Rarely has information been shared freely between management and staff and therefore deep mistrust permeates every layer of decision making within the organisation. Lack of direct access to the Planner and other donors has led to a perception among staff members that while the donors might have good intentions, they do not understand the project reality and in any case do not value staff inputs, further opening their directives to interpretation. Since staff are in closer proximity to the Implementer’s beneficiaries, this perception of unjust power relations has spread to them too and because the Project has largely bypassed the staff altogether it has come to symbolise the frustration staff members have felt over being subject to unjust power relations. On the insistence of one of the Planner’s board members, a prominent (female) member of staff and former whistleblower with a long history of disagreements with the management received a loan for a catering business which arguably has been the most successful from both a poverty reduction and employment generation point of view. However, the (both male) CEO and chairman of the Implementer board did not support this loan, despite both having received loans themselves, neither of which have had any discernible impact on employment and the latter of which has defaulted. Nonetheless, the Project’s star performer has had to duly report her business accounts every month to the CEO and have had to rely on him to oversee procurement. This was a particularly humiliating affair for her, with suppliers refusing to deliver when she was not able to pay herself. Both Planner requirements, in this context such instances have been used as justification for acts of everyday resistance from her and other borrowers with similar experiences; acts such as late repayments, missing or sloppy reporting, attempts to circumvent the CEO in procurement procedures, reluctance to fulfill employment promises etc. The intended borrowers from the point of view of the Project’s objective, i.e. the ones that did not receive the loans through personal connections but rather through merit, are ironically the ones that on paper look the worst. Sadly they are thus the least likely to having their financing renewed, with further adverse effects on job creation.

The CEO is the central broker in this microcosm within the developmentalist configuration, followed by the chairman of the board of trustees. With privileged access to donors, the Planner and a wider audience, both have been quite successful in obtaining development rents for the Implementer and selected members of the wider community in the form of “resources for capacity building” and Project loans to personal connections, respectively. Of course, simultaneously both have been trying to better their own position (they too are following the logics of seeking safety, and maximising and monopolising aid flows) and the easiest way to do so has simply been to refuse to advertise the Project in the local

11 Another British NGO but with an Anglican Christian motive, whose only aim is to fundraise for the Implementer.
context, relying instead on personal networks for applications. Furthermore, the CEO has extended Project loans as favours to strategic individuals by presenting their applications in a favourable light. The format of the application forms is written and contains detailed historic and projected cash flows which are difficult for the local business community to fill out satisfactorily due to a lack of in-depth knowledge of bookkeeping. Therefore, some help with filling out these forms go a long way towards ensuring their approval in the UK.

Interestingly, the CEO also performs another central function, namely that of being a development agent, as defined by Olivier de Sardan (2004), and a struggling one too. As such, there is reason to believe that although it is likely he has been implicit in channelling funds to other-than-intended borrowers, he might also have had a hard time explaining to business owners who did not fit the social impact criteria (i.e. where investments would have limited social impact) why that was the case. The CEO is therefore in the precarious position of being tasked with the job of translating the intentions of the Project to the local business community, promoting the view of business as a development partner and mediating between potential and successful borrowers and the Planner. In other words, while some loans may have been used as favours to obtain personal enrichment or influence in the community, it is likely that the CEO may not have been able to justify not extending the Project rents to e.g. the mayor’s son, although it was evident that there was serious concerns about the merit of this application. All in all it is a situation where the CEO has incentives to channel loans to big, safe borrowers; those whom it may it be in his own interest to do so; and those he is unable to refuse to help due to their relatively more powerful position in the local community, regardless of job creation potential. The borrowers that did receive their funding due to merit, are likely to see the Project’s power relations as unjust and engage in everyday acts of resistance, ironically putting themselves in a negative light from the Planner’s point of view. The outcome is therefore that far fewer jobs are created than the underlying economic theory would suggest. This is not due to a flaw in the technical rationale, but rather to a gross underestimation of other factors influencing the behaviours of staff, management and beneficiaries alike. In an attempt to minimise administrative burdens by dealing with beneficiaries only indirectly and putting in place various governance mechanisms, the Planner has set itself up for a radically different outcome than the one intended. The output may have been reached (loans disbursed and repaid) but the outcome (poverty reduction) has remained elusive. The Planner was caught unprepared by the potency of agency embodied in its configuration’s brokers, agents and beneficiaries, relying on a simplified cause-effect impact trajectory (loan creates jobs, reduces poverty) and failing to incorporate a systemic analysis of the local context.

Conclusion

The main point of this case study has been to show how, in the context of a transnational development projects’ implementation, other logics took precedence over the technical rationale of the proposed development solution. As a result, the Project outcome has been disappointing and the Planners have largely lost control over the Project itself with the majority of loans not being awarded on the basis of merit. Most notably the level of
coherence accommodating “real” modes of organisational logic has conflicted with that of the technical rationale and the former has proved to be stronger. The discourse of poverty reduction was never abandoned, serving, as Mosse would argue, as a post-rationalisation of an intervention largely controlled by local political, economic, historical and social influences. Simultaneously, the deployment of policy has been useful for mobilising support in a culture of results-based management in development, justifying heavy Planner involvement in governance and implementation. So then the natural question follows; what can we learn from this? Since it would appear that local and situational logics cannot reasonably be expected to take second place to technical rationales, is it to a certain extent inevitable that projects fall short of their promised potential? Not necessarily. I would argue, however, that Project are necessarily distorted or transformed during the implementation process and that it is highly likely that such distortion hinders the achievement of project objectives. This should not be taken as to mean that project-led development is necessarily unable to achieve its aim of poverty reduction, as has been more than hinted by Ferguson (1994) and others, but rather that room for improvement exists. At the simplest level this analysis suggests that project planners would do well to incorporate better human resource management in the form of adequate training for the “development agent” who is likely to be in the position of attempting to make the project’s logic take precedence over other logics as much as possible. While perhaps neither more effective nor willing in preventing many departures from the technical rationale of the Project, a more confident and better trained development agent could have prevented the most egregious loan disbursements such as the one to the mayor’s son. On a more fundamental level, this case study analysis implies that planners ought to be very realistic about the potential impact of their projects by the virtue of being a planned development intervention and allow for inevitable transformation during the implementation process. Unfortunately, the current fierce competition for funds between development projects does not encourage realistic estimations of impact but rather a strong positive bias leading to seemingly never ending adjustments of budgets and timeframes. As a body of knowledge builds up on distortions occurring as projects experience the “development encounter”, it is likely that the model of planned interventions and project-led development efforts is found inferior to other approaches featuring heavier state and private sector involvement and less micro-management by outside actors. This may not be good news for the developmentalist configuration, but its survival should be of secondary concern to the wellbeing of the world’s deprived.
References


Chapter 8

Transitional civil society, Insecurity and Volatile Environment

Shukria Dini and Abdulkadir Osman Farah

Introduction

The collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s led to the total disintegration of state/national security sector institutions, including the Somali police force, Somali National Army, and the correctional services. The disintegration of security, combined with the absence of state protection, ushered in violence: human rights abuses including gender-based violence that has largely been perpetuated by armed groups who have been turning against unarmed civilians for over two decades. As survivors of militarised violence, Somali women and men possess relevant information, knowledge that is essential in designing and implementing activities that are intended to improve security in their communities. This chapter argues that the protracted insecurity faced by both Somali men and women is the result of a number of factors that occurred in different periods of Somalia’s political processes. The insecurities faced by both genders in Somalia are amalgamations of a number of factors that Somalia as a nation has gone through. Some of these factors include bad governance, a military regime, and human rights violations that occurred in different periods of Somalia’s history and political stages. The period on which this chapter is focusses is the period when the Somali state collapsed, following the civil war in the 1990s. It will shed more light on how the protracted insecurity in Somalia impacts on both women and men and the two group’s overall contribution to security. It will also critically examine the security sector’s development efforts which were carried out in the transitional period, including the achievements, limitations and challenges that were encountered. Members of Somali civil society have pivotal roles to play in not only holding these institutions accountable, but also having representation on provincial and district-level security committees and being part of the decision-making process.

This chapter examines the disintegration of state institutions, including the national security sector, followed by the brutal civil war that led to over two decades of statelessness and protracted insecurity in Somalia. It also touches on the effects of the breakdown of the rule of law and violence on women and men as well as the two group’s overall contribution to security and peace. In order to fully comprehend the outcomes of collapsed state institutions and their effects on the security of people, it is essential to provide a brief overview of both internal and external factors that led to the demise of the Somali state in 1990s. The Somali civil war emanates from a crisis of a nascent state not gaining the necessary internal and external legitimacy to build a nation and create a stable society. Both post-colonial regimes, first successive civilian governments (1960-1969) and later military-led administrations (1969-1991), failed to fully legitimise their state power by incorporating the post-independent aspirations of Somali civil society. Soon after independence from the colonial powers of the United Kingdom and Italy, Somali civilian
governments pursued a diplomatic offensive, mainly targeting the emerging Cold War powers and the so-called patron states, the USA and the USSR, to foster external legitimacy and support in the 1960s (Menkhaus and Kegley, 1998). However, the civilian regime failed due to the lack of securing meaningful national and international support. The Somali military, which was the most powerful and professionalised component of Somali society at the time, exploited the state-civil society gap, and took power in a bloodless coup welcomed by most Somalis who were tired of the widespread corruption and mismanagement of civilian administration. Though initially succeeding with the revolutionary mobilisation of society, combined with military support from the then-Eastern Bloc, the military failed to fulfil the dreams of Somali society. After a failed military campaign in the Ogaden, a region inhabited by Somalis but ruled by Ethiopia, fragmentation within the military in the form of coup attempts spread to the wider society, leading to the establishment of numerous armed and unarmed oppositional military groups within the country and also in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere in 1978. A turning point came in 1990, when the then-rival Horn of African despots, Siad Barre of Somalia and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, agreed to suspend sponsoring each other’s opposition groups (Clark 1992). The deal forced the two main armed groups, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement, to relocate within Somalia proper, especially in the northeast and in the north where the two movements had their respective constituencies. Other armed movements such as the United Somali Congress and the Somali Patriotic Movement, with support bases in the south and South-Central Somalia – including the capital Mogadishu, joined the conflict (Ahmed and Green, 1999).

After a joint effort by armed militia from the countryside, supplemented by a popular uprising in and around Mogadishu, Somalia’s once-powerful military regime collapsed in 1991. Opposition against the regime had been mounting for decades in the country’s interior. Nonetheless, the various factions that ousted the regime failed to overcome their internal disagreements on power-sharing, and they embarked on the most-costly and tragic civil war Somalia ever experienced. The triumphant part, composed of largely-disorganised and undisciplined clan militias, underestimated the imminent fall of the regime (Fitzgerald, 2002: 57). Their lack of transitional plans for sharing power and governing the city, let alone the country, attested to their expectation of a prolonged vicious urban battle to control Mogadishu. Within weeks, in a hastily-arranged reconciliation conference in neighbouring Djibouti, a coalition of factions – mainly representing civilian political and business elites – announced an entering transitional government (Mohamoud, 2006). Worried about the possibility of yet another military takeover, participants rushed to exclude powerful rebel groups and their military leaders. Even worse, they instructed the army contingents to disband and surrender weapons to respective clan militias.

Although the protracted Somali civil war was long-term guerrilla warfare and rebellion originating from the country’s interior and border regions, the conflict lacked the essence of a revolutionary transformational character. It was far from the revolutionary rebellions the world had seen, for instance the likes of those led by Lenin of Russia, Mao of China, Castro of Cuba, and Ayatollah of Iran: with clear ideologies and long-term projects aimed at transforming society. Like the Somalis in their time, the Russian Bolsheviks initially ordered a form of popular army, in the distribution of weapons to civilians, which they
referred to as “the workers and peasants militia” (Shelley, 1996: 20). The difference was that the communists had clear ideological goals and plans. Similarly, while the Iranian opposition appealed to popular militias to implement and consolidate the Islamic revolution, the diverse militias remained accountable to the theocratic leadership, many of them in exile, who had clear strategies for the prospects of their nation and country (Richards, 2013). In the first case, communism represented the guiding principle while, in the latter case, clergy provided the vision for state mechanism and rule.

In retrospect, for the fragmented Somali rebels, overthrowing the regime was the end goal rather than means to provide alternatives. The unpopularity of the military regime among the public had increased the intensity of armed rebellion since early 1980s. Under personal rule, power often concentrates around one ruthless leader during which revolutionary tendencies shift political activities from a nomenklatura to a clan-klatura, in which the regime promotes loyalists not through professional or ideological merit, but through kinship relations (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Lewis, 1989). Nonetheless, the rebels failed to introduce a consistent vision and transformation strategies that the public could identify with and eventually join. On the contrary, the combination of an uncompromising authoritarian regime challenged by internally-fragmented opposition eventually led to the disintegration of not just the army, but also most national institutions (Kieh, 2007).

The forcible removal of the military regime by the clan-based armed opposition groups did not bring peace and good governance to Somalia. The victorious armed opposition groups, instead of protecting the public from violence and establishing order and the rule of law after the removal of the military regime, unleashed violence and atrocities against unarmed civilians for over two decades. The following section sheds light on the failure of armed opposition groups in establishing new political institutions, security and stability, and the ramifications of such failures for the Somali people. This might not be relevant for the chapter, but as there are big differences within Somalia – especially in relation to Somaliland – the geographical focus should be made clear.

**The Disintegration of State Institutions**

In the Somali context, the viciously-divided opposition complicated the potential of post-authoritarian peaceful transition. The outcome was a savage civil war and anarchy. The main cause of rebel disunity and their lack of ability to overcome internal rivalry were linked to the civic-military conflict and the tense relationships within the dissident movement, as well as their clannish character (Lewis 2004). The civic components in the diverse groups considered themselves as financiers and managers of the long rebellion, while the military commanders propagated themselves as the main force behind the regime collapse. The recent Egyptian transition indicates that, while the military constitutes a uniting force in nation-building efforts, it can also act as an obstacle towards democratisation and possible civilian rule. The fundamental role of the army is to ensure a country’s internal and external security, a task the Somali army failed to live up to, due to the embedded ‘deprofessionalisation’ initially orchestrated by the military regime. In
response, rebel military leaders did not just recruit from their respective clans in the inter-
rior, but also subordinated themselves under Somalia’s historic rival for regional hegemony, Ethiopia (Lewis, 1989).

While the origin of the decision to disband the army remains controversial, whether it came from the rebels or one of the leaders in the caretaker government, the then-Prime Minister Omar Arte Qaalib made a radio announcement where he ordered all members of security sectors – the army and police – to disband and report to their clan commu-
nities. For decades, the national army had, due to corruption and mismanagement, lost its once-credible institutional legitimacy and moral standing. This was the first time that the professional Somali army, which traditionally protected the common national interest, had to subordinate itself to clan militias. For ordinary citizens, such drastic developments represented three main interdependent challenges. First, the regime that was supposed to protect them involuntarily retreated from the capital city. Not just that, but they also left with armed loyalists to the interior for a possible strategic return, but the regime also abandoned citizens on their own. Secondly, the regime did not just leave frightened (and many of them defenceless) citizens and failing government institutions behind, but it also contributed to the tribalisation of the once-one of Africa’s most professional armies through personal rule and nepotism and the subordination of qualifications (Adam in Zartman, 1995). Thirdly, the process culminated in the militarisation of society, where each clan armed itself. We think that this process started before 1991. The process be-
egan with the military regime when it “militia-ised” society through rhetorical scientific socialism in an “illusionary political nation state” under the framework of guulwadayaal (Adan, 1994) through public mobilisation. On their part, the rebels combined urban and rural clan recruitment to achieve their main goal, which was to conquer the country and create a hegemonic state (Adam, 1992).

In this regard, citizens became hostages between an oppressive regime they seriously feared and obviously would not shed tears for in its demise, and disorganised and ex-
tremely threatening armed militias. Here the process of monopolisation and de-monop-
olisation of power is important. In traditional authoritarian societies, the monopoly of violence rests on the fear of a sovereign authority which, in this context, is symbolised by 
the military and the leader. When such personal authority, as Diamond (2008) suggests, 
with an entrenched conflict between the rule of law and the rule of person disappears, 
eventually the number of factions exercising power for narrow criminal gains proliferates. Therefore, societal militarisation impacts mostly on civilians, though differences to devel-
op the country or military state monopolisation to oppress people (Reardon, 1993) exist in military states’ monopolisation capabilities.

Such security developments had great impact on Somali society as a whole, not just with dangerous weapons ending up in untrained hands, but with the complete absence of state monitoring mechanisms. We think there needs to be some consideration of the na-
ture of the Somali state before its collapse, but also the process of unleashing widespread robbery, revenge killings, looting properties and rape became routine terrorising communities. Though powerful militias targeted particular clans, violence had no clear objectives. Clearly women, children and minorities constituted the most vulnerable victims. A leading expert on Somali society describes such violations as the following:
In the lawless chaos that characterized Somalia following the unravelling of state structures, old prejudices revived their full expression. In the case of the Banadiris [a Somali minority group] as a trading group they were believed to be wealthy; an being unarmed and unwarlike group, they became easy targets for militias loyal to the different warlords and armed bandits loyal to nobody: homes and businesses were destroyed, women and girls were raped in front of their relatives and countless were slaughtered. Lewis, 2008: 132.

This was not exclusive to a particular minority, but mostly, unarmed civilians, especially women and children, paid the heaviest price. This is due to armed militias considering the punishment of women and children as strategic to hurting their opponents and those that are most displaced and systematically abused by diverse conflicting groups are women and children (Hough, 2008). The Somali case might be unique as women in this part of the world appear, on the surface, to be better integrated into the clan structure. Normally traditional patrilineal societies, women are considered to be secondary members of the clan. On one hand, clans do their utmost, for honour purposes, to defend their women. In addition, Somali clans often intermarry and, through intermarriages, such clans can then gain access to protection from both their kin as well from their in-laws (Garner and El-Bushra, 2004). However, due to social upheaval, social institutions and actors that once provided protection to women were weakened and could no longer provide protection to women and men from armed and violent groups. During the militarised violence, Somali women and men could neither receive protection from their clans, nor could their clans defend their honour. For instance, weak clans in terms of defending the honour of their women and children were overrun by other dominant and heavily-armed clans. In other societies, such as the Balkans, the situation could be different and women might be treated differently. In numerous civil wars, for example in Europe and Africa, armed factions abused women for reasons of “ideological and racial purity” (Marry, 2010: 166). For instance, in the Balkan Wars, violations against women were part of ethnic cleansing and genocide strategies for diverse militias (Koo, 2002). Similar atrocities in which warlords considered genocide as an objective took place in Rwanda (Sharlach, 1999).

With the outbreak of civil war in Mogadishu, many urbanites (inhabitants of the capital city) managed to flee. In their place, armed nomads and semi-nomads with no knowledge of urban city life were recruited from the interior and took control, in the process vandalising their way through the city. The process of the homogenisation of society through centralisation and top-down strategies to oppress cultural and ideological diversification undermined the diverse social fabric of Somali society. Some of these include the urban-nomad distinction, and the militia-civilian distinction. In addition, modernisation processes transformed traditional societies. For instance, the thirteenth-century prominent Afro-Arab classic sociologist, Ibn-Khaldun, explained how people from the interior first undermine and destroy public structures, gradually building it up, and later leading it to decline. Referring to the core arguments of Ibn-Khaldun with regard to the nomadic-urban conflict, Abdullahi proposes the following:
Savagery has become the character and nature [of the Bedouins]. They enjoy it, because it means freedom from authority and no subservience to leadership. Such a natural disposition is the negation and antithesis of civilization...the very nature of their existence is the negation of building [urbanisation], which is the basis of civilization. Furthermore, since they do not see any value in labor and craftsman and do not appreciate it, the hope for profit vanishes, and no productive work is done. The sedentary population disperses and civilization decays... The Bedouins are not concerned with laws, or with deterring people from misdeeds... they care only for property that they might take away from people through looting... Under the rule of Bedouins, their subjects live as in a state of anarchy. Anarchy destroys mankind and ruins civilizations (Abdullahi cited by Osman, 2006).

The chaotic aggressive forward march impacted remaining civilians in multiple ways. The first was the immediate shock of losing state protection combined with the constant threat of roaming militia gangs on the streets. Second was the widespread insecurity generated by the systematic robbery and looting; uncontrolled gangs going into houses, randomly searching and killing people. Up to and during the collapse of the state, there was high inflation and a lack of food, where poor people had difficulty in paying for and getting food. The state lost support from the international community due to its human rights violations coupled with Somalia losing its geostrategic Cold War significance following the end of East-West rivalry (Souare, 2006). External aid creates not just dependency, but also a sense of not having property rights. Ordinary people also loot, as they consider the national property both as theirs but also belonging to the dictator and foreigners. External legitimacy and support is vital for these societies.

The remaining international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and diplomatic representations that could have comforted people or appealed for international assistance left the country due to the security challenges. America and other Western countries airlifted their personal and citizens with the help of US marines based at the coast. Secondly, in the short term, people found themselves displaced and not able to find their family members and relatives. Uncertain migration awaited most of them as they left the capital in search of food and security. Many of them left for the south, hoping to find relatives and seek protection. Others headed north; hoping the militias on the road would give free passage and refrain from harming them. The process represented major decline, as some of these people originally migrated away from traditionalism and localism. In general, the forced displacement is a strategy employed by different fighting factions, leading to “trans-boundary flight by civilians contributing to large scale asylum seekers and sudden influx over the span of the conflict” (Caruso, 2011: 2). Thirdly, the most fortunate Somalis left for other countries, following sponsorships and visas commissioned by relatives in the diaspora. The majority remained internally displaced in the country, living under the threat of starvation and violence. Many others became refugees in large camps in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. Under certain conditions, these refugees at least had shelter, but they were still confronted by security challenges.
For over two decades, the people of Somalia have been living in a violent environment. This section explains the ways in which Somali women and men were affected by state collapse and the protracted militarised violence. This section also sheds light on the ways in which they responded to the violence, and their overall contribution to peace and security in their communities. Somali women have been affected by state violence and collapse in specifically gendered ways that have exacerbated their traditionally-subordinate positions in their society. On one hand, like Somali men, women were impacted by the political disintegration, the breakdown of the rule of law, and the violence. They lost state protection and security, and were made vulnerable to all kinds of insecurities. On the other hand, due to the lack of opportunities and the prolonged insecurities, Somali women became more vulnerable and lost some of the gains that they made in education. It is worth noting that, prior to the civil war, both men and women had some protection under their clans. For instance, there is an agreement known as biri-magoydo among clans: to protect and not harm women, children and the elderly during clan clashes among them. Under this amnesty, there was an agreement that women, children, and the elderly were to be spared from all violence that may arise between or among clans. However, such amnesty, which all clans had agreed to uphold, had been violated during the civil war period. In fact, women, children and the elderly became primary targets of the violence waged by clan-based armed militias in South, Central Somalia, Puntland and Somailand. It is worth noting that Somali women are not purely victims, but are actors with their own agency who have directly and indirectly contributed to the conflict in their country. According to Sorensen, “women contribute to the outbreak of violence and hostilities – in many cases, they are instrumental in inciting men to defend group interests, honour, and collective livelihoods (Sorensen, 1998: ii). For example, some Somali women have their poetry (buuraanbur) to incite violence among warring groups, thereby contributing to the militarisation of men and society (Bouta et al., 2005). Thus, if we recognise the direct and indirect roles that women played in the violence, then we will recognise that they have important roles to play in improving and building security in their communities.

Engendering State Collapse and Militarisation: Women Resist Violence

Ethnic and civil wars are gendered, and impact women differently than men (Karam, 2001; McKay, 2000; Mertus, 2000; Tickner, 2001; Zeigler and Gunderson, 2006), and this has been the case in Somalia. Militarised conflicts erode women’s and men’s access to state protection, social services such as education, health care, livelihoods, and other opportunities. As state institutions disintegrated, including those in the security sector, the Somali people: men, women and children, were confronted with protracted insecurities. Due to the lack of state authority and the rule of law, unarmed civilians – including men and women – ended up without having state protection and were targeted by armed groups. It is worth noting that the warlords and their armed militias have violated the customary law (xeer), the biri magaydo which forbids any individual or groups from harming or targeting women, children and the elderly during clan conflict. Under this xeer, all warring factions must exempt this group (women, children and the elderly) from their violent acts and revenge killings. As a result of the above-mentioned violation of the xeer, due to their gender and clan affiliations, women and young girls were deliber-
ately subjected to all kinds of violence, displacement and they lost their properties. With no state and social institutions (such as clan elders) to turn to for protection, the people of Somalia were all left all alone to endure in such violence perpetrated by warlords and their armed militias. The loss of access to state protection, education, healthcare, and employment opportunities has not only reduced the status of Somali women, but has also worsened some of the earlier gender inequalities.

Furthermore, unarmed Somali men and young boys were affected by the violence waged by clan-based armed groups. We argue that not all Somali men participated in the clan warfare and the militarised violence that ravaged Somalia. Somali men were the primary targets of this violence waged by different armed and clan-based groups. They were directly targeted due to their gender and clan affiliations. They were forcibly displaced to refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, where they have remained in those camps for over two decades. Other men and boys, either by choice or by force, joined clan-based militias where they perpetrated violence on men and women from other clans. These men who directly and indirectly participated in the violence have also faced number of vulnerabilities and violence, including loss of protection, and susceptibility to death and displacement during and after violence. Warlords hailing from different clans exploited unemployed, illiterate, and poor young men. We argue, in fact, that the conflict that wreaked havoc in Somalia has been fought on the expenses of these vulnerable young men.

We also argue that militarisation has specific ramifications for women. Rehn and Sirleaf (2002: vii) argue that women in several conflict-affected nations become subject to "rape, sexual exploitation, mutilation, torture and displacement". In times of social and political upheavals, women are deliberately targeted because "they are perceived as symbolic bearers of the future of their cultural and ethnic identity and are responsible for future generations of their community" (Lindsey, 2005:23). While men and boys are also victims of violence (Moser and Clark, 2001), women carry both the physical and psychological trauma of these particular forms of violence, including rape (Large, 1997). Like other women in conflict zones, Somali women and girls have been subjected to rape, forced marriages and forced displacement.

In addition, gender roles and relations are also affected by militarised conflicts, particularly when primary income providers (men) are killed and livelihoods are destroyed (Bop, 2001; El-Bushra, 2000; Karam, 2001). In Somalia, the protracted political crisis and the violence has emasculated Somali men. For instance, men who survived the violence could no longer provide for their families, and this directly and indirectly affected previous gender roles and relations. For instance, women in conflict zones end up shouldering numerous roles and responsibilities, including those that were carried out primarily by their male counterparts in the pre-war period (El-Bushra, 2000). Women living in conflict zones become extremely important to the survival of their families and overall communities (Pankhurst, 2004). According to Gardner:

*Women’s increased economic role in the family implies a change in gender relations at household level. With the family no longer economically supported by a man, and often without a pro-

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ductive man in the household, many women have become the household head responsible for decision-making (2004:103-104).

We argue that, unlike Somali men, women coped with the new roles and relations that emerged from the social upheavals. In Somalia, women took up new roles and responsibilities. For example, a large number of women joined different income-generating activities including selling qat and petrol to maintain the basic survival and security of their families. Because of these new roles and responsibilities, women become significant to the survival of their families and provided new status in their families and overall communities. However, women’s new status and roles and responsibilities did not increase their representation in formal decision-making processes.

At the height of the clan warfare, women played an essential role in providing protection to women, children and men from the marauding militias. There are a number of cases where women sheltered and temporarily adopted certain individuals and groups claiming that they are their ‘kith and kin’, facilitating their safe passage to their ancestral lands. Women’s marginalisation in the clan system, as well as their multiple relations through birth and marriages with various clans, provided them some advantages and the space to promote security and peace, and to travel distances to conduct community work and have businesses. In addition, some men who belonged to the dominant clans were also able to protect their friends and neighbours from their own and other clans which were involved in clan warfare in Somalia. These men used their positions in their own clans to provide amnesty to men and women hailing from other clans.

Women are important actors that resolve conflicts on daily basis. For Anderson, women “are frequently the first to take the risks necessary to promote dialogue across divided communities and more towards reconciliation” (2000: 34). There have been various ways in which women resisted and responded to the militarisation in Somalia (Dini, 2009 and 2010). Whenever conflict breaks out in and outside of their communities, women serve as ergo nabadeed: peace envoys to advocate for peace and push for reconciliation. In addition, women who are in cross-clan relations and peace envoys study the conflict taking place inside or outside their communities, collect information and share it with different stakeholders and take immediate action to halt such conflicts. Women use their poetry, known as buraanburs to indicate their opposition to the conflict, as well as their support for peace. Through their poetry, women highlight ways in which the conflict has impacted their lives and the overall importance of peace. In addition, during conflict, women place pressure on warring groups, including their clan leaders, to halt their violence and reconcile with opposing groups. To prevent conflicts and promote reconciliation, Somali women also organise peace prayers known as Alla Bari, and directly appeal to clan leaders and warring groups to immediate halt hostilities. They also pressure their male relatives, particularly their spouses, sons, and brothers, not to directly or indirectly participate in such conflicts. Through peace prayers, meal-sharing and rallies, women clearly inform others that they will not financially or morally support such violence perpetuated by their own clans and other clans. Through such initiatives, women have successfully averted violence and contributed to peace and security in their respective communities. Wom-
en’s responses to quell violence have contributed to peace and security in Puntland and Somaliland – relatively peaceful regions. In the mid-1990s, when two powerful warlords fought in the capital, and which led to establishment of a green line which divided the city into two areas – Mogadishu North and South – each controlled one warlord, women resisted such division and violence perpetuated by the warlords. Women in Mogadishu belonging different clans, including those belonging to those of the warlords, took to the streets of Mogadishu to resist forced separation (the green line), and increased interactions with one another. Each time women were stopped at the checkpoints by both warlord’s militia groups, women used creative and convincing excuses of why they were frequently crossing the checkpoints, such as borrowing sugar, salt, or tea leaves from a family member or friend, when they were in fact crossing checkpoints to assess the effect of the violence on women, men, and children, and to deliver money to those who were affected by the violence. It was women who dismantled this green line and carried out numerous protests and rallies condemning such forced and imposed separation of the capital city (Dini, 2008). In 1997, women hailing from different sub-clans of Majerteen in Bosaso, a booming coastal town with a lucrative port in the Puntland region, were affected by violence, and took action to find solutions to their lawless city. Women in Bosaso collectively organised and mobilised scarce resources, to respond to the insecurity affecting their city. They used their scarce resources to rehabilitate old jails in the city, bought uniforms for former police, and explored ways to revive the security apparatus in the city, but all of these efforts were not enough to address insecurity in their city. They then approached and placed pressure on both their clan elders and the leadership of the armed militia – the SSDF – a clan-based armed militia led by General Mohamed Said Morgan, which was then controlling the region. However, the violence continued and women’s appeals to the different leaderships fell onto deaf ears. The only way that they could ensure that they were listened to by both their clan leaders and the SSDF leadership (both of whom failed to establish security in their city) was to disrupt the port activities and halt the revenues that were generated from the port, and which directly benefitted the SSDF. Women thought the only way their demand (to securitise the city) was going to be accommodated was to organise and stage sit-ins inside and outside the Bosaso port to disrupt the activities of the port in exchange for establishing security, law and order in the city. Women’s sit-ins obstructed the flow of goods in and out of the port. Some of the slogans that women used were, ‘If no security in Bosaso, no revenues for the militia group – SSDF’. In their sit-ins, women recited songs, buuraanburs, which captured how they were affected by insecurity and the failure of the leadership of the militia to maintain security. Other women from other towns and villages of Puntland also joined the protests to boycott the economic activities of the port which benefitted the SSDF militias. As women’s sit-ins hit the militia’s revenue that was generated from the port hard, the SSDF’s leadership were then willing to meet with, respond to the women’s demands, and they promised that they would improve security in the city. The SSDF leaders and leaders of women’s groups that carried out the sit-ins signed an agreement to work together. The women in Bosaso did end their sit-ins, but continued their contributions to the rehabilitation of old jails and the establishment of a police force, providing cars and even paid stipends to newly-recruited policemen to do night patrols to prevent crime and insecurity in the city, and in which some women themselves took part. This initiative was
named after one of the women leaders who participated in the sit-ins, Hufan Artan\(^1\), and became the Hufan Initiative (Dini, 2008). This case illustrates the power of women and their overall contributions to the stabilisation of their communities and the formation of security sector institutions, particularly in Puntland.

Similarly, women in various regions of Somalia took action to prevent and halt the violence which erupted between their clans as well as that of other clans. In Mogadishu, women play critical roles in improving and maintaining security in their districts and all over their capital city. They work closely with newly-emerging security sectors, including the police, and report criminal activities through text messages. Through creative ways, women have resisted violence and overall built bridges between hostile groups waging violence in their communities. Ordinary Somali women rose to the occasion and formed their own organisations to respond to the crises that engulfed their communities. They challenged themselves to contribute to the security of their families, extended family members, neighbours and other members of their respective communities by delivering much-needed services. They initiated lifesaving initiatives in their villages, towns and cities all over Somalia. A good example is the efforts of Dr Hawo Abdi, who won numerous global awards for her courage in confronting secular and religious extremists and warlords, and delivering lifesaving services to vulnerable people in her hometown, Afgooye, Mogadishu. In 2010, a magazine named Dr Abdi and her daughters as among their “Women of the Year”:

Her lifesaving efforts started in 1983, when she opened a one-room clinic on her family farm. As the government collapsed, refugees flocked to her, seeking food and care. Today she runs a camp housing approximately 90,000 people, mostly women and children because, as she says, “the men are dead, fighting, or have left Somalia to find work.” While Dr. Abdi has gotten some help, many charities refuse to enter Somalia. “It’s the most dangerous country,” says Kati Marton, a board member of Human Rights Watch. “Dr. Abdi is just about the only one doing anything.” Her greatest support: two of her daughters, Deqo, 35, and Amina, 30, also doctors, who often work with her. Despite the bleak conditions, Dr. Abdi sees a glimmer of hope. “Women can build stability,” she says. “We can make peace” (Glamour Magazine, 2010).

Furthermore, there are other heroic women in Somalia, such as Fatima Jibrell, an environmentalist and peace activist, and founder and former Executive Director of Horn Relief (now the African Development Solution) who won the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2002. Another prominent activist is Hawa Aden Mohamed, an educationist and peace activist, founder and Director of Galkacyo Education Centre for Peace, and known as “The Queen of Galkacyo”, who won the 2012 Nansen Refugee Award. There is Edna Ismail, who built maternity hospital in Hargeisa where she has been delivering much-needed

\(^1\) Hufan was 60 year old mother and a resident of Bosaso who was one of the leaders who organised such sit-ins.
reproductive healthcare services for women in her community, and who also became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somaliland. There are many other heroic women who have championed for peace and security in their various communities in war-torn Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, and their initiatives have directly and indirectly contributed to improving the security of their families and, overall, the nation.

Members of the Somalian diaspora communities have supported such initiatives led by ordinary women and men in Somalia, and they have made their financial contributions to community projects such as building health clinics, schools, digging wells and so on, from a distance. They also assisted their immediate families back home. Though the diaspora might have contributed to conflicting political mobilisation (Kleist, 2008), they have also contributed to social and economic development in numerous positive ways (Leeson, 2007). Somali women and men living in the diaspora collected funds and mobilised politically and collectively to build roads and hospitals and introduced other humanitarian activities to help the vulnerable in the country, and this led to bettering the lives of vulnerable people in Somalia.

Somali women have used their marginalisation with their clans into a positive way and tapped into the support from other men and women hailing from certain clans. Because they are on the margins of the clan system, women were able to build security and peace from the bottom up, and promote reconciliation among certain groups within their communities. In times of conflict, women’s loyalties, particularly those that are in cross-clan relations, are questioned and they are often portrayed as enemies and disloyal, and this has provided women a strategic space to manoeuvre and build alliances among other men and women hailing from other clans, and to access information from different stakeholders. In other words, Somali women have utilised their marginalisation as a tool to overcome gender discrimination and build relationships across clans.

Somali women’s responses to insecurity have not only weakened the intentions of warring groups to perpetuate violence, but have also improved the security of the people and overall communities. Despite Somali women’s important contributions to the stabilisation of their communities, they remain absent from the formal decision-making of security sector institutions. Women are not seen as important security actors. Somali women’s active participation and contribution as security actors is vital if Somalia is to emerge out of the ruins and become a stable and peaceful nation. Women are resourceful actors that have their own security concerns and their valuable contribution to improving security must be recognised and rewarded. As victims and actors of both conflicts and peace, and as citizens, Somali women must be included in all stages of security sector development. Security sector development efforts must be gender inclusive and sensitive, and women’s security needs / concerns must be incorporated. Clearly, the immediate concern for civilians was to save their lives and those of their relatives. Parents, particularly women, did whatever they could to save children and other family members. There have been some civic groups that have tried to help the suffering people. Some have conducted humanitarian activities.
Somalia’s protracted conflict has a regional dimension. Ethiopia, a neighbouring country, has played its role in destabilising Somalia through supporting and arming different warlords. The next section examines the roles of regional actors in perpetuating insecurity and the overall militarisation of war-torn Somalia.

The Role of the International Community Back and Then

The regional hegemon Ethiopia represents the main political and military actor in the Horn of Africa. The country simultaneously instigates and deals with security challenges in Somalia. Their technique includes the employment of warlord proxies that the Ethiopians play against each other to exert overall dominance (Samatar, 2007). The Ethiopians played multiple roles. They received and welcomed refugees, but dealt with the political and military conditions often in hegemonic terms (Iyob, 1993). Addis Ababa’s involvement in Somalia goes back to the Cold War period and the struggle between the two strong military men, Mengistu and Barre. Each regime favourably hosted and funded each other’s opposition groups. This led to the establishment of opposition enclaves in the two respective capitals. To consolidate their declining power and legitimacy, the two military leaders signed an agreement in Djibouti in early 1990, promising “to cease supporting each other’s insurgents” (Lefebvre, 1996). Ethiopian-controlled clan-based Somali rebels had no option but to resettle and confront the Somali government within the country.

When Somalia was about to collapse, the world, particularly countries that since colonialism poured weaponry into the country, concentrated on repatriating their nationals and chose to leave Somalia to its destiny. At the time, other international conflicts in such places such as Iraq and Yugoslavia preoccupied the international community and might prevented powerful countries from dealing with the Somali issue. Somalia became the victim of Cold War geostrategic narrowness in which the international community, especially powerful countries, concentrate on immediate regions, confirming the thesis of existential realism (Lieber, 1993). One of the main reasons why Somalia was deeply militarised with different weaponry from the East and West was its changing alliances with the Eastern and Western Blocs (Lefebvre, 1998). Humanitarian organisations, particularly those that did not repatriate their staff back to their countries, stayed behind and tried to relieve the pain of the suffering. Nonetheless, the continuing urban warfare, the warring factions, and the conditions on the ground worsened the situation, and made humanitarian efforts difficult to carry out. In 1992, after famine broke out in the south and the international media reported immense suffering by particularly women, children and the elderly, the USA intervened with Operation Restore Hope, to formally ensure food reached the suffering. Nonetheless, the initially humanitarian intervention ended in failure, and retreat by the Americans leaving the country to its own destiny. It was not just the Americans who left but major humanitarian NGOs also recused their presence, as active insurgency often prevents such organisations from operating (Lischer, 2007).

Boutros-Ghali, then the UN Secretary General, accused the world of ignoring the Somali conflict while paying more attention to the Yugoslav Wars. There was also tension and war against Saddam Hussain in the Gulf, but this did not prevent the international com-
munity from helping Ethiopia overcome its military dictatorship. The rebels there got US support to take over the country relatively peacefully. Consequently, there was limited and sporadic humanitarian aid. The time was known for its warlordism followed by US and international troops’ intervention.

After several failures, first by the Americans and then the United Nations Operation in Somalia mission, the international community withdrew, retreated and concentrated in Nairobi where they opened satellite offices to manage the troubles in Somalia from a safe distance. Complex groups of NGOs and national and supranational agencies took part in that process. The diaspora was also included. The question is, what did Nairobi or Kenya provide to bring this concentration of NGOs together? Kenya has historically been a country with Western links and interests, but the existence of a significant middle class in Nairobi, as well as the more or less British oriented political system, might attract people and organisations. It is also here where many Somalis, refugees as well as the business elite, resettled.

The stated objectives of humanitarian intervention did not comply with the concrete actions taken, all the while remaining strategic. In terms of a gender perspective, humanitarian aid was legitimised with gender arguments that women and children suffered under the civil strife and there was a need to help them. The suffering of the vulnerable, particularly women and children, play a central role in arguments to provide and maintain the humanitarian system (Carpenter, 2005). The international discourse of Islam had also impacted the situation. It shifted the focus from secular warlordism to religious warlordism, and also changed projecting the extremists rather than the traditional warlords as the enemy (Collins, 2007).

One of the positive outcomes of the state collapse and the civil war is that it opened up a space for ordinary Somali men and women to form institutions and associations to respond to the crises that engulfed their nation. Somali civil society emerged during the social upheavals. It has been catering for the needs of vulnerable people in a restricted and violent environment. The next section examines the contributions of these actors to easing the vulnerabilities of their beneficiaries.

**Statelessness and Insecurity: The Rise of Somali Civil Society**

Obviously the prolonged violence and suffering had a significant impact on the security of all Somalis. The systematic violations made Somali victims more resilient in coping with tremendous challenges with limited capabilities. In addition, domestic civic groups occasionally received compensation from external diaspora mobilized funding. In this regard, civil society provided relevant solutions to the security challenges people confronted in their daily activities, for instance, arranging meetings for opposing community members to get together and discuss possible solutions to their situation. In other situations, civic communities provide free education, food and shelter for vulnerable community members.
The top-down state organised Somali civil society disintegrated with the collapse of the military regime. Activists made numerous attempts to gather the fragments of the civil society but confronted obstacles emanating from clanism, warlordism and external involvement. Particularly intellectuals, elders, media groups and business people insisted on the reorganisation of more-inclusive civic elements. But they have partially failed due to oppression from the warlords combined with their attempts to survive and avoid risks. In the pursuit of a national civil society frame, despite the risks, committed activists secretly maintained their efforts. During the post-state collapse, Somali civil society mainly placed itself in opposition to warlords (Lewis, 2001). Women activists played a significant role in this process. Under anarchic societal conditions, civil society has to redefine itself. Following excessive violence and displacement, trust among people disappeared. Long-term neighbours and colleagues became harsh enemies, leading to the fragmentation and the exodus of the country by many. Those civic groups who preferred to remain in the country fell prey to the warlords and religious extremists. They witnessed the mobilisation and exploitation of the society under the new slogans of clanism and religious extremism. Consequently, those who wanted to provide genuine help for people with food, shelter, social help, education, and medical care would have to bribe the warlords to provide this service.

Eventually, with more international engagement, the civil society, including those who were more or less corrupt, played an intermediate role. Critics suggest that a new form of NGOisation began trying instead of linking to a national state, civil society group fragmented and linked to local, clan or warlords as well as international organisations consequently increasing the number of foreign funded civic groups. The international NGOs have, for instance, cooperated and used remittances through operating across the country (Gundel, 2002). In addition, there are cases were the international community, through the international NGOs, imagined warlords as peace lords (Menkhaus, 1996). Under such circumstances, many claim to fight for gender equality and empowerment. The process created increased dependency and intense competition between the different groups.

In Somalia, most previous external interventions focussed on the armed groups and not the improved the human security of the vulnerable population. Warlords received undeserved international recognition with the intention of finding lasting political solution. The one-sided approach to the War on Terror missed looking at the efforts and the significance of other relevant non-armed components in the society – women and civil society organisations (CSOs). Such contingents have long provided a bottom-up approach to pressing social and economic issues. Inevitably in recent years, strategies seem to shift with renewed emphasis on building Somalia from the bottom by, for instance, providing opportunities for women and community activists. Consequently, the contribution and the inclusion of women, including those from the diaspora, had improved social, political, and overall security conditions. Somali women in the diaspora, particularly those in the Arabian Gulf, cooperated with the national Somali women organisation before the state's collapse. After the collapse, the Somali diaspora continued to provide support, though this was more regional oriented (Farah, 2012). The earlier male-and warlord-dominated reconciliation processes undermined the participation of women in projecting and insist-
ing the notorious 4.5 formula of power sharing. The scheme divided the society into four major dominant clans and half for the joint minority clans, and compromised women’s potential contribution to viable political outcomes. The current federal government seems to act differently. For instance, the federal government that came to power in Mogadishu in autumn 2012 elevated the position of women by appointing highly qualified and competent female politicians to significant cabinet positions such as the former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fawsia Haji Yusuf and the former minister for welfare and social affairs Maryan Qasim. The interesting development is that this was a clan and traditionally-negotiated process, partially facilitated, funded, and protected by the international community, but made history by appointing the first ever female Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in Somalia.

Initially, according to the agreed roadmap, Somali women should acquire a minimum of thirty percent representation in the new political system, including in Parliament. Though the international community asserted substantial pressure through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the plan did not fully work out. Traditional leaders mostly selected male candidates, and only awarded women twelve percent of seats in the new parliament. Thus, the new assembly will be one characterised by “male patronage networks” (Goetz, 2007).

At the civil society level, Somali civil society remains fragmented, dependent on donor support and somewhat clan-oriented. Among them, however, it is possible to find active associations that have been working for better social, economic and political conditions for many years. Similarly, the diaspora is complex and fragmented but had, over the years, also participated in the development of the country (Farah, 2012).

The immediate dominant external players, such as AMISOM and UNSOM, receive funds from West. The US and EU have officially stated their narrow security and ideological strategies in Somalia. Their aim is to concentrate on national security interests by preventing and combatting piracy and extremism. The narrow security priorities might undermine gender balance and sensitivity. The international community worries that a traditional leader, warlord, or extremist might mobilise resistance. Therefore, what civic mobilised women’s groups can do is limited, particularly if the Somalis fail to solve the warlord and extremist challenges. Though women might have contributed to the conflict, the main source of the Somali conflict emanated from armed men in a vicious non-compromising power struggle. AMISOM troops operate on the front line and have partially secured the capital city Mogadishu and some other provincial cities. Such security gains, nonetheless, remain temporary as there is no clear political solution to bring armed groups into accepting their total defeat or willingness to join the political process peacefully. In the end, externally-imposed gender balance will not work, as Somalis have their own culture which considers women as an integrated part of the household and not a separate antagonistic individual. Thus, any serious permanent solution to gender challenges will have to come from Somalis.
Conclusion

Somalia has been a nation that has been haemorrhaging for decades. This chapter highlighted some of the ramifications of political and social disintegration for the people of Somalia. It also presented the roles of women and members of CSOs in the Somali conflict and security complexes. War-torn Somalia is a special case, a failed state with protracted and brutal militarised violence that negatively-perpetuated people’s security and access to basic social services for decades. The people of Somalia, including women, were subjected to violence, forced displacement and were denied from having a normal life with state protection and security. It is worth noting though that ordinary women and men, whether living inside or outside Somalia, heroically responded to the violence that wreaked havoc on their people and communities. Those inside Somalia took risks to serve the most vulnerable people in their communities. Those living in the diaspora supported not only family members that they left behind, but also supported humanitarian and development projects all over Somalia. The responses of individual or groups of Somali women and men have both local and diaspora dimensions, and thus it is pivotal that any efforts at transforming or developing security sector institutions in Somalia must be inclusive and gender sensitive. The active participation of women’s groups and members of civil society in the process of rebuilding security sector institutions in Somalia is essential to promote adequate public trust and confidence among Somalis. We argue that civil society and NGOs can make important contributions to the formulation of, and decisions relating to, the security sector, and facilitate public engagement with debates on national security.

As we write this chapter, there have been a number of positive changes that recently took place in Somalia. Over twenty years of stagnant political transition was ended in September 2012. There is a new government elected by the new parliamentarians and a parliament selected by clan elders representing all clans of Somalia which has received international recognition. The new government and the people of Somalia continue to face numerous challenges, including security. The new government has been pushing the international community to lift the arms embargo so that it can fight against hostile groups, including extremists. In addition, the emphasis on a top-down, state-centric approach to securitisation and rebuilding the security sector institutions raises number of concerns and may, in fact, lead to the re-militarisation of Somalia or the re-establishment of centralised security apparatuses which may fail to include other stakeholders such as women’s groups and members of civil society in playing essential roles in such efforts. The security of the state must not be separated from the security of the Somali people who have endured two decades of violence and contributed to the securitisation of their communities. Somali women inside and outside of Somalia used traditional, civic and transnational approaches as well as creative methods and resources to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance and improve the overall security conditions of a vulnerable population. Similarly, ordinary men and women formed institutions and responded to the immediate needs of members of their communities.

The international community has been contributing to the rebuilding of the security sector in war-torn Somalia. While such support is essential, it must not marginalise resource-
ful actors and institutions that have contributed to security and peace in Somalia from the efforts of rebuilding security sector institutions. The new government must also tap into the input and contributions of all Somalis, including those residing in the diaspora, to contribute to the development of security sector institutions.
References


To be a Somali and a woman fighting for equality and social justice in these times requires an even greater deal of courage than in times of peace. And yet it is more necessary than ever (Nuruddin, Farah, 2000).

Introduction

War and its aftermath are often considered negative, particularly for the most vulnerable group of society – women, children and the elderly. But conflict, because of its disruptive nature, can provide opportunities to restructure social norms and institutions and perhaps lead to a society that is more egalitarian and democratic. But these gains can be lost again after the conflict ends or as part of the conflict resolution process. Thus, cementing gains made during the war is critically important in ensuring that these rights are not lost.

In the case of Somalia, the long civil war, that is yet to conclude, has provided spaces for women to inhabit that were previously unavailable to them. It has also created realities on the ground that cannot be disputed, namely that Somali women have sought to keep their families and communities together in any way that they can. That Somali women have taken on this immense responsibility is not new. Whether it was fighting for independence from European colonisers or promoting the development of Somalia, Somali women have taken a positive and active role in advancing their country. Often, these contributions have been ignored, but during the past twenty years, denying women’s contributions is no longer possible.

This chapter seeks to explore one aspect of the larger role played by Somali women, specifically diaspora women’s activities through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In examining this, I hope to highlight their role in the provision of social services, and their promotion of peace-making and peace-building, and human rights, and state reconstruction from below. In a way, diaspora women are delivering services that were provided by the Somali state.

This is not to suggest that non-diaspora Somali women have done nothing. In fact, Somali women who remained at home bore the brunt of the violence that ensued from the civil war, while simultaneously taking on the responsibility of caring and providing for their families and their communities. In her study of Somali diaspora organizations in Toronto and Nairobi, Mohamud (2010) terms this the “feminization of Somali diasporic society”, although it is clear that this “feminization” is also evident within the larger Somalia’s civil society and can be traced back to the 1995 UN Beijing Conference (Tripp, 2003). Whereas
other diaspora interact with the state, in Somalia, the long and still incomplete attempts to resuscitate the central state, mean that these diasporic women have to negotiate with a host of entities claiming authority ranging from clan elders to local and regional governance structures. But a great deal has been written about the experiences of local Somali women, sometimes in their own words. For example, both Hawa Abdi (2013) and Asha Geelle Diiriye (2013), who are well known for their humanitarian work in Mogadishu and Puntland respectively, have written personal accounts of their experiences living in Somalia and their activities during the war. Similarly, Marian Arif Ghassim (1994) wrote about her views on the conflict in Somalia during the early part of the civil war.

Somali women who went abroad also shared these violent experiences with local Somali women within Somalia, on their journey out of the country and within the refugee camps. Recent studies on the Somali diaspora have largely focused on the ways that they contributed to the development of home, including through remittances, and the construction of schools, universities and hospitals (Ibrahim, 2010; Farah, 2009). Very little research has examined the activities of Somali diaspora women, particularly in the ways that women contribute to development, broadly defined, and in the ways that they transform existing norms at home.

This chapter seeks to address that research gap – by focusing on the role of returned diaspora women to Puntland and Somaliland in the social, economic and political spheres, and their impact on home. I argue that these returned diaspora women alter and challenge traditional norms and practices that are harmful to women and that marginalize their political, economic and social progress. Often, cultural or religious beliefs and practices are asserted in refusing women’s entrance into the political space, including their involvement in politics.

This chapter focuses on diaspora women for two reasons. First, despite facing hardships associated with settling in to their host communities, the contributions of Somali diaspora women have not been studied. Also absent from studies on the Somali diaspora are the ways that diaspora women are changing traditional norms and their contributions to the reconstruction of the state. Secondly, unlike diaspora men who come back alone, women often come back with their families and make a long-term commitment to home. I argue that returning with their families creates an imperative necessity for these women to ensure that basic services, such as education and healthcare, are available for their children. It also informs their drive to ensure that Somali society becomes egalitarian, just, and democratic.

The first part of this paper will provide a brief historical overview of the role of Somali women in the pre-war era. This is to create a comparative frame to discern what, if any, changes have occurred regarding women’s position within Somali society after 1991. This will be followed by an examination of the consequences of the civil war for Somali women. Third, a framework for the diasporic experiences of Somali women will be presented. The fourth section of this chapter will provide concrete examples of the work and contribution of diaspora women based on fieldwork carried out in Puntland and Somaliland. The final section will provide some concluding thoughts.
Linking NGOs, Civil Society and Diaspora

In most countries, civil society is that space between the family and the state. In the case of Somalia, civil society is to be found between a weak, fragile state being challenged by multiple and competing authorities in Somalia. Civil society has become a space largely inhabited by women and their organizations because their presence was denied in both formal and traditional public spaces. Most of these NGOs work in the provision of basic services and promotion of human rights. NGOs or more broadly associational networks cut across boundaries, connecting people and promoting peace, and these cross-cutting links are crucial in minimizing conflict (Varshney, 2001). Traditional authority and the state exclude women, but Somali women and their NGOs have created a space for themselves between those two institutions. And for the past twenty-four years, civil society groups and more specifically NGOs have been relatively free to pursue their own goals. In fact, throughout Africa, women’s organizations have become “arenas in which women have been able to assert their varied concerns” (Tripp, 2003: 233).

Somali women, particularly those coming from Western countries, are familiar with the role and uses of NGOs, although local Somali women also established their own NGOs including umbrella associations like the Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organization (COGWO), which had many of the NGOs in Somalia as members (Timmons, 2004). What really benefitted women and made these NGOs viable was the funding they received from international donors. These donors believed that circumventing African governments, many of whom were plagued with corruption and inefficiencies, would benefit these countries more because NGOs were easier to monitor and easier to ensure their accountability. And, as donors focused on advocacy and the promotion of women’s rights, Somali diaspora women were able to take advantage of this (Tripp, 2003). Somali women’s diasporic organizations often possessed the linguistic and other skills needed to run an organization as well as apply for funds. They could also count on other diasporas to assist with fundraising efforts, as will be seen below.

- Somali Women Before 1991

Somali society is both patriarchal and patrilineal. Descent is traced through the male line. Within this system, women’s loyalties are suspect because women are born into one clan and often marry into another. This created conditions for Somali women to assume multiple roles, responsibilities and links that, historically, made rural women ideal in bridging the gap between warring clans that included cementing peace agreements through the exchange of women as brides. In times of peace, though, Somali women’s activities were valued in how much they enhanced the position of their male relatives. But rather than being weak, women created their own networks of support, including informal networks, kinship groups, work groups or religious associations to strengthen themselves and battle against patriarchy (Ahmed, 1994; Affi, 2005). These groups, as well as support from close female relatives, permitted Somali women to undermine the negative effects of patriarchy on their lives.
During the colonial era, Somali women were actively involved in the struggle for independence. Zainab Jama documents the hardships endured by Somali women, including repudiation by their families, injury, imprisonment, and even death at the hands of Somali men who had sided with the colonizers (Jama, 1991 and 1994). Somali women were not only battling the colonizers, but also the patriarchal and clan-centric nature of Somali society, which expected women’s contributions but rejected their demands, such as equality in participation and benefits from their sacrifices. So, although Somali men expected that women would equally bear the responsibility for opposing the colonizers, they rejected their demands for leadership positions in the anti-colonial movement. Nevertheless, Somali women continued to fight until independence was won. Rather than receiving their due share, the door to political participation was firmly shut to them during the civilian democratic governments which ruled Somalia from 1960-1969 (El Bushra, 2004).

This door would partially open during the revolutionary government’s tenure from 1969-1991. This government introduced various laws meant to benefit women. This included compulsory education up to grade eight; free education and health care; overhauling of the family law by giving women equal rights to men; and appointing women to political positions, including allocating them up to ten per cent of parliamentary seats and as deputy ministers. Unfortunately, many of the laws intended to benefit women were not effectively implemented, and women were excluded from the Politburo, which was the highest governing body in the country (El Bushra, 2004).

• **Escaping Through Migration**

With the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, it was not only government institutions, which collapsed, but the cultural norms of Somali society shattered as well. As the civil war spread throughout the country, many Somalis sought safe haven in other countries. Once the Somali state disappeared in January 1991, millions of Somalis were on the move with at least two million leaving for Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti, and some continuing on to the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and Australia. State collapse had a gender dimension, in that the disappearance of institutions like hospitals and schools and other social services disproportionately affects women and girls more dramatically than men (Dini, 2008: 94).

Somali women were directly targeted by all factions, and experienced sexual, physical, and psychological violence. They also suffered from the destruction of their livelihood and essential services such as the collapse of health, education, and law and order. The conflict also left women with the responsibility to provide for their families’ needs. As such, war threatened “women’s security at the deepest levels and in the broadest ways” (El Bushra, 2007:134-135). This does not mean that Somali women were only passive victims of the war, but rather their experiences can simultaneously embody “trauma and resilience” (El Bushra, 2007:134-135).

Migration and the subsequent formation of the Somali diaspora took place over several decades and spread over many countries and continents. The most recent wave of Somali
migration occurred in the late 1980s and continues to the present. This migration was in reaction to the deteriorating economic and political conditions at home. Many of those who fled were refugees who requested and received refuge in Europe and, increasingly, in North America. Initially, many of those were from northwest Somalia, which faced escalating repression from the Somali government. As the fighting moved to southern Somalia, more and more people fled the country (Berns McGown, 1999; Farah, 2009; Waldo, 2006; Gundel, 2002).

Twenty-four years after the collapse of the state, and a continuous movement of Somalis to other countries, the number of Somalis living in the diaspora remains a guess at best, with the most-cited number being one million Somalis living abroad, constituting about fourteen per cent of the population. Recent reports, including a 2011 United Nations Development Programme one, have advanced a figure of one and a half million Somalis concentrated in three locations (Hammond et al, 2011). The first group of Somalis are those who have remained within the region, living largely as refugees in the neighboring countries of Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Yemen. The second group of Somalis that fled the conflict are to be found within the Middle East, especially in the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The final group are those who have settled in Europe and North America, including the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, the United States and Canada. Newer movements have created communities in Malaysia, Australia, South Africa, Libya, and Greece.

This spread of the Somali diaspora has merited the description of Somalia as a “globalised nation” (Sheikh and Healy, 2009; Menkhaus, 2008; Gundel, 2002). Laguerre, in his writings on the Haitian diaspora, expounds on this expanding nation when he notes, “the nation has outgrown the state because of its diasporic tentacles” (Laguerre 1991:635).

Somalis in the diaspora remit an estimated one billion dollars annually, although some studies suggest that remittances have increased to USD 1.5 billion as the number of Somalis migrating has grown (Sheikh and Healy, 2009; Hammond et al, 2011). Remittances now exceed foreign direct investments, development aid, and exports combined (Chalmers and Aden, 2008).

It is important to note that diaspora communities are not monolithic, and include economic and social migrants as well as political refugees. However, political refugees fleeing from their home and country due to war or other types of violence have a particular set of traumatic memories and experiences that define them by a strong emotional attachment to home. Unlike other diaspora, many political refugees engage in political activities, seeking to alter the conditions that led to their departure (Basch, et al., 1994). These political refugees can be more accurately described as conflict-generated diasporas because of their origins in violent displacement, and identities linked to symbolically important territory (Lyons, 2006). Conflict-generated diasporas more closely correspond to the original meaning of a diaspora – a group of people who have been forced to leave their homeland.
Surviving Migration: The Changing Role of Somali Women

This poem by legendary poetess, Hawa Jibril, who commented on and analyzed the position of women in Somali society aptly, presents the condition of Somali women in the diaspora with her poem Nostalgia:

Once you have no country, you have no esteem  
Your degree is as worthless as a worn-out dress  
Hungry for daran, camels abandon unfamiliar pastures  
Much worse is human longing  
In utter rage, some even commit suicide  
For, having lost prestige and possessions  
They cannot endure any discomfort  
My teeth are falling out, and my legs are feeble  
As if beaten, my whole body aches  
Bedridden most of the time, I go nowhere  
I miss my country’s unpolluted green grass  
Its cool breeze and soft sand  
Sleeping on simple handmade mats  
Swimming in the sea, the rivers rolling by  
Strolling in the warming sun  
Good neighbours and delightful times with friends  
My soul is yearning for the place where my people dwell  
But alas, my country has collapsed and I cannot visit  
Indeed there is no cure for nostalgia (Alim, 2010: 201).

The worldwide dispersal of Somalis is different from that of previous migration in that women comprise a significant number and, in some countries, form the greater part of the community. Diaspora women are viewed as social capital by their families because women are more consistent in helping their families than are men. The explanation given for the difference between men and women is that women are kinder and more caring than men. This stereotypical portrayal of women excuses men’s unwillingness to meet their responsibilities, shifting the burden onto women. As such, now families with female relatives – sisters, daughters, mothers – abroad are viewed as luckier and more likely to be well-off than others with sons abroad. In one anecdote, an elderly man walks into a café in Hargeisa and asks who would take his four sons in exchange for one daughter. This changing perception that women are essential to the survival and the wellbeing of their families has led to a changing perception of Somali diaspora women. Local Somalis view women as more reliable in responding to the daily needs of their families and, as one remittance recipient put it, the difference between men and women remitters is that women worry about meeting the daily needs of their family (Lindley, 2010). As refugees who have experienced trauma through loss of family and living in an alien environment, Somalis face difficulties in integrating into their new country. As Africans and as Muslims in the post-9/11 world, they face racism and discrimination. Due to their visibly Muslim dress, Somali women are exposed to more prejudice and discrimination, both socially and in the workforce (Decimo, 2007).
A significant number of families in the diaspora and at home are headed by women, increasing the responsibilities of Somali women, both to their families in the diaspora and at home. Their fragmented families contribute to difficulties in adjusting to life in the diaspora, as many adults are mentally and financially torn between home and their newly adopted country. The Somalis in the US and elsewhere in the diaspora maintain family networks by sending remittances and facilitating family re-unification. Remittances are used by families to meet their daily needs, pay for children’s education and to invest in construction, telecommunication companies, and other investments (Lindley, 2010).

Due to their level of education, their responsibilities for their families, and the type of employment open to them with limited language and educational skills, many women struggle to meet their financial responsibilities. Women were thrust into the role of being sole breadwinners for their families in the diaspora and at home. Often, they subjugate their needs and those of their children to families at home who are living under uncertain conditions. Somali women are so committed to helping their families that some in other developing countries even re-remit home a portion of their remittance, even when their own situation is precarious and they are receiving support from diaspora relatives in the West (Al-Sharmani, 2007). Due to the nature of the civil war, inter-clan relations were damaged as many sought protection within their own clans. Inter-marriages between clans, once promoted as a means of expanding access to resources and networks of support, were now discouraged (Timmons, 2004). Supporting one’s clan politically and financially, previously the domain of men, now included women. As such, women were expected to pay into their clan funds without being invited to sit under the proverbial tree and participate in the decision-making process, which continues to be the domain of men.

**Diaspora and Development**

Diasporas take part in the development of their home countries in numerous ways, including the transfer of money, goods, knowledge, and skills. Diasporas are also more likely to invest in their home countries, regardless of the political and economic conditions, than are non-diaspora investors. As such, many developing countries have come to rely on diaspora investors. Secondly, aside from investing at home, the diaspora can attract foreign investors to their home country, thereby indirectly contributing to development (Davone, 2007). Finally, the diaspora can formally engage with their home countries through the formation of NGOs or through hometown, ethnic, religious, and professional associations. All these different types of organizations connect with home in diverse ways to promote the development of the country. These diaspora organizations collaborate with locally-based organizations or individuals, who are then responsible for the disbursement of funds and project implementation. Sometimes, these organizations can also directly collaborate with their home governments, which would provide some of the funding.

Thus, rather than the traditional image of a diaspora that maintains long-distance relations with home, occasionally returning to visit family, more and more are diaspora circulating between home, host, and other diaspora locations. Michel Laguerre in his research on the Haitian diaspora clearly demonstrates these global relationships by showing that
the diaspora go through a process of de-diasporasation when they move home and re-diasporasation as they return to their host or other diaspora sites once again. For Laguerre, this process is not just one of changing location, but may involve acquiring citizenships in the case of second-generation diaspora or re-acquiring lost or renounced citizenship. This back and forth movement is often linked to business and political opportunities, as well as familial obligations. Laguerre categorizes diaspora activities into five groups, including as go-betweens or brokers between the homeland and the hostland; as government strategists or informal lobbyists; as transnational activists; as influence peddlers; and as homeland government officials in the hostland. From these different categories, the most relevant in the case of Somali diaspora women are as that of informal lobbyists, as a transnational activists, and as influence peddlers (Laguerre, 2006).

The interactions that diasporas, as groups or communities, have with their home countries are mediated by the conditions at home, in the host society, as well as in international relations. Therefore, “in analyzing transnational political subjects, it is important to recognize the multiple positionality that diasporas inhabit and that reflects both their agency and subjectivity” (Um, 2007: 254). Similar to other activities that take place across borders and continents, diaspora activities are shaped by changes in the global opportunity structure; by whether the diaspora is state-linked or stateless; and whether there are leaders within the diaspora (Smith and Stares, 2007). Somali diaspora women are impacted by changes in the international arena. The international community, which has prioritized the construction of a viable state for Somalia, often disregards the needs of women, including their desire for full political and social participation. For example, in the Garowe Principles, that women were allocated thirty per cent of the parliamentary seats was ignored by Somali politicians and the international community (UNPOS 2011). In this way, women's struggles are subjugated by the existing structures in place, which favor men. Somalis also qualify as a stateless diaspora, which gives them a free hand in how they engage with home, whereas a state-linked diaspora often has the state mediating their activities. Due to their globalized nature, the Somali diaspora has yet to produce structured leadership.

IV. Returned Diaspora Women: Transforming Society

Despite the difficulties they have faced with their migration and resettlement, Somali women in the diaspora nevertheless play an important part in the development of home. Due to their financial clout and their rising demands for political representation, Somali women are transforming their political, social and economic roles. Some diaspora women have relocated home to build schools, hospitals and lead nongovernmental organizations, and promote human rights and environmental concerns. Many of the projects carried out by these diasporic women often benefit women, children, and other vulnerable communities.

In 1996, Hawa Aden returned from Canada and began a school for girls in Kismayo. Threatened by the militia there, she closed the school. She restarted her efforts in Galkayo, establishing the Galkayo Education Center for Peace and Development. Her ef-
forts were again met suspicion and hostility by the community, encountering physical threats against her and the school. Demonstrating the resilience and strength of Somali women, Hawa secured the building for the first school from the government of Puntland (Interview with author, 2006).

When Aden applied for, and was denied, funding from the UN and other international organizations, the center’s founders reached out to the Somali diaspora and received support from thirteen Somali diaspora communities in various countries to fund the first school. Even though the GECPD now receives international funding, the support from the diaspora continues. To demonstrate both the widespread support received by the center as well as their gratitude to their donors, Aden lists all their funders by name and place of residence on their office wall. GECPD supporters include individuals who send their contributions directly to the center as well as groups who hold annual fundraisers. For example, a group of Somali-American women in Virginia send donations of about USD 1500 a year (Interview with author, 2008).

Tapping into her knowledge of the diaspora, the Executive Director of the center, Hawa Aden, uses trips abroad to raise funds. On a trip to Columbus, Ohio, a fundraiser was held for the center when Aden visited in 2002. Now, the center receives support from diasporas in Canada, the US, Sweden, Switzerland, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Australia, and Kenya. Signalling its growing importance to the larger Somali community, the center also receives funding from individual Somalis and companies across the country (Interview with author, 2006).

Today, the GECPD operates over a dozen schools for girls, minorities and women, and thousands have graduated from its schools. To encourage nomadic and internally displaced parents to send their daughters, the center owns and runs several boarding schools. It also offers an afternoon school program, called Second Chance, for young girls who are either working outside the home to support their families or are busy with household chores in the mornings that prevent them from attending the day school. Other programs that the center offers include vocational training and adult literacy programs for women. Today, more than four thousand girls, women and minority students benefit from the programs offered by the GECPD, while thousands more have graduated (Interview with author, 2006).

Aden’s activities are not limited to the educational sector; she also tackles a variety of topics, some of which are taboo within Somali culture, but which are detrimental to the health and wellbeing of girls and women in Puntland. This is in line with the view that the diaspora bring with them social remittances including ideas, beliefs, and ways of doing things from their host countries to their home countries (Levitt, 1998). These social remittances are intended to transform home by concerning themselves with issues that the diaspora sees as infringing on the human rights of some groups or those that hamper good governance, such as corruption or promoting free and fair elections.

Two of the issues that Aden undertook and that she continues to fight against are female genital cutting and forced prostitution, along with the accompanying rape of young girls.
In the first case, Aden was uncompromising on outlawing the practice of female genital cutting on girls. For example, rather than calling it female circumcision, which is the name preferred by Somalis as well as a direct translation of what it is called in Somali, or using the more neutral and descriptive term female genital cutting, Aden uses the much more controversial name of female genital mutilation. Aden organizes workshops and even made posters and T-shirts condemning this practice, and teaches classes on the detrimental effects of this practice in all her schools (Interview with author, 2006).

The much more divisive issue that Aden confronted was the issue of forced prostitution along with the rape of young girls. This issue most affected internally displaced people (IDP), particularly women and girls who fled the conflict in southern Somalia. Often these women lacked protection and, because they lived in areas that were not part of their clans’ territory, they did not receive the same level of protection that the women of Puntland could call upon (Hill, 2010). If a woman who is from Puntland claimed rape, theoretically, her male relatives and her clan would come to her aid in asking for justice. But, due to their IDP status, many of these women who were forced to engage in prostitution used the money to meet their family’s basic needs. Their IDP status and their clan membership meant that these women were unable to protect their young daughters from being raped and they received no assistance from the dominant clan or the Puntland state in seeking justice (Hill, 2010). Hawa Aden tried “to get the religious scholars to address this issue by condemning it in the Friday sermons but without much success.” According to Aden, the “religious scholars preferred to ignore the problem” especially since she had linked it to the widely available pornographic films that are openly sold in the city’s main market (Interview with author, 2006).

Another important contribution of the center is its peace promotion activities. Galkayo is split into north and south, and between the two clans that live there and which have hostile relations with one another. Except for the city center, which is open to everyone, each clan mostly keeps to its side of the city. But the GECPD runs schools in all neighborhoods of the city and the staff of the freely move within the city (Interview with author, 2006). For her commitment to changing the lives of girls and women in Somalia, Hawa Aden was awarded the “Women of Courage” award by the United Nations.

Diaspora contributions to education, whether in the form of remittances, or sending materials, or returning home to build these institutions is in line with migration literature which shows that diasporas engage in activities that not only contribute to its development but which transform home. The activities carried out by Hawa Aden and the GECPD are in line with the latter in that the organization does not stop at only educating girls and women but also seeks to transform the position of women within that society by directly addressing barriers to women’s rights and their advancement.

Other diaspora women have been active in the area of human rights much more directly, such as Zamzam Abdi Adan, a returned diaspora woman from the United Kingdom and former Executive Director of the development NGO the Committee of Concerned Somalis (CCS), as well as the former Chair of the Somaliland Human Rights Organizations Network, also known as Shuro-Net – an umbrella group of human rights organizations in Somali-
land. Zamzam Abdi Adan has been an active and visible force in promoting and speaking out against human rights violations in Somaliland. Whether speaking out for the freedom of the press or against the detention of political opposition leaders, or for the rights of prisoners, she has been a critical force in pressuring the Somaliland government to respect human rights (Interview with author, 2007). For example, when sixteen-year-old Zamzam Ahmed Dualeh from Puntland was charged with espionage, imprisoned, and claimed rape, torture and physical beating by the guards, it was Zamzam Abdi Adan who spoke out. Another Somali diaspora woman from the United Kingdom, a lawyer and the Director of African Rights, Raakiya Omaar, also got involved and hired four lawyers to represent Zamzam Ahmed Dualeh. Both Adan and Omaar were criticized for publicizing the case, particularly by some members of the Somaliland diaspora who considered it as negative publicity and harming the image of Somaliland, and potentially its quest for recognition (Interview with author, 2004).

In addition to her tireless work in the field of human rights, Zamzam Abdi Adan, as head of the CCS, advanced the economic, health and social wellbeing of Somalis, particularly that of women, through programs in micro-credit, skills development, and healthcare. In the political sphere, she was an activist who called for increasing the number of women in positions of political leadership and, through her network campaigns, Zamzam and other (mostly diaspora) women living in Hargeisa were able to increase the level of female participation in running for electoral office and in voting (Interview with author, 2007). As the current Somaliland Minister of Higher Education, Zamzam continues to contribute to the development of home.

Other diaspora women are to be found in all sectors of Somali society. For example, Fatima Jibrell, a long-time diasporic from the US and the head of the nongovernmental organization Horn Relief, now renamed African Development Solutions (ADESO), is a recognized activist for her work in environmental conservation and education. Some diaspora women are to be found in the business sector, establishing businesses and employing locals. Often, these diaspora women utilize the resources available at home. One returned diaspora woman from Canada established a frankincense business and was exporting it to various countries in the Middle East. Another, who had returned from the US, established a network for those in the fishing, frankincense, and livestock sectors so that small businesses, which are mostly owned by women, could work collaboratively and collectively advance their business interests (Interview with author, 2010).

**Diaspora Women and Politics**

As Somali women in the diaspora begin to realize their power, more are getting involved in politics. Their work with NGOs has served as a platform for many of these women to catapult them onto the national stage. At many community meetings, demonstrations and other events related to home, women in the diaspora in collaboration with local women are at the forefront, organizing and attending in large numbers. Politically, their participation has dramatically increased. In the last two reconciliation conferences in Djibouti and Kenya, a sizeable number of diaspora women attended, pushing for wom-
en’s participation in politics at home. Because participation was based on clan affiliation, women were separated along clan lines, but they often managed to work across clan lines in support of issues of concern to all women. At the 2002 reconciliation conference, Somali women delegates, a large number of whom came from the diaspora, formed the so-called Sixth Clan to counter the patriarchal effects of the clan which was pulling the women away from each other and undermining their ability to promote their agenda, including increasing the number of female parliamentarians and ensuring the representation of women at all levels of decision-making. The Sixth Clan was intended to designate the women participants as their own clan, with their own set of issues and concerns (Interview with author, 2008; Timmons 2004).

The women were successful in reserving twelve per cent of the parliamentary seats for women at the Kenya Conference and having it enshrined in the Transitional Federal Charter, although they were less successful in having women occupy all the seats, as some clans refused to allow women to represent them (Timmons 2004). Some of the women delegates were elected to the parliament and one woman from Columbus, Ohio unsuccessfully ran for the 2004 presidential election. In regional elections, Fowsiy Haji Aden from the UK attempted to run for the presidency of Somaliland in 2003, but was disqualified from participating for a variety of reasons, leaving the field open for the three male candidates. During 2012-2013, the Somali Federal Government had two women ministers, both from the United Kingdom, appointed to powerful positions. Fowsiy Yusuf Haji Aden, a long-time activist, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister, the first time that a woman has held this position. While the other, Marian Qasim, became the minister of the enlarged ministry of social services, which is responsible for education and healthcare. Somaliland also has two women ministers from the United Kingdom and the United States responsible for Education and Rural Development and Environment, similarly Puntland has two female ministers responsible for Women and Social Affairs and Constitutional and Federal Affairs.

Conclusion

As “the lives of Somali women continue to be besieged by unending material deprivation, violence, insecurity, chaos and anarchy” (Dini 2008:94), Somali women in the diaspora have stepped in to provide various services needed by women but which benefit the entire society. This is not to suggest that Somali women in Somalia cannot do or provide these services for themselves. They do and they are, and some have received international recognition and awards for their work. For example, Dr. Hawa Abdi in Afgoye has hosted thousands of the internally displaced fleeing from Mogadisho and runs the largest internally-displaced camp. And Edna Adan in Hargeisa, who has built a maternity hospital and a nursing school which has saved the lives of thousands of women and children, are examples of what locally-based Somali women can achieve; yet both rely on support from the diaspora. But this paper primarily seeks to highlight the sacrifices and commitments made by Somali women in the diaspora who are torn between two lives – that at home and in host societies.
Somalis at home and in the refugee camps are grateful for the economic support they receive from their mothers, daughters, nieces, aunts, and grandmothers. This gratitude is translating into a growing acknowledgement of women’s vital role within society. But demands for social justice, equality and political participation have led to resistance both within the diasporic communities and at home. Promotion of social and political rights among diaspora women is viewed suspiciously by the men, and as an indication of growing Western influences over women who have forgotten their place.

While men are bogged down in the politics of clannishness, violence and destruction, diaspora Somali women have sought to take advantage of their new environment in a variety of ways. Living in the diaspora has allowed them to create spaces that allow for their economic independence, while pursuing equal participation in all aspects of society.
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Chapter 10
Understanding Transnational Islamic NGOs in Somalia

Afyare A. Elmi

Introduction

In general, Islamic nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are “voluntary (national, regional or transnational, as well as community-based) entities for which Islam is an important inspiration to do good and an identity marker that distinguishes them from NGOs with similar orientations and objectives” (Salih, 2002: 3). More narrowly, transnational Islamic NGOs are not-for-profit entities; they collect donations, and work in several countries outside of their headquarters (Kaag, 2008). Taken together, transnational Islamic NGOs, like others in this business, are established to work in areas of relief and development in poor countries (Salih, 2002; Kaag, 2008). The sources of funding for Islamic NGOs (local, national, regional or transnational) include various types of donations that Muslims give – some of which are mandatory, such as zakat (Islamic alms), while others are voluntary, such as sadaqat (charity) (Salih, 2002; Saggiomo, 2011).

Saggiomo (2011) identifies private donations, public donations, and user fees as the three main sources of funding for most Islamic NGOs that work in Somalia. In addition, Islamic NGOs raise funds from Muslims in their respective countries. As mentioned above, philanthropy is a religious duty for every Muslim: those who can afford it must give mandatory alms from their wealth. However, it would be misleading to claim that only the rich contribute to charity. Islam encourages Muslims to pay charity (a small amount or large amount) regardless of their status. As such, this is perhaps the most important source of funding for Islamic NGOs coming from majority-Muslim or Western countries. In addition, as Saggiomo (2011) rightly argues, Islamic NGOs may access public funding from their home governments. In fact, some even apply for and receive American and British aid money (through the United States Agency for International Development and the UK’s Department for International Development). However, since 9/11, governments have been restricted in providing grants to NGOs (Saggiomo, 2011). Moreover, Islamic NGOs charge affordable user fees for the educational and health services they provide. Where someone cannot pay, the NGOs try to find sponsorships that might pay for the schooling of orphans or the poor (Saggiomo, 2011).

In this chapter, I examine the origins, activities and scope of transnational Islamic NGOs in Somalia. I then discuss and analyse their contributions, arguing that these NGOs, like many Western NGOs and inter-governmental organisations, largely focus on education, health, relief (mostly for the poor, and internally-displaced peoples (IDPs)), and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). Moreover, by classifying these NGOs according to their countries of origin, I analyse the features they share and those that are unique to a particular group of NGOs, such as those from Turkey. Finally, I discuss the impact of these or-
ganisations and the challenges they face in delivering humanitarian charity aid to needy Somalis.

**Nature, Activities and Scope of Transnational Islamic NGOs**

Somalia's state collapsed in 1991. Since then, civil war and drought have killed hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The suffering of the Somali people continues to this day. According to Laura Hammond, there are currently around 1.2 million refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Uganda. Moreover, there are about one and a half million internally-displaced Somalis within the country (Hammond, 2013). Many NGOs, from all corners of the world, provide assistance to the Somali people, and Islamic NGOs also play a critical role in this rescue effort (Saggiomo, 2012).

The exact number of Islamic NGOs is not known. For this study, I have identified twenty-three transnational NGOs from Turkey, the Middle Eastern region and Western countries that work in Somalia – there could be more charities in the country. Besides the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), which is a government agency, there are eight major NGOs from Turkey that work in Somalia. In addition, there are ten agencies from the Middle Eastern region: three from Saudi Arabia, two from Qatar, one from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt, one from Sudan, one from Kuwait, and one from Iran. Interestingly, Islamic NGOs are not only based in Muslim countries. In Somalia, there are at least five transnational NGOs that are based in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western countries. These organisations are usually established by Muslim communities in the West.

In Somalia, the areas in which the transnational Islamic NGOs work often differ: some focus on education and health; others work in a number of areas, including providing relief to the IDPs, and sponsoring and implementing development projects. In February 2013, I visited the Rajo camp in Mogadishu, which was set up for internally-displaced people. Turkish Red Crescent has been managing the camp since 2011. At the time, there were about twenty-nine thousand individuals in the camp. The Turkish Red Crescent built tents, provided food aid, and built a mosque, bathrooms, and a play area for the children in the camp. Turkish relief workers were present at the time I visited the camp. The Rajo camp was considered to be a model camp, and it was well-run compared to other camps in Mogadishu.

While there, I met the IDPs in the camp and some of the officials of the Turkish Red Crescent. Those managing the camp told me that they were thinking of finding a way to help rehabilitate the IDPs to their home villages. The Turkish Red Crescent also distributes food aid to different parts of Somalia. According to officials on the ground, as recently as November 2013, the agency sent emergency food aid to the areas of Puntland that had been affected by cyclones. In addition, the Crescent manages a consortium with the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, providing basic services for Mogadishu – garbage collection, incineration, production of sewage infrastructure, and debris removal. Eventually, once trained, Somali authorities are expected to take over these duties. I also met the IDPs who appreciated the assistance that the agency was providing to them.
The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), a Turkish Islamic NGO, is also active in Somalia. While in Mogadishu, I visited a new orphanage that the Zamzam Foundation, a local partner, and the IHH built together. The new orphanage houses about four hundred young orphans. More than a thousand Somali children from the neighbouring areas would also join the school there, but would not live in the compound (Personal Communication, 2013). In addition, according to the IHH reports, the organisation provided relief and sponsored a number of recovery projects. A case in point is drilling water wells; the IHH says it has drilled many shallow and deep wells in order to provide safe drinking water.

Moreover, Milli Gorus (Hasene), Yeryuzu Doktorlari (Doctors Worldwide – a UK-based Turkish NGO), Yardimeli and the Besir Trust assist Somalis in various ways. Milli Gorus (Hasene) is not new to Somalia. It used to come to Somalia in the past at least once a year in order to provide charity during Eid al-Adha (an Islamic holiday). However, after the famine, the organisation expanded its operations in Somalia and started to work on the ground, mostly in helping the IDPs. The organisation has rebuilt the marine and fisheries school in Mogadishu and partnered with the City University in Mogadishu in the operation of the institution. On the other hand, Yeryuzu Doktorlari specialises in providing medical assistance to Somalis, and has established the Shifa Hospital in Mogadishu. Moreover, Yardimeli, an Istanbul-based NGO, is building a specialised hospital with a hundred-bed capacity in the capital. It provides some food aid for IDPs and organises Qurban during Eid. The Besir Trust also manages an orphanage in Mogadishu. Finally, the Diyanet Trust, a governmental agency, provides religious education scholarships to Somali students in Turkey, and also manages the imam (preacher) school in Mogadishu. They have also renovated some mosques in Somalia.

Furthermore, another Turkish organisation, Al-Nile, is active in the area of education in Somalia. The Somali government allowed the Nile Organization to renovate and then operate two famous secondary schools in Mogadishu: the former Banadir Secondary School and the former polytechnic secondary school. Since renovating the latter, hundreds of students now study there. The organisation charges fees to students. In other words, this is not free education, even though it is heavily subsidised. In addition, other Turkish NGOs – associations and charitable trusts – deliver aid projects for Somalia on a temporary basis, such as Qurban organisations during Eid al-Adha, food aid during Ramadan, temporary medical missions, and so on. These depend on the donations earmarked for Somalia that these charities receive in Turkey and which change each year.
Table 10.1 Turkish-based NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Red Crescent</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>WASH and IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHH</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Gorus (Hasene)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors Worldwide</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yardimeli</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Education and WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besir Trust</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Education (orphanage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Blue Crescent</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyanat Trust</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the Turkish NGOs, other transnational Islamic NGOs from different Muslim countries are present in Somalia. The Qatar Red Crescent and Qatar Charity have offices in Mogadishu and provide assistance to the Somali people. The Qatar Red Crescent runs some hospitals and provides medical help to the sick. In fact, the Qatar Red Crescent has left positive impressions with the projects it has been managing while working in Somalia. The Qatar Charity has had an office in the capital since 2004 and it has supported basic services in education and health. In addition, the Arab Medical Union, an Egypt-based organisation, largely focuses on the area of health. Doctors from the organisation run a hospital in Mogadishu. They also travel to other cities in order to provide medical services to the needy of Somalia. Similarly, a Saudi-Arabia-based organisation, Patricians across the Continent (PAC), provides health services; while the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) focuses on education. On the other hand, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is active in a number of areas, including giving general relief and supporting the rehabilitation of IDPs. Moreover, the Saudi National Campaign (Saudi government donor) now funds sixty-five projects in education, health and livelihood which aim to reconstruct thirty-three schools, ten health facilities, a technical school, an orphan collage, and twenty socio-economic projects in ten regions. The Saudi National Campaign also funds the drilling of one hundred and fifty boreholes in Somalia (Interview, 2014, Mogadishu). The Organization of Islamic Conference’s Mogadishu office manages these projects. Furthermore, the Iran Red Crescent is also active in the health sector, and runs a medical centre in Mogadishu.

Direct Aid (formerly Africa Muslims Agency International), which is based in Kuwait, has been working in Somalia since the collapse of the state in 1991. The agency provides educational assistance in Somalia. It runs eight schools throughout the country, and it also supports one of Mogadishu’s higher education institutions – SIMAD University. The organisation has educated thousands of Somalis over the course of the last decade. Moreover, the Crescent Welfare Society International of the United Arab Emirates has been present in Somalia for the last twenty years. Like Direct Aid, the organisation works in the area of education. Finally, the Munazzamat Dawa Islamiya (Islamic Dawa Organization) of Sudan has also been active in Somalia for a long time. It has many schools throughout Somalia and has educated thousands of Somalis. Many graduates from Somali schools went to Sudan and other Arab destinations to complete their higher education.
### Table 10.2: Middle Eastern-based NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Education and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Education, WASH and livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricians across the Continent (PAC)</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Health, WASH and livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar Charity</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Education, WASH and livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawa Organization</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Education, health and livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Aid (Former Africa Muslim Agency)</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Education and livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Education and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination Office</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 57 Muslim States based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Advocacy, funding appeals and coordination of all humanitarian sectors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outside the Muslim countries, there are about five major NGOs based in Western countries that have offices in Mogadishu. While this list is not exhaustive, the biggest are Islamic Relief (UK), Mercy International (USA) and the Amoud Foundation. These NGOs are active in all areas of relief and development throughout the country. According to its reports, the Amoud Foundation runs the Al-Hayat Hospital, supports a number of education projects, and distributes food aid to the needy. Moreover, the Amoud Foundation dedicates parts of its funding to orphans throughout the Somali region. Mercy International has established a number of tuberculosis clinics in most regions. Moreover, it also assists malnourished children with food and nutrition support, and works in the field of malaria prevention (Personal Communication, 2013). In addition, Muslim Aid (UK) and Muslim Hands (UK) support health, education and emergency relief. They also help the IDPs.
Table 10.3: NGOs based in Non-Muslim countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mercy International</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Health, education and WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amoud Foundation</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>Health, education and WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>over 20 years</td>
<td>WASH, education and livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Aid</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>WASH and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Hands</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>WASH and livelihood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides delivering aid and implementing development projects, the OIC's Humanitarian Coordination Office has been actively working with local and international partner NGOs since 2011; most transnational Islamic NGOs are members of this collaboration effort. The office coordinates the works of forty-two organisations based in Somalia. Taking its cue from an earlier organisational model used by Nairobi-based NGOs that worked in Somalia, the office has organised its partners according to the functions they focus on. The Humanitarian Coordination Office of the OIC identified five functional areas in which most of its partner organisations work: food, education, health, non-food items, and WASH. Food distribution has been a major part of the work of all NGOs since Somalia's state collapsed in 1991. Unfortunately, because of the prolonged conflict and cyclical droughts, those who live in the most-fertile areas of Somalia have depended on such aid for a long time.

In addition, since Somalia's authorities cannot deliver basic services, the NGOs filled this vacuum and, since 1991, have been providing education and health services. The lucky ones (not all people, of course) that have access to education and health services have depended on NGOs. While Islamic NGOs are not the only group providing these vital services, their leadership role in these two sectors cannot be ignored. Finally, most Islamic organisations have also provided water and sanitation-related services and assisted many IDPs and needy Somalis with non-food items.

Findings, Analyses and Implications

Based on the above data, a number of observations can be made. First, it is clear that there are more Turkish NGOs than from any other Muslim country in the world. With the exception of one, almost all of the Turkish NGOs arrived after the 2011 famine. Obviously, the relationship between the Turkish and Somali peoples is not new. Somalia was part of the Islamic empire, and Turkey's presence in the Horn of Africa dates back to the sixteenth century. However, in this case, the dominance of Turkish NGOs is part of the Turkish government's decision to assist Somalia.
Turkey’s recent, unique, and successful humanitarian assistance to Somalia began with the writings and speeches of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the height of the 2011 famine in Somalia (Erdogan, 2011; BBC News, 2011). Prime Minister Erdogan criticised the international community for its poorly-coordinated relief effort. Standing on the side-lines while thousands of people starve is morally unacceptable, he argued. This was not mere rhetoric. On 19 August 2011, Erdogan visited Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu. In the delegation he led were ministers of his government and members of his family. While in Mogadishu, the Prime Minister and his delegation visited the victims of the famine and witnessed first-hand the magnitude of the disaster. Erdogan was moved to state, “This crisis tests the notion of civilisation and our modern values” (Erdogan, 2011). Promptly, the Turkish government installed Dr. Kani Turan as an ambassador in Mogadishu. Dr. Turan is a medical doctor and a humanitarian worker. He quickly developed an advanced understanding of the country, and as a result has done an excellent job in coordinating the Turkish effort in Somalia.

Substantive support aside, Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit has had two positive implications. First, it has helped further mobilise the Turkish population, aid agencies and business sector. I was in Istanbul in July 2011, which coincided with the month of Ramadan (the month in which Muslims fast during the day). The level of mobilisation among the Turkish population for the Somalia cause was tangible everywhere. The media, mosques and average people on the street all knew about the Somalia catastrophe, and I heard many stories of how people wanted to do something about it. In essence, the Turkish commitment was societal, not just a government reaction to a crisis. NGOs were part of this mobilisation, and it is therefore not surprising to see eight Turkish NGOs in Somalia. In fact, diplomatic sources told me that Turkey raised more than USD 300 million in 2011, surpassing the funds raised for the tsunami in Indonesia and floods in Pakistan. Erdogan’s visit has also raised the morale of the Somali people. In fact, through the symbolic importance of the visit and subsequent substantive assistance, Turkey has captured the imagination of the Somali people. Abandoned and neglected for a long time, Somalis feel that Turkey is a serious brotherly country that is determined to assist the Somali people. This has restored hope for many. Although traditional aid workers did not like this, Turkish agencies have benefited from Somali society’s more-positive perceptions of Turkey. In fact, the broad public support that the Turkish approach secured from the Somali population initially forced opposition groups to retract their violence from rescue efforts.

Second, all of the transnational Islamic NGOs listed above are on the ground. Somalia is a country that has not seen law and order for two decades. There are criminals, business warlords and corrupt politicians who are determined to exploit the misery of the millions affected by the famine. Some even opened their own camps and forced the famine victims to stay there. The problem was compounded by a lack of credible partnership at the Somali governmental level. With all these complications, and despite threats, delays and robbery, Islamic NGOs maintained offices in Somalia. Being on the ground in Somalia has actually reduced the administrative and delivery costs of these agencies. Compared to many Western NGOs that chose to operate from Nairobi or partner with local agencies, these organisations spend less on administration. Arguably, the most important factor that helped the transnational Islamic NGOs was the fact that they are on the ground.
Third, most Arab-based NGOs have been in Somalia for more than two decades: the WAMY and the IIRO (Saudi Arabia), Direct Aid, the Red Crescent Society (UAE), and Munazzamat Dawa Islamiya have been working in Somalia since 1991. The fact that these organisations kept their offices open against all odds is surprising. A second factor related to Arab-based NGOs is that most of them are managed by Somali professionals. Perhaps this is the main reason that has permitted these transnational organisations to stay in a lawless country for more than two decades. In contrast, Turkish NGOs are managed by Turkish citizens that are on the ground.

Fourth, although they work in various sectors, most transnational Islamic NGOs specialise in the education and health sectors. It is very clear from the above table that many Islamic NGOs work in areas of education. For instance, Direct Aid has at least eight schools throughout the country. Thousands of Somali students benefited from the schools that the Red Crescent Society of the UAE, WAMY and Munazzamat Dawa Islamiya have managed for the last two decades. In addition, Islamic NGOs have supported higher education institutions; Turkish NGOs are also active in the education sector. Besides hundreds of scholarship to Somali students, several Turkish NGOs, including IHH and Al-Nile renovated abandoned schools and now educate many Somali children. Besides education, Islamic NGOs focus on the health sector. For example, Doctors Worldwide runs the Shifa Hospital in Mogadishu. An Egyptian NGO, the Arab Medical Union, also has a hospital in Somalia; meanwhile the Qatar Red Crescent, the Turkish Red Crescent, the International Blue Crescent, Yardimeli and the Iran Red Crescent also specialise in the area of health.

There are two rationales given for the Islamic NGOs’ focus on education. One important reason is the vacuum left by the statelessness situation created in the 1990s. In fact, Somali students did not get the opportunity to go to school for the first few years of the civil war (1991–93). For many teachers and activists, this was a situation that could not be ignored. Some Somali educators convinced Islamic NGOs that came to help during the 1992 famine to support education sector. Related to this rationale is the fact that there were many unemployed teachers and educators available in the country. This became a job-creation opportunity for many in Somalia. In effect, this combination of negative circumstances worked for the benefit of society.

Fifth, since Arab-based NGOs have been in Somalia for the longest duration, they have developed a unique system that has made their efforts sustainable. Interestingly, a good number of the schools and health centres that these Islamic organisations have created are so far self-sustained. Most of these schools charge tuition fees. Those schools that are in urban centres attract many students that have families that can pay the tuition fees, which are generally affordable. For those that cannot afford the fees, agencies try to assist them through sponsorships. Back in 2000, I visited one school in Mogadishu. Coincidently, I met a parent who came to talk to the principal to negotiate the fees. The father told the principal that he had a number of children, and he could not pay the required fee for each of them. After a lengthy discussion, the principal gave a discount, which the parent accepted. I was told that this was a normal practice: administrators often use their discretion on the issue of how much they charge. According to one interviewee, Somali educators who led these organisations came up with the idea of cost-sharing because
they believed that the assistance from overseas could stop at any time.

Impact of Islamic NGOs in Somalia

It is difficult to measure the impact of Islamic NGOs in a precise manner. However, what is clear is that these organisations have had a significant economic, social and political impact on Somalia. Economically, whatever funding that these organisations spend in Somalia contributes to the economy of the entire country. In addition, many educators and administrators work for these organisations as well. More importantly, as a result of the services these organisations provide, tens of thousands of Somalis have received an education in the last twenty years. In fact, one can safely argue that the educated elite in Somalia are largely those that have been educated in Somalia and who then went on to Arab countries for further studies.

When it comes to university graduates, Sudan leads the way, with thousands of young men and women graduating from universities in the country every year. In addition, other Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Egypt, Uganda, Yemen, Malaysia, and Pakistan, have also educated Somali graduates. This fact has had a significant impact on the politics of the language used for educational instruction in Somalia: today, the Arabic language has become the de facto language of the educated elite.

In addition, various Somali Islamic movements have played a significant role in the success of the Islamic NGOs. There are cases where Islamist leaders lobbied these organisations and convinced them to open an office in Somalia. Even in those organisations where this is not the case, Islamist organisations were the natural candidates for partnering with NGOs from the Muslim world. Many of the Islamists spoke Arabic and understood the context well. Moreover, Islamic movements are diverse in terms of regions, and they are also well-organised, so can therefore deliver on their promises. As a result, many of the workers and leaders of Islamic NGOs have roots in one or more Islamic movements in Somalia.

Politically and socially, Islamist movements in Somalia have also benefited from this relationship. By the mid-1990s, many Islamist-led civil society organisations had emerged. They also helped to create umbrella organisations in education and health. In addition, the fact that they led organisations that provided basic services helped the Islamists raise their profile. In other words, working for or leading the Islamic NGOs became a training ground for many of them – and this later helped them in their political success. In fact, some of Somalia’s current prominent politicians have worked for one or more Islamic NGOs in Somalia.

Besides their positive impact on society, Islamic NGOs, like others, have a negative impact on state-building. These NGOs are the only providers of basic services to the people of the country. The Somali state is absent from health, education, food aid, and WASH, and this affects the legitimacy of the state in numerous ways (Wiktorowicz and Farouki, 2000). In addition, as a result of the civil war, many Somali professionals have left the country. The
NGOs employ and provide better salaries to those people who stayed behind. This is devastating for the uncompetitive Somali state, because few professionals are interested in joining the bureaucracy of the government. More importantly, the umbrella organisations, for instance, the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia and School Association for Formal Education (SAFE) that the Islamic NGOs created in order to fill the vacuum have now become permanent institutions that, at times, undermine the government’s ministries (Elmi, 2010). In fact, the Somali government realised that it could not do anything without the umbrella groups and therefore it reached an agreement with them in April 2014 (the Agreement between Umbrella Groups and the Somali Government). Overall, despite helping many needy Somalis, the growth of Islamic NGOs will challenge the growth of the Somali state in the future. However, this is not limited to the Islamic NGOs. In Somalia, one can say that all kinds of NGOs are undermining the state in multiple ways.

Challenges Facing Islamic NGOs

Generally, there are many security hazards when it comes to working in Somalia. There are multiple authorities that claim they rule parts of the country. Opportunistic politicians, militia leaders, gangs, and business warlords regularly threaten and harass NGOs as a whole. Besides this common security problem, Western governments’ suspicion of anything “Muslim” or “Islamic” is another challenge. For instance, some Western governments questioned the rescue efforts of Turkey and the positive reception it received from the public.

Western governments raise many questions relating to accountability and transparency. Accountability here does not only mean that which corresponds to their funders – Islamic NGOs are good at this, otherwise they would have lost their funding a long time ago: it means accountability to the public as a whole. A good number of Islamic NGOs (local or transnational) do not produce and publicise their annual reports or audited financial statements. For those that maintain websites, there is little information available on the projects they carry out in different countries. Islam does not encourage a person or even a group to boast about a charity payment. Normatively, it is better for one not to brag about what he or she has done, particularly when assisting a needy person. Perhaps some of the NGOs have poorly understood this normative duty, and they think it prevents them from presenting their work publicly.

Islamic NGOs face difficulties in accessing funding from overseas. Somalia’s financial institutions and banks are non-existent. Moreover, the country’s instability prevents international banks from opening branches in Somalia. As Saggiomo (2011) notes, some Arab governments stopped providing grants to their own agencies in Somalia because of accessibility. For the first time, a project which is funded by the Saudi government was delivered through OIC’s offices in Mogadishu, which are about to complete renovating thirty-three schools in ten regions, and deliver other thirty-two projects. Furthermore, it will hire teachers and administrators and support it for one year, before it transfers the schools to the Somali government. If this works, it might open channels where some other Muslim countries can undertake major projects.
In addition, Islamic NGOs from different countries face diverse challenges. For instance, Turkish NGOs have been in Somalia since 2011; for them, one major challenge is the sustainability of their work in the country. For now, they benefit from the heavy presence of the Turkish government in Somalia and the positive perception that comes with that. But, Turkish NGOs need to learn from the experience of the other Islamic NGOs. Schools and hospitals must be designed in a self-sustainable way if funding ever dries up. Obviously, some of them have already adopted the user-fee structure. But this might not be sufficient. Therefore, for all Islamic NGOs, endowments and other means of ensuring long-term success is in order.

Conclusion

Islamic NGOs provide assistance to many needy Somalis. Most of them have been working in the country for more than two decades. In this chapter, I explained the nature, activities and scope of these organisations. Based on the originating country, even though the list is not exhaustive, I found that there are twenty-three transnational Islamic NGOs that are from Turkey, Middle Eastern and Western countries. In addition, I found that the Islamic NGOs largely focus on education and health. I argued that these agencies lead in these two sectors. I analysed the reasons behind the decision for focusing on these areas, contending that the vacuum created by Somalia’s statelessness forced these organisations to focus education and health. In addition, I identified the economic, social and political impacts that these organisations had on the society and the state. Finally, I discussed the economic, security, accountability, and political challenges that Islamic NGOs face in Somalia. Overall, transnational Islamic NGOs have played crucial role in helping the Somali people. Like others, Islamic NGOs, although they fared better in some areas, have a long way to go to systematise and sustain themselves in Somalia.
References


Chapter 11

Re-Anchor Ethiopianism to Galvanise the
Transnational Movements for African Renaissance and Unity

Mammo Muchie and Hailemichael Teshome Demissie

To rake among the embers of Ethiopianism is to find a few sparks which may throw some light on the obscure roads into the African future (George Shepperson, 1953).

And thus would our contemporary intelligentsia draw inspiration from the African intellectuals of the 19th century to give birth to a new Ethiopianism that would enable Africa to claim the 21st century (Thabo Mbeki, 2010).

Introduction

In the wake of the centenary of the African National Congress (ANC) and at these moments of the celebration of the jubilee of the OAU-AU (Organization of African Unity-African Union), it is timely to revisit the “Ethiopianism” movement that was the ideological front of the struggle against Apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa and beyond. Ethiopianism started as a movement to countervail and challenge the racist theology of the white mission churches. The movement was inherently transnational, as it was effective in exploiting the deliberate ambiguity of the reference to “Ethiopia”, sometimes in its biblical Graeco-Roman usage, sometimes in its modern usage to refer to the East African Kingdom, and sometimes to both at the same time. This ambiguity was used as the strategy to conceal the political objectives of the movement as well as to flag it. While the Graeco-Roman usage of the mythical “Ethiopia” was invoked for the universal claim of the movement, Ethiopia as a reference to the free sovereign Abyssinian kingdom that was successful in fending off continual foreign aggression and was used to provide a concrete and immediate example of the beacon of freedom for the then-liberation and Pan-African movements. The spread of the anti-racist theology to emerge in the form of Ethiopianism across South Africa, “the pernicious Ethiopian propaganda” as the white authorities characterised it then, so deeply threatened the white supremacists that they legislated to ban it.

After a brief narrative of the Ethiopianism movement in Southern Africa, its highs and lows in the scholarship on anti-Apartheid and anti-colonial struggles, the chapter examines what lessons are to be drawn from Ethiopianism for the current endeavours to realise African Renaissance and unity. How Ethiopianism is understood and interpreted is of
vital significance to the current discourse on Pan-Africanism, the African Renaissance and African unity. It is a crucial legacy of the African liberation movement that will galvanise the transnational movements of today in their bid to stand up to the challenges of new modalities of exploitation currently, and in the times ahead.

“Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance” was the slogan adopted as the theme of the twentieth ordinary session of the AU Assembly held in Ethiopia in January 2013. The idea of an “African Renaissance” has now been in consistent currency for the last two decades. While this is not the first time that the idea of an African Renaissance has been floated, the particular reference here is to the Mbeki-Mandela idea of African renewal with the newly-liberated South Africa joining the continental community of nations. The idea has given rise to a flurry of activities including the establishment of research institutes (in Gaborone and Pretoria, for example), the publication of books and articles, not to mention the vibrant debate on various fora. The idea even seems to have its own symbol in the controversial gigantic monument built by the former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade named “African Renaissance”.

As much as it was able to garner support, it was also a subject of controversy and critique. Among the critiques of the initiative is the one that questions its originality and authenticity. The idea of African Renaissance has been slapped down as deeply Eurocentric. Thus, argues cultural historian Owen Alik Shahadah:

> The most profound problem with the specific usage of the Renaissance is shows[sic] the framework of Africa as nothing more than a cultural orphan of Europe. Africa must exist and define itself in its own terms of reference and not be boxed into European concepts and constructs (Shahadah, 2012).

The bias in this critique is evident, as it fails to see the initiative as an African initiative or lend it the benefit of the doubt to that effect. The critique chose to see the initiative from a European perspective, revealing the commonplace obsession of gauging African initiatives using European standards and tools. As such, the critique of the African Renaissance as a “cultural orphan” of European history cannot escape the very charge that it is itself levelling against the Mbeki-Mandela idea of African Renaissance – the critique itself is a Eurocentric critique. Its failure to probe into the African roots of the idea and how much the authors of the idea were inspired by the African, rather than the European, origins of the concept is indicative of the fixation with European ideas.

The critique overlooks and completely ignores the history of “outbursts of Afrocentrism” from the Harlem Renaissance to the Mbeki-Mandela African Renaissance (Masolo, 1994: 41). Unlike the critique above, some African scholars speak of a different point of view: “It is Europe which has arrogantly and illegitimately identified itself with what was originally not its own” (Ibid). Mbeki was indeed echoing the call of Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, who was the first secretary of the ANC, and then its future president (Bongmba, 2004: 295) Seme is famous for his 1906 medal-winning speech at Columbia, The Regeneration of Africa, in which he referred to Africa’s own history and not European history as the basis
for Africa’s regeneration. As he poignantly put it, “the ancestral greatness, the unimpaired genius, and the recuperative power of the race, its irrepressibility, which assures its permanence, constitute the African’s greatest source of inspiration” (Seme, 1906). The critiques eschewing the African contribution simply add to the self-denigration fodder that jams the production of African initiatives in general.

Any critique of the African Renaissance initiative could not claim credence without addressing the issue of the roots of the idea. Bringing together the concepts of Pan-Africanism and Renaissance as AU’s chosen theme was not a thoughtless amalgamation of ideas. It was, rather, a recognition of the link between the two ideas and their African roots and authorship. The idea of an African Renaissance was aired long before its twenty-first century reincarnations. It featured in the Pan-African ideals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it was known by various aliases of which Ethiopianism was among the most prominent. The powerful narratives that were developed around Ethiopianism are of such significance that they continue to inform the debates on the current quest for African unity and Renaissance. Africa should look back and bring back the ideals and ethos of Ethiopianism to meet the challenges of the unfinished business of African unity, and to stand up to the new and emerging challenges that are more subtle and insidious than the challenges that were faced during slavery, colonialism, and Apartheid. Africa is now in a situation reminiscent of the olden days. It is caught between old and new powers vying for their own spheres of influence in yet another edition of the “scramble for Africa”. There cannot be any better time than these trying times to bring back the discursive arsenals from the early struggles under the rubric of Ethiopianism.

The Rise and Spread of Ethiopianism

The early flashes of Ethiopianism date back to the sixteenth century, when African-American blacks as slaves in America found solace in the promise of a homeland in the empire of the Ethiopia of the Nile region. The references to Ethiopia in the Bible provided them with an ideology that they could use for their spiritual, political, and cultural uplifting. The blacks in America, the West Indies, Europe, and in Africa itself derived enormous inspiration from the Scriptures, where the word ‘Ethiopia’ occurs more than ninety times. By far the most widely-quoted verse, “probably the most widely quoted verse in Afro-American religious history”, is Psalm 68:31 – “Ethiopia shall stretch her hands unto God” (Haywood, 2000: 368). The verse was interpreted as pointing to the end of the curse on the black race – an end to the alienation of Africa from God. This was a European belief that was, to some extent, shared by blacks (Nelson, 1994: 68; Van Dijk, 2004: 176). Thus came into being the movement of Ethiopianism as a “method of winning Africa for Christ” and as a “forerunner of the subsequent African philosophies that aimed at black unity to confront White power” (Barrios, 2008: 33).

Some saw the beginning of the fulfilment of this prophetic verse on the political level. After the 1792-1800 successful slave insurrection in Haiti, it was declared: “Thus doth Ethiopia begin to stretch forth her hand, from the sink of slavery, to freedom and equality” (Dread History, undated). The verse gave rise to “a biblically-rooted pan-African her-
meneutic” that later became a widely used source of inspiration and legitimisation of Pan-Africanism (Nathan, 2012: 277). Garvey extensively used the Ethiopian discourse in the thinking that was later known as Garveyism. It was this same verse that was recited in the speeches for the motion to establish the South African Native National Congress, the precursor of the ANC (Hughes, 2011).

The main site of the Ethiopianism movement in Africa was Southern Africa, and some writers even define Ethiopianism by confining it to Southern Africa only (Shepperson, 1953). While it was a Pan-African transnational movement straddling the continent and the Atlantic, it was certainly more intense in Southern Africa. Chronologically, the Southern Africa experience was predated by the Ethiopianism movement in the New World, where black clergymen were excluded from full participation in church life. The black clergymen were debarred from occupying higher positions in church administration, irrespective of their qualifications or fitness for the relevant office. In 1787, an Ethiopian church, the African Episcopal Methodist church, was established under the leadership of a freed slave, Bishop Richard Allen, withdrawing from St George’s church in Philadelphia. Followers of this new church who took part in the American War of Independence wore a badge displaying the words “Allen’s Ethiopians”. Since then, the Ethiopianism movement has spread, as one author put it, “like the proverbial mustard seed” (Campbell, 1998: 63).

In both America and Southern Africa, the Ethiopianism movement was first a reaction to the discrimination in ecclesiastical administration and the outright marginalisation of black clergymen. The black clergymen underwent demeaning acts of de-selection for ordination and promotion to the clerical echelons. They were denied their deserved promotion to the higher ranks of the clergy for no other reason than the colour of their skin. The white mission churches had it as their unwritten bylaws that the ordination of blacks was to be avoided. Even where a black clergyman was ordained, he was stripped of the authority and privilege that he was supposed to have had by virtue of his ordination. The fact that this act of discrimination took place in locations as far apart as America and South Africa over a long period of time is proof that it was rather a systemic practice than a symptom of sporadic racism.

The reasons for the discontent of the black clergy that gave rise to the Ethiopianism movement, especially in Africa, range from the personal ambitions of individual black clergymen to doctrinal differences. The following summarises the principal causes of the movement:

- The frustrated desire of many Africans to become church leaders; colour prejudice practiced by missionaries and their failure to live by the Christian brotherhood they proclaimed; disputes over church discipline rooted in differing moral standards; the precedent of schism and denominationalism in Western Christianity; personal ambition among Ethiopian founders and their conviction of a divine calling; the denial to black women Christians of adequate means of self-expression in church; and the availability of Scriptures as the basis for a critique of mission Christianity (Pretorius and Jafta, 1997: 213).
The black clergy came to realise that the attempt to rectify the wrongdoings of the white clergy within the existing church structure would come to no avail. The Reverend Mangena Mokone, founder of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa, concluded that “this separation shows that we cannot be brothers” (Chirenje, 1987: 43). He further questioned, “If all this is so, where is justice? Where is brotherly love? Where is Christian sympathy?” (ibid). The option they resorted to was setting up their own independent churches, withdrawing from the white churches.

The first notable withdrawal from the white churches in Southern Africa took place when Nehemiah Tile, a minister who rose to prominence as an accomplished preacher in Thembuland, seceded from the Wesleyan Methodist church in 1884 – a hundred years after the first black church was established by Richard Allen in America. Tile’s move was the first salvo heralding a long history of the Ethiopianism movement in Africa. It was such a significant milestone in the history of the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa that Nelson Mandela himself paid tribute to the Thembu Church a century later:

> African clergymen sought to free themselves from the fetters of white missionaries by establishing African Independent Churches. One of the most celebrated breakaways was that of Nehemiah Tile who founded the Tembu Church in the Transkei in 1884.... That political movement was to culminate in the formation of the ANC in 1912. It is in this sense that the ANC we trace the seeds of the formation of our organisation to the Ethiopian movement of the 1890s (Address by Nelson Mandela to the Free Ethiopian Church of Southern Africa, 14 December 1992).

The next major event in the history of Ethiopianism was the establishment of Reverend Mangena Mokone’s church. After resigning from the Wesleyan Methodist church in Pretoria, he set up his own church and called it the Ethiopian Church of South Africa. Mokone quickly established alliances with the American black churches that shared a similar history of discrimination and had passed through a similar route to independence. The number of Ethiopian churches was growing at an alarming rate for the white authorities. “Ethiopia” became the label for independent African churches that seceded from the white mission churches. As Shepperson recounts, by 1912 in South Africa, the Ethiopianism movement has resulted in seventy-six independent churches, and three decades later the number had jumped to over eight hundred (Shepperson, 1953). With their own specific history and denomination, Ethiopian churches are now believed to number more than six thousand (Pretorius and Jafita, 1997).

Ethiopianism was a truly transnational movement; it was not a phenomenon confined only to the Southern African region or the African diaspora in America. It was a movement that fuelled the anti-colonial struggle in Eastern and Western Africa too. Jomo Kenyatta, certainly inspired by the movement, is quoted as saying that Ethiopianism was the most popular religious sect (Shepperson, 1953). In the then-Nyasaland, the 1915 uprising led by John Chilembwe, a Baptist minister who, like other Ethiopianists, broke away from the mission church, espoused Ethiopianism to finally become a national hero of independent
Malawi (Shepperson, 2003). As late as the dying years of colonialism, Ethiopianism was fully in operation, as is evidenced by the establishment of the Kenyan Church of Christ in Africa in 1957 withdrawing from the Anglican sect in the same fashion as the rest of the Ethiopian churches (BlackPast.org, undated).

Ethiopianism continued to animate the anti-colonial and anti-Apartheid struggles, even in the 1970s and 1980s. The significance of its philosophy continues to inspire historians and scholars to this day. Writing in the 1980s about the revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s, Mutero Chirenje (1987: 168) warns against any attempt at pitting the Ethiopianism movement against the African revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s: “If the activities of the Ethiopian movement and allied organisations...are viewed in the context of their time, they will be seen to be no less acts of self-determination than are the armed struggles for national liberation now taking place throughout the southern Africa”. Ethiopianism is not a spent force, as is implied by the fact that less and less of it is invoked in the post-colonial and post-Apartheid discourse. The essence of Ethiopianism was articulated by one of the founders of the Ethiopian churches as being a movement aimed:

To plant a self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating African Church which would produce a truly African type of Christianity suited to the genius and needs of the race and not a black copy of any European Church (Mzimba quoted in Pretorius and Jafuta, 1997: 212).

These ideals, in their political dimensions, are the ideals that Africa has not yet realised and are still struggling to achieve. It is to be reckoned that Ethiopianism has become even more relevant in the current context of twenty-first century exigencies and Africa’s place in the twenty-first century. “Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance”, the theme of the jubilee of the OAU-AU, strongly resonates with the ethos of Ethiopianism. The significance that the movement acquired over the centuries and the multiple meanings in which it was understood have enriched the idea and augmented its potency as a source of inspiration for all freedom-seeking people around the globe. The multiplicity of its meaning is such an important feature of the concept of Ethiopianism that it deserves to be treated on its own.

The Double Duality of Ethiopianism
Ethiopia of the Bible and Ethiopia the East African Kingdom

The Ethiopia in Ethiopianism is mainly the Ethiopia in the Graeco-Roman and biblical reference. How much overlap there is between the Ethiopia of the Graeco-Roman reference and the Kingdom of Ethiopia is still a matter of debate for historians. The concept of Ethiopianism reflects to some extent this debate, vacillating between the biblical Graeco-Roman reference and the Kingdom of Ethiopia. More often than not, the two references reinforced each other, owing to the endurance of the independence of the kingdom fending off European colonisation and encroachment, especially the victory at Adwa and the many other events from the coronation of Ras Tafari as Haile Sellassie and his deification in Rastafarianism, to the foundation of the OAU in Addis Ababa.
In the latter days of the movement, reference to the Kingdom of Ethiopia within the context of the movement was more explicit. The Ethiopian movement acquired more political content as an anti-colonial movement, especially after the battle of Adwa that bolstered “the mythic status and redemptive symbolism of Ethiopia in the eyes of Africans at home and abroad” (Dread History, undated). For the opponents of the movement and for those threatened by its expansion, the ambiguity compounded their anxiety. The convergence of the two senses of Ethiopia created a powerful synergy.

Ethiopianism that began mainly as a reaction to the discontent with church administration was now turning increasingly political, buoyed by the story of the beacon of a free African Kingdom that brought a European power to its knees. The movement’s identification with the Kingdom of Ethiopia reached a new height with the coronation of Haile Sellassie and the rise of Rastafarianism. Rastafarianism arose as a sequel of the Ethiopianism that was prevalent before it in Jamaica. With Haile Sellassie claiming a biblically-royal pedigree and taking the title of the King of Kings, Lord of Lords, and Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, descending from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, the Kingdom of Ethiopia was literally taken in its biblical understanding as the “black Zion” or the African “promised land” (Iyob, 1997). After the news of the coronation, there was a mobilisation among the blacks in the New World for a mass exodus back to Africa.

When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Africans on the continent and in the diaspora saw it as an attack on their revered symbolism of black history – Ethiopia as the “centre of the African world” (Pampallis, 1997: 147). Ruth Iyob quotes Nnamdi Azikwe’s homage to Ethiopia as a good example of how Ethiopia, “the last vestige of black autocracy”, was looked on by blacks around the world:

> It represents the type of government which the forefathers of Africans established in this continent. That country will go down as one of the few survivors of the great powers of history... The continued existence of Ethiopia after its contemporaries and their descendants had vanished from political history, is and should be an object of admiration (Iyob, 1997: 50).

The admiration was not without its practical implications as it led to a worldwide protest against Italy. The mobilisation against Italian aggression ranged from blacks enlisting in Harlem, New York to fight for Ethiopia, and South African dock workers protesting against the aggression by refusing to handle Italian cargo in Cape Town and Durban (Pampallis, 1997). After the eviction of Italy from Ethiopia, the restoration of Haile Sellassie was celebrated as a victory for Africa. Ethiopianism at this historical moment was invariably identified with the Ethiopian kingdom.

Ethiopia’s several contributions to the Pan-African cause further crystallised the identification of the Ethiopian Kingdom with the movement of Ethiopianism. The concept remains polysemous, especially as to whether the Ethiopia in Ethiopianism is the Kingdom of Ethiopia or the Ethiopia of ancient Greeks and the Bible. However, since the two senses in which ‘Ethiopia’ was used were complementary and reinforced each other, no historian...
agonises over the issue to delink the two ideas.\(^1\) Mandela and Mbeki speak of both Ethiopia and Ethiopianism. The symbolism Ethiopia conveyed for Mandela is on many levels: from the logistics he was provided by the kingdom; his first passport and his military training; to the observation at a ceremony where white military advisers were bowing to a black monarch, Haile Sellassie, were all significant moments for Mandela and the anti-Apartheid struggle that had its roots in the Ethiopianism movement (Mandela, 2010). His impression of Ethiopia was articulated in his autobiography where he said:

*Ethiopia always has a special place in my imagination and the prospect of visiting Ethiopia attracted me more strongly than a trip to France, England and America combined. I felt I would be visiting my own genesis, unearthing the roots of what made me an African* (Mandela, 1994:362).

For Thabo Mbeki, the link between Ethiopia and Ethiopianism is organic. He unifies the two ideas while referring to Ethiopia as providing “the central organising idea for all Africans”. By evoking the battle of Adwa, King Menelik, and the geopolitical role of Ethiopia and pulling the thread to link it with Pixley Seme’s famous Columbia speech and the activities of Ethiopianists like the first president of the ANC, John Dube, who was identified by the white authorities as “a pronounced Ethiopian who ought to be watched”, Mbeki establishes that one cannot draw a line between Ethiopia the East African nation and the Ethiopia of Ethiopianism (Mbeki, 2010).

The link between the history of Ethiopianism and the history of the Ethiopian Kingdom is at its strongest on the ideals that the movement was seeking to achieve, and the ideal the Kingdom of Ethiopia represented – freedom. The concept has transcended the geographical connotations, developing into an abstract universal philosophy underlying the struggle against discrimination, racism and European white supremacy. It is a concept appealing to all freedom-seeking people, irrespective of their background – racial, religious or otherwise.

The duality of Ethiopianism playing between the Ethiopia of the Bible and the East African Kingdom was an expression of yet another fundamental duality – the religious and political dimensions of Ethiopianism. The ecclesiastical beginnings of Ethiopianism have

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\(^1\) There are researchers who try to dissociate the two senses of Ethiopianism. Such researchers are obviously in the minority running against the widely-held stances on the interpretation of Ethiopianism. The analyses by Assafa Jalata and Ruth Iyob are examples here. Their take on Ethiopianism does not seem to be balanced. There is no denial that Adwa was an enormous inspiration not only for blacks but to all freedom-loving people all over the world. The movement of Ethiopianism was reinvigorated by Adwa and this is acknowledged by several writers. Assafa Jalata’s aim is to undo this by obscuring Adwa’s significance by magnifying the then rulers’ conduct towards their own people internally. Assafa Jalata and Ruth Iyob are glossing over the fact that Africans in slavery were beseeching a return home to the very chief who sold them for a ‘barrel of rum’. It is in no way reasonable to pit Ethiopianism against the internal struggle for democracy and as Ruth Iyob recalls, the attempt by some African groups to pressurise Haile Sellassie to carry out reforms did not succeed as the symbolic significance of Ethiopia for the whole of Africa was beyond question. The two issues – Ethiopia’s Pan-African role and Ethiopia’s democratic governance – should be considered on different levels and should be evaluated as such on their own.
not in any way limited the concept from taking on purely political and even military and insurgent action as its mode of operation. Right at the start, the choice of the very name “Ethiopia” was deeply political and profoundly subversive, as church historian Adrian Hastings recounts:

“Ethiopian” is an oddly misleading name for what has been characterised as ecclesiastical “Ethiopianism”, because it is not a Protestant name at all, but in itself is already evocative of quite other things. It is both symbolically African (proto-African, pan-African, one might say) and it can actually be found in the Bible. “Where can you find the name of Dutch reformed in the Bible?” or “Methodist”. This was no idle question but a very serious one. You have given us the Bible, and then to the Bible we shall go. The names of Zion and Ethiopia are most undoubtedly there (Hastings, 1979:74).

The seditious nature of the movement was well realised by the white regime that identified it as “its most dangerous opponent” (Etherington, 2012:55). Ethiopianism was the harbinger of the latter day “church and violence” debate of the sixties and seventies that demonstrated the political involvement of churches in the starkest of its manifestations (Tingle, 1992). The ANC moved to armed struggle, while Albert Luthuli, a devout Christian who was opposed to violence, was its president – a paradox that can be explained by the polysemous concept of Ethiopianism (Erlank, 2012: 89).

**From the Canon to the Cannon - Ethiopianism as a Transnational Politico-ecclesiastical Movement**

During the early flashes of Ethiopianism, it was thought to be non-threatening by the white colonial authorities. Before it soon came to be labelled as the “Ethiopian menace”, it was thought to be a church affair with no or limited political implications. The clergy-men who seceded from the white-governed churches were modest in their demand for independence. As Mangena Mokone, the founder of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa put it in his resignation letter, the motive for leaving the church was “to serve God in his own way” (Chirenje,1987: 42).The true reason behind Mokone’s resignation request was not lost on his superior to whom the resignation letter was tendered. Pretending to be unfazed by Mokone’s move the superior too downplayed the resignation treating it as an event of no real significance . The injustice that Mokone was made to endure, the racial discrimination against black clergymen, in particular the de-selection of black clergymen for higher office, was not mentioned in either Mokone’s resignation letter, or in his superior’s report to the higher church authorities.

Initially, the movement appeared to be a religious movement with no qualms about colonial rule. This was an important tack to get licence and recognition from the government.
“It was as important for the Ethiopians to have a political thrust as it was for them to conceal it” (Davenport, 1987: 231). With the passage of time, “a dialectical relationship between nationalism and Ethiopianism gradually appeared” (Lahouel, 1986: 686). Ethiopianism fuelled African nationalism, while African nationalism led to the proliferation of the independent churches.

It was, however, clear that the Ethiopianism movement was as much, if not more, political than it was religious. The revolting clergymen were expressing their protest at the discrimination that the church was practising against blacks – discrimination that was the order of the day with white settler rule, but was evidently against the Christian teaching of justice and the Christian brotherhood. The constitution of the Boer Republic of the Transvaal stipulated that there was “no equality in church or state between white and black people” (Pampallis, 1997: 3). It was, on the other hand, a shared position among the black nationalists that such racism is not what Christianity taught and that Christianity was indeed against it. The secessionist clergymen were unambiguous in their protest against discrimination, irrespective of the setting where it was taking place – church or government.

While it started as a religious movement, it was “apparent that spiritual matters were not primary issues” (Pretorius and Jafta, 1997: 213). Ethiopianism was a direct anti-racist and anti-colonial movement. Writing on the rise of one of the earliest Ethiopian churches, the Cape Times, in 1893, lamented in its editorial that “it would be the height of folly to ignore the [Thembu church]”. It characterised the church as “patriotic”, “political” and “ecclesiastical”. As historian Mutero Chireje (1987: 24) observed, the Cape Times was able to foresee the duality of the concept of Ethiopianism – both the religious and political aspects of Ethiopianism which he thought was not sufficiently stressed in the studies of Ethiopianism. Recent literature also points out that the view that Ethiopianism was apolitical had negatively impacted the research on the Christianity and politics relationship in Africa – a relationship that has yet to be defined to this day (Erlank, 2012).

**Ethiopianism Today**

Ethiopianism today seems to have been shelved to the archives section of the anti-racial, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle. It was declared “finished” when the focus was away from transnational Pan-African struggles of liberation, turning towards narrower regional and national liberation struggles. George Shepperson, a writer on Ethiopianism thus concluded:

*It seems that Ethiopianism is finished as a basis for political action and that it is now no more than a sentimental, nebulous symbol around which the bitter memories of intentions of both races may on occasion group themselves. (Shepperson, 1953: p.17).*
In its ecclesiastical sense, Ethiopianism has passed its sell by date. In the era of talk of the possibility of a black Pope, and with powerful churches led by black pastors, bishops and cardinals, the question of justice and fairness within churches might have been addressed to a great level of satisfaction as far as debarring black clergymen from church hierarchy is concerned.

However, churches are not institutions merely preoccupied with their own internal affairs. The social mission that they have assumed harks back to the precepts of the Ethiopianism movement, more in the political than in the ecclesiastical sense. In its political sense, Ethiopianism is alive and kicking, with a variegated purpose responsive to the demands of the day. African theology is called upon to confront corrupt leaders, to question the neoliberal ideology wreaking havoc on the African populace, and to be the voice for the voiceless. It is argued that African theology should interrogate concepts such as the African Renaissance in light of “black theology, which takes socio-economic realities seriously” (Bongmba, 2004: 307). Ethiopianism has been a prominent facet of black theology that remains operational, despite the push by mainstream politics to relegate it into irrelevance on the juridical basis of the separation of state and church. Churches are often prodded not to recoil from politics. As a South African clergyman put it, “if politics is that art of the actual, Christian hope seeks its transformation” (De Gruchy quoted in Bongmba, 2004: 308).

The social activism of churches is well documented in its various forms. Among the church movements espousing social activism, is the liberation theology movement that had a wide base in South America. This transnational movement advocates active church involvement in the struggle for social justice, radical economic structural change, and the rights of the poor. Liberation theology is overtly political and is even said to marry Marxism with Christian theology, with its followers mainly identified as “the Catholic and Protestant left” who are deeply critical of the dominant neoliberal ideology our time (Turner, 1994: 12). The liberation theology movement and the Ethiopianist movement share a common purpose, as both movements seek to “[do] theology from the perspective of the oppressed” (Turner, 1994: 16). In its African and Protestant chapter, the liberation theology movement finds expression in the works of Ghanaian pastor Dr. Mensah Otabil. Otabil sought to revive Ethiopianism as a “Christianised sequel to Pan-Africanism”, emphasising its transnational features – in effect completing the circle going back to the beginnings of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism, as shown in the discussion above, had its origins in the independent black churches that were the seedbed of Pan-African struggles. Ethiopianism was the moniker of the Pan-African movement until the beginnings of the twentieth century.

Otabil’s teaching was openly political with incisive criticism of African governments, the neoliberal world economic system, the structural adjustment programme (SAP) prescribed for Africa, neo-colonialism, the African mentality of “slavery”, and the “begging attitude”. His book, Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia: A Biblical Revelation on God’s Purpose for the Black Race, is thought to have laid the basis for what has been called an “Evangelical Pentecostal Liberation Theology” (Van Dijk, 2004: 165). Otabil’s liberation theology is fundamentally political in the same way that Ethiopianism was. He is quoted saying
Christians cannot say “let’s leave politics to the politicians”. In language that is starkly reminiscent of the Ethiopianism of the nineteenth century, Otabil attacks the twenty-first century global economic structure:

The economy is controlled by multinationals. We worked for them to create wealth for them to take it out of the country. We were hewers of wood and drawers of water. I prayed to God to prosper, but we have to change economic structures and social structures (Van Dijk, 2004: 178-179)

Otabil’s work, certainly inspired by Ethiopianism and Pan-Africanism, is testament to the relevance of Ethiopianism to present-day Africa and its quest for a dignified role in the global economic and political sphere. The relevance of Ethiopianism has been poignantly articulated in Mbeki’s appeal to the African intelligentsia:

And thus would our contemporary intelligentsia draw inspiration from the African intellectuals of the 19th century to give birth to a new Ethiopianism that would enable Africa to claim the 21st century (Mbeki, 2010).

The Significance of Ethiopianism for Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance

Current civic movements on the continent can learn a great deal from Ethiopianism. The history of Ethiopianism still animates the struggle for Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. It would be an inexcusable omission if the chapter on Ethiopianism is missing in any history book on the anti-colonialism and anti-Apartheid struggles, and moreso if it is overlooked in the search for inspiration and guidance for contemporary transnational movements aspiring to consummate the genuine liberation of Africa.

As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the OAU, it is imperative that we look back to the early history of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. The value of Ethiopianism could not be any higher than at the jubilee celebration of the Pan-African organisation – a time for reflection and action. The Pan-African movement for which Ethiopianism served as its alias until the early years of the twentieth century is indispensable in informing the trajectories that current Pan-Africanism should take. As Shepperson put it, “to rake among the embers of Ethiopianism is to find a few sparks which may throw some light on the obscure roads into the African future” (1953: 18).

And, of late, this argument has been updated: “We cannot understand the history and substance of the Pan-African Movement without drawing heavily upon sources now classified as Afro-American Studies on the one hand, and Carribean Studies on the other” (Cummings quoted in Prah in Muchie, 2003: 21). It is hardly contested that Ethiopianism occupies a critical place in the Afro-American and Carribean Studies.

The ethos of Ethiopianism lives on, despite the liberation of the continent from colonialism and Apartheid. The post-colonial condition failed to bring about the liberation that
would see Africa stand on its own. In the wake of independence, Africa found itself under the tutelage of former colonial powers still dictating Africa’s terms of engagement. This state of affairs underwent several christenings from neo-colonialism to empire, from globalisation to coloniality. The net effect has been that Africa is denied the right to decide for itself, let alone decide for the world. Fifty years on from independence, the quest for genuine liberation stands unanswered. It is back to square one for Africa, and by choosing the theme of Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance, the AU is, in effect, calling for movements like Ethiopianism to be brought back to inform today’s efforts at Africa’s genuine liberation.

No one is under any illusion with what independence has brought to Africa. With the newly-independent states of Africa came “slavery by consent” supplanting “slavery by coercion” under colonialism. This predicament is now captured by a neologism – “coloniality”. Ramón Grosfoguel (2009) expounds the state of coloniality under which post-independence Africa found itself:

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonisation of the world. The heterogeneous and multi global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the colonial matrix. “With juridical political colonisation we moved from a period of global colonialism to the current period of global coloniality”. Although colonial administrations have almost entirely been eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European people are still leaving under crude European/Euro-American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-European remain in place and are entangled with the international division of labour and accumulation of capital at a world scale (pp.21-22).

Living under the state of coloniality, as described above, is set to introduce the worst forms of exploitation that humanity has seen in terms of its sophistication, subtlety and brutality. The encounters with the international financial institutions (IFIs), from SAPs to Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers, have abundantly shown that it is the Euro-Americans who call the shots. In cases where countries are formally said to be free not to follow the prescriptions of the IFIs presenting a semblance of formal political independence, African countries could not act otherwise than according to the prescription. The declaration that they are free ignores what Chimni calls “the factor of structural coercion”, whereby the countries are rendered powerless to challenge IFI prescriptions. (Chimni, 2004: 13). Compliance with the IFI prescription is achieved “by the formulation of a compelling and authoritative vision of society, of progress, and of the individual” (Anghie, 2000: 284). This kind of domination is a new form of colonialism rightly dubbed as “postmodern colonialism”, where “control of land or political organisation or nation-states is less important than power over consciousness and consumption” (Silbey, 1997: 219).
‘Postmodern colonialism’ or coloniality is what describes the state of African agency today. The Evaluation by Chris Lansberg (undated) clearly depicts the scene:

At present, African states are not taking ownership of the international and partnership agenda, instead allowing it to drift and hover, thereby playing into the hands of Western powers that by nature and tradition show little interest in African issues beyond ensuring the continent can yield up its limitless resources. Any concerns Africa itself may have are pushed to the margins, where they will stay unless given clearly voiced. (p.9).

Africa, by choosing its own path of development and by reclaiming its agency, could shun the new modalities of exploitation. The philosophy of Ethiopianism as reflected in the African Renaissance concept of self-worth, self-reliance and freedom to decide Africa’s destiny, offers the much-needed guidance to navigate the turbulent waters of globalisation. Africa has the power not to be restrained by what some pop-globalisation theorists have called “the golden straitjacket” (Friedman, 2000). It has the discursive power and the historical justifications to claim the right to redefine globalisation on its own terms.

Ethiopianism and African Renaissance

The African Renaissance discourse leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity and the adequacy of content. One of the reasons for this is the close association of the idea with Thabo Mbeki. Some commentators have even detected it as a danger, and rightly so. As Chris Landsberg (undated) observed, there has been a consistent tendency among African leaders to undo ideas and initiatives having to do with their predecessors. The idea of an African Renaissance is no exception, and this is evident from President Jacob Zuma’s criticism of the African Renaissance idea that his predecessor popularised. Zuma said of the African Renaissance, “the call for an African Renaissance is threatening to become a fashionable concept while remaining largely a mystery to the majority of Africans” (Pritvorov and Shubin, 2000: 83).

Zuma’s criticism of the African Renaissance concept is also shared by scholarly writers who underscore that the idea largely remains an “empty vessel” with a high sentiment-low substance matrix. Ethiopianism serves to address this problematisation of the African Renaissance concept. The identification of the concept with Thabo Mbeki, while acknowledging the credit that is due to him, has made the concept vulnerable to all sorts of criticism. Even criticisms of Mbeki’s other policies sneak in as criticisms of the African Renaissance by mere association; that turns the debate rather hazy and compounds what Zuma has said of the concept above. Ethiopianism offers the requisite explanation that would put flesh on the bare bones of the African Renaissance concept. What Mbeki has defined as African Renaissance is very much what Ethiopianists were demanding. The essence of Ethiopianism was crisply put by the Zimbabwean historian, Mutero Chirenje, as follows: “Ethiopianism became a generic term to describe a whole range of the black man’s efforts to improve his religious, educational and political status in society (Chirenje, 1987:2).
Mbeki was indeed heavily drawing from the philosophy of the Ethiopianist movement when he defined African Renaissance:

\[
\text{We have a duty to define ourselves. We speak about the need for African Renaissance in part so that we, ourselves and not another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our vision and hopes are, how we do things, what programmes we adopt to make our lives worth living, who we relate to and how (Mbeki, 2004).}
\]

It was in strikingly similar terms that Ethiopianism was defined during its heyday. The Ethiopianist position was summarised by the editor of the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} as follows: "This is our country; these are our farms, and our mines, why are we not working them for the white people and giving them all the benefit?" (Pampallis, 1997: 58; Chirenje, 1987:106).

Mbeki’s use of the term “African Renaissance” is at best open for interpretation, and no wonder the charge of a “Northbound gaze” and the pitting of Afrocentric against Eurocentric ideas is raised (Ramose, 2000: 47). While his definition quoted above makes it abundantly clear that a Eurocentric agenda is in no way to corrupt the concept, the very use of the term and the ambiguity that surrounds it has drawn several criticisms. Mbeki’s critics have taken issue with the European Renaissance, arguing that the European Renaissance led to colonialism and slavery, as the inventions and instruments that it produced were deployed to carry out these projects. European Renaissance is therefore considered as “the negation of [the colonised and enslaved people’s] achievement” (Van Grasdorff, 2005: 17). On a different score, if Africa is to emulate the European Renaissance, it is missing the plot as the European Renaissance was long passé and Europe has moved on and relished the Enlightenment transcending the legacies of the Renaissance (Ramose, 2000: 56). Still others pose questions on whether Africa has the prerequisites for a European-type Renaissance (Van Grasdorff, 2005: 46). On the latter question, it is asked whether Africa is investing in the technologies of the century and whether it is ready to appropriate these technologies in ”its own way“ to use the refrain from the founder of the Ethiopian church – Mangena Mokone.

While modern technologies have served as vectors of globalisation and Western dominance, this should not obscure the emancipatory power of technologies. The internet still remains an instrument of the Western cultural and epistemological hegemony. However, it has the enormous power to resist such hegemony and to project African culture and knowledge on the world stage. Africa needs to appropriate the technology in its own terms, just as the Ethiopianists did while appropriating Christianity. Ethiopianism did not reject Christianity in its entirety, and is certainly short of “the unapologetic distancing from the Christianity of the white man” expressed through defection to Islam for example (Tilleraas, 2012: 27). Ethiopianism deployed Christianity’s own arsenals to fight the racism of the missionaries and their role as proxies and promoters of colonial masters.
The white mission churches were agents of an earlier phase of globalisation. It was clear that the mission churches had the objective of producing “Africans who would be serviceable for the project of colonialism” (Prah, 2011: 161). The Ethioplist movement took upon itself the duty to tease out the chaff from the wheat while embracing the globalisation of that era with a firm assertion that it should be in Africa’s terms. The establishment of independent Ethiopian churches across Africa was a counter-homogenising move against European-led globalisation. Ethioplistism teaches that resistance against globalisation and the struggle to preserve African identity, culture, and knowledge does not entail a wholesale rejection of what globalisation is all about.

This lesson could not be more relevant than in the context of the ongoing globalisation process and the dominance of the neoliberal ideology that is driving it. Africa needs to play its part in this process and should avoid being cornered in the ghetto of the “global village” that technology and globalisation are instituting. Africa should not be left on the margins of this process, but should be influencing and shaping its future not only for Africa’s benefit, but for the benefit of all humanity. This is exactly what Ethioplistism did by way of re-inventing Christian theology for the world in a non-racial and truly universal way. The contemporary equivalent of Ethioplistism in the globalisation discourse finds expression in the various proposals to do away with the discontents of globalisation and neoliberalism, and the calls for humane globalisation. In view of the handling of the issues of its days by the Ethioplist movement, present-day anti-or alternative-globalisation discourses cannot be taken as the first of their kind.

Conclusion

The relevance of Ethioplistism to contemporary socio-political discourse can be questioned on the basis of the aggressive secularism that is backed up by the constitutional order that sanctions the separation of church and state. However, as is shown in this contribution, the ideals of Ethioplistism are beyond the ecclesiastical, and directly address socio-political issues that could be categorised as purely secular matters. Ethioplistism informs the way of how Africa and the Pan-African transnational civic movements in particular should approach globalisation issues, Western technological and ideological dominance, and the dominance in knowledge production as a whole. As Ethioplistism overcame the temptation to totally reject the Christianity of the white man, Africa should also resist the unnecessary vigilance at rejecting the globalisation tide or ideas coming from the developed world. In the encounter with Eurocentric ideas, what Africa should do is exactly what the Ethioplistians did: process the new ideas but “in their own way”. African Renaissance should not necessarily emulate the European Renaissance; however, that should not lead to the conclusion that Africa cannot learn from the European Renaissance – not only from its achievements but also from its failures.

Ethioplistism successfully demonstrated that racial separation was not what Christianity taught. It took secessionist Ethiopian churches to establish this truth for the whole world. The Ethiopian churches excelled in their understanding of the Scriptures. The same excellence is what Du Bois was after when he encouraged Negro churches, Negro colleges,
Negro public schools, Negro businesses, and so on. It was not the objective of entrenching of racial separation that Du Bois was suggesting. His objective was that of showing Negro efficiency and ingenuity, and proving to the world how pointless racial segregation is. The resonance of this appeal cannot be lost on the transnational civic movements of today.
References


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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>Planned Lifetime Advocacy Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSPS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rnrs</td>
<td>National Renewable Natural Resources Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SannC</td>
<td>South African Native National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sapri</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sap</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
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<td>Sap</td>
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<td>SidS</td>
<td>Island developing states</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simad</td>
<td>Institute for Management and Administration Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sngo</td>
<td>Southern Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TandT</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tieas</td>
<td>Tax Information Exchange Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİKA</td>
<td>Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency ()</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİNGO</td>
<td>Transnational Islamic Non-governmental organizations</td>
</tr>
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<td>TİNGOs</td>
<td>Transnational NGOs</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Transnational organized crime</td>
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<td>TWN</td>
<td>Third World Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGC</td>
<td>United Nations Global Compact</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency of International Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of West Indies</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAMY</td>
<td>World Assembly of Muslim Youth</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WCD</td>
<td>World Commission on Dams</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Christian Humanitarian Organization</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yeryuzu Doktorlari</td>
<td>Doctors Worldwide</td>
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Transnational NGOs: Creative Connections of Development and Global Governance
Edited by Abdulkadir Osman Farah

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Layout: Hofdamerne ApS v/ Lea Rathnov
Illustration on frontpage: Colourbox.dk
ISBN: 978-87-7112-206-0

Published by:
Aalborg University Press
Skjernvej 4A, 2nd floor
DK – 9220 Aalborg Ø
Phone: +45 99407140
aauf@forlag.aau.dk
forlag.aau.dk

This book is published with financial support from Department of Culture and Global Studies, Aalborg University.

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This timely and truly comparative volume addresses head-on the controversial issues surrounding the role of NGOs and their place in the international governance architecture: do they undermine or support governments and do they supply resources that no other kind of organization can deliver? In a time when governments themselves are in crisis and failed states increasing in number around the world, these questions take on a profound significance, and in this volume they are debated in a fresh, fair and scholarly manner, but never losing sight of the fact that the issues are far from academic, but daily impact the lives of millions. This book restates in new ways the key issues surrounding transnationalism, international civil society, and the governance implications of our current global crisis.

Professor John Clammer
Institute for Advanced Studies in Sustainability, United Nations University

Globalization has generated new spaces for transnational human interactions, which have in turn shaped the predominant form of global governance today. This impressive book sheds new light on the emergence of transnational NGO as political actor. The penetrating analyses in different developmental contexts demonstrate complex dynamics of political interactions between transnational NGO and the hegemony of nation-state capitalism. It allows us to better gauge the extent to which such a political actor has transformed governing structure and process at both national and transnational levels.

Professor Chunrong Liu
School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, China

Our fragile world urgently needs more creative connections and critical movements of solidarity across regional and national borders. Transnational NGOS sometimes offer such spaces and paths of creative connections which also become paths of resistance to existing regimes at the local, national and inter-state levels. This book, ably and thoughtfully edited by Abdulkadir Osman Farah with contributions from Africa, China and around the world, is an important contribution to the field of transnational studies. It presents us case studies from China, Egypt, Qatar, Somalia and other parts of the world. The book challenges us not to be confined only to the discourse of global governance but to strive for realization of global citizenry. Today the discourse of global governance needs to be transformed into vision and practices of transnational frames of self-governance, mutual accountability, mutual dialogue and planetary realizations and the book is an important pointer in this direction.

Professor Ananta Kumar Giri
Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India